T43n1833_成唯識論演秘
大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
No. 1833 [cf. No. 1830]
成唯識論演秘卷第一(本)
沙門智周撰
疏。機有三品不同者。不定姓人歸於佛法。智解淺深三時悟異。名曰三機。非定別三。唯對不定立三時故。
疏。由斯二聖互執有空者。問唯望不定立有三時。何有二聖互執空有 答豈言不定唯祇一人人既有多。悟亦前後。前後各以所證為是互執何失 又縱一人。執前後別。對執不同亦得稱互。
疏。解深密經說唯識者。按彼經第一云。廣惠當知於六趣生死彼彼有情。或在四生身份生起。于中最初一切種子心識成就。廣惠此識名阿陀那。亦名阿賴耶。亦名為心。為依止故六識身轉。如依暴水而有浪生。依凈明鏡有影像起。
疏。花嚴中說唯心者。按彼經第十九頌云。譬如工畫師。不能知自心。而由心故畫。諸法性如是。若人知心行。普造諸世間。是人則見佛。了佛真實性。若人慾了知三世一切佛。應觀法界性。一切唯心起 又大般若四百六十七云。謂諸菩薩作是思惟。諸行如幻。唯是虛妄分別所起。一切皆是自心所變 準斯般若第二時中亦說唯識。疏依多分言第二時。
疏。制三十頌離廣略者。有云。瑜伽
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
No. 1833 [cf. No. 1830]
成唯識論演秘卷第一(本)
沙門智周撰
疏：『機』有三品不同，指的是不定性的人歸向佛法，由於智慧理解的深淺不同，領悟的時間有早晚差異，所以稱為『三機』。並非固定有三種人，只是針對不定性的人設立三種時機。
疏：因為這兩位聖者互相執著于『有』和『空』。問：只是針對不定性的人設立三種時機，怎麼會有兩位聖者互相執著于『空』和『有』呢？答：難道說不定性的人只有一個人嗎？既然人有很多，領悟也有先後。先後各自以自己所證悟的為正確，互相執著有什麼不對呢？又，即使是同一個人，執著於前后的不同，對立執著也可以稱為『互相』。
疏：《解深密經》中說『唯識』。按這部經的第一卷說：『廣惠（菩薩名），你應該知道，在六道生死輪迴中，那些有情眾生，或者在四種出生方式中生起，在其中最初一切種子心識成就。廣惠，這個識叫做阿陀那（執持識），也叫做阿賴耶（藏識），也叫做心。因為是依止，所以六識身才能運轉，就像依靠暴漲的洪水而有波浪產生，依靠清凈明亮的鏡子而有影像顯現。』
疏：《華嚴經》中說『唯心』。按這部經第十九頌說：『譬如工匠畫師，不能知道自己的心，但是因為心的緣故而作畫，諸法的性質也是這樣。如果有人知道心的執行，普遍造作諸世間，這個人就能見到佛，瞭解佛的真實本性。如果有人想要了解過去、現在、未來一切佛，應該觀察法界的本性，一切都是唯心所起。』又，《大般若經》第四百六十七卷說：『那些菩薩這樣思維，諸行就像幻象，只是虛妄分別所產生的，一切都是自心所變現的。』根據這部《般若經》，在第二時中也說了『唯識』。疏文依據多分而說是第二時。
疏：制定三十頌是爲了區分廣略兩種版本。有人說，《瑜伽（瑜伽師地論）》……
【English Translation】 English version T43 No. 1833 Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-vyākhyāna-guhyārtha
No. 1833 [cf. No. 1830]
Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-vyākhyāna-guhyārtha Volume 1 (Original)
Composed by the Monk Zhizhou
Commentary: The 'capacity' has three different grades, referring to those of uncertain nature who turn to the Buddha-dharma. Due to differences in the depth of wisdom and understanding, and differences in the timing of enlightenment, they are called the 'Three Capacities'. It is not that there are fixed three types of people, but rather three opportunities are established for those of uncertain nature.
Commentary: Because these two sages mutually cling to 'existence' and 'emptiness'. Question: Only three opportunities are established for those of uncertain nature, how can there be two sages mutually clinging to 'emptiness' and 'existence'? Answer: Is it said that there is only one person of uncertain nature? Since there are many people, there are also differences in the timing of enlightenment. Each takes what they have realized as correct, what is wrong with mutually clinging? Moreover, even if it is the same person, clinging to the differences between before and after, opposing clinging can also be called 'mutual'.
Commentary: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra speaks of 'Consciousness-Only'. According to the first chapter of that sutra: 'Guanghui (name of a Bodhisattva), you should know that among sentient beings in the six realms of samsara, or arising in the four forms of birth, within them, the initial mind-consciousness with all seeds is established. Guanghui, this consciousness is called Ādāna (clinging consciousness), also called Ālaya (storehouse consciousness), and also called mind. Because it is the basis of reliance, the six consciousnesses can function, just as waves arise depending on a raging flood, and images appear depending on a clear and bright mirror.'
Commentary: The Avataṃsaka Sūtra speaks of 'Mind-Only'. According to the nineteenth verse of that sutra: 'For example, a craftsman painter cannot know his own mind, but paints because of the mind; the nature of all dharmas is like this. If someone knows the workings of the mind, and universally creates all worlds, that person will see the Buddha and understand the true nature of the Buddha. If someone wants to understand all the Buddhas of the past, present, and future, they should observe the nature of the Dharma-realm; everything arises from Mind-Only.' Also, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, volume four hundred and sixty-seven, says: 'Those Bodhisattvas think like this: all actions are like illusions, merely arising from false discriminations, and everything is transformed by one's own mind.' According to this Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, 'Consciousness-Only' is also spoken of in the second period. The commentary relies on the majority to say it is the second period.
Commentary: The thirty verses were created to distinguish between the extensive and concise versions. Some say, the Yoga(yogācārabhūmi)...
等廣。二十論略。異前二論名離廣略 詳曰。未必然矣。但表得中雲離廣略。何要指斥。
疏。唯有無漏大定智悲者。問言唯定等證無文義。既但三法應無色身 答有二釋。一云亦無有所見者。亦唯能見識之變矣。如文義等。二云佛離戲論名等故。依本願．大悲變現色身令物睹益。故非戲論色身故有 詳曰。按佛地論．此論第十。前義為本。至文自悉。
疏。若依自識者。聽法者識名為自識 問佛無文義。有漏識變云何言似。無所似故 答有二釋。一云名等佛識雖無。然聽法者謂佛實說。故自心上有似文義。雖無本質所似名等。似自內心故亦無失。如言似我。向內似故。二云似佛無漏非文義也。無所似故。文義之言相從來矣 詳曰。后義難依。本明教體。不欲唯辨漏．無漏故 有云。七地已前有漏心位而過少故名似無漏。非約影．質名相似也 詳曰。疏意通言諸有漏心所變文．義。不唯七地。豈地前等不聽佛說。若許聽者。自識所變豈不得名似無漏耶。既得名似故前釋善 問佛若無言。林葉等喻而何以通 答據為其緣令諸有情識變法解。名我已說如手中葉。未為作緣眾生自心未起法解。名我未說如林中葉。約為增上名說．不說。
疏。成所引聲者。略有三釋。一云十二分教。是成滿聖之所引生名成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 等廣。《二十論略》。與前二論不同，在於名稱上區分了『離廣』和『略』。詳細地說，未必如此。只是表明得中（Detzhong）認為區分了『離廣』和『略』，何必要指責呢？
疏解：只有具備無漏大定智悲的人才會提問。問：只有定等（samādhi）才能證明無文義（no-textual meaning），既然只有這三種法，那麼佛陀就沒有色身了嗎？答：有兩種解釋。一是說，也沒有人能見到佛陀的色身，所能見到的只是識（consciousness）的變現罷了，就像文義等。二是說，佛陀遠離戲論（prapañca），所以名稱等也是如此。依靠本願和大悲心，變現色身讓眾生看到並受益，所以不是戲論的色身，因此佛陀是有色身的。詳細地說，按照《佛地論》和此論第十，前一種解釋是根本。其中的文義自然會明白。
疏解：如果依據自識（self-consciousness）的觀點，那麼聽法者的識就稱為自識。問：佛陀沒有文義，有漏識（tainted consciousness）的變現怎麼能說是相似呢？因為沒有什麼可以相似的。答：有兩種解釋。一是說，名稱等在佛識中雖然沒有，但是聽法者認為佛陀確實說了，所以在自己的心中有類似於文義的東西。雖然沒有本質可以相似，但所相似的是自己的內心，所以也沒有過失，就像說『像我』一樣，是向內相似。二是說，相似的是佛陀的無漏（untainted）智慧，而不是文義，因為沒有什麼可以相似的。文義的說法是從哪裡來的呢？詳細地說，后一種解釋難以依據，因為本意是闡明教義的本體，不只是辨別有漏和無漏。有人說，七地（seventh bhumi）以前的有漏心位因為過少，所以稱為相似於無漏，不是從影像和本質的角度來說相似。詳細地說，疏解的意思是普遍指各種有漏心所變現的文義，不只是七地。難道七地之前的人就不能聽佛陀說法了嗎？如果允許聽法，那麼自識所變現的難道就不能稱為相似於無漏嗎？既然可以稱為相似，所以前一種解釋是好的。問：如果佛陀沒有語言，那麼用樹林和葉子等作比喻又如何解釋呢？答：這是作為一種緣起，讓有情眾生的識變現出對法的理解。說『我已說如手中的葉子』，是因為已經作為緣起，眾生自心中已經生起對法的理解。說『我未說如林中的葉子』，是因為沒有作為緣起，眾生自心還沒有生起對法的理解。大約是作為增上緣，所以說『說』或『不說』。
疏解：『成所引聲』，大概有三種解釋。一是說十二分教（twelvefold division of the teachings），是成就圓滿的聖者所引生的，所以稱為『成』。
English version: Etcetera. Twenty Treatises - Abridged. Different from the previous two treatises in that the names distinguish between 'Separation, Expansion' and 'Abridgment'. In detail, it is not necessarily so. It merely indicates that Detzhong believes that 'Separation, Expansion' and 'Abridgment' are distinguished, so why criticize?
Commentary: Only those with undefiled great samādhi wisdom and compassion would ask. Question: Only samādhi, etc., can prove the absence of textual meaning. Since there are only these three dharmas, then does the Buddha not have a physical body? Answer: There are two explanations. One is that no one can see the Buddha's physical body either; what can be seen is only the transformation of consciousness, like textual meaning, etc. The second is that the Buddha is free from prapañca, so names, etc., are also like that. Relying on the original vow and great compassion, the physical body is transformed to allow sentient beings to see and benefit, so it is not a physical body of prapañca; therefore, the Buddha has a physical body. In detail, according to the Buddhabhumi Sutra and the tenth section of this treatise, the former explanation is fundamental. The textual meaning therein will naturally be understood.
Commentary: If based on the view of self-consciousness, then the consciousness of the listener is called self-consciousness. Question: The Buddha has no textual meaning, so how can the transformation of tainted consciousness be said to be similar? Because there is nothing to be similar to. Answer: There are two explanations. One is that although names, etc., are not in the Buddha's consciousness, the listener believes that the Buddha did indeed say them, so there is something similar to textual meaning in their own mind. Although there is no essence to be similar to, what is similar is their own mind, so there is no fault, just like saying 'like me', it is similar internally. The second is that what is similar is the Buddha's undefiled wisdom, not textual meaning, because there is nothing to be similar to. Where does the saying of textual meaning come from? In detail, the latter explanation is difficult to rely on, because the intention is to clarify the essence of the teachings, not just to distinguish between tainted and undefiled. Some say that the tainted mind-state before the seventh bhumi is called similar to undefiled because it is too little, not from the perspective of image and essence being similar. In detail, the commentary means to generally refer to the textual meaning transformed by various tainted mental states, not just the seventh bhumi. Can't those before the seventh bhumi listen to the Buddha's teachings? If listening is allowed, then can't what is transformed by self-consciousness be called similar to undefiled? Since it can be called similar, the former explanation is good. Question: If the Buddha has no language, then how can the metaphors of forests and leaves, etc., be explained? Answer: This is as a condition to allow the consciousness of sentient beings to transform into an understanding of the Dharma. Saying 'I have spoken like the leaves in my hand' is because it has already served as a condition, and the understanding of the Dharma has already arisen in the minds of sentient beings. Saying 'I have not spoken like the leaves in the forest' is because it has not served as a condition, and the understanding of the Dharma has not yet arisen in the minds of sentient beings. Approximately as an enhancing condition, so it is said 'spoken' or 'not spoken'.
Commentary: 'Sounds produced by accomplishment', there are roughly three explanations. One is that the twelvefold division of the teachings is produced by the accomplished and perfect sage, so it is called 'accomplishment'.
【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2
所引。二云成滿聖者。為諸有情施設言教。又立道理之所引起名成所引。三云成謂成實。實謂利樂所起之聲名成所引 詳曰。前二義局。第三理通。對法論云。成所引聲謂諸聖所說 有學不可名滿聖者故。若言自分滿亦名滿。兼有學者準此可通。然亦有濫。理不明也。今為釋者。成者成就。即得異名。諸得聖人莫問有學及無學者。但利物為法所起言教名成所引。
疏。我法唯善汝唯無記者。按天親論云。以一切善根滿足故得阿耨菩提 復有疑。若一切善法滿足得阿耨菩提。則所說法不得大菩提。何以故。以所說法無記法故 此義不然。何以故。汝法是無記。我法是記。釋汝彼小乘薩婆多也。我法天親指自大乘。記即善性。有于當果及勝自體可記別故。
疏。二識成決定者。此有二釋。一云說者成悲決定。聽者惠決定。二云由近善．惡二友。令能近者成於邪．正二識決定 問有說法者。依余心起聽法不解。近惡生善。近善返惡。決定之義而安在乎 答據多分說 或為遠因。
疏。謂余相續至差別識者。謂說法者是聽者余。相續即身。身有二分識差別緣。能與聽者而為緣故 令余續等。返上可知。
疏。隨墮八時者。八時之義。具如法苑 又薦福三藏和上釋云隨墮樂欲時。何所以者。解云。梵云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所引。二云成就圓滿的聖者，為所有有情眾生施設言教。又建立道理所引起的，名為成所引。三云成指成就真實，實指利益安樂所產生的聲音，名為成所引。詳細地說，前兩種解釋比較侷限，第三種解釋理路上更通順。《對法論》中說：『成所引聲，是指諸位聖者所說的。』有學位的人不能稱為圓滿的聖者，所以如果說自己分證圓滿也可以稱為圓滿，那麼兼有學位的聖者也可以這樣理解，但這樣理解也有濫用的嫌疑，道理上不夠明確。現在為解釋的人說，成就是指成就，也就是得到異名。諸位得到聖果的人，不論是有學位還是沒有學位的，只要利益眾生的法所產生的言教，就叫做成所引。 疏：『我法唯善，汝唯無記』。按照天親菩薩的論述說：『因為一切善根都圓滿具足，所以能夠證得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提（anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺）。』又有人懷疑，如果一切善法都圓滿具足才能證得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，那麼所說的法就不能證得大菩提。為什麼呢？因為所說的法是無記法。這種說法是不對的。為什麼呢？因為你的法是無記，我的法是有記。這裡『汝』指的是小乘薩婆多部（Sarvastivada），『我』指的是天親菩薩自己所代表的大乘。『記』就是善性，因為有對於當來的果報以及殊勝的自體可以記別。 疏：『二識成決定者』。對此有兩種解釋。一種說法是，說法的人成就悲心決定，聽法的人成就智慧決定。另一種說法是，由於親近善友或惡友，使得能夠親近的人對於邪見或正見的認識變得堅定。有人問，有說法的人，聽法的人依據其他的心念而起，聽法卻不理解，親近惡友反而生出善念，親近善友反而生出惡念，那麼『決定』的意義又在哪裡呢？回答是，這是根據大多數情況來說的，或者說是作為一種長遠的因緣。 疏：『謂余相續至差別識者』。是指說法的人是聽法者之外的，相續就是指身體。身體有二分識差別的因緣，能夠與聽法的人作為因緣。『令余續等』，反過來理解就可以明白了。 疏：『隨墮八時者』。八時的意義，詳細地記載在《法苑珠林》中。又有薦福寺的三藏和尚解釋說，『隨墮樂欲時』。為什麼這樣解釋呢？解釋說，梵語是……
【English Translation】 English version 'So Yin'. Secondly, it refers to accomplished and perfect sages who establish teachings for all sentient beings. Furthermore, establishing what is aroused by reason is called 'Cheng Suo Yin'. Thirdly, 'Cheng' refers to accomplishing reality, and 'Shi' refers to the sound arising from benefit and joy, which is called 'Cheng Suo Yin'. In detail, the first two interpretations are limited, while the third interpretation is more logically coherent. The Abhidharma-samuccaya states: 'The sound of 'Cheng Suo Yin' refers to what is spoken by all sages.' Those with learning cannot be called perfect sages, so if it is said that one's own partial attainment of perfection can also be called perfection, then sages with learning can also be understood in this way, but there is also a suspicion of abuse in this understanding, and the reasoning is not clear enough. Now, for those who explain it, 'Cheng' means accomplishment, which is to obtain a different name. All those who have attained sainthood, regardless of whether they have learning or not, as long as the teachings arising from the Dharma that benefit sentient beings are called 'Cheng Suo Yin'. Commentary: 'My Dharma is only good, your Dharma is only neutral.' According to the treatise of Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, 'Because all good roots are fully complete, one can attain Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, unsurpassed perfect enlightenment).' Some doubt that if all good dharmas are fully complete in order to attain Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, then the Dharma spoken cannot attain great Bodhi. Why? Because the Dharma spoken is neutral. This statement is incorrect. Why? Because your Dharma is neutral, and my Dharma is determinate. Here, 'you' refers to the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) of the Hinayana, and 'I' refers to Vasubandhu himself, representing the Mahayana. 'Determinate' is good nature, because there is a distinction that can be made regarding the future retribution and the superior self-nature. Commentary: 'The two consciousnesses become decisive.' There are two explanations for this. One explanation is that the speaker achieves decisive compassion, and the listener achieves decisive wisdom. Another explanation is that due to being close to good or evil friends, those who are able to be close become firm in their understanding of wrong or right views. Someone asks, if there are speakers and listeners who arise according to other thoughts, listen but do not understand, become good by being close to evil friends, and become evil by being close to good friends, then where is the meaning of 'decisive'? The answer is that this is based on most situations, or as a long-term cause. Commentary: 'Referring to the remaining continuum to the differentiated consciousness.' It refers to the speaker being other than the listener, and the continuum refers to the body. The body has the conditions for the differentiation of the two consciousnesses, which can be a condition for the listener. 'Let the remaining continuum, etc.', can be understood by reversing the understanding. Commentary: 'Falling into the eight times.' The meaning of the eight times is recorded in detail in the Dharma Garden Pearl Forest. Furthermore, the Tripitaka Master of Jianfu Temple explained, 'Falling into the time of pleasure and desire.' Why is it explained this way? The explanation is that the Sanskrit is...
一瑟吒此云樂欲。言頞瑟吒此云八時。攝論梵本云一瑟吒。明是樂欲 問二個三藏並親步祇園同覽梵典。忽焉一義解成楚．越 答二俱無失。何者觀天竺。一物名義含多。且如帝釋具有千號。前釋據歷時聲而文義起。故云八轉．八時。后解依自慕法而教體生。乃云隨墮樂欲 問論本若有一．頞二言。前後三藏可隨取一想乎。梵本未必無二字。如何得言隨取一耶 答何廢無性所制之論前後不同。二德所睹而本有別。亦猶此方諸述作者先後回互。其類寔繁。以此準彼斯亦何失。
疏。如言諸字至教體亦成者。此一段文據彼七心．及十二心合而作法。思準可悉。廣如法苑抉擇明也。
疏。不爾真如亦爾者。若也不取性用別質出教體者。無漏之教隨能聽反成漏等過。三寶．無為隨能緣心亦成有為有漏等失 問若佛實說經。何復言不說一字 答有三釋。一云諸佛法同。離於諸佛所說法外。法無可說名不說也。二云一切諸法皆如為性。真如離言。名不說法。又無如外法可說故。總名不說。三云。如眼等法性自本有。不由說已而方有故。故云不說。更有餘釋。如法苑抉擇 問真如約詮以分三性。今隨能變通染何失 答約詮義分三性可爾。今論實體。染即不然。余難準釋。
疏。三十本頌天親菩薩造者。問論題何故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『一瑟吒』（Eka-iccha）這裡的意思是樂欲（喜好，願望）。『頞瑟吒』（Artha）這裡的意思是八時（八個時間段）。《攝大乘論》（Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）的梵文字中用的是『一瑟吒』，明確表示是樂欲。問題：兩位三藏法師都親自前往祇園精舍，一同查閱梵文經典，為什麼對同一個詞的解釋卻截然不同，如同楚國和越國的人說話一樣？回答：兩種解釋都沒有錯。為什麼呢？因為在印度，一個事物或名稱往往包含多種含義。比如帝釋（Indra，眾神之王）就有上千個稱號。之前的解釋是根據歷時的聲音和文義而產生的，所以說是八轉、八時。後面的解釋是依據自身對佛法的愛慕而產生的教義，所以說是隨順墮入樂欲。問題：如果論的梵文字中既有『一』（Eka）又有『頞』（Artha）這兩個詞，那麼前後的三藏法師可以隨意選擇一個來理解嗎？梵文字未必沒有這兩個字，怎麼能說是隨意選擇一個呢？回答：為什麼無性（Asanga）菩薩所著的論，前後不能有所不同呢？兩位有德之士所見不同，原本就可能有差別。這就像我們這裡的許多作者，前後說法不一致一樣，這樣的例子很多。用這個來類比，又有什麼不對呢？
疏：如言諸字至教體亦成者。這一段文字是根據七心和十二心合起來進行修法。仔細思考就可以明白。詳細內容見《法苑珠林》的抉擇部分。
疏：不爾真如亦爾者。如果不是從體性和作用的差別來建立教體，那麼無漏的教法，隨著聽者的能力，反而會變成有漏的過失。三寶（佛、法、僧），無為法（涅槃）隨著能緣的心，也會變成有為法，有漏法的過失。問題：如果佛陀確實說了經，為什麼又說沒有說一個字呢？回答：有三種解釋。第一種說法是，諸佛的法都是相同的，在諸佛所說的法之外，沒有其他的法可以說了，所以說沒有說。第二種說法是，一切諸法的體性都是真如，真如是離言的，所以說不說法。又因為沒有真如之外的法可以說，所以總的來說是不說。第三種說法是，比如眼等法的體性，本來就存在，不是因為說了才有的，所以說不說。還有其他的解釋，見《法苑珠林》的抉擇部分。問題：真如如果按照詮釋來分，可以分為三性（遍計所執性，依他起性，圓成實性），現在隨著能變的心而通於染污，有什麼過失？回答：按照詮釋的意義來分三性是可以的，現在討論的是實體，染污就不對了。其他的疑問可以參照這個來解釋。
疏：三十本頌天親菩薩造者。問題：論的題目為什麼這樣？
【English Translation】 English version: 'Eka-iccha' here means desire (liking, wish). 'Artha' here means eight times (eight time periods). The Sanskrit version of the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra uses 'Eka-iccha', clearly indicating desire. Question: Two Tripiṭaka masters personally went to Jetavana Monastery and consulted the Sanskrit scriptures together, why are the interpretations of the same word so different, like people from the states of Chu and Yue speaking different languages? Answer: Neither interpretation is wrong. Why? Because in India, one thing or name often contains multiple meanings. For example, Indra (the king of gods) has thousands of names. The previous interpretation was based on the sound and meaning of the historical time, so it is said to be eight transformations, eight times. The latter interpretation is based on the love of the Dharma itself, so the doctrine arises, and it is said to be in accordance with falling into desire. Question: If the Sanskrit version of the treatise has both words 'Eka' and 'Artha', can the Tripiṭaka masters before and after choose one to understand at will? The Sanskrit version may not be without these two words, how can it be said that one can choose one at will? Answer: Why can't the treatise written by Asanga Bodhisattva be different before and after? The views of two virtuous people are different, and there may be differences in the original. This is like many authors here, whose statements are inconsistent before and after, and there are many such examples. What's wrong with using this analogy?
Commentary: 'As the words say, the characters to the teaching body are also formed.' This passage is based on the combination of the seven minds and the twelve minds to practice the Dharma. Careful consideration will make it clear. See the decision-making part of the Fayuan Zhulin for details.
Commentary: 'If not, Suchness is also like this.' If the teaching body is not established from the difference between nature and function, then the un-leaked teachings will turn into leaked faults depending on the listener's ability. The Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha), and unconditioned dharmas (Nirvana) will also become conditioned dharmas and leaked faults depending on the mind that can be conditioned. Question: If the Buddha really spoke the sutras, why say that he did not say a word? Answer: There are three explanations. The first explanation is that the dharmas of all Buddhas are the same, and there is no other dharma that can be said outside of the dharmas spoken by all Buddhas, so it is said that he did not speak. The second explanation is that the nature of all dharmas is Suchness, and Suchness is beyond words, so it is said that he does not speak the Dharma. Moreover, because there is no dharma outside of Suchness that can be said, it is generally said that he does not speak. The third explanation is that the nature of dharmas such as the eye is inherent, and it does not exist because it has been said, so it is said that it is not said. There are other explanations, see the decision-making part of the Fayuan Zhulin. Question: If Suchness is divided into three natures (Parikalpita, Paratantra, Parinispanna) according to interpretation, what is the fault if it is now connected to defilement according to the mind that can be transformed? Answer: It is okay to divide the three natures according to the meaning of interpretation, but now we are discussing the entity, and defilement is not right. Other questions can be explained with reference to this.
Commentary: 'The thirty verses were created by Vasubandhu Bodhisattva.' Question: Why is the title of the treatise like this?
不標本師 答有二釋。一云本頌文略義猶未了。釋文廣悉就顯而題。二云成唯識名唯釋論稱。故此但舉釋論師也 詳曰。本為標彼造釋論者。世親不是所以不言。何關文略義缺不標。又現所題雖釋論稱。標彼本頌亦復題云成唯識論。言成唯識唯釋論稱。亦少虧甄簡。
論。護法等菩薩造者。問大毗婆沙論群聖詳撰。故首題言羅漢等造。此論亦爾。何不等字安菩薩下 答彼論羅漢與和須蜜菩薩共修。為等菩薩故下置等。等異類故。此唯菩薩。故等在上。若等字安下。恐疑等彼異類聲聞。
疏。判本文者。科判經論元乎西域。大分為三。上下亦有。如智度論亦明三分。謂序．正．流通。佛地論中亦有三分。一教起因緣分。二聖教正說分。三依教奉行分。余如樞要。此方科釋創乎安公。自後諸德因而習焉。安公以理判諸經論多為三分。謂序．正．流通。廣如法花攝釋明也。
疏。依教廣成分者。廣成有三。一者廣成天親說頌。二者廣成如來之經。三者雙成佛．天親說 有義此論三分。一至教緣起分。二至教正說分。三釋名祈願分 問一切諸論皆三分耶 答隨作者意有無不定。如樞要引 有云。瑜伽但有正說。以慈氏尊自力圓滿不假憑力故無初後分 詳曰。理未必然。現處因位力云何滿。設自德滿可無初分
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『不標本師』，有兩種解釋。一種說法是本頌的文字簡略，含義還沒有完全明瞭，而解釋的文字詳細全面，就顯明地標出題目。另一種說法是，《成唯識論》這個名稱是唯有解釋論著時才使用的稱謂，因此這裡只提了解釋論著的論師。 詳細地說，標明本師是爲了標明那些造了解釋論著的人。世親（Vasubandhu）不屬於這種情況，所以沒有提及。這與文字簡略、含義缺失而沒有標明本師無關。而且，現在所題寫的雖然是解釋論著的稱謂，但標明本頌時也同樣題寫為《成唯識論》。說『成唯識』是唯有解釋論著時才使用的稱謂，也稍微缺乏甄別和簡擇。
論：『護法（Dharmapāla）等菩薩造者』。問：大毗婆沙論（Mahāvibhāṣā）是由眾多聖者詳細撰寫的，所以在開頭題寫『羅漢（Arhat）等造』。這部論也是如此，為什麼不把『等』字放在『菩薩』的下面？答：那部論是羅漢與和須蜜（Vasumitra）菩薩共同修撰的，爲了包括菩薩，所以在『等』字下面。因為『等』字包含不同類別。而這部論只有菩薩，所以『等』字在上面。如果把『等』字放在下面，恐怕會懷疑包括了不同類別的聲聞（Śrāvaka）。
疏：『判本文者』，科判經論的傳統源於西域（古印度），大體上分為三分。上下也有不同的分法，例如《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa）也明確分為三分，即序分、正宗分、流通分。《佛地論》中也有三分，一是教起因緣分，二是聖教正說分，三是依教奉行分。其餘的可以參考《樞要》。此地（中國）科釋經論始於安世高（An Shigao），自此之後的學者都沿襲了他的做法。安世高以義理來判分經論，大多分為三分，即序分、正宗分、流通分，詳細內容可以參考《法華攝釋》。
疏：『依教廣成分者』，廣成有三種，一是廣成天親（Vasubandhu）所說的頌文，二是廣成如來（Tathāgata）的經文，三是同時廣成佛和天親所說的內容。有一種觀點認為這部論分為三分，一是至教緣起分，二是至教正說分，三是釋名祈願分。問：一切論著都是三分嗎？答：根據作者的意圖，有或沒有不一定。例如《樞要》所引用的。有人說，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）只有正說分，因為慈氏菩薩（Maitreya）憑藉自己的力量圓滿，不需要憑藉其他力量，所以沒有初分和後分。詳細地說，這個道理未必如此。現在處於因位，力量怎麼能圓滿？即使自身功德圓滿，也可以沒有初分。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Not indicating the original teacher' has two explanations. One explanation is that the verses of the original text are concise, and the meaning is not yet fully understood, while the explanatory text is detailed and comprehensive, so the title is clearly indicated. The other explanation is that the name 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra' (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) is a term used only when interpreting treatises, so only the teacher who interpreted the treatise is mentioned here. In detail, indicating the original teacher is to indicate those who created the explanatory treatises. Vasubandhu does not fall into this category, so he is not mentioned. This is unrelated to the text being concise, the meaning being lacking, and the original teacher not being indicated. Moreover, although what is currently titled is the name of the explanatory treatise, when indicating the original verses, it is also titled 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra'. Saying that 'Vijñaptimātra' (Consciousness-Only) is a term used only when interpreting treatises also slightly lacks discrimination and selection.
Treatise: 'Made by Dharmapāla and other Bodhisattvas'. Question: The Mahāvibhāṣā (Great Commentary) was written in detail by many sages, so it is titled 'Made by Arhats and others' at the beginning. This treatise is also like that, so why not put the word 'others' below 'Bodhisattvas'? Answer: That treatise was jointly compiled by Arhats and Bodhisattva Vasumitra, to include Bodhisattvas, so it is below the word 'others'. Because 'others' includes different categories. This treatise only has Bodhisattvas, so 'others' is above. If the word 'others' is placed below, it may be suspected of including Śrāvakas (Hearers) of different categories.
Commentary: 'Judging the main text', the tradition of classifying scriptures and treatises originates from the Western Regions (ancient India), and is generally divided into three parts. There are also different divisions above and below, such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom), which is also clearly divided into three parts, namely the introduction, the main body, and the conclusion. In the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-Land), there are also three parts, one is the cause and condition of the teaching, the second is the correct explanation of the sacred teaching, and the third is the practice according to the teaching. For the rest, you can refer to the 'Essentials'. The classification and explanation of scriptures and treatises in this land (China) began with An Shigao, and scholars after that followed his practice. An Shigao judged and divided scriptures and treatises based on meaning, mostly dividing them into three parts, namely the introduction, the main body, and the conclusion. For details, you can refer to the 'Explanation of the Lotus Sutra'.
Commentary: 'Expanding the components according to the teaching', there are three types of expansion, one is the verses spoken by Vasubandhu, the second is the sutras of the Tathāgata, and the third is the content spoken by both the Buddha and Vasubandhu. One view is that this treatise is divided into three parts, one is the cause of the teaching, the second is the correct explanation of the teaching, and the third is the explanation of the name and the prayer. Question: Are all treatises divided into three parts? Answer: Depending on the author's intention, it is uncertain whether they exist or not. For example, as quoted in the 'Essentials'. Some say that the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) only has the main explanation, because Bodhisattva Maitreya is perfect by his own power and does not need to rely on other powers, so there is no initial or final part. In detail, this reasoning is not necessarily so. Now being in the causal position, how can the power be perfect? Even if one's own merits are perfect, there may be no initial part.
。何無第三。又復世親三十唯識亦但正說。豈亦力圓。故非善會。
疏。分別不同科者。泛科文意略有四種。一分別不同科。二義類相從科。三以文從義科。四以義依文科。今即初義。據實本．釋兩師造論而意一種。今依別義判二令異。云本論師為令含識斷障得果。釋論師者令法久住利樂有情。
疏。起殷凈心等者。初句意業。第二身．語。第三．四句通說三業。顯是敬禮之異名也。或初三句別配三業。
疏。三輪因者。身．語．意三如次為彼神變．記心．教戒輪因。略辨名者。修所成果威德作用難測名神。轉變不定名之為變。變者是境。神者智也 心謂他心。記謂別識。識別彼心故名記心。二並依主 教者教示。令彼善生。誡即誡勖。令其惡滅。教．誡兩異合得其名。相違釋也。又亦教亦誡。持業釋也。前非后是。教．誡俱是智之業故 解曰。前非者相違釋非也。今取持業釋。三者皆有摧伏．運轉故總名輪。俱持業釋。余釋如章 問三輪如次神境．他心．漏盡通攝。如次能示身．意．語化。語．意二業因何不次 答由語離過發言誠諦。令他于自信識其志。故得通果善悟他心。意業澄清息惡務善。故所招果得漏盡通。由斯發語教誡有情斷惡生善。因果相扶故無有失 又知他心不待于語。教誡於物必
【現代漢語翻譯】 為什麼沒有第三種說法呢？而且世親（Vasubandhu）的《三十唯識論》（Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only）也只是正面闡述，難道也是因為能力不夠圓滿，所以不是善巧的理解嗎？
疏：『分別不同科者』，泛泛地劃分科文的意義大致有四種：一是分別不同科，二是義類相從科，三是以文從義科，四是以義依文科。現在採用第一種意義。根據實際情況，本論師和釋論師造論的意圖是一致的。現在根據不同的意義，將二者判為不同。本論師是爲了使含識眾生斷除障礙，獲得果位。釋論師是爲了使佛法長久住世，利益安樂有情眾生。
疏：『起殷凈心等者』，第一句是意業，第二句是身語業，第三、四句是通說三業，顯示這是敬禮的異名。或者前三句分別對應三業。
疏：『三輪因者』，身、語、意三業依次是神變輪（miraculous transformation wheel）、記心輪（mind-reading wheel）、教誡輪（teaching wheel）的原因。簡略地辨別名稱：通過修行所成就的威德作用難以測度，稱為『神』。轉變不定，稱之為『變』。『變』是境，『神』是智。『心』指他心，『記』指辨識。辨識他人的心，所以稱為『記心』。這兩個詞都是依主釋（dependent compound）。『教』是教示，使他人產生善念。『誡』是誡勉，使他人消除惡念。『教』和『誡』兩個不同的詞合在一起構成名稱，是相違釋（dvandva compound）。或者『教』也是『誡』，是持業釋（karmadharaya compound）。前者不對，後者是對的。因為『教』和『誡』都是智慧的作用。解釋說：前者不對，是指相違釋不對。現在採用持業釋。三者都具有摧伏、運轉的作用，所以總稱為『輪』，都是持業釋。其餘的解釋如章疏所說。問：三輪依次被神境通（神通，supernatural power）、他心通（知他人心，telepathy）、漏盡通（斷盡煩惱，eradication of outflows）所攝，依次能夠示現身、意、語的教化。語、意二業為什麼不依次對應呢？答：因為語言遠離過失，發言誠實可信，使他人對自己產生信任，從而認識到自己的志向，所以能夠獲得通果，善於領悟他人的心意。意業澄清，停止作惡，努力行善，所以所招感的果報是獲得漏盡通。因此，發出的語言教誡有情眾生斷惡生善，因果互相扶持，所以沒有錯失。又因爲了解他人的心意不需要通過語言，教誡眾生必須
【English Translation】 Why is there no third explanation? Moreover, Vasubandhu's 'Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only' only presents the positive view. Is it also because his ability was not complete, and therefore not a skillful understanding?
Commentary: 'Differentiating the divisions' means that generally, there are roughly four ways to divide the meaning of the text: first, differentiating the divisions; second, classifying by similar meanings; third, using the text to follow the meaning; and fourth, using the meaning to rely on the text. Now, we are using the first meaning. According to the actual situation, the intention of both the original treatise writer and the commentary writer is the same. Now, based on different meanings, we distinguish the two. The original treatise writer's purpose is to enable sentient beings to cut off obstacles and attain fruition. The commentary writer's purpose is to make the Dharma endure and benefit sentient beings.
Commentary: 'Arising with sincere and pure mind, etc.' The first phrase refers to mental karma, the second to physical and verbal karma, and the third and fourth phrases generally refer to the three karmas, showing that these are different names for reverence. Alternatively, the first three phrases can be specifically matched with the three karmas.
Commentary: 'The causes of the three wheels' means that physical, verbal, and mental karmas are respectively the causes of the miraculous transformation wheel, the mind-reading wheel, and the teaching wheel. Briefly distinguishing the names: the majestic and virtuous effects achieved through practice are difficult to fathom, so they are called 'miraculous'. Transformation is uncertain, so it is called 'transformation'. 'Transformation' is the object, and 'miraculous' is wisdom. 'Mind' refers to the minds of others, and 'reading' refers to discernment. Discerning the minds of others is called 'mind-reading'. Both of these terms are dependent compounds. 'Teaching' is instruction, causing others to generate good thoughts. 'Admonishment' is exhortation, causing others to eliminate evil thoughts. 'Teaching' and 'admonishment' are two different words combined to form a name, which is a dvandva compound. Or 'teaching' is also 'admonishment', which is a karmadharaya compound. The former is incorrect, and the latter is correct, because both 'teaching' and 'admonishment' are functions of wisdom. Explanation: The former incorrectness refers to the incorrectness of the dvandva compound. Now we adopt the karmadharaya compound. All three have the function of subduing and revolving, so they are collectively called 'wheels', all of which are karmadharaya compounds. The remaining explanations are as stated in the chapter. Question: The three wheels are respectively encompassed by the supernatural power, telepathy, and eradication of outflows, and can respectively demonstrate physical, mental, and verbal teachings. Why are verbal and mental karmas not correspondingly matched? Answer: Because speech is free from faults, and truthful and trustworthy statements enable others to trust oneself and recognize one's aspirations, one can attain the fruition of supernatural powers and skillfully understand the minds of others. Mental karma is purified, ceasing evil and striving for good, so the resulting karmic reward is the attainment of the eradication of outflows. Therefore, the words spoken teach sentient beings to cut off evil and generate good, and cause and effect support each other, so there is no mistake. Furthermore, understanding the minds of others does not require language, and teaching sentient beings must
藉其言。故三輪化三業如次。非語業因即語為果。意業亦然 又按西域記云。西方敬儀總有九種。一發言慰問。二府首示敬。三舉手高揖。四合掌平拱。五者屈膝。六者長跪。七手．膝踞地。八五輪俱屈。九五體投地。此之九種顯唯二業。理可通意。
疏。一者虛妄即遍計所執者。遍計所執體性雖無。然是虛妄識之所執。亦名唯識。
疏。於前所斷清凈者。雖總言斷意斷染者。或無漏法皆名圓成。言斷於前亦無失矣。
疏。性即是識圓成自體者。此性即是識家圓成之自體也。而長讀之。所以得言唯識之性。不爾何故真名唯識。
疏。凈屬人故者。人即如來五蘊假者。涅槃經云。舍無常色獲得常色。余蘊亦爾。故人名凈。
疏。唯識性聲境第七攝者。第七轉聲具含依．境。為簡依故言境第七。
疏。是能差別者。由唯識性而為所證悟有淺深遂令三乘名位殊別。故般若經云。一切賢聖皆以無為法而有差別 天親釋云。以一切聖人依真如法清凈得名故。
疏。一切所敬皆第四轉聲者。問何所以耶 答第四為聲。為者緣由。所為之義。緣為有德堪為所敬故在第四。
疏。善逝體所生者。略為二釋。一云報．化二身名為善逝。體通二義。若善逝即體體屬報．化。善逝之體體屬
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：憑藉這些言論，所以三輪（身輪、語輪、意輪）教化身、語、意三業，次第進行。不是語業的原因，就不能以語言為結果。意業也是如此。另外，根據《西域記》記載，西方敬禮的儀式總共有九種：一是發言慰問，二是低頭表示尊敬，三是舉手高舉作揖，四是合掌平舉，五是屈膝，六是長跪，七是手和膝蓋著地，八是五輪（指兩手、兩膝和頭）都彎曲，九是五體投地。這九種敬禮方式明顯屬於身業和語業，但其道理也可以貫通到意業。
疏：『虛妄』就是指遍計所執性（Parikalpita-lakshana）。遍計所執性的體性雖然是空無的，但它是虛妄分別識所執著的對象，因此也稱為『唯識』。
疏：『對於先前所斷除的清凈』，雖然總的來說是斷除意和染污，但無漏法都可以稱為圓成實性（Parinishpanna）。說斷除先前所斷的，也沒有什麼錯誤。
疏：『自性就是識的圓成實自體』，這個自性就是識家圓成實性的自體。應該這樣理解。所以才能說唯識的自性。否則，為什麼真如被稱為唯識呢？
疏：『清凈屬於人』，這裡的人指的是如來的五蘊假合之身。如《涅槃經》所說：『捨棄無常的色蘊，獲得常恒的色蘊，其餘四蘊也是如此。』所以人被稱為清凈。
疏：『唯識性』的聲音，包含在境和所依的第七轉聲中。第七轉聲既包含所依，也包含境界，爲了簡別所依，所以說是『境第七』。
疏：『是能差別』，由於對唯識自性的證悟有深淺的差別，因此導致三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的名位有所不同。所以《般若經》說：『一切賢聖都因為無為法而有差別。』天親（Vasubandhu）解釋說：『一切聖人都是依靠真如法清凈而得名的。』
疏：『一切所敬都是第四轉聲』。問：為什麼這樣說呢？答：第四轉聲是『為』，『為』是緣由，是所為的意義。因為有德行的人堪為所敬，所以在第四轉聲。
疏：『善逝（Tathagata）的體所生』，大致有兩種解釋。一種說法是報身（Sambhogakaya）和化身（Nirmanakaya）被稱為善逝，體可以通於兩種含義。如果善逝就是體，那麼體就屬於報身和化身。善逝的體，體屬於報身和化身。
【English Translation】 English version: Through these words, the three wheels (body, speech, and mind) transform the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, in sequence. If it is not the cause of speech karma, then speech cannot be the result. The same is true for mind karma. Furthermore, according to the Records of the Western Regions, there are nine types of respectful gestures in the West: first, verbal greetings; second, bowing the head to show respect; third, raising the hands high in salutation; fourth, joining the palms together; fifth, bending the knees; sixth, kneeling; seventh, placing the hands and knees on the ground; eighth, bending all five limbs (referring to the two hands, two knees, and head); and ninth, prostrating the five limbs on the ground. These nine types of respectful gestures clearly belong to body and speech karma, but the principle can also be extended to mind karma.
Commentary: 'False' refers to the Parikalpita-lakshana (遍計所執性). Although the nature of Parikalpita-lakshana is empty, it is the object grasped by the false discriminating consciousness, so it is also called 'Vijnaptimatrata' (唯識, Consciousness-only).
Commentary: 'Purity in relation to what was previously severed,' although generally speaking, it is severing the mind and defilements, all Anāsrava-dharmas (無漏法, undefiled dharmas) can be called Parinishpanna (圓成實性, perfectly accomplished nature). There is no error in saying that what was previously severed is severed.
Commentary: 'Nature is the Parinishpanna self-nature of consciousness,' this nature is the self-nature of the Parinishpanna of the consciousness family. It should be read in this way. Therefore, it can be said to be the nature of Vijnaptimatrata. Otherwise, why is Suchness (真如) called Vijnaptimatrata?
Commentary: 'Purity belongs to the person,' the person here refers to the aggregate of five skandhas (五蘊) of the Tathagata (如來). As the Nirvana Sutra says, 'Abandoning the impermanent form skandha, one obtains the permanent form skandha, and the same is true for the other four skandhas.' Therefore, the person is called pure.
Commentary: The sound of 'Vijnaptimatrata nature' is contained in the seventh case of the object and the basis. The seventh case contains both the basis and the object. To distinguish the basis, it is said to be 'object seventh'.
Commentary: 'Is able to differentiate,' because the realization of the nature of Vijnaptimatrata has differences in depth, it leads to the different positions of the Three Vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna; 菩薩乘, Bodhisattvayāna). Therefore, the Prajnaparamita Sutra says, 'All sages and saints are differentiated by the unconditioned dharma.' Vasubandhu (天親) explains, 'All sages are named by relying on the purity of Suchness.'
Commentary: 'All that is respected is the fourth case.' Question: Why is this so? Answer: The fourth case is 'for,' 'for' is the reason, the meaning of what is done. Because those with virtue are worthy of respect, it is in the fourth case.
Commentary: 'Born from the body of the Sugata (善逝, Tathagata),' there are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that the Sambhogakaya (報身, enjoyment body) and Nirmanakaya (化身, emanation body) are called Sugata, and the body can be applied to both meanings. If the Sugata is the body, then the body belongs to the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya. The body of the Sugata belongs to the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya.
法身。慈尊繼襲佛之寶位是真佛子。名彼體生。二云善逝及體總是法身。慈氏之智要緣于如而方得生。智因彼起名彼所生。天親自指身及同學名為我等。師即無著菩薩是也 詳曰。善猶好也。逝即去矣。惡來生死好去涅槃。報．化二身誠為善逝。法體湛寂本無去來。何名善逝。故初釋善 或二障覆蔽未名為善。出障圓明方稱為善。簡異於昔立善逝名。非有所去方名為逝。理亦無失。
疏。此論所依及能起等者。論所依者。謂即三寶。無著．覺師子名能起者。如次造彼對法本．釋。
言佛至隨覺者。釋彼佛．僧為依所以。略不牒法。由聖弟子依法隨學。傳示後人令法不絕。所以僧寶亦為論依 言無倒造論者。明本．釋師能以三惠攝於教義而造論也。疏略牒意。具如彼論。
疏。世親雖是地前等者。問彼論既言佛聖弟子。世親不爾。如何可敬及造論耶 答聖之弟子名聖弟子。亦猶藥叉天之眾故。俱舍論中亦名天眾 若爾瑜伽云何以通。彼論說云證諦跡者方得造論 答通三乘說。若唯大乘不要見諦。根性利故。地前長時以練磨故不同二乘。
疏。常恒軌則等者。此釋伏難。難云法寶有四何偏敬理。疏有三釋。第一意云。法雖軌持若常軌則唯真如故故偏說之。有云。常恒軌則通釋於四。自問答云。教
．行．果三何得名常。答云經者常義故名為常 詳曰。雖有斯理乖疏本旨故不取也。余釋如疏。
疏。師資相因者。有傳釋云。若據修行次第說者。僧初。法中。佛后。由僧修行方得佛故 詳曰。雖有其理無教說也。未為指南。
疏。無畏無流證教法等者。此明法寶。謂四無畏絕四暴流。法總有四謂教．理．行．果。余文易悟。
疏。麟角諸部不同等者。且薩婆多麟角三根．菩薩二根皆法寶攝。故婆沙論一百三云。法證凈者謂獨覺身中三無漏根學．無學法。菩薩身中二無漏根諸有學法。及苦．集．滅三諦緣彼無漏信名法證凈。俱舍二十五大意亦同 釋夫言僧者和合為義。四人已上和合名僧。麟角．菩薩三千世界各獨出世故不名僧。非正覺故復不名佛。故在法收 問何故不許菩薩同出。復云何有二無漏根 答但據後身坐菩提樹而說。三十四念得成菩提。三十三心前是二根攝。不障已前有多菩薩亦不說彼有無漏根 問上天聖等不成僧眾何寶攝耶 答古有二釋。一云法寶所攝。二云僧寶收。雖無事和理和僧攝 詳曰。初釋雖通然論無簡。今依后釋 問天聖據理許在僧收麟角．菩薩何不亦爾 答天有多聖。理合名僧。彼既不然何得相例。
疏。由如來性調善者。二障習亡。如巧練金極調善故。由識機
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：為什麼經、律、論被稱為『常』？ 答：因為『經』具有恒常不變的意義，所以稱為『常』。 詳曰：雖然有這個道理，但與本旨有所乖離，所以不採用。其餘解釋如疏文。
疏：『師資相因』，有傳釋說：如果按照修行的次第來說，僧在最初，法在中間，佛在最後。因為通過僧的修行才能成就佛。 詳曰：雖然有這個道理，但沒有教證的依據，不能作為明確的指導。
疏：『無畏無流證教法等』，這裡說明的是法寶，指的是四無畏（佛的四種無所畏懼的自信）斷絕了四暴流（四種煩惱的洪流）。法總共有四種，即教、理、行、果。其餘文句容易理解。
疏：『麟角諸部不同等』，且薩婆多部的麟角喻獨覺（Pratyekabuddha）的三根（三無漏根），菩薩的二根（二無漏根）都屬於法寶所攝。所以《婆沙論》第一百零三卷說：『法證凈者，謂獨覺身中三無漏根學、無學法，菩薩身中二無漏根諸有學法，及苦、集、滅三諦緣彼無漏信名法證凈。』《俱舍論》第二十五卷的大意也相同。解釋僧的含義是和合。四人以上和合稱為僧。麟角喻獨覺、菩薩在三千世界各自獨自出世，所以不稱為僧。因為不是正覺，所以也不稱為佛，因此歸於法寶。 問：為什麼不允許菩薩同時出世？又為什麼說有二無漏根？ 答：只是根據後身坐在菩提樹下來說。三十四念（剎那）得成菩提，三十三心前是二根所攝。不障礙之前有多位菩薩，也不說他們有無漏根。 問：上天諸聖等不能構成僧眾，屬於哪一寶所攝？ 答：古有兩種解釋。一種說法是法寶所攝，一種說法是僧寶所攝。雖然沒有事和（共同從事）但有理和（共同證悟真理），所以屬於僧寶。 詳曰：最初的解釋雖然通用，但論述沒有簡別。現在依照後面的解釋。 問：天上的聖眾根據道理可以歸於僧寶，麟角喻獨覺、菩薩為什麼不可以這樣？ 答：天上有許多聖眾，道理上可以稱為僧。麟角喻獨覺、菩薩既然不是這樣，怎麼可以相提並論？
疏：『由如來性調善者』，二障（煩惱障和所知障）的習氣已經斷除。如同巧妙地鍛鍊黃金，極其調順善良。由識機（根據根機）...
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why are the Sutra (經), Vinaya (律), and Shastra (論) called 'Constant' (常)? Answer: Because 'Sutra' (經) has the meaning of being constant and unchanging, it is called 'Constant'. Detailed explanation: Although this reasoning exists, it deviates from the original intent, so it is not adopted. The remaining explanations are as in the commentary.
Commentary: 'Teacher and disciple relying on each other' (師資相因), there is a transmitted explanation that says: If according to the order of practice, Sangha (僧) is first, Dharma (法) is in the middle, and Buddha (佛) is last. Because only through the practice of the Sangha can one attain Buddhahood. Detailed explanation: Although this reasoning exists, there is no scriptural evidence, so it cannot be taken as a clear guide.
Commentary: 'Fearlessness, no outflows, proving the teaching Dharma, etc.' (無畏無流證教法等), this explains the Dharma Jewel (法寶), referring to the Four Fearlessnesses (佛的四種無所畏懼的自信) that have cut off the Four Torrents (四暴流) (four floods of afflictions). The Dharma in general has four aspects, namely teaching, principle, practice, and result. The remaining sentences are easy to understand.
Commentary: 'Pratyekabuddha (麟角) and various schools differ, etc.' (麟角諸部不同等), furthermore, the three roots (三根) (three un-outflow roots) of the Pratyekabuddha (獨覺) of the Sarvastivada school (薩婆多部), and the two roots (二根) (two un-outflow roots) of the Bodhisattva (菩薩) are all included in the Dharma Jewel (法寶). Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (《婆沙論》) Volume 103 says: 'The purity of Dharma proof refers to the three un-outflow roots of learning and non-learning Dharma in the body of the Pratyekabuddha, and the two un-outflow roots of all learning Dharma in the body of the Bodhisattva, and the un-outflow faith based on the three truths of suffering, accumulation, and cessation is called the purity of Dharma proof.' The main idea of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (《俱舍論》) Volume 25 is also the same. The meaning of Sangha (僧) is harmony and unity. Harmony and unity of four or more people is called Sangha. The Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva each appear alone in the three thousand worlds, so they are not called Sangha. Because they are not Perfectly Enlightened, they are also not called Buddha, therefore they are categorized under the Dharma Jewel. Question: Why are Bodhisattvas not allowed to appear simultaneously? And why is it said that there are two un-outflow roots? Answer: It is only based on the later body sitting under the Bodhi tree that this is said. Attaining Bodhi in thirty-four moments (剎那), the thirty-three minds before that are included in the two roots. It does not hinder that there were many Bodhisattvas before that, nor is it said that they have un-outflow roots. Question: The saints in the heavens, etc., cannot form a Sangha, which Jewel are they included in? Answer: There are two ancient explanations. One explanation is that they are included in the Dharma Jewel, and the other explanation is that they are included in the Sangha Jewel. Although there is no activity harmony (共同從事), there is principle harmony (共同證悟真理), so they belong to the Sangha Jewel. Detailed explanation: Although the initial explanation is common, the discussion lacks distinction. Now we follow the later explanation. Question: The saints in the heavens can be categorized under the Sangha Jewel according to principle, why can't the Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva be like this? Answer: There are many saints in the heavens, and in principle they can be called Sangha. Since the Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva are not like this, how can they be compared?
Commentary: 'Because the nature of the Tathagata (如來) is well-tamed' (由如來性調善者), the habitual tendencies of the two obscurations (二障) (afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations) have been eliminated. Like skillfully refining gold, it is extremely tamed and virtuous. Based on understanding the potential (識機)...
性故於所調有善方便。應病授藥故於能調亦善方便。利物無倦名具大悲。
疏。為生大智大悲者。斯有二義。一安惠等．生自悲．智。二生所化悲．智二也。他由論故悲．智得起。生自可悉。
疏。邪定等三者。按瑜伽論等第一百云。五無間業．及斷善根名邪定聚。學．無學法名正定聚。非學非無學名不定聚 大般若說與此有異。如法花攝釋會 有云十信第六名正定聚。造五無間業名邪定聚。未至十信第六心者不造逆業者名不定聚。又望大乘十信第七名正定聚。若作大乘五無間業名邪定聚。不定可知 詳曰。與瑜伽論而有違也。復無文據。理稍難依。
疏。如佛地等說者。按顯揚云。恭敬聽法現在利益及安樂故。又作四句。一利益非安樂。謂現順理精苦修道。二安樂非利益。謂現違法受五欲樂。三亦利益亦安樂。謂現以道而受於樂。四非利益亦非安樂。謂除前相 又按佛地論亦有四句。現益名義。當益名利。世間名義。出世名利。離惡名義。攝善名利。福德名義。智惠名利 詳曰。疏指佛地．顯揚等論。意明諸教說利樂處。非唯證彼利樂一體。
疏。利謂十利者。具如瑜伽三十五六。不可全引。但取大意略言也。十種如次合為五對。一所利差別對。二利體不同對。三利時現未對。四此世他世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為（菩薩）善於根據眾生的根性來施設方便法門，所以稱為『善方便』。因為（菩薩）善於根據眾生的病癥來給予相應的藥物，所以稱為『能調』，也善於使用方便法門。利益眾生而不知疲倦，這被稱為具足大悲心。
疏解：對於生起大智慧和大悲心的人來說，這裡有兩種含義：一是安惠等人，從自身生起悲心和智慧；二是（菩薩）使所教化的眾生生起悲心和智慧。其他人因為聽聞佛法等原因，悲心和智慧才得以生起，而（菩薩）自身生起悲心和智慧是可以完全理解的。
疏解：關於邪定等三種（聚類），根據《瑜伽師地論》等第一百卷記載：五無間業（殺父、殺母、殺阿羅漢、破和合僧、出佛身血）以及斷絕善根被稱為邪定聚。有學法（指聲聞乘的修學）和無學法（指阿羅漢的果位）被稱為正定聚。非有學非無學被稱為不定聚。《大般若經》的說法與此不同，如《法華經攝釋會》所說：十信位的第六位被稱為正定聚。造作五無間業被稱為邪定聚。未達到十信位第六位的心，但沒有造作逆業的人被稱為不定聚。另外，從大乘的角度來看，十信位的第七位被稱為正定聚。如果造作大乘的五無間業，則被稱為邪定聚。不定聚的情況可以依此類推。詳細地說，這與《瑜伽師地論》有所違背，而且沒有文獻依據，所以從道理上來說難以遵循。
疏解：如《佛地經論》等所說：根據《顯揚聖教論》記載，恭敬聽法能帶來現在的利益和安樂。又可以分為四種情況：一是利益但非安樂，指現在順應道理，精進刻苦地修道；二是安樂但非利益，指現在違背佛法，享受五欲之樂；三是既利益又安樂，指現在通過佛法而享受快樂；四是非利益也非安樂，指排除以上三種情況。另外，根據《佛地經論》也有四種情況：現在的利益稱為『義』，將來的利益稱為『利』；世間的利益稱為『義』，出世間的利益稱為『利』；遠離惡事稱為『義』，攝取善事稱為『利』；福德的利益稱為『義』，智慧的利益稱為『利』。詳細地說，疏解引用《佛地經論》、《顯揚聖教論》等論典，意在說明各教派都闡述了利益和安樂之處，並非僅僅證明利益和安樂是一體的。
疏解：『利』指的是十種利益，詳細內容見《瑜伽師地論》第三十五卷和第三十六卷，無法全部引用，只取其大意簡略說明。這十種利益依次可以合為五對：一是所利益的差別對比；二是利益的本體不同對比；三是利益的時間現在和未來對比；四是此世和彼世的利益對比。
【English Translation】 English version: Because (the Bodhisattva) is skilled in employing expedient means according to the nature of beings, it is called 'skillful in means'. Because (the Bodhisattva) is skilled in administering medicine according to the illness of beings, it is called 'able to adjust', and is also skilled in using expedient means. Benefiting beings without weariness is called possessing great compassion.
Commentary: For those who generate great wisdom and great compassion, there are two meanings here: First, Anhui and others generate compassion and wisdom from themselves; second, (the Bodhisattva) causes the beings they teach to generate compassion and wisdom. Others can only generate compassion and wisdom through hearing the Dharma, etc., while (the Bodhisattva)'s own generation of compassion and wisdom is fully understandable.
Commentary: Regarding the three (categories) of wrong determination, etc., according to the hundredth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) and others: the five heinous crimes (pañcānantarya - 五無間業, killing one's father, killing one's mother, killing an Arhat, disrupting the Sangha, shedding the blood of a Buddha) and severing roots of goodness are called the group of wrong determination. The Dharma of learning (referring to the practice of the Śrāvakayāna - 聲聞乘) and the Dharma of no-more-learning (referring to the fruit of Arhatship - 阿羅漢) are called the group of right determination. Neither learning nor no-more-learning is called the group of undetermined determination. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra (大般若經) differs from this, as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra-saṃgraha-vyākhyā (法華經攝釋會) says: the sixth stage of the ten faiths is called the group of right determination. Committing the five heinous crimes is called the group of wrong determination. Those whose minds have not reached the sixth stage of the ten faiths but have not committed heinous crimes are called the group of undetermined determination. Furthermore, from the perspective of the Mahāyāna, the seventh stage of the ten faiths is called the group of right determination. If one commits the five heinous crimes of the Mahāyāna, it is called the group of wrong determination. The situation of undetermined determination can be inferred accordingly. In detail, this contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, and there is no textual basis, so it is difficult to follow in principle.
Commentary: As the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra (佛地經論) and others say: According to the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations (Xianyang Shengjiao Lun - 顯揚聖教論), reverently listening to the Dharma brings present benefit and happiness. It can also be divided into four situations: first, benefit but not happiness, referring to diligently and painstakingly practicing the Way in accordance with reason in the present; second, happiness but not benefit, referring to indulging in the pleasures of the five desires in violation of the Dharma in the present; third, both benefit and happiness, referring to enjoying happiness through the Dharma in the present; fourth, neither benefit nor happiness, referring to excluding the above three situations. Furthermore, according to the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra (佛地經論), there are also four situations: present benefit is called 'meaning', future benefit is called 'advantage'; worldly benefit is called 'meaning', supramundane benefit is called 'advantage'; abandoning evil is called 'meaning', embracing good is called 'advantage'; the benefit of merit is called 'meaning', the benefit of wisdom is called 'advantage'. In detail, the commentary cites the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra, Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations and other treatises, intending to illustrate that various schools expound on the places of benefit and happiness, not merely to prove that benefit and happiness are one and the same.
Commentary: 'Benefit' refers to the ten benefits, the details of which can be found in the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth fascicles of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), which cannot be fully quoted, but only the general meaning is briefly explained. These ten benefits can be combined into five pairs in order: first, the contrast of the differences in what is benefited; second, the contrast of the different entities of benefit; third, the contrast of the time of benefit, present and future; fourth, the contrast of the benefits of this life and the next life.
對。五真妄分別對 論中初對二義合釋。學者難悟。今別辨之。余依論次。一純自利利他者。謂專為己或但利他事不兩兼故名純也。就純自中有斷有修。若違越不順菩薩儀則。謂為己樂求財受用。或為生天持戒精進修習定惠。或為利養恭敬供諸佛等。此等自利菩薩應斷。若不越隨順菩薩儀則。所有自利與上相違菩薩應修。純利他者亦斷．修二。謂以邪見修行施等。無因果見毀犯尸羅遠離正行。為他說法此等應斷。若諸菩薩已超下地。由悲願力舍諸靜慮。隨其所樂還生欲界。又自事已辨遍於十方無量眾生。能作無量大利益事。此純利他菩薩應修 二共自利利他者。為自逮物為物及自。行能兼齊故稱共也 于中亦二。一自利共他。若諸菩薩或悲為首。或為迴向無上菩提。於一切時修施忍等。當知是名自利共他 釋智以施等能得菩薩。悲兼濟物。故名自利而共他也 二他利共自者。又除如前所說諸相。其餘一切所有利他 釋除純利他應斷之者。彼由邪見無二利故。或除純利他中所應修者。無自利故 三利益種類自利利他者。謂於一法而自行之令他亦行。自他一種行一法故。自他行同名為種類。或此利益有五類故故名種類。種類言顯非一相似 其五類者。一無罪相。若諸菩薩所有自能少多攝善增長善法。令他亦爾 釋由攝長善
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於『五真妄分別對』（五種真實與虛妄的區分對比）中最初的兩種對比的綜合解釋，學者們難以領悟。現在我將分別辨析它們，其餘部分按照論著的順序進行。第一種是純粹的自利和利他。『純粹』指的是專門爲了自己或者僅僅爲了利益他人，不能兩者兼顧，因此稱為『純粹』。在純粹的自利中，有應該斷除的和應該修習的。如果違背不順應菩薩的儀則，比如爲了自己的快樂而追求財富並受用，或者爲了往生天界而持戒精進，修習禪定智慧，或者爲了獲得供養恭敬而供養諸佛等等，這些自利的行為是菩薩應該斷除的。如果不違越順應菩薩的儀則，所有與上述情況相反的自利行為，菩薩應該修習。純粹的利他也有應該斷除和應該修習兩種。比如以邪見修行佈施等，沒有因果觀念，毀犯戒律，遠離正當的行為，為他人說法等等，這些應該斷除。如果諸位菩薩已經超越了下地，由於悲心和願力的緣故，捨棄了各種禪定，隨著自己的意願還生於欲界，又或者自己的事情已經處理完畢，能夠普遍地在十方世界為無量眾生做無量大利益的事情，這種純粹的利他，菩薩應該修習。 第二種是共同的自利和利他。爲了自己獲得利益，爲了他人獲得利益，行為能夠兼顧並齊頭並進，因此稱為『共同』。其中也有兩種情況。一種是自利兼顧利他。如果諸位菩薩或者以悲心為首要，或者爲了迴向無上菩提，在一切時侯修習佈施忍辱等等，應當知道這被稱為自利兼顧利他。解釋說，通過佈施等行為能夠獲得菩提，以悲心兼顧救濟他人，因此稱為自利而兼顧利他。 第二種是他利兼顧自利。又除去前面所說的各種情況，其餘一切所有的利他行為。解釋說，除去純粹利他中應該斷除的那些，因為那些行為由於邪見而不能同時利益自己和他人；或者除去純粹利他中應該修習的那些，因為那些行為沒有自利。 第三種是利益的種類，自利和利他。指的是對於一種法門，自己修行也令他人修行，自己和他人修行同一種法門，因此自己和他人所行的相同，稱為『種類』。或者這種利益有五種類別，因此稱為『種類』。『種類』這個詞顯示了並非僅僅是相似而已。這五種類是：第一種是無罪之相。如果諸位菩薩所有自己能夠做到的，無論多少，都攝取善法，增長善法，也令他人這樣做。解釋說，由於攝取和增長善法。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the combined explanation of the initial two contrasts in the 'Five Distinctions Between Truth and Falsehood' (Pañca Satya-Mithyā Vibhāga), scholars find it difficult to comprehend. Now, I will separately analyze them, with the remaining parts following the order of the treatise. The first is pure self-benefit and benefiting others. 'Pure' refers to exclusively for oneself or solely for the benefit of others, not being able to combine both, hence it is called 'pure'. Within pure self-benefit, there are what should be abandoned and what should be cultivated. If it violates and does not accord with the conduct of a Bodhisattva, such as seeking wealth and enjoyment for one's own pleasure, or practicing precepts diligently and cultivating meditation and wisdom for rebirth in the heavens, or making offerings to all Buddhas for the sake of gain and respect, these self-benefiting actions are what a Bodhisattva should abandon. If it does not violate and accords with the conduct of a Bodhisattva, all self-benefiting actions contrary to the above situations, a Bodhisattva should cultivate. Purely benefiting others also has two aspects: what should be abandoned and what should be cultivated. For example, practicing giving with wrong views, having no concept of cause and effect, violating precepts, staying away from right conduct, teaching the Dharma to others, etc., these should be abandoned. If the Bodhisattvas have already transcended the lower realms, due to compassion and the power of vows, they abandon various meditations and are reborn in the desire realm according to their wishes, or if their own affairs have been completed and they can universally perform immeasurable great benefits for countless beings in the ten directions, this pure benefiting of others is what a Bodhisattva should cultivate. The second is common self-benefit and benefiting others. It refers to obtaining benefits for oneself, obtaining benefits for others, and actions that can be balanced and progress together, hence it is called 'common'. Among them, there are also two situations. One is self-benefit combined with benefiting others. If the Bodhisattvas either prioritize compassion or dedicate themselves to unsurpassed Bodhi, practicing giving, patience, etc., at all times, it should be known that this is called self-benefit combined with benefiting others. It is explained that through actions such as giving, one can attain Bodhi, and with compassion, one can help and relieve others, hence it is called self-benefit while also benefiting others. The second is benefiting others combined with self-benefit. It also excludes all other actions of benefiting others except for the various situations mentioned earlier. It is explained that it excludes those that should be abandoned in pure benefiting others, because those actions cannot benefit both oneself and others due to wrong views; or it excludes those that should be cultivated in pure benefiting others, because those actions lack self-benefit. The third is the types of benefits, self-benefit and benefiting others. It refers to a Dharma practice that one cultivates oneself and also causes others to cultivate, oneself and others cultivating the same Dharma practice, therefore, what oneself and others practice is the same, called 'types'. Or this benefit has five categories, therefore it is called 'types'. The word 'types' indicates that it is not merely similar. These five types are: The first is the aspect of being without fault. If all that the Bodhisattvas can do themselves, whether little or much, they gather good dharmas, increase good dharmas, and also cause others to do so. It is explained that due to gathering and increasing good dharmas.
離諸過患故名為無罪。無罪即相。相謂相狀．體相。下皆準知 二攝受相。若諸菩薩能引自他無染污樂．或眾具樂或住定樂 三此世相。四他世相。若諸菩薩自利利他。或有此世能為利益非於他世。或有他世能為利益非於此世。或此他世俱為利益。或此他世俱非利益 五寂滅相。若諸菩薩所有菩提及得菩提世出世間菩提分法。是名菩薩利益種類自利利他 四安樂種類自利利他者。與前第三名相似也。利益．安樂兩名有異。種類之言義意同也。此有五種。即疏所明五樂是也。故不引之 五因攝六果攝自利利他者。因果相順論一處明。于因果中皆有自利利他行也 有三因果。一異熟因果。二福因果。三智因果 異熟果者謂略有八。一壽量具足。謂長壽久住。二形色具足。謂形色端嚴。三族姓具足。謂生貴家。四自在具足。謂大財．位．明．屬。五信言具足。謂言無虛妄。六大勢具足。謂大名過人。七人性具足。具丈夫分成就男根。八大力具足。謂少疾有堪能 異熟因者。不傷害物是長壽因。惠施光明鮮凈衣物是端嚴因。舍離憍慢是族姓因。乞丐隨施是自在因。所言誠諦是信言因。供三寶等。是大勢因。樂男厭女人姓具足因。助諸眾生如法事業施他飲食是大力因 福智因果論一處明。聚雜難知今者別釋。所言福者。謂前三度
{ "translations": [ "離諸過患故名為無罪。無罪即是相（lakshana，特徵）。相是指相狀、體相。下面的解釋都依此類推。", "二、攝受相（samgraha-lakshana，接納的特徵）。如果諸位菩薩能夠引導自己和他人獲得沒有染污的快樂，或者各種資具的快樂，或者安住于禪定的快樂。", "三、此世相（ihajanma-lakshana，今生的特徵）。四、他世相（parajanma-lakshana，來世的特徵）。如果諸位菩薩既能利益自己也能利益他人，或者有在此世能夠帶來利益卻不能在來世帶來利益，或者有在來世能夠帶來利益卻不能在此世帶來利益，或者在此世和來世都能帶來利益，或者在此世和來世都不能帶來利益。", "五、寂滅相（nirvana-lakshana，寂滅的特徵）。如果諸位菩薩所有關於菩提（bodhi，覺悟）以及獲得菩提的世間和出世間的菩提分法（bodhipakshika-dharma，菩提的組成部分），這被稱為菩薩利益眾生的種類，包括自利和利他。", "四、安樂種類自利利他，與前面第三種名稱相似。利益和安樂這兩個名稱有所不同，種類這個詞的意義是相同的。這裡有五種，就是疏文所說的五種快樂，所以不再引用。", "五、因攝六果攝自利利他，因果相順，放在一處說明。在因果之中都有自利利他的行為。", "有三種因果。一、異熟因果（vipaka-hetuphala，成熟的因果）。二、福因果（punya-hetuphala，功德的因果）。三、智因果（jnana-hetuphala，智慧的因果）。", "異熟果是指略有八種。一、壽命具足，指長壽久住。二、形色具足，指形貌端正莊嚴。三、族姓具足，指生於高貴之家。四、自在具足，指擁有巨大的財富、地位、名望和眷屬。五、信言具足，指言語真實不虛妄。六、大勢具足，指擁有超越常人的巨大名聲。七、人性具足，具有丈夫的性別特徵，男根健全。八、大力具足，指很少生病，具有能力。", "異熟因是指：不傷害眾生是長壽的原因；佈施光明鮮艷乾淨的衣物是相貌端莊的原因；捨棄驕慢是出身高貴的原因；乞討后隨喜佈施是自在的原因；所說之言誠實可信是信言的原因；供養三寶等等是大勢的原因；喜歡男孩厭惡女孩是具備男性特徵的原因；幫助眾生如法的行為，佈施他人飲食是大力（體力）的原因。", "福智因果放在一處說明，混雜在一起難以理解，現在分別解釋。所說的福，是指前面的三種波羅蜜（paramita，度，到達彼岸）：佈施（dana）、持戒（shila）、忍辱（kshanti）。" ], "english_translations": [ 'Freedom from all faults is called 'sinlessness'. Sinlessness is a lakshana (characteristic). Lakshanameans appearance and essence. The following should be understood accordingly.', 'Two, the samgraha-lakshana (characteristic of embracing). If Bodhisattvas can lead themselves and others to undefiled joy, or the joy of various resources, or the joy of dwelling in samadhi (meditative absorption).', 'Three, the ihajanma-lakshana (characteristic of this life). Four, the parajanma-lakshana (characteristic of the next life). If Bodhisattvas benefit both themselves and others, or if there is benefit in this life but not in the next, or if there is benefit in the next life but not in this life, or if there is benefit in both this life and the next, or if there is no benefit in either this life or the next.', 'Five, the nirvana-lakshana (characteristic of nirvana). If all the Bodhisattvas have regarding bodhi (enlightenment) and the mundane and supramundane bodhipakshika-dharma (factors conducive to enlightenment) obtained from bodhi, this is called the types of benefits that Bodhisattvas bring to sentient beings, including benefiting themselves and benefiting others.', 'Four, the types of happiness, benefiting oneself and benefiting others, are similar to the third name mentioned earlier. The two names, benefit and happiness, are different, but the meaning of the word 'type' is the same. There are five types here, which are the five joys mentioned in the commentary, so they are not quoted again.', 'Five, the cause embracing the six effects, benefiting oneself and benefiting others, the cause and effect are in harmony, and they are explained in one place. In cause and effect, there are both self-benefiting and other-benefiting actions.', 'There are three types of cause and effect. One, vipaka-hetuphala (resultant cause and effect). Two, punya-hetuphala (meritorious cause and effect). Three, jnana-hetuphala (wisdom cause and effect).', 'The resultant effects refer to roughly eight types. One, completeness of lifespan, meaning longevity and long dwelling. Two, completeness of form and appearance, meaning having a dignified and beautiful appearance. Three, completeness of lineage, meaning being born into a noble family. Four, completeness of freedom, meaning having great wealth, status, fame, and retinue. Five, completeness of trustworthy speech, meaning speaking truthfully without falsehood. Six, completeness of great power, meaning having great fame surpassing others. Seven, completeness of human nature, having the characteristics of a male, with complete male genitalia. Eight, completeness of great strength, meaning rarely being sick and having the ability.', 'The resultant causes are: not harming beings is the cause of longevity; giving bright, fresh, and clean clothing is the cause of a dignified appearance; abandoning arrogance is the cause of noble birth; giving alms after begging is the cause of freedom; speaking truthfully and reliably is the cause of trustworthy speech; making offerings to the Triple Gem, etc., is the cause of great power; liking boys and disliking girls is the cause of having male characteristics; helping sentient beings in lawful activities, giving others food and drink is the cause of great strength (physical strength).', 'The cause and effect of merit and wisdom are explained in one place, mixed together and difficult to understand, now explained separately. What is called merit refers to the previous three paramitas (perfections, going to the other shore): dana (giving), shila (morality), and kshanti (patience).' ] }
．勤定一分．四無量等。言福因者總有三種。一者于福能得．能住．能增長欲 釋一于未得能得樂欲。二于已得能住樂欲。三于已住欲常令增長。二者于福善能隨順無違背緣。三者于福先已串習。
言福果者。謂諸菩薩依止福故。雖復長時流轉生死。不為極苦之所損惱。又能起作種種無量善巧事業。乃至究竟當證無上正等菩提。所言智者。即惠度全．勤定一分．及十力等。智因果者同前福也。于彼文中唯去福字置於智字。即智因果 七此世自利利他者。文有二種 一現自利。謂諸菩薩以如正理工巧業處積集財物。即於是財知量受用。又先所造可愛樂業異熟。于現法中受用彼果 二現利他。如諸菩薩現法自利。如是菩薩所他有情。由此獲得現法利益 八他世自利利他者。若於欲界能獲他世財寶具足自體具足。色．無色界獲他世等亦復如是 九畢竟自利利他者。若諸煩惱一切永斷八支聖道。若此為依獲得一切世間善法。由三因緣應知畢竟。一由自性究竟菩提故。二由不退八支聖道無有退故。三由受用果無盡故名為畢竟。
十不畢竟自利利他者。謂于欲界財寶具足自體具足。若因若果世間清凈。若因若果由三因緣知不畢竟。一由自性一切有為故。二者由退善有漏法由有退故。三由受果有終盡故名不畢竟。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勤奮和禪定是其中的一部分，還有四無量心等等。說到福德的因，總共有三種：第一種是對福德能夠獲得、能夠安住、能夠增長的意願。解釋一下，就是對於未得到的福德，產生想要得到的快樂意願；對於已經得到的福德，產生想要安住的快樂意願；對於已經安住的福德，經常令其增長。第二種是對福德能夠很好地隨順，沒有違背的因緣。第三種是對福德先前已經串習。
說到福德的果，就是指那些菩薩依靠福德的緣故，即使長時間在生死中流轉，也不會被極大的痛苦所損害惱亂，而且能夠發起和造作種種無量的善巧事業，乃至最終證得無上正等菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺）。所說的智慧，就是指般若波羅蜜多（Prajna-paramita，智慧度）的全部、勤奮和禪定的一部分，以及十力等等。智慧的因和果與前面的福德相同。在那些文字中，只需要把『福』字替換成『智』字，就是智慧的因和果。
第七，此生自利利他。文中有兩種：一是現世自利，指那些菩薩以如理如法的工巧業處積聚財物，然後對於這些財物知量受用，又受用先前所造可愛樂業的異熟果報。二是現世利他，就像那些菩薩在現世自利一樣，這些菩薩也使其他有情獲得現世的利益。
第八，來世自利利他。如果在欲界能夠獲得來世財寶具足、自體具足，在色界、無色界獲得來世等等也是如此。
第九，畢竟自利利他。如果諸煩惱一切永斷，八支聖道（Eightfold Noble Path）也獲得，如果以此為依靠獲得一切世間善法，應當通過三種因緣知道是畢竟的：一是由自性究竟菩提的緣故；二是由不退轉的八支聖道沒有退失的緣故；三是由受用果報沒有窮盡的緣故，所以稱為畢竟。
第十，不畢竟自利利他。指在欲界財寶具足、自體具足，無論是因還是果，都是世間清凈。無論是因還是果，通過三種因緣知道是不畢竟的：一是由自性一切有為法的緣故；二是由退失善的有漏法的緣故；三是由受用果報有終盡的緣故，所以稱為不畢竟。
【English Translation】 English version Diligence and Samadhi are a part of it, along with the Four Immeasurables, etc. Speaking of the causes of merit, there are generally three types: first, the desire for merit to be obtained, to be maintained, and to be increased. To explain, it is the joyful desire to obtain merit that has not yet been obtained; the joyful desire to maintain merit that has already been obtained; and to constantly increase merit that has already been maintained. Second, it is the condition of being able to follow merit well, without any opposing causes. Third, it is the prior habituation to merit.
Speaking of the fruits of merit, it refers to those Bodhisattvas who, relying on merit, even if they transmigrate in Samsara (cycle of rebirth) for a long time, will not be harmed or disturbed by extreme suffering, and can initiate and create various immeasurable skillful activities, and ultimately attain Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (Unsurpassed Perfect Enlightenment). What is called wisdom refers to the entirety of Prajna-paramita (Perfection of Wisdom), a portion of diligence and Samadhi, and the Ten Powers, etc. The causes and fruits of wisdom are the same as the aforementioned merit. In those texts, one only needs to replace the word 'merit' with the word 'wisdom,' and it becomes the causes and fruits of wisdom.
Seventh, benefiting oneself and others in this life. There are two types in the text: first, benefiting oneself in the present life, which refers to those Bodhisattvas who accumulate wealth through righteous and proper skillful means, and then use these wealth with moderation, and also enjoy the Vipaka (result) of the previously created lovable and pleasant Karma (action). Second, benefiting others in the present life, just as those Bodhisattvas benefit themselves in the present life, these Bodhisattvas also enable other sentient beings to obtain benefits in the present life.
Eighth, benefiting oneself and others in the next life. If one can obtain wealth and complete self in the Desire Realm in the next life, it is the same in the Form Realm and Formless Realm to obtain the next life, etc.
Ninth, ultimately benefiting oneself and others. If all afflictions are permanently severed, and the Eightfold Noble Path is also obtained, if one relies on this to obtain all worldly good Dharmas (teachings), it should be known as ultimate through three causes: first, it is due to the ultimate Bodhi (enlightenment) of its own nature; second, it is due to the non-retreating Eightfold Noble Path not having any regression; third, it is called ultimate because the enjoyment of the result is inexhaustible.
Tenth, not ultimately benefiting oneself and others. It refers to having wealth and complete self in the Desire Realm, whether it is the cause or the result, it is worldly purity. Whether it is the cause or the result, it is known as not ultimate through three causes: first, it is due to the nature of all conditioned Dharmas; second, it is due to the regression of good contaminated Dharmas; third, it is called not ultimate because the enjoyment of the result has an end.
疏。一因樂等者。五樂之義具如本論。今對一一略辨名體。為因生樂之因故名為因樂。體即四法。如疏所列。言樂相應者。即順樂受觸等心法。言所發業者。謂於樂果而起于業名樂所發。由此善業得可愛果名為因樂。或樂相應思名所發業。所發業能感當樂果名為因樂 詳曰。前正後非。非樂相應思皆能招樂果 故瑜伽云。若諸所有現法當來可愛果業名為因樂 意云。隨得現．未愛果之業名為因樂。疏取斯意云所發業。
疏。二受樂等者。受即是樂。喜．樂．舍三而為其體。三種皆有調暢義故總名為樂。不爾云何言通三界。云非唯受中樂者。非五受中唯一樂受名受樂也。云是樂自性者。體是受數。簡異前後因樂等也。
疏。苦對治樂等者。諸苦息滅位有樂覺生。對治之樂名對治樂。體性四釋。一云漪樂為體。二云以能息苦衣．食等物而為其性。三云以喜．樂受而為自性。與前受樂義分二也。若順樂受根．境所生名為受樂。若苦息時身．心適悅名對治樂。四云苦息之時有惠能覺。即此能覺惠為體也 詳曰。前三難據體若漪樂。散心．散地豈無此樂。衣等為體。與彼因樂而何別耶。若喜．樂者。豈苦息時總生喜．樂無舍受耶。舍受若有。何非其體而不取耶。又瑜伽云。此中受樂樂自性故。說名為樂。苦對治樂
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏解：『一因樂等者』，五種樂的含義已在本論中詳細說明。現在針對每一種略作辨析，說明其名稱和本體。作為產生快樂的原因，所以稱為『因樂』（hetu-sukha，cause of happiness）。其本體是四法，如疏解中所列。『言樂相應者』，是指與快樂感受相應的觸等心法（citta-dharma，mental factors）。『言所發業者』，是指對於快樂的結果而產生的業，名為『樂所發』（sukha-nirvrtti-karma，karma produced by happiness）。由此善業獲得可愛的果報，稱為『因樂』。或者，與快樂相應的思（cetana，volition）名為『所發業』，『所發業』能夠感得未來的快樂果報，稱為『因樂』。 詳細辨析：前面的說法正確，後面的說法不正確。並非所有與快樂相應的思都能招感快樂的果報。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）中說：『若諸所有現法當來可愛果業名為因樂』，意思是說，隨之獲得現在或未來可愛果報的業，稱為『因樂』。疏解採用了這個意思，說是『所發業』。
疏解：『二受樂等者』，受（vedanā，feeling）就是樂。喜（prīti，joy）、樂（sukha，pleasure）、舍（upekṣā，equanimity）三種感受是其本體。這三種感受都有調和暢適的含義，所以總稱為樂。否則，怎麼能說它貫通三界（trayo dhātavaḥ，three realms）呢？『云非唯受中樂者』，不是說五種感受中只有樂受才稱為『受樂』（vedanā-sukha，feeling of happiness）。『云是樂自性者』，本體是受數（vedanā-saṃkhyā，number of feelings），用以區別於前后的『因樂』等。
疏解：『苦對治樂等者』，在諸苦息滅的階段，有快樂的感覺產生，這種對治痛苦的快樂稱為『對治樂』（pratipakṣa-sukha，happiness as antidote to suffering）。關於其體性有四種解釋：第一種說法認為以『漪樂』（spanda-sukha，ripple of happiness）為本體。第二種說法認為以能夠止息痛苦的衣服、食物等事物作為其體性。第三種說法認為以喜、樂受作為其自性，這與前面的『受樂』在意義上有所區分。如果順應快樂的根、境所產生的快樂，稱為『受樂』；如果痛苦止息時身心舒適愉悅，稱為『對治樂』。第四種說法認為在痛苦止息的時候，有智慧能夠覺知，就以這種能夠覺知的智慧為本體。 詳細辨析：前三種說法難以成立。如果以『漪樂』為本體，那麼散亂心、散亂地難道沒有這種快樂嗎？如果以衣服等為本體，那麼這與前面的『因樂』又有什麼區別呢？如果以喜、樂受為本體，難道痛苦止息時總是產生喜、樂受而沒有舍受嗎？如果存在舍受，為什麼不將其作為本體呢？而且，《瑜伽師地論》中說：『此中受樂樂自性故。說名為樂。苦對治樂』。
【English Translation】 English version Commentary: 『One, causal happiness, etc.』 The meaning of the five kinds of happiness is fully explained in the original treatise. Now, a brief analysis is made for each one to explain its name and essence. Because it is the cause of generating happiness, it is called 『causal happiness』 (hetu-sukha, cause of happiness). Its essence is the four dharmas, as listed in the commentary. 『Speaking of happiness-corresponding』 refers to mental factors (citta-dharma) such as contact that correspond to pleasant feelings. 『Speaking of karma produced』 refers to the karma that arises in relation to the result of happiness, called 『produced by happiness』 (sukha-nirvrtti-karma, karma produced by happiness). Because of this wholesome karma, one obtains desirable results, which is called 『causal happiness』. Alternatively, volition (cetana, volition) corresponding to happiness is called 『karma produced』, and 『karma produced』 can bring about future happy results, which is called 『causal happiness』. Detailed analysis: The former statement is correct, but the latter is not. Not all volitions corresponding to happiness can bring about happy results. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 『Whatever karma with desirable results in the present or future is called causal happiness.』 This means that the karma that results in obtaining desirable results in the present or future is called 『causal happiness』. The commentary adopts this meaning, saying it is 『karma produced』.
Commentary: 『Two, feeling happiness, etc.』 Feeling (vedanā, feeling) is happiness. Joy (prīti, joy), pleasure (sukha, pleasure), and equanimity (upekṣā, equanimity) are its essence. All three feelings have the meaning of harmony and comfort, so they are collectively called happiness. Otherwise, how can it be said to pervade the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ, three realms)? 『Saying not only happiness in feeling』 does not mean that only pleasant feeling among the five feelings is called 『feeling happiness』 (vedanā-sukha, feeling of happiness). 『Saying it is the nature of happiness』 means that its essence is the number of feelings (vedanā-saṃkhyā, number of feelings), which distinguishes it from the preceding and following 『causal happiness』, etc.
Commentary: 『Happiness as antidote to suffering, etc.』 In the stage where all suffering ceases, a feeling of happiness arises. This happiness that counteracts suffering is called 『happiness as antidote to suffering』 (pratipakṣa-sukha, happiness as antidote to suffering). There are four explanations regarding its essence: The first explanation considers 『ripple of happiness』 (spanda-sukha, ripple of happiness) as its essence. The second explanation considers things like clothing and food that can stop suffering as its nature. The third explanation considers joy and pleasure as its own nature, which is somewhat different in meaning from the previous 『feeling happiness』. If the happiness produced by the roots and objects that accord with pleasant feelings is called 『feeling happiness』; if the body and mind are comfortable and happy when suffering ceases, it is called 『happiness as antidote to suffering』. The fourth explanation considers that when suffering ceases, there is wisdom that can perceive, and this wisdom that can perceive is its essence. Detailed analysis: The first three statements are difficult to establish. If 『ripple of happiness』 is taken as the essence, then wouldn't there be this happiness in a distracted mind or a distracted place? If clothing, etc., are taken as the essence, then what is the difference between this and the previous 『causal happiness』? If joy and pleasure are taken as the essence, then does the cessation of suffering always produce joy and pleasure without equanimity? If equanimity exists, why is it not taken as its essence? Moreover, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 『Here, feeling happiness is said to be happiness because it is the nature of happiness. Happiness as antidote to suffering』.
息眾苦故。說名為樂。非自性故。若體喜樂。云何論言非自性耶。第四義通。
疏。受斷樂等者。受等不行名為受斷樂。即滅定。受斷之樂依主立名。體即滅定 問瑜伽論云。住滅定時此勝義苦暫時寂靜故名為樂。當入定時唯滅無漏心．心所法。豈無漏法名勝義苦 答非非想地舍受等法名勝義苦。由入滅定遠加行時而能滅彼。據遠加行所滅之苦也。
疏。無惱害等者。煩惱等類名為惱害。出家等四離此惱故名之為樂。無惱即樂 出離樂者。信．戒為體。或離迫迮身心適悅喜．樂為體 遠離樂者。初禪喜樂。或總五支以為其體 寂靜樂者。第二禪上隨以四支．五支為體。或唯喜．樂隨應為體 詳曰。論既不云樂自性故名之為樂。故知不必喜．樂為體。如次信．戒總以禪支為體無失 覺法樂者。根本．后得二智為體。更有多釋廣辨如余 四樂如次。離家迫迮。遠欲不善。由無尋．伺粗動之法。煩惱．所知如實等覺故立四名。疏配后二名為涅槃及菩提者。不依瑜伽取婆沙意。不爾違論 問前三云何名無惱害 答瑜伽論云。諸餘所有無惱害樂。于最後樂能隨順故。是彼分故。能引彼故。當知亦名無惱害樂。
疏。要具四緣方應造論者。按彼論云。要具四德方可造論 一于昔諸師應離憍慢無如是心。古昔諸師
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為止息了眾多的痛苦，所以稱之為樂。如果樂是自性，為什麼又說它不是自性呢？這是從第四種意義上來說的。
疏：『受斷樂等』，受等不行，名為受斷樂，也就是滅盡定。受斷之樂是依主立名，其體性就是滅盡定。問：瑜伽論中說，住在滅盡定時，這種殊勝的苦暫時寂靜，所以名為樂。當入定時，只是滅除了無漏的心和心所法，難道無漏法也叫做殊勝的苦嗎？答：非想非非想處的舍受等法，名為殊勝的苦。因為進入滅盡定，通過遙遠的加行才能滅除它，這是就遙遠的加行所滅除的苦來說的。
疏：『無惱害等』，煩惱等類名為惱害。出家等四種情況遠離了這些惱害，所以稱之為樂。沒有惱害就是樂。出離樂，以信和戒為體。或者以遠離迫切的身心適悅喜樂為體。遠離樂，以初禪的喜樂為體，或者以總體的五支為體。寂靜樂，從第二禪以上，隨便以四支或五支為體，或者僅僅以喜樂隨應為體。詳細地說，論中既然沒有說樂是自性，所以稱之為樂，因此可知不必以喜樂為體。如信、戒總以禪支為體沒有缺失。覺法樂，以根本智和后得智為體。還有多種解釋，詳細的辨析如同其餘的解釋。四種樂依次是，離開家庭的迫切，遠離慾望和不善，由於沒有尋伺粗動之法，煩惱和所知如實等覺，所以立這四個名稱。疏中將后兩種樂配為涅槃和菩提，是不依據瑜伽論而採取婆沙的意義，否則就違背了瑜伽論。問：前面的三種樂為什麼稱為無惱害？答：瑜伽論中說，其餘所有無惱害的樂，對於最後的樂能夠隨順，是那最後樂的一部分，能夠引導那最後樂，應當知道也叫做無惱害樂。
疏：必須要具備四種因緣才能造論。按照瑜伽論中說，必須要具備四種德行才可以造論。第一，對於過去的諸位老師，應當遠離驕慢，沒有這樣的想法：古代的諸位老師
【English Translation】 English version: Because it ceases all suffering, it is called 'joy' (Sukha). If joy were self-existent, why would it be said that it is not self-existent? This is explained from the fourth meaning.
Commentary: 'The joy of cessation of sensation, etc.' means that the cessation of sensation, etc., is called the joy of cessation of sensation, which is Nirodha-samapatti (滅盡定, the attainment of cessation). The joy of cessation is named based on its dependence, and its essence is Nirodha-samapatti. Question: The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra (瑜伽論) says that when abiding in Nirodha-samapatti, this supreme suffering is temporarily pacified, so it is called joy. When entering this state, only the undefiled mind and mental factors are extinguished. Are undefiled dharmas also called supreme suffering? Answer: The feeling of equanimity (舍受) and other dharmas in the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (非想非非想地) are called supreme suffering. Because entering Nirodha-samapatti, through distant preparatory practices, can extinguish them. This refers to the suffering extinguished by distant preparatory practices.
Commentary: 'Without affliction, etc.' means that afflictions (煩惱) and similar things are called affliction. The four conditions of renunciation (出家) etc., are free from these afflictions, so they are called joy. Without affliction is joy. The joy of renunciation has faith (信) and discipline (戒) as its essence, or it has the joy and pleasure of being free from pressing physical and mental distress as its essence. The joy of detachment has the joy and pleasure of the first Dhyana (初禪) as its essence, or it has all five factors (五支) as its essence. The joy of tranquility, from the second Dhyana (第二禪) upwards, has either four or five factors as its essence, or it has only joy and pleasure as its essence, as appropriate. In detail, since the treatise does not say that joy is self-existent, it is called joy, so it can be known that it does not necessarily have joy and pleasure as its essence. For example, faith and discipline generally have the factors of Dhyana as their essence without error. The joy of the Dharma has the fundamental wisdom (根本智) and subsequent wisdom (后得智) as its essence. There are many other explanations, and detailed analyses are like the other explanations. The four joys are, in order, leaving the urgency of home, being far from desires and unwholesome things, because there are no coarse movements of seeking and investigation (尋伺), afflictions and what is known are truly and completely awakened, so these four names are established. The commentary associates the latter two joys with Nirvana (涅槃) and Bodhi (菩提), which does not follow the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra but adopts the meaning of the Vibhasa (婆沙), otherwise it would contradict the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra. Question: Why are the first three joys called without affliction? Answer: The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says that all other joys without affliction can accord with the final joy, are part of that final joy, and can lead to that final joy, so it should be known that they are also called joys without affliction.
Commentary: It is necessary to have four conditions to compose a treatise. According to the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra, it is necessary to have four virtues to compose a treatise. First, one should be free from arrogance towards the past teachers and not have such thoughts: The ancient teachers
尚能造論。況我今者當不造耶 二于有情類當起大悲作如是觀。若不造論無量有情于諸善法定當退失。有餘情類墮生老病死。是諸有情因我造論。若能解了乃至一句善說妙義。如是如是當奉行者。彼于長夜必獲大義利益安樂 三于同法者深生敬愛作如是觀。若不造論為欲利他。諸同法者于利他事定當退失 四不欲彰己有勝伎能無如是心。當令世間咸謂於我聰睿明哲能造論者開闡義者深生凈信。因此多獲利養恭敬。但為自他善根增長。以無染心乃可造論。
疏。明本論主造論之意等者。有義安惠等說。生正解者謂生唯識真俗二智。次火辨言。如實知者為生真智。后護法雲。得如實解為生俗智 詳曰。據相顯言少有其理。若以實論。三文皆通真俗二智。故第三云。令于唯識深妙理中得如實解。豈深妙理唯是識相非識真理。又知識相名如實智亦何爽理。故皆通二智。
疏。作論名造者。問唯識之義經中先明。論何言造 答三十頌教經中先無。據此名造。
疏。此上即是發端等者。略為四釋。一云上字誤也。應為者字。二云此．上等言皆是發端。意雖明此兼言上也。三云今造等言皆標舉等。在此字上故言此上。四云今造此論一句之言。是是發端等。由前別明今造等訖故。總指云此上。即是發端等也。然四釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
尚且能夠著書立論，何況我如今不應該著書立論嗎？二、對於有情眾生應當生起大悲心，作這樣的觀想：如果不著書立論，無量有情眾生在各種善法方面必定會退失。還有一些有情眾生會墮入生、老、病、死之中。這些有情眾生因為我著書立論，如果能夠理解乃至一句善說妙義，像這樣像樣地奉行，他們將在漫長的黑夜裡必定獲得巨大的利益、安樂。三、對於志同道合的人，深深地生起敬愛之心，作這樣的觀想：如果不著書立論，爲了利益他人，那些志同道合的人在利益他人的事情上必定會退失。四、不希望彰顯自己有殊勝的技能，沒有這樣的心。應當讓世間都認為我聰明睿智，能夠著書立論，開闡義理，從而對我深深地生起凈信。因此多獲得利養和恭敬，但只是爲了自己和他人善根的增長，以沒有染污的心才可以著書立論。
疏：解釋本論作者著書立論的用意等。有一種說法，安慧（Anhui）等人說，生起正解是指生起唯識的真智和俗智兩種智慧。其次，火辨（Huobian）說，如實知是指生起真智。後來，護法（Huofa）說，得到如實的理解是指生起俗智。詳細地說，根據表面的意思來說，稍微有些道理。如果從實際情況來說，這三段文字都貫通真智和俗智。所以第三段說，使人們對於唯識深奧的道理中得到如實的理解。難道深奧的道理僅僅是識相而不是識的真理嗎？又瞭解識相稱為如實智又有什麼不合理呢？所以都貫通真智和俗智。
疏：著書立論稱為『造』，有人問：唯識的意義經典中已經闡明，為什麼論著還要說『造』呢？回答：三十頌（Thirty Verses）是經典中沒有的，根據這一點稱為『造』。
疏：以上就是發端等。大概有四種解釋。一種說法是『上』字是錯誤的，應該是『者』字。第二種說法是『此』、『上』等字都是發端，意思是雖然說明了『此』，但也兼顧了『上』。第三種說法是『今造』等字都是標舉等，因為在『此』字之上，所以說『此上』。第四種說法是『今造此論』一句的話，是發端等。因為前面分別說明了『今造』等，所以總的指出來說『此上』，就是發端等。然而這四種解釋
【English Translation】 English version
'Still able to create treatises, how much more should I not create them now? Second, towards sentient beings, one should arise great compassion and contemplate thus: If treatises are not created, countless sentient beings will surely regress in all virtuous dharmas. Furthermore, some sentient beings will fall into birth, old age, sickness, and death. Because of my creation of treatises, if these sentient beings can understand even a single verse of well-spoken profound meaning, and practice it accordingly, they will surely obtain great benefit, happiness, and peace in the long night. Third, towards those who share the same dharma, deeply generate respect and love, and contemplate thus: If treatises are not created, for the sake of benefiting others, those who share the same dharma will surely regress in the matter of benefiting others. Fourth, do not desire to display one's own superior skills, and do not have such a mind. One should let the world generally think that I am intelligent and wise, able to create treatises and expound meanings, thereby deeply generating pure faith in me. Because of this, one will obtain much profit and reverence, but only for the sake of increasing the roots of goodness for oneself and others. Only with a mind free from defilement can one create treatises.'
Commentary: 'Explaining the intention of the author of this treatise, etc. One explanation, by Anhui (Anhui) and others, says that generating correct understanding refers to generating both the true wisdom and conventional wisdom of Consciousness-Only. Next, Huobian (Huobian) says that knowing things as they are refers to generating true wisdom. Later, Huofa (Huofa) says that obtaining a true understanding refers to generating conventional wisdom. In detail, according to the apparent meaning, there is a little reason. If speaking from the actual situation, these three passages all connect to both true wisdom and conventional wisdom. Therefore, the third passage says, 'To enable people to obtain a true understanding of the profound principles of Consciousness-Only.' Could it be that the profound principles are only the characteristics of consciousness and not the true principles of consciousness? Furthermore, what is unreasonable about knowing the characteristics of consciousness being called true wisdom? Therefore, they all connect to both true wisdom and conventional wisdom.'
Commentary: 'Creating treatises is called 'making'. Someone asks: The meaning of Consciousness-Only has already been explained in the sutras, why does the treatise still say 'making'? The answer: The Thirty Verses (Thirty Verses) are not in the sutras, based on this it is called 'making'.'
Commentary: 'The above is the beginning, etc.' There are roughly four explanations. One explanation is that the word 'above' is a mistake, it should be the word 'who'. The second explanation is that the words 'this', 'above', etc., are all beginnings, meaning that although 'this' is explained, it also takes 'above' into account. The third explanation is that the words 'now creating', etc., are all headings, etc., because they are above the word 'this', so it is said 'this above'. The fourth explanation is that the sentence 'now creating this treatise' is the beginning, etc. Because the 'now creating', etc., have been explained separately before, so it is generally pointed out that 'this above' is the beginning, etc. However, these four explanations.
中初解省過。思之可悉 有云。今造此論四字之上。一一皆具發端等四。又發端等一一別配今造此論 詳曰。若自釋論理猶差別可。若辨疏意全乖本旨。細尋可知。
疏。今說為生等者。問人我不遍所以見除。生言既寬何乃今取。如名眾生濫無情故 答世界有計無情為我。生攝無情無大寬失。如計色我。發爪等類亦在所執。此豈非計無情為我 問我通諸趣何不許言 答法亦名我。若言我空而濫於法。故亦除也 問眾生執有。以空為門破病顯理。眾生執空。應有為門遣執明理 答若破空病說有能除。若論顯理要資空觀 問有觀有相即不顯理。空相不遣豈得理耶 答由空為門遣能所取。方泯二相而能證理。從所由門名空顯理。理亦無失 有云。若也執空亦說為有。從多執有此說為空 詳曰。難意令有以顯于理。答言對空亦說于有。豈可有觀能顯于理耶。若言不說有顯理者。即答前難有不盡失。
疏。前四通取斷二障者。問生死沉沒皆由煩惱。何關智障墮三界等 答生死有二。由所知障墮于變易。變易即是化生所收。亦三界攝。又所知障非親滅生。為煩惱依言難越等。並無失矣。
疏。即根本沉下名之為重者。釋第五解為重之義。有義對業果故。貪等自效能引業果。眾苦本故。故名為重。
疏。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 中初解省過。思之可悉 有云：現在造這部論，『此論』這兩個字之上，每一個字都具備發端等四種含義。而且發端等每一個含義又分別對應『今造此論』。詳細分析：如果只是解釋論的道理，或許還有差別。如果辨析疏的意義，就完全違背了本來的宗旨，仔細推敲就可以明白。
疏中說『現在說為生等』，有人問：人我和眾生不普遍，所以被排除。『生』這個字含義寬泛，為什麼現在要取用？比如『眾生』這個名稱，氾濫到無情之物。回答：外道有計度無情之物為『我』的。『生』字包含無情之物，沒有太大的過失。比如計度色法為『我』，頭髮、指甲等也包含在所執著的對象中。這難道不是計度無情之物為『我』嗎？有人問：『我』通於各道，為什麼不允許說？回答：法也叫做『我』。如果說『我』空，就氾濫到法，所以也被排除。有人問：眾生執著『有』，用『空』作為門徑來破除病癥，顯明真理。眾生執著『空』，應該用『有』作為門徑來遣除執著，闡明真理。回答：如果破除『空』的病癥，說『有』能夠去除。如果論述顯明真理，就要憑藉『空』的觀照。有人問：『有』的觀照有相，就不能顯明真理。『空』的相狀不遣除，怎麼能得到真理呢？回答：通過『空』作為門徑，遣除能取和所取，才能泯滅二相而證得真理。從所憑藉的門徑，叫做『空』顯明真理，道理也沒有缺失。有人說：如果也執著『空』，也可以說為『有』。因為多數人執著『有』，所以這裡說『空』。詳細分析：提問者的意思是讓『有』來顯明真理。回答說，針對『空』也可以說『有』。難道『有』的觀照能夠顯明真理嗎？如果說不說『有』來顯明真理，那麼回答前面的提問，就有不完全的過失。
疏中說『前面四句通用於斷除二障』，有人問：生死沉沒都是由於煩惱，和智障有什麼關係，會導致墮落三界等？回答：生死有兩種。由於所知障，會墮落於變易生死。變易生死就是化生所包含的，也屬於三界所攝。而且所知障不是直接滅除生死的，是煩惱的依處，說難以超越等等，都沒有過失。
疏中說『就是根本沉下，叫做重』，解釋第五種解釋『重』的含義。有一種解釋是針對業果而言，貪等自效能夠引生業果，是眾苦的根本，所以叫做『重』。
疏中說：何
【English Translation】 English version: Middle Initial Explanation Skips Over. Thinking about it can reveal everything. It is said: Now, in creating this treatise, each of the four characters above 'this treatise' fully possesses the four aspects of origination, etc. Moreover, each of the origination, etc., separately corresponds to 'now creating this treatise.' Detailed analysis: If it were merely explaining the principles of the treatise, perhaps there would still be differences. But if analyzing the meaning of the commentary, it completely deviates from the original intent, which can be understood through careful examination.
The commentary says, 'Now speaking of beings, etc.' Someone asks: 'Why are 'person' (pudgala) and 'self' (atman) not universally included, and thus excluded? The term 'being' (sattva) is broad, so why take it now? For example, the name 'sentient beings' (sattvas) indiscriminately includes insentient things.' The answer: 'Heretics (tirthikas) consider insentient things as 'self' (atman). Including insentient things in 'being' (sattva) is not a great mistake. For example, considering form (rupa) as 'self' (atman), hair, nails, etc., are also included in what is grasped. Is this not considering insentient things as 'self' (atman)?' Someone asks: 'The 'self' (atman) pervades all realms (gati), why not allow it to be spoken of?' The answer: 'Dharma (dharma) is also called 'self' (atman). If saying 'self' (atman) is empty (sunya), it would indiscriminately include dharma (dharma), so it is also excluded.' Someone asks: 'Sentient beings (sattvas) are attached to existence (bhava). Using emptiness (sunyata) as a gateway breaks the illness and reveals the principle. Sentient beings (sattvas) are attached to emptiness (sunyata). Existence (bhava) should be used as a gateway to dispel attachment and clarify the principle.' The answer: 'If breaking the illness of emptiness (sunyata), speaking of existence (bhava) can remove it. If discussing revealing the principle, it is necessary to rely on the contemplation of emptiness (sunyata).' Someone asks: 'The contemplation of existence (bhava) has characteristics (lakshana), so it cannot reveal the principle. If the characteristics (lakshana) of emptiness (sunyata) are not dispelled, how can one attain the principle?' The answer: 'Through emptiness (sunyata) as a gateway, the grasper (grahaka) and the grasped (grahya) are dispelled. Only then can the two characteristics (lakshana) be extinguished and the principle be realized. From the gateway relied upon, it is called emptiness (sunyata) revealing the principle, and the principle is also without fault.' Someone says: 'If one is also attached to emptiness (sunyata), one can also speak of it as existence (bhava). Because most people are attached to existence (bhava), here emptiness (sunyata) is spoken of.' Detailed analysis: The questioner's intention is to have existence (bhava) reveal the principle. The answer says that in response to emptiness (sunyata), one can also speak of existence (bhava). Can the contemplation of existence (bhava) reveal the principle? If saying that not speaking of existence (bhava) reveals the principle, then the answer to the previous question has the fault of being incomplete.
The commentary says, 'The previous four verses universally take the two obscurations (avarana) to be severed.' Someone asks: 'The sinking and drowning in samsara (samsara) are all due to afflictions (klesha). What does the obscuration of knowledge (jnanavarana) have to do with falling into the three realms (trayo dhatavah), etc.?' The answer: 'There are two kinds of samsara (samsara). Due to the obscuration of knowledge (jnanavarana), one falls into the change and transformation samsara (parinama-samsara). Change and transformation samsara (parinama-samsara) is what is included in transformation birth (upapaduka), and is also included in the three realms (trayo dhatavah). Moreover, the obscuration of knowledge (jnanavarana) does not directly extinguish samsara (samsara), but is the basis of afflictions (klesha), saying it is difficult to overcome, etc., and there is no fault.'
The commentary says, 'That which fundamentally sinks down is called heavy (guru),' explaining the meaning of 'heavy (guru)' in the fifth explanation. One explanation is in relation to karmic results (karma-phala). Greed (lobha), etc., by their nature can lead to karmic results (karma-phala), and are the root of all suffering (duhkha), so they are called 'heavy (guru).'
The commentary says: What
故障理但說二空等者。舉初障理難後重障不應兼余。
疏。重唯二執等者。舉后斷重貪等亦除。難前障理不唯我法。
疏。此依見道至我見亦爾者。如樞要說 有義而言證空障隨斷者。依斷種說。故第四地身見但伏。害伴等障后地猶有 問我執可然。法執種斷。如何余障猶得現起 答但斷少分。所以余障猶得現行。花嚴經說第七地中菩提分觀方最勝故 詳曰。依斷種言不逾本疏見道等也。豈見道等種不盡耶。又言四地斷第六識法執少分。理恐有乖。按彼佛地．唯識等論。皆云四地便永斷滅。準此等文豈唯少分。花嚴但言七地中勝。不言其執七地方盡。何得為證。以第四地初學二乘。五．六兩位猶效于彼。第七超彼名勝何失。更思。
疏。又總解等者。不須別說我之與法。二合釋之。前解不爾。尋之可悉。
疏。無有少障不依執生者。問豈不許有獨行貪等 答雖有獨行亦遠由執起。如害伴等名依執生。故無妨矣。
疏。總四句答第二問者。詳曰。初之二句答我法執為障所由。后之二句釋斷亦兼貪等所以。理亦無失。
疏。問煩惱障至莖葉亦盡者。問此問何師。復何師 答問答俱通安惠等師 問若是護法。護法智障數同煩惱。執障復別。何言但執殊無品類。意識亦有障非執者。何故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果說二空（人空和法空）的道理是障礙的根源，那麼為什麼在初地斷除理上的障礙后，仍然有更重的障礙存在，而且這些障礙似乎不僅僅是人法二執導致的？
答：這裡說的『重』，指的是斷除更重的貪慾等煩惱。之前說的理障，不僅僅指我執和法執。
答：這裡是依據見道位（初地）的情況來說的，甚至我見（對自我的錯誤見解）也是如此。正如《樞要》所說：『有人認為，證悟空性后，障礙會隨之斷除』，這是依據斷除種子（煩惱的潛在力量）來說的。所以，第四地（焰慧地）的身見（對身體的錯誤見解）只是被伏住，而像害伴（傷害他人）等障礙，在更高的地上仍然存在。問：我執斷除還可以理解，法執的種子都斷除了，為什麼其他的障礙還會出現呢？答：只是斷除了少部分，所以其他的障礙仍然可以顯現。正如《華嚴經》所說，第七地（遠行地）的菩提分觀（修習菩提的各個方面）最為殊勝。詳察：依據斷除種子來說，並沒有超出本疏中見道位的範圍。難道見道位等沒有斷盡種子嗎？又說四地斷除第六識（意識）的法執少分，這恐怕有些不妥。按照《佛地論》、《唯識論》等論著的說法，四地就已經永遠斷滅了法執。按照這些經文，怎麼會只是斷除少部分呢？《華嚴經》只是說七地中菩提分觀最為殊勝，並沒有說七地才斷盡法執。怎麼能以此為證據呢？因為第四地只是初學的二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），五地、六地仍然效仿他們。第七地超越了他們，所以才說殊勝，這有什麼問題嗎？需要進一步思考。
答：又總的解釋是，不需要分別解釋『我』和『法』，而是將二者合起來解釋。之前的解釋不是這樣，仔細研究就可以明白。
答：沒有哪個障礙不是依賴於執著產生的。問：難道不是允許有獨行的貪慾等煩惱嗎？答：雖然有獨行的煩惱，但也是從執著產生的。比如害伴等，名義上是依賴於執著產生的，所以沒有妨礙。
答：總的用四句話來回答第二個問題。詳察：前兩句回答了我法執是產生障礙的原因，后兩句解釋了斷除我法執也兼帶斷除了貪慾等煩惱的原因。道理上沒有問題。
問：煩惱障（由煩惱產生的障礙）乃至它的莖葉（細微的部分）都斷盡了嗎？問：這個提問是哪位論師提出的？回答又是哪位論師的？答：提問和回答都通用於安慧等論師。問：如果是護法（論師），護法認為智障（由知見產生的障礙）的數量和煩惱障相同，執著產生的障礙又是另外一種。為什麼說只有執著，而沒有其他的品類呢？意識也有障礙，但不是由執著產生的，這是為什麼？
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the principle of the two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) is said to be the root of obstacles, then why, after the initial stage of overcoming obstacles in principle, do heavier obstacles still exist, and these obstacles do not seem to be solely caused by the attachment to self and phenomena?
Answer: The term 'heavier' here refers to the elimination of heavier afflictions such as greed. The previously mentioned obstacles in principle do not only refer to attachment to self and phenomena.
Answer: This is based on the situation of the Path of Seeing (first bhumi), and even the view of self (incorrect view of oneself) is the same. As the 'Essentials' say: 'Some believe that after realizing emptiness, obstacles will be eliminated accordingly,' which is based on the elimination of seeds (the potential power of afflictions). Therefore, the view of self (incorrect view of the body) in the fourth bhumi (Flame Wisdom bhumi) is only subdued, and obstacles such as harming companions still exist in higher bhumis. Question: It is understandable that attachment to self is eliminated, but if the seeds of attachment to phenomena are eliminated, why do other obstacles still arise? Answer: Only a small portion is eliminated, so other obstacles can still manifest. As the Avatamsaka Sutra says, the aspects of enlightenment (cultivation of various aspects of enlightenment) in the seventh bhumi (Far-Going bhumi) are the most excellent. Detailed examination: Speaking in terms of eliminating seeds does not exceed the scope of the Path of Seeing in this commentary. Does the Path of Seeing not exhaust the seeds? It is also said that the fourth bhumi eliminates a small portion of the attachment to phenomena in the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), which may be inappropriate. According to treatises such as the Buddhahood Treatise and the Consciousness-Only Treatise, the attachment to phenomena is permanently eliminated in the fourth bhumi. According to these texts, how can it be only a small portion? The Avatamsaka Sutra only says that the aspects of enlightenment are most excellent in the seventh bhumi, but it does not say that attachment is completely eliminated in the seventh bhumi. How can this be used as evidence? Because the fourth bhumi is only the initial learning of the two vehicles (Sravaka vehicle and Pratyekabuddha vehicle), the fifth and sixth bhumis still imitate them. The seventh bhumi surpasses them, so it is said to be excellent. Further reflection is needed.
Answer: Another general explanation is that there is no need to separately explain 'self' and 'phenomena,' but rather to explain them together. The previous explanation was not like this; careful study will reveal it.
Answer: There is no obstacle that does not arise from attachment. Question: Is it not permissible to have independent greed and other afflictions? Answer: Although there are independent afflictions, they ultimately arise from attachment. For example, harming companions is nominally dependent on attachment, so there is no contradiction.
Answer: The second question is answered generally with four sentences. Detailed examination: The first two sentences answer that attachment to self and phenomena is the cause of obstacles, and the last two sentences explain that eliminating attachment to self and phenomena also eliminates the cause of greed and other afflictions. There is no problem in principle.
Question: Are the afflictive obstacles (obstacles arising from afflictions), even their stems and leaves (subtle parts), completely eliminated? Question: Which master posed this question? And which master provided the answer? Answer: The question and answer are both applicable to masters such as Anhui. Question: If it is Dharmapala (master), Dharmapala believes that the number of intellectual obstacles (obstacles arising from knowledge) is the same as the number of afflictive obstacles, and the obstacles arising from attachment are different. Why is it said that there is only attachment, and no other categories? The consciousness also has obstacles, but they do not arise from attachment. Why is this?
答中但以五識愛．恚等法為等流耶 答所知障數雖同煩惱。名品不殊云無品類。答中既云五識等中等意識也 問若安惠者。問即無違。答亦有過。以所知障障．執無差。何得根葉本末有別 答雖障即執。然約諸識執有淺深。義分本末亦無有失。具如樞要 有義執障相望得有兩句。一但障皆執。二有執非障。謂善．無覆無記心等。復云執．障無有寬狹。諸障自性皆名執故。諸是執者皆名障故。應知安惠但有漏法。唯除第七一切皆說名所知障。皆名執故 詳曰。初義全非。后義有濫 初義何過 答所知障者。覆所知境無顛倒性令不顯現名所知障。豈可是執不覆理耶。后義濫者。言障皆執但有漏法皆名執故。斯言有濫。佛地論云。障所發業及所得果亦名為障。此之果．業豈皆執耶。由斯總對所知障性及於業．果而為二句。一但執皆障。謂障自性及業．果中心．心法者。有二分故。二但障非執。即業及果非心．心所者。無二分故。
疏。修禪定時受為勝障者。此通熏．修二義。若不熏修殊勝定故。勝定之障。若受勝能障修于定。勝即是障。后解為正。
疏。一切煩惱皆能續生等者。界界全惑各續自界。按瑜伽云。當言全界非不全界。何以故。若未離欲。于自生處方得受生。非離欲故。未離欲者諸煩惱品所有粗重隨
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：在回答中，是否以五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）的愛、恚（嗔恨）等法作為等流因呢？ 答：所知障（對真理的認知障礙）的數量雖然與煩惱相同，但名稱和種類並不相同，因此不能說是同一種類。在回答中既然說了五識等，也包括意識。 問：如果按照安慧的觀點呢？ 問：那就沒有矛盾了。 答：也有過失。因為所知障的『障』（障礙）和『執』（執著）沒有差別，怎麼能說根、葉、本、末有區別呢？ 答：雖然『障』就是『執』，但就各個識來說，執著有深淺之分，從意義上區分本末也沒有錯。具體內容詳見《樞要》。 有觀點認為，『執』和『障』相互對應可以分為兩種情況：一是凡是障礙都是執著；二是有些執著不是障礙，比如善心、無覆無記心等。又有人說，『執』和『障』沒有寬泛和狹窄之分，因為所有障礙的自性都叫做執著，所有是執著的都叫做障礙。應該知道，安慧認為只有有漏法（有煩惱的法），除了第七識（末那識）之外，都可以說是所知障，都可以說是執著。 詳細辨析：第一種觀點完全錯誤，第二種觀點有混淆。 第一種觀點有什麼過失？ 答：所知障是指遮蔽所知之境，使其不顯現無顛倒的真性，這叫做所知障。怎麼能說是執著而不遮蔽真理呢？第二種觀點的混淆在於，說障礙都是執著，只要是有漏法都叫做執著。這種說法有混淆。佛地論說，由障礙所引發的業和所得到的果也叫做障礙。這些果和業難道都是執著嗎？因此，總的來說，針對所知障的性質以及業和果，可以分為兩種情況：一是凡是執著都是障礙，指的是障礙的自性以及業和果中的心和心法，因為它們有二分（能取和所取）；二是有些障礙不是執著，指的是業和果中不是心和心所的，因為它們沒有二分。
疏解：修習禪定時，將『受』（感受）作為殊勝的障礙，這裡既包括熏習的含義，也包括修習的含義。如果不熏習修習殊勝的禪定，那麼『受』就是殊勝禪定的障礙。如果『受』殊勝，能夠障礙修習禪定，那麼『受』就是障礙。后一種解釋是正確的。
疏解：一切煩惱都能延續生命等，指的是各個界（欲界、色界、無色界）的全部迷惑各自延續各自的界。按照《瑜伽師地論》的說法，應當說是全界，而不是不全界。為什麼呢？因為如果沒有脫離欲界，只能在自己所生的處所才能受生，因為沒有脫離慾望。沒有脫離慾望的人，各種煩惱品類所具有的粗重隨
【English Translation】 English version: Question: In the answer, are the love, hatred, etc. of the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) considered as the isodynamic cause? Answer: Although the number of Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations) is the same as that of afflictions, their names and categories are different, so they cannot be said to be the same category. Since the answer mentions the five consciousnesses, it also includes the mind consciousness. Question: What if according to the view of Anhui? Question: Then there is no contradiction. Answer: There is also a fault. Because there is no difference between 'obstruction' and 'attachment' in Jnana-avarana, how can there be differences in root, leaf, origin, and end? Answer: Although 'obstruction' is 'attachment', in terms of each consciousness, there are differences in the depth of attachment, and there is nothing wrong with distinguishing the origin and end in terms of meaning. See the 'Essentials' for details. Some believe that 'attachment' and 'obstruction' can be divided into two situations in correspondence: first, all obstructions are attachments; second, some attachments are not obstructions, such as wholesome mind, neutral mind, etc. Others say that there is no broad or narrow distinction between 'attachment' and 'obstruction', because the nature of all obstructions is called attachment, and all that is attachment is called obstruction. It should be known that Anhui believes that only defiled dharmas (dharmas with afflictions), except for the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness), can be said to be Jnana-avarana, and can be said to be attachment. Detailed analysis: The first view is completely wrong, and the second view is confusing. What is the fault of the first view? Answer: Jnana-avarana refers to obscuring the object of knowledge, so that it does not manifest its non-inverted true nature, which is called Jnana-avarana. How can it be said to be attachment without obscuring the truth? The confusion of the second view lies in saying that all obstructions are attachments, and that all defiled dharmas are called attachments. This statement is confusing. The Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the karma caused by obstruction and the resulting fruit are also called obstructions. Are these fruits and karma all attachments? Therefore, in general, in response to the nature of Jnana-avarana and karma and fruit, it can be divided into two situations: first, all attachments are obstructions, referring to the nature of obstruction and the mind and mental factors in karma and fruit, because they have two aspects (grasper and grasped); second, some obstructions are not attachments, referring to karma and fruit that are not mind and mental factors, because they do not have two aspects.
Commentary: In the practice of meditation, taking 'feeling' (vedana) as a supreme obstacle includes both the meaning of habituation and the meaning of practice. If one does not habituate and practice supreme meditation, then 'feeling' is an obstacle to supreme meditation. If 'feeling' is supreme and can obstruct the practice of meditation, then 'feeling' is an obstacle. The latter explanation is correct.
Commentary: All afflictions can continue life, etc., refers to the fact that all the delusions of each realm (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) continue their respective realms. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, it should be said that it is the entire realm, not the incomplete realm. Why? Because if one has not detached from the desire realm, one can only be born in the place where one was born, because one has not detached from desire. Those who have not detached from desire, the grossness of all categories of afflictions follows
轉自身。亦能為彼異身生因。由是因緣當知一切煩惱皆能續生 釋若現起潤則非一切。若據成就助業受生故言全界。舉離欲盡即不受生。返顯未離即一切惑皆續生也 或據起現名為全界。故彼論云。將受生時。于自體上貪愛現行。于男于女愛恚互行。又疑男女今為與我共行事不。又我見慢等法亦現行。由此當知一切煩惱皆續生。故知據現名為全界。二解任取。
疏。乃至有頂諸惑暫斷等者。得於初禪上至有頂名至有頂。由得彼定能伏諸惑名惑暫斷。伏有頂下諸地惑也。非有頂惑亦能伏之。無欣上故。
疏。彼分涅槃者。略為二釋。一而伏煩惱所顯之理。是真涅槃之少分故。故名彼分。二云即四禪等所有凈定。由伏煩惱有寂靜義名為涅槃。以是有為故名彼分。分者相似流類之義。據無惑邊有寂靜義。與真涅槃稍相似故。故名彼分。故瑜伽論第十二云。四靜慮者或複名為彼分涅槃。由諸煩惱一分斷故。非決定故。名彼分涅槃。后解為本。前雖無文理可通也。
疏。住此二中非為不住者。有無餘依名之為二。樂住二中雲非不住。致此言者。明無住處名真解脫。彼既樂住。故非真解脫。
疏。所知之障者。問此障之體亦是所知。何非持業 答漏．無漏法皆是所知。若持業者豈無漏法亦名障耶。由有此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：也能成為其他個體的產生之因。由此因緣，應當明白一切煩惱都能持續產生。如果煩惱只是暫時顯現，那麼並非所有煩惱都能持續產生。如果根據成就（指業力）來助長受生，那麼可以說整個界（指三界）的煩惱都能持續產生。舉例來說，如果離欲界和色界頂的煩惱已經斷盡，就不會再受生。反過來，這表明如果還沒有斷盡這些煩惱，那麼一切煩惱都會持續產生。或者，根據煩惱的現起情況，可以稱之為整個界。因此，《瑜伽師地論》中說：『將要受生時，對於自身產生貪愛，對於男人或女人產生愛或嗔，並且懷疑男人或女人現在是否與我共同行事，以及我見、慢等法也會現行。』由此可知，一切煩惱都會持續產生。因此，根據煩惱的現起情況，可以稱之為整個界。這兩種解釋可以任選其一。 疏：乃至有頂諸惑暫斷等。『得於初禪上至有頂』，是指禪定境界從初禪一直到有頂天。『由得彼定能伏諸惑』，是指通過獲得這些禪定，能夠暫時壓伏各種煩惱。這裡指的是壓伏有頂天以下各地的煩惱，而不是說有頂天的煩惱也能被壓伏，因為沒有對更高境界的欣求。 疏：彼分涅槃。對於『彼分涅槃』，略有二種解釋。第一種解釋是，通過壓伏煩惱所顯現的道理，是真正涅槃的一小部分，因此稱為『彼分』。第二種解釋是，四禪等所有清凈的禪定，由於壓伏了煩惱而具有寂靜的意義，因此稱為涅槃。但因為這些禪定是有為法，所以稱為『彼分』。『分』的意思是相似的流類。根據沒有煩惱的方面，具有寂靜的意義，與真正的涅槃稍微相似，所以稱為『彼分』。因此，《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說：『四靜慮有時也被稱為彼分涅槃，因為各種煩惱被部分斷除，並非完全斷除，所以稱為彼分涅槃。』后一種解釋是根本的解釋，前一種解釋雖然沒有明確的文句，但道理上也是可以通順的。 疏：住此二中非為不住。『有餘依』和『無餘依』被稱為『二』。如果樂於安住在這二者之中，就不能說是『不住』。之所以要這樣說，是因為真正的解脫是沒有安住之處的。如果樂於安住，就不是真正的解脫。 疏：所知之障。問：這個障礙的本體也是所知，為什麼不是持業釋（一種複合詞的構成方式）？答：有漏法和無漏法都是所知。如果是持業釋，難道無漏法也叫做障礙嗎？因為有這個...
【English Translation】 English version: It can also be the cause for the arising of other individuals. From this cause and condition, it should be understood that all afflictions (kleshas) can continue to arise. If afflictions only manifest temporarily, then not all afflictions can continue to arise. If, according to accomplishment (karma), it helps to promote rebirth, then it can be said that the afflictions of the entire realm (the three realms) can continue to arise. For example, if the afflictions of the Realm of Desire (Kamadhatu) and the peak of the Form Realm (Rupadhatu) have been completely eradicated, then there will be no more rebirth. Conversely, this indicates that if these afflictions have not been completely eradicated, then all afflictions will continue to arise. Alternatively, according to the manifestation of afflictions, it can be called the entire realm. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'When about to be reborn, greed and attachment arise towards oneself, love and hatred arise towards men or women, and doubts arise as to whether men or women are now engaging in activities with me, and views of self (atma-drishti), pride (mana), and other dharmas also manifest.' From this, it is known that all afflictions will continue to arise. Therefore, according to the manifestation of afflictions, it can be called the entire realm. Either of these two explanations can be chosen. Commentary: 'Even the afflictions of the Peak of Existence (Bhavagra) are temporarily suppressed, etc.' 'Attaining the first dhyana (ch'an) up to the Peak of Existence' refers to the state of meditative concentration from the first dhyana up to the Bhavagra heaven. 'Being able to subdue the afflictions by attaining these samadhis' means that by attaining these samadhis, one can temporarily suppress various afflictions. This refers to suppressing the afflictions of the realms below the Bhavagra heaven, not that the afflictions of the Bhavagra heaven can also be suppressed, because there is no longing for higher realms. Commentary: 'A Portion of Nirvana (Pati-bhaga-nirvana)'. Regarding 'A Portion of Nirvana', there are two brief explanations. The first explanation is that the principle revealed by suppressing afflictions is a small part of true Nirvana, hence it is called 'A Portion'. The second explanation is that all pure samadhis such as the four dhyanas, due to suppressing afflictions, have the meaning of tranquility, hence they are called Nirvana. But because these samadhis are conditioned dharmas (samskrita-dharmas), they are called 'A Portion'. 'Portion' means a similar stream or category. According to the aspect of no afflictions, it has the meaning of tranquility, and is slightly similar to true Nirvana, hence it is called 'A Portion'. Therefore, the twelfth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'The four dhyanas are sometimes also called A Portion of Nirvana, because various afflictions are partially eliminated, not completely eliminated, hence they are called A Portion of Nirvana.' The latter explanation is the fundamental explanation, and although the former explanation does not have explicit wording, it is logically consistent. Commentary: 'Dwelling in these two is not non-dwelling'. 'With remainder' (sa-upadisesa) and 'without remainder' (nir-upadisesa) are called 'two'. If one is happy to dwell in these two, then it cannot be said to be 'non-dwelling'. The reason for saying this is that true liberation is without a dwelling place. If one is happy to dwell, then it is not true liberation. Commentary: 'The Obstruction of the Knowable (jneyavarana)'. Question: The substance of this obstruction is also knowable, why is it not a determinative compound (tatpurusa)? Answer: Defiled (sasrava) and undefiled (anasrava) dharmas are both knowable. If it were a determinative compound, would undefiled dharmas also be called obstructions? Because there is this...
過故從依主非持業。
論。得二勝果者。此對等覺．二乘解脫何得名勝。廣如義燈 有義解等覺妨相傳三釋。一云。一剎那間正體．后得與佛平等名為等覺。依長時言對彼名勝。二云真智平等。后智劣佛。三云真俗二智俱未究竟不名平等。無間．解脫同斷一障。故說等言。習氣未盡。雜染未舍。鏡智未生。事智未起。未遍緣俗。知真未圓。故實非等 詳曰。雖有三解疑猶未遣。且金剛位是無間道。何有長時對之云勝。設云此位有多剎那佛平等者。是何剎那。彼俱無間。未可於中分成勝劣。若勝形前。前非等覺。何過須釋。若形二智名勝等者。障猶未盡。復未圓證。以何名等。若對斷障同名為等。理即有失而文未見。由斯三釋皆未敢依。未見所據。而無所據 今助一釋。佛所得法而皆得之菩薩稱等。所得自在離障圓極故佛云勝。故大般若五十五云。云何當知已圓滿。第十法雲地菩薩。與諸如來應言無異。善現是菩薩已圓滿六波羅蜜多．八定．三十七道．三三昧．五眼．六通．佛十力．四無畏．無礙．無量．十八不共．一切智．道相智．一切相智．一切佛法故。若復永斷一切煩惱習氣相續便住佛地。是故當知與諸如來應言無異 釋曰。現正等覺是一切智。極善通達是道相智。現等別覺是一切相智 又四百七十七云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：過未、現在、未來，從屬關係、依處關係、主謂關係，都不是持業釋（一種複合詞的構成方式）。
論：獲得二種殊勝果位的人，這是針對等覺菩薩（指即將成佛的菩薩）和二乘（聲聞、緣覺）的解脫而言，為何稱之為殊勝？詳細內容見《義燈》。
有義疏解釋等覺菩薩的妨難，有三種解釋。第一種說法是：在一剎那間，正體智（根本智）、后得智（差別智）與佛平等，稱為等覺。從長時間來說，相對於菩薩，佛才名為殊勝。第二種說法是真智（證悟空性的智慧）平等，后得智不如佛。第三種說法是真智和俗智（認識世俗現象的智慧）都沒有究竟，不能稱為平等。無間道（證悟前的最後階段）和解脫道（證悟后的狀態）共同斷除一種障礙，所以說『等』。但習氣（煩惱的殘餘）沒有斷盡，雜染（不清凈）沒有捨棄，鏡智（如實反映一切的智慧）沒有生起，事智（處理事務的智慧）沒有發起，沒有普遍地緣取世俗，認識真理沒有圓滿，所以實際上不是平等。
詳細地說，雖然有三種解釋，但疑問仍然沒有消除。且金剛喻定（無間道）是無間道，怎麼會有長時間相對於它而說殊勝呢？假設說此位有很多剎那與佛平等，是哪個剎那？它們都是無間道，不可在其中分成殊勝和低劣。如果殊勝在前面，那前面的就不是等覺，有什麼過失需要解釋呢？如果說二智（真智和俗智）名為殊勝和平等，但障礙還沒有斷盡，又沒有圓滿證得，憑什麼稱為『等』？如果針對斷除障礙相同而稱為『等』，道理上就有缺失，而且文中沒有體現。因此，這三種解釋都不敢依從，沒有看到依據，也沒有什麼依據。
現在我來輔助一種解釋：佛所得到的法，菩薩也都能得到，所以稱為『等』。佛所得到的自在、遠離障礙、圓滿到極點，所以佛稱為『勝』。所以《大般若經》第五十五卷說：『如何應當知道已經圓滿？第十法雲地（最高階位的菩薩）菩薩，與諸如來應當說沒有差異。善現（須菩提），這位菩薩已經圓滿了六波羅蜜多（佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、般若）、八定（四禪、四空定）、三十七道品（四念處、四正勤、四如意足、五根、五力、七覺支、八正道）、三三昧（空、無相、無愿）、五眼（肉眼、天眼、慧眼、法眼、佛眼）、六通（天眼通、天耳通、他心通、宿命通、神足通、漏盡通）、佛十力（處非處智力、業異熟智力、根勝劣智力、種種界智力、種種解智力、至所趣道智力、靜慮解脫等持等至智力、宿命隨念智力、死生智力、漏盡智力）、四無畏（一切智無畏、漏盡無畏、說障法無畏、說道盡苦道無畏）、無礙解（法無礙解、義無礙解、辭無礙解、樂說無礙解）、無量、十八不共法（如來獨有的十八種功德）、一切智（總體智慧）、道相智（認識修行道路的智慧）、一切相智（認識一切事物現象的智慧）、一切佛法。』如果永遠斷除一切煩惱習氣的相續，便安住于佛地。因此，應當知道與諸如來應當說沒有差異。
解釋說：現證正等覺是一切智，極其善於通達是道相智，現證別覺是一切相智。
又，《四百論》第四百七十七頌說：
【English Translation】 English version: Past, present, and future; subordinate relationship, dependent relationship, subject-predicate relationship, none of these are Tatpurusha (a type of compound word formation).
Treatise: Those who attain the two supreme fruits, in comparison to the Samyak-sambuddha (perfectly enlightened Buddha) and the liberation of the Two Vehicles (Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas), why are they called supreme? Details can be found in the 'Yi Deng'.
Some commentaries explain the difficulties regarding Samyak-sambuddha with three interpretations. The first is: in a single moment, the fundamental wisdom (Prajna), and the subsequent wisdom (Jnana) are equal to the Buddha, and this is called Samyak-sambuddha. Speaking in terms of a long period, the Buddha is called supreme compared to the Bodhisattva. The second is that the true wisdom (wisdom of emptiness) is equal, but the subsequent wisdom is inferior to the Buddha. The third is that neither true wisdom nor conventional wisdom (wisdom of worldly phenomena) is ultimate, so they cannot be called equal. The path of no-more-learning (Anantarya-marga) and the path of liberation (Vimukti-marga) jointly cut off one obstacle, so it is said to be 'equal'. However, the habitual tendencies (residual traces of afflictions) have not been completely eliminated, the impurities (defilements) have not been abandoned, the mirror-like wisdom (Adarsha-jnana) has not arisen, the wisdom of action (Kritya-anushthana-jnana) has not been initiated, it has not universally grasped the conventional, and the understanding of truth is not complete, so in reality, it is not equal.
In detail, although there are three explanations, the doubts have not been eliminated. Moreover, the Vajra-like Samadhi (Vajropama Samadhi) (path of no-more-learning) is the path of no-more-learning, how can there be a long period relative to it to say it is supreme? Suppose it is said that in this position there are many moments equal to the Buddha, which moment is it? They are all paths of no-more-learning, and it is impossible to divide them into superior and inferior. If the supreme is in front, then the one in front is not Samyak-sambuddha, what fault needs to be explained? If it is said that the two wisdoms (true wisdom and conventional wisdom) are called supreme and equal, but the obstacles have not been completely eliminated, and they have not been fully realized, why are they called 'equal'? If it is said that they are called 'equal' because they are the same in cutting off obstacles, then there is a logical flaw, and it is not reflected in the text. Therefore, these three explanations are not dared to be followed, no basis has been seen, and there is no basis.
Now I will assist with an explanation: the Dharma obtained by the Buddha can also be obtained by the Bodhisattva, so it is called 'equal'. The freedom obtained by the Buddha, the distance from obstacles, and the perfection to the extreme, so the Buddha is called 'supreme'. Therefore, the fifty-fifth volume of the 'Great Prajna Sutra' says: 'How should it be known that it has been completed? The tenth Dharma Cloud Ground (Dharma-megha) (the highest level of Bodhisattva) Bodhisattva, should be said to be no different from all the Tathagatas. Subhuti, this Bodhisattva has completed the six Paramitas (Dana, Shila, Kshanti, Virya, Dhyana, Prajna), eight Samadhis (four Dhyanas, four formless absorptions), thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (four Smrtyupasthanas, four Samyakprahana, four Rddhipadas, five Indriyas, five Balas, seven Bojjhangas, eight Aryangas), three Samadhis (Shunyata, Animitta, Apranihita), five eyes (flesh eye, heavenly eye, wisdom eye, Dharma eye, Buddha eye), six Abhijna (Divyacakshus, Divyashrotra, Paracittajnana, Purvanivasanusmrti, Divyacakshus, Asravaksayajnana), Buddha's ten powers (Sthanasthana-jnana-bala, Karmavipaka-jnana-bala, Nanadhimukti-jnana-bala, Nanadhatu-jnana-bala, Indriyaparapara-jnana-bala, Sarvatragaminipratipada-jnana-bala, Dhyanavimoksha-samadhisamapattisamutthana-jnana-bala, Purvanivasanusmrti-jnana-bala, Cyutyupapada-jnana-bala, Asravaksaya-jnana-bala), four fearlessnesses (Sarvadharmabhisambodha-vaisaradya, Sarvasravaksaya-vaisaradya, Antarayika-dharmadesana-vaisaradya, Niryana-pratipad-desana-vaisaradya), unobstructed eloquence (Pratisamvid), immeasurable, eighteen unshared Dharmas (Avenika-dharmas) (eighteen unique qualities of the Tathagata), all-knowing (Sarvajna), knowledge of the path (Margajnana), knowledge of all aspects (Sarvakarajnana), all Buddha Dharmas.' If one permanently cuts off the continuity of all afflictions and habitual tendencies, one will abide in the Buddha ground. Therefore, it should be known that there should be no difference from all the Tathagatas.
Explanation: Manifesting perfect enlightenment is all-knowing, being extremely good at understanding is the knowledge of the path, manifesting separate enlightenment is the knowledge of all aspects.
Also, the four hundred and seventy-seventh verse of the 'Four Hundred Treatises' says:
若無間道行一切法。未離闇障。未到彼岸。未得自在。未得果時。名為菩薩。若解脫道行於一切法。已離闇障。已到彼岸。已得自在。已得果已時。乃名為異。由位有異法非無別 準於此文。無異之言等之別名。障未離等顯佛為勝。據斯所憑于理通矣 問勝劣差等義焉在 答約所得德名數無差。等言德數。不據用齊一同圓極方名等也。故智度論云。如月十四．十五日雖同是月。小不令海潮。得潮有異。而佛．菩薩亦復如是。又如向．果勝劣性差聖名同也。如言燒衣一分亦轉。據斯相形等．勝無咎。
疏。令達二空等者。我法無體名之為空。非二空性。
疏。若大乘中至互顯者。但舉小乘名謬我法。影取空見名謬唯識。大乘空見知我法無。非謬我法。撥識理無故得言謬。非全不解。不得名迷。但影顯也。而無互義。互言相從。
疏。薩婆多量等者。問量有何過 答有云。宗言實有心．心法喻。大乘忿等是假非實。喻有一分所立不成。大乘瓶等是境非實。因有不定。若宗法言決定非無。故無過也 詳曰。宗云非無因亦決定相違過也 量云。汝離心之境。定非是有。除心心所內境．無為．不相應等是所知故。如龜毛等。
疏。清辨量等者。問量有何過 答因有不定過。為如外境是所知故證識是無。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果菩薩在未證得阿羅漢果位的階段，以無間道（Anantarya-marga，直接趨向解脫的道路）修行一切法，此時尚未脫離無明的障礙，尚未到達涅槃的彼岸，尚未獲得自在，尚未證得果位，那麼就稱其為菩薩。如果阿羅漢以解脫道（Vimukti-marga，脫離輪迴的道路）修行一切法，已經脫離無明的障礙，已經到達涅槃的彼岸，已經獲得自在，已經證得果位，那麼就稱其為阿羅漢。由於果位不同，所以稱謂不同，但法本身並沒有本質區別。根據這段經文，『無異』之說只是『等』的別名，而『障未離』等則顯示佛的殊勝。依據這些，在道理上是講得通的。問：勝、劣、差、等這些概念的意義在哪裡？答：從所獲得的功德和名號的數量上來說，沒有差別。『等』指的是功德的數量。但並非指作用完全相同，圓滿程度完全一樣。所以《智度論》（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）中說，比如農曆十四、十五的月亮，雖然都叫月亮，但十四的月亮不能引起海潮，十五的月亮才能引起海潮，佛和菩薩也是如此。又比如向道位（Srota-apanna-marga，預流果的道路）和阿羅漢果位（Arhat-phala，阿羅漢的果位），勝劣的性質有差別，但聖者的名號是相同的。比如燒衣服，即使只燒了一部分，也算是燒了。根據這些來衡量，說『等』和『勝』都沒有問題。 疏：『令達二空』等，我執和法執都沒有實體，所以稱之為『空』。並非指二空的自性。 疏：『若大乘中至互顯者』，僅僅舉出小乘的名相，就說是謬解了我執和法執，影射地認為空見是謬解了唯識。大乘的空見知道我執和法執都是虛妄的，並非謬解了我執和法執。否定了唯識的道理，所以才能說是謬解。但並非完全不理解，所以不能說是迷惑，只是影射地顯現出來而已。而沒有相互的意義，『互』指的是相互依從。 疏：『薩婆多量』等，問：量（Pramana，認識的工具）有什麼過失？答：有人說，宗（Paksha，論題）說心和心法是真實存在的，但大乘認為忿怒等是虛假的，不是真實的。比喻有一部分不能成立。大乘認為瓶子等是外境，不是真實的，所以因（Hetu，理由）是不確定的。如果宗法說決定不是沒有，就沒有過失。詳細地說，宗說不是沒有，因也是決定相違的過失。量說：你離開心的外境，一定不是存在的。因為除了心和心所的內境、無為法（Asamskrta，非因緣和合的法）、不相應行法（Citta-viprayukta-samskara，非心相應的行法）等，都是所知，比如龜毛等。 疏：『清辨量』等，問：量有什麼過失？答：因有不確定的過失。因為像外境是所知，所以證明識是不存在的。
【English Translation】 English version: If a Bodhisattva, while not yet attaining the state of an Arhat, practices all Dharmas with the Anantarya-marga (the path directly leading to liberation), at this time, they have not yet escaped the darkness of ignorance, have not yet reached the shore of Nirvana, have not yet attained freedom, and have not yet attained the fruit. Then, they are called a Bodhisattva. If an Arhat practices all Dharmas with the Vimukti-marga (the path of liberation from Samsara), having already escaped the darkness of ignorance, having already reached the shore of Nirvana, having already attained freedom, and having already attained the fruit, then they are called an Arhat. Because the states are different, the names are different, but the Dharmas themselves have no essential difference. According to this passage, the saying 'no difference' is just another name for 'equal,' while 'not yet escaped the obstacles' and so on show the superiority of the Buddha. Based on these, it is logically understandable. Question: What is the meaning of the concepts of superior, inferior, difference, and equality? Answer: In terms of the merits obtained and the number of titles, there is no difference. 'Equal' refers to the number of merits. But it does not mean that the functions are exactly the same, or that the degree of perfection is exactly the same. Therefore, the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says, for example, the moon on the fourteenth and fifteenth days of the lunar month are both called the moon, but the moon on the fourteenth cannot cause tides, while the moon on the fifteenth can cause tides. The Buddha and Bodhisattvas are also like this. Also, for example, the Srota-apanna-marga (stream-enterer path) and the Arhat-phala (Arhat fruit) have different natures of superiority and inferiority, but the names of the saints are the same. For example, burning clothes, even if only a part is burned, it is still considered burned. Measured by these, there is no problem in saying 'equal' and 'superior'. Commentary: 'To understand the two emptinesses' and so on, the ego-grasping and Dharma-grasping have no substance, so they are called 'emptiness.' It does not refer to the nature of the two emptinesses. Commentary: 'If in the Mahayana up to mutual manifestation,' merely citing the names of the Hinayana and saying that it is a misunderstanding of ego-grasping and Dharma-grasping, implicitly thinking that the view of emptiness is a misunderstanding of Vijnanavada (Yogacara). The Mahayana view of emptiness knows that ego-grasping and Dharma-grasping are both illusory, and it is not a misunderstanding of ego-grasping and Dharma-grasping. Denying the principle of Vijnanavada, so it can be said to be a misunderstanding. But it is not a complete misunderstanding, so it cannot be said to be delusion, it is only implicitly manifested. And there is no mutual meaning, 'mutual' refers to mutual dependence. Commentary: 'Sarvastivadins' inference' and so on, question: What is the fault of Pramana (means of knowledge)? Answer: Some say that the Paksha (thesis) says that mind and mental Dharmas are real, but the Mahayana believes that anger and so on are false, not real. The metaphor cannot be established in part. The Mahayana believes that pots and so on are external objects, not real, so the Hetu (reason) is uncertain. If the Paksha says that it is definitely not non-existent, there is no fault. In detail, the Paksha says that it is not non-existent, and the Hetu is also a fault of definite contradiction. The inference says: the external object that you leave the mind is definitely not existent. Because except for the internal object of mind and mental factors, Asamskrta (unconditioned Dharmas), Citta-viprayukta-samskara (non-mind-associated formations), etc., are all knowable, such as turtle hair, etc. Commentary: 'The inference of Bhavaviveka' and so on, question: What is the fault of Pramana? Answer: The Hetu has the fault of uncertainty. Because like the external object is knowable, so it proves that consciousness is non-existent.
為如內境是所知故證識為有。
疏。依遠行等教者。按瑜伽論五十七云。依何根處說遠行等。答依意根處。由於前際無始時故。遍緣一切所知境故。名為遠行。諸心相續一一轉故。無主宰故。名為獨行。無色．無見。亦無對故。名為無身。依止色故名寢于窟。疏所釋者依無性解也。
疏。依五根所行境等者。無性攝論第四釋此經云。謂此五根所行境界。唯是意識一一各別能領受義。既云意識一一別受。明無餘識 問楞伽．涅槃皆明一識。此師所立乃扶彼經。云何論主判為邪執 答有義楞伽意說。七依八種而方得生。故言第八起諸識浪。非說第八轉作餘七。涅槃經意。以彼六識識性是同故立一識。依根分六。非六體一名為一識。如彼經云。如一色性隨五根緣得五塵名。豈言一色體即一耶。五境雖別變礙義同。同一蘊攝故說名一色。識亦應爾。了別性同一蘊攝故。故名一識。故涅槃經第十四云。眼識性異。乃至意識性異。是故無常。若但一體云何言異。故如前會。不爾前後豈自楙楯。又涅槃經三十九云。譬如一火因木．草等名木等火。意識亦爾。因眼根等名眼等識者。此顯六識同意處故總名意識。余文準會。其理可悉。
疏。第四經部等計者。問意明無所。明三所等豈扶本意 答全無分無總名為無。不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如同內在的境界是能被認知的事物一樣，以此來證明意識的存在。
疏解：依據《遠行》等經典所說。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷所說：『依據什麼根源來說遠行等呢？』回答：『依據意根。』因為在過去無始的時間裡，它普遍地緣取一切所知的境界，所以叫做『遠行』。各種心識相續，一個接一個地轉變，沒有主宰，所以叫做『獨行』。沒有顏色、沒有形體，也沒有對立，所以叫做『無身』。依靠色身而存在，所以叫做『寢于窟』。疏解中所解釋的是依據無性菩薩的理解。
疏解：依據五根所行境界等。無性菩薩在《攝大乘論》第四卷中解釋此經說：『這五根所行境界，只是意識各自個別地領受其意義。』既然說意識各自個別地領受，就表明沒有其他的識。問：既然《楞伽經》、《涅槃經》都闡明只有一個識，這位論師所立的觀點乃是支援那些經典，為什麼論主卻判定為邪執呢？答：有一種觀點認為，《楞伽經》的意思是說，七識依靠第八識才能產生，所以說第八識生起各種識浪，並非說第八識轉變成其餘七識。《涅槃經》的意思是說，因為這六識的識性是相同的，所以立為一識，依據根而分為六，並非六個體的名稱是一個識。如那部經所說：『如一種色性，隨著五根的緣而得到五塵的名稱。』難道說一種色體就是一嗎？五境雖然不同，但變礙的意義相同，同屬於一個蘊所攝，所以說名稱為一色。識也應該這樣，了別的性質相同，同屬於一個蘊所攝，所以名稱為一識。』所以《涅槃經》第十四卷說：『眼識的性質不同，乃至意識的性質不同，所以是無常的。』如果只是一個本體，怎麼說不同呢？所以如前面所會通的那樣。不然的話，前後豈不是自相矛盾？又《涅槃經》第三十九卷說：『譬如一火，因為木、草等而名為木等火。意識也是這樣，因為眼根等而名為眼等識。』這顯示六識同意之處，所以總名為意識。其餘的文句可以參照理解，其中的道理就可以明白了。
疏解：第四，經部等的主張。問：意明沒有處所，闡明三處所等，豈不是違背了本意？答：完全沒有、部分沒有、總的來說沒有，都叫做沒有。
【English Translation】 English version: Just as the internal realm is something that can be known, this is used to prove the existence of consciousness (vijñāna).
Commentary: According to the teachings of 'Distant Travel' (dūragama) and others. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 57: 'Based on what root is 'distant travel' etc. spoken of?' The answer is: 'Based on the mind-root (manas). Because in the past, without beginning, it universally grasps all knowable realms, it is called 'distant travel'. Because the continuities of various consciousnesses transform one after another, without a ruler, it is called 'solitary travel'. Because it has no color, no form, and no opposition, it is called 'bodiless'. Because it relies on the physical body, it is called 'sleeping in a cave'.' The explanation in the commentary is based on the understanding of Asaṅga.
Commentary: According to the realms of the five senses, etc. Asaṅga, in the fourth section of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, explains this sutra by saying: 'The realms of these five senses are only the meanings that consciousness individually and separately receives.' Since it says that consciousness individually and separately receives, it indicates that there are no other consciousnesses. Question: Since the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra both clarify that there is only one consciousness, and this teacher's established view supports those sutras, why does the author of the treatise judge it as a heretical view? Answer: One view holds that the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra means that the seven consciousnesses rely on the eighth consciousness to arise, so it says that the eighth consciousness gives rise to various waves of consciousness, not that the eighth consciousness transforms into the other seven. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra means that because the nature of these six consciousnesses is the same, it establishes one consciousness, dividing into six based on the root, not that the name of the six entities is one consciousness. As that sutra says: 'Like one color-nature, following the conditions of the five senses, it obtains the names of the five objects.' Does it mean that one color-entity is one? Although the five realms are different, the meaning of change and obstruction is the same, and they are all included in one aggregate, so it is said to be one color. Consciousness should also be like this, the nature of discernment is the same, and it is included in one aggregate, so it is called one consciousness.' Therefore, the fourteenth section of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The nature of eye-consciousness is different, and even the nature of mind-consciousness is different, therefore it is impermanent.' If it were just one entity, how could it be said to be different? Therefore, it should be understood as explained earlier. Otherwise, wouldn't it be self-contradictory before and after? Also, the thirty-ninth section of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'For example, one fire is named wood-fire, etc., because of wood, grass, etc. Consciousness is also like this, named eye-consciousness, etc., because of the eye-root, etc.' This shows that the six consciousnesses agree in their place, so they are collectively called consciousness. The remaining sentences can be understood by analogy, and the principle can be understood completely.
Commentary: Fourth, the assertion of the Sautrāntika school, etc. Question: The meaning is that there is no location, clarifying the three locations, etc., doesn't this contradict the original meaning? Answer: Completely non-existent, partially non-existent, and generally non-existent are all called non-existent.
爾分無四計何攝。故疏總言亦無失矣。故大毗婆沙論一百四十二云。尊者覺天作如是說。諸有為法有二自性。一者大種。二者謂心。離大種外無所造色。離心無所。諸色皆是大種差別。非色皆是心之差別。若經部師自有二釋。一譬喻師唯心無所。同覺天計。二有心所四釋不同。故順正理論第十一云。謂執別有心所論者。於心所中多興諍論。或唯說三大地法。或唯說四。或說有十。或說十四 解云。如次說受．想．思。說四加觸。說十即是十大地法。十四加貪．及嗔．癡．慢。
論。故作斯論者。此之結文前之二師亦合有之。上言今造此論一句。后之二師理亦合有。不可繁重故互影顯。
疏。第二科是三分者。有云相．見．自證名為三分 詳曰。不然。三分本是陳那立故。又亦應言四分．二分成立唯識。護法．難陀釋此論故。又復如何以三分成。三十頌中三各攝幾。全無行相成焉有矣。
疏。準瑜伽攝論等者。瑜伽者相應之義。境．行．果三並相應故。即所詮也。論從所詮名瑜伽論。攝論正宗明十殊勝。十殊勝者。前八是因后二為果。就前八中。初二是境。次六是智。智即行也。斯之二論正宗所明。唯境．行．果。唯識準彼亦境．行．果為正所宗。
疏。心與境冥等者。嘆聖心智親證於境。離
其妄執曰與境冥。體妙殊勝功能莫方。得斯勝德名為神會 有云。如次配后．本智。又云本智緣如名心境冥。世第一法名之為智。見道名神 詳曰。雖為穿鑿全無所據。有何所以。后得．本智別名心智。本智之境而名神耶。如何有漏與無漏見而有會義。
疏。以八轉聲釋世間等者。按彼經四百九十八云。是六波羅密何因緣故。名為世間及出世間。舍利子。世間者。謂六波羅密是世間故。乃至依世間故名為世間。舍利子。出世間者。謂此六波羅密是出世間故。拔出世間故。由世間出故。為世間出故。從世間出故。世間之出故。依世間出故。名出世間 詳曰。準此經文。疏所引云是世間出名世間者。出字剩也。題卷亦誤。
疏。後後遂有相見等者。問相．見二分發乎無始。云何後後方遂有耶 答約更增說。如法華言來入此宅。又縱無始際相．見亦因熏習。熏習後起。熏習相．見起非一。故言後後。
疏。若安惠解至別無依總無等者。有義。聖教我法所執既無。如何聖教亦無依無。故應別解。彼宗世間所說我法。及一分聖教菩薩．二乘所變現者。此無依無。由有漏心皆名執故。若諸菩薩無漏心現及佛現者。皆強施設。義依于體不違正理。問若爾二分皆是所執。彼無二分依何假說。答安惠解云。說依二分且
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他們錯誤地認為這與境界相冥合。這種本體的微妙殊勝，其功能無法估量。獲得這種殊勝功德，就稱為『神會』。有人說，這依次對應於後得智和本智。又有人說，本智所緣的如如之境，名為『心境冥』。世第一法被稱為『智』，見道則稱為『神』。詳細考察這些說法，都是牽強附會，毫無根據。有什麼理由呢？后得智和本智是心智的別名，難道本智的境界可以稱為『神』嗎？如何能說有漏和無漏的見解能有會合之義呢？
疏文中用八轉聲來解釋『世間』等概念。按照那部經的四百九十八頁所說：『舍利子，這六波羅蜜（Six Paramitas）是因何緣故，被稱為世間和出世間呢？舍利子，所謂世間，是因為這六波羅蜜是世間的緣故，乃至依存於世間的緣故，所以稱為世間。舍利子，所謂出世間，是因為這六波羅蜜是出世間的緣故，拔出世間的緣故，由於從世間而出，爲了世間而出，從世間而出，世間的出離，依存於世間的出離，所以稱為出世間。』詳細考察這段經文，疏文所引用的『是世間出名世間』，多了一個『出』字。題卷也錯了。
疏文中說：『後來才逐漸有了相見等現象。』請問，相分和見分是從無始以來就有的，為什麼說是後來才逐漸有的呢？回答說，這是從更加增長的角度來說的。比如《法華經》（Lotus Sutra）所說的『來入此宅』。而且，即使從無始以來就有相分和見分，也是因為熏習的作用。熏習之後才會產生。熏習所產生的相分和見分不止一種，所以說是『後來』。
疏文中說：『如果按照安慧（Anhui）的解釋，乃至別無所依，總無等等。』有一種觀點認為，聖教所說的我和法，既然執著都沒有了，為什麼聖教也沒有所依呢？所以應該另外解釋。他們宗派所說的世間我和法，以及一部分聖教，菩薩和二乘所變現的，這些是沒有所依的。因為有漏心都稱為執著。如果諸菩薩的無漏心所顯現的，以及佛所顯現的，都是勉強施設的，義理上依存於本體，不違背正理。請問，如果這樣，相分和見分都是所執著的，他們沒有相分和見分，又依據什麼來假說呢？回答說，安慧的解釋是，說是依據相分和見分暫且。
【English Translation】 English version: They mistakenly cling to the idea that it merges with the realm. The subtle and supreme nature of this entity, its functions are immeasurable. Obtaining this supreme virtue is called 'Divine Assembly' (Shenhui 神會). Some say that this corresponds in order to Subsequent Wisdom (Houde Zhi 后得智) and Original Wisdom (Benzhi 本智). Others say that the suchness realm (Ruru zhi jing 如如之境) that Original Wisdom cognizes is called 'Mind-Realm Merger' (Xinjing Ming 心境冥). The Supreme Worldly Dharma (Shi di yi fa 世第一法) is called 'Wisdom' (Zhi 智), and seeing the Path (Jian Dao 見道) is called 'Divine' (Shen 神). Upon detailed examination, these statements are far-fetched and without any basis. What reason is there for this? Subsequent Wisdom and Original Wisdom are other names for Mind-Wisdom (Xinzhi 心智). Can the realm of Original Wisdom be called 'Divine'? How can it be said that the views of the defiled (with outflows) and undefiled (without outflows) can have a meaning of assembly?
The commentary uses the eightfold case endings to explain concepts such as 'Worldly' (Shijian 世間). According to page 498 of that scripture: 'Shariputra (舍利子), for what reason are these Six Paramitas (六波羅蜜) called Worldly and Transcendent? Shariputra, what is called Worldly is because these Six Paramitas are worldly, and even dependent on the worldly, therefore they are called Worldly. Shariputra, what is called Transcendent is because these Six Paramitas are transcendent, extracting from the worldly, because they emerge from the worldly, for the sake of emerging from the worldly, emerging from the worldly, the transcendence of the worldly, dependent on the transcendence of the worldly, therefore they are called Transcendent.' Upon detailed examination of this scripture, the commentary's quote 'is worldly emergence called worldly' has an extra character 'emergence'. The title scroll is also wrong.
The commentary says: 'Later, there gradually came to be phenomena such as appearance and seeing.' I ask, the appearance-aspect (xiangfen 相分) and seeing-aspect (jianfen 見分) have existed since beginningless time, so why is it said that they gradually came to be later? The answer is that this is spoken from the perspective of further increase. For example, the Lotus Sutra says 'come enter this house'. Moreover, even if the appearance-aspect and seeing-aspect have existed since beginningless time, it is because of the function of habituation (熏習). They arise after habituation. The appearance-aspect and seeing-aspect that arise from habituation are not just one kind, so it is said 'later'.
The commentary says: 'If according to Anhui's explanation, even to the point of having no separate reliance, having no totality, etc.' One view holds that since the self and dharmas spoken of in the sacred teachings have no clinging, why is it that the sacred teachings also have no reliance? Therefore, it should be explained separately. The worldly self and dharmas spoken of by their sect, as well as a portion of the sacred teachings, those manifested by Bodhisattvas and the Two Vehicles (二乘), these have no reliance. Because defiled minds are all called clinging. If the undefiled minds of the Bodhisattvas manifest, as well as what the Buddhas manifest, these are all forced establishments, and in terms of meaning, they rely on the entity and do not contradict correct reasoning. I ask, if that is the case, and the appearance-aspect and seeing-aspect are both what is clung to, what do they rely on to falsely speak of them, since they have no appearance-aspect and seeing-aspect? The answer is that Anhui's explanation is that it is said to rely on the appearance-aspect and seeing-aspect for the time being.
依世間．一分聖教。若無漏心佛所現者。此等皆依自證假說。又此亦得依識所變。自證分中分別說有能所變故。若依此釋說所變言未皆說名相．見二分 詳曰。除佛以外余無漏心。相傳二釋。一云有執。有二分故。一云無執。無漏二分非虛妄故。第八論云。八識心．心所有漏所攝皆有執故。已簡無漏。或無漏心皆無相．見。疏中且依第一義說。二分既執諸佛便無。所以我法不依佛立。依余聖者有漏心說。名無依無。據斯一義理亦何失。具如義燈。
疏。此所變之能變有三種者。論言此者此其所變。所變體者即見．相分 有義。此有二義。一云此者此能變識。二云此者此我法二。此我法二所依見．相能變之識有三種故 詳曰。本釋為正。何所以者。夫言此者指陳之義。前言我法依識所變。既云所變必有能變。故異前言此能變三。明知此言屬於所變。若此能變文勢疏斷。又此我法亦為不可。為言我法即是所變非是見．相。見．相復非我法所依。既有斯濫。故從本疏。
疏。三法轉相依者。我法依相．見。相．見依識體 問何故頌言我法名彼見．相為此 答對自證分近．遠別故立彼．此言。三法轉依遠．近別故。
疏。思量即識準前釋者。異熟兩釋但準持業。何以故。既云思量。明非是種。種位無有思量
義故。故疏但言思量即識準於前釋。
疏。然濫第七者。問何故不言濫第八耶 答第八通緣三種境故無濫不言 若爾第六遍緣諸境。應不得名了別境識 答以根對境得名了別 問根．境相對七．八應然 詳曰。準此等妨言濫七．八亦應好也。疏據顯相且言濫七。
疏。依第二三至相無別者。問何故不辨初勝義耶 答初據勝義諦而有兩釋。一云初體即第二俗。第二俗中可言八別。故除初真。二云初真體雖即第二俗。俗劣真勝。故初真中亦無八別。今依初釋故除初真。如下第七疏自兩解。
疏。亦非體類別有九識者。此解意云。非是體別。類別合有九識。
疏。濫鄰近者。問全取他名可云鄰近。今言異熟．思量．了別自他俱說。何成鄰近 答鄰近釋者。取俱時法以立自名。若無及言。恐言異熟由與思量．了別俱時。異熟名為思量．了別。亦無失矣。六釋差別具如法苑抉擇明之。
疏。合作二文科者。初略釋頌所有論文分為二段。一別解三句合為一段。二總解二句。合為一段。有兩種合故名合作二文科也。
疏。總作三文科者。初略釋頌一段論文。總為三段名總三文。
疏。前是共相等者。軌名為前。余前後等皆準此知。又前四對。不約次第以配軌持。取義配也 有義軌唯有法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這個緣故。所以疏文只說『思量』就是『識』，是依據前面的解釋。
疏文：『然而混濫第七識』。問：為什麼不說混濫第八識呢？答：因為第八識普遍緣取三種境界，沒有混濫，所以不說。如果這樣，第六識也普遍緣取各種境界，不應該叫做『了別境識』。答：因為根與境相對才得名『了別』。問：根和境相對，第七識和第八識也應該是這樣。詳細地說，按照這種說法，說混濫第七識和第八識也應該可以。疏文是根據顯現的表相來說混濫第七識。
疏文：『依據第二、第三識乃至相無差別』。問：為什麼不辨析最初的勝義諦呢？答：最初的勝義諦有兩種解釋。一種說法是最初的本體就是第二種世俗諦。在第二種世俗諦中可以說有八種差別，所以排除最初的真諦。另一種說法是最初的真諦本體雖然就是第二種世俗諦，但世俗諦低劣，真諦殊勝，所以在最初的真諦中也沒有八種差別。現在依據第一種解釋，所以排除最初的真諦。如下面第七識的疏文自己有兩種解釋。
疏文：『也不是本體類別而有九識』。這個解釋的意思是說，不是本體類別，類別合起來有九識。
疏文：『混濫鄰近的識』。問：完全取用其他識的名稱可以說成是鄰近。現在說『異熟』（Vipāka，果報）、『思量』（Manas，末那識）、『了別』（Vijñāna，識別）自己和他人都在說，怎麼能說是鄰近呢？答：鄰近的解釋是，取用俱時法來建立自己的名稱。如果沒有『及』字，恐怕會說『異熟』是因為與『思量』、『了別』俱時，『異熟』的名稱就是『思量』、『了別』，也就沒有過失了。六種解釋的差別詳細地在《法苑義林章》中闡明。
疏文：『合作為二文科』。最初略微解釋頌文，所有論文分為兩段。一段是分別解釋三句合為一段，另一段是總的解釋兩句合為一段。有兩種合併，所以叫做『合作為二文科』。
疏文：『總的作為三文科』。最初略微解釋頌文一段論文。總共分為三段，叫做『總三文』。
疏文：『前面是共相等』。『軌』（Hetu，因）名為『前』。其餘的前後等都按照這個來理解。另外，前面四對，不按照次第來配合『軌』和『持』（Dharana，保持），是取其意義來配合。有一種說法是『軌』只有『法』（Dharma，法）
【English Translation】 English version: Because of this reason. Therefore, the commentary only says 'thinking' is 'consciousness,' based on the previous explanation.
Commentary: 'However, it overlaps with the seventh consciousness.' Question: Why not say it overlaps with the eighth consciousness? Answer: Because the eighth consciousness universally cognizes three kinds of objects, there is no overlap, so it is not mentioned. If so, the sixth consciousness also universally cognizes all kinds of objects, so it should not be called 'discriminating consciousness.' Answer: Because the root is in relation to the object, it is named 'discrimination.' Question: If the root and object are in relation, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses should also be like that. In detail, according to this statement, it should also be good to say it overlaps with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. The commentary is based on the apparent phenomena to say it overlaps with the seventh consciousness.
Commentary: 'Based on the second, third consciousnesses, up to the absence of difference in characteristics.' Question: Why not analyze the initial ultimate truth? Answer: There are two explanations for the initial ultimate truth. One explanation is that the initial essence is the second conventional truth. In the second conventional truth, it can be said that there are eight differences, so the initial truth is excluded. Another explanation is that although the initial truth essence is the second conventional truth, the conventional truth is inferior, and the truth is superior, so there are no eight differences in the initial truth. Now, based on the first explanation, the initial truth is excluded. As in the commentary on the seventh consciousness below, there are two explanations.
Commentary: 'It is not that there are nine consciousnesses due to different categories of essence.' The meaning of this explanation is that it is not that there are nine consciousnesses due to different categories of essence combined.
Commentary: 'Overlapping with neighboring consciousnesses.' Question: Completely taking the names of other consciousnesses can be called neighboring. Now, saying 'Vipāka' (異熟, maturation), 'Manas' (思量, thinking), 'Vijñāna' (了別, discrimination) are spoken of by both oneself and others, how can it be said to be neighboring? Answer: The explanation of neighboring is to take co-occurring dharmas to establish one's own name. If there is no 'and' word, it is feared that it would be said that 'Vipāka' is because it co-occurs with 'Manas' and 'Vijñāna,' and the name of 'Vipāka' is 'Manas' and 'Vijñāna,' and there would be no fault. The differences in the six explanations are explained in detail in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang'.
Commentary: 'Collaborating as two sections of text.' Initially, briefly explaining the verse, all the papers are divided into two sections. One section is to separately explain the three sentences as one section, and the other section is to generally explain the two sentences as one section. There are two combinations, so it is called 'collaborating as two sections of text.'
Commentary: 'Generally making three sections of text.' Initially, briefly explaining the verse, one section of the paper. In total, it is divided into three sections, called 'general three texts.'
Commentary: 'The former is the common equality.' 'Hetu' (軌, cause) is named 'former.' The rest of the former and latter, etc., are understood accordingly. In addition, the previous four pairs are not matched with 'Hetu' and 'Dharana' (持, holding) according to the order, but are matched by taking their meaning. One view is that 'Hetu' only has 'Dharma' (法, law).
。持亦通無。此一盡理。許無義宗能生解者。約無本質。非無影像能生心也。故下論云。緣用必依實有體故 詳曰。若從其勝軌在有法。據但生解無亦名軌。故瑜伽論五十二中。以五種理成緣無識。識既緣無。豈非無法生物解耶。若生物解何不名軌 若爾云何緣用必實 答據生識體緣必有體。若行解起因無亦生。如立我無豈不生彼我無行解。故亦無違。疏等之意如燈具釋。
疏。十三住等者。問如佛法說祠授等者。何亦不名我種種相 答有兩釋。一云且據得聖及修行者。不說余類。二云祠授等名雖我別號。然非通稱。所以不取。若取一一所有別名其數巨億。前解為正。
疏。二向不定者。略為二釋。一云唯第二向。超越．次第有差別故。若次第者。斷欲修惑前之五品所起四道。及第六品加行．無間總名為向。若超越者。始從一坐順抉擇分。見十五心名之為向 二云。前二種向名二不定。非唯第二。第二如前。第一向者前十五心有斷修惑。有不斷者。先伏不伏有差別故 詳曰。若據修惑斷．不斷別。第二可通。若理教明行相殊別。前解為勝 問第三．四向亦有不定。何唯言二 答據論所舉。略不言余。
疏。崇聚生因等者。崇聚即是積聚異名。是蘊義也。俱舍頌云。聚．生門．種族。是蘊．處．界義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『持亦通無』，意思是說，『持』這個概念也可以通過『無』來理解。『此一盡理』，指的是這種理解方式是完全符合道理的。如果許『無義宗』（認為事物本質為空性的宗派）能夠產生理解，那是因為他們所指的是沒有實在的本質，而不是沒有影像，影像仍然可以引發心識活動。因此，《瑜伽師地論》中說：『緣用必依實有體故』，意思是說，心識的緣取和作用必須依賴於真實存在的自體。 詳細解釋：如果從殊勝的『軌』（指修行的方法或途徑）在於『有法』（指具有實在自性的事物）的角度來看，那麼僅僅是產生理解，『無』也可以被認為是『軌』。所以，《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷中，用五種道理來證明心識可以緣取『無』。既然心識可以緣取『無』，難道不是『無法』（指不存在的事物）也能產生對事物的理解嗎？如果『無法』也能產生理解，為什麼不能稱之為『軌』呢？ 如果這樣說，那麼『緣用必實』（心識的緣取必須依賴於真實存在的事物）又該如何解釋呢？回答是，從產生心識的自體來看，心識的緣取必須依賴於真實存在的自體。但是，如果行為和理解的產生，『無』也可以作為原因而產生作用。例如，當我們確立『我無』（沒有自我）的觀念時，難道不會產生對『我無』的行為和理解嗎？所以，這並不矛盾。疏文等的意思可以參考《燈具釋》。 『疏。十三住等者』，疏文中提到的十三住等。問：如果按照佛法所說，祭祀和授予等行為，為什麼不被稱為『我的種種相』呢？回答有兩種解釋：第一種解釋是，這裡僅僅是根據已經證得聖果以及正在修行的人來說的，不包括其他類別的人。第二種解釋是，祭祀和授予等名稱雖然是『我』的別稱，但不是通用的稱謂，所以不採用。如果採用每一個事物的所有別稱，那數量將非常巨大。前一種解釋是正確的。 『疏。二向不定者』，疏文中提到的二向不定。大致有兩種解釋：第一種解釋是，只有第二向（指一來向，梵文：sakrdāgāmin）是不定的，因為在超越和次第上存在差別。如果是次第修行，那麼斷除欲界煩惱之前，五品的修惑所產生的四道，以及第六品的加行道和無間道，總稱為『向』。如果是超越修行，那麼從一開始就通過一個禪坐順著抉擇分，見到十五心，這被稱為『向』。 第二種解釋是，前兩種『向』（指預流向，梵文：srotaāpanna和一來向，梵文：sakrdāgāmin）被稱為『二不定』，而不僅僅是第二向。第二向如前所述。第一向指的是前十五心中，有的斷除了修惑，有的沒有斷除，這是因為先前是否已經調伏煩惱存在差別。詳細解釋：如果根據修惑的斷除與否來區分，第二向可以通用。但是，如果從理教的闡明和行相的差別來看，前一種解釋更為殊勝。問：第三向（指不還向，梵文：anāgāmin）和第四向（指阿羅漢向，梵文：arhat）也有不定的情況，為什麼只說『二』呢？回答是，根據論中所舉的例子，只是簡略地說明，沒有提及其他情況。 『疏。崇聚生因等者』，疏文中提到的崇聚生因等。『崇聚』就是『積聚』的另一種說法，是『蘊』（梵文：skandha）的意思。《俱舍論》的頌文說：『聚．生門．種族，是蘊．處．界義』，意思是說，積聚、生門、種族，是蘊、處（梵文：āyatana）、界（梵文：dhātu）的含義。
【English Translation】 English version: 『持亦通無』 (『Holding also communicates with non-being』): This means that the concept of 『holding』 can also be understood through 『non-being』. 『此一盡理』 (『This one exhausts the principle』): This refers to the fact that this way of understanding is completely in accordance with reason. If the 『無義宗』 (Wuyizong, the school that believes in the emptiness of the essence of things) is allowed to generate understanding, it is because they are referring to the absence of a real essence, not the absence of images, which can still trigger mental activity. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『緣用必依實有體故』 (『The use of conditions must rely on a real existing entity』): This means that the mind's grasping and function must rely on a real existing self-nature. Detailed explanation: If we look at it from the perspective that the supreme 『軌』 (gui, refers to the method or path of practice) lies in 『有法』 (youfa, refers to things with real self-nature), then merely generating understanding, 『無』 (wu, non-being) can also be considered 『軌』 (gui). Therefore, in the fifty-second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, five reasons are used to prove that consciousness can grasp 『無』 (wu). Since consciousness can grasp 『無』 (wu), doesn't 『無法』 (wufa, non-existent things) also generate understanding of things? If 『無法』 (wufa) can also generate understanding, why can't it be called 『軌』 (gui)? If this is the case, how should 『緣用必實』 (『The use of conditions must be real』) be explained? The answer is that, from the perspective of generating the self-nature of consciousness, the grasping of consciousness must rely on a real existing self-nature. However, if the arising of behavior and understanding, 『無』 (wu) can also act as a cause and produce an effect. For example, when we establish the concept of 『我無』 (wuwu, no self), doesn't it generate behavior and understanding of 『我無』 (wuwu)? Therefore, this is not contradictory. The meaning of the commentary and others can be found in the Dengjushi. 『疏。十三住等者』 (『Commentary: The thirteen abodes, etc.』): The thirteen abodes mentioned in the commentary. Question: According to the Dharma taught by the Buddha, why are sacrificial offerings and bestowals not called 『my various aspects』? There are two explanations: The first explanation is that this is only based on those who have attained sainthood and those who are practicing, excluding other categories of people. The second explanation is that although names such as sacrificial offerings and bestowals are other names for 『I』, they are not common terms, so they are not adopted. If every single thing's other names were adopted, the number would be enormous. The former explanation is correct. 『疏。二向不定者』 (『Commentary: The two paths are uncertain』): The two uncertain paths mentioned in the commentary. There are roughly two explanations: The first explanation is that only the second path (sakrdāgāmin, once-returner) is uncertain, because there are differences in transcendence and sequence. If it is sequential practice, then the four paths generated by the five grades of afflictions in the desire realm before the elimination of desire, as well as the preparatory path and the path of immediate release of the sixth grade, are collectively called 『path』. If it is transcendent practice, then from the beginning, through one meditation session, following the decisive part, seeing the fifteen minds, this is called 『path』. The second explanation is that the first two 『paths』 (srotaāpanna, stream-enterer and sakrdāgāmin, once-returner) are called 『two uncertain』, not just the second path. The second path is as described above. The first path refers to the fact that among the first fifteen minds, some have eliminated the afflictions of practice, and some have not, because there is a difference in whether the afflictions have been subdued beforehand. Detailed explanation: If we distinguish based on whether the afflictions of practice have been eliminated, the second path can be used universally. However, if we look at it from the perspective of the elucidation of the principle and the difference in the appearance of practice, the former explanation is more superior. Question: The third path (anāgāmin, non-returner) and the fourth path (arhat, arhat) also have uncertain situations, why only say 『two』? The answer is that, according to the examples cited in the treatise, it is only a brief explanation, and other situations are not mentioned. 『疏。崇聚生因等者』 (『Commentary: Accumulation, aggregation, cause of birth, etc.』): The accumulation, aggregation, cause of birth, etc. mentioned in the commentary. 『崇聚』 (chongju) is another way of saying 『積聚』 (jiju, accumulation), which is the meaning of 『蘊』 (skandha, aggregate). The verse in the Abhidharmakośa says: 『聚．生門．種族，是蘊．處．界義』 (『Accumulation, gate of birth, lineage, are the meanings of aggregate, āyatana, dhātu』): This means that accumulation, gate of birth, and lineage are the meanings of aggregate, āyatana (sense base), and dhātu (element).
釋曰。一切諸色略為一聚說名色蘊。由此聚義蘊義得成。余蘊亦爾 謂能生長心．心所法故名為處。是能生長彼作用義 如一山中有多銅鐵金銀等族說名多界。如是一身有十八類諸法種族名十八界。此中種族是生本義。如是眼等誰之生本。謂同類因。
疏。餘三善巧者。所等有七。疏但列四。后三不出。故言餘三。
疏。或四善巧者。論舉三種等言等四。成七善巧。如燈列也 問善巧何義 答善巧是智。蘊等是境。智緣蘊等名蘊善巧。蘊等從智亦名善巧 問按大菩薩藏經第八及十說十善巧。一依趣善巧。即是四依。謂依義等。二資糧。謂福智二。三念住。謂四念住。四四正勝。謂四正勤。五五道分。謂信等五根。六覺分。謂七覺支。七道分。謂八聖道。八趣作一道。所謂菩薩證大菩提等。九緣起。謂十二緣。十一切法。謂為無為。與疏所列十何不同 答中邊為治十我見故。經為菩薩修波羅密多。各據一意立十不同。
疏。故以了別釋識之義者。有疏本云。釋識之用故 有解云。若護法師見分名用。體依他故。若安惠師見分無體 故自體上有了別用。依他性收 詳曰。用字錯也。應從義言。即護法師識自體分亦名了別。不須約見顯識了別。
疏。彼五種類非定俱行者。除遍行外余之心所並種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
釋義：一切諸色可以概括地歸為一類，稱作色蘊（Rupa-skandha，物質之集合）。因為有聚集和包含的含義，所以稱為『蘊』。其餘的蘊也是如此。『處』（Ayatana，感覺的來源）是指能夠生長心和心所法（Citta-caitta，心及心所）的地方，是能夠產生它們作用的地方。
就像一座山中蘊藏著多種銅、鐵、金、銀等礦藏，可以稱為多種『界』（Dhatu，元素）。同樣，一個身體中有十八類不同的法（Dharma，佛法）的種子，稱為十八界。這裡，『種子』是產生的基礎的意思。那麼，像眼（ চক্ষু ,cakṣu）等，是誰產生的基礎呢？是指同類的因。
疏解：其餘三種善巧，『所等』包括七種。疏解中只列出了四種，後面三種沒有列出，所以說『其餘三種』。
疏解：或者說四種善巧，論中列舉了三種，加上『等』字，就等於四種，總共構成七種善巧，就像燈的排列一樣。問：善巧是什麼意思？答：善巧是智慧。蘊等是所觀察的境界。智慧緣于蘊等，稱為蘊善巧。蘊等從智慧產生，也可以稱為善巧。問：按照《大菩薩藏經》第八和第十的說法，有十種善巧。一是依趣善巧，就是四依（四種依靠）。二是資糧，指福德和智慧兩種。三是念住，指四念住（四種專注）。四是四正勝，指四正勤（四種精進）。五是五道分，指信等五根（五種根基）。六是覺分，指七覺支（七種覺悟的因素）。七是道分，指八聖道（八正道）。八是趣作一道，指菩薩證得大菩提等。九是緣起，指十二緣起（十二因緣）。十是一切法，指有為法和無為法。這和疏解中所列的十種有什麼不同？答：中邊是爲了對治十種我見（十種對自我的錯誤觀念）。《大菩薩藏經》是爲了菩薩修習波羅蜜多（Paramita，到達彼岸）而說的。各自根據不同的目的設立了不同的十種。
疏解：所以用『了別』來解釋識（Vijnana，意識）的含義。有的疏解版本說：解釋識的作用。有的解釋說：如果按照護法（Dharmapala）的觀點，見分（意識的顯現部分）是作用，本體是依他的。如果按照安慧（Sthiramati）的觀點，見分沒有本體，所以在自體上具有了別的作用，屬於依他性。詳細地說，『用』字是錯誤的，應該用『義』字。即使是護法師的識的自體分，也可以稱為『了別』，不需要通過見分來顯示識的了別。
疏解：這五種種類並非一定是同時生起的。除了遍行心所（Sarvatraga-caitasika，普遍存在的心理活動）之外，其餘的心所都是如此。
【English Translation】 English version:
Explanation: All forms can be broadly categorized into one group, called Rupa-skandha (aggregate of form). Because it has the meaning of gathering and containing, it is called 'skandha' (aggregate). The other skandhas are also like this. 'Ayatana' (source of sensation) refers to the place where the mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta) can grow, and it is the place where their functions can arise.
Just as a mountain contains various minerals such as copper, iron, gold, and silver, it can be called multiple 'Dhatu' (elements). Similarly, a body contains eighteen categories of different Dharma (teachings) seeds, called the eighteen Dhatus. Here, 'seed' means the basis of generation. So, like the eye (cakṣu), what is the basis of generation? It refers to the cause of the same kind.
Commentary: The remaining three skillful means, 'etc.' includes seven types. The commentary only lists four, and the last three are not listed, so it says 'the remaining three'.
Commentary: Or four skillful means, the treatise lists three, and adding 'etc.' equals four, making a total of seven skillful means, like the arrangement of lamps. Question: What does skillful mean? Answer: Skillful means is wisdom. Skandhas etc. are the objects of observation. Wisdom arising from skandhas etc. is called skandha skillful means. Skandhas etc. arising from wisdom can also be called skillful means. Question: According to the eighth and tenth chapters of the Mahābodhisattva-piṭaka Sūtra, there are ten skillful means. First, the skillful means of reliance, which is the four reliances. Second, provisions, referring to the two types of merit and wisdom. Third, mindfulness, referring to the four mindfulnesses. Fourth, the four right efforts. Fifth, the five faculties, referring to the five roots of faith etc. Sixth, the factors of awakening, referring to the seven factors of enlightenment. Seventh, the path factors, referring to the Noble Eightfold Path. Eighth, the path of attainment, referring to Bodhisattvas attaining great Bodhi etc. Ninth, dependent origination, referring to the twelve links of dependent origination. Tenth, all dharmas, referring to conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. How is this different from the ten listed in the commentary? Answer: The Middle Way is to counteract the ten views of self. The Mahābodhisattva-piṭaka Sūtra is for Bodhisattvas to practice Paramita (perfection). Each establishes different ten according to different purposes.
Commentary: Therefore, 'discrimination' is used to explain the meaning of Vijnana (consciousness). Some commentary versions say: explain the function of consciousness. Some explanations say: If according to Dharmapala's view, the appearance aspect (the appearing part of consciousness) is the function, and the substance is dependent on others. If according to Sthiramati's view, the appearance aspect has no substance, so it has the function of discrimination in itself, belonging to dependent nature. In detail, the word 'function' is wrong, it should be the word 'meaning'. Even the self-nature aspect of Dharmapala's consciousness can be called 'discrimination', and it is not necessary to show the discrimination of consciousness through the appearance aspect.
Commentary: These five types do not necessarily arise simultaneously. Except for the Sarvatraga-caitasika (omnipresent mental factors), the rest of the mental factors are like this.
類也。即貪信等而不俱行 有云如彼第八遍行起時。余識遍行未必起故 詳曰。不然。若以余識遍行不起故但言心。亦可余識不常時行。八遍恒起但言心所。故知不可。
疏。識俱有者。性與識俱而復是有。
疏。論唯二依他性者。攝論第四如下引之。
疏。不爾如何名他心智者。若也不許除緣如智余皆有相。即他心智而不得成。
疏。后得智等不外取者。釋所以也。既不外取。若不變相如何可說名知他心。若言外取不變相者。應親得彼。何名唯識。
疏。如大造色者。如能所造雖各別種。然由能造所造方起得能造名。要由其心境方生故。故言唯識 問心所亦由心王方起應名識變 答但見．相二由識而生。復是識上能所緣用故。說別種者是同種類。復是識用親所取故。心所不然。又亦自別起見．相故。何得相例。
疏。似依他有二分體無者。似彼依他有體之法。自體是無。
疏。如自證分相貌亦有者。舉所似也。如者似也。似他自證相貌現也。
疏。無明支通三性者。夫無明俱必有其執。三性心內既有無明。明知三性必皆有執 問若護法宗如何會彼 答未見護法會彼之文。取護法宗相傳多釋。一云據第七識相應無明。遍前六識三性位故名通三性。二云隨有宗說。彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『類也』，意思是說貪、信等心所不一定同時生起。有人說，就像第八識的遍行心所生起時，其他識的遍行心所未必同時生起。詳細解釋說，如果因為其他識的遍行心所不一定生起，就只說是『心』，那麼也可以說其他識不是常時生起，而第八識的遍行心所恒常生起，就只說是『心所』，所以知道這種說法是不可以的。
疏：『識俱有者』，意思是說體性與識同時存在並且是實有的。
疏：『論唯二依他性者』，《攝大乘論》第四卷中有如下引用。
疏：『不爾如何名他心智者』，如果不允許除了緣之外，像智慧一樣其餘的都有相，那麼他心智就無法成立。
疏：『后得智等不外取者』，解釋原因。既然不向外取，如果不變現相貌，怎麼能說知道他人的心呢？如果說向外取，但是不變現相貌，那麼應該直接獲得那個心，還叫什麼唯識呢？
疏：『如大造色者』，比如能造作和所造作，雖然是不同的種類，但是由於能造作，所造作才能生起，才能得到能造作的名稱。一定要由心和境才能產生，所以說唯識。問：心所也由心王才能生起，應該叫做識變。答：但是見分和相分二者是由識而生，並且是識上的能緣和所緣的作用，所以說不同的種類，並且是識的作用所直接取到的。心所不是這樣，而且也各自生起見分和相分，怎麼能相比呢？
疏：『似依他有二分體無者』，類似於依他起性，有體性的法，自體是空無的。
疏：『如自證分相貌亦有者』，舉出相似的例子。『如』是相似的意思，類似於他（依他起性）的自證分相貌顯現。
疏：『無明支通三性者』，無明一定伴隨著執著。三性心中既然有無明，很明顯三性一定都有執著。問：如果按照護法宗的觀點，應該如何解釋呢？答：沒有看到護法宗解釋這個問題的文字。根據護法宗相傳的說法，大多解釋為：第一種說法是根據第七識相應的無明，普遍存在於前六識的三性位，所以叫做通三性。第二種說法是隨有宗的說法，他們...
【English Translation】 English version: '類也' (lèi yě), means that greed, faith, and other mental factors do not necessarily arise simultaneously. Some say that just as the pervasive mental factors of the eighth consciousness arise, the pervasive mental factors of other consciousnesses may not arise at the same time. A detailed explanation says that if we only say 'mind' because the pervasive mental factors of other consciousnesses do not necessarily arise, then we can also say that other consciousnesses do not arise constantly, while the pervasive mental factors of the eighth consciousness constantly arise, so we only say 'mental factors.' Therefore, we know that this statement is not acceptable.
Commentary: '識俱有者' (shì jù yǒu zhě) means that the nature and consciousness exist simultaneously and are real.
Commentary: '論唯二依他性者' (lùn wéi èr yī tā xìng zhě), the fourth volume of the Saṃgrahaṇī (She Da Cheng Lun) contains the following quotation.
Commentary: '不爾如何名他心智者' (bù ěr rú hé míng tā xīn zhì zhě), if it is not allowed that everything except conditions, like wisdom, has an appearance, then telepathy (tā xīn zhì) cannot be established.
Commentary: '后得智等不外取者' (hòu dé zhì děng bù wài qǔ zhě), explains the reason. Since it does not take from the outside, if it does not manifest an appearance, how can it be said to know the minds of others? If it is said to take from the outside but does not manifest an appearance, then it should directly obtain that mind. What is called Vijñānavāda (唯識, Wéishì, Consciousness-only)?
Commentary: '如大造色者' (rú dà zào sè zhě), for example, the creator and the created, although they are different types, the created can only arise because of the creator, and the name of the creator can only be obtained. It must be produced by the mind and the object, so it is called Vijñānavāda. Question: Mental factors also arise from the mind-king, so they should be called transformations of consciousness. Answer: However, the 'seeing' (jian fen) and 'appearance' (xiang fen) aspects are produced by consciousness, and they are the functions of the consciousness as the perceiver and the perceived, so they are called different types, and they are directly taken by the function of consciousness. Mental factors are not like this, and they also arise separately as 'seeing' and 'appearance' aspects, so how can they be compared?
Commentary: '似依他有二分體無者' (sì yī tā yǒu èr fēn tǐ wú zhě), similar to the dependent nature (paratantra), the substance of the dharma that has a substance is empty in itself.
Commentary: '如自證分相貌亦有者' (rú zì zhèng fēn xiāng mào yì yǒu zhě), gives a similar example. '如' (rú) means similar, similar to the self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvedana) of the other (dependent nature) appearing.
Commentary: '無明支通三性者' (wú míng zhī tōng sān xìng zhě), ignorance (avidyā) must be accompanied by attachment. Since there is ignorance in the three natures, it is clear that all three natures must have attachment. Question: If according to the Dharmapāla school, how should this be explained? Answer: I have not seen the text of the Dharmapāla school explaining this question. According to the transmitted sayings of the Dharmapāla school, most explanations are: The first explanation is based on the ignorance associated with the seventh consciousness, which is pervasive in the three natures of the first six consciousnesses, so it is called encompassing the three natures. The second explanation is according to the Svatantrika school, they...
約分位以辨緣生。無明支位所有五蘊皆名無明。故通三性。三云法執為無明地。以此為緣名通三性 詳曰。三解俱非。第一非者。第七無明豈無明支。發總別業方名支故。第二非者。有宗但說無明位蘊總名無明。不說彼位五蘊善俱。若善等俱即行支故。第三非者。不障法執得名無明。執等正起如何得與善等心並云通三性 今為一釋。據第七識無明而說 何名為支 答由第七識無明力故。餘六識等方起無明能發於業。雖非支體為支遠緣假名為支。據此義邊名通三性。餘人不簡故不同也。
疏。二執遍等者。二執俱依相．見二分名之為遍 問何故自證但法執依 答實為二依。為法依顯。有軌持故。故偏言之。主宰義隱。隱我不說。
疏。非有似有者。不同真如是真實有名為非有。從緣生故非體全無名為似有。
疏。我名能見等者。準彼宗計。眼等諸根名見．覺等。我能領知覺彼根等見．覺等事。即據根本說我能見。計思為我。其義可知 有義由於能取施設彼二。故說依見立我法名。理實但依相分施說。親所遍計唯相分故。又解言依二分通能所計。見能施設。相所施設處。此解應合唯識玄宗。由能遍計及所遍計。方可施設所執性故。疏中總說不分別也 詳曰。若無計我為能緣者。可如所斷。若計能緣何不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 約分位以辨緣生：通過對不同階段的劃分來辨別緣起法。 無明支位所有五蘊皆名無明：在無明支的階段，所有的五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）都被稱為無明。故通三性：因此，它通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。 三云法執為無明地。以此為緣名通三性：有人說，對法的執著是無明的根源，以此為緣故稱為通於三種性質。 詳曰：詳細辨析如下： 三解俱非：以上三種解釋都不正確。 第一非者。第七無明豈無明支。發總別業方名支故：第一種解釋不對，因為第七識的無明怎麼能說是無明支呢？只有能引發總業和別業的才能稱為支。 第二非者。有宗但說無明位蘊總名無明。不說彼位五蘊善俱。若善等俱即行支故：第二種解釋不對，因為有宗只說無明階段的蘊總稱為無明，並沒有說那個階段的五蘊是善的。如果與善等相應，那就是行支了。 第三非者。不障法執得名無明。執等正起如何得與善等心並云通三性：第三種解釋不對，不能障礙法執的才能稱為無明。執著等正在生起，怎麼能與善等心並存，還說通於三種性質呢？ 今為一釋。據第七識無明而說：現在我來解釋一下，是根據第七識的無明來說的。 何名為支？答：什麼是支呢？ 由第七識無明力故。餘六識等方起無明能發於業。雖非支體為支遠緣假名為支。據此義邊名通三性。餘人不簡故不同也：回答：由於第七識無明的力量，其餘六識等才能生起無明，從而引發業。雖然第七識無明不是支的本體，但它是支的遠因，所以假名為支。根據這個意義來說，它通於三種性質。其他人沒有仔細辨別，所以說法不同。 疏。二執遍等者。二執俱依相．見二分名之為遍：疏文說，兩種執著（我執和法執）普遍存在，是因為兩種執著都依賴於相分和見分，所以稱為普遍。 問何故自證但法執依？答實為二依。為法依顯。有軌持故。故偏言之。主宰義隱。隱我不說：問：為什麼自證分只依賴於法執呢？答：實際上是兩種執著都依賴。因為法執比較明顯，有規範和支援的作用，所以偏重說它。主宰的意義比較隱蔽，所以隱去了我執。 疏。非有似有者。不同真如是真實有名為非有。從緣生故非體全無名為似有：疏文說，『非有似有』，不同於真如是真實存在的，所以稱為『非有』。因為是從因緣生起的，不是完全沒有本體，所以稱為『似有』。 疏。我名能見等者。準彼宗計。眼等諸根名見．覺等。我能領知覺彼根等見．覺等事。即據根本說我能見。計思為我。其義可知：疏文說，『我』被稱為能見等，按照他們的宗派的說法，眼等諸根稱為見、覺等。『我』能夠領知和覺察那些根等見、覺等事。這是根據根本來說『我』能見。把思量當作『我』，其中的含義可以理解。 有義由於能取施設彼二。故說依見立我法名。理實但依相分施說。親所遍計唯相分故。又解言依二分通能所計。見能施設。相所施設處。此解應合唯識玄宗。由能遍計及所遍計。方可施設所執性故。疏中總說不分別也：有一種解釋說，由於能取（能緣）而施設我法二者，所以說依賴於見分而建立我法之名。但實際上只是依賴於相分而施設，因為親近地被遍計的只有相分。還有一種解釋說，依賴於見分和相分，通於能計和所計。見分是能施設者，相分是所施設之處。這種解釋應該符合唯識宗的玄妙之處，因為通過能遍計和所遍計，才能施設所執性。疏文中總的來說，沒有分別。 詳曰。若無計我為能緣者。可如所斷。若計能緣何不：詳細辨析：如果沒有計度『我』為能緣者，可以像所斷那樣處理。如果計度『我』為能緣，為什麼不...
【English Translation】 English version: Approximate the divisions to discern dependent origination: Discern the arising of dependent origination by dividing the stages. All five aggregates in the stage of ignorance are called ignorance: In the stage of ignorance (avidya), all five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) are called ignorance. Therefore, it pervades the three natures: Thus, it pervades the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Some say that attachment to dharma is the ground of ignorance. Because of this condition, it is said to pervade the three natures: Some say that attachment to dharma is the root of ignorance, and because of this condition, it is called pervading the three natures. Detailed explanation: A detailed analysis is as follows: All three explanations are incorrect: The above three explanations are all incorrect. The first is incorrect because how can the seventh consciousness's ignorance be a branch of ignorance? Only that which can trigger general and specific karma can be called a branch: The first explanation is incorrect because how can the ignorance of the seventh consciousness be considered a branch of ignorance? Only that which can trigger general and specific karma can be called a branch. The second is incorrect because the Consciousness-Only school only says that the aggregates in the stage of ignorance are collectively called ignorance. It does not say that the five aggregates in that stage are wholesome. If they are associated with wholesomeness, then it is the branch of formations: The second explanation is incorrect because the Consciousness-Only school only says that the aggregates in the stage of ignorance are collectively called ignorance. It does not say that the five aggregates in that stage are wholesome. If they are associated with wholesomeness, then it is the branch of formations (samskara). The third is incorrect because that which does not obstruct attachment to dharma can be called ignorance. How can attachment, etc., be arising and coexist with wholesome minds, and still be said to pervade the three natures?: The third explanation is incorrect because that which does not obstruct attachment to dharma can be called ignorance. How can attachment, etc., be arising and coexist with wholesome minds, and still be said to pervade the three natures? Now, here is an explanation based on the ignorance of the seventh consciousness: Now, I will explain it based on the ignorance of the seventh consciousness (manas). What is called a branch? Answer: Due to the power of the ignorance of the seventh consciousness, the other six consciousnesses, etc., then arise ignorance and can trigger karma. Although it is not the substance of a branch, it is a distant cause of a branch, so it is provisionally called a branch. According to this meaning, it is said to pervade the three natures. Others do not discern this, so their explanations are different: Answer: Due to the power of the ignorance of the seventh consciousness, the other six consciousnesses, etc., then arise ignorance and can trigger karma. Although the ignorance of the seventh consciousness is not the substance of a branch, it is a distant cause of a branch, so it is provisionally called a branch. According to this meaning, it is said to pervade the three natures. Others have not carefully discerned this, so their explanations are different. The 'two attachments are pervasive' means that both attachments rely on the image-division (相分, nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-division (見分, darśana-bhāga), and are therefore called pervasive: The commentary says that the 'two attachments (self-attachment and dharma-attachment) are pervasive' because both attachments rely on the image-division and the seeing-division, and are therefore called pervasive. Question: Why does the self-awareness division (自證分, svasaṃvedana-bhāga) only rely on dharma-attachment? Answer: In reality, it relies on both. Because dharma-attachment is more obvious and has a guiding and supporting function, it is emphasized. The meaning of mastery is hidden, so I do not speak of self-attachment: Question: Why does the self-awareness division only rely on dharma-attachment? Answer: In reality, it relies on both. Because dharma-attachment is more obvious and has a guiding and supporting function, it is emphasized. The meaning of mastery is hidden, so I do not speak of self-attachment. The 'not real but like real' means that it is different from Suchness (真如, tathatā), which is truly existent, so it is called 'not real'. Because it arises from conditions, it is not completely without substance, so it is called 'like real': The commentary says, ''not real but like real,'' different from Suchness, which is truly existent, so it is called ''not real.'' Because it arises from conditions, it is not completely without substance, so it is called ''like real.'' The 'self' is called the seer, etc., according to their school's view. The sense organs such as the eyes are called seeing, awareness, etc. The 'self' can understand and perceive the seeing, awareness, etc., of those sense organs. This is based on the fundamental view that the 'self' can see. Considering thought as the 'self,' the meaning is understandable: The commentary says, ''self'' is called the seer, etc., according to their school's view. The sense organs such as the eyes are called seeing, awareness, etc. The ''self'' can understand and perceive the seeing, awareness, etc., of those sense organs. This is based on the fundamental view that the ''self'' can see. Considering thought as the ''self,'' the meaning is understandable. Some explain that the two (self and dharma) are established due to the grasper (能取, grāhaka). Therefore, it is said that the names of self and dharma are established based on the seeing-division. In reality, it is only established based on the image-division because only the image-division is closely discriminated. Another explanation is that it relies on both divisions, encompassing both the grasper and the grasped. The seeing-division is the establisher, and the image-division is the place of establishment. This explanation should align with the profound teachings of the Consciousness-Only school because the imagined nature (所執性, parikalpita-svabhāva) can only be established through the discriminator (遍計, parikalpita) and the discriminated (所遍計, parikalpita). The commentary speaks generally and does not differentiate: Some explain that the two (self and dharma) are established due to the grasper. Therefore, it is said that the names of self and dharma are established based on the seeing-division. In reality, it is only established based on the image-division because only the image-division is closely discriminated. Another explanation is that it relies on both divisions, encompassing both the grasper and the grasped. The seeing-division is the establisher, and the image-division is the place of establishment. This explanation should align with the profound teachings of the Consciousness-Only school because the imagined nature can only be established through the discriminator and the discriminated. The commentary speaks generally and does not differentiate. Detailed explanation: If there is no calculation of 'self' as the grasper, it can be treated as what is to be severed. If 'self' is calculated as the grasper, why not...: Detailed explanation: If there is no calculation of ''self'' as the grasper, it can be treated as what is to be severed. If ''self'' is calculated as the grasper, why not...
依見。見是能緣似所執故。由此故言似我法也。又今正辨施設我法處。不釋能所遍計之義。不可說言據能所計言見相也。設約遍計世間我法可如所釋。聖教我法其義如何。豈聖我法亦唯遍計。況論明言依斯二分施說我法。若唯依相執我能緣。相分與我無不相似。有何所以依相施設。故疏所斷理甚明矣。
疏。攝論說唯二義者。按無性論第四本論云。云何安立如是諸識成唯識性略由三相。一由唯識無有義故。二由二性有相有見。二識別故。三由種種行相生起。唯識者是無義故。所說唯言專為遣義。由二性者謂見及相。於一識中二分俱轉不即不離。由種種者。二分各有種種行相俱時而起。廣如彼論。
疏。執說我法者。執唯世間。說即聖教。
疏。見變似能取亦相分攝者。此釋難陀不依見分立我法意。見分所變似能取相不異相分。故我法二但依相立。與護法等義不同者隨作者意。不可齊責。
疏。如敘本有至此中破之者。此護月師不釋天親三十唯識。為共護法同時而出義有乖舛。故敘破之。
疏。如世說火口不被燒者。問名詮於火。名若得火名令被燒。何難燒口 答名依于聲。聲發於口。聲．名二法皆非可燒。故難所發令燒于口。
疏。此所變者至但說似情者。問前明護法。以有似
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 根據『見』（dṛṣṭi，能緣）的觀點，『見』類似於所執著的對象。因此，才說它類似於『我』（ātman）和『法』（dharma）。而且，現在正在辨析施設『我』和『法』之處，而不是解釋能遍計和所遍計的意義。不能說這是根據能所計度而說的『見相』。如果按照遍計所執性的世間『我』和『法』來解釋，或許可以像你所說的那樣。但聖教中的『我』和『法』，其意義又該如何理解呢？難道聖教中的『我』和『法』也只是遍計所執性嗎？更何況經論明明是依據這二分（能取、所取）來施設和解說『我』和『法』。如果僅僅依據相分執著『我』，那麼能緣的相分與『我』沒有什麼不像的，又有什麼理由要依據相分來施設呢？所以窺基大師在《成唯識論述記》中的辨析是非常明確的。
疏：『攝論說唯二義者』。按照無性菩薩的《攝大乘論釋》第四本論所說：『如何安立這些識成為唯識性呢？簡略地說，有三種相：一、因為唯識沒有外境的緣故；二、因為二性，即有相分和見分，二識有別；三、因為種種行相生起。』所謂『唯識』，是因為沒有外境的緣故。所說的『唯』字，專門用來遣除外境。『由二性者』，是指見分和相分。在一個識中，二分同時運轉，不即不離。『由種種者』，二分各自有種種行相，同時生起。詳細內容可以參考該論。
疏：『執說我法者』。『執』是指世間的觀點，『說』是指聖教的觀點。
疏：『見變似能取亦相分攝者』。這是解釋護法論師不依據見分來建立『我』和『法』的意圖。見分所變現的類似於能取的相，與相分沒有區別。因此，『我』和『法』二者只是依據相分而建立。這與護法等論師的觀點不同，隨作者的意圖而定，不能一概而論。
疏：『如敘本有至此中破之者』。這是因為護月論師沒有解釋世親菩薩的《三十唯識論》，而且與護法論師同時出現，義理上有乖違之處，所以敘述並破斥他。
疏：『如世說火口不被燒者』。問：名稱詮釋了火，如果名稱能夠代表火，為什麼不能燒口呢？答：名稱是依附於聲音的，聲音是從口中發出的。聲音和名稱二法都不是可以被燒的。所以難以用所發出的聲音來燒口。
疏：『此所變者至但說似情者』。問：前面說明護法論師認為有類似於
【English Translation】 English version: According to the view of 『dṛṣṭi』 (seeing, the faculty of cognition), 『seeing』 is similar to the object being grasped. Therefore, it is said to be similar to 『ātman』 (self) and 『dharma』 (law/phenomenon). Moreover, we are now analyzing the establishment of 『self』 and 『dharma』, rather than explaining the meaning of the imagined and the imagining. It cannot be said that this is the 『appearance of seeing』 based on the calculation of the grasper and the grasped. If we explain it according to the worldly 『self』 and 『dharma』 of the parikalpita-svabhāva (completely dependently arisen nature), perhaps it can be as you said. But what about the meaning of 『self』 and 『dharma』 in the sacred teachings? Are the 『self』 and 『dharma』 in the sacred teachings also merely parikalpita-svabhāva? Furthermore, the scriptures clearly establish and explain 『self』 and 『dharma』 based on these two divisions (the grasper and the grasped). If we only rely on the appearance aspect to grasp the 『self』, then the appearance aspect of the cognizing faculty is not dissimilar to the 『self』. What reason is there to establish it based on the appearance aspect? Therefore, Master Kuiji』s analysis in the Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji (Commentary on the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi Shastra) is very clear.
Commentary: 『The Samgraha says only two meanings.』 According to Vasubandhu』s She Da Cheng Lun Shi (Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha) fourth book says: 『How to establish these consciousnesses as the nature of Vijnaptimatrata? Briefly speaking, there are three aspects: First, because Vijnaptimatrata has no external objects; second, because of the two natures, namely the nimitta-bhāga (appearance aspect) and the darśana-bhāga (cognition aspect), the two consciousnesses are different; third, because various characteristics arise. The so-called 『Vijnaptimatrata』 is because there are no external objects. The word 『only』 is specifically used to eliminate external objects. 『By two natures』 refers to the darśana-bhāga and the nimitta-bhāga. In one consciousness, the two aspects operate simultaneously, neither identical nor separate. 『By various』 means that the two aspects each have various characteristics that arise simultaneously. Detailed content can be found in that treatise.
Commentary: 『Those who adhere to the saying of self and dharma.』 『Adhere』 refers to the worldly view, and 『saying』 refers to the view of the sacred teachings.
Commentary: 『The seeing transforms into something similar to the grasper, which is also included in the nimitta-bhāga.』 This explains Dharmapala』s intention not to establish 『self』 and 『dharma』 based on the darśana-bhāga. The appearance transformed by the darśana-bhāga is similar to the grasping aspect and is no different from the nimitta-bhāga. Therefore, 『self』 and 『dharma』 are only established based on the nimitta-bhāga. This is different from the views of Dharmapala and others, depending on the author's intention, and cannot be uniformly criticized.
Commentary: 『As in narrating the original existence to refute it here.』 This is because Vasubandhu did not explain the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only, and he appeared at the same time as Dharmapala, so there are discrepancies in the meaning, so he narrates and refutes him.
Commentary: 『As the world says that the mouth of fire is not burned.』 Question: The name explains the fire. If the name can represent the fire, why can't it burn the mouth? Answer: The name is attached to the sound, and the sound comes from the mouth. Sound and name are not burnable. Therefore, it is difficult to burn the mouth with the sound that is emitted.
Commentary: 『This transformed one to only say similar feelings.』 Question: The previous explanation of Dharmapala believes that there are similar
無。以內似外。今說似情。情豈是外。及無體耶 答實但似情及似於內。言似外等約彼執情所執相說。所執之相是所遍計。體是無故。故疏前後望義說別。亦不相違。有義論言似二分者。而有二釋。一云相似名似。如疏所辨。二云以非實故說為似也。非謂似言別有所似。后說為勝。聖教我法亦此中說。不可說名似所執故。或通二釋攝義方終。
疏。不許末那有法執者。問何所以耶 答論說第七四惑相應謂我見等。不言法故 問何故余識許有法執 答論言三界虛妄分別。法執若無何成虛妄 若爾七無應非虛妄 答我法皆妄。第七有我故亦虛妄。論如下引。
疏。八識生至六七似我者。理實七識而似於法。舉總數也。我據能執但言六．七。
疏。又解至識自體者。問后解意何 答若不有此依他二似。自證以何為親所緣。見．相無體不成緣故 若爾後解乃為其勝。何斷難知 答若以堅執方無體者。護法何別。護法豈許所執二分是依他耶。又自證變依他性者名為相．見。依此堅執為我法者。名似我法復有何失。若許爾者不殊護法。由此難知 若爾前解即自證分無親緣失 答有體為緣是護法義。安惠許假得成緣故。故前解勝。又準安惠。實法生假。如自證分生於相．見。假法生實。如自證分從自種生。種子皆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『以內似外，今說似情。情豈是外，及無體耶？』問：內在的顯現類似於外在的顯現，現在說（阿賴耶識）類似於情識（末那識）。情識難道是外在的嗎？以及（所執著的）體性是空無的嗎？ 答：實際上只是類似於情識，以及類似於內在的顯現。說類似於外在等等，是就彼等執著情識所執著的相狀而說的。所執著的相狀是所遍計的，體性是空無的。所以疏文前後互相望文生義，說法有所區別，也不互相違背。有義論說（阿賴耶識）類似於二分（見分和相分）的，而有兩種解釋。一種解釋說，相似叫做『似』，如疏文所辨析的。另一種解釋說，因為不是真實的，所以說為『似』。不是說『似』這個詞另外有所相似。后一種說法更為殊勝。聖教和我法也在此中說，不可說的叫做類似於所執著的。或者貫通兩種解釋，才能完整地涵蓋意義。
疏文：『不許末那有法執者。』問：為什麼不允許末那識（末那，Manas，第七識，意根）有法執呢？ 答：論中說第七識與四種煩惱相應，即我見等，沒有說法執。 問：為什麼其餘的識允許有法執呢？ 答：論中說三界是虛妄分別，如果沒有法執，怎麼能成就虛妄呢？ 若爾，第七識沒有法執，那麼第七識應不是虛妄的？ 答：我執和法執都是虛妄的。第七識有我執，所以也是虛妄的。論中如下引用。
疏文：『八識生至六七似我者。』理實七識而似於法。舉總數也。我據能執但言六．七。
疏文：『又解至識自體者。』問：后一種解釋的含義是什麼？ 答：如果沒有這種依他起的兩種相似顯現，自證分（Svasamvedana，第八識的自證分）用什麼作為親所緣緣呢？見分和相分沒有體性，不能成為緣故。 若爾，后一種解釋更為殊勝，為什麼難以判斷呢？ 答：如果認為只有堅固執著的才沒有體性，那麼護法（Dharmapala）的觀點有什麼區別呢？護法難道允許所執著的二分是依他起的嗎？而且自證分變現依他起的體性，叫做相分和見分。依據這種堅固執著作為我法，叫做類似於我法，又有什麼過失呢？如果允許這樣，那麼和護法的觀點沒有什麼區別。因此難以判斷。若爾，前一種解釋即自證分沒有親緣的過失？ 答：有體性作為緣是護法的觀點。安慧（Sthiramati）允許假法可以成為緣故。所以前一種解釋更為殊勝。又按照安慧的觀點，實法生起假法，如自證分生起相分和見分。假法生起實法，如自證分從自己的種子生起，種子都是實法。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Within resembles without, now it is said to resemble emotion. Is emotion external, and without substance?』 Question: Does the internal manifestation resemble the external manifestation? Now it is said that (Alaya-vijnana) resembles emotion (Manas, the seventh consciousness). Is emotion external, and is the nature (of what is grasped) empty? Answer: In reality, it only resembles emotion and resembles the internal manifestation. Saying it resembles the external, etc., is in reference to the aspects grasped by those who cling to emotion. The grasped aspect is what is conceptually constructed, and its nature is empty. Therefore, the commentary's interpretation varies depending on the perspective, but they do not contradict each other. Some argue that (Alaya-vijnana) resembles the two aspects (the seeing aspect and the appearing aspect), and there are two explanations for this. One explanation says that similarity is called 『resemblance,』 as analyzed in the commentary. The other explanation says that because it is not real, it is called 『resemblance.』 It is not that the word 『resemblance』 refers to something else that is similar. The latter explanation is more superior. The holy teachings and my Dharma are also discussed here; what cannot be spoken of is called resembling what is grasped. Or, by integrating the two explanations, the meaning can be fully encompassed.
Commentary: 『Those who do not allow Manas to have Dharma-grasping.』 Question: Why is Manas (Manas, the seventh consciousness, the root of mind) not allowed to have Dharma-grasping? Answer: The treatise says that the seventh consciousness is associated with four afflictions, namely self-view, etc., but does not mention Dharma-grasping. Question: Why are the other consciousnesses allowed to have Dharma-grasping? Answer: The treatise says that the three realms are false discriminations. If there were no Dharma-grasping, how could falsity be established? If so, if the seventh consciousness does not have Dharma-grasping, then the seventh consciousness should not be false? Answer: Both self-grasping and Dharma-grasping are false. The seventh consciousness has self-grasping, so it is also false. The treatise quotes as follows.
Commentary: 『The eight consciousnesses arise, and the sixth and seventh resemble self.』 In reality, the seventh consciousness resembles Dharma. This is a general statement. 『Self』 refers to the grasping, so only the sixth and seventh are mentioned.
Commentary: 『Another explanation reaches the self-nature of consciousness.』 Question: What is the meaning of the latter explanation? Answer: If there were not these two dependent arising resemblances, what would the self-awareness (Svasamvedana, the self-awareness aspect of the eighth consciousness) use as its direct condition? The seeing aspect and the appearing aspect have no nature, so they cannot be conditions. If so, the latter explanation is more superior, why is it difficult to judge? Answer: If it is thought that only what is firmly grasped has no nature, then what is the difference from Dharmapala's view? Does Dharmapala allow the grasped two aspects to be dependently arisen? Moreover, the self-awareness transforming the nature of dependent arising is called the appearing aspect and the seeing aspect. Relying on this firm grasping as self and Dharma is called resembling self and Dharma, what fault is there? If this is allowed, then there is no difference from Dharmapala's view. Therefore, it is difficult to judge. If so, the former explanation has the fault that the self-awareness has no direct condition? Answer: Having a nature as a condition is Dharmapala's view. Sthiramati allows false phenomena to become conditions. Therefore, the former explanation is more superior. Also, according to Sthiramati's view, real phenomena give rise to false phenomena, such as self-awareness giving rise to the appearing aspect and the seeing aspect. False phenomena give rise to real phenomena, such as self-awareness arising from its own seeds, and the seeds are all real phenomena.
是第八相故 有義安惠能計．所計皆自證分。謂依他起。依此堅執方名二分。由此我法依自證立。說依二分立我法者。是隨執心生所計著說。由此安惠亦得說有無依于有。有體強說二種假也 詳曰。此與本疏第二釋者名別意同。觀此德意。取此為勝。今取疏斷。所以然者。疏主躬參譯司親奉指誨。豈諸末學同年語哉。亦猶三傳演經。餘二豈與丘明騁駕。
疏。然護法至變似我法者。問五．八如何云似我法。答有見．相分似六．七識我法相．見。非起二執名似我法。具如義燈。
疏。安惠至皆有執者。問安惠宗計。隨其所緣能取．所取執實有者。方是相．見。非一切心皆緣二取。云何識皆有二分耶。答有義隨所計度境未必俱。總說諸心可為四句。有唯相非見。謂五．八識。有唯見非相。謂第七識。有二分俱有。謂第六識。有二分俱無。謂無漏識。然第六識未必皆俱。意云諸識緣于見．相有差別也 詳曰。今觀此釋。答問不盡。復非至當。元本不問緣境差別答故非當。不說二分生之所由。斯為不盡。二分生由正辨如燈 今又釋云。雖隨緣一。有漏識起必有能緣．所緣之相。闕一不可。故復識起二分俱生。非由所緣具見．相二后二分起 問有漏皆執。豈有漏心自證分等皆非現量 答有義義或可然 若爾雜集如何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為是第八識的相分，所以有安慧論師認為，能取和所取都是自證分。這是指依他起性。依據這個堅固執著，才稱為二分。因此，我法（主觀的『我』和客觀的『法』）是依據自證分而建立的。說依據二分建立我法，是隨順執著心所產生的計度而說的。因此，也可以說安慧論師認為『有』依賴於『有』，有體性而強行說成兩種假立。
詳細地說，這和本疏第二次解釋的名稱不同，但意思相同。觀察德意的觀點，認為這個解釋更好。現在採用疏文的判斷，原因是疏主親自參與翻譯，親自接受指導，豈是後來的學習者可以相提並論的呢？也像三傳解釋經典，其他兩家怎麼能和左丘明並駕齊驅呢？ 疏文說：『然而護法認為變現得像我法。』問：第五識和第八識怎麼能說是像我法呢？答：有見分和相分，類似於第六識和第七識的我法相和見。不是生起二種執著，而是名為像我法。詳細情況見《義燈》。 疏文說：『安慧認為都有執著。』問：安慧宗的觀點認為，隨其所緣，能取和所取都執著為真實存在，才是相分和見分。不是一切心都緣於二取，為什麼說一切識都有二分呢？答：有的觀點認為，隨所計度的境界未必都有。總的來說，各種心可以分為四句：有隻有相分而沒有見分的，比如第五識和第八識；有隻有見分而沒有相分的，比如第七識；有二分都有的，比如第六識；有二分都沒有的，比如無漏識。然而，第六識未必都有二分。意思是說，各種識緣于見分和相分是有差別的。詳細地說，現在觀察這個解釋，回答問題並不完全，也不是最恰當的。原本沒有問緣境的差別，所以回答得不恰當。沒有說二分產生的由來，這是不完全的地方。二分產生的由來，在《義燈》中有詳細辨析。現在又解釋說：雖然隨所緣而只有一個，但有漏識生起時，必定有能緣和所緣的相狀，缺少一個都不可以。所以，有漏識生起時，二分同時產生，不是由於所緣具有見分和相分，然後二分才產生。問：有漏識都有執著，難道有漏心的自證分等都不是現量嗎？答：有的觀點認為，義理上或許可以這樣說。如果這樣，那麼《雜集論》又該如何解釋呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Because it is the 'aspect' (相分, lakṣaṇa-bhāga) of the eighth consciousness, Ānanda (安慧, Ānanda) argues that both the 'apprehender' (能取, grāhaka) and the 'apprehended' (所取, grāhya) are the 'self-awareness' (自證分, sva-saṃvedana-bhāga). This refers to the 'dependent nature' (依他起, paratantra-svabhāva). Only by firmly adhering to this is it called 'two aspects' (二分, dvi-bhāga). Therefore, 'I' (我, ātman) and 'dharma' (法, dharma) are established based on 'self-awareness'. To say that 'I' and 'dharma' are established based on 'two aspects' is to speak according to the conceptualizations arising from attachment. Therefore, it can also be said that Ānanda believes that 'existence' (有, bhāva) depends on 'existence', and that having a nature is forcibly spoken of as two kinds of false establishments. In detail, this differs in name but is the same in meaning as the second explanation in the original commentary. Observing the intention of virtue, it is considered that this explanation is better. Now, the judgment of the commentary is adopted because the author of the commentary personally participated in the translation and personally received instructions. How can later learners be compared? It is also like the three commentaries explaining the scriptures; how can the other two be compared to Zuo Qiuming (左丘明)? The commentary says: 'However, Dharmapāla (護法, Dharmapāla) believes that what is manifested resembles 'I' and 'dharma'.' Question: How can the fifth and eighth consciousnesses be said to resemble 'I' and 'dharma'? Answer: The 'seeing aspect' (見分, darśana-bhāga) and the 'aspect' resemble the 'I' and 'dharma' aspects and views of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. It is not the arising of two kinds of attachments, but is called resembling 'I' and 'dharma'. See Yi Deng (義燈) for details. The commentary says: 'Ānanda believes that there are attachments.' Question: Ānanda's view is that, according to what is cognized, the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended' are both attached to as truly existing, and this is the 'aspect' and the 'seeing aspect'. Not all minds cognize the two apprehensions, so why is it said that all consciousnesses have two aspects? Answer: Some argue that the object of conceptualization does not necessarily have both. Generally speaking, various minds can be divided into four categories: some have only the 'aspect' and not the 'seeing aspect', such as the fifth and eighth consciousnesses; some have only the 'seeing aspect' and not the 'aspect', such as the seventh consciousness; some have both aspects, such as the sixth consciousness; some have neither aspect, such as the 'unconditioned consciousness' (無漏識, anāsrava-vijñāna). However, the sixth consciousness does not necessarily have both aspects. The meaning is that various consciousnesses have differences in cognizing the 'seeing aspect' and the 'aspect'. In detail, observing this explanation, the answer to the question is not complete, nor is it the most appropriate. The original question did not ask about the difference in cognizing objects, so the answer is not appropriate. It does not explain the origin of the two aspects, which is incomplete. The origin of the two aspects is analyzed in detail in Yi Deng. Now, it is further explained that although there is only one according to what is cognized, when a 'conditioned consciousness' (有漏識, sāsrava-vijñāna) arises, there must be the appearance of the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended', and one cannot be missing. Therefore, when a 'conditioned consciousness' arises, the two aspects arise simultaneously, not because the object of cognition has the 'seeing aspect' and the 'aspect', and then the two aspects arise. Question: All 'conditioned consciousnesses' have attachments, so are the 'self-awareness' of 'conditioned minds' (有漏心, sāsrava-citta) not 'direct perception' (現量, pratyakṣa)? Answer: Some argue that, in terms of meaning, it may be so. If so, then how should the Compendium of Abhidharma (雜集論, Abhidharmasamuccaya) be explained?
眼等說名現量 答安惠但合本．釋。同部非即以彼為定量故 詳曰。經亦明言五識現量。今言非者豈非違教。正釋應云。望執輕重名現非量。五．八執微故名現量。亦如勝義．世俗善等。
疏。三釋如前者。釋前我法分別文中。三師釋如是。
疏。無安惠解等者。前明安惠義有兩釋。此據初義。思可知也。
論。但隨妄情至故說為假者。具辨如疏 有義此二段文明世我法。但隨妄情等無體隨情假。內識所變等以無依有假 詳曰。世間．聖教皆明我法。何故多文唯說世間我法二耶。又準何理知但明彼世間我法耶。縱亦明彼聖教我法。違何文理。故疏正也。義周備故。
疏。后解不依四勝義者。若依四勝相分雖假。形於遍計是初勝義。既一向判名為非實。故知但據殊勝說也。
疏。依人二諦者。總指前判二師所明及引論等。勝人知故名為勝義。劣人所知名為世俗。
疏。以上略明等者。此結我法分別下文。此所結文字難陀義。護法兼明。護法不唯立二分故。故屬難陀。同許有體故兼明也。
疏。心變似我法同分攝者。問心變似法相隨蘊收。即蘊計我相應蘊攝 答即蘊計我相實隨蘊。離蘊計我既無本質相。隨能變心王．心所以判于蘊。即四蘊攝。疏言同分。且據離蘊所計之我當
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『眼等說名現量』，回答：安慧（Anhui，人名）和達磨波羅（Dharmapala，人名）的《釋》。同一部派不立即以它為定量的原因。 詳細地說，經書中也明確說明五識（five consciousnesses）是現量（pratyaksa，直接認知）。現在說不是，難道不是違背教義嗎？正確的解釋應該是：相對於執著的輕重來說，稱為現非量（apramana，非量）。五識和第八識執著微弱，所以稱為現量。也像勝義（paramartha，勝義諦）和世俗（samvriti，世俗諦）、善等一樣。
疏：三種解釋如前面所說。在解釋前面關於我法分別的文章中，三位論師是這樣解釋的。
疏：沒有安慧的解釋等，前面說明安慧的意義有兩種解釋，這裡是根據第一種意義。可以思考理解。
論：只是隨著虛妄的情感才說是假。詳細的辨析如疏中所說。有一種觀點認為這兩段文字說明了世間的我法。只是隨著虛妄的情感等，沒有實體，隨著情感是假。內識所變等，因為沒有所依，所以是有依假。詳細地說，世間和聖教都說明了我法，為什麼很多文章只說世間的我法呢？又根據什麼道理知道只是說明世間的我法呢？縱然也說明了聖教的我法，違背了什麼文理呢？所以疏的解釋是正確的，意義周全完備。
疏：後面的解釋不依據四勝義（paramartha，勝義諦）的原因是，如果依據四勝義，相分雖然是假，但對於遍計所執性（parikalpita，遍計所執性）來說是最初的勝義。既然一概判定為非實，所以知道只是根據殊勝來說的。
疏：依據人二諦（satya，真諦）的原因是，總的指前面判定的兩位論師所說明的以及引用的論等。殊勝的人知道所以稱為勝義，低劣的人知道所以稱為世俗。
疏：以上略微說明等，這是總結我法分別下面的文章。這裡總結的文字是難陀（Nanda，人名）的意義，護法（Dharmapala，人名）兼明。護法不只是立二分，所以屬於難陀，共同認可有實體，所以兼明。
疏：心變現的像我法，屬於同分攝。問：心變現的像法，隨著蘊（skandha，蘊）收取。即蘊計我相應蘊攝。答：即蘊計我相，實際上隨著蘊。離蘊計我，既然沒有本質相，隨著能變的心王和心所，所以判于蘊，即四蘊攝。疏中說同分，暫且根據離開蘊所計的我來說。
【English Translation】 English version 'Eye and so on are said to be direct perception (pratyaksa)', Answer: Anhui (Anhui, a person's name) and Dharmapala's (Dharmapala, a person's name) 'Explanation'. The reason why the same school does not immediately take it as a valid means of knowledge (pramana). In detail, the scriptures also clearly state that the five consciousnesses (five consciousnesses) are direct perception. Now saying it is not, isn't that contrary to the teachings? The correct explanation should be: relative to the weight of attachment, it is called non-valid means of knowledge (apramana). The five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness have weak attachments, so they are called direct perception. It is also like the ultimate truth (paramartha) and conventional truth (samvriti), goodness, and so on.
Commentary: The three explanations are as mentioned before. In explaining the previous article on the distinction between self and dharma, the three masters explained it this way.
Commentary: Without Anhui's explanation, etc., the previous explanation of Anhui's meaning has two interpretations, this is based on the first meaning. It can be understood through contemplation.
Treatise: It is only said to be false because it follows deluded emotions. The detailed analysis is as described in the commentary. One view is that these two paragraphs explain the mundane self and dharma. It is only false because it follows deluded emotions, without substance. The transformations of the inner consciousness, etc., are conditionally false because they have no basis. In detail, both the mundane and the sacred teachings explain self and dharma, why do many articles only talk about the mundane self and dharma? And according to what principle do we know that it only explains the mundane self and dharma? Even if it also explains the sacred self and dharma, what scriptures or logic does it violate? Therefore, the commentary's explanation is correct, and the meaning is comprehensive and complete.
Commentary: The reason why the later explanation does not rely on the four ultimate truths (paramartha) is that if it relies on the four ultimate truths, although the image-aspect is false, it is the initial ultimate truth for the completely imagined nature (parikalpita). Since it is categorically judged as unreal, we know that it is only based on the superior to say it.
Commentary: The reason for relying on the two truths (satya) of people is that it generally refers to the explanations of the two masters who made the judgment earlier and the cited treatises, etc. It is called ultimate truth because it is known by superior people, and it is called conventional truth because it is known by inferior people.
Commentary: The above briefly explains, etc., this is a summary of the article below on the distinction between self and dharma. The text summarized here is the meaning of Nanda (Nanda, a person's name), and Dharmapala (Dharmapala, a person's name) also clarifies it. Dharmapala does not only establish two divisions, so it belongs to Nanda, and they both acknowledge that there is substance, so it also clarifies it.
Commentary: The mind transforms into something that resembles self and dharma, belonging to the same division. Question: The mind transforms into something that resembles dharma, following the aggregates (skandha) to collect. That is, the aggregate-based self corresponds to the aggregate collection. Answer: The aggregate-based self actually follows the aggregates. Since the self apart from the aggregates has no essential characteristics, it is judged to belong to the aggregates according to the transforming mind-king and mental factors, that is, the four aggregates are collected. The commentary says the same division, temporarily based on the self conceived apart from the aggregates.
情顯現遍常之相名法同分。不說所變相分之體在法同分 又所變相無多差別。相分是假。故同分收。同分寬故。前解為勝。
論。一者執體周遍等者。問何要周遍 答按廣百論第三。敘云一類外道執。我周遍於一切處受苦．樂故。我無形質。亦無動作。不可隨身往來生死。故知內我遍於一切。
論。二者執我隨身不定等者。問立意云何 答廣百論云。一類外道作如是言。我若周遍如虛空者。不應隨身受諸苦樂。如空界無所往來。其性湛然非作．受者。是故我性應如色等隨所依身形量不定。雖無形礙。而有所依轉變。隨身受諸苦樂。雖依形質有卷有舒。而我體性無生無滅。如渧油水。隨水廣狹雖有卷舒而無增減。
論。三者執我如一極微等者。意復云何 答廣百論云。一類外道復作是言。若我體性隨形量者。即應如身有分有變。又汝執我隨所依身。似水依堤。如油遂水。是則此我如彼水．油。既變既易。或非常非一。引此為喻而言。我體為常為一與理相違。是故我體住于身內。形量極細如一極微。不可分析。體常無變。動慮．動身能作．能受。
疏。如一瞿聲別目于牛者。一瞿聲中詮於九義。獸是一數。總括一切走獸之屬。若言于牛即總獸中之一別也 俱舍論第五云。於九義中共立一瞿聲。故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：情顯現遍常之相，名為法同分（指眾生共同的業力所感，顯現的共同境界）。不認為所變現的相分（指外在的現象）的本體存在於法同分之中。而且所變現的相沒有很多差別，相分是虛假的，所以歸於同分。因為同分範圍更寬泛，所以之前的解釋更合理。
論：第一種外道執著『我』的本體周遍一切等。問：為什麼要執著周遍？答：根據《廣百論》第三，敘述說有一類外道執著，『我』周遍於一切處感受苦樂，所以『我』沒有形質，也沒有動作，不可能隨身體往來生死。因此可知內在的『我』遍於一切。
論：第二種外道執著『我』隨身體不定等。問：他們立論的意圖是什麼？答：《廣百論》說，有一類外道這樣說：『我』如果周遍如虛空，就不應該隨身體感受各種苦樂。如同空界沒有往來，其性湛然，不是作者和受者。所以『我』的性質應該像色等，隨所依之身體，形量不定。雖然沒有形礙，但有所依而轉變，隨身體感受各種苦樂。雖然依據形質有卷有舒，但『我』的體性沒有生滅，如同滴入水中的油，隨水面的廣狹有卷舒，但沒有增減。
論：第三種外道執著『我』如一個極微（指最小的物質單位）等。意圖又是什麼？答：《廣百論》說，有一類外道又這樣說：如果『我』的體性隨形量而變化，就應該像身體一樣有分有變。而且你執著『我』隨所依之身體，像水依堤岸，像油附著在水上。那麼這個『我』就像水和油一樣，既變又易，或者非常非一。用這個來比喻說『我』的本體為常為一，與道理相違背。所以『我』的本體住在身體內，形量極細如一個極微，不可分析，體常無變，動念、動身，能作能受。
疏：如用『一瞿聲』來特別指稱牛，『一瞿聲』中詮釋了九種含義。獸是一個總數，總括一切走獸之屬。如果說牛，就是總獸中的一個類別。《俱舍論》第五說：在九種含義中共同建立一個『瞿聲』。
【English Translation】 English version: The appearance of the universally pervasive and constant aspect is called Dharma-samānatā (the shared karmic result experienced by beings). It is not considered that the substance of the manifested aspect-division (external phenomena) exists within the Dharma-samānatā. Moreover, the manifested aspects do not have many differences; the aspect-division is unreal, so it is included in the samānatā. Because samānatā is broader, the previous explanation is superior.
Treatise: The first type of heretics clings to the idea that the 'self' is universally pervasive, etc. Question: Why cling to pervasiveness? Answer: According to the third section of the Śata-pañcāśatka-śāstra (廣百論), it is narrated that a certain type of heretic clings to the idea that the 'self' is universally present in all places, experiencing suffering and joy. Therefore, the 'self' has no form or action and cannot follow the body through birth and death. Thus, it is known that the inner 'self' pervades everything.
Treatise: The second type of heretics clings to the idea that the 'self' is not fixed with the body, etc. Question: What is their intention in establishing this view? Answer: The Śata-pañcāśatka-śāstra says that a certain type of heretic says this: 'If the 'self' were as pervasive as space, it should not experience various sufferings and joys with the body. Like the realm of space, which has no coming or going, its nature is serene and is neither an agent nor a recipient. Therefore, the nature of the 'self' should be like form, etc., with its shape and size not fixed according to the body it relies on. Although it has no form or obstruction, it transforms according to what it relies on, experiencing various sufferings and joys with the body. Although it has contraction and expansion according to form, the nature of the 'self' has no birth or death, like a drop of oil in water, which has contraction and expansion according to the width of the water surface, but does not increase or decrease.'
Treatise: The third type of heretics clings to the idea that the 'self' is like a single ultimate particle (an extremely small unit of matter), etc. What is their intention? Answer: The Śata-pañcāśatka-śāstra says that a certain type of heretic says this: 'If the nature of the 'self' changes according to shape and size, it should have divisions and changes like the body. Moreover, you cling to the idea that the 'self' follows the body it relies on, like water relying on a bank, like oil adhering to water. Then this 'self' is like water and oil, both changing and easily altered, or neither permanent nor one. Using this as a metaphor to say that the substance of the 'self' is permanent and one contradicts reason. Therefore, the substance of the 'self' resides within the body, with an extremely fine shape and size like a single ultimate particle, which cannot be analyzed, and its substance is constantly unchanging, with thoughts and actions, capable of acting and receiving.'
Commentary: For example, using 'one go-sound' to specifically refer to a cow, 'one go-sound' explains nine meanings. 'Beast' is a general term, encompassing all kinds of running animals. If you say 'cow,' it is a category within the general category of beasts. The fifth section of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (俱舍論) says: 'A 'go-sound' is jointly established among nine meanings.'
有頌言。方．獸．地．光．言。金剛．眼．天．水。於斯九種義。智者立瞿聲。
疏如伏犧等者。能伏犧牲故名伏犧。有智者伏犧帝主。
疏。如汝虛空者。問準數論師。空．唯量者轉變無常。常因不轉。豈非喻有能立不成 答傳三釋。一云彼宗空有二種。謂常．無常。常非諦攝。以無為故。亦猶佛法無為不在蘊中攝。故論指常空而以為喻。二云即此一量合破二宗。常遍之因別屬勝．數遍唯數論。常遍俱對勝論師宗。三云如因明法因．喻不極更作比量而成立之。今此亦爾。先成空常后將為喻。量云。汝所執虛空。應非轉變無常。許遍故。如汝神我等。
疏。常遍之因亦犯隨一者。泛爾常遍非自不許。今明我有。故自宗無成隨一也。今即因有所依不成。有法之我自不許有。常遍之因無所依故。
疏。若大乘至違宗者。違有二義。一云自許有我。今復破之故成違自 問破受苦樂不破我體。何成違自 答破受苦樂本為破我。不爾破誰不受苦樂。二云自聖教中不說有我。今者許有故成違自。前解勝也。
疏。許義同故者。許與執言其義同也。是以論中但有執字 有云解因明者共許于彼他因喻上而置執言 詳曰。全成虛構。前解為正。
疏。如同處不相離色等者。按瑜伽論六十五。有三種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有頌詞說：『方（方位）、獸（動物）、地（土地）、光（光明）、言（言語），金剛（金剛杵）、眼（眼睛）、天（天空）、水（水）。』對於這九種意義，智者建立了『瞿聲』（Ghosha，聲音）。
疏解中『如伏犧等』的意思是：能夠馴服犧牲，所以叫做伏犧（Fuxi，中國神話人物）。有智慧的人伏犧是帝王。
疏解中『如汝虛空者』是：問難準數論師（Samkhya，印度哲學流派）的觀點，認為空（Akasha，空間）只是量（pramana，認知手段），是轉變無常的。常（Nitya，永恒）是原因，不轉變。難道不是比喻有能立不成（Sadhana，論證）嗎？回答有三種解釋。第一種說法是，他們的宗派認為空有兩種，即常和無常。常不是諦（Satya，真理）所包含的，因為它沒有作用。就像佛法中的無為（Asamskrita，非造作）不在蘊（Skandha，五蘊）中包含一樣。所以論典指的是常空而作為比喻。第二種說法是，這一個量同時破斥兩個宗派。常遍之因（Nitya-vyapaka-karana，常且遍的原因）分別屬於勝論（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）和數論，遍只屬於數論。常遍都針對勝論師的宗派。第三種說法是，就像因明（Hetuvidya，邏輯學）的法則一樣，因（Hetu，原因）、喻（Drishtanta，例子）不充分，就再作比量（Anumana，推論）來成立它。現在這裡也是這樣。先成立空是常的，然後將它作為比喻。量是：你所執著的虛空，應該不是轉變無常的，因為你承認它是遍的。就像你的神我（Atman，靈魂）等。
疏解中『常遍之因亦犯隨一者』是：泛泛地說常遍，不是自己不承認。現在說明我有常遍，所以自己的宗派沒有成立隨一（Siddhanta，宗義）。現在這個因有所依，不能成立。有法（Dharmin，具有屬性的事物）的我，自己不承認有。常遍之因沒有所依。
疏解中『若大乘至違宗者』是：違有兩種意義。第一種說法是，自己承認有我（Atman，靈魂），現在又破斥它，所以構成違自（Svasiddhanta-virodha，自相矛盾）。問：破斥感受苦樂，不破斥我的本體，怎麼構成違自？答：破斥感受苦樂，本來是爲了破斥我。不然破斥誰不受苦樂？第二種說法是，自己的聖教中沒有說有我，現在卻承認有，所以構成違自。前一種解釋更好。
疏解中『許義同故者』是：許（Angikara，承認）和執（Graha，執著）這兩個詞的意思相同。因此論中只有執這個字。有人說，解釋因明的人共同承認在彼（Para，他人）的因喻上使用執這個字。詳細考察，完全是虛構。前一種解釋是正確的。
疏解中『如同處不相離色等者』是：按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-shastra），有三種。
【English Translation】 English version: There is a verse that says: 'Direction (Disha), animal (Tiryak), earth (Bhumi), light (Prabha), speech (Vac), Vajra (Vajra, diamond scepter), eye (Netra), sky (Akasha), water (Ap).' For these nine meanings, the wise establish 'Ghosha' (Ghosha, sound).
The explanation 'like Fuxi etc.' means: able to subdue sacrifices, hence the name Fuxi (Fuxi, a figure in Chinese mythology). The wise Fuxi was an emperor.
The explanation 'like your space' is: questioning the view of the Samkhya (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy) school, which believes that space (Akasha, space) is only a means of cognition (pramana), and is impermanent. The eternal (Nitya, eternal) is the cause and does not change. Isn't this a metaphor for an unestablished proof (Sadhana, proof)? The answer has three explanations. The first explanation is that their school believes that there are two kinds of space, namely eternal and impermanent. The eternal is not included in the truth (Satya, truth), because it has no function. Just like the unconditioned (Asamskrita, unconditioned) in Buddhism is not included in the aggregates (Skandha, five aggregates). Therefore, the treatise refers to the eternal space as a metaphor. The second explanation is that this one means of cognition refutes two schools at the same time. The cause of eternal pervasiveness (Nitya-vyapaka-karana, the cause that is eternal and pervasive) belongs to the Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika, a school of Indian philosophy) and Samkhya schools respectively, and pervasiveness only belongs to the Samkhya school. Eternal pervasiveness is aimed at the Vaisheshika school. The third explanation is that, just like the rules of logic (Hetuvidya, logic), if the cause (Hetu, cause) and example (Drishtanta, example) are insufficient, another inference (Anumana, inference) is made to establish it. This is also the case here. First establish that space is eternal, and then use it as a metaphor. The inference is: the space you adhere to should not be impermanent, because you admit that it is pervasive. Like your self (Atman, soul) etc.
The explanation 'the cause of eternal pervasiveness also violates one of the two' means: generally speaking, eternal pervasiveness is not something that one does not admit. Now it is explained that I have eternal pervasiveness, so my own school does not establish one of the two (Siddhanta, doctrine). Now this cause has something to rely on and cannot be established. The self (Atman, soul) of the subject (Dharmin, the thing that possesses attributes) is not admitted to exist. The cause of eternal pervasiveness has nothing to rely on.
The explanation 'if the Mahayana violates the doctrine' means: there are two meanings of violation. The first explanation is that one admits that there is a self (Atman, soul), but now refutes it, so it constitutes self-contradiction (Svasiddhanta-virodha, self-contradiction). Question: Refuting the experience of suffering and pleasure does not refute the essence of the self, so how does it constitute self-contradiction? Answer: Refuting the experience of suffering and pleasure is originally to refute the self. Otherwise, who is being refuted who does not experience suffering and pleasure? The second explanation is that one's own sacred teachings do not say that there is a self, but now one admits that there is, so it constitutes self-contradiction. The former explanation is better.
The explanation 'because the meaning of acceptance is the same' means: the meaning of the words acceptance (Angikara, acceptance) and attachment (Graha, attachment) are the same. Therefore, there is only the word attachment in the treatise. Some say that those who explain logic commonly admit that the word attachment is used on the cause and example of the other (Para, other). Upon detailed examination, it is completely fabricated. The former explanation is correct.
The explanation 'like color etc. that are inseparable in the same place' is: according to the Yogacarabhumi-shastra (Yogacarabhumi-shastra), there are three kinds.
不相離色。一一處不相離者。謂諸大種及所造色。同住一處 釋一即同也。能造．所造更互相望。大小量等互相涉入不相障礙。處所無異名為同處。無別極微二處而住名不相離。且如一眼七物相望。互相涉入同一處住。謂眼．身根．色．香．味．觸．能造地大七各極微同一處也 問所造有六。能造何一 答有二釋。一云雖一地大通能造六。故能造一。二云有六。不爾所造六。云何別言能造一。據地頭同合而言也。如言一眼七極微成。而實一根有無量微。但言七者據類談也。能造亦然 二相雜不相離者 釋如一眼根有多極微。一根微處七物同住。以此七物對彼七物。雖非同處然相和雜鄰近而住名之為和。七七各別名之為雜。無間隔故名不相離 故瑜伽論第三云。和雜不相離者。則此大種極微。與余聚集能造所造色處俱故 釋是前同處不相離處所有極微。名此大種極微等也 三和合不相離者。又若有聚集。或麻豆等為諸膠蜜及沙糖等之所攝持 釋異大所造二聚和合。如多豆等雖以蜜等之所攝持。和合一聚。然不相涉入。復是異大所造異聚相望故名和合。不相離者無間隔也。略示大網。具如彼鈔。
疏。有情共果至一切我處無別者。共果山等雖處無別。體非是我。然是所受。可一受時余不能受。我能作受。豈得相例。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『不相離色』，是指色法之間互不分離。『一一處不相離者』，指的是諸大種（地、水、火、風四大元素）以及所造色（由四大元素所產生的色法），共同住於一個處所。解釋『一』即是『同』。能造色（四大種）和所造色相互觀望，大小、量等互相涉入而不互相障礙。處所沒有差異，稱為『同處』。沒有不同的極微在兩個處所居住，稱為『不相離』。例如，一隻眼睛，七種事物相互觀望，互相涉入，共同住於一個處所。這指的是眼根、身根、色、香、味、觸，以及能造的地大，這七種極微共同在一個處所。問：所造色有六種，能造色為何只有一種？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，雖然只有地大一種，但它普遍能造六種所造色，所以說能造色只有一種。另一種說法是，能造色也有六種。如果不是這樣，所造色有六種，為何特別說能造色只有一種？這是根據地大的共同結合而言的。例如說一隻眼睛由七個極微構成，而實際上一個根有無數個極微，但說七個，是根據種類來說的。能造色也是這樣。 『二相雜不相離者』，解釋：例如一隻眼根有多個極微，一個根的極微處，七種事物共同居住。用這七種事物與那七種事物相對，雖然不是在同一個處所，但互相混合雜糅，鄰近而住，稱為『和』。七七各自不同，稱為『雜』。沒有間隔，所以稱為『不相離』。所以《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說：『和雜不相離者，則是此大種極微，與其餘聚集的能造所造色處俱故。』解釋：這是前面所說的同處不相離處所中的極微，稱為此大種極微等。 『三和合不相離者』，又如有聚集，或者像麻豆等，被諸如膠、蜜以及砂糖等所攝持。解釋：不同的大種所造的兩種聚集和合。例如多個豆子等，雖然被蜜等所攝持，和合在一起，但並不互相涉入。而且是不同的大種所造的不同聚集相互觀望，所以稱為『和合』。不相離指的是沒有間隔。簡略地展示了大綱，詳細內容見彼鈔。
疏：『有情共果至一切我處無別者』，共同的果報，如山等，雖然處所沒有區別，但本體不是『我』（Atman）。然而山等是所受用的，可以一個受用時，其餘不能受用。而『我』能作受用，怎麼能相提並論呢？
【English Translation】 English version 'Not separated from form (色)' refers to the inseparability between forms. 'One by one, not separated in one place' refers to the great elements (四大種, earth, water, fire, and wind) and the derived forms (所造色, forms produced by the four great elements) residing together in one place. Explaining 'one' means 'same'. The producer (能造色, the four great elements) and the produced (所造色, derived forms) observe each other, and their sizes and quantities interpenetrate without obstructing each other. Having no difference in location is called 'same place'. Not having different ultimate particles residing in two places is called 'not separated'. For example, in one eye, seven things observe each other, interpenetrate, and reside together in one place. This refers to the eye-organ, body-organ, form (色), smell (香), taste (味), touch (觸), and the earth element (地大) that produces them; these seven ultimate particles are together in one place. Question: There are six derived forms, so why is there only one producing element? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that although there is only one earth element, it universally produces the six derived forms, so it is said that there is only one producing element. The other explanation is that there are six producing elements as well. If not, since there are six derived forms, why specifically say there is only one producing element? This is based on the common combination of the earth element. For example, it is said that one eye is composed of seven ultimate particles, but in reality, one organ has countless particles, but saying seven is based on the category. The same is true for the producing elements. 'Two intermingled and not separated' Explanation: For example, one eye-organ has multiple ultimate particles, and in the place of one organ's ultimate particles, seven things reside together. Using these seven things in relation to those seven things, although they are not in the same place, they are mixed and mingled together, residing nearby, called 'harmony (和)'. The seven sevens are each different, called 'mixture (雜)'. Because there is no separation, it is called 'not separated'. Therefore, the third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says: 'Those harmonized, mixed, and not separated are the ultimate particles of these great elements, together with the places of the producing and produced forms that are gathered together.' Explanation: These are the ultimate particles in the same place that are not separated, as mentioned earlier, called the ultimate particles of these great elements, etc. 'Three harmonized and not separated' Also, if there is a gathering, or like sesame seeds and beans, held together by things like glue, honey, and sugar. Explanation: Two gatherings produced by different great elements are harmonized. For example, multiple beans, etc., although held together by honey, etc., and harmonized together, do not interpenetrate each other. Moreover, they are different gatherings produced by different great elements observing each other, so it is called 'harmonization (和合)'. Not separated means there is no separation. Briefly showing the outline, detailed content can be found in that commentary.
Commentary: 'Sentient beings' common result, up to all places where the self (我, Atman) is not different' Although the common result, such as mountains, etc., has no difference in location, its substance is not 'self (我, Atman)'. However, mountains, etc., are what is received and used; when one is received, the others cannot be received. But the 'self (我, Atman)' can perform the receiving and using, so how can they be compared?
疏。又以業果身為因等者。宗．喻同前。改前因云。業果及身與諸我合故。思可知也。
疏。前說三計皆是計攝者。問數論我思。思即行蘊。如何前三皆離蘊攝 答雖我是思。而不說思是行蘊故 若爾思在何蘊所收 答彼不立蘊故非蘊攝 此亦不然。如即蘊我佛法談彼。非他宗中許在蘊也。思我應爾 答即蘊計者雖不言蘊。然指五蘊以為其我。而數論師自言。思我離心．心所別有自體。故廣百論第三云。數論外道作如是言。思即是我。其性常住。彼論破云。如是思我離心心所別有體相難可了知。故知思我非即心所。是離蘊攝 問前言依見立我法者如數論師。豈不桙楯 答言離蘊等據彼宗說。言依見立佛法談彼。故前後疏不相違也。
疏。大乘一念即俱得緣等者。有無本質悉緣名俱。有宗要有質．影心緣。若但闕質心即不起名獨不生。經部相．質俱無心生名俱得起。此乃總結前三宗別 問有宗自許第六識緣空花等不。若許緣者。此即緣無心亦得起。若不許者即違聖教 答彼雖許緣。然托實花方乃緣之。緣空花時隨依三世實花同緣。許三世法皆實有故。余皆準知。
疏。量云我應非常等者。問計我則蘊。我既是常。蘊亦應爾。不爾如何言我即蘊。故知蘊常。今以為喻。喻闕所立 答有二釋。一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏：又以業果身（指由業力產生的果報之身）為因等，宗（指宗派）、喻（指比喻）與前文相同。修改之前的『因』為：業果及身與諸『我』結合的緣故，這是可以思考得知的。 疏：前面說三種計度都屬於『計攝』（被錯誤的觀念所包含）。問：數論派所說的『我』是『思』（思考），『思』即是行蘊（五蘊之一）。為什麼前面三種計度都說是離開五蘊而存在的？答：雖然『我』是『思』，但不能說『思』就是行蘊。問：如果這樣，『思』被包含在哪個蘊中？答：他們（數論派）不建立五蘊，所以『思』不被五蘊所包含。這也不對。比如在佛法中談論『即蘊我』（認為『我』就是五蘊），並不是在其他宗派中允許『我』存在於五蘊之中。『思我』也應該是這樣。答：認為『我』就是五蘊的計度，雖然不說五蘊，但指的是以五蘊為『我』。而數論師自己說，『思我』離開心（心王）、心所（心所有法）而有單獨的自體。所以《廣百論》第三卷說，數論外道這樣說：『思』就是『我』，它的性質是常住不變的。該論破斥說：像這樣的『思我』，離開心和心所而有單獨的體相，難以瞭解。所以知道『思我』不是心所，是離開五蘊而存在的。問：前面說依靠見解來建立『我』法，比如數論師，難道不是矛盾嗎？答：說離開五蘊等，是根據數論派的說法。說依靠見解來建立，是佛法中談論他們。所以前後的解釋並不矛盾。 疏：大乘認為一念之中就能同時得到所緣的境等，有（指存在）和無（指不存在）的本質都緣于名言，所以說是『俱』（同時）。有宗（指唯識宗）認為，要有本質和影像，心才能緣取。如果缺少本質，心就不能生起，這叫做『獨不生』（單獨不生起）。經部（指經量部）認為，相（指相分）和本質都沒有，心也能生起，這叫做『俱得起』（同時生起）。這實際上是總結了前面三種宗派的區別。問：有宗自己是否允許第六識緣取空花等？如果允許緣取，那麼這就是緣取不存在的事物，心也能生起。如果不允許，就違背了聖教。答：他們雖然允許緣取，但要依託真實的花才能緣取它。緣取空花的時候，是隨順依靠三世（過去、現在、未來）的實花一同緣取。因為他們認為三世法都是真實存在的。其餘的可以類推得知。 疏：量云（量式說）『我應該不是常』等。問：如果計度『我』就是五蘊，『我』既然是常，五蘊也應該是常。如果不是這樣，怎麼能說『我』就是五蘊？所以知道五蘊是常。現在用五蘊為常作為比喻，這個比喻缺少所要成立的。 答：有兩種解釋。一
【English Translation】 English version Commentary: Furthermore, regarding 'taking the karmic result body (the body resulting from karmic actions) as the cause,' the tenet (referring to the school of thought) and the analogy are the same as before. Modify the previous 'cause' to: 'Because the karmic result and the body are combined with the various 'selves' (atma),' this can be understood through contemplation. Commentary: Regarding the previous statement that the three views are all included in 'conceptual grasping,' the question arises: The 'self' (atma) of the Samkhya school is 'thought' (manas), and 'thought' is the mental aggregate (one of the five skandhas). Why are the previous three views said to be separate from the aggregates? Answer: Although the 'self' is 'thought,' it cannot be said that 'thought' is the mental aggregate. Question: If so, in which aggregate is 'thought' included? Answer: They (the Samkhya school) do not establish the five aggregates, so 'thought' is not included in the aggregates. This is also incorrect. For example, in Buddhism, when discussing 'the self as the aggregates' (believing that the 'self' is the five skandhas), it is not allowed in other schools that the 'self' exists within the aggregates. The 'thought-self' should be the same. Answer: Those who believe that the 'self' is the aggregates, although they do not speak of the aggregates, they refer to the five aggregates as the 'self.' However, the Samkhya teachers themselves say that the 'thought-self' is separate from the mind (citta, the king of mind) and mental factors (cittavrtti, mental events) and has its own independent entity. Therefore, the third volume of the Hundred Verses states that the Samkhya heretics say: 'Thought' is the 'self,' and its nature is permanent. That treatise refutes this by saying: Such a 'thought-self,' being separate from the mind and mental factors and having its own independent entity, is difficult to understand. Therefore, it is known that the 'thought-self' is not a mental factor but exists separately from the aggregates. Question: The previous statement that relying on views to establish the 'self' and dharma, such as the Samkhya teachers, is it not contradictory? Answer: Saying 'separate from the aggregates,' etc., is according to the Samkhya school's view. Saying 'relying on views to establish' is Buddhism discussing them. Therefore, the previous and subsequent explanations are not contradictory. Commentary: The Mahayana school believes that in a single moment of thought, one can simultaneously obtain the object of perception, etc. The essence of existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava) both depend on names, so it is said to be 'simultaneous' (俱). The school of existence (referring to the Yogacara school) believes that there must be both an essence and an image for the mind to perceive. If the essence is lacking, the mind cannot arise, which is called 'not arising alone' (獨不生). The Sautrantika school believes that neither the appearance (nimitta) nor the essence is present, yet the mind can arise, which is called 'arising simultaneously' (俱得起). This is actually a summary of the differences between the previous three schools. Question: Does the school of existence itself allow the sixth consciousness to perceive empty flowers, etc.? If it allows perception, then this is perceiving non-existent things, and the mind can still arise. If it does not allow it, then it contradicts the sacred teachings. Answer: Although they allow perception, they rely on real flowers to perceive them. When perceiving empty flowers, they rely on the real flowers of the three times (past, present, and future) to perceive them together. Because they believe that the dharmas of the three times are all real. The rest can be inferred accordingly. Commentary: The inference (syllogism) says, 'The self should not be permanent,' etc. Question: If the 'self' is considered to be the aggregates, and the 'self' is permanent, then the aggregates should also be permanent. If this is not the case, how can it be said that the 'self' is the aggregates? Therefore, it is known that the aggregates are permanent. Now, using the permanence of the aggregates as an analogy, this analogy lacks what is to be established. Answer: There are two explanations. One
云。先以量成令蘊無常。然後為喻。量云。蘊定無常。待眾緣故。如瓶盆等。又若彼立蘊為常者。有違世間。世間共知蘊無常故 二云彼雖計我體即是蘊。許無常我即名常 若爾云何名我即蘊 答豈責群瞽而墜坑乎。下別破中亦有其妨。釋應同此。故不別出。
疏。根及屬色者。即扶根塵名為屬色。屬於根故。亦有本雲根及塵色。語雖有異而義無違。
疏。及無表色等者。問此無表色即內色蘊。何須今指 答雖內色蘊望以類別。故別破之。
疏。如所標者。論中所言中離蘊我離蘊。即是蘊不攝義。故此所標即是內也。
疏。然別有體等者。問若爾如何不是離蘊。復與瑜伽第四類我而有何別 答雖別有體。體與其蘊非即非離。彼第四計雖言在蘊。蘊與其我而即有異。故不同也。
疏。若破俱句至無同喻者。龜毛等法雖不可說以之為我可說非我。量云不可說非我者。此一分宗龜毛喻而不得轉。故闕喻也。
疏。應定說是蘊等者。略有二釋。一云雖復雙云我與非我。他本計我。非我兼說。故應雜云。如言我非我然體實唯我。雖言蘊非蘊我應定是蘊 二云此是伏難。難云計我與蘊不即不離。不即不離正是本計。明我非我亦合本計。如何非我不是正破。為此破云。應定是蘊。如似其我。我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：首先用量論來成立五蘊（Skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）是無常的，然後用比喻來說明。量論如下：五蘊一定是無常的，因為它依賴於眾多因緣。比如瓶子、盆子等都是無常的。此外，如果他們認為五蘊是常，那就違背了世間的常識，因為世間普遍認為五蘊是無常的。 二問：他們雖然認為『我』（Atman，靈魂、真我）的本體就是五蘊，但允許無常的『我』被稱為常。如果這樣，又怎麼能說『我』就是五蘊呢？答：這豈不是在責怪一群瞎子掉進坑裡嗎？下面的分別破斥中也有這樣的妨礙。解釋應該與此相同，所以不再單獨列出。
疏解：『根及屬色者』，就是扶助根的塵，稱為屬色，因為它屬於根。也有版本說『根及塵色』，說法雖然不同，但意義沒有違背。
疏解：『及無表色等者』，問：這無表色（Avijñapti-rūpa，不可知色）就是內色蘊（Rūpa-skandha，色蘊），為什麼現在還要特別指出？答：雖然是內色蘊，但從類別上來說，還是有區別的，所以要分別破斥。
疏解：『如所標者』，論中所說的『中離蘊我離蘊』，就是『我』不被五蘊所包含的意思。所以這裡所標的就是『內』。
疏解：『然別有體等者』，問：如果這樣，為什麼不是離蘊（與五蘊分離）？又與《瑜伽師地論》第四類所說的『我』有什麼區別？答：雖然『我』有不同的本體，但這個本體與五蘊既非即也非離。而《瑜伽師地論》第四類所說的『我』，雖然說在五蘊中，但五蘊與『我』是有區別的，所以不同。
疏解：『若破俱句至無同喻者』，像龜毛等法，雖然不能說它是我，但可以說它不是我。量論如下：不可說非我者，這一分宗（Sapaksa，同品）用龜毛來比喻，卻無法成立，所以缺少比喻。
疏解：『應定說是蘊等者』，大概有兩種解釋。一種說法是：雖然同時說『我』與『非我』，但他們本來就認為『我』，『非我』只是兼帶說說而已。所以應該混雜著說，比如『我說非我』，但本體實際上只是『我』。雖然說『蘊非蘊』，但我應該一定是蘊。另一種說法是：這是伏難（Prasaṅga，逼難），難點在於認為『我』與蘊不即不離，不即不離正是他們本來的觀點。明明說『我非我』也符合他們本來的觀點，為什麼說『非我』不是正破呢？爲了破斥這一點，所以說『應定是蘊』，就像那個『我』一樣，『我』
【English Translation】 English version: Question: First, establish the impermanence of the Skandhas (the five aggregates constituting individual experience: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) using logic, and then illustrate with a metaphor. The logical argument is as follows: The Skandhas are certainly impermanent because they depend on numerous conditions. For example, pots, basins, and the like are all impermanent. Furthermore, if they consider the Skandhas to be permanent, it contradicts worldly knowledge, as the world universally recognizes the Skandhas as impermanent. Second question: Although they believe that the essence of the 'Self' (Atman, soul) is the Skandhas, they allow the impermanent 'Self' to be called permanent. If so, how can it be said that the 'Self' is the Skandhas? Answer: Isn't this like blaming a group of blind people for falling into a pit? Similar obstacles exist in the subsequent refutations. The explanation should be the same as this, so it is not listed separately.
Commentary: 'Roots and associated form' refers to the dust that supports the roots, called associated form because it belongs to the roots. There is also a version that says 'roots and dust form,' the wording is different, but the meaning is not contradictory.
Commentary: 'And non-revealing form, etc.' Question: Is this non-revealing form (Avijñapti-rūpa) the same as the internal form Skandha (Rūpa-skandha)? Why is it necessary to point it out now? Answer: Although it is an internal form Skandha, it is still different in terms of category, so it must be refuted separately.
Commentary: 'As indicated' refers to the statement in the treatise 'the Self is separate from the Skandhas in the middle, the Self is separate from the Skandhas,' which means that the 'Self' is not included in the Skandhas. So what is indicated here is 'internal'.
Commentary: 'But there is a separate entity, etc.' Question: If so, why is it not separate from the Skandhas? And what is the difference between this and the fourth type of 'Self' mentioned in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra? Answer: Although the 'Self' has a different entity, this entity is neither identical nor separate from the Skandhas. The fourth type of 'Self' mentioned in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, although said to be in the Skandhas, is different from the Skandhas, so it is not the same.
Commentary: 'If refuting both clauses to no similar metaphor' refers to things like turtle hair, which cannot be said to be 'Self,' but can be said to be 'not Self.' The logical argument is as follows: 'That which cannot be said to be not Self,' this one-sided proposition (Sapaksa) uses turtle hair as a metaphor, but it cannot be established, so it lacks a metaphor.
Commentary: 'Should definitely be said to be Skandhas, etc.' There are roughly two explanations. One explanation is: Although both 'Self' and 'not Self' are mentioned, they originally considered it to be 'Self,' and 'not Self' was just mentioned incidentally. So it should be said in a mixed way, such as 'I say not Self,' but the essence is actually just 'Self.' Although it says 'Skandhas and not Skandhas,' I should definitely be Skandhas. Another explanation is: This is a Prasaṅga (forcing a consequence), the difficulty lies in thinking that the 'Self' and the Skandhas are neither identical nor separate, and neither identical nor separate is precisely their original view. Clearly saying 'Self and not Self' also conforms to their original view, so why is saying 'not Self' not a direct refutation? In order to refute this point, it is said 'should definitely be Skandhas,' just like that 'Self,' 'Self'
是正計。是彼本義。疏取本意難令即蘊。例意同前。
疏。又量至故無過者。問為無為喻為取我上為無為義。為取余耶。答但取我上。具如義燈 詳曰。設取我外為無為義為喻亦得。余有無為等有不可說義。有無為等而不在彼我非我聚。我上既有不可說義。云何即在我非我攝。喻有二立。可為正喻 問余有無為云何得有不可說義 答無為不得說作有為。有為返此 若爾何故論云又既不可說有為無為。豈余有為等不可說作為無為耶 答既兩句論成其一量。應須分別。不可說者而舉因也。有無為者舉其喻矣。因喻合言故無有失。若直準論。論中不言不在聚等。如何宗云於我非我聚亦不可說 問若取我外余為無為。論說又亦。又亦于誰 答由前難我而非是實。今更難彼非我聚等故言又也。亦者亦彼余有為無為。余有為無為有不可說。即不在於我非我聚。我亦同彼故。故言亦也。更思。
疏。雖性體常至非共許故者。詳曰。此他比量。犯他不定。何得非過。應改因云許非自性作用或時有不起故。既簡自性便無不定。或可自性安於宗中。而兼破之亦無其失。然初解勝。本破我故。
論。若無思慮等者。詳曰。疏除僧佉。理實兼破數論一分受果等之義。亦無其失。量云。汝解脫實我應不能受涅槃樂果。許無思慮
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是正確的計算。這是他們原本的意義。疏解選取原本的意義很難使其立即蘊含。例子的意義與前面相同。
疏解：又推論到『所以沒有過失』。問：是將『無為』比喻為在我之上，作為『無為』的意義？還是取其他的？答：只取在我之上的。具體如《義燈》所說。詳細地說，假設取我之外作為『無為』的意義，作為比喻也可以。其餘的『有無為』等有不可說的意義。有『無為』等，但不在彼我非我的聚集之中。我之上既然有不可說的意義，為何就在我非我的範疇內？比喻有兩種成立方式，可以作為正確的比喻。問：其餘的『無為』，為何會有不可說的意義？答：『無為』不能說成『有為』，『有為』反過來也是如此。如果這樣，為何論中說『又既然不可說有為無為』，難道其餘的『有為』等不可說作為『無為』嗎？答：既然兩句話構成一個量，就應該分別說明。『不可說』是舉出原因。『有無為』是舉出比喻。原因和比喻合在一起說，所以沒有缺失。如果直接按照論述，論中沒有說『不在聚集等之中』，如何能說宗義是『在我非我的聚集之中也不可說』？問：如果取我之外的其餘作為『無為』，論中說『又亦』，『又亦』是指誰？答：因為之前反駁我，但並非事實。現在進一步反駁他們非我的聚集等，所以說『又』。『亦』是指其餘的『有為無為』。其餘的『有為無為』有不可說的意義，即不在我非我的聚集之中。我也與他們相同，所以說『亦』。再思考。
疏解：雖然自性本體常住，但因為不是共同認可的。詳細地說，這是其他的比量，犯了『他不定』的錯誤。為何不是過失？應該修改原因為『認可非自性作用，有時有不生起』。既然簡化了自性，就沒有不確定的地方。或者可以將自性安放在宗義中，並且兼帶破斥它，也沒有什麼缺失。然而最初的解釋更好，因為原本就是要破斥『我』。
論：如果無思慮等。詳細地說，疏解排除了僧佉（Samkhya，數論），實際上也兼帶破斥了數論（Samkhya）一部分接受果報等的意義，也沒有什麼缺失。量云：你的解脫實我，應該不能接受涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）的樂果，認可無思慮。
【English Translation】 English version: This is the correct calculation. This is their original meaning. The commentary's selection of the original meaning makes it difficult to immediately imply. The meaning of the example is the same as before.
Commentary: Furthermore, inferring to 'therefore there is no fault'. Question: Is 'non-action' (無為, Wuwei) being used as a metaphor for being above the 'self' (我, Wo), as the meaning of 'non-action'? Or is it taking something else? Answer: It only takes what is above the 'self'. As detailed in the 'Lamp of Meaning'. In detail, suppose taking something outside the 'self' as the meaning of 'non-action', it can also be used as a metaphor. The remaining 'having non-action' (有無為, Youwuwei) etc. have inexpressible meanings. There is 'non-action' etc., but it is not in the gathering of 'self', 'non-self' (非我, Feiwo). Since there is an inexpressible meaning above the 'self', why is it within the category of 'self' and 'non-self'? There are two ways to establish a metaphor, which can be used as a correct metaphor. Question: Why does the remaining 'non-action' have an inexpressible meaning? Answer: 'Non-action' cannot be said to be 'action' (有為, Youwei), and 'action' is the opposite of this. If so, why does the treatise say 'Moreover, since it cannot be said to have action or non-action', could it be that the remaining 'action' etc. cannot be said to be 'non-action'? Answer: Since the two sentences constitute a measure, they should be explained separately. 'Inexpressible' is to cite the cause. 'Having non-action' is to cite the metaphor. The cause and metaphor are said together, so there is no omission. If directly according to the treatise, the treatise does not say 'not in the gathering etc.', how can the tenet say that 'it is also inexpressible in the gathering of self and non-self'? Question: If taking the remainder outside the 'self' as 'non-action', the treatise says 'moreover also', who does 'moreover also' refer to? Answer: Because previously refuting me, but it is not the truth. Now further refuting their non-self gathering etc., so it says 'moreover'. 'Also' refers to the remaining 'having action and non-action'. The remaining 'having action and non-action' has an inexpressible meaning, that is, it is not in the gathering of self and non-self. I am also the same as them, so it says 'also'. Think further.
Commentary: Although the nature of the substance is permanent, it is not commonly acknowledged. In detail, this is another inference, committing the error of 'other uncertainty'. Why is it not a fault? The cause should be changed to 'acknowledging non-self-nature function, sometimes there is no arising'. Since the self-nature is simplified, there is no uncertainty. Or the self-nature can be placed in the tenet, and also refuting it, there is no omission. However, the initial explanation is better, because originally it was to refute the 'self'.
Treatise: If there is no thought etc. In detail, the commentary excludes Samkhya (僧佉, a school of Indian philosophy), and in fact also refutes the meaning of a part of Samkhya (數論, a school of Indian philosophy) accepting the fruits of karma etc., and there is no omission. The measure says: Your liberation, the real self, should not be able to receive the blissful fruit of Nirvana (涅槃, a state of enlightenment), acknowledging no thought.
故。猶如虛空。彼宗計我。得解脫時雖無思慮。而能受彼涅槃樂果。故破無失。
論。理俱不成者。有義二釋。一云有慮無慮皆不成故。二云若有慮者常住不成。若無慮者作．受不成。
疏。若對吠世至如足等者。問勝論足等六句何攝。答實句所收。即實句中四大為體。
論。若非我見所緣境者。有義二釋。一云同疏。外道我體非我見緣。故下論云。若無我見能證涅槃。次云若是我見境者。是設遮也。若爾下云又諸我見不緣我等。豈不相扶。答應說我云。我見有二。一執著我見。二雖緣我而不執著。初染后凈。言無我見得涅槃者據無染見。下立量破。破染我見故無相扶。二云諸宗計我皆我見緣。故后二量無相扶失。而言非我見緣者。是設遮也 詳曰。若言我見有二種者。即彼我體亦我見緣。云何得言非我見境。故知彼宗凈我見者。不作我解不名我見。
疏。雖不作如解等者。無分別智雖復不作真如之解。仍喚真如緣真如心緣。汝我應爾。然彼本計而不許也。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第一(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第一(末)
◎論。所信至教者。問何者言教得至教名 答通於凡．聖言無差別。可信者語皆至教量。契至理故。會實事故。如八語品．四聖言等。故顯揚論第十一云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，就像虛空一樣。他們宗派所計度的『我』（ātman），在獲得解脫時即使沒有思慮，也能領受涅槃的快樂果報。所以破斥他們的觀點沒有過失。
論：『理俱不成』是指，有一種解釋是，無論有思慮還是無思慮都不成立。另一種解釋是，如果有思慮，就不能常住；如果沒有思慮，就不能進行造作和領受。
疏：如果針對吠世史迦（Vaiśeṣika）的『如足等』的觀點，那麼要問勝論的足等六句被歸入哪一類？回答是歸入『實句』，即『實句』中以四大為本體。
論：如果不是『我見』（ātma-dṛṣṭi）所緣的境界，有一種解釋是和疏鈔相同。外道的『我』（ātman）的本體不是『我見』所緣。所以下面的論述說：『如果沒有我見能夠證得涅槃』，接著說『如果是『我見』的境界』，這是假設的遮止。如果這樣，下面的論述說『又各種我見不緣我等』，難道不是互相扶持嗎？應該說『我』（ātman）有兩種『我見』：一種是執著的『我見』，一種是雖然緣『我』（ātman）但不執著。前者是染污的，後者是清凈的。說沒有『我見』能夠得到涅槃，是根據沒有染污的見解。下面建立量來破斥，破斥的是染污的『我見』，所以沒有互相扶持的過失。另一種解釋是，各個宗派所計度的『我』（ātman）都是『我見』所緣，所以後面的兩個量沒有互相扶持的過失。說不是『我見』所緣，是假設的遮止。詳細地說，如果說『我見』有兩種，那麼他們的『我』（ātman）的本體也是『我見』所緣，怎麼能說不是『我見』的境界？所以知道他們宗派清凈的『我見』，不作『我』（ātman）的理解，不稱為『我見』。
疏：即使不作如是理解等，無分別智即使不作真如的理解，仍然稱作真如緣真如，心緣。你們的『我』（ātman）也應該是這樣。然而他們原本的計度卻不允許這樣。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第一（本終）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第一（末）
論：所信的至教，問：什麼樣的言教才能得到『至教』的名稱？答：通於凡夫和聖人的言語沒有差別，可以相信的話都是『至教』的量，因為契合至理，符合實際情況。如八語品、四聖言等。所以《顯揚論》第十一說：
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is like empty space. Their sect's concept of 'ātman' (self), even without thought at the time of liberation, can still receive the blissful result of Nirvana. Therefore, refuting their view is without fault.
Treatise: 'Both principles are unestablished' means that one interpretation is that neither having thought nor not having thought is established. Another interpretation is that if there is thought, it cannot be permanent; if there is no thought, it cannot perform actions or receive results.
Commentary: If, in response to the Vaiśeṣika's view of 'like feet, etc.,' the question is, to which category do the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, such as feet, belong? The answer is that they are included in the category of 'substance,' that is, the four great elements are the essence of 'substance'.
Treatise: If it is not the object of 'ātma-dṛṣṭi' (self-view), one interpretation is the same as the commentary. The essence of the 'ātman' (self) of the non-Buddhist path is not the object of 'self-view'. Therefore, the following discussion says: 'If there is no self-view that can attain Nirvana,' and then says, 'If it is the object of 'self-view',' this is a hypothetical negation. If so, the following discussion says, 'Also, various self-views do not relate to self, etc.,' isn't this mutually supportive? It should be said that there are two types of 'self' (ātman) 'self-view': one is the clinging 'self-view', and the other is although it relates to 'self' (ātman) but does not cling. The former is defiled, and the latter is pure. Saying that without 'self-view' one can attain Nirvana is based on the absence of defiled views. The following establishes a syllogism to refute, refuting the defiled 'self-view', so there is no fault of mutual support. Another interpretation is that the 'self' (ātman) conceived by each sect is the object of 'self-view', so the latter two syllogisms do not have the fault of mutual support. Saying that it is not the object of 'self-view' is a hypothetical negation. In detail, if it is said that there are two types of 'self-view', then their 'self' (ātman) is also the object of 'self-view', how can it be said that it is not the object of 'self-view'? Therefore, it is known that their sect's pure 'self-view' does not understand it as 'self' (ātman) and is not called 'self-view'.
Commentary: Even if it does not make such an understanding, etc., non-discriminating wisdom, even if it does not make an understanding of Suchness, is still called Suchness relating to Suchness, mind relating. Your 'self' (ātman) should also be like this. However, their original calculation does not allow this.
Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 1 (End of the Text)
Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 1 (End)
Treatise: The trusted ultimate teaching, question: What kind of teaching can be called the 'ultimate teaching'? Answer: There is no difference between the speech of ordinary people and sages, and words that can be trusted are all measures of the 'ultimate teaching' because they are consistent with the ultimate truth and conform to reality. Such as the eight speech qualities, the four holy sayings, etc. Therefore, the eleventh volume of the Śūnyatā-sūtra says:
。至教者謂一切智人所設言教。或從彼聞法隨法行。此復三種。一聖言所攝。二對治雜染。三不違法相 聖言所攝者。謂如來．及諸弟子所說經教。不違正法不違正義 對治雜染者。謂依此法善修習時。能求調伏貪．嗔．癡等 不違法相者。翻違法相。當知是名不違法相。違法相者。謂于無相增于有相。于雜染法立為清凈等。名違法相 問外道言教三義並無。云何名彼為至教耶 答隨彼宗言論云所信簡違宗矣。
疏。總破前師等者。問設總破者豈亦不有一分相扶。各許凈見不緣我故。又互不許染緣我故 答故疏說云但緣我見皆不緣我。此簡凈見及互不許。悉皆盡矣。論略指法。疏具明也 有云。若言我見應不緣我。即有過失。染見不緣我故者 詳曰。不然。違論．及疏。疏．論敘難皆言染見。彼許緣我 問若爾自宗能．所緣義皆應不成。故外難云。汝宗眼識應不緣色。有所緣故。如緣聲等識。難所緣量準可知也 答彼量便有自教．世間相違等過。世間共許眼緣於色。我即不爾 問正智緣如非世共許。他以為難何事不齊。難準前作 答本意但爭我體有無。汝妄執我常能作受。故為前量。然真如理非能作受。體是實有。故正智緣。廣如掌珍論 問他若將彼第七．八識為難如何 答我能所緣皆假言說。復不離識。汝我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 至教指的是一切智人（Sarvajna，指佛陀）所設立的言教，或者從他們那裡聽聞佛法並依之修行。這又分為三種：一是聖言所攝，二是能對治雜染，三是不違法相。
聖言所攝指的是如來（Tathagata，指佛陀）以及諸弟子所說的經教，不違背正法，也不違背正義。
對治雜染指的是，依靠這些佛法善加修習時，能夠調伏貪、嗔、癡等煩惱。
不違法相，就是與違法相相反。應當知道這就是不違法相。違法相指的是，對於無相的事物增加有相的執著，對於雜染的法認為是清凈等等，這些都叫做違法相。
問：外道的言教這三種意義都不具備，為什麼還稱他們為至教呢？
答：這是隨順他們宗派的言論，意思是說他們所信仰的，與他們的宗派不相違背。 總破前師等： 問：如果全部破斥，難道就沒有一部分是相互扶持的嗎？因為他們各自都認可清凈的見解不緣于『我』（Atman），而且互相不認可染污的見解緣于『我』。
答：所以疏文中說：『但凡緣於我見的，都不緣於我』。這就概括了清凈的見解以及互相不認可的情況，全部都包括在內了。論中只是簡略地指出了法，疏文中則具體地闡明了。
有人說：如果說『我見』不應該緣于『我』，那就有了過失，因為染污的見解不緣于『我』。
詳細地說：不是這樣的。這違背了論和疏文。疏文和論述中敘述的困難都說是染污的見解，他們認可染污的見解緣于『我』。
問：如果這樣，你們宗派的能緣和所緣的意義都應該不能成立。所以外道提出詰難說：你們宗派的眼識應該不能緣於色（Rupa），因為它有所緣，就像緣于聲（Shabda）等識一樣。詰難所緣的量可以依此類推。
答：他們的量就有了與自己教義、與世間常識相違背等過失。世間普遍認可眼睛能夠緣於色，而『我』不是這樣。
問：正智緣于真如（Tathata）並非世間普遍認可的，他們用這個來詰難，為什麼不能同樣對待？詰難可以參照前面的方式進行。
答：本意只是爭論『我』的體性是否存在，你們妄自執著『我』是常能作和受的。所以才用前面的量。然而真如的道理不是能作和受，它的體性是真實存在的，所以正智慧夠緣於它。詳細的內容可以參考《掌珍論》。
問：如果他們用第七識（末那識，Manas）和第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）來詰難，該如何回答？
答：我們所說的能緣和所緣都是假立的言說，而且不離於識。你們的『我』
【English Translation】 English version: The 'Ultimate Teaching' refers to the teachings established by the Sarvajna (Omniscient One, referring to the Buddha), or those who hear the Dharma from them and practice accordingly. This is further divided into three types: first, that which is encompassed by the sacred words; second, that which counteracts defilements; and third, that which does not violate the characteristics of reality (Dharmalaksana).
That which is encompassed by the sacred words refers to the scriptures and teachings spoken by the Tathagata (Thus Gone One, referring to the Buddha) and his disciples, which do not contradict the correct Dharma or the correct meaning.
That which counteracts defilements refers to the fact that when one diligently practices according to these teachings, one can subdue afflictions such as greed, anger, and ignorance.
'Not violating the characteristics of reality' is the opposite of 'violating the characteristics of reality.' It should be understood that this is what is meant by 'not violating the characteristics of reality.' 'Violating the characteristics of reality' refers to adding the perception of existence to that which is without characteristics, or considering impure dharmas to be pure, and so on. These are called 'violating the characteristics of reality.'
Question: The teachings of non-Buddhists do not possess these three meanings. Why are they called 'Ultimate Teachings'?
Answer: This is in accordance with the tenets of their own schools, meaning that what they believe does not contradict their own school. General Refutation of Previous Teachers, etc.: Question: If there is a complete refutation, is there not some part that is mutually supportive? Because they each acknowledge that pure views do not depend on the 'self' (Atman), and they mutually do not acknowledge that defiled views depend on the 'self.'
Answer: Therefore, the commentary says: 'All views that depend on the self do not depend on the self.' This encompasses pure views and mutual non-acknowledgment, including everything. The treatise only briefly points out the Dharma, while the commentary explains it in detail.
Some say: If it is said that 'self-view' should not depend on the 'self,' then there is a fault, because defiled views do not depend on the 'self.'
In detail: That is not so. This contradicts the treatise and the commentary. The difficulties described in the treatise and commentary all refer to defiled views, and they acknowledge that defiled views depend on the 'self.'
Question: If that is so, the meaning of the subject and object of cognition in your school should not be established. Therefore, non-Buddhists raise the objection: The eye-consciousness of your school should not cognize form (Rupa), because it has an object of cognition, just like consciousnesses that cognize sound (Shabda) and so on. The measure of objecting to the object of cognition can be inferred accordingly.
Answer: Their measure has faults such as contradicting their own teachings and contradicting worldly common sense. The world universally acknowledges that the eye can cognize form, but the 'self' is not like that.
Question: Correct wisdom cognizing Suchness (Tathata) is not universally acknowledged by the world. Why is it not treated the same way when they use this to object? The objection can be made in the same way as before.
Answer: The original intention is only to argue about whether the nature of the 'self' exists. You falsely cling to the 'self' as being constantly capable of acting and experiencing. That is why the previous measure is used. However, the principle of Suchness is not capable of acting and experiencing; its nature is truly existent, so correct wisdom can cognize it. Detailed content can be found in the Treatise on the Palm of the Hand.
Question: If they use the seventh consciousness (Manas, the mind consciousness) and the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, the storehouse consciousness) to object, how should one answer?
Answer: Our talk of subject and object of cognition are all provisional expressions, and they are not separate from consciousness. Your 'self'
及見實能所緣。我復離識。故不為例。應審思之。
疏無有一我是相分者。彼二論中明十六種大外道論。所緣皆是自心相分。若有一我體是相分。我體可得名為所緣見緣於我。既無其我體是相分。故知我體不是所緣。見亦不緣我為其境。
疏。自下第四解分別俱生者。有義此文示其正義。于理為勝 詳曰。俱生分別豈外道許。彼宗既無今標明彼分別．俱生。何乖自義言示自義名為勝耶．故疏無失。
疏。言我執至皆名執者。若言我見不通心王．及余心所。執言寬故。該見同時心．心所等皆名為執 或言我執亦唯是見。如下但說見名為執。今取前釋。
疏。以許染凈雜所生者。下第十論云。三性因緣許雜引生 問第七相分雜引云何 答有二釋。一云。第七現相隨於見．質通於二性。此相熏種。種隨現相亦名二性。后相依此二性種生名雜引生 二云。此第七相或質同種。或見同種。種稱雜引也。性雜可知 前解為勝。許第七相別有種故。
疏。不稱本質至名為有執者。五識不親緣自外質名為不稱 有云。初禪眼識見慾火災相分與質不相似故。別種生故 詳曰。當地五識所緣質．相豈同種耶。復云何稱。若言異地不稱義顯故舉之者。亦為不可。便疑同地種同相稱。
論。緣識所變五取
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及觀察到真實存在的能取和所取。我已脫離了識，因此不能作為例子。應該仔細思考。
疏：沒有一個我是作為相分（lakṣaṇa-bhāga，影像部分）存在的。在他們的兩種論述中，闡明了十六種大外道的理論。他們所緣的都是自心的相分。如果有一個我的本體是相分，我的本體就可以被認為是所緣，見（darśana，見解）緣於我。既然沒有我的本體是相分，就知道我的本體不是所緣，見也不會以我為境界。
疏：下面第四個解釋是關於分別俱生（sahaja-vikalpa，與生俱來的分別）的。有一種觀點認為，這段文字顯示了其正確的含義，在道理上更為優勝。詳細地說，俱生分別難道是外道所允許的嗎？他們的宗派既然沒有，現在卻標明他們的分別和俱生，這與自己的主張相悖，怎麼能說是顯示自己的含義，並且是優勝的呢？因此，疏文沒有錯誤。
疏：說到『我執』直到『都名為執』。如果說『我見』不包括心王（citta-rāja，主要意識）以及其他心所（caitta，心理活動），那麼『執』這個詞的含義更寬泛，包括了與見同時存在的心、心所等，都可以稱為『執』。或者說，『我執』也僅僅是見，如下文只說見名為執。現在採用前一種解釋。
疏：因為允許染污和清凈混合產生。下文第十論說：『三性（tri-svabhāva，三種自性）的因緣允許混合引生。』問：第七識的相分如何混合引生？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是：第七識的現相隨著見和質（vastu，實體），貫通於兩種性質。這個相熏習種子，種子隨著現相也稱為兩種性質。後來的相依靠這兩種性質的種子而生，稱為混合引生。另一種說法是：這個第七識的相或者與質同種，或者與見同種，種子稱為混合引生。性質混合是可以理解的。前一種解釋更為優勝，因為允許第七識的相有不同的種子。
疏：不符合本質直到名為有執。五識（pañca-vijñāna，五種感官意識）不直接緣于自身之外的質，稱為不符合。有人說：初禪（prathama-dhyāna，禪定第一階段）的眼識所見的火災相分與質不相似，因為是不同的種子所生。詳細地說，當地五識所緣的質和相難道是同一種子嗎？又怎麼能符合呢？如果說異地不符合，意義明顯，所以舉出這個例子，這也是不可以的。這樣會懷疑同地的種子相同，相符合。
論：緣于識所變的五取蘊（pañca-upādāna-skandha，五種執取蘊）。
【English Translation】 English version: And also observing the truly existing grasper and grasped. I have separated from consciousness, therefore it cannot be taken as an example. It should be carefully considered.
Commentary: There is no 'I' that exists as a lakṣaṇa-bhāga (image-part). In their two treatises, they clarify the theories of the sixteen great non-Buddhist paths. What they cognize are all lakṣaṇa-bhāga of their own minds. If there were an 'I' whose essence was a lakṣaṇa-bhāga, then the essence of 'I' could be considered the cognized object, and darśana (view) would cognize 'I'. Since there is no 'I' whose essence is a lakṣaṇa-bhāga, it is known that the essence of 'I' is not the cognized object, and darśana does not take 'I' as its object.
Commentary: The fourth explanation below concerns sahaja-vikalpa (innate discrimination). Some argue that this passage reveals its correct meaning and is superior in reasoning. In detail, is sahaja-vikalpa something that non-Buddhists would allow? Since their school does not have it, yet now they label their discrimination and sahaja, how can this contradict their own meaning and be called superior? Therefore, the commentary is not mistaken.
Commentary: When it says 'attachment to self' up to 'all are called attachment'. If it is said that 'view of self' does not include citta-rāja (mind-king, main consciousness) and other caitta (mental activities), then the meaning of the word 'attachment' is broader, including the mind, mental activities, etc. that exist simultaneously with the view, all of which can be called 'attachment'. Alternatively, 'attachment to self' is also merely a view, as the following text only says that view is called attachment. Now we adopt the former explanation.
Commentary: Because it is allowed that defiled and pure are mixed to produce. The tenth treatise below says: 'The conditions of the tri-svabhāva (three natures) allow mixed production.' Question: How does the lakṣaṇa-bhāga of the seventh consciousness produce mixedly? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is: the appearance of the seventh consciousness follows the seeing and the substance (vastu), penetrating both natures. This appearance熏習(perfumes) the seed, and the seed following the appearance is also called two natures. The subsequent appearance relies on the seed of these two natures to arise, called mixed production. Another explanation is: this lakṣaṇa-bhāga of the seventh consciousness is either of the same seed as the substance, or of the same seed as the seeing, and the seed is called mixed production. The mixing of natures is understandable. The former explanation is superior because it allows the lakṣaṇa-bhāga of the seventh consciousness to have different seeds.
Commentary: Not conforming to the essence up to being called having attachment. The pañca-vijñāna (five sense consciousnesses) do not directly cognize the substance outside themselves, which is called not conforming. Some say: the fire disaster lakṣaṇa-bhāga seen by the eye consciousness in the prathama-dhyāna (first dhyana) is not similar to the substance, because it is born from different seeds. In detail, are the substance and appearance cognized by the five consciousnesses in the same place the same seed? How can they conform? If it is said that not conforming in a different place is obvious, so this example is given, that is also not acceptable. This would lead to the suspicion that the seeds in the same place are the same, and the appearances conform.
Treatise: Cognizing the pañca-upādāna-skandha (five aggregates of clinging) transformed by consciousness.
蘊者。問此五取蘊何識所變 答有義除第六識餘七識變。第六所變自親相分下文別說起自心相執為我故 問若是本質如何但說緣識所變 答理實亦因余能變之識。說所變言依相．見故。實理親緣唯所變相。若依本質亦緣能變。此隨相顯說所變言。實亦不應言識所變。不爾前執應說變言。前既但言緣第八識。此亦但應緣五取蘊 問何名取蘊 答對法第一云。以取合故名為取蘊。釋。合是和義．順義。不相離相資義。由蘊與取更相和順。遞不相離更令生長。故名取蘊。余具樞要。
疏。其實亦有者。有本質也。
疏。非無本質是俱生者。非有俱生執不緣本質。起。釋俱生執要有本質之所以也。
疏。初簡修道不相應惑者。獨頭貪等名不相應。世道能伏。
疏。若頓悟者亦通見斷等者。有義俱生我見行相微細。如何超果說見道斷。若言助伴先有漏伏。理亦不然。相應貪等我見行同。如何說伴前有漏伏。若伏相應我見應爾。行相同故。對法等說超初．二果。隨轉理門。非大乘義 詳曰。障．果相違礙即斷之。欲界煩惱既礙不還。見道斷之而有何失。若言惑細。豈勝無漏見道之智。若不勝者勝斷不勝何不許耶 又言伴者流類相助。非要相應。要相應者云何五地說斷害伴。故疏不說相應之貪名伴已伏 又
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"疏：『若頓悟者亦通見斷等者』，有一種觀點認為，俱生我見（sahaja-ātmadṛṣṭi，與生俱來的我見）的行相（ākāra，狀態）非常微細，如何能夠超越果位（phala，修行證果）而說是見道（darśanamārga，見道位）所斷除的呢？如果說是依靠助伴（sahāya，輔助因素）先以有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）之法伏除，道理上也是不通的。因為與我見相應的貪等煩惱，其行相與我見相同，如何能說助伴先以有漏之法伏除呢？如果伏除了相應的我見，也應該伏除我見本身，因為它們的行相相同。《對法論》等論典中說超越初果（srotaāpanna，預流果）、二果（sakṛdāgāmin，一來果），是隨順理門（nyāyadvara，道理之門）而說的，並非大乘（mahāyāna，大乘佛教）的真實義理。詳細地說，障礙（āvaraṇa，煩惱障）與果位（phala，修行證果）是相互違礙的，斷除了障礙才能證得果位。欲界（kāmadhātu，欲界）的煩惱既然障礙了不還果（anāgāmin，不還果），那麼在見道位斷除這些煩惱又有什麼過失呢？如果說煩惱微細，難道能勝過無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）的見道之智嗎？如果不能勝過，那麼勝者斷除不勝者，為什麼不允許呢？又說『伴』是指同類相助，並非一定要相應。如果一定要相應，那麼為什麼在五地（pañcabhūmika，五地菩薩）才說斷除和損害助伴呢？所以疏中沒有說相應的貪慾名為助伴已被伏除。", "又：", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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"", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", ], "english_translations": [ "English version:", "Question: By which consciousness (vijñāna) are these five aggregates of clinging (pañcaskandha) transformed?", "Answer: According to one view, all seven consciousnesses except the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna) transform them. The sixth consciousness transforms its own directly perceived aspect (svasaṃvedanāṃśa), which will be discussed separately below, because it clings to its own mental image (cittākāra) as 'self' (ātman).", "Question: If the essence (vastu) of the five aggregates is external, why is it only said to be transformed by consciousness?", "Answer: In reality, the five aggregates are also caused by other transforming consciousnesses. The term 'transformed' is used in relation to the aspect (lakṣaṇāṃśa) and the cognitive aspect (darśanāṃśa). In reality, the direct condition (pratyaya) only conditions the transformed aspect. If based on the essence, it also conditions the transforming consciousness. Here, it is said to be 'transformed' according to the manifested aspect. In reality, it should not be said to be transformed by consciousness. Otherwise, when previously clinging to the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna), it should have been said to be 'transformed' instead of 'conditioned'. Since it was previously only said to be conditioned by the eighth consciousness, here it should also only be said to be conditioned by the five aggregates.", "Question: What are the aggregates of clinging (upādānaskandha)?", "Answer: The first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Because of clinging, they are called aggregates of clinging.' The explanation is that 'joining' means harmony and compliance, meaning not being separate and mutually supportive. Because the aggregates (skandha) and clinging (upādāna) are harmonious with each other, not separate, and cause each other to grow, they are called aggregates of clinging. The rest is explained in detail in the Śāsanavārtā.", "", "Commentary: 'In reality, there is also essence' refers to having an essence.", "", "Commentary: 'Not without essence is the co-arisen' means that the co-arisen clinging to self (sahaja-ātmagrāha) does not arise without conditioning an essence. The explanation is that the arising of co-arisen clinging to self must have an essence as its basis.", "", "Commentary: 'Initially distinguishing the afflictions not corresponding to the path of cultivation' refers to independent greed (ekatrapṛthagjana-rāga) and other non-corresponding formations (cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra). Worldly paths can subdue these afflictions.", "", "Commentary: 'If one has sudden enlightenment, it also includes what is severed by the path of seeing' according to one view, the co-arisen self-view (sahaja-ātmadṛṣṭi) has a very subtle mode of operation (ākāra), how can it be said to be severed by the path of seeing (darśanamārga) by surpassing the fruition (phala)? If it is said that relying on companions (sahāya), first subduing with defiled (sāsrava) dharmas, the reasoning is also not valid. Because the greed and other afflictions corresponding to self-view have the same mode of operation as self-view, how can it be said that the companions are first subdued with defiled dharmas? If the corresponding self-view is subdued, then self-view itself should also be subdued, because their modes of operation are the same. The Abhidharmasamuccaya and other treatises say that surpassing the first fruit (srotaāpanna) and second fruit (sakṛdāgāmin) is said according to the door of reasoning (nyāyadvara), not the true meaning of Mahayana (mahāyāna). In detail, obstructions (āvaraṇa) and fruitions (phala) are mutually contradictory, and one can attain fruition only by severing obstructions. Since the afflictions of the desire realm (kāmadhātu) obstruct the non-returning fruit (anāgāmin), what fault is there in severing these afflictions on the path of seeing? If it is said that the afflictions are subtle, can they surpass the undefiled (anāsrava) wisdom of the path of seeing? If they cannot surpass it, then why is it not allowed that the superior severs the inferior? Furthermore, 'companion' refers to mutual assistance of the same kind, not necessarily corresponding. If it is necessary to correspond, then why is it said that companions are severed and harmed only on the fifth ground (pañcabhūmika)? Therefore, the commentary does not say that the corresponding greed is called a companion that has already been subdued.", "Also:" ] }
云相應行相同者。亦為不可。諸論皆言心王．心所同一所緣不同行相。若言對法隨轉理者。何處大乘不許超果。不許超果斷欲我見。此論明言而無生上退斷下失。豈不相違。亦不可以末那惑例。末那煩惱不能潤生障不還故。又復論主已自簡訖。
疏。界第九者。當界當界第九品也。
疏。有難斷不名細等者。詳曰。疏有三句。以理言之有第四句。即三心中第二心也。望初非細。望第三心非是難斷。
疏。此就所斷以作二解者。解難斷義。即言品類是第一解。次言難易是第二解。
疏。以行相翻說者。我執正違生空之智。所以今言生空除滅 問若言俱生修道斷者。與楞伽經豈不相違。按四卷經第二說云。大惠身見有二種。謂俱生．及妄想。須陀洹人二種身見斷故疑法不生。十卷第四文意大同 答有義俱生據伏。分別約斷。斷之與伏俱名斷故。或翻譯者不悟大乘。隨自所解小乘相說。薩婆多等皆見斷故。
論。且數論者。依天親菩薩傳。敘此師事。如燈具引。又相傳云。劫初之時有一外道。舊百論等名伽毗羅。此人修道得五通仙。造略數論已知世無常。身不久住。恐他於後破所造論。遂欲留身久住與他論難。往自在天所請延壽法。自在天云。汝可往林食余甘子。即可久住。其餘甘子。未熟
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果認為與云相應的行（Yuna corresponding line）相同，這也是不可能的。各種論述都說心王（Citta-raja，心識的主體）和心所（Caitasika，心的附屬作用）所緣相同，但行相不同。如果說符合對法（Abhidharma）的隨轉理，那麼哪裡的大乘（Mahayana）不認可超越果位？不認可超越果位，斷除欲界的我見（Sakkayaditthi，認為五蘊為我的邪見）。此論明明說沒有在無生（Anutpada，不生不滅的境界）之上退轉，也沒有斷除下位而失去上位的情況，這豈不是自相矛盾？也不能用末那（Manas，意識）的迷惑來類比。末那的煩惱不能滋潤生命，也不能障礙不還果（Anagami-phala，不再返回欲界的果位）。而且論主已經自己簡別清楚了。
疏：『界第九者』，指的是當界（Dhatu，界）的第九品。
疏：『有難斷不名細等者』，詳細解釋說，疏中有三句話，從道理上講有第四句話，即三心中的第二心。相對於第一個心來說，它不是細微的；相對於第三個心來說，它不是難以斷除的。
疏：『此就所斷以作二解者』，解釋難斷的含義。說品類是第一種解釋，說難易是第二種解釋。
疏：『以行相翻說者』，我執（Ahamkara，對自我的執著）正好違背生空之智（Sunyata-jnana，證悟空性的智慧），所以現在說生空可以除滅我執。問：如果說俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）的我執是通過修道斷除的，那麼與《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）豈不是相違背？按照四卷本《楞伽經》第二卷所說，大慧（Mahamati），身見（Sakkayaditthi，認為五蘊為我的邪見）有兩種，即俱生的和妄想的。須陀洹（Sotapanna，入流果）斷除了兩種身見，所以對佛法不會產生懷疑。十卷本第四卷的文意大致相同。答：有一種觀點認為，俱生的我執是暫時降伏，分別的我執才是真正斷除。斷除和降伏都可以稱為斷。或者翻譯者不理解大乘的教義，按照自己理解的小乘（Hinayana）的觀點來解釋。薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等都認為有見斷（Drishti-prahana，通過見道斷除的煩惱）。
論：『且數論者』，根據天親菩薩（Vasubandhu）的傳記，敘述這位老師的事蹟，如同燈具所引用。又相傳，劫初的時候有一位外道，舊《百論》等稱他為伽毗羅（Kapila）。此人修道獲得了五神通，知道世間無常，身體不能長久住世。擔心以後有人破壞他所造的理論，於是想長久住世與他人辯論。前往自在天（Isvara）處請求延壽的方法。自在天說：『你可以去林中吃余甘子（Amalaka），就可以長久住世。』其餘甘子還沒有成熟。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is thought that the lines corresponding to the clouds are the same, that is also impossible. All treatises say that the Citta-raja (mind-king, the subject of consciousness) and Caitasika (mental factors, the mind's subsidiary functions) have the same object but different characteristics. If it is said to accord with the principles of Abhidharma, then where does Mahayana not acknowledge surpassing the fruit? Not acknowledging surpassing the fruit, cutting off the Sakkayaditthi (self-view, the false view of considering the five aggregates as self) of the desire realm. This treatise clearly states that there is no regression above Anutpada (non-arising, the state of non-birth and non-death), nor is there a loss of the higher by cutting off the lower. Isn't this contradictory? It also cannot be compared to the delusion of Manas (mind). The afflictions of Manas cannot nourish life, nor can they obstruct the Anagami-phala (non-returning fruit, the state of not returning to the desire realm). Moreover, the author of the treatise has already distinguished it clearly himself.
Commentary: 'The ninth of the realm' refers to the ninth chapter of the Dhatu (realm).
Commentary: 'Having difficult to cut off is not called subtle, etc.' Explaining in detail, the commentary has three sentences, and logically speaking, there is a fourth sentence, which is the second mind among the three minds. Relative to the first mind, it is not subtle; relative to the third mind, it is not difficult to cut off.
Commentary: 'This takes the cut-off as making two explanations' explains the meaning of difficult to cut off. Saying that the category is the first explanation, and saying that the difficulty is the second explanation.
Commentary: 'Speaking in terms of characteristics', Ahamkara (ego-attachment, attachment to self) directly contradicts Sunyata-jnana (wisdom of emptiness, wisdom that realizes emptiness), so now it is said that emptiness can eliminate ego-attachment. Question: If it is said that Sahaja (innate, inborn) ego-attachment is cut off through cultivation, then isn't it contradictory to the Lankavatara Sutra? According to the second chapter of the four-volume Lankavatara Sutra, Mahamati, there are two kinds of Sakkayaditthi (self-view, the false view of considering the five aggregates as self), namely Sahaja and conceptual. Sotapanna (stream-enterer) cuts off both kinds of self-view, so doubts about the Dharma do not arise. The meaning of the fourth chapter of the ten-volume version is roughly the same. Answer: One view is that Sahaja ego-attachment is temporarily subdued, while conceptual ego-attachment is truly cut off. Cutting off and subduing can both be called cutting off. Or the translator did not understand the teachings of Mahayana and explained it according to his own understanding of Hinayana. Sarvastivada, etc., all believe in Drishti-prahana (afflictions cut off through the path of seeing).
Treatise: 'Moreover, the Samkhya school', according to the biography of Vasubandhu, narrates the deeds of this teacher, as quoted in the lamp. It is also said that at the beginning of the kalpa, there was a heretic, called Kapila in the old Hundred Treatises, etc. This person cultivated and obtained the five supernormal powers, knowing that the world is impermanent and the body cannot live long. Fearing that someone would destroy his created theories in the future, he wanted to live long and debate with others. He went to Isvara (the self-existent lord) to ask for a method to prolong life. Isvara said, 'You can go to the forest and eat Amalaka (Indian gooseberry), and you can live long.' The remaining Amalaka were not yet ripe.
之時其色乃青。若已熟者其色黃白。此即仙藥。此藥初食酸苦少味。食已若飲冷水口中甘味。猶如食蜜。因以名焉。仙獲此藥乃恐無常。更往天所復請延年。天云斷為一物最得長壽。天遂變仙為一方石。可一丈餘。在頻陀山余甘子林。陳那菩薩造因明論。成以宗因喻破其數論。彼仙門徒莫能通者。將陳那難辭書之於石。石尋書答。陳那知已與仙門屬共往石所。書難在石同對記之。明旦來看。尋書解訖。如是復書。日日往看。至二．三日方始能解。陳那復書七日方解。如是復書更不能釋。其石流汗大吼。振碎迸在空中。於是天神掌捧陳那。住在空中說頌讚嘆。時眾既睹。於是陳那所造諸論盛行於世。
疏。二變易而非本一說十六諦者。問下明五大而有兩說。兩說皆許五大成根。但別．總異。既能生他合唯俱句。云何此說唯變易耶 答而言五大別成根者。且約展轉少相成說。據實成根體唯唯量。由斯十六名唯變易。審思。
疏。一自性者。問自性體即刺阇等三。云何三種合名一諦 答體實有三。作業等即同。故合為一 有義三德類同合之為一 詳曰不可。勇．塵．闇等種種差別。何名類同。
疏。今云黃赤黑等者。由此三種是黃等故。所以能成一切諸色。余之名等皆悉準此行相釋之。
疏。又從
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時，這種藥的顏色是青色的。如果已經成熟，它的顏色是黃白色的。這就是仙藥。這種藥剛吃的時候味道酸苦，沒什麼味道。吃完后，如果喝一口冷水，口中就會感到甘甜，就像吃了蜂蜜一樣，因此得名。仙人得到這種藥后，仍然擔心會有無常（Anitya，佛教術語，指世事無常）到來，再次前往天界請求延長壽命。天神說，斷絕與一物的聯繫，最能獲得長壽。於是天神將仙人變成了一塊方石，大約一丈多高，位於頻陀山（Vindhya Mountains）的余甘子林（Emblic myrobalan forest）。陳那菩薩（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家）造了《因明論》（Hetu-vidyā，古印度邏輯學著作），用宗（thesis）、因（reason）、喻（example）破斥了數論派（Samkhya，古印度哲學流派）。那些仙人的門徒沒有能理解的，就把陳那（Dignāga）的難題寫在石頭上。石頭隨即書寫作答。陳那（Dignāga）知道后，與仙人及其門徒一同前往石頭所在之處。將難題寫在石頭上，共同記錄答案。第二天去看，石頭已經解答完畢。像這樣反覆書寫，每天都去看，過了兩三天才能完全理解。陳那（Dignāga）再次書寫，七天後才能解答。像這樣反覆書寫，石頭再也不能解答。那石頭流汗，大吼一聲，震碎迸散在空中。於是天神用手掌托起陳那（Dignāga），住在空中，說頌讚嘆。當時在場的人都看到了這一幕。於是，陳那（Dignāga）所造的各種論著盛行於世。 疏：二、變易而非本一說十六諦者。問：下面說明五大（Mahābhūta，佛教術語，指地、水、火、風、空五種基本元素）而有兩種說法。兩種說法都認可五大（Mahābhūta）構成根（Indriya，佛教術語，指感覺器官）。但有別相和總相的差異。既然能生他，合唯俱句，為什麼這種說法只是變易呢？答：如果說五大（Mahābhūta）分別構成根（Indriya），那只是就展轉少相成來說的。實際上，構成根（Indriya）的體只是唯量。因此，十六諦（Sixteen Realities）的名稱只是變易。仔細思考。 疏：一、自性者。問：自性（Prakriti，數論哲學概念，指宇宙的本源）的體就是刺阇（Rajas，數論哲學概念，指激性）、等三（Sattva，數論哲學概念，指悅性；Tamas，數論哲學概念，指惰性）。為什麼三種合起來稱為一諦（One Reality）？答：體實際上有三種。作業等是相同的，所以合為一體。有義認為三德（Three Gunas）的類別相同，所以合為一體。詳曰：不可。勇（Courage）、塵（Dust）、闇（Darkness）等種種差別，怎麼能說是類別相同呢？ 疏：現在說黃赤黑等，因為這三種是黃等，所以能構成一切諸色。其餘的名稱等都按照這種方式來解釋。 疏：又從
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, its color was blue. If it was ripe, its color would be yellowish-white. This was the elixir. When first eaten, this medicine tasted sour and bitter with little flavor. After eating it, if one drank a mouthful of cold water, a sweet taste would be felt in the mouth, like eating honey, hence the name. Having obtained this medicine, the immortal still feared impermanence (Anitya, Buddhist term referring to the transience of all things), and went again to the heavens to request an extension of life. The deity said that severing connection with one thing was the best way to obtain longevity. Thereupon, the deity transformed the immortal into a square stone, more than ten feet tall, located in the Emblic myrobalan forest (forest of Phyllanthus emblica) on Mount Vindhya (Vindhya Mountains). Dignāga Bodhisattva (Dignāga, an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) composed the Hetu-vidyā (Hetu-vidyā, ancient Indian logical treatise), using thesis, reason, and example to refute the Samkhya school (Samkhya, an ancient Indian philosophical school). Those disciples of the immortal who could not understand it, wrote Dignāga's (Dignāga) difficult questions on the stone. The stone then wrote answers. Dignāga (Dignāga), knowing this, went with the immortal and his disciples to the place where the stone was. The difficult questions were written on the stone, and the answers were recorded together. The next day, they went to see, and the stone had already answered them completely. Writing back and forth like this, they went to see it every day, and it took two or three days to fully understand. Dignāga (Dignāga) wrote again, and it took seven days to answer. Writing back and forth like this, the stone could no longer answer. The stone sweated, roared loudly, and shattered into pieces in the air. Thereupon, the deity held Dignāga (Dignāga) in his palm, dwelling in the air, and spoke verses of praise. Those present at the time all witnessed this scene. Thus, the various treatises composed by Dignāga (Dignāga) flourished in the world. Commentary: Two, 'changeable' rather than 'originally one' refers to the sixteen realities. Question: Below, it explains the five great elements (Mahābhūta, Buddhist term referring to the five basic elements of earth, water, fire, wind, and space) with two different explanations. Both explanations acknowledge that the five great elements (Mahābhūta) constitute the faculties (Indriya, Buddhist term referring to the sense organs). However, there are differences in specific and general characteristics. Since they can generate others, combining only with similar categories, why is this explanation only 'changeable'? Answer: If it is said that the five great elements (Mahābhūta) separately constitute the faculties (Indriya), that is only in terms of gradual and minor formation. In reality, the substance constituting the faculties (Indriya) is only a single measure. Therefore, the name 'sixteen realities' is only 'changeable'. Consider carefully. Commentary: One, 'self-nature'. Question: The substance of self-nature (Prakriti, Samkhya philosophical concept referring to the origin of the universe) is precisely Rajas (Rajas, Samkhya philosophical concept referring to the quality of passion), and the three qualities (Sattva, Samkhya philosophical concept referring to the quality of goodness; Tamas, Samkhya philosophical concept referring to the quality of inertia). Why are the three combined called 'one reality'? Answer: The substance actually has three. The functions, etc., are the same, so they are combined into one. Some argue that the categories of the three Gunas (Three Gunas) are the same, so they are combined into one. Detailed explanation: Not possible. Courage, dust, darkness, and other various differences, how can they be said to be the same category? Commentary: Now saying yellow, red, black, etc., because these three are yellow, etc., therefore they can constitute all colors. The remaining names, etc., should all be interpreted in this way. Commentary: Furthermore, from
冥往至我受用故者。問何不受用能成冥性耶 答所成之法雖不離本。要本轉變方堪用之。故言受用所成之法。如所成器雖體即金。要成其器方可受用。故言用器不說用金。此亦應爾。
疏。從自性先生大者。問自性生大。餘二十二許展轉生。云何論言二十三法總自性成 答二十三體皆自性成。據相相起但言生大。余傳傳生亦無失矣。
疏。我執者。執知其我所須事業。亦如律云執事人也。
疏。初名轉異等者。我執初從大起之際名為轉異。亦如世間蘇油等瓶日炙津生。我從大生義同於此。名為絹織。或轉異者說彼大也。以言初故。大從自性轉異有故。
疏。我慢生五大者。問按涅槃經三十九云。從慢生十六法。謂五大．五知根．五作業根．心平等根。一何乖返 答有義經譯誤也。彼經下云。是十六法從五法生。所謂五塵。若慢已生十六法者。云何復云是五法生。故知譯謬 詳曰惑復彼宗計。有八十部差。經之上下各舉一說。斯亦何過。
疏故十一法變易非本順此後解者。乍觀兩解雖總別殊。然皆言大而能造根。十一非本合順二解。實理前釋且約展轉有助成義。實成根體是五唯量。故順后釋。
疏。大遺根等者遺者棄。即是吐棄大．小便路。
疏。不同瓶等者。問瓶他許實
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於『冥往至於我受用』的原因。問：為什麼不受用就能成就冥性呢？答：所成就的法雖然不離其根本，但必須經過根本的轉變才能被使用。所以說受用的是所成就的法。就像製成的器皿，雖然本體是金，但必須製成器皿才能被使用。所以說用器皿，而不是用金。這裡也應該這樣理解。
疏：從自性產生大（Mahat，宇宙理性或覺性）的原因。問：自性產生大，其餘二十二個要素（許）輾轉相生。為什麼說二十三種法總由自性成就呢？答：二十三種體都由自性成就。根據相互之間的關係，只說是產生了大。其餘的要素輾轉相生也沒有錯謬。
疏：『我執』是指執著于認知『我』所需要的事務，就像律宗所說的『執事人』一樣。
疏：最初名為『轉異』等。我執最初從大產生的時候，名為『轉異』。就像世間的酥油等放在瓶子里被太陽曬后產生津液一樣。我從大產生，意義與此相同，名為絹織。或者說『轉異』是指那個『大』。因為說是最初，所以『大』是從自性轉變而來的。
疏：我慢產生五大（五種基本元素）的原因。問：按照《涅槃經》第三十九卷所說，從慢產生十六法，即五大（地、水、火、風、空），五知根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身），五作業根（手、足、口、大小便處），心平等根。這為什麼相互矛盾呢？答：有一種說法是經文翻譯有誤。那部經的下文說：這十六法是從五法產生的，即五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）。如果慢已經產生了十六法，為什麼又說是從五法產生的呢？所以知道是翻譯的錯誤。詳細地說，這是因為那個宗派計算有八十種差別。經文的上下分別舉出一種說法，這又有什麼過錯呢？
疏：所以說十一種法變易而非根本，是爲了順應後面的解釋。乍一看兩種解釋雖然有總別之分，但都說『大』能夠造根，十一種法並非根本，這符合兩種解釋。實際上，前一種解釋是就輾轉相助成的意義而言的。真正成就根體的是五唯量（五種感覺的潛在形式），所以順應後面的解釋。
疏：大遺根等，『遺』是捨棄的意思，就是吐棄大小便的道路。
疏：不同於瓶子等。問：瓶子在其他宗派看來是實有的
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the reason for 'going secretly to what I enjoy.' Question: Why can't non-enjoyment achieve secret nature? Answer: Although the achieved dharma is inseparable from its root, it must undergo a transformation of the root to be used. Therefore, it is said that what is enjoyed is the achieved dharma. Just like a made vessel, although its substance is gold, it must be made into a vessel to be used. Therefore, it is said to use the vessel, not to use the gold. This should also be understood in this way.
Commentary: Regarding the reason why Self-nature produces Mahat (cosmic intellect or awareness). Question: Self-nature produces Mahat, and the remaining twenty-two elements (approximately) arise in turn. Why is it said that all twenty-three dharmas are achieved by Self-nature? Answer: All twenty-three entities are achieved by Self-nature. According to the mutual relationships, it is only said that Mahat is produced. There is no error in the remaining elements arising in turn.
Commentary: 'Ego-attachment' refers to attachment to the knowledge of the affairs needed by 'I,' just like the 'executor' mentioned in the Vinaya school.
Commentary: Initially named 'transformation,' etc. When ego-attachment initially arises from Mahat, it is called 'transformation.' Just like when ghee, etc., in a bottle are exposed to the sun and produce liquid. The meaning of 'I' arising from Mahat is the same as this, called silk weaving. Or 'transformation' refers to that 'Mahat.' Because it is said to be initial, 'Mahat' is transformed from Self-nature.
Commentary: The reason why ego-conceit produces the five great elements (five basic elements). Question: According to the thirty-ninth chapter of the Nirvana Sutra, sixteen dharmas arise from conceit, namely the five great elements (earth, water, fire, wind, space), the five sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), the five action faculties (hands, feet, mouth, excretory and reproductive organs), and the mind-equanimity faculty. Why is this contradictory? Answer: One interpretation is that the sutra was translated incorrectly. The following part of that sutra says: These sixteen dharmas arise from five dharmas, namely the five objects of sense (form, sound, smell, taste, touch). If conceit has already produced sixteen dharmas, why is it said that they arise from five dharmas? Therefore, it is known that it is a translation error. In detail, this is because that school calculates eighty different kinds of differences. The sutra mentions one interpretation above and another below, what fault is there in this?
Commentary: Therefore, it is said that the eleven dharmas are changeable and not fundamental, in order to comply with the later explanation. At first glance, although the two explanations have general and specific differences, they both say that 'Mahat' can create the roots. The eleven dharmas are not fundamental, which is in accordance with both explanations. In reality, the former explanation refers to the meaning of mutual assistance. What truly achieves the root entity is the five subtle elements (the potential forms of the five senses), so it complies with the later explanation.
Commentary: Mahat excretory roots, etc., 'excretory' means abandonment, which is the path of excreting urine and feces.
Commentary: Different from bottles, etc. Question: Bottles are considered real by other schools.
。復多法成。今此因中豈無不定 答亦入所立故無不定。
疏。若言三德至無同異者。一一別人以三德成。而非是假。軍等但以多人等成。故名為假。不說軍等以二德成。若三德為因。軍等同喻闕無能立。若將別人以為其喻。別人非假。闕無所立。故名無喻。
疏。若據三假等者。問此論下云是聚集假。豈不相違 答此依未滅約時言之名相續假。彼據積集多法以成。故不違也。
疏。真如離言者。真如體非多事成。故不同彼。
疏。以得色時亦得大等者。彼說五根．心平等根是現量體。彼以大等成於色等。故得色時亦得大等 我執等法現量得者。皆準此知。
疏。彼執是常者。以非生滅名為常也 不同神我．自性等常。
疏。之現量所得者。眼等五根體是現量。大等但是現量所緣。今置之言顯是依主。不言之。為言境體即是現量。
論。三體既遍等者。問外人難云。汝宗第八亦同此過。以能變識體無別故。汝若不違我何有失 答由六識等熏習力故。山無山別。故第八識非一切處皆變為山。故不同汝。
疏。相實有三等者。三德未變大等法時。各有一相名之為三。變大等時方合為一。
疏。由違自宗故為一難者。此中體．相相例而徴合成兩難。以俱違宗故但言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：又因為多種法聚合而成。現在這個因中難道沒有不確定的因素嗎？答：也包含在所建立的範圍內，所以沒有不確定的因素。
疏：如果說三德成就到沒有相同和差異的程度，那麼一個個別的人是由三德成就的，而不是虛假的。軍隊等只是由很多人等構成，所以稱為虛假。不說軍隊等由二德成就。如果以三德為因，軍隊等同喻就缺少能成立的條件。如果將個別的人作為比喻，個別的人不是虛假的，就缺少所要成立的條件，所以稱為沒有比喻。
疏：如果依據三假等，問：這篇論著下面說這是聚集假，難道不矛盾嗎？答：這是依據未滅的時候，就時間而言，稱為相續假。那是因為積累聚集多種法而成就，所以不矛盾。
疏：真如離言，真如的本體不是由多種事物構成，所以和那些不同。
疏：因為得到色的時候也得到大等，他們說五根、心平等根是現量體。他們用大等成就色等，所以得到色的時候也得到大等。我執等法現量得到，都參照這個來理解。
疏：他們認為是常，因為不是生滅的，所以稱為常。不同於神我、自性等常。
疏：現量所得的，眼等五根的本體是現量。大等只是現量所緣。現在加上『之』字，顯示是依主。不加『之』字，就說是境體就是現量。
論：三體既然普遍相等，問：外人詰難說：你們宗派的第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）也同樣有這個過失，因為能變識的本體沒有差別。如果你們不反駁，我有什麼過失？答：由於六識等的熏習力，山沒有山的差別。所以第八識不是在所有地方都變為山，所以和你們不同。
疏：相實有三等，三德未變大等法的時候，各自有一個相，稱之為三。變大等的時候才合為一個。
疏：因為違背自己的宗派，所以是一個難點。這裡體、相相互類比而提出，合成為兩個難點。因為都違背宗派，所以只說一個難點。
【English Translation】 English version: Moreover, it is formed by the aggregation of many dharmas. Now, in this cause, is there no uncertain factor? Answer: It is also included within what is established, so there is no uncertain factor.
Commentary: If it is said that the accomplishment of the three attributes reaches a state where there is no sameness or difference, then each individual person is accomplished by the three attributes and is not false. Armies, etc., are only constituted by many people, etc., so they are called false. It is not said that armies, etc., are accomplished by two attributes. If the three attributes are taken as the cause, then the analogy of armies, etc., lacks the condition to be established. If an individual person is taken as the analogy, the individual person is not false, and the condition to be established is lacking, so it is called having no analogy.
Commentary: If based on the three falsities, etc., question: This treatise below says that this is an aggregation falsity, is this not contradictory? Answer: This is based on the time when it has not yet ceased, and in terms of time, it is called a continuous falsity. That is because it is accomplished by accumulating and aggregating many dharmas, so it is not contradictory.
Commentary: True Thusness (Tathatā, 真如) is beyond words, the substance of True Thusness is not constituted by many things, so it is different from those.
Commentary: Because when obtaining color (rūpa, 色), one also obtains the great elements (mahābhūta, 大等), they say that the five roots (pañcendriya, 五根), and the mind-equal root are the substance of direct perception (pratyakṣa, 現量). They use the great elements to accomplish color, etc., so when obtaining color, one also obtains the great elements. The direct perception of the ego-grasping (ātma-graha, 我執) and other dharmas should all be understood in accordance with this.
Commentary: They hold it to be permanent, because it is not subject to arising and ceasing, so it is called permanent. It is different from the permanent self (ātman, 神我), nature (prakṛti, 自性), etc.
Commentary: What is obtained by direct perception, the substance of the five roots such as the eye is direct perception. The great elements are only the object of direct perception. Now, adding the word 'of' shows that it is dependent. Without the word 'of', it is said that the object-substance is direct perception.
Treatise: Since the three substances are universally equal, question: An outsider challenges, saying: Your school's eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識) also has this fault, because the substance of the transforming consciousness has no difference. If you do not refute this, what fault do I have? Answer: Due to the force of the熏習 of the six consciousnesses, etc., mountains have no difference from mountains. Therefore, the eighth consciousness does not transform into mountains everywhere, so it is different from you.
Commentary: The characteristics are truly threefold, etc., when the three attributes have not yet transformed into the great elements, etc., each has a characteristic, which is called three. Only when they transform into the great elements do they combine into one.
Commentary: Because it violates one's own school, it is a difficult point. Here, the substance and characteristics are presented by analogy, combining into two difficult points. Because both violate the school, only one difficult point is mentioned.
一。
疏。前第一翻至似同此難者。次前論云。又三是別。是第一翻。言似此者。即此次下第三翻文。非此第二。以第二文而未難彼失本三相及本體故生起下文。故第二末而言此也。
疏。由彼復計至各有三相者。此準疏文但有五量。返覆作者合有八量。勒為四對。第二對中疏文具二。余之三對疏但一量示方隅爾 一總法即別破。疏大等總法至為難亦爾 二總相即體破。疏又微三事至如總相。文中具有覆逆二量 三總相非一破。疏三事總相至如本三事 四別相三破。疏三事別相至如大等。返例可知 有云。三對有六量者理不盡也。
疏。儒童子五頂者。有云。儒童有五弟子名為五頂 有義然即說儒童名五頂 然疏中說其儒童子稱為五頂。亦未可依 儒童即是童子異名。婆羅門父非童子故 詳曰。然初師義雖無所據理猶可通。第二師義斥疏全非。世之立名有種種異。稚年貌美號為儒童。老從舊稱斯有何過。若言儒童即令唯小。俗字觀音應即是聖。此既不爾彼云何然。
疏。若有色味香觸名地者。問十句論后諸門中雲。地由十四德說名有德。如下疏列。如何今云地有四德 答若顯地體唯由四德。若論其地與德為依名有德者。有十四德。余之十德非顯地故。故不言之亦不相違。余水．火等皆準此釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一。
疏：前面第一次辯論到『相似』，是指與此處的提問者相似。之前論中說：『又三是別』，是第一次辯論。說『類似此處』，就是指此次下面第三次辯論的內容，不是指這第二次辯論。因為第二次辯論並沒有反駁對方失去『本三相』（dravya-lakṣaṇa，自相、共相、作用相）以及本體，所以才生起下面的內容。因此在第二次辯論的末尾說『此也』。
疏：由於對方又計較到『各有三相』，這裡根據疏文只有五種衡量。如果加上反覆作者，共有八種衡量，歸納為四對。第二對中，疏文中包含了兩種。其餘三對，疏文只用一種衡量來指示方向。一，總法即別破：疏文『大等總法』到『為難亦爾』。二，總相即體破：疏文『又微三事』到『如總相』。文中具有覆蓋和逆反兩種衡量。三，總相非一破：疏文『三事總相』到『如本三事』。四，別相三破：疏文『三事別相』到『如大等』。反過來推論可知。有人說，三對有六種衡量，這個說法並不完全正確。
疏：儒童子五頂（Kumārarūpa-pañcaśikha，以童子形象示現的五頂）。有人說，儒童有五個弟子，名叫五頂。另一種說法是，儒童的名字就叫五頂。然而疏文中說儒童子被稱為五頂，也不可依從。儒童只是童子的另一種稱呼，婆羅門的父親不是童子。詳細地說，雖然最初的說法沒有根據，但道理上還說得通。第二種說法批評疏文完全不對。世間立名有各種各樣的不同。年幼貌美被稱為儒童，年老沿用舊稱，這有什麼不對？如果說儒童就只能是小孩，那麼俗字觀音（Avalokiteśvara，觀世音菩薩）就應該是聖人了嗎？既然不是這樣，那又怎麼能那樣說呢？
疏：如果說有色、味、香、觸才叫地（pṛthivī，地界），那麼《十句論》後面的各個門中說，地由十四種德來說明，才叫做『有德』，如下面的疏文所列。為什麼現在說地有四種德？回答：如果顯示地的本體，只用四種德。如果說地與德相互依存，才叫做『有德』，那麼就有十四種德。其餘的十種德不是用來顯示地的，所以不說它們，這也不矛盾。其餘的水（āpas，水界）、火（tejas，火界）等都可以參照這個解釋。
【English Translation】 English version I.
Commentary: The previous first debate, up to 'similar,' refers to someone similar to the questioner here. The previous treatise says, 'Also, the three are different,' which is the first debate. Saying 'similar to here' refers to the content of the third debate below, not the second. Because the second debate did not refute the opponent's loss of the 'inherent three characteristics' (dravya-lakṣaṇa, self-characteristic, common characteristic, and function characteristic) and the essence, the following content arises. Therefore, at the end of the second debate, it says 'this also'.
Commentary: Because the opponent again argues that 'each has three characteristics,' according to the commentary, there are only five measures here. If the repeated author is added, there are eight measures in total, summarized into four pairs. In the second pair, the commentary contains two. In the remaining three pairs, the commentary only uses one measure to indicate direction. 1. General dharma is specifically refuted: The commentary 'General dharma such as great' to 'is also difficult'. 2. General characteristic is essentially refuted: The commentary 'Also, the three subtle matters' to 'like general characteristic'. The text contains both covering and reversing measures. 3. General characteristic is not one refuted: The commentary 'The general characteristic of the three matters' to 'like the original three matters'. 4. Specific characteristic is threefold refuted: The commentary 'The specific characteristic of the three matters' to 'like great etc.'. The reverse inference can be known. Some say that three pairs have six measures, but this statement is not entirely correct.
Commentary: Kumārarūpa-pañcaśikha (儒童子五頂, Five-Crested Youth, appearing in the form of a youth). Some say that the Kumārarūpa had five disciples named Pañcaśikha. Another view is that the name of the Kumārarūpa was Pañcaśikha. However, the commentary says that the Kumārarūpa is called Pañcaśikha, which is also not reliable. Kumārarūpa is just another name for a youth; the father of the Brahmin is not a youth. In detail, although the initial statement has no basis, it is still logically understandable. The second statement criticizes the commentary as completely incorrect. There are various differences in naming in the world. A young and beautiful person is called Kumārarūpa; using the old name when old, what is wrong with that? If it is said that Kumārarūpa can only be a child, then the common name Avalokiteśvara (觀世音菩薩, Guanyin Bodhisattva) should be a sage? Since it is not like this, then how can it be said like that?
Commentary: If it is said that only having color, taste, smell, and touch is called earth (pṛthivī, earth element), then in the various sections after the Ten Categories Treatise, it says that earth is explained by fourteen qualities and is called 'having qualities,' as listed in the commentary below. Why does it now say that earth has four qualities? Answer: If the essence of earth is shown, only four qualities are used. If it is said that earth and qualities are interdependent and are called 'having qualities,' then there are fourteen qualities. The remaining ten qualities are not used to show earth, so they are not mentioned, and this is not contradictory. The remaining water (āpas, water element), fire (tejas, fire element), etc., can all be explained in this way.
。
疏。能詮緣之因名時等者。由俱等時體是實有故。與詮緣心名句等而為因也。余皆仿此。
疏。若覺樂至名我者。由我能令九德和合而能起智。故舉所和及所起智以顯我體 有云。和合即和合句。由我與彼和合為因。和合即能和合九德 詳曰。不然。十句論云。我謂是覺．樂．苦．欲．嗔．勤勇．行．法．非法等。和合因緣。起智為相。若我亦是和合句因。彼論即應和合之下而置等字。既不如是。故知我者非和合因。又彼論釋意云謂覺．樂等九德不和合因緣起智名意。亦應意與不和合法而為其因。九德方能起于智耶。若許爾者彼宗何處有不和合。若不爾者我何故然。又十句論上下。不言我與和合句作因緣也。
疏。唯眼所取一依名色者。簡異余德名唯眼所取。色依一實名為一依。故彼論云。聲．觸．色．味．香各一根所取。色．味．香等皆依一實。然眼取時。要多微合方為其境 今談其色。體依一實非一依色即眼能取。故彼論云。色．香．味等若依極微及二微果。名非現量 若一依色即眼能取。何非現境眼等所得皆現量故。或據其體是眼所取一依名色。不是許眼取一微色。
疏。量有五種者。微．短何殊。長．大何別。俱依二微．三微果故 答體雖無別形待為異 有云。微．大二量據臥
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
疏：『能詮緣之因名時等者』，是因為時間和方位等在同一時間是真實存在的，因此與詮釋事物的心、名、句等構成原因。其餘情況可以依此類推。
疏：『若覺樂至名我者』，是因為『我』能使九種德性（覺、樂、苦、欲、嗔、勤勇、行、法、非法）和諧統一，從而產生智慧。所以，用所和諧的德性和所產生的智慧來彰顯『我』的本體。
有人說：『和合』就是『和合句』。因為『我』與『彼』（指九德）的和合是產生智慧的原因，而『和合』本身就能使九德和諧統一。詳細分析如下：這種說法不對。《十句論》中說，『我』指的是覺、樂、苦、欲、嗔、勤勇、行、法、非法等，是和合的因緣，以產生智慧為表相。如果『我』也是『和合句』的原因，那麼該論就應該在『和合』之下加上『等』字。既然不是這樣，就知道『我』不是『和合』的原因。而且，該論的解釋是說，覺、樂等九德不和合的因緣產生智慧，這也可以說『意』與不和合法是產生智慧的原因嗎？九德才能產生智慧嗎？如果允許這樣說，那麼他們宗派哪裡有不和合呢？如果不允許這樣說，那麼我為什麼是這樣呢？而且，《十句論》的上下文中，沒有說『我』與『和合句』構成因緣。
疏：『唯眼所取一依名色者』，是爲了區別于其他德性，所以說是『唯眼所取』。『色』依賴於單一的實體，所以稱為『一依』。因此，《十句論》中說，聲、觸、色、味、香各自被一個根所取。色、味、香等都依賴於一個實體。然而，眼睛取色的時候，需要多個極微的集合才能成為其對象。現在討論的是『色』，其本體依賴於一個實體，不是依賴於一個極微的『色』，就是眼睛能夠取到的。所以，該論中說，色、香、味等如果依賴於極微或者二微的果，就不是現量。如果依賴於一個實體的『色』就是眼睛能夠取到的，為什麼不是現量呢？因為眼睛等所得到的都是現量。或者說，根據其本體是眼睛所取的一個實體，所以稱為『色』，而不是允許眼睛取一個極微的『色』。
疏：『量有五種者』，微小和短有什麼區別？長和大的區別在哪裡？都是依賴於二微、三微的果。
回答：本體雖然沒有區別，但形狀不同。
有人說：微小和大這兩種量是根據臥...
【English Translation】 English version:
Commentary: 'The cause of the expressive condition is called time, etc.' because time and direction, etc., are truly existent at the same time. Therefore, they are the cause of the mind, name, and sentence, etc., that express things. The rest can be inferred accordingly.
Commentary: 'If awareness and pleasure are called 'I',' it is because 'I' can harmonize the nine virtues (awareness, pleasure, suffering, desire, anger, diligence, action, dharma, non-dharma) and thus generate wisdom. Therefore, the essence of 'I' is revealed by the virtues that are harmonized and the wisdom that is generated.
Some say: 'Harmony' is the 'harmonious sentence'. Because the harmony of 'I' and 'that' (referring to the nine virtues) is the cause of generating wisdom, and 'harmony' itself can harmonize the nine virtues. Detailed analysis is as follows: This statement is incorrect. The Ten Categories Treatise says that 'I' refers to awareness, pleasure, suffering, desire, anger, diligence, action, dharma, non-dharma, etc., which are the causes and conditions of harmony, with the appearance of generating wisdom. If 'I' is also the cause of the 'harmonious sentence', then the treatise should add 'etc.' after 'harmony'. Since it is not like this, we know that 'I' is not the cause of 'harmony'. Moreover, the explanation of the treatise is that the causes and conditions of the non-harmony of the nine virtues such as awareness and pleasure generate wisdom, can it also be said that 'intention' and non-harmonious dharma are the cause of generating wisdom? Can the nine virtues generate wisdom only in this way? If it is allowed to say so, then where does their sect have non-harmony? If it is not allowed to say so, then why am I like this? Moreover, the Ten Categories Treatise does not say that 'I' constitutes a cause and condition with the 'harmonious sentence'.
Commentary: 'That which is taken only by the eye and depends on one reality is called color' is to distinguish it from other virtues, so it is said to be 'taken only by the eye'. 'Color' depends on a single entity, so it is called 'one dependence'. Therefore, the Ten Categories Treatise says that sound, touch, color, taste, and smell are each taken by one root. Color, taste, smell, etc., all depend on one entity. However, when the eye takes color, it needs a collection of multiple atoms to become its object. Now we are discussing 'color', whose essence depends on one entity, not the 'color' that depends on one atom, which is what the eye can take. Therefore, the treatise says that if color, smell, taste, etc., depend on atoms or the fruit of two atoms, they are not direct perception. If the 'color' that depends on one entity is what the eye can take, why is it not direct perception? Because what the eye, etc., obtain is all direct perception. Or, according to its essence, it is one entity taken by the eye, so it is called 'color', rather than allowing the eye to take one atom of 'color'.
Commentary: 'There are five kinds of measure', what is the difference between small and short? Where is the difference between long and large? They all depend on the fruit of two atoms and three atoms.
Answer: Although the essence is not different, the shapes are different.
Some say: The two measures of small and large are based on lying...
而言。長．短兩種約立以說 詳曰。何故立中不許微．大。臥中不得有短．長耶。論復不說。教理並無。固難依也。
疏。所生之離等者。如樹草等。遭風等緣枝葉摧殘。與空離際生得一離。離是所生。故名離生。所生之離者此釋詞也 復由離體能令法離。合義翻此。
疏。此有二種者。相順名同違名不同 有云。因果同時名為見同。如火與煙是同時故。因果異時名見不同。如見禾死已有霜故。雖有同時約多分說 詳曰。難知。若同時見名同時者。見煙之時既不見火。何得名同。若亦見火此即現知。何得言比。若言煙．火據體同時名同時者。禾損與霜豈異時耶 若云見煙必有大體。禾損不爾不相例者 此亦不爾。如見禾盛名為見因。豈能生因此時有體有不遍失。復違彼論。論云見不同故比者。謂見因果相屬一義和合相違。于彼畢竟不現見境所有智生。論既自云由相違等方有智生。明不同者是非順義。同義翻此。
疏。數習名念因者。但數修習名之為習。不同佛法熏習名習。
疏。攢擲等者。由作因力而為因故。攢矛擲石石等方去。不爾不發。
疏。正智喜因者。與智俱時喜受名因。或離染緣。而是正智喜躍之因。二釋任取。
疏。常于實轉者。略為二釋。一云體性是常唯實上有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 而言。長和短兩種概念可以用來建立和說明（事物）。 詳細解釋：為什麼建立『中』的概念，卻不允許有『微』和『大』？在『臥』的狀態中，為什麼不能有『短』和『長』呢？論典中沒有說明，教義和道理上也沒有依據，所以很難遵循。
疏：『所生之離等者』，例如樹木、草等，遭遇風等因緣，枝葉被摧殘，與空間分離之際，產生一種『離』。『離』是所產生的，所以稱為『離生』。『所生之離』是對此詞語的解釋。又因為『離』的本體能夠使法分離，所以從『合』的反義來翻譯它。
疏：『此有二種者』，相互順應的稱為『同』，相違背的稱為『不同』。有人說：因和果同時發生的稱為『見同』，例如火和煙是同時的。因和果不同時發生的稱為『見不同』，例如見到禾苗受損是因為之前有霜。雖然有同時發生的情況，但大多是就不同時的情況來說的。詳細解釋：難以理解。如果同時見到才稱為『同時』，那麼見到煙的時候既然沒有見到火，怎麼能稱為『同』呢？如果也見到了火，這便是現量知，怎麼能說是比量呢？如果說煙和火就其本體而言是同時的，所以稱為『同時』，那麼禾苗受損和霜難道不是不同時發生的嗎？如果說見到煙必然有其大的本體，而禾苗受損不是這樣，所以不能相提並論，這也是不對的。例如見到禾苗茂盛，稱為見到『因』，難道能因此而產生『因』嗎？此時有本體的說法並不普遍適用，而且違背了彼論。論中說因為『見不同』所以才能進行比量，指的是見到因果相互關聯、意義和合相違背，對於那些畢竟不能現量見到的境界，才能產生智慧。論中既然自己說由相違等才能產生智慧，說明『不同』不是順應的意義，『同』是『不同』的反義。
疏：『數習名念因者』，只是多次修習稱為『習』，不同於佛法中的熏習稱為『習』。
疏：『攢擲等者』，由於造作的因的力量而成為因。攢矛、擲石頭等，石頭等才能飛出去，否則就不能發射。
疏：『正智喜因者』，與智慧同時產生的喜受稱為因，或者遠離染污的因緣，是正智喜悅的因。兩種解釋任選其一。
疏：『常于實轉者』，大概有兩種解釋。一種說法是體性是常，只在實法上存在。
【English Translation】 English version: And so on. The concepts of 'long' and 'short' are established to explain (things). Detailed explanation: Why establish the concept of 'middle' but not allow 'minute' and 'large'? In the 'lying down' state, why can't there be 'short' and 'long'? The treatise doesn't explain, and there's no basis in doctrine or reason, so it's difficult to follow.
Commentary: 'That which is produced from separation, etc.,' such as trees, grass, etc., encountering conditions like wind, etc., causing branches and leaves to be destroyed, and at the moment of separation from space, a 'separation' is produced. 'Separation' is what is produced, so it's called 'separation-produced'. 'That which is produced from separation' is an explanation of this term. Furthermore, because the substance of 'separation' can cause dharmas to separate, it is translated from the opposite meaning of 'union'.
Commentary: 'There are two kinds of this,' that which agrees is called 'same', that which contradicts is called 'different'. Some say: when cause and effect occur simultaneously, it's called 'seeing the same', like fire and smoke are simultaneous. When cause and effect occur at different times, it's called 'seeing differently', like seeing damaged crops because there was frost before. Although there are simultaneous occurrences, it mostly refers to non-simultaneous occurrences. Detailed explanation: Difficult to understand. If seeing simultaneously is called 'simultaneous', then since you don't see the fire when you see the smoke, how can it be called 'same'? If you also see the fire, then this is direct perception, how can it be called inference? If it's said that smoke and fire are simultaneous in their substance, so it's called 'simultaneous', then aren't crop damage and frost non-simultaneous? If it's said that seeing smoke necessarily implies a large substance, but crop damage is not like that, so they can't be compared, this is also incorrect. For example, seeing flourishing crops is called seeing the 'cause', can this produce the 'cause'? The statement that there is substance at this time is not universally applicable, and it contradicts that treatise. The treatise says that because of 'seeing differently' one can infer, referring to seeing cause and effect related, meaning and harmony contradicting each other, and for those realms that cannot be directly perceived, wisdom can arise. Since the treatise itself says that wisdom arises from contradiction, etc., it shows that 'different' is not the meaning of agreement, and 'same' is the opposite of 'different'.
Commentary: 'Repeated practice is called the cause of mindfulness,' simply repeated practice is called 'practice', different from the perfuming in Buddhist teachings called 'practice'.
Commentary: 'Piling up and throwing, etc.,' due to the power of the cause of action, it becomes a cause. Piling up spears, throwing stones, etc., the stones, etc., can fly out, otherwise they cannot be launched.
Commentary: 'Right wisdom is the cause of joy,' the feeling of joy that arises simultaneously with wisdom is called the cause, or the condition of being away from defilement, is the cause of the joy of right wisdom. Choose either of the two explanations.
Commentary: 'Always revolving in reality,' there are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that the substance is constant and only exists in real dharmas.
名常實轉。二云恒常唯在實句上轉名為常也。
疏。是遮德等心心所等者。由此異故遮緣德等心．心所法不緣之。表緣實等心．心所法而能緣也。或異為因令緣九實心．心所等各有差別。故彼論云。遮彼覺因。表此覺因。名異句義 問德等亦有自類差別及異實義。何不依立 答德皆是實家之德。實為依故。故言以德而顯實也。有．及同異亦實性故。故但依本而立其異。
疏。俱分體至一切根所取者。此有總別。俱分者實德．業三。三不同故名為總異。九實名實名為總同。德．業亦爾。且一地實有眾多地。總名一地名為別同。一一義差名為別異。德．業準此。此同異性在於色上即眼根取。余根亦爾。名諸根德 問空．時．方．我．意既唯是一。如何得有別俱分耶 答有三釋。一云但總相言有別俱分。非全一一實皆有別。二云我．意．時等對於多人．及諸方．時亦得有別。空望別別能合之者說亦有多義。三云約與德依多少亦異名別俱分 問按彼論文。俱言俱分無總別言。疏準何開 答雖不明言理實定有。故彼論云。俱分云何謂實性。一切實和合於一一實實詮緣因。德．業亦爾。釋即總俱分。彼云。及彼一義和合地性．色性．取性。釋如次即是實．德．業三別俱分義。由此疏開善得彼旨。
疏。和合等唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 名常實轉：二云，『恒常』這個名稱只在『實句』上轉變，因此得名『常』（Nitya）。（Nitya：恒常）
疏：『是遮德等心心所等者』，因為這些不同，所以遮止了緣于德等的心和心所法不緣於它們。表明緣于實等的心和心所法能夠緣於它們。或者，因為不同，使得緣於九實的心和心所等各有差別。所以《彼論》說：『遮止了那個覺的因，表明了這個覺的因』，這就是『名異句義』。
問：德等也有自類的差別以及異於實的意義，為什麼不依據這些來建立呢？
答：德都是實家的德，以實為依靠。所以說用德來彰顯實。有、以及同異也是實的性質，所以只依據根本的實來建立其不同。
疏：『俱分體至一切根所取者』，這裡有總和別的區分。『俱分』指的是實、德、業這三者。因為三者不同，所以名為『總異』。九實名為『實』，名為『總同』。德、業也是這樣。而且，一個地方的實有眾多地方。總名為一個地方，名為『別同』。一一義的差別名為『別異』。德、業可以參照這個來理解。這種同異性在色上，就是眼根所取。其餘的根也是這樣，名為諸根德。
問：空（Akasa）、時（Kala）、方（Dik）、我（Atman）、意（Manas）既然只有一個，怎麼會有別的俱分呢？
答：有三種解釋。第一種說法是，只是從總相上來說有別的俱分，並非全部一一實都有別。第二種說法是，我、意、時等對於多人以及諸方、時也可以有別。空對於能夠合攏的別別之物來說，也有多種意義。第三種說法是，從與德的依附多少來說也有不同，這被稱為別的俱分。
問：按照《彼論》的論文，『俱言俱分』沒有總別之說，疏根據什麼來開顯呢？
答：雖然沒有明確說明，但理實上一定有。所以《彼論》說：『俱分是什麼？就是實性。一切實和合於一一實，是實詮釋的緣因。』德、業也是這樣。這個解釋就是總俱分。《彼論》說：『以及那個一義和合地性、色性、取性。』這個解釋依次就是實、德、業這三者的別俱分義。因此，疏的開顯很好地領會了《彼論》的旨意。
疏：『和合等唯
【English Translation】 English version 'Nama Nitya Sat Parivrtti': 'Nitya' (Eternal) is named only when it transforms on the 'Sat Vakya' (True Sentence). (Nitya: Eternal)
Commentary: 'Is che de adi citta caitta adi': Because of these differences, it prevents the mind and mental factors that are related to Guna (Quality) etc. from being related to them. It indicates that the mind and mental factors related to Sat (Substance) etc. are able to be related to them. Or, because of the differences, the mind and mental factors related to the nine Sat etc. each have differences. Therefore, 'The other treatise' says: 'Prevent the cause of that awareness, indicate the cause of this awareness', this is the 'meaning of different name sentences'.
Question: Guna (Quality) etc. also have differences in their own categories and meanings that are different from Sat (Substance). Why not establish them based on these?
Answer: Guna (Quality) are all qualities of the Sat (Substance) family, relying on Sat (Substance). Therefore, it is said that Guna (Quality) is used to manifest Sat (Substance). Existence, as well as similarity and difference, are also the nature of Sat (Substance), so only the fundamental Sat (Substance) is used to establish its differences.
Commentary: 'Klubhaga kaya sarva indriya grahana': Here there is a distinction between general and specific. 'Klubhaga' refers to Sat (Substance), Guna (Quality), and Karma (Activity). Because the three are different, they are called 'general differences'. The nine Sat (Substance) are called 'Sat (Substance)', which is called 'general similarity'. Guna (Quality) and Karma (Activity) are also like this. Moreover, the Sat (Substance) in one place has many places. The general name is one place, which is called 'specific similarity'. The difference in each meaning is called 'specific difference'. Guna (Quality) and Karma (Activity) can be understood by referring to this. This similarity and difference in Rupa (Form) is what the eye root takes. The other roots are also like this, called the qualities of the roots.
Question: Since Akasa (Space), Kala (Time), Dik (Direction), Atman (Self), and Manas (Mind) are only one, how can there be other Klubhaga?
Answer: There are three explanations. The first explanation is that there are other Klubhaga only in terms of general appearance, not all Sat (Substance) have differences. The second explanation is that Atman (Self), Manas (Mind), Kala (Time), etc. can also have differences for many people and all directions and times. Akasa (Space) also has multiple meanings for things that can be combined separately. The third explanation is that there are also differences in terms of the amount of dependence on Guna (Quality), which is called other Klubhaga.
Question: According to the thesis of 'The other treatise', 'Klubhaga' does not have general and specific statements, what does the commentary rely on to reveal it?
Answer: Although it is not explicitly stated, it must be true in principle. Therefore, 'The other treatise' says: 'What is Klubhaga? It is the nature of Sat (Substance). All Sat (Substance) combine in each Sat (Substance), which is the causal factor of Sat (Substance) interpretation.' Guna (Quality) and Karma (Activity) are also like this. This explanation is the general Klubhaga. 'The other treatise' says: 'And that one meaning combines the nature of earth, the nature of color, and the nature of taking.' This explanation is in order the meaning of the other Klubhaga of Sat (Substance), Guna (Quality), and Karma (Activity). Therefore, the commentary's revelation is a good understanding of the purpose of 'The other treatise'.
Commentary: 'Samavaya adi kevala
一物者。問有能而令實等造果。造果不一。有能故多。和合而能和合實等。實等一一而有多種。和合應多 答實等各別。或共造果。造果非一故。故有能多。和合但令總實．德．業相屬不離。故體唯一。
疏。空時方我意五是一物者。問意如二微云何一物 答一人身中祇有一種名之為一。縱如二微不言微成。故亦名一。
疏。意等是常者。問如二微大何名常耶 答非他所作即名為常。雖如二微不言他作。故是常也。
疏。覺樂等無常者。問如色．味等隨所依實通常無常此覺樂等何不亦爾。彼說覺等而依我故 答若非所作可名為常。若是所作縱所依常亦是無常。覺等十四皆所作故。故彼論說。此十四德皆待因生。待因生者即是所作。故是無常。如彼具明。恐繁不錄。
疏。離性無常者。問離合相對。離唯無常。合何不爾。又說合性亦待因故 答業等合時有所依實而是常故。故得通常。離即不爾。故不相例。又雖待因體非所作。故得為常。余皆準此。
疏。彼此唯是無常者。問此．彼既約近．遠二覺待數．時．方。時方二全．數之一分體既是常。彼此何故而無常耶 答夫待他生即是所作。所作彼．此體是無常。不同一等親依常故而得名常。此疏待故。
疏。色味香觸若地所有唯是無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一物：問：如果『有能』（Samarthatva，能力）能夠令『實等』（Dravyatva，實體性）產生結果，而產生的結果不只一種，因為『有能』是多的，所以和合（Samyoga，結合）能夠令『和合實等』。『實等』一一對應有多種，那麼和合應該也是多的吧？答：『實等』各自不同，或者共同產生結果。因為產生的結果不只一種，所以『有能』是多的。和合只是令總體的『實』（Dravya，實體）、『德』（Guna，屬性）、『業』（Karma，業力）相互關聯不分離，所以本體是唯一的。
疏：空、時、方、我、意五者是一物。問：『意』（Manas，意）如同兩個微塵，怎麼能說是一物呢？答：在一個人的身體中只有一種『意』，所以稱之為一。即使像兩個微塵，也不說是微塵組成的，所以也稱為一。
疏：『意等』是常。問：如果像兩個微塵那麼大，怎麼能稱為常呢？答：不是其他所造作的，就稱為常。即使像兩個微塵，也不說是其他所造作的，所以是常。
疏：覺、樂等是無常。問：如果像色、味等，隨著所依的『實』通常是無常的，那麼這個覺、樂等為什麼不是這樣呢？他們說覺等是依靠『我』（Atman，我）的。答：如果不是所造作的，可以稱為常。如果是所造作的，即使所依靠的是常，也是無常的。覺等十四種都是所造作的。所以他們的論述說，這十四種德都是等待因緣而生的。等待因緣而生的就是所造作的，所以是無常。如他們的論述詳細說明，恐怕繁瑣，所以不記錄。
疏：離性是無常。問：離和合是相對的，離只有無常，合為什麼不是這樣呢？又說合性也是等待因緣的。答：業等和合的時候，有所依靠的『實』，而且是常，所以能夠通常。離就不這樣，所以不能相比。又雖然等待因緣，但本體不是所造作的，所以可以成為常。其餘的都照此推論。
疏：此、彼唯是無常。問：此、彼是關於近、遠兩種感覺，等待數、時、方。時、方兩種是全部，數是一種，本體既然是常，此、彼為什麼是無常呢？答：凡是等待他物而生的，就是所造作的。所造作的彼、此本體是無常。不同於一等親近依靠常，所以得名為常。這個疏是等待的緣故。
疏：色、味、香、觸如果屬於地，所有唯是無
【English Translation】 English version One thing: Question: If 'Samarthatva' (capability) can cause 'Dravyatva' (substantiality) to produce results, and the results produced are not just one kind, because 'Samarthatva' is multiple, then 'Samyoga' (combination) can cause 'Samyoga Dravyatva'. If each 'Dravyatva' corresponds to multiple kinds, then 'Samyoga' should also be multiple, right? Answer: 'Dravyatva' are distinct from each other, or they jointly produce results. Because the results produced are not just one kind, 'Samarthatva' is multiple. 'Samyoga' only causes the overall 'Dravya' (substance), 'Guna' (quality), and 'Karma' (action) to be interconnected and not separated, so the essence is unique.
Commentary: Space, Time, Direction, Self, and Mind, these five are one thing. Question: 'Manas' (mind) is like two atoms, how can it be said to be one thing? Answer: In one person's body, there is only one kind of 'Manas', so it is called one. Even if it's like two atoms, it's not said to be composed of atoms, so it's also called one.
Commentary: 'Manas' etc. are eternal. Question: If it's as big as two atoms, how can it be called eternal? Answer: What is not created by others is called eternal. Even if it's like two atoms, it's not said to be created by others, so it is eternal.
Commentary: Perception, pleasure, etc. are impermanent. Question: If like color, taste, etc., depending on the 'Dravya' (substance) they rely on, they are usually impermanent, then why aren't perception, pleasure, etc. like this? They say that perception etc. rely on 'Atman' (self). Answer: If it is not created, it can be called eternal. If it is created, even if what it relies on is eternal, it is also impermanent. Perception and the fourteen others are all created. So their argument says that these fourteen qualities are all born dependent on causes. What is born dependent on causes is created, so it is impermanent. As their argument explains in detail, fearing verbosity, it is not recorded.
Commentary: The nature of separation is impermanent. Question: Separation and combination are relative. Separation is only impermanent, why isn't combination like this? Also, it is said that the nature of combination also depends on causes. Answer: When actions etc. combine, they rely on 'Dravya' (substance), and it is eternal, so it can usually be. Separation is not like this, so they cannot be compared. Also, although it depends on causes, the essence is not created, so it can be eternal. The rest can be inferred from this.
Commentary: 'This' and 'That' are only impermanent. Question: 'This' and 'That' are about the two feelings of near and far, waiting for number, time, and direction. Time and direction are complete, number is one part, since the essence is eternal, why are 'This' and 'That' impermanent? Answer: Whatever is born waiting for others is created. The created 'This' and 'That' are impermanent in essence. Unlike one etc. that closely rely on the eternal, so they are named eternal. This commentary is because of waiting.
Commentary: Color, taste, smell, touch, if they belong to earth, all are only non-
常者。即彼論也。因於粗地為同類因。故皆無常。
疏。因門中等者。彼論諸門辨德之中。約因明德名為因門。
疏。火合為因者。按彼論云。火合為因者。謂地所有諸極微色．香．味．觸者 釋一一地上所有色．香．味．觸。由諸極微與火合故為因生起。故論復云。色．香．味．觸地所有。極微．和合者與火合。既云極微．和合者與火合。明知火與地等極微合生香等 有云。前念之香而與火合為因。能生后念之香 又云。色等．火合為因生香 又云兩火極微而生子微 詳曰。總不應理。皆違彼論。
疏。同類為因等者。按彼論云。色．味．香．觸同類為因者。謂二微果等和合 釋二微果等和合之色。從彼極微色等而生。極微色等是微果色同類因故。故論復云。極微色等能造同類。二微等色同類果故。
疏。從前同類為因生者。疏家釋彼同類因義 問今引火合同類因文如何證彼香唯無常 答二微果等彼許無常。香既在於二微果上從同類生。故知無常。彼說地上所有香等即皆無常。今引火合顯香地有。明知無常 問既唯無常。何故彼論唯無常中。但有十三不說香耶 答覺等十三不約所依以辨無常。同類合明有十三德。香．味等四由約所依辨常．無常。與覺等別不言十四。
疏。液性地火
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『常』（nitya，永恒）是指他們的理論。因為在粗糙的物質（地，prthivi）中，同類是原因，所以一切都是無常的（anitya，非永恒）。
疏：『因門中等』是指他們的理論中，在辨別功德的各個方面，依據原因來闡明功德，這被稱為『因門』（hetu-dvara，原因之門）。
疏：『火合為因』是指，根據他們的理論，『火合為因』是指地（prthivi）上所有極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）的色（rupa，顏色）、香（gandha，氣味）、味（rasa，味道）、觸（sprastavya，觸感）。解釋：在每一塊地上，所有的色、香、味、觸，都是由於極微與火（tejas）結合而產生的。因此，該理論又說：『色、香、味、觸是地所具有的，極微的和合與火結合』。既然說『極微的和合與火結合』，就清楚地表明火與地等極微結合產生香等。有人說：『前一念的香與火結合作為原因，能夠產生后一念的香。』又有人說：『色等與火結合作為原因產生香。』還有人說：『兩個火的極微產生子微。』詳細地說，這些都不合理，都違背了他們的理論。
疏：『同類為因等』是指，根據他們的理論，『色、味、香、觸同類為因』是指二微果（dviparamāṇu-phala，雙原子果）等的和合。解釋：二微果等和合的色，是從極微的色等產生的。極微的色等是微果的色的同類原因。因此，該理論又說：『極微的色等能夠創造同類，二微等色是同類果。』
疏：『從前同類為因生者』，疏家解釋了同類原因的含義。問：現在引用火合（agni-samyoga，火的結合）同類原因的文句，如何證明香唯有無常？答：二微果等他們認為是無常的。香既然存在於二微果上，從同類產生，所以知道是無常的。他們說地上所有的香等都是無常的。現在引用火合來顯示香存在於地上，明確知道是無常的。問：既然唯有無常，為什麼他們的理論在唯有無常中，只有十三種（覺等，buddhi-ādi，知覺等），沒有說香呢？答：覺等十三種不是依據所依（asraya，所依賴的事物）來辨別無常。同類結合表明有十三種功德。香、味等四種是由於依據所依來辨別常（nitya，永恒）與無常。與覺等不同，所以沒有說十四種。
疏：液性（sneha，液體性質）、地（prthivi，土地）、火（tejas，火）
【English Translation】 English version 'Permanent' (nitya) refers to their theory. Because in coarse matter (earth, prthivi), the homogeneous is the cause, therefore everything is impermanent (anitya).
Commentary: 'Among the doors of causes' means that in their theory, among the various aspects of distinguishing virtues, elucidating virtues based on causes is called the 'door of causes' (hetu-dvara).
Commentary: 'Fire combination as the cause' means, according to their theory, 'fire combination as the cause' refers to the color (rupa), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), and touch (sprastavya) of all atoms (paramanu, the smallest unit of matter) on earth (prthivi). Explanation: On every piece of earth, all colors, smells, tastes, and touches are produced because atoms combine with fire (tejas). Therefore, the theory also says: 'Color, smell, taste, and touch are possessed by earth; the combination of atoms combines with fire.' Since it says 'the combination of atoms combines with fire,' it clearly shows that fire combines with atoms of earth, etc., to produce smell, etc. Some say: 'The smell of the previous moment combines with fire as the cause, which can produce the smell of the next moment.' Others say: 'Color, etc., combine with fire as the cause to produce smell.' Still others say: 'Two fire atoms produce a child atom.' In detail, these are all unreasonable and contradict their theory.
Commentary: 'Homogeneous as the cause, etc.' means, according to their theory, 'color, taste, smell, and touch as homogeneous causes' refers to the combination of two-atom fruits (dviparamāṇu-phala) etc. Explanation: The color of the combination of two-atom fruits, etc., is produced from the color, etc., of atoms. The color, etc., of atoms is the homogeneous cause of the color of the atomic fruit. Therefore, the theory also says: 'The color, etc., of atoms can create the homogeneous; the color of two atoms, etc., is the homogeneous fruit.'
Commentary: 'Those born from the previous homogeneous as the cause,' the commentator explains the meaning of the homogeneous cause. Question: Now, how does quoting the sentence of fire combination (agni-samyoga) homogeneous cause prove that smell is only impermanent? Answer: They consider two-atom fruits, etc., to be impermanent. Since smell exists on two-atom fruits and is produced from the homogeneous, it is known to be impermanent. They say that all smells, etc., on earth are impermanent. Now, quoting fire combination shows that smell exists on earth, clearly knowing it to be impermanent. Question: Since it is only impermanent, why does their theory only have thirteen kinds (cognition, etc., buddhi-ādi) in the impermanent, without mentioning smell? Answer: The thirteen kinds of cognition, etc., do not distinguish impermanence based on the support (asraya). The combination of the homogeneous indicates that there are thirteen virtues. The four kinds of smell, taste, etc., distinguish permanence (nitya) and impermanence based on the support. Different from cognition, etc., so it does not say fourteen kinds.
Commentary: Liquid nature (sneha), earth (prthivi), fire (tejas)
所有一切是無常者。準此液性不依地．火父母極微。可依水微。由此彼許液通常也。地等堅硬。父母之微無流液也。火如何無。非堅硬故 答彼許眼見堅赤炭等亦名為火。縱焰火等亦不同水性。勁．弱異。
疏。隨所依實若常無常者。此色等十隨其所應依水．火．風父母極微即名常住。依子微等是無常也。色．味．香．觸若依于地。彼宗自說唯是無常 問色等依地父母微不。若不依者有何所以。若許依者。色等能依何唯無常 答彼論無釋。以理言之。義同液性不依于地父母極微。火等極微色義得有。能依通常。
疏。如地至一向是常者。實句中地與德覺等竟無相應。名常不會。
疏。自許德等者。且如地上所有諸德名自許德。此德與自所依之實有會時故。非常不會故名無常。
疏。如常無常所作非所作亦爾者。有義但是常者即非所作。若是無常即有二種。有法無常皆是所作。無說無常即非所作。無說無體不可作故。但非恒無名無常也。疏言無說所作非作。此義將非 詳曰。彼論不說所作非作。然據理者有義可依。疏意通結前之所明常無常。隨應得說所作非作。不是偏結無說一句。既稱為無所作何有。而見非耶。由彼論中作非作例同於前常無常義。故疏等復而言之也。
疏。子微已上是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一切事物都是無常的。因此，液體的性質不依賴於地（Prithvi，地元素）、火（Agni，火元素）的父母極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）。它可以依賴於水（Ap，水元素）的極微。因此，他們認為液體通常是這樣。地等是堅硬的，父母極微沒有流動性。火為什麼沒有流動性呢？因為它不是堅硬的。回答：他們認為眼睛所見的堅硬的紅色木炭等也被稱為火。即使是火焰等也與水的性質不同，有勁和弱的區別。
疏：隨其所依的實體是常還是無常？這些色（Rūpa，顏色）、聲（Śabda，聲音）、香（Gandha，氣味）、味（Rasa，味道）、觸（Sparśa，觸感）等十種事物，隨其所應，依賴於水、火、風（Vāyu，風元素）的父母極微，就被稱為常住。依賴於子極微等則是無常的。色、味、香、觸如果依賴於地，他們自己的宗派說這唯是無常。問：色等是否依賴於地的父母極微？如果不依賴，原因是什麼？如果允許依賴，色等能依賴，為什麼唯獨是無常的？答：他們的論典沒有解釋。從道理上講，意義與液體的性質不依賴於地的父母極微相同。火等極微可以有色等性質，能依賴通常。
疏：如果說地始終是常，那麼實體句中的地與德（Guṇa，性質）、覺（Buddhi，知覺）等就完全沒有相應，不能稱為常。
疏：自己所允許的德等，比如地上所有的德，被稱為自己所允許的德。這些德與自己所依賴的實體有會合的時候，所以不是常，因為不會合，所以稱為無常。
疏：如常與無常，所作與非所作也是這樣。有些事物只是常，就不是所作。如果是無常，就有兩種情況。有法無常都是所作。無說無常就不是所作。因為無說沒有實體，不能被製造。只是非恒常，被稱為無常。疏說無說所作非作，這個意義恐怕不對。詳細地說，他們的論典沒有說所作非作。然而根據道理，有些意義可以依據。疏的意義是總結前面所說明的常無常，隨應可以說所作非作。不是偏偏總結無說一句。既然稱為無，有什麼所作呢？為什麼會看到非呢？因為他們的論典中，作與非作的例子與前面的常無常的意義相同，所以疏等又說了它。
疏：子極微以上是
【English Translation】 English version: All things are impermanent. Therefore, the property of liquidity does not depend on the parent atoms (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter) of earth (Prithvi, the earth element) and fire (Agni, the fire element). It can depend on the atoms of water (Ap, the water element). Therefore, they consider liquids to be generally like this. Earth and the like are solid, and the parent atoms do not have fluidity. Why doesn't fire have fluidity? Because it is not solid. Answer: They consider the solid red charcoal, etc., seen by the eyes to also be called fire. Even flames, etc., are different from the nature of water, with differences in strength and weakness.
Commentary: If the entity on which it depends is permanent or impermanent? These ten things, such as color (Rūpa, color), sound (Śabda, sound), smell (Gandha, smell), taste (Rasa, taste), and touch (Sparśa, touch), depending on what is appropriate, rely on the parent atoms of water, fire, and wind (Vāyu, the wind element), and are called permanent. Depending on the child atoms, etc., they are impermanent. If color, taste, smell, and touch depend on earth, their own sect says that this is only impermanent. Question: Do color, etc., depend on the parent atoms of earth? If they do not depend, what is the reason? If it is allowed to depend, why are color, etc., which can depend, only impermanent? Answer: Their treatise does not explain. Logically speaking, the meaning is the same as the property of liquidity not depending on the parent atoms of earth. Fire and other atoms can have properties such as color, and can usually depend.
Commentary: If it is said that earth is always permanent, then earth in the entity sentence has no correspondence with qualities (Guṇa, qualities), perception (Buddhi, perception), etc., and cannot be called permanent.
Commentary: The qualities, etc., that are allowed by oneself, such as all the qualities on the earth, are called the qualities allowed by oneself. These qualities have a time of meeting with the entity on which they depend, so they are not permanent, because they do not meet, so they are called impermanent.
Commentary: Just as permanent and impermanent, made and unmade are also like this. Some things are only permanent, so they are not made. If it is impermanent, there are two situations. All impermanent dharmas are made. Unspoken impermanence is not made. Because unspoken has no entity, it cannot be made. Only non-constant is called impermanent. The commentary says that unspoken made is not made, this meaning is probably not correct. In detail, their treatise does not say made and unmade. However, according to reason, some meanings can be based on. The meaning of the commentary is to summarize the permanent and impermanent explained earlier, and it can be said that made and unmade should be said accordingly. It is not just summarizing the unspoken sentence. Since it is called unspoken, what is made? Why do you see non-made? Because in their treatise, the examples of made and unmade are the same as the meaning of permanent and impermanent in the front, so the commentary, etc., said it again.
Commentary: Child atoms and above are
現量等者。有義今解子微亦非現得者 詳曰。疏既說雲子微已上。明知不說子微為現。下破順世明多果合以為其境。不證子微是現境也。具如義燈。
疏。空時方等至非現量得者。有義空為聲依。聲唯現境。何故說空非現境耶。故可說空亦為現境 詳曰。不然。雖耳依空。空豈所聞令耳得耶。不同地等。他許色等依地有故。故眼得地。又論解現量云。于至實色等．根等和合有了相生是名現量。空非根合故非現得 又云。現量云何。謂了相於至色．味乃至地．水火實所有智。若空亦是現量得者。何故不言而至空耶。違教違理故難依也。
疏。文不說重等者。疏主應撿不正本也。
今親撿彼論。云色．香．味．觸現非現境。若附極微及二微果。名非現境。謂若依附天非一實。是名理量境。聲一切是現境。數量．別．合．離．彼．此．液．潤．重勢用。如色．味．香亦爾。故知重性通現．非現。
疏。雖有六句一向是常等者。此重說彼十句之中常．無常等。欲顯常中能生果者。故重舉之。
疏。五句全至雖常不生果者。問我是作者。何不生果 答但能造因不作果故。所受之果他所作故。
疏。德句準有能者。實等生果要須有能。所以有能名常生果。液等十德生果所須。故同有能。名常
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於現量等（Xiànliàng děng）的問題。有人認為，即使是極微（jīwēi）也無法通過現量獲得。詳細解釋如下：疏文既然說到了『極微以上』，就明確知道沒有說極微是現量。下面駁斥順世外道（Shùnshì wàidào），他們認為多果合一就是現量的境界。這並不能證明極微是現量的境界。具體內容可以參考《義燈》（Yìdēng）。
疏文說，空、時、方等（Kōng, shí, fāng děng）不是通過現量獲得的。有人認為，空是聲音的所依，聲音是現量的境界，為什麼說空不是現量的境界呢？所以可以說空也是現量的境界。詳細解釋如下：不對。雖然耳朵依賴於空，但空難道是能被聽到的，從而讓耳朵獲得認知的嗎？這和地等（dì děng）不同。其他宗派認為色等（sè děng）依賴於地而存在，所以眼睛可以認知地。而且，《論》（lùn）中解釋現量說，『對於真實的色等（sè děng）、根等（gēn děng）和合而產生了相，這叫做現量。』空不是根和合而產生的，所以不是通過現量獲得的。又說，『現量是什麼？就是對於真實的色、味乃至地、水、火的實有智。』如果空也是通過現量獲得的，為什麼不說『乃至空』呢？這違背了教義和道理，所以難以採納。
疏文沒有說重等（zhòng děng），疏主應該檢查一下是不是不正的版本。
現在親自檢查那部論，上面說，色、香、味、觸（sè, xiāng, wèi, chù）現在不是現量的境界。如果附著于極微（jīwēi）以及二微果（èrwēi guǒ），就叫做非現量的境界。如果依賴於天，就不是唯一的真實，這叫做理量的境界。聲音一切都是現量的境界。數量、別、合、離、彼、此、液、潤、重、勢用（shùliàng, bié, hé, lí, bǐ, cǐ, yè, rùn, zhòng, shìyòng）和色、味、香一樣。所以知道重性（zhòng xìng）既是現量，也是非現量。
疏文說，雖然有六句一向是常等（cháng děng），這是重複說了前面十句中的常、無常等（cháng, wúcháng děng）。想要顯示常中能生果，所以重複提到了。
疏文說，五句全部雖然是常但不生果。問：『我是作者，為什麼不生果？』答：『只能造因，不能作果，所接受的果是他人所作的。』
疏文說，德句（dé jù）可以比照有能（yǒu néng）。實等（shí děng）生果必須要具備有能，所以有能叫做常生果。液等十德（yè děng shí dé）生果所必須，所以同樣具備有能，叫做常。
【English Translation】 English version Regarding 'present cognition' (Xiànliàng děng). Some argue that even atoms (jīwēi) cannot be obtained through direct perception. A detailed explanation follows: Since the commentary mentions 'above atoms,' it clearly indicates that atoms are not considered direct perception. The refutation of the Lokayata (Shùnshì wàidào) view, which considers the aggregation of multiple effects as the realm of direct perception, does not prove that atoms are the object of direct perception. Refer to the 'Lamp of Meaning' (Yìdēng) for details.
The commentary states that space, time, direction, etc. (Kōng, shí, fāng děng) are not obtained through direct perception. Some argue that space is the basis of sound, and sound is within the realm of direct perception. Why then is space said not to be within the realm of direct perception? Therefore, it can be said that space is also within the realm of direct perception. A detailed explanation follows: That is not correct. Although the ear relies on space, is space something that can be heard, thus enabling the ear to gain cognition? This is different from earth, etc. (dì děng). Other schools believe that form, etc. (sè děng) depend on earth for their existence, so the eye can perceive earth. Furthermore, the treatise (lùn) explains direct perception as follows: 'When there is a combination of real form, etc. (sè děng), sense faculties, etc. (gēn děng), and a characteristic arises, this is called direct perception.' Space is not produced by the combination of sense faculties, so it is not obtained through direct perception. It also says, 'What is direct perception? It is the real knowledge of real form, taste, and even earth, water, and fire.' If space were also obtained through direct perception, why not say 'and even space'? This contradicts doctrine and reason, so it is difficult to accept.
The commentary does not mention heaviness, etc. (zhòng děng). The author of the commentary should check if it is a corrupt version.
Now, personally examining that treatise, it says that form, smell, taste, and touch (sè, xiāng, wèi, chù) are not currently within the realm of direct perception. If attached to atoms (jīwēi) and the result of two atoms (èrwēi guǒ), it is called the realm of non-direct perception. If it depends on the heavens, it is not the only reality; this is called the realm of inference. Sound is entirely within the realm of direct perception. Number, distinction, conjunction, disjunction, this, that, fluidity, moisture, heaviness, and activity (shùliàng, bié, hé, lí, bǐ, cǐ, yè, rùn, zhòng, shìyòng) are like form, taste, and smell. Therefore, it is known that heaviness (zhòng xìng) is both direct and non-direct perception.
The commentary says that although there are six phrases that are always constant, etc. (cháng děng), this is a repetition of constant, impermanent, etc. (cháng, wúcháng děng) from the previous ten phrases. The intention is to show that among the constant, there are those that can produce effects, so it is mentioned again.
The commentary says that all five phrases, although constant, do not produce effects. Question: 'I am the agent, why do I not produce effects?' Answer: 'I can only create causes, not effects; the effect received is created by others.'
The commentary says that the category of qualities (dé jù) can be compared to having the ability (yǒu néng). Realities, etc. (shí děng) must have the ability to produce effects, so having the ability is called constantly producing effects. The ten qualities of fluidity, etc. (yè děng shí dé) are necessary for producing effects, so they also have the ability and are called constant.
生果。
疏然實有中等者。十句之中九句實有名多實有。此多實中五是現量。現量所以得名為多。不爾不得名多現量。五是現量。五非現量。現．非現等現何名多 詳曰。通明十句亦得名多。多者非一。故五名多。不須相形方名多也。
問十句．六句相攝云何 答實．德．業等六句可知。異．有無能而有多釋。有義三種同異句攝。三種皆是差別義故。有義異句既唯實轉。即實句收。有能．無能實．德．業三得果之時。望各自果．及非自果定所須因。還依實等三句所攝。六句依有不收無說 詳曰。后說為勝。有依憑故 或不相攝。理亦無過。若依實等即實等攝。德亦依實應亦實收。此既不收彼云何攝。又彼論中無相攝處。
疏。六句皆實者。有義通假。謂軍．林等。若依前解軍．林等假非六取收。故后說勝 詳曰。彼軍．林等離人．樹等無別軍．林。攝假隨實名實何失。又不攝假即非勝者。不攝無說亦應非勝。故疏所明理無爽矣。
疏。不可以無用難等者。謂自真如實不離識。恐彼妄謂是離識有。而為不定。為遮此故不言無作 若爾常住不生果。因亦于如轉。彼何不遮耶 答據實無作不生果等。皆是正因。真如自許不離識故不成不定。然立因法不可雙陳。故論且舉常住為難。
疏。量云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生果（Śrāvakaphala）：指聲聞乘所證得的果位。
疏鈔中說，『疏然實有中等者』，意思是十句話中有九句確實是『有名多實有』。在這『多實』中，有五句是現量（pratyakṣa，直接認知）。之所以稱現量為『多』，是因為如果不這樣稱呼，就不能稱之為『多現量』。五句是現量，五句不是現量。現量和非現量等，憑什麼稱之為『多』呢？詳細解釋說，即使是通明的十句，也可以稱之為『多』。『多』不是指單一，所以五句就可以稱為『多』，不需要相互比較才能稱為『多』。
問：十句和六句之間的相攝關係是怎樣的？答：實（dravya，實體）、德（guṇa，屬性）、業（karma，作用）等六句是可以理解的。異（bheda，差異）、有能（śakti，能力）、無能（aśakti，無能力）則有多種解釋。有一種觀點認為，三種（有能、無能、異）都包含在『同異句』中，因為這三種都屬於差別的意義。另一種觀點認為，『異句』僅僅是『實句』的轉變，因此可以歸入『實句』。『有能』和『無能』在『實』、『德』、『業』三句獲得果報的時候，對於各自的果報以及非各自的果報，都是必須的因，因此仍然包含在『實』等三句中。六句依據『有』，不包含『無』的說法。詳細解釋說，後面的說法更為合理，因為有依據。或者說，它們之間不相互包含，在道理上也沒有什麼問題。如果依據『實』等，那麼就包含在『實』等之中。『德』也依據『實』，那麼也應該包含在『實』之中。既然這裡不包含，那麼又怎麼能說包含呢？而且在那部論中，也沒有相互包含的地方。
疏鈔中說，『六句都是實』，有一種觀點認為是通假，比如『軍隊』、『森林』等。如果按照之前的解釋，『軍隊』、『森林』等是假名，不包含在這六句之中，所以後面的說法更為合理。詳細解釋說，那些『軍隊』、『森林』等，離開了人、樹等就沒有其他的『軍隊』、『森林』。包含假名跟隨實名，又有什麼損失呢？而且不包含假名就不是更合理的說法。不包含『無』也應該不是更合理的說法。所以疏鈔所闡明的道理並沒有什麼錯誤。
疏鈔中說，『不可以用無用難等來詰難』，意思是說，自身的真如（tathatā，如如）實際上不離識（vijñāna，意識）。恐怕他們錯誤地認為真如是離開識而存在的，因此成為不定因。爲了遮止這種觀點，所以不說『無作』。如果這樣，常住（nitya，永恒）就不會產生果報，因也會在如如上轉變，為什麼不遮止呢？回答說，根據實際情況，『無作』、『不生果』等，都是正因。真如自己承認不離識，所以不能構成不定因。然而，立因法不能同時陳述兩種，所以論中暫且舉出『常住』來作為詰難。
疏鈔中說，『量云』
【English Translation】 English version: Śrāvakaphala: Refers to the fruit attained by those in the Śrāvakayāna (the Vehicle of the Hearers).
The commentary states, 'Among those that are manifestly real, there is a middle category.' This means that nine out of ten statements are indeed 'name-substantial and real.' Among these 'many real' statements, five are direct perception (pratyakṣa). The reason direct perception is called 'many' is that if it were not called so, it could not be called 'many direct perceptions.' Five are direct perception, and five are not direct perception. With direct and non-direct perceptions, how can it be called 'many'? A detailed explanation says that even the ten clear statements can be called 'many.' 'Many' does not refer to a single thing, so five can be called 'many.' It does not need to be compared to be called 'many.'
Question: What is the relationship of inclusion between the ten statements and the six statements? Answer: The six statements of substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), etc., are understandable. Difference (bheda), capability (śakti), and incapability (aśakti) have multiple interpretations. One view is that the three (capability, incapability, and difference) are all included in the 'same-different statement' because these three all belong to the meaning of difference. Another view is that the 'difference statement' is merely a transformation of the 'substance statement,' so it can be included in the 'substance statement.' When 'capability' and 'incapability' attain results in the three statements of 'substance,' 'quality,' and 'action,' they are necessary causes for their respective results and non-results, so they are still included in the three statements of 'substance,' etc. The six statements are based on 'existence' and do not include the statement of 'non-existence.' A detailed explanation says that the latter statement is more reasonable because it has a basis. Or, they do not include each other, and there is nothing wrong with that in principle. If based on 'substance,' etc., then they are included in 'substance,' etc. 'Quality' is also based on 'substance,' so it should also be included in 'substance.' Since it is not included here, how can it be said to be included? Moreover, there is no place for mutual inclusion in that treatise.
The commentary states, 'All six statements are real.' One view is that they are general and borrowed, such as 'army,' 'forest,' etc. If according to the previous explanation, 'army,' 'forest,' etc., are nominal and not included in these six statements, so the latter statement is more reasonable. A detailed explanation says that those 'army,' 'forest,' etc., have no other 'army,' 'forest' apart from people, trees, etc. Including nominal names following real names, what is the loss? Moreover, not including nominal names is not a more reasonable statement. Not including 'non-existence' should also not be a more reasonable statement. Therefore, the principle elucidated by the commentary has no error.
The commentary states, 'One cannot use useless difficulties, etc., to challenge.' This means that one's own Suchness (tathatā) is actually not separate from consciousness (vijñāna). Fearing that they might mistakenly think that Suchness exists apart from consciousness, thus becoming an uncertain cause. To prevent this view, it is not said 'uncreated.' If so, permanence (nitya) would not produce results, and the cause would also transform on Suchness, why not prevent it? The answer is that, according to the actual situation, 'uncreated,' 'not producing results,' etc., are all correct causes. Suchness itself admits that it is not separate from consciousness, so it cannot constitute an uncertain cause. However, the method of establishing a cause cannot state two things at the same time, so the treatise temporarily cites 'permanence' as a challenge.
The commentary states, 'The measure says'
此等實常不生果者。問宗．因既同。豈不有法成於有法因無依耶 答疏但指法。不能繁詞。理實應牒常不生果一一法名以為宗也。思之可解。
疏。或余句無常雖不生果等者。即德句中合離等德而無常者不生果也 問今他比量。他許離識實有自體。何非不定。答疏主所造因明疏中。立自他因甄簡剖析如其楚．越。而辨此論往往揮雜甘蒿猶參 今以愚度智聊有二意。一試諸學者而悟不耶。即俱舍論有斯意矣。二餘因明師於一因過不分九例。今隨他語。復欲發生學者覺惠故示紕謬。若言疏主實闇斯理。因明疏內何巨照然。故應不出前之二意。故因應云許是常住不生果故。簡諸不定悉皆無也。
疏。今言常住至在異喻者。即因異喻。準覺樂等宗同因異。理門九句當第八句同品分轉亦為正因。
疏。又不言常等者。即宗．因中皆除常字。宗除覺等。不爾相扶 詳曰。縱除常言。覺等亦但是宗同品。彼許覺等而能生果。非因同喻。故彼論云。一體．別體彼覺為因。此體．彼體以遠近覺而為因也。既言為因。
明能生果。
疏。同喻亦非定是有性者。據意喻說言非定有。覺等喻上無礙之因而得轉故。
疏。初中有二以德例實等者。詳曰。若準疏科。地．水．火三一段之文無所攝也。故今言者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：像這樣本質上恒常且不產生結果的事物。問：宗（S宗，Subject，論題）和因（H因，Hetu，理由）既然相同，難道不是有法（dharmas，事物）會因為有法之因（hetu of dharmas）而無法成立嗎？答：註釋只是指出了法（dharmas），沒有詳細說明。實際上應該把『恒常不生果』的每一個法（dharma）都作為宗（S宗，Subject，論題）來論述。仔細思考就能理解。 疏：或者其餘的句子，如『無常雖不生果』等，指的是在德（guna，屬性）的句子中，像『合』（samprayoga，結合）『離』（viyoga，分離）等這些無常的德（guna，屬性）不產生結果。問：現在其他的比量（anumana，推論）中，對方承認離識（vijñana，意識）有真實的自體（svabhava，自性），為什麼不是不定因（anaikantika-hetu，不確定的理由）？答：註釋的作者在所造的因明（hetuvidya，因明學）疏（commentary）中，對於自因（sva-hetu，自己的理由）和他因（para-hetu，他人的理由）的甄別剖析非常清楚，就像楚國和越國一樣分明。但是辨析這個論點時，常常把有用的和沒用的混在一起。現在我以愚昧揣度智慧，姑且提出兩點看法：一是試探學者們是否能領悟，就像《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，阿毗達摩俱舍論）有這樣的用意；二是其他的因明（hetuvidya，因明學）師對於一個因（hetu，理由）的過失，不區分九種情況。現在我順著別人的話，又想引發學者們的覺悟和智慧，所以指出其中的錯誤。如果說註釋的作者確實不明白這個道理，那麼他的因明（hetuvidya，因明學）疏（commentary）中怎麼會有如此巨大的光芒呢？所以應該不出以上兩種用意。所以因（hetu，理由）應該這樣說：『因為是恒常住（nitya，常住）不生果（anitya，無常）的緣故』，這樣就可以排除所有不定因（anaikantika-hetu，不確定的理由）了。 疏：現在說『恒常住』到『在異喻』，指的是因（hetu，理由）的異喻（vydatireka，反例）。按照覺（buddhi，覺悟）、樂（sukha，快樂）等宗（S宗，Subject，論題）相同，因（hetu，理由）不同的情況，《理門》（Nyaya-mukha，入正理論）的九句中，第八句『同品分轉』也是正因（sad-hetu，正確的理由）。 疏：又不說『常』等，指的是宗（S宗，Subject，論題）和因（hetu，理由）中都去掉了『常』字。宗（S宗，Subject，論題）去掉了覺（buddhi，覺悟）等，否則就不能相互扶持。詳細地說，即使去掉了『常』字，覺（buddhi，覺悟）等也只是宗（S宗，Subject，論題）的同品（sapaksha，同類）。對方承認覺（buddhi，覺悟）等能夠產生結果，而不是因（hetu，理由）的同喻（sapaksha，同類）。所以他們的論點說：『一體（eka-dravya，單一實體）、別體（nana-dravya，不同實體）的覺（buddhi，覺悟）是因（hetu，理由）。此體（idam-dravya，這個實體）、彼體（adas-dravya，那個實體）以遠近的覺（buddhi，覺悟）作為因（hetu，理由）。』既然說是因（hetu，理由）， 就表明能夠產生結果。 疏：同喻（sapaksha，同類）也並非一定是『有性』，這是根據意喻（arthapatti，意義推論）來說的，說它並非一定是『有性』。覺（buddhi，覺悟）等喻（dristanta，例子）上沒有障礙的因（hetu，理由）才能成立。 疏：最初的『中有二以德例實』等，詳細地說，如果按照註釋的科判，地（prthivi，地）、水（ap，水）、火（tejas，火）這三段文字就沒有地方可以歸屬了。所以現在說...
【English Translation】 English version: Such things that are inherently permanent and do not produce results. Question: Since the Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic) and the Reason (H因, Hetu, the reason) are the same, wouldn't it be that dharmas (things) cannot be established because of the reason of dharmas (hetu of dharmas)? Answer: The commentary only points out dharmas and does not elaborate. In reality, each dharma of 'permanent and not producing results' should be taken as the Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic) for discussion. Think about it and you will understand. Commentary: Or the remaining sentences, such as 'impermanent though not producing results,' refer to those impermanent qualities (guna, attributes) in the sentences about qualities (guna, attributes), such as 'conjunction' (samprayoga, combination) and 'separation' (viyoga, separation), which do not produce results. Question: Now, in other inferences (anumana, reasoning), the opponent admits that consciousness apart from objects (vijñana, consciousness) has a real self-nature (svabhava, own-being), why is it not an uncertain reason (anaikantika-hetu, uncertain reason)? Answer: The author of the commentary on epistemology (hetuvidya, the science of reasoning) has very clear distinctions and analyses of self-reasons (sva-hetu, one's own reasons) and other-reasons (para-hetu, others' reasons), as clear as the difference between the states of Chu and Yue. However, when analyzing this argument, he often mixes useful and useless things together. Now, I venture to offer two opinions based on my limited understanding: First, to test whether scholars can understand, just as the Abhidharmakośa (Abhidharmakośa, Treasury of Knowledge) has such an intention; second, other epistemologists (hetuvidya, the science of reasoning) do not distinguish the nine types of faults of a single reason (hetu, reason). Now, following others' words, I also want to inspire scholars' awakening and wisdom, so I point out the errors in it. If it is said that the author of the commentary really does not understand this principle, then how could there be such a great light in his commentary on epistemology (hetuvidya, the science of reasoning)? Therefore, it should not be beyond the above two intentions. Therefore, the reason (hetu, reason) should be stated as: 'Because it is permanent (nitya, permanent) and does not produce results (anitya, impermanent),' so that all uncertain reasons (anaikantika-hetu, uncertain reasons) can be excluded. Commentary: Now, saying 'permanent' to 'in the dissimilar example' refers to the dissimilar example (vydatireka, counter-example) of the reason (hetu, reason). According to the case where the Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic) is the same, such as awareness (buddhi, awareness), pleasure (sukha, pleasure), etc., and the reason (hetu, reason) is different, in the nine sentences of the Nyaya-mukha (Nyaya-mukha, The Gate of Logic), the eighth sentence 'partially present in the similar class' is also a valid reason (sad-hetu, correct reason). Commentary: Also, not saying 'permanent' etc. means that the word 'permanent' is removed from both the Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic) and the Reason (hetu, reason). The Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic) removes awareness (buddhi, awareness) etc., otherwise they cannot support each other. In detail, even if the word 'permanent' is removed, awareness (buddhi, awareness) etc. are only similar instances (sapaksha, similar class) of the Subject (S宗, Subject, the topic). The opponent admits that awareness (buddhi, awareness) etc. can produce results, but they are not similar examples (sapaksha, similar class) of the reason (hetu, reason). Therefore, their argument says: 'Awareness (buddhi, awareness) of one substance (eka-dravya, single substance) and different substances (nana-dravya, different substances) is the reason (hetu, reason). This substance (idam-dravya, this substance) and that substance (adas-dravya, that substance) take awareness (buddhi, awareness) from near and far as the reason (hetu, reason).' Since it is said to be the reason (hetu, reason), it indicates that it can produce results. Commentary: The similar example (sapaksha, similar class) is not necessarily 'having nature,' which is based on implication (arthapatti, presumption) to say that it is not necessarily 'having nature.' The reason (hetu, reason) on the example (dristanta, example) of awareness (buddhi, awareness) etc. can be established without obstacles. Commentary: The initial 'there are two, using qualities to exemplify reality' etc. In detail, if according to the classification of the commentary, the three paragraphs of text on earth (prthivi, earth), water (ap, water), and fire (tejas, fire) have nowhere to belong. Therefore, now saying...
初中有二。一俱觸應同破。二同見無異破。初中復二。文易可知。
疏。其地等至皆有觸故者。由身得觸。地等有觸身得地等。
疏。色德至風中無色者。色不依風。由此身根不得於色 若爾身得地等何不得色。色依地故 答根．境相對身得風等。由地有觸故亦得之。非得地等一切之德。非自境故。
疏。彼以假實地等俱名地者。佛法談彼。非是他宗立有假地。即眼所見名假地也。地堅為性。實身根得 有言眼所見水名為假地 詳曰。不應然。眼所見水但是假水。他亦許水是眼見故。若眼所見水名假地者。更何等水是眼所見。若言他眼不許見水。違彼此論。
疏。文言雖總等者。結申正義。文言總也。不以論云無實地等。即難於他色即是地。自五境分。色不即地。若難他者有違宗失。
疏。亦非地等是此中意者論言亦非眼見實地等者。意說地等非眼所見實句所攝。
是此意者。即是彼此相例之意。
疏。業至三色等性者。大有．俱分是色性也。
疏。取聲之時至名定耳根者。近身之空而起取聲之作用故 問耳根常不 答耳即是空。故耳亦常 或是無常。如本微常所生子微是無常故 然前解勝。彼論說耳即是空。故。與微義別。
疏。虛空至數為喻者。數字恐
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 初中的破斥有兩種。一是共同觸覺和反應的破斥，二是共同視覺無差異的破斥。第一種又分為兩種情況，文義容易理解。
疏：『其地等至皆有觸故者』，因為身體能感受到觸覺，所以地等（地、水、火、風）具有觸覺，身體才能感受到地等。
疏：『色德至風中無色者』，顏色不依賴於風。因此，身體的感官無法感受到顏色。如果這樣，身體能感受到地等，為什麼不能感受到顏色呢？因為顏色依賴於地。答：根（感官）和境（對像）相對，身體能感受到風等。因為地有觸覺，所以也能感受到地。但並非能感受到地等的一切屬性，因為顏色不是身體感官的直接對象。
疏：『彼以假實地等俱名地者』，佛法討論的是這些，而不是其他宗派所立的虛假的地。眼睛所見到的稱為假地。地的堅硬是其性質，身體的感官可以感受到。有人說眼睛所見的水稱為假地。詳細地說，不應該是這樣。眼睛所見的水只是假水。其他宗派也承認水是眼睛可以見到的。如果眼睛所見的水稱為假地，那麼還有什麼水是眼睛可以見到的呢？如果說其他宗派的眼睛不允許見到水，那就違背了彼此的論點。
疏：『文言雖總等者』，總結並闡述正義。文言是總括性的。不能因為論中說沒有真實的地等，就反駁他說顏色就是地。因為五境（色、聲、香、味、觸）是分開的，顏色不是地。如果反駁他，就犯了違背自己宗派的錯誤。
疏：『亦非地等是此中意者』，論中說『亦非眼見實地等者』，意思是說地等不是眼睛所能見到的真實事物，不屬於實句所包含的範圍。
『是此意者』，這就是彼此相互類比的意思。
疏：『業至三色等性者』，大有（Mahābhūta，四大元素）、俱分（Upādāyarūpa，所造色）是色的性質。
疏：『取聲之時至名定耳根者』，靠近身體的虛空產生了聽取聲音的作用，因此稱為確定的耳根。問：耳根是常還是無常？答：耳根就是虛空，所以耳根也是常。或者說是無常，就像由基本微粒所生的子微粒是無常的。然而，前面的解釋更好。因為論中說耳根就是虛空，所以與微粒的意義不同。
疏：『虛空至數為喻者』，數字恐怕
【English Translation】 English version There are two refutations in the 'beginning'. The first is the refutation of shared tactile sensation and response. The second is the refutation of shared visual perception without difference. The first is further divided into two, the meaning of the text is easily understood.
Commentary: 'Because the earth and so on all have touch', because the body can experience touch, therefore earth and so on (earth, water, fire, wind) have touch, so the body can experience earth and so on.
Commentary: 'The quality of color, up to the absence of color in wind', color does not depend on wind. Therefore, the body's senses cannot perceive color. If so, the body can perceive earth and so on, why can't it perceive color? Because color depends on earth. Answer: The root (sense organ) and the object are relative, and the body can perceive wind and so on. Because earth has touch, it can also perceive earth. But it cannot perceive all the attributes of earth and so on, because color is not the direct object of the body's senses.
Commentary: 'They call both the false and real earth and so on as earth', the Buddha's teachings discuss these, not the false earth established by other schools. What the eyes see is called false earth. The hardness of earth is its nature, and the body's senses can perceive it. Some say that the water seen by the eyes is called false earth. In detail, it should not be so. The water seen by the eyes is just false water. Other schools also admit that water can be seen by the eyes. If the water seen by the eyes is called false earth, then what kind of water can be seen by the eyes? If it is said that the eyes of other schools do not allow seeing water, then it violates each other's arguments.
Commentary: 'Although the words are general, and so on', summarize and explain the correct meaning. The words are general. One cannot argue that color is earth just because the treatise says there is no real earth and so on. Because the five objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) are separate, color is not earth. If one refutes him, one commits the error of violating one's own school.
Commentary: 'It is not that earth and so on are the meaning here', the treatise says 'It is not that the real earth and so on seen by the eyes', meaning that earth and so on are not real things that can be seen by the eyes, and do not belong to the scope included in real sentences.
'Is this the meaning', this is the meaning of mutual analogy.
Commentary: 'Karma to the nature of the three colors and so on', Mahābhūta (the four great elements), Upādāyarūpa (derived form) are the nature of color.
Commentary: 'When taking sound, to the name of the fixed ear root', the void near the body produces the function of hearing sound, so it is called the fixed ear root. Question: Is the ear root permanent or impermanent? Answer: The ear root is void, so the ear root is also permanent. Or it is impermanent, like the sub-particle produced by the basic particle is impermanent. However, the previous explanation is better. Because the treatise says that the ear root is void, so it is different from the meaning of particle.
Commentary: 'Void to number as a metaphor', the number is probably
錯。應為不字。空．擇滅等雖不離心不得將為喻。何所以者。空．擇滅等是佛法法。今就他宗以為比量。不可將自擇滅等法而以為喻。故疏言就他宗比量。釋所以也。若不爾者。前來何處有擇滅喻而云數也。
疏。雖有他隨一過等者。佛法名他。外道他故。余準可知。
疏。餘八句一一別除為八比量者。有義九句之中。隨除何句以為宗．因。言非實等。非顯多量。所以者何。且如初宗言德等者。除無說句並皆等不。若不等不盡。因便不定若言等者。余皆所等。即一宗．因已能成立所等八句非離識有。更余為宗犯相扶失。前已成故由此初量總成八句。后別立一總成二量 詳曰。疏意說云。九句之中隨除於一即得為量。非唯局在非實．有二。余句皆有可除為量之義。恐迷方者依文封執非實．非有二得為量余乃不得故言八量。或約句數而有別別二合等義。不要令作 又復不言二合等量而無過也。為令學者得生異智故作此言。
論。彼所執有等者。問以非無因而難他者。即佛法中諸有體法亦不得成 他量難云。汝聲。應離色外無別自性。許非無故。猶如色等 答宗中自教．世間．現量．自語相違。汝豈不許聲離色有。下許異實因亦有此難。破亦同之 問外又難云。汝七．八識。應離六識無別自．體。許是識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不對。應該是『不』字。空（Śūnyatā，佛教中的空性概念）、擇滅（Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）等雖然不離心，但不能將它們作為比喻。為什麼呢？因為空、擇滅等是佛法。現在我們是借用其他宗派的觀點來進行比量，不能用我們自己的擇滅等法來作比喻。所以疏文中說『就他宗比量』，就是解釋這個原因。如果不是這樣，那麼前面哪裡有擇滅的比喻，卻說是數論的呢？
疏文：『雖有他隨一過等者』，佛法被稱為『他』，因為相對於外道來說是『他』。其餘的可以類推得知。
疏文：『其餘八句一一別除為八比量者』，有一種觀點認為，在九句話中，隨便去除哪一句都可以作為宗（命題）、因（理由）。說『非實』等，並非只顯示多種量。為什麼呢？比如最初的宗，說『德等』，去除『無說句』后，其餘的都相等嗎？如果不是都相等，那麼因就不確定；如果說是都相等，那麼其餘的都是所等同的，即一個宗、因已經能夠成立所等同的八句『非離識有』。再另外立宗，就犯了互相扶持的過失，因為前面已經成立了。因此，最初的比量總共成立八句，後面分別立一個，總共成立兩個比量。詳細地說，疏文的意思是說，在九句話中，隨便去除一句就可以成為比量，並非僅僅侷限於『非實』、『非有』兩種情況。其餘的句子都有可以去除作為比量的意義。恐怕迷惑的人會按照字面意思執著于『非實』、『非有』兩種情況可以作為比量，而其餘的則不可以，所以說有八個比量。或者根據句子的數量，有分別、二合等意義。不要讓人們這樣認為。又，不說是二合等量，也沒有過失。爲了讓學者產生不同的智慧，所以這樣說。
論：『彼所執有等者』，用『非無因』來詰難對方，那麼佛法中諸多的有體之法也無法成立。對方的比量是：『你的聲音，應該離開色之外沒有別的自性，因為你承認它不是沒有（原因），就像色等一樣。』回答：宗中與自教（自己的教義）、世間（世俗常識）、現量（現量所見）、自語（自己說過的話）相違背。你難道不承認聲音離開色而存在嗎？下面承認『異實因』也有這個難點，破斥的方法也相同。對方又詰難說：『你的第七、第八識，應該離開第六識沒有別的自體，因為你承認它們是識。』
【English Translation】 English version: Incorrect. It should be the word 'not'. Śūnyatā (emptiness in Buddhism), Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (cessation through wisdom) etc., although not separate from the mind, cannot be used as metaphors. Why? Because Śūnyatā, Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, etc., are Buddhist doctrines. Now we are using the views of other schools for comparison, so we cannot use our own Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha etc. as metaphors. Therefore, the commentary says 'comparing based on other schools', which explains this reason. If not, then where was the metaphor of Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha mentioned earlier, and why was it said to be of the Sāṃkhya school?
Commentary: 'Although there is the fault of 'other' and 'one-sidedness', etc.', the Buddha's teachings are called 'other' because they are 'other' relative to non-Buddhist schools. The rest can be inferred.
Commentary: 'The remaining eight clauses are individually removed to form eight inferences', one view is that among the nine clauses, any one can be removed to serve as the subject (thesis) and reason (hetu). Saying 'non-existent in reality' etc., does not only show multiple quantities. Why? For example, the initial subject, saying 'qualities etc.', after removing the 'unspeakable clause', are the rest all equal? If they are not all equal, then the reason is uncertain; if they are said to be all equal, then the rest are all equated, i.e., one subject and reason can already establish the eight clauses that are equated as 'not separate from consciousness'. Establishing another subject would commit the fault of mutual support, because it has already been established earlier. Therefore, the initial inference establishes a total of eight clauses, and later establishing one separately establishes a total of two inferences. In detail, the commentary means that among the nine clauses, removing any one can become an inference, not only limited to 'non-existent in reality' and 'non-existent'. The remaining clauses all have the meaning of being removable as an inference. Fearing that confused people would adhere to the literal meaning that 'non-existent in reality' and 'non-existent' can be used as inferences, while the rest cannot, it is said that there are eight inferences. Or, according to the number of clauses, there are separate, combined, etc. meanings. Do not let people think this way. Also, not saying that there are combined etc. inferences is also not a fault. This is said to allow scholars to generate different wisdom.
Treatise: 'Those who hold existence etc.', using 'not without a cause' to challenge the opponent, then the many existing entities in Buddhism also cannot be established. The opponent's inference is: 'Your sound should have no separate self-nature apart from form, because you admit that it is not without (a cause), just like form etc.' Answer: The subject contradicts one's own teachings, worldly knowledge, direct perception, and one's own words. Do you not admit that sound exists apart from form? The following admission of 'different reality as a cause' also has this difficulty, and the method of refutation is the same. The opponent further challenges: 'Your seventh and eighth consciousnesses should have no separate self-nature apart from the sixth consciousness, because you admit that they are consciousnesses.'
性非無故。如眼等識。若離六識。應非識性。許異六識故。如畢竟無等。量三支具。七．八應無 答前因有決定相違過。相違量云。自七．八識。應離六識有別自體。許為他識俱有根故。如眼等根。后量宗有一分他所別過。佛法不許第八與六一向相離。因亦一分他隨一過。八為六依非定異故。又俗有別真無別故。既為似立三支寧具。故我七．八識義得成。應更審思。
疏。遮決定相違者。外作量云。所說有性。離實等三有別自體。除無說外餘六句中隨一攝故。如異等句 有云。有性。異實等三定應別有。實等所不攝故。如同異性 詳曰。言別有者別有其體。若爾因有不定之過。為如同異實等不攝有是別有體。為如無說實等不攝有是無別體。故應依前。
疏。此難恒齊等者。此論主言。汝雖前解我今後責。有無恒齊。汝今何方能遣我難 或有無齊。論主何方能遣外難。前解為本 有義若勝論救有法有有難令無無。亦應汝色等非無待因故有。龜毛非有待因故無。既許有法從因而有。無不待無。我亦有法由有故有。無法不假無法方無 解云我法有因果。因果俱生滅。汝有為因起。應非是一．常 詳曰釋旨甚好。詞當疏闕。可謂白圭而猶玷矣。何所以者。無為之理為離系果．及能作因。豈即生滅。若據有為文無簡
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『性非無故』（自性並非沒有原因）。例如眼識等。如果離開六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識），應該就不是識的自性了。因為你允許它與六識不同，就像『畢竟無』等情況一樣。你所立的量（推理）的三支（宗、因、喻）都具備。那麼第七識（末那識）、第八識（阿賴耶識）應該不存在。 回答：你前面的因（理由）有決定相違的過失。相違的量是：第七、第八識，應該離開六識有不同的自體。因為你允許它們是其他識，並且與根（眼根等）同時存在。就像眼根等一樣。後面的量在宗（論題）上有一部分被他人所否定。佛法不承認第八識與六識完全分離。因（理由）也有一部分隨他人所否定，因為第八識是六識的所依，並非一定是不同的。而且，世俗諦上它們是不同的，但在真諦上它們沒有分別。既然你所立的三支是相似的，怎麼能說是完備的呢？所以我的第七、第八識的觀點是成立的，你應該更仔細地思考。 疏解：爲了遮止決定相違，對方建立量說：所說的『有性』（存在的性質），離開實、德、有這三種，有不同的自體。除了『無說』之外，在其餘六句（指名、句、文、味、觸、作）中隨便哪一句都包含它，就像『異』等句一樣。有人說：『有性』，與實、德、有這三種一定應該是不同的。因為實、德、有不包含它，就像『同異性』一樣。詳細解釋：說『別有』，是指有不同的自體。如果這樣，因（理由）就有不確定的過失。是因為如同『同異』，實、德等不包含『有』，所以『有』是別有的自體？還是如同『無說』，實、德等不包含『有』，所以『有』是沒有別的自體？所以應該按照前面的說法。 疏解：這個責難是針對『恒常』和『齊一』等性質。論主說：你雖然之前解釋了，我現在再來責難。『有』和『無』是恒常齊一的，你現在用什麼方法能夠消除我的責難？或者說，『有』和『無』是齊一的，論主用什麼方法能夠消除對方的責難？之前的解釋是根本。 有一種觀點認為，如果論辯者勝出，就可以用『有法』來反駁『有』的責難，使『無』沒有立足之地。也應該說，你的色等不是沒有待因所以才存在的，龜毛不是有待因所以才不存在的。既然你承認『有法』是從因而產生的，『無』不是不依賴『無』而產生的。我也認為『有法』是因為『有』才存在的，『無法』不是不依賴『無法』才不存在的。 解釋說：我的法有因果，因果同時生滅。你的有為法是因為因才產生的，應該不是單一和常恒的。詳細解釋：這個解釋的旨意很好，只是文字上有所欠缺。可以說是美玉上的瑕疵。為什麼這麼說呢？無為的道理是離系的果，以及能作的因，怎麼會是生滅的呢？如果按照有為法來說，文字上沒有簡別。
【English Translation】 English version '性非無故' (Self-nature is not without a cause). For example, eye consciousness and so on. If it is separated from the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness), it should not be the self-nature of consciousness. Because you allow it to be different from the six consciousnesses, just like 'utter non-existence' and so on. The three components (thesis, reason, and example) of your established syllogism are complete. Then the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness) and the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness) should not exist. Answer: Your previous reason has the fault of decisive contradiction. The contradictory syllogism is: the seventh and eighth consciousnesses should have different self-entities apart from the six consciousnesses. Because you allow them to be other consciousnesses and exist simultaneously with the roots (eye root, etc.). Just like the eye root, etc. The later syllogism has a part of the thesis denied by others. Buddhism does not admit that the eighth consciousness is completely separated from the six consciousnesses. The reason is also partly denied by others, because the eighth consciousness is the basis of the six consciousnesses and is not necessarily different. Moreover, they are different in conventional truth, but they are not different in ultimate truth. Since the three components you established are similar, how can they be said to be complete? Therefore, my view of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses is valid, and you should think more carefully. Commentary: In order to prevent decisive contradiction, the opponent establishes a syllogism saying: the so-called 'existence-nature' (the nature of existence) has a different self-entity apart from substance, quality, and existence. Except for 'non-expression', any one of the remaining six phrases (referring to name, sentence, word, taste, touch, action) contains it, just like the 'different' phrase. Someone says: 'Existence-nature' must be different from substance, quality, and existence. Because substance, quality, and existence do not include it, just like 'identity and difference'. Detailed explanation: Saying 'separate existence' means having a different self-entity. If so, the reason has the fault of uncertainty. Is it because, like 'identity and difference', substance, quality, etc. do not include 'existence', so 'existence' is a separate self-entity? Or is it because, like 'non-expression', substance, quality, etc. do not include 'existence', so 'existence' has no separate self-entity? Therefore, it should be according to the previous statement. Commentary: This criticism is aimed at properties such as 'constancy' and 'uniformity'. The proponent says: Although you explained it before, I will criticize it again now. 'Existence' and 'non-existence' are constant and uniform, what method can you use now to eliminate my criticism? Or, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are uniform, what method can the proponent use to eliminate the opponent's criticism? The previous explanation is fundamental. One view is that if the debater wins, he can use 'existent dharma' to refute the criticism of 'existence', so that 'non-existence' has no foothold. It should also be said that your form, etc. do not exist because they have no dependent cause, and turtle hair does not exist because it has a dependent cause. Since you admit that 'existent dharma' is produced from a cause, 'non-existence' is not produced without relying on 'non-existence'. I also think that 'existent dharma' exists because of 'existence', and 'non-existent dharma' does not exist without relying on 'non-existence'. The explanation says: My dharma has cause and effect, and cause and effect arise and cease simultaneously. Your conditioned dharma is produced because of a cause, and should not be singular and constant. Detailed explanation: The meaning of this explanation is very good, but the wording is somewhat lacking. It can be said to be a flaw in the jade. Why do I say that? The principle of unconditioned dharma is the result of detachment, as well as the cause that can be made, how can it be arising and ceasing? If according to conditioned dharma, there is no distinction in the text.
故。他實．德．業雖有因起。他亦自許有無常者。豈不相扶。若偏難常。亦何不簡。故今應云。我有為法有因果。因果俱生滅。汝實等法有因起。實等並應非一．常。
疏。莫此亦非同異性者。此同異性非但不是彼實等性。亦復自體非同異性。是故言亦 詳曰。或亦前有。前有已破非實等性。同異同彼。故論言亦。
疏。此中無自言相違等過者。有義此言汝執。雖能顯示非自所許。然法．有法二言相違。不可說無違自語失。故宗應云汝同異性應非實．德．業性 詳曰。若不言簡法違有法可自語違。有法言汝明非自許。今以法違。何自語過。若以言簡亦成過者。即因明論天主敘彼有法自相相違之量應非真破。亦有自語相違過故。彼既不違此何即過。故然改宗云汝同異性非無此理。若牒論全文而為有法故當依疏。
疏。然今宗至應別簡者。若不簡別直依論作。即有法成有法等失。德．業並在有法之中。復將為喻。故有此過。
疏。此中所言至當句為宗者。即論中雲勿此亦非實．德．業。是非取上言實．德．業三。彼但總非。非量破故 言故別者。釋別當句為宗之義。意乃顯論中無總量理。
疏。等取德喻等者。有義亦等總宗之喻。總宗之喻非實．德．業故。別等取和合句義 詳曰。論中既
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，『他』（對方）所主張的『實』(Dravya，實體) 、『德』(Guna，屬性) 、『業』(Karma，活動) 雖然有因緣生起，但他自己也承認有無常的性質，這難道不是互相矛盾嗎？如果偏執于常，又為何不加以簡化呢？所以現在應該說：我所承認的有為法有因果關係，因和果都是生滅變化的。你所主張的『實』等法有因緣生起，那麼『實』等法也應該不是單一的、常住不變的。
疏：不要認為這也不是同異性。這個同異性不僅不是你所主張的『實』等性，而且它自身也不是同異性。所以說『亦』。詳細地說：或者前面已經有了。前面已經破斥了『實』等性，同異性與它們相同。所以論中說『亦』。
疏：這裡沒有自相矛盾等過失。有一種觀點認為，這句話是針對你所執著的。雖然能夠顯示不是自己所承認的，但是『法』(Dharma，事物) 和『有法』(Dharmin，具有事物性質的主體) 這兩個詞是相互矛盾的，不能說沒有違背自己言語的過失。所以宗應該說：你所主張的同異性應該不是『實』、『德』、『業』的性質。詳細地說：如果不簡化『法』，違背了『有法』，就可能出現自語相違的過失。『有法』這個詞表明不是自己所承認的。現在用『法』來違背，有什麼自語相違的過失呢？如果用『言簡』也成為過失，那麼因明論中天主敘述的『有法』自相矛盾的量就應該不是真正的破斥。也有自語相違的過失。既然那裡沒有違背，這裡為什麼就是過失呢？所以應該更改宗，說：你所主張的同異性並非沒有這個道理。如果按照論的全文作為『有法』，就應當依照疏。
疏：現在宗要分別簡別。如果不分別簡別，直接按照論來做，就會出現『有法』成為『有法』等的過失。『德』、『業』都在『有法』之中，又將它們作為比喻，所以有這個過失。
疏：這裡所說的『當句為宗』，就是論中說的『不要認為這也不是實、德、業』。『非』是取上面的『實』、『德』、『業』三種。他們只是總體的否定，不是量破的緣故。說『故別』，是解釋分別當句作為宗的意義。意思是說論中沒有總量的道理。
疏：『等取德喻等』，有一種觀點認為也是總宗的比喻。總宗的比喻不是『實』、『德』、『業』的緣故。分別等取和合句的意義。詳細地說：論中既然
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, although 'his' (the opponent's) asserted 'Dravya' (substance), 'Guna' (quality), and 'Karma' (activity) arise from causes, he himself admits that they are impermanent. Isn't this contradictory? If you are attached to permanence, why not simplify it? So now it should be said: I acknowledge that conditioned dharmas have cause and effect, and both cause and effect are subject to arising and ceasing. The 'Dravya' and other dharmas that you assert arise from causes, so 'Dravya' and the others should not be singular and permanent.
Commentary: Do not think that this is not the same as the identity and difference nature. This identity and difference nature is not only not the same as the 'Dravya' and other natures that you assert, but it is also not the same as the identity and difference nature in itself. Therefore, it is said 'also'. In detail: perhaps it already existed before. The 'Dravya' and other natures have already been refuted before, and the identity and difference nature is the same as them. Therefore, the treatise says 'also'.
Commentary: There is no fault of self-contradiction here. One view is that this statement is directed at what you are attached to. Although it can show that it is not what you acknowledge, the two words 'Dharma' (thing) and 'Dharmin' (the subject possessing the nature of a thing) are contradictory, and it cannot be said that there is no fault of contradicting one's own words. Therefore, the thesis should say: The identity and difference nature that you assert should not be the nature of 'Dravya', 'Guna', and 'Karma'. In detail: If 'Dharma' is not simplified, it contradicts 'Dharmin', and there may be a fault of self-contradiction. The word 'Dharmin' indicates that it is not what you acknowledge. Now, using 'Dharma' to contradict, what fault of self-contradiction is there? If using 'simplification' also becomes a fault, then the inference of the Lord of Logic in the Hetuvidya-shastra, which describes the self-contradiction of 'Dharmin', should not be a true refutation. There is also a fault of self-contradiction. Since there is no contradiction there, why is there a fault here? Therefore, the thesis should be changed to say: The identity and difference nature that you assert is not without this reason. If the entire text of the treatise is taken as 'Dharmin', then it should be based on the commentary.
Commentary: Now the thesis needs to be distinguished separately. If it is not distinguished separately and is done directly according to the treatise, there will be a fault of 'Dharmin' becoming 'Dharmin', etc. 'Guna' and 'Karma' are both within 'Dharmin', and they are also used as metaphors, so there is this fault.
Commentary: The 'phrase as the thesis' mentioned here is what the treatise says, 'Do not think that this is not also Dravya, Guna, and Karma'. 'Not' takes the three above, 'Dravya', 'Guna', and 'Karma'. They are only a general negation, not because of the refutation of the measure. Saying 'therefore separate' is to explain the meaning of distinguishing the phrase as the thesis. The meaning is to show that there is no principle of total measure in the treatise.
Commentary: 'Etc. taking Guna as a metaphor, etc.', one view is that it is also a metaphor for the total thesis. The metaphor for the total thesis is not 'Dravya', 'Guna', and 'Karma'. Separately, etc., take the meaning of the combined phrase. In detail: Since in the treatise
無難總之宗。等等總喻。喻何所設。
疏。應非實地者。非實地言通二義。一者非是真實之地。二者非是實句中地。
疏。然文唯有以性同實例者 詳曰。觀論之意。令實．德．業同同異性不別立性。此乃以實而同性例 又疏標云。難令離實等無同異性。今判論中以性同實。應筆誤也。
疏。無別有大非實性者。九句之上共有一性名為大也 問何為此難 答彼依相似立同異性。九皆非實。非實相似。故難令立大非實性。
疏。若不爾至犯相扶過者。此有二意。一云若不直責爾者。他許德上有非實性。此乃相符 二云若不總難九句之上而共立一大非實性。即有相符。他許諸德立非實故。若九句上大非實性。他即不許故無相符。前解為本。
疏。前之五句現量所得者。有義今解。實．德通現．非現。若唯現境。何故十句說通非現 又下論云。極微聚集足成根境。亦破本計。故知實等通非現境。此即三全二句小分現量所得 詳曰。疏言五句是現量境據總聚言。不言實等一一別法皆是現量 何以知者 答疏敘勝論諸門義中廣自分別現．非現境。豈可前後自相魚肉。若言疏主談本六句言五現量。疏之上下何不說言五唯現量。既不言唯。故知疏意據此句中有現量境名五現也。
疏。非是緣不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無難總之宗』（沒有困難的總綱）。『等等總喻』（等等的總比喻）。『喻何所設』（比喻是爲了什麼而設立的）？
疏：『應非實地者』（應該是否定實體之處）。『非實地言通二義』（否定實體之處的言論包含兩種含義）：一者，『非是真實之地』（不是真實存在的地方）；二者，『非是實句中地』（不是真實語句中的地方）。
疏：『然文唯有以性同實例者』（然而文中只有用性質相同的例子來類比）。詳曰：『觀論之意』（考察論著的意圖），『令實．德．業同同異性不別立性』（使實體、屬性、業與同性、異性相同，不另外設立性質）。『此乃以實而同性例』（這是用實體來類比同性）。又疏標云：『難令離實等無同異性』（難以使離開實體等沒有同性、異性）。今判論中以性同實（現在判斷論中用性質與實體相同），應筆誤也（應該是筆誤）。
疏：『無別有大非實性者』（沒有另外一個大的非實體性質）。『九句之上共有一性名為大也』（在九句之上共同有一個性質，名為大）。問：『何為此難』（為什麼有這個難點）？答：『彼依相似立同異性』（他們依靠相似性來建立同性、異性）。『九皆非實』（九個都不是實體），『非實相似』（非實體相似），『故難令立大非實性』（所以難以讓他們建立大的非實體性質）。
疏：『若不爾至犯相扶過者』（如果不是這樣，就會犯互相支援的過失）。『此有二意』（這裡有兩種意思）：一云：『若不直責爾者』（如果不是直接責備你），『他許德上有非實性』（他允許屬性上有非實體性質），『此乃相符』（這乃是互相符合）。二云：『若不總難九句之上而共立一大非實性』（如果不是總的責難九句之上而共同建立一個大的非實體性質），『即有相符』（就會有互相符合），『他許諸德立非實故』（因為他允許諸屬性建立非實體性質）。『若九句上大非實性』（如果九句之上是大的非實體性質），『他即不許故無相符』（他就不允許，所以沒有互相符合）。『前解為本』（前面的解釋為根本）。
疏：『前之五句現量所得者』（前面的五句是現量所得到的）。『有義今解』（有一種解釋現在解釋）：『實．德通現．非現』（實體、屬性貫通現量、非現量）。『若唯現境』（如果僅僅是現量境界），『何故十句說通非現』（為什麼十句都說貫通非現量）？又下論云：『極微聚集足成根境』（極微聚集足以形成根境），『亦破本計』（也破斥了原來的計較）。『故知實等通非現境』（所以知道實體等貫通非現量境界）。『此即三全二句小分現量所得』（這就是三句完全，兩句小部分是現量所得到的）。詳曰：『疏言五句是現量境據總聚言』（疏中說五句是現量境界，是根據總的聚集來說的），『不言實等一一別法皆是現量』（不是說實體等每一個個別的法都是現量）。『何以知者』（憑什麼知道呢）？答：『疏敘勝論諸門義中廣自分別現．非現境』（疏中敘述勝論的各種門義中廣泛地分別了現量、非現量境界），『豈可前後自相魚肉』（怎麼可以前後自相矛盾）。『若言疏主談本六句言五現量』（如果說疏主談論原本的六句，說五句是現量），『疏之上下何不說言五唯現量』（疏的上下為什麼不說五句僅僅是現量）。『既不言唯』（既然沒有說僅僅），『故知疏意據此句中有現量境名五現也』（所以知道疏的意圖是根據這句中有現量境界，所以稱為五現量）。
疏：『非是緣不』（不是因為緣不...）
【English Translation】 English version 'Wu Nan Zong Zhi Zong' (The principle of no difficult general outline). 'Deng Deng Zong Yu' (The general metaphor of etcetera). 'Yu He Suo She' (What is the purpose of establishing metaphors)?
Commentary: 'Ying Fei Shi Di Zhe' (Should be the negation of the real ground). 'Fei Shi Di Yan Tong Er Yi' (The statement of negating the real ground contains two meanings): First, 'Fei Shi Zhen Shi Zhi Di' (It is not a real place); second, 'Fei Shi Shi Ju Zhong Di' (It is not a place in a real sentence).
Commentary: 'Ran Wen Wei You Yi Xing Tong Shi Li Zhe' (However, the text only uses examples with the same nature to make analogies). Detailed explanation: 'Guan Lun Zhi Yi' (Examining the intention of the treatise), 'Ling Shi. De. Ye Tong Tong Yi Xing Bu Bie Li Xing' (Make substance, attribute, and karma the same as sameness and difference, without separately establishing nature). 'Ci Nai Yi Shi Er Tong Xing Li' (This is using substance to make an analogy to sameness). Also, the commentary states: 'Nan Ling Li Shi Deng Wu Tong Yi Xing' (It is difficult to make the absence of sameness and difference separate from substance, etc.). Now, judging that nature is the same as substance in the treatise, it should be a writing error.
Commentary: 'Wu Bie You Da Fei Shi Xing Zhe' (There is no other great non-substantial nature). 'Jiu Ju Zhi Shang Gong You Yi Xing Ming Wei Da Ye' (Above the nine sentences, there is a common nature called 'great'). Question: 'He Wei Ci Nan' (Why is there this difficulty)? Answer: 'Bi Yi Xiang Si Li Tong Yi Xing' (They rely on similarity to establish sameness and difference). 'Jiu Jie Fei Shi' (All nine are non-substantial), 'Fei Shi Xiang Si' (Non-substantial is similar), 'Gu Nan Ling Li Da Fei Shi Xing' (Therefore, it is difficult to make them establish a great non-substantial nature).
Commentary: 'Ruo Bu Er Zhi Fan Xiang Fu Guo Zhe' (If not, it will commit the fault of mutual support). 'Ci You Er Yi' (There are two meanings here): One says: 'Ruo Bu Zhi Ze Er Zhe' (If you do not directly blame you), 'Ta Xu De Shang You Fei Shi Xing' (He allows that there is a non-substantial nature on the attribute), 'Ci Nai Xiang Fu' (This is mutual agreement). The second says: 'Ruo Bu Zong Nan Jiu Ju Zhi Shang Er Gong Li Yi Da Fei Shi Xing' (If you do not generally criticize the above nine sentences and jointly establish a great non-substantial nature), 'Ji You Xiang Fu' (There will be mutual agreement), 'Ta Xu Zhu De Li Fei Shi Gu' (Because he allows the establishment of non-substantial nature for all attributes). 'Ruo Jiu Ju Shang Da Fei Shi Xing' (If the great non-substantial nature is above the nine sentences), 'Ta Ji Bu Xu Gu Wu Xiang Fu' (He will not allow it, so there is no mutual agreement). 'Qian Jie Wei Ben' (The previous explanation is fundamental).
Commentary: 'Qian Zhi Wu Ju Xian Liang Suo De Zhe' (The previous five sentences are obtained by direct perception). 'You Yi Jin Jie' (There is an interpretation now explaining): 'Shi. De Tong Xian. Fei Xian' (Substance and attribute are connected to direct perception and non-direct perception). 'Ruo Wei Xian Jing' (If it is only the realm of direct perception), 'He Gu Shi Ju Shuo Tong Fei Xian' (Why do all ten sentences say that they are connected to non-direct perception)? Also, the following argument says: 'Ji Wei Ju Ji Zu Cheng Gen Jing' (The aggregation of extremely small particles is enough to form the root and object), 'Yi Po Ben Ji' (Also refutes the original calculation). 'Gu Zhi Shi Deng Tong Fei Xian Jing' (Therefore, it is known that substance, etc., are connected to the realm of non-direct perception). 'Ci Ji San Quan Er Ju Xiao Fen Xian Liang Suo De' (This is that three sentences are complete, and small parts of two sentences are obtained by direct perception). Detailed explanation: 'Shu Yan Wu Ju Shi Xian Liang Jing Ju Zong Ju Yan' (The commentary says that the five sentences are the realm of direct perception, according to the general aggregation), 'Bu Yan Shi Deng Yi Yi Bie Fa Jie Shi Xian Liang' (It does not say that each individual dharma such as substance, etc., is direct perception). 'He Yi Zhi Zhe' (How do you know)? Answer: 'Shu Xu Sheng Lun Zhu Men Yi Zhong Guang Zi Fen Bie Xian. Fei Xian Jing' (The commentary narrates the various meanings of the Sheng Lun school and widely distinguishes between the realms of direct perception and non-direct perception), 'Qi Ke Qian Hou Zi Xiang Yu Rou' (How can it be self-contradictory before and after). 'Ruo Yan Shu Zhu Tan Ben Liu Ju Yan Wu Xian Liang' (If it is said that the commentator discusses the original six sentences and says that five sentences are direct perception), 'Shu Zhi Shang Xia He Bu Shuo Yan Wu Wei Xian Liang' (Why doesn't the upper and lower parts of the commentary say that five sentences are only direct perception). 'Ji Bu Yan Wei' (Since it does not say only), 'Gu Zhi Shu Yi Ju Ci Ju Zhong You Xian Liang Jing Ming Wu Xian Ye' (Therefore, it is known that the commentator's intention is based on the fact that there is a realm of direct perception in this sentence, so it is called five direct perceptions).
Commentary: 'Fei Shi Yuan Bu' (It is not because of the cause not...)
離至現量所得者。此但遮實非是緣彼離識外境智之所得。而不表是緣不離識現量智得。以彼實句本無體故。又識內境非皆現量智之所得。
疏。恐監持業釋等者。若不言緣。為言離識實有自體即是現量。論若許爾者。即自他宗皆說心等非離識故。故違宗過。
疏。其覺樂等亦八法中者。有法名法。
疏。即有一分相符之失等者。有義有說緣言簡相符過。此即非理。應問彼言。有法之中簡覺等不。若其以簡何故相符。若不簡者。設定緣言豈能遮簡。由此即應為簡相符。于有法中先除覺等 詳曰。此難意云。論說緣言在於法中。如何以法遮有法過。由斯即應于有法中言除覺等。便無相符。今以理觀。簡亦何失。連類言之可當悟矣。
且如佛法對聲論師立聲無常。無常宗法。便簡聲上所有常義。若不簡者他許聲常豈不相符。相符不有故知能簡。今者實等有法之中含能所緣。法中言緣。意遣有法能緣覺等。與立聲宗而有何別。獨不見許。故一緣言兼簡相符。想應無失。請審詳之。
疏。若論說言至說唯字者。準此文意似牒外難 外難意云。彼既許有唯緣實心。論中應置唯緣二字。言唯緣者簡去覺等。無相符失。緣顯能緣。無違宗過。
疏。通緣二者至現量得故者。既許一心雙緣二境。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『離至現量所得者』，這僅僅是遮止了實在，並非是憑藉那遠離識之外境的智慧所得。但並不表示是憑藉不離識的現量智所得，因為那『實在』一詞本身沒有實體。而且識之內的境並非都是現量智所能獲得的。 疏：『恐監持業釋等者』，如果不說『緣』，就說是遠離識的實有自體就是現量。論如果允許這樣，那麼其他宗派都會說心等不是遠離識的，所以就違反了宗義的過失。 疏：『其覺樂等亦八法中者』，『有法』名為『法』。 疏：『即有一分相符之失等者』，有一種觀點認為，使用『緣』字可以避免相符的過失。這並不合理，應該反問他們，在『有法』之中是否排除了感覺等？如果排除了，為何還會相符？如果不排除，設定『緣』字又怎能遮止排除？因此，應該爲了排除相符，在『有法』之中先排除感覺等。詳細地說，這個難點的意思是說，論中說『緣』字在於『法』中，如何用『法』來遮止『有法』的過失？因此，應該在『有法』中說排除感覺等，就沒有相符的過失了。現在用道理來觀察，排除又有什麼過失呢？聯繫起來說就可以明白了。 例如，佛法針對聲論師，立論說聲音是無常的，『無常』是宗法，就排除了聲音上所有的常義。如果不排除，對方認為聲音是常的，豈不是就相符了？因為不相符，所以知道可以排除。現在，實在等『有法』之中包含能緣和所緣，『法』中說『緣』，意思是遣除『有法』中能緣的感覺等。與立論說聲音是無常的有什麼區別呢？難道沒有看到允許嗎？所以一個『緣』字兼顧了排除相符，想來應該沒有過失，請仔細審察。 疏：『若論說言至說唯字者』，根據這段文字的意思，好像是轉述外人的詰難。外人的詰難意思是說，既然允許有唯獨緣實在的心，論中就應該加上『唯緣』二字。說『唯緣』是爲了排除感覺等，就沒有相符的過失。『緣』字顯明瞭能緣，沒有違反宗義的過失。 疏：『通緣二者至現量得故者』，既然允許一個心同時緣兩個境，那麼...
【English Translation】 English version:
'That which is obtained through direct perception of reality (Li zhi xian liang suo de zhe)' only negates the real (shi zai), and is not obtained through the wisdom that cognizes external objects apart from consciousness. It does not imply that it is obtained through direct perception wisdom that does not separate from consciousness, because the term 'real' (shi zai) itself has no substance. Moreover, objects within consciousness are not all obtainable through direct perception wisdom. Commentary: 'Afraid of the karmadharaya compound interpretation, etc. (Kong jian chi ye shi deng zhe)': If 'cognition (yuan)' is not mentioned, and it is said that the truly existing self-nature apart from consciousness is direct perception, if the treatise (lun) allows this, then other schools will say that mind, etc., are not apart from consciousness, so it violates the tenets of the school. Commentary: 'That feeling of pleasure, etc., are also among the eight dharmas (qi jue le deng yi ba fa zhong zhe)': 'Something that possesses dharma (you fa)' is called 'dharma (fa)'. Commentary: 'That there is a fault of partial agreement, etc. (jiu you yi fen xiang fu zhi shi deng zhe)': One view holds that using the word 'cognition (yuan)' can avoid the fault of agreement. This is unreasonable. They should be asked in return whether they exclude feeling, etc., from 'something that possesses dharma (you fa)'. If they exclude it, why would there be agreement? If they do not exclude it, how can setting the word 'cognition (yuan)' prevent exclusion? Therefore, in order to exclude agreement, feeling, etc., should be excluded first from 'something that possesses dharma (you fa)'. In detail, the meaning of this difficulty is that the treatise says the word 'cognition (yuan)' is in 'dharma (fa)', how can 'dharma (fa)' be used to prevent the fault of 'something that possesses dharma (you fa)'? Therefore, it should be said in 'something that possesses dharma (you fa)' to exclude feeling, etc., then there will be no fault of agreement. Now, observing with reason, what fault is there in excluding? Speaking in connection, it can be understood. For example, in Buddhist teachings, against the Sound Theorists (Sheng lun shi), it is argued that sound is impermanent (sheng wu chang). 'Impermanence (wu chang)' is the property of the thesis (zong fa), which excludes all permanent meanings on sound. If it is not excluded, and the opponent thinks sound is permanent, wouldn't it agree? Because it does not agree, it is known that it can be excluded. Now, 'something that possesses reality, etc. (shi deng you fa)' contains the cognizer and the cognized, and saying 'cognition (yuan)' in 'dharma (fa)' means to eliminate the feeling, etc., that can cognize in 'something that possesses dharma (you fa)'. What is the difference from arguing that sound is impermanent? Haven't you seen the allowance? Therefore, one word 'cognition (yuan)' also takes into account the exclusion of agreement, and it should be without fault. Please examine it carefully. Commentary: 'If the treatise says, up to saying the word 'only (wei)'' (ruo lun shuo yan zhi shuo wei zi zhe), according to the meaning of this passage, it seems to be transcribing the opponent's difficulty. The opponent's difficulty means that since it is allowed that there is a mind that only cognizes reality (shi), the words 'only cognition (wei yuan)' should be added in the treatise. Saying 'only cognition (wei yuan)' is to exclude feeling, etc., and there is no fault of agreement. The word 'cognition (yuan)' clarifies the cognizer, and there is no fault of violating the tenets of the school. Commentary: 'Connecting the two cognitions, up to being obtained through direct perception (tong yuan er zhe zhi xian liang de gu zhe)', since it is allowed that one mind simultaneously cognizes two objects, then...
境互從。是離不離實有自體現量所得。何所以者。不可一心分之為二。是以二境。更互相從名離不離現量所得。由是唯言簡此不得。
疏。其總緣者亦所簡故者。其總緣中若是離識實有自體現實得者。亦入所破。故論緣言簡諸過盡。
論。大自在天者。按提婆菩薩釋外道小乘涅槃論云。摩醯首羅論師作如是說。果是那羅延所作。梵天是因。摩醯首羅一體三分。所謂梵天．那羅延．摩醯首羅。地是依處。地主是摩醯首羅。於三界中所有一切命．非命物。皆是摩醯首羅天生。摩醯首羅身者。虛空是頭。大地是身。水是尿。山是糞。一切眾生是腹中蟲。風是氣。火是暖。罪福是業。是八種是摩醯首羅身。自在天是生滅因。一切從自在天生．從自在天滅名為涅槃。故自在天常。一切物涅槃因 又傳釋云。彼宗自在有三身別。謂法．報．化。彼說報身居色天上不來下生。狀似世尊受用身也。其變化身隨形六道教化眾生。然說多住雪山北面。或在南海未剌耶山頂。法身即此論所敘是。
疏。遍故至能生諸法者。遍故何不於一切處能生諸法。常故何不於一切時能生諸法。而別分也。
論。余執梵王等者。按提婆論中敘此諸計。言大梵者。圍陀論師說。從那羅延天齊中生大蓮花。從於蓮花生梵天祖翁。彼梵天
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 境互從：境界互相依存。這是『離不離』（指既分離又不分離）的實有自體現量（指通過直接感知獲得的知識）所揭示的。原因是什麼呢？因為不可能將一個心識分割成兩個。因此，兩個境界更互相依存，這被稱為『離不離』現量所得。因此，僅僅使用『緣』（條件）這個詞就能避免這些問題。
疏：其總緣者亦所簡故者：總的條件也是需要排除的。如果總的條件是獨立於識之外的，具有實在的自性，並且可以通過現量獲得，那麼它也屬於需要破斥的對象。因此，論文中使用『緣』這個詞來避免各種錯誤。
論：大自在天者：根據提婆菩薩的《外道小乘涅槃論》記載，摩醯首羅（Maheśvara，大自在天）論師這樣說：果是由那羅延（Nārāyana，毗濕奴）所創造的，梵天（Brahmā，創造之神）是因。摩醯首羅一體三分，即梵天、那羅延和摩醯首羅。地是依靠之處，地的主宰是摩醯首羅。在三界中，所有一切有生命和無生命的事物，都是摩醯首羅天所生。摩醯首羅的身是：虛空是頭，大地是身，水是尿，山是糞，一切眾生是腹中蟲，風是氣，火是暖，罪福是業。這八種是摩醯首羅的身。自在天是生滅的原因，一切從自在天生，從自在天滅，被稱為涅槃。所以自在天是常住的，是一切事物涅槃的原因。又傳說解釋說，他們的宗派認為自在天有法身、報身、化身三種身。他們說報身居住在色界天上，不來下生，形狀類似於世尊的受用身。他的化身隨著六道眾生的形態而變化，教化眾生。據說他多住在雪山北面，或在南海未剌耶（Malaya）山頂。法身就是這篇論文所描述的。
疏：遍故至能生諸法者：如果大自在天是普遍存在的，為什麼不能在一切地方產生諸法？如果是常住的，為什麼不能在一切時間產生諸法？為什麼要進行區分呢？
論：余執梵王等者：根據提婆的論述，其中記載了這些觀點。關於大梵天（Mahābrahmā）的說法是：圍陀（Veda，吠陀）論師說，從那羅延天（Nārāyana）的肚臍中生出大蓮花，從蓮花中生出梵天祖翁（Brahmā）。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Jing hu cong』: Realms are mutually dependent. This is revealed by the 『li bu li』 (neither separate nor inseparable) real self-manifestation perception (knowledge gained through direct perception). What is the reason? Because it is impossible to divide one mind into two. Therefore, the two realms are even more mutually dependent, which is called 『li bu li』 perception. Therefore, simply using the word 『yuan』 (condition) can avoid these problems.
Commentary: 『Qi zong yuan zhe yi suo jian gu zhe』: The general condition is also something to be excluded. If the general condition is independent of consciousness, has a real self-nature, and can be obtained through direct perception, then it also belongs to the object to be refuted. Therefore, the treatise uses the word 『yuan』 to avoid various errors.
Treatise: 『Da zi zai tian zhe』: According to Devadeva Bodhisattva's 『Nirvana Treatise on Heretical Paths and Lesser Vehicle』, the Maheśvara (Great自在天) philosopher said: The result is created by Nārāyana (Vishnu), and Brahmā (the god of creation) is the cause. Maheśvara is one entity with three aspects, namely Brahmā, Nārāyana, and Maheśvara. The earth is the place of reliance, and the lord of the earth is Maheśvara. In the three realms, all living and non-living things are born from Maheśvara. The body of Maheśvara is: space is the head, the earth is the body, water is urine, mountains are feces, all sentient beings are worms in the belly, wind is breath, fire is warmth, and sin and merit are karma. These eight are the body of Maheśvara. The自在天 is the cause of birth and death, and everything that is born from the自在天 and dies from the自在天 is called Nirvana. Therefore, the自在天 is permanent and is the cause of Nirvana for all things. It is also said that their sect believes that the自在天 has three bodies: the Dharma body, the Reward body, and the Transformation body. They say that the Reward body resides in the heavens of the Form Realm and does not descend to be born, resembling the Enjoyment body of the World Honored One. His Transformation body changes with the forms of beings in the six realms, teaching sentient beings. It is said that he mostly resides on the north side of the Snow Mountains or on the summit of Mount Malaya in the South Sea. The Dharma body is what is described in this treatise.
Commentary: 『Bian gu zhi neng sheng zhu fa zhe』: If the Great自在天 is omnipresent, why can't it produce all dharmas in all places? If it is permanent, why can't it produce all dharmas at all times? Why is there a distinction?
Treatise: 『Yu zhi Fan wang deng zhe』: According to Devadeva's treatise, these views are recorded in it. Regarding the statement about Mahābrahmā (Great梵天): The Veda (吠陀) philosopher said that a great lotus flower is born from the navel of Nārāyana (那羅延天), and Brahmā (梵天) is born from the lotus flower.
作一切命．無命物。從梵天口中生婆羅門。兩臂中生剎利。兩髀中生毗舍。從兩腳生首陀。一切大地是修福德戒場。生一切花草以為供養。化作山野禽獸人中豬羊等類。于戒場殺害供養梵天。得生彼處名涅槃 言時者。謂時論師。作如是說。時熟一切物熟。時散一切物散。是故我論中說。如被弓箭射時不到不死。時到則小草觸即死。一切物時生。時熟。時滅。時不可過。是故時常生一切物 言方者。謂方論師。作如是說。最初生諸方。從諸方生世間人。從人生天地。天地滅沒還入彼處名為涅槃。是故方常 言本際者。謂本生。安荼論師說。本無日．月．星辰．虛空．及地。唯有火．水。時大安荼生如雞子。周匝金色。時熟破為二段。一段在上作天。一段在下作地。彼二中間生梵天。名一切眾生祖翁。作一切有命．無命物。如是等物散沒彼處名涅槃 言自然者。謂無因論師。作如是說。無因無緣生一切物。無染凈因緣。如我論中說。如棘荊針無人作。孔雀等類種種畫色皆無人作。自然而有。不從因生名為涅槃。自然是常。生一切物 言虛空者。謂口力論師。作如是說。虛空是萬物因。最初生虛空。虛空生風。風生火。火生煙。煙生水。水即凍凌堅作地。地生種種藥草。藥草生五穀。五穀生命。是故我論中說。命是食。后
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『作一切命，無命物』：他們認為梵天（Brahma，印度教中的創造之神）從口中生出婆羅門（Brahmana，祭司階層），從雙臂中生出剎帝利（Kshatriya，武士階層），從大腿中生出吠舍（Vaishya，商人階層），從雙腳中生出首陀羅（Shudra，奴隸階層）。他們認為整個大地都是修習福德的戒場，生長一切花草用來供養。梵天化作山野禽獸，以及人類中的豬羊等。在戒場中殺害這些動物來供養梵天，死後便能生到梵天之處，這被稱為涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。 『言時者』：這是指時論師的觀點。他們這樣說：『時』成熟，一切事物就成熟；『時』消散，一切事物就消散。因此，我的理論中說，如同被弓箭射中，『時』未到就不會死；『時』到，即使被小草觸碰也會死。一切事物都由『時』而生，由『時』而熟，由『時』而滅。『時』不可超越。所以，『時』是永恒的，能生出一切事物。 『言方者』：這是指方論師的觀點。他們這樣說：最初產生諸方（各個方向），從諸方產生世間人，從人產生天地。天地毀滅后，迴歸到諸方之處，這被稱為涅槃。所以，『方』是永恒的。 『言本際者』：這是指本生論。安荼論師說：最初沒有日月星辰、虛空和大地，只有火和水。當時，巨大的安荼（Anda，宇宙卵）像雞蛋一樣產生，周圍是金色的。『時』成熟后，它破裂成兩段，一段在上面成為天，一段在下面成為地。這兩段中間生出梵天，被稱為一切眾生的祖翁，他創造了一切有生命和無生命的物體。這些物體消散后迴歸到安荼之處，這被稱為涅槃。 『言自然者』：這是指無因論師的觀點。他們這樣說：沒有原因，沒有緣由，一切事物自然產生。沒有染污和清凈的因緣。如同我的理論中說：如同帶刺的荊棘，沒有人制造；孔雀等動物身上各種各樣的色彩，也沒有人繪製，都是自然而有的，不是從因緣產生的，這被稱為涅槃。『自然』是永恒的，能生出一切事物。 『言虛空者』：這是指口力論師的觀點。他們這樣說：虛空是萬物的根源。最初產生虛空，虛空產生風，風產生火，火產生煙，煙產生水，水凍結成堅硬的土地。土地生長各種藥草，藥草生長五穀，五穀產生生命。因此，我的理論中說：生命是食物的延續。
【English Translation】 English version 『Making all living beings and non-living things』: They believe that Brahma (the creator god in Hinduism) created Brahmins (the priestly class) from his mouth, Kshatriyas (the warrior class) from his arms, Vaishyas (the merchant class) from his thighs, and Shudras (the servant class) from his feet. They believe that the entire earth is a field for practicing meritorious deeds, growing all kinds of flowers and plants for offerings. Brahma transforms into wild animals such as birds and beasts, as well as pigs and sheep among humans. Killing these animals in the field of precepts to offer to Brahma allows one to be born in Brahma's realm after death, which is called Nirvana (liberation). 『Speaking of Time』: This refers to the view of the Time theorists. They say: 『When』 matures, everything matures; 『when』 dissipates, everything dissipates. Therefore, in my theory, it is said that like being shot by an arrow, one will not die if 『time』 has not arrived; when 『time』 arrives, one will die even if touched by a small grass. Everything is born from 『time』, matures from 『time』, and perishes from 『time』. 『Time』 cannot be surpassed. Therefore, 『time』 is eternal and can produce everything. 『Speaking of Direction』: This refers to the view of the Direction theorists. They say: Initially, all directions (various directions) are produced, from which the people of the world are produced, and from people, heaven and earth are produced. After the destruction of heaven and earth, they return to the place of all directions, which is called Nirvana. Therefore, 『direction』 is eternal. 『Speaking of the Origin』: This refers to the theory of original birth. The Anda theorist says: Initially, there were no sun, moon, stars, void, and earth, only fire and water. At that time, the huge Anda (cosmic egg) was produced like an egg, surrounded by gold. When 『time』 matured, it broke into two pieces, one piece above becoming heaven, and one piece below becoming earth. Between these two pieces, Brahma was born, who is called the ancestor of all living beings, and he created all living and non-living things. After these things dissipate, they return to the place of Anda, which is called Nirvana. 『Speaking of Nature』: This refers to the view of the No-Cause theorists. They say: Without cause, without condition, everything arises naturally. There is no cause of defilement or purity. As my theory says: Like thorny brambles, no one makes them; the various colors on animals such as peacocks are not painted by anyone, but are natural, not produced from causes and conditions, which is called Nirvana. 『Nature』 is eternal and can produce everything. 『Speaking of Void』: This refers to the view of the Oral Power theorists. They say: Void is the root of all things. Initially, void is produced, void produces wind, wind produces fire, fire produces smoke, smoke produces water, and water freezes into hard earth. The earth grows various herbs, herbs grow five grains, and five grains produce life. Therefore, my theory says: Life is the continuation of food.
時還沒虛空名涅槃。虛空是常名涅槃因。
疏。其我至前後別者。此釋違也。違云今明法執。何故論我。答意可知。
疏。下破之中至為不定者。由許聲性常不能詮。下破之中彼不得將聲性為喻而與論主而作不定。故云無喻 有云。由此不得與大乘作法自相相違者 詳曰。不然。設許能詮祇有不定失。法自相相違過者同無異有。今能詮因二喻皆有。故是不定。余能詮聲無常為同。聲性為異。思之可悉。論。有外道執極微常者。此師所計我法色．心皆四大造。故廣百論第二云。順世外道作如是言。諸法及我大種為性。四大種外無別有物。即四大種和合為我．及身．心等 問內外男女既有差別。能成大種亦差別不 答雖大種性內外無異。然有安立形相差別 有義順世極微有其三類。一極精虛。二者清凈。三非虛．凈。所生之果亦有其三。一心．心所。二眼等根。三色．聲等。如其次第三因所生 詳曰。雖有此言不知何據。準廣百論此敘難依。彼論說云內外大種性無差別。云何得三種不同 問順世何意計微為常 答恐后劫成無種子故。故俱舍論第十二云。一類外道執極微常。彼謂空劫餘極微在。何緣彼執猶有餘極微。勿后粗事生無種子故。由斯此師計微常也。
論。若無方分等者。問彼本計微造一切法。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時還沒有虛空，也沒有名為涅槃的境界。虛空是常，是涅槃的因。
疏：『其我至前後別者』，這是解釋（與論題）相違背。相違背是指現在明明討論的是法執，為什麼卻討論我？回答是（其）用意是可以理解的。
疏：『下破之中至為不定者』，因為（外道）認為聲性是常，不能詮釋（意義）。『下破之中』是指他們不能將聲性作為比喻，來與論主進行不定（的辯論）。所以說『無喻』。有人說：『由此不得與大乘作法自相相違者』。詳細地說，不是這樣的。假設允許（聲）能詮釋（意義），也只有不定（的過失）。『法自相相違』的過失，等同於『無異有』。現在能詮釋（意義）的因和二個比喻都有，所以是不定（的）。其餘能詮釋（意義）的聲音，無常是同（喻），聲性是異（喻）。仔細思考就可以明白。論：有外道執著極微是常的。這個師（外道）所認為的我、法、色、心，都是四大（地、水、火、風）所造。所以《廣百論》第二（卷）說：順世外道這樣說，諸法以及我，其自性都是大種。四大種之外，沒有別的物體。就是四大種和合成為我，以及身、心等。問：內外男女既然有差別，能構成大種的（四大）也有差別嗎？答：雖然大種的性質內外沒有差異，但是有安立的形相差別。有一種說法是，順世外道的極微有三種：第一種是極精虛，第二種是清凈，第三種是非虛非凈。所產生的果也有三種：第一是心、心所，第二是眼等根，第三是色、聲等。如其次第，由三種因所生。詳細地說，雖然有這種說法，但不知道有什麼依據。按照《廣百論》來看，這種敘述難以依據。那部論說內外大種的性質沒有差別，怎麼會有三種不同呢？問：順世外道為什麼認為極微是常的？答：是擔心后劫形成時沒有種子。所以《俱舍論》第十二（卷）說：有一類外道認為極微是常的。他們認為空劫之後，還殘留著極微。為什麼他們認為還有殘留的極微呢？是擔心後來的粗糙事物產生時沒有種子。因此這個師（外道）認為極微是常的。
論：『若無方分等者』，問：他們本來認為極微能造一切法。
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, there was neither space nor a state called Nirvana (liberation). Space is constant and is the cause of Nirvana.
Commentary: '其我至前後別者' (Qí wǒ zhì qiánhòu bié zhě) - This explains the contradiction. The contradiction is that we are clearly discussing the attachment to Dharma (law), so why are we discussing the self? The answer is that the intention is understandable.
Commentary: '下破之中至為不定者' (Xià pò zhī zhōng zhì wèi bùdìng zhě) - Because they (the heretics) believe that the nature of sound is constant and cannot express (meaning). '下破之中' (Xià pò zhī zhōng) means that they cannot use the nature of sound as a metaphor to engage in uncertain (arguments) with the proponent. Therefore, it is said 'no metaphor'. Some say: '由此不得與大乘作法自相相違者' (Yóu cǐ bùdé yǔ dàchéng zuòfǎ zìxiāng xiāngwéi zhě). In detail, it is not like that. Even if it is allowed that (sound) can express (meaning), there is only the fault of uncertainty. The fault of 'the Dharma contradicting itself' is the same as 'no difference in existence'. Now, the cause that can express (meaning) and the two metaphors are all present, so it is uncertain. The remaining sounds that can express (meaning), impermanence is the same (metaphor), and the nature of sound is a different (metaphor). Careful consideration will make it clear. Treatise: There are heretics who insist that the ultimate particle (極微 jīwēi) is constant. This teacher (heretic) believes that the self, Dharma, form, and mind are all created by the four great elements (四大 sìdà) (earth, water, fire, and wind). Therefore, the second (chapter) of the Guang Bai Lun (廣百論, Treatise in One Hundred Verses) says: The followers of the Lokayata (順世外道 shùnshì wàidào) say that all Dharmas and the self are by nature the great elements. Apart from the four great elements, there is nothing else. It is the combination of the four great elements that becomes the self, as well as the body, mind, etc. Question: Since there are differences between internal and external, male and female, are there also differences in the (four great elements) that constitute the great elements? Answer: Although the nature of the great elements is no different internally and externally, there are established differences in form. One view is that the ultimate particles of the Lokayata have three types: the first is extremely refined and empty, the second is pure, and the third is neither empty nor pure. The resulting fruits are also of three types: the first is mind and mental states, the second is the roots such as the eyes, and the third is form, sound, etc. In that order, they are produced by the three causes. In detail, although there is this statement, I do not know what the basis is. According to the Guang Bai Lun, this narrative is difficult to rely on. That treatise says that the nature of the internal and external great elements is no different, so how can there be three different types? Question: Why do the Lokayata believe that the ultimate particle is constant? Answer: It is because they are worried that there will be no seed when the next kalpa (劫 jié, eon) is formed. Therefore, the twelfth (chapter) of the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論 jùshě lùn) says: There is a type of heretic who believes that the ultimate particle is constant. They believe that after the empty kalpa, there are still ultimate particles remaining. Why do they believe that there are still remaining ultimate particles? It is because they are worried that there will be no seed when the later coarse things are produced. Therefore, this teacher (heretic) believes that the ultimate particle is constant.
Treatise: '若無方分等者' (Ruò wú fāng fēn děng zhě) - If there are no spatial divisions, etc. Question: They originally believed that the ultimate particle could create all Dharmas.
心．心所等亦合有礙。今以為喻豈得成耶 答如義燈釋。今助一釋。望能造大實無差別。然所造心無礙。能緣心不成粗。造色有礙。整合粗色宗計爾也。不可依于狂夫而無禮樂之軌。故破二師以心．心所為喻亦得。
疏。德句中量德等者。實亦得有長．短量合。不異微．大二量體故。故不言也 有義即是微量及短量德子微有故 詳曰。果色之言唯因子微可如所斷。孫微已去亦名果色。云何不取長大量耶。
論。若謂果色遍在自因等者。有義此依宗敘。前文說云不越因量非是本宗 詳曰。今觀論勢前為本計亦復何爽。故前論云。又所生果不越因量。此牒而破。若非本計論牒于誰。故前本計。此為轉敘亦應無失。
疏。以三微果等因非極微故者。言三微者第三子微 果即第七。第七之因即名為微不名為極。所以總言如所在因。故不別言如所在極微。極微之言不通微故。極微子微皆得名為所在因也。
疏。此中二量如次前者。不成粗色及非根取二種之量。即前論云。又所生果至便違自執。兩段文中而已作訖。故此不敘。
疏。此是宗義者。大乘宗。大乘不許沙體受水。銅體受藥。
疏。就宗難者。就外道宗。彼許果色入因微中。亦許水入沙微中故。故得取沙而為喻也 問大乘同處不相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心和心所等精神現象也應該是有障礙的。現在用它們來作比喻，怎麼能成立呢？回答如同《義燈》的解釋。現在我再補充一個解釋，希望能夠達到究竟真實而沒有差別。然而，所造的心是沒有障礙的，能緣的心也不會變成粗大的東西。所造的色是有障礙的，整合粗大的色，這是宗派的計度。不可以依賴於狂夫而沒有禮樂的規範。所以，駁斥二位論師以心和心所作為比喻也是可以的。
疏：『德句中量德等者』，實際上也可以有長短的量合，不異於微小和大這兩種量的體性。所以沒有說。有一種觀點認為，這就是微量和短量，因為德的子微是存在的。詳細地說，如果說果色僅僅因為子微就可以像所斷定的那樣，那麼孫微以後也叫做果色，為什麼不取長大量呢？
論：如果說果色普遍存在於它的因等之中，有一種觀點認為這是依照宗派的敘述。前面的文章說不超出因的量，這不是本宗的觀點。詳細地說，現在觀察論的態勢，前面作為本宗的計度又有什麼妨礙呢？所以前面的論說：『又所生果不越因量』，這是照錄並加以駁斥。如果不是本宗的計度，那麼照錄的是誰的觀點呢？所以前面是本宗的計度，這裡作為轉述也應該沒有錯誤。
疏：『以三微果等因非極微故者』，所說的三微，指的是第三個子微。果指的是第七個。第七個的因就叫做微，不叫做極微。所以總的來說，就像它所在的因。所以不特別說就像它所在的極微。極微這個詞不包括微。極微和子微都可以叫做它所在的因。
疏：『此中二量如次前者』，指的是不成粗色和非根所取的兩種量。也就是前面論述所說的：『又所生果至便違自執』。這兩段文字中已經完成了，所以這裡不再敘述。
疏：『此是宗義者』，指的是大乘宗。大乘不承認沙子的本體可以容納水，銅的本體可以容納藥物。
疏：『就宗難者』，指的是就外道宗而言。他們承認果色可以進入因微之中，也承認水可以進入沙微之中。所以可以取沙子作為比喻。問：大乘認為同處不相容，
【English Translation】 English version: Mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) should also be obstructive. Now, using them as metaphors, how can it be established? The answer is as explained in the 'Yi Deng' (Commentary on the Meaning of Light). Now, I will add another explanation, hoping to achieve ultimate truth without difference. However, the mind that is created is not obstructive, and the mind that cognizes will not become coarse. The created form is obstructive, and the aggregation of coarse form is the calculation of the school. One should not rely on a madman and be without the norms of propriety and music. Therefore, refuting the two teachers by using mind and mental factors as metaphors is also acceptable.
Commentary: 'Among the qualities in the phrase 'qualities of measurement, etc.', in reality, there can also be combinations of long and short measurements, not different from the nature of the two measurements of minute and large. Therefore, it is not mentioned. Some argue that it is the minute quantity and short quantity, because the sub-minute of the quality exists. In detail, if it is said that the resultant form can only be like what is determined because of the sub-minute, then even the grandson-minute onwards is also called resultant form, why not take the long and large quantity?
Treatise: If it is said that the resultant form is universally present in its cause, etc., some argue that this is according to the school's narrative. The previous text said that it does not exceed the quantity of the cause, which is not the view of this school. In detail, now observing the trend of the treatise, what harm is there in taking the previous as the calculation of this school? Therefore, the previous treatise said: 'Moreover, the produced result does not exceed the quantity of the cause.' This is a quotation and refutation. If it is not the calculation of this school, then whose view is being quoted? Therefore, the previous was the calculation of this school, and this as a restatement should also be without error.
Commentary: 'Because the causes such as the three-minute result are not ultimate minutes', the so-called three-minute refers to the third sub-minute. The result refers to the seventh. The cause of the seventh is called minute, not ultimate minute. Therefore, generally speaking, it is like the cause where it is located. Therefore, it is not specifically said like the ultimate minute where it is located. The term ultimate minute does not include minute. Both ultimate minute and sub-minute can be called the cause where it is located.
Commentary: 'Among these two quantities, the former in order', refers to the two kinds of quantities that do not form coarse form and are not taken by the senses. That is, the previous treatise said: 'Moreover, the produced result until then violates one's own adherence.' These two passages have already been completed, so they are not narrated here.
Commentary: 'This is the doctrine of the school', refers to the Mahayana school. Mahayana does not admit that the substance of sand can receive water, or that the substance of copper can receive medicine.
Commentary: 'Difficulties based on the school', refers to the non-Buddhist schools. They admit that the resultant form can enter into the causal minute, and also admit that water can enter into the sand minute. Therefore, sand can be taken as a metaphor. Question: Mahayana believes that things in the same place are incompatible,
離色互相涉入。豈非因果體相受入 答無實極微。是假識變。故得涉入。不同彼宗。
疏。量云至如藥變銅者。就他為量。他許藥微入銅微故。故得為喻。
疏。一應無次行等者。此一頌文而量有五。一彼論云。若無隔別眼所行境執為一物。應無漸次行大地理。若下一足至一切故。量云。無障隔處此下一足時。所未至處時亦應已至。汝執一故。猶如於此 二彼論云。又應俱時於此。于彼無至未至。一物一時理不應有得．未得故 量云。汝宗世間無隔斷物。無有一法有至．未至。執是一故。如手握珠 三彼論云。又一方處應不得有多象．馬等有間隙事。若處有一亦即有餘。云何此．彼可辨差別 量云。於此無障隔一方處所有多象．馬。一象住地應余馬等亦住此地。執是一故。如此象住地 四彼論云。或二如何可於一處有至．未至中間見空 量云。無隔一處象．馬二居。應不得有中間空處。執是一故。如手握珠 五彼論云。又亦應無小水蟲等難見細物。彼與粗物同一處量應等故 量云。小水蟲等依無流水能依。應等所依之量。執所依一故。由如無流一頗胝迦一所依色。
疏。不言同異至是彼性故者。顯有．同異既是諸法性。故論言等。若論明言有．及同異。不知此二是諸法性。
疏。又等同異顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『離色互相涉入。豈非因果體相受入？』 答：『無實極微（沒有實體的最小微粒），是假識變（虛假的意識轉變）。故得涉入（因此可以相互涉入）。不同彼宗（與他們的宗派不同）。』
疏（註釋）：『量云至如藥變銅者（譬如用藥使銅發生變化），就他為量（就他們的觀點來衡量）。他許藥微入銅微故（他們認為藥的微粒進入銅的微粒中），故得為喻（所以可以作為比喻）。』
疏（註釋）：『一應無次行等者（應該沒有次第行走等情況），此一頌文而量有五（這一頌文中有五個量）。一彼論云（他們的論點說）：若無隔別眼所行境執為一物（如果沒有間隔，眼睛所見的境界執著為同一事物），應無漸次行大地理（應該沒有逐漸行走于廣闊大地的情況）。若下一足至一切故（如果下一步落腳就到達所有地方）。量云（量論說）：無障隔處此下一足時（沒有阻礙的地方，當下一步落腳時），所未至處時亦應已至（未到達的地方也應該已經到達）。汝執一故（因為你執著為一）。猶如於此（就像在這裡）。二彼論云（他們的論點說）：又應俱時於此于彼無至未至（又應該同時在這裡在那裡，沒有到達和未到達）。一物一時理不應有得．未得故（一個事物在同一時間不應該有得到和未得到）。量云（量論說）：汝宗世間無隔斷物（你的宗派認為世間沒有阻隔之物），無有一法有至．未至（沒有一種法有到達和未到達）。執是一故（因為執著為一）。如手握珠（就像手握著珠子）。三彼論云（他們的論點說）：又一方處應不得有多象．馬等有間隙事（又在一個地方不應該有多頭大象、馬等有間隙的事情）。若處有一亦即有餘（如果一個地方有一個，也應該有其餘的）。云何此．彼可辨差別（如何能辨別這個和那個的差別）。量云（量論說）：於此無障隔一方處所有多象．馬（在這個沒有阻礙的一個地方有多頭大象、馬），一象住地應余馬等亦住此地（一頭大象居住的地方，其餘的馬等也應該居住在這個地方）。執是一故（因為執著為一）。如此象住地（就像這頭大象居住的地方）。四彼論云（他們的論點說）：或二如何可於一處有至．未至中間見空（或者兩個事物如何可以在一個地方有到達、未到達，中間看到空隙）。量云（量論說）：無隔一處象．馬二居（沒有阻隔的一個地方，大象和馬居住在一起），應不得有中間空處（應該沒有中間的空隙）。執是一故（因為執著為一）。如手握珠（就像手握著珠子）。五彼論云（他們的論點說）：又亦應無小水蟲等難見細物（又應該沒有小水蟲等難以看見的細小物體）。彼與粗物同一處量應等故（它們與粗大的物體在同一地方，大小應該相等）。量云（量論說）：小水蟲等依無流水能依（小水蟲等依靠沒有流水的能依靠之物），應等所依之量（應該等於所依靠之物的大小）。執所依一故（因為執著所依靠之物為一）。由如無流一頗胝迦（就像沒有流水的單一頗胝迦（水晶）），一所依色（一個所依靠的顏色）。』
疏（註釋）：『不言同異至是彼性故者（不說相同和不同，是因為這是它們的性質），顯有．同異既是諸法性（顯示存在、相同和不同既然是諸法的性質），故論言等（所以論中說相等）。若論明言有．及同異（如果論中明確說存在以及相同和不同），不知此二是諸法性（就不知道這二者是諸法的性質）。』
疏（註釋）：『又等同異顯（又相等、相同和不同顯示）』
【English Translation】 English version: 'The separation of form mutually interpenetrates. Isn't this the mutual reception of cause and effect, substance and appearance?' Answer: 'Unreal ultimate particles (without substantial smallest particles) are false consciousness transformations (illusory transformations of consciousness). Therefore, they can interpenetrate (thus they can mutually interpenetrate). This is different from their school (different from their sect).'
Commentary: 'The argument says, 'Like medicine transforming copper,' it is measured according to their view. They allow that the medicine's particles enter the copper's particles, so it can be used as a metaphor.'
Commentary: 'There should be no sequential walking, etc.' This one verse has five arguments. 1. Their argument says: 'If there is no separation, and the objects seen by the eye are grasped as one thing, there should be no gradual walking across the vast earth. If one step reaches everything.' The argument says: 'In a place without obstruction, when one step is taken, the place not yet reached should also already be reached. Because you hold it as one. Like here.' 2. Their argument says: 'Also, it should be simultaneously here and there, with no reaching or not reaching. It is unreasonable for one thing to have attainment and non-attainment at the same time.' The argument says: 'Your school believes that there are no obstructing things in the world, and no dharma has reaching and not reaching. Because you hold it as one. Like a hand holding a pearl.' 3. Their argument says: 'Also, in one place, there should not be multiple elephants, horses, etc., with gaps between them. If there is one in a place, there should also be the rest. How can the differences between this and that be distinguished?' The argument says: 'In this unobstructed place, there are multiple elephants and horses. The place where one elephant resides should also be the place where the other horses reside. Because you hold it as one. Like the place where this elephant resides.' 4. Their argument says: 'Or how can two things have reaching and not reaching in one place, with empty space in between?' The argument says: 'In an unobstructed place, elephants and horses reside together. There should be no empty space in between. Because you hold it as one. Like a hand holding a pearl.' 5. Their argument says: 'Also, there should be no small, hard-to-see things like water insects. They should be equal in size to the coarse things in the same place.' The argument says: 'Small water insects, etc., rely on a non-flowing, reliable thing. They should be equal in size to what they rely on. Because you hold what they rely on as one. Like a single, non-flowing crystal (Phatika), a single color that is relied upon.'
Commentary: 'Not speaking of sameness and difference is because it is their nature.' It shows that existence, sameness, and difference are the nature of all dharmas, so the treatise speaks of equality. If the treatise explicitly speaks of existence, sameness, and difference, then one would not know that these two are the nature of all dharmas.
Commentary: 'Also, equality, sameness, and difference show'
類別故者。除有．同異所餘之法非顯類別。復非法性故不等之 問數論本宗不立六句。今有．同異何言彼計 答彼雖不別立六句義。法體不無即名為有。法有同異名同異性。不同勝論 有說三德名為有性。二十三諦名同異性 詳曰。準此論破。有性不唯在於三德。故論結云便違三德我等體異亦違世間諸法差別。故知有性通二十五。二十五差異即為同異。
疏。又我等至差別相者。若論其體。二十三諦即自性故體無其差。若據相言二十三別。今約其相亦是所破。故等等之。初即約體故二別也。
疏。此中色等至不定過者。等數量等十一種德及地．水．火。皆眼境故。若不等之有不定過 不定過云。其所說色為如聲等非色性故非是眼境。為如數等非色性故是眼境耶。
疏。如共故非一等者。此交加說。若順言者共故非異即別非一 詳曰。或但如疏亦不交加 言共非一者。有．同異性與所有法而非是一。如似共相與所相法而非是一。假．實．能．所種種異故 言別非異者。有．同異性異其所有。別別法外而無有體。體即彼故。故名不異。似佛法中所有共相故言如共 有說。以無別故故稱為一。義差別故復言亦異。如內宗中水波等喻。大意同疏。
疏。雙無之言無所表故者。但言無兒即知石女。何須
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 類別故者：如果除了『有』（Bhava，存在）、『同』（Sāmānya，共性）、『異』（Viśeṣa，殊性）之外，剩餘的法不是顯而易見的類別，並且因為它們不是法性（Dharmatā，法的本性），所以它們是不相等的。 問：數論（Sāṃkhya）本宗不建立六句義（六種範疇），現在說『有』、『同』、『異』，他們會怎麼解釋？ 答：雖然他們不特別建立六句義，但法的本體並非沒有『有』，這就被稱為『有』。法具有『同』和『異』的性質，這被稱為『同異性』。這與勝論（Vaiśeṣika）不同。 有一種說法是，三種德（Guna，屬性）被稱為『有性』，二十三種諦（Tattva，真實）被稱為『同異性』。 詳細解釋：按照這個論證來破斥，『有性』不僅僅在於三種德。因此，論證總結說，這就違背了三種德，我和其他事物的本體不同，也違背了世間諸法的差別。因此，可知『有性』貫穿於二十五諦。二十五諦的差異就是『同異』。
疏：『又我等至差別相者』，如果討論其本體，二十三種諦就是自性（Prakṛti，本原），因此本體沒有差別。如果根據現象來說，二十三種諦是不同的。現在根據現象來討論，這也是要破斥的。因此用『等等』來表示。最初是根據本體，所以說『二別』。
疏：『此中色等至不定過者』，例如數量等十一種德，以及地、水、火，都是眼睛的對境。如果不相等，就會有不定過（Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa，不定因）。 不定過是指：你所說的色，是像聲音等那樣，因為不是色的性質，所以不是眼睛的對境呢？還是像數等那樣，因為不是色的性質，所以是眼睛的對境呢？
疏：『如共故非一等者』，這是交加著說的。如果順著說，就是因為共性所以不是異性，也就是差別不是單一。 詳細解釋：或者只是像疏文那樣，不交加著說。說『共非一者』，『有』、『同異性』與所有法不是同一個，就像共相（Sāmānya，共相）與所相法（Viśeṣa，殊相）不是同一個。因為假、實、能、所種種不同。 說『別非異者』，『有』、『同異性』異於其所有，在個別的法之外沒有本體，本體就是它們。因此稱為『不異』。類似於佛法中所有的共相，所以說『如共』。 有一種說法是，因為沒有差別，所以稱為『一』。因為意義有差別，所以又說『亦異』。就像內宗（佛教內部）中水波等的比喻。大意與疏文相同。
疏：『雙無之言無所表故者』，只要說沒有兒子，就知道是石女，何必再說沒有女兒呢？
【English Translation】 English version: 『Kategori故者』 (Category): If, besides 『Bhava』 (有, existence), 『Sāmānya』 (同, commonness), 『Viśeṣa』 (異, particularity), the remaining dharmas are not obvious categories, and because they are not Dharmatā (法性, the nature of dharma), they are unequal. Question: The Sāṃkhya (數論) school does not establish the six categories (六句義). Now, what would they say about 『Bhava』 (有), 『Sāmānya』 (同), and 『Viśeṣa』 (異)? Answer: Although they do not specifically establish the six categories, the essence of dharma is not without 『Bhava』 (有), which is called 『Bhava』. Dharma has the nature of 『Sāmānya』 (同) and 『Viśeṣa』 (異), which is called 『Sāmānyaviśeṣa』 (同異性). This is different from Vaiśeṣika (勝論). One explanation is that the three Gunas (德, qualities) are called 『Bhava』 (有性), and the twenty-three Tattvas (諦, truths) are called 『Sāmānyaviśeṣa』 (同異性). Detailed explanation: According to this argument, 『Bhava』 (有性) is not only in the three Gunas. Therefore, the argument concludes that it contradicts the three Gunas, the essence of 『I』 and other things are different, and it also contradicts the differences of all dharmas in the world. Therefore, it can be known that 『Bhava』 (有性) permeates the twenty-five Tattvas. The differences of the twenty-five Tattvas are 『Sāmānyaviśeṣa』 (同異).
Commentary: 『又我等至差別相者』 (Furthermore, regarding the differences between 『I』 and others), if discussing its essence, the twenty-three Tattvas are Prakṛti (自性, primordial nature), so the essence has no difference. If according to the phenomena, the twenty-three Tattvas are different. Now, discussing according to the phenomena, this is also to be refuted. Therefore, 『etc.』 is used. Initially, it is according to the essence, so it is said 『two differences』.
Commentary: 『此中色等至不定過者』 (Among these, 『color』 etc. leads to the fallacy of uncertainty), for example, the eleven qualities such as number, and earth, water, fire, are all objects of the eye. If they are not equal, there will be the fallacy of uncertainty (Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa, 不定因). The fallacy of uncertainty means: Is the color you are talking about like sound etc., because it is not the nature of color, so it is not an object of the eye? Or is it like number etc., because it is not the nature of color, so it is an object of the eye?
Commentary: 『如共故非一等者』 (Like commonness, therefore not oneness, etc.), this is said in an overlapping way. If said in a straightforward way, it means because of commonness, it is not difference, that is, difference is not oneness. Detailed explanation: Or it is just like the commentary, not said in an overlapping way. Saying 『commonness is not oneness』 means that 『Bhava』 (有), 『Sāmānyaviśeṣa』 (同異性) and all dharmas are not the same, just like Sāmānya (共相, common characteristic) and Viśeṣa (殊相, particular characteristic) are not the same. Because false, real, able, and what is able are all different. Saying 『difference is not otherness』 means that 『Bhava』 (有), 『Sāmānyaviśeṣa』 (同異性) are different from what they possess, and there is no essence outside of the individual dharmas, the essence is them. Therefore, it is called 『not other』. Similar to all the common characteristics in Buddhism, so it is said 『like commonness』. One explanation is that because there is no difference, it is called 『one』. Because the meaning is different, it is also said 『also different』. Like the analogy of water waves etc. in internal Buddhism. The general meaning is the same as the commentary.
Commentary: 『雙無之言無所表故者』 (The words 『both without』 express nothing), just saying there is no son, it is known that it is a barren woman, why is it necessary to say there is no daughter?
復說無女之言。
疏。又此言表即同第二者。第四計中有四句破。表同第一不雙非難。遮同第二無所執難 問且如大乘一切色上有質礙性。此名有性。色法即有非色法無名同異性。此之二性與色等法。亦得名為亦一亦異非一非異還同外道。如何破他 答大乘宗義假名施設。非識外實。迷悟有別。由是悟故四句皆是。若也迷者四句皆非。故不同彼 問今以四句破彼外宗。大乘正義何句所攝 答有義大乘正法非四句收。不可言故。無定性故 詳曰。若同外計一句亦非。若依假詮通有四句而有何失。更互相望得成四句。如前應悉。
成唯識論演秘卷第一(末終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第二(本疏第二)
沙門智周撰
疏。今言離識簡違宗過者。問設言異識何有違宗 答大乘宗中異識之色不是無故。
疏。稍相近等者。相似名近。大小俱說心為能取心即是識 有云。體即識故談彼心王。稍相近故說彼心所 詳曰。此未必然。何意心所獨名相近。若似名近何不兼心。近王名近境相更近。何乃先破 或據一邊義必通也。然成繁碎。
疏。對有三種者。問對為何義 答謂礙也。礙有二義。一障礙名礙。二拘礙名礙。三有對中障礙有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 重申『沒有女性』的說法。
疏解：又，這個說法所表達的與第二種情況相同。第四種計較中有四句破斥。表達與第一種情況相同，則難以避免雙重否定。遮蓋與第二種情況相同，則無所執著，難以駁斥。問：比如大乘佛教認為一切色法都具有質礙性（rupa has the characteristic of obstruction）。這被稱為『有性』（existence）。色法即是有，非色法即是無，這被稱為『同異性』（identity and difference）。這兩種性質與色法等法，也可以被稱為『亦一亦異』（both one and different）或『非一非異』（neither one nor different），這樣是否與外道相同？如何破斥他們？答：大乘宗義是假名施設（provisional designation），並非在識之外存在真實的法。迷（delusion）與悟（enlightenment）有所區別。因為覺悟的緣故，四句都是成立的。如果迷惑，那麼四句都不成立。所以與外道不同。問：現在用四句破斥外道宗義，那麼大乘正義屬於哪一句？答：有義認為，大乘正法不能被四句所涵蓋，因為它是不可言說的，沒有固定不變的性質。詳細說明：如果與外道的計較相同，那麼一句也不成立。如果依據假名詮釋，那麼四句都可以成立，又有什麼過失呢？更互相觀望，可以形成四句。如前所述，應該詳細瞭解。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第一（末尾） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1833 《成唯識論演秘》
《成唯識論演秘》卷第二（本疏第二）
沙門智周 撰
疏解：現在說『離開識』是爲了避免違背宗義的過失。問：假設說『異識』，怎麼會違背宗義呢？答：在大乘宗中，異識之色（color separate from consciousness）不是不存在的。
疏解：稍微相近等等。相似稱為『近』。大小都說心為能取，心即是識。有人說：體即是識，所以談論心王（mind-king）。因為稍微相近，所以說心所（mental functions）。詳細說明：這不一定正確。為什麼心所單獨被稱為相近？如果相似稱為近，為什麼不包括心？相對於心王來說，近是相近，境相（object-aspects）更加相近。為什麼先破斥境相？或者根據一邊的意義，必然是通達的。然而這樣會變得繁瑣。
疏解：對有三種。問：『對』是什麼意思？答：是指『礙』。『礙』有兩種含義：一是障礙，稱為『礙』；二是拘礙，稱為『礙』。三是有對中，有障礙。
【English Translation】 English version: Repeating the statement of 'no woman'.
Commentary: Furthermore, this statement expresses the same meaning as the second case. In the fourth calculation, there are four sentences of refutation. Expressing the same as the first case makes it difficult to avoid double negation. Covering the same as the second case means there is nothing to cling to, making it difficult to refute. Question: For example, Mahayana Buddhism believes that all forms (rupa) have the characteristic of obstruction (質礙性). This is called 'existence' (有性). Form is existence, non-form is non-existence, which is called 'identity and difference' (同異性). Can these two natures, along with form and other dharmas, also be called 'both one and different' (亦一亦異) or 'neither one nor different' (非一非異), thus being the same as external paths (外道)? How to refute them? Answer: The Mahayana doctrine is a provisional designation (假名施設), not a real dharma existing outside of consciousness. There is a difference between delusion (迷) and enlightenment (悟). Because of enlightenment, all four sentences are valid. If there is delusion, then all four sentences are invalid. Therefore, it is different from external paths. Question: Now using the four sentences to refute the external paths' doctrines, which sentence does the correct Mahayana doctrine belong to? Answer: Some argue that the correct Mahayana Dharma cannot be encompassed by the four sentences because it is inexpressible and has no fixed nature. Detailed explanation: If it is the same as the external paths' calculations, then none of the sentences are valid. If based on provisional interpretation, then all four sentences can be valid, so what fault is there? By looking at each other, the four sentences can be formed. As mentioned before, it should be understood in detail.
《Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Elucidation of the Hidden Meaning》 Volume 1 (End) Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43 No. 1833 《Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Elucidation of the Hidden Meaning》
《Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Elucidation of the Hidden Meaning》 Volume 2 (Second Commentary)
Composed by Shramana Zhizhou
Commentary: Now saying 'apart from consciousness' is to avoid the fault of violating the doctrine. Question: Supposing we say 'consciousness different', how would it violate the doctrine? Answer: In the Mahayana doctrine, color separate from consciousness (異識之色) is not non-existent.
Commentary: Slightly similar, etc. Similarity is called 'near'. Both the large and small say that mind is the taker, mind is consciousness. Some say: The substance is consciousness, therefore they talk about the mind-king (心王). Because it is slightly similar, they talk about mental functions (心所). Detailed explanation: This is not necessarily correct. Why are mental functions exclusively called near? If similarity is called near, why not include mind? Relative to the mind-king, near is near, object-aspects (境相) are even nearer. Why refute object-aspects first? Or according to one side's meaning, it must be comprehensive. However, this would become cumbersome.
Commentary: There are three kinds of 'opposition'. Question: What is the meaning of 'opposition' (對)? Answer: It refers to 'obstruction' (礙). 'Obstruction' has two meanings: one is hindrance, called 'obstruction'; the other is restriction, called 'obstruction'. The third is in opposition, there is hindrance.
對。障礙名礙。所緣．境界。拘礙名礙。
疏。境界有對等者。然境拘礙能照根．識有多差別。故施設論作如是言。有眼於水有礙非陸。如魚等眼。有眼於陸有礙非水。從多分說如人等眼。有眼俱礙。如畢舍遮．室獸摩羅等眼。有俱非礙。謂除前相。有眼于夜有礙非晝。如鵂鹠等眼。有眼于晝有礙非夜。從多分說如人等眼。有眼俱礙。如野乾等眼。有俱不礙。謂除前相 釋施設論者六足中一。大迦多衍那造 畢舍遮者唐云食血肉。鬼之異名也 室獸摩羅傍生類也。形如壁蛒。小者二丈。大者百尺 俱不礙者。即諸盲者 問根．識各能緣照自境。何名為礙 答祇為自境拘自根．識。不令于余境等轉故。或自境等和合轉時。于余境等而不得起故名為礙。故俱舍論云。云何眼等於自境界所緣轉時說名有對。越彼于余此不轉故。或復礙者是和合義。謂眼等法于自境界．及自所緣和合轉故 釋曰。雙問雙答境界．所緣二有對也。釋中有二。並以拘礙名為礙也。
疏。心心所法至名為所緣者。顯所緣有對。執猶慮托。心．心所法其性羸劣非境不生。猶如羸人非杖不起。故彼境等是心所慮。名為所緣。此據有緣其用方起。非必正起。故過．未心亦名有對。礙緣境用名所緣對。
疏。若於彼法等者。顯境界對。于彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：障礙的含義是妨礙。所緣，即是境界。拘禁妨礙也稱為障礙。
疏解：『境界有對等者』，意思是境界的拘礙對於能照見的根和識有多種差別。因此，《施設論》中這樣說：有的眼睛對於水有妨礙，對於陸地沒有妨礙，比如魚的眼睛。有的眼睛對於陸地有妨礙，對於水沒有妨礙，從大多數情況來說，比如人的眼睛。有的眼睛兩者都有妨礙，比如畢舍遮（Pisaca，食血肉的鬼）和室獸摩羅（Sisumara，形如壁虎的傍生類）的眼睛。有的眼睛兩者都沒有妨礙，就是排除以上情況。有的眼睛對於夜晚有妨礙，對於白天沒有妨礙，比如鵂鹠（xiū liú，貓頭鷹）的眼睛。有的眼睛對於白天有妨礙，對於夜晚沒有妨礙，從大多數情況來說，比如人的眼睛。有的眼睛兩者都有妨礙，比如野干（yě gān，豺）的眼睛。有的眼睛兩者都沒有妨礙，就是排除以上情況。釋《施設論》是六足論之一，由大迦多衍那（Mahakatyayana）所造。畢舍遮（Pisaca）翻譯成漢語是食血肉，是鬼的一種異名。室獸摩羅（Sisumara）是傍生類，形狀像壁虎，小的有二丈，大的有百尺。『俱不礙者』，指的是那些盲人。問：根和識各自能夠緣照自己的境界，為什麼還稱為妨礙？答：只是因為自己的境界拘禁了自己的根和識，不讓它們在其他的境界等上運轉。或者在自己的境界等和合運轉時，對於其他的境界等而不能生起，所以稱為妨礙。所以《俱舍論》中說：『什麼是眼等在自己的境界所緣上運轉時被稱為有對？因為超越了那個，在這個上就不能運轉。』或者妨礙是和合的意思，指的是眼等法在自己的境界和自己的所緣上和合運轉。釋義說：雙重提問，雙重回答，境界和所緣都是有對的。解釋中有兩種，都是以拘禁妨礙稱為妨礙。
疏解：『心心所法至名為所緣者』，顯示了所緣有對。執，就像是考慮和依託。心和心所法，它們的性質羸弱，沒有境界就不能產生，就像是羸弱的人沒有枴杖就不能站起來。所以那些境界等是心所考慮的，稱為所緣。這是根據有緣才能起作用來說的，不一定必須是正在生起。所以過去和未來的心也稱為有對。妨礙緣境的作用稱為所緣對。
疏解：『若於彼法等者』，顯示了境界對。對於那個
【English Translation】 English version: The meaning of 'obstacle' (Avaraṇa) is hindrance. 'Alambana' (所緣, object of thought), that is, the realm (Gocara, 境界). Restraint and hindrance are also called obstacles.
Commentary: 'The realm has opposition, etc.' means that the restraint of the realm has many differences for the perceiving faculties and consciousness. Therefore, the Prajñapti-śāstra (施設論) says: 'Some eyes are obstructed by water but not by land, such as the eyes of fish. Some eyes are obstructed by land but not by water, generally speaking, such as the eyes of humans. Some eyes are obstructed by both, such as the eyes of Pisacas (畢舍遮, flesh-eating ghosts) and Sisumaras (室獸摩羅, an aquatic animal resembling an alligator). Some eyes are not obstructed by either, which excludes the above situations. Some eyes are obstructed by night but not by day, such as the eyes of owls. Some eyes are obstructed by day but not by night, generally speaking, such as the eyes of humans. Some eyes are obstructed by both, such as the eyes of jackals. Some eyes are not obstructed by either, which excludes the above situations.' The commentary on the Prajñapti-śāstra is one of the six Pada-śāstras, created by Mahakatyayana (大迦多衍那). 'Pisaca' (畢舍遮) is translated into Chinese as 'flesh-eating,' which is another name for ghosts. 'Sisumara' (室獸摩羅) is a type of animal, shaped like a gecko, with the smaller ones being twenty zhang (丈, approx. 3 meters) long and the larger ones being a hundred zhang long. 'Not obstructed by either' refers to those who are blind. Question: Faculties and consciousness can each perceive their own realms, so why is it called an obstacle? Answer: It is only because one's own realm restricts one's own faculties and consciousness, preventing them from operating in other realms, etc. Or, when one's own realm, etc., operates in conjunction, one cannot arise in other realms, etc., so it is called an obstacle. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論) says: 'How is it said that the eyes, etc., are called 'having opposition' when operating in their own realm of object? Because beyond that, they cannot operate in this.' Or, 'obstacle' means 'conjunction,' referring to the fact that the eyes, etc., operate in conjunction with their own realm and their own object.' Explanation: A double question and a double answer, both the realm and the object are 'having opposition.' There are two explanations, both using restraint and hindrance as the meaning of 'obstacle.'
Commentary: 'The mind and mental factors, up to being called the object,' shows that the object has opposition. 'Grasping' is like considering and relying on. The mind and mental factors are weak in nature and cannot arise without a realm, just like a weak person cannot stand without a cane. Therefore, those realms, etc., are what the mind considers, and are called the object. This is based on the idea that function arises only when there is an object, and it does not necessarily have to be currently arising. Therefore, past and future minds are also called 'having opposition.' The function of hindering the realm is called the opposition of the object.
Commentary: 'If in that dharma, etc.,' shows the opposition of the realm. Regarding that
色等此眼．耳等。有見．聞等取境功能。說此色等為眼等境。功能所託名為境界。如人于彼有勝功能。便說彼為我之境界。此約有能。非要起用故彼同分仍名有對。礙取境用名境界對 問取．緣何別 答取謂照矚。緣謂緣慮。故二別也。又俱舍論句數聊簡云。若法境界有對亦障礙有對耶。應作四句。謂七心界．法界一分諸相應法是第一句。色等五境是第二句。眼等五根是第三句。法界一分非相應法是第四句。若法境界有對亦所緣有對耶。應順后句答。謂若所緣有對定是境界有對。有雖境界有對而非所緣有對。謂眼等五根。
疏。然經部至十處所攝者。亦如大乘十八界種第六．八緣以境對根合法處攝。從所生現十八界收。此亦相似。
疏正理論至別有色故者。問有部亦爾。何乃諍耶 答正理難意我粗細實。可細從粗在十處收。汝粗既假。云何實細從假十處非法處耶。經部意云。雖假實殊隨所成粗在於十處非法處攝。故有諍也。
疏。薩婆多等粗細俱實者。等說出世．及說假部。說假部計蘊門皆實。說出世言出世並實。故粗細色在蘊。出世悉皆實故。故疏等言等此二宗各小分也。餘部全同 或復全異。故不等之。
疏。五根等亦攝在中等者。問此量對誰 答略為三釋 一對有部。五根．境等攝入
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：色等（rupa, 等代表顏色等）是眼睛、耳朵等（眼等，指眼根、耳根等）的境界。眼睛、耳朵等具有見、聞等獲取外境的功能。所說的色等是眼睛等的境界，功能所依賴的被稱為境界。就像人們對於某事物具有強大的功能，就說那事物是我的境界。這是從具有功能方面來說的，並非一定要實際起作用，因此色等與眼根等同屬於有對。阻礙獲取外境的功能，這被稱為境界對。問：『取』（grahanam, 攝取）和『緣』（alambana, 緣慮）有什麼區別？答：『取』是指照見和關注，『緣』是指緣念和思慮，所以二者不同。此外，《俱舍論》的句數略有簡化，說：『如果一個法是境界有對，它也是障礙有對嗎？』應該分為四句來回答。七心界（sapta vijnana-kayah, 七種識）和法界（dharma-dhatu, 法的界限）的一部分以及諸相應法（samprayukta-dharma, 與心識相應的法）是第一句。色等五境（rupa-adi-panca-vishaya, 色、聲、香、味、觸五種外境）是第二句。眼等五根（cakshur-adi-panca-indriya, 眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）是第三句。法界的一部分非相應法是第四句。如果一個法是境界有對，它也是所緣有對嗎？』應該順著後面的句子回答，即如果所緣有對，那一定是境界有對。有些是境界有對，但不是所緣有對，比如眼等五根。 疏：然而經部（Sautrantika, 佛教部派之一）認為十處（dasa ayatanani, 十種產生認識的場所）所包含的，也像大乘（Mahayana, 大乘佛教）十八界（ashtadasa dhatavah, 十八種構成世界的要素）中第六意識和第八阿賴耶識緣取外境，以境對根，歸合法處（dharma-ayatana, 法的場所）所攝。從所生現象來看，十八界也是這樣歸納的，這與經部的觀點相似。 疏正理論：至於別有色故。問：有部（Sarvastivada, 說一切有部）也是這樣，為什麼還要爭論呢？答：正理的難點在於我認為粗細都是真實的，細微的可以歸於粗大的，所以在十處中可以包含。你們認為粗大的是虛假的，怎麼能把真實的細微的歸於虛假的十處非法處呢？經部的意思是，雖然虛假和真實不同，但隨著所形成的粗大，就在十處和非法處中包含，所以才有爭論。 疏：薩婆多等（Sarvastivadins, 一切有部）認為粗細都是真實的。『等』字包括說出世部和說假部。說假部認為蘊門都是真實的，說出世部認為出世法都是真實的。因此，粗細的色都在蘊中，出世法都是真實的。所以疏中的『等』字包括這兩個宗派的小部分。其餘的部派要麼完全相同，要麼完全不同，所以沒有包括在內。 疏：五根等也包含在中間等。問：這個量是對誰說的？答：略微解釋為三種：一是對有部。五根、境等包含在內。
【English Translation】 English version: Rupa (rupa, form), etc., are the objects of the eye, ear, etc. (eye, etc., referring to eye-faculty, ear-faculty, etc.). The eye, ear, etc., have the function of seeing, hearing, etc., to grasp external objects. What is said to be rupa, etc., are the objects of the eye, etc., and what the function relies on is called the object. Just as people have great power over something, they say that thing is my object. This is from the perspective of having function, not necessarily actually functioning, so rupa, etc., and eye-faculty, etc., still belong to the category of 'having resistance'. Obstructing the function of grasping external objects is called 'object with resistance'. Question: What is the difference between 'taking' (grahanam, grasping) and 'object' (alambana, object of thought)? Answer: 'Taking' refers to seeing and focusing, while 'object' refers to contemplating and thinking, so the two are different. In addition, the number of verses in the Abhidharmakosha is slightly simplified, saying: 'If a dharma is an object with resistance, is it also an obstruction with resistance?' It should be answered in four sentences. The seven consciousness realms (sapta vijnana-kayah, seven kinds of consciousness) and a part of the dharma realm (dharma-dhatu, the boundary of dharma) and all associated dharmas (samprayukta-dharma, dharmas associated with consciousness) are the first sentence. The five objects of form, etc. (rupa-adi-panca-vishaya, the five external objects of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) are the second sentence. The five faculties of eye, etc. (cakshur-adi-panca-indriya, the five sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) are the third sentence. A part of the dharma realm that is not an associated dharma is the fourth sentence. If a dharma is an object with resistance, is it also an object of thought with resistance?' It should be answered according to the latter sentence, that is, if the object of thought has resistance, it must be an object with resistance. Some are objects with resistance, but not objects of thought with resistance, such as the five faculties of eye, etc. Commentary: However, the Sautrantika (Sautrantika, one of the Buddhist schools) believes that what is contained in the ten places (dasa ayatanani, ten places where cognition arises) is also like the sixth consciousness and the eighth alaya consciousness in the eighteen realms (ashtadasa dhatavah, eighteen elements that make up the world) of Mahayana (Mahayana, Mahayana Buddhism) grasping external objects, using objects to oppose the faculties, and being included in the dharma-ayatana (dharma-ayatana, the place of dharma). From the perspective of the phenomena produced, the eighteen realms are also summarized in this way, which is similar to the view of the Sautrantika. Commentary on the Correct Principle: As for the reason that there are separate forms. Question: The Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'All Exists' school) is also like this, so why argue? Answer: The difficulty of the correct principle lies in the fact that I think that both coarse and fine are real, and the subtle can be attributed to the coarse, so it can be included in the ten places. You think that the coarse is false, how can you attribute the real subtle to the false ten places and non-dharma places? The meaning of the Sautrantika is that although false and real are different, as the coarse formed, it is included in the ten places and non-dharma places, so there is a dispute. Commentary: The Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, the 'All Exists' school), etc., believe that both coarse and fine are real. The word 'etc.' includes the school that speaks of the transcendent and the school that speaks of the false. The school that speaks of the false believes that the aggregates are all real, and the school that speaks of the transcendent believes that the transcendent dharmas are all real. Therefore, both coarse and fine forms are in the aggregates, and the transcendent dharmas are all real. Therefore, the word 'etc.' in the commentary includes a small part of these two schools. The remaining schools are either completely the same or completely different, so they are not included. Commentary: The five faculties, etc., are also included in the middle, etc. Question: To whom is this quantity said? Answer: Briefly explained in three ways: One is to the Sarvastivada. The five faculties, objects, etc., are included.
宗中。故無不定。若對經部有相符失。經部根等皆是假故。雖破能成。為遮不定兼破根等。亦無失矣 二對經部。五根．境等攝入同喻。論意但破能成微故 三雙破二宗。然別作量。若以一量破二宗者進退有過。思可知也。第三義備。前二理通。
疏。無為至無不定者。非色喻言攝無為等。無為無礙。不成衣等。故入同中。故彼不得將為不定。
疏。此二量破經部者。詳曰。以折宗法而為其因成非實有。通前三量亦應無失。已成宗法得為因故。
疏。極微有方分理不應成一者。以一極微對六方面名有方分。既有六方所對不同。能對之微云何體一 應立量云。所執極微。體應不一。可分折故。有方分故。如諸粗色。
疏。不然因有隨不成者。若以此文對經部者。無方分因便成隨一。經部不許無方分故。
疏。為量同前者。同前承光發影中量。難彼極微令有方分。
疏。聚應如極微者。一極微處若有六微。應諸聚色如極微量。展轉相望不過量故。則應聚色亦不可見。
疏觸與不觸皆應有分者。若相觸者。相對礙故。理有方分。設不觸著擬宜六方亦須有分。若不爾者何名對色。
疏。聚不異無二者。聚不異言牒有宗救。聚色與微而無異故。無二之言天親難彼。聚色應無影
．障二也。即極微故。猶如極微。
疏。此結非等者。既破極微非實有。已成前量云外有對色定非實有。因乃無過。
疏。此非他心等境者。他心智者但緣他心不緣根故。且依凡夫。六識散心之所不得。第六雖緣然非現得。故必除之。理實余聖非定六識亦不得也。其第七識因中自他皆不緣根。果他不許故亦不簡。
論。以能發識比知是有者。泛明比知略有四種 一以因比果。如觀現法有引後用知所引果 二以果比因。即觀現法有酬前義知能引因 三以體比用。觀所成法而知作者．作具差別 四以用比體。觀作者等知所成法。今論所明以果知因。由用比體。
論。外有對色理不成等者。論中意明五根但是內識變現。為下自明五塵境故。然有對言．及內識變義該根．境。疏主因敘諸宗五塵。不說此文是明塵也 故總結云心外有對前已遮破。故此諸根但是內識之所變現 若爾何故引觀所緣緣頌義而以為證 答意取識變一邊為證。有義破云。疏說此說所緣之境是識所變非外微成。今不依此。若已顯境是內識變。何故次下復云眼等外所緣緣理非有耶。明知此文但顯五根是識所變 詳曰。談何容易而見彈斥。疏何有云此說所緣豈不自加。又疏前科分明自指根．境等別。明疏不謬。當審尋之。
疏。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『障二也。即極微故。猶如極微。』 這句話的意思是，障礙有兩種。一種是極微（kalāpa，物質的最小單位），就像極微一樣。
『疏。此結非等者。既破極微非實有。已成前量云外有對色定非實有。因乃無過。』 這段疏文解釋說，這裡總結的『非等』，是因為既然已經破斥了極微並非真實存在，那麼就已經通過之前的論證成立了『外在的有對色必定不是真實存在』的結論。因此，這個論證沒有過失。
『疏。此非他心等境者。他心智者但緣他心不緣根故。且依凡夫。六識散心之所不得。第六雖緣然非現得。故必除之。理實余聖非定六識亦不得也。其第七識因中自他皆不緣根。果他不許故亦不簡。』 這段疏文解釋說，這裡所說的『非他心等境』，是因為具有他心智（paracitta-jñāna，瞭解他人心識的能力）的人，只是以他人的心識為對象，而不是以根（indriya，感覺器官）為對象。而且，這裡是依據凡夫（pṛthagjana，普通人）的情況來說的，凡夫的六識（ṣaṭ vijñānāni，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）在散亂的狀態下無法獲得這種認知。第六識（意識）雖然能夠緣取，但並非直接獲得。因此，必須排除這種情況。實際上，其他的聖者也並非一定能通過六識獲得這種認知。第七識（末那識，manas-vijñāna）在因位時，無論自心還是他心，都不緣取根。在果位時，其他宗派不承認有第七識，因此也不需要進行簡別。
『論。以能發識比知是有者。泛明比知略有四種 一以因比果。如觀現法有引後用知所引果 二以果比因。即觀現法有酬前義知能引因 三以體比用。觀所成法而知作者．作具差別 四以用比體。觀作者等知所成法。今論所明以果知因。由用比體。』 這段論述說，通過能夠引發識（vijñāna，意識）的事物來推知其存在，一般來說，比量（anumāna，推理）可以分為四種：第一種是以因（hetu，原因）比果（phala，結果），例如觀察到現在的行為能夠引發未來的作用，從而推知所引發的結果；第二種是以果比因，即觀察到現在的行為能夠酬償之前的意義，從而推知能夠引發這種行為的原因；第三種是以體（svabhāva，本體）比用（kārya，作用），觀察所成就的事物，從而瞭解作者和工具的差別；第四種是以用比體，觀察作者等，從而瞭解所成就的事物。現在論中所說明的是以果推知因，通過作用來推知本體。
『論。外有對色理不成等者。論中意明五根但是內識變現。為下自明五塵境故。然有對言．及內識變義該根．境。疏主因敘諸宗五塵。不說此文是明塵也 故總結云心外有對前已遮破。故此諸根但是內識之所變現 若爾何故引觀所緣緣頌義而以為證 答意取識變一邊為證。有義破云。疏說此說所緣之境是識所變非外微成。今不依此。若已顯境是內識變。何故次下復云眼等外所緣緣理非有耶。明知此文但顯五根是識所變 詳曰。談何容易而見彈斥。疏何有云此說所緣豈不自加。又疏前科分明自指根．境等別。明疏不謬。當審尋之。』 這段論述說，『外在的有對色在道理上不能成立』，論中的意思是說明五根（pañcendriyāṇi，眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）只是內在意識的變現，這是爲了下面說明五塵境（pañca viṣayāḥ，色、聲、香、味、觸）的緣故。然而，『有對』這個詞以及『內在意識的變現』的含義，涵蓋了根和境。疏主的解釋是因為敘述了各個宗派關於五塵的觀點，並沒有說這段文字是說明五塵的。因此總結說，心外有對的說法之前已經遮破了。所以這些根只是內在意識所變現的。如果這樣，為什麼引用觀察所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，所緣的條件）的偈頌的意義來作為證據呢？回答說，這是取意識變現的一方面作為證據。有一種觀點反駁說，疏文說這裡所說的所緣的境是意識所變現的，而不是外在的微塵所形成的。現在不依據這種說法。如果已經顯示境是內在意識的變現，為什麼接下來又說眼等外在的所緣緣在道理上是不存在的呢？這明明是說明這段文字只是顯示五根是意識所變現的。詳細地說，談論佛法不是容易的事情，怎麼能輕易地進行反駁呢？疏文中哪裡有說『這裡所說的所緣』這種話呢？這不是自己新增的嗎？而且疏文前面的科判分明地指出了根和境等的區別。說明疏文沒有錯誤。應當仔細地審察。
『疏。』 （此處為疏文的開始，但內容為空）
English version: '障二也。即極微故。猶如極微。' This means that there are two kinds of obstacles. One is 'kalāpa' (the smallest unit of matter), just like 'kalāpa'.
'疏。此結非等者。既破極微非實有。已成前量云外有對色定非實有。因乃無過。' This commentary explains that the 'non-equality' concluded here is because since it has already been refuted that 'kalāpa' is not truly existent, it has been established through previous reasoning that 'external objects with resistance are definitely not truly existent'. Therefore, this argument has no fault.
'疏。此非他心等境者。他心智者但緣他心不緣根故。且依凡夫。六識散心之所不得。第六雖緣然非現得。故必除之。理實余聖非定六識亦不得也。其第七識因中自他皆不緣根。果他不許故亦不簡。' This commentary explains that 'not objects of others' minds, etc.' is because those with 'paracitta-jñāna' (the ability to know others' minds) only take others' minds as their object, not the 'indriya' (sense organs). Moreover, this is based on the situation of 'pṛthagjana' (ordinary people), whose six 'ṣaṭ vijñānāni' (the six consciousnesses: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) cannot attain this kind of cognition in a distracted state. Although the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) can take it as an object, it is not directly obtained. Therefore, this situation must be excluded. In reality, other sages also cannot necessarily obtain this kind of cognition through the six consciousnesses. The seventh consciousness ('manas-vijñāna') does not take sense organs as its object, whether it is one's own mind or others' minds, in the causal stage. In the resultant stage, other schools do not acknowledge the existence of the seventh consciousness, so there is no need to differentiate it.
'論。以能發識比知是有者。泛明比知略有四種 一以因比果。如觀現法有引後用知所引果 二以果比因。即觀現法有酬前義知能引因 三以體比用。觀所成法而知作者．作具差別 四以用比體。觀作者等知所成法。今論所明以果知因。由用比體。' This treatise states that inferring existence through things that can give rise to consciousness ('vijñāna'), generally speaking, 'anumāna' (inference) can be divided into four types: The first type is inferring the result ('phala') from the cause ('hetu'), such as observing that present actions can give rise to future functions, thereby inferring the result that is given rise to. The second type is inferring the cause from the result, that is, observing that present actions can compensate for previous meanings, thereby inferring the cause that can give rise to these actions. The third type is inferring the function ('kārya') from the essence ('svabhāva'), observing the things that have been accomplished, thereby understanding the differences between the author and the tools. The fourth type is inferring the essence from the function, observing the author, etc., thereby understanding the things that have been accomplished. What is explained in this treatise is inferring the cause from the result, inferring the essence through the function.
'論。外有對色理不成等者。論中意明五根但是內識變現。為下自明五塵境故。然有對言．及內識變義該根．境。疏主因敘諸宗五塵。不說此文是明塵也 故總結云心外有對前已遮破。故此諸根但是內識之所變現 若爾何故引觀所緣緣頌義而以為證 答意取識變一邊為證。有義破云。疏說此說所緣之境是識所變非外微成。今不依此。若已顯境是內識變。何故次下復云眼等外所緣緣理非有耶。明知此文但顯五根是識所變 詳曰。談何容易而見彈斥。疏何有云此說所緣豈不自加。又疏前科分明自指根．境等別。明疏不謬。當審尋之。' This treatise states that 'external objects with resistance cannot be established in principle', the meaning in the treatise is to explain that the five 'pañcendriyāṇi' (sense organs: eye-organ, ear-organ, nose-organ, tongue-organ, and body-organ) are merely manifestations of inner consciousness, this is for the sake of explaining the five 'pañca viṣayāḥ' (sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) below. However, the term 'with resistance' and the meaning of 'manifestation of inner consciousness' encompass both the sense organs and the sense objects. The commentator's explanation is because it narrates the views of various schools regarding the five sense objects, it does not say that this passage is explaining the sense objects. Therefore, it concludes that the idea of external objects with resistance outside the mind has already been refuted previously. So these sense organs are merely manifestations of inner consciousness. If so, why is the meaning of the verse observing the 'ālambana-pratyaya' (object-condition) cited as evidence? The answer is that it takes the aspect of consciousness manifestation as evidence. One view refutes that the commentary says that the object observed here is a manifestation of consciousness, not formed by external particles. Now, this view is not followed. If it has already been shown that the object is a manifestation of inner consciousness, why does it then say that the external object-condition of the eye, etc., is not existent in principle? It is clear that this passage only shows that the five sense organs are manifestations of consciousness. In detail, discussing the Dharma is not an easy matter, how can one easily refute it? Where does the commentary say 'the object observed here'? Isn't this adding it oneself? Moreover, the previous section of the commentary clearly points out the differences between the sense organs and the sense objects, etc. It shows that the commentary is not mistaken. One should examine it carefully.
'疏。' (Here begins the commentary, but the content is empty)
【English Translation】 English version: '障二也。即極微故。猶如極微。' This means that there are two kinds of obstacles. One is 'kalāpa' (the smallest unit of matter), just like 'kalāpa'.
'疏。此結非等者。既破極微非實有。已成前量云外有對色定非實有。因乃無過。' This commentary explains that the 'non-equality' concluded here is because since it has already been refuted that 'kalāpa' is not truly existent, it has been established through previous reasoning that 'external objects with resistance are definitely not truly existent'. Therefore, this argument has no fault.
'疏。此非他心等境者。他心智者但緣他心不緣根故。且依凡夫。六識散心之所不得。第六雖緣然非現得。故必除之。理實余聖非定六識亦不得也。其第七識因中自他皆不緣根。果他不許故亦不簡。' This commentary explains that 'not objects of others' minds, etc.' is because those with 'paracitta-jñāna' (the ability to know others' minds) only take others' minds as their object, not the 'indriya' (sense organs). Moreover, this is based on the situation of 'pṛthagjana' (ordinary people), whose six 'ṣaṭ vijñānāni' (the six consciousnesses: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) cannot attain this kind of cognition in a distracted state. Although the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) can take it as an object, it is not directly obtained. Therefore, this situation must be excluded. In reality, other sages also cannot necessarily obtain this kind of cognition through the six consciousnesses. The seventh consciousness ('manas-vijñāna') does not take sense organs as its object, whether it is one's own mind or others' minds, in the causal stage. In the resultant stage, other schools do not acknowledge the existence of the seventh consciousness, so there is no need to differentiate it.
'論。以能發識比知是有者。泛明比知略有四種 一以因比果。如觀現法有引後用知所引果 二以果比因。即觀現法有酬前義知能引因 三以體比用。觀所成法而知作者．作具差別 四以用比體。觀作者等知所成法。今論所明以果知因。由用比體。' This treatise states that inferring existence through things that can give rise to consciousness ('vijñāna'), generally speaking, 'anumāna' (inference) can be divided into four types: The first type is inferring the result ('phala') from the cause ('hetu'), such as observing that present actions can give rise to future functions, thereby inferring the result that is given rise to. The second type is inferring the cause from the result, that is, observing that present actions can compensate for previous meanings, thereby inferring the cause that can give rise to these actions. The third type is inferring the function ('kārya') from the essence ('svabhāva'), observing the things that have been accomplished, thereby understanding the differences between the author and the tools. The fourth type is inferring the essence from the function, observing the author, etc., thereby understanding the things that have been accomplished. What is explained in this treatise is inferring the cause from the result, inferring the essence through the function.
'論。外有對色理不成等者。論中意明五根但是內識變現。為下自明五塵境故。然有對言．及內識變義該根．境。疏主因敘諸宗五塵。不說此文是明塵也 故總結云心外有對前已遮破。故此諸根但是內識之所變現 若爾何故引觀所緣緣頌義而以為證 答意取識變一邊為證。有義破云。疏說此說所緣之境是識所變非外微成。今不依此。若已顯境是內識變。何故次下復云眼等外所緣緣理非有耶。明知此文但顯五根是識所變 詳曰。談何容易而見彈斥。疏何有云此說所緣豈不自加。又疏前科分明自指根．境等別。明疏不謬。當審尋之。' This treatise states that 'external objects with resistance cannot be established in principle', the meaning in the treatise is to explain that the five 'pañcendriyāṇi' (sense organs: eye-organ, ear-organ, nose-organ, tongue-organ, and body-organ) are merely manifestations of inner consciousness, this is for the sake of explaining the five 'pañca viṣayāḥ' (sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) below. However, the term 'with resistance' and the meaning of 'manifestation of inner consciousness' encompass both the sense organs and the sense objects. The commentator's explanation is because it narrates the views of various schools regarding the five sense objects, it does not say that this passage is explaining the sense objects. Therefore, it concludes that the idea of external objects with resistance outside the mind has already been refuted previously. So these sense organs are merely manifestations of inner consciousness. If so, why is the meaning of the verse observing the 'ālambana-pratyaya' (object-condition) cited as evidence? The answer is that it takes the aspect of consciousness manifestation as evidence. One view refutes that the commentary says that the object observed here is a manifestation of consciousness, not formed by external particles. Now, this view is not followed. If it has already been shown that the object is a manifestation of inner consciousness, why does it then say that the external object-condition of the eye, etc., is not existent in principle? It is clear that this passage only shows that the five sense organs are manifestations of consciousness. In detail, discussing the Dharma is not an easy matter, how can one easily refute it? Where does the commentary say 'the object observed here'? Isn't this adding it oneself? Moreover, the previous section of the commentary clearly points out the differences between the sense organs and the sense objects, etc. It shows that the commentary is not mistaken. One should examine it carefully.
'疏。' (Here begins the commentary, but the content is empty)
有以過去五識相分為五塵者。是過去世五識所變相分熏成後生現行今為識境。故觀所緣論云。或前識相為后識緣。引本識中生似自果功能令起。不違理故。
疏。不見香味通假者。雖無明文。以理言之亦得有假。如和合香可許是假。故瑜伽論五十四云。空行風中無俱生香。唯假合者。既云假合。明知是假味中必有和合之味類香通假。
疏。謂曾現見色等者。釋論解云。曾見色者。謂能持過去識受用義以顯界性。現見色者。謂能持現在識受用義以顯界性 釋曰。受者取也。即釋前現見。義者是境。即明前色由能持識根方取境。故舉所持以明界也。此但明界。界謂能持。不言眼義。或持識者顯其界義。受用義者明其眼義。
疏。及此種子者。釋論云。謂眼種子或唯積聚。為引當來眼故。或已成就。為生現在眼根 釋曰。由此種子能生二世現行眼根。眼根因故亦名眼界。故彼論云。故此二種名眼界者。眼生因故。二世眼種名為二種。因義名界。總以持．因二義名界。然瑜伽論五十六中六義名界。恐繁不具。余根準此。
疏。由本熏時等者。根實唯種。由熏種時心變似色。對法據此熏時似色名為現色。余根亦然。
疏。對所生之果識等者。能生果法名為功能。現行色根能生識果。據此假說現行
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有人認為過去的五識相可以分為五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸，是五種感官的對象）。這是過去世的五識所變的相分（認識的對象）熏習而成的，在後來產生現行，現在作為識的境界。所以《觀所緣論》說：『或者前一識的相分為后一識的緣（條件）。』這是從本識（根本識）中產生類似自身結果的功能，使之生起，不違背道理。
疏：『不見香味通假者』。雖然沒有明確的文字說明，但從道理上講也可以有假。例如，混合的香可以認為是假。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷說：『在空行風中沒有俱生香（天然存在的香），只有假合的香。』既然說是假合，就明確知道是假。味道中一定有混合的味道，類似於香的通假。
疏：『謂曾現見色等者』。《釋論》解釋說：『曾見色者，是指能夠保持過去識受用義，以顯示界性（功能）。現見色者，是指能夠保持現在識受用義，以顯示界性。』釋曰：受，是取的意思，就是解釋前面的現見。義，是指境界，就是說明前面的色由能夠保持識根才能取境。所以舉出所持的來表明界。這只是說明界，界是指能夠保持。沒有說眼義。或者保持識的，顯示它的界義。受用義，是說明它的眼義。
疏：『及此種子者』。《釋論》說：『指眼種子，或者只是積聚，爲了引生將來的眼根；或者已經成就，爲了產生現在的眼根。』釋曰：由此種子能夠產生二世（過去和現在）的現行眼根。眼根的因，所以也叫眼界。所以該論說：『所以這兩種叫做眼界，因為是眼產生的因。』二世的眼種叫做二種。因的意義叫做界。總的來說，用保持和因這兩種意義來命名界。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷中用六種意義來命名界，恐怕過於繁瑣，所以不全部列出。其餘的根可以參照這個。
疏：『由本熏時等者』。根實際上只是種子。由於熏習種子時，心變現得像色。對法（阿毗達摩）根據這種熏習時像色的情況，稱之為現色。其餘的根也是這樣。
疏：『對所生之果識等者』。能夠產生果法的叫做功能。現行的色根能夠產生識果。根據這個，假說現行。
【English Translation】 English version: Some argue that the past five consciousnesses' aspect-divisions (相分) can be divided into the five dusts (五塵) (objects of the five senses: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch). These are the aspect-divisions transformed by the past five consciousnesses, which, through habitual influence (熏習), give rise to present activity (現行) and now serve as the realm of consciousness. Therefore, the Treatise on Observation of the Object of Cognition (觀所緣論) states: 'Or the aspect-division of a prior consciousness becomes the condition (緣) for a subsequent consciousness.' This means that from the fundamental consciousness (本識), a function similar to its own result arises, causing it to occur, which is not contrary to reason.
Commentary: 'Not seeing that smell and taste are mutually interchangeable (通假).' Although there is no explicit textual statement, it can be argued logically that there can be interchangeability. For example, mixed incense can be considered interchangeable. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) Volume 54 states: 'In the wind of the empty realm, there is no co-arisen smell (俱生香), only artificially combined smells.' Since it is said to be artificially combined, it is clear that it is interchangeable. In taste, there must be mixed tastes, similar to the interchangeability of smell.
Commentary: 'Referring to having previously seen forms, etc.' The Commentary (釋論) explains: 'Having previously seen forms refers to being able to maintain the meaning of the past consciousness's enjoyment, in order to reveal the element-nature (界性) (functional capacity). Currently seeing forms refers to being able to maintain the meaning of the present consciousness's enjoyment, in order to reveal the element-nature.' Explanation: 'Enjoyment' (受) means 'taking,' which explains the previous 'currently seeing.' 'Meaning' (義) refers to the object (境), which explains that the previous form can only be taken by maintaining the root of consciousness. Therefore, the maintained is mentioned to clarify the element. This only clarifies the element, which refers to being able to maintain. It does not mention the meaning of the eye. Or, maintaining the consciousness reveals its element-nature. 'Meaning of enjoyment' clarifies the meaning of the eye.
Commentary: 'And these seeds (種子).' The Commentary states: 'Referring to the eye-seed, either merely accumulated, in order to draw forth the future eye-root; or already accomplished, in order to produce the present eye-root.' Explanation: From these seeds, the active eye-root of the two times (past and present) can be produced. The cause of the eye-root is also called the eye-element (眼界). Therefore, the treatise states: 'Therefore, these two are called the eye-element, because they are the cause of the eye's production.' The eye-seeds of the two times are called 'two kinds.' The meaning of cause is called 'element.' In general, the two meanings of maintaining and cause are used to name the element. However, in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra Volume 56, six meanings are used to name the element, but fearing prolixity, they are not all listed. The other roots can be understood similarly.
Commentary: 'Due to the time of the original influence (熏時), etc.' The root is actually just a seed. Due to the mind transforming to resemble form at the time of influencing the seed, the Abhidharma (對法) calls this resemblance to form at the time of influence 'present form' (現色). The other roots are the same.
Commentary: 'Regarding the resulting consciousness produced, etc.' That which can produce the resulting dharma is called function (功能). The active form-root can produce the consciousness-result. Based on this, it is hypothetically said to be active.
色根名為功能。功能即是種子異名。
疏。功能生識等者。大小皆許根名功能。所以論云發眼等識名眼等根。舉功能顯。由體有諍故論不出之根體也 詳曰。或唯現家會所緣論名功能意。彼言功能據極成說。雖實現色是眼等根。由不極成故彼不說。
疏。下破所緣緣至第三結正義者。詳曰。撿下文中歸正義處。乃是總破有對色中大文第三。除此更無歸正義處。破有部后雖復結云許有極微尚致此失。然無歸於正義之處。以理應云后總結也。即是復云許有極微文等是也 或可。文言況無識外真實極微。即正義。
疏。外人執他身心至故今非之者。有義此亦不然。論文但破有對實色不破心故。又理非有。指前破文。前但破色不破心故。但言義便故總敘宗。非文意者即無有失 詳曰。雖複本意破外有對。論今以彼所緣緣破。所緣緣寬。有對義局。以寬成狹破他心等非自親緣斯有何失。若不許者即此論標所緣緣言。攝義不盡復不定失。他許他心雖是所緣非自識變。是自外故。故知論意總包一切所緣緣也。不得說言非文意也 又疏意云。他心．心等非自親緣緣。非所緣。不斥心義。云何難云論但破色不破心耶。難失疏旨。得論玄妙疏誠可觀。
疏。諸預流等者。一剎那頃受等心所還能自緣 問何獨初果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 色根（Rupa-indriya，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）的名稱是功能（karman）。功能也就是種子的另一個名稱。
疏：『功能生識等者』，大小乘都認可根名為功能。所以論中說，『產生眼識等，名為眼等根』。這是舉功能來顯明。因為本體存在爭議，所以論中沒有提出根的本體。詳細地說，或者唯有現觀家（Abhidharmikas）會以所緣論（Alambana）來命名功能。他們所說的功能是根據極成（prasiddha，已成立的）的說法。雖然實現的色（rupa）是眼等根，但因為不是極成，所以他們沒有這樣說。
疏：『下破所緣緣至第三結正義者』。詳細地說，檢查下文歸於正義之處，乃是總破有對色（sapratigha-rupa，有障礙之色）中的第三大段。除了這裡，再沒有歸於正義之處。破斥有部（Sarvastivadins）之後，雖然又總結說『允許有極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）仍然會導致這種過失』，但沒有歸於正義之處。從道理上說，應該說是後面的總結。也就是重複說『允許有極微』等文句。或者可以說，文中的意思是，更何況沒有識外真實的極微，這就是正義。
疏：『外人執他身心至故今非之者』。有一種觀點認為這也不對。論文只是破斥有對實色（sapratigha-rupa），沒有破斥心。而且『理非有』，指的是前面的破斥文。前面只是破斥色，沒有破斥心。只是說『義便』，所以總括敘述宗義，並非論文的本意，這樣就沒有過失。詳細地說，雖然本意是破斥外在的有對，但論今用彼所緣緣（alambana-pratyaya，所緣之緣）來破斥。所緣緣的範圍更寬，有對的意義侷限。用寬泛的所緣緣來成就狹義的破斥，破斥他心等不是自己的親緣，這有什麼過失？如果不允許這樣，那麼此論標明所緣緣，就不能完全包含意義，又會產生不確定的過失。他們（外人）允許他心雖然是所緣，但不是自己識的變現，是自身之外的。所以知道論的本意是總括一切所緣緣。不能說不是論文的本意。而且疏的意思是說，他心、心等不是自己的親緣緣，不是所緣。沒有指責心的意義。怎麼能責難說論只是破斥色，沒有破斥心呢？這樣就喪失了疏的旨意。能夠理解論的玄妙，疏確實值得一看。
疏：『諸預流等者』。一個剎那頃，受等心所（vedana-caitasika，感受等心所）還能自緣（svasamvedana，自我認知）。問：為什麼單單是初果（srotapanna，預流果）？
【English Translation】 English version The name of Rupa-indriya (sense faculties, referring to the five sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is karman (function). Function is another name for seed.
Commentary: 'Function producing consciousness, etc.' Both Hinayana and Mahayana acknowledge that the name of the root is function. Therefore, the treatise says, 'Producing eye-consciousness, etc., is called the eye-root, etc.' This is to clarify by citing the function. Because there is dispute over the substance, the treatise does not mention the substance of the root. In detail, perhaps only the Abhidharmikas would name function based on the Alambana (object) theory. What they say about function is based on established (prasiddha) statements. Although realized rupa (form) is the eye-root, etc., they do not say so because it is not established.
Commentary: 'The following refutation of Alambana-pratyaya to the third conclusion of the correct meaning.' In detail, examining the place in the following text that returns to the correct meaning, it is the third major section in the general refutation of sapratigha-rupa (obstructive form). Apart from this, there is no other place that returns to the correct meaning. After refuting the Sarvastivadins, although it is summarized again by saying 'Allowing the existence of paramanu (smallest unit of matter) still leads to this fault,' there is no return to the correct meaning. Logically speaking, it should be the later summary. That is, repeating the sentences 'Allowing the existence of paramanu,' etc. Or it can be said that the meaning of the text is, let alone the absence of real paramanu outside of consciousness, this is the correct meaning.
Commentary: 'Outsiders hold onto the mind and body of others, hence the present negation.' One view is that this is also incorrect. The treatise only refutes sapratigha-rupa (obstructive real form), not the mind. Moreover, 'the principle is non-existent' refers to the previous refutation text. The previous text only refuted form, not the mind. It only says 'meaning is convenient,' so it summarizes the doctrine, which is not the original intention of the treatise, so there is no fault. In detail, although the original intention is to refute external obstruction, the treatise now uses Alambana-pratyaya (object-condition) to refute it. The scope of Alambana-pratyaya is broader, and the meaning of obstruction is limited. Using the broad Alambana-pratyaya to accomplish the narrow refutation, refuting that the minds of others, etc., are not one's own close conditions, what fault is there? If this is not allowed, then this treatise's labeling of Alambana-pratyaya cannot fully encompass the meaning, and it will produce an uncertain fault. They (outsiders) allow that the minds of others, although they are objects, are not transformations of one's own consciousness, but are outside of oneself. Therefore, it is known that the treatise's intention is to encompass all Alambana-pratyaya. It cannot be said that it is not the original intention of the treatise. Moreover, the commentary means that the minds of others, etc., are not one's own close conditions, and are not objects. It does not criticize the meaning of the mind. How can one criticize by saying that the treatise only refutes form and not the mind? This would lose the commentary's intention. Being able to understand the treatise's profundity, the commentary is indeed worth reading.
Commentary: 'Those who are Srotapanna, etc.' In a single moment, vedana-caitasika (feeling, etc., mental factors) can still self-cognize (svasamvedana). Question: Why only the Srotapanna (stream-enterer)?
答一切皆得。凡夫不明。所以不說。預流初聖故舉例余。
疏。此即總牒共許所緣緣義者。有義斥云。若牒共許何名汝執。又自宗義次前已說。何須重說。今辨親緣。豈大乘中能引自識。是此所引親所所緣 詳曰。所緣緣者為境生識。此之名義大小通許。名之為共。非言此緣體性差別一切率同名為共也。亦如因明共比量義而所諍宗實不同故。前標所緣辨自識變。未明何義名所緣緣。今牒共許所緣緣中他所許義言執何違。何有重失。難引自識例此知非。
疏。法必有體至是所緣者。有義彼似境相非是所緣。屬能緣攝故說似境名所緣者必不應理 詳曰。此蓋似破。于無過中妄生過故。疏談彼意識上必有似境之相。其色等境方名所緣不爾便非。何以故。能緣無彼取境用故。又如眼識緣色之時。識上若無似境之相。色境名為眼所緣者。色必應為耳識所緣。耳識亦無似色相故。若不爾者比量相違。若許爾者有雜亂失。由此要須有似境相。然疏文約而義繁也。長披審思幽旨方悟。疏中不斷似境之相屬所緣也 又疏次云。其似境相即是行相大小乘別。解四分處必自明也。
疏。今以為喻意取小分者。但取非緣一分為喻。名為小分。
疏。以五識是有法所收等者。無過所以如燈具辨 問本成和合非五識緣。今
【現代漢語翻譯】 答：一切皆有可能獲得。凡夫因為不明事理，所以不說。證得預流果的初聖者，因此舉例說明其餘果位。
疏：這裡是總括陳述大小乘共同認可的所緣緣的含義。有人反駁說：『如果陳述的是共同認可的，那怎麼能說是你自己的執著呢？』而且你自己的宗義在前面已經說過了，為什麼還要重複說呢？現在辨析的是親緣，難道在大乘中能引出自己的識，是這個所引的親所所緣嗎？詳細地說，所緣緣是指以境界為條件而生起的識。這個名稱和含義，大小乘都認可，所以說是『共同』。並非說這個緣的體性和差別完全相同，才叫做『共同』。也像因明中共同的比量一樣，而所爭論的宗義實際上是不同的。前面標明了所緣，辨析了自識的變現，但沒有說明什麼含義叫做所緣緣。現在陳述共同認可的所緣緣中他人所認可的含義，說這是『執著』有什麼不對？有什麼重複的過失？難以引出自己的識，用這個例子就知道不是。
疏：法必然有體性，直到『是所緣』。有人認為，那個相似於境界的相，不是所緣，屬於能緣所攝，所以說『相似於境界』，名為所緣，一定是不合理的。詳細地說，這大概是想破斥，在沒有過失的地方妄生過失。疏文中說，那個意識上必然有相似於境界的相，那個色等境界才叫做所緣，否則就不是。為什麼呢？因為能緣沒有那個取境的作用。又如眼識緣色的時候，識上如果沒有相似於境界的相，色境被稱為眼所緣，那麼色必然應該為耳識所緣。因為耳識也沒有相似於色的相。如果不這樣，就與比量相違背。如果允許這樣，就會有雜亂的過失。因此，必須要有一個相似於境界的相。然而疏文簡略而含義繁多。長久地披閱審思，才能領悟其中的幽深旨意。疏文中不斷定相似於境界的相屬於所緣。而且疏文中接著說：『那個相似於境界的相，就是行相，大小乘有所區別。』解釋四分的時候必然會自己明白。
疏：現在用它來作比喻，意思是取小部分。只是取非緣的一部分來作比喻，叫做小部分。
疏：因為五識是有法所收等。沒有過失，所以像燈具一樣辨析。問：本來是和合而成，不是五識所緣。現在
【English Translation】 Answer: Everything is attainable. Ordinary people do not understand, so they do not speak of it. Those who have attained the first stage of sainthood, Srotapanna (stream-enterer) (first stage of enlightenment), therefore give examples for the remaining stages.
Commentary: This is a general statement summarizing the meaning of 'objective condition' (所緣緣, Suo Yuan Yuan) as commonly accepted by both Hinayana and Mahayana. Someone might object: 'If you are stating what is commonly accepted, how can it be called your own attachment?' Moreover, your own doctrine has already been stated before, why repeat it? Now we are analyzing the 'proximate condition' (親緣, Qin Yuan). Could it be that in Mahayana, one can derive one's own consciousness, which is the 'proximate object' (親所所緣, Qin Suo Suo Yuan) derived from this? In detail, 'objective condition' refers to the consciousness that arises based on an object. This name and meaning are accepted by both Hinayana and Mahayana, so it is called 'common.' It does not mean that the nature and differences of this condition are completely the same, and therefore called 'common.' It is like the common analogy in Hetu-vidya (因明, Yin Ming, science of logic), where the debated doctrines are actually different. Earlier, we marked the 'objective condition' and analyzed the transformation of self-consciousness, but did not explain what meaning is called 'objective condition.' Now, stating the meaning accepted by others within the commonly accepted 'objective condition,' what is wrong with calling it an 'attachment'? What is the fault of repetition? It is difficult to derive one's own consciousness; from this example, we know it is not.
Commentary: A dharma (法, Dharma) must have a substance, up to 'is the objective condition.' Someone thinks that the appearance resembling an object is not the objective condition, but belongs to the 'cognizing subject' (能緣, Neng Yuan), so saying 'resembling an object' is called the objective condition, which must be unreasonable. In detail, this is probably an attempt to refute, creating a fault where there is no fault. The commentary says that there must be an appearance resembling an object on that consciousness, and that the object such as form is called the objective condition; otherwise, it is not. Why? Because the cognizing subject does not have the function of grasping the object. Also, when eye-consciousness cognizes form, if there is no appearance resembling the object on the consciousness, and the form is called the object of the eye, then the form must be cognized by ear-consciousness. Because ear-consciousness also does not have an appearance resembling form. If not, it contradicts the analogy. If this is allowed, there will be confusion. Therefore, there must be an appearance resembling the object. However, the commentary is concise but the meaning is extensive. Only by reading and thinking carefully for a long time can one understand the profound meaning. The commentary does not determine that the appearance resembling the object belongs to the objective condition. Moreover, the commentary then says: 'That appearance resembling the object is the characteristic, and Hinayana and Mahayana are different.' When explaining the four divisions, one will surely understand it oneself.
Commentary: Now using it as a metaphor, the meaning is to take a small part. It only takes a part of the non-condition as a metaphor, called a small part.
Commentary: Because the five consciousnesses are included in the 'possessor of dharma' (有法, You Fa), etc. There is no fault, so analyze it like a lamp. Question: Originally, it is formed by combination, not cognized by the five consciousnesses. Now
意在法五在有法。乃成和合非是意緣。何關五識。若爾頌中何言五識 答五雖有法亦名所立。故如瑜伽云何所立有二謂自性．差別理門亦云但由法故成於法。如是成立於有法 問法中言設。明非實許。第二月上設五所緣。理竟何失。而於法中要除五耶 答他許自違縱他名設。他元不許云何稱設 詳曰。歷觀群典設有二途。一者他許自宗不許而有設言。二者自他雖總不許。為有所奪假縱于彼亦復言設。即攝大乘設許經部色．心互為無間緣義。如下當悉。第二月喻他雖不許為五所緣。為奪于緣縱許所緣。理亦何失。同攝論故。若準此理。彼頌五識在於法中亦應無爽。當更審思。
疏。亦非法性等者。性者體也。無實體故名非法性。
疏。義須加減者。或有疏云。不須加減。略為二釋。一云義是。不字非也。然有無境雖皆所緣。但意所緣非五識境。據義而言當須加減。非文不正須加減之 二不字正。義言謬也。彼文既正。第一解中不須減出五識設所緣等五字。但如初作五在有法。即無過故。二釋俱通。后解稍順。
疏。然觸至不同長等者。但地等增名澀．滑等。不同長等相形待立 問長．短何故聚．集攝耶 答若約相形即相待假。據多法成名聚集假。亦不相違。
疏。如命等者。大宗命根體是假法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：意根在於有法（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物）中，五識在於有法中。那麼意根的生起是由於和合（samanvaya，各種條件聚合）而非意緣（manas-pratyaya，意根的緣），這與五識有什麼關係？如果這樣，頌文中為何提到五識？ 答：五識雖然也有法，但也名為所立（sthāpita，被建立的）。所以如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）所說：『什麼是所立？有兩種，即自性（svabhāva，事物自身的性質）和差別（viśeṣa，事物之間的差異）。』理門（nyāya-dvāra，推理的途徑）也說：『僅僅由於法（dharma，事物）的緣故，才能成就法。』 這樣才能在有法中成立。 問：在法中說『假設』，表明並非真實許可。比如第二個月亮上假設有五所緣（pañca-ālambana，五種所緣境），道理上究竟有什麼缺失？為什麼在法中一定要排除五識呢？ 答：他人許可，自己卻違背，可以稱之為『假設』。他人原本就不許可，又怎麼能稱之為『假設』呢？ 詳細地說，歷來觀察各種經典，『假設』有兩種途徑：一是他人許可，但自己的宗派不許可，所以用『假設』的說法；二是自己和他人雖然都不許可，爲了有所取捨，姑且允許對方，也用『假設』的說法。例如《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中假設經部（Sautrāntika）的色（rūpa，物質）和心（citta，精神）互為無間緣（anantara-pratyaya，無間斷的因緣）的意義，如下文將詳細說明。第二個月亮的譬喻，他人雖然不許可作為五所緣，爲了取捨因緣，姑且允許它是所緣，道理上又有什麼缺失呢？和《攝大乘論》的例子相同。如果按照這個道理，那首頌中說五識存在於法中，也應該沒有問題。應當更仔細地思考。
疏：『也非法性等』，性是指體（śarīra，身體，實體）。因為沒有實體，所以稱為非法性。
疏：『義須加減』，或者有疏解釋說：『不需要加減。』 簡略地分為兩種解釋：一種解釋說：『義是』，『不』字是『非』的意思。雖然有境（viṣaya，對像）和無境（aviṣaya，非對像）都是所緣，但意根的所緣不是五識的境。根據意義來說，應當需要加減，不是文字不正，而是需要加減。另一種解釋說：『不』字是正確的，『義』的說法是錯誤的。因為原文既然正確，第一種解釋中就不需要減去『五識設所緣等』這五個字。只要像最初那樣，把『五』放在『有法』中，就沒有過失了。兩種解釋都說得通，后一種解釋稍微順暢一些。
疏：『然而觸至不同長等』，只是地等增加，才有名為澀（khara，粗糙）、滑（ślaksana，平滑）等。不同於長（dīrgha，長）、短（hrasva，短）等相互比較才能成立。 問：長、短為什麼被聚（saṃghāta，集合）、集（samuccaya，積聚）所包含呢？ 答：如果從相互比較來說，就是相待假（apekṣika-prajñapti，依待假立）。根據多種法成就，名為聚集假（rāśi-prajñapti，聚集假立）。兩者並不矛盾。
疏：『如命等』，大宗（mahā-sampradāya，主要宗派）認為命根（jīvitendriya，生命力）的體是假法（prajñapti-sat，假名安立的法）。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: The mind-consciousness (manas-vijñāna) is in the dharmin (that which possesses a quality), and the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) are in the dharmin. Then, the arising of the mind-consciousness is due to the samanvaya (combination, aggregation of conditions) and not the manas-pratyaya (condition of mind-consciousness). What does this have to do with the five consciousnesses? If so, why does the verse mention the five consciousnesses? Answer: Although the five consciousnesses also have dharmas, they are also called sthāpita (established). Therefore, as the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says: 'What is established? There are two kinds, namely svabhāva (self-nature, inherent nature) and viśeṣa (distinction, difference).' The nyāya-dvāra (gate of reasoning) also says: 'Only because of the dharma (thing, phenomenon) can the dharma be accomplished.' In this way, it can be established in the dharmin. Question: Saying 'suppose' in the dharma indicates that it is not a real permission. For example, supposing there are five objects of perception (pañca-ālambana) on the second moon, what is the fault in principle? Why must the five consciousnesses be excluded from the dharma? Answer: If others permit it, but you violate it yourself, it can be called 'suppose'. If others originally do not permit it, how can it be called 'suppose'? In detail, observing various scriptures throughout history, there are two ways of 'supposing': one is that others permit it, but one's own school does not permit it, so the term 'suppose' is used; the other is that although neither oneself nor others permit it, in order to make a choice, one tentatively allows the other party, and the term 'suppose' is also used. For example, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) supposes the meaning of the Sautrāntika (Sūtra School) that rūpa (matter, form) and citta (mind, consciousness) are mutually anantara-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition), as will be explained in detail below. In the analogy of the second moon, although others do not permit it to be the five objects of perception, in order to choose the conditions, tentatively allowing it to be the object of perception, what is the fault in principle? It is the same as the example in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. If according to this principle, then the verse saying that the five consciousnesses exist in the dharma should also be correct. It should be considered more carefully.
Commentary: 'Also not dharma-nature, etc.', nature refers to śarīra (body, substance). Because there is no substance, it is called non-dharma-nature.
Commentary: 'The meaning requires addition and subtraction', or some commentaries explain: 'No addition or subtraction is needed.' Briefly divided into two explanations: one explanation says: 'The meaning is', the word 'not' means 'no'. Although both viṣaya (object) and avişaya (non-object) are objects of perception, the object of perception of the mind-consciousness is not the realm of the five consciousnesses. According to the meaning, addition and subtraction should be required, not that the text is incorrect, but that addition and subtraction are required. The other explanation says: the word 'not' is correct, the statement of 'meaning' is wrong. Since the original text is correct, in the first explanation, there is no need to subtract the five words 'five consciousnesses suppose object of perception, etc.'. As long as, like the beginning, 'five' is placed in 'dharmin', there is no fault. Both explanations make sense, the latter explanation is slightly smoother.
Commentary: 'However, touch is different from long, etc.', only when earth, etc., are increased, are there names such as khara (rough), ślaksana (smooth), etc. Different from dīrgha (long), hrasva (short), etc., which can only be established by comparing each other. Question: Why are long and short included in saṃghāta (aggregate, collection) and samuccaya (accumulation, assemblage)? Answer: If speaking from mutual comparison, it is apekṣika-prajñapti (dependent designation). According to the accomplishment of multiple dharmas, it is called rāśi-prajñapti (aggregate designation). The two are not contradictory.
Commentary: 'Like life, etc.', the mahā-sampradāya (major tradition, great lineage) believes that the jīvitendriya (faculty of life, life-force) is prajñapti-sat (provisionally existent, nominally true).
。意所緣緣。證自五識緣識內假。
疏。五識上無彼極微相如眼根者。問因言五識無極微相。喻上眼識無彼根相。根與極微二既不同。云何能立於喻得轉 答準所緣論。因中但云于眼識上無彼相故省極微言。即無過矣。以根等喻五識亦無彼之相故。
疏。若彼救言至準量亦爾者。詳曰。亦可以量難微隱相 量云。未和合時。和合之相亦應顯現。體即和合之極微故。如已合時。
疏。雖有多相等者。如一色上有苦．無常及愛．非愛乃至微圓一切等相故名為多。五識唯緣色等自相言一分也。
論。有執色等為此所緣等者。眾賢師義具如疏明。又正理論云。色等極微散未合時。同毗婆沙及經部師非五識境。以識上無極微相故。多微聚集展轉相望。一一極微有粗相生。方眼等識所緣之境。且如七微共聚相資。各各有一粗相而生量等七微。然此粗相唯現在有。雖是質礙互相涉入。如經部者所造之色。又與能生因細極微必得同處。如經部者能造所造互相涉入。故緣粗相必緣極微。以同處故。然和合相雖說生言。非異能生別有體性。但本極微無有粗相。今和集已。體雖不改相轉成粗。故說生言。非如本計多微共聚共成一相。
疏。問眼緣心土至何理不齊者。此難意云。如緣自相。為更變相方乃緣之。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意所緣緣（Yi Suo Yuan Yuan）：意識所緣的條件。證自五識緣識內假：證明前五識所緣的，是識內的假象。
疏：五識上無彼極微相如眼根者：疏文中說，前五識上沒有像眼根那樣的極微細小的相狀。問因言五識無極微相。喻上眼識無彼根相：提問者說，因為五識沒有極微的相狀，所以比喻說眼識沒有眼根的相狀。根與極微二既不同。云何能立於喻得轉：眼根和極微這二者既然不同，怎麼能成立這個比喻並得以推論呢？答準所緣論。因中但云于眼識上無彼相故省極微言。即無過矣：回答說，依據《所緣論》，原因在於只說眼識上沒有那樣的相狀，所以省略了『極微』二字，這樣就沒有過失了。以根等喻五識亦無彼之相故：因為用眼根等來比喻，說明前五識也沒有那樣的相狀。
疏：若彼救言至準量亦爾者：疏文中說，如果對方辯解說，依據量論也是如此。詳曰。亦可以量難微隱相：詳細地說，也可以用量論來詰難極微的隱蔽相。量云。未和合時。和合之相亦應顯現。體即和合之極微故。如已合時：量論說，在極微尚未和合的時候，和合的相狀也應該顯現出來，因為它的本體就是和合的極微，就像已經和合的時候一樣。
疏：雖有多相等者：疏文中說，即使有多種相等等。如一色上有苦．無常及愛．非愛乃至微圓一切等相故名為多：比如一個色法上，有苦、無常以及可愛、不可愛乃至微細、圓滿等等一切相狀，所以稱為多。五識唯緣色等自相言一分也：前五識只緣色法等各自的自相，只說它們的一部分。
論：有執色等為此所緣等者：論中說，有人執著色法等是前五識所緣的境。眾賢師義具如疏明：眾多賢師的觀點，詳細地在疏文中說明。又正理論云。色等極微散未合時。同毗婆沙及經部師非五識境。以識上無極微相故：另外，《正理論》中說，色法等的極微在散開未和合的時候，和毗婆沙師以及經部師的觀點相同，都不是前五識所緣的境，因為識上沒有極微的相狀。多微聚集展轉相望。一一極微有粗相生。方眼等識所緣之境：多個極微聚集，互相觀望，每一個極微都有粗大的相狀產生，這才成為眼識等所緣的境。且如七微共聚相資。各各有一粗相而生量等七微：比如七個極微共同聚集，互相資助，各自有一個粗大的相狀產生，其量等於七個極微。然此粗相唯現在有。雖是質礙互相涉入：然而這種粗大的相狀只有在現在才有，雖然是物質阻礙，互相涉入。如經部者所造之色。又與能生因細極微必得同處：就像經部師所造的色法，又與能生的因，也就是細小的極微必定在同一個地方。如經部者能造所造互相涉入。故緣粗相必緣極微。以同處故：就像經部師所說的能造和所造互相涉入，所以緣粗大的相狀必定緣極微，因為它們在同一個地方。然和合相雖說生言。非異能生別有體性。但本極微無有粗相。今和集已。體雖不改相轉成粗。故說生言：然而和合的相狀雖然說是產生，但並非與能生者不同，另有體性。只是原本極微沒有粗大的相狀，現在和集之後，本體雖然沒有改變，相狀卻轉變成粗大，所以說是產生。非如本計多微共聚共成一相：並非像原先所認為的那樣，多個極微共同聚集，共同形成一個相狀。
疏：問眼緣心土至何理不齊者：疏文中說，提問者問，眼識緣心識的境，到什麼道理上不一致呢？此難意云。如緣自相。為更變相方乃緣之：這個提問的意思是說，比如緣各自的自相，難道要改變相狀才能緣嗎？
【English Translation】 English version: Yi Suo Yuan Yuan (意所緣緣): The conditions that the consciousness relies on. Zheng Zi Wu Shi Yuan Shi Nei Jia (證自五識緣識內假): Proving that what the first five consciousnesses perceive are internal illusions within the consciousness.
Commentary: Wu Shi Shang Wu Bi Ji Wei Xiang Ru Yan Gen Zhe (五識上無彼極微相如眼根者): The commentary states that the first five consciousnesses do not have extremely subtle appearances like the eye-faculty. Question: Because it is said that the five consciousnesses do not have extremely subtle appearances, it is compared to the eye-consciousness not having the appearance of the eye-faculty. Since the faculty and the extremely subtle are different, how can this analogy be established and inferred? Answer: According to the 'Treatise on Objects of Cognition,' the reason is that it is only said that the eye-consciousness does not have that appearance, so the words 'extremely subtle' are omitted, and thus there is no fault. Because the five consciousnesses also do not have that appearance, it is compared to the eye-faculty, etc.
Commentary: Ruo Bi Jiu Yan Zhi Zhun Liang Yi Er Zhe (若彼救言至準量亦爾者): The commentary states that if the other party argues that it is also the same according to the 'Treatise on Measurement.' Detailed explanation: The subtle and hidden appearances can also be questioned using measurement. Measurement states: When they are not yet combined, the appearance of combination should also appear, because its substance is the combined extremely subtle, just like when they are already combined.
Commentary: Sui You Duo Xiang Deng Zhe (雖有多相等者): The commentary states that even if there are many appearances, etc. For example, on one form, there are suffering, impermanence, and lovable, unlovable, and even subtle, complete, etc., all appearances, so it is called many. The five consciousnesses only perceive the self-characteristics of form, etc., and only speak of a portion of them.
Treatise: You Zhi Se Deng Wei Ci Suo Yuan Deng Zhe (有執色等爲此所緣等者): The treatise states that some hold that form, etc., are the objects perceived by the first five consciousnesses. The meanings of the many virtuous teachers are explained in detail in the commentary. Also, the 'Treatise on Right Reason' states that when the extremely subtle particles of form, etc., are scattered and not combined, they are not the objects of the five consciousnesses, like the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika schools, because the consciousness does not have the appearance of extremely subtle particles. When many subtle particles gather and look at each other, each extremely subtle particle has a coarse appearance, and then it becomes the object perceived by the eye-consciousness, etc. For example, when seven subtle particles gather together and support each other, each has a coarse appearance, and its quantity is equal to seven subtle particles. However, this coarse appearance only exists in the present. Although they are material obstacles and interpenetrate each other, like the form created by the Sautrantika school, it must also be in the same place as the subtle extremely subtle particles that are the cause of its production. Like the creator and the created interpenetrating each other according to the Sautrantika school, therefore, perceiving the coarse appearance necessarily perceives the extremely subtle particles, because they are in the same place. However, although the appearance of combination is said to arise, it is not different from the producer and has a separate substance. It is just that the original extremely subtle particles did not have a coarse appearance, but now after combining, although the substance has not changed, the appearance has changed to coarse, so it is said to arise. It is not like the original view that many subtle particles gather together and form one appearance together.
Commentary: Wen Yan Yuan Xin Tu Zhi He Li Bu Qi Zhe (問眼緣心土至何理不齊者): The commentary states that the questioner asks, 'What principle is inconsistent with the eye-consciousness perceiving the realm of the mind-consciousness?' The meaning of this question is: For example, when perceiving their respective self-characteristics, is it necessary to change the appearance in order to perceive it?
為更不變即能緣也。若不變者便同正量。正量緣境不變相故。有部緣微亦無相故。余準可知。
論。然識變時頓現一相等者。問何故大色不合微成而頓變耶 答無實極微能生粗色。所以頓變。不以微成。故瑜伽論第三云。於色聚中曾無極微。若從自種生時唯聚集生。或細．或中．或大。又非極微整合色聚。故知粗色而但頓變。
疏。形量大者體是實有者。問瓶等頓變亦非微成。何故名假 答傳有兩釋 一云瓶．盆等相雖識頓變。然唯是形。故說名假。今說所緣識頓變者。意顯色故。故實非假。言一相者理實是形。今以形色標於色相。必無有違 二云瓶等頓變但四境相。故四境實說為瓶等故名為假。后說為勝。
疏。后如悔等者。悔體雖有癡增名悔。待于無癡說癡為悔。
疏。非如青等相待仍實者。青對黃等而得青名。然不得說青名為黃。如短待長。非但不得名之為長。必復不得定名為短。所以不同青等顯色。
疏。無別緣假者。要兼實緣。無能離實而別緣假。
疏。唯意得之者。意識能得彼別假也。
疏。名緣假者。但言緣假。五識必能緣彼依青分位假故。
疏。然依他至所折色說者。而言此微為依他者。但依所折色體說也。微體實無非依他也。
疏。由五
緣故佛說極微者。按彼論云。建立極微有五勝利。謂由分折一合聚色安立方便。于所緣境便能清凈廣大修習。是初勝利。又能漸斷薩迦耶見。是第二利。如能漸斷薩迦耶見。如是必能漸斷憍慢。是第三利。又能漸伏諸煩惱纏。是第四利。又能速疾除遣諸相。是第五利 釋。第一破常而證無常。二知無常不計我等。三既無我。我俱憍慢必能斷滅。四斷見慢已於彼境界伏惑不起。五由伏惑故不取相能除法執 或五勝利即三解脫。初之二種空解脫門。第三．第四無愿解脫。第五一種即無相門。行相易準。
疏。更無細分者。按彼論第三云。然色聚有分非極微。何以故。由極微即是分。此是聚色所有。非極微復有餘極微。是故極微非有分也。
疏。非肉天眼境等者。問何所以者。答按彼論云。以彼天眼唯取聚色中表上下前後兩邊若明若闇。必不能取極微處所。由極微體以惠分析而建立故。論標天眼肉眼類知。故不別釋。即餘三眼皆緣極微 問惠．法二眼以何為體能觀極微 答以慧為體。然本．后智分為兩釋。一云二眼皆后得智。惠眼觀空。法眼觀有。或二種眼通觀空．有。若爾空者云何緣微。答緣極微空空智得緣 二云惠眼觀如即根本智。法眼觀空即后得智。若爾惠眼云何緣微。答緣極微如名緣極微 詳曰。今依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 佛陀解釋極微的原因。根據相關論著，建立極微有五種殊勝利益。第一，通過分析、組合聚集的色法，便於安立，對於所緣境能夠清凈廣大地修習，這是最初的殊勝利益。第二，能夠逐漸斷除薩迦耶見（身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是『我』的錯誤見解），這是第二種利益。如果能夠逐漸斷除薩迦耶見，那麼必定能夠逐漸斷除憍慢（驕傲自滿），這是第三種利益。又能逐漸降伏各種煩惱纏縛，這是第四種利益。又能迅速去除各種表相，這是第五種利益。 解釋：第一，破除常的觀念，從而證明無常。第二，瞭解無常，就不會執著于『我』等觀念。第三，既然沒有『我』，與『我』相關的憍慢必定能夠斷滅。第四，斷除邪見和慢心后，對於相應的境界，煩惱就不會生起。第五，由於降伏了煩惱，就不會執著于表相，能夠去除法執（對佛法的執著）。 或者說，這五種殊勝利益實際上就是三種解脫門。最初的兩種利益對應空解脫門。第三和第四種利益對應無愿解脫門。第五種利益對應無相解脫門。修行的過程可以依此推斷。
疏解：『更無細分者』。根據相關論著第三卷的說法，色聚（物質的集合）是有部分的，但極微不是。為什麼呢？因為極微本身就是最小的單位。這是聚集的色法所具有的，而不是極微還有其他的極微組成。因此，極微是不可再分的。
疏解：『非肉天眼境等者』。問：為什麼呢？答：根據相關論著，因為天眼只能觀察到聚集的色法中表現出來的上下前後兩邊，無論是明亮還是黑暗，必定不能觀察到極微的處所。因為極微的本體是通過智慧分析而建立的。論中提到天眼和肉眼，可以依此類推。因此不再分別解釋。其餘三種眼都能觀察到極微。問：慧眼和法眼以什麼為本體能夠觀察極微？答：以智慧為本體。然而，根本智和后得智有兩種解釋。一種說法是，這兩種眼都是后得智。慧眼觀察空性，法眼觀察有。或者說，這兩種眼都能觀察空性和有。如果是這樣，那麼空性如何緣于極微呢？答：通過緣極微的空性，空智才能緣到。另一種說法是，慧眼觀察如，即根本智。法眼觀察空性，即后得智。如果是這樣，那麼慧眼如何緣于極微呢？答：緣極微的如，名為緣極微。 詳細地說，現在依據...
【English Translation】 English version: The reason why the Buddha spoke of atoms (極微, jí wēi). According to the relevant treatises, establishing atoms has five excellent benefits. First, through the analysis and combination of aggregated forms (色法, sè fǎ), it facilitates establishment, enabling pure and extensive practice on the object of focus. This is the initial excellent benefit. Second, it can gradually eliminate the view of self (薩迦耶見, sà jiā yè jiàn, also known as 身見, shēn jiàn, the false view that the body, a combination of the five aggregates, is 'I'). This is the second benefit. If one can gradually eliminate the view of self, then one will surely be able to gradually eliminate arrogance (憍慢, jiāo màn). This is the third benefit. Furthermore, it can gradually subdue various afflictions and entanglements. This is the fourth benefit. And it can quickly remove various appearances. This is the fifth benefit. Explanation: First, it refutes the notion of permanence, thereby proving impermanence. Second, understanding impermanence, one will not cling to notions of 'self' and so on. Third, since there is no 'self,' arrogance related to 'self' will surely be extinguished. Fourth, having eliminated wrong views and pride, afflictions will not arise in relation to the corresponding realm. Fifth, because afflictions are subdued, one will not cling to appearances and can remove attachment to the Dharma (法執, fǎ zhí, clinging to Buddhist teachings). Alternatively, these five excellent benefits are actually the three doors to liberation. The first two benefits correspond to the door of emptiness (空解脫門, kōng jiě tuō mén). The third and fourth benefits correspond to the door of wishlessness (無愿解脫門, wú yuàn jiě tuō mén). The fifth benefit corresponds to the door of signlessness (無相門, wú xiàng mén). The process of practice can be inferred accordingly.
Commentary: 'There is no finer division.' According to the third volume of the relevant treatises, aggregates of form (色聚, sè jù, collections of matter) have parts, but atoms do not. Why? Because the atom itself is the smallest unit. This is what aggregated forms possess, but it is not that an atom is composed of other atoms. Therefore, atoms are indivisible.
Commentary: 'Not the realm of the physical eye or heavenly eye, etc.' Question: Why is that? Answer: According to the relevant treatises, because the heavenly eye can only observe the upper, lower, front, and back sides manifested in aggregated forms, whether bright or dark, it certainly cannot observe the location of atoms. Because the essence of atoms is established through analysis by wisdom. The treatise mentions the heavenly eye and physical eye, and one can infer accordingly. Therefore, it is not explained separately. The remaining three eyes can all observe atoms. Question: What is the basis for the wisdom eye (慧眼, huì yǎn) and Dharma eye (法眼, fǎ yǎn) to be able to observe atoms? Answer: Wisdom is the basis. However, there are two explanations for fundamental wisdom (根本智, gēn běn zhì) and subsequent wisdom (后得智, hòu dé zhì). One explanation is that both eyes are subsequent wisdom. The wisdom eye observes emptiness, and the Dharma eye observes existence. Or, both types of eyes can observe emptiness and existence. If that is the case, then how does emptiness relate to atoms? Answer: Through emptiness related to atoms, empty wisdom can relate to it. Another explanation is that the wisdom eye observes suchness (如, rú), which is fundamental wisdom. The Dharma eye observes emptiness, which is subsequent wisdom. If that is the case, then how does the wisdom eye relate to atoms? Answer: Relating to the suchness of atoms is called relating to atoms. In detail, now according to...
后解。有所憑故。對法論云。真如唯是聖惠眼境。故知惠眼而緣真如 問佛眼體何 答有二義。一云因別法．惠。果總佛眼。故智度論云。猶如四河而至大池總名為海。二云無分別惠以為其體。與惠．法眼體有別故。或以大悲名為佛眼 詳曰。前解為本。智度論文自明解故。后釋大悲義亦局故 問按智度論四眼至佛總名佛眼。云何極微非肉天境 答為二釋。一云雖至佛位亦能緣微。因位不爾。不同惠．法因果皆能以微為境。二云而言佛眼能緣者。但取一分慧為性者。肉．天至佛雖名佛眼。以體非惠故不緣微。后釋為勝 問大乘極微豈無本質 答聖教既云以假想惠分折建立。何有本質 有義極微有二。一者本性。二影像相。言本性者佛．大菩薩以神通力折彼大地而為極微故名本性。問瑜伽等論但說惠折以為極微。此即影像。何有本質。答對敵申宗略故不說。稍同外故。故順正理三十二云。極微有二。一實。二假。實謂極成色等自相。于和集位現量所得。假由分折比量所知。恐濫有宗故但說假。理實大乘亦有二也。而言聚色無極微者。亦準此知。豈于自宗無細礙色。又大乘中非由散微整合聚色。說聚色無。折聚成微義不違也。又菩薩等作水等觀。變于本質根．塵等類。皆為水．火．金．銀．蘇等 何獨微觀不能變彼本質成
微。若許成微云何不許有微本質。問既有本質云何名假。答且本質微第八所變。非識外故不同余宗。故說名假。然有質礙故說為實。本質極微異熟相故不熏成種。其影像微非如本質有質礙用故說為假。作所緣緣生眼識故說為實有。影像相微熏成種子。不爾後識無影像故。問於色等處何處所收。答質．影二微唯法處收。唯意境故。又與影像同一種故。質十處收。影必應爾 詳曰。仰觀所斷理則富矣教鮮證焉。今據大宗粗申皁白。本性微略有五失 一義無憑失。大法王御宇迷者目決于金言。上士韜光惑者斷疑于玉牒。玉牒攸載可頂載奉持。出自人情固躊躇叵據。今所立義聖教迥無。欲令學者何憑信入 二違聖教失。按瑜伽五十四云。問何故極微無生無滅。答由諸聚色最初生時全分而生。最後滅時不至極微位中間盡滅。猶如水滴。復由五相應知名不如理思議極微。謂於色聚中有極微自性而住。或有生滅。或謂極微與極微或合或散。或謂眾色極微積集。或謂極微能生別異眾多聚色。又顯揚十八云。謂諸極微但假想立。自體實無。若言有微。豈不違上諸聖教耶。若言前教據無散微成聚色等名無極微。不障折粗所成微者。此非善救。折粗之微即最後滅。何非有滅。此所折微后合成粗。何不名生。豈所折微永不合耶。又聚色中即有二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 微。如果允許有極微，為什麼不允許有極微的本質呢？問：既然有本質，為什麼又說是假立的呢？答：且本質極微是第八識（阿賴耶識）所變現的，不是在識之外，所以不同於其他宗派的觀點，因此說它是假立的。然而，因為它有質礙，所以說是真實的。本質極微是異熟果相，所以不能熏習成種子。它的影像極微不像本質極微那樣有質礙作用，所以說是假立的。作為所緣緣而生起眼識，所以說是實有的。影像相微能夠熏習成種子，否則，後來的識就沒有影像了。問：在色等處所中，它屬於哪裡所攝？答：質微和影微都只屬於法處所攝，因為它們只是意境。又因為它們與影像屬於同一種類。質微屬於十處所攝，影微也必定如此。詳細地說，仰望所斷的道理就豐富了，但教證卻很少。現在根據大宗的觀點，粗略地說明黑白。本性極微略有五種過失：一、義無憑據的過失。大法王統治天下，迷惑的人依靠金言來決斷。上士韜光養晦，迷惑的人依靠玉牒來斷疑。玉牒所記載的可以頂戴奉持，出自人情就猶豫不決，難以依據。現在所立的義理，聖教中完全沒有，想讓學者憑什麼相信並進入呢？二、違背聖教的過失。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷所說：『問：為什麼極微沒有生滅？答：由於各種聚集的色法最初產生時是全分而生，最後滅亡時不會到極微的階段，在中間就滅亡了，就像水滴一樣。』又由於五種相應的知，知道不如理思議極微。即認為在色聚中有極微的自性而住，或者有生滅，或者認為極微與極微或者結合或者分散，或者認為眾多色法是極微積聚而成，或者認為極微能生出別異的眾多聚色。又《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷說：『所謂的極微，只是假想安立的，自體實際上沒有。』如果說有極微，豈不是違背了上述的各種聖教嗎？如果說前面的教義是根據沒有散微而成聚色等，所以才說沒有極微，不障礙折斷粗色所成的極微，這不是好的辯解。折斷粗色所成的極微就是最後滅亡的，為什麼沒有滅亡呢？這種折斷的極微後來又合成粗色，為什麼不叫生呢？難道這種折斷的極微永遠不會再結合了嗎？又聚色中就有兩種極微。
【English Translation】 English version Microscopic. If the existence of ultimate particles (微, wei) is accepted, why not accept the existence of the essence of ultimate particles? Question: Since there is essence, why is it called provisional (假, jia)? Answer: The essential ultimate particle is transformed by the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālaya-vijñāna). It is not outside of consciousness, so it is different from the views of other schools, hence it is said to be provisional. However, because it has substance and obstruction, it is said to be real. The essential ultimate particle is a result of different maturation (異熟, vipāka), so it does not generate seeds (種, bīja). The image ultimate particle does not have the substance and obstruction like the essential ultimate particle, so it is said to be provisional. It arises as the object-condition (所緣緣, ālambana-pratyaya) for eye-consciousness, so it is said to be truly existent. The image-aspect ultimate particle can generate seeds, otherwise, later consciousnesses would not have images. Question: In which of the sense bases (處, āyatana) such as form (色, rūpa) is it included? Answer: The substantial and image ultimate particles are only included in the dharma-base (法處, dharma-āyatana), because they are only mental objects. Also, because they are of the same kind as images. The substantial particle is included in the ten bases (十處, daśa-āyatana), and the image particle must also be. In detail, looking up to the principles to be abandoned is rich, but the scriptural proofs are few. Now, based on the views of the major school, I will roughly explain the right and wrong. The essential nature ultimate particle has roughly five faults: First, the fault of lacking evidence. The Great Dharma King (大法王, Mahādharma-rāja) rules the world, and the confused rely on golden words to make decisions. The superior person hides his light, and the confused rely on jade tablets to resolve doubts. What is recorded in the jade tablets can be respectfully upheld, but what comes from human feelings is hesitant and difficult to rely on. The doctrine now established has no basis in the sacred teachings, so how can scholars believe and enter into it? Second, the fault of contradicting the sacred teachings. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) volume 54: 'Question: Why do ultimate particles have no birth and death? Answer: Because when various aggregates of form (色聚, rūpa-skandha) first arise, they arise as a whole, and when they finally perish, they do not reach the stage of ultimate particles, but perish in the middle, like a drop of water.' Also, due to the five corresponding knowledges, one knows that it is not reasonable to think about ultimate particles. That is, to think that there is a self-nature of ultimate particles residing in the aggregate of form, or that there is birth and death, or that ultimate particles combine or disperse with each other, or that many forms are accumulated from ultimate particles, or that ultimate particles can produce different and numerous aggregates of form. Also, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論) volume 18 says: 'The so-called ultimate particles are only provisionally established, and there is actually no self-nature.' If you say there are ultimate particles, wouldn't that contradict the above sacred teachings? If you say that the previous teachings are based on the fact that there are no scattered ultimate particles forming aggregates of form, so it is said that there are no ultimate particles, and it does not hinder the ultimate particles formed by breaking down coarse forms, then this is not a good defense. The ultimate particles formed by breaking down coarse forms are the last to perish, so why is there no perishing? These broken ultimate particles later combine to form coarse forms, so why is it not called birth? Could it be that these broken ultimate particles will never combine again? Also, there are two kinds of ultimate particles in the aggregate of form.
分。大聖所折極微自性又所折微。更互相望亦有合散。色聚亦有微量積集。亦得名為別生眾聚。何意瑜伽總判名為無生．無滅不如理思。又所折者體既不無。諸論云何判無實體但假想立。若言諸論對敵申宗恐濫外義略不說者。亦非成救自許實微元總不說何名申宗。既許假實兩種極微。何獨說假即申宗矣。又微自許恐濫不說。三科他有必應懼濫大乘不說。若云三科同故故說。亦為不可。若據名同。極微亦爾。若約體說。小大三科體性假實種種亦異。云何名同。又本質微第八所變。非識外故。故名假者。即根．塵等第八親緣併名假。眼等五識親所緣者類亦應然。非識外故。此等不然彼云何爾。故知本無故教不說 問豈佛．菩薩不能折粗為極微耶。答亦不能折至於極微。故瑜伽云。不至極微中間盡滅猶如水滴 釋乃至神通分散聚色而滅其粗。猶粗不至極微之位。中間滅盡猶如水滴。從大至小亦不得至極微位也。所以爾者。以聚色中無極微性故。若佛．菩薩折粗成微教亦應說。教既不說無乃意乎 三縱有不熏失。設佛．菩薩折粗成微。此微菩薩六識緣不。若不緣者既自第六觀心所折。何得不緣。自在位識諸根互用。所折之微既許實色。如何不緣。若言緣者何不熏種。未果滿故。故不應言本質極微異熟相故不熏成種。若言異熟不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：大聖（指佛或高級菩薩）所分解的極微（不可再分的最小物質單位），其自性以及所分解的微粒，互相之間也有聚合和分散。色聚（物質的集合體）也有微小的量積累聚集。也可以被命名為個別產生的眾聚。為什麼瑜伽行派（唯識宗）總的判斷為無生、無滅，不如理思擇？而且所分解的物體本體並非不存在。各種論典為什麼判定為沒有實體，只是假想設立？如果說各種論典是爲了針對敵對宗派闡述自己的宗義，恐怕混淆外道的意義而略過不說，這也並非是成立救護，自己所許的真實極微根本不說，怎麼能叫闡述宗義？既然允許假和實兩種極微，為什麼只說假就是闡述宗義呢？而且極微自己允許恐怕混淆而不說，三科（五蘊、十二處、十八界）其他宗派有必定應該害怕混淆大乘不說。如果說三科相同所以才說，這也是不可以的。如果根據名稱相同，極微也是這樣。如果按照本體來說，小大三科的體性、假實種種也不同。怎麼能叫相同？而且本質微是第八識（阿賴耶識）所變現的，不是識外之物，所以名為假。那麼根（眼耳鼻舌身）、塵（色聲香味觸）等第八識親所緣的都名為假。眼等五識親所緣的類別也應該這樣，不是識外之物。這些不對，他們怎麼說呢？所以知道本來沒有，所以教義不說。 問：難道佛、菩薩不能把粗大的物體分解成極微嗎？ 答：也不能分解到極微。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『不至極微中間盡滅，猶如水滴』。 解釋：乃至神通分散聚色而滅其粗，猶粗不至極微之位。中間滅盡猶如水滴。從大至小亦不得至極微位也。所以這樣是因為聚色中沒有極微的性質。如果佛、菩薩分解粗大物體成為極微，教義也應該說。教義既然不說，難道不是這個意思嗎？ 三、縱然有不熏習而失的情況。假設佛、菩薩分解粗大物體成為極微，這個極微菩薩的六識緣取嗎？如果不緣取，既然是自己第六識（意識）觀心所分解的，怎麼能不緣取？自在位的識，諸根互相使用。所分解的微粒既然允許是實色，如何不緣取？如果說緣取，為什麼不熏習成種子？因為沒有果滿的緣故。所以不應該說本質極微是異熟相的緣故不熏習成種子。如果說異熟不……
【English Translation】 English version: Question: The ultimate minute particles (the smallest indivisible units of matter) that the great sages (referring to Buddhas or high-level Bodhisattvas) break down, their self-nature, and the minute particles that are broken down, also have aggregation and dispersion among themselves. Material aggregates (collections of matter) also have minute amounts accumulating and gathering. They can also be named individually produced aggregates. Why does the Yogacara school (Vijnanavada) generally judge them as having no birth and no extinction, not thinking reasonably? Moreover, the substance of what is broken down is not non-existent. Why do various treatises determine that they have no substance, but are merely hypothetically established? If it is said that various treatises are expounding their own doctrines to counter opposing schools, fearing confusion with the meanings of external paths and omitting them, this is not establishing protection. The real minute particles that one allows are not mentioned at all, so how can it be called expounding doctrine? Since both hypothetical and real minute particles are allowed, why is only saying the hypothetical considered expounding doctrine? Moreover, minute particles are allowed by oneself, fearing confusion and not mentioning them. The three categories (five aggregates, twelve sense bases, eighteen realms) that other schools have must fear confusion and not be mentioned by Mahayana. If it is said that the three categories are the same, so they are mentioned, this is also not acceptable. If based on the same name, minute particles are also like that. If speaking in terms of substance, the nature of the small, large, and three categories, hypothetical and real, are all different. How can they be called the same? Moreover, the essential minute particle is transformed by the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness), not something external to consciousness, so it is called hypothetical. Then the roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), dust (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), etc., which are directly perceived by the eighth consciousness, are all called hypothetical. The categories directly perceived by the five consciousnesses such as eye consciousness should also be like this, not something external to consciousness. These are not right, how do they say it? Therefore, knowing that they originally did not exist, the teachings do not say. Question: Can Buddhas and Bodhisattvas not break down coarse objects into ultimate minute particles? Answer: They also cannot break down to the ultimate minute particles. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Without reaching the ultimate minute particles, they are completely extinguished in the middle, like a drop of water.' Explanation: Even if supernatural powers disperse aggregated matter and extinguish its coarseness, the coarseness still does not reach the position of ultimate minute particles. It is completely extinguished in the middle like a drop of water. From large to small, it also cannot reach the position of ultimate minute particles. The reason for this is that there is no nature of ultimate minute particles in aggregated matter. If Buddhas and Bodhisattvas break down coarse objects into ultimate minute particles, the teachings should also say so. Since the teachings do not say so, isn't that the meaning? Three, even if there are cases of not perfuming and losing. Suppose Buddhas and Bodhisattvas break down coarse objects into ultimate minute particles, do the six consciousnesses of this Bodhisattva perceive these ultimate minute particles? If they do not perceive them, since it is one's own sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) that breaks them down through contemplation, how can they not perceive them? In the state of freedom, the consciousnesses and roots use each other. Since the minute particles that are broken down are allowed to be real matter, how can they not be perceived? If it is said that they are perceived, why are they not perfumed into seeds? Because the fruition is not complete. Therefore, it should not be said that the essential minute particles are not perfumed into seeds because of their different ripening aspects. If it is said that different ripening does not...
熏成種。不障餘六熏成種者。何乃不言。若言易知故不說者。異熟不熏誰之不悟。何即說之 四無因種同失。若質．影微皆熏成種。容可影．質二微種同。自斷影熏而質不熏。因何而得二微同種。若言質微雖無新熏。而有本有與影同種者。理亦不可。因佛．菩薩折而方立云何本有。故不可言本．影同種 五假實種同失。設質．影微共同一種。影假質實。實假不同。如何種共。若許爾者。心．色等異應皆同種。許即違教。不許違理。由斯五失立本．質微甚難依也。若影像微許熏種者過亦多種。廣如燈辨。
疏。此義雖通等者。依止名身通諸根矣。而身根勝得總身名。余立別稱。
疏。前已破錶至今更破無表者。前破對色。表亦在中而已破訖。今為外人于總色中別執表實。故更破之。破錶令無名破無表。不是破彼無表之色名破無表。
論。若言是形等者。彼以總身一分形色。而能表示自發業心。故說形色名為身表。身所造業名為自業。故成業論云。此中有說。且身表業形色為性。誰之形色。謂身形色。若身形色。何故前言身所造業故名身業。謂總名身一分攝故名身形色。依身大種而發生故名身所造。以總身言于別亦轉。此能表示自發業心令他知故。為顯此義故說頌言。由外發身．語。表內心所思。譬彼
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本\n熏習成種子。如果不阻礙其餘六個熏習成種子，為什麼不說呢？如果說容易知道所以不說，那麼異熟不熏習誰不知道？為什麼又要說呢？四、無因的種子一同喪失。如果質（實質，指實際存在的物體）和影（影子，指投射的影像）的微塵都能熏習成種子，或許可以接受影和質的兩種微塵相同。如果斷定影子能熏習而實質不能熏習，那麼憑什麼得到兩種微塵相同的種子呢？如果說實質微塵雖然沒有新的熏習，但有原本就有的，與影子相同種子的，道理也不可行。因為佛（Buddha，覺悟者）和菩薩（Bodhisattva，追求覺悟的修行者）折伏后才成立，怎麼能說原本就有呢？所以不能說本有和影子是同一種子。五、假和實的種子一同喪失。假設質和影的微塵共同是一種種子，影子是假的，實質是真的，真假不同，怎麼能是共同的種子呢？如果允許這樣，心（citta，精神，意識）和色（rūpa，物質）等不同，應該都是同一種子。允許就違背了教義，不允許就違背了道理。由於這五個過失，建立本有和質的微塵非常難以依據。如果影像的微塵允許熏習種子，過失也有很多種，詳細的論述如同燈的辨析。\n\n疏：這個意義雖然普遍，但所依止的名和身通於諸根。而身根殊勝，得到總身的名稱，其餘的則另立名稱。\n\n疏：前面已經破斥了表色，現在再次破斥無表色，是因為前面破斥的是對色，表色也包含在其中，已經破斥完畢。現在是爲了外人對總色中特別執著表色為實有，所以再次破斥它。破斥表色是爲了讓無表色沒有名稱，不是破斥那個無表色的名稱來破斥無表色。\n\n論：如果說是形等，他們以總身的一部分形色，而能表示自己發起的業心，所以說形色名為身表。身體所造的業名為自業。所以成業論說：『這裡有人說，且身表業以形色為性質，是誰的形色？是身體的形色。』如果是身體的形色，為什麼前面說身體所造的業才名為身業？因為總名為身，一部分包含在其中，所以名為身形色。依靠身體的大種而發生，所以名為身體所造。以總身來說，對於別身也適用。這能表示自己發起的業心，讓別人知道，爲了顯示這個意義，所以說了頌：『由外在發出身和語，表露內心所思，譬如……』" ], "english_translations": [ "English version\n'The perfuming to become a seed. If it doesn't obstruct the remaining six perfuming to become seeds, why isn't it mentioned? If it's said that it's easily understood so it's not mentioned, who doesn't realize that the Vipāka (result of actions) doesn't perfume? Why is it mentioned then? Four, seeds without a cause are lost together. If both the substance (the actual existing object) and the shadow (the projected image) of dust can perfume to become seeds, it might be acceptable that the two kinds of dust, shadow and substance, are the same. If it's determined that the shadow can perfume but the substance cannot, then how can the same seed for both kinds of dust be obtained? If it's said that although the substance dust doesn't have new perfuming, it has an original one that is the same seed as the shadow, the reasoning is also not feasible. Because it is established after being subdued by Buddhas (Buddha, the awakened one) and Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva, practitioners who pursue enlightenment), how can it be said to be originally existent? Therefore, it cannot be said that the original and the shadow are the same seed. Five, the false and the real seeds are lost together. Suppose the dust of substance and shadow are together one kind of seed, the shadow is false, the substance is real, the true and false are different, how can they be a common seed? If this is allowed, then mind (citta, spirit, consciousness) and form (rūpa, matter) and other differences should all be the same seed. Allowing this would violate the teachings, not allowing it would violate reason. Due to these five faults, establishing the original and the substance dust is very difficult to rely on. If the dust of the image is allowed to perfume seeds, there are also many kinds of faults, the detailed discussion is like the analysis of the lamp.'\n\nCommentary: 'Although this meaning is universal, the name and body that it relies on are common to all roots. But the body root is superior and gets the name of the total body, the rest are given separate names.'\n\nCommentary: 'The reason why the manifested form has already been refuted before, but now the unmanifested form is refuted again, is because what was refuted before was the visible form, and the manifested form was also included in it, and has already been refuted. Now it is because outsiders particularly cling to the manifested form as real among all forms, so it is refuted again. Refuting the manifested form is to make the unmanifested form have no name, it is not refuting the name of that unmanifested form to refute the unmanifested form.'\n\nTreatise: 'If it is said to be shape, etc., they use a part of the shape and color of the total body to express the mind of the action they initiated, so they say that shape and color are called body expression. The karma created by the body is called self-karma. Therefore, the Treatise on the Accomplishment of Karma says: \'Here some say that the karma of body expression is characterized by shape and color, whose shape and color? The shape and color of the body.\' If it is the shape and color of the body, why did it say earlier that the karma created by the body is called body karma? Because the general name is body, and a part is included in it, so it is called the shape and color of the body. It arises relying on the great elements of the body, so it is called created by the body. Speaking of the total body also applies to the separate body. This can express the mind of the action they initiated, letting others know, to show this meaning, so it says in the verse: \'From the external expression of body and speech, the thoughts in the mind are revealed, like...'\n" ] }
潛淵魚。鼓波而自表。形色者何。謂長等性。何者長等。謂于彼生長等名想。此色處攝。
論。若言是動等者。動謂行動。行動即是色處所攝。故成業論云。有說身錶行動為性。何名行動。謂轉至余方。此攝在何處。謂色處攝。何緣知此轉至余方。謂差別相不可知故 釋曰。既差別相而故知有動至余方也。俱舍亦云。動名身表。以身動時由業動故。
疏雖彼自宗至無不定過者。詳曰。或可因中以言簡之。應云除色．心等是有為故。或色．心等攝入宗中。皆無不定。雖本破動。為遮不定兼破色．心令剎那滅。違他順己亦無過矣。
疏。謂滅應更生至無不定者。詳曰。住不更生。待因之因於住得轉。何理不得成不定耶。若住非滅非不定者。夫不定者唯對宗法。滅既有法。住雖非滅何廢不定。由斯住相攝入宗中。或因中簡即無過矣。
論。非顯非形等者。按成業論云。日出論者作如是言。諸行實無至余方義。有為法性唸唸滅故。然別有法心差別為因依手足等起。此法能作手足物異方生因。是名行動。亦名身表。謂色處攝。雖亦名動。然唸唸滅不至余方。與前計別。
疏。五天有五論師者。按西域傳。東天馬鳴。南天提婆。西天室利羅多。北天鳩摩羅多。中天龍樹。具如彼辨。
疏。豈
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『潛淵魚，鼓波而自表。』（潛藏在深淵裡的魚，攪動水波來顯示自己的存在。）這是在描述什麼形色呢？指的是『長等性』（長度相等）。什麼是『長等』呢？指的是對於彼（指魚）的生長等狀態的名相概念。這些都屬於色處（Rūpa-āyatana，色界）所包含的。
論：如果說是動等（運動等）呢？動，指的是行動。行動就是色處所包含的。所以成業論（Abhidharmakosa-bhasya，俱舍論的註釋）說：『有人說，身體的表相，以行動為特性。』什麼叫做行動呢？指的是轉移到其他地方。這包含在什麼地方呢？包含在色處中。憑什麼知道這是轉移到其他地方呢？因為差別相（distinguishing characteristics）無法得知的緣故。
釋曰：既然差別相無法得知，所以就知道有運動到其他地方。俱舍論（Abhidharmakosa，阿毗達磨俱舍論）也說：『動，名為身表。』因為身體動的時候，是由業（karma）的推動所致。
疏：雖然他們自己的宗派（指唯識宗）…直到沒有不定的過失。詳細地說，或許可以在因（hetu，原因）中用簡略的語言來表達。應該說，除了色、心等是有為法（saṃskṛta，有生滅變化的事物）的緣故。或者將色、心等攝入到宗（paksa，論題）中，都沒有不定的過失。雖然本來是爲了破斥動（運動），爲了遮止不定（anaikāntika，不確定性），兼帶破斥色、心，使之剎那滅（ksanika，瞬間消逝），即使違揹他人，順從自己，也沒有過失。
疏：所謂滅（nirodha，消滅）應該更生…直到沒有不定的過失。詳細地說，住（sthiti，持續）不更生，等待因的因，對於住的狀態得以轉變。有什麼道理不能成立不定呢？如果住不是滅，也不是不定，那麼不定只是針對宗法（pakṣa-dharma，論題的性質）。滅既然有法（dharma，事物），住即使不是滅，又有什麼妨礙不定呢？因此，住相（sthiti-laksana，持續相）攝入到宗中，或者在因中進行簡化，就沒有過失了。
論：非顯非形等。按照成業論所說：日出論者（Suryodayavadins）這樣說：諸行（samskara，一切有為法）實際上沒有到其他地方的意義。因為有為法的性質是念念滅（ksanika，剎那生滅）的緣故。然而，另外有一種法，以心的差別為原因，依靠手足等而生起。這種法能夠作為手足等物在不同地方生起的原因。這叫做行動，也叫做身表，屬於色處所包含的。雖然也叫做動，但是念念滅，不會到其他地方，與之前的說法不同。
疏：五天（Panca-deśa，古印度分為東、南、西、北、中五個區域）有五位論師。按照西域記（大唐西域記）所說：東天是馬鳴（Asvaghosa），南天是提婆（Aryadeva），西天是室利羅多（Sri-lata），北天是鳩摩羅多（Kumaralata），中天是龍樹（Nagarjuna）。具體情況如彼處所辨析。
疏：難道……
【English Translation】 English version: 'A fish lurking in the deep reveals itself by stirring the waves.' What form and color is being described here? It refers to 'equality of length' (dīrghādi-samatā). What is 'equality of length'? It refers to the conceptual designation of the growth and other states of that (the fish). These are included within the Rūpa-āyatana (sphere of form).
Treatise: If it is said to be movement, etc.? Movement refers to action. Action is included within the Rūpa-āyatana. Therefore, the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya (commentary on the Abhidharmakosa) says: 'Some say that the appearance of the body has action as its characteristic.' What is called action? It refers to moving to another place. Where is this included? It is included in the Rūpa-āyatana. How is it known that this is moving to another place? Because the distinguishing characteristics are unknowable.
Explanation: Since the distinguishing characteristics are unknowable, it is known that there is movement to another place. The Abhidharmakosa also says: 'Movement is called bodily expression.' Because when the body moves, it is caused by the movement of karma.
Commentary: Although their own school (referring to the Yogacara school)... until there is no fault of being indefinite. In detail, perhaps it can be simplified in the cause (hetu). It should be said that, except for form, mind, etc., which are conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta), there is no fault of being indefinite. Or, if form, mind, etc., are included in the thesis (paksa), there is no fault of being indefinite. Although the original purpose was to refute movement, in order to prevent indefiniteness, it also refutes form and mind, causing them to be momentary (ksanika). Even if it contradicts others and agrees with oneself, there is no fault.
Commentary: The so-called cessation (nirodha) should give rise to further... until there is no fault of being indefinite. In detail, duration (sthiti) does not give rise to further. Waiting for the cause of the cause, the state of duration can be transformed. What reason is there that it cannot establish indefiniteness? If duration is neither cessation nor indefinite, then indefiniteness is only directed at the property of the thesis (pakṣa-dharma). Since cessation has a dharma (thing), even if duration is not cessation, what prevents indefiniteness? Therefore, the characteristic of duration (sthiti-laksana) is included in the thesis, or if it is simplified in the cause, there is no fault.
Treatise: Neither manifest nor formed, etc. According to the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, the Suryodayavadins (those who advocate the arising of the sun) say: 'The samskaras (conditioned phenomena) actually have no meaning of going to another place. Because the nature of conditioned phenomena is momentary (ksanika).' However, there is another dharma, which arises due to the difference of mind, relying on hands, feet, etc. This dharma can be the cause of the arising of things like hands and feet in different places. This is called action, also called bodily expression, which belongs to the Rūpa-āyatana. Although it is also called movement, it is momentary and does not go to another place, which is different from the previous statement.
Commentary: The five regions of India (Panca-deśa, ancient India was divided into five regions: East, South, West, North, and Central) have five teachers. According to the Records of the Western Regions (Da Tang Xiyu Ji), Asvaghosa (馬鳴) was in the East, Aryadeva (提婆) was in the South, Sri-lata (室利羅多) was in the West, Kumaralata (鳩摩羅多) was in the North, and Nagarjuna (龍樹) was in the Central region. The details are as described there.
Commentary: Could it be that...
以顯等為表知者。見佛相好色身生敬。此所見色但名顯色。無表示故。觸等準知。
疏。或復語等者。問前解何別 答前釋但言語能表了。而不分別。后解分別。由其語聲有假名等而有表也。
疏。識變簡經部等者。問身．語二表經部．有宗俱非識變。何故身表而言識變即簡有宗。語表識變即簡經部 答經部執有動為身表。真．似相對似簡真動。有宗不然。故識變簡。有宗粗實故聲是實。所以似簡。經部不然。但識變簡。各據一義亦不相違。
疏。謂身勇身精進者。勇謂策勵。精進謂勤。由二在內不示他故名為無表。
疏。心勇等者。此心勇等者心所所攝。今明於色故不取也。文同表矣。
論。然依思愿等者。有義定道亦依誓願所起思立。謂將起彼定道惑時愿云。我當許時入定。由此便能引起勝思遮于惡色假名無表。又約自性言但依思。若通眷屬。即依俱行心．心所立。義亦無違。能遮惡惑通相應故。如二定體眷屬而言。依二十二心等種立。若自性者但依能厭惠種上立。今此必爾。聖說依思業自性故 詳曰。入定起愿。但為出定時分限也。不緣于惑而方發願。與別解脫愿有別也。不可為例。又彼眷屬通依余立。有理無教。理亦難據。何所以者。若以二定依多種立例惑同者。別解脫惑理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以顯色等作為能被認知的事物。見到佛的相好莊嚴的色身而生起敬意。這裡所見到的顏色，僅僅稱為顯色（可見的顏色），因為它沒有表示作用。觸等其他的法，可以依此類推得知。
疏：『或復語等者』，問：這與前面的解釋有什麼區別？答：前面的解釋只是說語言能夠表達意義，但沒有進行詳細的區分。後面的解釋則進行了區分，因為語言的聲音具有假名等特性，因此具有表達作用。
疏：『識變簡經部等者』，問：身表和語表，經部（經量部）和有宗（有部宗）都認為不是識所變現的，為什麼說身表是識變就簡別了有宗，而語表是識變就簡別了經部？答：經部認為有動作為身表，真動和似動相對，似動就簡別了真動。有宗不是這樣認為的，所以說識變簡別了有宗。有宗認為聲音是粗實的，所以似聲就簡別了真聲。經部不是這樣認為的，所以只是識變簡別了經部。各自依據一個角度來說，並不互相矛盾。
疏：『謂身勇身精進者』，勇，指的是策勵；精進，指的是勤奮。因為這兩種力量在內心，沒有向外顯示給他人，所以稱為無表（無表色）。
疏：『心勇等者』，這裡的心勇等屬於心所法所攝。現在討論的是色法，所以不取心勇等。文義與身表相同。
論：『然依思愿等者』，有一種觀點認為，定道也是依據誓願所產生的思而建立的。也就是說，在將要生起彼定道惑的時候，發願說：『我應當在某個時候入定。』由此就能引起殊勝的思，遮止惡色假名無表。如果從自性的角度來說，僅僅是依據思。如果從眷屬的角度來說，就是依據俱行的心和心所而建立。義理上也沒有矛盾，因為能夠遮止惡惑，並且與（心和心所）相應。例如，二定的本體和眷屬來說，是依據二十二種心等種子而建立的。如果從自性的角度來說，僅僅是依據能夠厭患的智慧種子而建立。現在這裡一定是這樣，聖者說的是依據思業的自性。詳曰：入定前發願，只是爲了出定的時候確定時間界限。不是因為緣于惑而才發願，這與別解脫戒的愿不同，不能作為例子。而且，彼（二定）的眷屬可以依據其他的法而建立，有道理但沒有教證。道理上也難以依據。為什麼這樣說呢？如果以二定依據多種種子而建立為例，認為惑也一樣，那麼別解脫惑的道理
【English Translation】 English version: 'Taking manifest forms (顯色, xiǎn sè) etc. as objects of cognition.' Seeing the auspicious and beautiful form-body of the Buddha generates reverence. The color seen here is only called 'manifest form' (visible color), because it has no expressive function. Touch and other dharmas can be understood by analogy.
Commentary: 'Or again, speech etc.' Question: What is the difference between this and the previous explanation? Answer: The previous explanation only said that language can express meaning, but did not make detailed distinctions. The latter explanation makes distinctions, because the sound of language has characteristics such as provisional names (假名, jiǎ míng), and therefore has an expressive function.
Commentary: 'Consciousness-only transformation distinguishes Sautrāntika etc.' Question: Both body-expression and speech-expression are not considered transformations of consciousness by both the Sautrāntika (經部, Jīng bù) and Sarvāstivāda (有宗, Yǒu zōng) schools. Why is it said that body-expression being a transformation of consciousness distinguishes Sarvāstivāda, while speech-expression being a transformation of consciousness distinguishes Sautrāntika? Answer: The Sautrāntika school considers movement as body-expression. True movement and apparent movement are relative, and apparent movement distinguishes true movement. The Sarvāstivāda school does not think this way, so it is said that consciousness-only transformation distinguishes Sarvāstivāda. The Sarvāstivāda school considers sound to be coarse and real, so apparent sound distinguishes true sound. The Sautrāntika school does not think this way, so only consciousness-only transformation distinguishes Sautrāntika. Each is based on one perspective, and they do not contradict each other.
Commentary: 'Referring to bodily courage and bodily diligence.' Courage refers to encouragement; diligence refers to effort. Because these two forces are within the mind and are not shown to others, they are called non-manifest (無表色, wú biǎo sè).
Commentary: 'Mental courage etc.' Mental courage etc. here are included in the mental factors (心所法, xīn suǒ fǎ). Now we are discussing form, so we do not take mental courage etc. The meaning is the same as body-expression.
Treatise: 'However, relying on thought, aspiration, etc.' One view is that meditative paths (定道, dìng dào) are also established based on the thought arising from vows. That is, when about to arise the defilements of that meditative path, one makes a vow saying: 'I shall enter samādhi at a certain time.' From this, one can arouse excellent thought, preventing evil form, provisional name, and non-manifest form. If speaking from the perspective of self-nature, it is only based on thought. If speaking from the perspective of retinue, it is based on the co-arising mind and mental factors. There is no contradiction in meaning, because it can prevent evil defilements and is in accordance with (the mind and mental factors). For example, in terms of the essence and retinue of the two samādhis, they are established based on twenty-two kinds of mind seeds etc. If from the perspective of self-nature, it is only based on the seed of wisdom that can renounce. It must be like this now, as the sage said it is based on the self-nature of thought-karma. Detailed explanation: Making a vow before entering samādhi is only to determine the time limit for exiting samādhi. It is not because of being conditioned by defilements that one makes a vow. This is different from the vows of Prātimokṣa (別解脫戒, bié jiě tuō jiè), and cannot be taken as an example. Moreover, the retinue of those (two samādhis) can be established based on other dharmas, which has reason but no scriptural proof. It is also difficult to rely on in terms of reason. Why is this so? If we take the establishment of the two samādhis based on various seeds as an example, thinking that defilements are the same, then the reason for the defilements of Prātimokṣa
亦應爾。思種同時有多種故。又應表惑亦依現思相應法立。若言此等無遮惡能故不依立。定道相應何得即有。若言非勝復非業性而不立者。定道應爾。若表惑及別解脫亦依俱時種及相應。理即有也。而教未見。
論。善惡思種增長位立者。此散無表何要依種 若不依種。受惑已后散亂等心。應不名為具律儀等。為遮此過故依種立。故成業論云。若三種業但思為體。于散亂心．及無心位爾時無思。如何得有名具律儀．不律儀者。由思差別所熏成種不損壞故。名具律儀．不律儀者。故無有過。
疏。殊勝思者。簡下中思不發無表者。按成業論云。思差別者簡取勝思能發律儀．不律儀表。由此思故熏成二種殊勝種子。依二種子未損壞位。假立善．惡律儀無表。
疏。猶現無依諸福業事者。無依之義略有兩釋 一云依謂所施財物等類。此財物等是業所託名之為依。今者雖無所依諸物不起身業。但聞諸善而起深心隨喜恭敬。而於身中福亦續起。此所起福名無依福 二云非唯起心亦身恭敬所增之福。但無施物總名無依。
疏。施主遠處等者。此有依福。即所施物名之為依。故俱舍論第十三云。如契經云。善男子等成熟有依七福業事。若行．若住．若寐．若覺恒時相續福業漸增 釋七福事者。一施羈旅客。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：也應該是這樣。因為思的種子是同時存在多種的。而且，也應該說表惑也是依據與現行思相應的法而建立的。如果說這些沒有遮惡的能力，所以不依據它來建立。那麼，與定道相應的思，又怎麼能立即就有遮惡的能力呢？如果說它不是殊勝的，也不是業的性質，所以不建立，那麼，定道也應該如此。如果表惑以及別解脫也依據同時存在的種子以及相應的法，道理上就應該有，只是經典中沒有見到這樣的說法。
論：善惡思的種子在增長的階段建立。這些散亂的無表業，為什麼要依據種子呢？如果不依據種子，那麼在接受煩惱之後，散亂等心，就不應該被稱為具有律儀等。爲了遮止這個過失，所以依據種子來建立。所以《成業論》說：『如果三種業只是以思為體，在散亂心以及無心位的時候，那時沒有思，怎麼能有名為具有律儀、不律儀的人呢？因為思的差別所熏習成的種子沒有損壞的緣故，所以名為具有律儀、不律儀。』所以沒有過失。
疏：殊勝的思，是簡別下品和中品的思，它們不能引發無表業。按照《成業論》所說，思的差別是選取殊勝的思，能夠引發律儀和不律儀的無表業。因為這種思的緣故，熏習成了兩種殊勝的種子。依據這兩種種子沒有損壞的階段，假立善和惡的律儀無表。
疏：就像現在沒有所依的各種福業之事。沒有所依的含義大概有兩種解釋：一種解釋是，所依指的是所施捨的財物等。這些財物等是業所依託的，所以稱為所依。現在即使沒有所依的財物，不起身業，但是聽到各種善事而生起深刻的隨喜恭敬之心，那麼在身中福業也會繼續生起。這種生起的福業稱為無依福。另一種解釋是，不僅僅是生起心意，還有身體恭敬所增加的福，只是沒有施捨的財物，總稱為無依。
疏：施主在遠處等等。這屬於有依福，所施捨的財物稱為所依。所以《俱舍論》第十三說：『如契經所說，善男子等成熟有依的七種福業之事。如果行走、如果站立、如果睡眠、如果醒覺，恒常相續的福業逐漸增長。』解釋七種福業之事，第一種是施捨給羈旅客。
【English Translation】 English version: It should be so. Because there are multiple seeds of thought existing simultaneously. Moreover, it should also be said that manifest defilements (表惑) are established based on the laws corresponding to the present thought. If it is said that these do not have the ability to prevent evil, therefore they are not established based on it, then how can the thought corresponding to fixed path (定道) immediately have the ability to prevent evil? If it is said that it is not superior, nor is it the nature of karma, so it is not established, then the fixed path should also be the same. If manifest defilements and separate liberation (別解脫) are also based on simultaneously existing seeds and corresponding laws, then in principle it should exist, but such a statement has not been seen in the scriptures.
Treatise: The seeds of good and evil thought are established in the stage of growth. Why do these scattered non-manifest karmas (無表) need to rely on seeds? If they do not rely on seeds, then after accepting afflictions, scattered minds, etc., should not be called possessing precepts (律儀) etc. In order to prevent this fault, they are established based on seeds. Therefore, the Cheng Ye Lun (成業論) says: 'If the three types of karma are only based on thought, then at the time of scattered mind and mindless state, there is no thought at that time, how can there be people named as possessing precepts or non-precepts? Because the seeds formed by the difference of thought are not damaged, they are called possessing precepts or non-precepts.' Therefore, there is no fault.
Commentary: Superior thought is to distinguish inferior and middle-grade thoughts, which cannot initiate non-manifest karma. According to the Cheng Ye Lun, the difference of thought is to select superior thought, which can initiate the non-manifest karma of precepts and non-precepts. Because of this thought, two kinds of superior seeds are cultivated. Based on the stage where these two kinds of seeds are not damaged, the non-manifest karma of good and evil precepts is provisionally established.
Commentary: Like the various meritorious deeds that are now without reliance. The meaning of 'without reliance' has roughly two explanations: One explanation is that reliance refers to the property, etc., that is given. These properties, etc., are what the karma relies on, so they are called reliance. Now, even if there is no property to rely on, and no physical karma is initiated, but hearing various good deeds and giving rise to deep joy and reverence, then meritorious deeds will continue to arise in the body. This arising meritorious deed is called reliance-free merit. Another explanation is that it is not only the arising of intention, but also the merit increased by physical reverence, but the absence of giving property is generally called reliance-free.
Commentary: The benefactor is far away, etc. This belongs to merit with reliance, and the property given is called reliance. Therefore, the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (俱舍論) says: 'As the sutra says, good men, etc., mature seven meritorious deeds with reliance. Whether walking, standing, sleeping, or waking, the constantly continuous meritorious deeds gradually increase.' Explaining the seven meritorious deeds, the first is giving to travelers.
二施路行人。三施病人。四施侍病人。五施園林。六施常食。七隨時施。如是七種有所依事故名有依。善故名福。作故名業。思託名事。
疏。若新熏種等者。難陀師義。唯是新熏。而於彼宗分為二釋。一云。種子唸唸體增。即如疏辨 若爾後時既無現熏種云何增 答由發惑思能熏力勝合所熏種後後體增。如水．土等有勝功能令麥等種生芽莖等種種多果。惑等種體既復倍增。有依．無依福業事等亦體增也 二云增者但種子上能防惡惑七支功能而倍倍增。何所以者。要現熏習種方生故。又若體增后時現生從何種起。不可有生有不生者。種勢等故。后亦不得多種共生。違世間故。故但用增 詳曰。雖有兩釋用增為正。
疏。若新舊合用者。此護法釋。傳有五解 一云體增。體有二種。一新。二舊。唯新熏增而非本有。本有勢力不及新故。又非今時思愿起故 二云由發惑思合新體增本有用增。依體增立 三云新舊悉體增長。依二增立 四云新種用增。其體不增。本有體用皆悉不增。理同前師。尋可知也 五云本亦用增而體不增。然唯本有俱為一釋。如疏所明。三師合論總有八釋。皆用增勝。正如疏斷 問無表之色依表種立。表種既多。為依何立 答正釋如燈。傳有五解 一云第三羯磨末後念心。若住求惑等流善
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二、佈施路上的行人（施路行人）：為在道路上行走的人提供幫助。 三、佈施病人（施病人）：為生病的人提供醫藥和照顧。 四、佈施照顧病人的人（施侍病人）：為照顧病人的人提供幫助和支援。 五、佈施園林（施園林）：提供花園和林地供人休息和享用。 六、佈施日常食物（施常食）：提供日常所需的食物。 七、隨時佈施（隨時施）：在任何需要的時候提供幫助。 像這樣七種因為有所依靠的緣故，所以稱為『有依』。因為是善行，所以稱為『福』。因為是行為，所以稱為『業』。因為是思考和依託，所以稱為『事』。
疏解：如果說是新熏習的種子等等。難陀（Nanda）師的觀點是，只有新熏習的。並且在他的宗派里分為兩種解釋。一種說法是，種子唸唸之間本體增長，就像疏解里辨析的那樣。如果這樣，那麼之後沒有現行熏習的時候，種子怎麼增長呢？回答是，由於發起迷惑的思緒，能夠熏習的力量勝過所熏習的種子，所以後來的本體增長。就像水、土等有殊勝的功能，能夠讓麥子等種子生出芽、莖等等多種多樣的果實。迷惑等的種子本體既然又加倍增長，有依、無依的福業事等，本體也增長。第二種說法是，增長只是種子上的能夠防止惡的迷惑的七支功能加倍增長。為什麼這樣說呢？因為一定要現行熏習的種子才能產生。而且如果本體增長，之後現行產生是從什麼種子產生的呢？不可能有產生和不產生的情況，因為種子的勢頭是相等的。之後也不可能多種種子共同產生，因為違背世間的常理。所以只是用增長。 詳細地說，雖然有兩種解釋，但是用增長是正確的。
疏解：如果說是新舊結合使用。這是護法（Dharmapala）的解釋。流傳有五種解釋。一種說法是本體增長。本體有兩種，一種是新的，一種是舊的。只有新熏習的增長，而不是原本就有的。因為原本有的勢力不如新的，而且不是現在這個時候的思愿產生的緣故。第二種說法是，由於發起迷惑的思緒，新本體增長，原本有的用增長。依據本體增長而建立。第三種說法是，新的和舊的本體都增長。依據兩種增長而建立。第四種說法是，新的種子用增長，它的本體不增長。原本有的本體和用都不增長。道理和前面的老師相同，尋找就可以知道。第五種說法是，原本有的也用增長，但是本體不增長。然而只有原本有的都作為一種解釋。就像疏解里說明的那樣。三位老師合起來討論總共有八種解釋，都認為用增長殊勝。正如疏解里判斷的那樣。問：無表色（Avijñapti-rūpa）依靠表色（Vijñapti-rūpa）的種子而建立。表色的種子既然很多，那麼依靠什麼而建立呢？回答：正確的解釋就像燈一樣。流傳有五種解釋。一種說法是第三羯磨（karma）最後的心念。如果安住于尋求迷惑的等流善。
【English Translation】 English version: 2. Giving to travelers on the road (Śīla-pathika): Providing assistance to those traveling on roads. 3. Giving to the sick (Śīla-rogin): Providing medicine and care to those who are ill. 4. Giving to those who attend the sick (Śīla-śuśrūṣaka): Providing help and support to those who care for the sick. 5. Giving gardens and groves (Śīla-ārāma): Providing gardens and groves for people to rest and enjoy. 6. Giving regular food (Śīla-nitya-bhakta): Providing daily necessities of food. 7. Giving at any time (Śīla-yathākāla): Providing help whenever needed. These seven are called 'with support' (sa-āśraya) because they have something to rely on. Because it is a good deed, it is called 'merit' (puṇya). Because it is an action, it is called 'karma' (karma). Because it is thought and reliance, it is called 'matter' (artha).
Commentary: If it is said to be newly perfumed seeds, etc. Nanda's view is that only newly perfumed seeds exist. And in his school, it is divided into two explanations. One explanation is that the substance of the seed increases in every moment, just as explained in the commentary. If so, how does the seed increase when there is no manifest perfuming later? The answer is that because the thought that generates delusion has a stronger perfuming power than the perfumed seed, the later substance increases. Just like water, soil, etc., have excellent functions that allow seeds like wheat to produce sprouts, stems, and various fruits. Since the substance of delusion, etc., increases doubly, the meritorious deeds with and without support also increase in substance. The second explanation is that the increase is only in the seven-branch function on the seed that can prevent evil delusions, which increases doubly. Why is this so? Because only a seed that is currently perfumed can produce. Also, if the substance increases, from which seed does the current production arise later? It is impossible for some to produce and some not to produce, because the momentum of the seeds is equal. It is also impossible for multiple seeds to produce together later, because it violates worldly common sense. Therefore, only the function increases. In detail, although there are two explanations, using the increase of function is correct.
Commentary: If it is said to be a combination of new and old. This is Dharmapala's explanation. There are five interpretations transmitted. One explanation is that the substance increases. There are two types of substance, one new and one old. Only the newly perfumed increases, not the original. Because the power of the original is not as strong as the new, and because it is not generated by the thoughts and wishes of the present time. The second explanation is that due to the thought that generates delusion, the new substance increases, and the function of the original increases. It is established based on the increase of substance. The third explanation is that both the new and old substances increase. It is established based on the two increases. The fourth explanation is that the new seed's function increases, but its substance does not increase. The substance and function of the original do not increase. The principle is the same as the previous teacher, which can be found out. The fifth explanation is that the original also increases in function, but its substance does not increase. However, only the original is considered as one explanation. As explained in the commentary. The three teachers together have a total of eight explanations, all of which consider the increase of function to be superior. Just as judged in the commentary. Question: Unmanifest form (Avijñapti-rūpa) is established based on the seed of manifest form (Vijñapti-rūpa). Since there are many seeds of manifest form, on what is it established? Answer: The correct explanation is like a lamp. There are five interpretations transmitted. One explanation is the last thought of the third karma (karma). If one dwells on seeking the outflow of delusion.
心。即依此種而假建立。若於此時起住不同分心。或在無心。即依前位近因等起末後心立 二云始初乞惑乃至第三羯磨后念所熏成種。期心滿故皆可增長。故可總依多種假立 若爾如何初念唯立一具七支無表色耶 答種雖有多各各有能。唯防一具身．語七支。故說初念唯有七支。實非唯七。又種子和合不可分別。勢力既同。總立無失 三云唯依近因等起末後念心思種子立。非依多種無有前失。此一念心近能發惑故唯依此 四云唯依近因等起初念心種發身．語中。此最勝故。身．語因此成善．惡故。后皆隨轉。非轉因故。如剎那思性不定故。由此最初能發無表 五云近因等起中無論初后。但最勝者事究竟時。思種增長能發無表 有義斷云。可依第二勝思相續。功能力齊有依．不依所以無故。非如有宗表唯一念。大乘身．語既相續流。能發彼思皆名錶故。故無表色依多念思。但表皆能發無表故。律儀既爾。不律儀等準此應知 詳曰。觀此斷意其理非無。然稍雜亂。轉與隨轉有何差別。近因．剎那二起何殊。許于初念有多七支復無文故。故第四釋理最為勝。余皆有失思準可悟。又新熏等前有八釋。以今無表所依種義所有五釋歷彼前八。一一有五成四十釋。其正不正量可知矣。
疏。初熏種時舊亦生種者。現行熏彼新熏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心，即是依據這種子而假立的。如果在此時生起、安住的心念不同，或者處於無心狀態，那就是依據前一階段的近因等所生起的最後心念來建立。第二種說法是，最初生起迷惑，乃至第三次羯磨（羯磨，佛教儀式）后的念頭所熏習成的種子，因為期望心願圓滿，都可以增長。因此可以總括地依據多種種子假立。如果這樣，為什麼最初一念只成立一個具有七支的無表色呢？回答是，種子雖然有很多，各自都有其作用。只是爲了防止一個身體和語言的七支產生。所以說最初一念只有七支，實際上並非只有七支。而且種子和合在一起，無法分別，勢力相同，總括地建立也沒有過失。第三種說法是，只依據近因等所生起的最後念頭的心思種子來建立，不依據多種種子，就沒有前面的過失。因為這一念心最能引發迷惑，所以只依據這個。第四種說法是，只依據近因等所生起的最初念頭的心種來引發身語。因為這個最殊勝。身語因此成就善惡。之後都隨之轉變。不是轉變的原因。比如剎那的思念，性質不定。因此最初能引發無表。第五種說法是，近因等所生起的心念中，無論最初還是最後，只要是最殊勝的，在事情完成時，心思種子增長，就能引發無表。有一種觀點果斷地說，可以依據第二種殊勝的思念相續，功能和力量相同，有依據和沒有依據沒有區別。不像有宗派認為表色只有一念。大乘的身語既然相續不斷，能夠引發它們的思念都稱為表色。所以無表色依據多念思念。但是表色都能引發無表。律儀既然如此，不律儀等也應該依此推知。詳細地說，觀察這種觀點，道理並非沒有，但稍顯雜亂。轉變和隨轉變有什麼區別？近因和剎那兩種生起有什麼不同？允許在最初一念中有多重七支，又沒有依據。所以第四種解釋道理最為殊勝。其餘的都有缺失，可以根據思考領悟。另外，新熏等前面有八種解釋，用現在無表所依據的種子之義的所有五種解釋，來歷數前面的八種解釋，每一種有五種，總共四十種解釋。其中正確與否，可以衡量得知。
疏：最初熏習種子時，舊的種子也會生出新的種子。現行的行為熏習新的種子。
【English Translation】 English version The mind is provisionally established based on this kind of seed. If, at this time, the arising and abiding of thoughts are different, or if one is in a state of no-mind, then it is established based on the last thought arising from the proximate cause, etc., of the previous stage. The second view is that the seeds formed by the initial arising of delusion, up to the thoughts after the third Karma (Karma, Buddhist ritual), can all increase because of the expectation of fulfilling the wish. Therefore, it can be generally established based on various seeds. If so, why does the initial thought only establish one unmanifested form with seven limbs? The answer is that although there are many seeds, each has its own function. It is only to prevent the arising of a body and speech with seven limbs. Therefore, it is said that the initial thought only has seven limbs, but in reality, it is not only seven. Moreover, the seeds are combined together and cannot be distinguished, and their powers are the same, so there is no fault in establishing them collectively. The third view is that it is established only based on the seed of thought of the last thought arising from the proximate cause, etc., and there is no previous fault if it is not based on various seeds. Because this one thought is most capable of causing delusion, it is based only on this. The fourth view is that it is only based on the seed of the initial thought arising from the proximate cause, etc., to initiate body and speech. Because this is the most excellent. Body and speech thus accomplish good and evil. Afterwards, they all change accordingly. It is not the cause of the change. For example, a momentary thought is uncertain in nature. Therefore, the initial thought is capable of initiating the unmanifested. The fifth view is that among the thoughts arising from the proximate cause, etc., whether initial or final, as long as it is the most excellent, when the matter is completed, the seed of thought increases and can initiate the unmanifested. One view decisively states that it can be based on the second excellent continuous thought, with the same function and power, and there is no difference between having a basis and not having a basis. It is not like some schools that believe that manifested form is only one thought. Since the body and speech of Mahayana are continuous, the thoughts that can initiate them are all called manifested forms. Therefore, unmanifested form is based on multiple thoughts. However, manifested forms can all initiate the unmanifested. Since the precepts are like this, the non-precepts, etc., should also be inferred accordingly. In detail, observing this view, the reasoning is not without merit, but it is somewhat chaotic. What is the difference between transformation and subsequent transformation? What is the difference between the two arisings of proximate cause and moment? Allowing multiple seven limbs in the initial thought is also without basis. Therefore, the fourth explanation is the most excellent in reasoning. The rest have flaws, which can be understood through contemplation. In addition, there are eight previous explanations for new imprints, etc. Using all five explanations of the meaning of the seeds on which the current unmanifested is based, to enumerate the previous eight explanations, each has five, totaling forty explanations. Whether they are correct or not can be measured and known.
Commentary: When initially imprinting seeds, old seeds also give rise to new seeds. Current actions imprint new seeds.
種時。本有舊種亦復摶生一種子也。即是四法同時起也。此非正義。
疏。又簡遠近等者。審慮決定遠近如次皆是所起身．語加行。加行之中分遠近也。
疏。及與剎那者。其動發思發身．語者多為近因。為因引起身．語二故。故名等起。能起名起。第二念後心．心所等但名剎那。剎那剎那自相引起。近因起者名之為轉。依彼現．種立表．無表。剎那等起名為隨轉。隨前轉故。不依現．種立無表等。以非決定是善．惡性起身．語故。由有隨轉業起分明。故立有也。
疏。彼決定得色名因等者。諸律儀惑悉皆能止身．語惡色。顯揚據此故能止惑。從所止法以立色名。若發身．語諸惑不定故。彼不依所發身．語而立色號。
疏。定道合說者。彼顯揚論定．道．別脫三惑合說。云依不現行建立色性。三皆能止惡身．語故。
疏。此顯差別等者。此唯識論顯隨心惑．及不隨心二惑差別。故別脫言發身．語也。定．道不必皆能發故 問律儀防惡。惡通三世。防何世耶 答傳有三釋。一云通防三世。過．未雖無依現立故。故防現在義即防三。二云唯防現在。過．未無故。三云唯防未來。過．現已起。防無用故 詳曰。初釋為勝。如無漏見依瑜伽等亦得說言斷三世惑。此亦應爾。至下當悉 問發惑之
思愿遮惡色。惡色既七皆是所緣。應熏七種依立無表 答如二定體依能厭立。此亦應然。依能遮種。
疏。非是表者。不發身．語但名無表 若爾何故名正語等 答止惡身．語名正語等。
疏。如發身語思等者。不示他故。非種子故 問道相應思非表．無表。而依何法名道律儀 答且約別脫依種子立。道相應思非種子故云非表．無表。非盡理也。
疏。又望不同等者。望發身．語而名為表。據防惡色名為無表。
疏。不爾等者。此顯理也。八地已去及乎。如來既恒在定。六純無漏。豈可不有身．語表耶。疏雖三釋后解為正。
疏。不發善身語等者。據八地前及八地中不發時說。
疏。然無無表者。章有兩說。今疏同章第二師說 問表義云何 答后思表前思名意表業 問前思已滅何所表耶 答如第三羯磨無心之時方名錶者。表前方便思故得名為表。此亦爾也。又思見分及自證分更互相表。名為表也。
疏。三業無表皆假等者。按佛地論云。雖有毀犯制立學處。但假安立而非實有。諸無表業唯以不作為其性故亦非實有。
論。能動身思等者。按成業論釋三名云。身論諸根大造和合差別為體。積集所成是為身義。業即是思差別為性。有所造作是為業義。思能動身說為身業
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『思愿遮惡色』（Samvara-cetanā pratisedhayati akusalavarnam）：遮止惡色的思愿。既然惡色這七種都是所緣，那麼應該熏習七種依附而建立的無表色嗎？答：就像二定（dhyāna，禪定）的自體依附於能厭離而建立一樣，這也應該如此，依附於能遮止的種子。
疏：『非是表者』：不引發身、語，只稱為無表色。如果這樣，為什麼稱為正語等？答：止息惡身、語，稱為正語等。
疏：『如發身語思等者』：因為不示現給他人，也不是種子。問：與道相應的思不是表色，也不是無表色，那麼依附於什麼法而稱為道律儀？答：暫且就別解脫戒（prātimokṣa，戒律）來說，是依附於種子而建立的。與道相應的思不是種子，所以說不是表色、無表色，但這並非完全合理的解釋。
疏：『又望不同等者』：相對於引發身、語而稱為表色，根據防止惡色而稱為無表色。
疏：『不爾等者』：這顯示了道理。八地（aṣṭamabhūmi，第八地）以上乃至如來，既然恒常在定中，六根純凈無漏，怎麼可能沒有身、語表色呢？疏文雖然有三種解釋，但后一種解釋是正確的。
疏：『不發善身語等者』：這是根據八地之前以及八地之中不引發（善）身、語的時候說的。
疏：『然無無表者』：章疏有兩種說法，現在疏文與章疏的第二種說法相同。問：表（vijñapti，表示）的含義是什麼？答：後面的思表示前面的思，稱為意表業。問：前面的思已經滅了，表示什麼呢？答：就像第三羯磨（karma，業）在無心的時候才稱為表一樣，表示前面的方便思，所以才得名為表。又，思的見分和自證分互相表示，稱為表。
疏：『三業無表皆假等者』：按照《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）所說，即使有毀犯而制定學處，也只是假安立，並非真實存在。諸無表業只是以不作為其性質，所以也不是真實存在。
論：『能動身思等者』：按照《成業論》解釋三名說，身是指諸根、大種（mahābhūta，四大元素）和合的差別為體，積聚所成是身的含義。業就是以思的差別為性質，有所造作是業的含義。思能動身，所以說為身業。
【English Translation】 English version 'Samvara-cetanā pratisedhayati akusalavarnam' (Thoughts and volition that prevent evil actions): The thought and volition that prevent evil actions. Since these seven types of evil actions are all objects of cognition, should we cultivate the seven types of non-revealing form (aviññatti-rūpa) that are established based on these objects? Answer: Just as the essence of the two concentrations (dhyāna) is established based on the ability to renounce, so too should this be, based on the seed of prevention.
Commentary: 'Not revealing': It does not initiate actions of body and speech, but is only called non-revealing form. If so, why are they called right speech, etc.? Answer: Stopping evil actions of body and speech is called right speech, etc.
Commentary: 'Like thoughts that initiate actions of body and speech, etc.': Because it is not shown to others, nor is it a seed. Question: Thoughts corresponding to the path are neither revealing nor non-revealing, so what dharma do they rely on to be called the discipline of the path? Answer: For the sake of individual liberation vows (prātimokṣa), it is established based on seeds. Thoughts corresponding to the path are not seeds, so it is said that they are neither revealing nor non-revealing, but this is not a completely reasonable explanation.
Commentary: 'Also, the perspective is different, etc.': Relative to initiating actions of body and speech, it is called revealing form; based on preventing evil actions, it is called non-revealing form.
Commentary: 'Not so, etc.': This reveals the principle. Since those on the eighth ground (aṣṭamabhūmi) and even the Tathāgata are constantly in concentration, and the six senses are pure and without outflows, how could there not be revealing forms of body and speech? Although the commentary has three explanations, the last one is correct.
Commentary: 'Not initiating good actions of body and speech, etc.': This is said based on the time before the eighth ground and in the middle of the eighth ground when (good actions) are not initiated.
Commentary: 'However, there is no non-revealing form': The chapter has two explanations. The current commentary agrees with the second explanation in the chapter. Question: What is the meaning of 'revealing' (vijñapti)? Answer: The later thought reveals the earlier thought, which is called mental revealing karma. Question: The earlier thought has already ceased, so what does it reveal? Answer: Just as the third karma (karma) is called revealing when there is no mind, it reveals the preceding expedient thought, so it is called revealing. Also, the seeing aspect and self-awareness aspect of thought reveal each other, which is called revealing.
Commentary: 'The non-revealing forms of the three karmas are all provisional, etc.': According to the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra, even if there are violations and precepts are established, they are only provisionally established and not truly existent. All non-revealing karmas are only characterized by non-action, so they are also not truly existent.
Treatise: 'Thoughts that can move the body, etc.': According to the Karma-siddha-śāstra, the three names are explained as follows: The body refers to the combination of the faculties, the great elements (mahābhūta), and their differences as its essence; the accumulation of these is the meaning of the body. Karma is characterized by the differences in thought; the act of creating is the meaning of karma. Thought can move the body, so it is called bodily karma.
。令身相續異方生因。風界起故具足應言動身之業。除動身言但名身業。如益力油但言力油。如動塵風但名塵風 語謂語言。音聲為性。此能表了所欲說義故名為語。或復語者字等所依。由帶字等能詮表義。故名為語。能發語思說名為業。具足應言發語之業。除發語言但名語業。喻同身業 意謂意識。能思量故。趣向餘生．及境界故說名為意。作動意思說名意業。具足應言作意之業。或意相應業。除彼作字．及相應言但云意業。喻如前說。略提大意。具如彼辨。
論。能動身思至說名意業者。問思有四種。三如論辨。第四剎那。此何不說 答。有義剎那等起三性不定。罪．福二行彼非定依故。此說業不論第四。若末後思性類同者即動發收。第三通轉．及隨轉故。故不別說。其初二思望身．語業遠因等起。動發近因。由此應言遠因等起必初二思。有初二思非遠因起。如邪見俱不發身．語。近因等起必動發思。有動發思非近因起。如剎那思。
疏。問若發身語思等者。有義今不依此。如所熏種雖非是色。而能防色假名為色何妨。現思以非色故雖不能表。而能髮色假名錶色。然疏主意近覺知非。表無表章許名錶也 詳曰。疏無誤也。不同色．聲有示他義為實表色。不同種子有相續義為假無表。云非表等。不障以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『令身相續異方生因』（使身體在不同的地方持續產生的原因）。『風界起故具足應言動身之業』（因為風界的生起，完整地說應該是動身之業）。『除動身言但名身業』（省略『動身』二字，只稱為身業）。『如益力油但言力油』（如同增強力量的油，只稱為力油）。『如動塵風但名塵風』（如同吹動塵土的風，只稱為塵風）。 『語謂語言』（語，指的是語言）。『音聲為性』（以音聲為本質）。『此能表了所欲說義故名為語』（因為語言能夠表達想要說的意思，所以稱為語）。『或復語者字等所依』（或者，語是文字等所依賴的）。『由帶字等能詮表義』（由於帶有文字等，能夠詮釋表達意義）。『故名為語』（所以稱為語）。『能發語思說名為業』（能夠引發語言的思，稱為業）。『具足應言發語之業』（完整地說應該是發語之業）。『除發語言但名語業』（省略『發語』二字，只稱為語業）。『喻同身業』（比喻如同身業）。 『意謂意識』（意，指的是意識）。『能思量故』（因為能夠思量）。『趣向餘生．及境界故說名為意』（因為趨向于其他的生命和境界，所以稱為意）。『作動意思說名意業』（產生作用的思，稱為意業）。『具足應言作意之業』（完整地說應該是作意之業）。『或意相應業』（或者與意相應的業）。『除彼作字．及相應言但云意業』（省略『作』字和『相應』二字，只稱為意業）。『喻如前說』（比喻如同前面所說）。『略提大意』（簡略地提出大意）。『具如彼辨』（詳細的解釋在其他地方）。 論：『能動身思至說名意業者』（能夠發動身體的思，到稱為意業）。問：『思有四種。三如論辨。第四剎那。此何不說』（思有四種，其中三種如論中所辨。第四種是剎那思，為什麼這裡不說）。答：『有義剎那等起三性不定。罪．福二行彼非定依故』（有一種觀點認為，剎那思等生起的三種性質是不確定的。罪和福兩種行為不是它的固定依靠）。『此說業不論第四』（這裡所說的業，不包括第四種剎那思）。『若末後思性類同者即動發收』（如果最後一種思的性質與前面相同，那就是發動和收攝）。『第三通轉．及隨轉故』（因為第三種思是普遍轉變和隨之轉變的）。『故不別說』（所以不另外說明）。『其初二思望身．語業遠因等起』（最初的兩種思，對於身業和語業來說，是遠因等生起）。『動發近因』（發動是近因）。『由此應言遠因等起必初二思』（由此應該說，遠因等生起一定是最初的兩種思）。『有初二思非遠因起』（有最初的兩種思，不是遠因生起）。『如邪見俱不發身．語』（比如邪見，都不會引發身業和語業）。『近因等起必動發思』（近因生起一定是發動思）。『有動發思非近因起』（有發動思，不是近因生起）。『如剎那思』（比如剎那思）。 疏：『問若發身語思等者』（問：如果發動身語的思等等）。『有義今不依此』（有一種觀點認為，現在不依據這種說法）。『如所熏種雖非是色。而能防色假名為色何妨』（比如被薰染的種子，雖然不是色，但是能夠防止色，假名為色有什麼妨礙）。『現思以非色故雖不能表。而能髮色假名錶色』（現在的思，因為不是色，所以雖然不能直接表達，但是能夠引發色，假名為表達色）。『然疏主意近覺知非』（然而疏主的意圖是接近覺知，而不是）。『表無表章許名錶也』（表達無表，允許稱為表達）。『詳曰』（詳細地說）。『疏無誤也』（疏的解釋沒有錯誤）。『不同色．聲有示他義為實表色』（不同於色和聲，具有向他人展示意義的真實表達色）。『不同種子有相續義為假無表』（不同於種子，具有相續意義的虛假無表）。『云非表等』（說不是表達等等）。『不障以』（不妨礙）。
【English Translation】 English version: '令身相續異方生因' (lìng shēn xiāngxù yì fāng shēng yīn) [Causes the body to continuously arise in different places]. '風界起故具足應言動身之業' (fēng jiè qǐ gù jùzú yīng yán dòng shēn zhī yè) [Because the wind element arises, it should be fully stated as the karma of moving the body]. '除動身言但名身業' (chú dòng shēn yán dàn míng shēn yè) [Omitting 'moving the body', it is simply called body karma]. '如益力油但言力油' (rú yì lì yóu dàn yán lì yóu) [Like oil that increases strength, it is simply called strength oil]. '如動塵風但名塵風' (rú dòng chén fēng dàn míng chén fēng) [Like wind that moves dust, it is simply called dust wind]. '語謂語言' (yǔ wèi yǔyán) [Speech refers to language]. '音聲為性' (yīnshēng wéi xìng) [Sound is its nature]. '此能表了所欲說義故名為語' (cǐ néng biǎo liǎo suǒ yù shuō yì gù míng wéi yǔ) [Because it can express the meaning one wants to say, it is called speech]. '或復語者字等所依' (huò fù yǔ zhě zì děng suǒ yī) [Or, speech is what words and the like rely on]. '由帶字等能詮表義' (yóu dài zì děng néng quán biǎo yì) [Because it carries words and the like, it can interpret and express meaning]. '故名為語' (gù míng wéi yǔ) [Therefore, it is called speech]. '能發語思說名為業' (néng fā yǔ sī shuō míng wéi yè) [The thought that can initiate speech is called karma]. '具足應言發語之業' (jùzú yīng yán fā yǔ zhī yè) [It should be fully stated as the karma of initiating speech]. '除發語言但名語業' (chú fā yǔyán dàn míng yǔ yè) [Omitting 'initiating speech', it is simply called speech karma]. '喻同身業' (yù tóng shēn yè) [The analogy is the same as body karma]. '意謂意識' (yì wèi yìshí) [Mind refers to consciousness]. '能思量故' (néng sīliáng gù) [Because it can think]. '趣向餘生．及境界故說名為意' (qùxiàng yú shēng, jí jìngjiè gù shuō míng wéi yì) [Because it tends towards other lives and realms, it is called mind]. '作動意思說名意業' (zuò dòng yìsi shuō míng yì yè) [The thought that acts is called mind karma]. '具足應言作意之業' (jùzú yīng yán zuòyì zhī yè) [It should be fully stated as the karma of mental action]. '或意相應業' (huò yì xiāngyìng yè) [Or karma corresponding to the mind]. '除彼作字．及相應言但云意業' (chú bǐ zuò zì, jí xiāngyìng yán dàn yún yì yè) [Omitting the word 'action' and 'corresponding', it is simply called mind karma]. '喻如前說' (yù rú qián shuō) [The analogy is as previously stated]. '略提大意' (lüè tí dàyì) [Briefly mentioning the main idea]. '具如彼辨' (jù rú bǐ biàn) [Detailed explanations are elsewhere]. Treatise: '能動身思至說名意業者' (néng dòng shēn sī zhì shuō míng yì yè zhě) [That which can move the body's thought to be called mind karma]. Question: '思有四種。三如論辨。第四剎那。此何不說' (sī yǒu sì zhǒng. sān rú lùn biàn. dì sì chànà. cǐ hé bù shuō) [There are four types of thought. Three are explained in the treatise. Why is the fourth, momentary thought, not mentioned here?]. Answer: '有義剎那等起三性不定。罪．福二行彼非定依故' (yǒu yì chànà děng qǐ sān xìng bù dìng. zuì, fú èr xíng bǐ fēi dìng yī gù) [One view is that the three natures of momentary thought are uncertain. Sinful and meritorious actions are not its fixed reliance]. '此說業不論第四' (cǐ shuō yè bù lùn dì sì) [The karma discussed here does not include the fourth, momentary thought]. '若末後思性類同者即動發收' (ruò mòhòu sī xìng lèi tóng zhě jí dòng fā shōu) [If the nature of the last thought is the same as the previous ones, it is the initiation and collection]. '第三通轉．及隨轉故' (dì sān tōng zhuǎn, jí suí zhuǎn gù) [Because the third thought is universally transforming and following]. '故不別說' (gù bù bié shuō) [Therefore, it is not explained separately]. '其初二思望身．語業遠因等起' (qí chū èr sī wàng shēn, yǔ yè yuǎn yīn děng qǐ) [The first two thoughts are the distant causes for body and speech karma]. '動發近因' (dòng fā jìn yīn) [Initiation is the near cause]. '由此應言遠因等起必初二思' (yóu cǐ yīng yán yuǎn yīn děng qǐ bì chū èr sī) [Therefore, it should be said that the distant cause must be the first two thoughts]. '有初二思非遠因起' (yǒu chū èr sī fēi yuǎn yīn qǐ) [There are the first two thoughts that are not distant causes]. '如邪見俱不發身．語' (rú xiéjiàn jù bù fā shēn, yǔ) [Like wrong views, they do not initiate body and speech karma]. '近因等起必動發思' (jìn yīn děng qǐ bì dòng fā sī) [The near cause must be the initiating thought]. '有動發思非近因起' (yǒu dòng fā sī fēi jìn yīn qǐ) [There is initiating thought that is not a near cause]. '如剎那思' (rú chànà sī) [Like momentary thought]. Commentary: '問若發身語思等者' (wèn ruò fā shēn yǔ sī děng zhě) [Question: If initiating body and speech thought, etc.]. '有義今不依此' (yǒu yì jīn bù yī cǐ) [One view is that we do not rely on this now]. '如所熏種雖非是色。而能防色假名為色何妨' (rú suǒ xūn zhǒng suī fēi shì sè. ér néng fáng sè jiǎ míng wéi sè hé fáng) [Like a seed that has been薰染 (xūnrǎn, influenced), although it is not form, it can prevent form, so what is the harm in calling it form?]. '現思以非色故雖不能表。而能髮色假名錶色' (xiàn sī yǐ fēi sè gù suī bùnéng biǎo. ér néng fā sè jiǎ míng biǎo sè) [Present thought, because it is not form, although it cannot directly express, it can initiate form, so it is falsely called expressing form]. '然疏主意近覺知非' (rán shū zhǔ yì jìn juézhī fēi) [However, the commentator's intention is close to awareness, not]. '表無表章許名錶也' (biǎo wúbiǎo zhāng xǔ míng biǎo yě) [Expressing the unexpressed is allowed to be called expression]. '詳曰' (xiáng yuē) [In detail]. '疏無誤也' (shū wú wù yě) [The commentary is not mistaken]. '不同色．聲有示他義為實表色' (bùtóng sè, shēng yǒu shì tā yì wéi shí biǎo sè) [Unlike form and sound, which have the meaning of showing others, it is the real expression of form]. '不同種子有相續義為假無表' (bùtóng zhǒngzi yǒu xiāngxù yì wéi jiǎ wúbiǎo) [Unlike seeds, which have the meaning of continuity, it is the false unexpressed]. '云非表等' (yún fēi biǎo děng) [Saying it is not expression, etc.]. '不障以' (bù zhàng yǐ) [Does not hinder].
為假表色也。若不爾者。后既知非章中許表。云何于疏而不改耶。豈故欲將迷學者乎。疏既不改。故知不謬。本意如前。
疏。造作於心等者。問若造作心何非意業 答彼唯動意。今此復能動身．語故故非意業 有云。此思能起身．語所起身．語有所造作 有義由發動思能起身．語即名造作。身．語是思所造作故 詳曰。疏釋為正。故下論云。思謂令心造作為性。于善等品沒心為業。驅役自心令造善等。彼既明文。此何不許造作於心名有所造。不可說彼唯明意業。文無有簡通明思故復云心令造作善等。豈身．語二無善等耶。令心既是造作心義。余解紕謬思可知矣。
疏。道有二義等者。有義彈云。言游履者是所緣義。此且非理。若對現在說過名前。過去無體何名能履。若對未來現在名前。未來未生何為所履。若引發義名游履者。理亦不然。其引發者是通生義。既前二思是能引發。道義即是前審決思。如何所引第三名道 詳曰。疏立無違。彈者似破。現在名前。未來名履。豈不許意緣未來耶。若許緣者所緣名履竟有何失。若言引發是通生義是審決者。難亦誣謬。設縱引發是通生義。何唯審決。豈發動思非通生耶。若言非者違諸聖教。三業皆能招異熟故。又疏但云所引發義名所游履。而不說為屬能引也。且猶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
這是虛假的表色。如果不是這樣，那麼後來既然在『知非章』中允許表色，為什麼在疏文中不修改呢？難道是故意要迷惑學習者嗎？疏文既然沒有修改，就知道沒有錯誤，原本的意思和前面一樣。
疏文說：『造作於心』等等。問：如果造作於心，為什麼不是意業（mano-karma，心的行為）？答：因為那只是動念。現在這個（指身語的造作）又能動身、語，所以不是意業。有人說：這個思（cetanā，意志）能起身、語，所起身、語有所造作。有一種解釋是，由發動思能起身、語，就叫做造作。身、語是思所造作的。詳細地說，疏文的解釋是正確的。所以下面的論中說：『思，是指使心造作為其性質，在善等品類中以沒心為作用，驅使自己的心去造作善等。』那裡已經有明確的文字，為什麼不允許造作於心叫做有所造呢？不能說那裡只是說明意業，因為文中沒有簡別，普遍說明思，所以又說心令造作善等。難道身、語二業沒有善等嗎？令心就是造作心的意思，其他的解釋是錯誤的，思考就可以知道。
疏文說：『道有二義』等等。有人反駁說：『言語和行為是所緣的意義』，這不合道理。如果針對現在，說過名之前，過去沒有實體，怎麼能說是能行？如果針對未來，現在名之前，未來沒有產生，怎麼能說是所行？如果引發的意義叫做游履，道理也不對。這個引發是普遍產生的意義。既然前面的兩個思是能引發，道的意義就是前面的審決思（adhimokṣa-cetanā，決意），如何被引發的第三個思叫做道？詳細地說，疏文的立論沒有違背，反駁的人似乎在強行破斥。現在名之前，未來名履，難道不允許意識緣未來嗎？如果允許緣，所緣叫做履，究竟有什麼過失？如果說引發是普遍產生的意義，是審決思，這個責難也是誣賴。假設引發是普遍產生的意義，為什麼只有審決思？難道發動思不是普遍產生嗎？如果說不是，就違背了諸聖教，因為三業都能招感異熟果。而且疏文只是說所引發的意義叫做所游履，而沒有說是屬於能引的。暫且這樣。
【English Translation】 English version:
This is a false representation. If it were not so, since representation is permitted in the 'Chapter on Knowing What is Not,' why is it not amended in the commentary? Is it intentionally meant to confuse learners? Since the commentary is not amended, it is known to be without error, and the original meaning remains the same as before.
The commentary says: 'Creating in the mind,' etc. Question: If creating is in the mind, why is it not mental karma (mano-karma, action of mind)? Answer: Because that is only a thought. Now this (referring to the creation of body and speech) can also move body and speech, so it is not mental karma. Some say: This volition (cetanā, will) can arise body and speech, and what arises body and speech has creation. One explanation is that, by the initiating volition, body and speech can arise, which is called creation. Body and speech are created by volition. In detail, the commentary's explanation is correct. Therefore, the treatise below says: 'Volition means making the mind create as its nature, and in the categories of good, etc., it takes immersing the mind as its function, driving one's own mind to create good, etc.' Since there is clear text there, why is it not allowed that creating in the mind is called having something created? It cannot be said that it only explains mental karma, because the text does not distinguish, and universally explains volition, so it also says that the mind causes the creation of good, etc. Do body and speech not have good, etc.? Causing the mind is the meaning of creating the mind, and other explanations are erroneous, which can be known by thinking.
The commentary says: 'The path has two meanings,' etc. Someone refutes: 'Speech and behavior are the meaning of what is cognized,' which is unreasonable. If it is directed at the present, before the name is spoken, the past has no substance, so how can it be said to be able to walk? If it is directed at the future, before the present name, the future has not arisen, so how can it be said to be what is walked upon? If the meaning of initiating is called traveling, the reasoning is also incorrect. This initiating is the meaning of universally producing. Since the previous two volitions are the initiators, the meaning of the path is the previous determining volition (adhimokṣa-cetanā, decision), how is the third volition that is initiated called the path? In detail, the commentary's establishment is not contradictory, and the refuter seems to be forcibly refuting. Before the present name, the future is called walking, is it not allowed that consciousness cognizes the future? If it is allowed to cognize, what is cognized is called walking, what fault is there? If it is said that initiating is the meaning of universally producing, and is the determining volition, this accusation is also slanderous. Assuming that initiating is the meaning of universally producing, why only the determining volition? Is the initiating volition not universally producing? If it is said that it is not, it contradicts the teachings of the saints, because the three karmas can all attract different ripening fruits. Moreover, the commentary only says that the meaning of what is initiated is called what is traveled upon, and does not say that it belongs to the initiator. Let it be so for now.
荒野本無路徑。后因人履其路方有。此道豈非人所引耶。發動所引而得道名于理何失見彈斥乎。
疏。身語是業道義者。業道之義。義即境也。
疏。不相似故者。不相似故名不相應。不似色．心質礙．緣慮。
論。非如色心至有體可得者。有義非疏釋云。因非如色等現量所得。非如心等比量所得。作此立因。因不定失。彼說無為非如色．心二量所得體相可得。應言許是有為非如色．心質礙．緣慮二量所得體相可得者。即無不定 詳曰。疏已簡云自無為法舉色等等他宗無為非此所許遮過已盡。何有不定。準有義因。乃有相違決定過也。相違因云。許非慮．礙及假無為。為．無為中隨一攝故。如實無為。宗義可知。又豈彼宗不許聖者證得無為。若許得者。無為何非現量所得。除現量智更有何法能證無為。若言不同色．心而得名非得者。亦為不可。喻取少分。有現量得即為喻也。
疏。又擇滅等非此所許亦無不定者。有義此亦不然。共比量於他有不定過名不定故。故但如文即無不定。無為亦如色．心．心所體相可得。非無體故者 詳曰。若共比量犯他不定即為過者。何有正量。且如九句第二之因。亦犯他宗決定相違。以彼自許有聲性故。域龍何乃斷為正因。及將此因聲．勝相對便為不定。以此故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：荒野原本沒有道路，後來因為有人踩踏才有了路。那麼，這條道路難道不是人引導出來的嗎？既然是人引導而得，那麼將『道』這個名稱歸於『理』，在道理上有什麼錯誤，以至於要受到指責呢？
疏：身和語是業的道路和意義。業道的意義，這個『義』就是境界。
疏：因為不相似的緣故。因為不相似的緣故，所以叫做不相應。不像色（rupa，物質）、心（citta，精神）那樣有質礙和緣慮。
論：並非像色和心那樣有實體可以獲得。有義的解釋並非像疏釋所說的那樣。因為不像色等那樣可以通過現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）獲得，也不像心等那樣可以通過比量（anumana，推理）獲得。如果這樣立論，就會有因不定（hetu-asiddha，理由不成立）的過失。他們說無為（asamskrta，非造作）不像色和心那樣可以通過現量和比量兩種方式獲得其體相。應該說，允許有為（samskrta，造作）不像色和心那樣有質礙和緣慮兩種方式獲得其體相，這樣就沒有不定了。詳細地說，疏已經簡要說明，從自宗的無為法舉出色等等，其他宗派的無為不是這裡所允許的，遮止過失已經窮盡，怎麼會有不定呢？按照有義的理由，反而有相違決定（viruddha-vyabhicara，相反且不確定）的過失。相違因說：允許不是慮（思考）、礙（障礙）以及假無為，因為在有為和無為中屬於其中之一。如實無為（tathata-asamskrta，真如非造作）的宗義是可以知道的。而且，難道他們宗派不承認聖者證得無為嗎？如果承認證得，那麼無為怎麼不是現量所得？除了現量智（pratyaksa-jnana，直接感知智慧）還有什麼方法能夠證得無為？如果說不同於色和心而獲得，所以不能稱為獲得，這也是不可以的。比喻只取了少部分，有現量獲得就可以作為比喻。
疏：又，擇滅（pratisamkhya-nirodha，選擇滅）等不是這裡所允許的，也沒有不定。有義認為這也是不對的，共同比量對於他人有不定的過失，所以叫做不定。所以只要按照原文就沒有不定。無為也像色、心、心所（caitta，心所法）那樣可以獲得其體相，不是沒有實體。詳細地說，如果共同比量犯了他人的不定，就成為過失，那麼哪裡還有正量（pramana，正確的認知方式）？比如九句中的第二個理由，也犯了他宗的決定相違，因為他們自己承認有聲性。域龍為什麼斷定為正因？以及將這個理由與聲、勝相對，就成為不定。因此。
【English Translation】 English version: Originally, there were no paths in the wilderness. Later, paths came into existence because people walked on them. So, isn't this path guided by people? Since it is guided by people, what is wrong with attributing the name 'path' to 'principle' that it should be criticized?
Commentary: Body and speech are the paths and meanings of karma. The meaning of the path of karma, this 'meaning' is the realm.
Commentary: Because of dissimilarity. Because of dissimilarity, it is called non-correspondence. It is not like rupa (form, matter), citta (mind, consciousness) which have substantial obstruction and conceptualization.
Treatise: It is not like form and mind that have a substance that can be obtained. The explanation of 'having meaning' is not as the commentary explains. Because it is not obtained by pratyaksa (direct perception) like form, nor is it obtained by anumana (inference) like mind. If this is established as a reason, there will be the fault of hetu-asiddha (unestablished reason). They say that asamskrta (unconditioned) cannot have its substance and characteristics obtained by the two means of perception and inference like form and mind. It should be said that samskrta (conditioned) is allowed to not have its substance and characteristics obtained by the two means of substantial obstruction and conceptualization like form and mind, then there is no uncertainty. In detail, the commentary has already briefly explained that from the asamskrta dharma of our own school, form etc. are brought up, and the asamskrta of other schools is not allowed here, and the fault of exclusion has been exhausted, so how can there be uncertainty? According to the reason of 'having meaning', there is instead the fault of viruddha-vyabhicara (contradictory and uncertain). The contradictory reason says: it is allowed that it is not thought, obstruction, and false asamskrta, because it belongs to either samskrta or asamskrta. The doctrine of tathata-asamskrta (suchness unconditioned) can be known. Moreover, doesn't their school admit that sages attain asamskrta? If they admit attainment, then how is asamskrta not obtained by direct perception? What other method is there besides pratyaksa-jnana (direct perception wisdom) that can prove asamskrta? If it is said that it is obtained differently from form and mind, so it cannot be called attainment, that is also unacceptable. The analogy only takes a small part, and having direct perception attainment can be used as an analogy.
Commentary: Furthermore, pratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through discrimination) etc. are not allowed here, and there is no uncertainty. 'Having meaning' thinks this is also incorrect, the common inference has the fault of uncertainty for others, so it is called uncertainty. Therefore, as long as it is according to the original text, there is no uncertainty. Asamskrta can also have its substance and characteristics obtained like form, mind, and caitta (mental factors), it is not without substance. In detail, if the common inference commits the uncertainty of others, it becomes a fault, then where is pramana (valid cognition)? For example, the second reason in the nine sentences also commits the definite contradiction of other schools, because they themselves admit that there is the nature of sound. Why does Yu Long determine it as a correct reason? And if this reason is compared with sound and excellence, it becomes uncertain. Therefore.
知。共比量者違共及自方名為過。違他便非。不爾乃違諸教理也。又言無為如色．心等非無體者。為自．他耶。若他無為許之心外。心外不有何言非無。若自宗者。何乃不有他不定耶。若言非許無不定者。與疏何別。雖有異端固難為據。
論。非異色心作用可得者。如疏具簡真如等法不定失矣。有義說因應云許是有為或無為不攝。非異色．心及諸心所作用可得。即簡不定 詳曰。自宗無為非定異心。他宗無為非自共許。何有不定須加論乎 問色．心．心所為即是因。為不爾耶 設爾何過 二俱有失。若云因者。因但取彼不異色．心作用之義。豈取彼體。又因是彼有法之義。若實色．心依假得等豈非倒乎。若非因者。成非實宗。實色．心等豈非異喻。因於彼轉。何非不定。色．心亦非異色．心等有作用故 答為二釋。一云因攝。雖因正取非異作用。色．心乃是所不異法。故在因收。正因依宗無倒依失 二云。異喻。因應加云。許無慮．礙非異色．心．及諸心所作用可得便無不定。色．心異喻。有慮．礙故。二釋任取。
論。畢竟無等者。按瑜伽論第十六。說有五種無。一未生無。謂未來諸行。二已滅無。謂過去諸行。三互相無。謂諸餘法由所餘相。若遠離性。若非有性。或所餘法。與諸餘法不和合性。四勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：知。共比量（指與大眾共有的衡量標準）中，如果違反了共許的原則以及自身的立場，就稱為過失。如果違反了他人的立場，那就不算過失。否則，就會違反各種教義和道理。又有人說，『無為法』（指不依賴因緣造作的法）就像『色』（指物質現象）、『心』（指精神現象）等一樣，並非沒有實體。這是指你自己的宗派還是他人的宗派？如果是他人的宗派，而他人所許的『無為法』在你自己的『心』之外，『心』之外本來就沒有東西，又怎麼能說它不是『無』呢？如果是你自己的宗派，又為什麼不能說它是不定的呢？如果說不承認『無』，所以不是不定，那和疏文又有什麼區別呢？即使有不同的說法，也難以作為依據。
論：如果說『非異色心作用可得』（指不是不同於色法和心法的作用可以獲得），就像疏文中詳細分析的『真如』（指事物本來的真實狀態）等法，就會有不確定的過失。有一種觀點認為，因應該這樣說：『許是有為法（指依賴因緣造作的法）或者無為法不攝，非異色、心及諸心所作用可得』，這樣就能排除不確定性。詳細分析：自己的宗派所說的『無為法』，並非一定不同於『心』；他人的宗派所說的『無為法』，並非自己和他人共同認可的。哪裡會有不確定性，需要加以討論呢？問：『色』、『心』、『心所』（指心的作用）是因，還是不是因呢？假設是因，會有什麼過失？兩種假設都有過失。如果說是因，那麼因只是取『不異色心作用』的意義，難道是取它的本體嗎？而且因是彼有法的意義，如果真實的『色』、『心』依賴於假立而得，難道不是顛倒嗎？如果說不是因，那就成了非實宗（不承認事物真實存在的宗派）。真實的『色』、『心』等難道不是異喻嗎？因在彼處轉變，為什麼不是不定呢？『色』、『心』也不是不同於『色』、『心』等，因為有作用。答：有兩種解釋。一種解釋是說，因包含『色』、『心』。雖然因主要取『非異作用』，但『色』、『心』是不異之法，所以在因的範圍之內。正因依賴於宗，沒有顛倒依賴的過失。另一種解釋是說，是異喻。因應該加上『許無慮礙』（指沒有憂慮和障礙），『非異色、心、及諸心所作用可得』，這樣就沒有不確定性。『色』、『心』是異喻，因為有憂慮和障礙。兩種解釋任你選擇。
論：『畢竟無等』（指徹底的沒有等等）。按照《瑜伽師地論》第十六卷的說法，有五種『無』。一是『未生無』（指尚未產生的沒有），指未來的諸行。二是『已滅無』（指已經滅亡的沒有），指過去的諸行。三是『互相無』（指互相之間的沒有），指各種法由於其餘的相，如果遠離了某種性質，或者不是某種性質，或者其餘的法與各種法不和合的性質。四是『勝
【English Translation】 English version: Know. In the common inference (referring to the shared standard of measurement), if one violates the commonly accepted principles and one's own position, it is called a fault. If one violates the position of others, it is not considered a fault. Otherwise, it would violate various doctrines and principles. Furthermore, some say that 'unconditioned dharmas' (referring to dharmas that do not depend on causes and conditions) are like 'rupa' (referring to material phenomena), 'citta' (referring to mental phenomena), etc., and are not without substance. Does this refer to your own school or the school of others? If it is the school of others, and the 'unconditioned dharma' accepted by others is outside your own 'mind,' and there is nothing outside the 'mind' in the first place, then how can you say that it is not 'non-existent'? If it is your own school, then why can't you say that it is uncertain? If you say that you do not acknowledge 'non-existence,' so it is not uncertain, then what is the difference between that and the commentary? Even if there are different views, they are difficult to use as a basis.
Treatise: If one says 'non-different rupa-citta function can be obtained' (referring to the function that is not different from rupa and citta can be obtained), like the 'Tathata' (referring to the true state of things as they are) and other dharmas analyzed in detail in the commentary, there will be the fault of uncertainty. One view holds that the reason should be stated as: 'It is accepted that conditioned dharmas (referring to dharmas that depend on causes and conditions) or unconditioned dharmas are not included, non-different rupa, citta, and all mental functions can be obtained,' so that uncertainty can be eliminated. Detailed analysis: The 'unconditioned dharma' spoken of by one's own school is not necessarily different from 'citta'; the 'unconditioned dharma' spoken of by the school of others is not jointly recognized by oneself and others. Where would there be uncertainty that needs to be discussed? Question: Are 'rupa,' 'citta,' and 'citta-vrtti' (referring to the functions of the mind) the cause, or are they not the cause? If they are assumed to be the cause, what fault would there be? Both assumptions have faults. If it is said to be the cause, then the cause only takes the meaning of 'not different rupa-citta function,' is it taking its substance? Moreover, the cause is the meaning of the dharma that exists there. If the real 'rupa' and 'citta' depend on the provisional establishment, is it not inverted? If it is said that it is not the cause, then it becomes a non-realist school (a school that does not acknowledge the real existence of things). Are the real 'rupa,' 'citta,' etc., not different metaphors? The cause transforms there, why is it not uncertain? 'Rupa' and 'citta' are also not different from 'rupa,' 'citta,' etc., because they have functions. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the cause includes 'rupa' and 'citta.' Although the cause mainly takes 'non-different function,' 'rupa' and 'citta' are non-different dharmas, so they are within the scope of the cause. The correct cause depends on the doctrine, and there is no fault of inverted dependence. The other explanation is that it is a different metaphor. The cause should be added with 'accepting no worries and obstacles,' 'non-different rupa, citta, and all mental functions can be obtained,' so there is no uncertainty. 'Rupa' and 'citta' are different metaphors because they have worries and obstacles. You can choose either explanation.
Treatise: 'Ultimately non-existent, etc.' According to the sixteenth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there are five types of 'non-existence.' First, 'non-existence of the unarisen' (referring to the non-existence of what has not yet arisen), referring to the future actions. Second, 'non-existence of the ceased' (referring to the non-existence of what has already ceased), referring to the past actions. Third, 'mutual non-existence' (referring to the non-existence between each other), referring to various dharmas due to the remaining characteristics, if they are far from a certain nature, or are not a certain nature, or the nature of the remaining dharmas not being in harmony with various dharmas. Fourth, 'superior
義無者。謂由世俗言說自性。假設言論所安立性。五畢竟無。謂石女兒等。
論。或余實法所不攝等者。有義疏說假實相對因。謂假法之餘。乃實法之餘。此非理也。彼宗得等皆是假法之餘。實法攝故。因便不成。故今別說除不相應外余色．心等實法不攝故 詳曰。依觀疏中重疊簡略誠無過矣。何枉剩焉。故疏簡云。此中余言顯色．心等所不攝也。既云色．心之所不攝。豈不遮彼隨一過耶。又疏復云。不言許者隨一不成。此乃顯得他雖實攝。明自許得實法不攝故置許言。許言有二。一許色．心實法不攝。自他皆許。敵者許得亦非色．心。二許但是實法不攝。唯自宗許。許言寬狹。簡過乃窮。疏何非理。
疏。不能起因有三者。外以三因明得能起。即下論中外救等是。
疏。論主六難者。以六個難而破三因。
論。未得已失應永不生者。問未來應生。闕緣不起亦名已失。此定不生。得非擇故。今難於此豈不相符 答論中言總。量應簡之。
論。一切非情應永不起者。彼宗不許他身．非情而立得故。故俱舍論第四云。非他相續。無有成就他身法故。非非相續。無有成就非情法故 釋曰。若成他身有趣身業自他雜過 非非相續。謂是非情。若成非情便壞法性。為是有情。為非情耶。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『義無』（Yi Wu）指的是根據世俗的言語習慣和事物自性，通過假設性的言論所建立的性質。『五畢竟無』（Wu Bi Jing Wu）指的是像石女兒這樣的事物，它們根本不存在。
論：『或余實法所不攝等者』（Huo Yu Shi Fa Suo Bu She Deng Zhe），有義疏解釋說這是假法和實法相對的因。也就是說，假法之外的，才是實法之外的。這種說法是不合理的。因為他們的宗派認為『得』（De）等都屬於假法之外，但又被實法所包含，所以這個因不能成立。因此，現在另外解釋為，除了不相應行法之外，其餘的色法、心法等實法所不包含的。詳細地說，依據《觀疏》（Guan Shu）中的重疊簡略，確實沒有錯誤。為什麼還要多此一舉呢？所以《疏》（Shu）中簡略地說：『這裡說的「余」字，顯示了色法、心法等所不包含的。』既然說是色法、心法所不包含的，難道不能遮止隨一的過失嗎？而且《疏》（Shu）中又說：『不說「許」（Xu）字，隨一就不能成立。』這正是爲了顯示，雖然其他宗派認為『得』（De）被實法所包含，但表明自己宗派認為『得』（De）不被實法所包含，所以才設定『許』（Xu）字。『許』（Xu）字有兩種含義：一是允許色法、心法等實法不包含『得』（De），這是自宗和他宗都認可的；二是允許『得』（De）只是不被實法所包含，這隻有自宗認可。『許』（Xu）字的寬泛和狹窄，窮盡了簡別過失的可能性。《疏》（Shu）怎麼會不合理呢？
疏：『不能起因有三者』（Bu Neng Qi Yin You San Zhe），從外在以三種原因來說明『得』（De）能夠生起，也就是下面論中的外救等。
疏：『論主六難者』（Lun Zhu Liu Nan Zhe），用六個難點來破斥三種原因。
論：『未得已失應永不生者』（Wei De Yi Shi Ying Yong Bu Sheng Zhe），問：未來應該產生的，因為缺少因緣而不能生起，也可以叫做已失，這樣就一定不會產生，因為『得』（De）不是擇滅。現在用這個來責難，難道不符合嗎？答：論中的話是總體的，量應該簡化。
論：『一切非情應永不起者』（Yi Qie Fei Qing Ying Yong Bu Qi Zhe），他們的宗派不允許在他身、非情上建立『得』（De），所以《俱舍論》（Ju She Lun）第四卷說：『不是他人的相續，因為沒有成就他人身體的法；不是非情，因為沒有成就非情之法的。』解釋說：如果成就他人的身體，就會有有趣身業的自他混雜的過失。『非非相續』（Fei Fei Xiang Xu）指的是非情。如果成就非情，就會破壞法性，成為有情還是非情呢？
English version 'Yi Wu' (義無, absence of meaning) refers to the nature established through hypothetical statements based on conventional language and the self-nature of things. 'Wu Bi Jing Wu' (五畢竟無, five ultimately non-existent things) refers to things like the horns of a rabbit, which simply do not exist.
Treatise: 'Huo Yu Shi Fa Suo Bu She Deng Zhe' (或余實法所不攝等者, or those not included in other real dharmas, etc.). Some commentaries explain this as the cause of the opposition between false and real dharmas. That is, what is outside of false dharmas is outside of real dharmas. This is unreasonable because their school believes that 'De' (得, attainment) and others are outside of false dharmas, but are included in real dharmas, so this cause cannot be established. Therefore, it is now explained separately as not being included in the remaining real dharmas such as form and mind, except for non-associated formations. In detail, according to the 'Guan Shu' (觀疏, Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra), there is indeed no fault in the overlapping simplification. Why add unnecessary details? Therefore, the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) briefly says: 'The word 'remaining' here shows that it is not included in form, mind, etc.' Since it is said that it is not included in form and mind, can it not prevent the fault of 'one of'? Moreover, the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) also says: 'If the word 'Xu' (許, permission) is not mentioned, 'one of' cannot be established.' This is precisely to show that although other schools believe that 'De' (得, attainment) is included in real dharmas, it shows that one's own school believes that 'De' (得, attainment) is not included in real dharmas, so the word 'Xu' (許, permission) is set. The word 'Xu' (許, permission) has two meanings: one is to allow that real dharmas such as form and mind do not include 'De' (得, attainment), which is recognized by both one's own school and other schools; the other is to allow that 'De' (得, attainment) is only not included in real dharmas, which is only recognized by one's own school. The breadth and narrowness of the word 'Xu' (許, permission) exhaust the possibility of distinguishing faults. How can the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) be unreasonable?
Commentary: 'Bu Neng Qi Yin You San Zhe' (不能起因有三者, there are three causes that cannot arise), from the outside, three causes are used to explain that 'De' (得, attainment) can arise, which are the external rescues, etc. in the following treatise.
Commentary: 'Lun Zhu Liu Nan Zhe' (論主六難者, the treatise master's six difficulties) uses six difficulties to refute the three causes.
Treatise: 'Wei De Yi Shi Ying Yong Bu Sheng Zhe' (未得已失應永不生者, what has not been attained and has already been lost should never arise), Question: What should arise in the future, but cannot arise due to lack of conditions, can also be called lost, so it will definitely not arise, because 'De' (得, attainment) is not cessation by discrimination. Is it not consistent to use this to question now? Answer: The words in the treatise are general, and the quantity should be simplified.
Treatise: 'Yi Qie Fei Qing Ying Yong Bu Qi Zhe' (一切非情應永不起者, all non-sentient beings should never arise), their school does not allow the establishment of 'De' (得, attainment) in other bodies and non-sentient beings, so the fourth volume of the 'Abhidharmakośa' (俱舍論, Abhidharmakośa) says: 'It is not the continuity of others, because there is no dharma that achieves the body of others; it is not non-sentient, because there is no dharma that achieves non-sentient beings.' Explanation: If the body of others is achieved, there will be the fault of self and others being mixed in the interesting body karma. 'Fei Fei Xiang Xu' (非非相續, non-non-continuity) refers to non-sentient beings. If non-sentient beings are achieved, the nature of dharma will be destroyed, will it be sentient or non-sentient?
【English Translation】 'Yi Wu' (義無, absence of meaning) refers to the nature established through hypothetical statements based on conventional language and the self-nature of things. 'Wu Bi Jing Wu' (五畢竟無, five ultimately non-existent things) refers to things like the horns of a rabbit, which simply do not exist.
Treatise: 'Huo Yu Shi Fa Suo Bu She Deng Zhe' (或余實法所不攝等者, or those not included in other real dharmas, etc.). Some commentaries explain this as the cause of the opposition between false and real dharmas. That is, what is outside of false dharmas is outside of real dharmas. This is unreasonable because their school believes that 'De' (得, attainment) and others are outside of false dharmas, but are included in real dharmas, so this cause cannot be established. Therefore, it is now explained separately as not being included in the remaining real dharmas such as form and mind, except for non-associated formations. In detail, according to the 'Guan Shu' (觀疏, Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra), there is indeed no fault in the overlapping simplification. Why add unnecessary details? Therefore, the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) briefly says: 'The word 'remaining' here shows that it is not included in form, mind, etc.' Since it is said that it is not included in form and mind, can it not prevent the fault of 'one of'? Moreover, the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) also says: 'If the word 'Xu' (許, permission) is not mentioned, 'one of' cannot be established.' This is precisely to show that although other schools believe that 'De' (得, attainment) is included in real dharmas, it shows that one's own school believes that 'De' (得, attainment) is not included in real dharmas, so the word 'Xu' (許, permission) is set. The word 'Xu' (許, permission) has two meanings: one is to allow that real dharmas such as form and mind do not include 'De' (得, attainment), which is recognized by both one's own school and other schools; the other is to allow that 'De' (得, attainment) is only not included in real dharmas, which is only recognized by one's own school. The breadth and narrowness of the word 'Xu' (許, permission) exhaust the possibility of distinguishing faults. How can the 'Shu' (疏, Commentary) be unreasonable?
Commentary: 'Bu Neng Qi Yin You San Zhe' (不能起因有三者, there are three causes that cannot arise), from the outside, three causes are used to explain that 'De' (得, attainment) can arise, which are the external rescues, etc. in the following treatise.
Commentary: 'Lun Zhu Liu Nan Zhe' (論主六難者, the treatise master's six difficulties) uses six difficulties to refute the three causes.
Treatise: 'Wei De Yi Shi Ying Yong Bu Sheng Zhe' (未得已失應永不生者, what has not been attained and has already been lost should never arise), Question: What should arise in the future, but cannot arise due to lack of conditions, can also be called lost, so it will definitely not arise, because 'De' (得, attainment) is not cessation by discrimination. Is it not consistent to use this to question now? Answer: The words in the treatise are general, and the quantity should be simplified.
Treatise: 'Yi Qie Fei Qing Ying Yong Bu Qi Zhe' (一切非情應永不起者, all non-sentient beings should never arise), their school does not allow the establishment of 'De' (得, attainment) in other bodies and non-sentient beings, so the fourth volume of the 'Abhidharmakośa' (俱舍論, Abhidharmakośa) says: 'It is not the continuity of others, because there is no dharma that achieves the body of others; it is not non-sentient, because there is no dharma that achieves non-sentient beings.' Explanation: If the body of others is achieved, there will be the fault of self and others being mixed in the interesting body karma. 'Fei Fei Xiang Xu' (非非相續, non-non-continuity) refers to non-sentient beings. If non-sentient beings are achieved, the nature of dharma will be destroyed, will it be sentient or non-sentient?
疏。須即緣者。即無漏智欲緣真如而即能緣。由智有種能起現緣。
疏。前何須者。不離有情法自成就。詎假得乎。
疏。后即無故者。離有情法法體即無。如龜毛等。何依立得。
論。然依有情至立三種成就者。問得．獲．成就三何別耶。答若依小宗總別有異。得總余別。故俱舍論第四云。得有二種。一者未得已失今獲。二者得已不失成就。故體義同。依總別門分差別稱 釋獲．成就二差別者。有云。若法未得及得已失俱今初得。此法上得創至生相即名為獲。若流至現得已不失名為成就。獲時不名成。成就不名獲。若古德釋。成通新舊。獲唯據新。其中得失如彼論鈔。若大乘者義乃通矣。如現行法雖唯新得。亦得名為現行成就。種有新重．本有二別。俱名成就亦名得．獲。故瑜伽論五十二云。云何得．獲．成就。謂若略說。生緣．攝受．增盛之因說名為得 釋曰。種是生果之因緣故名為生緣。由種有生果之功能果方得有種名攝受。即所生果名為增盛。或種有彼生果勢用名為增盛。增盛即因。由有此能假立為得。廣有同異如彼鈔釋 問于彼他身．及非情上而有得耶 答正辨如疏。復有二說 一云非情外器自所變者種成非現。現行非情非內身故。若成就彼應名有情。若他所變非自種生。若種若現俱非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：疏解：『須即緣者』，意思是說無漏智慧想要緣于真如（宇宙萬物的本性），並且能夠緣到。這是因為智慧具有一種能力，能夠引發顯現的緣起。 疏解：『前何須者』，意思是如果不依賴於有情眾生，那麼法（事物）本身就自然成就，哪裡還需要去獲得呢？ 疏解：『后即無故者』，意思是如果脫離了有情眾生，那麼法的本體就什麼都沒有，就像烏龜的毛一樣，無所依憑，如何能夠成立呢？ 論：『然依有情至立三種成就者』，提問：『得』（prapti，獲得）、『獲』（labha，取得）、『成就』（siddhi，成就）這三者有什麼區別呢？回答：如果按照小乘宗派的觀點，總體和個別上存在差異。『得』是總稱，其餘兩個是別稱。所以《俱舍論》第四卷說：『得有兩種，一是未得已失現在獲得，二是已得不失成就。』因此，本體意義相同，只是根據總別之門來區分差別。解釋『獲』和『成就』的差別在於：有人說，如果法是未曾獲得或者已經失去而現在初次獲得，那麼在這種法上，獲得最初生起的狀態就叫做『獲』。如果（法）流轉到顯現，獲得后沒有失去，就叫做『成就』。獲得的時候不叫做成就，成就的時候不叫做獲得。如果是古代德行的解釋，『成就』可以通用於新的和舊的，『獲』只適用於新的。其中的得失就像《俱舍論鈔》所說的那樣。如果按照大乘的觀點，意義就貫通了。比如現行法雖然只是新獲得的，也可以叫做現行成就。種子有新熏習的和本有的兩種區別，都可以叫做成就，也可以叫做『得』、『獲』。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『什麼是得、獲、成就？』如果簡略地說，產生緣起、攝受、增盛的原因叫做『得』。解釋說：種子是產生結果的原因，所以叫做產生緣起。由於種子具有產生結果的功能，結果才能夠存在，種子因此被稱為攝受。所產生的結果叫做增盛。或者種子具有產生結果的勢用，叫做增盛。增盛就是原因。由於具有這種能力，假立為『得』。廣義上的相同和不同，就像《瑜伽師地論鈔》所解釋的那樣。提問：在其他的身體上以及非有情的事物上，會有『得』嗎？回答：正確的辨析就像疏解所說的那樣。還有兩種說法：一種說法是，非有情的外在器物是自身所變化的，種子是成就而非現行。現行不是有情，也不是內在的身體。如果成就了它，就應該叫做有情。如果是他人所變化的，不是自身種子所生的，那麼無論是種子還是現行，都不是。
【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: 『sū kīṃ cid ārabheta』 means that the unconditioned wisdom wants to connect with the tathatā (suchness, the true nature of all things) and is able to connect. This is because wisdom has a capacity to initiate manifest conditions. Commentary: 『pūrvaṃ kimapekṣam』 means if it does not rely on sentient beings, then the dharma (things) itself will naturally be accomplished, where is the need to obtain it? Commentary: 『paścād abhāvaḥ kutaḥ』 means if it is separated from sentient beings, then the essence of the dharma will be nothing, like the hair of a tortoise, without any reliance, how can it be established? Treatise: 『atha sattvān niśritya trayaḥ siddhayaḥ sthāpyante』 Question: What are the differences between 『prapti』 (attainment), 『labha』 (acquisition), and 『siddhi』 (accomplishment)? Answer: According to the Hinayana schools, there are differences in general and specific terms. 『Prapti』 is the general term, and the other two are specific terms. Therefore, the fourth volume of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says: 『Prapti has two types: one is not yet attained, already lost, and now acquired; the other is already attained and not lost, accomplished.』 Therefore, the essence is the same, but the differences are distinguished according to the general and specific aspects. Explaining the difference between 『labha』 and 『siddhi』: Some say that if a dharma has not been obtained or has been lost and is now obtained for the first time, then the state of the initial arising of attainment on this dharma is called 『labha』. If (the dharma) flows to manifestation and is obtained without being lost, it is called 『siddhi』. The time of acquisition is not called accomplishment, and the time of accomplishment is not called acquisition. According to the interpretation of ancient virtues, 『siddhi』 can be applied to both new and old, while 『labha』 only applies to new. The gains and losses are as described in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya commentary. According to the Mahayana view, the meaning is consistent. For example, although the currently active dharma is only newly obtained, it can also be called current accomplishment. Seeds have two distinctions: newly conditioned and inherent. Both can be called accomplishment, and can also be called 『prapti』 and 『labha』. Therefore, the fifty-second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『What are prapti, labha, and siddhi?』 Briefly speaking, the causes of arising, reception, and increase are called 『prapti』. Explanation: Seeds are the cause of producing results, so they are called arising. Because seeds have the function of producing results, the results can exist, and the seeds are therefore called reception. The produced result is called increase. Or the seeds have the power to produce results, which is called increase. Increase is the cause. Because of this ability, it is hypothetically established as 『prapti』. The similarities and differences in a broader sense are as explained in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra commentary. Question: Is there 『prapti』 in other bodies and non-sentient things? Answer: The correct analysis is as described in the commentary. There are two other views: One view is that the external objects of non-sentient beings are transformed by themselves, and the seeds are accomplished but not manifest. Manifestation is not sentient and is not an internal body. If it is accomplished, it should be called sentient. If it is transformed by others and not born from one's own seeds, then neither the seeds nor the manifestation are.
成就。若於他身自所變者。種成非現。若成現行應自身攝。若他所變若種若現皆非所成 一云非情．及與他身自所變者。種現俱成。雖非執受攝為己體。從自種子非外起故。自識變故。不離識故。彼亦說名為可成法。他變他身外器虛空名非可成。非自種生．自識變故 詳曰。后說為勝。不違唯識。復順下說變他扶塵正義所說。若變他．器現不成者。云何受用他之扶塵及外器色。又豈所受但種非現。而言種成非現成耶。
疏。然五十六者。依撿彼論云。得依因．自在．現行分位建立。此復三種。謂種子．自在．現行成就。更無餘也。疏對雜集而舉來者。意明是說得等之文。不言彼即與雜集同一處引也。
疏。對法第五至亦名不成就者。按彼論云。種子成者謂若生欲界。色．無色界系煩惱．隨煩惱由種子成就故成熟及生得善 釋曰是本論也。唯明煩惱．及生得善。論依未離欲異生說。若已離欲或生上地。隨所離欲。即此地煩惱．隨煩惱。亦成就亦不成就未永言隨眠故。對治道所損故。如其次第。及生得善隨所生地即此地成就 釋曰師子覺釋。本論但依欲界未離欲說。釋論兼據離欲生上及上二界明成不成。此即欲界。論若生色界欲界系煩惱．隨煩惱。由種子成就故。成就亦名不成就。色．無色界系煩惱．隨煩惱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：成就。如果是在他人身上或者自身所變化的事物，那麼只有種子成就而非現行成就。如果成就的是現行，那麼應該屬於自身所攝。如果是他人所變化的事物，無論是種子還是現行，都不是所能成就的。有一種說法是，非情之物以及他人之身，自身所變化的事物，種子和現行都成就。雖然不是執受所攝，但作為自身的體性，因為是從自身種子生起而不是從外部生起，是自身意識所變現，不離於識，所以也被稱為可成就之法。他人所變現的他身、外器、虛空，則不是可成就之法，因為不是自身種子所生，也不是自身意識所變現。詳細地說，后一種說法更為殊勝，不違背唯識的觀點，也順應了下文所說的變現他人扶塵的正義。如果變現他人的扶塵不是現行成就，那麼如何受用他人的扶塵以及外器色？難道所受用的只是種子而非現行，所以才說種子成就而非現行成就嗎？ 疏文中提到的五十六種成就，是依據《瑜伽師地論》所說，從得依因（Detayāna）、自在（Īśvara）、現行（Ābhoga）的分位來建立的。這又分為三種，即種子成就、自在成就、現行成就，沒有其他的了。疏文對照《雜集論》而舉出，意在說明這是關於『得』等的文句，並不是說它與《雜集論》在同一處被引用。 疏文中提到的《對法論》第五，以及『亦名不成就』等內容，是根據《阿毗達磨集論》所說，『種子成者，謂若生欲界，色、無色界系煩惱、隨煩惱由種子成就故成熟及生得善』。釋文中說這是本論的內容，只說明瞭煩惱以及生得善。本論是依據未離欲的異生而說的。如果已經離欲，或者生於上地，那麼隨著所離的慾望，此地的煩惱、隨煩惱，也成就，也不成就，因為沒有永遠斷除隨眠，也因為對治道有所損害。如其次第，以及生得善，隨著所生的地，此地就成就。釋文中說，師子覺的解釋是，本論只是依據欲界未離欲的情況而說，而釋論則兼顧了離欲生上以及上二界，來說明成就與不成就。這裡指的是欲界的情況。論中說，『若生欲界系煩惱、隨煩惱，由種子成就故，成就亦名不成就。色、無色界系煩惱、隨煩惱』。
【English Translation】 English version: Accomplishment. If it is something transformed in another's body or one's own, then only the seed is accomplished, not the present action. If the present action is accomplished, then it should be included within oneself. If it is transformed by another, whether seed or present action, it is not what can be accomplished. One view is that non-sentient things, as well as another's body and what is transformed by oneself, both seed and present action are accomplished. Although not included in what is grasped as one's own, it is taken as one's own nature because it arises from one's own seed and not from outside, and because it is transformed by one's own consciousness and is not separate from consciousness, so it is also called an accomplishable dharma. What is transformed by another, such as another's body, external objects, and space, are not accomplishable because they are not born from one's own seed and are not transformed by one's own consciousness. In detail, the latter view is more superior, not contradicting the Yogācāra (唯識) perspective, and also in accordance with the correct meaning of transforming another's supporting dust as mentioned below. If the transformation of another's supporting dust is not accomplished in the present action, then how can one enjoy another's supporting dust and external objects? Is it that what is enjoyed is only the seed and not the present action, so it is said that the seed is accomplished but not the present action? The fifty-six kinds of accomplishments mentioned in the commentary are established according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), based on the divisions of Detayāna (得依因), Īśvara (自在), and Ābhoga (現行). These are further divided into three types: seed accomplishment, Īśvara accomplishment, and Ābhoga accomplishment. There are no others. The commentary cites the Abhidharma-samuccaya (雜集論) to clarify that these are sentences about 'attainment' and so on, not to say that it is quoted from the same place as the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The fifth section of the Abhidharma-sūtra (對法論) mentioned in the commentary, as well as the content such as 'also called non-accomplishment,' is based on the Abhidharmasamuccaya (阿毗達磨集論), which states, 'Seed accomplishment means that if one is born in the desire realm, the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the form and formless realms are matured because of the accomplishment of the seeds, and the naturally acquired goodness.' The commentary says that this is the content of the original treatise, which only explains afflictions and naturally acquired goodness. The original treatise is based on the view of ordinary beings who have not yet detached from desire. If one has already detached from desire or is born in the higher realms, then according to the desire that has been detached, the afflictions and secondary afflictions of that realm are both accomplished and not accomplished, because the latent tendencies have not been permanently eliminated, and because the antidotal path has caused some damage. In order, and the naturally acquired goodness, according to the realm in which one is born, that realm is accomplished. The commentary says that the explanation of Śīla-buddhi (師子覺) is that the original treatise only speaks according to the situation of the desire realm where one has not detached from desire, while the commentary takes into account those who have detached from desire and are born in the upper realms, as well as the upper two realms, to explain accomplishment and non-accomplishment. This refers to the situation of the desire realm. The treatise says, 'If one is born in the desire realm, the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the desire realm are accomplished because of the accomplishment of the seeds, and are also called non-accomplishment. The afflictions and secondary afflictions of the form and formless realms.'
。由種子成就故。成就及生得善。若生無色界欲．色界系煩惱．隨煩惱。由種子成就故。成就亦名不成。無色界系煩惱．隨煩惱。由種子成就故。成就及生得善 釋曰。此釋論者明上二界成．不成就。夫生上地必伏下惑。故上對下名成．不成。種在名成。其生得善不起異界。故皆當地名之為成 問生上二界有離自染。何故自地不名不成 答文略故也 或前欲界明離自染名成．不成。例上應爾。故不舉也 問如上將下起下地愛此即唯成。云何名為亦不成耶 答據多分說。又依上生不說生下。非委談也 問生二界上地之時亦離下染。云何生上當界之惑總名成耶 答依界而論。不據地說。
疏。無不成就者。無煩惱用名不成就。
疏。然準對法至通成不成者。如在一界。余界生得望有種故名為成就。現行不起名不成就。
疏。以在他界至唯說成就者。釋對法論不說所以。煩惱容有起他地者。對起．不起名成．不成。生得善法無起異界。不同煩惱故但說成。
疏。亦不說現行名種子成就者。但生得善種有其用即名成就。不要生現方始名為種子成就 有云。此論第八說于現行亦名為種。故今簡之 詳曰。雖有此理然乖疏旨。
疏。此依我見至及不成者。此我見斷而有兩說 一云即與當地第九惑同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於種子而成就，成就和生得善法。如果生於無慾界，（沒有）繫縛煩惱和隨煩惱，由於種子而成就，成就也稱為不成。沒有繫縛煩惱和隨煩惱，由於種子而成就，成就和生得善法。《釋》曰：這是解釋論者闡明上二界（色界和無色界）的成就與不成就。凡是生於上地者，必定降伏地獄的迷惑，所以上界對地獄來說，稱為成就與不成就。種子存在時稱為成就，其生得的善法不會在其他界生起，所以在當地都稱為成就。問：生於上二界有遠離自身染污的情況，為什麼在自身所處的界不稱為不成就呢？答：這是因為文句省略了。或者，前面欲界說明了遠離自身染污稱為成就與不成就，按照這個例子，上二界也應該如此，所以沒有提及。問：如果將地獄（的煩惱）帶到上界，生起下地的愛，這僅僅是成就，為什麼又稱為不成就呢？答：這是根據大多數情況來說的。而且依據生於上界的情況，沒有說生於地獄的情況，不是詳細討論。問：生於二界上地的時候，也遠離了地獄的染污，為什麼生於上界時，該界所有的迷惑都總稱為成就呢？答：這是依據界來論述的，不是依據地來說的。 疏：沒有不成就的情況，沒有煩惱的作用稱為不成就。 疏：然而，根據《對法論》到『通成不成』，例如在一個界，對於其他界生得的（善法），因為有種子，所以稱為成就。現行不起作用，稱為不成就。 疏：因為在其他界到『唯說成就』，解釋《對法論》沒有說明原因。煩惱容許有生起其他地的（情況），對於生起與不生起，稱為成就與不成就。生得的善法沒有生起其他界的情況，和煩惱不同，所以只說成就。 疏：也沒有說現行稱為種子成就，只是生得的善種有其作用就稱為成就，不需要生起現行才稱為種子成就。有人說：《俱舍論》第八說現行也稱為種，所以現在要加以區分。詳細地說：雖然有這個道理，但是不符合疏的旨意。 疏：這是依據我見到『及不成者』，對於我見的斷除，有兩種說法：一種說法是與當地第九惑相同。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the seed's accomplishment, accomplishment and naturally acquired goodness occur. If born in the realm without desire, (without) the bondage of afflictions and secondary afflictions, because of the seed's accomplishment, accomplishment is also called non-accomplishment. Without the bondage of afflictions and secondary afflictions, because of the seed's accomplishment, accomplishment and naturally acquired goodness occur. Commentary: This explanation clarifies the accomplishment and non-accomplishment of the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm). Whoever is born in the upper realms must subdue the delusions of the lower realms, so the upper realms are called accomplishment and non-accomplishment in relation to the lower realms. When the seed exists, it is called accomplishment; the naturally acquired goodness does not arise in other realms, so it is called accomplishment in its own realm. Question: Those born in the upper two realms have abandoned their own defilements, so why is it not called non-accomplishment in their own realm? Answer: This is because the sentence is abbreviated. Or, the previous Desire Realm explained that abandoning one's own defilements is called accomplishment and non-accomplishment; according to this example, the upper two realms should also be like this, so it is not mentioned. Question: If one brings (afflictions) from the lower realm to the upper realm, giving rise to love for the lower realm, this is only accomplishment, so why is it also called non-accomplishment? Answer: This is according to most situations. Moreover, according to the situation of being born in the upper realm, the situation of being born in the lower realm is not mentioned; it is not a detailed discussion. Question: When one is born in the upper realms of the two realms, one also abandons the defilements of the lower realms, so why are all the delusions of that realm collectively called accomplishment when one is born in the upper realm? Answer: This is discussed according to the realm, not according to the location. Commentary: There is no non-accomplishment; the absence of the function of afflictions is called non-accomplishment. Commentary: However, according to the 'Abhidharma' to 'universal accomplishment and non-accomplishment,' for example, in one realm, for the naturally acquired (goodness) of other realms, because there is a seed, it is called accomplishment. When the present action does not arise, it is called non-accomplishment. Commentary: Because it is in other realms to 'only speaks of accomplishment,' the explanation of the 'Abhidharma' does not explain the reason. Afflictions may arise in other realms; for arising and not arising, it is called accomplishment and non-accomplishment. Naturally acquired goodness does not arise in other realms, which is different from afflictions, so only accomplishment is mentioned. Commentary: It is also not said that present action is called seed accomplishment; only when the naturally acquired good seed has its function is it called accomplishment; it is not necessary for present action to arise before it is called seed accomplishment. Some say: The eighth chapter of the 'Abhidharmakosa' says that present action is also called a seed, so we must now distinguish it. In detail: Although there is this reason, it does not conform to the meaning of the commentary. Commentary: This is based on the view of self to 'and non-accomplishment'; there are two views on the cutting off of the view of self: One view is that it is the same as the ninth delusion of the local area.
時斷 一云九地第六我見。皆至金剛一時頓斷。今依初義。若后義者。離欲之時有斷．未斷 有云。約伏有成．不成 詳曰。不然。疏自標云若無漏道依染種體名成．不成。故知約斷。若是伏者前已明訖。何須重明。
疏。如斷善根用不成者。問正斷善際但除生得。云何加行用不成耶 答生得劣善彼時猶無。加行勝善云何得有。又若斷善加行位時。彼方便善而已不起。後方正斷生得善也。若不爾者彼邪見心。何力能斷生得善耶。由此總言邪見斷善。邪見加行亦名邪見。即斷加行．生得二善。若根本邪見名為邪見言見斷善。唯斷生得故。諸聖教說斷于善。寬狹不同當如斯會。
疏。以種隱難知等者。問按顯揚論。種合為一。現行開二。何乃不同 答有二釋。一如義燈。一云有義顯揚論意種子類同故合為一。現行相別故開二種 問如小乘中得有三種。謂俱．前．后。大乘同耶 答有義兩釋。一云既無二世無前後得。但隨所成可名法俱。二云或可義說應別安立。如現行法由熏習力得而不失名法后得。引發種子為生現行名法前得。此前．后時唯依種立。俱時種．現名法俱得。無為之得名非前．后 詳曰。理雖可通然義稍狹。不說種有三種得故。而今釋者。過．未雖無而於現在假立三世。依於三世如次立彼后．俱．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 時斷：一種觀點認為，第九地（Navama-bhūmi）的第六我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi）在金剛喻定（Vajropama-samādhi）時頓然斷除。現在依據第一種觀點。如果依據后一種觀點，那麼離欲（vītarāga）之時，是斷了還是未斷？有人說，這要看是否已經通過修行伏住了煩惱。詳細來說，並非如此。疏文（指《成唯識論述記》）自己標明，如果無漏道（anāsrava-mārga）依附於染污種子的體性，那麼是『成』還是『不成』，所以可知是關於斷除的。如果是伏住煩惱，那麼前面已經說明過了，何須再次說明。
疏文：如果斷善根（kuśala-mūla）時，『用不成』，那麼請問，在真正斷善根的時候，只是除去了生得善（upapattilābha-kuśala），為什麼說加行善（prayogalābha-kuśala）的『用』也不成呢？回答：因為生得的劣善（hīna-kuśala）那時還沒有，加行的殊勝善（praṇīta-kuśala）又怎麼會有呢？而且，如果斷善根是在加行位（prayoga-avasthā）時，那麼方便善（upāya-kuśala）就已經不生起了，之後才真正斷除生得善。如果不是這樣，那麼邪見心（mithyā-dṛṣṭi-citta）有什麼力量能夠斷除生得善呢？因此總的來說，邪見斷善，邪見的加行也名為邪見，即斷除了加行善和生得善。如果根本邪見（mūla-mithyā-dṛṣṭi）名為邪見，說『見斷善』，那麼只是斷除了生得善。因此，各種聖教（ārya-śāsana）所說的『斷于善』，寬泛程度不同，應當這樣理解。
疏文：因為種子隱沒難以知曉等等。請問，按照《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra）的說法，種子（bīja）合為一個，現行（pratyaya）分為二個，為什麼這裡不同呢？回答：有兩種解釋。一種如義燈（Yideng）所說，一種觀點認為，《顯揚聖教論》的意思是種子種類相同，所以合為一個；現行相狀不同，所以分為兩種。請問，如小乘（Hīnayāna）中，得（prāpti）有三種，即俱得（sahajāta-prāpti）、前得（pūrvajāta-prāpti）、后得（paścāt-jāta-prāpti），大乘（Mahāyāna）也是這樣嗎？回答：有兩種解釋。一種觀點認為，既然沒有二世（dvaya-adhvan），就沒有前後得，但可以隨著所成就的法（dharma）而名為法俱得。另一種觀點認為，或許可以根據意義來分別安立。如現行法由熏習力（vāsanā-bala）獲得而不失，名為法后得；引發種子而生現行，名為法前得。這前、后時，只是依種子而立。俱時生起的種子和現行，名為法俱得。無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma）的獲得，不屬於前得或后得。詳細來說，道理上雖然可以通達，但意義稍顯狹隘，因為沒有說種子有三種得。而現在解釋的人，雖然過去和未來沒有，但在現在假立三世，依據三世依次安立后得、俱得。
【English Translation】 English version Temporary Interruption: One view holds that the sixth self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi) of the ninth ground (Navama-bhūmi) is abruptly severed at the time of the Vajra-like Samādhi (Vajropama-samādhi). We now rely on the first view. According to the latter view, at the time of detachment (vītarāga), is it severed or not severed? Some say it depends on whether the afflictions have been subdued through practice. In detail, it is not so. The commentary (referring to the 'Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only') itself indicates that if the undefiled path (anāsrava-mārga) relies on the nature of defiled seeds, is it 'accomplished' or 'not accomplished'? Therefore, it is known to be about severance. If it is about subduing afflictions, then it has already been explained earlier, so why explain it again?
Commentary: If the 'function is not accomplished' when severing roots of goodness (kuśala-mūla), then please ask, at the time of truly severing roots of goodness, only the innate goodness (upapattilābha-kuśala) is removed, so why is it said that the 'function' of acquired goodness (prayogalābha-kuśala) is also not accomplished? Answer: Because the inferior innate goodness (hīna-kuśala) is not yet present at that time, how can there be the superior acquired goodness (praṇīta-kuśala)? Moreover, if severing roots of goodness is at the stage of application (prayoga-avasthā), then skillful means (upāya-kuśala) will no longer arise, and only then will innate goodness be truly severed. If it is not so, then what power does the wrong view mind (mithyā-dṛṣṭi-citta) have to sever innate goodness? Therefore, generally speaking, wrong view severs goodness, and the application of wrong view is also called wrong view, which severs both acquired goodness and innate goodness. If the fundamental wrong view (mūla-mithyā-dṛṣṭi) is called wrong view, saying 'view severs goodness,' then only innate goodness is severed. Therefore, the various teachings of the saints (ārya-śāsana) speak of 'severing goodness' with different degrees of breadth, and should be understood in this way.
Commentary: Because seeds are hidden and difficult to know, etc. Please ask, according to the 'Ornament of Clear Realization' (Abhisamayālaṃkāra), seeds (bīja) are combined into one, and manifestations (pratyaya) are divided into two, why is it different here? Answer: There are two explanations. One is as explained in the 'Lamp of Meaning' (Yideng), and one view holds that the 'Ornament of Clear Realization' means that seeds are of the same kind, so they are combined into one; manifestations are different in appearance, so they are divided into two. Please ask, as in the Lesser Vehicle (Hīnayāna), there are three kinds of attainment (prāpti), namely, simultaneous attainment (sahajāta-prāpti), prior attainment (pūrvajāta-prāpti), and subsequent attainment (paścāt-jāta-prāpti), is it the same in the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna)? Answer: There are two explanations. One view holds that since there are no two times (dvaya-adhvan), there is no prior or subsequent attainment, but it can be called simultaneous attainment of dharma (dharma) according to the dharma that is accomplished. Another view holds that perhaps it can be established separately according to meaning. For example, the manifested dharma that is obtained and not lost through the power of habituation (vāsanā-bala) is called subsequent attainment of dharma; the seed that gives rise to manifestation is called prior attainment of dharma. This prior and subsequent time is only established based on seeds. Seeds and manifestations that arise simultaneously are called simultaneous attainment of dharma. The attainment of unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta-dharma) does not belong to prior or subsequent attainment. In detail, although it can be understood in principle, the meaning is slightly narrow, because it does not say that seeds have three kinds of attainment. And those who explain it now, although the past and future do not exist, they falsely establish three times in the present, and establish subsequent attainment and simultaneous attainment in order according to the three times.
前得。
疏。今者大乘擇滅之得定屬道等者。有說得者唯依有為。分位別故。無為無得。無有功能前後分位差別義故。諸論皆言于其種．現而立得故。未曾有處於無為法立不相應。而余處言得擇滅者。由解脫道證會擇滅假說得言。不別建立不相應得。故於無為唯有智證 詳曰。按教準理。諸無為法亦有得得。故雜集論第五云。謂于善．不善．無記法。若增若減假立得．獲．成就。既云于善而立得等。無為何無。文不遮故。言增減者即得．非得。證得名增。不得名減 又云。問何等名為解脫得因。答若於真如先已集起煩惱粗重。若遇隨順得對治緣便能永害。此堪任性名解脫得因 釋曰。無始時來障真理惑名先起惑。善友正教名為隨順得對治緣。此堪任性即能對治。體無漏種。或即現行無漏聖道。無漏聖道即是解脫得之因也 既自明言解脫之得。明知無為立得何失。又說聖道為能得因。故無為得屬能得道 又按俱舍。擇滅之得屬能得道。非擇滅得隨所依身。雖復小教大乘不破亦可為證。此明有教。不同有為有多分位得屬所得。故諸聖教而不具言亦無失矣。而言理者。且實真如體唯一種。對望不同。分為三．四．及六．八等。今望證會而有不同。立得何失。若無分位不許立得。既無分位。亦應不得說多差別。彼此別因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
前得。
疏：現在大乘宗認為，擇滅的獲得確定屬於道等。有人說，『得』只能依據有為法，因為有分位的差別。無為法沒有『得』，因為它沒有功能、前後分位的差別。各種論典都說，在種子、現行上建立『得』。未曾有在無為法上建立不相應的說法。而其他地方說獲得擇滅，是因為解脫道證悟了擇滅，假說為『得』，不另外建立不相應的『得』。因此，對於無為法，只有智慧的證悟。詳細地說，按照教義和道理，各種無為法也有『得』。所以《雜集論》第五卷說：『對於善、不善、無記法，如果增加或減少，就假立為得、獲、成就。』既然說對於善法而建立『得』等，無為法為什麼沒有呢？經文沒有遮止。所說的增加或減少，就是『得』和『非得』。證得稱為增加，不得稱為減少。又說：『問：什麼叫做解脫的得因？答：如果對於真如（tathata，事物的真實如是之性）先前已經積聚了煩惱粗重，如果遇到隨順的對治因緣，就能永遠斷除。這種堪能性叫做解脫的得因。』解釋說：無始以來，障礙真理的迷惑叫做先前生起的迷惑。善友的正教叫做隨順的對治因緣。這種堪能性就能對治，本體是無漏的種子，或者就是現行的無漏聖道。無漏聖道就是解脫的得因。既然自己明白地說了解脫的『得』，明明知道在無為法上建立『得』有什麼過失呢？又說聖道是能得之因，所以無為的『得』屬於能得之道。又按照《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，論述佛教認知的論著），擇滅的『得』屬於能得之道，非擇滅的『得』隨所依之身。即使是小乘教義，大乘也不破斥，也可以作為證明。這說明有教義依據。不同於有為法有多種分位，『得』屬於所得。所以各種聖教沒有完全說清楚也沒有過失。說到道理，而且真實的真如體只有一種，對望不同，分為三、四以及六、八等。現在希望證悟而有不同，建立『得』有什麼過失呢？如果沒有分位就不允許建立『得』，既然沒有分位，也就不應該說有多種差別，彼此是不同的原因。
【English Translation】 English version:
Prāpta (前得, attainment).
Commentary: Now, the Mahāyāna school determines that the attainment of Nirodhanirodha (擇滅, cessation through wisdom) definitely belongs to the path, etc. Some say that 'attainment' can only be based on conditioned dharmas (有為法, saṃskṛta-dharma), because there are distinctions in phases. Unconditioned dharmas (無為法, asaṃskṛta-dharma) do not have 'attainment' because they lack the function and the distinction of phases before and after. Various treatises say that 'attainment' is established on the basis of seeds and manifestations. There has never been a case of establishing non-correspondence on unconditioned dharmas. However, other places say that the attainment of Nirodhanirodha is because the path of liberation realizes Nirodhanirodha, so it is hypothetically called 'attainment,' and no separate non-corresponding 'attainment' is established. Therefore, for unconditioned dharmas, there is only the realization of wisdom. In detail, according to the teachings and principles, various unconditioned dharmas also have 'attainment.' Therefore, the fifth volume of the Saṃgrahaṇī (雜集論, Compendium of Determinations) says: 'For good, unwholesome, and neutral dharmas, if there is an increase or decrease, it is hypothetically established as attainment, acquisition, or accomplishment.' Since it is said that 'attainment,' etc., is established for good dharmas, why would unconditioned dharmas not have it? The text does not prohibit it. The so-called increase or decrease is 'attainment' and 'non-attainment.' Realization is called increase, and non-attainment is called decrease. It also says: 'Question: What is called the cause of the attainment of liberation? Answer: If one has previously accumulated afflictions and coarse burdens towards tathatā (真如, suchness), if one encounters favorable conditions for counteracting them, one can permanently eliminate them. This potentiality is called the cause of the attainment of liberation.' The explanation says: Since beginningless time, the delusion that obstructs the truth is called the previously arisen delusion. The correct teachings of good friends are called favorable conditions for counteracting them. This potentiality can counteract them, and its essence is a seed of non-outflow, or it is the present non-outflow noble path. The non-outflow noble path is the cause of the attainment of liberation. Since it clearly says the 'attainment' of liberation, it is clear that there is no fault in establishing 'attainment' on unconditioned dharmas. It also says that the noble path is the cause of attainment, so the unconditioned 'attainment' belongs to the path of attainment. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論, Treasury of Abhidharma), the 'attainment' of Nirodhanirodha belongs to the path of attainment, and the 'attainment' of Apratisamkhyanirodha (非擇滅, cessation without wisdom) follows the body it relies on. Even if it is the teachings of the Hīnayāna, the Mahāyāna does not refute it, and it can also be used as proof. This shows that there is a basis in the teachings. Unlike conditioned dharmas, which have multiple phases, 'attainment' belongs to what is attained. Therefore, there is no fault even if the various sacred teachings do not fully explain it. Speaking of principles, the true essence of tathatā is only one kind, but viewed differently, it is divided into three, four, six, eight, etc. Now, hoping for realization, there are differences, so what fault is there in establishing 'attainment'? If there are no phases, it is not allowed to establish 'attainment.' Since there are no phases, it should not be said that there are many differences, and they are different causes from each other.
誠不可得。故立為善。
論。翻此假立不成就名者。問既翻得等非得亦名不獲．不成。不獲．不成云何差異 答大乘無文。習小乘者而傳釋云。謂若有法先未曾失。及重得已但今初失。此法非得創至生相將不成時說名不獲。若流至現名不成時。然不獲時未名不成就。不成就時不名不獲 問小乘非得有法前等三種差別。大乘同耶 答有三釋。翻前得義義準可知。同於小乘立亦無妨。但假實殊。
疏。一屬所得等者屬謂系屬。有為法上所有能得皆屬所得。同有為故。
疏。二屬能得道等者。得是有為。故滅能得不屬所得。為．無為別。六行斷惑。此能得得即是有漏。若無漏智所證滅得得即無漏。有宗六行而能斷惑得擇滅也。
疏。三屬所依者。問何乃爾耶 答有．無為別。不屬非擇。非漏．無漏二道所得故。不屬道故屬所依。
疏。一屬道至世道得故者。問六行得滅亦由智惠簡擇方證何非擇滅 答若智簡擇能斷惑種所顯之理方名擇滅。六行不爾故理非擇。
疏。如畢竟得非擇等者。如入見道。黃門身等永更不生皆名畢竟得非擇滅。耶理如燈。
疏。三屬種子等者。此緣闕法有更生義故屬種子。
疏。非心緣證者。緣六行道 證無漏道。
疏。通有漏三性等者。具
如燈說。
論。此類雖多至名異生性者。按婆沙論四十五中而釋名云。尊者世友作如是說。能令有情起異類見．異類煩惱。造異類業受異類生故名異生。複次能令有情墮異界故往異趣故受異生故名異生性。
論。于諸聖法未成就故者。問既于諸聖未成就故名為異生。若於諸聖隨得一種應唯名聖 答有義兩釋。一云義同小乘。不獲一切三乘聖法名為異生。若獲小分即名聖者。故俱舍論第四云。不獲何聖法名異生性。謂不獲一切。此不獲言表異於獲。若異此者。謂諸佛世尊亦不成就二乘聖法應名異生。故知不要具獲諸聖方名聖者。大乘亦爾。下云依於二障立異生性。二乘斷一即非異生。即同俱舍不獲一切聖法名異生性。若獲小分即名聖者。二云與薩婆多義有差別。二乘迴心未至上地亦名聖者。得生空智斷煩惱故亦名異生。未得法空智未斷所知故。然依彼說將為順理。今此亦言于諸聖法不成就故 詳曰。今取后釋。如二乘者回趣大乘至於初地名得聖性。若得小聖即全名聖無異生義。何至初地云得聖耶。若云得彼大乘聖性名得聖者。未得大前何得不名為異生耶。又此但云未成諸聖名為異生。不言小獲即全名聖 問二乘無學未迴心前。為唯聖性。為俱句耶 答若決定性唯名聖性。自果滿故。若不定性而有兩種。一云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如燈所說。
論：此類雖然繁多，以至於名稱不同，性質也不同。按照《婆沙論》第四十五卷中的解釋，尊者世友這樣說：『能夠使有情產生不同種類的見解、不同種類的煩惱，造作不同種類的業，承受不同種類的果報，所以叫做異生。』又說：『能夠使有情墮入不同的界，前往不同的趣，承受不同的生命，所以叫做異生性。』
論：對於各種聖法沒有成就的緣故。問：既然因為對於各種聖法沒有成就所以叫做異生，如果對於各種聖法隨便獲得一種，應該只叫做聖者。答：有兩種解釋。一種說法與小乘相同，沒有獲得一切三乘聖法就叫做異生，如果獲得少許就叫做聖者。所以《俱舍論》第四卷說：『沒有獲得什麼聖法叫做異生性？』回答是『沒有獲得一切』。這個『沒有獲得』表示與『獲得』不同。如果不是這樣，那麼諸佛世尊也沒有成就二乘聖法，應該叫做異生。所以知道不必完全獲得各種聖法才叫做聖者。大乘也是這樣。下面說依據二障建立異生性，二乘斷除一種就不是異生。這與《俱舍論》相同，沒有獲得一切聖法叫做異生性，如果獲得少許就叫做聖者。另一種說法與薩婆多部的意義有差別，二乘迴心，沒有達到上地也叫做聖者，因為得到生空智，斷除了煩惱。也叫做異生，因為沒有得到法空智，沒有斷除所知障。然而依照他們的說法，認為是順理的。現在這裡也說對於各種聖法沒有成就的緣故。詳細地說，現在採用後面的解釋。例如二乘人迴心趣向大乘，到達初地，叫做得到聖性。如果得到少許聖性就完全叫做聖者，沒有異生的意義。為什麼要到初地才說得到聖性呢？如果說得到那個大乘聖性叫做得到聖者，那麼在沒有得到大乘聖性之前，怎麼能不叫做異生呢？而且這裡只是說沒有成就各種聖法叫做異生，沒有說稍微獲得就完全叫做聖者。問：二乘無學在沒有迴心之前，是隻有聖性，還是兩者都有呢？答：如果是決定性的，就只叫做聖性，因為自己的果位已經圓滿。如果是不定性的，就有兩種情況。一種說法是：
【English Translation】 English version: As the lamp says.
Treatise: Although these are numerous, to the point that their names and natures differ. According to the 45th fascicle of the Vibhasa, Venerable Vasumitra says: 'That which causes sentient beings to generate different kinds of views, different kinds of afflictions, create different kinds of karma, and receive different kinds of rebirths is called prthag-jana (異生, 'different being').' Furthermore, 'That which causes sentient beings to fall into different realms, go to different destinies, and receive different lives is called prthag-jana-tva (異生性, 'nature of a different being').'
Treatise: Because one has not achieved the various noble dharmas. Question: Since one is called a prthag-jana because one has not achieved the various noble dharmas, if one were to obtain even one of the noble dharmas, should one only be called a noble one? Answer: There are two interpretations. One interpretation is the same as in the Hinayana: not obtaining all the noble dharmas of the three vehicles is called a prthag-jana. If one obtains a small portion, one is called a noble one. Therefore, the fourth fascicle of the Abhidharmakosa says: 'Not obtaining which noble dharma is called prthag-jana-tva?' The answer is 'Not obtaining all.' This 'not obtaining' indicates a difference from 'obtaining.' If it were otherwise, then the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, would also not have achieved the noble dharmas of the two vehicles and should be called prthag-jana. Therefore, it is known that one does not need to fully obtain all the noble dharmas to be called a noble one. The Mahayana is also like this. Below it says that prthag-jana-tva is established based on the two obscurations. If a follower of the two vehicles eliminates one, they are no longer a prthag-jana. This is the same as the Abhidharmakosa: not obtaining all the noble dharmas is called prthag-jana-tva. If one obtains a small portion, one is called a noble one. The other interpretation differs from the Sarvastivada school. A follower of the two vehicles who has turned their mind but has not reached the higher grounds is also called a noble one because they have attained the wisdom of emptiness of self and have eliminated afflictions. They are also called a prthag-jana because they have not attained the wisdom of emptiness of dharmas and have not eliminated the obscuration of knowledge. However, according to their explanation, it is considered reasonable. Now, here it also says because one has not achieved the various noble dharmas. In detail, we now adopt the latter interpretation. For example, when a follower of the two vehicles turns their mind towards the Mahayana and reaches the first ground, it is called attaining noble nature. If one obtains a small amount of noble nature, one is completely called a noble one, and there is no meaning of prthag-jana. Why is it said that one attains noble nature only upon reaching the first ground? If it is said that obtaining that Mahayana noble nature is called obtaining a noble one, then before obtaining the Mahayana noble nature, how can one not be called a prthag-jana? Moreover, here it only says that not achieving the various noble dharmas is called a prthag-jana, and it does not say that obtaining a small amount is completely called a noble one. Question: Before a non-returning disciple of the two vehicles turns their mind, do they only have noble nature, or do they have both? Answer: If it is definitive, it is only called noble nature because their own fruition is complete. If it is indefinite, there are two situations. One explanation is:
唯聖。據所求果今已滿故。二云俱句。雖未迴心求于大乘。然有彼性障而未顯故得俱句 問大乘異生性三非得中何非得攝 答聖性唯通自在．現行。非種子成就。異生反彼。故但自在．現行不成 問自在據種有種姓者。云何亦名自在不成 答雖有種體用不成故。故亦不成。若用成者非異生故。有說論既自言依障種立。故應但說名種不成 詳曰。此非善釋。若望障種此即種成。何名不成。故知非得望所未得名為非得。如前說善。
疏。唯俱舍正理立等者。按俱舍論第五云。此復二種。一無差別。二有差別。無差別者謂諸有情同分。一切有情各等有故。有差別者謂諸有情界．地．趣．生．種姓．男．女．近事．苾芻．學．無學等各別同分。一類有情各等有故。復有法同分謂隨蘊．處．界 釋曰。一切有情而等有故名無差別。差別有情同類等有名有差別。準法同分亦合有二。但論略也。且如五蘊。蘊義是同。此相似因名無差別。蘊蘊各別自相似因名有差別。界．處等法皆仿於此 問有情同分無差別者。為體一．多 答有兩釋。一云體一。猶如命根。一云體多。如所依法。后說有憑。前無文也。故正理論云。云何異熟。謂趣．生等同分。云何等流。謂種性等。又先業所引是為異熟。現加行起是名等流。若同命根即唯異熟
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 唯聖（指佛陀）。根據所求的果報現在已經圓滿的緣故。二云俱句（兩種說法都成立）。雖然還沒有迴心轉向追求大乘佛法，但因為有那個（大乘）的本性被障礙而未能顯現的緣故，所以兩種說法都成立。 問：大乘異生（尚未進入聖道的凡夫）的自性、三種非得（種子非得、自在非得、現行非得）中，屬於哪種非得所攝？ 答：聖人的自性只通于自在和現行，不是種子成就。異生則與此相反，所以只是自在和現行不成（就大乘聖性而言）。 問：自在如果根據種子有種姓的人來說，為什麼也叫做自在不成？ 答：雖然有種子的體，但作用不成，所以也叫做不成。如果作用成就，那就不是異生了。有人說，論著既然自己說依據障礙種子而建立，所以應該只說名稱為種子不成。 詳細地說，這並非好的解釋。如果從障礙種子來看，這（大乘聖性）就是種子成就，為什麼叫做不成？所以要知道非得是針對所未得到的（大乘聖性）而說的，叫做非得，如前面所說的那樣好。
疏：只有俱舍宗和正理宗才建立『等』這個概念。按照《俱舍論》第五卷所說：『這又有兩種，一是無差別，二是有差別。無差別是指諸有情的同分，因為一切有情各自平等具有。有差別是指諸有情的界、地、趣、生、種姓、男、女、近事（優婆塞、優婆夷）、苾芻（比丘）、學（有學）、無學（無學）等各自不同的同分，一類有情各自平等具有。又有法同分，是指隨蘊、處、界。』 解釋說：一切有情平等具有的，叫做無差別。差別有情同類平等具有的，叫做有差別。按照法的同分也應該有兩種，只是論著省略了。比如五蘊，蘊的意義是相同的，這種相似的因叫做無差別。蘊和蘊各自不同的自相似因叫做有差別。界、處等法都仿照這個例子。 問：有情同分無差別，是體性是一個還是多個？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是體性是一個，猶如命根。一種說法是體性是多個，如所依法。後面的說法有依據，前面的說法沒有依據。所以《正理論》說：『什麼是異熟？是指趣、生等的同分。什麼是等流？是指種姓等。』又說，先前的業所引導的是異熟，現在加以修行而生起的是等流。如果和命根相同，那就只有異熟。
【English Translation】 English version Only the Holy One (referring to the Buddha). According to the desired result, it is now fulfilled. The two statements of '俱句' (both statements are valid) are both established. Although one has not yet turned their mind to seek the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) teachings, because that (Mahayana) nature is obstructed and has not yet manifested, both statements are valid. Question: Among the nature of an ordinary being (異生, someone who has not entered the path of the saints) in Mahayana, and the three 'non-attainments' (非得, seed non-attainment,自在 non-attainment, and現行 non-attainment), which non-attainment does it belong to? Answer: The nature of a saint only pertains to '自在' (freedom/sovereignty) and '現行' (manifestation), not 'seed' (種子) attainment. An ordinary being is the opposite of this, so only '自在' and '現行' are not attained (in terms of Mahayana saintly nature). Question: If '自在' (freedom/sovereignty) is based on those who have the lineage of seeds, why is it also called '自在' non-attainment? Answer: Although there is the substance of the seed, its function is not achieved, so it is also called non-attainment. If the function is achieved, then it is not an ordinary being. Some say that since the treatise itself states that it is established based on obstructing seeds, it should only be said that the name is seed non-attainment. In detail, this is not a good explanation. If viewed from the perspective of obstructing seeds, this (Mahayana saintly nature) is seed attainment, so why is it called non-attainment? Therefore, one should know that non-attainment is spoken of in relation to what has not been attained (Mahayana saintly nature), and is called non-attainment, as it was said before.
Commentary: Only the Sarvastivada (俱舍) and Nyaya (正理) schools establish the concept of 'equality' (等). According to the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (俱舍論): 'This again has two types, one is without difference, and the other is with difference. Without difference refers to the commonality of all sentient beings, because all sentient beings equally possess it. With difference refers to the different commonalities of sentient beings in terms of realms (界), planes (地), destinies (趣), births (生), lineages (種姓), male (男), female (女), lay followers (近事, Upasaka/Upasika), monks (苾芻, Bhiksu), learners (學, those still in training), and non-learners (無學, those who have completed training), one type of sentient beings equally possesses it. There is also the commonality of dharmas, which refers to the aggregates (蘊), sense bases (處), and realms (界).' The explanation says: What all sentient beings equally possess is called without difference. What different sentient beings of the same type equally possess is called with difference. According to the commonality of dharmas, there should also be two types, but the treatise omits it. For example, the five aggregates (五蘊), the meaning of 'aggregate' is the same, this similar cause is called without difference. The self-similar causes of each different aggregate are called with difference. The realms (界), sense bases (處), and other dharmas all follow this example. Question: Is the nature of the commonality of sentient beings without difference one or many? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the nature is one, like the life force (命根). One explanation is that the nature is many, like what is relied upon by the law (所依法). The latter explanation has a basis, while the former explanation has no basis. Therefore, the Nyāyasūtra (正理論) says: 'What is the result of maturation (異熟)? It refers to the commonality of destinies (趣), births (生), etc. What is the outflow (等流)? It refers to lineages (種姓), etc.' It also says that what is guided by previous karma is the result of maturation, and what arises from present practice is called outflow. If it is the same as the life force, then there is only the result of maturation.
何有等流。其法同分亦有兩釋。準前可知。
疏。如異熟色等者。即內有情五根等色業所感者名為異熟。若外諸色。及內身中非業所感而有二分是等流色。
疏。更有餘難準生為之者。難云外法非趣．生。非趣生故無同分。外法非趣．生。非趣．生故無生等。若言外法是有為。外同內法有生等。亦應外法有相似。外同內法立同分。以古有宗外無同分故為此難。
疏。此設外救出自論文者。出順正理。
疏。后為微逐文外意者。而無論文。疏主自意。又安惠師救俱舍中亦有此微。疏主小同。
疏此義失宗者。小乘失宗。本不以造而解於色。今者以造而為其難。故乖本宗。即就本計更難彼云。質礙名為色。故能所造皆攝色。但相似故立同分。同分相似何不有。
疏。設欲翻勝論等者。改彼勝論所說同句以為同分。名翻勝論。故俱舍論第五云。又應顯成勝論所執。彼宗執有總同義句。於一切法總同言智由此發生。有云。善妙談論名為勝論。翻此妙論云我不立。理亦難知。經許假有。今翻為無有違教失故云難知 詳曰。前解為正。順疏論故。
疏。不同小乘等者。按順正理第十三云。此中身形．業用．樂欲展轉相似故名為同。分是因義。即別實物是此同因。故名同分。
疏
【現代漢語翻譯】 什麼是等流果？其法同分（Samatā-bhāga，相似性）也有兩種解釋，參照前面的內容可以理解。
疏：如異熟色等，即指有情眾生的五根等色，由業力所感而生，稱為異熟果。如果是外在的諸色，以及內在身體中非由業力所感而有的二分，就是等流色。
疏：更有其他的責難，可以參照生起的方式來理解。責難說，外法不是趣向或生起的狀態，因為不是趣向或生起的狀態，所以沒有同分。外法不是趣向或生起的狀態，因為不是趣向或生起的狀態，所以沒有生等（生、住、異、滅）。如果說外法是有為法，外法和內法一樣有生等，那麼外法也應該有相似性。外法和內法一樣可以建立同分。因為古代有宗派認為外法沒有同分，所以提出這樣的責難。
疏：這裡假設的外救，出自論文，指的是《順正理論》。
疏：後面為稍微追逐文外的意思，而無論論文，是疏主的自意。另外，安慧論師在《俱舍論》中的解釋也有這種微妙之處，疏主的觀點略有不同。
疏：此義失宗，指的是小乘失宗。本來不以『造』來解釋色法，現在卻以『造』來作為責難，所以違背了本宗。即就本宗的觀點進一步責難對方說：質礙稱為色，所以能造和所造都屬於色法。只是因為相似，所以建立同分。同分相似，為什麼不能有呢？
疏：假設想要反駁勝論等，就是改變勝論所說的『同句』，改為『同分』，這叫做反駁勝論。所以《俱舍論》第五卷說：『又應該顯明地成立勝論所執。』彼宗認為有總同義句，對於一切法的總同之智由此而生。有人說：善妙的談論稱為勝論，反駁這種妙論說『我不立』，道理也很難理解。經文允許假有，現在反駁為無，有違背教義的過失，所以說難知。詳細地說，前面的解釋是正確的，因為順應了疏論。
疏：不同於小乘等，按照《順正理論》第十三卷所說：『此中身形、業用、樂欲輾轉相似，所以稱為同。分是因的意思，即別別的實物是此同因，所以名叫同分。』
疏
【English Translation】 What are the equable flows? There are two explanations for its 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity). It can be understood by referring to the previous content.
Commentary: 'Such as the resultant color,' refers to the colors of the five roots of sentient beings, which are produced by karmic force and are called resultant effects. If they are external colors, and the two parts within the body that are not produced by karmic force, they are equable flow colors.
Commentary: There are other difficulties that can be understood by referring to the way things arise. The difficulty is that external dharmas are not in a state of 'approaching' or 'arising'. Because they are not in a state of 'approaching' or 'arising', they have no 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity). External dharmas are not in a state of 'approaching' or 'arising'. Because they are not in a state of 'approaching' or 'arising', they have no 'birth' etc. (birth, duration, change, cessation). If it is said that external dharmas are conditioned, and external dharmas have 'birth' etc. like internal dharmas, then external dharmas should also have similarity. External dharmas can establish 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity) like internal dharmas. Because ancient schools believed that external dharmas had no 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity), this difficulty is raised.
Commentary: The external rescue assumed here comes from the treatise, referring to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.
Commentary: Later, slightly pursuing the meaning outside the text, regardless of the treatise, is the commentator's own intention. In addition, Ācārya Sthiramati's explanation in the Abhidharmakośa also has this subtlety, but the commentator's view is slightly different.
Commentary: 'This meaning loses the tenet' refers to the loss of the tenet of the Hīnayāna. Originally, 'making' was not used to explain color dharmas, but now 'making' is used as a difficulty, so it violates the original tenet. Based on the original view of this school, further challenge the opponent by saying: 'That which is obstructive is called color, so both the maker and the made belong to color dharmas. It is only because of similarity that 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity) is established. Why can't there be similarity in 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity)?'
Commentary: Assuming that one wants to refute the Vaiśeṣika school, it means changing the 'common phrase' mentioned by the Vaiśeṣika school to 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity), which is called refuting the Vaiśeṣika school. Therefore, the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa says: 'It should also be clearly established what the Vaiśeṣika school adheres to.' That school believes that there is a common phrase of general meaning, and the wisdom of the general commonality of all dharmas arises from this. Some say: 'Excellent discussion is called Vaiśeṣika', refuting this excellent discussion by saying 'I do not establish it', and the reason is also difficult to understand. The scriptures allow for provisional existence, but now refuting it as non-existence has the fault of violating the teachings, so it is said to be difficult to know. In detail, the previous explanation is correct, because it follows the commentary.
Commentary: Different from the Hīnayāna etc., according to the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 'Here, the body shape, activities, desires are similar in turn, so it is called 'samatā' (similarity). 'Bhāga' means cause, that is, separate real things are the common cause of this, so it is called 'samatā-bhāga' (similarity).'
Commentary
。俱舍經部等者。按彼論云。若爾所說同分是何。即如是類諸行生時。于中假立人同分等。如諸穀麥等同分也。
疏。及無色界起不同分心等者。此敘有宗難經部也。按順正理第十三云。若處無所引異熟內五色處。于彼或時無業所引第六意處。謂于長時起染污識．或善有漏．及無漏識相續位中。無業所引異熟分故。說何為命 釋曰。正理難意于無色界無內五處。或起余心無異熟意。異熟勢分于彼既無。說何為壽。疏中敘難但取彼意不具彼文 言不同分心者。即是染污．有漏善等。與業所引異熟心別名不同分。雖無漏心亦非同分。無漏．漏別故別言之 經部命根而有兩說。一正理說依六處立。二俱舍說依眾同分。然俱舍師救前破云。若依異熟立者是異熟。若依余立者。雖依彼立非隨彼法而判性。如名．句等依善．惡聲。
論。然依此識立命根等者。若依此論。唯依種子以為命根。命即是根。持業釋也。若顯揚論謂業所引異熟六處住時決定名為命根。現行第八在第六處取彼為命。即命之根。根是種故。或命即根。俱是現故。
疏。言識者簡相應法種者。問第八王．所俱業所引。應齊有能令住決定。何不依所種立命耶 答有兩說。一云若爾一身即有六命。隨所依種而有六故。二說依六滅生心同。事業等故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：俱舍經部等的主張，根據他們的論述：『如果這樣，那麼所說的同分是什麼呢？』就是像這樣同類的諸行產生時，在其中假立人同分等等，就像各種穀物麥類等的同分一樣。
疏文中『以及沒有業力引發的不同分心等等』，這是敘述有宗對經部的詰難。根據《順正理論》第十三卷所說：『如果在沒有業力所引的異熟內五色處的地方，有時沒有業力所引的第六意處，比如在長時間生起染污識、或者有漏善、以及無漏識相續的階段中，因為沒有業力所引的異熟分，那麼說什麼才是命呢？』解釋說，《順正理論》詰難經部的觀點在於，在沒有業力、沒有內五處的情況下，或者生起其他的沒有異熟的意處。異熟的勢力在這種情況下既然沒有，那麼說什麼才是壽命呢？疏文敘述詰難，只是採用了其中的意思，沒有完全引用原文。』不同分心』，就是染污、有漏善等等，與業力所引的異熟心不同，所以稱為不同分。雖然無漏心也不是同分，但因為無漏和有漏的差別，所以特別提出來。經部關於命根有兩種說法：一種是《順正理論》所說，依據六處而建立；另一種是《俱舍論》所說，依據眾同分。然而，俱舍論師爲了挽救之前的駁斥，說：『如果依據異熟而建立，那就是異熟；如果依據其他而建立，雖然依據它而建立，但不是隨著它的法性而判斷性質，就像名、句等依據善、惡的聲音一樣。』
論中說：『然而依據這個識而建立命根等等』，如果依據這個論點，就只是依據種子作為命根。命就是根，這是持業釋。如果按照《顯揚論》的說法，業力所引的異熟六處住留的時間決定了，就稱為命根。現行的第八識在第六處取彼為命，也就是命的根，根是種子的緣故。或者命就是根，都是現行的緣故。
疏文中說：『所說的識，是簡別相應法種』。問：第八識王以及與其相應的業力所引的法，應該同時具有使之住留決定的能力，為什麼不依據所依的種子而建立命根呢？答：有兩種說法。一種說法是：『如果這樣，那麼一身就會有六個命，因為隨著所依的種子而有六個。』另一種說法是：『依據六滅生心相同，事業等等相同。』
【English Translation】 English version: The position of the Kośa school and others, according to their treatises: 'If so, then what is the so-called 'samatā'? It is when such similar aggregates arise, we provisionally establish 'human samatā' and so on, just like the samatā of various grains such as wheat and barley.'
The commentary states, 'And the absence of dissimilar minds arising from karma,' this narrates the Sarvāstivāda school's challenge to the Sautrāntika school. According to the thirteenth volume of the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra: 'If in a place where there are no internally-produced sense bases of differentiated maturation resulting from karma, there is sometimes no sixth mental sense base produced by karma, such as in the continuous states of arising defiled consciousness, or wholesome contaminated consciousness, or uncontaminated consciousness, because there is no differentiated maturation resulting from karma, then what is said to be life?' The explanation says, the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra challenges the Sautrāntika's view that in the absence of karma and the five internal sense bases, or the arising of other mental states without differentiated maturation, since the power of differentiated maturation is absent in that case, then what is said to be lifespan? The commentary narrates the challenge, only adopting its meaning without fully quoting the original text. 'Dissimilar minds' are defiled minds, contaminated wholesome minds, etc., which are different from the mind of differentiated maturation produced by karma, hence they are called dissimilar. Although uncontaminated minds are also not 'samatā', they are mentioned separately because of the difference between uncontaminated and contaminated. The Sautrāntika school has two views on the life faculty: one, according to the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra, is established based on the six sense bases; the other, according to the Abhidharmakośa, is based on the 'nikāya-sabhāga' (community of beings). However, the Kośa masters, in order to salvage the previous refutation, say: 'If it is established based on differentiated maturation, then it is differentiated maturation; if it is established based on something else, although it is established based on it, its nature is not judged according to its dharma, just like names, phrases, etc., are based on wholesome and unwholesome sounds.'
The treatise states: 'However, based on this consciousness, the life faculty is established, etc.' If based on this treatise, it is only based on the seed that the life faculty is considered. 'Life is the root,' this is a karmadhāraya compound. If according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the time during which the six sense bases of differentiated maturation produced by karma remain is definitely called the life faculty. The manifest eighth consciousness takes that as life in the sixth sense base, that is, the root of life, because the root is the seed. Or life is the root, both being manifest.
The commentary states: 'The consciousness mentioned is to distinguish the seeds of associated dharmas.' Question: The eighth consciousness-king and the karmically produced dharmas associated with it should simultaneously have the ability to cause it to remain determined, why not establish the life faculty based on the seed on which it relies? Answer: There are two views. One view is: 'If so, then one body would have six lives, because there are six depending on the seed on which it relies.' The other view is: 'The arising of the mind based on the six cessations is the same, the activities, etc., are the same.'
。論說識種以劣從勝。如說唯心亦攝心所。又俱異熟。業所引故。如依五蘊立一同分。命依多種。體亦唯一 詳曰。前正。相應種子無力持故。如所變相無實用故。持用既無依何立命。不以小同令一切等。
疏。非取生現行識等者。有說此種由業所引。有能生識一期分位差別功能。依此假立 詳曰。疏釋正也。大小乘教無說能生名命根也。且俱舍頌曰。命根體即壽。能持燸及識 雜集論云。識蘊相續住時決定令眾同分常得安住或百年等。名為命根。瑜伽．顯揚．五蘊等論皆以住持而名命也 問若以能持為命之義。業種亦有能持之功。何不取耶 答大．小乘教皆言命是業之所引異熟無記。若取業種便乖前義。故以簡之。
疏。命根無屬等者。按五十七云。問命根何等根分 釋曰。二十二根中是何根分 論主答云。此無所屬。先業所引時量決定而建立故唯說假有 釋曰故知命根非依現識。現識即屬意根攝故 問種從於現亦意處收。何無屬耶 答如男女二．三無漏根。以彼所依身根．九根小分為體。不名無屬。此但依彼種上假立。不是所依根之分故名無所屬 問依現假立不取現體。何非無屬 答準於斯理依現假立不違瑜伽依唯識文明言種故。復依種立有多理故。故取依種 問三科之中法處．法界．行蘊攝命。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於識別種子時，應以弱者服從於強者。例如，當說『唯心』時，也包括了心所（Cittasika，心所法）。此外，它們都是異熟（Vipāka，果報），由業力所牽引。正如依據五蘊（Pañcakkhandha，色、受、想、行、識）建立一個共同的類別一樣，命根（Jīvitindriya，生命力）依賴於多種因素，但其體性是唯一的。詳細來說，前面的說法是正確的，因為相應的種子沒有力量去維持生命。就像所變現的相沒有實際用處一樣，如果維持和作用都不存在，那麼生命又依據什麼而存在呢？不能因為它們之間存在微小的相同之處，就認為一切都是等同的。 疏文：『非取生現行識等者』，有人說這種子是由業力所牽引，具有產生識（Viññāṇa，意識）在一期生命中不同階段的功能。依據這種功能而假立命根。詳細來說，疏文的解釋是正確的。大小乘佛教的教義中都沒有說能產生識的功能叫做命根。而且，《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，阿毗達摩俱舍論）的頌文說：『命根的體性就是壽命，能夠維持體溫和意識。』《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya，攝阿毗達摩義論）中說：『識蘊（Viññāṇakkhandha，識蘊）相續存在時，決定使眾生的共同類別能夠常得安住，或者一百年等，這叫做命根。』《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra，瑜伽師地論）、《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra，現觀莊嚴論）、《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa，五蘊論）等都以住持的功能來命名命根。問題：如果以能維持作為命的含義，那麼業的種子也有能維持的功用，為什麼不取業的種子作為命根呢？回答：大小乘佛教的教義都說命是由業所牽引的異熟無記（Avyākṛta，非善非惡），如果取業的種子作為命根，就違背了前面的定義，所以要排除它。 疏文：『命根無屬等者』，按照第五十七卷所說：『問：命根屬於哪一種根？』解釋說：『在二十二根（Dvāviṃśatindriya，二十二根）中，屬於哪一種根？』論主的回答是：『此無所屬。因為是由先業所牽引，時間長短已經決定，所以只是假立的。』解釋說：『所以知道命根不是依據現識（Vartamāna-vijñāna，現在的意識）。因為現識屬於意根（Manindriya，意根）所攝。』問題：種子是從現識產生的，也屬於意處（Manāyatana，意處）所收，為什麼說它無所屬呢？回答：就像男女二根、三無漏根（Anāsravendriya，無漏根）一樣，因為它們所依賴的身根（Kāyendriya，身根）、九根的小部分作為體性，所以不叫做無所屬。而命根只是依據那些種子而假立的，不是所依賴的根的一部分，所以叫做無所屬。問題：依據現識假立，不取現識的體性，為什麼不是無所屬呢？回答：按照這個道理，依據現識假立並不違背《瑜伽師地論》和《唯識論》（Vijñānavāda，唯識宗）中明確說明是依據種子而建立的說法。而且，依據種子建立有很多道理。所以取依據種子而建立的說法。問題：在三科（Triskandha，三科）之中，法處（Dharmāyatana，法處）、法界（Dharmadhātu，法界）、行蘊（Saṃskāraskandha，行蘊）攝命根，為什麼？
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the discussion of identifying seeds, the inferior should yield to the superior. For example, when 'Mind-Only' is mentioned, it also includes mental factors (Cittasika). Furthermore, they are all results of maturation (Vipāka), led by karma. Just as a common category is established based on the five aggregates (Pañcakkhandha), the life faculty (Jīvitindriya) relies on various factors, but its essence is singular. In detail, the previous statement is correct because the corresponding seeds lack the power to sustain life. Just as the manifested appearances have no practical use, if sustenance and function are absent, then what does life rely on? One cannot equate everything simply because there are minor similarities between them. Commentary: 'Not taking the currently arising consciousness etc.' Some say that this seed is led by karma and has the function of producing consciousness (Viññāṇa) in different phases of a lifetime. Based on this function, the life faculty is provisionally established. In detail, the commentary's explanation is correct. Neither the teachings of the Greater Vehicle nor the Lesser Vehicle state that the function of producing consciousness is called the life faculty. Moreover, the verse in the Abhidharmakośa states: 'The essence of the life faculty is life itself, capable of sustaining warmth and consciousness.' The Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'When the continuum of the aggregate of consciousness (Viññāṇakkhandha) exists, it determines that the common category of beings can constantly abide, or for a hundred years, etc. This is called the life faculty.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, etc., all name the life faculty based on its function of sustaining. Question: If the meaning of life is based on the ability to sustain, then the seeds of karma also have the function of sustaining. Why not take the seeds of karma as the life faculty? Answer: The teachings of both the Greater and Lesser Vehicles state that life is an indeterminate result of maturation (Avyākṛta) led by karma. If the seeds of karma are taken as the life faculty, it would contradict the previous definition, so it must be excluded. Commentary: 'The life faculty is unattached etc.' According to volume fifty-seven: 'Question: To which faculty does the life faculty belong?' The explanation is: 'Among the twenty-two faculties (Dvāviṃśatindriya), to which faculty does it belong?' The master of the treatise answers: 'It is unattached. Because it is led by past karma, and the duration has been determined, it is only provisionally established.' The explanation is: 'Therefore, it is known that the life faculty is not based on current consciousness (Vartamāna-vijñāna). Because current consciousness is included in the faculty of mind (Manindriya).' Question: Seeds arise from current consciousness and are also included in the sphere of mind (Manāyatana), so why is it said to be unattached? Answer: Just like the two faculties of male and female, and the three unconditioned faculties (Anāsravendriya), because they rely on the physical faculty (Kāyendriya) and the small parts of the nine faculties as their essence, they are not called unattached. However, the life faculty is only provisionally established based on those seeds and is not part of the faculty it relies on, so it is called unattached. Question: Based on provisional establishment on current consciousness, not taking the essence of current consciousness, why is it not unattached? Answer: According to this principle, provisional establishment based on current consciousness does not contradict the statements in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and Vijñānavāda, which clearly state that it is established based on seeds. Moreover, there are many reasons to establish it based on seeds. Therefore, the statement of establishing it based on seeds is taken. Question: Among the three aggregates (Triskandha), why are the sphere of phenomena (Dharmāyatana), the realm of phenomena (Dharmadhātu), and the aggregate of formations (Saṃskāraskandha) included in the life faculty?
名無屬 答有義假立命根約功能異。故說非根非法處攝 詳曰。不然。瑜伽意問二十二中是何根分。不約三科明所攝故。故彼論云。問男．女二根何等根分。答是身根分。問最後三根何等根分。答是九根分。謂信等九。問命根何等分。答此無所屬。唯假立故。準此故知。對二十二明相攝也 問種有新舊依何種立 答有二釋。一云法爾．新熏隨其所應先業所引正作因緣生現識者。依彼種立。二云依二種立。共作因緣生第八識。勢力等故和合似一。不可說有體各別故。無二命失 有義斷云。今依前說。名言種子既有眾多。不可一切共生果故。然今命根所依之種。要前生熏。先業引故 詳曰。護法既許新．舊合用。命根所依亦應如是。或唯依舊。或唯依新。或通依二。遇緣即依不可定判。又但許依新．舊二種。不言一切皆悉總依。言所依種要前生熏。即唯新舊。如何斷取前之所釋。
疏。又是現行識所持等者。此第二釋。於此釋中典有三意 一云是現行者。顯揚六處俱是現行。現行即是種識所持 二云是現行者。顯揚六處是第六現。六現者第八現識。第八現識識種所持 三云是現行者。顯揚六處是現行也。識所持者。六現是彼第八識持。從所持說。能持等者。六現現八俱名所持。八種持故 雖有三義前解為本。后二理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『名無屬』（命根不屬於任何一根）的回答是，『有義假立命根約功能異』（因為命根是假立的，它的存在是基於其獨特的功能）。因此說，命根『非根非法處攝』（不被歸類為任何一種根，法或處）。 詳細解釋：並非如此。瑜伽論中關於二十二根的提問，並沒有按照三科（五蘊、十二處、十八界）來明確其歸屬。因此，該論典說：『問：男根、女根屬於哪一根？答：屬於身根。問：最後的三根（未知根、已知根、具知根）屬於哪一根？答：屬於九根，即信等九根。問：命根屬於哪一根？答：此無所屬，唯假立故。』 依據此論，可知這是針對二十二根來明確其相互歸屬。 問：種子有新舊之分，依據哪一種來建立命根？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，『法爾』（本性如此）和『新熏』（新熏習的種子）隨其所應，由先前的業力所引導，作為產生現識的直接因緣，依據這種種子來建立命根。另一種說法是，依據兩種種子來建立命根。共同作為產生第八識的因緣，因為其勢力相等，和合起來似乎是一個整體，不能說其本體各不相同，因此不會出現兩個命根的情況。 有一種觀點斷言說：現在依據前一種說法。名言種子既然有很多，不可能全部共同產生果。然而，現在命根所依賴的種子，必須是先前已經熏習過的，由先前的業力所引導。 詳細解釋：護法既然允許新種子和舊種子共同起作用，那麼命根所依賴的種子也應該如此。或者僅僅依賴舊種子，或者僅僅依賴新種子，或者同時依賴兩種種子。遇到因緣時就依賴哪一種，不可妄加判斷。而且，僅僅允許依賴新種子和舊種子兩種，並沒有說一切種子都全部依賴。說所依賴的種子必須是先前已經熏習過的，即僅僅是新舊兩種。如何斷然採取前一種解釋？
疏：『又是現行識所持等者』，這是第二種解釋。在這個解釋中，經典有三種含義。 一種說法是，『是現行者』，顯揚六處（眼處、耳處、鼻處、舌處、身處、意處）都是現行。現行就是種子識所持。 第二種說法是，『是現行者』，顯揚六處是第六現（第六意識的現行）。六現就是第八現識（阿賴耶識）。第八現識是被第八識的種子所持。 第三種說法是，『是現行者』，顯揚六處是現行。『識所持者』，六現是被第八識所持。從被持的角度來說，能持等者，六現和現行的第八識都叫做被持，因為被第八識的種子所持。雖然有三種含義，但前一種解釋是根本，后兩種解釋在道理上有所欠缺。
【English Translation】 English version The answer to 『名無屬』 (míng wú shǔ, the life faculty does not belong to any root) is, 『有義假立命根約功能異』 (yǒu yì jiǎ lì mìng gēn yuē gōng néng yì, the life faculty is provisionally established based on its distinct function). Therefore, it is said that the life faculty 『非根非法處攝』 (fēi gēn fēi fǎ chù shè, is not categorized as any root, dharma, or place). Detailed explanation: That is not the case. The question in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論) regarding the twenty-two faculties does not clarify their affiliation according to the three categories (five aggregates, twelve sense bases, eighteen realms). Therefore, the treatise says: 『Question: To which faculty do the male and female faculties belong? Answer: They belong to the body faculty. Question: To which faculty do the last three faculties (the faculty of the unknown, the faculty of the known, and the faculty of complete knowledge) belong? Answer: They belong to the nine faculties, namely the nine faculties of faith, etc. Question: To which faculty does the life faculty belong? Answer: It does not belong to any; it is only provisionally established.』 According to this treatise, it can be known that this is to clarify the mutual affiliation of the twenty-two faculties. Question: Seeds are divided into new and old; based on which kind is the life faculty established? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that 『法爾』 (fǎ ěr, suchness) and 『新熏』 (xīn xūn, newly perfumed seeds) as appropriate, guided by previous karma, serve as the direct cause for the arising of present consciousness; the life faculty is established based on this kind of seed. Another explanation is that the life faculty is established based on two kinds of seeds. Together, they serve as the cause for the arising of the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識), because their strengths are equal, and they combine to appear as a single whole. It cannot be said that their entities are distinct, so there would not be two life faculties. One view asserts: Now, according to the former explanation, since there are many name-and-form seeds, it is impossible for all of them to jointly produce a result. However, the seed on which the life faculty relies must be one that has been previously perfumed, guided by previous karma. Detailed explanation: Since Dharmapāla (護法) allows new and old seeds to work together, the seed on which the life faculty relies should also be like this. Either it relies solely on the old seed, or it relies solely on the new seed, or it relies on both seeds simultaneously. Whichever it encounters the condition for, it relies on that one; it cannot be arbitrarily judged. Moreover, it is only allowed to rely on the two kinds of seeds, new and old; it is not said that all seeds are relied upon entirely. Saying that the seed relied upon must be one that has been previously perfumed means only the new and old kinds. How can one decisively adopt the former explanation?
Commentary: 『又是現行識所持等者』 (yòu shì xiàn xíng shí suǒ chí děng zhě, 『Moreover, it is held by the manifest consciousness, etc.』), this is the second explanation. In this explanation, the scripture has three meanings. One explanation is, 『是現行者』 (shì xiàn xíng zhě, 『it is manifest』), clarifying that the six sense bases (eye base, ear base, nose base, tongue base, body base, mind base) are all manifest. The manifest is what is held by the seed consciousness. The second explanation is, 『是現行者』 (shì xiàn xíng zhě, 『it is manifest』), clarifying that the six sense bases are the sixth manifest (the manifestation of the sixth consciousness). The six manifests are the eighth manifest consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識). The eighth manifest consciousness is held by the seeds of the eighth consciousness. The third explanation is, 『是現行者』 (shì xiàn xíng zhě, 『it is manifest』), clarifying that the six sense bases are manifest. 『識所持者』 (shí suǒ chí zhě, 『held by consciousness』), the six manifests are held by the eighth consciousness. From the perspective of being held, both the six manifests and the manifest eighth consciousness are called 『held』 because they are held by the seeds of the eighth consciousness. Although there are three meanings, the former explanation is fundamental, and the latter two explanations are deficient in reasoning.
通。
疏。雖二解者。前又解以上名第一釋。又解以下為第二解。
疏。或本識種或六處種等者。牒前二解。識種第一。六處第二。
疏。取五根種等者。問既以種子名為命根。設現間斷而種不已。何得難云即應名死 答種有功能現不應斷。現行既斷明種無能。能既謝焉何不名死 有云取六根種立命為善 詳曰。不然。有分捨命。三界命差。種種之遇。如疏斷善。
論。應無色時有別實法等者。疏中假敘有五問答。準理言之他難未息。且第五翻云。心法通能狀。唯有心種名無心。色法唯所厭。唯有心法名無色。外言亦爾。心法通能厭。非色非心名無心。色法唯所厭。唯有心法名無色。故未息諍 又釋疏中第二外難。傳四師釋 一云厭心能厭無。依種立無心。厭色能厭在。不依種假立。此釋不然。外云亦然。厭心能厭無。有別實法礙。厭色能厭在。無別實法遮 二云我說無心是假法故。故於二位有無不定。汝說實有不依色．心。如何不許二處俱有。此亦不然。外人難云。汝既是假一有一無。何妨我實一無一有 三云厭心入無心。依厭心種立。厭色入無色。亦依厭心種立。此亦不然。厭心心不行。可依心種立。厭色心尚行。何得依心種。又無聖教說無色定是假立也 四云爲破執實依種立假。實執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 通。
疏：雖然有兩種解釋，前面又解釋了以上的內容是第一種解釋，又解釋了以下的內容是第二種解釋。
疏：或者本識的種子，或者六處的種子等等，這是引述前面的兩種解釋。識的種子是第一種，六處的種子是第二種。
疏：取五根的種子等等。問：既然以種子名為命根，假設現在間斷了而種子沒有停止，為什麼可以反駁說那就應該叫做死亡？答：種子有功能，現行不應該斷絕。現行既然斷絕了，說明種子沒有功能。功能既然消失了，為什麼不能叫做死亡？有人說取六根的種子來建立命根是好的。詳細地說，不是這樣的。有有分捨命，三界的壽命有差別，種種的遭遇，就像疏中說的斷善。
論：在無色界的時候，有別的實法等等。疏中假設敘述了五個問答。按照道理來說，對方的詰難還沒有停止。而且第五次反駁說，心法普遍能夠表述，只有心的種子叫做無心。色法只是被厭惡的，只有心法叫做無色。外人的說法也是這樣。心法普遍能夠厭惡，非色非心叫做無心。色法只是被厭惡的，只有心法叫做無色。所以爭論沒有停止。又解釋疏中的第二個外人的詰難。流傳著四位法師的解釋。第一位說，厭惡心能夠厭惡無，依靠種子來建立無心。厭惡色能夠厭惡存在，不依靠種子假立。這種解釋不對。外人說也是這樣，厭惡心能夠厭惡無，有別的實法阻礙。厭惡色能夠厭惡存在，沒有別的實法遮蔽。第二位說，我說無心是假法，所以在兩種情況下有無不定。你說實有不依靠色、心，為什麼不允許兩個地方都有？這也是不對的。外人反駁說，你既然是假的一有一無，為什麼妨礙我實的一無一有？第三位說，厭惡心進入無心，依靠厭惡心的種子來建立。厭惡色進入無色，也依靠厭惡心的種子來建立。這也是不對的。厭惡心的時候心不行，可以依靠心的種子來建立。厭惡色的時候心還在執行，怎麼能依靠心的種子？而且沒有聖教說無色定是假立的。第四位說，爲了破除執著實有，依靠種子來建立假有。執著實有。
【English Translation】 English version: Passage.
Commentary: Although there are two explanations, the previous explanation above is the first explanation, and the explanation below is the second explanation.
Commentary: Either the seed of the fundamental consciousness (本識, mūla-vijñāna), or the seeds of the six sense bases (六處, ṣaḍ-āyatana), etc. This refers to the previous two explanations. The seed of consciousness is the first, and the seeds of the six sense bases are the second.
Commentary: Taking the seeds of the five roots (五根, pañcendriyāṇi), etc. Question: Since the seed is named the root of life (命根, jīvitendriya), if it is currently interrupted but the seed has not ceased, why can it be refuted by saying that it should be called death? Answer: The seed has function, and the present manifestation should not be cut off. Since the present manifestation is cut off, it indicates that the seed has no function. Since the function has disappeared, why can't it be called death? Some say that establishing the root of life by taking the seeds of the six roots is good. In detail, it is not like this. There is the abandonment of life in the existence (有分, bhavaṅga), the lifespans of the three realms are different, and there are various encounters, just like the cutting off of good as mentioned in the commentary.
Treatise: When in the realm of non-form (無色, arūpa), there are separate real entities, etc. In the commentary, five questions and answers are hypothetically narrated. According to reason, the other party's challenge has not stopped. Moreover, the fifth rebuttal says that mental phenomena universally can describe, only the seed of mind is called 'no-mind' (無心, acitta). Material phenomena are only what is disliked, only mental phenomena are called 'no-form'. The outsider's statement is also like this. Mental phenomena universally can dislike, non-form and non-mind is called 'no-mind'. Material phenomena are only what is disliked, only mental phenomena are called 'no-form'. Therefore, the dispute has not stopped. Also, explaining the second outsider's challenge in the commentary. Four teachers' explanations are transmitted. The first one says, disliking mind can dislike non-existence, relying on the seed to establish 'no-mind'. Disliking form can dislike existence, not relying on the seed to hypothetically establish. This explanation is not correct. The outsider says it is also like this, disliking mind can dislike non-existence, there are separate real entities obstructing. Disliking form can dislike existence, there are no separate real entities blocking. The second one says, I say 'no-mind' is a provisional (假, prajñapti) phenomenon, therefore, existence and non-existence are uncertain in the two positions. You say it really exists and does not rely on form and mind, why not allow both places to have it? This is also not correct. The outsider rebuts, since you are provisional, one exists and one does not, why prevent my real one from not existing and one existing? The third one says, disliking mind enters 'no-mind', relying on the seed of disliking mind to establish. Disliking form enters 'no-form', also relying on the seed of disliking mind to establish. This is also not correct. When disliking mind, the mind does not function, it can rely on the seed of mind to establish. When disliking form, the mind is still functioning, how can it rely on the seed of mind? Moreover, there is no sacred teaching that says the non-form concentration (無色定, ārūpya-samāpatti) is hypothetically established. The fourth one says, in order to break the attachment to reality, relying on the seed to establish the provisional. Attachment to reality.
若無假亦非有。此亦不然。且滅盡定三乘通得。豈為對執而施設耶 詳曰。觀前諸釋雖總有理皆未窮難。今助二解。一我無心定能厭無。無心依心種假立。無色能厭心不已。無色不依色種立。汝無色定能厭在。無色容實不依余。無心能厭既云無。無心應假依他立。由彼宗說非色非心即為定體。不說依他而假立故。故為斯難。二以無色定且抑他爾。不息他救。意者思之可知。由此故有第二假遮非實破也。
論。假亦能遮等者。有義疏說極微是實和合是假。又說彼宗瓶等能遮實不能遮。此皆是錯。一切有宗能成．所成皆是實故。即所成實亦是能遮者 詳曰。有宗所成五塵雖實。塵合成瓶。瓶等是假。疏說彼瓶為和合假。不說所成五塵為假 又疏說雲實極微法而不能遮。不和合故。明知所成既是和合。許是能遮一何妄破 又此疏初而以四句辨宗別。云薩婆多粗細皆實。豈可前後自楙楯耶。疏文文約而義包也。
疏。此引有別法等者。此俱舍也。問按俱舍云。若生無想有情天中。有法能令心．心所滅名為無想。是實有物能遮未來心．心所法令暫不起。如堰江河。既證無想是實有物。云何得言非謂假實以為喻耶 答喻意成前有法能令心．心所滅。顯所遮外而有能遮不成實有。若不爾者有宗．經部皆許堰等非是實有。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『若無假亦非有』，如果不是虛假的，那也不是真實存在的。這種說法也不對。而且滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態）是聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）、緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna）和菩薩乘（Bodhisattvayāna）三乘共通的，難道是爲了針對某種執著而設立的嗎？ 詳細解釋：觀察之前的各種解釋，雖然總體上都有道理，但都沒有窮盡難題。現在我補充兩種解釋：第一，我說『無心定』（asaṃjñika-samāpatti，無想定）能夠厭離『無』，是因為『無心』是依附於『心』的種子而假立的。無色界（ārūpyadhātu）的禪定能夠厭離，是因為『心』沒有停止。無色界的禪定不是依附於『色』的種子而建立的。你說無色界的禪定能夠厭離，無色界容許真實存在而不依賴於其他。『無心』能夠厭離，既然說是『無心』，那麼『無心』就應該是依附於他者而假立的。因為他們的宗義說非色非心就是定的本體，不說依他而假立，所以才會有這樣的詰難。第二，用無色界的禪定來抑制對方，並不是爲了停止對方的辯解。其中的意思仔細思考就可以明白。因此，才會有第二種假立遮遣，而不是真實破斥。
論：『假亦能遮』等等，有一種義疏說極微（paramāṇu，物質的最小單位）是真實的，和合（saṃghāta，組合）是虛假的。又說他們的宗義中瓶子等能夠遮蔽，真實的東西不能遮蔽。這些都是錯誤的。一切有部（Sarvāstivāda）所承認的能成（sādhana，能證明者）和所成（sādhya，所要證明者）都是真實的。也就是說，所成之實也是能遮蔽的。 詳細解釋：有部宗義所承認的五塵（pañca viṣayāḥ，色、聲、香、味、觸）雖然是真實的，但塵埃合成瓶子，瓶子等是虛假的。義疏說那個瓶子是和合的假象，而不是說所成的五塵是虛假的。而且義疏還說真實的極微法不能遮蔽，因為它們沒有和合。這明明知道所成既然是和合的，就允許它是能遮蔽的，為什麼還要胡亂破斥呢？而且這篇義疏一開始就用四句來辨別宗義的差別，說薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）粗細都是真實的，怎麼可以前後自相矛盾呢？義疏的文字簡略而意義深遠。
疏：『此引有別法』等等，這裡指的是《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）。問：按照《俱舍論》所說，如果生到無想有情天（asaṃjñasattvadeva，無想天）中，有一種法能夠使心和心所（citta-caitta，心理活動）滅盡，名為『無想』。這是一種真實存在的物質，能夠遮蔽未來的心和心所，使它們暫時不生起，就像堤壩攔截江河一樣。既然證明了『無想』是真實存在的物質，怎麼能說不是用假象和實物來作比喻呢？答：用比喻是爲了說明先前有法能夠使心和心所滅盡，顯示在所遮蔽之外有能遮蔽，而不是說能遮蔽是真實存在的。如果不是這樣，有部宗和經部（Sautrāntika）都承認堤壩等不是真實存在的。
【English Translation】 English version: 'If there is no false, then there is no true.' This is also not right. Moreover, Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment) is common to the Śrāvakayāna (Hearer Vehicle), Pratyekabuddhayāna (Solitary Realizer Vehicle), and Bodhisattvayāna (Bodhisattva Vehicle). Is it established to counter some attachment? Detailed explanation: Observing the previous explanations, although they are generally reasonable, they have not exhausted the difficulties. Now I add two explanations: First, I say that 'asaṃjñika-samāpatti' (non-perception attainment) can be averse to 'non-existence' because 'non-perception' is falsely established based on the seed of 'mind'. The dhyāna (meditation) of the Ārūpyadhātu (Formless Realm) can be averse because 'mind' has not stopped. The dhyāna of the Formless Realm is not established based on the seed of 'form'. You say that the dhyāna of the Formless Realm can be averse, and the Formless Realm allows for real existence without relying on others. 'Non-perception' can be averse, and since it is said to be 'non-perception', then 'non-perception' should be falsely established based on others. Because their doctrine says that non-form and non-mind are the essence of the attainment, and does not say that it is falsely established based on others, that's why there is such a difficulty. Second, using the dhyāna of the Formless Realm to suppress the other party is not to stop the other party's defense. The meaning of this can be understood by careful consideration. Therefore, there is a second false refutation, not a real refutation.
Treatise: 'False can also obstruct,' etc. One commentary says that paramāṇu (ultimate particle, the smallest unit of matter) is real, and saṃghāta (combination) is false. It also says that in their doctrine, bottles, etc., can obstruct, but real things cannot obstruct. These are all wrong. Everything that the Sarvāstivāda (All Exists School) acknowledges as sādhana (means of proof) and sādhya (what is to be proven) is real. That is to say, the reality of what is to be proven is also what can obstruct. Detailed explanation: Although the pañca viṣayāḥ (five sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) acknowledged by the Sarvāstivāda are real, the dust particles combine to form a bottle, and the bottle, etc., are false. The commentary says that the bottle is a false combination, not that the resulting five dusts are false. Moreover, the commentary also says that real ultimate particles cannot obstruct because they are not combined. It is clear that since what is produced is a combination, it is allowed to be obstructive. Why refute it randomly? Moreover, this commentary initially uses four sentences to distinguish the differences between the doctrines, saying that the Sarvāstivāda considers both coarse and fine to be real. How can it be self-contradictory from beginning to end? The text of the commentary is concise but the meaning is profound.
Commentary: 'This quotes that there is a separate dharma,' etc. This refers to the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Abhidharma). Question: According to the Abhidharmakośa, if one is born in the asaṃjñasattvadeva (Realm of Non-Perception), there is a dharma that can extinguish the citta (mind) and caitta (mental factors), called 'non-perception'. This is a real substance that can obstruct future mind and mental factors, causing them not to arise temporarily, like a dam blocking a river. Since it is proven that 'non-perception' is a real substance, how can it be said that it is not using false and real things as metaphors? Answer: The metaphor is used to illustrate that previously there was a dharma that could extinguish mind and mental factors, showing that there is an obstruction outside of what is being obstructed, rather than saying that the obstruction is real. If this were not the case, both the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika (Sutra School) would acknowledge that dams, etc., are not real.
為實之喻。喻豈不有兩俱所立不成過耶。為離此過故不成實。斯乃疏主深得彼旨。有義如堤塘言。與外人量為不定過。謂外量云。二無心定．無想異熟。定是實有。是能遮故。如無色定。與作過云。為如無色定是能遮故是實有耶。為如堤塘是能遮故非實有耶 詳曰。是法差別過。以實有者是法自相。離色．心實有。不離色．心實有是法差別。有宗意成離色．心有。無也定者是不離心。反為異喻。因於彼轉成差別過。
論。發勝期愿等者。問加行之中通於定散。散發愿者理在不疑。定加行中亦能發不 答有二釋。一云能發。一云初修專注厭心無由能發。若得自在發無有失。
論。無想定前求無想果故所熏種招異熟識者。有義明瞭心中求無想果故。微微心所熏成種為果熟因能招異熟。微微心中行想微劣。非別能求當異熟故 詳曰。論自明言無想定前求無想果不簡遠近。微微之心豈非定前。若微微心劣不求者。云何前云微微心時熏異熟識成極增上厭心等種。豈劣現行所熏得種乃成增上。故行相細名為微微。非據微劣名微微也。故疏說正。
疏。明瞭心時種子招異熟者。即微微心名為明瞭。對彼無心故稱明瞭。第二解言明了心者對微微心名為明瞭。
疏。此言雖總至二果別故者。有義一種子體約前後
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是用一個比喻來說明。但這個比喻難道沒有兩方面都站不住腳的過失嗎？爲了避免這個過失，所以說它不是真實的。窺基法師的註釋深刻地理解了對方的意圖。有一個比喻就像堤壩一樣。如果與外道辯論，就會出現不確定的過失。外道會說：『二無心定（指無想定和滅盡定）、無想異熟（無想天的果報）是真實存在的，因為它們能夠遮止（煩惱）。』就像無色定一樣。如果反駁說：『像無色定一樣，因為能夠遮止（煩惱）就是真實存在的嗎？』或者說：『像堤壩一樣，因為能夠遮止（洪水）就不是真實存在的嗎？』詳細地說，這是法差別過失。因為真實存在的是法的自相。離開色、心是真實存在，不離開色、心是真實存在，這是法的差別。有宗（唯識宗）的意圖是離開色、心而存在。無想定是不離開心的。反而成了不同的比喻。因此，在對方那裡轉成了差別過失。 論：『發起殊勝的期望等』。問：加行（修行）之中，通於禪定和散亂。散亂心中發起願望，道理上沒有疑問。禪定加行中也能發起嗎？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是能發起。一種說法是初修禪定，專注厭離之心，沒有辦法發起。如果得到自在，發起就沒有缺失。 論：『在無想定之前，爲了求無想果，所以熏習的種子招感異熟識』。有一種解釋是，在明瞭心中求無想果，所以微微的心所熏習成種子，作為果報成熟的原因，能夠招感異熟。在微微心中，行想微弱，不能單獨求得當來的異熟果。詳細地說，論中自己明明說在無想定之前求無想果，不分遠近。微微之心難道不是在禪定之前嗎？如果微微之心微弱，不能求得，那麼為什麼前面說在微微心時，熏習異熟識，成為極增上的厭離心等種子？難道微弱的現行所熏習的種子，反而能成為增上？所以行相細微叫做微微，不是根據微弱叫做微微。所以窺基法師的註釋是正確的。 疏：『在明瞭心時，種子招感異熟』。就是微微心叫做明瞭。相對於無心，所以稱為明瞭。第二種解釋說明了心是對微微心而言的，稱為明瞭。 疏：『這個說法雖然總括，但到二果時就不同了』。有一種解釋是一種子體，從前後來說。
【English Translation】 English version: This is an analogy to illustrate the point. But doesn't this analogy have the fault of being untenable on both sides? To avoid this fault, it is said that it is not real. Master Kuiji's commentary deeply understands the other party's intention. There is an analogy like a dike. If arguing with externalists, there will be the fault of uncertainty. Externalists would say: 'The two non-mind samadhis (referring to Asaṃjñā-samāpatti and Nirodha-samāpatti), and Asaṃjñika-vipāka (the fruition of the heaven of non-perception) are real, because they can obstruct (afflictions).' Like the Formless Samadhis. If countered: 'Like the Formless Samadhis, because they can obstruct (afflictions), are they real?' Or: 'Like a dike, because it can obstruct (floods), is it not real?' In detail, this is the fault of Dharma difference. Because what is real is the self-nature of Dharma. Being separate from form and mind is real, not being separate from form and mind is real, this is the difference of Dharma. The intention of the Consciousness-only school is to exist separately from form and mind. The Asaṃjñā-samāpatti is not separate from mind. On the contrary, it becomes a different analogy. Therefore, it turns into the fault of difference on the other party's side. Treatise: 'Generating excellent aspirations, etc.' Question: Within the practice (of cultivation), it applies to both samadhi and distraction. There is no doubt about generating aspirations in a distracted mind. Can it also be generated in the practice of samadhi? Answer: There are two explanations. One says it can be generated. One says that in the initial practice of samadhi, focusing on the mind of aversion, there is no way to generate it. If one attains freedom, there is no loss in generating it. Treatise: 'Before the Asaṃjñā-samāpatti, in order to seek the fruit of non-perception, the seeds that are perfumed cause the maturation consciousness.' One explanation is that in the clear mind, one seeks the fruit of non-perception, so the subtle mental factors perfumed into seeds, as the cause of fruition, can cause maturation. In the subtle mind, the thought is weak, and it cannot independently seek the future fruition. In detail, the treatise itself clearly states that before the Asaṃjñā-samāpatti, one seeks the fruit of non-perception, without distinguishing near or far. Isn't the subtle mind before samadhi? If the subtle mind is weak and cannot seek, then why did it say earlier that in the subtle mind, the perfuming of maturation consciousness becomes the seeds of extremely increasing aversion, etc.? Can the seeds perfumed by the weak present action become increasing? Therefore, the subtle appearance is called subtle, not based on weakness. Therefore, Master Kuiji's commentary is correct. Commentary: 'In the clear mind, the seeds cause maturation.' That is, the subtle mind is called clear. Relative to the non-mind, it is called clear. The second explanation clarifies that the clear mind is in relation to the subtle mind, and it is called clear. Commentary: 'Although this statement is general, it is different when it comes to the two fruits.' One explanation is that one seed body is considered from before and after.
位招二種果等者。微心時種滅已即無。如何別說招總異熟。故亦非理。若依別報轉識諸根說別業招即無有失。然應云明瞭心等招別異熟微微心時招總異熟。或微微心通招總別。瑜伽論云。能引定思能感彼天異熟果故。如何違教倒說招別 詳曰。若言明了招彼轉識別報異熟微微招彼總報異熟。無想異熟假故不招。如何聖說無想定因。無想異熟而為果耶。假名為招如燈具辨。
疏。無心以去至無想異熟者。即是彼天第六識等種子之上。能遮彼地六識等現不起功能。名為無想異熟體也。
疏。故前解為勝者。問勝義何也 答言無想定招彼果故。以微微種建立定故。以前非定。若取前心而減彼者。云何得說由定生彼。又彼別報而無其體。云何實種能招彼耶。故前解勝 有義疏云微微心至各招一果。今不依彼者 詳曰。疏已斷訖。何煩重非。
疏。今解等者。疏主出彼無想事體疏有兩釋。復有說云。彼本有初別報異熟轉識暫起宿因緣力后不復生。故依第八生得無記心．心所滅。此不行位假立無想。彼無生得心．心所時。依彼現八而假建立無想異熟。無想異熟既果非因。故不可說依種子立。有義斷此以為正說 詳曰。依種為正。若言彼位有現第八故依立者。二無心定亦有第八。何不依立而依種耶。若言是果下依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於『位招二種果等者』（位置招致兩種果報等同）的說法，如果說微細心念生滅之後就消失了，那麼如何區分招致總報和別報的異熟果呢？所以這種說法是不合理的。如果依據別報轉識和諸根來說別業招致果報，就沒有問題。然而，應該說，明瞭的心等招致別異熟，微細心念招致總異熟，或者微細心念可以同時招致總報和別報。《瑜伽師地論》中說：『能引發禪定的思，能感得彼天（指無想天）的異熟果。』為什麼違背教義，顛倒地說招致別報呢？
詳細解釋：如果說明了的心招致轉識的別報異熟，微細的心招致總報異熟，那麼無想的異熟是虛假的，不能招致果報。那麼聖人為什麼說無想定是因，而無想異熟是果呢？這只是假名為招，就像燈具的比喻一樣。
疏文：『無心以去至無想異熟者』，指的是彼天（無想天）第六識等的種子之上，能夠遮蔽彼地（無想天）六識等現行不起作用的功能，這被稱為無想異熟的本體。
疏文：『故前解為勝者』，問：勝義在哪裡呢？答：因為無想定招致彼果。因為以微細的種子建立禪定。以前的說法不是禪定。如果取前心而減少它，怎麼能說是由禪定而生彼果呢？而且彼別報沒有實體，怎麼能說真實的種子能招致彼果呢？所以前面的解釋更好。有一種解釋說，微細心念各自招致一種果報。現在不依據那種說法。
詳細解釋：疏文已經斷定了，為什麼還要重複否定呢？
疏文：『今解等者』，疏主解釋了無想的事體，疏文有兩種解釋。還有一種說法是，彼本有初別報異熟轉識暫時生起，由於宿世因緣的力量，後來不再生起。所以依據第八識生得的無記心和心所滅，在這種不行位的狀態下，假立為無想。在沒有生得心和心所的時候，依據彼現行的第八識而假立無想異熟。無想異熟既然是果而不是因，所以不能說依據種子而建立。有人斷定這種說法是正確的。
詳細解釋：依據種子才是正確的。如果說彼位有現行的第八識，所以依據它而建立，那麼二無心定（滅盡定和無想定）也有第八識，為什麼不依據它而建立，而要依據種子呢？如果說是果，下面會依據…… English version: Regarding the statement 'position causes two kinds of results to be equal,' if subtle thoughts cease and disappear, how can we differentiate between the results of general retribution and specific retribution? Therefore, this statement is unreasonable. If we explain that specific karma causes specific retribution based on the specific retribution of consciousness and the senses, then there is no problem. However, it should be said that clear thoughts cause specific retribution, and subtle thoughts cause general retribution, or subtle thoughts can cause both general and specific retribution simultaneously. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra states: 'The thought that can induce samadhi can cause the result of the other realm (referring to the Realm of Non-Perception).' Why contradict the teachings and say that it causes specific retribution?
Detailed explanation: If it is said that clear thoughts cause the specific retribution of transformed consciousness, and subtle thoughts cause the general retribution, then the retribution of non-perception is false and cannot cause results. Then why do the sages say that the non-perceptual samadhi is the cause, and the retribution of non-perception is the result? This is just a false name for causation, like the analogy of a lamp.
Commentary: 'Without mind, going to the retribution of non-perception' refers to the function on the seeds of the sixth consciousness, etc., of that realm (the Realm of Non-Perception), which can block the function of the six consciousnesses, etc., of that realm from arising. This is called the substance of the retribution of non-perception.
Commentary: 'Therefore, the previous explanation is superior.' Question: What is the superior meaning? Answer: Because the non-perceptual samadhi causes that result. Because samadhi is established with subtle seeds. The previous explanation was not samadhi. If we take the previous mind and diminish it, how can we say that it is born from samadhi? Moreover, that specific retribution has no substance, so how can we say that the real seed can cause that result? Therefore, the previous explanation is better. One explanation says that subtle thoughts each cause one result. Now we do not rely on that explanation.
Detailed explanation: The commentary has already concluded, why repeat the negation?
Commentary: 'The current explanation, etc.' The commentator explains the substance of non-perception, and there are two explanations in the commentary. Another explanation is that the original specific retribution of transformed consciousness temporarily arises due to the power of past karmic conditions, and then no longer arises. Therefore, based on the eighth consciousness born without intention and the cessation of mental functions, in this state of non-activity, non-perception is falsely established. When there is no consciousness or mental function born without intention, non-perceptual retribution is falsely established based on the existing eighth consciousness. Since non-perceptual retribution is a result and not a cause, it cannot be said to be established based on seeds. Some conclude that this explanation is correct.
Detailed explanation: Relying on seeds is correct. If it is said that there is an existing eighth consciousness in that state, so it is established based on it, then the two mindlessness samadhis (cessation samadhi and non-perceptual samadhi) also have the eighth consciousness. Why not establish it based on that, but instead rely on seeds? If it is a result, the following will rely on...
【English Translation】 Regarding the statement 'position causes two kinds of results to be equal,' if subtle thoughts cease and disappear, how can we differentiate between the results of general retribution and specific retribution? Therefore, this statement is unreasonable. If we explain that specific karma causes specific retribution based on the specific retribution of consciousness and the senses, then there is no problem. However, it should be said that clear thoughts cause specific retribution, and subtle thoughts cause general retribution, or subtle thoughts can cause both general and specific retribution simultaneously. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra states: 'The thought that can induce samadhi can cause the result of the other realm (referring to the Realm of Non-Perception).' Why contradict the teachings and say that it causes specific retribution? Detailed explanation: If it is said that clear thoughts cause the specific retribution of transformed consciousness, and subtle thoughts cause the general retribution, then the retribution of non-perception is false and cannot cause results. Then why do the sages say that the non-perceptual samadhi is the cause, and the retribution of non-perception is the result? This is just a false name for causation, like the analogy of a lamp. Commentary: 'Without mind, going to the retribution of non-perception' refers to the function on the seeds of the sixth consciousness, etc., of that realm (the Realm of Non-Perception), which can block the function of the six consciousnesses, etc., of that realm from arising. This is called the substance of the retribution of non-perception. Commentary: 'Therefore, the previous explanation is superior.' Question: What is the superior meaning? Answer: Because the non-perceptual samadhi causes that result. Because samadhi is established with subtle seeds. The previous explanation was not samadhi. If we take the previous mind and diminish it, how can we say that it is born from samadhi? Moreover, that specific retribution has no substance, so how can we say that the real seed can cause that result? Therefore, the previous explanation is better. One explanation says that subtle thoughts each cause one result. Now we do not rely on that explanation. Detailed explanation: The commentary has already concluded, why repeat the negation? Commentary: 'The current explanation, etc.' The commentator explains the substance of non-perception, and there are two explanations in the commentary. Another explanation is that the original specific retribution of transformed consciousness temporarily arises due to the power of past karmic conditions, and then no longer arises. Therefore, based on the eighth consciousness born without intention and the cessation of mental functions, in this state of non-activity, non-perception is falsely established. When there is no consciousness or mental function born without intention, non-perceptual retribution is falsely established based on the existing eighth consciousness. Since non-perceptual retribution is a result and not a cause, it cannot be said to be established based on seeds. Some conclude that this explanation is correct. Detailed explanation: Relying on seeds is correct. If it is said that there is an existing eighth consciousness in that state, so it is established based on it, then the two mindlessness samadhis (cessation samadhi and non-perceptual samadhi) also have the eighth consciousness. Why not establish it based on that, but instead rely on seeds? If it is a result, the following will rely on...
種者。種被現熏種應非果。種上功能翻往往時定為果何失。
疏。善等恒行心等者。等言等彼有覆．無覆。長途所起名為恒行。非不間斷名恒行也 或疏脫也。應云不恒行。
疏。無想異熟通持業依士者。當體立名即持業也。從因受稱故依士也。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第二(本)
成唯識論演秘卷第二(末)(論第二)
◎疏。如童女想等者。西域立法出逢童女表有吉祥。又如童女齒白唇薄腳膝纖團。表此女人生子必善。異前相者生子必惡。
疏。然遮生等至決定相違者。遮彼生等定別有故。與彼定別而作違故名決定違。非是第六決定相違。決定相違改他宗法．及因喻故 有云。第六雖不改因亦得成故 詳曰。不然。第一．第六二種不定更有何別。故初釋正。
疏。無為無生至三種能相者。此外人難。
疏。體無起盡等者。論主答也。
疏。此難不然等者。問外言亦爾。立．不立別。何能息難 答我宗無為亦立假想。故大集經第二十云。無為之法有三種相。謂無出．無滅．無住。瑜伽八十八云。有為是無常。三有為相施設可得。與此相違應知常住無為三相 若爾何故不相應法但二十四 答舉勝而談二十四也。我既假施。汝應實立。又難彼六。我宗無為體是一無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『種者』（bija，種子）：如果種子是被現在的熏習所產生的，那麼種子就不應該是果（phala，結果）。如果種子上的功能翻轉，往往在一定的時間后成為果，那又有什麼損失呢？
疏：『善等恒行心等者』：『等』字包括有覆（savrana，有染污的）和無覆（anavrana，無染污的）。長時間執行所產生的，稱為『恒行』。並非不間斷才稱為『恒行』。或者這裡疏漏了，應該說『不恒行』。
疏：『無想異熟通持業依士者』：以自體立名，就是『持業』（karmadharaya，同格關係）。從因接受名稱，所以是『依士』（tadadhina，依屬關係）。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第二（本）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第二（末）（論第二）
疏：『如童女想等者』：在西域，有一種習俗，遇到童女象徵吉祥。又如童女牙齒潔白、嘴唇薄、腳和膝蓋纖細圓潤，表示這個女人生下的孩子一定好。如果與這些特徵相反，生下的孩子一定不好。
疏：『然遮生等至決定相違者』：因為遮止彼生等，一定有其他的差別。因為與彼等差別而產生違背，所以稱為『決定相違』。並非是第六種『決定相違』。『決定相違』會改變他宗的法則以及因喻。有人說：第六種即使不改變因，也能成立。詳細地說，不然。第一種和第六種『不定』還有什麼區別？所以最初的解釋是正確的。
疏：『無為無生至三種能相者』：這是外人的詰難。
疏：『體無起盡等者』：這是論主的回答。
疏：『此難不然等者』：外人問：你的說法也是這樣，立或者不立有什麼區別，怎麼能平息詰難？答：我宗的無為也立假想。所以《大集經》第二十卷說：『無為之法有三種相，謂無出、無滅、無住。』《瑜伽師地論》第八十八卷說：『有為是無常，三有為相施設可得。與此相違，應知常住無為三相。』如果這樣，為什麼不相應法只有二十四種？答：這是舉其殊勝之處而談二十四種。我既然是假施設，你就應該真實地建立。又詰難他們六種。我宗的無為體是一無所有的。
【English Translation】 English version 'Bija' (seed): If the seed is produced by present perfuming, then the seed should not be the 'phala' (result). If the function on the seed reverses and often becomes the result after a certain time, what is the loss?
Commentary: 'Good, etc., constantly acting mind, etc.': 'Etc.' includes the covered (savrana, defiled) and uncovered (anavrana, undefiled). What arises from long-term operation is called 'constant acting'. It is not that uninterruptedness is called 'constant acting'. Or there is an omission here, it should be said 'not constant acting'.
Commentary: 'Non-thought, different maturation, all possessing the nature of identity and dependence': Establishing a name based on its own nature is 'possessing the nature of identity' (karmadharaya, appositional compound). Receiving a name from the cause, therefore it is 'dependence' (tadadhina, dependent relation).
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 2 (Original)
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 2 (End) (Treatise 2)
Commentary: 'Like the thought of a virgin, etc.': In the Western Regions, there is a custom that encountering a virgin symbolizes auspiciousness. Also, if a virgin's teeth are white, lips are thin, and feet and knees are slender and round, it indicates that the child born to this woman will certainly be good. If it is the opposite of these characteristics, the child born will certainly be bad.
Commentary: 'However, preventing birth, etc., to definite contradiction': Because preventing their birth, etc., there must be other differences. Because it contradicts those differences, it is called 'definite contradiction'. It is not the sixth type of 'definite contradiction'. 'Definite contradiction' will change the laws and examples of other schools. Some say: The sixth type can be established even without changing the cause. In detail, it is not so. What is the difference between the first and sixth types of 'indefinite'? Therefore, the initial explanation is correct.
Commentary: 'Non-action, non-birth, to the three capable characteristics': This is an objection from outsiders.
Commentary: 'The substance has no arising and ceasing, etc.': This is the treatise master's answer.
Commentary: 'This difficulty is not so, etc.': Outsiders ask: Your statement is also like this, what is the difference between establishing or not establishing, how can you quell the difficulty? Answer: Our school's non-action also establishes a hypothetical. Therefore, the twentieth volume of the 'Mahasamghata Sutra' says: 'The Dharma of non-action has three characteristics, namely, no arising, no ceasing, and no abiding.' The eighty-eighth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says: 'Action is impermanent, and the three characteristics of action can be established. Contrary to this, one should know the three characteristics of permanence and non-action.' If so, why are there only twenty-four non-corresponding dharmas? Answer: This is talking about twenty-four by citing their superior aspects. Since I am hypothetically establishing, you should truly establish it. They are also challenged on the six types. Our school's non-action is a complete nothingness in substance.
差別故無假相。汝宗滅等許體多同有為多有實相。
疏。因有親疏者。謂六因中除能作因餘五皆是因緣所攝。且同類因三性五蘊各自為因。如善識蘊望自為親。望餘四蘊名之為疏。以非識故。余互相望親疏準此。
疏。緣法亦爾者。四緣之中除因緣外皆名為緣。且自六根望自六識名親增上。余望六識名之為疏。不為礙故。非近生故。余準此知。
疏。正理師至是取用者。按正理論第十四意。生相未來但起功能非是作用。現取果用方是作用。作用必功能。功能非必有作用 俱舍師破。功能．作用眼目異名。何故生用但名功能。住等三種名為作用。又違娑沙評家所說。說云無有等無間緣異時取果異時與果。準彼論主。入無心定即是過去取．與果也。既過去取應名現在 正理師言。等無間緣現在頓取過去漸與者。此為不可。即無間緣異時取．與違前婆沙。
疏。何不去來法皆有功能者。此難過．未一切諸法皆有功能。不但生相及與果也。俱本有故。
疏生。非作用等者。此乃牒計成前難意。由汝本言生與果等不是作用顯是功能。不言余法有功能故。又難生相無作功。作功無故名功能。余未來亦無作用。無作用故名功能。難過去法亦準此知。
疏。異滅至便非現在者。問準正理論。住．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『差別故無假相』。你們宗派（指正量部）認為『滅』等（指無為法）的體性多數與『有為法』相同，多數具有『實相』。
疏：『因有親疏者』，指的是六因（sadhetu）中，除了『能作因』（karana-hetu）之外，其餘五種都屬於『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya）所攝。例如，『同類因』（sabhaga-hetu）中，三性（trisvabhava）、五蘊（panca-skandha）各自為因。如善的識蘊（vijnana-skandha）相對於自身來說是『親』，相對於其餘四蘊來說，就稱為『疏』，因為它不是識。其餘互相之間的親疏關係，可以依此類推。
疏：『緣法亦爾者』，四緣（catuh-pratyaya）之中，除了『因緣』之外，其餘都稱為『緣』（pratyaya）。例如，自身的六根（sadindriyani）相對於自身的六識（sad-vijnanani）來說，是『親增上』，相對於其餘的六識來說，就稱為『疏』，因為它不妨礙，也不是近生的原因。其餘的可以依此類推。
疏：『正理師至是取用者』，根據《正理論》（Nyayanusara-sastra）第十四意，『生相』（jati-laksana）在未來只是產生功能，而不是作用。現在取得果的作用才是作用。作用必定有功能，但功能不一定有作用。《俱舍論師》（Abhidharmakosa-acarya）反駁說，功能和作用只是名稱不同，為什麼生用只稱為功能，而住等三種稱為作用？又違背了《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）評家的說法，說沒有等無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya）異時取果、異時與果。按照該論主的說法，進入無心定（asamjnika-samapatti）就是過去取、與果。既然過去取，就應該稱為現在。正理師說，等無間緣現在頓取，過去漸與，這是不可能的。即無間緣異時取、與，違背了之前的《婆沙論》。
疏：『何不去來法皆有功能者』，這是責難過去、未來一切諸法都有功能，不僅僅是生相及與果。因為它們本來就存在。
疏生：『非作用等者』，這是重複之前的計較，形成責難的意思。因為你們本來就說生與果等不是作用，而是功能，卻沒有說其餘的法有功能。又責難生相沒有作功，因為沒有作功，所以稱為功能。其餘的未來也沒有作用，因為沒有作用，所以稱為功能。責難過去法也可以依此類推。
疏：『異滅至便非現在者』，問：按照《正理論》的說法，住（sthiti）...
【English Translation】 English version 『Because of difference, there is no false appearance.』 Your school (referring to the Sautrantika) believes that the nature of 『cessation』 (nirodha) and others (referring to unconditioned dharmas) is mostly the same as 『conditioned dharmas』 (samskrta-dharmas), and mostly possesses 『real characteristics』 (satya-laksana).
Commentary: 『The cause has closeness and distance』 refers to that among the six causes (sadhetu), except for the 『efficient cause』 (karana-hetu), the remaining five are all included in 『causal condition』 (hetu-pratyaya). For example, in 『cause of the same kind』 (sabhaga-hetu), the three natures (trisvabhava) and five aggregates (panca-skandha) each serve as a cause. For example, a wholesome aggregate of consciousness (vijnana-skandha) is 『close』 relative to itself, and is called 『distant』 relative to the other four aggregates, because it is not consciousness. The closeness and distance between the others can be inferred by analogy.
Commentary: 『The condition dharmas are also like this』 refers to that among the four conditions (catuh-pratyaya), except for 『causal condition』, the remaining are all called 『condition』 (pratyaya). For example, one's own six sense organs (sadindriyani) are 『close and supreme』 relative to one's own six consciousnesses (sad-vijnanani), and are called 『distant』 relative to the other six consciousnesses, because they do not obstruct and are not the cause of near arising. The others can be understood by analogy.
Commentary: 『The Vaibhasika masters take effect here』 According to the fourteenth meaning of the Nyayanusara-sastra, 『birth aspect』 (jati-laksana) only produces function in the future, not effect. Taking the effect of the result now is the effect. Effect must have function, but function does not necessarily have effect. The Abhidharmakosa-acarya refutes that function and effect are just different names. Why is arising effect only called function, while the three types of duration, etc., are called effect? It also violates the statement of the Vibhasa commentators, who say that there is no immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) that takes the result at a different time and gives the result at a different time. According to the master of that treatise, entering the unconscious samadhi (asamjnika-samapatti) is taking and giving the result in the past. Since it is taken in the past, it should be called the present. The Vaibhasika masters say that it is impossible for the immediately preceding condition to take it all at once in the present and give it gradually in the past. That is, the immediately preceding condition takes and gives at different times, which violates the previous Vibhasa.
Commentary: 『Why do past and future dharmas all have function?』 This is to blame that all past and future dharmas have function, not just the birth aspect and giving the result. Because they originally exist.
Commentary on arising: 『Not effect, etc.』 This is to repeat the previous argument, forming the meaning of blame. Because you originally said that arising and giving the result, etc., are not effect, but function, but you did not say that the other dharmas have function. It is also to blame that the birth aspect has no working function. Because there is no working function, it is called function. The rest of the future also has no effect. Because there is no effect, it is called function. The past dharmas can also be blamed by analogy.
Commentary: 『Different cessation until it is not the present』 Question: According to the Nyayanusara-sastra, duration (sthiti)...
異．滅三皆能取果。起用各別。于所相法住令安住令取勝果。異即衰損令取劣果。滅即壞滅令入過去。難豈非過 答異等不能引于勝果名不取果。就一邊難亦無失也。
疏婆沙第三說未來三法有作用者。按彼論云。謂一切法能于未來有作用者。總有三類。一者內法。如苦法智忍。二者外法。如月光明。三內外法。如諸生相 問苦法智忍作用云何 答即彼論云。苦法智忍能正舍異生性。謂正生時舍異生性。于正滅位能斷欲界見苦所斷十種隨眠 釋曰。言正生者即未來世。未來世舍異生性。是忍作用。餘二可知。
疏。即前異不成等者。按彼論。經部破有部云。異於一法進退推微理不應有。異謂前後性相轉變。非即此法可言異此。故說頌曰。即前異不成。異前非一法。是故於一法。立異終不成 釋曰。異相異法。若即是前住相住法異義不成。非別法故。此乃進責。若異相法異前住相所住之法。法即非一。若住異法而有別者。有違宗過。彼許一法有住異故。此退責也。
疏。十時分位者。胎內．胎外各有五時。俱如法數。
疏。諸論唯望於前者。諸論通明一切有情。有情之名亦攝無學。無學末心更無後蘊。無後可異故言望前。
疏。亦說除彼末心者。除彼無學最後之心。對余有情亦得異后。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『異』（變化，difference）、『滅』（消滅，cessation）和『住』（持續，duration）三種相都能產生結果。它們的作用和效用各自不同。對於所相關的法，『住』使其安住併產生殊勝的結果。『異』即衰損，使其產生低劣的結果。『滅』即壞滅，使其進入過去。問：難道不是已經過去了（指『滅』）嗎？答：『異』等不能引向殊勝的結果，所以不能稱為產生結果。只從一個方面來責難，也沒有什麼過失。
《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra）第三卷說，未來三種法有作用。按照該論的說法，一切法能在未來產生作用的，總共有三類：一是內法，如苦法智忍（kṣānti-jñāna-dharma-duḥkha，對苦諦的忍耐和智慧）；二是外法，如月光明；三是內外法，如諸生相（jāti-lakṣaṇa，出生的相）。問：苦法智忍的作用是什麼？答：該論說，苦法智忍能正確地捨棄異生性（pṛthag-jana-tva，凡夫的性質），即在正生起時捨棄異生性，在正滅位時能斷除欲界見苦所斷的十種隨眠（anuśaya，煩惱的潛在傾向）。解釋：所說的『正生』是指未來世。未來世捨棄異生性，是忍的作用。其餘兩種可以類推得知。
疏：即前面所說的『異』不成等。按照該論，經部（Sautrāntika）破斥有部（Sarvāstivāda）說，對於一個法，進退推移細微的變化，道理上不應該有。『異』是指前後性質和相狀的轉變，不能說就是這個法不同於這個法。所以說了偈頌：『即前異不成，異前非一法，是故於一法，立異終不成。』解釋：『異相』和『異法』，如果就是前面的『住相』和『住法』，那麼『異』的意義就不能成立，因為不是別的法。這是進一步的責難。如果『異相』和『異法』不同於前面的『住相』和『所住之法』，那麼法就不是同一個法。如果『住』和『異』是不同的法，那麼就違背了宗義的過失，因為他們認為一個法有『住』和『異』。這是退一步的責難。
疏：十個時分階段，胎內和胎外各有五個階段，都如法數所說。
疏：各論只針對前者而言。各論普遍說明一切有情（sattva，眾生）。『有情』這個名稱也包括無學（aśaikṣa，無學果位）。無學末心（最後一念心）之後，不再有後蘊（uttara-skandha，後來的蘊）。因為沒有後來的可以變化，所以說是針對前者而言。
疏：也說除了那個末心。除了無學最後的心，對於其餘的有情，也可以有後面的變化。
【English Translation】 English version 'Difference' (anitya), 'cessation' (nirodha), and 'duration' (sthiti) can all produce results. Their functions and effects are different. Regarding the related dharmas, 'duration' causes them to abide and produce superior results. 'Difference,' being decay, causes them to produce inferior results. 'Cessation,' being destruction, causes them to enter the past. Question: Isn't it already past (referring to 'cessation')? Answer: 'Difference,' etc., cannot lead to superior results, so they cannot be called producing results. There is no fault in criticizing from one aspect only.
The Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, volume 3, states that the three future dharmas have functions. According to that treatise, all dharmas that can produce effects in the future are generally of three types: first, internal dharmas, such as the kṣānti-jñāna-dharma-duḥkha (patience and wisdom regarding the truth of suffering); second, external dharmas, such as moonlight; and third, internal and external dharmas, such as the jāti-lakṣaṇa (characteristics of birth). Question: What is the function of kṣānti-jñāna-dharma-duḥkha? Answer: That treatise states that kṣānti-jñāna-dharma-duḥkha can correctly abandon the pṛthag-jana-tva (nature of an ordinary being), that is, abandon the nature of an ordinary being at the moment of arising, and at the moment of cessation, it can sever the ten anuśayas (latent tendencies of affliction) that are severed by seeing suffering in the desire realm. Explanation: The so-called 'arising' refers to the future world. Abandoning the nature of an ordinary being in the future world is the function of patience. The other two can be understood by analogy.
Commentary: The aforementioned 'difference' is not established, etc. According to that treatise, the Sautrāntika school refutes the Sarvāstivāda school, saying that for one dharma, subtle changes in advancement and retreat should not exist in principle. 'Difference' refers to the transformation of nature and characteristics before and after; it cannot be said that this dharma is different from this dharma. Therefore, the verse says: 'The preceding difference is not established; what is different from the preceding is not the same dharma; therefore, establishing difference in one dharma is ultimately not possible.' Explanation: 'Different characteristic' and 'different dharma,' if they are the preceding 'abiding characteristic' and 'abiding dharma,' then the meaning of 'difference' cannot be established because it is not a separate dharma. This is a further criticism. If the 'different characteristic' and 'different dharma' are different from the preceding 'abiding characteristic' and 'abiding dharma,' then the dharma is not the same dharma. If 'abiding' and 'difference' are different dharmas, then there is a fault of contradicting the doctrine, because they believe that one dharma has 'abiding' and 'difference.' This is a step-back criticism.
Commentary: The ten time divisions, there are five stages inside the womb and five stages outside the womb, all as described in the Dharma numbers.
Commentary: The treatises only refer to the former. The treatises universally explain all sattvas (sentient beings). The name 'sentient being' also includes aśaikṣa (those in the state of no-more-learning). After the last mind of the aśaikṣa, there are no more uttara-skandhas (subsequent aggregates). Because there is nothing subsequent that can change, it is said to refer to the former.
Commentary: It also says except for that last mind. Except for the last mind of the no-more-learner, there can also be subsequent changes for other sentient beings.
故不相違。
論。若名句文至非實能詮者。問大乘自許他方佛土色亦能詮是異聲有。因豈不犯自不定耶 答非實詮言以簡彼訖故無不定。
疏。若不言法處等者。若宗但言非離所依別有實體。他許屈曲離所依色別有實體。故闕所立。若言法處。他亦不許色上屈曲在於法處。故喻無過。
疏。不可難言戒體但依思等者。外難意云。長等但依色。即令別處收。無表唯依思。應不同處攝。答意云。無表現與思同法處。何得難令不同處耶。此即且據同處答他不離他責。他責之曰。長．短亦爾。現同處故。何得難令別處耶。由此次下當正解也 有云。現行是意境。能依是意境。故同法處收 詳曰。定道無表理容可然。別脫無表如何依現。又若意境即同法處。色等屈曲自亦意境。應唯法處。故知非也。
論。此應如彼聲等者。疏有兩意。初立量破。而言此者此小內聲。彼亦彼小絃管聲也。次云又若語聲等者。此言此自內屈曲聲。彼即彼外內生名聲。然疏中量與前外量作有法差別。思可知也。
疏。但如汝化身語二業等者。意如燈釋 問既許能詮成語業不 答大乘語業實體唯思。若據假業。縱離質聲名業無失。故佛地論第七說云化身語業各有三種。謂自他身．非身相應。意業唯二。謂自他身。無非身
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，（上述兩種觀點）並不互相矛盾。
論：如果名、句、文（name, phrase, sentence）直到非真實能詮釋者。問：大乘佛教自己承認他方佛土的顏色也能詮釋，這是異聲有（different sound existence）。那麼，這個因（reasoning）豈不是犯了自不定（self-uncertainty）的錯誤嗎？答：用『非真實詮釋』這個詞來排除那種情況，所以沒有不定的問題。
疏：如果不說法處等，如果宗（thesis）只是說沒有離開所依（that which is relied upon）而獨立存在的實體，對方認為屈曲（curvature）離開所依的顏色而獨立存在。因此，缺少了所立（that which is to be established）。如果說法處（dharma realm），對方也不認為顏色上的屈曲存在於法處。因此，比喻沒有過失。
疏：不可用戒體只是依靠思等來反駁。外人的反駁意思是說，長等（length etc.）只是依靠顏色，就應該被歸類到別處（another place）。無表（non-revealing karma）只是依靠思，應該被歸類到不同的地方。回答的意思是說，無表現（non-revealing manifestation）與思（thought）同屬於法處，怎麼能反駁說應該歸類到不同的地方呢？這只是根據同處來回答對方，沒有離開對方的責難。對方責難說，長、短也是這樣，現在同屬於一處，怎麼能反駁說應該歸類到別處呢？因為這個原因，下面將要正確地解釋。有人說，現行（present action）是意境（realm of mind），能依（that which relies upon）是意境，所以被歸類到法處。詳細考察后認為，定道（path of concentration）的無表在道理上可以這樣說，別解脫（individual liberation）的無表怎麼能依靠現行呢？而且，如果意境等同於法處，顏色等的屈曲本身也是意境，應該只屬於法處。所以知道這種說法是不對的。
論：這應該像聲音等一樣。疏有兩種解釋。首先，建立量（measure）來破斥。說『此』，指的是此小內聲（this small internal sound）。『彼』，指的是彼小絃管聲（that small stringed instrument sound）。其次說，又如果語聲等，這裡說『此』，指的是此自內屈曲聲（this self-internal curvature sound）。『彼』，指的是彼外內生名聲（that external-internal produced name sound）。然而，疏中的量與前面的外量在有法（subject of the inference）上做了區別，可以思考得知。
疏：但像你的化身語二業等。意思是像燈釋（lamp explanation）。問：既然允許能詮（that which can express）成為語業（verbal karma）嗎？答：大乘佛教的語業實體只是思。如果根據假業（provisional karma），即使離開質聲（substantial sound），成為業也沒有過失。所以《佛地論》第七卷說，化身語業各有三種，即自身、他身、非身相應。意業（mental karma）只有兩種，即自身、他身，沒有非身。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, (the above two viewpoints) do not contradict each other.
Treatise: If name, phrase, and sentence, up to that which is not truly capable of expressing. Question: The Mahayana school itself admits that the colors of other Buddha lands can also express meaning; this is a 'different sound existence'. Then, doesn't this reason commit the fault of 'self-uncertainty'? Answer: The term 'not truly capable of expressing' is used to exclude that case, so there is no problem of uncertainty.
Commentary: If one does not mention 'dharma realm' etc., if the thesis only states that there is no independent entity apart from that which is relied upon, the opponent believes that curvature exists independently apart from the color it relies upon. Therefore, what is to be established is lacking. If one mentions 'dharma realm', the opponent also does not believe that the curvature on color exists in the dharma realm. Therefore, the analogy has no fault.
Commentary: It is not permissible to argue that the precepts only rely on thought etc. The opponent's argument means that length etc. only rely on color, so they should be categorized elsewhere. Non-revealing karma only relies on thought, so it should be categorized in a different place. The answer means that non-revealing manifestation and thought both belong to the dharma realm, so how can one argue that they should be categorized in different places? This is only answering the opponent based on the same place, without departing from the opponent's criticism. The opponent criticizes, saying that length and shortness are also like this; since they currently belong to the same place, how can one argue that they should be categorized in different places? Because of this reason, the following will correctly explain. Some say that present action is the realm of mind, and that which relies upon is the realm of mind, so they are categorized in the dharma realm. Upon detailed examination, it is considered that the non-revealing karma of the path of concentration can reasonably be said to be like this, but how can the non-revealing karma of individual liberation rely on present action? Moreover, if the realm of mind is equivalent to the dharma realm, then the curvature of color etc. is also the realm of mind, and should only belong to the dharma realm. Therefore, it is known that this statement is incorrect.
Treatise: This should be like sounds etc. The commentary has two explanations. First, establish a measure to refute. Saying 'this' refers to 'this small internal sound'. 'That' refers to 'that small stringed instrument sound'. Secondly, saying 'also if verbal sounds etc.', here saying 'this' refers to 'this self-internal curvature sound'. 'That' refers to 'that external-internal produced name sound'. However, the measure in the commentary differs from the previous external measure in terms of the subject of the inference; this can be understood through reflection.
Commentary: But like your transformation body's verbal and physical karma etc. The meaning is like the lamp explanation. Question: Since it is permitted that that which can express becomes verbal karma? Answer: The substance of verbal karma in Mahayana Buddhism is only thought. If based on provisional karma, even if it departs from substantial sound, there is no fault in becoming karma. Therefore, the seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the verbal karma of the transformation body each has three types, namely corresponding to self-body, other-body, and non-body. Mental karma only has two types, namely self-body and other-body, and there is no non-body.
也非身謂非情。若心相應非非情故。故但二種 問小乘化語得為業不 答若依有部。即質化語能生名等。是語業性。若離質化。依婆沙意而有兩釋 一云化語性是語業。由心發故。雖離質化無執受生。然屬有情非外器攝。故風輪等外器音聲。與此相違不能詮也。絃管等聲類亦如是亦無詮表。有歌曲等似名非真。許是語聲。由風氣等所引發故。雖名語聲仍外器攝。無名非業。不成就故 二云雖是能詮然無實名。所有詮表似名非實。如鏡中火似火非真。性亦非業。又不成就。以無執受大種生故。諸論據似說有情名。依即質化說成化語。
疏。今大乘因俱等者。按對法第一云。因受大種者。謂語等聲。因不受大種者。謂樹等聲。因俱者。謂手鼓等聲 釋曰。因謂所以。受謂執受。省故言受。即內大種所引之聲有情數攝。因不受聲翻前可知。由內外緣所引之聲名為俱也。二增上緣發生一聲。然有宗不許。故顯宗論云。無一聲性以有執受．及無執受大種為因。二四大種各別果故。雖二大種有相扣擊而俱為因各別發聲。據自依處不成三體。雖有手鼓相擊為因發生二聲。而相映奪隨取一種。相別難知。是故聲處唯有二種。今依大乘。不取小義。
疏。如林聲說法亦得有善等者。在佛化者而是善收。所餘不爾。以佛色．聲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也不是說身體，也不是說情識。如果心與（化語）相應，就不是非情識之物。所以只有兩種情況。
問：小乘所說的化語可以成為業嗎？
答：如果按照有部的觀點，那麼有物質基礎的化語能夠產生名稱等，具有語業的性質。如果脫離物質基礎而變化，根據《婆沙論》的觀點，有兩種解釋：
一種觀點認為，化語的性質是語業，因為它由心所發動。雖然脫離了物質基礎的變化，沒有執受而產生，但仍然屬於有情，不屬於外在器物。因此，風輪等外在器物的聲音與此相反，不能詮釋意義。絃樂器等的聲音也類似，也沒有詮釋表達的功能。有些歌曲等類似名稱，但不是真正的名稱，可以被認為是語聲，因為它是由風氣等所引發的。雖然被稱為語聲，但仍然屬於外在器物，沒有名稱，因此不是業，不能成就。
另一種觀點認為，雖然化語能夠詮釋意義，但沒有實在的名稱，所有的詮釋表達都類似名稱，但不是真實的，就像鏡子中的火，看起來像火但不是真火。因此，化語的性質也不是業，也不能成就，因為它不是由有執受的大種所產生的。各種論典似乎在說有情之名，是依據有物質基礎的變化來說明成就化語。
疏：現在大乘認為因是俱等的。按照《對法論》第一卷所說：『因執受大種』，指的是語言等聲音；『因不執受大種』，指的是樹木等聲音；『因俱』，指的是手鼓等聲音。
解釋：因，指的是原因；受，指的是執受，省略了『執』字，所以說『受』。即由內在的大種所引發的聲音，屬於有情之列。『因不受聲』，與前面的意思相反，可以理解。由內外因緣所引發的聲音，稱為『俱』。
兩種增上緣發生一種聲音，但有宗派不認可這種說法。因此，《顯宗論》說：沒有一種聲音的性質，因為有執受和無執受的大種作為原因，兩種四大種各有不同的結果。雖然兩種大種有相互撞擊，但都作為原因各自發出聲音。根據各自所依之處，不能形成三種實體。雖然有手鼓相互撞擊作為原因，發生兩種聲音，但相互掩映奪取，只能取一種聲音。因為相互區別難以知曉，所以聲音之處只有兩種。現在依據大乘的觀點，不採納小乘的意義。
疏：像樹林的聲音說法，也可以有善等。在佛所化現的聲音中，是善的，可以被攝取。其餘的則不然，因為佛的色、聲……
【English Translation】 English version It is neither said to be the body, nor said to be emotions. If the mind is in accordance with (transformed speech), then it is not a non-sentient thing. Therefore, there are only two situations.
Question: Can the transformed speech mentioned in Hinayana become karma?
Answer: If according to the Sarvastivada school, then transformed speech with a material basis can produce names, etc., and has the nature of speech karma. If it is transformed away from the material basis, according to the interpretation of the Vibhasa, there are two explanations:
One view is that the nature of transformed speech is speech karma because it is initiated by the mind. Although it is transformed away from the material basis and produced without apprehension, it still belongs to sentient beings and does not belong to external objects. Therefore, the sound of wind wheels and other external objects is the opposite of this and cannot interpret meaning. The sound of stringed instruments, etc., is similar, and also has no function of interpreting and expressing. Some songs, etc., are similar to names, but are not true names, and can be considered speech sounds because they are caused by wind and other factors. Although called speech sounds, they still belong to external objects, have no name, and therefore are not karma and cannot be accomplished.
Another view is that although transformed speech can interpret meaning, it has no real name, and all interpretations and expressions are similar to names, but are not real, just like the fire in a mirror, which looks like fire but is not real fire. Therefore, the nature of transformed speech is also not karma and cannot be accomplished because it is not produced by the great elements with apprehension. Various treatises seem to be talking about the names of sentient beings, based on the transformation with a material basis to explain the accomplishment of transformed speech.
Commentary: Now, Mahayana believes that the cause is co-equal. According to the first volume of the Abhidharma, 'The cause apprehends the great elements' refers to sounds such as language; 'The cause does not apprehend the great elements' refers to sounds such as trees; 'The cause is co-equal' refers to sounds such as hand drums.
Explanation: Cause refers to the reason; apprehension refers to grasping, omitting the word 'grasp,' so it is called 'apprehension.' That is, the sound caused by the internal great elements belongs to the category of sentient beings. 'The cause does not apprehend sound' is the opposite of the previous meaning and can be understood. The sound caused by internal and external causes is called 'co-equal.'
Two enhancing conditions produce one sound, but some schools do not recognize this statement. Therefore, the Vijnaptimatrata-sastra says: There is no single nature of sound because the great elements with and without apprehension are the cause, and the two great elements each have different results. Although the two great elements collide with each other, they both act as causes and each emits sound separately. According to their respective places of reliance, three entities cannot be formed. Although hand drums collide with each other as a cause, two sounds are produced, but they obscure and seize each other, and only one sound can be taken. Because the mutual distinction is difficult to know, there are only two kinds of sound places. Now, according to the Mahayana viewpoint, the meaning of Hinayana is not adopted.
Commentary: Like the sound of the forest speaking Dharma, there can also be good, etc. In the sounds transformed by the Buddha, it is good and can be taken. The rest are not, because the Buddha's form, sound...
皆唯善故 有義設非是化。有情勝業所感外器有如是聲。能詮諸法同絃管聲。亦無有失 詳曰。經中唯言是佛化作。絃管等聲要人吹扣。無教不例故難依也。
疏。以語與名不即離等者。此遮伏難難云我名離語汝不許之。既不許離汝應即語。故有斯答。
疏。天所愛等者。略有二釋 一天屬能愛。愛屬所愛。所愛名天天之愛故。依主釋 二天之與愛並屬能愛。今者所愛得天愛名。即有財釋。如毗伽羅論而明此事。即樞要中所說是也。
疏。文者彰義等者。名．句二種為彰為顯。顯彰自性差別義故。文為所依從能依說稱為彰顯 有說文體即名彰顯。以能詮彼名．句二故。能詮即是彰顯義也 詳曰。疏釋為正。有所憑故。故瑜伽論五十二云。若唯依文俱可了達音韻而已。不能了達所有事義。若依止名便能了達彼彼諸法自性．自相。亦了音韻。不能了達深廣差別。若依止句當知一切皆能了達。俱舍第五云。𧙃．阿等字非能詮表。順正理論七十六云。文謂不．能親目于義。但與名．句為詮義依。此等諸論言文不能了達事義能詮於法。云何名顯。若名能顯。云何不能了事義耶。故疏釋善 若爾何故五十二云於一切所知所詮事中。極略想是文。若中是名。若廣是句 答由能為依助彼名．句令成詮表。遠有詮義。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『皆唯善故，有義設非是化』：因為一切都是爲了利益眾生，所以即使有些現象看起來不是佛陀直接示現的，也具有教化的意義。 『有情勝業所感外器有如是聲。能詮諸法同絃管聲。亦無有失』：眾生殊勝的業力所感召的外在世界，會有各種各樣的聲音。這些聲音如果能夠詮釋諸法實相，就像絃樂和管樂的聲音一樣，也沒有什麼過失。 詳曰：經文中只說是佛陀化現。絃樂和管樂的聲音需要人吹奏彈撥才能發出，沒有教證可以類比，所以難以依據。
疏：『以語與名不即離等者』：這是爲了反駁對方提出的難題。對方說：『我的名和語是分離的，你不允許這樣。既然不允許分離，那麼你的名就應該等同於語。』所以有這樣的回答。
疏：『天所愛等者』：大致有兩種解釋： 一、『天』屬於能愛者，『愛』屬於所愛者。所愛者被稱為『天之愛』，這是依主釋（Tatpurusha compound）。 二、『天』和『愛』都屬於能愛者。現在所愛者獲得了『天愛』這個名稱，這是有財釋（Bahuvrihi compound）。可以參考《毗伽羅論》來詳細瞭解此事，也就是《樞要》中所說的。
疏：『文者彰義等者』：名和句這兩種都是爲了彰顯意義。彰顯自性差別之義。文是名和句所依賴的基礎，從能依的角度來說，稱為彰顯。 有人說，文的本體就是彰顯，因為它能夠詮釋名和句。能詮釋就是彰顯的意義。詳曰：疏的解釋是正確的，因為它有依據。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『如果只依靠文字，那麼只能理解音韻，不能理解所有的事義。如果依靠名，就能理解彼彼諸法的自性、自相，也能理解音韻，但不能理解深廣的差別。如果依靠句，那麼要知道一切都能理解。』《俱舍論》第五卷說：『𧙃、阿等字不能詮釋意義。』《順正理論》第七十六卷說：『文是指不能直接指明意義的，只是作為名和句詮釋意義的依據。』這些論典都說文不能理解事義，但能詮釋法，那麼怎麼能說是彰顯呢？如果名能彰顯，為什麼又不能理解事義呢？所以疏的解釋是好的。如果這樣，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷又說：『在一切所知所詮釋的事物中，極簡略的想法是文，中等是名，廣博是句』呢？答：因為文能夠作為名和句的依據，幫助名和句成就詮釋，所以從長遠來看，具有詮釋的意義。
【English Translation】 English version: '皆唯善故 有義設非是化' (jie wei shan gu, you yi she fei shi hua): Because everything is for the benefit of sentient beings, even if some phenomena do not appear to be direct manifestations of the Buddha, they still have the meaning of edification. '有情勝業所感外器有如是聲。能詮諸法同絃管聲。亦無有失' (you qing sheng ye suo gan wai qi you ru shi sheng. neng quan zhu fa tong xian guan sheng. yi wu you shi): The external world perceived by sentient beings due to their superior karma has various sounds. If these sounds can explain the true nature of all dharmas, just like the sounds of stringed and wind instruments, then there is no fault. Detailed explanation: The sutra only says that it is a transformation by the Buddha. The sounds of stringed and wind instruments require people to play them, and there is no teaching that can be compared, so it is difficult to rely on.
Commentary: '以語與名不即離等者' (yi yu yu ming bu ji li deng zhe): This is to refute the opponent's difficult question. The opponent said: 'My name and speech are separate, and you do not allow this. Since you do not allow separation, then your name should be the same as speech.' Therefore, there is this answer.
Commentary: '天所愛等者' (tian suo ai deng zhe): There are roughly two explanations: 1. '天' (tian - deva, god) belongs to the lover, and '愛' (ai - love) belongs to the beloved. The beloved is called '天之愛' (tian zhi ai - the love of the deva), which is a Tatpurusha compound. 2. '天' (tian - deva, god) and '愛' (ai - love) both belong to the lover. Now the beloved gets the name '天愛' (tian ai - deva's love), which is a Bahuvrihi compound. Refer to the Vyakarana Shastra for details, which is what is said in the Essentials.
Commentary: '文者彰義等者' (wen zhe zhang yi deng zhe): Names and sentences are both for revealing meaning. Revealing the meaning of self-nature and difference. The text is the basis on which names and sentences depend. From the perspective of what is relied upon, it is called revelation. Some say that the essence of the text is revelation, because it can explain names and sentences. The ability to explain is the meaning of revelation. Detailed explanation: The commentary's explanation is correct because it has a basis. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 52, says: 'If one only relies on the text, then one can only understand the phonetics, and cannot understand all the meanings of things. If one relies on the name, then one can understand the self-nature and characteristics of those dharmas, and can also understand the phonetics, but cannot understand the deep and broad differences. If one relies on the sentence, then know that everything can be understood.' The Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, volume 5, says: 'The letters 𧙃 and 阿 cannot explain meaning.' The Nyayanusara-sastra, volume 76, says: 'The text refers to what cannot directly point to the meaning, but only serves as the basis for names and sentences to explain the meaning.' These treatises all say that the text cannot understand the meaning of things, but can explain the Dharma, so how can it be said to be revelation? If the name can reveal, why can't it understand the meaning of things? Therefore, the commentary's explanation is good. If so, why does the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 52, say: 'Among all the knowable and explainable things, the extremely brief thought is the text, the medium is the name, and the broad is the sentence'? Answer: Because the text can serve as the basis for names and sentences, helping names and sentences to achieve explanation, so in the long run, it has the meaning of explanation.
詮義疏微名之為略。非親所詮小名為略 今又釋云。若言能詮唯名．句二。若言能顯通名．句．文。文能顯彼音韻差別名．句二故。故五十二云。若唯依文。但可了達音韻而已。顯揚十二云。顯發名．句故謂之文。對法第二云。此言文者能彰彼二故。又此名顯能顯義故。義者所以。文是能顯聲之音韻之所以也。
疏。自相共相體非是遍者。此之二相互不相遍名非遍也。
疏。自性差別體即遍通者。此二俱遍自相．共相。故名為遍也。
疏。今不同彼等者。今此論言名詮自性。不同余教現量所證諸法自體之自性也。疏云諸法至唯現量證。即舉所證之自性體。
疏。若爾一切法皆不可言等者。問與次問答何有別耶 答前粗后微。故二別也。細思可悟。
疏。又唯五根五塵心心法得者。根．塵自相名皆不得。故唯心得。佛果八識悉皆得之。因中第八得二自相。五識但得五塵自相。六五同緣得塵自相。定中意識亦得五根。余即不爾 問五根照境。五境自相根何不得 答現量之心名得自相。根非現量故不得彼 若爾何故顯揚論云問如是現量誰所有。答色根現量等。準彼答詞。即五根體亦名現量。今何言非 答彼文意舉心之根．境。以為能有現量之心而言現量。現量之體實唯心法。
疏。不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：詮義疏對『微』的解釋稱之為『略』。如果不是親身所詮釋的，那麼小的方面也稱為『略』。現在又解釋說，如果說能詮釋的只有『名』（Nāma，名稱，概念）和『句』（Vākya，句子）兩種。如果說能顯現的，那麼『名』、『句』、『文』（Vyañjana，文字）都可以。文字能顯現那些音韻的差別，所以說是『名』和『句』。因此，《五十二》中說，如果僅僅依靠文字，那麼只能瞭解音韻而已。《顯揚十二》中說，顯發『名』和『句』，所以稱之為『文』。《對法》第二中說，這裡說的『文』，能夠彰顯『名』和『句』這二者。而且這個『名』的顯現能夠顯現意義，意義是原因。文字是能夠顯現聲音的音韻的原因。
疏：自相（Svalakṣaṇa，自體相）和共相（Sāmānyalakṣaṇa，共法相）的體不是普遍的。這二者相互不普遍，稱為『非遍』。
疏：自性差別體就是普遍相通的。這二者都普遍於自相和共相，所以稱為『遍』。
疏：現在不同於他們所說的。現在此論所說的『名』詮釋自性，不同於其他教派現量（Pratyakṣa，現量）所證的諸法自體之自性。疏中說『諸法至唯現量證』，就是舉出所證的自性體。
疏：如果這樣，一切法都不可說等等。問：與上次的問答有什麼區別呢？答：前面是粗略的，後面是細微的，所以有區別。仔細思考就能領悟。
疏：又只有五根（Pañcendriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）、五塵（Pañcaviṣaya，色、聲、香、味、觸五種感覺對像）、心（Citta，心識）、心法（Caitta，心所法）才能得到。根和塵的自相都不能得到，所以只有心才能得到。佛果的八識（Aṣṭa vijñāna，八種識）全部都能得到。因地中的第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）能得到兩種自相。五識（Pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種識）只能得到五塵的自相。第六識（意識，Mano-vijñāna）和五識共同緣取，能得到塵的自相。定中的意識也能得到五根。其餘情況則不是這樣。問：五根照見境界，五境的自相根為什麼不能得到？答：現量的心才能得到自相，根不是現量，所以不能得到。如果這樣，為什麼《顯揚論》中說：『問：這樣的現量是誰所有的？答：色根現量等。』按照那個回答，五根的體也稱為現量，現在為什麼說不是？答：那篇文章的意思是舉出心的根和境，作為能夠有現量的心而言說的現量。現量的體實際上只有心法。
疏：不
【English Translation】 English version: The explanation of 'micro' in the 詮義疏 (Quanyi Shu, Commentary on the Meaning) is called '略' (lüè, abbreviation, brief explanation). If it is not personally explained, then the small aspects are also called '略'. Now it is further explained that if we say what can express is only '名' (Nāma, name, concept) and '句' (Vākya, sentence). If we say what can reveal, then '名', '句', and '文' (Vyañjana, letter, text) can all do so. Text can reveal the differences in those phonetics, so it is said to be '名' and '句'. Therefore, it is said in 《五十二》 (Wushier, Fifty-Two) that if one relies only on the text, then one can only understand the phonetics. It is said in 《顯揚十二》 (Xianyang Shi'er, Manifestation of the Twelfth) that it reveals '名' and '句', so it is called '文'. It is said in the second 《對法》 (Duifa, Counter-Dharma) that the '文' mentioned here can manifest these two, '名' and '句'. Moreover, the manifestation of this '名' can reveal the meaning, and the meaning is the reason. Text is the reason that can reveal the phonetics of sound.
Commentary: The essence of 自相 (Svalakṣaṇa, self-characteristic) and 共相 (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, common characteristic) is not universal. These two are not mutually universal, and are called '非遍' (fēi biàn, non-pervasive).
Commentary: The essence of self-nature difference is universally connected. These two are both universal in 自相 and 共相, so they are called '遍' (biàn, pervasive).
Commentary: Now it is different from what they say. Now the '名' mentioned in this treatise explains self-nature, which is different from the self-nature of the self-essence of all dharmas proven by the 現量 (Pratyakṣa, direct perception) of other schools. The commentary says 'all dharmas to only direct perception proof', which is to cite the self-nature essence of what is proven.
Commentary: If so, all dharmas are unspeakable, etc. Question: What is the difference between this question and answer and the previous one? Answer: The former is rough, and the latter is subtle, so there is a difference. Careful thought can lead to understanding.
Commentary: Moreover, only the 五根 (Pañcendriya, five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), 五塵 (Pañcaviṣaya, five sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch), 心 (Citta, mind), and 心法 (Caitta, mental factors) can obtain. The self-characteristics of the roots and dusts cannot be obtained, so only the mind can obtain them. All eight consciousnesses (Aṣṭa vijñāna, eight consciousnesses) of the Buddha-fruit can obtain them. The eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, store consciousness) in the causal stage can obtain two kinds of self-characteristics. The five consciousnesses (Pañca-vijñāna, five sense consciousnesses) can only obtain the self-characteristics of the five dusts. The sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna, mind consciousness) and the five consciousnesses jointly grasp, and can obtain the self-characteristics of the dusts. The consciousness in samadhi can also obtain the five roots. Other situations are not like this. Question: The five roots illuminate the realm, why can't the roots obtain the self-characteristics of the five realms? Answer: The mind of direct perception can obtain the self-characteristics, the roots are not direct perception, so they cannot obtain them. If so, why does the 《顯揚論》 (Xianyang Lun, Manifestation Treatise) say: 'Question: Who has such direct perception? Answer: Form-root direct perception, etc.' According to that answer, the essence of the five roots is also called direct perception, why do you say it is not now? Answer: The meaning of that article is to cite the root and realm of the mind, as the direct perception spoken of by the mind that can have direct perception. The essence of direct perception is actually only mental dharma.
Commentary: Not
得共相之別義者。即共相差別義。差別之義句所得故 問此名．句二所詮自．共。與現．比量所緣何別 答有同．別。且比量心而有同者。通緣彼二。若不爾者。如何得言聞謂比量。比量據此得緣彼二。而言別者。于自．共相為欲了知。心相．行解實比余法。方名比量所取共相。現量望彼而言同者。但言名．句詮於色．聲常．無常等。此自．共相現量亦緣而言別者。名．句所詮但依心變無實體性。唯共相轉。現量帶詮。彼之二相總名自相。又現量心尋彼名言所詮之法。雖不定計名屬義等。而作行解亦與彼同。聲不及處智不轉故。佛知彼無以遍緣故。亦與彼同。除前諸義。若五．八識在於因位相。正義有體。定所帶相通有無體。名．句所詮共相無故。故與彼別 問名．句所詮心變無體唯共相轉。比量亦爾。二能變心．及二所緣竟何別耶 答句等所詮該於一切自類之法名為共相。比量所緣通於異類名為共相。如所作因通聲．瓶故。比量之心立一種類貫比余法。尋句等心即不如是。故有差別 若爾尋句等智何量所收 答定心緣名現量所收。尋名橫計即是遍計。非量所攝。若不橫計雖不作意。貫于余法亦比量攝。不爾此心是何攝耶。更思 問名．句所詮與經所說二相何別 答經依法體。名．句所詮想心安立 問何故不取緣名等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 獲得共相差別之意義者，即是共相差別之義。差別的意義是由語句所得來的。 問：名（nāma）、句（pada）二者所詮釋的自相（svalakṣaṇa）、共相（sāmānyalakṣaṇa），與現量（pratyakṣa）、比量（anumāna）所緣的境有何區別？ 答：有相同之處，也有不同之處。就比量心（anumāna-citta）而言，相同之處在於，比量心普遍緣取自相和共相。如果不是這樣，怎麼能說『聞謂比量』呢？比量憑藉此（共相）而能緣取彼（自相）。不同之處在於，對於自相、共相，爲了了知心相、行解（ākāra），確實比其他法更為殊勝，才稱為比量所取之共相。現量望彼（比量）而言相同之處在於，只是說名、句詮釋色（rūpa）、聲（śabda）、常（nitya）、無常（anitya）等，此自相、共相現量也能緣取。不同之處在於，名、句所詮釋的只是依心而變，沒有實體性，唯有共相運轉。現量帶有詮釋，彼之二相總名為自相。又，現量心尋覓彼名言所詮釋的法，雖然不一定計度名屬於義等，而作行解也與彼相同。聲音不及之處，智慧不運轉，因為佛陀知彼（一切法）而能普遍緣取，也與彼相同。除去前面所說的各種意義。如果五識（pañca-vijñāna）、八識（aṣṭa-vijñāna）在因位時，正義是有體性的，定所帶的相通於有體性、無體性。名、句所詮釋的共相沒有體性，所以與彼不同。 問：名、句所詮釋的心變無體，唯有共相運轉，比量也是如此，二者的能變心（pariṇāma-citta）以及二者所緣的境，究竟有何區別呢？ 答：語句等所詮釋的，包括一切自類之法，名為共相。比量所緣的，通於異類，名為共相。例如所作因（kṛtaka-hetu）通於聲、瓶。比量之心，建立一種種類，貫穿比較其他法。尋覓語句等的心，卻不是這樣，所以有差別。 若這樣，尋覓語句等的智慧，屬於何量所攝？ 答：定心緣名，屬於現量所攝。尋名橫計，即是遍計（parikalpita），非量所攝。如果不橫計，雖然不作意，貫穿于其他法，也屬於比量所攝。不然，此心屬於何攝？更應思考。 問：名、句所詮釋的，與經所說的二相（dvākāra）有何區別？ 答：經依於法體（dharma-kāya），名、句所詮釋的是想心安立。 問：為何不取緣名等？
【English Translation】 English version That which obtains the distinct meaning of a common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is the meaning of the distinction of a common characteristic. The meaning of distinction is obtained from sentences. Question: What is the difference between the self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) that are expressed by name (nāma) and sentence (pada), and what is cognized by perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna)? Answer: There are similarities and differences. Regarding the mind of inference (anumāna-citta), the similarity is that it universally cognizes both. If not, how could it be said that 'hearing is inference'? Inference relies on this (common characteristic) to cognize that (self-characteristic). The difference is that, regarding self-characteristic and common characteristic, in order to understand the mental appearance (ākāra) and interpretation (ākāra), it is truly superior to other dharmas, and is therefore called the common characteristic grasped by inference. Regarding perception in relation to that (inference), the similarity is that names and sentences express form (rūpa), sound (śabda), permanence (nitya), impermanence (anitya), etc., and perception also cognizes these self-characteristics and common characteristics. The difference is that what is expressed by names and sentences only changes according to the mind and has no substantial nature; only the common characteristic operates. Perception involves expression, and the two aspects of that are collectively called self-characteristic. Furthermore, the mind of perception seeks the dharma expressed by those names, and although it does not necessarily conceptualize that the name belongs to the meaning, etc., its interpretation is the same. Where sound does not reach, wisdom does not operate, because the Buddha knows that (all dharmas) and can universally cognize them, it is also the same. Except for the meanings mentioned earlier. If the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) and eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa-vijñāna) are in the causal stage, the correct meaning is that they have substance, and the aspects they carry are common to both substance and non-substance. The common characteristic expressed by names and sentences has no substance, so it is different from that. Question: The mind-transformed nature expressed by names and sentences is without substance, and only the common characteristic operates. Inference is also like this. What is the difference between the transforming mind (pariṇāma-citta) of the two and what is cognized by the two? Answer: What is expressed by sentences, etc., includes all dharmas of the same class and is called a common characteristic. What is cognized by inference is common to different classes and is called a common characteristic. For example, the cause of being made (kṛtaka-hetu) is common to sound and a pot. The mind of inference establishes a kind of category and compares it to other dharmas. The mind that seeks sentences, etc., is not like this, so there is a difference. If so, to which category of valid cognition (pramāṇa) does the wisdom that seeks sentences, etc., belong? Answer: The mind that focuses on names belongs to perception. Seeking names and making arbitrary calculations is conceptualization (parikalpita), which is not included in valid cognition. If there is no arbitrary calculation, although there is no intention, it also belongs to inference if it connects to other dharmas. Otherwise, to which category does this mind belong? Further consideration is needed. Question: What is the difference between what is expressed by names and sentences and the two aspects (dvākāra) mentioned in the scriptures? Answer: The scriptures rely on the dharma-body (dharma-kāya), while what is expressed by names and sentences is established by the mind of thought. Question: Why not take what is conditioned by names, etc.?
智所有相分為共相等。但取行解心變者耶 答所變相分不通余類不得名共。行解通余故名共相 問此尋名智既依共相。其相體無。如何得有名言熏習能生本體 答尋名言智相分非無。順行解心能生本體。但于相上作青黃等．色聲等解。解心所緣此之共相體性是無。于自相上增益此故。更有問答。如章具辨。
疏。未了有名等者。略有二釋 一云由未能了法自相故不得有名。文巧略也。余準此釋 二云雖有多字。猶未能了法之自性故須有名。有句準此。此明立彼名．句．文三。不取于頌之所以也。故下結云不別說頌。后解勝也 問依字有名．句。三皆不相應。依句頌方成。頌不相應攝 答有二釋。一如疏辨。二云字成名．句等。言勢相續不相應。頌雖以句成。言勢間隔非彼攝。
疏。雖二自相互不相離等者。即是法．詞二無礙體。體唯是惠。所對有別。體非異也。
疏。詞對機等者。且如如來能以一音起一切聲以應物機。
疏。耳聞已等者。此約聞法行相分二。非聲．名等有二別體 或可。非體有異之言。顯前法．詞二無礙解。
論。諸餘佛土至立三故者。維摩等經是為證也 問按彼經云。我土如來無文字說。但以眾香合諸天人入律行等。此乃香上不立名等何得為證 答對於此土音聲屈
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：智所認識的相分為共同之相（共相，事物共有的普遍性質）等。難道只是取決於行解（對佛法的修行和理解）之心所變現的嗎？ 答：心所變現的相分不與其他種類相通，因此不能稱為『共相』。行解可以與其他種類相通，所以稱為『共相』。 問：這種尋名智（通過名稱來尋求事物本質的智慧）既然依賴於共相，而共相的體性是虛無的，那麼如何能夠通過名言熏習（通過語言文字的反覆薰陶）來產生本體（事物的真實存在）呢？ 答：尋名言智的相分並非虛無，它順應行解之心，能夠產生本體。只是在相上附加了青黃等顏色、聲音等概念。這種解心所緣的共相，其體性是虛無的。因為在自相（事物自身獨特的性質）上增添了這些概念。更詳細的問答，可以參考相關章節的詳細解釋。
疏：『未了有名等者』，大致有兩種解釋：一種解釋是，由於未能了解法的自相（事物自身的性質），所以無法建立名稱。這是文辭上的巧妙省略。其餘部分可以參照這種方式來解釋。另一種解釋是，即使有很多文字，仍然未能了解法的自性，所以需要建立名稱。『有句準此』可以參照這種方式來理解。這裡說明建立名、句、文三種，不採用頌（佛經中的偈頌）的形式的原因。所以下面總結說『不別說頌』。后一種解釋更為合理。 問：按照字來建立名、句，這三者並不相應。按照句子才能構成頌，那麼頌是否不屬於相應的內容呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種解釋如疏文所說。另一種解釋是，字構成名、句等，但語言的勢頭是連續的，並不相應。頌雖然由句子構成，但語言的勢頭是間隔的，所以不屬於相應的內容。
疏：『雖二自相互不相離等者』，指的是法（事物本身）和詞（語言文字）二者無礙的體性。體性只是智慧，所針對的對象不同。體性並非不同。
疏：『詞對機等者』，例如如來能夠用一種聲音發出一切聲音，來應和眾生的根機（接受佛法的能力）。
疏：『耳聞已等者』，這裡從聽聞佛法的修行狀態分為兩種，並非聲音、名稱等有不同的體性。或者說，『非體有異』這句話，是爲了彰顯前面所說的法和詞二者無礙的理解。
論：『諸餘佛土至立三故者』，《維摩詰經》（Vimalakirti Sutra）等經典可以作為證明。 問：按照《維摩詰經》所說，『我的國土中，如來不用文字說法，只是用各種香來使天人進入修行』。這明明是在香上不建立名稱等，怎麼能作為證明呢？ 答：這是針對此土（我們所居住的娑婆世界）的音聲屈折（使用語言文字）的情況而說的。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: The characteristics perceived by wisdom are divided into common characteristics (Gongxiang, shared universal qualities of things) and so on. Is it merely determined by the transformations of the mind engaged in practice and understanding (Xingjie, practice and understanding of the Dharma)? Answer: The characteristics transformed by the mind do not extend to other categories, therefore they cannot be called 'common characteristics'. Practice and understanding can extend to other categories, so they are called 'common characteristics'. Question: Since this wisdom of seeking names (seeking the essence of things through names) relies on common characteristics, and the essence of common characteristics is emptiness, how can the repeated influence of names and words (Mingyan Xunxi, repeated influence through language and writing) give rise to the substance (the true existence of things)? Answer: The characteristics of the wisdom of seeking names are not empty; they accord with the mind of practice and understanding and can give rise to the substance. It is only that concepts such as blue, yellow, colors, and sounds are added to the characteristics. The common characteristics perceived by this mind of understanding are empty in nature because these concepts are added to the self-characteristics (Zixiang, unique qualities of things). More detailed questions and answers can be found in the detailed explanations in the relevant chapters.
Commentary: 'Those who have not understood have names, etc.' There are roughly two explanations: One explanation is that because one has not been able to understand the self-characteristics of the Dharma (qualities of things), one cannot establish names. This is a clever omission in the wording. The rest can be explained in reference to this. The other explanation is that even though there are many words, one still has not been able to understand the self-nature of the Dharma, so it is necessary to establish names. 'Have sentences according to this' can be understood in reference to this. This explains that the reason for establishing the three types of name, sentence, and text is that they do not adopt the form of verses (Gatha in Buddhist scriptures). Therefore, it is concluded below that 'verses are not discussed separately'. The latter explanation is more reasonable. Question: According to the establishment of names and sentences based on words, these three are not corresponding. Only by sentences can verses be formed, so do verses not belong to the corresponding content? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is as stated in the commentary. The other explanation is that words form names, sentences, etc., but the momentum of language is continuous and does not correspond. Although verses are formed by sentences, the momentum of language is intermittent, so they do not belong to the corresponding content.
Commentary: 'Although the two self-characteristics are not separate from each other, etc.' refers to the unobstructed nature of Dharma (things themselves) and words (language and writing). The nature is only wisdom, and the objects targeted are different. The nature is not different.
Commentary: 'Words respond to the opportunity, etc.' For example, the Tathagata (Tathagata, 'Thus Come One', an epithet of the Buddha) can emit all sounds with one sound to respond to the faculties (the ability to receive the Dharma) of sentient beings.
Commentary: 'Having heard, etc.' This divides the practice of hearing the Dharma into two types, not that sounds, names, etc., have different natures. Or, the statement 'the nature is not different' is to highlight the unobstructed understanding of Dharma and words mentioned earlier.
Treatise: 'All other Buddha lands to establish three reasons' The Vimalakirti Sutra (Vimalakirti Sutra) and other scriptures can be used as proof. Question: According to the Vimalakirti Sutra, 'In my Buddha land, the Tathagata does not preach with words, but uses various fragrances to lead the gods and humans into practice.' This clearly does not establish names, etc., on fragrances, so how can it be used as proof? Answer: This is in response to the inflection of sounds (using language and writing) in this land (the Saha world where we live).
曲所立名字。言彼土無。不說彼香無文名等 問香上名等行相云何 答因香差別悟法自性差別等故。猶聲屈曲解法等也 問思等如何依立名等 答由依思等了法性等假立名等 若爾彼土佛說法不 答亦說法 問如何表示令他得解而名說耶 答由能說者思上名等。令應化機思數等上名等得起名之為說。夫說法者本令他解。思等為緣他因解起名說何失 問豈彼眾生總得他心。又下如何能知上意 答世界既差。總得何失。上加於下下解無違 問此方亦有見色。聞香自思解義。應依思等立名．句．文 答有二釋。一依多分。二云由曾聞聲先解名等。后見色等於義解生。憶念先時名．句等故 問此依香等解。云憶教依聲。他解籍香生。同憶香非教 答要先聞聲見色生解。雖見色解教依聲。聞香生解不由聲故。許名等依香等 前解為勝。此依色等立名．句等。而無教遮覆不違理 問聲內勤勇發。名等可即聲。香待外方生。名等應非有 答內香亦勤發。如聲得有名。外香同水林。名有何違理。由聞香等得生解故 若爾亦依所詮生悟。應亦依彼立於名等 答由因能詮所詮方解。故名．句等不依所詮 問經言依香以為佛事。即依香等立文．名．句。經亦說言或有佛土寂寞無言。或但虛空而為佛事。豈即依彼無言說等立名．句耶。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：根據什麼來建立名字？ 答：因為那個世界沒有（我們所說的）名字，所以不說那個世界沒有香味、文字、名字等。 問：香味上的名字等的行相是怎樣的？ 答：因為通過香味的差別，領悟到法的自性差別等，就像聲音的屈曲變化可以解釋法一樣。 問：思（思考）等如何依靠來建立名字等？ 答：由於依靠思考等來了解法的自性等，所以假立名字等。 問：如果這樣，那個世界的佛說法嗎？ 答：也說法。 問：如何表示才能讓他人理解，而稱之為說法呢？ 答：由於能說法者在思考上建立名字等，讓應化的眾生在思考、數量等上產生名字等，這稱之為說法。說法者本來是爲了讓他人理解，以思考等為緣，他人因此而產生理解，稱之為說法有什麼過失呢？ 問：難道那個世界的眾生都能瞭解他人的心意嗎？而且下位者如何能知道上位者的意思呢？ 答：世界既然不同，都能瞭解（他人的心意）有什麼過失呢？上位者施加於下位者，下位者理解沒有違背之處。 問：這個世界也有通過看顏色、聞香味自己思考來理解意義的，應該依靠思考等來建立名字、句子、文字。 答：有兩種解釋。一是依靠大部分情況，二是說因為曾經聽到聲音，先理解了名字等，之後看到顏色等，對於意義的理解產生，回憶起先前時候的名字、句子等。 問：這裡依靠香味等來理解，說回憶教義依靠聲音，他人理解憑藉香味產生，如同回憶香味不是教義。 答：要先聽到聲音、看到顏色產生理解，即使看到顏色理解教義依靠聲音，聞到香味產生理解不是因為聲音的緣故，所以允許名字等依靠香味等。 前一種解釋更為殊勝。這裡依靠顏色等來建立名字、句子等，而沒有教義的遮止，也不違背道理。 問：聲音在內部通過勤奮努力而發出，名字等可以立即與聲音相應；香味等待外部條件產生，名字等應該不是本來就有的。 答：內部的香味也是通過勤奮努力而發出的，就像聲音一樣可以有名字；外部的香味如同水和樹林，名字有什麼違背道理的呢？因為通過聞香味等能夠產生理解的緣故。 問：如果這樣，也依靠所詮釋的內容產生領悟，也應該依靠它來建立名字等。 答：因為通過能詮釋和所詮釋才能理解，所以名字、句子等不依靠所詮釋的內容。 問：經書上說依靠香味來作為佛事，就是依靠香味等來建立文字、名字、句子。經書也說或者有的佛土寂靜沒有言語，或者只有虛空而作為佛事，難道就是依靠那沒有言語等來建立名字、句子嗎？
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Upon what are names established? Answer: Because that land does not have (what we call) names, it is not said that that land lacks fragrance, writing, names, etc. Question: What is the characteristic of names, etc., based on fragrance? Answer: Because through the differences in fragrance, one realizes the differences in the nature of the Dharma, etc., just as the inflections of sound can explain the Dharma. Question: How are thoughts, etc., relied upon to establish names, etc.? Answer: Because by relying on thoughts, etc., to understand the nature of the Dharma, etc., names, etc., are provisionally established. Question: If that is the case, does the Buddha in that land preach the Dharma? Answer: He also preaches the Dharma. Question: How is it expressed so that others can understand, and is called preaching? Answer: Because the one who can preach establishes names, etc., on thoughts, allowing the beings to be transformed to generate names, etc., on thoughts, numbers, etc., this is called preaching. The preacher originally intends to have others understand, and with thoughts, etc., as the condition, others thus generate understanding, what fault is there in calling it preaching? Question: Do the beings in that world all understand the minds of others? And how can those below know the intentions of those above? Answer: Since the worlds are different, what fault is there in all understanding (the minds of others)? Those above bestow upon those below, and those below understand without contradiction. Question: In this world, there are also those who understand the meaning by seeing colors and smelling fragrances and thinking for themselves. Names, sentences, and words should be established based on thoughts, etc. Answer: There are two explanations. One is based on most situations, and the other is that because one has heard sounds before, one first understands names, etc., and then seeing colors, etc., the understanding of meaning arises, recalling the names, sentences, etc., from earlier times. Question: Here, understanding relies on fragrance, etc., saying that recalling the teachings relies on sound, and others' understanding arises from fragrance, like recalling fragrance is not a teaching. Answer: One must first hear sounds and see colors to generate understanding. Even if seeing colors and understanding the teachings relies on sound, generating understanding by smelling fragrance is not because of sound. Therefore, it is permissible for names, etc., to rely on fragrance, etc. The former explanation is more superior. Here, names, sentences, etc., are established based on colors, etc., and there is no prohibition from the teachings, nor does it contradict reason. Question: Sound is emitted internally through diligent effort, and names, etc., can immediately correspond to sound; fragrance waits for external conditions to arise, and names, etc., should not be inherent. Answer: Internal fragrance is also emitted through diligent effort, just like sound can have names; external fragrance is like water and forests, what contradiction is there in names? Because understanding can arise through smelling fragrance, etc. Question: If that is the case, understanding should also arise based on what is being explained, and names, etc., should also be established based on it. Answer: Because understanding arises through the explainer and what is being explained, names, sentences, etc., do not rely on what is being explained. Question: The scriptures say that relying on fragrance is to perform the Buddha's work, which is to establish words, names, and sentences based on fragrance, etc. The scriptures also say that there are Buddha lands that are silent and without words, or only have emptiness as the Buddha's work. Could it be that names and sentences are established based on that absence of words, etc.?
答立名何失。如依思等即其事也。無依聲言名無言也。亦不違理 問既不依聲而立名等。應無聲．耳 答此土不依香等名教。香等不無。故彼聲．耳亦復得有。
疏。發身語多法立等者。且據所發以辨于多。理對所防名多亦得。
疏。命根等者。所持有六。能持之命而得多名。此乃正答前外難也。無表依多。所依身．語色．聲處收能依無表故法處攝。命根亦爾。名等類然。長等不然。故同色處。
疏。有義至法處攝者。若爾外言。我亦如是何理偏責 詳曰。據實依思以立無表。但是一法。此釋無違。若指他難而依所發以明無表。前釋為勝。
疏。餘十種法等者。大乘不相應有二十四。明十四訖。余之十種準上應知。故指不說。
論。有執隨眠等者。按宗輪論。大眾部等云。隨眠非心。非心所法。亦無所緣。隨眠異纏。與心不相應 問計意云何 答彼意說云。隨眠即是貪等。隨眠亦有十種。若無心位及起善時。由有隨眠名異生等。若是心所無心等位既無諸染。應名聖者。若彼位有。何名無心．及善心等。由此計為心不相應。
疏。此義最心粗者。此薩婆多所以名粗。若纏是現行。現行纏與隨眠之義而不相應。言隨眠者隨逐有情眠伏不起。若現行纏不相續故。非眠伏故。故與隨眠名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果立名沒有依據，會失去什麼？答：如果依據思等（心理活動），那就是它們本身的作用。如果沒有依據聲音言語來立名，那就是沒有言語。這也不違反道理。問：既然不依據聲音而立名等，那麼應該沒有聲音和耳朵才對。答：這個地方不依據香等來命名事物，但香等並非不存在。所以，聲音和耳朵也同樣可以存在。
疏：『發身語多法立等者』，是暫且根據所發出的行為來區分多種情況。如果從所防止的角度來說，稱為『多』也可以。
疏：『命根等者』，所持有的有六種。能持有生命的命根因此而有多種名稱。這正是對前面外道提問的正確回答。無表業依附於多種事物。所依附的身、語屬於色、聲處所包含，能依附的無表業屬於法處所攝。命根也是這樣，名稱等也類似。長等則不然，所以屬於色處。
疏：『有義至法處攝者』，如果這樣，外道會說：『我也像你一樣，有什麼道理只責備我？』詳細解釋說，根據實際情況，是依據思來建立無表業，但這只是一種法。這樣解釋沒有矛盾。如果針對他人的提問，而依據所發出的行為來說明無表業，那麼前面的解釋更好。
疏：『餘十種法等者』，大乘不相應行法有二十四種。說明了十四種之後，其餘的十種可以參照上面的內容來理解，所以只指明而不詳細說明。
論：『有執隨眠等者』，根據《宗輪論》，大眾部等認為，隨眠不是心，也不是心所法，也沒有所緣。隨眠不同於纏，與心不相應。問：他們的意思是怎樣？答：他們的意思是說，隨眠就是貪等。隨眠也有十種。在沒有心的時候以及生起善心的時候，因為有隨眠，所以稱為異生等。如果是心所法，在沒有心等狀態時，既然沒有各種染污，應該稱為聖者。如果那個時候還有染污，又怎麼能稱為無心或善心等呢？因此，他們認為隨眠與心不相應。
疏：『此義最心粗者』，這是薩婆多部被稱為粗的原因。如果纏是現行，現行的纏與隨眠的意義是不相應的。所謂隨眠，是隨逐有情，使其處於睡眠狀態，不能生起（善法）。如果現行的纏不能相續，就不是睡眠狀態，所以與隨眠的名稱不符。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is lost if establishing names has no basis? Answer: If based on thought and other mental activities (思等), then it is their function. If establishing names without relying on sound and language, then there is no language. This does not contradict reason. Question: Since establishing names and so on does not rely on sound, there should be no sound and ears. Answer: In this land, naming things does not rely on scents and so on, but scents and so on are not non-existent. Therefore, sound and ears can also exist.
Commentary: '發身語多法立等者 (fa shen yu duo fa li deng zhe)' (those who establish multiple dharmas based on actions of body and speech), is to temporarily distinguish multiple situations based on the actions that are emitted. If viewed from the perspective of what is being prevented, calling it 'multiple' is also acceptable.
Commentary: '命根等者 (ming gen deng zhe)' (life-faculty and so on), there are six things that are held. The life-faculty that holds life has multiple names because of this. This is the correct answer to the previous question from the outsiders. Unmanifested karma (無表) relies on multiple things. The body and speech it relies on are contained within the realms of form (色) and sound (聲), while the unmanifested karma that relies on them is included in the realm of dharmas (法). The life-faculty is also like this, and names and so on are similar. Length and so on are not like this, so they belong to the realm of form.
Commentary: '有義至法處攝者 (you yi zhi fa chu she zhe)' (some meanings are included in the realm of dharmas), if so, outsiders would say: 'I am also like you, what reason is there to only blame me?' A detailed explanation says that according to the actual situation, unmanifested karma is established based on thought, but this is only one dharma. This explanation has no contradiction. If addressing the questions of others and explaining unmanifested karma based on the actions that are emitted, then the previous explanation is better.
Commentary: '餘十種法等者 (yu shi zhong fa deng zhe)' (the remaining ten dharmas and so on), the Mahayana non-associated formations have twenty-four types. After explaining fourteen types, the remaining ten types can be understood by referring to the above content, so they are only pointed out and not explained in detail.
Treatise: '有執隨眠等者 (you zhi sui mian deng zhe)' (some hold to latent tendencies and so on), according to the Tattvasiddhi Shastra (宗輪論), the Mahasamghika school and others believe that latent tendencies (隨眠, sui mian) are not mind, nor mental factors, and have no object. Latent tendencies are different from entanglements (纏, chan), and are not associated with mind. Question: What is their intention? Answer: Their intention is to say that latent tendencies are greed and so on. There are also ten types of latent tendencies. When there is no mind and when good mind arises, because there are latent tendencies, they are called ordinary beings and so on. If they were mental factors, then in the state of no mind and so on, since there would be no defilements, they should be called sages. If there were still defilements at that time, how could they be called no mind or good mind and so on? Therefore, they believe that latent tendencies are not associated with mind.
Commentary: '此義最心粗者 (ci yi zui xin cu zhe)' (this meaning is the crudest), this is why the Sarvastivada school is called crude. If entanglements are manifest, the manifest entanglements are not associated with the meaning of latent tendencies. What is called latent tendency is that which follows sentient beings, causing them to be in a state of sleep, unable to arise (good dharmas). If manifest entanglements cannot continue, then it is not a state of sleep, so it does not match the name of latent tendency.
之及義。皆不相應 問何知有部隨眠是現 答按俱舍論第十九云。毗婆沙師作如是說。欲貪等體即是隨眠 又云。阿毗達摩依實相說。即諸煩惱說名隨眠。故本論說欲貪隨眠三根相應。既曰相應。明知現也 有義問云。大乘既以染污種子為隨眠性。外亦難云。汝宗惑種應非隨眠。名貪等故。如現貪等。答我宗隨眠但可說為貪等種子。不名貪等。故因不成。若爾於我此理非無。但可說為貪等隨眠。不名貪等。論主所立因亦不成。此難應思 詳曰。名貪等因。破彼隨眠非不相應。而不障彼是隨眠攝。何以此因反難染種不名隨眠。深乖論旨。若言設防大眾部等為此難者。亦不應言我宗隨眠不名貪等。所以者何。如十八界種隨其現名十八界。貪等隨眠何即不爾。又若隨眠不名貪等貪等隨眠應非貪等。若許爾者。此隨眠等何法攝耶。故為不可。今與彼因作相違決定 我宗染種。定是隨眠名為貪等。無所緣故。如汝隨眠對大眾等便無過也。他若救言。我亦爾者應詰彼云。不障隨眠但不許汝不相應攝。又直責云。我宗染種名貪等。隨現貪等心所收。汝宗隨眠貪等名不相應中雲何攝。
論。執別有余等者。按成業論。敘正量部說無表惑是不相應云。有說此法名不失壞。由此法故能得當來愛．非愛果。意業亦爾。許有此法。若不爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及這些觀點是否符合正義。這些都不相符。問：如何得知有部（Sarvastivada）認為隨眠（anusaya，潛在的煩惱）是現實存在的？答：根據《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakosa）第十九卷所說，毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika）這樣說：『欲貪等的本體就是隨眠。』又說：『阿毗達摩（Abhidharma）依據實相而說，將各種煩惱稱為隨眠。』因此，《俱舍論》說欲貪隨眠與三種根相應。既然說是『相應』，明顯可知它是現實存在的。有人問：大乘佛教既然以染污種子作為隨眠的性質，那麼也可以反駁說：『你們宗派的惑種不應是隨眠，因為它被稱為貪等，就像現實存在的貪等一樣。』答：我們宗派的隨眠只能說是貪等的種子，不能稱為貪等。因此，這個論證不成立。如果這樣，那麼對於我們來說，這個道理並非沒有道理，但只能說是貪等隨眠，不能稱為貪等。論主所提出的論證也不成立。這個反駁應該仔細思考。詳細地說，被稱為貪等的原因，並不能否定隨眠與煩惱相應，也不能阻止它被歸類為隨眠。為什麼這個原因反而被用來反駁染污種子不被稱為隨眠呢？這深深違背了論旨。如果說這是爲了防止大眾部（Mahasamghika）等宗派提出這樣的反駁，也不應該說我們宗派的隨眠不被稱為貪等。為什麼呢？就像十八界（dhatus）的種子隨著其顯現而被稱為十八界一樣，貪等隨眠為什麼就不能這樣呢？而且，如果隨眠不被稱為貪等，那麼貪等隨眠就不應該是貪等。如果允許這樣，那麼這些隨眠應該被歸類為什麼法呢？因此，這是不可行的。現在我們用相反的決定來回應他們的論證：我們宗派的染污種子，一定是隨眠，並且被稱為貪等，因為它沒有所緣。就像你們的隨眠對於大眾部等宗派來說就沒有過失一樣。如果對方辯解說：『我也是這樣。』那麼應該反駁他們說：『不阻止隨眠，但不允許你們不相應地攝取。』或者直接責問說：『我們宗派的染污種子被稱為貪等，被現實存在的貪等心所攝取，你們宗派的隨眠被稱為貪等，如何在不相應中攝取呢？』 論：如果執著于存在其他不同的東西等。根據《成業論》（Siddhiniścaya-śāstra），正量部（Sammitīya）說無表惑是不相應的，『有人說這種法被稱為不失壞，因為這種法能夠獲得未來的可愛或不可愛果報。』意業也是如此，允許存在這種法。如果不是這樣……
【English Translation】 English version: And whether these views are in accordance with righteousness. None of them are in accordance. Question: How do we know that the Sarvastivadins consider anusaya (latent defilements) to be present? Answer: According to the Abhidharmakosa, Volume 19, the Vaibhashikas say: 'The essence of desire, greed, etc., is anusaya.' It also says: 'Abhidharma speaks according to reality, calling various defilements anusaya.' Therefore, the Abhidharmakosa says that the anusaya of desire and greed is associated with three roots. Since it says 'associated,' it is clear that it is present. Someone asks: Since Mahayana Buddhism takes defiled seeds as the nature of anusaya, it can also be retorted: 'Your school's seeds of delusion should not be anusaya, because they are called greed, etc., just like present greed, etc.' Answer: Our school's anusaya can only be said to be the seeds of greed, etc., and cannot be called greed, etc. Therefore, this argument is not valid. If so, then for us, this reasoning is not without reason, but it can only be said to be anusaya of greed, etc., and cannot be called greed, etc. The argument put forward by the author is also not valid. This rebuttal should be carefully considered. In detail, being called greed, etc., does not negate that anusaya is associated with defilements, nor does it prevent it from being classified as anusaya. Why is this reason used to refute that defiled seeds are not called anusaya? This deeply violates the intent of the treatise. If it is said that this is to prevent schools such as the Mahasamghikas from raising such rebuttals, it should not be said that our school's anusaya is not called greed, etc. Why? Just as the seeds of the eighteen dhatus are called the eighteen dhatus as they manifest, why can't the anusaya of greed, etc., be like this? Moreover, if anusaya is not called greed, etc., then the anusaya of greed, etc., should not be greed, etc. If this is allowed, then what dharma should these anusayas be classified as? Therefore, this is not feasible. Now we respond to their argument with the opposite determination: Our school's defiled seeds are definitely anusaya and are called greed, etc., because they have no object of focus. Just like your anusaya has no fault for schools such as the Mahasamghikas. If the other party argues: 'I am also like this,' then they should be retorted: 'It does not prevent anusaya, but it does not allow you to take it in a non-associated way.' Or directly question: 'Our school's defiled seeds are called greed, etc., and are taken by the present greed, etc., mental states. Your school's anusaya is called greed, etc., how can it be taken in non-association?' Treatise: If one clings to the existence of other different things, etc. According to the Siddhiniscaya-sastra, the Sammitiya school says that avijñapti-vijnapti (unmanifested karma) is not associated with defilements, 'Some say that this dharma is called non-perishing, because this dharma can obtain future lovable or unlovable results.' Mental karma is also like this, allowing the existence of this dharma. If not...
者余心起時此便斷滅。心相續中．若不引起如是別法。云何能得當來世果。是故定應許有此法。此法實有。心不相應行蘊所攝。余如疏明。
論。一現所知法者。有義非說色等是現量境名現所知。若言心等他心智境。如何下說世共了知。他心智境非世知故。又約他心名現所知。眼等應是現所知攝。佛心現量緣眼等故。故知但是世間共了名現知也 詳曰。若世共了名現所知。何事分三。三豈世人而不了知。現見世呼眼．耳等故。若言不知眼等體相名非了者。心等體相世豈了乎。瓶等現知。何須別說。故知論云現所知者。據世間中容有而談。非約一切。以他心智世有得故。五根世間必無現得。第八雖緣非極成義故不依說。由斯三類義有不同故別開也。故從本疏。
論。或色心等所顯性故者。色．心相顯四句分別。一以色顯色。二以色顯心。並如疏迷。三以心顯心。謂他心智。四以心顯色。謂心緣色 問無為云何色．心顯耶 答有義虛空無為通色．心顯。佛地論說。五蘊無處顯虛空故。又心緣空故名心顯。擇滅無為若依能證唯心所顯。若依離縛．自性斷者。亦唯心顯。以簡擇心斷染顯故。通說三斷是色．心顯。由斷五蘊而證得故。或唯心顯。若非擇滅通色．心顯。色．心緣開而顯得故。不動．想受唯心所顯。其
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當我的心念生起時，這個法就斷滅了。在心識的相續中，如果不引起這樣的特殊法，怎麼能得到未來的果報呢？所以必定應該承認有這個法。這個法是真實存在的，屬於心不相應行蘊所攝。其餘的解釋如疏文中詳細說明。
論：『一現所知法者』，有一種解釋不是說色等是現量的境界，才叫做現所知。如果說是心等是他心智的境界，為什麼下文又說『世共了知』呢？因為他心智的境界不是世間所能瞭解的。而且如果按照他心來定義現所知，那麼眼等也應該被歸為現所知了，因為佛的心現量能夠緣眼等。所以可知，這裡只是指世間共同瞭解的才叫做現知。詳細解釋：如果世間共同瞭解的就叫做現所知，為什麼還要分成三種呢？難道這三種是世人所不能瞭解的嗎？因為世人能夠直接看到眼、耳等。如果說不知道眼等的體相，所以不能算作了解，那麼心等的體相世人就能瞭解嗎？瓶等是現知，為什麼還要特別說明呢？所以可知，論中所說的『現所知』，是根據世間中可能存在的情況來說的，不是指所有情況。因為他心智在世間有人能夠獲得。五根在世間必定無法直接獲得。第八識雖然能夠緣，但不是極成之義，所以不依據它來說。因為這三類在意義上有不同，所以才分別開立。所以要按照本疏的解釋。
論：『或色心等所顯性故者』，色和心相互顯現，可以分為四句來討論：第一種是以色顯色，第二種是以色顯心，這兩種情況都如疏文中所迷惑的。第三種是以心顯心，指的是他心智。第四種是以心顯色，指的是心緣色。問：無為法如何被色和心所顯現呢？答：有一種解釋是，虛空無為法能夠通於色和心而顯現。《佛地論》中說，五蘊沒有地方能夠顯現虛空。而且心能夠緣空，所以叫做心顯。擇滅無為法如果依據能證的心，就唯有心所顯現。如果依據離縛、自性斷，也唯有心顯，因為通過簡擇心來斷除染污而顯現。總的來說，三種斷都是色和心所顯現，因為通過斷除五蘊而證得。或者說唯有心顯。若非擇滅無為法能夠通於色和心而顯現，因為色和心緣開而顯得。不動和想受唯有心所顯現。
【English Translation】 English version: When this thought arises in my mind, this dharma ceases. If such a distinct dharma is not produced in the continuity of consciousness, how can one obtain the future karmic result? Therefore, it must be acknowledged that this dharma exists. This dharma is real and is included within the aggregates of non-associated mental formations (citta-viprayukta-samskara-skandha). The rest is explained in detail in the commentary.
Treatise: 'One, the dharma known through direct perception (pratyaksha-jnana-dharma)' - One interpretation is that it does not refer to forms (rupa) etc. as the objects of direct perception, which are then called 'directly known'. If it refers to minds (citta) etc. as the objects of the wisdom of knowing others' minds (paracitta-jnana), why does the following text say 'commonly known by the world'? Because the objects of the wisdom of knowing others' minds are not known by the world. Moreover, if 'directly known' is defined in terms of others' minds, then the sense organs (eye etc.) should also be included in 'directly known', because the Buddha's direct perception can perceive the sense organs etc. Therefore, it is understood that only what is commonly known by the world is called 'directly known'. Detailed explanation: If what is commonly known by the world is called 'directly known', why divide it into three categories? Are these three categories not understood by the people of the world? Because people can directly see the eyes, ears, etc. If it is said that not knowing the essence of the eyes etc. means not understanding, then can the people of the world understand the essence of the mind etc.? Pots etc. are directly known, so why is there a need for special explanation? Therefore, it can be understood that the 'directly known' mentioned in the treatise refers to situations that may exist in the world, not all situations. Because some people in the world can attain the wisdom of knowing others' minds. The five sense organs cannot be directly attained in the world. Although the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana) can perceive, it is not an established meaning, so it is not relied upon for explanation. Because these three categories have different meanings, they are established separately. Therefore, follow the explanation in the original commentary.
Treatise: 'Or because of the nature manifested by forms, minds, etc.' - Forms and minds manifest each other, which can be discussed in four ways: The first is form manifesting form. The second is form manifesting mind. Both of these situations are as confusing as described in the commentary. The third is mind manifesting mind, which refers to the wisdom of knowing others' minds. The fourth is mind manifesting form, which refers to the mind perceiving form. Question: How can unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta-dharma) be manifested by forms and minds? Answer: One interpretation is that space (akasa), an unconditioned dharma, can be manifested by both forms and minds. The Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the five aggregates (skandha) have no place to manifest space. Moreover, the mind can perceive space, so it is called mind-manifested. If cessation through discrimination (pratisankhya-nirodha), an unconditioned dharma, is based on the mind that can realize it, then it is only manifested by the mind. If it is based on liberation from bondage and the cessation of self-nature, it is also only manifested by the mind, because it is manifested by the discriminating mind cutting off defilements. Generally speaking, the three cessations are manifested by forms and minds, because they are attained by cutting off the five aggregates. Or it can be said that they are only manifested by the mind. Non-cessation through discrimination (apratisankhya-nirodha), an unconditioned dharma, can be manifested by both forms and minds, because forms and minds open up and manifest it. Immovability (acala) and perception (samjna) are only manifested by the mind.
義可知。今此通顯諸無為因故。總說言或色．心等所顯性也 問若所知因以破彼者。他亦以此因破大乘雲。汝真如等。非不離識無為自性。所知性故。如色．心等。此量亦應成真能破 答宗相扶過。大乘無為與心．色等而非即．離。今難非離故為過也 若爾他改宗。云非不即離識無為之性。復如何通 答亦犯相扶。心言路寂而非有．無及即．離等。遮定即．離言不即．離。
疏。由第三轉上依主釋者。第三轉者名為由聲。亦名具聲。由智惠力斷惑所顯故屬由聲。更有餘義。如因明鈔。
疏。非擇力所得亦爾者。亦是第三依主釋也 問第三由聲。今言非由何得同耶 答雖不由智。然由緣闕無為方顯。故第三放。
疏。其虛空不動等者。有義不能礙物名之為虛。無色等故說之為空。虛即是空。持業釋 詳曰。離諸障礙名為虛空。不能礙物。無色等者。皆離障義。義既無別。何成持業。
論。虛空容受色等法故者。若法內外皆有虛空名遍名空。但法外有不名容遍。既能合法各有虛空。空隨能合體應非一 問若能合法便難成多。豈不自教而見違耶。故佛地經云。譬如虛空雖遍諸色種種相中。而不可說有種種相。體唯一味。如來法界亦復如是。解深密經意亦同之 答大乘虛空性非是有。無質礙處假名虛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意義是可以理解的。現在，這裡普遍地顯示了諸無為法的因，所以總的來說，或者說是色、心等所顯現的自性。問：如果用所知因來破斥對方，對方也可以用這個因來破斥大乘，說：你們的真如等，不是不離識的無為自性，因為是所知性，就像色、心等一樣。這個量式也應該成為真正的能破。答：宗和相互相扶持而有過失。大乘的無為法與心、色等既不是相同也不是相離。現在，以『非離』作為難點，所以有過失。如果對方改變宗義，說：不是不即不離識的無為之性，又該如何應對？答：也犯了相扶的過失。心言的道路寂靜，既不是有也不是無，也不是即或離等。遮止了『定即』、『定離』的說法，所以說『不即不離』。 疏：『由第三轉上依主釋』，第三轉稱為『由聲』，也稱為『具聲』。由於智慧的力量斷除迷惑所顯現，所以屬於『由聲』。還有其他的意義，如因明鈔所說。 疏：『非擇力所得亦爾』，也是第三依主釋。問：第三轉是『由聲』，現在說『非由』，怎麼能相同呢？答：雖然不是由智慧，但是由於因緣缺失，無為法才能顯現，所以是第三轉。 疏：『其虛空不動等』，有一種解釋是，不能阻礙物體叫做虛空，因為沒有顏色等，所以說它是空。虛即是空，是持業釋。詳細地說，離開一切障礙叫做虛空，不能阻礙物體，沒有顏色等，都是離開障礙的意思。意義既然沒有區別，怎麼能成為持業釋呢？ 論：『虛空容受色等法故』，如果一個法內外都有虛空，就叫做遍，叫做空。但是隻有法外有虛空，不能叫做容遍。既然能夠使每個法都有虛空，那麼虛空隨著能夠容納的物體，其本體應該不是單一的。問：如果能夠容納法，就難以成為多，難道不是自相矛盾嗎？所以《佛地經》說：『譬如虛空，雖遍諸色種種相中，而不可說有種種相，體唯一味。』《解深密經》的意思也相同。答：大乘的虛空，其自性不是實有，只是在沒有質礙的地方假名為虛空。
【English Translation】 English version: The meaning is understandable. Now, here it universally reveals the causes of all unconditioned dharmas (wuwei fa), so generally speaking, it is either the nature manifested by form (se), mind (xin), etc. Question: If one uses the 'knowable cause' to refute the other party, the other party can also use this cause to refute Mahayana, saying: Your Suchness (zhenru), etc., is not an unconditioned nature that is inseparable from consciousness (shi), because it is a knowable nature, like form (se), mind (xin), etc. This syllogism should also become a true refutation. Answer: The subject (zong) and the reason (xiang) mutually support each other, resulting in a fault. The unconditioned dharma (wuwei fa) of Mahayana is neither identical nor separate from mind (xin), form (se), etc. Now, using 'non-separation' as the difficulty is therefore a fault. If the other party changes the subject (zong), saying: It is not a nature that is neither identical nor separate from the unconditioned nature of consciousness (shi), how should one respond? Answer: It also commits the fault of mutual support. The path of mental speech is silent, neither existent nor non-existent, nor identical or separate, etc. It prevents the assertion of 'definitely identical' or 'definitely separate', so it says 'neither identical nor separate'. Commentary: 'Relying on the possessive compound (yizhushi) in the third case (zhuǎn)', the third case is called 'by-sound' (yousheng), also called 'with-sound' (jusheng). Because it is manifested by the power of wisdom (zhihui) to cut off delusion (huò), it belongs to 'by-sound' (yousheng). There are other meanings, as stated in the Yinming Chao. Commentary: 'What is obtained not by selective power (ze li) is also the same', is also a possessive compound (yizhushi) in the third case. Question: The third case is 'by-sound' (yousheng), now saying 'not by' (feiyou), how can they be the same? Answer: Although not by wisdom (zhihui), the unconditioned dharma (wuwei fa) can only manifest due to the lack of conditions (yuan), so it is the third case. Commentary: 'Its emptiness (xukong), immobility (budong), etc.', one explanation is that what cannot obstruct objects is called emptiness (xukong), because it has no color (se), etc., so it is called emptiness (kong). Emptiness (xu) is emptiness (kong), it is an appositional compound (chiyeshi). In detail, being free from all obstacles is called emptiness (xukong), not being able to obstruct objects, having no color (se), etc., all mean being free from obstacles. Since the meanings are not different, how can it be an appositional compound (chiyeshi)? Treatise: 'Because emptiness (xukong) accommodates form (se) and other dharmas', if a dharma has emptiness (xukong) both inside and outside, it is called pervasive (bian), called emptiness (kong). But if emptiness (xukong) is only outside the dharma, it cannot be called pervasive accommodation (rongbian). Since it can make each dharma have emptiness (xukong), then the substance of emptiness (xukong) should not be singular, following what it can accommodate. Question: If it can accommodate dharmas, it is difficult to become many, isn't it self-contradictory? Therefore, the Buddhabhumi Sutra says: 'For example, although emptiness (xukong) pervades all forms (se) in various aspects, it cannot be said to have various aspects, its substance is of one taste.' The meaning of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra is also the same. Answer: The nature of emptiness (xukong) in Mahayana is not real existence, it is just a provisional name for a place without obstruction.
空。無法無礙故遍諸色。雖遍色中無性不改。體性無差云唯一味 問下明虛空依如．識立。云何可說性是無耶 答彼經但據無質礙處即名虛空 何以驗焉 答經以虛空喻凈法界。若取依如所立虛空。能所喻法便無異矣。取依識變。識變有為。不可為喻。故彼經云。如虛空中種種色相現生．現滅。而此虛空無生無滅。如是如來凈法界中諸知變化利眾生事現生．現滅而凈法界無生滅。故知不取依識變者。
論。諸法應互相遍者。問難意云何 答彼執空一而與法合。前難虛空隨能合法體應成多。今責能合隨所合空體應成一。若更互遍可名體一。若不遍者何名一耶。應作量云。彼法。應遍此法。執彼此法體是一故。彼應如此。亦同二十唯識難無次行等量。
疏。謂變空作無色等礙者。無色等法障礙之相。
疏。有漏一識因等者。如義燈明 有云有漏一識者唯第六識。因無漏二識者妙觀．平等。對究竟果名為因也。果無漏三智者唯是佛位。故名為果 詳曰。雖理亦通。法師既為入室之徒。故依燈正。
論。此所現相假說為常等者。按顯揚論第十八云。虛空無為者。由心所變境相相似故立為常。非緣彼心。緣彼境界有時變異故 問識變無為別熏種耶 答獨影從見不別熏種。廣如燈辨 有義別熏。論自說云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：空性是無礙的，因此遍及一切色法（rupa，物質現象）。雖然遍及一切色法，但其自性不變。其體性和合無別，可說是一種味道（eka-rasa，單一味道）。 問：下面經文說明虛空是依如（tathata，真如）和識（vijnana，意識）而建立的，怎麼能說空性是無呢？ 答：那部經只是根據沒有質礙之處，就稱之為虛空。 憑什麼驗證呢？ 答：經文以虛空比喻清凈法界（parisuddha-dhatu，完全清凈的界）。如果取依如所立的虛空，那麼能比喻的和所比喻的法就沒有差別了。取依識變，識變是有為法（samskrta-dharma，有為法），不可以作為比喻。所以那部經說：『如虛空中種種色相現生現滅，而此虛空無生無滅。如是如來清凈法界中諸知變化利眾生事現生現滅，而清凈法界無生滅。』所以知道不取依識變。 論：諸法應該互相遍及，這個問難是什麼意思？ 答：對方執著空性是單一的，並且與法結合。前面難點是虛空隨著能結合的法，其體性應該成為多種。現在責難能結合的隨著所結合的空性，其體性應該成為單一。如果更互相遍及，可以稱為體性是一。如果不遍及，怎麼能稱為一呢？應該這樣立量：『彼法，應該遍及此法，因為執著彼此法體是一。』彼應該如此。也如同《二十唯識論》中難無次行等的量。 疏：所謂變化空性，作為無色等障礙，是指無色等法障礙的相狀。 疏：有漏一識因等，如《義燈》所闡明：有云，有漏一識，指第六識。因無漏二識，指妙觀、平等。對究竟果來說，稱為因。果無漏三智，唯有佛果才能達到，所以稱為果。 詳：雖然道理也說得通，但法師既然是入室的弟子，所以依據《義燈》為準。 論：這些所顯現的相，假說為常等。按《顯揚論》第十八說：虛空無為，由於心所變現的境相相似，所以立為常。並非緣彼心，緣彼境界有時變異的緣故。 問：識變無為，是否單獨熏習種子？ 答：獨影意識（ekamsika-vijnana，獨影意識）不單獨熏習種子。詳細的解釋如《燈》所辨析。有義認為單獨熏習。《論》自己說：
【English Translation】 English version: Emptiness is unobstructed, therefore it pervades all forms (rupa, material phenomena). Although it pervades all forms, its nature does not change. Its essence is unified and undifferentiated, and can be said to be of one flavor (eka-rasa, single flavor). Question: The following scriptures state that space is established based on Suchness (tathata, thusness) and consciousness (vijnana, consciousness). How can it be said that emptiness is non-existent? Answer: That scripture only refers to the absence of material obstruction as 'space.' How can this be verified? Answer: The scripture uses space as a metaphor for the pure Dharma realm (parisuddha-dhatu, completely pure realm). If we take space as established based on Suchness, then the metaphor and what it represents would be no different. Taking it as a transformation of consciousness, the transformation of consciousness is conditioned (samskrta-dharma, conditioned dharma) and cannot be used as a metaphor. Therefore, that scripture says: 'Just as various forms appear and disappear in space, but space itself does not arise or cease. Similarly, in the pure Dharma realm of the Tathagata, various activities of knowledge and transformation that benefit sentient beings appear and disappear, but the pure Dharma realm does not arise or cease.' Therefore, we know that it does not take the transformation of consciousness as its basis. Treatise: All dharmas should pervade each other. What is the meaning of this question? Answer: The opponent insists that emptiness is singular and combines with dharmas. The previous difficulty was that the nature of emptiness should become multiple along with the dharmas it combines with. Now, the criticism is that the nature of what is combined should become singular along with the emptiness it combines with. If they pervade each other, they can be called one in essence. If they do not pervade each other, how can they be called one? The proposition should be stated as follows: 'That dharma should pervade this dharma because it is insisted that the essence of those dharmas is one.' It should be like this. It is also similar to the measure in the 'Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only' that challenges the impossibility of sequential actions, etc. Commentary: The so-called transformation of emptiness into obstructions such as formlessness refers to the characteristics of obstruction by dharmas such as formlessness. Commentary: The cause of defiled consciousness, etc., as explained in the 'Lamp of Meaning': Some say that the one defiled consciousness refers to the sixth consciousness. The two undefiled consciousnesses as causes refer to Wondrous Observation and Equality. They are called causes in relation to the ultimate result. Detailed explanation: Although the reasoning is also valid, since the Dharma master is an initiated disciple, he relies on the 'Lamp' as the standard. Treatise: These appearances that are manifested are provisionally called permanent, etc. According to the eighteenth chapter of the 'Exposition of the Scriptures': The unconditioned nature of space is established as permanent because the objects transformed by the mind are similar. It is not conditioned by that mind because the objects conditioned by that mind sometimes change. Question: Does the unconditioned transformation of consciousness separately imprint seeds? Answer: The reflected image consciousness (ekamsika-vijnana, reflected image consciousness) does not separately imprint seeds. Detailed explanations are as analyzed in the 'Lamp'. Some argue that it does separately imprint. The treatise itself says:
隨分別有虛空等相。數習力故心等生時。似虛空等無為相現。故知別熏成種子也。此緣生相實是有為。生滅之法前後相似。似一常等說為無為不生滅故。故名為假 詳曰 雖言數習心生似空。而說不言別熏種也。廣如燈破。
疏。大眾部等九無為者。初之三種體皆一物。顯有分位非體成多。次空等四即四無色所依之處。別有無為是滅所攝。要得此滅依之方生彼。能依細五蘊自是無常。所依四無色而是常住 問色界何無 答以蘊非細界非極勝。能依心等能緣上下無隔礙故。無色不然。心不緣下。既有隔礙。別有無為為所依也。緣起支性謂生死法。定無明後方生行等。定行等前有無明等。此理是一。性常決定。其無明等是有為攝。理是無為。由此生死有別理故能為礙窮。故先無明後行等起。一切聖道效能離染。理常是一。某八差別自是生滅。理是無為。由有別理能為礙窮。故道決定次第差別能離苦等。據實一切聖道皆然。此中舉勝且言八道。
疏。化地部九無為者。擇滅等三三體各一。定障名動是散動也。由斷此動而得無為名為不動。善等真如三體各一。性皆是善。道支．緣起同大眾部。
疏。三滅中立無常滅等者。謂擇．非擇．無常滅名為三滅。無常滅者。有為相中滅相是也。非唯擇滅．非擇滅二名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 隨著各自具有虛空等表相，由於多次串習的力量，心識等生起時，會呈現出類似虛空等無為的表相。因此可知，這是由個別的熏習而形成種子。這種緣生之相，實際上是有為法，是生滅之法，前後相似，所以被說成是『一』和『常』等，稱為無為，是因為它不生不滅。所以，這只是假名安立。詳細地說，雖然說多次串習，心識生起時類似虛空，但並沒有說這是個別熏習的種子。更詳細的解釋，可以參考《燈破論》。
大眾部等所立的九種無為法中，前三種（擇滅、非擇滅、虛空無為）的本體都是單一的，只是爲了顯示其不同的分位，並非本體是多種。其次，空等四種（空無邊處、識無邊處、無所有處、非想非非想處）是四無色定所依之處。另外還有一種無為法是滅所攝。必須證得這種滅，才能依之而生起彼（四無色定）。能依的細五蘊本身是無常的，所依的四無色定才是常住的。問：為什麼（四無色定）是無為法？答：因為蘊不是細的，界不是極殊勝的。能依的心識等能夠緣上下，沒有隔礙。無色定則不然，心識不能緣下，既然有隔礙，所以需要另外的無為法作為所依。緣起支的性質是指生死之法。一定是先有無明，然後才生起行等；一定是先行等，之前才有無明等。這個道理是唯一的，性質是恒常決定的。其中的無明等是有為法所攝，而這個道理是無為法。由於生死有這樣的差別道理，所以能夠作為障礙的窮盡。因此，一定是先有無明，然後才生起行等。一切聖道的性質是能夠離染，這個道理恒常是唯一的。其中的八聖道差別本身是生滅法，而這個道理是無為法。由於有這樣的差別道理能夠作為障礙的窮盡，所以道有決定的次第差別，能夠離苦等。實際上，一切聖道都是如此，這裡只是舉出殊勝的八聖道來說明。
化地部所立的九種無為法中，擇滅等三種（擇滅、非擇滅、虛空無為）的本體各自是單一的。定障名為動，是散動的意思。由於斷除了這種動，而得到的無為法，稱為不動。善等真如三種（善真如、不善真如、無記真如）的本體各自是單一的，性質都是善的。道支和緣起與大眾部相同。
在三種滅中，安立無常滅等，是指擇滅、非擇滅、無常滅，這三種稱為三滅。無常滅是指有為相中的滅相。
【English Translation】 English version Along with the respective appearances of emptiness and so on, due to the force of repeated practice, when consciousness and so on arise, they seem to manifest the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena like emptiness. Therefore, it is known that this is due to individual conditioning forming seeds. This conditioned arising appearance is actually conditioned. The phenomena of arising and ceasing are similar before and after, so they are said to be 'one' and 'constant,' and are called unconditioned because they neither arise nor cease. Therefore, it is merely a provisional designation. In detail, although it is said that through repeated practice, consciousness arises resembling emptiness, it is not said that this is an individually conditioned seed. For a more detailed explanation, refer to the 'Lamp Breaking Treatise'.
Among the nine unconditioned dharmas established by the Mahasanghika (大眾部) and others, the first three (Nirvana by discrimination (擇滅), Nirvana not by discrimination (非擇滅), and Space as unconditioned (虛空無為)) are each single in essence. They manifest divisions but are not multiple in essence. Next, the four 'spheres' of emptiness and so on (Sphere of infinite space (空無邊處), Sphere of infinite consciousness (識無邊處), Sphere of nothingness (無所有處), Sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (非想非非想處)) are the places upon which the four formless realms rely. There is another unconditioned dharma included in cessation. One must attain this cessation in order to rely on it and give rise to those (four formless realms). The subtle five aggregates that rely on it are themselves impermanent, while the four formless realms they rely on are permanent. Question: Why are the (four formless realms) unconditioned? Answer: Because the aggregates are not subtle, and the realms are not supremely excellent. The consciousness and so on that rely on them can perceive above and below without obstruction. The formless realms are not like this; consciousness cannot perceive below. Since there is obstruction, another unconditioned dharma is needed as a basis of reliance. The nature of the links of dependent origination refers to the dharmas of birth and death. Definitely, after ignorance (無明) arises, actions (行) and so on arise; definitely, before actions and so on, there is ignorance and so on. This principle is unique, and its nature is always determined. The ignorance and so on within it are included in conditioned dharmas, while this principle is an unconditioned dharma. Because birth and death have such a different principle, it can serve as the exhaustion of obstacles. Therefore, ignorance must come first, and then actions and so on arise. The nature of all noble paths is to be able to separate from defilements. This principle is always unique. The eightfold distinctions within it are themselves phenomena of arising and ceasing, while this principle is unconditioned. Because there is such a different principle that can serve as the exhaustion of obstacles, the path has a definite sequential distinction and can separate from suffering and so on. In reality, all noble paths are like this; here, the excellent eightfold path is mentioned to illustrate.
Among the nine unconditioned dharmas established by the Haimavata (化地部), the three, Nirvana by discrimination (擇滅), Nirvana not by discrimination (非擇滅), and Space as unconditioned (虛空無為), are each single in essence. The obstacle to concentration is called 'movement,' which means distraction. Because this movement is cut off, the unconditioned dharma obtained is called 'immovability.' The three suchnesses of goodness and so on (Good suchness (善真如), Ungood suchness (不善真如), and Indeterminate suchness (無記真如)) are each single in essence, and their nature is all good. The path links and dependent origination are the same as in the Mahasanghika.
Among the three cessations, establishing impermanent cessation and so on refers to Nirvana by discrimination (擇滅), Nirvana not by discrimination (非擇滅), and Impermanent cessation (無常滅), which are called the three cessations. Impermanent cessation refers to the characteristic of cessation within conditioned phenomena.
為無為。即此滅相亦無為攝。由此無為有勢力故令法遷謝。若不爾者能相．所相俱是有為。云何能相令所相滅。故知滅相是無為。如婆沙三十八明 又按智度論四十二云。滅有三種。謂知緣滅．非智緣滅．無常滅。不說無常滅是無為也。大小乘異也。
疏。約詮約理等者。詮謂詮顯。能顯於法併名為詮。非唯名等獨名詮也。三性不同。理從於詮故分三種。談理是一。但名真如。
疏。無別釋名者。但言無為不成六釋。無別合故。若言虛空無為等。皆成持業。並如前疏 有義其想受滅滅屬想受。是持業釋。想受滅無為即依主釋。滅若無為想受之滅。即依主釋。想受滅無為即持業釋。依又動地得無為故。不動無為亦依主釋 詳曰疏釋為本。理既不乖。有義亦得。
疏。即依假體皆可說假者。依識所變立此八種。八種皆假。
疏。實亦可然者。若依法性而皆實。
疏。不障一法得多無為者。略有三釋 一云且如一貪九品不同。斷此一貪證九無為。無為無品。約所斷說故名為多 二云釋外難。外難意云。斷想受等已得擇滅。何故望此複名不動無為等耶。不障此一想受等滅。而能證得擇滅．不動多無為也 三云舉斷一貪得多無為。證受等斷而立擇滅。亦得不動多無為也。后釋為勝。
疏。
無自言相違者。前有法言能取彼覺。后法復言亦不緣彼。既言能取何不緣彼。既不緣彼何名能取。故成相違。量標汝言故無斯咎。
疏。無違宗者。有法宗言能取彼色。彼心外色。心外色法自宗非有。復非心取。今言取彼故違自宗。宗置汝言亦無失矣。
疏。二障三住過者。有本言通乃寫誤也。過謂過失。二障之失歷三住也。
疏。有唯法執種子者。如羅漢所起法執。如燈具明也。
疏。又俱所變等者。變似我時必變似法。變似法時未必有我。言亦爾者。亦前二執。
論。緣識所變蘊處界等者。問既云所變。八識幾是能變識耶 傳有三釋 一云唯除第六顯餘七識。第六所變即親所緣。下文別說起自心相執為法故 二云通八。雖第六變是親所緣。初文通說。下方別說親所緣緣故亦無失 三云唯顯第六意識。由是即說唯親所緣。既是親緣故蘊．處．界唯是有漏。同前取蘊。但開合異 有義斷云。言識所變即親所緣。如何復言起自心相。由此但依疏解為正。
疏。又我唯總執故者。執總聚法以為我也 問別計五蘊亦為其我。何得名總 答雖別計蘊亦得總名。且如色蘊含根．境等。不同處．界。名總無失 有云。且舉總執。據實有別 詳曰。此非善釋。失疏本意。若一一蘊皆別別計。乃
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無自語相違背的情況。先前有法之言說能夠取彼覺（能夠認知到那個覺受），後來的法之言說又不緣彼（不以那個覺受為對像）。既然說能夠取，為何又不緣彼？既然不緣彼，又憑什麼說能夠取？因此構成自相矛盾。用量（衡量標準）來標示你的言論，所以沒有這種過失。 疏：沒有違背宗義的情況。有法宗的言論說能夠取彼色（能夠認知到那個色法），彼色是心外的色法。心外的色法，在自宗（自己的宗派）中是不存在的，也不是心所能取到的。現在說能夠取彼，所以違背了自宗。用宗義來衡量你的言論，也就沒有過失了。 疏：二障三住的過失。原本的『通』字是抄寫錯誤。過，指的是過失。二障的過失，經歷三住（三個階段）。 疏：有唯法執的種子。比如阿羅漢所產生的法執，就像燈具的光明一樣。 疏：又，俱所變等。變現得像我的時候，必定也變現得像法。變現得像法的時候，未必有我。『言亦爾者』，也是指前面的兩種執著。 論：緣識所變的蘊、處、界等。問：既然說是所變現的，那麼八識中，有幾個是能變識呢？傳中有三種解釋：第一種說法是，除了第六識（意識）之外，其餘七個識都是能變識。第六識所變現的就是親所緣（直接的所緣）。下文特別說明，生起自心之相，執著為法。第二種說法是，八識都是能變識。雖然第六識所變現的是親所緣，但最初的經文是通說的。下文分別說明親所緣緣，所以也沒有過失。第三種說法是，只顯現第六意識。因為這裡直接說的是親所緣。既然是親所緣，所以蘊、處、界都是有漏的。和前面取蘊一樣，只是開合不同。有義斷言說，說是識所變現的，就是親所緣。如何又說生起自心之相？因此只能依據疏解為正確。 疏：又，我只是總的執著。執著總體的聚合之法，認為是『我』。問：分別計度五蘊，也認為是『我』，為什麼說是總的執著呢？答：雖然分別計度五蘊，也可以稱為總的。比如色蘊，包含根、境等，不同於處、界，所以說是總的沒有過失。有人說：這裡只是舉出總的執著，實際上也有分別的執著。詳細地說，這種解釋不好，失去了疏解的本意。如果一一蘊都分別計度，那麼...
【English Translation】 English version: There is no self-contradiction in the words. The previous statement of the Dharma is able to grasp that feeling (to be able to cognize that feeling), and the subsequent statement of the Dharma does not take that as its object (does not take that feeling as its object). Since it is said to be able to grasp, why does it not take that as its object? Since it does not take that as its object, how can it be said to be able to grasp? Therefore, it constitutes a contradiction. Use measurement (a standard) to mark your words, so there is no such fault. Commentary: There is no contradiction to the tenets. The statement of the Dharma school says that it can grasp that form (to be able to cognize that form), and that form is external to the mind. External form, in one's own school, does not exist and cannot be grasped by the mind. Now it is said to be able to grasp that, so it violates one's own tenets. Use the tenets to measure your words, and there will be no fault. Commentary: The fault of the two obscurations and three abodes. The original word '通' (tong, general) is a transcription error. '過' (guo, fault) refers to a fault. The fault of the two obscurations goes through three abodes (three stages). Commentary: There are seeds of clinging only to the Dharma. For example, the Dharma clinging that arises in an Arhat is like the light of a lamp. Commentary: Also, '俱所變等' (ju suo bian deng, both transformed, etc.). When transforming to resemble 'I', it must also transform to resemble the Dharma. When transforming to resemble the Dharma, there may not be an 'I'. '言亦爾者' (yan yi erzhe, the words are also like this) also refers to the previous two attachments. Treatise: The aggregates, realms, and spheres, etc., are transformed by consciousness. Question: Since it is said to be transformed, how many of the eight consciousnesses are transforming consciousnesses? There are three interpretations transmitted: The first says that except for the sixth consciousness (意識, yi shi, mind consciousness), the other seven consciousnesses are transforming consciousnesses. What the sixth consciousness transforms is the directly perceived object (親所緣, qin suo yuan). The following text specifically states that arising from the aspect of one's own mind is clinging to the Dharma. The second says that all eight consciousnesses are transforming consciousnesses. Although what the sixth consciousness transforms is the directly perceived object, the initial sutra text is a general statement. The following text separately explains the condition of the directly perceived object, so there is no fault. The third says that only the sixth consciousness is manifested. Because it directly speaks of the directly perceived object. Since it is the directly perceived object, the aggregates, realms, and spheres are all with outflows (有漏, you lou). It is the same as grasping the aggregates earlier, only the opening and closing are different. Some righteous assertions say that what is said to be transformed by consciousness is the directly perceived object. How can it be said to arise from the aspect of one's own mind? Therefore, it can only be based on the commentary for correctness. Commentary: Also, 'I' is only a general clinging. Clinging to the general aggregate of dharmas as 'I'. Question: Separately calculating the five aggregates is also considered 'I', so why is it called a general clinging? Answer: Although separately calculating the five aggregates can also be called general. For example, the aggregate of form contains roots, objects, etc., which is different from the spheres and realms, so it is not a fault to call it general. Some say: This only gives the general clinging as an example, but in reality, there are separate clingings. In detail, this explanation is not good and loses the original meaning of the commentary. If each aggregate is separately calculated, then...
分別我非俱生計故。
疏。然上座部等者。按婆沙論第九云。或復有執。心．心所法能了相應。如法密部。彼作是說。惠等能了相應受等。有部破云。問何緣不知相應諸法答同一所緣俱時轉故。謂一有情心．心所法於一境界俱時而轉．理無展轉互相緣義。譬如多人集在一處。或同觀下。或共觀空。現必不能互相見面。心．心所法亦復如是。若智慧知相應受者。彼受為能緣自體不。若緣自體。則有前說緣自心過。若不能緣。則心．心所應俱時起不同所緣。勿有此失故不能知相應諸法。
疏。化地部說緣共有法者。按婆沙第九云。或復有執。心．心所法能了俱有。如化地部。彼作是說。惠有二種俱時而生。一相應。二不相應。相應惠知不相應者。不相應知相應 詳曰。釋相應等具辨如燈。疑共字錯。共字濫俱。寫者草誤 或俱與共義意相似。疏取意談而非錯也 有部破云。問何緣不知俱有諸法。答極相近故。如籌沾取安膳那藥置於眼中。極相近故眼不能見。此亦如是。
疏。西方說惠俱五蘊等者。按婆沙第九云。西方諸師作如是說。與惠俱生諸蘊相續。自身攝者是俱有法。有部難云。若爾眼識應不能取自身諸色。余識亦爾。彼作是說。五識能取自身中境。意識不能。有部難云。若爾意識應不能取一切境
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『分別我非俱生計故。』
疏：然上座部等者。按《婆沙論》第九云：『或復有執，心、心所法能了相應。如法密部。』彼作是說：『惠（智慧）等能了相應受（感受）等。』有部破云：『問：何緣不知相應諸法？答：同一所緣俱時轉故。』謂一有情心、心所法於一境界俱時而轉，理無展轉互相緣義。譬如多人集在一處，或同觀下，或共觀空，現必不能互相見面。心、心所法亦復如是。若智慧知相應受者，彼受為能緣自體不？若緣自體，則有前說緣自心過。若不能緣，則心、心所應俱時起不同所緣。勿有此失故不能知相應諸法。
疏：化地部說緣共有法者。按《婆沙》第九云：『或復有執，心、心所法能了俱有。如化地部。』彼作是說：『惠有二種俱時而生，一相應，二不相應。相應惠知不相應者，不相應知相應。』詳曰：釋相應等具辨如燈。疑共字錯。共字濫俱。寫者草誤。或俱與共義意相似。疏取意談而非錯也。有部破云：『問：何緣不知俱有諸法？答：極相近故。』如籌沾取安膳那藥置於眼中，極相近故眼不能見。此亦如是。
疏：西方說惠俱五蘊等者。按《婆沙》第九云：『西方諸師作如是說，與惠俱生諸蘊相續，自身攝者是俱有法。』有部難云：『若爾眼識應不能取自身諸色，余識亦爾。』彼作是說：『五識能取自身中境，意識不能。』有部難云：『若爾意識應不能取一切境？』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Because of the discrimination of 'self,' there is no inherent calculation.'
Commentary: As for the Sarvāstivāda school and others, according to the ninth chapter of the Vibhāṣā, 'Some hold that the mind and mental functions can understand what is concurrent, like the Dharmagupta school.' They say, 'Wisdom (慧, prajñā) and others can understand concurrent feelings (受, vedanā) and others.' The Sarvāstivāda school refutes this, asking, 'Why is it that concurrent dharmas are not known?' The answer is, 'Because they arise simultaneously from the same object.' This means that the mind and mental functions of a sentient being arise simultaneously in relation to the same object, and there is no logical basis for them to mutually condition each other. It is like many people gathered in one place, either looking down together or looking at the sky together; they certainly cannot see each other. The same is true of the mind and mental functions. If intelligence can know concurrent feelings, can those feelings be the object that intelligence cognizes? If it cognizes itself, then there is the previously mentioned fault of the mind cognizing itself. If it cannot cognize itself, then the mind and mental functions should arise simultaneously but not from the same object. To avoid this error, concurrent dharmas cannot be known.'
Commentary: The Dharmatrāta school says that what is cognized are co-existent dharmas. According to the ninth chapter of the Vibhāṣā, 'Some hold that the mind and mental functions can understand what is co-existent, like the Dharmatrāta school.' They say, 'Wisdom has two types that arise simultaneously: one is concurrent, and the other is not concurrent. Concurrent wisdom knows what is not concurrent, and what is not concurrent knows what is concurrent.' Detailed explanation: The explanation of concurrence and so on is fully explained like a lamp. It is suspected that the word 'co-' (共) is a mistake, and that 'co-' is confused with 'concurrent' (俱). The scribe made a careless mistake. Or 'concurrent' and 'co-' have similar meanings. The commentary takes the meaning and speaks of it, and it is not a mistake. The Sarvāstivāda school refutes this, asking, 'Why are co-existent dharmas not known?' The answer is, 'Because they are extremely close.' It is like using a counter to take añjana medicine and placing it in the eye; because it is extremely close, the eye cannot see it. This is also the case.
Commentary: The Westerners say that wisdom is concurrent with the five aggregates and so on. According to the ninth chapter of the Vibhāṣā, 'The Western teachers say that the aggregates that arise concurrently with wisdom, which are continuous and contained within oneself, are co-existent dharmas.' The Sarvāstivāda school objects, 'If that is the case, then eye consciousness should not be able to grasp the colors of its own body, and the same is true for the other consciousnesses.' They say, 'The five consciousnesses can grasp the objects within their own bodies, but consciousness cannot.' The Sarvāstivāda school objects, 'If that is the case, then consciousness should not be able to grasp all objects?'
界。便為非理。有部自云。此隨轉色及此隨轉不相應行名俱有法 詳曰。化地西方二義。大同。
疏。云五識依色根等者。釋五識緣俱色所以。
疏。設佛鏡智等者。問凡夫自證亦各自知。應名為佛 答佛一剎那知餘一切．及自相應。凡夫不爾。不名為佛。
疏。見分之境心等必同者。此會違也。謂有難云。心．心所等各緣自見。自見既別。如何王．所名同所緣。故有斯答。
疏。然一一自證等者。且同時心除受以外與余心所緣受見時。受自證分亦緣自見名同所緣。不要受見與余見分同緣受見方名同緣。緣余心所亦復如是。
疏。自緣妨至第二釋者。前雖多解后解為勝。故指第二。
論。有作是難等者。有說唯敘外道難也。有義兼敘小乘之人。若不爾者。下通難中雲何說言又假必依真事立者。理必不然。此牒于誰。既有後牒。明前有難 詳曰。有義為勝。犢子等部許有我故。余無我者與有我計合而言也。疏中但云此𠯈世難。不言唯故意亦通也。
疏。無所說義假法者。牒所無假。前擇由假說我法中疏有兩判。一假我法乃屬於說。但假言說以為我法。二假我法不在於言。以所說為。今非第二。
疏。其體似法亦不成者。正難似無。
疏。似無依故者。釋所以也
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『界』（dhātu，構成要素）。這便是不合道理的。有部（Sarvāstivāda）自己說，這隨轉的色（rūpa，物質）以及這隨轉的不相應行（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra，心不相應行）名為俱有法（sahabhū-dharma，同時存在的法）。詳細地說，化地部（Mahīśāsaka）和西方部（Dharmaguptaka）的兩種說法，大體相同。
疏：『說五識依色根等』，這是解釋五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）緣俱生色的原因。
疏：『假設佛的鏡智等』，這是提問：凡夫的自證分（svasaṃvedana，自我認知）也各自知道，應該被稱為佛嗎？回答：佛在一剎那間知道其餘一切，以及與自己相應的。凡夫不是這樣，所以不被稱為佛。
疏：『見分（darśana-bhāga，認知部分）的境（viṣaya，對像）、心等必定相同』，這是爲了消除矛盾。有人提出疑問說：心、心所（caitasika，心理活動）等各自緣自己的見分，自己的見分既然不同，為何王（心王，citta，主要的心）和所（心所）所緣的對象卻相同？所以有這樣的回答。
疏：『然而一一自證等』，暫且說同時的心，除了受（vedanā，感受）以外，與其餘心所緣受的見分時，受的自證分也緣自己的見分，名為同所緣。不需要受的見分與其餘見分共同緣受的見分，才名為同緣。緣其餘心所也是這樣。
疏：『自緣妨至第二釋』，之前雖然有多種解釋，但後面的解釋更為優勝，所以指向第二種解釋。
論：『有人這樣責難等』，有人說只是敘述外道（tīrthika，非佛教修行者）的責難。有的觀點認為也包括小乘（Hīnayāna）之人。如果不是這樣，下面的通難中，為何說『又假必依真事立』？這個道理必然不對。這是針對誰說的？既然有後面的指責，說明前面有責難。詳細地說，有的觀點更為優勝。犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）等部派允許有我（ātman，靈魂）的存在，其餘無我論者與有我論者合在一起說。疏中只是說這是世俗的責難，沒有說是唯一的，也包含了其他情況。
疏：『無所說義假法』，這是指沒有所說意義的假法（prajñapti-dharma，假名法）。前面選擇由假說我法中，疏有兩種判斷。一是假我法屬於言說，只是假借言說作為我法。二是假我法不在於言說，以所說為準。現在不是第二種情況。
疏：『其體似法也不成』，這是直接責難相似的無（abhāva，不存在）。
疏：『似無依故』，這是解釋原因。
【English Translation】 English version 'Dhātu' (element). This is unreasonable. The Sarvāstivāda school itself says that the rūpa (matter) that follows along with it, and the citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra (non-associated formations) that follows along with it, are called sahabhū-dharmas (co-existent dharmas). In detail, the two meanings of the Mahīśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka schools are largely the same.
Commentary: 'Saying that the five vijñānas (consciousnesses) rely on the sense organs, etc.' This explains the reason why the five vijñānas (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) are conditioned by co-existent rūpa.
Commentary: 'Suppose the mirror-like wisdom of the Buddha, etc.' This asks: The svasaṃvedana (self-awareness) of ordinary people also knows itself, should it be called a Buddha? Answer: A Buddha knows everything else in an instant, as well as what corresponds to himself. Ordinary people are not like this, so they are not called Buddhas.
Commentary: 'The viṣaya (object) of the darśana-bhāga (seeing-part), the mind, etc., must be the same.' This is to resolve a contradiction. Someone raises the question: The mind, caitasikas (mental activities), etc., each are conditioned by their own seeing-part. Since their own seeing-parts are different, how can the object conditioned by the king (citta, main mind) and the mental activities be called the same? Therefore, there is this answer.
Commentary: 'However, each self-awareness, etc.' For the time being, when the simultaneous mind, except for vedanā (feeling), is conditioned by the seeing-part of feeling with other mental activities, the self-awareness of feeling is also conditioned by its own seeing-part, and is called the same object conditioned. It is not necessary for the seeing-part of feeling to be conditioned by the seeing-part of feeling together with other seeing-parts to be called the same object conditioned. It is the same for conditioning other mental activities.
Commentary: 'The obstacle of self-conditioning reaches the second explanation.' Although there were many explanations before, the later explanation is superior, so it points to the second explanation.
Treatise: 'Some people make this criticism, etc.' Some say that it only narrates the criticism of the tīrthikas (non-Buddhist practitioners). Some opinions believe that it also includes people of the Hīnayāna (Smaller Vehicle). If this were not the case, in the general criticism below, why does it say 'Moreover, the false must rely on the establishment of the real'? This principle must be incorrect. Who is this directed at? Since there is a later accusation, it indicates that there was a criticism before. In detail, some opinions are superior. The Vātsīputrīya school, etc., allows the existence of ātman (self, soul), and the other non-self theorists are combined with the self theorists to speak. The commentary only says that this is a worldly criticism, and does not say that it is the only one, and also includes other situations.
Commentary: 'The false dharma (prajñapti-dharma, nominal dharma) without the meaning of what is said.' This refers to the false dharma that has no meaning of what is said. In the previous selection of saying 'I' by means of the false, the commentary has two judgments. First, the false 'I' dharma belongs to speech, and only borrows speech as the 'I' dharma. Second, the false 'I' dharma is not in speech, but is based on what is said. Now it is not the second situation.
Commentary: 'Its substance resembling dharma is also not established.' This is a direct criticism of the similar abhāva (non-existence).
Commentary: 'Because it relies on the similar non-existence.' This explains the reason.
。汝宗說似依于假立。所依假無。能依之似故亦不有。
疏。即義依體假者。此結依于義依體假而為難矣。
疏。又所變之似既無等者。由無真故。故似無也。
疏。能說之假不有者。有所變似依之立假。由似既無故假不立。言能說假即前第一假我．假法但依說立。名為能說。
疏。即有體強設假者。結依有體強設假難。
疏。世間我法標宗說無者。論主標宗無世我法。所以外人但難聖教。
論。彼難非理者。詳曰。科判具疏。又今助科總分為二 一彼難非理至前已破故。總非小乘及以外道 二依類等下。別破二計。犢子等計既許有我。故作此科亦應無失。
論。依類至俱不成者。問假依類．實。外意何耶 答彼云。假者依似．共立。類有似．共。如言人類。由人相似方得類名。人業大同名為共法。由類有此似．及共法故假依類。又實句火內外皆有。人身內火似身外火。設與外火同有猛赤。亦有似．共故假依實。即人身中有斯類．實。故依類．實說人似火 又依宗計。凡諸假說皆依類．實二句所攝。非唯假火。
論。依類假說理且不成者。下別破類．實。破類．實中皆指似．共。有義初破依類似事不成。后破依實共法不成。文自明說。然諸師說。依類依實。皆通破
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：你們宗派所說的『似』，是依附於假立而存在的。如果所依附的『假』不存在，那麼能依附的『似』也就不會存在。
疏：即義依體假者，這是總結依附於義依體假來進行反駁。
疏：又所變之似既無等者，因為沒有真實存在的本體，所以『似』也就無從談起。
疏：能說之假不有者，有所變之『似』，依靠它來建立『假』。由於『似』已經不存在，所以『假』也無法成立。所說的『能說假』，就是前面第一種『假我』、『假法』，只是依附於言說而成立，所以稱為『能說』。
疏：即有體強設假者，這是總結依附於有體強設假來進行反駁。
疏：世間我法標宗說無者，論主標明宗義，認為世間的『我』和『法』都是不存在的。因此，外道只能反駁聖教。
論：彼難非理者，詳細的科判在疏文中。現在輔助科判，總分為二：一、『彼難非理至前已破故』，總的否定小乘以及外道的觀點；二、『依類等下』，分別破斥兩種計執。犢子部等宗派既然承認有『我』的存在，所以作出這樣的科判也應該沒有錯誤。
論：依類至俱不成者，問：『假』是依附於『類』和『實』而存在的，外道的意圖是什麼呢？答：他們認為，『假』是依附於相似性和共同性而建立的。『類』具有相似性和共同性，例如說『人類』，因為人們之間有相似之處，才能得到『類』的名稱。人們的行為大體相同，稱為『共法』。因為『類』具有這種相似性和共同性，所以『假』是依附於『類』而存在的。另外，『實』，例如火，無論在內部還是外部都存在。人身體內的火，類似於身體外的火，假設它與外面的火一樣具有猛烈和赤紅的性質，也具有相似性和共同性，所以『假』是依附於『實』而存在的。也就是說，人的身體中具有這種『類』和『實』，所以說人像火。另外，按照他們的宗派觀點，凡是虛假的說法，都包含在『類』和『實』這兩種範疇之中，不僅僅是『假火』。
論：依類假說理且不成者，下面分別破斥『類』和『實』。在破斥『類』和『實』的過程中，都指向了相似性和共同性。有一種觀點認為，首先破斥依附於類似的事物不能成立，然後破斥依附於真實的共同法則不能成立。文中有明確的說明。然而，各位論師認為，依附於『類』和依附於『實』，都是普遍的破斥。
【English Translation】 English version: Your sect's so-called 'semblance' (似) is based on a hypothetical establishment. If the 'hypothetical' (假) on which it relies does not exist, then the 'semblance' (似) that relies on it will also not exist.
Commentary: 'That is, relying on the hypothetical of meaning and substance' (即義依體假者), this concludes the refutation based on relying on the hypothetical of meaning and substance.
Commentary: 'Moreover, the semblance of what is transformed is non-existent' (又所變之似既無等者), because there is no truly existent entity, therefore 'semblance' (似) is non-existent.
Commentary: 'The hypothetical of what can be said does not exist' (能說之假不有者), there is a 'semblance' (似) of what is transformed, relying on it to establish the 'hypothetical' (假). Since 'semblance' (似) is already non-existent, the 'hypothetical' (假) cannot be established. The so-called 'hypothetical of what can be said' refers to the first type of 'hypothetical self' (假我) and 'hypothetical dharma' (假法) mentioned earlier, which are only established based on speech, hence the name 'what can be said'.
Commentary: 'That is, forcibly establishing a hypothetical based on an entity' (即有體強設假者), this concludes the refutation based on relying on forcibly establishing a hypothetical based on an entity.
Commentary: 'The world's self and dharma, declaring the principle of non-existence' (世間我法標宗說無者), the author declares the principle that the world's 'self' (我) and 'dharma' (法) are non-existent. Therefore, outsiders can only refute the holy teachings.
Treatise: 'Their refutation is unreasonable' (彼難非理者), detailed analysis is in the commentary. Now, to assist the analysis, it is divided into two parts: 1. 'Their refutation is unreasonable, as it has been refuted before' (彼難非理至前已破故), generally negating the views of Hinayana and external paths; 2. 'Relying on categories, etc., below' (依類等下), specifically refuting two views. Since the Vatsiputriya school and others admit the existence of a 'self' (我), making such an analysis should not be a mistake.
Treatise: 'Relying on categories to both be unestablished' (依類至俱不成者), Question: What is the intention of outsiders in saying that 'hypothetical' (假) relies on 'categories' (類) and 'reality' (實)? Answer: They believe that 'hypothetical' (假) is established based on similarity and commonality. 'Categories' (類) have similarity and commonality, such as saying 'humanity' (人類), because there are similarities between people, the name 'category' (類) can be obtained. People's actions are generally the same, called 'common dharma' (共法). Because 'categories' (類) have this similarity and commonality, 'hypothetical' (假) relies on 'categories' (類). Also, 'reality' (實), such as fire, exists both internally and externally. The fire inside the human body is similar to the fire outside the body. Suppose it has the same intense and red properties as the external fire, it also has similarity and commonality, so 'hypothetical' (假) relies on 'reality' (實). That is to say, the human body has this 'category' (類) and 'reality' (實), so it is said that humans are like fire. In addition, according to their sectarian view, all false statements are included in these two categories of 'category' (類) and 'reality' (實), not just 'hypothetical fire' (假火).
Treatise: 'The theory of relying on categories is unreasonable' (依類假說理且不成者), below, 'categories' (類) and 'reality' (實) are refuted separately. In the process of refuting 'categories' (類) and 'reality' (實), both point to similarity and commonality. One view is that, first, refuting that relying on similar things cannot be established, and then refuting that relying on real common laws cannot be established. The text has a clear explanation. However, the various masters believe that relying on 'categories' (類) and relying on 'reality' (實) are both universal refutations.
彼似事．共法。此定非理者 詳曰。雙破定然。非非理也。論破類云。若無共德而假說彼等。破依實云。若謂人．火德相似故等。此即如次破共．似法。何言非理。若言如次舉無共．似以破似．共。理亦不然。文既明言彼無共．似。何故不得名破共．似。故應從前雙破為正。
論。人類猛等現見亦有互相離者。具辨如疏 問外救意云。說猛赤人而似於火。此人人類與赤等德不相離故。不說一切人類猛等皆不相離皆似於火。何故諸德並以貧富先後事等。以辨相離。而為難耶 答有云。人起嗔時面赤心急假說為火。彼若歡喜面白心緩。雖無猛赤。曾起猛赤亦說似火。雖與德離猶說似火。故不得言不相離故方假說也。此亦不然。言人似火。皆依于現不約曾言。若據曾言不息他救。救云汝依曾有名為假者。我據有體名不相離說之為假。斯亦何失。故知不可 詳曰。縱急赤人人類與德有離．不離。內德不離。外火猛德與類互離。論據外德云互相離。而言亦者以外離德。亦內不離猛赤之德。彼若救云依內德者。理亦不然。有內無外便無共法。無共法故過同於前。故論不說。
疏。此總結非皆有比量者。前二破中皆有其量。今略言之。破初量云。汝言類句。定不依之立於假火。無共德故。猶如水等 破第二量。宗同於前
。因云猛赤等德有互離故。猶如水等。更思。
論。說火在人不在德故者。問外人但云。由人與火德相似故說人為火。不言其火而在於德。若難彼云火不在德。豈不相扶 詳曰。諸德云云。廣如余辨。理皆難究 今助一釋。若謂人火德相似下應有難．救。而難彼云。若據相似而假說者。即應說人猛赤等德而似火德。不應說人似火也。以人與火不相似故。他救云爾實以人上赤急等法以類火故。言人似火舉人取德。故次難云。說火在人不在德也。世間說彼似火之言但目於人。不屬人上猛赤等德。論文隱括而不具言。
疏。德是實家德可依假說者。此設縱也。德是實德。而依于德假說火者。可許其假而依于實。
疏。今不在德等者。世間但說火在於人。人非實德。如何乃言假依實耶。
疏。此即便依假人說實火者。假合名人。火是實法。即是依假而立實火。不是依實立假火也。便違本計。
疏。既說火在人等者。世說假火既在於人。即由人似名為假火。非由德似。既依於人立於假火。人非是實。云何得言假依實立。
疏。此中有救等者。外為難云。火有猛赤火名真火。人有猛等似彼名假。誰言其火而依于德。乃復難言火不在德。應詰彼云。人．火猛赤所依各異。既無共德依何說假。無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為云、猛、赤等屬性各自獨立存在，就像水等事物一樣。再思考一下。
論：如果說火存在於人而不是屬性中，那麼可以反問外道：你們只是說因為人和火的屬性相似，所以說人像火，但並沒有說火存在於屬性中。如果反駁他們說火不在屬性中，難道不是互相矛盾嗎？詳細的解釋如同其他地方的辨析一樣，其中的道理難以窮盡。現在我來補充一種解釋。如果認為人和火的屬性相似，下面應該有難以辯駁的詰難。反駁他們說，如果根據相似而假借來說，就應該說人具有猛、赤等屬性，類似於火的屬性，而不應該說人像火。因為人和火併不完全相似。他們的辯解是，實際上是因為人身上具有赤、急等特性，類似於火，所以說人像火，這是指人具有火的屬性。因此接著反駁說，火存在於人而不是屬性中。世俗所說的像火，只是指人，而不是指人身上猛、赤等屬性。原文比較簡略，沒有完全說清楚。
疏：如果屬性是實在的，那麼可以根據屬性來假借說火。這是假設性的說法。如果屬性是實在的，而根據屬性來假借說火，那麼可以允許這種假借是基於實在的。
疏：現在說火不在屬性中等，世俗只是說火存在於人身上，人不是實在的屬性，怎麼能說是假借基於實在呢？
疏：這實際上是根據虛假的人來說實在的火。假借結合而成為人，火是實在的法，這就是根據虛假而建立實在的火，而不是根據實在來建立虛假的火。這就違背了原來的主張。
疏：既然說火存在於人等，世俗所說的假火既然存在於人身上，就是因為人相似才稱為假火，而不是因為屬性相似。既然根據人來建立假火，人不是實在的，怎麼能說是假借基於實在而建立呢？
疏：這裡面有辯解等，外道反駁說，火具有猛、赤，火的名字是真火，人具有猛等，類似於火，所以稱為假火。誰說火是基於屬性的？又反駁說火不在屬性中。應該反問他們說，人、火的猛、赤所依據的各不相同，既然沒有共同的屬性，根據什麼來說假借？沒有共同的屬性。
【English Translation】 English version: Because the qualities of cloud (Yún), fierceness (Měng), redness (Chì), etc., exist independently, just like water and other things. Think about it further.
Treatise: If it is said that fire exists in a person and not in the qualities, then one can ask the heretics: You only say that because a person and fire have similar qualities, it is said that a person is like fire, but it is not said that fire exists in the qualities. If you refute them by saying that fire is not in the qualities, isn't that contradictory? Detailed explanations are like the distinctions made elsewhere; the principles are difficult to exhaust. Now I will add an explanation. If it is thought that a person and fire have similar qualities, there should be irrefutable challenges below. Refute them by saying that if according to similarity, it is borrowed to say, then it should be said that a person has qualities such as fierceness and redness, similar to the qualities of fire, and it should not be said that a person is like fire. Because a person and fire are not completely similar. Their defense is that, in fact, it is because a person has characteristics such as redness and quickness, similar to fire, so it is said that a person is like fire, which refers to a person having the qualities of fire. Therefore, it is then refuted that fire exists in a person and not in the qualities. What the world says is like fire only refers to the person, not to the qualities of fierceness and redness in the person. The original text is relatively brief and does not fully explain it.
Commentary: If the qualities are real, then it is possible to borrow the qualities to say fire. This is a hypothetical statement. If the qualities are real, and fire is borrowed to say based on the qualities, then it can be allowed that this borrowing is based on reality.
Commentary: Now saying that fire is not in the qualities, etc., the world only says that fire exists in a person, and a person is not a real quality, so how can it be said that the borrowing is based on reality?
Commentary: This is actually saying real fire based on a false person. False borrowing combines to become a person, and fire is a real dharma, which is establishing real fire based on falsehood, not establishing false fire based on reality. This violates the original proposition.
Commentary: Since it is said that fire exists in a person, etc., since the false fire that the world says exists in a person, it is called false fire because the person is similar, not because the qualities are similar. Since false fire is established based on a person, and a person is not real, how can it be said that the borrowing is established based on reality?
Commentary: There are defenses here, etc. The heretics refute that fire has fierceness and redness, and the name of fire is true fire. A person has fierceness, etc., similar to fire, so it is called false fire. Who says that fire is based on qualities? It is also refuted that fire is not in the qualities. They should be asked in return that the fierceness and redness of a person and fire are based on different things. Since there are no common qualities, what is the borrowing based on? There are no common qualities.
共假說過如前說。以此等難前已具明故不舉也 問外若救云。共謂相似。如汝大乘識變外器。雖各不同相似名共。不說一物貫於二處方名為共 答略為三釋 一云火有猛德。人無其德。以人非是實句攝故。如何得言有于共法而假說耶。若言人聚．火聚二中有德相似名為共者。亦為不可。非唯依實一聚之中。通諸法故 二云以似名共。共．似無別。即依二法而立於假。云何前云依三法立。故救非理。
疏。以破小乘伏難者。小乘雖立真等三種。文不顯說故云伏也。此據前難無小乘說。
疏。小乘等自辨真事等者。不通外道名為自也。雖小乘等而非一類。總皆內法。名自無失。
疏。或是外道等者。地堅火熱。如是一切諸法自相名為共許。雖是共許假亦不依此等而立。
疏。非謂共許張人身等者。此釋量就他宗所以。以大乘宗不許多法成其自相。眾多法成但和合假。
疏。現覺如夢等者。薩婆多等許識外境。故為難云。若無外境寧有此覺我今現證如是境耶。為答彼難故有此頌 言現覺者。作證色等行解之心 如夢等者。此舉喻也。夢中亦言我見色等。色等之境離心外無。非夢現覺。境亦如是 見及境已無者。正申難意。此師六識不許並起。眼等五識隨一現緣。而不分別我今現見。后現作解
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 共同假說的駁斥如前所述。因為這些詰難在前面已經詳細說明，所以不再贅述。問：如果外人辯解說，『共同』是指相似。例如，你們大乘宗認為識所變現的外在器世界，雖然各不相同，但因為相似而稱為『共同』。並不是說一個事物貫穿于兩個地方才叫做『共同』。』答：略作三種解釋：一、火有猛烈的性質，人沒有這種性質。因為人不是真實句所包含的，怎麼能說有共同的性質而假立呢？如果說人聚、火聚這二者之中有相似的性質，所以稱為『共同』，這也是不行的。因為『共同』不是僅僅依存於一個真實的聚，而是通於一切法的。二、以相似之名作為『共同』，『共同』和『相似』沒有區別，那麼就是依存於兩種法而建立假說。為什麼前面說依存於三種法建立假說呢？所以這種辯解是不合理的。 疏：『以破小乘伏難者』，小乘雖然立了真等三種，但經文中沒有明顯說明，所以說是『伏』。這是根據前面的詰難，認為小乘沒有這種說法。 疏：『小乘等自辨真事等者』，不通於外道，所以稱為『自』。雖然是小乘等，但並非同一類，總的來說都是內法，所以稱為『自』沒有錯誤。 疏：『或是外道等者』，地是堅硬的，火是熱的，像這樣一切諸法的自相，稱為共同認可的。雖然是共同認可的，但假說也不依存於這些而建立。 疏：『非謂共許張人身等者』，這是解釋衡量他宗的原因。因為大乘宗不認為許多法成就其自相，眾多法成就的只是和合假。 疏：『現覺如夢等者』，薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等宗派認為有識之外的境界，所以詰難說：『如果沒有外在的境界，怎麼會有這種感覺，我現在明明證知有這樣的境界呢？』爲了回答他們的詰難，所以有這個偈頌。『言現覺者』，是指對色等進行認識和理解的心。『如夢等者』，這是舉例子。夢中也說我見到色等，但色等的境界離開心之外是沒有的。不是夢中的現覺，境界也是這樣。『見及境已無者』，這是正式申明詰難的意思。這位論師認為六識不能同時生起，眼等五識隨一個出現而緣取境界，但不分別我現在見到。後來才出現理解。
【English Translation】 English version: The refutation of the common hypothesis is as previously stated. Because these difficulties have already been clearly explained before, they will not be repeated. Question: If an outsider argues, 'Common' means similar. For example, your Mahayana school believes that the external world transformed by consciousness, although different, is called 'common' because of their similarity. It is not that one thing penetrates two places that is called 'common.' Answer: Briefly, there are three explanations: First, fire has fierce properties, but humans do not have these properties. Because humans are not included in the real category, how can it be said that there is a common property and a false establishment? If it is said that there are similar properties in the human aggregate and the fire aggregate, so they are called 'common,' this is also not acceptable. Because 'common' does not only rely on one real aggregate, but is common to all dharmas. Second, using the name of similarity as 'common,' 'common' and 'similarity' are no different, then it is based on two dharmas to establish a false hypothesis. Why did it say earlier that it is based on three dharmas to establish a false hypothesis? Therefore, this argument is unreasonable. Commentary: 'To refute the hidden difficulties of the Hinayana,' although the Hinayana establishes three types such as truth, etc., it is not clearly stated in the scriptures, so it is said to be 'hidden.' This is based on the previous difficulty, believing that the Hinayana does not have this statement. Commentary: 'The Hinayana, etc., distinguish truth and reality themselves,' not extending to external paths, so it is called 'self.' Although it is Hinayana, etc., they are not the same category, and generally speaking, they are all internal dharmas, so it is not wrong to call it 'self.' Commentary: 'Or it is external paths, etc.,' the earth is solid, and fire is hot. Like this, the self-characteristics of all dharmas are called commonly recognized. Although it is commonly recognized, the false establishment does not rely on these. Commentary: 'Not referring to the commonly accepted Zhang person's body, etc.,' this is to explain the reason for measuring other schools. Because the Mahayana school does not believe that many dharmas achieve their self-characteristics, but that many dharmas achieve only the combined false. Commentary: 'Present awareness is like a dream, etc.,' the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'all exists' school) and other schools believe that there are realms outside of consciousness, so they question: 'If there are no external realms, how can there be this feeling, I clearly know that there are such realms now?' To answer their difficulty, there is this verse. 'Speaking of present awareness' refers to the mind that recognizes and understands forms, etc. 'Like a dream, etc.,' this is giving an example. In a dream, it is also said that I see forms, etc., but the realms of forms, etc., do not exist outside of the mind. It is not present awareness in a dream, and the realm is also like this. 'Seeing and the realm are already gone,' this is formally stating the meaning of the difficulty. This teacher believes that the six consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously, and the five consciousnesses such as the eye arise and grasp the realm, but do not distinguish that I am seeing now. Later, understanding arises.
是第六識。前現量境及現量心並已落謝。寧許有現量者。起現覺時既無現識。能見亦無。如何此時許有現量證外境有。
疏。若說共相唯有觀心者。大乘共相體性是無。唯觀心中作共相解。約此行解名為共相。具如燈辨。
論。亦非離此至為假所依者。具如樞要。有義謂通外難。外難云。若言詮法不得自相。如何喚火便得火等。故此通云。謂假智詮雖不得自相。亦非離此自相之外。有別方便施設自相為假所依。由詮火名無始串習。依火自相不依於水。假智隨名但緣於火。且如假名詮法自相。雖不稱實要杖所詮自相施設。假智亦爾。不離自相假智生故。問此即假說必依于真。如何破他。答雖依自相不稱所依。故不可說假必依真。若爾外言我亦如是。雖假依真亦不說言而稱真故。答汝之真事許識外有。如前廣破。我但識變何得相例 詳曰。非無其理。然依論意本解為正。故論前云假智詮不得自相。此文即云亦非離此。若非智詮此此誰。又若自相。如何自相施設自相。又施設者。巧便安立所以之義。以彼自相安立自相為假所依義疏且昧。又雖識變不變有別。而假依真有相濫失。故今不依。
疏。假智及詮至說為假故者。假智所變．假詮所詮。與法自相而相似故。故說智詮而為假也。
疏。故智相非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是第六識（第六種意識）。之前的現量境（直接認知的對象）和現量心（直接認知的心）都已經過去。怎麼能允許有現量呢？生起現覺（直接的感知）時，既然沒有現識（直接認知的意識），能見者也沒有，如何此時允許有現量來證明外境的存在呢？
疏：如果說共相（事物共同的性質）只是觀心所產生的，那麼大乘佛教認為共相的體性是空無的。只是在觀心中產生對共相的理解。根據這種理解進行修行和理解，就叫做共相。具體內容詳見《燈辨》。
論：也不是離開自相（事物自身的特性）而成為假立所依的。具體內容詳見《樞要》。有一種觀點認為這是爲了駁斥外道的詰難。外道的詰難是：如果言詮（語言表達）不能表達自相，那麼為什麼一說『火』就能得到火等事物呢？所以這裡解釋說：雖然假智詮（虛假的認知表達）不能表達自相，但也不是離開這個自相之外，有其他方便來施設自相作為假立所依。由於稱呼『火』這個名稱是無始以來的串習，所以是依據火的自相，而不是依據水。虛假的認知隨著名稱，只是緣於火。比如假名（虛假的名詞）詮釋事物的自相，雖然不符合真實，但要依靠所詮釋的自相來施設。虛假的認知也是這樣，不離開自相而產生。問：這既然是假說，必定依賴於真，如何駁斥他人呢？答：雖然依賴於自相，但不符合所依賴的自相，所以不能說假必定依賴於真。如果這樣，外道會說我也一樣，雖然假依賴於真，也不說言語就符合真。答：你們所說的真實事物，承認在識之外存在，之前已經廣泛駁斥過。我只是識的變現，怎麼能相提並論呢？詳述：並非沒有道理。然而依據論的本意來解釋才是正確的。所以論前面說假智詮不能表達自相，這裡又說也不是離開這個自相。如果不是智詮，那麼這個『此』指的是什麼？又如果是自相，如何用自相來施設自相？而且施設的意思是巧妙地安立。用那個自相來安立自相作為假立所依的意義，疏的解釋有些含糊。而且雖然識的變現，不變和變有所區別，但假依賴於真有混淆的過失。所以現在不依據這種解釋。
疏：假智和詮釋，乃至說為假的原因是：假智所變現的，假詮釋所詮釋的，與事物的自相相似，所以說智詮是虛假的。
疏：所以智相不是……
【English Translation】 English version: It is the sixth consciousness (the sixth type of consciousness). The previous present object (the object of direct cognition) and the present mind (the mind of direct cognition) have already passed away. How can we allow for present cognition? Since there is no present consciousness (the consciousness of direct cognition) when present awareness (direct perception) arises, and there is no seer, how can we allow for present cognition to prove the existence of external objects at this time?
Commentary: If it is said that common characteristics (the common properties of things) are only produced by observing the mind, then Mahayana Buddhism believes that the nature of common characteristics is empty. It is only in the mind of observation that an understanding of common characteristics arises. Practicing and understanding according to this understanding is called common characteristics. See 'Lamp Discrimination' for details.
Treatise: Nor is it apart from this to become a false support. See 'Essentials' for details. One view is that this is to refute the objections of externalists. The externalists' objection is: If language cannot express self-characteristics, then why can we obtain fire and other things when we say 'fire'? Therefore, this explains: Although false cognitive expression cannot express self-characteristics, it is not apart from these self-characteristics that there are other means to establish self-characteristics as false supports. Because calling the name 'fire' is a habit from beginningless time, it is based on the self-characteristic of fire, not based on water. False cognition follows the name and only relates to fire. For example, a false name (a false noun) interprets the self-characteristic of things. Although it does not conform to reality, it must rely on the self-characteristic of what is interpreted to establish it. False cognition is also like this, arising without being separated from self-characteristics. Question: Since this is a false statement, it must rely on the truth. How can it refute others? Answer: Although it relies on self-characteristics, it does not conform to the self-characteristics it relies on, so it cannot be said that the false must rely on the truth. If so, the externalist will say that I am also the same. Although the false relies on the truth, it does not say that words conform to the truth. Answer: The real things you speak of are admitted to exist outside of consciousness, which has been widely refuted before. I am only a manifestation of consciousness, how can we compare them? Detailed explanation: It is not without reason. However, it is correct to explain according to the original meaning of the treatise. Therefore, the treatise says earlier that false cognitive expression cannot express self-characteristics, and here it says that it is not apart from these self-characteristics. If it is not cognitive expression, then what does this 'this' refer to? And if it is a self-characteristic, how can we use a self-characteristic to establish a self-characteristic? Moreover, the meaning of establishment is to skillfully establish. The meaning of using that self-characteristic to establish a self-characteristic as a false support is somewhat vague in the commentary. Moreover, although the manifestation of consciousness, the unchanging and the changing are different, there is a fault of confusion in the false relying on the truth. Therefore, I do not rely on this explanation now.
Commentary: The reason why false cognition and interpretation, and even saying it is false, is that what is transformed by false cognition and what is interpreted by false interpretation are similar to the self-characteristics of things, so it is said that cognitive interpretation is false.
Commentary: Therefore, the characteristic of cognition is not...
所依者。非假智詮親所依也。非是不許為疏所依。
疏。然緣自性色及詮故者。緣自性色詮自性色。
疏。不聞聲起比智者。不能依聲而起比智。云不聞聲。非是嬰兒全不聞聲。
疏。此鼠前生為貓食等者。問前為人等后死為鼠。見鴟等類應不驚走 答由前前生曾作鼠故。或在人中曾聞見故。故亦驚也 問鼠等豈皆得宿命智知彼食已 答義意如此。非必鼠等作此等心方驚走也。但為俱生而保養命故。
疏。心心所法此是誰緣者。根．塵．種等是心所緣。心知自相此能緣心誰之所緣。誰能緣此心之自相。
疏。若言他心智慧緣至如余散心者。問他心智者即通所收。何名為散。答且他心智略有三類 一謂如來．八地已去菩薩所得定通無別 二者二乘．七地已還菩薩所得．及凡夫人修得之者。依定而起。然非即定復不同散 三者報得。此唯散心。若依定起名為證量。報得不爾。以他心聚有非證量故言非證非謂一切。他心證量義即不遍。若自證分證量義備。故遣他心而取自證。
疏。安惠謂佛他心智緣者。問此師何故不取自證為能知耶 答安惠見分遍計無體而非是心。心即自證故不自知。但佛他心了諸心也。
疏。依他有法謂一色等者。非說共相是依他性有體之法。意明共相由杖
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所依：並非是假立的智慧所詮釋的親近所依。但並非是不允許作為疏釋所依據的對象。
疏釋：『然緣自性色及詮故者』，意思是緣自性色，詮釋自性色。
疏釋：『不聞聲起比智者』，是指不能依靠聲音而生起比量智慧。所謂『不聞聲』，並非指嬰兒完全聽不到聲音。
疏釋：『此鼠前生為貓食等者』。問：如果前生是人等，死後轉生為老鼠，見到鴟（chī，貓頭鷹）等類似的動物，應該不會驚慌逃跑吧？答：因為前前生曾經做過老鼠的緣故，或者在做人的時候曾經聽聞見過（貓頭鷹等），所以也會驚慌。問：老鼠等難道都獲得了宿命智，知道它們會被吃掉嗎？答：道理是這樣，並非一定是老鼠等產生了這樣的想法才驚慌逃跑。只是爲了與生俱來的保護生命的本能。
疏釋：『心心所法此是誰緣者』。根、塵、種子等是心所緣的對象。心了知自己的自相，這個能緣的心又是誰所緣的對象？誰能緣這個心的自相？
疏釋：『若言他心智慧緣至如余散心者』。問：他心智既然被通所包含，為什麼又說是散心呢？答：且把他心智大致分為三類：一是指如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號之一）、八地（菩薩修行階位）以上的菩薩所獲得的，定通沒有差別；二是二乘（聲聞和緣覺）、七地及以下的菩薩所獲得的，以及凡夫人修習獲得的，依靠禪定而生起，但並非就是禪定，也不同於散心；三是報得的，這只是散心。如果依靠禪定而生起，就稱為證量。報得的則不是這樣。因為他心聚有非證量的緣故，所以說非證，並非指一切。他心證量的意義並不普遍。如果自證分證量的意義就完備了，所以捨棄他心而取自證。
疏釋：『安惠謂佛他心智緣者』。問：這位安惠（Anhui，人名）論師為什麼不取自證作為能知呢？答：安惠認為見分是遍計所執，沒有實體，並非是心。心就是自證，所以不能自己了知自己。只是佛的他心智慧夠了知所有心。
疏釋：『依他有法謂一色等者』。並非是說共相是依他性有實體的法。意思是說明共相是由木杖...
【English Translation】 English version That which is relied upon: It is not the close reliance explained by falsely established wisdom. However, it is not that it is not allowed to be the basis for interpretation.
Commentary: 'Therefore, because of the nature of form and explanation,' means to perceive the nature of form and explain the nature of form.
Commentary: 'Those who do not hear the sound and generate inferential wisdom' refers to those who cannot rely on sound to generate inferential wisdom. 'Not hearing the sound' does not mean that infants do not hear any sound at all.
Commentary: 'This mouse was eaten by a cat in a previous life, etc.' Question: If in a previous life it was a human, etc., and after death it was reborn as a mouse, upon seeing an owl (chī) or similar creatures, shouldn't it not be startled and run away? Answer: Because in previous previous lives it had been a mouse, or because it had heard or seen (owls, etc.) when it was a human, it would still be startled. Question: Do mice, etc., all gain the wisdom of knowing their past lives and know that they will be eaten? Answer: The principle is like this; it is not necessarily that mice, etc., have such thoughts before they are startled and run away. It is simply due to the innate instinct to protect their lives.
Commentary: 'Of the mental and mental factors, what does the mind rely on?' The sense faculties, objects, seeds, etc., are what the mental factors rely on. The mind knows its own self-nature; what does this knowing mind rely on? Who can rely on the self-nature of this mind?
Commentary: 'If it is said that the wisdom of knowing others' minds can reach even distracted minds.' Question: Since the wisdom of knowing others' minds is included in the superknowledges, why is it called a distracted mind? Answer: The wisdom of knowing others' minds can be roughly divided into three categories: First, that which is obtained by Tathagatas (Tathagata, one of the titles of the Buddha) and Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground (stage of Bodhisattva practice), where the samadhi-born superknowledges are indistinguishable; second, that which is obtained by Hearers and Solitary Realizers, Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground and below, and ordinary people through practice, arising from samadhi, but it is not exactly samadhi, nor is it the same as a distracted mind; third, that which is obtained as a result of past actions, which is simply a distracted mind. If it arises from samadhi, it is called valid cognition. That which is obtained as a result of past actions is not like this. Because the collection of others' minds includes non-valid cognition, it is said to be non-valid, but not everything. The meaning of valid cognition of others' minds is not universal. If the meaning of valid cognition of self-awareness is complete, then others' minds are abandoned and self-awareness is taken.
Commentary: 'Anhui (Anhui, a person's name) says that the Buddha's wisdom of knowing others' minds relies on...' Question: Why doesn't this teacher, Anhui, take self-awareness as the knower? Answer: Anhui believes that the appearance aspect is completely conceptualized and has no substance, and is not the mind. The mind is self-awareness, so it cannot know itself. Only the Buddha's wisdom of knowing others' minds can know all minds.
Commentary: 'Dependently existent phenomena, such as a single color, etc.' It is not saying that the common characteristic is a dependently existent phenomenon with substance. It means to explain that the common characteristic is due to a stick...
有體法上而起名依有法。
疏。及於此中至此相是無者。能遍計心所增之相。同於共相體亦是無。故云及也。
疏。心變共相外必有體者。外謂本質。
疏。乃至緣我等者。問即蘊計我可言實合名必有體。離蘊計我何為外體 答亦依名教而起計故亦名有也。
疏。或別緣等者。雖不有質。然相不無及杖言教。亦得名為有合緣也。
疏。又解即共相別緣等者。問前言共相但是觀心無別體性。此何復言亦依他耶 答遍通諸法名為共相。此實觀心行解安布。今談此心所緣之法是相依他。不爾此心緣何為境。然此相分實不通余。但是觀心作通余解。由是前後亦不相違。更有多妨如燈具明。
疏。應不能緣二三諦等者。二二三三乃至四合以緣諦也。故置等言。此即壞緣四諦觀也。
疏。如佛地三解者。如樞要引。疏下亦明。
疏。此非安惠文者。經頌所言識所變者即見．相分。其體非無。安惠二分體即不有。所以知非。並結長行亦非安惠。
論。多異熟性故者。有義應作四句。有異熟非多。謂六識中業所感者。有間斷故不名為多。有多非異熟。謂第七識有覆性故。俱非即是六識之中非業招者。俱句第八。遮餘三句故說多言。
疏。寬狹何事遮不說者。縱令寬狹有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『有體法上而起名依有法』的意思是，在具有實體的法的基礎上，建立名稱，依賴於存在的法。
疏解：『及於此中至此相是無者』，指的是能遍計的心所增益的相，與共相一樣，其體性也是不存在的。所以說『及也』。
疏解：『心變共相外必有體者』，這裡說的『外』指的是本質。
疏解：『乃至緣我等者』，有人問：如果依蘊計度有『我』，可以說『實合』，名稱必定有體。如果離開蘊計度有『我』，那麼外在的體是什麼呢？回答是：也是依據名言教法而生起計度，所以也稱為『有』。
疏解：『或別緣等者』，即使沒有實質，但相不是沒有，以及杖言教，也可以稱為『有合緣』。
疏解：『又解即共相別緣等者』，有人問：前面說共相只是觀心，沒有別的體性，這裡為什麼又說『亦依他耶』？回答是：普遍通達諸法，名為共相。這實際上是觀心的行解安布。現在談論的是此心所緣的法，是相依他。否則，此心緣什麼作為境？然而此相分實際上不通於其他，只是觀心作通於其他的理解。因此，前後也不相違背。還有很多妨礙，如燈具明。
疏解：『應不能緣二三諦等者』，指的是二二三三乃至四合起來緣四諦。所以用『等』字。這就會破壞緣四諦的觀行。
疏解：『如佛地三解者』，如《樞要》所引，疏解下面也會說明。
疏解：『此非安惠文者』，經頌所說的『識所變者』，指的是見分和相分，它們的體不是沒有。安慧的二分體就是不存在的。所以知道不是安慧的觀點。並且總結的長行也不是安慧的觀點。
論：『多異熟性故者』，有一種解釋應該作四句：有異熟但不是多，指的是六識中由業力所感生的，因為有間斷，所以不稱為多。有多但不是異熟，指的是第七識，因為有覆藏性。俱非，指的是六識中不是由業力招感的。俱是，指的是第八識。遮止其餘三句，所以說『多』。
疏解：『寬狹何事遮不說者』，即使寬狹有...
【English Translation】 English version: 『有體法上而起名依有法』 means that names are established based on dharmas (法) that have substance (體), relying on existing dharmas.
Commentary: 『及於此中至此相是無者』 refers to the appearances (相) increased by the mind (心) that universally calculates (遍計), which, like common characteristics (共相), are also non-existent in their essence (體性). Hence the use of 『及也』.
Commentary: 『心變共相外必有體者』 The 『outside』 (外) here refers to the essence (本質).
Commentary: 『乃至緣我等者』 Someone asks: If 『I』 (我) is conceived based on the skandhas (蘊), it can be said to be 『actually combined』 (實合), and the name must have a substance. If 『I』 is conceived apart from the skandhas, then what is the external substance? The answer is: It is also based on nominal teachings (名言教法) that conception arises, so it is also called 『existing』 (有).
Commentary: 『或別緣等者』 Even if there is no substance (質), the appearance (相) is not non-existent, and the teachings of staff and words (杖言教) can also be called 『existing combined conditions』 (有合緣).
Commentary: 『又解即共相別緣等者』 Someone asks: Earlier it was said that common characteristics (共相) are only the observation of the mind (觀心) and have no other essence (體性). Why is it now said that 『it also depends on others』 (亦依他耶)? The answer is: Universally penetrating all dharmas is called common characteristics. This is actually the practice and understanding (行解) arrangement (安布) of the observation of the mind. What is now being discussed is the dharma that this mind cognizes, which is appearance-dependent (相依他). Otherwise, what does this mind cognize as its object (境)? However, this appearance-division (相分) actually does not connect to others; it is only the observation of the mind that makes the understanding of connecting to others. Therefore, the beginning and the end do not contradict each other. There are many more obstacles, like the brightness of a lamp.
Commentary: 『應不能緣二三諦等者』 refers to two twos, three threes, and even four combined to cognize the Four Noble Truths (四諦). Therefore, the word 『etc.』 (等) is used. This would destroy the contemplation (觀行) of the Four Noble Truths.
Commentary: 『如佛地三解者』 as quoted in the Essentials (樞要), and the commentary below will also explain.
Commentary: 『此非安惠文者』 The sutra verse that says 『what is transformed by consciousness』 (識所變者) refers to the seeing-division (見分) and the appearance-division (相分), and their substance is not non-existent. The two divisions of Anhui (安慧) are non-existent in essence. Therefore, it is known that it is not Anhui's view. And the concluding long passage is also not Anhui's view.
Treatise: 『多異熟性故者』 One interpretation should be made into four sentences: There is maturation (異熟) but not much (多), referring to what is produced by karma (業力) in the six consciousnesses (六識), because it is intermittent (間斷), so it is not called much. There is much but not maturation, referring to the seventh consciousness (第七識), because it has a concealing nature (有覆性). Both are not, referring to what is not produced by karma in the six consciousnesses. Both are, referring to the eighth consciousness (第八識). Excluding the other three sentences, therefore it is said 『much』.
Commentary: 『寬狹何事遮不說者』 Even if width and narrowness have...
何違事遮不說之。
疏。此中意說等者。問何意須約熏習之位便取異熟 答由前外難若無實我。云何世間及諸聖教說有我法。前答彼云。我法熏習諸識生時變似我法。為此故取熏習識位。
論。了境相粗故者。有義應作四句。有了境非相粗 第七．八識。有相粗非了境。六識心所。有俱非謂七．八心所。有俱句。第六心王。亦了亦粗故。
疏。六不共義者。簡七．八也。前之五義皆對佛果緣于細境六識明也。
疏。此名唯望現果為名者。因能變名唯對所生現行果說。
疏。此種及現行所引生故者。釋種得名果變所以。
疏。不以等流所變等者。即此習氣有因有果。論中但舉習氣之因以彰其體。不舉其果而辨體也。
疏。義顯所生等者。釋論舉因不說果意 問本意欲明所生之果通八識等。何不舉果直以明之。而乃舉因方便顯耶 答若舉其因。顯此習氣亦有因生。並顯所生通八識等。復能顯自亦能為因。若直舉果。恐疑習氣不從因得。為含多義故舉其因。異熟習氣亦準此知。
疏。流謂流類者。有說。等謂相似。已顯類同。所言流者是流住義。果從因起。因所流故名之為流。等之流故。亦依主釋 或所生果與因相似名之為等。從彼所起名之為流。此等即流。持業釋也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 什麼違背了事實真相而隱瞞不說呢？
疏解：這裡所說的『等』，意思是說：有人問，為什麼要限定在熏習的階段才取異熟果呢？回答是：因為前面外道的責難，如果沒有真實的我，為什麼世間和聖教都說有我法呢？之前的回答是，我法熏習諸識生起時，變現出類似我法的樣子。因此才取熏習識的階段。
論：了別境界的相粗顯的緣故。有人認為應該作四句分析：有了別境界但相不粗顯的——第七識、第八識。有相粗顯但不能了別境界的——六識的心所法。既不能了別境界相也不粗顯的——第七識、第八識的心所法。既能了別境界相也粗顯的——第六識心王。因為它既能了別境界，相也粗顯。
疏解：六不共義，是爲了簡別第七識、第八識。前面的五種意義都是針對佛果而言，因為佛果能夠緣于細微的境界，這是六識所不能比的。
疏解：這裡所說的『唯望現果為名』，是指因能變，只是針對所生的現行果而說的。
疏解：這裡所說的『此種及現行所引生故』，是解釋種子得名為果變的原因。
疏解：這裡所說的『不以等流所變等』，是指這種習氣有因有果。論中只舉了習氣的因來彰顯它的體性，沒有舉它的果來辨別它的體性。
疏解：『義顯所生等』，是解釋論中只舉因而不說果的用意。有人問：本意是想說明所生的果通於八識等，為什麼不直接舉果來闡明，而是舉因來方便地顯示呢？回答是：如果舉其因，就能顯示這種習氣也是由因所生，並且顯示所生之果通於八識等，還能顯示自身也能作為因。如果直接舉果，恐怕會懷疑習氣不是從因得來的。爲了包含多種意義，所以舉了因。異熟習氣也可以參照這個來理解。
疏解：『流』的意思是流類。有人說，『等』的意思是相似，已經顯示了類別相同。所說的『流』是流注的意思，果從因生起，因所流出，所以叫做流。與『等』同類的流，也是依主釋。或者說，所生的果與因相似，叫做『等』，從彼所生起，叫做『流』。這個『等』就是『流』，是持業釋。
【English Translation】 English version What violates the truth and is concealed without being spoken?
Commentary: Here, 'etc.' means: Someone asks, why must it be limited to the stage of熏習 (xunxi, habitual influence) to take the 異熟 (yishu, Vipāka) fruit? The answer is: Because of the previous external criticism, if there is no real self, why do worldly and sacred teachings say there is self and dharma? The previous answer was that self and dharma熏習 (xunxi, habitual influence) when the consciousnesses arise, they transform into something similar to self and dharma. Therefore, the stage of熏習 (xunxi, habitual influence) consciousness is taken.
Treatise: Because the characteristics of the perceived realm are coarse. Some believe that four possibilities should be considered: There is perceiving of the realm but the characteristics are not coarse - the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. There are coarse characteristics but no perceiving of the realm - the mental functions of the six consciousnesses. There is neither perceiving of the realm nor coarse characteristics - the mental functions of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. There is both perceiving of the realm and coarse characteristics - the sixth consciousness, because it both perceives the realm and has coarse characteristics.
Commentary: The six uncommon meanings are to distinguish the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. The previous five meanings are all in relation to the Buddha's fruit, because the Buddha's fruit can be connected to subtle realms, which the six consciousnesses cannot.
Commentary: 'Only named in relation to the present fruit' means that the cause can transform, but it is only spoken of in relation to the present manifest fruit that is produced.
Commentary: 'This seed and the arising of the present action' explains the reason why the seed is named the transformation of the fruit.
Commentary: 'Not transformed by 等流 (dengliu, equable flow) etc.' refers to this 習氣 (xunxi, habitual energy) having cause and effect. The treatise only mentions the cause of the 習氣 (xunxi, habitual energy) to highlight its essence, and does not mention its effect to distinguish its essence.
Commentary: 'The meaning reveals what is produced etc.' explains the intention of the treatise to only mention the cause and not the effect. Someone asks: The original intention was to clarify that the fruit produced is connected to the eight consciousnesses etc., why not directly mention the fruit to clarify it, but instead mention the cause to conveniently reveal it? The answer is: If the cause is mentioned, it can show that this 習氣 (xunxi, habitual energy) is also produced from a cause, and it also shows that the fruit produced is connected to the eight consciousnesses etc., and it can also show that it can also be a cause itself. If the fruit is directly mentioned, there may be doubt that the 習氣 (xunxi, habitual energy) is not obtained from a cause. To contain multiple meanings, the cause is mentioned. The 異熟 (yishu, Vipāka) 習氣 (xunxi, habitual energy) can also be understood in this way.
Commentary: 'Flow' means flowing categories. Some say that '等 (deng, equable)' means similar, which already shows that the categories are the same. The 'flow' that is spoken of is the meaning of flowing and abiding. The fruit arises from the cause, and what flows from the cause is called flow. The flow of '等 (deng, equable)' is also a possessive compound. Or, the fruit produced is similar to the cause, and is called '等 (deng, equable)', and what arises from it is called 'flow'. This '等 (deng, equable)' is 'flow', which is a determinative compound.
故論說云由果似因名等流故。
疏。舉因能熏者。二習氣因體是能熏。名因能熏。能熏即因。
疏。不說我見熏習等者。問異熟習氣豈異等流習氣外有而別說耶 答善．惡種子生自現種名為等流。有餘緣助感后異熟即名異熟。雖體無異有別勝能故開為二。我見熏習方此不如故不可說。由此異熟必是等流。自有等流不名異熟。即無記種．及彼善．惡不招果者。
疏。三界具幾等者。欲界等流具有三性。異熟二性。上二界中等流二性。異熟唯一。無不善故。
疏。未知生何等者。即論說云。八識生者。答生何也。為因緣者。答如何生。名等流者。答起何果。下異熟果亦準此知。
疏。余法亦爾者。第八心所名余法也。
疏。若爾即真異熟等者。問按彼論云。阿賴耶識相應受。於一切時唯是不苦不樂。唯是異熟生。不言識體亦異熟生。言異熟生豈不乖彼 答相應之受既異熟生。識從於彼必定同也。故論不言。
疏。今五義中取第一者。問準前所明總有六義云何言五 答意明異熟對異熟生。六中第三非異熟生復非異熟。所以除之但云五義。
疏。今明圓成性者。略為二釋。一大段第二廣明相性。對前略標名為今也 二今字錯應為不字。明彼初標一頌半中不說圓成。前釋為勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 故《論》中說，由果在性質上類似於因，所以稱為等流果（Nisyanda-phala，由因產生的，性質上與因相似的果報）。 疏：解釋『因能熏』。二習氣因（Vāsanā-hetu，由熏習產生的因）的本體是能熏習的。名（Nāma，名稱）也是能熏習的。能熏習的就是因。 疏：不說我見熏習等，問：異熟習氣（Vipāka-vāsanā，成熟果報的習氣）難道在等流習氣（Nisyanda-vāsanā，與因同類的習氣）之外，另外單獨說明嗎？答：善或惡的種子從自身現行的種子產生，這稱為等流。如果有其他因緣的幫助，感受後來的異熟果報，就稱為異熟。雖然本體沒有差異，但有特別殊勝的功能，所以分為二者。我見熏習在這方面不如等流和異熟，所以不能說。由此可知，異熟必定是等流。但有些等流不稱為異熟，即無記的種子，以及那些不招感果報的善或惡的種子。 疏：三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）各具有幾種等流？欲界的等流具有三種性質（善、惡、無記）。異熟具有兩種性質（善、惡）。色界和無色界中，等流具有兩種性質（善、無記）。異熟只有一種性質（善），因為沒有不善的。 疏：未知生何等果，即《論》中說：八識（Aṣṭa vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）所生的果報是什麼？答：生何種果報？為因緣果（Hetu-phala，由因緣產生的果報）嗎？答：如何產生？名為等流果嗎？答：產生什麼果報？下面的異熟果（Vipāka-phala，成熟果報）也可以參照這樣理解。 疏：其餘法也是這樣，第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）的心所（Caitasika，與心相應的心理活動）稱為其餘法。 疏：如果這樣，就是真正的異熟等，問：按照那部論典所說，阿賴耶識相應的受（Vedanā，感受），在任何時候都是不苦不樂的，只是異熟所生，沒有說識體也是異熟所生。說異熟所生，難道不是與那部論典相矛盾嗎？答：相應的受既然是異熟所生，識從屬於它，必定也是相同的。所以論典中沒有說。 疏：現在五義中取第一義，問：按照前面所說明的，總共有六義，為什麼說五義？答：意思是說異熟對異熟生而言，六義中的第三義既不是異熟生，也不是異熟，所以排除它，只說五義。 疏：現在說明圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，三種自性之一，指通過如實修行而成就的真實自性），略分為兩種解釋：第一大段，第二廣明相性。相對於前面的略標，稱為『今』。第二種解釋認為『今』字是錯誤的，應該是『不』字。說明前面初標的一頌半中沒有說圓成實性。前一種解釋更為殊勝。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the treatise says, 'Because the result is similar to the cause in nature, it is called Nisyanda-phala (result of outflowing, a result that is similar in nature to its cause).' Commentary: Explaining 'cause can perfume'. The substance of the two Vāsanā-hetu (cause of habit-energy) is what can perfume. Nāma (name) can also perfume. What can perfume is the cause. Commentary: Not mentioning the perfuming of self-view, etc. Question: Is the Vipāka-vāsanā (habit-energy of maturation) separate from the Nisyanda-vāsanā (habit-energy of outflowing) and explained separately? Answer: Good or evil seeds arise from the presently manifest seeds themselves, and this is called outflowing. If there are other conditions assisting, experiencing the subsequent Vipāka-phala (result of maturation) is called Vipāka. Although the substance is not different, it has particularly superior functions, so it is divided into two. The perfuming of self-view is not as good as these, so it cannot be said. From this, it can be known that Vipāka is certainly outflowing. However, some outflowing is not called Vipāka, namely, the seeds of indeterminate nature, and those good or evil seeds that do not bring about results. Commentary: How many kinds of outflowing do the three realms (Trailokya, the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the formless realm) each possess? The realm of desire's outflowing has three natures (good, evil, and indeterminate). Vipāka has two natures (good and evil). In the realm of form and the formless realm, outflowing has two natures (good and indeterminate). Vipāka has only one nature (good), because there is no unwholesome. Commentary: Not knowing what kind of result is produced, that is, the treatise says: What is the result produced by the eight consciousnesses (Aṣṭa vijñāna, the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, Manas consciousness, and Ālaya consciousness)? Answer: What kind of result is produced? Is it Hetu-phala (result of cause and condition)? Answer: How is it produced? Is it called Nisyanda-phala? Answer: What result is produced? The following Vipāka-phala can also be understood in this way. Commentary: The remaining dharmas are also like this; the mental functions (Caitasika, mental activities associated with the mind) of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) are called the remaining dharmas. Commentary: If that is so, then it is truly Vipāka, etc. Question: According to that treatise, the feeling (Vedanā, sensation) associated with the Ālaya-vijñāna is always neither painful nor pleasant, and is only produced by Vipāka. It does not say that the substance of the consciousness is also produced by Vipāka. Isn't saying 'produced by Vipāka' contradictory to that treatise? Answer: Since the associated feeling is produced by Vipāka, the consciousness, being subordinate to it, must also be the same. Therefore, the treatise does not say it. Commentary: Now, among the five meanings, the first meaning is taken. Question: According to what was explained earlier, there are a total of six meanings, so why say five meanings? Answer: The meaning is that in relation to Vipāka-ja (produced by Vipāka), the third of the six meanings is neither Vipāka-ja nor Vipāka, so it is excluded, and only five meanings are mentioned. Commentary: Now explaining the Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (perfected nature, one of the three natures), it is briefly divided into two explanations: the first major section, and the second, which broadly explains the characteristics and nature. In relation to the preceding brief indication, it is called 'now'. The second explanation considers the word 'now' to be a mistake and should be the word 'not'. It explains that the first verse and a half of the initial indication did not mention the Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. The former explanation is more superior.
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疏。初略解三后廣分別者。有義初略說三相。后廣解因相。疏說後文廣解三相此定非理。下文自說一切種相應更分別。不言應更廣三相故 詳曰。以彼總聲于別而轉。聖教明許種相即是三中一故。亦何有違。
論。謂雜染互為緣等者。問若能藏故即名賴耶。僧佉真性應賴耶體。許能藏故 答彼能所藏無有異故不名賴耶。故攝大乘第一等云。非如大等顯了法性藏最勝中。阿賴耶識攝藏諸法亦復如是 釋彼計冥性有最勝能名藏最勝。大等諸法果相顯著名了法性。若未變時藏在冥性不異冥性。若已變異亦復不離。冥性為因大等為果。因果同體以明攝藏。今立賴耶攝藏因果。而非即異故不同彼 又能所藏傳有三釋。一云現行第八與所持種互為二藏。謂現持種。種名所藏。現名能藏。種生現識。識名所藏。種是能藏 二云現初能變與諸轉識互為緣起名能所藏。本識為因七識是果。七識為因本識是果。所藏為因能藏為果 三云以種望現能熏七識名能所藏。從七識生能生彼故 有義斷云。然今論意依第二說。論主下釋達磨經云。此頌意說阿賴耶識與諸轉識互為因果。故但應說以現望現名能所藏說為因果。復破疏云。言能藏者但取現識能持種義。此即不然。論說能藏顯是因性。不可現識與所持種為因緣故。下說現識能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
疏：最初略微解釋三種（阿賴耶識的）相，之後廣泛分別說明。有一種觀點認為，最初略說三種相，之後廣泛解釋因相。《疏》中說後文廣泛解釋三種相，這一定是不合理的。下文自己說一切種子相應更分別，沒有說應該更廣泛地解釋三種相，所以……
詳細地說，因為那個總的音聲可以轉為個別的意義，聖教明確允許種子相就是三種相中的一種，又有什麼違背呢？
論：所說的雜染互相為緣等。問：如果因為能夠藏而被稱為阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識），那麼僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派）的真性（Prakṛti，自性）也應該是阿賴耶的本體，因為它也被認為是能夠藏的。答：他們的能藏和所藏沒有差異，所以不稱為阿賴耶。所以《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一等中說：『不像大等顯了法性藏最勝中，阿賴耶識攝藏諸法也同樣如此。』解釋說，他們認為冥性（Prakṛti，自性）有最殊勝的功能，名為藏最勝。大等諸法果相顯著名為顯了法性。如果未變異時，藏在冥性中，不異於冥性。如果已經變異，也仍然不離冥性。冥性為因，大等為果。因果同體，以此說明攝藏。現在建立阿賴耶攝藏因果，而不是即是或異於因果，所以不同於他們。
又能藏和所藏的傳承有三種解釋。第一種說法是，現行第八識（阿賴耶識）與所持有的種子互相作為兩種藏。即現行識持有種子，種子名為所藏，現行識名為能藏。種子生出現識，現識名為所藏，種子是能藏。第二種說法是，現行初能變（阿賴耶識）與諸轉識互相作為緣起，名為能所藏。本識為因，七識是果。七識為因，本識是果。所藏為因，能藏是果。第三種說法是，以種子來看現行，能夠熏習七識，名為能所藏。從七識生起，能夠生彼（種子），所以是能所藏。
有一種觀點果斷地說，然而現在論主的意圖是依據第二種說法。《論》的作者在下面解釋《達磨經》（Dharma Sūtra）說：『這首偈頌的意思是說阿賴耶識與諸轉識互相為因果。』所以只應該說以現行識來看現行識，名為能所藏，說是因果。又反駁《疏》說：『所說的能藏，只是取現行識能夠持有種子的意義。』這就不對了。《論》中說能藏，明顯是因的性質，不可認為現行識與所持有的種子為因緣。下面說現識能夠……
【English Translation】 English version:
Commentary: Initially, the three aspects (of Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) are briefly explained, and later they are extensively differentiated. One view holds that the three aspects are initially mentioned briefly, and later the causal aspect is explained in detail. The commentary states that the subsequent text extensively explains the three aspects, which is certainly unreasonable. The following text itself states that all seed aspects should be further differentiated, without mentioning that the three aspects should be further elaborated, therefore...
In detail, because that general sound can be transformed into a specific meaning, the sacred teachings explicitly allow the seed aspect to be one of the three aspects, so what contradiction is there?
Treatise: What is said about defilements mutually being conditions, etc. Question: If it is called Ālaya (storehouse consciousness) because it can store, then should the Prakṛti (primordial nature) of Sāṃkhya (school of thought) also be the substance of Ālaya, since it is also considered capable of storing? Answer: Their ability to store and what is stored are not different, so it is not called Ālaya. Therefore, the first section of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) states: 'It is not like the most excellent store of the manifest Dharma-nature in the great, etc. The Ālaya-vijñāna stores all dharmas in the same way.' It explains that they believe Prakṛti has the most excellent function, called the most excellent store. The resultant aspects of the great, etc., are manifestly named the manifest Dharma-nature. If it has not changed, it is stored in Prakṛti and is not different from Prakṛti. If it has already changed, it is still not separate from Prakṛti. Prakṛti is the cause, and the great, etc., are the results. Cause and effect are of the same substance, thereby explaining storage. Now, we establish Ālaya storing cause and effect, but it is neither identical to nor different from cause and effect, so it is different from them.
Furthermore, there are three explanations for the transmission of what can be stored and what is stored. The first explanation is that the currently active eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) and the seeds it holds mutually serve as two types of storage. That is, the currently active consciousness holds the seeds, the seeds are called what is stored, and the currently active consciousness is called what can store. Seeds give rise to manifest consciousness, manifest consciousness is called what is stored, and seeds are what can store. The second explanation is that the currently active primary transformation (Ālaya-vijñāna) and the transforming consciousnesses mutually serve as arising conditions, called what can be stored and what is stored. The fundamental consciousness is the cause, and the seven consciousnesses are the results. The seven consciousnesses are the cause, and the fundamental consciousness is the result. What is stored is the cause, and what can store is the result. The third explanation is that, from the perspective of seeds looking at the manifest, it can perfume the seven consciousnesses, called what can be stored and what is stored. It arises from the seven consciousnesses and can give rise to them (seeds), so it is what can store.
One view decisively states that the intention of the treatise master is based on the second explanation. The author of the Treatise explains the Dharma Sūtra below, saying: 'The meaning of this verse is that the Ālaya-vijñāna and the transforming consciousnesses are mutually cause and effect.' Therefore, it should only be said that looking at the manifest consciousness from the perspective of the manifest consciousness is called what can be stored and what is stored, and it is said to be cause and effect. It also refutes the Commentary, saying: 'What is said about what can store only takes the meaning of the manifest consciousness being able to hold seeds.' This is incorrect. The Treatise says that what can store is clearly the nature of the cause, and it cannot be considered that the manifest consciousness and the seeds it holds are the cause and condition. Below it says that the manifest consciousness can...
持種故名因相者。由能所持體不異故。能生諸法。說現望現名之為因。非說能持望所持種名為因也。又能所藏皆通種．現。無別體故 詳曰。雖有此斷理亦難憑。現望于現因緣豈立。現不親能生於現故。若言非因由有其力與因名者。現望于種何不許耶。豈現望種無有力乎。又疏后解因相之中。自斷三相皆通種．現。自既目擊何事斥耶。余多分別具如燈辨 問無漏凈種亦依第八。現凈因生復熏成種。第八望之何非二藏獨言雜染 答能攝為因。所攝為果。非能所治得為因果。故不取之 若爾賴耶應非凈依 答是增上緣。為依不爽 問余有漏識除生第八餘有漏種非八因果何名二藏 答諸有漏種本識性同。無別體故。轉識與八互得為緣。俱有漏故故不相例。
疏。又離二無總等者。問二釋何別 答前約因果。后據體義。故分二釋 問前總自體離因果無。何故第二方言離二無別總耶 答克實二釋皆悉別外而無有總。約問分二。與后顯前亦無有失。
疏。然果種狹者。種為果相。果相種狹。唯業所招方名為果。即是第八親名言種是果種體。言唯業果釋所以也。
疏。經部計色根中有心心所等者。按瑜伽論五十一。依經部義立因緣云。複次若諸色根．及自大種。非心．心所種子所隨遂者。入滅盡定。入無想定。生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『持種故名因相』是指，由於能持（指能保持種子的能力）和所持（指被保持的種子）的本體沒有差異。能生出各種法，被稱為『現』（現象），相對於『現』來說，被稱為『因』（原因）。這裡說的『因』，不是指能持的種子相對於所持的種子而言的。而且，能藏（能儲存）和所藏（被儲存）都包括種子和現象，因為它們沒有不同的本體。詳細地說，即使有這樣的判斷，道理也很難站住腳。現象相對於現象，怎麼能成立因緣關係呢？因為現象不能直接產生現象。如果說，雖然不是因，但因為有力量而被稱為因，那麼現象相對於種子，為什麼不能這樣認為呢？難道現象相對於種子就沒有力量嗎？而且，疏（註釋）後面解釋因相時，自己斷定三種相都包括種子和現象。既然自己已經看到了，為什麼還要駁斥呢？更多詳細的辨析，可以參考《燈辨》。 問：無漏凈種（沒有煩惱的清凈種子）也依賴於第八識（阿賴耶識）。現象的清凈因產生后，又熏習成種子。第八識相對於它，為什麼不是二藏（兩種儲存）所說的雜染（不清凈）呢？答：能攝持的作為因，所攝持的作為果。不能被治理的（指清凈的）不能作為因果。所以不取它。如果這樣，阿賴耶識就不應該是清凈的所依了嗎？答：它是增上緣（輔助條件）。作為所依並沒有錯。問：其餘的有漏識（有煩惱的識）除了產生第八識，其餘的有漏種子不是第八識的因果，為什麼被稱為二藏呢？答：各種有漏種子的本體與本識（根本識）相同，沒有不同的本體。轉識（轉變的識）與第八識可以互相作為緣，都是有煩惱的，所以不能相提並論。
疏（註釋）：『又離二無總等者』。問：兩種解釋有什麼區別？答：前面是就因果關係來說的，後面是就本體的意義來說的。所以分為兩種解釋。問：前面說總自體離開了因果就沒有，為什麼第二種解釋才說離開了兩種就沒有總的呢？答：實際上兩種解釋都是說離開了外在的就沒有總的。根據提問分為兩種，與後面顯示前面也沒有什麼缺失。
疏（註釋）：『然果種狹者』。種子作為果的相，果的相，種子狹窄。只有業力所招感的才被稱為果。也就是第八識親近的名言種子是果種的本體。『唯業果』解釋了原因。
疏（註釋）：『經部計色根中有心心所等者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷，依據經部的觀點建立因緣說：再者，如果各種色根以及自身的大種，不是心、心所的種子所隨順的，那麼進入滅盡定（一種禪定狀態），進入無想定（一種禪定狀態），產生...
【English Translation】 English version 'Holding seeds is therefore called the aspect of cause' means that because the substance of what can hold (referring to the ability to maintain seeds) and what is held (referring to the seeds being maintained) are not different. What can produce all dharmas (phenomena) is called 'manifestation' (phenomenon), and relative to 'manifestation', it is called 'cause' (reason). The 'cause' here does not refer to the ability to hold seeds relative to the seeds being held. Moreover, what can be stored (can store) and what is stored (being stored) both include seeds and phenomena, because they do not have different substances. In detail, even if there is such a judgment, the reasoning is difficult to stand. How can the causal relationship be established between phenomena relative to phenomena? Because phenomena cannot directly produce phenomena. If it is said that although it is not a cause, it is called a cause because of its power, then why can't phenomena be regarded as such relative to seeds? Is it that phenomena have no power relative to seeds? Moreover, when the commentary later explains the aspect of cause, it determines that the three aspects all include seeds and phenomena. Since you have already seen it yourself, why do you still refute it? For more detailed analysis, please refer to 'Lamp Discrimination'. Question: Do the undefiled pure seeds (seeds without afflictions) also rely on the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna)? After the pure cause of phenomena arises, it is again perfumed into seeds. Relative to it, why isn't the eighth consciousness the impurity mentioned in the two treasuries (two kinds of storage)? Answer: What can be gathered is taken as the cause, and what is gathered is taken as the effect. What cannot be governed (referring to purity) cannot be taken as cause and effect. Therefore, it is not taken. If so, shouldn't Ālaya-vijñāna be the basis of purity? Answer: It is an auxiliary condition (supporting condition). There is nothing wrong with being a basis. Question: Apart from producing the eighth consciousness, why are the remaining defiled seeds of the other defiled consciousnesses, which are not the cause and effect of the eighth consciousness, called the two treasuries? Answer: The substance of the various defiled seeds is the same as the fundamental consciousness (root consciousness), and there is no different substance. The transforming consciousness (transforming consciousness) and the eighth consciousness can be causes for each other, and both are defiled, so they cannot be compared.
Commentary: 'Moreover, there is no totality, etc., apart from the two.' Question: What is the difference between the two explanations? Answer: The former is about the relationship between cause and effect, and the latter is about the meaning of the substance. Therefore, it is divided into two explanations. Question: The former said that the total self does not exist without cause and effect. Why did the second explanation say that there is no totality without the two? Answer: In fact, both explanations say that there is no totality apart from the external. It is divided into two according to the question, and there is no loss in showing the former with the latter.
Commentary: 'However, the seed of the result is narrow.' The seed is the aspect of the result, and the aspect of the result, the seed is narrow. Only what is invited by karma is called the result. That is, the eighth consciousness's close verbal seed is the substance of the result seed. 'Only karma result' explains the reason.
Commentary: 'The Sutra school calculates that there are mental functions, etc., in the color roots.' According to the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, according to the view of the Sutra school, the causal condition is established: Furthermore, if the various color roots and their own great elements are not followed by the seeds of mind and mental functions, then they enter cessation meditation (a state of meditation), enter non-thought meditation (a state of meditation), produce...
無想天。后時不應識等更生。然必更生。是故當知心．心所法種子隨逐色根。以此為緣彼得更生。複次若諸識非色種子所隨逐者。生無色界異生。從彼壽盡業盡沒已還生下時。色無種子應不更生。然必更生。是故當知諸色種子隨逐于識。以此為緣色法更生。
疏。現行望種非者。非俱有因 問現行望彼所熏之種何非俱因 答望生現種不望現行所熏之種。又明第八。第八不熏故望種非。不辨余識故無過矣。
疏。如小四相者。小望本法但是但有而非是因。同現望種故引為喻。
疏。今于能作因中辨持種者。持種因義六因之中能作因攝。能作寬故。
疏。又亦為清凈種者。此識能為清凈種依名清凈種。
疏。以自證分但有三義者。因．果．體三名為三義。
論。一切種相應更分別者。問異熟習氣為因相不。若是如何說生自果。不是如何果名異熟 答傳有二釋。一云因相。論舉親生影顯業種。二云但取等流習氣。故今此云親生自果。異熟因果依別義說 詳曰觀論之意后釋為勝。尋論可悉。
論。體用因果理應爾者。攝論唯望體用明之。瑜伽但據因果以辨。此論兼之 攝論本云。何賴耶識中諸雜染品法種子。為別異住。為無別異。非彼種子有別實物於此中住。亦非不異 無性論第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無想天（Saññā-nāsaṃkhya-āyatana）：在無想天中，後來的時間裡，不應有識別等等的再次產生。然而，它們必定會再次產生。因此，應當知道心和心所法的種子是跟隨色根（rūpāyatana）的。以這個為緣，它們才能再次產生。此外，如果各種識不是色種子所跟隨的，那麼就不會有異生的產生。從他們壽命終結、業力耗盡而死亡后，再次投生到較低的境界時，如果沒有色的種子，色法就不應該再次產生。然而，它們必定會再次產生。因此，應當知道各種色的種子是跟隨於識的。以這個為緣，色法才能再次產生。
疏：現行望種非者：不是俱有因。問：現行望彼所熏之種，為何不是俱有因？答：望生現種，不望現行所熏之種。又明第八（ālaya-vijñāna）：第八不熏故望種非。不辨余識故無過矣。
疏：如小四相者：小望本法，但是但有，而非是因。同現望種故引為喻。
疏：今于能作因中辨持種者：持種因義，六因之中能作因攝。能作寬故。
疏：又亦為清凈種者：此識能為清凈種依，名清凈種。
疏：以自證分但有三義者：因、果、體三名為三義。
論：一切種相應更分別者：問：異熟習氣（vipāka-vāsanā）為因相不？若是，如何說生自果？不是，如何果名異熟？答：傳有二釋。一云因相。論舉親生影顯業種。二云但取等流習氣。故今此云親生自果。異熟因果依別義說。詳曰：觀論之意，后釋為勝。尋論可悉。
論：體用因果理應爾者：《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）唯望體用明之。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）但據因果以辨。此論兼之。《攝大乘論》本云：『何賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna）中諸雜染品法種子，為別異住？為無別異？』非彼種子有別實物於此中住，亦非不異。《無性論》（Asaṅga）第
【English Translation】 English version: The Heaven of Non-Perception (Saññā-nāsaṃkhya-āyatana): In the Heaven of Non-Perception, later on, there should be no further arising of perception, etc. However, they will certainly arise again. Therefore, it should be known that the seeds of mind and mental factors follow the sense-organs of form (rūpāyatana). By this condition, they are able to arise again. Furthermore, if the various consciousnesses are not followed by the seeds of form, then there would be no arising of different births. When they die after their lifespan ends and their karma is exhausted, and are reborn in a lower realm, if there were no seeds of form, the phenomena of form should not arise again. However, they will certainly arise again. Therefore, it should be known that the various seeds of form follow consciousness. By this condition, the phenomena of form are able to arise again.
Commentary: 'The present manifestation is not the seed' means that it is not a co-existent cause. Question: Why is the present manifestation not a co-existent cause in relation to the seed that it has perfumed? Answer: It refers to the seed that gives rise to the present manifestation, not the seed perfumed by the present manifestation. Furthermore, it clarifies the eighth (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness): Because the eighth does not perfume, it is not the seed. There is no fault because it does not discuss the other consciousnesses.
Commentary: 'Like the minor four characteristics' means that the minor characteristics in relation to the original dharma are only 'is' and 'has', but not a cause. It is used as a metaphor because it is similar to the present manifestation in relation to the seed.
Commentary: 'Now, among the efficient causes, we distinguish the cause that holds the seed' means that the meaning of the cause that holds the seed is included within the efficient cause among the six causes. This is because the efficient cause is broad.
Commentary: 'Also, it is the seed of purity' means that this consciousness can be the basis for the seed of purity, and is called the seed of purity.
Commentary: 'Because the self-cognition division only has three meanings' means that cause, effect, and substance are the three meanings.
Treatise: 'All seeds should be further distinguished accordingly' Question: Is the habit-energy of the resultant (vipāka-vāsanā) a causal aspect or not? If it is, how can it be said to produce its own effect? If it is not, how can the effect be called resultant? Answer: There are two explanations transmitted. One says it is a causal aspect. The treatise cites the karma-seed that directly produces the shadow to reveal it. The second says it only takes the habit-energy of equipropagation. Therefore, it is now said here that it directly produces its own effect. The cause and effect of the resultant are explained according to a separate meaning. Detailed explanation: Observing the meaning of the treatise, the latter explanation is superior. The treatise can be understood by examining it.
Treatise: 'Substance, function, cause, and effect should be like this in principle' means that the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Great Vehicle) only clarifies it in terms of substance and function. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) only distinguishes it according to cause and effect. This treatise combines both. The original text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'In what way do the seeds of the defiled dharmas in the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) abide? Are they separate and different, or are they not separate and different?' The seeds do not have a separate, real substance abiding in it, nor are they not different. The Asaṅga's commentary, chapter
二釋云。一切種子是阿賴耶功能差別。如法作用與諸法體。非一非異。此亦復爾 瑜伽五十二云。種子云何非析諸行別有實物名為種子。亦非余處。然即諸行如是種姓．如是等生．如是安布名為種子。亦名為果。果與種子不相雜亂。若望過去諸行即此名果。若望未來諸行。即此名種子。望彼諸法不可定說異．不異相。猶如真如。
疏。此即諦唯者。唯在俗諦名之為唯。不望假實名為唯也。
疏。此是實唯者。唯在俗諦種可言實。勝義即非。
疏。此助瑜伽會於此等者。問可此會彼。云何助彼而會此耶。造論前後尊卑異故。復彼何違而待會耶 答助學彼者顯教不違故為通會。彼論說種唯在俗諦。俗諦對真名為假故。此論說實豈不相違。今顯彼論對一真諦。此論不爾。二論望差。故不違返。
疏。亦非見分者。不依見分名非見分。由護月師許種依見。為異於彼故言非見。
疏。不可見分初受余熏等者。設遮餘人見受熏也。
疏。隱器色不論者。無色見分緣地獄器。瑜伽隱之但言緣種。
疏。舊相傳至唯三分故者。由以自證為能緣故故依見分。見分不許緣于種子不依自證。其第四分不離第三別有體性。故但三分 有說。護月種無別體。但依賴耶識上功能假說種子。故自證分緣見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第二種解釋說，一切種子是阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存識）的功能差別，就像法的運作和諸法的本體一樣，非一非異。這裡也是如此。《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說，什麼是種子？並非分析諸行后，另外存在一個實物叫做種子，也不是在其他地方。而是就在諸行中，像這樣的種姓、像這樣等同產生、像這樣安排佈置，就叫做種子，也叫做果。果和種子不會互相混雜。如果從過去諸行的角度來看，就稱之為果；如果從未來諸行的角度來看，就稱之為種子。從這些法的角度來看，無法確定地說它們是異還是非異，就像真如（Tathātā，事物的真實本性）一樣。
疏解：這裡說的『唯』，只是在俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）上才稱為『唯』，不涉及假和實，所以稱為『唯』。
疏解：這裡說的『實唯』，只是在俗諦的種子才能說是『實』，在勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）上就不是了。
疏解：這裡說的是幫助《瑜伽師地論》會通這些觀點。問：可以說是用這個來會通那個，為什麼說是幫助那個而會通這個呢？因為造論的先後和尊卑不同。而且《瑜伽師地論》有什麼違背的地方需要會通呢？答：幫助學習《瑜伽師地論》的人，是因為顯教（Nītārtha，究竟了義的教法）沒有違背的地方，所以進行會通。《瑜伽師地論》說種子只在俗諦，俗諦相對於真諦（Satya，真理）來說是假的，而此論說種子是實的，這難道不是互相違背嗎？現在說明《瑜伽師地論》是針對一真諦（Eka-satya，唯一的真諦）而言，而此論不是這樣。兩部論的觀察角度不同，所以沒有違背。
疏解：也不是見分（Darśana-bhāga，認識作用的部分），不是依靠見分而稱為非見分。因為護月論師（Rakṣita）認為種子依賴於見分，爲了區別於他的觀點，所以說非見分。
疏解：不可見分最初接受其他熏習等等，這是假設遮止其他人認為見分接受熏習。
疏解：隱藏了器世間的顏色而不論述，沒有顏色的見分緣取地獄器世間，瑜伽師地論隱藏了這一點，只說緣取種子。
疏解：舊的說法相傳只有三分，因為以自證分（Svasaṃvedana-bhāga，自我認識的部分）作為能緣的緣故，所以依賴於見分。見分不允許緣取種子，不依賴於自證分。第四分不離開第三分，另外具有體性，所以只有三分。有人說，護月的種子沒有單獨的體性，只是依賴於阿賴耶識上的功能，假說為種子，所以自證分緣取見分。
【English Translation】 English version: The second explanation says that all seeds are the functional differences of Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), just like the function of dharmas and the substance of all dharmas, which are neither one nor different. This is also the case here. The fifty-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, what are seeds? It is not that after analyzing all the activities, there is another real thing called a seed, nor is it in other places. Rather, it is within the activities themselves, such a lineage, such equal arising, such arrangement and placement, is called a seed, and also called a fruit. Fruits and seeds do not mix with each other. If viewed from the perspective of past activities, it is called a fruit; if viewed from the perspective of future activities, it is called a seed. From the perspective of these dharmas, it cannot be definitively said whether they are different or non-different, just like Tathātā (the true nature of things).
Commentary: The 'only' mentioned here is only called 'only' in Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), and does not involve the false and the real, so it is called 'only'.
Commentary: The 'real only' mentioned here, only the seeds in Saṃvṛti-satya can be said to be 'real', not in Paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth).
Commentary: This refers to helping the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra reconcile these views. Question: It can be said that this is used to reconcile that, why is it said to help that and reconcile this? Because the order and seniority of the composition of the treatises are different. Moreover, what contradictions does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra have that need reconciliation? Answer: Helping those who study the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is because the Nītārtha (definitive teachings) do not have any contradictions, so reconciliation is carried out. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that seeds are only in Saṃvṛti-satya, and Saṃvṛti-satya is false relative to Satya (truth), while this treatise says that seeds are real, isn't this contradictory? Now it is explained that the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is aimed at Eka-satya (the one truth), while this treatise is not. The perspectives of the two treatises are different, so there is no contradiction.
Commentary: It is also not Darśana-bhāga (the seeing aspect), it is not called non-seeing aspect by relying on the seeing aspect. Because Rakṣita (a commentator) believes that seeds depend on the seeing aspect, in order to distinguish from his view, it is said to be non-seeing aspect.
Commentary: The seeing aspect cannot initially receive other熏習 (b熏習, influences), etc., this is a hypothetical prevention of others thinking that the seeing aspect receives 熏習 (b熏習, influences).
Commentary: The color of the receptacle world is hidden and not discussed, the colorless seeing aspect grasps the lower realm receptacle world, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra hides this point and only says it grasps the seeds.
Commentary: The old saying is that there are only three parts, because Svasaṃvedana-bhāga (self-awareness aspect) is used as the grasper, so it relies on the seeing aspect. The seeing aspect is not allowed to grasp the seeds, and does not rely on the self-awareness aspect. The fourth part does not leave the third part and has a separate substance, so there are only three parts. Some say that Rakṣita's seeds do not have a separate substance, but only rely on the function of Ālaya-vijñāna, falsely saying it is a seed, so the self-awareness aspect grasps the seeing aspect.
分時亦名緣種。無別相故非見所緣 復有說云。依心自體故自證緣。問此師種子何分所收。答有三說。一云即是自證分收。由假說彼無實體故順第二釋。一云見收。自證境故。順疏所敘。一云雖依自證而立亦見分收。自證緣故。順第三釋 詳曰。既無明教優劣叵斷。取捨任情。
論。因果俱是善等性故者。問既隨因果以判于性。應隨因果有多差別 答可爾。故瑜伽論九十六云。住自性界者。謂十八界墮自相續各各決定差別種子。習增長界者。謂即諸法或是善．惡于餘生中先已數習令彼現行。故於今時種子強盛依附相續由是為因。暫遇小緣便能現起定不可轉。複次以要言之。雖界種類十八可得。然一一界業趣有情種種品類有差別故當知無量。三性各有多類差別。
論。諸無漏種等者。問既非異熟識性所攝。依護法義是識分不 答傳有兩說。一相分收。若爾第八應緣此種。答二解。一云許緣無失。此釋不正。一云不緣。但說見分親所緣者皆名相分。不言諸相皆見所緣 若爾不緣應非唯識 答不離識故唯識。無違 問設許緣彼復有何失 答因位第八唯是有漏。非有漏心所緣之相是真無漏。為此不緣 二云既非見緣依自證分自證分攝。若至無漏方相分收。凈見緣故 有義斷云。前解為勝。雖在因位非見所緣。是相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 分位也可以稱為緣種（產生結果的條件）。因為沒有獨立的相狀，所以不是見分所緣的境。 還有一種說法是，種子依心自體而存在，所以是自證分所緣的境。有人問：這位法師所說的種子屬於哪一部分？回答有三種說法：第一種說法認為，種子就是自證分所攝。因為是假說，沒有實體，所以符合第二種解釋。第二種說法認為，種子屬於見分所攝，因為是自證分的境，符合疏文所說。第三種說法認為，種子雖然依自證分而立，但也屬於見分所攝，因為是自證分所緣的境，符合第三種解釋。詳細地說，因為沒有明確的教義說明哪種說法更好，所以取捨可以根據個人意願。
論：因為因和果都是善等性質。有人問：既然根據因和果來判斷性質，那麼應該隨著因和果的不同而有很多差別。回答：可以這樣說。所以《瑜伽師地論》第九十六卷說：『安住自性界』，是指十八界（眼界、耳界、鼻界、舌界、身界、意界、色界、聲界、香界、味界、觸界、法界、眼識界、耳識界、鼻識界、舌識界、身識界、意識界）墮在各自的相續中，各有決定的差別種子。『習增長界』，是指這些法，無論是善是惡，在以後的生命中已經多次熏習，使它們現行。所以在現在這個時候，種子非常強盛，依附在相續中，因此作為原因，暫時遇到小的因緣，就能現起，一定不可改變。』再次用要點來說，雖然界的種類有十八種可以得到，但是每一個界的業趣有情種種品類有差別，所以應當知道是無量的。三性（善、惡、無記）各有多種差別。
論：諸無漏種等。有人問：既然不是異熟識（第八識）的性質所攝，那麼按照護法的觀點，是識的一部分嗎？回答：流傳有兩種說法。第一種說法是相分所攝。如果這樣，第八識應該緣此種子。回答有兩種解釋：一種解釋是允許緣，沒有過失。這種解釋不正確。另一種解釋是不緣。只是說見分親所緣的都叫做相分，不是說所有的相都是見分所緣。如果這樣，不緣就不應該是唯識。回答：因為不離識，所以是唯識，沒有違背。有人問：假設允許緣彼，又有什麼過失？回答：因位的第八識只有有漏，不是有漏心所緣的相是真正的無漏，因此不緣。第二種說法是既然不是見分所緣，就依自證分，是自證分所攝。如果到了無漏，才是相分所攝，因為是清凈見分所緣。有一種觀點果斷地說：前面的解釋更好。雖然在因位不是見分所緣，但是是相。
【English Translation】 English version: Divisions can also be called 'conditioned seeds' (hetu-bīja, conditions for producing results). Because they do not have independent characteristics, they are not the objects cognized by the seeing-consciousness (darśana-bhāga). Another explanation is that seeds exist dependent on the self-nature of the mind itself, so they are objects cognized by the self-witnessing consciousness (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga). Someone asks: To which part do the seeds mentioned by this Dharma master belong? There are three answers: The first explanation is that seeds are included in the self-witnessing consciousness. Because it is a provisional explanation and has no substance, it aligns with the second explanation. The second explanation is that seeds are included in the seeing-consciousness because they are the objects of the self-witnessing consciousness, which aligns with what the commentary says. The third explanation is that although seeds are established based on the self-witnessing consciousness, they are also included in the seeing-consciousness because they are objects cognized by the self-witnessing consciousness, which aligns with the third explanation. In detail, because there is no clear teaching to determine which explanation is better, the choice can be made according to personal preference.
Treatise: Because both cause and effect are of good nature, etc. Someone asks: Since nature is determined based on cause and effect, there should be many differences depending on the cause and effect. Answer: That may be so. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Chapter 96, says: 'Abiding in the self-nature realm' refers to the eighteen realms (dhātu, eye-realm, ear-realm, nose-realm, tongue-realm, body-realm, mind-realm, form-realm, sound-realm, smell-realm, taste-realm, touch-realm, dharma-realm, eye-consciousness-realm, ear-consciousness-realm, nose-consciousness-realm, tongue-consciousness-realm, body-consciousness-realm, mind-consciousness-realm) falling into their respective continuums, each with determined and distinct seeds. 'Habitually increasing realm' refers to these dharmas, whether good or bad, that have been repeatedly cultivated in future lives, causing them to manifest. Therefore, at this time, the seeds are very strong and attached to the continuum, so as a cause, they can manifest as soon as they encounter a small condition, and it is impossible to change. To summarize, although eighteen kinds of realms can be obtained, each realm has different kinds of karma, tendencies, sentient beings, and categories, so it should be known that they are immeasurable. The three natures (good, evil, and neutral) each have many kinds of differences.
Treatise: All unconditioned seeds, etc. Someone asks: Since they are not included in the nature of the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna, the eighth consciousness), according to the view of Dharmapāla, are they part of consciousness? Answer: There are two transmitted explanations. The first explanation is that they are included in the object-consciousness (nimitta-bhāga). If so, the eighth consciousness should cognize these seeds. There are two explanations: One explanation is that it is permissible to cognize them without fault. This explanation is incorrect. The other explanation is that it does not cognize them. It only says that what the seeing-consciousness directly cognizes is called the object-consciousness, but it does not say that all objects are cognized by the seeing-consciousness. If so, not cognizing them should not be Mind-Only (citta-mātra). Answer: Because it is not separate from consciousness, it is Mind-Only, and there is no contradiction. Someone asks: Suppose it is permissible to cognize them, what faults would there be? Answer: The eighth consciousness in the causal stage only has conditioned (sāsrava) qualities. The object cognized by the conditioned mind is not truly unconditioned (anāsrava). Therefore, it does not cognize them. The second explanation is that since it is not cognized by the seeing-consciousness, it depends on the self-witnessing consciousness and is included in the self-witnessing consciousness. If it reaches the unconditioned state, then it is included in the object-consciousness because it is cognized by the pure seeing-consciousness. One view decisively says: The previous explanation is better. Although it is not cognized by the seeing-consciousness in the causal stage, it is an object.
分類。從余相分相分所攝。
論。雖名異熟而非無記等者。問依異熟故名為異熟。依無記故應名無記 答有義可然。前說唯善約其自性自果說故 詳曰。不然。異熟義寬。無記乃局。故不相例。又言善者體殊勝義。不可勝善從於所依立於劣稱。不同有漏。有漏與依性類同故。
疏。此除佛無漏等者。佛種不依異熟識故。又佛五根亦是善也。取不成喻。所以除也。能依之識與所依眼而性不同。種及異熟其義亦爾。故言齊也。
疏。三家無諍等者。新熏．本有．新舊合用名三家也。其本有家雖不許生。然熏增長而亦許故。故通三也。
疏。護月義者。亦名月藏。
論。如惡叉聚者。於一聚中法爾而有多品類也。西域有之人以為染。並取其油。故瑜伽論九十六云。然一一界種種品類有差別故。如惡叉聚。於此聚中有多品類。雖說為一有無量種。疏意少別。如瑜伽鈔而會之也。
疏。又第三卷次前上文者。瑜伽第二明諸種子所熏之上。辨諸有情有無涅槃。此生下也。
疏。初但有一者。問本有無始何得云初 答據本名初。如一貪心本唯一種。此種生現。現行滅已此還自類前後引生。至對治道種方永斷。故無雜亂中斷等過。
疏。非無漏能熏亦始有者。無漏凡位而未能起。故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 分類：從余相分（yú xiāng fēn，剩餘的相分）和相分（xiāng fēn，相分）所包含。
論：雖然名為異熟（yì shú，果報），但並非無記（wú jì，非善非惡）等。問：依據異熟的緣故，名為異熟，依據無記的緣故，應該名為無記？答：某種意義上可以這樣說。前面所說的唯善，是就其自性自果而說的緣故。詳曰：不然。異熟的意義寬泛，無記則侷限。所以不能相比。又說善，是因為其體殊勝的緣故。不可勝的善，從其所依而立於劣稱。不同於有漏（yǒu lòu，有煩惱）法。有漏法與其所依的性質種類相同。
疏：這裡排除佛的無漏（wú lòu，無煩惱）等，是因為佛的種子不依異熟識的緣故。而且佛的五根（wǔ gēn，眼耳鼻舌身）也是善的。取不成比喻，所以排除。能依的識與所依的眼，性質不同。種子和異熟的意義也是如此。所以說是相同的。
疏：三家無諍等，新熏（xīn xūn，新熏習）、本有（běn yǒu，本來具有）、新舊合用（xīn jiù hé yòng，新熏習和本來具有結合使用）名為三家。其本有家雖然不許生，然而熏習增長也是允許的，所以通於三家。
疏：護月義者，也叫月藏（yuè zàng，月藏）。
論：如惡叉聚（è chā jù，一種果實，比喻多種事物聚集在一起）一樣，在一個聚集體中，自然而然地有多種品類。西域有人用它來染色，並提取其油。所以《瑜伽論》（Yújiā lùn）第九十六卷說：『然而每一界種種品類有差別，如惡叉聚，於此聚中有多品類，雖說為一，有無量種。』疏的意義稍有不同，如《瑜伽鈔》（Yújiā chāo）而會通之。
疏：又第三卷次於前上文，瑜伽第二明諸種子所熏之上，辨諸有情有無涅槃（niè pán，寂滅）。此生下也。
疏：最初只有一個，問：本有無始，怎麼能說最初？答：根據本名來說是最初。如一個貪心，本來只有一種。此種生出現行，現行滅后，此還自類前後引生，直到對治道種才永遠斷除。所以沒有雜亂中斷等過失。
疏：非無漏能熏也是始有，無漏在凡位而未能生起，所以。
【English Translation】 English version: Classification: Included within the divisions of residual characteristics (yú xiāng fēn) and characteristics (xiāng fēn).
Treatise: Although named 'resultant maturation' (yì shú), it is not 'unspecified' (wú jì) etc. Question: Because of relying on resultant maturation, it is named 'resultant maturation'; because of relying on 'unspecified', it should be named 'unspecified'? Answer: In a certain sense, it can be so. The previous statement of 'only wholesome' was made in terms of its own nature and its own result. Detailed explanation: Not so. The meaning of 'resultant maturation' is broad, while 'unspecified' is limited. Therefore, they cannot be compared. Furthermore, 'wholesome' is said because its essence is particularly superior. The unsurpassable wholesome is established with an inferior term based on what it relies on. It is different from defiled (yǒu lòu) phenomena. Defiled phenomena and what they rely on are of the same nature and kind.
Commentary: This excludes the undefiled (wú lòu) qualities of the Buddha etc., because the Buddha's seeds do not rely on the resultant maturation consciousness. Moreover, the Buddha's five roots (wǔ gēn) are also wholesome. It is excluded because it does not form a valid analogy. The consciousness that relies and the eye that is relied upon are different in nature. The meaning of seeds and resultant maturation is also the same. Therefore, it is said to be the same.
Commentary: 'The three schools have no dispute' etc., 'newly perfumed' (xīn xūn), 'originally present' (běn yǒu), and 'new and old combined' (xīn jiù hé yòng) are called the three schools. Although the 'originally present' school does not allow arising, it does allow for increase through perfuming. Therefore, it applies to all three.
Commentary: The meaning of 'Protecting the Moon' is also called 'Moon Treasury' (yuè zàng).
Treatise: Like a cluster of aksha fruits (è chā jù), within one cluster, there are naturally many categories. In the Western Regions, some people use it for dyeing and extract its oil. Therefore, the ninety-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yújiā lùn) says: 'However, each realm has various categories with differences, like a cluster of aksha fruits. Within this cluster, there are many categories. Although it is said to be one, there are countless kinds.' The meaning of the commentary is slightly different; it is reconciled as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra Commentary (Yújiā chāo).
Commentary: Furthermore, the third fascicle follows the preceding text. The second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains the perfuming of various seeds and distinguishes whether sentient beings have nirvana (niè pán) or not. This gives rise to the following.
Commentary: 'Initially, there is only one.' Question: The originally present is without beginning, how can it be said to be initial? Answer: According to the original name, it is initial. For example, a single greed initially has only one kind. This seed arises as manifest activity. After the manifest activity ceases, it still generates its own kind, leading to subsequent arising, until the antidote path seed permanently cuts it off. Therefore, there are no faults such as confusion or interruption.
Commentary: 'The undefiled cannot perfume' is also initially present. The undefiled is in the position of an ordinary being and has not yet arisen, therefore.
不得言能熏無漏亦無始有。
疏。非花不熏等者。非是花氣不薰苣勝。苣勝香氣而自本有。
論。說聞熏等者。按無性論第三云。複次云何一切種子異熟果識為雜染因。復為出世能對治彼凈心種子。又出世心昔未曾習。故彼熏習決定應無。既無熏習從何種生。是故應答。從最清凈法界等流正法聞熏習種子所生 釋曰。諸佛法界永離一切客塵障故名最清凈。謂從法界所起教法名為等流。無倒聽聞如是教法故名正聞。依此正聞所起熏習是名熏習。即此熏習能生出世無漏之心名為種子。如是種子非阿賴耶未曾得故。余文可悉。
疏。五十二真如所緣緣種子生者。按彼論云。諸出世間法從何種子生。若言粗重自性種子為種子生不應道理。答諸出世間法從真如所緣緣種子生。非彼習氣積集種子所生 釋曰。相傳天竺略有三釋 一唯新熏宗。勝軍論師。自有兩解。一云諸佛菩薩由證真如。展轉流出十二分教。見道已前勝解行地緣彼經教作所緣生。從本為名名從真如所緣緣生。二云初地出世聖道。一從世第一法為增上．無間二緣而生。二從真如所緣緣生 二本有宗。護月論師。亦有兩釋。一云本有無漏種子為增上緣。真如為所緣緣故。順解脫等善根得生。二云本有無漏種子為因緣。解脫分等為增上緣。世第一法為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不得說它能薰染無漏法，也不能說它是無始就存在的。
疏解：『非花不熏等者』，不是說花的氣味不能薰染苣勝（一種香草）。苣勝的香氣是其本身就具有的。
論述：『說聞熏等者』，根據《無性論》第三卷所說：『其次，為什麼說一切種子異熟果識是雜染的因，又是出世間能對治它的清凈心種子呢？又因為出世間心過去從未曾熏習過，所以那種熏習必定是沒有的。既然沒有熏習，又從什麼種子產生呢？』所以應該回答說：『是從最清凈的法界等流正法聞熏習種子所生。』
解釋：諸佛的法界永遠遠離一切客塵（煩惱）的障礙，所以稱為最清凈。從法界所產生的教法稱為等流。沒有顛倒地聽聞這樣的教法，所以稱為正聞。依靠這種正聞所產生的熏習，就叫做熏習。這種熏習能產生出世間的無漏之心，稱為種子。這樣的種子不是阿賴耶識（第八識）所未曾擁有的。其餘的文字可以自己理解。
疏解：『五十二真如所緣緣種子生者』，根據《無性論》所說：『諸出世間法從何種子生？若言粗重自性種子為種子生不應道理。』回答說：『諸出世間法從真如所緣緣種子生，非彼習氣積集種子所生。』
解釋：相傳在天竺（古印度）略有三種解釋：一是唯新熏宗，勝軍論師有兩種解釋。一種說法是諸佛菩薩因為證悟真如（事物的真實本性），輾轉流出十二分教（佛經的十二種分類）。見道（證悟真理的最初階段）之前，勝解行地（通過深刻理解而實踐的階段）緣彼經教作為所緣而生，從根本上來說，名為從真如所緣緣生。另一種說法是初地（菩薩修行階位的第一個階段）的出世聖道，一是通過世第一法（世間最高的智慧）作為增上緣（輔助條件）和無間緣（直接條件）而生，二是來源於真如所緣緣。二是本有宗，護月論師也有兩種解釋。一種說法是本有的無漏種子作為增上緣，真如作為所緣緣，所以順解脫（順應解脫）等善根得以產生。另一種說法是本有的無漏種子作為因緣，解脫分（趨向解脫的部分）等作為增上緣，世第一法作為
【English Translation】 English version It cannot be said that it can perfume the unconditioned (anāsrava) nor that it is beginninglessly existent.
Commentary: 'Not that flowers do not perfume, etc.' It is not that the scent of flowers cannot perfume kushtha (a type of fragrant herb). The fragrance of kushtha is inherent in itself.
Treatise: 'Speaking of hearing and perfuming, etc.' According to the third volume of the Wu Xing Lun (Treatise on the Absence of Nature): 'Furthermore, why is it said that the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) with all its seeds and resultant effects is the cause of defilement, and also the seed of pure mind that can counteract it in the supramundane? Moreover, since the supramundane mind has never been cultivated in the past, that kind of perfuming must definitely be non-existent. Since there is no perfuming, from what seed does it arise?' Therefore, the answer should be: 'It arises from the seed of the dharma (teachings) of the tathatā (suchness) realm, which is the most pure, flowing forth as the correct hearing and perfuming.'
Explanation: The dharma realm of all Buddhas is forever free from the obstructions of all adventitious dust (kleshas), therefore it is called the most pure. The teachings that arise from the dharma realm are called flowing forth. Hearing such teachings without inversion is called correct hearing. The perfuming that arises from this correct hearing is called perfuming. This perfuming can generate the unconditioned mind of the supramundane, which is called a seed. Such a seed is not something that the ālaya-vijñāna has never possessed. The remaining text can be understood by oneself.
Commentary: 'The fifty-two tathatā object-condition seeds arise.' According to that treatise: 'From what seed do all supramundane dharmas arise? If it is said that the coarse and heavy self-nature seed is the seed from which they arise, it would not be reasonable.' The answer is: 'All supramundane dharmas arise from the tathatā object-condition seed, not from the seed accumulated by habitual tendencies.'
Explanation: It is traditionally said that there are roughly three explanations in India: First, the Only Newly Perfumed School, with two interpretations by Master Shengjun. One explanation is that all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, through realizing tathatā (the true nature of things), gradually emanate the twelve divisions of the teachings (twelve categories of Buddhist scriptures). Before the Path of Seeing (the initial stage of enlightenment), the stage of profound understanding and practice arises by taking those scriptures as the object-condition, and fundamentally, it is named as arising from the tathatā object-condition. The other explanation is that the supramundane holy path of the first bhūmi (the first stage of a Bodhisattva's path) arises from the highest mundane dharma (the highest worldly wisdom) as the supporting condition and the immediate condition, and secondly, it arises from the tathatā object-condition. Second, the Inherently Existent School, with two interpretations by Master Hùyuè. One explanation is that the inherently existent unconditioned seed serves as the supporting condition, and tathatā serves as the object-condition, so that roots of goodness such as conforming to liberation can arise. The other explanation is that the inherently existent unconditioned seed serves as the causal condition, the aspects of liberation serve as the supporting condition, and the highest mundane dharma serves as
無間緣。真如為所緣緣故。初地出世間法得生。論從後緣隱前不說。云從真如所緣緣生 三新舊合。戒賢師釋。與第二師義意同也。更有同異。具如彼鈔。
疏。謂與諸識作二緣性等者。如燈具辨。
疏。如言諸法至俱是一種生者。本有師宗自有兩解。此牒初釋。初釋意云。善．惡二業是異熟因。異熟及因共一種生。此有一難。如文可悟。
疏。又汝若言至各一種者。牒第二解。此解意云。誰言異熟與善．惡因但一種耶。於此解中難有二也。如文易知。
疏。設俱新起等者。此本有難。難意云。我言本有。即合善．惡與異熟果而為因緣。汝俱新舊。豈新業望新異熟是因緣耶。此既不爾彼云何然。
疏。然觀本意后解是本者。本有師義雖言兩解。前解設陳。后釋是本。
疏。應諸現行至熏增長故者。正難轉識望第八識不名因緣。但熏增長同於業故。
疏。此本有種以自類為其因緣者。正義自敘。
疏。既爾至新熏生故者。本有師難。難意可解。
疏。然以生種類同等者。正義者釋舊種生種類同新種生于現行得名因緣。然據護法新舊合生。今者且隨不正答也。
疏。不同唯本有者。舊新俱有。以舊類新。舊亦因緣。汝唯本有。無可為類。故非因緣。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無間緣。真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）作為所緣緣的緣故，初地（初地菩薩的果位）的出世間法得以產生。論典從後緣隱藏前緣的角度，沒有對此進行說明。說是從真如所緣緣而生。 三家新舊觀點合在一起。戒賢（Śīlabhadra，印度佛教大師）的解釋，與第二位論師的意義相同。還有其他的相同和不同之處，詳細情況如彼鈔所述。 疏文說：『與諸識作二緣性等』，如同燈具的辨別一樣。 疏文說：『如言諸法至俱是一種生者』，本有師（認為種子本就存在的學派）的宗義自有兩種解釋。這裡是引用第一種解釋。第一種解釋的意思是：善業和惡業是異熟因（導致不同結果的業因），異熟果和業因共同從一種生起。這裡有一個難點，可以從文字中領悟。 疏文說：『又汝若言至各一種者』，這是引用第二種解釋。這種解釋的意思是：誰說異熟果和善業、惡業因只有一種呢？對於這種解釋，有兩個難點。可以從文字中容易地理解。 疏文說：『設俱新起等者』，這是本有師提出的一個難點。難點的意思是：我說的是本有，就是把善業、惡業和異熟果合在一起作為因緣。你們說是新舊都有，難道新業期望新的異熟果作為因緣嗎？這種情況既然不是這樣，那麼其他情況怎麼會是這樣呢？ 疏文說：『然觀本意后解是本者』，本有師的意義雖然說了兩種解釋，前一種解釋只是假設陳述，后一種解釋才是根本。 疏文說：『應諸現行至熏增長故者』，這是正面反駁轉識（轉變的意識）對於第八識（阿賴耶識）不能稱為因緣，只是熏習增長，與業的作用相同。 疏文說：『此本有種以自類為其因緣者』，這是正義的自我陳述。 疏文說：『既爾至新熏生故者』，這是本有師提出的一個難點。難點的意思可以理解。 疏文說：『然以生種類同等者』，正義的解釋是舊種子生種類相同，新種子生於現行，可以稱為因緣。然而根據護法（Dharmapāla，印度佛教論師）的觀點，新舊種子合在一起產生。現在只是隨便地回答一下。 疏文說：『不同唯本有者』，舊種子和新種子都有，以舊種子為新種子的同類，舊種子也是因緣。你們只有本有，沒有可以作為同類的東西，所以不是因緣。
【English Translation】 English version The uninterrupted condition. Because of True Suchness (Tathata, the true nature of things) as the object-condition, the supramundane dharma of the first ground (the stage of the first Bhumi Bodhisattva) can arise. The treatise does not explain this from the perspective of the later condition concealing the former condition. It says it arises from the object-condition of True Suchness. The three schools' new and old views are combined. Śīlabhadra's (Indian Buddhist master) explanation is the same in meaning as the second teacher. There are other similarities and differences, as detailed in that commentary. The commentary says: 'Acting as two condition-natures for the various consciousnesses, etc.,' is like the distinction of a lamp. The commentary says: 'As it is said, all dharmas up to being of one kind,' the doctrine of the school that believes in inherently existing seeds (the school that believes seeds exist from the beginning) has two interpretations. This quotes the first interpretation. The meaning of the first interpretation is: good and evil karma are the causes of different maturation (karma that leads to different results), and the result of different maturation and the cause together arise from one kind. There is a difficulty here, which can be understood from the text. The commentary says: 'Also, if you say up to each being of one kind,' this quotes the second interpretation. The meaning of this interpretation is: who says that the result of different maturation and the causes of good and evil karma are only of one kind? For this interpretation, there are two difficulties. It is easy to understand from the text. The commentary says: 'Suppose they all arise newly, etc.,' this is a difficulty raised by the school that believes in inherently existing seeds. The meaning of the difficulty is: what I say is inherently existing, which is to combine good and evil karma with the result of different maturation as a condition. You say that both new and old exist, do you expect new karma to expect a new result of different maturation as a condition? Since this situation is not like this, how can other situations be like this? The commentary says: 'However, observing the original intention, the later explanation is the root,' although the meaning of the school that believes in inherently existing seeds has two explanations, the former explanation is only a hypothetical statement, and the latter explanation is the root. The commentary says: 'All present activities should up to being increased by熏習,' this is a direct refutation that the transforming consciousness (the changing consciousness) cannot be called a condition for the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), but only increases by熏習, which is the same as the function of karma. The commentary says: 'These inherently existing seeds take their own kind as their condition,' this is a self-statement of the correct meaning. The commentary says: 'Since it is so, up to being newly熏習ed,' this is a difficulty raised by the school that believes in inherently existing seeds. The meaning of the difficulty can be understood. The commentary says: 'However, because the kind of birth is the same, etc.,' the explanation of the correct meaning is that the old seeds give rise to the same kind, and the new seeds give rise to present activities, which can be called a condition. However, according to Dharmapāla's (Indian Buddhist commentator) view, new and old seeds arise together. Now, I am just answering casually. The commentary says: 'Different from only inherently existing,' both old and new seeds exist, and the old seeds are the same kind as the new seeds, so the old seeds are also a condition. You only have inherently existing seeds, and there is nothing that can be the same kind, so it is not a condition.
論。勿無漏種生有漏故者。有云他亦許無漏種為有漏因。如延壽法．及無漏法為有漏因感十王等者 詳曰。不爾延壽法者但由無漏資彼故業。豈許親生有漏果耶。又十王報諸處皆云因地前修。豈客地前已起無漏。設回趣者亦非無漏親感彼果。無漏不招三有果故。
疏。善不善種小乘可爾者。此設許之。非彼本計 有云。有部除能作因余皆因緣。不善得為有覆無記同類因也。同諦故者 詳曰。設彼不善為無記因亦不為證。此明善法為不善因故。
論。分別論者。按瑜伽論第二十七敘彼計云。分別論者作如是計。心性本凈客塵煩惱所染污故相不清凈。又云。染污．不染污心其體無異。謂若相應煩惱未斷名染污心。若時斷已名不染污 彼宗意云。無始已來心體自凈。由起煩惱故名染污。染污非心無始本性故立客名 問有情無始有心稱本性凈。心性染本無。寧非本是聖 答有情無始心性亦然。有心即染故非是聖 問有心即染。何故說云心性本凈說染為客 答后修道時由染斷滅唯性凈在。故染稱客。
疏。起心非凈難者。依他起心名為起心。
疏。若言無漏體滅至亦不然者。此牒外救外救意云。我本無漏體不斷絕。汝若言我無漏斷者。故亦不然。
疏。以有漏為相性是無漏者。牒彼外意生下論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：如果說無漏的種子不能產生有漏的果，有人會說，他們也承認無漏的種子可以作為有漏果的因，比如通過延壽法（prolonging life rituals）以及無漏法（undefiled dharmas）作為有漏果的因，從而感得十王（Ten Kings of Hell）的果報。詳細分析：並非如此。延壽法只是藉助無漏的力量來資助過去的業力，怎麼能說是直接產生有漏的果報呢？而且，關於十王果報的說法，各處都說是由於因地（causal ground）之前所修的善業，哪裡有說在客地（foreign land）之前已經生起無漏的說法呢？即使是迴向，也不是無漏直接感得那個果報，因為無漏法不會招感三有（three realms of existence）的果報。 疏：關於善與不善的種子，小乘可以這樣認為。這是假設他們這樣認為，並非他們本來的觀點。有人說：有部（Sarvastivada）除了能作因（causal efficacy）之外，其餘都認為是因緣（conditions）。不善可以作為有覆無記（morally ambiguous with obscurations）的同類因（cause of the same type）。同諦故（same truth）。詳細分析：即使他們認為不善可以作為無記的因，也不能作為證據，因為這裡說明的是善法可以作為不善的因。 論：分別論者（Vibhajyavadin）。根據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第二十七卷的記載，他們這樣認為：心性（nature of mind）本來是清凈的，因為被客塵煩惱（adventitious defilements）所染污，所以顯得不清凈。又說：染污的心和不染污的心，其本體沒有區別，如果相應于煩惱而沒有斷除，就叫做染污心；如果斷除了煩惱，就叫做不染污心。他們的意思是說：從無始以來，心體（essence of mind）自身是清凈的，因為生起煩惱，所以叫做染污。染污不是心無始以來的本性，所以稱為『客』。問：有情（sentient beings）從無始以來就有心，稱之為本性清凈，如果心性的染污本來就沒有，那為什麼不是本來就是聖潔的呢？答：有情從無始以來心性也是如此，有心就意味著有染污，所以不是聖潔的。問：有心就意味著有染污，為什麼又說心性本來清凈，說染污是『客』呢？答：因為在後來的修行過程中，通過斷滅染污，只有清凈的本性存在，所以染污被稱為『客』。 疏：生起心就不是清凈的，這很難解釋。依他起心（dependent arising mind）叫做起心。 疏：如果說無漏的本體斷滅，這也是不對的。這是駁斥外道的觀點。外道的觀點是：我本來的無漏體沒有斷絕，如果你們說我的無漏斷了，那也是不對的。 疏：以有漏作為相，而自性是無漏的。這是引用外道的觀點，下面會進行論述。
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Regarding the statement 'undefiled seeds cannot give rise to defiled results,' some might argue that they also acknowledge undefiled seeds as causes for defiled results, such as using longevity practices (Yan Shou Fa) and undefiled dharmas (Wu Lou Fa) as causes for defiled results, thereby experiencing the retribution of the Ten Kings (Shi Wang). Detailed analysis: That's not the case. Longevity practices merely utilize the power of the undefiled to aid past karma. How can it be said that they directly produce defiled results? Moreover, regarding the retribution of the Ten Kings, it's universally stated that it arises from virtuous deeds cultivated in the causal ground (Yin Di) previously. Where is it said that the undefiled has already arisen before in a foreign land (Ke Di)? Even if there's dedication of merit, it's not the undefiled directly causing that result, because the undefiled does not attract the results of the three realms of existence (San You). Commentary: Regarding good and unwholesome seeds, the Hinayana (Xiao Sheng) may accept this. This is assuming they accept it, not their original view. Some say: The Sarvastivada (You Bu), except for the efficient cause (Neng Zuo Yin), considers everything else as conditions (Yin Yuan). Unwholesome can be a cause of the same type (Tong Lei Yin) for obscured indeterminate (You Fu Wu Ji). 'Same truth' (Tong Di Gu). Detailed analysis: Even if they consider unwholesome as a cause for indeterminate, it cannot be used as evidence, because this clarifies that wholesome dharmas can be causes for unwholesome. Treatise: The Vibhajyavadin (Fen Bie Lun Zhe). According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yu Jia Shi Di Lun), volume 27, they hold this view: The nature of mind (Xin Xing) is originally pure, but because it's defiled by adventitious defilements (Ke Chen Fan Nao), it appears impure. Furthermore, they say: Defiled and undefiled minds are not different in essence. If it corresponds to afflictions and hasn't been severed, it's called a defiled mind; if afflictions have been severed, it's called an undefiled mind. Their meaning is: From beginningless time, the essence of mind (Xin Ti) is inherently pure. Because afflictions arise, it's called defiled. Defilement is not the original nature of mind from beginningless time, so it's called 'adventitious.' Question: Sentient beings (You Qing) have had mind from beginningless time, which is said to be inherently pure. If the defilement of mind-nature is originally non-existent, why isn't it originally holy? Answer: The mind-nature of sentient beings is also like this from beginningless time. Having mind implies having defilement, so it's not holy. Question: Having mind implies having defilement, why is it said that mind-nature is originally pure, and defilement is 'adventitious'? Answer: Because in the later stages of practice, by severing defilement, only the pure nature remains, so defilement is called 'adventitious.' Commentary: 'Arising mind is not pure' is difficult to explain. Dependent arising mind (Yi Ta Qi Xin) is called arising mind. Commentary: If it's said that the essence of the undefiled is extinguished, that's also incorrect. This refutes the externalist's view. The externalist's view is: My original undefiled essence is not severed. If you say my undefiled is severed, that's also incorrect. Commentary: Taking the defiled as the characteristic, while the self-nature is undefiled. This quotes the externalist's view, which will be discussed below.
文。
疏。諸異生位應無漏現行等者。異生泛起諸心等時。此心即應名為無漏。以性凈故。如諸聖者無漏之心。若許爾者。即異生位起心之時應名聖者。以許起彼無漏心故。疏中文總故開之也。
論。然契經說至說心空理等者。按勝鬘經云。如來藏者。是法界藏。法身藏。出世間上上藏。自性清凈藏。此自性清凈如來藏。而客煩惱．上煩惱所染。
疏。有圓寂法者。圓寂之法即是無漏菩提因也。
論。或說心體非煩惱等者。按瑜伽論五十四云。又復諸識自性非染。由世尊說一切心性本清凈故。所以者何。非心自性畢竟不凈能生過失。猶如貪等一切煩惱。
疏。轉齊義等者。此義具如法苑三身章辨。恐繁不引也。
成唯識論演秘卷第二(終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第三(本)
沙門知周撰
疏。世親即通等者。按彼論第二云。一切種子復有六義。剎那滅者。謂二種子皆無間定滅壞故。所以者何。不應常法為種子體。以一切時其性如本無差別故 釋曰。二種子者謂內外種 言俱有者。謂非過．未亦非相離得為種子。何以故。若於此時種子有。即于爾時果生故 恒隨轉者。謂阿賴耶識乃至治生。外法種子乃至
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 文。
疏。諸異生位應無漏現行等者。異生泛起諸心等時。此心即應名為無漏。以性凈故。如諸聖者無漏之心。若許爾者。即異生位起心之時應名聖者。以許起彼無漏心故。疏中文總故開之也。
論。然契經說至說心空理等者。按勝鬘經云。如來藏（Tathagatagarbha，如來之胎）者。是法界藏（Dharmadhatu-garbha，法界之寶藏）。法身藏（Dharmakaya-garbha，法身的寶藏）。出世間上上藏（Lokottara-paramottara-garbha，超越世間的至高寶藏）。自性清凈藏（Svabhavavisuddha-garbha，自性清凈的寶藏）。此自性清凈如來藏（Svabhavavisuddha-Tathagatagarbha），而客煩惱（Agantuka-klesa，外來煩惱）、上煩惱（Upaklesa，隨煩惱）所染。
疏。有圓寂法者。圓寂之法即是無漏菩提因也。
論。或說心體非煩惱等者。按瑜伽論五十四云。又復諸識自性非染。由世尊說一切心性本清凈故。所以者何。非心自性畢竟不凈能生過失。猶如貪等一切煩惱。
疏。轉齊義等者。此義具如法苑三身章辨。恐繁不引也。
成唯識論演秘卷第二(終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第三(本)
沙門知周撰
疏。世親即通等者。按彼論第二云。一切種子復有六義。剎那滅者。謂二種子皆無間定滅壞故。所以者何。不應常法為種子體。以一切時其性如本無差別故 釋曰。二種子者謂內外種 言俱有者。謂非過．未亦非相離得為種子。何以故。若於此時種子有。即于爾時果生故 恒隨轉者。謂阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）乃至治生。外法種子乃至
【English Translation】 English version: Text.
Commentary: 'That in the position of ordinary beings, there should be non-outflow activity, etc.' When ordinary beings generally give rise to various thoughts, etc., this thought should be called non-outflow because of its pure nature, like the non-outflow mind of the sages. If this is allowed, then when ordinary beings give rise to thoughts, they should be called sages because it is allowed that they give rise to this non-outflow mind. The commentary opens up the general meaning in the text.
Treatise: 'However, the sutras say, up to the point of explaining the principle of the emptiness of mind, etc.' According to the Srimala Sutra, the Tathagatagarbha (Tathagatagarbha, the womb of the Tathagata) is the Dharmadhatu-garbha (Dharmadhatu-garbha, the treasury of the Dharmadhatu), the Dharmakaya-garbha (Dharmakaya-garbha, the treasury of the Dharmakaya), the Lokottara-paramottara-garbha (Lokottara-paramottara-garbha, the supreme treasury beyond the world), and the Svabhavavisuddha-garbha (Svabhavavisuddha-garbha, the treasury of self-nature purity). This Svabhavavisuddha-Tathagatagarbha (Svabhavavisuddha-Tathagatagarbha) is defiled by Agantuka-klesa (Agantuka-klesa, adventitious afflictions) and Upaklesa (Upaklesa, secondary afflictions).
Commentary: 'Having the Dharma of perfect tranquility.' The Dharma of perfect tranquility is the non-outflow cause of Bodhi.
Treatise: 'Or it is said that the substance of mind is not affliction, etc.' According to the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra, volume 54, 'Moreover, the self-nature of all consciousnesses is not defiled. Because the World-Honored One said that the nature of all minds is originally pure. Why is that? The self-nature of mind is not ultimately impure and able to produce faults, like greed and all afflictions.'
Commentary: 'The meaning of turning equally, etc.' This meaning is fully explained in the chapter on the Three Bodies in the Fa Yuan. Fearing prolixity, it is not cited here.
Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-vyakhya, Volume 2 (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1833, Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-vyakhya
Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-vyakhya, Volume 3 (Beginning)
Composed by the Shramana Zhizhou
Commentary: 'Vasubandhu is universally understood, etc.' According to the second volume of that treatise, 'All seeds have six meanings. Momentary cessation means that the two seeds are definitely destroyed without interval. Why is that? A permanent dharma should not be the substance of a seed, because its nature is the same at all times without difference.' Explanation: The two seeds refer to internal and external seeds. 'Having both' means that they are not past or future, nor can they be separated to be seeds. Why is that? If the seed exists at this time, then the fruit is produced at that time. 'Constantly following and transforming' refers to the Alaya-vijnana (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) up to the production of treatment. The seeds of external dharmas, up to...
根住。或乃至熟 言決定者。謂此種子各別決定。不從一切一切得生。從此物種還生此物 待眾緣者。謂此種子待自眾緣方能生果。非一切時能生一切。若於是處是時遇自眾緣。即於此處此時自果得生 唯能引自果者。謂自種子但引自果。如阿賴耶識種子唯能引生阿賴耶識。如稻穀等唯能引生稻穀等果 餘者不言外法種者。易故不說。舉難以顯。文初標言一切種故。
疏。亦顯大眾等者。略為二釋 一云言十二緣起非是者。非種子也。言無為無取等者。釋其所以 二云非是之言而屬下句。顯彼緣起體非無為。言無取等。釋所以也 前釋為本。本顯無為非是種子。不欲破彼無為義故 問因論生論。他若救云無為體性雖非緣生。而能隔彼立緣生名。斯亦何失。亦如想受無為等義 答應詰彼云。且汝無為為有功能。為無功能。若有功能應非無為。有功能故如所隔法。若無功能如何能隔 若爾大乘無為亦爾。一切賢聖皆以無為而有差別。二過亦同 答但由賢聖證有淺深而有差別。豈由無為而有功能令賢聖別。故不相例。若言無為體即緣生。其過更甚。思可知矣 有義亦遮上座現在一念心．心所法而有前後先生后滅。色法四時生．住．異．滅。及古薩婆多現在一念住．異．滅三先後次第者 詳曰。理未必然。彼等雖計二．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『根住。或乃至熟』，言『決定者』（決定性）：是指此種子各有各的決定性。不是從任何事物都能生出任何事物。而是從此物種還生此物種。 『待眾緣者』（依賴眾多因緣）：是指此種子要依賴自身的眾多因緣才能產生結果。不是在任何時候都能產生任何事物。如果在這個地方、這個時間遇到了自身的因緣，那麼就在這個地方、這個時間，自身的結果才能產生。 『唯能引自果者』（只能引生自身結果）：是指自身種子只能引生自身的結果。例如，阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子之處）的種子只能引生阿賴耶識。如同稻穀等只能引生稻穀等結果。 『餘者不言外法種者』（其餘未提及的外法種子）：因為容易理解所以不說。舉出難以理解的來顯明。文章開頭已經標明了一切種子。
疏：『亦顯大眾等者』，略為兩種解釋： 第一種解釋說，『言十二緣起非是者』，指十二緣起（dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda，佛教關於生命輪迴的十二個環節）不是種子。『言無為無取等者』，解釋了其中的原因。 第二種解釋說，『非是』二字屬於下句。顯示那緣起的本體不是無為法（asaṃskṛta，不依賴因緣而存在的法）。『言無取等』，解釋了其中的原因。前一種解釋是根本。根本上顯示無為法不是種子，是不想破斥那無為法的意義。 問：因論而生論。如果對方辯解說，無為法的體性雖然不是因緣所生，但能隔開其他事物而建立緣生的名稱，這又有什麼過失呢？就像想（saṃjñā，感知）、受（vedanā，感受）的無為法等意義一樣。 答：應該反問對方說，那麼你所說的無為法是有功能，還是沒有功能？如果有功能，就不應該是無為法。因為有功能就如同所隔開的法一樣。如果沒有功能，又如何能夠隔開呢？ 如果這樣，那麼大乘佛教（Mahāyāna）的無為法也是如此。一切賢聖都因為無為法而有差別。這兩種過失也是一樣的。 答：只是因為賢聖證悟的深淺而有差別。難道是因為無為法有功能才使得賢聖有差別嗎？所以不能相提並論。如果說無為法的體性就是緣生，那過失就更大了。仔細思考就可以知道。 有一種觀點也遮止了上座部（Sthavira nikāya）現在一念的心、心所法（citta-caitta，心和心理活動）有前後先生后滅，色法（rūpa，物質現象）有四時生、住、異、滅，以及古薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）現在一念住、異、滅三種先後次第的說法。 詳細地說，這個道理未必如此。他們雖然認為二……
【English Translation】 English version: 'Root-abiding, or even maturing,' meaning 'determined': This refers to the fact that each seed has its own determination. Not everything can be born from everything else. Rather, this species gives rise to this species. 'Awaiting numerous conditions,' meaning 'dependent on numerous causes': This refers to the fact that this seed must rely on its own numerous conditions in order to produce a result. It is not that everything can be produced at any time. If, in this place and at this time, it encounters its own conditions, then in this place and at this time, its own result can be produced. 'Only able to lead to its own result': This refers to the fact that one's own seed can only lead to one's own result. For example, the seed of the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) can only lead to the arising of the ālaya-vijñāna. Just as rice and the like can only lead to the arising of rice and the like. 'The rest, not mentioning the seeds of external dharmas': Because it is easy to understand, it is not mentioned. The difficult to understand is brought up to clarify. The text initially indicates all seeds.
Commentary: 'Also revealing the masses, etc.,' is briefly explained in two ways: The first explanation says, 'The twelve links of dependent origination are not seeds,' referring to the fact that the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda, the twelve links of interdependent arising) are not seeds. 'Saying unconditioned and non-grasping, etc.,' explains the reason for this. The second explanation says that the words 'are not' belong to the following sentence. It shows that the substance of that dependent origination is not unconditioned (asaṃskṛta, unconditioned dharma). 'Saying non-grasping, etc.,' explains the reason for this. The former explanation is fundamental. Fundamentally, it shows that the unconditioned is not a seed, because it does not want to refute the meaning of that unconditioned. Question: From a discussion arises another discussion. If the other party argues that although the nature of the unconditioned is not produced by conditions, it can separate other things and establish the name of conditioned arising, what fault is there in this? It is like the meaning of unconditioned perception (saṃjñā) and feeling (vedanā), etc. Answer: You should ask the other party in return, is your unconditioned functional or non-functional? If it is functional, it should not be unconditioned. Because if it is functional, it is like the dharma that is separated. If it is non-functional, how can it separate? If that is the case, then the unconditioned of Mahāyāna Buddhism is also the same. All sages and saints have differences because of the unconditioned. These two faults are also the same. Answer: It is only because the sages and saints have differences in the depth of their realization that there are differences. Is it because the unconditioned has a function that makes the sages and saints different? Therefore, they cannot be compared. If you say that the nature of the unconditioned is conditioned arising, then the fault is even greater. You can understand this by thinking carefully. One view also prevents the Sthavira nikāya from saying that the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta, mind and mental activities) of the present moment have a sequence of arising and ceasing, and that material phenomena (rūpa, material phenomena) have four phases of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, and that the ancient Sarvāstivāda school has three sequential stages of abiding, changing, and ceasing in the present moment. In detail, this reasoning is not necessarily so. Although they believe in two...
四．三法俱時而有。皆唯一念名剎那滅。若言一念有多法俱故不許者。種生現時有三法俱。種應非種。若言彼計有次第故故非種者。容簡上座。有宗一念豈分時耶。何得簡之。文論但遮常無轉法。彼二．四．三豈常無轉。由斯未必遮彼生等。然傍義簡理亦應通。
疏。即顯現簡彼第七者。謂無性人現行第七熏成種時雖果俱有。以種子果體性沉隱。所以現七不名種子 問論云謂與現行果法。簡諸現識不名種訖。論更何用下之現字。何煩疏說云顯現簡耶 答若無下現疑因無體及在過．未亦得名種。為遮此事故置現言 若爾現中但攝二義。前現行言已簡現識。下現字中應除顯現 答即顯現言釋彼第七非種所以。若不爾者有何所以無性現七不名種耶 若爾論何不言顯現 答若言顯現唯得一義失餘二義故不言顯現 問顯現乃遮一切現行。何但無性 答余現闕余非但此一。無性第七唯闕此一。故偏簡焉。
疏。現有唯在因者 問所生果法體既不無。無非因起。何故現有獨處於因 答非所生果一切皆有。如獨影境與見同種因可不無。故現有言但處因上 或通於果。疏中且據別總配法。亦不相違。
疏。同在現在亦不相違者。雖因在生果在於滅。然同現在。故亦不違果俱有義。準下第三因在於滅果在於生。此中疏錯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 四、三種法同時存在。都以唯一念頭名為剎那滅。如果說一個念頭有多種法同時存在，所以不被允許的說法，那麼種子生起和顯現時有三種法同時存在。種子應該不是種子。如果說他們認為有次第，所以不是種子，那麼容許簡擇上座部。有宗認為一念不分時，怎麼能簡擇呢？論文只是遮止常無轉變的法。那二、四、三難道是常無轉變的嗎？因此未必能遮止生等。然而從旁義簡擇，道理也應該相通。
疏：即是顯現來簡擇那第七識，就是說無自性的人現行第七識熏習成種子時，雖然果和種子同時存在，因為種子和果的體性沉寂隱沒，所以現行的第七識不能稱為種子。問：論文說，『用來簡擇與現行果法，簡擇各種現識不稱為種子』完畢。論文還用下面的『現』字做什麼？為什麼疏要說『顯現簡擇』呢？答：如果沒有下面的『現』字，會懷疑因沒有自體，以及在過去、未來也可能被稱為種子。爲了遮止這種情況，所以設定『現』字。如果這樣，『現』字中只包含兩種含義。前面的『現行』已經簡擇了現識，下面的『現』字中應該去除顯現的含義。答：『即顯現』這句話解釋了第七識不是種子的原因。如果不這樣，有什麼原因無自性的現行第七識不能稱為種子呢？如果這樣，論文為什麼不說『顯現』呢？答：如果說『顯現』，只能得到一種含義，失去其餘兩種含義，所以不說『顯現』。問：『顯現』乃是遮止一切現行，為什麼只針對無自性的人？答：其餘的現行缺少其餘的條件，不只是這一個。無自性的第七識只缺少這一個條件，所以偏重簡擇它。
疏：現有唯獨存在於因中。問：所生的果法體既然不是沒有，沒有不是因生起的。為什麼現有唯獨存在於因中？答：不是所生的果一切都有。比如獨影境和見同一種因，可以不是沒有。所以『現有』這句話只用于因上。或者也通用於果。疏中暫且根據別總來配合法，也不互相違背。
疏：同時存在於現在也不互相違背。雖然因在生起，果在滅去，但同時存在於現在。所以也不違背果同時存在的含義。按照下面的第三點，因在滅去，果在生起。這裡疏文錯了。
【English Translation】 English version Four. Three dharmas exist simultaneously. All are called 'instantaneous cessation' in a single thought. If it is said that multiple dharmas exist simultaneously in a single thought, which is not permissible, then when a seed arises and manifests, three dharmas exist simultaneously. The seed should not be a seed. If it is said that they believe there is a sequence, so it is not a seed, then allow the selection of the Theravada (Sthavira) school. The Sarvastivadins (having school) believe that a single thought does not divide time, how can it be selected? The treatise only prevents dharmas that are constant and unchanging. Are those two, four, or three constant and unchanging? Therefore, it may not be able to prevent arising, etc. However, selecting from a side meaning, the principle should also be consistent.
Commentary: That is, using manifestation to select that seventh consciousness (Manas), that is to say, when a person without inherent existence's (nihsvabhava) currently active seventh consciousness cultivates into a seed, although the result and the seed exist simultaneously, because the nature of the seed and the result are silent and hidden, the currently active seventh consciousness cannot be called a seed. Question: The treatise says, 'Used to select the currently active result dharma, selecting various currently active consciousnesses not called seeds' is finished. What does the treatise use the following word 'currently active' for? Why does the commentary say 'manifestation selection'? Answer: If there is no following word 'currently active', there will be doubt that the cause has no substance, and that it may also be called a seed in the past and future. In order to prevent this situation, the word 'currently active' is set. If so, the word 'currently active' only contains two meanings. The previous 'currently active' has already selected the currently active consciousness, and the meaning of manifestation should be removed from the following word 'currently active'. Answer: The phrase 'that is manifestation' explains the reason why the seventh consciousness is not a seed. If not, what is the reason why the currently active seventh consciousness of a person without inherent existence cannot be called a seed? If so, why doesn't the treatise say 'manifestation'? Answer: If 'manifestation' is said, only one meaning can be obtained, and the remaining two meanings are lost, so 'manifestation' is not said. Question: 'Manifestation' is to prevent all currently active things, why only target people without inherent existence? Answer: The remaining currently active things lack the remaining conditions, not just this one. The seventh consciousness of a person without inherent existence only lacks this one condition, so it focuses on selecting it.
Commentary: 'Currently existing' only exists in the cause. Question: Since the substance of the produced result dharma is not non-existent, and non-existence is not caused by a cause, why does 'currently existing' only exist in the cause? Answer: Not all produced results have it. For example, the solitary shadow realm and seeing have the same kind of cause, which may not be non-existent. Therefore, the phrase 'currently existing' is only used on the cause. Or it also applies to the result. The commentary temporarily matches the dharmas according to the distinction between specific and general, which is not contradictory.
Commentary: Existing simultaneously in the present is also not contradictory. Although the cause is arising and the result is ceasing, they exist simultaneously in the present. Therefore, it does not contradict the meaning of the result existing simultaneously. According to the third point below, the cause is ceasing and the result is arising. The commentary is wrong here.
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疏。若爾種望種等者。因種在滅。果種在生。應同種現名果俱有 設爾何失 若爾種子生現。現生種二竟何別。俱果俱故。故疏結云何為料簡 又違瑜伽。
論。現種異類者。問何故前難分別論者。性相同耶 答約漏．無漏言性相同。非據一切 或就彼宗。彼宗心體名之為種。相名為現。不同自宗現行．種子。
疏。見分緣見等者。即自證分緣于見也。是見分體亦名見分。
疏。即非因緣攝者。見．見同時雖名因果。不是因緣。
疏。若爾種望現起等者。類同種．種。但是因果不名因緣。
疏。不許后種生果故者。結無因緣。若其前後后能生果。可有因緣。既多同起而無起者。故無因緣。
疏。種望于種類亦應然者。類同現行無二自體一念得並 問本．新二種豈不併耶 答若為因緣並即不可。本．新非因故並無失。 若爾新種設生現行。與本種現亦非因緣。何不許並 答即一剎那二心並失 若爾色種新應生現。望不障色有多並故 答緣未具故。又若生現有未窮失。
疏。問若爾至體相違故者。此難意云。亦應見道摶生新種。不以同時本有種子為因而生。以相違故。
疏。此不同時至種生種失者。此釋意云。此摶生種由世第一同時無漏種子引生。不以同時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
疏：如果這樣，種子望向種子等情況，因為因種子處於滅的狀態，果種子處於生的狀態，應該和種子顯現時一樣，名稱和果同時存在。假設這樣，會有什麼過失呢？如果這樣，種子生出現行，現行生出種子，這兩種情況究竟有什麼區別？因為都是果，所以疏中總結說，如何進行簡別？又違背了《瑜伽師地論》。 論：現行和種子是不同類別的。問：為什麼前面的難點要分別討論呢？是因為它們的性質相同嗎？答：從有漏、無漏的角度來說，性質是相同的，但不是指所有方面都相同。或者就他們的宗派來說，他們的宗派認為心體名為種子，相名為現行，不同於我們宗派的現行和種子。 疏：見分緣見等情況，就是自證分緣于見分。這個見分的體也叫做見分。 疏：即非因緣所攝，見和見同時，雖然名為因果，但不是因緣。 疏：如果種子望向現起等情況，類似於種子和種子，只是因果關係，不稱為因緣。 疏：不許后種子生果的緣故，總結說沒有因緣。如果前後種子，後面的能生果，就可以有因緣。既然很多同時生起，卻沒有生起者，所以沒有因緣。 疏：種子望向種類也應該這樣，類似於現行，沒有兩個自體，一念可以同時存在。問：本有種子和新種子難道不能同時存在嗎？答：如果作為因緣，同時存在就不可以。本有種子和新種子不是因，所以同時存在沒有過失。如果新種子生出現行，和本有種子的現行也不是因緣，為什麼不允許同時存在呢？答：因為一個剎那有兩個心同時存在就會有缺失。如果色法的新種子應該生出現行，望向不障礙的色法，有很多可以同時存在，為什麼不行呢？答：因為緣還不具足。而且如果生出現行，會有沒有窮盡的過失。 疏：問：如果這樣到體相違的緣故。這個難點的意思是說，也應該在見道時摶生新的種子，不以同時本有的種子為因而生，因為相違的緣故。 疏：此不同時到種子生種的缺失。這個解釋的意思是說，這個摶生的種子由世第一同時的無漏種子引導而生，不以同時的種子為因。
【English Translation】 English version:
Commentary: If so, regarding seed looking towards seed, etc., because the cause-seed is in the state of cessation, and the effect-seed is in the state of arising, it should be the same as when the seed manifests, with the name and effect coexisting. If we assume this, what fault would there be? If so, the seed giving rise to manifestation, and manifestation giving rise to seed, what is the difference between these two situations? Because both are effects, the commentary concludes, how should we differentiate? Furthermore, it contradicts the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論). Treatise: Manifestation and seed are of different categories. Question: Why should the previous difficulties be discussed separately? Is it because their natures are the same? Answer: From the perspective of defiled (漏) and undefiled (無漏), their natures are the same, but this does not mean they are the same in all aspects. Or, according to their school, their school considers the mind-essence to be the seed, and the appearance to be the manifestation, which is different from our school's manifestation and seed. Commentary: 'Cognition-aspect conditions cognition, etc.' means that the self-cognition-aspect conditions the cognition-aspect. The substance of this cognition-aspect is also called the cognition-aspect. Commentary: 'That is, not included in cause-condition', although cognition and cognition are simultaneous and are called cause and effect, they are not cause-condition. Commentary: If the seed looks towards the arising of manifestation, etc., it is similar to seed and seed, which are only cause-effect relationships and are not called cause-condition. Commentary: 'Because it is not allowed that the later seed gives rise to the effect', it is concluded that there is no cause-condition. If the preceding and following seeds, the latter can give rise to the effect, then there can be cause-condition. Since many arise simultaneously, but there is no arising, there is no cause-condition. Commentary: 'The seed looking towards the category should also be like this', similar to manifestation, there are not two self-entities, and one thought can exist simultaneously. Question: Can't the original seed and the new seed exist simultaneously? Answer: If they are cause-condition, they cannot exist simultaneously. The original seed and the new seed are not causes, so there is no fault in existing simultaneously. If the new seed gives rise to manifestation, and it is not a cause-condition with the manifestation of the original seed, why is it not allowed to exist simultaneously? Answer: Because if two minds exist simultaneously in one moment, there will be a deficiency. If the new seed of form should give rise to manifestation, looking towards unobstructed forms, many can exist simultaneously, why not? Answer: Because the conditions are not yet complete. Moreover, if manifestation arises, there will be the fault of endlessness. Commentary: Question: 'If so, to the reason of contradictory substance'. The meaning of this difficulty is that a new seed should also be produced during the path of seeing (見道), not caused by the simultaneous original seed, because they are contradictory. Commentary: 'This is not simultaneous to the fault of seed giving rise to seed'. The meaning of this explanation is that this produced seed is guided by the simultaneous undefiled seed of the highest mundane state (世第一), not caused by the simultaneous seed.
無漏種起。故無同念種生種失。
問。此摶生種何名新熏 答由世第一熏習力故增無漏種。無漏種子引后摶生。摶生所以得新熏稱。
疏。即本有種至但三法者。本種．新現俱為因緣生新熏種。此非正釋。本種望新非因緣故。若據疏緣理亦無失。
疏。由此別脫等者。由此同念無摶生種。卻證於前別解脫戒用增為勝。
疏。前解即體增等者。即是四法同時之義。
論。雖因與果至無自體故者。有義難云。因現有用果非無。可說果由現因起。果在未來體非有。如何現果由因生 答正由後果無方說從因起 難因體落謝用常存。可言果由因用起。因體落謝用隨亡。後果無因不生起 有釋如下說云。觀現在法有引後用。假立當果對說現因。是故現因能引後果 破云不然。此種子義前後相生因果皆實。彼說現識假名因果。不應以彼而證此義 詳曰。余釋有違理如前破因生後果今略答云。以落謝因生後果。因無後果可不生。現因體用既非無。後果有因起何失。余難類思。
疏。為因既通種與有種者。前種望與現行為因。后種望與種子為因。種能種生名為有種 或復翻彼現能熏種名為有種。種子與此有種為因。意明種子與現．及種二為因也 問按無性論第二。釋引自果云。今此種子是誰種子。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無漏種生起，因此沒有同唸的種子生起和種子消失。
問：這個摶生種（phuán shēng zhǒng，由業力形成的種子）為什麼稱為新熏？答：由於世第一（shì dì yī，世間最高的智慧）的熏習力，增長了無漏種（wú lòu zhǒng，沒有煩惱的種子）。無漏種子引生後來的摶生。摶生因此得到新熏的稱呼。
疏：即本有種（běn yǒu zhǒng，本來就有的種子）到但三法（dàn sān fǎ，只有三種法）的意思是，本種、新現（xīn xiàn，新出現的）都作為因緣生起新熏種。這不是正確的解釋。本種對於新熏來說不是因緣。如果按照疏的緣起道理來說也沒有錯。
疏：由此別脫等（yóu cǐ bié tuō děng，由此解脫等等）的意思是，由此同念沒有摶生種，反而證明了前面的別解脫戒（bié jiě tuō jiè，不同的解脫戒律）的作用增長而更為殊勝。
疏：前解即體增等（qián jiě jí tǐ zēng děng，之前的解釋就是本體增長等等）的意思是，就是四法同時存在的意義。
論：雖然因與果（yīn yǔ guǒ，原因和結果）到沒有自體的緣故的意思是，有人提出疑問說，因現在有作用，果並非沒有。可以說果由現在的因生起。果在未來，本體並非存在，如何現在的果由因生起？答：正因為後果沒有才說從因生起。難：因的本體衰落消失，作用常存，可以說果由因的作用生起。因的本體衰落消失，作用也隨之消失，後果沒有因就不能生起。有一種解釋如下所說，觀察現在的法有引生後來的作用，假立當來的果，相對來說現在的因，因此現在的因能夠引生後來的果。破斥說：不是這樣的。這個種子的意義是前後相生，因果都是真實的。他們說現在的識是假名的因果，不應該用他們來證明這個意義。詳細地說，其他的解釋有違背道理的地方，如同前面破斥因生後果一樣，現在簡略地回答說，用衰落消失的因生起後來的果，因沒有後果可以不生起。現在的因本體和作用既然不是沒有，後果有因生起有什麼過失？其他的疑問可以類推思考。
疏：為因既通種與有種者（wèi yīn jì tōng zhǒng yǔ yǒu zhǒng zhě，作為原因既包括種子和有種）的意思是，前面的種子對於現在的行為來說是因，後面的種子對於種子來說是因。種能生種，名為有種。或者反過來說，現在的能熏種名為有種。種子與這個有種作為因。意思是說明種子與現在以及種子二者作為因。問：按照無性論（Wú Xìng Lùn）第二，解釋引生自己的果說，現在這個種子是誰的種子？
【English Translation】 English version When non-outflow seeds arise, there is no simultaneous arising and ceasing of seeds of the same thought.
Question: Why is this 'phuán shēng zhǒng' (摶生種, seed formed by karma) called 'newly perfumed'? Answer: Because of the power of 'shì dì yī' (世第一, the highest wisdom in the world) perfuming, it increases the non-outflow seeds. The non-outflow seeds lead to the subsequent 'phuán shēng'. Therefore, 'phuán shēng' gets the name 'newly perfumed'.
Commentary: 'That is, the original seed' to 'only three dharmas' means that the original seed and the newly manifested both act as causes and conditions for the arising of the newly perfumed seed. This is not a correct explanation. The original seed is not a cause or condition for the newly perfumed. If based on the commentary's principle of dependent origination, there is no error.
Commentary: 'Therefore, separate liberation, etc.' means that because of this simultaneous thought, there is no 'phuán shēng' seed. Instead, it proves that the function of the preceding 'bié jiě tuō jiè' (別解脫戒, separate liberation precepts) increases and becomes more superior.
Commentary: 'The previous explanation is that the substance increases, etc.' means that it is the meaning of the simultaneous existence of the four dharmas.
Treatise: 'Although cause and effect' to 'because there is no self-nature' means that some argue, 'The cause currently has function, and the effect is not non-existent. It can be said that the effect arises from the present cause. The effect is in the future, and its substance is not existent. How can the present effect arise from the cause?' Answer: 'Precisely because the subsequent effect does not exist, it is said to arise from the cause.' Objection: 'The substance of the cause declines and disappears, but its function always remains. It can be said that the effect arises from the function of the cause.' The substance of the cause declines and disappears, and its function also disappears. The subsequent effect cannot arise without a cause. One explanation is as follows: 'Observing that the present dharma has the function of leading to the subsequent, a future effect is provisionally established, in contrast to the present cause. Therefore, the present cause can lead to the subsequent effect.' Refutation: 'That is not so. The meaning of this seed is that cause and effect arise successively, and both are real. They say that the present consciousness is a provisional cause and effect. One should not use them to prove this meaning.' In detail, other explanations have contradictions to reason, just like the previous refutation of the cause giving rise to the subsequent effect. Now, briefly answer, 'Using the declining and disappearing cause to give rise to the subsequent effect, if the cause has no subsequent effect, it may not arise. Since the substance and function of the present cause are not non-existent, what fault is there in the subsequent effect arising from the cause?' Other questions can be thought about analogously.
Commentary: 'As the cause includes both seed and existent seed' means that the preceding seed is the cause for the present action, and the subsequent seed is the cause for the seed. The seed that can produce seeds is called an existent seed. Or, conversely, the present perfuming seed is called an existent seed. The seed and this existent seed act as causes. The intention is to explain that the seed and the present and seed both act as causes. Question: According to the second chapter of the Wú Xìng Lùn (無性論), explaining the production of its own effect, 'Whose seed is this seed now?'
答唯能引自果。所言唯者。若於此時能生自果。即于爾時說名種子。種與有種並無始故 釋。種謂種子。有種即是阿賴耶識。阿賴耶識能有種故名為有種 又因名種。果名有種 前釋為勝 此種．有種未生果前俱無始有故。對引自名為種子。疏之所明豈不乖此 答疏雖用彼種．有種名。而意有別。故亦無違。
疏。能熏生故者。種子是彼能熏現生 若爾本有其義云何 答亦由增故 或相從言總名生也。
疏。勝軍如何釋此者。彼云無失。生．滅二相雖同一世是二剎那。以為因果故亦不是即剎那也。
疏。復云何釋無種已生者。勝軍釋云。彼隨轉理。非大乘義。復何失。至下具釋。
疏。薩婆多與善法等與惡無記為同類因等者。問按俱舍云。謂相似法與相似法為同類因。三性．五蘊自部自地。唯與自地自部為因。云何今云善望不善為同類耶 答疏文言總。意談不善得與有覆無記為因。以同部故。
疏。遍行因等是異性果者。準有宗義。身．邊二見是遍行因。體是無記。遍與同地五部染法而為其因。五部染中既有不善。故得因果成異性也 若爾云何得等流果 俱是染故名為等流。
疏。俱有因取異熟等果者。故俱舍第六云。謂此與心一果異熟及一等流 問何故下云俱有．相應得士用
果 答士用果中而有通別。別士用果唯是俱有．相應因得。若通士用六因皆得。而但用力所得之果皆名士用。故不相違。疏據通說。
疏。此闕何義等者。問及答也。八非能熏故闕果俱。
疏。其無性人等者。乘前為問。第八不熏無果俱義。第七既熏六義具矣。故應名種。
疏。第八門中者。重明因相總有十門。種子之義當第八也 問言引自果即色．心等各自種生。第七相分云何生八 答是心相故故能生心 問所熏種為一為二 設爾何失 若唯一種云何生慮．非慮二耶。七相八見有差別故。若熏二種能熏既一。種云何二 答雖能熏一。由有本質熏二無失。余難思擇。
論。外穀麥等者。問內外種子皆能為因何獨言外假非實種 答按無著攝論說二頌釋。具如疏引 無性釋云。又外種子若稻穀等或有雖種而復失壞。若稊稗等或有不種而復得生。云何內種非如外種有作不作失得過失。故次答云。故成相違。以內種子與外種子不同法故名曰相違。若內種子與外種子有差別者。云何前文說阿賴耶識是一切法真實種子。為避此難故說外種內為緣等。由稻穀等皆是眾生感受用業熏習種子。依阿賴耶力所變現。是故外種離內無別 又世親云。謂外種子唯就世俗說為種子。所以者何。彼亦皆是阿賴耶識所變現故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 果：回答說，士用果（Purusakara-phala，由人的努力產生的果報）在果報中具有共通和不共通之處。不共通的士用果僅僅是俱有因（sahabhu-hetu，同時存在的因）和相應因（samprayuktaka-hetu，相應的因）所產生的。如果說是共通的士用果，那麼六因（hetu，因）都可以產生。然而，僅僅通過努力所得的果報都稱為士用果，因此並不矛盾。疏文是根據共通的說法。
疏：『此處缺少什麼意義』等，是提問和回答。第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）不是能熏習的，因此缺少果俱義（phala-sahabhu，果報同時存在）。
疏：『那些無性人』等，是承接前面的提問。第八識不熏習，沒有果俱義。第七識（Manas-vijnana，末那識）既然熏習，六義都具備了，所以應該稱為種子（bija，種子）。
疏：『第八識門中』，是再次說明因相總共有十個方面。種子的意義在於第八識。問：如果說引自果（svaphala，自身產生的果報）即是色（rupa，物質）、心（citta，精神）等各自的種子所生，那麼第七識的相分（nimitta-bhaga，影像部分）如何產生第八識？答：因為是心相（citta-nimitta，心的影像），所以能夠產生心。問：所熏習的種子是一個還是兩個？假設這樣有什麼過失？如果只有一種，怎麼能產生慮（citta，思慮）和非慮（acitta，非思慮）兩種呢？因為第七識的相分和第八識的見分（darsana-bhaga，能見部分）有差別。如果熏習兩種，能熏習的只有一個，種子怎麼能是兩個呢？答：雖然能熏習的只有一個，由於有本質（vastu，實在），所以熏習兩種沒有過失。其餘的困難可以進一步思考。
論：『外面的穀麥等』，問：內外種子都能作為因，為什麼只說外面的種子是假借的，不是真實的種子？答：按照無著（Asanga）的《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）所說的兩個偈頌來解釋，具體如疏文所引用。無性（Asvabhava）解釋說：『而且外面的種子，比如稻穀等，有的即使播種了也會失壞，有的比如稊稗等，即使不播種也會生長。為什麼內部的種子不像外部的種子那樣有作與不作、失與得的過失呢？』所以接著回答說：『所以成為相違。』因為內部的種子和外部的種子是不同的法，所以叫做相違。如果內部的種子和外部的種子有差別，為什麼前面的經文說阿賴耶識是一切法真實的種子？爲了避免這個困難，所以說外面的種子在內部作為緣（pratyaya，條件）等。由於稻穀等都是眾生感受用業（karma，業）熏習的種子，依靠阿賴耶識的力量所變現，因此外面的種子離開內部就沒有區別。』又世親（Vasubandhu）說：『所謂外面的種子，只是就世俗的層面來說是種子。為什麼呢？因為它們也都是阿賴耶識所變現的。』
【English Translation】 English version Fruit: The answer is that Purusakara-phala (fruit resulting from human effort) has common and uncommon aspects among fruits. Uncommon Purusakara-phala is solely produced by Sahabhu-hetu (co-existent cause) and Samprayuktaka-hetu (associated cause). If it is said to be common Purusakara-phala, then all six hetus (causes) can produce it. However, only the fruits obtained through effort are called Purusakara-phala, so there is no contradiction. The commentary is based on the common explanation.
Commentary: 'What meaning is missing here?' etc., refers to the question and answer. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is not capable of perfuming, so it lacks the meaning of phala-sahabhu (co-existence of fruit).
Commentary: 'Those who are without nature' etc., continues from the previous question. The eighth consciousness does not perfume, so it lacks the meaning of phala-sahabhu. Since the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) perfumes, it possesses all six meanings, so it should be called a bija (seed).
Commentary: 'In the eighth consciousness section,' it is to clarify again that there are ten aspects in total regarding the characteristics of causes. The meaning of seed lies in the eighth consciousness. Question: If it is said that the fruit derived from itself (svaphala) is produced by the respective seeds of rupa (matter), citta (mind), etc., then how does the nimitta-bhaga (image-part) of the seventh consciousness produce the eighth consciousness? Answer: Because it is citta-nimitta (image of the mind), it can produce the mind. Question: Is the perfumed seed one or two? What fault would there be in assuming so? If there is only one, how can it produce both citta (thought) and acitta (non-thought)? Because there is a difference between the nimitta-bhaga of the seventh consciousness and the darsana-bhaga (seeing-part) of the eighth consciousness. If two seeds are perfumed, and there is only one that can perfume, how can there be two seeds? Answer: Although there is only one that can perfume, because there is vastu (reality), there is no fault in perfuming two. Other difficulties can be further considered.
Treatise: 'External grains such as wheat,' Question: Both internal and external seeds can act as causes, why is it only said that external seeds are borrowed and not real seeds? Answer: According to the two verses explained in Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha, as quoted in the commentary. Asvabhava explains: 'Moreover, external seeds, such as rice, may be sown but still be destroyed, while others, such as weeds, may grow even without being sown. Why don't internal seeds have the faults of action and inaction, loss and gain, like external seeds?' Therefore, the answer continues: 'Therefore, they are contradictory.' Because internal seeds and external seeds are different dharmas (phenomena), they are called contradictory. If there is a difference between internal seeds and external seeds, why does the previous text say that Alaya-vijnana is the real seed of all dharmas? To avoid this difficulty, it is said that external seeds act as pratyaya (condition) etc. internally. Because rice etc. are all seeds perfumed by the karma (action) of sentient beings' experiences, manifested by the power of Alaya-vijnana, therefore external seeds are no different from internal ones.' Also, Vasubandhu says: 'So-called external seeds are only said to be seeds in the context of conventional truth. Why? Because they are all manifested by Alaya-vijnana.'
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疏。以重變故等者。其根種子第八變已生現根時。復變現根。
論。此種勢力生近果等者。問何要引為 答按無性攝論第二具明。大略而云。若二種子唯作生因非引因者。收置倉等麥等種子。不應久時相似相續。喪后屍骸如[病-丙+青]瘀等分位隨轉亦不應有。何者才死即應滅壞。云何譬如任運后滅。譬如射箭放弦行力為能生因。令箭離弦不即墮落。彎弓行力為箭引因。令箭前行遠有所至。非唯放弦行力能生。應即墮故亦非動勢。展轉相推應不墮故。既離弦行遠有所至。故知此中有二行力能生．能引。
疏。若爾空等至假法不論者。此質。意云。若假是無故不須簡。無為應爾亦不須簡。真如無為善言攝故。非擇滅等同生等故。雖善等攝猶更別簡。假法雖無遮亦何失。
疏。由此故應第一說善者。即前說言依他攝假。此解勝也。
疏。無明熏真如等者。自古諸德多為此計。此論明簡。故知古非。馬鳴菩薩亦言真如受熏持種。恐譯者誤。
疏其無性人等者。問縱不言染亦非受熏。何煩斯簡。答正取心王名為可熏體。第七豈非是心王耶。由此但以染污簡之。
疏。即成一種生二芽過者。如一識種色．心兩處皆悉持之。熏既同時。勢力復等。后遇生緣兩處齊生。故有兩識一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏：以重變故等者。其根種子（根本識中的種子）在第八識變現已生起現行根時，又變現出新的現行根。
論：此種勢力生近果等者。問：為什麼要引用這個例子？答：根據無性《攝大乘論》第二部分詳細說明。大略來說，如果兩個種子僅僅作為生因而不是引因，那麼像儲藏在倉庫里的麥子等種子，就不應該長時間相似相續。喪失后的屍骸，如青瘀等分位隨時間推移變化，也不應該存在。為什麼呢？因為才死就應該滅壞。云何譬如任運后滅？譬如射箭，放弦的行力是能生因，使箭離開弓弦后不立即掉落。彎弓的行力是箭的引因，使箭向前飛行，到達遠方。如果只有放弦的行力作為能生因，箭應該立即掉落，如果只有動勢，展轉相推，箭應該不會掉落。既然箭離開弓弦后能飛行到遠方，所以知道其中有兩種行力，能生、能引。
疏：若爾空等至假法不論者。此質，意云：如果假法是無，所以不需要簡別。無為法也應如此，也不需要簡別。真如（Tathata）無為是善言所攝，非擇滅等同生等故。雖然被善等所攝，仍然要特別簡別。假法即使遮止又有什麼損失？
疏：由此故應第一說善者。即前說言依他攝假。此解勝也。
疏：無明熏真如等者。自古以來的許多德行之人都這樣認為。此論明確簡別，所以知道古人的說法是錯誤的。馬鳴菩薩也說真如受熏持種，恐怕是翻譯的人理解錯誤。
疏：其無性人等者。問：縱然不說是染污，也不是受熏，何必如此簡別？答：這裡主要取心王（Citta-raja）作為可熏的本體。第七識難道不是心王嗎？因此只用染污來簡別。
疏：即成一種生二芽過者。如一個識種在色、心兩處都持有。熏習既然是同時的，勢力又相等，後來遇到生緣，兩處同時生起，所以就有一個識種生起兩個芽的過失。
【English Translation】 English version Commentary: 'By reason of repeated changes, etc.' means that when the root seed (bija in the Alaya-vijnana) in the eighth consciousness has already manifested the present root, it again manifests a new present root.
Treatise: 'This power of the seed produces proximate results, etc.' Question: Why is it necessary to cite this example? Answer: According to Asanga's Mahayana-samgraha, the second part explains this in detail. Roughly speaking, if two seeds only act as the cause of production (hetu) and not as the cause of leading (pratyaya), then seeds like wheat stored in a warehouse should not continue in a similar sequence for a long time. The corpse after death, such as the changes in the bruised areas over time, should also not exist. Why? Because it should perish immediately after death. How can it be compared to perishing after a period of time? For example, when shooting an arrow, the force of releasing the string is the productive cause, causing the arrow to not fall immediately after leaving the bowstring. The force of drawing the bow is the leading cause of the arrow, causing the arrow to fly forward and reach a distant place. If only the force of releasing the string were the productive cause, the arrow should fall immediately. If there were only momentum, the arrow should not fall due to successive pushes. Since the arrow can fly far after leaving the string, it is known that there are two forces in it, one that produces and one that leads.
Commentary: 'If so, why are empty phenomena and false dharmas not discussed?' This is a question, meaning: If false dharmas are non-existent, then there is no need to distinguish them. The same should be true for unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta), and there is no need to distinguish them either. True Thusness (Tathata) as unconditioned is included in the category of good words, because non-selective cessation (nirodha-samapatti) is the same as arising, etc. Although included in the category of good, it is still necessary to distinguish them separately. Even if false dharmas are negated, what loss is there?
Commentary: 'Therefore, it is appropriate to first speak of good.' This refers to the previous statement that dependent-origination includes the false. This explanation is superior.
Commentary: 'Ignorance perfumes True Thusness, etc.' Many virtuous people in ancient times thought this way. This treatise clearly distinguishes, so it is known that the ancient people's statement is wrong. Bodhisattva Asvaghosa also said that True Thusness receives perfume and holds seeds, perhaps the translator misunderstood.
Commentary: 'Those like Asanga, etc.' Question: Even if it is not said to be defiled, it is not perfumed, so why bother with this distinction? Answer: Here, the mind-king (Citta-raja) is mainly taken as the perfumable entity. Is the seventh consciousness not the mind-king? Therefore, it is only distinguished by defilement.
Commentary: 'It becomes the fault of one seed producing two sprouts.' For example, one seed of consciousness holds both form and mind. Since the perfuming is simultaneous and the power is equal, later, when encountering the conditions for arising, both places arise simultaneously, so there is the fault of one seed of consciousness producing two sprouts.
時而起。處雖有二是一識故名一種也 若爾何故下難彼云即有多種生一之過 答理實而有一種生多。多生一失。前後互舉亦無過矣。
論。二有勝用是能熏等者。有說。業感六識之中有勝有劣劣不能熏。論言不熏而據劣者。若以論文無所簡別總說不熏。亦應法執非能熏攝。名異熟故。故知業感勝者能熏。勝者是何。謂受三分。舍受俱者唯是劣故。故非能熏。苦．樂受俱名行相勝。是能熏也。或舍受中復分三種。違．順．中容。中容不熏。餘二能熏 復有說云。此中但遮第八心品。六識異熟無非能熏。無別聖教說不熏故。八無所熏可非能熏。六有所熏無不熏者。又心．心所若非能熏即是所熏。何有心法非能．所熏 詳曰。二俱非理。初師之義斥如義燈。又約三受以辨勝劣。既非聖教無乃意乎 若后師言。但遮第八餘並能熏。此論應結唯七轉識可是能熏。何假須說有勝勢用。既言勝等明有遮簡。又餘六識有所熏故皆令能熏。第八心所亦應能熏。有所熏故 又言何有心法非能所熏。第八相應應非心所。非能所熏故。既有多失。故不可依。
疏。二種所生等者。自名言種．及業種也。
疏。或此法爾等者。不須約彼二種所生。但由無用不能熏也。
疏。如耶見等者。問品類雖同增減有別。豈唯增長即
【現代漢語翻譯】 時而生起。雖然處在兩種狀態，但因為是一個識，所以名為一種。如果這樣，為什麼下面反駁說有多種產生一個的過失呢？回答是，道理上確實存在一種產生多種，多種產生一個的過失。前後互相舉例，也沒有什麼過失。
論：二、具有殊勝的作用，是能熏等。有人說，業力感生的六識中，有殊勝的，有低劣的，低劣的不能熏習。論中說不熏習，是根據低劣的來說的。如果按照論文沒有簡別，總說不熏習，也應該把法執排除在能熏習之外，因為名稱是異熟。所以知道業力感生的殊勝者能夠熏習。殊勝者是什麼呢？就是領受三分。舍受（Upeksha，不苦不樂的感受）相應的識只是低劣的，所以不能熏習。苦受（Dukkha，痛苦的感受）、樂受（Sukha，快樂的感受）相應的識，名為行相殊勝，是能熏習的。或者舍受中又分為三種：違、順、中容。中容不熏習，其餘兩種能熏習。又有人說，這裡只是遮止第八識（Alaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）的心品，六識的異熟沒有不能熏習的，沒有別的聖教說不熏習的緣故。第八識沒有所熏習的，可以不是能熏習的。六識有所熏習的，沒有不熏習的。又，心、心所如果不是能熏習的，就是所熏習的。哪裡有心法不是能熏、所熏的呢？詳細地說，兩種說法都不合理。第一個師父的意義，斥責如同義燈。又用三種感受來辨別殊勝低劣，既然不是聖教，難道不是自己的意思嗎？如果后一個師父說，只是遮止第八識，其餘都能熏習，這個論應該總結為只有七轉識（Seven Transformations of Consciousness）才是能熏習的，何必需要說有殊勝的勢用。既然說殊勝等，說明有遮止簡別。又其餘六識因為有所熏習，都令能熏習，第八識的心所也應該能熏習，因為有所熏習。又說哪裡有心法不是能所熏習的，第八識相應應該不是心所，因為不是能所熏習的緣故。既然有很多過失，所以不可以依從。
疏：兩種所生等，指自名言種（Self-name seed）、及業種（Karma seed）。
疏：或者此法爾等，不需要根據那兩種所生，只是因為沒有用處，所以不能熏習。
疏：如耶見等，問：品類雖然相同，增減有差別，難道只是增長嗎？
【English Translation】 They arise from time to time. Although there are two states, because it is one consciousness, it is called one kind. If so, why does the following refute with the fault of many producing one? The answer is that, in principle, there is indeed the fault of one producing many and many producing one. There is no fault in citing examples back and forth.
Treatise: Secondly, having superior function is the ability to perfume, etc. Some say that among the six consciousnesses produced by karma, some are superior and some are inferior, and the inferior cannot perfume. The treatise says that it does not perfume, based on the inferior. If, according to the treatise, there is no distinction and it is generally said that it does not perfume, then the attachment to dharma should also be excluded from the ability to perfume, because the name is Vipaka (異熟, result of actions). Therefore, it is known that the superior produced by karma can perfume. What is superior? It is the reception of the three parts. The consciousness corresponding to Upeksha (舍受, neutral feeling) is only inferior, so it cannot perfume. The consciousness corresponding to Dukkha (苦受, painful feeling) and Sukha (樂受, pleasant feeling) is called superior in appearance and is able to perfume. Or Upeksha is further divided into three types: contrary, compliant, and neutral. The neutral does not perfume, and the other two can perfume. Others say that this only prevents the mind of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識), and there is no Vipaka of the six consciousnesses that cannot perfume, because there is no other holy teaching that says it does not perfume. The eighth consciousness has nothing to be perfumed, so it may not be able to perfume. The six consciousnesses have something to be perfumed, and none of them do not perfume. Also, if the mind and mental factors are not able to perfume, they are what is perfumed. Where is there a mental dharma that is not able to perfume or what is perfumed? In detail, both statements are unreasonable. The meaning of the first teacher is criticized as being like a lamp of righteousness. Also, using the three feelings to distinguish between superior and inferior, since it is not a holy teaching, is it not your own meaning? If the latter teacher says that only the eighth consciousness is prevented, and the rest can perfume, this treatise should conclude that only the Seven Transformations of Consciousness are able to perfume, why is it necessary to say that there is a superior power. Since it says superior, etc., it shows that there is prevention and distinction. Also, because the remaining six consciousnesses have something to be perfumed, they all cause the ability to perfume, and the mental factors of the eighth consciousness should also be able to perfume, because they have something to be perfumed. Also, it is said that where is there a mental dharma that is not able to perfume or what is perfumed, the eighth consciousness should not be a mental factor, because it is not able to perfume or what is perfumed. Since there are many faults, it cannot be followed.
Commentary: The two kinds of arising, etc., refer to the Self-name seed (自名言種) and the Karma seed (業種).
Commentary: Or this is just the way it is, etc., it is not necessary to base it on those two kinds of arising, but simply because it is useless, it cannot perfume.
Commentary: Like false views, etc., Question: Although the categories are the same, the increase and decrease are different, is it just an increase?
名能熏 答論言增減名能熏者。二隨有一即是能熏。若不爾者見道已去所生無漏唯增不減應不能熏。彼尚能熏此何不許。
疏。已前頓斷有得義不者。十地已前諸地之中能頓斷不。此縱問也。易知不答。理準菩薩有力可斷。一故意留。二不障地。所以必無不至金剛斷修道惑。
疏。一一地通三界所斷者。此言倒也。意說一一地中能斷三界所知障也。
疏。若有九品者。三界九地合為九品。非一一地別有九品。
疏。前解方成者。即第一釋唯增之義而得成也。故疏自云今日為增。明不結成前第二釋故 問雖生三界所緣無異。能緣行相唯作一常。有何別因得成九品 答無明漸增三界法爾有九品差。斯亦何失。
疏。若以無性有情第七等者。顯前第二釋非理也 詳曰。觀第二釋。不以有性．無性相例。余有此釋故敘非之 問疏二釋中何者為優 答初釋為勝。有增義顯。若第二釋減義難知。雖三界殊能所緣等。何為而有行相減耶。故第一勝。
疏。若相分相熏何法為礙者。有何法障不令變為相分熏耶。障法既無。故得熏矣。
疏。如自證分等者。若爾何故言見．相熏 答約用而說。
疏。即是本識同此無妨者。說本識中種生現行名俱有因。同此唯識。
疏。如俱有因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 名能熏：回答論中的『增減名能熏』問題。兩種情況中，只要有一種存在，就能成為能熏。如果不是這樣，那麼見道之後所產生的無漏法，只有增長而沒有減少，就不應該能夠成為能熏。既然見道后的無漏法尚且能熏，為什麼這裡不允許呢？
疏：之前所說的頓斷，是否意味著獲得了某種東西？十地之前，各個地之間能否頓斷？這是一種假設性的提問，容易理解，所以沒有回答。按照道理，菩薩有能力可以頓斷，一是故意保留，二是不妨礙進階到更高的地。因此，一定能夠到達金剛喻定，斷除修道位的迷惑。
疏：每一地都通於三界所斷的煩惱？這種說法是顛倒的。意思是說，每一地中都能斷除三界所有的所知障。
疏：如果存在九品？三界九地合起來構成九品，而不是每一地分別有九品。
疏：前面的解釋才能成立？指的是第一種解釋，即唯有增長的含義才能成立。所以疏中自己說『今天是爲了說明增長』，表明沒有總結成前面的第二種解釋。問：雖然產生於三界，所緣的對象沒有差異，能緣的行相也只是一個常數，有什麼不同的原因能夠形成九品？答：無明逐漸增長，三界的法則自然有九品的差別，這又有什麼問題呢？
疏：如果以無性有情的第七識等為例？這表明前面的第二種解釋是不合理的。詳細地說，觀察第二種解釋，不以有性、無性來類比。其他人有這種解釋，所以敘述它並否定它。問：疏中的兩種解釋哪個更好？答：第一種解釋更好，有增長的含義明顯。如果第二種解釋，減少的含義難以理解。即使三界不同，能緣和所緣等同，為什麼會有行相的減少呢？所以第一種解釋更好。
疏：如果相分和相分相互熏習，有什麼法則會成為障礙呢？有什麼法則會阻礙它，不讓它變為相分熏習呢？既然沒有阻礙的法則，所以能夠熏習。
疏：比如自證分等？如果是這樣，為什麼說見分和相分相互熏習？答：這是從作用的角度來說的。
疏：就是本識和它一樣沒有妨礙？說的是本識中的種子生出現行，名為俱有因，和唯識一樣。
疏：比如俱有因
【English Translation】 English version 『Name as Perfumer』: Answering the question of 『increase and decrease in name as perfumer』 in the treatise. Among the two situations, as long as one exists, it can become the perfumer. If not, then the un-leaked (anāsrava) dharmas arising after the Path of Seeing (darśanamārga), which only increase and do not decrease, should not be able to become the perfumer. Since the un-leaked dharmas after the Path of Seeing can still perfume, why is it not allowed here?
Commentary: Does the previous statement about sudden severance mean that something is obtained? Before the Ten Grounds (bhūmi), can there be sudden severance among the various grounds? This is a hypothetical question, easy to understand, so there is no answer. According to reason, a Bodhisattva has the ability to suddenly sever, firstly, intentionally retaining something, and secondly, not hindering advancement to higher grounds. Therefore, one will certainly reach the Vajra Samādhi (vajropamasamādhi) and sever the delusions of the Path of Cultivation (bhāvanāmārga).
Commentary: Does each ground penetrate the afflictions to be severed in the Three Realms (tridhātu)? This statement is inverted. It means that in each ground, one can sever all the obstructions of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa) in the Three Realms.
Commentary: If there are nine grades? The nine grounds of the Three Realms together constitute the nine grades, not that each ground separately has nine grades.
Commentary: The previous explanation can be established? This refers to the first explanation, that only the meaning of increase can be established. Therefore, the commentary itself says 『today is to explain increase,』 indicating that it does not conclude with the previous second explanation. Question: Although arising in the Three Realms, the objects of perception are not different, and the characteristics of what is perceived are only a constant, what different reasons can form the nine grades? Answer: Ignorance gradually increases, and the laws of the Three Realms naturally have nine grades of difference, so what is the problem?
Commentary: If taking the seventh consciousness (manas) of sentient beings without inherent nature (asvabhāva) as an example? This shows that the previous second explanation is unreasonable. In detail, observing the second explanation, it does not use inherent nature and lack of inherent nature for analogy. Others have this explanation, so it is narrated and negated. Question: Which of the two explanations in the commentary is better? Answer: The first explanation is better, the meaning of increase is clear. If it is the second explanation, the meaning of decrease is difficult to understand. Even if the Three Realms are different, the perceiver and the perceived are the same, why would there be a decrease in characteristics? Therefore, the first explanation is better.
Commentary: If the object-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) and the object-aspect mutually perfume, what dharma would become an obstacle? What dharma would hinder it, not allowing it to become object-aspect perfuming? Since there is no hindering dharma, it can perfume.
Commentary: Like the self-awareness aspect (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga) etc.? If so, why is it said that the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) and the object-aspect mutually perfume? Answer: This is spoken from the perspective of function.
Commentary: It is that the fundamental consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) is the same as this without hindrance? It is said that the seeds in the fundamental consciousness give rise to the present manifestation, called co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu), the same as Consciousness-Only (vijñānamātra).
Commentary: Like the co-existent cause
體至不能熏故者。結小乘因體非俱有因 言不熏者釋所以也。便以自義而顯他非。
疏。非現望現為因緣攝同類因者。不是現行而望于現為同類因。
疏。依義為問者。義謂體義。以不可知而無別體故不問也。
疏。次解釋中依頌而牒者。釋在問后名之為次。言不可知即本頌矣。
疏。對法唯據至故略不說者。故彼論云。為何義觀執受耶。謂受生所依色故是執受義。若依此色受得生是名執受。
疏。不相離大所發之聲等者。四大既為第八所執。故彼所發不離大聲亦名執受。
疏。猶如毛輪者。所緣幻化。有為不實。故譬毛輪 有云。說境微細。或境多故。故類毛輪勘。
疏。不爾心等相應是彼所緣者。若也不取如前會爾四蘊名名。心既名攝心應即是梨耶所緣。余相亦爾 或是字錯。應為豈字。前釋為本。
疏。因執心所執等者。善．無記心是能遍計。是妄執心所執之法。所執之法從彼能執以立彼名。所執自以見．相熏種。亦得名為遍計所執妄執習氣 或能遍計相分之中熏所執種子。所執種子名執習氣。前釋為勝。
疏。一切色至應不緣者。色非能熏亦非能計。八復無執。此色相中又無種子。亦應第八不緣此相。以彼說言緣執種故。若言雖實而得緣色。且據種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『體至不能熏故者』，這是因為結生小乘的因，其體性並非俱有因。『言不熏者』，解釋了為什麼不能熏習的原因。這實際上是用自己的觀點來顯示別人的錯誤。
疏：『非現望現為因緣攝同類因者』，不是指現行（的狀態）期望現行（的狀態）作為同類因。
疏：『依義為問者』，這裡的『義』指的是體義。因為（第八識）不可知且沒有別的體性，所以不問。
疏：『次解釋中依頌而牒者』，解釋在提問之後，所以稱為『次』。『言不可知』就是本頌的內容。
疏：『對法唯據至故略不說者』，因為《阿毗達磨》中只是根據這一點，所以簡略地沒有詳細說明。因為那部論典中說：『爲了什麼意義而觀察執受呢？』（答案是）『因為是受生所依的色法，所以是執受的意義。如果依靠這個色法而得到生，就叫做執受。』
疏：『不相離大所發之聲等者』，四大既然被第八識所執持，那麼四大所發出的不離四大之聲也叫做執受。
疏：『猶如毛輪者』，所緣的境界是幻化的，有為法是不真實的，所以用旋轉的毛輪來比喻。有人說，這是因為所緣的境界非常微細，或者境界太多，所以用旋轉的毛輪來類比。
疏：『不爾心等相應是彼所緣者』，如果不是這樣，心等相應法是第八識所緣的。如果第八識不取（心所法），那麼按照前面的解釋，四蘊中的受、想、行、識都叫做『名』。心既然被『名』所攝，那麼心就應該是阿賴耶識所緣的。其他的（受、想、行）相也一樣。或者這個『是』字是錯的，應該是『豈』字。前面的解釋是根本。
疏：『因執心所執等者』，善心、無記心是能遍計的，是虛妄執著的心所執著的法。所執著的法是從能執著的心那裡建立名稱的。所執著的法自己以見分、相分熏習種子，也可以叫做遍計所執的虛妄執著的習氣。或者能遍計的相分之中熏習所執著的種子，所執著的種子叫做執習氣。前面的解釋更好。
疏：『一切色至應不緣者』，色法不能熏習，也不能計度，第八識又沒有執著。這個色相中又沒有種子，那麼第八識就不應該緣這個色相。因為第八識的經文中說緣執著的種子。如果說雖然沒有種子，但實際上可以緣色法，那麼就只是根據種子來說。
【English Translation】 English version '體至不能熏故者 (tǐ zhì bù néng xūn gù zhě)': 'The reason why the substance cannot be perfumed' is because the cause of rebirth in the Lesser Vehicle (Hinayana) is not a co-existent cause in its nature. '言不熏者 (yán bù xūn zhě)': 'The statement that it cannot be perfumed' explains the reason why it cannot be perfumed. This is actually using one's own view to show the errors of others.
疏 (shū): '非現望現為因緣攝同類因者 (fēi xiàn wàng xiàn wèi yīnyuán shè tónglèi yīn zhě)': 'It is not that the present (state) expects the present (state) to be the cause of the same kind through cause and condition.'
疏 (shū): '依義為問者 (yī yì wèi wèn zhě)': 'Asking based on the meaning' refers to the meaning of the substance. Because (the Eighth Consciousness) is unknowable and has no other substance, it is not asked.
疏 (shū): '次解釋中依頌而牒者 (cì jiěshì zhōng yī sòng ér dié zhě)': 'The explanation following the question is called '次 (cì)' (next). '言不可知 (yán bù kězhī)' ('The statement that it is unknowable') is the content of the verse itself.
疏 (shū): '對法唯據至故略不說者 (duì fǎ wéi jù zhì gù lüè bù shuō zhě)': 'Because the Abhidharma only relies on this point, it is briefly not explained in detail.' Because that treatise says: 'For what meaning is the grasping observed?' (The answer is) 'Because it is the form that the rebirth relies on, therefore it is the meaning of grasping. If rebirth is obtained by relying on this form, it is called grasping.'
疏 (shū): '不相離大所發之聲等者 (bù xiānglí dà suǒ fā zhī shēng děng zhě)': 'The sound, etc., produced by the inseparable Four Great Elements' means that since the Four Great Elements are grasped by the Eighth Consciousness, the sound produced by the Four Great Elements, which is inseparable from them, is also called grasping.
疏 (shū): '猶如毛輪者 (yóurú máolún zhě)': 'Like a hair-wheel' means that the object of perception is illusory, and conditioned dharmas are unreal, so it is compared to a rotating hair-wheel. Some say that this is because the object of perception is very subtle, or there are too many objects, so it is compared to a rotating hair-wheel.
疏 (shū): '不爾心等相應是彼所緣者 (bù ěr xīn děng xiāngyìng shì bǐ suǒ yuán zhě)': 'If not, the mental concomitants, etc., are what it perceives.' If the Eighth Consciousness does not grasp (the mental factors), then according to the previous explanation, the feelings, perceptions, volitions, and consciousness in the Four Aggregates are all called 'name'. Since the mind is included in 'name', then the mind should be what the Alaya Consciousness perceives. The other (feelings, perceptions, volitions) aspects are the same. Or the character '是 (shì)' (is) is wrong, it should be '豈 (qǐ)' (how could). The previous explanation is fundamental.
疏 (shū): '因執心所執等者 (yīn zhí xīn suǒ zhí děng zhě)': 'The mind that grasps and what is grasped by the mind, etc.' means that the wholesome mind and the neutral mind are the ones that can universally calculate, and are the dharmas grasped by the mind that is falsely attached. The grasped dharmas establish their names from the mind that can grasp. The grasped dharmas themselves perfume seeds with the seeing-aspect and the object-aspect, and can also be called the habits of the falsely attached to the universally calculated. Or, within the object-aspect of what can be universally calculated, the seeds of what is grasped are perfumed, and the seeds of what is grasped are called grasping habits. The previous explanation is better.
疏 (shū): '一切色至應不緣者 (yīqiè sè zhì yìng bù yuán zhě)': 'All form should not be perceived' means that form cannot perfume, nor can it be calculated, and the Eighth Consciousness does not grasp it. There are no seeds in this form-aspect, so the Eighth Consciousness should not perceive this aspect. Because the Eighth Consciousness's sutra says that it perceives the seeds of grasping. If it is said that although there are no seeds, it can actually perceive form, then it is only based on the seeds.
論言緣執習。既爾何妨實緣三性種。且依染種說。
疏。既爾第八應亦能熏者。此破伏執。執者說云。既言第八緣執習氣。何無執耶。故有斯責。
疏。即以此為證者。問所熏種子名執習氣。證能熏識為執可然。藏識不爾。此何為證 答余善心等由二分故故名為執。藏識亦然何不有執。故得為證 若爾藏識應亦能熏。同餘七識 答無別所熏非能熏攝。
疏。今此師意至如下自知者。初釋自證．見．相同種。后釋種別。有多問答。如后具陳。
疏。若爾無色界至此義應思者。問按彼論云。于欲界中緣狹小執受境。於色界中緣廣大執受境。于無色界空無邊處．識無邊處緣無量執受境。于無所有處緣微細執受境。于非想非非想處緣極微細執受境。如何說緣無色廣大 答撿文者誤。疏主意取無色為難。以無色界唯緣種故。既言彼識緣無量等執受之境。明知第八緣種功能 問云何彼種名無量等 答緣無量境心所熏故故名無量 或無量等種上功能。能生無量現行心故。前釋為勝。
疏。即是能生至不違本識者。雖彼種上有多別能。謂即是善及於廣大。廣大之能同識無記。故能緣之。廣大即功能。即種子也。
疏。又無色界廣大之用等者。此釋應善。省諸過故 有義但緣種體隨有功能皆能緣之
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論述緣起、執取和習氣。既然如此，為什麼不能說實有緣起三性種呢？這裡先依據染污的種子進行說明。
疏：既然如此，第八識（阿賴耶識）也應該能夠熏習吧？這是爲了駁斥一種固執的觀點。持這種觀點的人說，既然說第八識緣取執取和習氣，為什麼說它沒有執取呢？所以有這樣的責難。
疏：用這個作為證據。問：被熏習的種子名為執習氣，證明能熏習的識為執取，這還可以理解。但藏識（阿賴耶識）不是這樣，這怎麼能作為證據呢？答：其他的善心等，因為有二分（見分和相分），所以名為執取。藏識也是這樣，為什麼不能有執取呢？所以可以作為證據。如果這樣，藏識也應該能夠熏習，和其餘七識一樣。答：因為它沒有特別的所熏，所以不屬於能熏。
疏：現在這位法師的意思，到後面自然會明白。先解釋自證分、見分、相同種，然後解釋種子的差別，有很多問答，在後面會詳細陳述。
疏：如果這樣，沒有（原文如此，疑為「色」）至此義應思。問：按照那部論典的說法，在欲界中，緣取狹小執受境；在界中，緣取廣大執受境；在無界的空無邊處、識無邊處，緣取無量執受境；在無所有處，緣取微細執受境；在非想非非想處，緣取極微細執受境。為什麼說緣取無色界的廣大境呢？答：查閱文字的人理解有誤。疏主的意圖是拿無色界來發難，因為無界只緣取種子。既然說那個識緣取無量等的執受之境，就說明第八識緣取種子的功能。問：為什麼那些種子名為無量等呢？答：因為緣取無量境的心所熏習，所以名為無量。或者無量等種子上的功能，能夠產生無量現行心。前一種解釋更好。
疏：就是能生，直到不違背本識（阿賴耶識）。雖然那些種子上有多種不同的功能，就是善以及廣大。廣大的功能和識的無記性相同，所以能夠緣取它。廣大就是功能，也就是種子。
疏：又沒有**界廣大的作用等。這個解釋應該很好，因為它省略了很多過失。有一種觀點認為，只緣取種子的本體，隨之而來的功能都能緣取。
【English Translation】 English version: A discussion on conditions, attachment, and habitual energies. If that's the case, why can't we say there are truly existent seeds of the three natures of dependent origination? Here, we'll start by explaining based on defiled seeds.
Commentary: Since that's the case, the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) should also be able to imprint, right? This is to refute a stubborn view. Those who hold this view say, 'Since it's said that the eighth consciousness conditions attachment and habitual energies, why say it has no attachment?' Hence, there's this challenge.
Commentary: Using this as evidence. Question: The seeds that are imprinted are called 'habitual energies of attachment.' Proving that the consciousness that can imprint is attachment is understandable. But the storehouse consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) isn't like that, so how can this be used as evidence? Answer: Other wholesome minds, etc., are called attachment because they have two aspects (the seeing aspect and the object aspect). The storehouse consciousness is also like that, so why can't it have attachment? Therefore, it can be used as evidence. If that's the case, the storehouse consciousness should also be able to imprint, just like the other seven consciousnesses. Answer: Because it has no specific object to be imprinted upon, it doesn't belong to the category of that which can imprint.
Commentary: The intention of this master will become clear later. First, he explains the seeds of self-awareness, the seeing aspect, and the commonality. Then, he explains the differences between seeds, with many questions and answers, which will be elaborated on later.
Commentary: If that's the case, without form (should be 'rūpa'?) ... this meaning should be considered. Question: According to that treatise, in the desire realm, one conditions small objects of attachment; in the form realm, one conditions vast objects of attachment; in the formless realm, in the sphere of infinite space and the sphere of infinite consciousness, one conditions limitless objects of attachment; in the sphere of nothingness, one conditions subtle objects of attachment; in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, one conditions extremely subtle objects of attachment. Why do you say that one conditions the vast realm of the formless realm? Answer: The person who checked the text made a mistake. The commentator's intention is to challenge with the formless realm because the formless realm only conditions seeds. Since it's said that that consciousness conditions limitless objects of attachment, it shows that the eighth consciousness conditions the function of seeds. Question: Why are those seeds called 'limitless,' etc.? Answer: Because they are imprinted by the mind that conditions limitless objects, they are called 'limitless.' Or, the function on the limitless seeds can produce limitless manifest minds. The former explanation is better.
Commentary: That is, 'can produce,' until 'doesn't contradict the fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).' Although those seeds have many different functions, namely, wholesomeness and vastness. The function of vastness is the same as the non-defiled nature of consciousness, so it can condition it. Vastness is function, which is also the seed.
Commentary: Also, the vast function of the formless realm, etc. This explanation should be good because it omits many faults. Some argue that one only conditions the essence of the seed, and all the functions that come with it can be conditioned.
。所以者何。若善種子差別功能。由性別故說不緣者。應漏善．惡所熏成種皆通二性。體是無記用善．惡分。既不如是。何言體同本識無記說是所緣。用通善等非所緣耶。若言一種體．用別故通二性者。若爾論說因果俱善豈唯約用。又體不離識善等種體名為無記。用不離體隨體無記。故種體．用俱識所緣。體．用俱是善等所生。能生善等俱善等攝 問若爾無想定等豈皆所緣 答彼非所緣 既爾如何但從功能皆說緣耶 解云厭心種上防心功能非無想定。但約此能假立彼定。雖緣種子差別功能不緣假也。然彼假法不離實故。緣種之時亦緣假者。即無有失 詳曰。理不一途寧無此義。委尋疏旨固亦無違。來難成似。其所以者。言隨本識及對因果以判性者。依種體論不依用說。善．惡之用二性自成。何待因果方名善．惡。又種之體隨識因果性既不恒。何得責令善．惡等種定唯二性。又以種體不離識故名為無記。便難種用不離種體成無記者。亦應色種不離識故而無質礙。色種現果不離種故應無質礙。體用因果非即．離故。此既不爾彼云何然 又云。但緣厭種功能無想定等假不緣者。若爾彼定其體全無。厭種功能非定非假。前論說云假亦能遮。假目何法。又約防能立彼定者。為定即能。為依于能方假立定。定若即能。定云何假。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：為什麼這麼說呢？如果說善的種子有差別功能，因為性別的緣故說它不緣，那麼應該遺漏了善和惡所熏成的種子，它們都通於兩種性質（善與惡）。種子本體是無記性，而作用則分為善和惡。既然不是這樣，為什麼說種子本體和本識一樣是無記性，所以說是所緣，而作用通於善等卻不是所緣呢？如果說一種種子的本體和作用不同，所以通於兩種性質，那麼如果經論說因和果都是善的，難道僅僅是就作用而言嗎？而且本體不離識，善等種子的本體名為無記，作用不離本體，隨本體而無記，所以種子的本體和作用都是識所緣的。本體和作用都是善等所生的，能生善等，都屬於善等所攝。 問：如果這樣，無想定（nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha，滅盡定）等難道都是所緣嗎？答：它們不是所緣。既然如此，為什麼只從功能上都說是緣呢？解釋說，厭心（disgust）的種子上有防止心的功能，而不是無想定。只是就這種功能假立彼定（無想定）。雖然緣種子的差別功能，但不緣假法。然而彼假法不離實法，所以緣種子的時候也緣假法，就沒有過失了。 詳細地說，道理不是隻有一條路，難道沒有這種意義嗎？仔細尋味疏鈔的旨意，本來也沒有違背。來難似乎成立。其中的原因在於，說隨本識以及對因果來判斷性質，是依據種子的本體來論述，不是依據作用來說。善和惡的作用，兩種性質自然成就，何必等待因果才名為善或惡呢？而且種子的本體隨識的因果，性質既然不恒常，怎麼能責令善、惡等種子一定只有兩種性質呢？又因為種子的本體不離識，所以名為無記，就以此來責難種子的作用不離種子的本體而成為無記，那麼也應該色種不離識的緣故而沒有質礙。色種顯現果實不離種子的緣故，應該沒有質礙。本體、作用、因果不是即，也不是離，既然這個不是這樣，那個怎麼會是這樣呢？ 又說，只是緣厭種的功能，無想定等假法不緣。如果這樣，彼定（無想定）的本體完全沒有。厭種的功能不是定，也不是假法。前面的論述說假法也能遮止。假法指的是什麼法？又說依據防止的功能來建立彼定，是定就是功能，還是依靠功能才假立定？定如果是功能，定怎麼是假法？如果
【English Translation】 English version: Why is this so? If it is said that good seeds have different functions, and because of gender, it is said that they are not conditioned, then the seeds that are perfumed by good and evil should be omitted, and they all pass through two natures (good and evil). The substance of the seed is neutral, while the function is divided into good and evil. Since this is not the case, why say that the substance of the seed is the same as the Alaya-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness), which is neutral, so it is the conditioned, while the function passes through good, etc., but is not the conditioned? If it is said that the substance and function of a seed are different, so it passes through two natures, then if the scriptures say that the cause and effect are both good, is it only in terms of function? Moreover, the substance is inseparable from consciousness, and the substance of good seeds, etc., is called neutral. The function is inseparable from the substance, and follows the substance to be neutral. Therefore, the substance and function of the seed are both conditioned by consciousness. The substance and function are both produced by good, etc., and what can produce good, etc., all belong to the category of good, etc. Question: If so, are nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha (cessation of perception and sensation) etc. all conditioned? Answer: They are not conditioned. Since this is the case, why do you say that they are all conditioned only from the function? The explanation is that there is a function of preventing the mind on the seed of disgust, not nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha. It is only based on this function that the nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha is falsely established. Although the difference function of the seed is conditioned, the false dharma is not conditioned. However, since the false dharma is inseparable from the real dharma, there is no fault in conditioning the false dharma when conditioning the seed. In detail, the principle is not only one way, is there no such meaning? Carefully examining the meaning of the commentary, there is originally no violation. The difficulty seems to be established. The reason for this is that saying that the nature is judged according to the Alaya-consciousness and the cause and effect is based on the substance of the seed, not on the function. The function of good and evil, the two natures are naturally accomplished, why wait for the cause and effect to be called good or evil? Moreover, since the nature of the seed follows the cause and effect of consciousness, and the nature is not constant, how can we demand that good, evil, and other seeds must have only two natures? Also, because the substance of the seed is inseparable from consciousness, it is called neutral, and this is used to criticize that the function of the seed is inseparable from the substance of the seed and becomes neutral. Then, the form seed should also be without obstruction because it is inseparable from consciousness. The form seed manifests the fruit and is inseparable from the seed, so there should be no obstruction. Substance, function, cause, and effect are neither identical nor separate. Since this is not the case, how can that be the case? It is also said that only the function of the disgust seed is conditioned, and the false dharmas such as nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha are not conditioned. If so, the substance of nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha is completely non-existent. The function of the disgust seed is neither a samadhi nor a false dharma. The previous discussion said that the false dharma can also prevent. What dharma does the false dharma refer to? It is also said that the nirodha-saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha is established based on the function of prevention. Is the samadhi the function, or is the samadhi falsely established based on the function? If the samadhi is the function, how is the samadhi a false dharma? If
依能立有無窮失。故知其定即種防能。非別境定。定故稱假。本識不緣非為假也 又云。緣種亦緣假者。若爾本識應分別變。由斯疏道理乃通矣。
疏。又種有三品者。心．色等種三性等差各有三品。或三界種名為三品。
疏。即己體者。相不離識名為己體。
疏。若斷未斷隨增減者。斷減。未增。凡．聖第八所緣異也。
論。有根身者。有義即五根體名為有根。無別能有。如有色言。所依色等體雖非根。而能有根亦名有根 根及有根和合積聚故名為身。
疏。以根微細等者。意辨論中根．身雙舉。根微細故不唯言根。身濫外塵不獨云身。故兼言之二失皆遣。
疏。即諸根五處者。即五扶塵。
疏。緣他五境者。即是他身五扶塵。
疏。此有量者。量云。自八不能執他扶塵。非自內身故。如外五境。
論。此二皆是識所執受等者。此執受義通大小乘。于中鉅細非無差異。對法第五唯約生受 伽五十三通據依持生受而說 故對法雲。謂受生所依色故是執受義。若依此色受得生故是名執受 瑜伽論云。若識依執名執受色。此復云何。識識所詫。安危事同和合生長。又此為依能生諸受。與此相違非執受色。初狹．后寬。二論別也。現種根．境具如疏會 若依小乘。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 依賴於『能』（neng，能力）會產生無窮的過失。因此可知，所謂的『定』（ding，禪定）實際上是防止產生『能』（neng，能力）的種子。它並非是獨立於其他境界的『定』（ding，禪定）。因為是『定』（ding，禪定），所以稱之為『假』（jia，虛假）。本識（ben shi，阿賴耶識）不緣取任何事物，所以才說是『假』（jia，虛假）。還有一種說法是，緣取種子也緣取『假』（jia，虛假）的事物。如果這樣，本識（ben shi，阿賴耶識）就應該能夠分別變現事物了。因此，這種解釋才能使疏文的道理通順。
疏文：又種子有三品者。心、色等種子，在三性（san xing，三種性質，即善、惡、無記）的差別上，各有三品。或者說，三界（san jie，欲界、色界、無色界）的種子被稱為三品。
疏文：即己體者。相（xiang，相分）不離識（shi，見分），稱為己體（ji ti，自身的體性）。
疏文：若斷未斷隨增減者。斷則減少，未斷則增加。凡夫和聖人的第八識（di ba shi，阿賴耶識）所緣取的對象是不同的。
論：有根身者。有一種解釋是，五根（wu gen，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）的本體稱為『有根』（you gen，具有根）。沒有其他的『能有』（neng you，使之存在的能力）。就像說『有色』（you se，具有顏色）一樣，所依之色等本體雖然不是根，但是能夠使根存在，也可以稱為『有根』（you gen，具有根）。根（gen，感覺器官）和『有根』（you gen，具有根）和合積聚，所以稱為身（shen，身體）。
疏文：以根微細等者。這裡是爲了辨析論中同時提到『根』（gen，感覺器官）和『身』（shen，身體）的原因。因為根（gen，感覺器官）非常微細，所以不能只說『根』（gen，感覺器官）。而『身』（shen，身體）容易和外在的塵境混淆，所以不能單獨說『身』（shen，身體）。因此，同時使用這兩個詞，可以避免這兩種過失。
疏文：即諸根五處者。就是指五扶塵（wu fu chen，五根所依賴的物質）。
疏文：緣他五境者。就是指他身（ta shen，他人的身體）的五扶塵（wu fu chen，五根所依賴的物質）。
疏文：此有量者。意思是說，第八識（di ba shi，阿賴耶識）不能執取他人的扶塵（fu chen，扶助根塵），因為它不是自身內部的。就像外在的五境（wu jing，色、聲、香、味、觸）一樣。
論：此二皆是識所執受等者。這種執受（zhi shou，執持領受）的含義，在大乘（da cheng，Mahayana）和小乘（xiao cheng，Hinayana）中都是通用的。其中，在範圍大小上並非沒有差異。《對法》（dui fa，Abhidharma）第五卷只涉及生受（sheng shou，由生而來的感受）。《瑜伽》（yu qie，Yoga）第五十三卷則同時包括依持生受（yi chi sheng shou，依賴於某種事物而產生的感受）而說。所以《對法》（dui fa，Abhidharma）中說：『所謂受生所依之色，就是執受（zhi shou，執持領受）的含義。如果依靠這種色，感受才能產生，這就叫做執受（zhi shou，執持領受）。』《瑜伽論》（yu qie lun，Yoga-sastra）中說：『如果識（shi，意識）所依賴和執持的色，稱為執受色（zhi shou se，被執持領受的色）。這是什麼呢？就是識（shi，意識）所珍視的，安危與它共同，和合生長的。而且，這種色是諸受（zhu shou，各種感受）產生的基礎。與此相反的，就不是執受色（zhi shou se，被執持領受的色）。』前者狹窄，後者寬泛。這兩種論典的差別就在於此。現行、種子、根、境都如疏文所解釋的那樣會合。如果依據小乘（xiao cheng，Hinayana）。
【English Translation】 English version Relying on 'neng' (ability) leads to infinite faults. Therefore, it is known that 'ding' (samadhi) is actually a seed for preventing the arising of 'neng' (ability). It is not a 'ding' (samadhi) that is separate from other realms. Because it is 'ding' (samadhi), it is called 'jia' (false). The fundamental consciousness (ben shi, Alaya-vijnana) does not cognize anything, so it is said to be 'jia' (false). Another saying is that cognizing seeds also cognizes 'jia' (false) things. If so, the fundamental consciousness (ben shi, Alaya-vijnana) should be able to differentiate and manifest things. Therefore, this explanation can make the reasoning of the commentary clear.
Commentary: Furthermore, seeds have three grades. Seeds of mind, form, etc., each have three grades in the differences of the three natures (san xing, three natures: good, evil, and neutral). Or, the seeds of the three realms (san jie, desire realm, form realm, formless realm) are called three grades.
Commentary: 'That is, one's own substance' means that the aspect (xiang, nimitta-bhaga) is inseparable from consciousness (shi, vijnana, the seeing aspect), and is called one's own substance (ji ti, one's own essence).
Commentary: 'If cut off or not cut off, it increases or decreases accordingly' means that if cut off, it decreases; if not cut off, it increases. The objects cognized by the eighth consciousness (di ba shi, Alaya-vijnana) of ordinary people and sages are different.
Treatise: 'Those with root bodies' means that, according to one interpretation, the substance of the five roots (wu gen, the five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is called 'having roots' (you gen, having roots). There is no other 'neng you' (ability to exist). Just as saying 'having color' (you se, having color), although the substance of the color, etc., on which it depends is not a root, it can enable the root to exist and can also be called 'having roots' (you gen, having roots). The root (gen, sense organ) and 'having roots' (you gen, having roots) combine and accumulate, so it is called body (shen, body).
Commentary: 'Because the roots are subtle, etc.' This is to explain why the treatise mentions both 'root' (gen, sense organ) and 'body' (shen, body). Because the root (gen, sense organ) is very subtle, it is not enough to say only 'root' (gen, sense organ). And 'body' (shen, body) is easily confused with external dust, so it is not enough to say only 'body' (shen, body). Therefore, using both terms avoids both faults.
Commentary: 'That is, the five places of the roots' refers to the five supporting dusts (wu fu chen, the material elements that support the five sense organs).
Commentary: 'Cognizing the five external objects' refers to the five supporting dusts (wu fu chen, the material elements that support the five sense organs) of another's body (ta shen, another person's body).
Commentary: 'This is limited' means that the eighth consciousness (di ba shi, Alaya-vijnana) cannot grasp the supporting dust (fu chen, supporting dust) of others, because it is not internal to oneself. It is like the external five objects (wu jing, form, sound, smell, taste, and touch).
Treatise: 'These two are both grasped by consciousness, etc.' The meaning of this grasping (zhi shou, holding and receiving) is common to both Mahayana (da cheng, Mahayana) and Hinayana (xiao cheng, Hinayana). Among them, there are differences in scope. The fifth volume of the Abhidharma (dui fa, Abhidharma) only concerns the feeling of being born (sheng shou, feeling arising from birth). The fifty-third volume of the Yoga (yu qie, Yoga) includes both relying on and holding the feeling of being born. Therefore, the Abhidharma (dui fa, Abhidharma) says: 'What is called the color on which feeling depends is the meaning of grasping (zhi shou, holding and receiving). If feeling arises relying on this color, it is called grasping (zhi shou, holding and receiving).' The Yoga-sastra (yu qie lun, Yoga-sastra) says: 'If the color that consciousness (shi, vijnana) relies on and holds is called grasped color (zhi shou se, color that is held and received). What is this? It is what consciousness (shi, vijnana) cherishes, whose safety and danger are shared, and which grows together. Moreover, this color is the basis for the arising of all feelings (zhu shou, various feelings). What is contrary to this is not grasped color (zhi shou se, color that is held and received).' The former is narrow, and the latter is broad. The difference between the two treatises lies in this. Manifestation, seeds, roots, and objects all converge as explained in the commentary. If based on Hinayana (xiao cheng, Hinayana).
俱舍第二。現在五根．扶根四塵名有執受。余非執受。執受義者。即彼論云。心．心所法共所執受。攝為依處名有執受。損益展轉更相隨故。即諸世間說有覺觸。眾緣所觸覺樂等故。此同瑜伽有二義也。根．境等九復如對法 問大乘何意唯第八識名能執受 答按瑜伽論五十一云。由五因故 一謂賴耶識先世所造業行為因。眼等轉識現緣為因。謂根．境等 二六識三性可得 三六識無覆無記異熟所攝類不可得 四六識別依于彼彼依彼彼識轉。即彼所依應有執受。余無執受。設許執受亦不應理。識遠離故 五又所依止應成數數執受過失。所以者何。由彼眼識於一時轉。一時不轉。余識亦爾。第八異彼故能執受。
疏。變即轉變者。即是生變。下疏結云故能生因說名能變。
疏緣無漏種準此應知者。因中第八望無漏種二變俱無。不緣．不熏如次不名緣生二變。果位本識緣故名變。因位無漏六．七二識具有二變。果中七識但緣名變。義思可知。
疏。即根種等具二變義等者。現行第八望根與種具緣．執二。外器但緣。其種子識對現七識唯生一變。現望現七三變俱無。若種子識望現根．器。即生名變。器亦是識共相種生。疏示方隅且舉現識。現識及種合而言之。根具三變。外器二變。
疏。經部至已略
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《俱舍論》第二：現在的五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官），以及扶助五根的四種微細物質（色、聲、香、味），被稱為『有執受』。其餘的則不是『執受』。『執受』的意義，正如《俱舍論》中所說：『心和心所法共同執持、攝取的，作為所依之處，稱為『有執受』。』因為損益和展轉之間互相隨順的緣故。也就是世間所說的有覺觸，因為眾緣所觸而覺知樂等感受的緣故。這與《瑜伽師地論》中的兩種意義相同。根、境等九種，又如《阿毗達磨》中所說。 問：大乘佛教是什麼意思，只有第八識（阿賴耶識）才被稱為『能執受』？ 答：按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說，由於五個原因： 一、所謂的阿賴耶識以先世所造的業行為因，眼等轉識以現前所緣為因，即根、境等。 二、第六識（意識）的三性（善、惡、無記）可以獲得。 三、第六識的無覆無記（非善非惡，不障礙解脫）的異熟果所攝的種類不可得。 四、第六識分別依賴於彼彼所依，隨彼彼識而轉。即彼所依應該有執受，其餘的沒有執受。假設允許有執受，也不合道理，因為識遠離的緣故。 五、而且所依止應該成為數數執受的過失。為什麼呢？因為眼識於一時轉，一時不轉，其餘的識也是這樣。第八識與它們不同，所以能夠執受。
疏：『變』即轉變，就是生變。下面的疏文總結說：『所以能生之因，稱為能變。』
疏：『緣無漏種準此應知』，因位中的第八識對於無漏種（無漏的種子）來說，兩種『變』都沒有。不緣、不熏習，依次不稱為緣生二變。果位中的本識因為緣故稱為『變』。因位中的無漏的第六、第七識具有兩種『變』。果位中的第七識只是緣故稱為『變』。其中的意義可以思考得知。
疏：『即根種等具二變義等』，現行第八識對於根和種子來說，具有緣和執兩種『變』。對於外在的器世界只是緣。其種子識對於現行的第七識只有生起一種『變』。現行識對於現行的第七識來說，三種『變』都沒有。如果種子識對於現行的根和器世界來說，就是生起『變』。器世界也是識的共相種子所生。疏文只是爲了指示方向，所以只舉了現行識。現行識和種子合起來說，根具有三種『變』，外在的器世界具有兩種『變』。
疏：經部宗的觀點到這裡已經省略了。
【English Translation】 English version Kusha Chapter 2: The present five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body - the five sense organs) and the four subtle matters that support the five roots (form, sound, smell, taste) are called 'having appropriation' (arising from grasping). The rest are not 'appropriation'. The meaning of 'appropriation', as stated in the 'Kusha': 'What the mind and mental functions jointly grasp and collect, as a basis of support, is called 'having appropriation'.' Because benefit and harm mutually follow each other in turn. That is, what the world calls having sensation, because of the touch of various conditions and the awareness of pleasure and other feelings. This is the same as the two meanings in the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra'. The nine kinds of roots, objects, etc., are again as described in the 'Abhidharma'. Question: What does Mahayana Buddhism mean when only the eighth consciousness (Alaya-consciousness) is called 'capable of appropriation'? Answer: According to the fifty-first volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', it is due to five reasons: 1. The so-called Alaya-consciousness takes the karmic actions created in previous lives as the cause, and the transforming consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness take the present object as the cause, that is, the roots, objects, etc. 2. The three natures (good, evil, and neutral) of the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) can be obtained. 3. The kind of the sixth consciousness that is covered by non-afflictive ignorance (neither good nor evil, not hindering liberation) and belongs to the result of maturation cannot be obtained. 4. The sixth consciousness separately relies on each basis of support, and turns with each consciousness. That is, the basis of support should have appropriation, and the rest do not have appropriation. Even if appropriation is allowed, it is not reasonable, because the consciousness is far away. 5. Moreover, the basis of support should become the fault of repeated appropriation. Why? Because the eye-consciousness turns at one time and does not turn at another time, and the other consciousnesses are also like this. The eighth consciousness is different from them, so it can appropriate.
Commentary: 'Transformation' means change, that is, arising change. The commentary below concludes: 'Therefore, the cause that can produce is called capable of transformation.'
Commentary: 'Knowing that the conditions for non-outflow seeds are based on this', the eighth consciousness in the causal stage has no two 'transformations' for non-outflow seeds (seeds of non-outflow). Not conditioning, not perfuming, are not called the two transformations of arising from conditions in sequence. The original consciousness in the fruit stage is called 'transformation' because of conditioning. The non-outflow sixth and seventh consciousnesses in the causal stage have two 'transformations'. The seventh consciousness in the fruit stage is only called 'transformation' because of conditioning. The meaning can be understood by thinking.
Commentary: 'That is, the roots, seeds, etc., have the meaning of two transformations', the currently acting eighth consciousness has two 'transformations' of conditioning and appropriation for the roots and seeds. It only conditions the external world of vessels. Its seed consciousness only produces one 'transformation' for the currently acting seventh consciousness. The currently acting consciousness has no three 'transformations' for the currently acting seventh consciousness. If the seed consciousness is for the currently acting roots and vessels, it is the arising of 'transformation'. The world of vessels is also produced by the common seed of consciousness. The commentary only gives the direction, so it only cites the currently acting consciousness. The currently acting consciousness and the seed are combined, the roots have three 'transformations', and the external world of vessels has two 'transformations'.
Commentary: The view of the Sautrantika school has been omitted here.
解訖者。即經部師俱無起等。如第一疏。
疏。然唯初解等者。略為二釋 一云如因第八緣自三境。但相無質。心所杖八相為質緣。或所更互托為質起。故不可言本質是同名為同一。由此應言相名行相。行相相似名同所緣 二云疏錯。應云然唯第二無初解者。余言同前 詳曰。后釋優也 何以明之 答見名行相。相但相似名同所緣。不名行相。竟何失耶 又疏下會瑜伽論云。瑜伽據質名同所緣。此約影像名所緣等。豈可前後自為楚．越 又按疏主瑜伽鈔云。若也影像名行相者。即以本質為所緣者體一名同。行相體別故名不同。若以見分名行相者。即親相分體雖各別。似名同一。見分體緣各各異故名為不同 由此故知。見名行相。第八王．所相分相似名同所緣。見分各別名不同行。若也相分名行相者。即行相同。如何說云不同一行。第八非定緣本質境。復云何說同一所緣。若云相分相似名同。若爾所緣。行相是一。如何而說同．不同言。以此故知疏顛倒也。
疏。無心心所自能緣故者。彼宗不許心．心所法而能自緣。
論若心心所至自所緣境者。有義諸師皆說。初量破彼正量．安惠不破餘部。今解不然。十九部義雖心．心所緣境之時有行境相。其行境相是能緣相非是所緣。如何初量唯破正量。是故應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『解訖者』（jie qi zhe）指的是經部師（Jingbu shi），比如俱無起（Ju Wuqi）等人，正如《第一疏》（Di Yi Shu）所說。
疏：『然唯初解等者』（ran wei chu jie deng zhe）這句話，略作兩種解釋：第一種說法是，比如第八識（第八識，Alaya-vijnana）以其自身的三種境為緣，但『相』（xiang，aspect）沒有實體，心所（xin suo，mental factors）憑藉第八識的『相』作為實體來緣取。或者說，彼此互相依託作為實體而生起。因此，不能說本質相同，而稱之為『同一』（tong yi，the same）。由此應該說『相』名為『行相』（xing xiang，cognitive aspect），『行相』相似，名為『同所緣』（tong suo yuan，same object）。第二種說法是，《疏》（shu，commentary）有錯誤，應該說『然唯第二無初解者』（ran wei di er wu chu jie zhe），其餘的說法與前一種相同。
詳細地說，后一種解釋更好。為什麼這麼說呢？回答是，『見』（jian，perception）名為『行相』，『相』只是相似，名為『同所緣』，不名為『行相』，這有什麼損失呢？而且，《疏》（shu，commentary）下面會引用《瑜伽論》（Yuqie lun）說，《瑜伽論》（Yuqie lun）根據實體而稱之為『同所緣』，這裡是根據影像而稱之為『所緣』等等。怎麼可以前後自相矛盾呢？
而且，按照《疏主瑜伽鈔》（Shuzhu Yuqie Chao）所說，如果影像名為『行相』，那麼以本質為所緣的，其體性相同，名為『同一』，『行相』的體性不同，所以名稱不同。如果以『見分』（jian fen，perceiving aspect）名為『行相』，那麼即使『親相分』（qin xiang fen，directly perceived aspect）的體性各不相同，但相似，名稱也相同。『見分』的體性和所緣各不相同，所以名稱不同。由此可知，『見』名為『行相』，第八識的『王』（wang，consciousness）、『所相分』（suo xiang fen，object aspect）相似，名為『同所緣』，『見分』各不相同，名稱不同『行』。如果『相分』名為『行相』，那麼『行相』相同，如何說『不同一行』呢？第八識並非一定緣取本質境，又怎麼說『同一所緣』呢？如果說『相分』相似，名為『同』，那麼『所緣』和『行相』就是一樣的，如何說『同』和『不同』呢？因此可知，《疏》（shu，commentary）是顛倒的。
疏：『無心心所自能緣故者』（wu xin xin suo zi neng yuan gu zhe），他們的宗派不承認心（xin，mind）和心所法（xin suo fa，mental factors）能夠自緣。
論：『若心心所至自所緣境者』（ruo xin xin suo zhi zi suo yuan jing zhe），有些師父都說，初量（chu liang，initial valid cognition）破斥他們，正量（Zhengliang， Sautrantika）和安惠（Anhui）不破斥其他部派。現在解釋不是這樣。十九部（shijiu bu，nineteen schools）的觀點是，即使心（xin，mind）和心所（xin suo，mental factors）緣取境的時候有『行境相』（xing jing xiang，aspect of the object being cognized），但『行境相』是能緣的『相』，不是所緣的。為什麼初量（chu liang，initial valid cognition）只破斥正量（Zhengliang， Sautrantika）呢？所以應該……
【English Translation】 English version: 'Jie qi zhe' refers to the masters of the Sautrantika school, such as Kuwuqi and others, as stated in the 'First Commentary'.
Commentary: 'Ran wei chu jie deng zhe' can be interpreted in two ways: The first interpretation is that, for example, the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) takes its own three realms as its object, but the 'aspect' (xiang) has no substance. Mental factors rely on the 'aspect' of the eighth consciousness as substance to take as object. Or, they mutually rely on each other as substance to arise. Therefore, it cannot be said that the essence is the same, and it is called 'the same'. Hence, it should be said that 'aspect' is called 'cognitive aspect' (xing xiang), and similar 'cognitive aspects' are called 'same object' (tong suo yuan). The second interpretation is that the 'Commentary' (shu) is incorrect and should say 'Ran wei di er wu chu jie zhe', with the rest of the statement remaining the same as the first.
In detail, the latter interpretation is better. Why is this so? The answer is that 'perception' (jian) is called 'cognitive aspect', and 'aspect' is only similar and called 'same object', not 'cognitive aspect'. What is the loss in this? Moreover, the 'Commentary' (shu) below will quote the 'Yoga Treatise' (Yuqie lun), saying that the 'Yoga Treatise' (Yuqie lun) calls it 'same object' based on substance, while here it is called 'object' based on image, and so on. How can it be self-contradictory?
Moreover, according to the 'Commentary on the Yoga Treatise' (Shuzhu Yuqie Chao), if the image is called 'cognitive aspect', then the essence taken as the object has the same nature and is called 'the same', while the nature of the 'cognitive aspect' is different, so the name is different. If the 'perceiving aspect' (jian fen) is called 'cognitive aspect', then even if the nature of the 'directly perceived aspect' (qin xiang fen) is different, it is similar, and the name is the same. The nature of the 'perceiving aspect' and the object are different, so the name is different. From this, it can be known that 'perception' is called 'cognitive aspect', and the 'consciousness' (wang), 'object aspect' (suo xiang fen) of the eighth consciousness are similar and called 'same object', while the 'perceiving aspects' are different and the names are different. If the 'object aspect' is called 'cognitive aspect', then the 'cognitive aspect' is the same, how can it be said that 'not the same'? The eighth consciousness does not necessarily take the essential realm as its object, so how can it be said to be 'the same object'? If it is said that the 'object aspects' are similar and called 'the same', then the 'object' and the 'cognitive aspect' are the same, so how can 'the same' and 'different' be said? Therefore, it can be known that the 'Commentary' (shu) is reversed.
Commentary: 'Wu xin xin suo zi neng yuan gu zhe', their school does not acknowledge that the mind (xin) and mental factors (xin suo fa) can self-cognize.
Treatise: 'Ruo xin xin suo zhi zi suo yuan jing zhe', some masters all say that the initial valid cognition (chu liang) refutes them, while the Sautrantika (Zhengliang) and Anhui do not refute other schools. Now the explanation is not like this. The view of the nineteen schools (shijiu bu) is that even when the mind (xin) and mental factors (xin suo fa) take an object, there is an 'aspect of the object being cognized' (xing jing xiang), but the 'aspect of the object being cognized' is the aspect of the cognizer, not the object. Why does the initial valid cognition (chu liang) only refute the Sautrantika (Zhengliang)? Therefore, it should...
說。初量通破二十部也 詳曰。雖所帶相計屬能緣。然說此相似所緣故所緣即相。所緣之相名所緣相。不同正量此似亦無。由斯諸德義亦何爽。
論。若心心所無能緣等者 有義諸師皆云破安惠師．及清辨義。今解通破正量部義。彼說心等緣境之時。更不別說于能緣心有行相故 詳曰。此明二分。言能緣相即見分心。非約見分依心上立。若別立者三分何別。如前見分名為行相。豈見分上而別說耶。由斯正量有能緣相。故知諸德說不乖論。
疏。清辨亦云等。有義由勝義諦非但無有能緣之相。心體亦無。論文既說有心．心所。但緣境時無能緣相。故知唯就世俗以破。諸師皆言清辨有相而無見者。此不依宗。彼依世俗說唯識故。於世俗中雖有心．境。隱劣顯勝名唯識故 詳曰。非善破也。于無過中有過言故。疏中既云若約世俗見．相俱有。今且遠汝一切唯境。此豈不許彼有見耶。若言破余不序疏者。破他可通。自立不爾。既據世俗見．相俱存。何理獨遣彼能緣相。又言心體為現種耶。若現行者既無能緣。何名現識。可審詳諸。
疏。第二合破安惠者。有義又說。此中破安惠義。雖解此是二分非三分文。如何說彼無能緣耶。自證即是能緣用故。故於二分但可破彼無所緣相 或可。此文非二分義。即是三分
【現代漢語翻譯】 說：初量已經普遍地駁斥了二十部派的觀點。（初量：佛教邏輯學中的一個概念，指最初的量度或認知。） 詳細解釋：雖然所帶的相（相：佛教術語，指事物的表象或特徵）可以歸屬於能緣（能緣：佛教術語，指能認知的主體，如心識），但因為說這個相似的所緣（所緣：佛教術語，指被認知或認識的對象）的緣故，所以所緣就是相。所緣的相被稱為所緣相。這與正量部（正量部：佛教部派之一）不同，在正量部中，這種相似的所緣相也是不存在的。因此，這些德義（德義：指佛教中的各種功德和意義）又有什麼衝突呢？ 論：如果心和心所（心所：佛教術語，指伴隨心識生起的各種心理活動）沒有能緣等作用的話…… 有一種觀點認為，諸位法師都說這是在駁斥安慧（安慧：佛教論師）的觀點以及清辨（清辨：佛教論師）的觀點。現在解釋為普遍地駁斥正量部的觀點。他們認為，心等在緣取境界的時候，不再另外說明在能緣的心上存在行相（行相：佛教術語，指心識活動的特徵或狀態）。 詳細解釋：這裡闡明了二分（二分：佛教術語，指心識的能緣和所緣兩個部分）。所說的能緣相就是見分心（見分心：佛教術語，指心識中能見、能認知的部分）。並非是依附於心上而建立見分。如果另外建立見分，那麼三分（三分：佛教術語，指心識的見分、相分和自證分）又有什麼區別呢？如同前面所說，見分被稱為行相，難道要在見分之上另外說明嗎？因此，正量部存在能緣相。由此可知，諸位法師的說法並沒有違背論典。 疏：清辨也說『等』。有一種觀點認為，由於勝義諦（勝義諦：佛教術語，指最高的真理）不僅沒有能緣之相，心體本身也是不存在的。論文既然說了有心和心所，只是在緣取境界的時候沒有能緣相，所以可知只是就世俗諦（世俗諦：佛教術語，指相對的、世俗的真理）來駁斥。諸位法師都說清辨有相而無見，這並不符合他的宗義。他依據世俗諦來說唯識（唯識：佛教術語，指一切事物都只是心識的顯現）的道理，所以在世俗諦中雖然有心和境，但因為隱沒和顯現的勝劣關係，所以稱為唯識。 詳細解釋：這不是很好的駁斥。因為在沒有過失的地方說有過失。疏中既然說如果按照世俗諦，見分和相分都是存在的，現在卻要遠離你的一切唯境（唯境：佛教術語，指只有外境存在，沒有心識的觀點）。這難道不是不允許他有見分嗎？如果說駁斥其他宗派而不是疏文，那麼駁斥他人是可以的，但自己立論就不是這樣了。既然依據世俗諦，見分和相分都存在，那麼有什麼道理單獨去除他的能緣相呢？又說心體是現種（現種：佛教術語，指已經顯現的種子）嗎？如果是現行（現行：佛教術語，指已經發生作用的）的心識，既然沒有能緣，那麼怎麼能稱為現識（現識：佛教術語，指當下顯現的心識）呢？應該仔細地考察這些問題。 疏：第二，結合起來駁斥安慧的觀點。有一種觀點又說，這裡是在駁斥安慧的觀點。即使理解這是二分而不是三分的文句，又怎麼能說他沒有能緣呢？因為自證（自證：佛教術語，指心識能夠自我認知的功能）就是能緣的作用。所以對於二分，只能駁斥他沒有所緣相。 或者可以認為，這段文字不是二分的含義，而是三分的含義。
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese version: It is said that the initial measure (初量, Chuliang: a concept in Buddhist logic, referring to the initial measurement or cognition) has universally refuted the views of the twenty schools. Detailed explanation: Although the characteristics (相, xiang: Buddhist term, referring to the appearance or features of things) it carries can be attributed to the 'knower' (能緣, nengyuan: Buddhist term, referring to the subject capable of cognition, such as consciousness), because it speaks of this similar 'object of knowledge' (所緣, suoyuan: Buddhist term, referring to the object being cognized or known), the object of knowledge is the characteristic. The characteristic of the object of knowledge is called the 'object-of-knowledge characteristic'. This is different from the Zhengliang school (正量部, Zhengliangbu: one of the Buddhist schools), in which this similar object-of-knowledge characteristic does not exist either. Therefore, what conflicts are there in these virtues and meanings (德義, deyi: referring to various merits and meanings in Buddhism)? Treatise: If the mind and mental factors (心所, xin suo: Buddhist term, referring to various psychological activities that arise with consciousness) do not have the function of 'knower', etc... One view holds that all the masters say that this is refuting the views of Anhui (安慧, Anhui: a Buddhist master) and Qingbian (清辨, Qingbian: a Buddhist master). Now it is explained as universally refuting the views of the Zhengliang school. They believe that when the mind, etc., grasp the realm, it is no longer necessary to separately state that there is a characteristic (行相, xingxiang: Buddhist term, referring to the characteristics or states of mental activity) on the 'knower' mind. Detailed explanation: This clarifies the two parts (二分, erfen: Buddhist term, referring to the two parts of consciousness, the 'knower' and the 'known'). The so-called 'knower' characteristic is the 'seeing-part' mind (見分心, jianfenxin: Buddhist term, referring to the part of consciousness that can see and cognize). It is not established by relying on the mind to establish the 'seeing-part'. If the 'seeing-part' is established separately, then what is the difference between the three parts (三分, sanfen: Buddhist term, referring to the 'seeing-part', 'image-part', and 'self-awareness part' of consciousness)? As mentioned earlier, the 'seeing-part' is called the characteristic, so is it necessary to separately state it on the 'seeing-part'? Therefore, the Zhengliang school has the 'knower' characteristic. From this, it can be known that the statements of the masters do not contradict the treatise. Commentary: Qingbian also said 'etc.'. One view holds that, because the ultimate truth (勝義諦, shengyidi: Buddhist term, referring to the highest truth) not only does not have the characteristic of the 'knower', but the mind-essence itself also does not exist. Since the treatise says that there are mind and mental factors, but there is no 'knower' characteristic when grasping the realm, it can be known that it is only refuting based on the conventional truth (世俗諦, shisudi: Buddhist term, referring to the relative, conventional truth). The masters all say that Qingbian has characteristics but no seeing, which does not conform to his doctrine. He relies on the conventional truth to explain the principle of 'only consciousness' (唯識, weishi: Buddhist term, referring to the idea that all things are only manifestations of consciousness), so although there are mind and realm in the conventional truth, it is called 'only consciousness' because of the superiority and inferiority of concealment and manifestation. Detailed explanation: This is not a good refutation. Because it speaks of faults where there are no faults. Since the commentary says that if according to the conventional truth, the 'seeing-part' and the 'image-part' both exist, now it wants to stay away from your 'only realm' (唯境, weijing: Buddhist term, referring to the view that only the external realm exists, without consciousness). Does this not disallow him from having a 'seeing-part'? If it is said that it is refuting other schools and not the commentary, then refuting others is possible, but establishing oneself is not like this. Since the 'seeing-part' and the 'image-part' both exist based on the conventional truth, then what reason is there to remove his 'knower' characteristic alone? Also, is the mind-essence a 'manifest seed' (現種, xianzhong: Buddhist term, referring to a seed that has already manifested)? If it is a 'manifest action' (現行, xianxing: Buddhist term, referring to something that has already taken effect) of consciousness, since there is no 'knower', then how can it be called 'manifest consciousness' (現識, xianshi: Buddhist term, referring to the consciousness that is currently manifesting)? These issues should be carefully examined. Commentary: Second, combining to refute Anhui's view. One view also says that this is refuting Anhui's view. Even if it is understood that this is a sentence of two parts and not three parts, how can it be said that he has no 'knower'? Because 'self-awareness' (自證, zizheng: Buddhist term, referring to the function of consciousness to be able to self-cognize) is the function of the 'knower'. Therefore, for two parts, it can only refute that he has no 'object-of-knowledge characteristic'. Or it can be considered that this passage does not mean two parts, but three parts.
詳曰。此明二分見．相相對名能．所緣以破安惠何過而有。又論自結故心．心所必有二相。故不可判屬三分也。
疏。又大眾部至與此等同者。此釋前標十九部意。
疏。自緣體者即不如是者。顯此上云余大眾也。
疏。以不曾為相分緣等者。如諸色等曾為相分被見分緣故后能憶。心既不爾。后何能憶。故后能憶明由先時自證緣也。
疏。佛地第三等者。按彼論引集量論云。集量論說。諸心．心法皆證自體名為現量。若不爾者如不曾見不應憶念。
疏。此中有行相至名為相似者。重成釋彼瑜伽之意 言此中者。此瑜伽論。即以相分名為行相 言境據總者。相分相似。如緣青等相分俱青。故名為總。由是論云同一所緣 言見據別故名為相似者。相似即是不同之義故論說云不同行相 問夫言相似雖體不同有少比類。今見言似有何相類 答如緣青等王．所皆然。故名相似。有云。境據總下四句疏文下。雙會瑜伽．唯識兩論 詳曰。不爾。前釋為正。尋之可悉。
疏。此心心所許時依同等者。此論第三云所緣等。等者亦是相似之義。余文同來。
疏。現量為比果問答亦然者。問此之問答與前何差而須指耶 答前依分難。此據量難。
疏。如末那章者。此指攝論明末那處名
【現代漢語翻譯】 詳曰：這說明了二分見（二分法觀點），『相』和『見』相對，以『能緣』和『所緣』來破斥安慧（Anhui，人名，佛教論師）的觀點，否則會有什麼過失呢？而且，《論》中自己也總結說，『故心』（意識）和『心所』（心理活動）必然有『二相』（兩種特性）。因此，不能把它們歸為三分（三分法）。
疏：『又大眾部至與此等同者』，這是解釋前面所說的十九部派的含義。
疏：『自緣體者即不如是者』，這表明了上面所說的『余大眾』（其他大眾部派）。
疏：『以不曾為相分緣等者』，例如各種顏色等曾經作為『相分』（現象部分）被『見分』（認知部分）所認知，所以之後能夠回憶。心如果不是這樣，之後怎麼能夠回憶呢？所以之後能夠回憶，說明是由先前的『自證緣』（自我驗證的條件）所導致的。
疏：『佛地第三等者』，根據《佛地經論》（Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra）第三卷等記載，該論引用《集量論》（Pramanavarttika）說，《集量論》說，所有的『心』（意識）和『心法』（心理現象）都驗證自身，這叫做『現量』（直接認知）。如果不是這樣，就像沒有見過一樣，不應該能夠回憶。
疏：『此中有行相至名為相似者』，這是再次解釋《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）的含義。『言此中者』，指的是《瑜伽師地論》，它把『相分』叫做『行相』（心理活動的表現形式）。『言境據總者』，『相分』是相似的，例如認知青色等，『相分』都是青色的，所以叫做『總』（總體）。因此，《論》中說『同一所緣』（相同的認知對像）。『見據別故名為相似者』，相似就是不同的意思，所以《論》中說『不同行相』（不同的心理活動表現形式）。問：如果說是相似，雖然本體不同，但也有少許類似之處。現在說相似，有什麼相似之處呢？答：例如認知青色等，『王』（主要）和『所』（次要）都是如此，所以叫做相似。有人說，『境據總下四句疏文下』，是雙重會通《瑜伽師地論》和《唯識論》（Vijnaptimatrata-sastra）兩部論。詳曰：不是這樣。前面的解釋是正確的，仔細研究就可以明白。
疏：『此心心所許時依同等者』，這部論的第三卷說『所緣等』（認知對像等）。『等者』也是相似的意思。其餘的文字和前面相同。
疏：『現量為比果問答亦然者』，問：這個問答和前面的有什麼區別，需要特別指出呢？答：前面是根據『分』（部分）來提問，這裡是根據『量』（認知方式）來提問。
疏：『如末那章者』，這裡指的是《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）中說明『末那』（末那識，Manas）的地方。
【English Translation】 Commentary: This clarifies the two-division view, where 'appearance' and 'cognition' are relative. It uses 'object' and 'subject' to refute Anhui's (a Buddhist philosopher) view. Otherwise, what fault would there be? Furthermore, the treatise itself concludes that 'consciousness' and 'mental factors' necessarily have 'two aspects'. Therefore, they cannot be attributed to three divisions (the three-division theory).
Subcommentary: 'Moreover, the Mahasamghika school and others hold the same view' explains the meaning of the nineteen schools mentioned earlier.
Subcommentary: 'Self-cognizing entity is not like that' indicates the 'other Mahasamghikas' mentioned above.
Subcommentary: 'Because it has never been an object of the appearance division, etc.' For example, various colors have been objects of the appearance division and cognized by the cognition division, so they can be recalled later. If the mind is not like this, how can it be recalled later? Therefore, the ability to recall later indicates that it is caused by the previous 'self-verifying condition'.
Subcommentary: 'The third section of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, etc.' According to the third section of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, it quotes the Pramanavarttika, saying that all 'consciousness' and 'mental phenomena' verify themselves, which is called 'direct perception'. If it were not so, like something never seen, it should not be able to be recalled.
Subcommentary: 'Here, having characteristics is called similarity' re-explains the meaning of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. 'Here' refers to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, which calls the 'appearance division' 'characteristics'. 'The object is based on the general' means that the appearance division is similar. For example, when cognizing blue, the appearance divisions are all blue, so it is called 'general'. Therefore, the treatise says 'same object'. 'Cognition is based on the particular, so it is called similarity' means that similarity is the meaning of difference, so the treatise says 'different characteristics'. Question: If it is said to be similar, although the entities are different, there are some similarities. Now, what is similar about saying it is similar? Answer: For example, when cognizing blue, both the 'king' (primary) and the 'subordinate' are like that, so it is called similar. Some say that 'the object is based on the general' is a double convergence of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Vijnaptimatrata-sastra. Commentary: That is not the case. The previous explanation is correct, and it can be understood by careful study.
Subcommentary: 'This mind and mental factors are allowed to have the same time and basis' The third section of this treatise says 'object, etc.' 'Etc.' also means similarity. The rest of the text is the same as before.
Subcommentary: 'Direct perception is also the same for the question and answer of inference as a result' Question: What is the difference between this question and answer and the previous one that needs to be pointed out? Answer: The previous one is based on 'division' to ask, and this one is based on 'cognition' to ask.
Subcommentary: 'Like the section on Manas' This refers to the place in the Mahayana-samgraha that explains 'Manas' (Manas-vijnana).
末那章。以彼廣以義門而辨故與章名。疏來意者。為伏難云。五識現量何縛有耶。故疏答云。為是煩惱所染污相故有縛也。外伏難云。何以明知。故指彼章。今按無性第一論云。此即是識雜染所依。于定不定善等位中。皆不相違恒現行故。其如何等。謂善心時亦執我故。由此五識得有相縛。言是疏主末那章者非也。
疏。即以自證為相分緣者。用不離體故說是言。
疏。得得非得法者。大得小得。故重言得。所得。之法體非是得名非得法 問難意如何 答如彼大得能得本法復得小得不立第四。生亦如之。例見同彼。緣相．自證不須第四。
疏。無別種生者。隨彼相見同種師釋。或約獨影非盡理言。
論。若內若外皆有所取等者。如疏具明。有義同疏。而立理云。前長行雲謂第二分但緣第一。佛心見分不唯緣初。亦通后故。又前標宗釋有漏識。非無漏故。又無漏位三分皆能緣餘三分。如何內外互相系屬。
疏。雖緣真如至亦不得緣者。雖有處言見分緣如。見既用外。實不得緣 詳曰。且依見分不緣如義。為順此中見名外故。非盡理矣。
疏。若爾內心應非外果者。此難意云。內外有差別。外非內法果。外內義不同。內亦非外果 答指同前量．非量義思可知之 今又答云。一見通緣
內外妨。故外不為內法果。自證分緣兩過無。所以內得為外果。
疏。心若自緣至無差別過者。即自證分而緣見等。據此為難。能所作等並皆心故故無差別 有云。約唯識難不約四分。既唯是識何因果等差別有耶 詳曰。不爾。本緣四分而此難生。下疏結云依見分說。故知不是依唯識難。
論。即外大種者。有義所言外者簡異於內。內外義殊有其五釋 一云所執名外。謂心外故。餘名為內。不離識故 二云本質名外。亦心外故。影像名內。自心內故 三云諸法義理差別名內諸法體事自性名外。故迷理者說依內門。發身．語等說名依外 四云在自相續名之為內。他身．非情說名外也。以彼皆是自身外故 五云十二處中心等所依六根名內。以親近故。心等所緣六境名外。由疏遠故。今論言外依第四門。然疏說云雖非識外外處名外。此解不然。根及根依下論自說俱名內故。若約處門根可名內。扶根依處應名外故 詳曰。自斷有監。疏解無違。但言器色由外處故而得外名。誰言攝彼扶塵色耶。此即想聲別處轉故。斷依第四他身豈得同外器耶。論意唯明外器色故。若言但取第四一分何棄第五。不簡第四故自斷非。
疏。瑜伽六十六有共中二者。按彼論云。由善．不善．無記作意引發先業。能牽諸行令住不絕。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：內外妨礙。因此，外境不能成為內心法則的結果。自證分（Svasamvedana，指意識能夠自我感知的部分）和緣（pratyaya，條件）兩方面都有過失，所以內心能夠成為外境的結果。
疏解：如果心緣于自身，以至於沒有差別，那就是自證分緣于見分等。根據這一點來責難，能取和所取的作用等都是心，所以沒有差別。有人說，這是根據唯識宗（Yogacara）來責難，而不是根據四分說（Caturamsa）。既然一切都是識，為什麼因果等會有差別呢？詳細地說，不是這樣的。本識緣於四分，而這個責難由此產生。下面的疏解總結說，這是依據見分說的，所以知道這不是依據唯識宗的責難。
論：所謂『外大種』（bahir-mahābhuta，外部基本元素），有一種解釋說，『外』是爲了區別于『內』。內外之義不同，有五種解釋：第一種說法是，所執著的稱為『外』，因為在心之外；其餘的稱為『內』，因為不離識。第二種說法是，本質（vastu，實在）稱為『外』，也是因為在心之外；影像（pratibimba，反映）稱為『內』，因為在自心之內。第三種說法是，諸法的義理差別稱為『內』，諸法的體事自性稱為『外』。所以迷惑于義理的人說，要依據內門；發起身語等行為，稱為依據外門。第四種說法是，在自身相續中的稱為『內』，他人的身體和非情之物稱為『外』，因為它們都是自身之外的。第五種說法是，十二處（dvadasayatana，十二感官領域）中，心等所依的六根（sadindriya，六種感官）稱為『內』，因為親近；心等所緣的六境（sadvisaya，六種感官對像）稱為『外』，因為疏遠。現在論中所說的『外』，依據的是第四種解釋。然而疏解說，即使不是識之外，外處（bahirayatana，外部領域）也稱為『外』。這種解釋不對。根和根所依，下面的論述自己會說都稱為『內』。如果按照處門來說，根可以稱為『內』，扶根所依之處應該稱為『外』。詳細地說，自己否定自己是有問題的。疏解沒有違背。只是說器世間（bhajana-loka，物質世界）的顏色由於是外處，所以得到『外』的名稱。誰說攝取了扶塵色（bhuta-rupa，由四大組成的色）呢？這是想和聲在不同的處所轉變的緣故。否定依據第四種解釋，他人的身體怎麼能和外器世間相同呢？論的意義只是說明外器世間的顏色。如果說只取第四種解釋的一部分，為什麼要捨棄第五種解釋呢？不區分第四種解釋，所以自己否定自己是不對的。
疏解：《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第六十六卷中有共同的兩種。按照那部論典所說，由善、不善、無記的作意（manaskara，心理活動）引發先前的業（karma，行為），能夠牽引諸行（samskara，心理傾向）令其持續不斷。
【English Translation】 English version: Internal and external are obstructive. Therefore, external objects cannot be the result of internal laws. There are faults in both Svasamvedana (self-awareness, the part of consciousness that can perceive itself) and pratyaya (conditions), so the internal can be the result of the external.
Commentary: If the mind is related to itself to the point of having no difference, that is, Svasamvedana is related to the Vijnana-bhaga (perception aspect) etc. Based on this, it is difficult to argue that the functions of the grasper and the grasped are all mind, so there is no difference. Some say that this is a criticism based on Yogacara, not Caturamsa (the four aspects). Since everything is consciousness, why are there differences in cause and effect, etc.? In detail, it is not like that. The original consciousness is related to the four aspects, and this criticism arises from this. The commentary below concludes that it is based on the Vijnana-bhaga, so it is known that this is not a criticism based on Yogacara.
Treatise: The so-called 'bahir-mahābhuta' (external great elements), one explanation says that 'external' is to distinguish it from 'internal'. The meaning of internal and external is different, and there are five explanations: The first explanation is that what is clung to is called 'external' because it is outside the mind; the rest are called 'internal' because they are not separate from consciousness. The second explanation is that vastu (essence) is called 'external', also because it is outside the mind; pratibimba (reflection) is called 'internal' because it is within one's own mind. The third explanation is that the differences in the meaning of dharmas are called 'internal', and the substance and nature of dharmas are called 'external'. Therefore, those who are confused about the meaning say that they should rely on the internal gate; initiating actions of body and speech is called relying on the external gate. The fourth explanation is that what is in one's own continuum is called 'internal', and the bodies of others and non-sentient things are called 'external' because they are all outside oneself. The fifth explanation is that among the dvadasayatana (twelve sense fields), the sadindriya (six senses) on which the mind and others depend are called 'internal' because they are close; the sadvisaya (six sense objects) on which the mind and others depend are called 'external' because they are distant. The 'external' mentioned in the treatise now is based on the fourth explanation. However, the commentary says that even if it is not outside of consciousness, the bahirayatana (external realm) is also called 'external'. This explanation is not correct. The root and what the root depends on, the following discussion will say that they are both called 'internal'. If according to the sense field gate, the root can be called 'internal', the place where the root depends should be called 'external'. In detail, denying oneself is problematic. The commentary does not contradict. It only says that the color of the bhajana-loka (material world) gets the name 'external' because it is an external place. Who said that it includes the bhuta-rupa (material form composed of the four elements)? This is because thought and sound are transformed in different places. Denying relying on the fourth explanation, how can the bodies of others be the same as the external material world? The meaning of the treatise is only to explain the color of the external material world. If you say that you only take a part of the fourth explanation, why abandon the fifth explanation? Not distinguishing the fourth explanation, so denying oneself is incorrect.
Commentary: In the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume sixty-six, there are two kinds of commonalities. According to that treatise, the previous karma (action) is initiated by good, unwholesome, and neutral manaskara (mental activity), which can lead the samskara (mental tendencies) to continue uninterrupted.
所謂外分共不共業之所生起。
釋。明有情住由此三業能感器界。器界為依有情得住。
疏。共中不共如己田宅等者。有義但初句收。多自受用。然亦有他受用義故。又如扶塵唯在自身。由有少分為他用義尚名為共。如何田等翻名不共 詳曰。不可。若爾扶塵應亦初句。有他用義如田宅等。若言屬自非初句者。宅等應然亦屬自故若言扶塵屬自內身不相例者。祇由此義扶塵名為不共中共。宅等名為共中不共。外．內異故。復不屬他。故非初攝 問佛．菩薩等所變凈土不離穢處。凈穢相望應第二句 傳有二釋。一云有漏不凈由同處故。業復少同受用有別名第二句。佛唯無漏。菩薩極凈。雖穢同處。凈．不凈業有差別故非第二句 二云凈穢其處既同。即是第二共中不共 詳曰。初釋善也。且同地器有情共變。由有別業於此復分宅等諸境。異生．佛等即不如之。何得相望屬第二句。
疏。緣長等時並緣青等者。有義緣長等者以之為正。佛地論說十八圓凈所現凈土具顯．形色。準知穢土隨識所變廣狹份量有形色也。前論亦云隨量大小頓現一相 詳曰。言緣長等為據別緣。為約長等不離青等。緣青等時義言緣之。若義言緣疏已明訖。若別緣者如何第八因緣變耶。亦不可以佛地為證凈穢異故。
論。雖諸有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所謂外在的共同業和不共同業所產生的果報。
解釋：說明有情眾生居住的世界，是由這三種業力所感召的器世間（指有情眾生所居住的環境）。器世間是眾生賴以生存的基礎。
疏解：共同業中的不共同業，例如自己的田地住宅等。有一種觀點認為，只有第一句（共業）包含了這些，因為田宅等主要由自己受用。但也有他人受用的情況。又如扶塵根（指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根的依處，是色法），只存在於自身。由於有少部分為他人所用，尚且稱為共業。為什麼田地等反而稱為不共同業呢？詳細分析：不能這樣說。如果這樣，扶塵根也應該屬於第一句（共業），因為它也有他人受用的情況，如田宅等。如果說扶塵根屬於自身，所以不屬於第一句，那麼田宅等也同樣屬於自身。如果說扶塵根屬於自身的內在身體，不能與田宅等相提並論，那麼正因為這個原因，扶塵根被稱為不共中的共業，田宅等被稱為共業中的不共業。因為外在和內在不同，而且田宅等不完全屬於自己，所以不屬於第一句（共業）。問：佛和菩薩等所變化的清凈國土，並沒有離開不清凈的地方。清凈和不清凈相互對比，應該屬於第二句（共中共業）嗎？傳承有兩種解釋。一種說法是，有漏的不清凈，因為在同一個地方。業力又有少部分相同，受用有所區別，所以稱為第二句（共中共業）。佛只有無漏，菩薩極其清凈。雖然不清凈的地方相同，但清凈和不清凈的業力有差別，所以不屬於第二句（共中共業）。第二種說法是，清凈和不清凈的地方既然相同，就是第二種共中共業。詳細分析：第一種解釋是正確的。而且，同一地界的器世間是有情共同變現的。由於有不同的業力，又在此基礎上分出田宅等各種境界。異生（凡夫）和佛等的情況並非如此。怎麼能相互對比，歸屬於第二句（共中共業）呢？
疏解：緣取長等形狀時，也緣取青等顏色。有一種觀點認為，緣取長等形狀是主要的。《佛地論》說，十八圓滿清凈所顯現的凈土，具足顯現形狀和顏色。據此推知，不清凈的國土，隨著意識所變現的廣狹份量，也有形狀和顏色。前論也說，隨著份量的大小，頓然顯現一個相狀。詳細分析：說緣取長等形狀，是根據個別緣取而言，還是說緣取長等形狀不離青等顏色？緣取青等顏色時，就包含了緣取形狀的含義。如果是含義上的緣取，疏解已經說明完畢。如果是分別緣取，那麼第八識（阿賴耶識）如何作為因緣來變現呢？也不可以用《佛地論》作為證據，因為清凈和不清凈的國土不同。
論：雖然各種有情...
【English Translation】 English version: What are called the arising of external shared and unshared karma.
Explanation: Explains that sentient beings reside in the world, which is sensed by these three karmas. The vessel realm (referring to the environment in which sentient beings live) is the basis upon which sentient beings depend for existence.
Commentary: Unshared within the shared, such as one's own fields and residences. One view holds that only the first sentence (shared karma) includes these, because fields and residences are mainly enjoyed by oneself. However, there are also cases where others benefit from them. Furthermore, the supporting sense organs (the physical basis of the five senses: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body) exist only within oneself. Because a small portion is used by others, it is still called shared karma. Why are fields, etc., instead called unshared karma? Detailed analysis: This is not correct. If so, the supporting sense organs should also belong to the first sentence (shared karma), as they also have cases where others benefit, like fields and residences. If it is said that the supporting sense organs belong to oneself, so they do not belong to the first sentence, then fields and residences also belong to oneself. If it is said that the supporting sense organs belong to one's own internal body and cannot be compared to fields and residences, then precisely for this reason, the supporting sense organs are called 'unshared within the shared,' and fields, etc., are called 'shared within the unshared,' because the external and internal are different, and fields, etc., do not completely belong to oneself, so they do not belong to the first sentence (shared karma). Question: The pure lands transformed by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, etc., do not leave impure places. The contrast between pure and impure should belong to the second sentence (shared-shared karma), right? There are two interpretations passed down. One says that the defiled impurity is because they are in the same place. The karma also has a small portion in common, and the enjoyment is different, so it is called the second sentence (shared-shared karma). Buddhas only have the unconditioned, and Bodhisattvas are extremely pure. Although the impure place is the same, the karma of purity and impurity is different, so it does not belong to the second sentence (shared-shared karma). The second interpretation is that since the pure and impure places are the same, it is the second type of shared-shared karma. Detailed analysis: The first interpretation is correct. Moreover, the vessel realm of the same realm is jointly manifested by sentient beings. Due to different karmas, various realms such as fields and residences are further divided on this basis. The situations of ordinary beings and Buddhas, etc., are not the same. How can they be compared and attributed to the second sentence (shared-shared karma)?
Commentary: When perceiving shapes such as length, one also perceives colors such as blue. One view holds that perceiving shapes such as length is primary. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the pure lands manifested by the eighteen perfections fully manifest shapes and colors. From this, it can be inferred that impure lands also have shapes and colors according to the extent and measure transformed by consciousness. The previous treatise also says that according to the size of the measure, a single aspect is suddenly manifested. Detailed analysis: Saying that perceiving shapes such as length is based on individual perception, or does it mean that perceiving shapes such as length is inseparable from colors such as blue? When perceiving colors such as blue, it includes the meaning of perceiving shapes. If it is a matter of meaning, the commentary has already explained it. If it is separate perception, then how does the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) transform as a cause?
Treatise: Although various sentient beings...
情至遍似一者。問且如一樹有情共變。而一有情伐用之時為用自變。為兼用他。若唯自者餘人變者應存不已。樹何不見。若亦用他何名唯識 答樹等既是共相種生。皆相隨順互有增益。彼一有情自所變者所緣親用。他所變者與自所變為增上緣亦疏緣用。一切相望自為所順。他為能順。由所順無能順亦滅。由斯樹喪唯識亦成 問何以得知互相增益 答對法第七說有共業為增上緣。如次下引 若爾燈明喻義不成。一燈光滅餘光猶在。法不相似何得為喻 答喻取少分故不相違。
疏。五十四諸有對法等者。疏引文略今更具云。何因緣故諸有對法同處一處不相舍離。而不說名無對性耶。答隨順轉故。由彼展轉相隨順生不相妨礙。又由如是種類三業增上所感如是而生。何以故。一切色聚一切色根共受用故 釋曰。而難意云。如一色聚餘香等微亦同其處應名無對。其答意云。色等之中有違．不違。違者別居。順者同處。又業力致。何以得知一處有多。如一色聚眼見是色。鼻嗅有香。舌嘗即味。身覺有觸。故言色根共受用也。
疏。又成器時他方三禪等者。以第四禪不壞不成。故但舉彼成壞同處。
論。由是設生他方自界等者。問器．種俱境。緣何不同 答器為依持但變同地。種即不爾為境通緣 又三界種隨能變
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於『情至遍似一者』的問題。問：比如一棵樹，所有有情眾生共同感受它的變化。當一個有情眾生砍伐使用這棵樹時，是隻使用自己所變現的部分，還是也使用其他有情眾生所變現的部分？如果只使用自己所變現的部分，那麼其他有情眾生所變現的部分應該仍然存在，為什麼我們看不到那棵樹？如果也使用其他有情眾生所變現的部分，那又怎麼能說是『唯識』（一切唯心造）呢？ 答：樹等事物是共業所生的，它們相互隨順，互相增益。其中，一個有情眾生自己所變現的部分是其所緣的直接作用對像；其他有情眾生所變現的部分，對於這個有情眾生自己所變現的部分來說，是增上緣，也是間接作用對象。一切事物相互依存，對於自身來說，是所隨順的對象；對於其他事物來說，是能隨順的對象。由於所隨順的對象消失了，能隨順的對象也隨之消失。因此，樹木消失，『唯識』的道理仍然成立。 問：如何得知事物之間互相增益呢？ 答：《對法論》第七卷說，有共業作為增上緣。接下來會引用相關內容。 如果這樣說，那麼燈光的比喻就不成立了。一盞燈的光熄滅了，其他的燈光仍然存在。這兩種情況並不相似，怎麼能作為比喻呢？ 答：比喻只是取其相似的部分，所以並不矛盾。
疏解：『五十四諸有對法等者』。《瑜伽師地論》的疏解引用的原文比較簡略，現在補充完整：『是什麼因緣導致有對法（有相互作用的法）同處一處，不相舍離，卻不能稱為無對性呢？』答：『因為它們隨順運轉。由於它們輾轉相隨順而生，互不妨礙。又因為這是由同類的三業增上所感而生。』為什麼呢？『因為一切色聚、一切色根共同受用。』 解釋：提問者的意思是，如果一個色聚存在，那麼其他的香等微細物質也應該存在於同一處，應該稱為無對。回答者的意思是，在色等事物中，存在違背和不違背的情況。違背的事物各自存在於不同的地方，隨順的事物存在於同一處。這也是業力所致。如何得知同一處存在多種事物呢？比如一個色聚，眼睛看到的是顏色，鼻子聞到的是香味，舌頭嚐到的是味道，身體感覺到的是觸感。所以說色根共同受用。
疏解：『又成器時他方三禪等者』。因為第四禪不壞不滅，所以只舉出三禪的成壞與此處相同。
論：『由是設生他方自界等者』。問：器世間和種子都是所緣境，為什麼作用不同呢？答：器世間是作為依持，只在同一地界內發生變化。種子則不同，作為所緣境，可以普遍地產生作用。另外，三界的種子隨其所能變現的能力而變化。
【English Translation】 English version Regarding the question of 'sentient beings universally experiencing things as one': Question: For example, a tree is subject to changes experienced by all sentient beings. When one sentient being cuts down and uses this tree, are they only using the part transformed by their own mind, or are they also using the part transformed by other sentient beings? If they are only using the part transformed by their own mind, then the part transformed by other sentient beings should still exist. Why can't we see that tree? If they are also using the part transformed by other sentient beings, then how can it be said to be 'Vijñānavāda' (consciousness-only)? Answer: Trees and other things are born from shared karma. They are mutually compliant and mutually beneficial. Among them, the part transformed by one's own mind is the direct object of their perception; the part transformed by other sentient beings is a supporting condition and also an indirect object for the part transformed by oneself. All things are interdependent. For oneself, it is the object to be complied with; for others, it is the subject that complies. Because the object to be complied with disappears, the subject that complies also disappears. Therefore, the disappearance of the tree proves the principle of 'Vijñānavāda'. Question: How can we know that things mutually benefit each other? Answer: The seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that shared karma serves as a supporting condition. Relevant content will be cited below. If that's the case, then the analogy of the lamp is not valid. When the light of one lamp goes out, the light of other lamps still exists. These two situations are not similar, so how can they be used as an analogy? Answer: The analogy only takes the similar parts, so there is no contradiction.
Commentary: 'Fifty-four, all dharmas with opposition, etc.' The original text quoted in the commentary of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is relatively brief, so it is now supplemented in full: 'What is the reason why dharmas with opposition (dharmas with mutual interaction) are in the same place, do not leave each other, but cannot be called non-opposition?' Answer: 'Because they operate in accordance with each other. Because they are born in mutual compliance and do not hinder each other. Also, because this is born from the same kind of karma as a supporting condition.' Why? 'Because all aggregates of form and all sense faculties are used together.' Explanation: The questioner's intention is that if an aggregate of form exists, then other subtle substances such as fragrance should also exist in the same place, and it should be called non-opposition. The answerer's intention is that among things such as form, there are cases of opposition and non-opposition. Opposing things exist in different places, and compliant things exist in the same place. This is also caused by the power of karma. How can we know that multiple things exist in the same place? For example, an aggregate of form, the eyes see the color, the nose smells the fragrance, the tongue tastes the flavor, and the body feels the touch. Therefore, it is said that the sense faculties are used together.
Commentary: 'Also, when a vessel is formed, the third dhyāna of other realms, etc.' Because the fourth dhyāna does not decay or perish, only the formation and destruction of the third dhyāna are mentioned as being the same as here.
Treatise: 'Therefore, assuming birth in other realms, one's own realm, etc.' Question: The receptacle world and seeds are both objects of perception, so why do they have different effects? Answer: The receptacle world serves as a support and only changes within the same realm. Seeds are different; as objects of perception, they can universally produce effects. In addition, the seeds of the three realms change according to their ability to transform.
識所在之界故得緣之。器乃不然何得相例。
疏。如大梵變者。即維摩經梵天王云。我見此界如自在宮。即其事也。又上界天而來此界。必變凈器為自依處。以此粗界不持彼故。
疏。對法第五至業種隨故者。按彼第五而無文說。彼第七中明五共業。故云如經言有共業云何共業。若業能令諸器世間種種差別。或復有業令諸有情展轉增上。由此業力說諸有情更互相望為增上緣。以彼互有增上力故亦名共業。恐疏寫誤以七為五。意引對法亦同此論。而有經證共業之事更思。
疏。此顯生無色等者。疏釋彼意由據業種云令器界種種差別名為共業。不約一切起于現行變諸器界方名共業。
疏。不爾便無四分之義者。不變影者見既親證第三分已。何須第四為證量果乎。故無四分。
疏。此中三性種至隨識非煩惱者。有說三性雖有異。隨依說無記。煩惱即同不善等。故不名煩惱 詳曰。性由體類義。隨依可無記。煩惱別義增故種名煩惱 問煩惱非染污。可不隨依稱。既在二性收。隨性非煩惱。
答界種性雖同。據別異依系。或種類猶然。故不從依稱。二釋之中任情取捨。
疏。即天眼耳至應非有情者。由若不許緣異界境天眼．耳根與八系別。第八不持故應爛壞。若爾何名有情。
疏。即眾生有增減過等者。天眼．耳根即有情數。一身別起而不屬此故名為增。又若爛壞複名為減 問實義許持何非增過。系不同故 答雖系不同不離此界能持之識。有所依屬故不名情。
疏。難第一師等者。下根身中初師是也。疏乘其便預難其義。
疏。生盲等亦爾者。不枮陷者而根猶在。但外物翳致不能見。枮者不爾。
疏。舊本第四頌等者。問舊新二頌境．識前後雖復不同。大意相似。何乃偏責 答舊云本識。本識局一。言似於彼故成其失。新言識生。識通八識。隨緣我等故無過矣 新論釋云。變似義者謂似色等諸境性現。變似情者。謂似自他身五根性現。變似我者。謂染末那與我癡等恒相應故。變似了者。謂餘六識。了相粗故。
論。故生他地等者。問此證何義 答有二釋 一云證自變他扶塵 二云證自不變他根。扶塵共許不待言故。而證意云。若自能變他依及根。彼往他等根依合在。俱所變故。既唯依在而根滅無。返證余時俱變依處 若爾何唯舉生他地及涅槃耶。豈余死等猶有根乎 答理俱無根。且就顯說。若生自地恐他救言以自識變。前釋為正 問依處他反。自之引因義應不立。亦能變者迨劫末有。所變之骸應同能反 答如言唯識許境親疏。遺骸待變自他何失。有為勢分修短
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏：即眾生有增減過失等情況。天眼、耳根即屬於有情之數。如果一個身體額外生出（天眼、耳根），而不屬於原有的身體，因此名為『增』。又如果（天眼、耳根）腐爛損壞，又名為『減』。 問：如果從實義上允許『持』，為什麼『非增』有過失？因為所繫不同。 答：雖然所繫不同，但不離此界能持之識。因為有所依屬，所以不名為有情。
疏：難第一師等情況。指下根身中的最初的老師。疏文趁此機會預先駁難其義。
疏：生盲等情況也是如此。指不枯竭陷落，而根還在的情況。只是因為外物遮蔽導致不能看見。枯竭陷落的情況則不是這樣。
疏：舊本第四頌等情況。問：舊頌和新頌在境、識前後順序上雖然有所不同，但大意相似。為什麼偏偏要責難舊頌？ 答：舊頌說『本識』（alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識），『本識』侷限於一個。言語上類似於彼（指犢子部補特伽羅（pudgala）），所以造成了過失。新頌說『識生』，『識』通於八識。隨順因緣而有我等，所以沒有過失。新論解釋說：變似義，是指變現得像色等諸境的體性。變似情，是指變現得像自身和他人的身五根的體性。變似我，是指染污的末那識（manas，末那識）與我癡等恒常相應。變似了，是指其餘六識，因爲了別的相狀粗顯。
論：所以生於他地等情況。問：這個論證說明什麼義理？ 答：有兩種解釋：一說是爲了證明自識變現他人的扶塵根；二說是爲了證明自識不變現他人的根。扶塵根是大家共同認可的，所以不必再說。而論證的意圖是說，如果自識能夠變現他人的依處和根，那麼當他們前往他處時，根和依處應該一起存在，因為都是自識所變現的。既然只有依處存在而根滅無，反過來證明其餘時候也是一起變現依處。 若這樣，為什麼只舉出生於他地和涅槃（nirvana）的情況呢？難道其餘的死亡等情況還有根存在嗎？ 答：道理上都是沒有根的。這裡只是就明顯的情況來說。如果說生於自地，恐怕他人會辯解說這是用自己的識變現的。所以前一種解釋是正確的。 問：依處是他人的，反過來用自識來引證，義理上應該不能成立。也能變現者，直到劫末都有，所變現的骸骨應該和能變現者一樣反過來。 答：就像說唯識宗允許境有親疏一樣，遺骸等待變現，對於自他有什麼過失？有為法的勢力有長短。
【English Translation】 English version Commentary: 'That is, sentient beings have increase, decrease, faults, etc.' The divine eye and ear faculties are counted among sentient beings. If an additional one arises from a body and does not belong to it, it is called 'increase.' Furthermore, if it rots and decays, it is called 'decrease.' Question: If 'holding' is allowed in the real sense, why is 'non-increase' a fault? Because what is bound is different. Answer: Although what is bound is different, it does not depart from the consciousness that can hold within this realm. Because it has something to rely on, it is not called a sentient being.
Commentary: 'Difficulties with the first teacher, etc.' refers to the initial teacher in the lower root body. The commentary takes the opportunity to preemptively refute its meaning.
Commentary: 'The congenitally blind, etc., are also like this.' This refers to cases where the root is still present without withering or collapsing. It is just that external objects obscure it, preventing sight. It is not like this in cases of withering.
Commentary: 'The fourth verse in the old version, etc.' Question: Although the old and new verses differ in the order of object and consciousness, their general meaning is similar. Why is the old verse particularly criticized? Answer: The old verse speaks of 'alaya-vijñana (alaya-consciousness, 阿賴耶識).' Alaya-consciousness is limited to one. The language is similar to that of the Pudgalavada (犢子部) , so it becomes a fault. The new verse speaks of 'consciousness arising.' 'Consciousness' encompasses the eight consciousnesses. It accords with conditions to have self and so on, so there is no fault. The new treatise explains: 'Transforming into the likeness of objects' means transforming to appear like the nature of objects such as form. 'Transforming into the likeness of sentient beings' means transforming to appear like the nature of one's own and others' five sense faculties. 'Transforming into the likeness of self' means that the defiled manas (末那識) is constantly associated with self-ignorance and so on. 'Transforming into the likeness of cognition' means the remaining six consciousnesses, because the aspect of cognition is coarse.
Treatise: 'Therefore, being born in another land, etc.' Question: What meaning does this proof demonstrate? Answer: There are two explanations: One is to prove that one's own consciousness transforms the adventitious dust of others' sense organs; the other is to prove that one's own consciousness does not transform others' sense organs. The adventitious dust is commonly accepted, so there is no need to mention it. The intention of the proof is that if one's own consciousness could transform others' support and roots, then when they go to other places, the roots and support should exist together, because they are both transformed by one's own consciousness. Since only the support exists and the roots are extinguished, it proves in reverse that at other times, the support is transformed together. If so, why only mention being born in another land and nirvana (涅槃)? Do the remaining cases of death, etc., still have roots? Answer: In principle, there are no roots in any of these cases. Here, it is just speaking in terms of what is obvious. If it were said that one is born in one's own land, others might argue that this is transformed by one's own consciousness. Therefore, the former explanation is correct. Question: The support belongs to others, and using one's own consciousness to draw a conclusion in reverse should not be valid. Those who can transform exist until the end of the kalpa, and the transformed remains should be able to reverse the transformation like the transformer. Answer: Just as the Yogacara school allows for intimacy and distance in objects, what fault is there in the remains awaiting transformation for self and others? The power of conditioned dharmas has lengths and durations.
不同。不同能變有謝無咎。
疏。借識力者問與定通力二有何別 答身在於上不起于下定通等也。所以如疏起下散識故有別也 問起下散識豈不依上定通引耶。若許爾者即定通攝。何乃別開 答不爾所以別開 問設上定通為緣引者豈不得耶 答縱定通引然是他地。由此別開更思。
疏。身在下地上天眼耳等者。問天眼．耳根既與異熟眼．耳同處。同取境不。若同取者云何異熟而能遠取。又如何能發眼．耳通。若不發者如何同取。若不同取二根同處。云何得有取．不取耶 答為二釋。一云同取。通力引生遠取何失。如欲界根有長養等既同發識。此亦應爾 二不同取。言定等力據識緣境。又若異熟能發彼通。何須起彼天眼．耳根。亦同一處業力不同。見等各別。同處別發亦復何失。按智度論。修得天眼在肉眼上。導彼肉眼亦能遠見。
疏。佛故豪光等者。問梵亦因光而得見下。何不言之 答梵觀于下自力亦能故不言也。若也傍觀萬八千界。亦由佛力自力不迨。且據上下故不云梵。
疏。雖第八變至內身文者。雖言第八因定通力而皆能變。于定不見變內身文。
疏。亦非是身以無根故者。問既無其根云何得言佛邊聽法 答第六識聽不待于根。故瑜伽云聞謂比量。
疏。八地已去通定無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不同。不同之處在於，（神通的）變化會有窮盡之時，而（禪）定則沒有窮盡。
疏解：有人借用識力（對經文）提出疑問：神通力和禪定力二者有什麼區別？回答：身處上方（指高層禪定），不起于下方（指低層禪定），（二者的）定通力是相等的。之所以有區別，是因為（從）疏解（來看），（神通力）是從下方生起，散亂的識，所以有區別。問：從下方生起散亂的識，難道不是依靠上方的禪定力引導嗎？如果允許這樣說，那麼（神通力）就被禪定力所包含，為什麼還要單獨分開呢？答：不是這樣的，所以要單獨分開。問：假設上方的禪定力作為緣來引導（神通力），難道不可以嗎？答：即使禪定力引導，（神通力）也是在其他地方（發揮作用）。因此要單獨分開，需要進一步思考。
疏解：身處在下方的地上，（卻能擁有）天眼、天耳等（神通）。問：天眼、天耳根既然與異熟（業報）所生的眼、耳同處一地，它們所取（觀察）的境界是否相同？如果相同，為什麼異熟眼、耳不能遠距離觀察？又如何能引發天眼、天耳通？如果不引發，又如何能說它們所取（觀察）的境界相同？如果不同，（既然）二根同處一地，為什麼會有能取（觀察）和不能取（觀察）的區別？答：有兩種解釋。第一種說法是，（天眼、天耳）與異熟眼、耳所取的境界相同。通過神通力引發（天眼、天耳）進行遠距離觀察，有什麼不可以的？就像欲界眾生的根有長養等作用，既然都能引發識，天眼、天耳也應該如此。第二種說法是，（天眼、天耳）與異熟眼、耳所取的境界不同。所說的禪定力等，是依據識緣取境界而言的。而且，如果異熟眼、耳能引發神通，又何必生起天眼、天耳根呢？（天眼、天耳）與異熟眼、耳雖然同處一地，但業力不同，所見等也各有區別。同處一地而各自引發不同的作用，又有什麼不可以的？按照《智度論》的說法，修得的天眼在肉眼之上，引導肉眼也能遠見。
疏解：佛陀放出豪光等。問：梵天（Brahmā，色界天主）也是因為（佛陀的）光芒才能看到下方，為什麼不提及呢？答：梵天觀察下方，依靠自身的力量也能做到，所以不提及。如果（梵天）要旁觀萬八千世界，也需要依靠佛陀的力量，自身的力量達不到。而且這裡是就（觀察）上下方而言，所以不提及梵天。
疏解：即使第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）變化到內身文（指細微之處），（也是如此）。雖然說第八識因禪定通力而都能變化，但在禪定中卻看不到變化到內身文。
疏解：也不是（真實的）身體，因為它沒有根。問：既然沒有根，怎麼能說（化身）在佛陀身邊聽法？答：第六識（意識，Manas-vijnana）聽法不需要依靠根。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說，聽聞是指比量（通過推理而知）。
疏解：八地（指八地菩薩）以後，神通和禪定沒有（區別）。
【English Translation】 English version Different. The difference lies in that the transformations (of supernormal powers) can have an end, while (meditative) concentration does not.
Commentary: Someone, using the power of consciousness (to question the scripture), asks: What is the difference between the power of supernormal abilities and the power of meditative concentration? Answer: Being in the upper (referring to higher levels of meditative concentration) and not arising from the lower (referring to lower levels of meditative concentration), the powers of concentration and supernormal abilities are equal. The reason for the difference is that (from) the commentary (it appears), (the power of supernormal abilities) arises from below, scattering consciousness, so there is a difference. Question: Doesn't the scattering consciousness arising from below rely on the guidance of the upper meditative concentration? If this is allowed, then (the power of supernormal abilities) is included in the meditative concentration. Why separate them? Answer: It is not like that, so they are separated. Question: Suppose the upper meditative concentration is used as a condition to guide (the power of supernormal abilities), is that not possible? Answer: Even if meditative concentration guides, (the power of supernormal abilities) functions in other places. Therefore, they are separated, and further thought is needed.
Commentary: Being on the lower ground, (yet possessing) the divine eye, divine ear, etc. (supernormal abilities). Question: Since the divine eye and ear roots are in the same place as the eyes and ears born from different maturation (karmic retribution), do they take (observe) the same realms? If they are the same, why can't the eyes and ears born from different maturation observe from a distance? And how can they trigger the divine eye and ear powers? If they don't trigger them, how can it be said that they take (observe) the same realms? If they are different, (since) the two roots are in the same place, why is there a difference between being able to take (observe) and not being able to take (observe)? Answer: There are two explanations. The first explanation is that (the divine eye and ear) take the same realms as the eyes and ears born from different maturation. What is wrong with using the power of supernormal abilities to trigger (the divine eye and ear) to observe from a distance? Just like the roots of sentient beings in the desire realm have the function of growth, etc., since they can all trigger consciousness, the divine eye and ear should also be like that. The second explanation is that (the divine eye and ear) take different realms from the eyes and ears born from different maturation. The so-called power of meditative concentration, etc., is based on the consciousness grasping realms. Moreover, if the eyes and ears born from different maturation can trigger supernormal abilities, why bother to generate the divine eye and ear roots? (The divine eye and ear) and the eyes and ears born from different maturation, although in the same place, have different karmic forces, and what they see, etc., is also different. What is wrong with each triggering different functions in the same place? According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom), the divine eye obtained through cultivation is above the physical eye, guiding the physical eye to also see from a distance.
Commentary: The Buddha emits rays of light, etc. Question: Brahmā (the lord of the Form Realm) can also see below because of (the Buddha's) light, why not mention it? Answer: Brahmā observes below and can also do it by his own power, so it is not mentioned. If (Brahmā) wants to observe the ten thousand eight thousand worlds from the side, he also needs to rely on the Buddha's power, and his own power cannot reach it. Moreover, this is in terms of (observing) above and below, so Brahmā is not mentioned.
Commentary: Even if the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) transforms to the inner body text (referring to subtle details), (it is the same). Although it is said that the eighth consciousness can transform everything due to the power of meditative concentration, the transformation to the inner body text cannot be seen in meditative concentration.
Commentary: It is not (a real) body, because it has no roots. Question: Since it has no roots, how can it be said that (the manifested body) is listening to the Dharma by the Buddha's side? Answer: The sixth consciousness (Manas-vijnana) listens to the Dharma without relying on the roots. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says that hearing refers to inference (knowing through reasoning).
Commentary: After the eighth ground (referring to the eighth-ground Bodhisattva), there is no (difference) between supernormal abilities and meditative concentration.
差者。通智。定定。體實有別。約性不殊。起無前後。所作相似據一邊說。
疏。由此故知至疏所緣緣者。如在地獄起天眼．耳緣上界色。地獄第八而不緣上。即天眼．耳無第八境為所杖質。故闕疏緣 問上地散眼見下三災。上界第八亦緣災不 答實不緣。護法不許異界第八變異界器 若爾上眼無疏所緣過如何遣 答以下第八所變為緣亦有何過 問因於定通令第八識緣他異地身器得不 答疏不定判。樞要．及燈義意許也 有義釋云。若變自身他地可爾。下地能引天眼．耳故。他地他身及他地器。設定等力如何能變。變之何用。粗細懸隔不依持故 若爾如何說定等力即不決定 此亦無違。業力所變內身外器必定同地。若定等力變自內身即不決定。下能引上天眼．耳故。變器．他身此一向定。言變身器不定等者言總意別。不言身器皆有不定。疏說上界起通來下令下得見名因通者依他通故。此定不然。上界來下作欲界化。下所見者即自地故 詳曰。如菩薩等變身為魚地．海金．酪。地獄有情得受不耶。若不受者變之何益。若許用者有情第八豈不緣彼。不緣而受非唯識故。故知因他通力而引能變異地身器等也。即彼扶塵名為身也。魚．金．酪等非欲界故 設若救云有情六識托菩薩等所變米等。以為本質變而乃用。亦如上
眼緣下三災托下第八所變為質。此亦不然。縱緣自六所變之者。第八從本言由通力亦何傷也。與余常時境不同故。前云上眼托下第八。由上第八不得緣下。所以然者。若上第八自變下災。粗細既隔于彼無用。若杖下八所變之災為質方變。變復何用。又非定通之所引故由斯不變。若變魚．米而有用故。復通力引何得相例。若粗細別不許變者。即餘六識亦應不緣。粗細隔故 若爾因八緣無漏失 答亦無違。不親緣故。若言親用而方變者。第八不應變他扶塵。六亦不變菩薩魚等。非親用故。若許親用便非唯識又論明言定通等力界地自他而不決定。何強分別致有多違。可謂與蛇而安足矣 又云上來作欲界化。下見自地。理亦不然。言作欲化。似欲界故。實上地系。欲界地法無修得化。如下當辨。
疏。得威德定者。有威德者所起勝定名威德定。此有兩釋 一云自在菩薩．及二乘者所得之定。故瑜伽云。非是一切所有定心皆有能生此色功能。唯一類有。故知唯聖 二云亦通異生。依定久習得自在者。簡非自在名一類有。亦無其失。前解為勝。
疏。又解以初禪眼耳等者。此不次也。合在於前天眼．耳境已下言也 問前明眼．耳本質有無。何意次言眼．耳緣上系之同異 答前雖明質。未論其相系之差別故次明也。質．
相雖殊。由俱境故。故云又解 問初禪眼等見上地色有本質不 答雖不明言理合有也。以他第八所變為質。
疏。由此三識所知必同等者。眼．耳．身三身識相分既唯初禪。故眼．耳二相非上系。
疏。五十四至生因闕故者。因闕之義略有兩釋 一云種子名因。彼無種故故名因闕 二云因者所以之義。彼無生香等道理故 問設許有之違何理耶 答若許定心而現香．味。香．味隨心上地所繫。此即上地而有香．味。違諸教過。由斯定心不變香．味。兼疏所明合為三釋。言加行心即是因也。或疏所解不異前二。加行之因。因即前二。更無別也。
疏。又無用者。香．味依于段食施設。彼無段食。縱有香．味而何所為。
疏。或是根本及所變等者。如次所起名定通色。通依定生故通名果。
疏。皆通變及化者。變謂轉變改易其質。化謂化現。無而忽有。佛定通力俱能為也。
疏。通可引起根之與塵等者。問若在於佛二位心所既恒相應。云何通．定引根．塵別 答雖俱時起。力用不同所變有差。而亦何變。又無漏心必有定道俱時而起。相應一思對此兩種名定道戒。以二助思有遮防故。今定．通二雖復同時。所起色等對能起二名為定．通同戒何失。
疏。由定力變異身器者。前雖略
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『相雖殊，由俱境故』。意思是說，雖然現象不同，但都是由相同的境界所產生的。 『故云又解』。因此又有一種解釋。 問：初禪（Dhyana，禪定）的眼識等能否見到上地（higher realms）的色法（rupa，物質）的本質？ 答：雖然經文中沒有明確說明，但從道理上講應該是可以的。因為那是第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）所變現的本質。
疏：『由此三識所知必同等者』。意思是說，眼識、耳識、身識這三種身識所認識的相分（nimitta-bhaga，影像部分）都只是初禪的境界。 『故眼．耳二相非上系』。因此，眼識和耳識所認識的相分不是屬於上界的。
疏：『五十四至生因闕故者』。關於『因闕』（cause is lacking）的含義，大概有兩種解釋： 一說，種子（bija，seed）被稱為因。因為上界沒有產生香等物質的種子，所以稱為『因闕』。 二說，因是指原因或道理。因為上界沒有產生香等物質的道理，所以稱為『因闕』。 問：如果允許上界有香、味等物質，會違背什麼道理呢？ 答：如果允許禪定之心顯現香、味等物質，那麼這些香、味等物質就會隨著禪定之心而屬於上界。這就意味著上界有香、味等物質，違背了經教的說法。因此，禪定之心不會變現香、味等物質。結合疏文的解釋，總共有三種解釋。加行心（preparatory action）就是因。 或者疏文的解釋與前兩種解釋沒有區別。加行的因，就是指前面的兩種因，沒有其他的區別。
疏：『又無用者』。又沒有用處。香、味等物質是依附於段食（kabali-kara-ahara，分段食物）而存在的。上界沒有段食，即使有香、味等物質又有什麼用呢？
疏：『或是根本及所變等者』。如其次第所產生的稱為定通色（dhyana-abhijna-rupa，禪定神通所生的色法）。神通是依靠禪定而產生的，所以總稱為果（phala，結果）。
疏：『皆通變及化者』。變是指轉變，改變其性質。化是指化現，無中生有，突然出現。佛（Buddha）的禪定和神通都能做到。
疏：『通可引起根之與塵等者』。神通可以引起根（indriya，感官）和塵（visaya，對像）等。 問：如果佛（Buddha）的兩種智慧（二位心所）始終相應，為什麼神通和禪定所引起的根和塵會有區別呢？ 答：雖然是同時產生的，但力量和作用不同，所變現的也有差別。又變現了什麼呢？而且無漏心（anasrava-citta，沒有煩惱的心）必然有禪定和道（道諦，the truth of the path）同時產生。與思（cetanā，意志）相應的這兩種力量被稱為定道戒（dhyana-marga-sila，禪定之道所生的戒律）。因為這兩種力量輔助思，具有遮防的作用。現在禪定和神通雖然同時產生，但所產生的色法等，對於能產生它們的禪定和神通來說，分別被稱為定和通，如同戒律一樣，有什麼過失呢？
疏：『由定力變異身器者』。依靠禪定的力量改變身體和器物。
【English Translation】 English version '相雖殊，由俱境故' (Xiang sui shu, you ju jing gu). This means that although phenomena are different, they all arise from the same realm. '故云又解' (Gu yun you jie). Therefore, there is another explanation. Question: Can the eye consciousness, etc., of the first Dhyana (初禪, initial meditative absorption) see the essence of the rupa (色法, form/matter) of the higher realms (上地)? Answer: Although it is not explicitly stated in the scriptures, it should be possible in principle. Because it is the essence transformed by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, 阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness).
Commentary: '由此三識所知必同等者' (You ci san shi suo zhi bi tong deng zhe). This means that the nimitta-bhaga (相分, image-portion) perceived by the three body consciousnesses—eye, ear, and body—is only the realm of the first Dhyana. '故眼．耳二相非上系' (Gu yan er er xiang fei shang xi). Therefore, the image-portions perceived by the eye and ear consciousnesses do not belong to the higher realms.
Commentary: '五十四至生因闕故者' (Wu shi si zhi sheng yin que gu zhe). Regarding the meaning of '因闕' (yin que, cause is lacking), there are roughly two explanations: One explanation is that bija (種子, seed) is called cause. Because the higher realms do not have the seeds to produce fragrant substances, it is called 'cause is lacking'. Another explanation is that cause refers to the reason or principle. Because the higher realms do not have the principle to produce fragrant substances, it is called 'cause is lacking'. Question: If it is allowed that the higher realms have fragrant and flavorful substances, what principle would be violated? Answer: If it is allowed that the mind in samadhi (定心, concentrated mind) manifests fragrant and flavorful substances, then these substances would belong to the higher realms along with the mind in samadhi. This would mean that the higher realms have fragrant and flavorful substances, which violates the teachings of the scriptures. Therefore, the mind in samadhi does not transform fragrant and flavorful substances. Combining this with the commentary, there are three explanations in total. Preparatory action (加行心, preparatory mind) is the cause. Or the explanation in the commentary is no different from the previous two explanations. The cause of preparatory action refers to the previous two causes, and there is no other difference.
Commentary: '又無用者' (You wu yong zhe). Moreover, it is useless. Fragrant and flavorful substances depend on kabali-kara-ahara (段食, coarse food). The higher realms do not have coarse food, so what is the use of having fragrant and flavorful substances?
Commentary: '或是根本及所變等者' (Huo shi gen ben ji suo bian deng zhe). What arises in sequence is called dhyana-abhijna-rupa (定通色, form produced by meditative power and supernormal knowledge). Supernormal knowledge arises from reliance on dhyana, so it is generally called phala (果, result).
Commentary: '皆通變及化者' (Jie tong bian ji hua zhe). Transformation (變) refers to changing and altering its nature. Manifestation (化) refers to manifesting, suddenly appearing from nothing. The dhyana and supernormal powers of the Buddha (佛) can both do this.
Commentary: '通可引起根之與塵等者' (Tong ke yin qi gen zhi yu chen deng zhe). Supernormal powers can cause the arising of indriya (根, sense organs) and visaya (塵, sense objects), etc. Question: If the two wisdoms (二位心所) of the Buddha (佛) are always in accordance, why are the sense organs and sense objects caused by supernormal powers and dhyana different? Answer: Although they arise simultaneously, their power and function are different, and what they transform is also different. What else is transformed? Moreover, anasrava-citta (無漏心, undefiled mind) necessarily has dhyana and the path (道諦, the truth of the path) arising simultaneously. These two powers that are in accordance with cetana (思, volition) are called dhyana-marga-sila (定道戒, precepts arising from dhyana and the path). Because these two powers assist volition and have the function of preventing and guarding. Now, although dhyana and supernormal powers arise simultaneously, the rupa, etc., that arise are called dhyana and supernormal powers in relation to the dhyana and supernormal powers that can cause them, just like precepts, what fault is there?
Commentary: '由定力變異身器者' (You ding li bian yi shen qi zhe). Relying on the power of dhyana to transform the body and objects.
說意正明通。又未引證。今具援據故重舉之。
疏。變身萬億等者。按彼論云。心自在轉微細性者。謂色．無色二界諸色。如經說有平等心諸天。曾於人中如是如是資熏磨瑩其心。隨此修力住一毛端空量地處。展轉更互不相妨礙 釋曰。色界二色名為自在。一定心現。二自在定所感報色。無色但一定心所現。二界定色因自在定之所起故。名心自在微細性也。所引經者傳釋但證色界報色。即凈居天名等心天。詣佛聽法一萬六千由旬之身。一一皆住毛端量地。猶如燈光不相障礙。又凈居上十地菩薩名等心天 詳曰。依無色定亦能起身而來佛所名等心天。斯亦何過。經不簡故。又論雙言上之二界。何故引證但證色界。故知通證理無傷也。又瑜伽論不言共立。或本不同。或是疏主準于余文故言共也。故智度論第九十三云。遍凈天六十人坐一針頭。又色．無色而各自類不相障礙。非是二界互不礙也。乍觀彼文為言二界互不礙也。
疏。色界亦說有亦令互相見者。瑜伽既說色界諸天亦變身等。故知不唯無色界也。而有疏本作設字等寫者草誤。從說為正。
疏。亦應不緣等流色等有間斷者。問除業所招異熟色。外即諸善．惡及外器等皆名等流。間斷之因豈非一分兩俱不成 答疏略示法。具應言簡。簡理可知。又疏
意示前量不定。非為量破。
論。略說此識至所現變色者。問第八既緣法處實色。五亦緣不。若不緣者聖變魚等凡應不見。若許緣者五十四說法處攝色名無見對。復云何通 答如燈第二彼已分別。復有釋云。變定等色而無見對。但與眼等為增上緣名見金等。
疏。此中有難如理應思者。難云。以因從於果隨現法界收。以境對於心從識法界攝 答因緣親辨體。種隨於現收。為境引他疏故非法處攝。
疏。極略極迥色者。折根．器等為極微者名為極略。折像等色為極微者名為極迥。
疏。若唯意緣等者。獨頭意識緣根．塵等由分別生。亦名遍計所起攝也。
疏。以闇從明者。幽隱顯蔽名為闇明。十處法處名為明闇者義可斷矣。
疏。亦非由說至亦緣有故者。意說第六與五同緣雖名分別。緣境有用。
論。初必有用后必有境者。疏釋因緣．分別二變總有四釋。取第四釋尋之可悉 有義三釋。一云但現量心名因緣變。諸比．非量皆分別變。二云第八王．所名因緣變。余心．心所名分別變。三云唯第八心王是因緣變。相應心所亦分別變。此護法義。持種受熏唯心王故。自判前二有多過失。第三可通 問若說眼等所緣色等皆無實用。豈眼等識皆緣假法 答假有名種自有約義依實說假非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『意示前量不定。非為量破。』
論：簡略地說，此識乃至所顯現變化的色法。問：第八識既然緣法處所攝的實色，那麼前五識也緣嗎？如果不緣，那麼聖者所變化的魚等，凡夫應該看不見。如果允許緣，那麼五十四說法處所攝的色法，名為無見對。又該如何解釋呢？答：如同燈的第二義，那裡已經分別過了。還有一種解釋說，變化出來的定等色法，沒有見對。但與眼等作為增上緣，名為見到金等。
疏：這裡有難以如理思考的地方。難點在於：以因從果，隨現法界而收攝；以境對於心，從識法界而攝取。答：因緣親自分辨體性，種子隨現行而收攝。作為境界引導其他事物是疏遠的，所以不屬於法處所攝。
疏：極其微小和極其遙遠的色法。將根、器等折解為極微的，稱為極略。將形象等色法折解為極微的，稱為極迥。
疏：如果只有意識緣等。獨頭意識緣根、塵等，由分別產生。也名為遍計所起所攝。
疏：以黑暗跟隨光明。幽隱顯蔽名為黑暗光明。十處和法處名為光明黑暗，這個意義可以斷定。
疏：也不是因為說乃至也緣有的緣故。意思是說第六識與前五識一同緣，雖然名為分別，但緣境是有作用的。
論：最初必定有用，之後必定有境。疏釋因緣變和分別變總共有四種解釋。取第四種解釋尋找就可以完全瞭解。有義理的三種解釋：第一種說法是隻有現量心名為因緣變。各種比量、非量都是分別變。第二種說法是第八識的識王和所依名為因緣變。其餘的心和心所名為分別變。第三種說法是隻有第八識心王是因緣變。相應的心所也是分別變。這是護法的義理。因為持種受熏只有心王才能做到。自己判斷前兩種說法有很多過失。第三種說法可以融通。問：如果說眼等所緣的色等都沒有實際作用。難道眼等識都緣假法嗎？答：假名有種子，自有約定俗成的意義，依靠實法而說假，並非完全沒有。
【English Translation】 English version: 'The indication of intention before measurement is uncertain. It is not destroyed by measurement.'
Treatise: Briefly speaking about this consciousness, up to the colors manifested and transformed. Question: Since the eighth consciousness cognizes the real colors contained in the Dharmadhatu (realm of mental objects), do the first five consciousnesses also cognize them? If they do not, then ordinary people should not be able to see the fish and other things transformed by sages. If it is accepted that they do, then the colors contained in the fifty-four doctrines, called 'non-manifesting resistance', how can this be reconciled? Answer: It is like the second meaning of a lamp, which has already been distinguished there. There is also an explanation that the colors transformed into samadhi (meditative concentration) and the like do not have 'non-manifesting resistance'. However, they serve as the dominant condition for the eyes and other senses, and are called seeing gold and the like.
Commentary: Here there are difficulties that should be considered according to reason. The difficulty lies in: 'Because the cause follows from the effect, it is collected within the manifested Dharmadhatu; because the object is related to the mind, it is taken from the consciousness Dharmadhatu.' Answer: 'Causation personally distinguishes the substance; the seed is collected according to the manifestation. As a condition to guide other things, it is distant, therefore it is not contained within the Dharmadhatu.'
Commentary: Extremely minute and extremely remote colors. Breaking down roots, vessels, etc., into extremely small particles is called 'extremely minute'. Breaking down images and other colors into extremely small particles is called 'extremely remote'.
Commentary: If only the mind cognizes, etc. The independent consciousness cognizes roots, dust, etc., which arise from discrimination. It is also called being contained within what is conceptually constructed (Parikalpita).
Commentary: Because darkness follows from light. Obscurity and concealment are called darkness and light. The ten sense bases and the Dharmadhatu are called light and darkness, and this meaning can be determined.
Commentary: It is not because of saying, up to also cognizing because there is. It means that the sixth consciousness cognizes together with the first five consciousnesses, although it is called discrimination, cognizing the object has a function.
Treatise: Initially there must be a function, and afterwards there must be an object. The commentary explains that there are four explanations in total for the transformation of causation and the transformation of discrimination. Take the fourth explanation and search for it to fully understand. There are three explanations with meaning: The first explanation is that only the directly perceived mind is called the transformation of causation. All inferences and non-measurements are transformations of discrimination. The second explanation is that the king and the dependent of the eighth consciousness are called the transformation of causation. The remaining minds and mental factors are called the transformation of discrimination. The third explanation is that only the eighth consciousness mind-king is the transformation of causation. The corresponding mental factors are also the transformation of discrimination. This is the doctrine of Dharmapala (a Buddhist protector deity). Because only the mind-king can hold the seed and receive the influence. He himself judges that the first two explanations have many faults. The third explanation can be reconciled. Question: If it is said that the colors, etc., cognized by the eyes, etc., have no practical function, do the eye consciousnesses, etc., all cognize false phenomena? Answer: False names have seeds, and there is a conventional meaning. Speaking of falsity based on reality is not completely without foundation.
五識緣。是分別心。義別說故。影像色等雖無礙故得名假色。然說種生即名為實。故無過失 詳曰。非但前二有多過失。即第三釋亦同前過。所以者何。如第八識任運而起。所變之境從實種生名因緣變。即五轉識一分第六與五俱起。任運緣者亦因修起境實種生。何乃即判為分別變。故今依取疏第四也。
疏。然一念心得成二種等者。緣根．塵等名因緣變。緣七心界分別變攝。
疏。反顯八俱具有二變者。王．所如次因緣．分別二變所攝。
論。若變心等至不能緣故者。深密經云。變化心者無自依心有依他心。按佛地論第六釋云。謂化心等依實心現。但實心上相分。似有緣慮等心。如鏡中火無別自體 此釋意云。無自所依實見分心名無自依。而有似慮名有依他 又見．自證．證自證分名自依心。化心異彼。名無自依有依他心。同前可知。
疏。即現比二量至可應分別者。如第六意緣曾實境熏成實種後生實現。此雖比量分別變收。容有實用。第六現量與五同緣亦有實用。若定心緣十八界者。用通假實如前應知。
疏。此中謂約身器為小者。身即是器。非外器器。五十一中依身器器以明寬狹。有義疏說通依身．器以釋。今不依此。彼論但依執受境說狹小廣大 詳曰。不得疏旨。徒為萎菲。請
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：五識所緣的境，是分別心。因為意義不同所以這樣說。影像色等雖然沒有阻礙，因此得名假色，然而說是從種子生起，就名為真實，所以沒有過失。詳細地說，不只是前兩種解釋有很多過失，第三種解釋也和前面一樣有過失。為什麼這麼說呢？比如第八識任運而起，所變現的境界從真實的種子生起，名為因緣變。即使是五轉識和一部分第六識一起生起，任運緣取的境界也是因為修行而生起，境界從真實的種子生起。為什麼就判定為分別變呢？所以現在依據《瑜伽師地論》的解釋。
疏：然而一念心可以成就兩種變現等。緣根（indriya，感覺器官）、塵（visaya，感覺對像）等名為因緣變，緣七心界屬於分別變所攝。
疏：反過來顯示八識都具有兩種變現。王（citta，心王，即八識）和所（caitta，心所，即心所法）依次被因緣變和分別變所攝。
論：如果變現的心等不能緣取境界，是因為深密經（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）說：『變化心沒有自依心，有依他心。』按照《佛地論》（Buddhabhumisutra）第六的解釋說，所謂化心等依靠實心顯現，只是在實心上的相分，似乎有緣慮等心，如同鏡子中的火沒有別的自體。這個解釋的意思是，沒有自己所依靠的真實見分心，名為無自依。而有相似的思慮，名為有依他。又見分（darsanabhaga，能見分）、自證分（svasamvedanabhaga，自證分）、證自證分（samvedanasvasamvedanabhaga，證自證分）名為自依心。化心和它們不同，名為無自依有依他心。和前面所說的一樣可以理解。
疏：即現量（pratyaksa，現量）、比量（anumana，比量）這兩種量，乃至可以應當分別。比如第六意識緣取曾經真實的境界，熏習成為真實的種子，然後生起實現。這雖然被比量分別變所攝，容許有實用。第六意識的現量和五識一同緣取境界，也有實用。如果定心緣取十八界（dhatus，十八界）的話，用處貫通假和實，應該像前面所說的那樣理解。
疏：這裡所說的是以身（kaya，身體）和器（bhajana，器世界）為小。身就是器，不是外面的器。五十一心所中，依靠身器來表明寬狹。有的義疏說貫通依靠身和器來解釋。現在不依據這個說法。那部論只依據執受境來說狹小廣大。詳細地說，沒有理解疏的旨意，只是徒勞地衰敗。
【English Translation】 English version: The object cognized by the five consciousnesses is the discriminating mind. This is said because the meanings are different. Although image-colors and the like are unobstructed, hence they are called 'provisional colors,' yet saying they arise from seeds is called 'real,' so there is no fault. In detail, it's not only that the previous two explanations have many faults, but the third explanation also has the same faults as before. Why is this so? For example, the eighth consciousness arises spontaneously, and the object it transforms arises from real seeds, called 'causal transformation.' Even the five sense consciousnesses and a portion of the sixth consciousness that arise together, the objects they spontaneously cognize also arise from real seeds due to practice. Why then is it judged as 'discriminating transformation'? Therefore, we now rely on the fourth explanation in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.
Commentary: 'However, a single moment of mind can accomplish two kinds of transformations, etc.' Cognizing the roots (indriya, sense organs), objects (visaya, sense objects), etc., is called 'causal transformation.' Cognizing the seven mind-realms is included in 'discriminating transformation.'
Commentary: 'Conversely, showing that all eight consciousnesses have two transformations.' The king (citta, the mind-king, i.e., the eight consciousnesses) and the mental factors (caitta, mental factors, i.e., mental functions) are respectively included in causal transformation and discriminating transformation.
Treatise: 'If the transformed mind, etc., cannot cognize objects, it is because the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says: 'The transformation-mind has no self-reliant mind, but has other-reliant mind.'' According to the sixth explanation in the Buddhabhumisutra, the so-called transformation-mind, etc., appears relying on the real mind, but only the image-portion on the real mind seems to have cognitive functions, like fire in a mirror has no separate self-nature. The meaning of this explanation is that the real seeing-portion mind that has no self-reliance is called 'no self-reliance.' And having similar thoughts is called 'other-reliance.' Also, the seeing-portion (darsanabhaga, the seeing aspect), self-awareness-portion (svasamvedanabhaga, the self-awareness aspect), and awareness-of-self-awareness-portion (samvedanasvasamvedanabhaga, the awareness-of-self-awareness aspect) are called 'self-reliant mind.' The transformation-mind is different from them, called 'no self-reliance and other-reliance.' It can be understood as before.
Commentary: 'That is, the two kinds of valid cognition, direct perception (pratyaksa, direct perception) and inference (anumana, inference), up to what should be distinguished.' For example, the sixth consciousness cognizes a past real object, perfuming it into a real seed, and then giving rise to realization. Although this is included in discriminating transformation by inference, it allows for practical use. The direct perception of the sixth consciousness, like the five consciousnesses, also has practical use. If the samadhi mind cognizes the eighteen realms (dhatus, eighteen elements), the use penetrates the provisional and the real, it should be understood as before.
Commentary: 'Here, it is said that the body (kaya, body) and the vessel (bhajana, vessel world) are small.' The body is the vessel, not the external vessel. Among the fifty-one mental factors, the breadth is explained by relying on the body and the vessel. Some commentaries say that the explanation penetrates relying on the body and the vessel. Now we do not rely on this explanation. That treatise only relies on the apprehended object to say small and large. In detail, it does not understand the meaning of the commentary, but only withers away in vain.
審詳焉。
疏。此亦所立同者。同前滅定在所立中。
疏。二計宗各解不同者。經部．有宗釋有別也。至下當知。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第三(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第三(末)(論本第三)
◎疏。令相隨順等者。此隨轉門。故俱舍論第十云。三和有三。一同在一世故名三和。二因果相順不相違返故名三和。謂根與境雖在過．未識居現在。因果義成。三互相隨順同得一果。謂根．境．識雖各一世。同一觸果故名和合。初之一義依五識說。后二意識。
疏。或依增上等者。依大乘義。以第七識俱時有故。
論。觸似彼起故名分別者。問根等有生心等能。殊別於前名變異。觸既似彼有功能。應同根等名變異 答根等為依無所似。故據生能名變異。觸是能依似所依。但名分別非變異。
疏。應說觸觸為緣等者。如十二支觸生於受言觸緣受。既觸生觸何不說言觸緣于觸。
疏。若自不似等者。觸言似彼。似彼生受。觸稱似彼。應亦似彼而生於觸。何故言似有生．不生。觸不生觸觸應非似。
疏。如受等法等者。受等心所全不能生余心所故不名分別。觸異受等得分別名。
疏。又如受領觸不領作意等者。此明心所雖有功能然分限定。受但領觸可意等相。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 審詳焉。
疏。此亦所立同者。同前滅定在所立中。
疏。二計宗各解不同者。經部（Sautrantika）．有宗（Sarvastivada）釋有別也。至下當知。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第三(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第三(末)(論本第三)
◎疏。令相隨順等者。此隨轉門。故俱舍論第十云。三和有三。一同在一世故名三和。二因果相順不相違返故名三和。謂根與境雖在過．未識居現在。因果義成。三互相隨順同得一果。謂根．境．識雖各一世。同一觸果故名和合。初之一義依五識說。后二意識。
疏。或依增上等者。依大乘義。以第七識俱時有故。
論。觸似彼起故名分別者。問根等有生心等能。殊別於前名變異。觸既似彼有功能。應同根等名變異 答根等為依無所似。故據生能名變異。觸是能依似所依。但名分別非變異。
疏。應說觸觸為緣等者。如十二支觸生於受言觸緣受。既觸生觸何不說言觸緣于觸。
疏。若自不似等者。觸言似彼。似彼生受。觸稱似彼。應亦似彼而生於觸。何故言似有生．不生。觸不生觸觸應非似。
疏。如受等法等者。受等心所全不能生余心所故不名分別。觸異受等得分別名。
疏。又如受領觸不領作意等者。此明心所雖有功能然分限定。受但領觸可意等相。
【English Translation】 English version Examine it in detail.
Commentary: This also refers to what is established as the same. Similar to the previous 'cessation of attainment' being within what is established.
Commentary: The two schools' interpretations differ. The Sautrantika (經部) and Sarvastivada (有宗) schools have different explanations. This will be understood later. ◎
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 3 (End of the Volume)
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 3 (End) (Third Section of the Treatise)
◎ Commentary: 'Causing mutual accordance,' etc. This refers to the 'following transformation' aspect. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, Chapter 10, states: 'The three harmonies are threefold. First, they exist in the same lifetime, hence called three harmonies. Second, cause and effect are in accordance and not contradictory, hence called three harmonies. That is, although the sense faculties and objects are in the past and future, consciousness resides in the present, thus the meaning of cause and effect is established. Third, they mutually accord and together attain one result. That is, although the faculties, objects, and consciousness each exist in one lifetime, they share the same result of contact, hence called harmony.' The first meaning is explained based on the five consciousnesses. The latter two refer to the mind consciousness.
Commentary: 'Or based on the dominant condition,' etc. This is according to the Mahayana meaning, because the seventh consciousness exists simultaneously.
Treatise: 'Contact is named 'discrimination' because it resembles that which arises from it.' Question: The sense faculties, etc., have the ability to generate mind, etc., which is distinct from the previous, and is called 'transformation.' Since contact resembles them and has function, it should be called 'transformation' like the faculties, etc. Answer: The faculties, etc., are the basis and do not resemble anything, therefore, based on their ability to generate, they are called 'transformation.' Contact is dependent and resembles what it depends on, so it is only called 'discrimination' and not 'transformation.'
Commentary: 'It should be said that contact is conditioned by contact,' etc. As in the twelve links, contact gives rise to feeling, so it is said that feeling is conditioned by contact. Since contact gives rise to contact, why not say that contact is conditioned by contact?
Commentary: 'If it does not resemble itself,' etc. It is said that contact resembles that, and resembling that gives rise to feeling. Contact is said to resemble that, so it should also resemble that and give rise to contact. Why is it said that resembling sometimes gives rise and sometimes does not? If contact does not give rise to contact, then contact should not be said to resemble.
Commentary: 'Like feeling and other dharmas,' etc. Mental factors like feeling cannot generate other mental factors, so they are not called 'discrimination.' Contact is different from feeling, etc., and is given the name 'discrimination.'
Commentary: 'Also, like feeling apprehends contact but volition does not apprehend attention,' etc. This clarifies that although mental factors have functions, they are limited. Feeling only apprehends the agreeable aspects of contact, etc.
而不領觸生作意等。觸但似三而不自似。又受言領觸。此觸取于可意等事。而不似觸而生於受及作意等。
疏。復言於三第六囀者。三字必錯。合為之字。論中言之不云三故。
論。思於行蘊為主勝故者。大小聖教皆有此義。故俱舍論第一云。除前及后色．受．想．識餘一切行皆名行蘊。然薄伽梵于契經中。說六思身名行蘊者。由最勝故。所以者何。行名造作。思是業性。造作義強故名最勝。是故佛說若能造作有漏有為名行取蘊。
論。謂觸所取可意等相者。問其所取相若據本質王．所皆同。若依相分瑜伽等言行相相似。云何但說觸受所取相為鄰近耶 答疏有二釋。有義雖心．心所所緣相似。觸．受所緣然極相似。詳曰。所取境中既有相似．極相似別。此乃所緣便不同矣。實義言者雖所緣境質同影似。然彼能緣而於境取非無差別。舉所取境顯能緣也。
論。然觸自性是實非假者。為經部師有計觸假。論為斯立自性有也。故俱舍論第十敘經部義而有兩師 有說三和即名為觸。如契經言如是三法聚集和合說名為觸 有說別法與心相應。三和合所生說名為觸。今破前師。
疏。今取界身足者。詳曰。通取俱舍理亦無違。心所性言簡識．根．境。無不定失。
疏。六愛經部至不同假觸者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 而且不領納觸、生、作意等等。觸僅僅類似於三者，但本身並不像。另外，『受』是指領納觸，這個觸取的是可意等事物，但它不像觸那樣，而是生起受和作意等等。
疏：再次說到『於三第六囀』，這個『三』字一定是錯的，應該合為『之』字。因為論中說的是『之』，而不是『三』。
論：思在行蘊中是主要且殊勝的。大小乘佛教都有這個觀點。所以《俱舍論》第一卷說：『除了前面的色、受、想、識，其餘一切行都叫做行蘊。』然而，薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）在契經（Sutra，佛經）中說六思身名為行蘊，是因為思最殊勝。為什麼這樣說呢？行是指造作，思是業的性質，造作的意義強烈，所以說思最殊勝。因此，佛說如果能夠造作有漏有為的，就叫做行取蘊。
論：所謂觸所取的可意等相。問：它所取的相，如果根據本質，王（Raja，國王）和所（所緣）都相同。如果依據相分，瑜伽（Yoga，相應）等說行相相似，為什麼只說觸受所取的相是鄰近的呢？答：疏中有兩種解釋。有一種觀點認為，雖然心和心所所緣的相似，但觸和受所緣的極其相似。詳細地說，所取的境中既然有相似和極其相似的區別，那麼所緣就不同了。實在的意義是說，雖然所緣的境本質相同，影像相似，但能緣在取境時並非沒有差別。這是舉所取的境來顯示能緣。
論：然而觸的自性是真實的，不是虛假的。這是因為經部師（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）認為觸是虛假的，所以論爲了破斥這種觀點，才立觸的自性是真實的。所以《俱舍論》第十卷敘述經部義時，有兩種說法：一種說法是三和合就叫做觸，如契經所說：『像這樣三種法聚集和合，就叫做觸。』另一種說法是，另外有一種法與心相應，由三和合所生，叫做觸。現在破斥前一種說法。
疏：現在取界、身就足夠了。詳細地說，通取《俱舍論》的道理也沒有違背。心所性可以簡別識、根、境，沒有不確定的過失。
疏：六愛經部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）直到不同意假觸。
【English Translation】 English version And not experiencing contact, origination, attention, etc. Contact only resembles the three but does not resemble itself. Furthermore, 'feeling' refers to experiencing contact. This contact takes agreeable things, etc., but it is not like contact; rather, it gives rise to feeling and attention, etc.
Commentary: Again, regarding 'in the sixth case of the three,' the word 'three' must be a mistake; it should be combined into the word 'of.' Because the treatise says 'of,' not 'three.'
Treatise: 'Thinking is primary and superior in the aggregate of formations.' Both the teachings of the Greater and Lesser Vehicles have this meaning. Therefore, the first volume of the Abhidharmakosha states: 'Except for the preceding form, feeling, perception, and consciousness, all other formations are called the aggregate of formations.' However, the Bhagavan (the Blessed One) in the sutras says that the six bodies of thinking are called the aggregate of formations because thinking is the most superior. Why is this so? Formation means creation, and thinking is the nature of karma. The meaning of creation is strong, so it is called the most superior. Therefore, the Buddha said that if one can create defiled and conditioned things, it is called the aggregate of grasping at formations.
Treatise: 'So-called contact takes agreeable aspects, etc.' Question: If the aspect it takes is based on the essence, the king (Raja, the object) and the object (the object of cognition) are the same. If based on the aspect-division, Yoga (union) and others say the characteristics are similar, why only say that the aspects taken by contact and feeling are close? Answer: The commentary has two explanations. One view is that although the objects of mind and mental factors are similar, the objects of contact and feeling are extremely similar. In detail, since there are differences between similar and extremely similar in the objects taken, the objects of cognition are different. The real meaning is that although the essence of the object of cognition is the same and the image is similar, the cognizer is not without difference in taking the object. This is to show the cognizer by citing the object taken.
Treatise: 'However, the nature of contact is real, not false.' This is because the Sautrantikas (a Buddhist school) consider contact to be false, so the treatise establishes that the nature of contact is real to refute this view. Therefore, the tenth volume of the Abhidharmakosha narrates the Sautrantika doctrine with two views: One view is that the combination of the three is called contact, as the sutra says: 'Thus, the gathering and combination of these three dharmas is called contact.' Another view is that there is another dharma that corresponds to the mind, produced by the combination of the three, called contact. Now, we refute the former view.
Commentary: Now, taking realm and body is sufficient. In detail, there is no contradiction in generally taking the principles of the Abhidharmakosha. The nature of mental factors can distinguish consciousness, roots, and objects, without the fault of uncertainty.
Commentary: The Sautrantikas (a Buddhist school) of the six loves up to disagreeing with false contact.
。有義既無別體從他分說如何名實。雖不同觸以多法成。依實立愛名定假故。故知初因對界身足亦有不定。非正因也 詳曰。假實之義形待不定。如大乘種。真俗相對種非唯真即名為假。有無相對。種非全無複名為實。愛亦同之為喻何失。對彼所立三和假觸。愛得名實。初因無過。
疏。量云觸別有體者。詳曰。彼既許愛依思分立。豈非喻有所立不成。應如論言是實非假即無其失。雖思分位然得名實。
論。是食攝故者。疏有兩釋。后解易知。初解之中言許實故。簡于喻上所立之過。經部粗色說皆假故。故第二因亦無失矣 有義其第二因若總三食為同喻者。所立不成。假食三塵是假有故。別以識．思二為同喻因成不定。疏何故說假食實有 詳曰。因明之法。宗．因．喻三若有過者容致言簡。為論文略疏致許言。復云心所亦通於下。明遮喻．因過乃盡矣。何事見責。
論。能為緣故者。有義其第三因同前初因亦有不定 詳曰。愛非全假如前已釋。故無不定。
論。非即三和者。有義前之三因皆悉成此非三和宗即無其過。非即三和宗若成者。其實有宗自然成故。不須重立以為宗也 詳曰。縱成其觸非三和已。何理實有自然得成。如彼愛等雖非三和亦非實有。共畢竟無生等四相。亦非三和豈實有耶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有人認為，如果『義』（artha，意義）已經存在，就不需要從其他事物中區分出獨立的『體』（svabhāva，自性），那麼如何確定名和實的關係呢？即使『觸』（sparśa，接觸）不同，也是由多種要素構成的。因為依賴於真實而建立『愛』（tṛṣṇā，渴愛）的名稱，所以它是假有的。因此，可以知道最初的『因』（hetu，原因）對於『界』（dhātu，界）、『身』（kāya，身體）來說是不確定的，不是正確的『因』。詳細來說，假和實的意義取決於所參照的對象，是不確定的。例如，在大乘佛教中，『種』（bīja，種子）相對於真諦和俗諦來說，『種』並非完全是真諦，因此被稱為假有；相對於有和無來說，『種』並非完全是無，因此被稱為實有。『愛』也是如此，用它來作比喻有什麼不對？相對於他們所建立的三和合的假『觸』，『愛』可以被認為是名實相符的。最初的『因』沒有過失。
疏：如果量論說『觸』有獨立的『體』，詳細來說，既然他們允許『愛』依賴於『思』（cetanā，思）而建立，難道不是比喻有所不能成立嗎？應該像論中說的那樣，是實有而非假有，這樣就沒有過失了。即使是『思』的分位，也能夠獲得名實相符的地位。
論：因為『是食攝故』（āhāra-saṃgraha，為食所攝），疏中有兩種解釋。後面的解釋容易理解。在最初的解釋中，因為允許是實有，所以可以避免在比喻上所建立的過失。經部宗認為粗色都是假有的。因此，第二個『因』也沒有過失。有人認為，如果第二個『因』將三種『食』（āhāra，食物）都作為相同的比喻，那麼所要建立的就不能成立。因為假『食』的三『塵』（rajas，塵）是假有的。如果分別以『識』（vijñāna，識）、『思』作為相同的比喻，那麼『因』的成立就不確定了。疏中為什麼要說假『食』是實有的呢？詳細來說，因明的方法，宗、因、喻三者如果有過失，可以簡單地說出來。因為論文簡略，所以疏中允許這樣說。又說『心所』（caitta，心所）也普遍存在於下文中，說明遮止比喻和『因』的過失已經窮盡了。為什麼要責備呢？
論：因為『能為緣故』（pratyaya-hetu，能為緣故），有人認為第三個『因』和最初的『因』一樣，也是不確定的。詳細來說，『愛』並非完全是假有的，如前所述，所以沒有不確定的過失。
論：『非即三和者』（na te eva trayaḥ，非即三和），有人認為，前面的三個『因』都能夠成立，這個『非三和』的『宗』（pakṣa，宗）就沒有過失。如果『非即三和』的『宗』成立，那麼『實有』的『宗』自然就成立了，不需要重新建立一個『宗』。詳細來說，即使成立了『觸』不是三和合的，憑什麼『實有』就能自然成立呢？就像『愛』等，雖然不是三和合的，也不是實有的。共同的『畢竟無生』（atyantānutpāda，畢竟無生）等四相，也不是三和合的，難道是實有的嗎？
【English Translation】 English version: Some argue that if 'artha' (meaning) already exists, there is no need to distinguish an independent 'svabhāva' (self-nature) from other things. Then how can the relationship between name and reality be determined? Even if 'sparśa' (contact) is different, it is composed of multiple elements. Because 'tṛṣṇā' (craving) is established based on reality, it is conventionally existent. Therefore, it can be known that the initial 'hetu' (cause) is uncertain for 'dhātu' (element), 'kāya' (body), and is not a correct 'hetu'. In detail, the meaning of conventional and real depends on the reference object and is uncertain. For example, in Mahayana Buddhism, 'bīja' (seed) is not entirely true relative to truth and convention, so it is called conventional existence; relative to existence and non-existence, 'bīja' is not entirely non-existent, so it is called real existence. 'Tṛṣṇā' is also the same, what is wrong with using it as a metaphor? Relative to the three-fold aggregation of conventional 'sparśa' they established, 'tṛṣṇā' can be considered to match name and reality. The initial 'hetu' has no fault.
Commentary: If the logician says that 'sparśa' has an independent 'svabhāva', in detail, since they allow 'tṛṣṇā' to be established based on 'cetanā' (volition), isn't the metaphor unable to be established? It should be like what is said in the treatise, it is real rather than conventional, so there is no fault. Even if it is the division of 'cetanā', it can obtain the status of matching name and reality.
Treatise: Because 'āhāra-saṃgraha' (included in nutriment), there are two explanations in the commentary. The latter explanation is easy to understand. In the initial explanation, because it is allowed to be real, the fault established on the metaphor can be avoided. The Sautrāntika school believes that coarse matter is all conventional. Therefore, the second 'hetu' also has no fault. Some argue that if the second 'hetu' takes all three 'āhāra' (nutriment) as the same metaphor, then what is to be established cannot be established. Because the three 'rajas' (dust) of conventional 'āhāra' are conventionally existent. If 'vijñāna' (consciousness) and 'cetanā' are taken as the same metaphor separately, then the establishment of 'hetu' is uncertain. Why does the commentary say that conventional 'āhāra' is real? In detail, in the method of logic, if there are faults in the thesis, reason, and example, it can be said simply. Because the treatise is brief, the commentary allows this to be said. It is also said that 'caitta' (mental factors) are also universally present in the following text, indicating that the faults of preventing the metaphor and 'hetu' have been exhausted. Why should there be blame?
Treatise: Because 'pratyaya-hetu' (cause as a condition), some argue that the third 'hetu' is also uncertain like the initial 'hetu'. In detail, 'tṛṣṇā' is not entirely conventional, as explained earlier, so there is no fault of uncertainty.
Treatise: 'na te eva trayaḥ' (not just the three), some argue that the previous three 'hetu' can all be established, and there is no fault in the 'pakṣa' (thesis) of 'not just the three'. If the 'pakṣa' of 'not just the three' is established, then the 'pakṣa' of 'real existence' will naturally be established, and there is no need to re-establish a 'pakṣa'. In detail, even if it is established that 'sparśa' is not a three-fold aggregation, how can 'real existence' be naturally established? Just like 'tṛṣṇā' and so on, although they are not a three-fold aggregation, they are not real either. The common four characteristics such as 'atyantānutpāda' (absolute non-arising) are also not a three-fold aggregation, are they real?
。故知不可非三和成實有自立。
論。謂此驚覺應起心種等者。有義依疏初說作意種子。警已逢緣應起心種。以警種者。此唯種子義不相應今釋相應現作意故。解云。由現作意行相難知故。此舉種以釋體性。雖作是解其理極難。故今但依第二釋也 謂現作意警覺現起相應心種。以之為性現令起種名應起種。非當起種名應起也 詳曰。何理得知明現作意。若言本說相應法故故知現者。若爾心所與心相應名為相應。應俱辨現。如何第八前亦明種。又若警覺現起種者。夫言種子生果為義。現果既生何意須警。若令趣境自是現能。論乃合云警應起現。若言由種現方得生。雖在現位但言警種。若爾前觸例亦應然。前何不言和合三種。彼既不爾此云何然。故疏初解理固無失。余如燈會。
疏。此質不定至復應思擇者。此生等喻有隨一過。大乘不許有小生故。設有生等。生等復假。故無不定。
論。唯自性受至共余相故者。按顯宗論第二。云何此受領納隨觸。謂受是觸鄰近果故。此隨觸聲為顯因義。能順受故。受能領納。能順觸因。是故說受領納隨觸。領納隨觸名自性受。領納所緣雖亦是受。一切皆同領納境故。是故唯說領納隨觸名自性受。別相定故領納所緣名執取受。非此所辨。相不定故。
論。若似觸
【現代漢語翻譯】 因此可知，三和合（Sanhe he，三種要素的和合）並非真實存在，沒有自立性。
論：所謂『驚覺應起心種』等，有一種解釋是依據窺基的疏鈔，最初的說法是作意種子（zuoyi zhongzi，注意力的種子）。警覺已經遇到因緣，應該生起心種。因為警覺種子，這僅僅是種子的含義，與現在解釋的相應不符，現在解釋的是相應的現行作意。解釋說：因為現行作意的行相難以知曉，所以這裡舉種子來解釋體性。雖然這樣解釋，但道理極其困難。所以現在只依據第二種解釋。所謂現行作意警覺現起相應的心的種子，以這個作為體性，現在令種子生起，名為『應起種』，不是將要生起的種子，名為『應起』。詳細地說，用什麼道理得知是明瞭的現行作意？如果說本來就說相應法，所以知道是現行。如果這樣，心所與心相應，名為相應，應該都辨別為現行。為什麼第八識（第八識，Alaya-識）前面也說明是種子？又如果警覺現起種子，種子以生果為意義。現行果已經產生，為什麼需要警覺？如果令趣向境界，自然是現行的能力。論中應該合起來說『警覺應起現行』。如果說由種子現行才能生起，即使在現行位，但只說警覺種子。如果這樣，前面的觸也應該一樣。前面為什麼不說和合三種？既然前面不是這樣，這裡為什麼這樣？所以窺基疏鈔最初的解釋，道理確實沒有缺失。其餘的如同燈會（denghui，燈的集會）。
疏：這裡質疑不定，直到『還應該思考選擇』，這裡生等譬喻，有隨一過失。大乘（Mahayana）不承認有小生，即使有生等，生等也是假立的，所以沒有不定。
論：唯有自性受，直到『共同其餘相』，按照《顯宗論》（Xianzong lun）第二卷，說什麼樣的受是領納隨觸？說是受是觸的鄰近果。這裡『隨觸』的聲音，是爲了顯示因的意義，能夠順從受的緣故。受能夠領納，能夠順從觸因，所以說受領納隨觸。領納隨觸，名為自性受。領納所緣，雖然也是受，一切都相同領納境界的緣故。所以只說領納隨觸，名為自性受，別相確定緣故。領納所緣，名為執取受，不是這裡所辨別的，相不確定緣故。
論：如果相似觸
【English Translation】 Therefore, it is known that the union of three factors (Sanhe he, the union of three elements) is not truly existent and has no self-nature.
Treatise: Regarding 'arousing the seed of mind that should be awakened,' etc., one interpretation, based on Kuiji's commentary, initially states that it is the seed of attention (zuoyi zhongzi, seed of attention). When awakening encounters conditions, it should give rise to the seed of mind. Because awakening is a seed, this is merely the meaning of a seed, which does not correspond to the current explanation of corresponding manifest attention. The explanation says: Because the characteristics of manifest attention are difficult to know, the seed is used here to explain its nature. Although explained in this way, the reasoning is extremely difficult. Therefore, we now rely only on the second explanation. The so-called manifest attention awakens the corresponding seed of mind that arises, taking this as its nature. Causing the seed to arise now is called 'the seed that should arise,' not the seed that is about to arise, which is called 'should arise.' In detail, by what reasoning is it known to be clear manifest attention? If it is said that corresponding dharmas were originally spoken of, then it is known to be manifest. If so, mental factors corresponding to the mind are called corresponding, and both should be distinguished as manifest. Why is it that the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness, Alaya-vijnana) also explains it as a seed earlier? Furthermore, if awakening manifests the seed, the seed has the meaning of producing a result. Since the manifest result has already arisen, why is awakening needed? If it causes one to move towards the object, it is naturally the ability of the manifest. The treatise should combine and say 'awakening should manifest the manifest.' If it is said that the seed must manifest in order to arise, even if it is in the manifest position, only awakening the seed is spoken of. If so, the preceding contact should be the same. Why didn't the preceding say the union of three? Since the preceding is not like this, why is this like this? Therefore, Kuiji's initial explanation is indeed not lacking in reason. The rest is like the lamp meeting (denghui, gathering of lamps).
Commentary: Here, the questioning is uncertain, until 'it should be considered and chosen again.' The analogy of arising, etc., has a single fault. The Mahayana (Mahayana) does not acknowledge small arising. Even if there is arising, etc., arising, etc., is also falsely established, so there is no uncertainty.
Treatise: Only self-nature feeling, until 'common to other aspects.' According to the second volume of the Treatise on Manifest Teachings (Xianzong lun), what kind of feeling is receptive following contact? It is said that feeling is the proximate result of contact. Here, the sound of 'following contact' is to show the meaning of cause, because it can accord with feeling. Feeling can receive and can accord with the cause of contact, so it is said that feeling receives following contact. Receiving following contact is called self-nature feeling. Receiving the object, although it is also feeling, everything is the same because it receives the object. Therefore, only receiving following contact is called self-nature feeling, because the distinct characteristics are determined. Receiving the object is called grasping feeling, which is not what is being distinguished here, because the characteristics are uncertain.
Treatise: If similar to contact
生名領觸者。按順正理云。如父生子子之媚好皆似於父。亦如果從種生果似於因。受從觸生應知亦爾。
疏。或即因是果等者。若無之言。恐有執因正即是果。夫因果者不即離故。為簡其濫故論置之。
論。又既受因等者。不從於他但據于自可名自性。今既似他何名自性。即應說名似因之受。而不可言自性受也。
論。若謂如王食國邑者。此正理論具如疏引。言食國邑舉因顯果。
論。施設種種名言為業者。問既施名等。何非語因 答如樞要．義燈等辨 有義云。因有二。一意施設。二言施設。有境像等相狀不同。意解施設差別名故。尋伺推度法義淺深。隨義隨機而起說故。想思惟名不起說故 有云。同是起言說因。但粗細異故有差別。若爾上地何無語因。想遍地故。若言想細尋伺因粗。要有粗因方能發語。獨想不能。若爾．想業應說發言。如何但云施設為業。又想遍與尋．伺相應唯名為細亦未應理。故應定說二因不同 詳曰。傍觀二義義皆有餘。想不起說論云何說方能隨起種種名言。方能之言何所詮屬。雖分粗細不簡親疏。豈粗細因皆親起語。故名不修。由此應依樞要．燈說。
論。思謂令心造作為性者。問性．業何別。答有義令心總于善等法中而造作者此思之性。於三性中改轉造
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『生名領觸者』，按照順世正理的說法，就像父親生兒子，兒子的一切美好都像父親；也像果實從種子而生，與因相似。受（vedanā，感受）從觸（sparśa，接觸）而生，也應該知道是這樣的。
疏：『或即因是果等者』，如果沒有這樣的說法，恐怕有人會執著于因本身就是果。因和果的關係是不即不離的，爲了避免這種誤解，所以論中特別提出來。
論：『又既受因等者』，如果不是從其他事物而來，僅僅依據自身就可以稱為自性（svabhāva，自性）。現在既然類似於其他事物，怎麼能稱為自性呢？應該說它類似於因的受，而不能說是自性受。
論：『若謂如王食國邑者』，這個正理論在疏中已經詳細引用。『食國邑』是用因來顯示果。
論：『施設種種名言為業者』，問：既然施設名言等，為什麼不是語因（vākkāraṇa，語言之因）？答：如《樞要》、《義燈》等所辨析。有一種觀點認為，因有兩種：一是意施設，二是言施設。有境像等相狀不同。意解施設差別名故，尋（vitarka，尋）伺（vicāra，伺）推度法義淺深，隨義隨機而起說故。想（saṃjñā，想）思惟名不起說故。有一種觀點認為，同是起言說因，但粗細異故有差別。如果這樣，上地（ūrdhabhūmi，更高的禪定境界）為什麼沒有語因？因為想遍及一切地方。如果說想細而尋伺因粗，必須要有粗因才能引發語言，單獨的想不能。如果這樣，想業應該說能引發語言，為什麼只說是施設為業？而且想遍與尋、伺相應，僅僅稱為細也不合理。所以應該確定地說，兩種因是不同的。詳細地說，旁觀兩種觀點，都有不足之處。想不起說，論中怎麼說才能隨之而起種種名言？『才能』這兩個字是什麼意思？雖然分粗細，但不區分親疏，難道粗細因都能直接引發語言嗎？所以名不修。因此應該依據《樞要》、《義燈》的說法。
論：『思謂令心造作為性者』，問：性（lakṣaṇa，性質）、業（karman，作用）有什麼區別？答：有一種觀點認為，令心在善等法中造作，這是思的性質。於三性中改轉造作，這是思的作用。
【English Translation】 English version:
'The one who is named as the leader of contact (sparśa)' According to the Sautrāntika school, it is like a father begetting a son, and all the son's good qualities resemble the father; also like a fruit arising from a seed, resembling the cause. Feeling (vedanā) arises from contact (sparśa), and it should be known that it is also like this.
Commentary: 'Or that the cause is exactly the effect, etc.' If there were no such statement, there would be a risk of someone clinging to the idea that the cause itself is the effect. The relationship between cause and effect is neither identical nor separate. To avoid this misunderstanding, the treatise specifically mentions it.
Treatise: 'Moreover, since feeling arises from a cause, etc.' If it does not come from other things, but is based solely on itself, it can be called self-nature (svabhāva). Now that it resembles other things, how can it be called self-nature? It should be said that it is a feeling resembling the cause, and cannot be called feeling of self-nature.
Treatise: 'If it is said to be like a king consuming a country and its cities,' this correct principle is quoted in detail in the commentary. 'Consuming a country and its cities' uses the cause to reveal the effect.
Treatise: 'Establishing various names and terms as its function.' Question: Since establishing names and terms, etc., why is it not a cause of speech (vākkāraṇa)? Answer: As explained in works like the Essential and the Lamp of Meaning. One view is that there are two kinds of causes: one is conceptual establishment, and the other is verbal establishment. They differ in aspects such as the object and image. Conceptual understanding establishes different names, and investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra) speculate on the profoundness and shallowness of the Dharma, giving rise to speech according to the meaning and the occasion. Thought (saṃjñā) and contemplation do not give rise to speech. Another view is that both are causes of speech, but they differ in coarseness and fineness. If so, why are there no causes of speech in the higher realms (ūrdhabhūmi)? Because thought pervades everywhere. If it is said that thought is subtle and investigation and analysis are coarse, there must be a coarse cause to initiate speech; thought alone cannot. If so, the function of thought should be said to initiate speech. Why is it only said to be the function of establishment? Moreover, thought is associated with investigation and analysis, and is only called subtle, which is also unreasonable. Therefore, it should be definitively said that the two causes are different. In detail, observing both views, each has its shortcomings. Thought does not initiate speech, so how does the treatise say that various names and terms can arise accordingly? What does the word 'can' mean? Although they are divided into coarse and fine, they do not distinguish between close and distant. Can both coarse and fine causes directly initiate speech? Therefore, the name is not cultivated. Thus, one should rely on the explanations of the Essential and the Lamp.
Treatise: 'Intention (cetanā) is defined as having the nature of causing the mind to create.' Question: What is the difference between nature (lakṣaṇa) and function (karman)? Answer: One view is that causing the mind to create in good and other dharmas is the nature of intention. Transforming and creating within the three natures is the function of intention.
作說名為業。故此業用亦非遍因。疏說三遍故未盡理 詳曰。夫言改轉易換異名。若也始終一類之事應無思業。無改轉故。故今釋者性但令作。業役令作。單．重廣．略行相有異。既云善等等惡．無記。無記通於八識皆有。說思名遍亦何爽理。若準瑜伽第三所說。思之行相是別非遍。如疏所述彼可知也。
論。此觸等五至故名相應者。疏中二解。除行相者順教理也。瑜伽說四。此論自云行相雖異。何得取之 問夫簡法者。前義不盡須后法簡前。若遮盡后法何須。如論四義時．依二法遮簡已周。何繁后二。豈時．依同境．事別耶 答有二釋。一云此論四義不次。次應說云境．時．依事 簡意者何 答凡言相應雖心．心所。非心．心所總共相應故須簡也 若心．心所總名相應。所緣別者應名相應。故境等簡 前後心等所緣境等應名相應。故時同簡 諸識俱起應名相應。故依同簡 六．八依同應名相應。故事等簡 二云論說依次。雖有依同非相應故。
若依同故即名相應。六．八二識應名相應。故所緣簡 六．八有時同緣境者應是相應。故事等簡 后釋為正。
疏。行簡依同等者。即與緣簡別見相似。由斯疏斷但四義也。故更不明。簡略起伏如上已具。
疏。極不明瞭是舍受相者。問果位亦舍。豈
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
作者說，『名為業』。因此，這種業的作用也不是普遍的原因。疏文中說『三遍』，因此沒有完全窮盡道理。詳細地說，所謂『改轉易換』是不同的名稱。如果始終是同一類事情，就不應該有思業，因為沒有改變和轉化。所以現在的解釋是，『性』只是使之運作，『業』役使令其運作。單純、複雜、廣、略的行相有所不同。既然說了善等等惡、無記，無記通於八識都有。說思名為『遍』又有什麼不合道理的呢？如果按照《瑜伽師地論》第三所說，思的行相是別非遍，就像疏文所說的那樣，可以知道。 論：『此觸等五至故名相應者』。疏文中兩種解釋，除去行相的解釋是順應教理的。《瑜伽師地論》說四種。此論自己說行相雖然不同，怎麼能取用呢？問：所謂簡法，前面的意義沒有窮盡，需要後面的法來簡別前面的。如果遮止窮盡，後面的法又有什麼用呢？比如論述四義時，用『時』、『依』二法遮簡已經足夠周全，為什麼還要繁瑣地加上後面的兩種呢？難道『時』、『依』與『境』、『事』相同，只是境和事不同嗎？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，此論的四義沒有按照順序排列，順序應該說成『境』、『時』、『依』、『事』。簡別的意思是什麼呢？答：凡是說相應，雖然是心、心所（Citta-caitta，心和心所），但不是心、心所全部共同相應，所以需要簡別。如果心、心所總稱為相應，所緣（Alambana，對像）不同就應該稱為相應，所以用境等來簡別。前後心等所緣的境等應該稱為相應，所以用時間相同來簡別。諸識同時生起應該稱為相應，所以用所依相同來簡別。六識、八識所依相同應該稱為相應，所以用事情相同來簡別。第二種說法是，論述是按照順序排列的。即使有依相同的情況，也不是相應， 所以用所緣來簡別。六識、八識有時共同緣境，應該算是相應，所以用事情等來簡別。后一種解釋是正確的。 疏文：『行簡依同等者』，即與緣簡別見相似。因此疏文判斷只有四義。所以不再詳細說明。簡略的起伏變化如上文已經詳細說明。 疏文：『極不明瞭是舍受相者』。問：果位也有舍受（Upeksha-vedana，舍受），難道
【English Translation】 English version:
The author says, 'It is called karma.' Therefore, the function of this karma is not a universal cause either. The commentary says 'three pervasions,' so it has not fully exhausted the principle. In detail, the so-called 'change, transformation, alteration, and exchange' are different names. If it is always the same kind of thing, there should be no thought-karma, because there is no change or transformation. So the current explanation is that 'nature' only makes it work, and 'karma' employs it to work. The characteristics of simple, complex, broad, and concise are different. Since it is said that good, etc., evil, and neutral, the neutral pervades all eight consciousnesses. What is unreasonable about saying that thought is called 'pervasive'? If according to what is said in the third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the characteristic of thought is distinct and not pervasive, as the commentary says, it can be known. Treatise: 'This touch, etc., five, therefore called corresponding.' There are two explanations in the commentary. The explanation that removes characteristics is in accordance with the teachings. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says four kinds. This treatise itself says that although the characteristics are different, how can they be adopted? Question: As for distinguishing dharmas, if the previous meaning is not exhausted, the subsequent dharma is needed to distinguish the previous one. If the subsequent dharma is stopped from being exhausted, what is the use of it? For example, when discussing the four meanings, using the two dharmas of 'time' and 'basis' to distinguish is already sufficient and comprehensive. Why add the latter two in a complicated way? Are 'time' and 'basis' the same as 'object' and 'matter', only the object and matter are different? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the four meanings of this treatise are not arranged in order. The order should be 'object', 'time', 'basis', 'matter'. What is the meaning of distinguishing? Answer: Whenever it is said to be corresponding, although it is mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta), it is not that all minds and mental factors correspond together, so it needs to be distinguished. If mind and mental factors are collectively called corresponding, and the object (Alambana) is different, it should be called corresponding, so it is distinguished by object, etc. The objects, etc., of the previous and subsequent minds should be called corresponding, so it is distinguished by the same time. The simultaneous arising of all consciousnesses should be called corresponding, so it is distinguished by the same basis. The same basis of the six and eight consciousnesses should be called corresponding, so it is distinguished by the same matter. The second explanation is that the treatise is arranged in order. Even if there is the same basis, it is not corresponding, so it is distinguished by the object. The six and eight consciousnesses sometimes share the same object, which should be considered corresponding, so it is distinguished by matter, etc. The latter explanation is correct. Commentary: 'The distinction of characteristics and the same basis, etc.,' is similar to the distinction seen in the object. Therefore, the commentary judges that there are only four meanings. So it is not explained in detail anymore. The brief ups and downs have been explained in detail above. Commentary: 'Extremely unclear is the characteristic of neutral feeling (Upeksha-vedana).' Question: Is there also neutral feeling (Upeksha-vedana) in the fruition position?
不明瞭 答夫言舍者中容寂靜及不明瞭。果雖明瞭而是寂靜故得名舍。
疏。若能分別至取境定故者。問為不緣彼違順之境名不分別。為緣于彼不起分別名不分別 答違順有多。若怨愛等違順之境此即不緣。若境損益如蘊．寒．執．打柏．摩按．逼迫．適悅名違順者。雖緣于彼而不分別違順之相名不分別 若爾如何名取境定 答因修而緣常不分別。名取境定 若爾何名取中容境 答雖境違順。能緣之心一類而緣不分違順。以境從心名中容境。若不爾者云何下言由識執受后時身受差別而生。故知本識緣彼境也 有義。疏解不緣取境定故。若說緣者境便不定。此理不然 詳曰。取境定語意如前釋。無不緣言。何得加之妄為彈斥。
疏。如八證中至任運生解者。初執受證而有五因。今此所言當彼五中第一因也。故對法雲。謂阿賴耶識先行因滅。眼等轉識現緣因發。如說根．境作意力故諸轉識生。是名初因。
論。此識任運剎那別緣者。問恒緣三境何名別緣 答影像之境新新而起。前後不一故緣名別。具如疏明 有義非是所緣前後易脫。但非如定專注所緣。義說別言 詳曰。言不同定專注所緣理即可爾。云非易脫道理難詳。豈八所緣非有為攝。若有為法。有為法者剎那生滅。云何不名前後易脫。
疏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不明瞭：回答說，『舍』（Upeksha，不偏不倚）的狀態中，包含著寂靜和不明瞭。即使結果是明瞭的，但因為是寂靜的，所以才被稱為『舍』。
疏解：『若能分別至取境定故』的意思是，如果不能分別違背和順從的境界，是否意味著不分別？或者說，雖然緣于這些境界，但不生起分別心，才是不分別？回答是，違背和順從有很多種。對於怨恨、愛戀等違背和順從的境界，阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）是不緣的。如果境界帶來損害或利益，比如蘊（Skandha，五蘊）、寒冷、執著、打擊、按摩、逼迫、舒適等，這些被稱為違順的境界，雖然緣于這些境界，但不分別違背和順從的相狀，這才是『不分別』。如果這樣，如何稱之為『取境定』（Grahana-vastu-niyama，對所取境的決定）呢？回答是，因為通過修行而緣于常，所以不分別，這叫做『取境定』。如果這樣，什麼叫做『取中容境』（Upekshendriya-visaya，舍受所緣境）呢？回答是，雖然境界有違背和順從，但能緣之心以同一類方式去緣，不區分違背和順從。因為境界是從心而生的，所以稱為『中容境』。如果不是這樣，為什麼下面會說『由識執受后時身受差別而生』呢？由此可知，本識（Mūlavijñāna，根本識）是緣于這些境界的。有一種觀點認為，疏解『不緣取境定故』，如果說是緣，那麼境界就不定了。這個道理是不對的。詳細地說，『取境定』的含義如前面解釋的那樣，並沒有說『不緣』，為什麼要妄加評論呢？
疏解：『如八證中至任運生解者』的意思是，最初的執受證（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）有五個原因。現在這裡所說的，是那五個原因中的第一個原因。所以《對法》（Abhidharma，阿毗達磨）中說，『阿賴耶識的先行因滅，眼等轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，現行識）的現緣因生髮，就像所說的根、境、作意的力量，所以諸轉識生起。』這就是所謂的初因。
論：『此識任運剎那別緣者』的意思是，阿賴耶識任運地在每個剎那緣不同的境界。問：阿賴耶識恒常緣於三種境界（根、境、種子），為什麼說是『別緣』（Visesa-alambana，特別的所緣）呢？答：影像的境界是不斷新生的，前後不一，所以緣叫做『別』。具體內容如疏解中所說。有一種觀點認為，不是所緣的境界前後容易脫落，而是不像禪定那樣專注所緣，所以用『別』這個詞。詳細地說，說不像禪定那樣專注所緣，這個道理還可以。說不是容易脫落，這個道理就難以詳盡了。難道八識所緣的不是有為法（Samskrta，有為法）所攝嗎？如果有為法，有為法是剎那生滅的，為什麼不說前後容易脫落呢？
疏
【English Translation】 English version 『Unclear』: The answer is that in the state of 『Upeksha』 (equanimity), there is both tranquility and unclearness. Even if the result is clear, it is called 『Upeksha』 because it is tranquil.
Commentary: The meaning of 『If one can distinguish, then one is determined in grasping the object』 is: If one cannot distinguish between adverse and favorable states, does it mean there is no distinction? Or does it mean that although one is aware of these states, one does not give rise to discrimination, which is non-discrimination? The answer is that there are many kinds of adverse and favorable states. For adverse and favorable states such as resentment and love, the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) does not engage with them. If the state brings harm or benefit, such as the Skandhas (aggregates), cold, attachment, hitting, massaging, pressing, comfort, these are called adverse and favorable states. Although one is aware of these states, one does not discriminate between the aspects of adversity and favorability, and this is 『non-discrimination』. If so, how is it called 『Grahana-vastu-niyama』 (determination in grasping the object)? The answer is that because one cultivates and is aware of the constant, one does not discriminate, and this is called 『Grahana-vastu-niyama』. If so, what is called 『Upekshendriya-visaya』 (the object of equanimity)? The answer is that although the state has adversity and favorability, the mind that is aware of it engages in the same way, without distinguishing between adversity and favorability. Because the state arises from the mind, it is called 『Upekshendriya-visaya』. If it were not so, why would it be said below that 『it arises from the discrimination of bodily sensations at a later time due to the mind's grasping』? From this, it can be known that the Mūlavijñāna (root consciousness) is aware of these states. Some argue that the commentary 『not engaging, therefore determined in grasping the object』 means that if it is said to be engaging, then the state is not determined. This reasoning is incorrect. In detail, the meaning of 『determined in grasping the object』 is as explained earlier. There is no mention of 『not engaging』, so why add it and criticize it falsely?
Commentary: The meaning of 『As in the eight proofs, up to the spontaneous arising of understanding』 is that the initial Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) has five causes. What is being said here is the first of those five causes. Therefore, the Abhidharma (teachings) says, 『The preceding cause of the Ālayavijñāna ceases, and the present cause of the Pravrtti-vijnana (active consciousness) arises, just as the power of the root, object, and attention are said to cause the arising of the various Pravrtti-vijnana.』 This is what is called the initial cause.
Treatise: 『This consciousness spontaneously and momentarily engages with different objects』 means that the Ālayavijñāna spontaneously engages with different states in each moment. Question: The Ālayavijñāna constantly engages with three states (root, object, seed), so why is it said to be 『Visesa-alambana』 (special object)? Answer: The states of the images are constantly newly arising, and are not the same before and after, so the engagement is called 『Visesa』. The specific content is as explained in the commentary. Some argue that it is not that the engaged states are easily detached before and after, but rather that it is not as focused on the engaged object as in meditation, so the word 『Visesa』 is used. In detail, the reasoning that it is not as focused on the engaged object as in meditation is acceptable. The reasoning that it is not easily detached is difficult to detail. Are the objects engaged by the eight consciousnesses not included in the Samskrta (conditioned phenomena)? If they are conditioned phenomena, and conditioned phenomena arise and cease in each moment, why not say that they are easily detached before and after?
Commentary
。大乘亦有自性善如本釋中者。對法論中無著本論．師子覺釋皆具明之。下當具引。
疏。三等起善等者。問準對法雲隨逐善者。謂即彼諸法習氣。發起善者。謂彼所起身業．語業。準彼種子隨逐善收。云何即判屬等起善 答論開疏合。望義不同亦無失也。
疏。勝義無記謂虛空非釋者。問何唯此二名無記耶 答真如性凈。其擇滅等斷惑所顯。以寂靜故勝義善收。虛空．非擇體非實有。不同真如。復非智慧斷惑等得不同餘三。由斯二義故無記攝 問亦依識變立虛空等。何不隨識三性攝耶 答且依如立假空等說。若依識變實通三性。
論。流轉還滅應不得成者。問苦．集二諦名為流轉。說使常生人．天趣中未逾苦．集。流轉之義何事不成 答夫云流轉包括五趣。若唯人．天流轉不足故云不成。非據全無名不成也。
疏。余例難亦然者。略有二義。一云餘者謂受等四。二云餘者謂行相余。所不例者亦應難之。難思可悉。
疏。亦應受等例成失等者。詳曰。今觀此質與難不齊。難前意云。觸雖不與自觸相應。有餘相應例相應門。行相雖復了別等別。然亦各各自有行相。亦復不闕行相之義。何不例王行相門耶。今者受數全不與受而得相應。與行相應義寬狹別。何得以此而質于彼 問此質不成彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 大乘佛教也有自性本善的觀點，就像《本釋》中所說的那樣。《對法論》中，無著菩薩的根本論和師子覺的註釋都詳細闡明了這一點。下面將具體引用。
疏：『三等起善等』，問：按照《對法論》所說，『隨逐善』是指那些法的習氣，『發起善』是指由那些習氣所產生的身業和語業。既然那些種子隨逐善而攝，為什麼又判屬於等起善呢？答：論典和疏鈔的角度不同，從不同角度來看，並沒有錯誤。
疏：『勝義無記謂虛空非擇滅』，問：為什麼只有虛空和非擇滅被稱為無記呢？答：真如的體性是清凈的，擇滅等是斷除煩惱后所顯現的，因為寂靜的緣故，被歸為勝義善。虛空和非擇滅的體性並非真實存在，與真如不同。而且，它們不是通過智慧斷除煩惱等而獲得的，與其餘三種（受、想、行）不同。因為這兩個原因，所以被歸為無記。問：虛空等也是依識的變現而建立的，為什麼不隨識的三性（善、惡、無記）而攝呢？答：這只是依據如如而立的假立的虛空等來說的。如果依據識的變現，實際上是通於三性的。
論：『流轉還滅應不得成』，問：苦諦和集諦被稱為流轉，說眾生常常在人、天道中輪迴，沒有超出苦和集，流轉的意義有什麼不能成立的呢？答：所說的流轉包括五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）。如果僅僅在人、天道中流轉，是不夠全面的，所以說不能成立。並非說完全沒有，而是說不完整。
疏：『余例難亦然』，略有二義：一說『余』是指受等四蘊（受、想、行、識，不包括色蘊）。二說『余』是指行相的其餘部分。沒有舉例說明的，也應該進行推論。其中的難點可以仔細思考。
疏：『亦應受等例成失等』，詳細解釋說：現在看來，這個質問和前面的難點並不一致。前面的難點是說，觸雖然不與自身相應，但有其餘的相應，可以類比相應門。行相雖然有種種差別，但各自都有自己的行相，也不缺少行相的意義。為什麼不類比王（心王）的行相門呢？現在受蘊完全不與受蘊相應，與行蘊相應的意義寬泛程度不同。怎麼能用這個來質問那個呢？問：這個質問不能成立。
【English Translation】 English version: In Mahayana Buddhism, there is also the view of inherent goodness, as mentioned in the 'Commentary on the Original Text'. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), both Asanga's (無著) root text and Sthiramati's (師子覺) commentary clearly explain this. I will quote them in detail below.
Commentary: 'The three arising from good, etc.' Question: According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 'following good' refers to the habitual tendencies of those dharmas (法), and 'arising from good' refers to the physical and verbal actions that arise from those tendencies. Since those seeds (種子) are included in 'following good', why are they also classified as 'arising from good'? Answer: The perspective of the treatise and the commentary are different. There is no error when viewed from different angles.
Commentary: 'Ultimate reality, unconditioned, refers to space (虛空) and non-selective cessation (非擇滅).' Question: Why are only space and non-selective cessation called unconditioned? Answer: The nature of Suchness (真如) is pure. Selective cessation, etc., are manifested after the elimination of afflictions (惑). Because of their tranquility, they are categorized as ultimate good. The nature of space and non-selective cessation is not truly existent, unlike Suchness. Moreover, they are not attained through wisdom eliminating afflictions, etc., unlike the other three (feeling, perception, volition). For these two reasons, they are categorized as unconditioned. Question: Space, etc., are also established based on the transformations of consciousness (識). Why are they not included in the three natures (善, 惡, 無記) of consciousness? Answer: This is just based on the hypothetical establishment of space, etc., as they are based on Suchness. If based on the transformations of consciousness, they actually encompass all three natures.
Treatise: 'Transmigration and cessation should not be accomplished.' Question: The truths of suffering (苦諦) and origination (集諦) are called transmigration. It is said that beings are constantly reborn in the realms of humans and gods, not exceeding suffering and origination. What is there about the meaning of transmigration that cannot be established? Answer: The transmigration that is spoken of includes the five realms (地獄, 餓鬼, 畜生, 人, 天). If transmigration only occurred in the realms of humans and gods, it would not be complete, so it is said that it cannot be established. It is not that there is absolutely none, but that it is incomplete.
Commentary: 'The remaining examples are also difficult in the same way.' There are roughly two meanings: One meaning of 'remaining' refers to the four aggregates of feeling, etc. (受, 想, 行, 識, excluding form 色). The second meaning of 'remaining' refers to the remaining aspects of characteristics. What is not exemplified should also be inferred. The difficulties therein can be carefully considered.
Commentary: 'It should also be a mistake to exemplify with feeling, etc.' Detailed explanation: Now, looking at this question, it is not consistent with the previous difficulty. The previous difficulty was saying that although contact (觸) does not correspond with itself, there is other correspondence, which can be compared to the gate of correspondence. Although characteristics have various differences, each has its own characteristics, and there is no lack of the meaning of characteristics. Why not compare it to the gate of the characteristics of the king (mind)? Now, feeling (受) does not correspond with feeling at all, and the meaning of corresponding with volition (行) has different degrees of breadth. How can this be used to question that? Question: This question cannot be established.
難何遣 答觸等雖復不自相應。然餘四法亦即是彼王相應法。所以故得例相應門。行相與王無少交涉。豈得相例。
疏。便有三十六種見相分種等者。見分．相分各三十六。思可知也。
疏。頓生六果者。問六處受熏。能熏王．所皆熏本識。本識合有三十六個一時頓生。何但言六 答雖六所熏皆有六種。六種同處共生一果。果故但有六頓生妨。
疏。不可論其本質生與不生等者。不可說言心王所熏而生本質。心所所熏而即不生。何以所者。王．所六種皆所熏故。
疏。乍可論其本質影像者。能熏之識乍可論。其能熏心王生於本質。能熏心所生於影像。
疏。其所熏不然者。不得論其王．所所熏生於本質．影像等異。
疏。若爾雜集至受一期報者。按彼論云。若於一生頓受一切所得異熟無有過失。所以者何。若造眾多無間業者所感身形最極柔耎。所感苦具眾多猛利。由此頓受種種大苦。
疏。成業論中自解此妨者。按彼論云。如何一一心．心所法。從二種子相續而生。不見芽等從種生法有如是事。可藉多緣生於一果。無從二種有一果生。
疏。今加斷舍者。有義五數得名因果無異。如何例心有舍名耶。故但如前第二師說 詳曰。言斷舍者據舍縛說。雖復不執觸等為我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如何遣除（這個疑問）？ 答：觸等（Sparśa，感覺等）雖然本身並不與心王相應，但其餘四法（受、想、行、識）也即是彼心王相應的法。所以才能夠通過類比相應的途徑來理解。而行相與心王沒有絲毫交涉，怎麼能夠類比呢？
疏：便有三十六種見相分種等者。見分（Dṛśyabhāga，能見分）、相分（Nimittabhāga，所見分）各有三十六種，仔細思考就可以理解。
疏：頓生六果者。問：六處（Ṣaḍāyatana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）受到熏習，能夠熏習心王和所熏習的本識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識），本識總共有三十六個（種子）一時頓然產生，為什麼只說六個呢？答：雖然六處所熏習的都有六種（種子），但這六種（種子）在同一處所共同產生一個果，所以果只有六個，頓生並沒有妨礙。
疏：不可論其本質生與不生等者。不可以這樣說，心王所熏習而產生本質（Svabhāva，自性），心所（Caitasika，心所有法）所熏習就不產生本質。為什麼呢？因為心王和心所這六種都是所熏習的。
疏：乍可論其本質影像者。能夠熏習的識可以勉強說，能夠熏習的心王產生本質，能夠熏習的心所產生影像（Pratibimba，影像）。
疏：其所熏不然者。不能夠說心王和心所所熏習的產生本質、影像等不同。
疏：若爾雜集至受一期報者。按照《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）所說，如果在一生中頓然承受一切所得的異熟果報，沒有過失。為什麼呢？如果造作眾多無間業（Ānantarika-karma，五逆罪）的人，所感受的身形最為柔弱，所感受的苦具眾多而猛烈，因此頓然承受種種巨大的痛苦。
疏：成業論中自解此妨者。按照《成業論》所說，如何一一心、心所法，從兩種子相續而生？不見芽等從種子生長的規律有這樣的事情，可以憑藉多種因緣產生一個果，沒有從兩種子產生一個果的。
疏：今加斷舍者。有一種觀點認為，五數（色、受、想、行、識）可以稱為因果沒有差別，如何類比心有舍（Upekṣā，舍受）的名稱呢？所以只如前面第二位法師所說。詳細地說，說斷舍是根據捨棄束縛來說的，雖然不執著觸等為我（Ātman，我）。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: How to dispel (this doubt)? Answer: Although Sparśa (contact, etc.) is not inherently corresponding to the mind-king, the other four dharmas (Vedanā, Saṃjñā, Saṃskāra, Vijñāna - feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) are also the dharmas corresponding to that mind-king. That's why it can be understood through the analogy of correspondence. But the characteristics have no connection with the mind-king, how can they be compared?
Commentary: 'Then there are thirty-six kinds of seed-like aspects of the seeing and seen divisions, etc.' The Dṛśyabhāga (seeing-division) and Nimittabhāga (seen-division) each have thirty-six kinds, which can be understood with careful thought.
Commentary: 'Suddenly producing six results.' Question: The six Āyatana (sense bases - eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) are熏習 (perfumed), capable of perfuming both the mind-king and the perfumed Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness). The Ālayavijñāna has a total of thirty-six (seeds) that suddenly arise at once, why only say six? Answer: Although the six places that are perfumed each have six kinds (of seeds), these six kinds (of seeds) in the same place together produce one result, so there are only six results. The sudden arising is not an obstacle.
Commentary: 'It is not possible to discuss whether its Svabhāva (essence) arises or not, etc.' It cannot be said that the mind-king perfumed produces the Svabhāva, and the Caitasika (mental factors) perfumed does not produce the Svabhāva. Why? Because these six kinds of mind-king and mental factors are all perfumed.
Commentary: 'One can tentatively discuss its Svabhāva and Pratibimba (image).' The consciousness that is capable of perfuming can barely be said to be able to perfuming the mind-king produces the Svabhāva, and the perfuming mental factors produce the Pratibimba.
Commentary: 'What is perfumed is not like that.' It cannot be said that what is perfumed by the mind-king and mental factors produces different Svabhāva, Pratibimba, etc.
Commentary: 'If so, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, one receives a lifetime of retribution.' According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, if one suddenly receives all the Vipāka (result of actions) in one lifetime, there is no fault. Why? If one commits many Ānantarika-karma (deeds with immediate retribution), the body that is felt is extremely weak, and the instruments of suffering that are felt are numerous and intense, therefore one suddenly endures all kinds of great suffering.
Commentary: 'The Karmasiddhishastra itself explains this obstacle.' According to the Karmasiddhishastra, how can each mind and mental factor arise continuously from two seeds? It is not seen that the growth of sprouts, etc., from seeds has such a thing. It can rely on many conditions to produce one result, but there is no case of one result arising from two seeds.
Commentary: 'Now adding 斷舍 (cessation and abandonment).' There is a view that the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) can be called cause and effect without difference, how can the mind be compared to having the name Upekṣā (equanimity)? Therefore, it is only as the second Dharma master said earlier. In detail, saying cessation and abandonment is based on abandoning bondage, although one does not cling to Sparśa, etc., as Ātman (self).
。然是煩惱所雜之法。心王舍藏心所能雜亦復不有。據此例舍。故此論第八云。不染污法二義說斷。一雜縛斷。謂斷緣．彼．雜彼煩惱。賴耶即是斷緣彼惑。名之為舍。觸等即是斷雜彼惑。名之為舍。何理不順而不許之。而言舍名。賴耶名者據縛而立。故但縛無即得名舍。以觸等名不依縛立。縛舍名存。實無違也 又解賴耶未舍觸等名為阿賴耶識相應心所。心舍執藏觸等不復名阿賴耶相應心所。據斯名舍理亦應通 二釋前勝。
疏。如暴流水至隨流不捨者。有說此中總有三喻。如次況彼。謂愛非愛．受用．自性三種緣起。初喻顯示由第八識五趣流轉。第二顯示生眼等識受用境界。第三顯示自性相續而不斷絕。
疏。未來果法應不待因者。問現在之果待因始生。豈非喻闕所立宗耶 答雖曾待因。今已生訖更不待因。言已生果意簡此也。
疏。即應過去有半作用者。心．心所法有取果用。色法不然。故名為半。若爾作用者過去既有。云何得定言唯依現耶。
疏。彼與果用滅覆滅失者。現在與果而由於滅。過既與果應更須滅。若無滅者障彼果生。何名與果。又復與現有相例失。若許有滅。滅覆滅失。故成業云應滅覆滅。
疏。取果之用生復生過者。現取果時生相生已方能取之。過既取果還須
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：然而這些是與煩惱混合的法。心王（Citta-raja，指第八識）捨棄執藏，心所（Caitasika，指與心相應的心理活動）能夠混合，也不再存在。根據這個例子來捨棄。所以此論第八卷說：『不染污法有兩種意義上的斷除。一是雜縛斷，即斷除緣、彼、雜彼煩惱。阿賴耶（Ālaya，指第八識）就是斷除緣彼惑，名為捨棄。觸等（Sparśa，指觸覺等）就是斷除雜彼惑，名為捨棄。』有什麼道理不順而不允許這樣呢？而言捨棄之名，阿賴耶之名是根據縛（Bandha，指束縛）而立的，所以只要縛不存在，就可稱為捨棄。因為觸等之名不是依據縛而立的，所以縛捨棄了，名稱仍然存在，實際上沒有矛盾。又解釋說，阿賴耶未捨棄觸等，名為阿賴耶識相應心所（Ālaya-vijñāna-samprayukta-caitasika，指與阿賴耶識相應的心理活動）。心捨棄執藏，觸等不再稱為阿賴耶相應心所。根據這個名稱的捨棄，道理也應該相通。二是解釋前面的殊勝之處。 疏：如暴流水至隨流不捨者。有人說這裡總共有三個比喻，依次比況愛非愛（Iṣṭāniṣṭa，指喜歡和不喜歡）、受用（Upabhoga，指享受）、自性（Svabhāva，指自身本性）三種緣起（Pratītyasamutpāda，指因緣和合而生）。第一個比喻顯示由第八識（Aṣṭama-vijñāna，指阿賴耶識）在五趣（Pañca-gati，指五種輪迴的去處）中流轉。第二個比喻顯示生起眼識等來受用境界。第三個比喻顯示自性相續而不斷絕。 疏：未來果法應不待因者。問：現在的果待因才生，豈不是比喻缺失了所立的宗義嗎？答：雖然曾經待因，現在已經生完了，更不需要待因。說『已生果』，意在簡別這一點。 疏：即應過去有半作用者。心、心所法有取果的作用，色法（Rūpa，指物質現象）不是這樣，所以稱為『半』。如果這樣，作用在過去已經有了，怎麼能確定說只依現在呢？ 疏：彼與果用滅覆滅失者。現在給予果，但由於滅而消失。過去既然給予果，應該更需要滅。如果沒有滅，就會障礙那個果的產生，怎麼能稱為給予果呢？又與現在有相類似地消失。如果允許有滅，滅又會消失，所以成就業說應該滅了又滅。 疏：取果之用生復生過者。現在取果時，生相生起后才能取果。過去既然取果，還須...
【English Translation】 English version: However, these are dharmas mixed with afflictions (Kleśa). The Citta-raja (Mind-king, referring to the eighth consciousness, Ālaya), abandons clinging, and the Caitasikas (mental activities associated with the mind) that can mix are also no longer present. According to this example, abandonment occurs. Therefore, the eighth volume of this treatise says: 'Non-defiled dharmas have two meanings of cessation. First, the cessation of mixed bondage, which is the cessation of the conditions, those, and the afflictions mixed with those. Ālaya (the eighth consciousness) is the cessation of the afflictions conditioned by those, called abandonment. Sparśa (contact, etc.) is the cessation of the afflictions mixed with those, called abandonment.' What reason is there to disagree and not allow this? As for the name of abandonment, the name Ālaya is established based on bondage (Bandha), so as long as bondage does not exist, it can be called abandonment. Because the name of Sparśa, etc., is not established based on bondage, even if bondage is abandoned, the name remains, and there is actually no contradiction. Another explanation is that when Ālaya has not abandoned Sparśa, etc., it is called Ālaya-vijñāna-samprayukta-caitasika (mental activities associated with Ālaya consciousness). When the mind abandons clinging, Sparśa, etc., are no longer called Ālaya-associated mental activities. According to this abandonment of name, the principle should also be consistent. Second, it explains the previous excellence. Commentary: 'Like a rushing stream that flows without ceasing.' Some say that there are three metaphors in total here, which respectively illustrate the three kinds of conditioned arising (Pratītyasamutpāda): Iṣṭāniṣṭa (desirable and undesirable), Upabhoga (enjoyment), and Svabhāva (self-nature). The first metaphor shows the transmigration of the eighth consciousness (Aṣṭama-vijñāna, Ālaya consciousness) in the five realms (Pañca-gati). The second metaphor shows the arising of eye consciousness, etc., to experience objects. The third metaphor shows the continuous and uninterrupted nature of self-nature. Commentary: 'The future result should not depend on causes.' Question: The present result depends on causes to arise. Isn't this a metaphor lacking the established thesis? Answer: Although it once depended on causes, it has already arisen and no longer needs to depend on causes. Saying 'already arisen result' is to distinguish this point. Commentary: 'Then the past should have half the function.' The mind and mental activities have the function of taking results, but Rūpa (material phenomena) is not like this, so it is called 'half'. If so, the function already existed in the past, how can it be determined that it only depends on the present? Commentary: 'That which gives the result disappears and disappears again.' The present gives the result, but it disappears due to cessation. Since the past gave the result, it should need to cease again. If there is no cessation, it will obstruct the arising of that result. How can it be called giving the result? Also, it disappears similarly to the present. If it is allowed to cease, the cessation will disappear again, so the karma says that it should cease and cease again. Commentary: 'The function of taking the result has the fault of arising and arising again.' When the present takes the result, the characteristic of arising arises before it can take the result. Since the past took the result, it still needs...
待生方能取也。若許爾者生復生失。若不許者即現取果應不待生。彼此異因不可得故。
疏。如瑜伽論至依種子立者。瑜伽．中邊如燈所引對法．顯揚今略引之。按對法論師子覺云。因果已受用者。謂已生故已滅故。染凈功用已謝者。謂如現在貪等．信等。令心染凈功能無故。攝因已壞者。置習氣已方滅故。果及自相有非有者。謂今時所引習氣有故。能引實事無故憶念分別相者。謂唯有彼所緣境相故。一切一分是過去。余未來現在及無為。明未來云有因非已生者。為簡無為。彼雖非已生。而無因故。未得自相者。自體未生故。因果未受用者。謂彼種子未作所作故。彼性未生故。一切一分是未來。明現在之因果受用未受用者。謂因已滅故。果猶有故。能顯過．未相者。謂現在世是能施設去．來世相。所以者何。依止現在假立去．來故。約當得位假立未來。約曾得位假立過去。作用現前者。謂眼等法正為識等所依等事故。一切一分是現在 又顯揚論第九云。言有過去業由此業故眾生受有損害受．無損害受。此亦依彼習氣密意假說彼法為有。謂于諸行中曾有凈．不凈業生滅。由此因緣故彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故愛．不愛果生。又言三世色乃至識。此亦依三種行相密意故說。謂依因相密意說有未
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：必須等到未來才能取得。如果允許你這樣做，那麼生了又生，最終還是會失去。如果不允許你這樣做，那麼當下就能取得果實，就不應該等待未來。因為彼此的原因不同，所以不可能同時得到。
疏解：如《瑜伽師地論》所說，乃至依據種子而建立。瑜伽、中邊，如同燈所引導，對法、《顯揚》，現在簡略地引用。《對法論》的論師子覺說，因果已經受用，是指已經生起和已經滅去。染凈的功用已經消失，是指像現在的貪慾等、信心等，使心染污或清凈的功能已經沒有了。攝因已經壞滅，是指放置習氣之後才滅去。果以及自相，有和沒有，是指現在所引發的習氣是有的，但能引發真實事物的因已經沒有了。憶念分別相，是指只有那些所緣境的相。一切事物的一部分是過去，其餘的是未來、現在以及無為法。說明未來時，說有因但還沒有生起，是爲了簡別無為法。無為法雖然沒有生起，但也沒有原因。還沒有得到自相，是指自體還沒有生起。因果還沒有受用，是指那些種子還沒有發揮作用，它們的性質還沒有生起。一切事物的一部分是未來。說明現在時，說因果受用和未受用，是指因已經滅去，但果仍然存在。能夠顯示過去和未來的相，是指現在世能夠施設過去和未來的相。為什麼這樣說呢？因為依靠現在而假立過去和未來。依據將要得到的地位而假立未來，依據曾經得到的地位而假立過去。作用顯現於前，是指眼等法正在作為識等的所依等事。一切事物的一部分是現在。另外，《顯揚論》第九卷說，說有過去業，是因為這個業的緣故，眾生會承受有損害的感受或沒有損害的感受。這也是依據那些習氣的密意而假說那些法是有的。是指在各種行中，曾經有清凈或不清凈的業生滅。因為這個因緣的緣故，那些行的殊勝差異相續不斷地運轉，這叫做習氣。因為這個相續所攝的習氣，所以會產生可愛或不可愛的果報。又說三世的色乃至識，這也是依據三種行相的密意而說的。是指依據因相的密意而說有未來。
【English Translation】 English version: It can only be taken when it is about to be born. If you are allowed to do so, then birth after birth will still be lost. If you are not allowed to do so, then the fruit should be taken immediately and should not wait for birth. Because the causes are different from each other, it is impossible to obtain them at the same time.
Commentary: As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), up to the establishment based on seeds. Yoga, Madhyanta-vibhanga (Discrimination of the Middle and Extremes), like the lamp guides, Abhidharma (Higher Doctrine), Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge, now briefly quoted. The Abhidharma master, Sīhaprabha (Lion Light), said that the cause and effect have already been enjoyed, meaning they have already arisen and ceased. The functions of defilement and purity have disappeared, referring to things like present greed and faith, etc., which no longer have the function of defiling or purifying the mind. The collected cause has been destroyed, meaning it ceases after placing the habit energy. The fruit and its own characteristics, existing and non-existing, refer to the habit energy that is currently being generated, but the cause that can generate real things no longer exists. Recollection and discrimination aspects refer to only the aspects of those objects of cognition. A portion of all things is past, and the rest are future, present, and unconditioned. Explaining the future, it says that there is a cause but it has not yet arisen, in order to distinguish the unconditioned. Although the unconditioned has not arisen, it also has no cause. It has not yet obtained its own characteristics, meaning the self-nature has not yet arisen. The cause and effect have not yet been enjoyed, meaning those seeds have not yet functioned, and their nature has not yet arisen. A portion of all things is future. Explaining the present, it says that the cause and effect are enjoyed and not enjoyed, meaning the cause has ceased, but the fruit still exists. It can reveal the aspects of the past and future, meaning the present world can establish the aspects of the past and future. Why is this so? Because the past and future are hypothetically established based on the present. The future is hypothetically established based on the position to be obtained, and the past is hypothetically established based on the position that has been obtained. The function manifests in front, meaning the eye and other dharmas are currently serving as the basis for consciousness and other things. A portion of all things is present. Furthermore, the ninth volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge says that there is past karma because of this karma, sentient beings will experience harmful or harmless feelings. This is also a hypothetical statement based on the hidden meaning of those habit energies. It refers to the fact that in various actions, there have been pure or impure karmas arising and ceasing. Because of this cause and condition, the superior and different aspects of those actions continue to operate, which is called habit energy. Because of the habit energy contained in this continuum, lovable or unlovable consequences will arise. It also says that the form, and even consciousness, of the three times, is also spoken of based on the hidden meaning of the three types of actions. It refers to the fact that the future is spoken of based on the hidden meaning of the cause aspect.
來。依彼自相密意說有現在。依彼果相密意說有過去。
疏。六十六至皆說六通者。又瑜伽論三十七．大般若經第九．薩遮尼乾子經第七．瓔珞經第六．清凈毗尼方廣經．寂調音天子問經．十地論第五．雜集論第十四．無性攝論第九皆悉明之。具如章引。
疏。此中亦同勝軍論師等者。問上座．勝軍一切同耶 答有同異。勝軍色．心皆有三相。上座不爾。同義可悉 有義上座．勝軍有差別者。其上座計心．心所法生滅二時。時二體一將滅名滅。勝軍所說依瑜伽等已滅名滅。若色及心皆有三相。三相雖別而體同一。
論。謂現在至生滅二時者。問彼何意耶 答由經但云是生滅法故立二時 若爾云何色有三相 答色法遲鈍實有三時。經依決定但云生滅。以其住相有無不定故不言也。
疏。法生時酬因至．二法為二時者。影舉二法二時因果。對顯一法二時因果。冀令明悟一二差別。
疏。為果之時與前法俱等者。問為因果時既前後並。云何名為一法辨耶 答為因果時雖前後並然據自體而於現在有生滅二。不望別法以分二時故名一法 問此之一法為因果時為望于自。為對他耶 答對他為也。由自至生他法至滅對滅名果。自流至滅他法至生對生名因 若爾與后二法何別 答后對自他合為生滅。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 來。依據彼（指現在）的自相（自身所具有的性質）的密意，說有現在（An instant）。依據彼（指未來）的果相（由因產生的果的性質）的密意，說有過去（Past）。
疏（註釋）。六十六至都說六通（Six Supernatural Powers）者。又《瑜伽師地論》第三十七卷、《大般若經》第九卷、《薩遮尼乾子經》第七卷、《瓔珞經》第六卷、《清凈毗尼方廣經》、《寂調音天子問經》、《十地論》第五卷、《雜集論》第十四卷、《無性攝論》第九卷都詳細闡明了六通。具體內容如章節所引用。
疏（註釋）。此處也與勝軍論師等相同者。問：上座（Thera）、勝軍（Jitasena）一切都相同嗎？答：有相同之處，也有不同之處。勝軍認為色（Rupa）、心（Citta）都有三相（Three Characteristics）。上座不這樣認為。相同之處可以理解。有觀點認為上座、勝軍有差別：上座認為心、心所法（Mental Factors）有生滅二時（Two Times of Arising and Ceasing）。時間二者本體是一，將要滅的時候叫做滅。勝軍所說依據《瑜伽師地論》等，已經滅了叫做滅。如果色及心都有三相，三相雖然不同，但本體是同一的。
論（正文）。謂現在至生滅二時者。問：彼（指經文）是什麼意思呢？答：因為經文只說『是生滅法』，所以立生滅二時。若果真如此，那麼色為什麼有三相呢？答：色法（Rupa-dharma）遲鈍，實際上有三時。經文依據決定的說法，只說生滅。因為住相（Duration）的有無不定，所以不說。
疏（註釋）。法生時酬因至、二法為二時者。影射舉出二法二時的因果關係，對比顯現一法二時的因果關係，希望能夠明白一和二的差別。
疏（註釋）。為果之時與前法俱等者。問：為因果時既然前後並列，為什麼稱為一法辨呢？答：為因果時雖然前後並列，但依據自體而言，在現在有生滅二時，不期望別的法來區分二時，所以稱為一法。問：這一個法為因果時，是相對於自身，還是相對於他法呢？答：相對於他法。由自身到生，他法到滅，相對滅叫做果。自身流轉到滅，他法到生，相對生叫做因。若果真如此，與後面的二法有什麼區別呢？答：後面是對自身和他法合起來說生滅，這裡...
【English Translation】 Come. According to the secret meaning of its own characteristic (Svalaksana) of that (referring to the present), it is said that there is the present (An instant). According to the secret meaning of the characteristic of its result (Phalaksana) of that (referring to the future), it is said that there is the past (Past).
Commentary. The sixty-sixth section and onwards all speak of the Six Supernatural Powers (Six Supernatural Powers). Also, the thirty-seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the ninth volume of the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, the seventh volume of the Satyakanirgrantha Sutra, the sixth volume of the Inraka Sutra, the Vimalavinitaya-vaipulya Sutra, the Santi-svaradeva-pariprccha Sutra, the fifth volume of the Dasabhumika-sastra, the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the ninth volume of the Mahayanasamgraha-upanibandha all clearly explain the Six Supernatural Powers. The specific content is as quoted in the chapters.
Commentary. Here, it is also the same as the Master Jitasena, etc. Question: Are the Thera (Thera) and Jitasena (Jitasena) completely the same? Answer: There are similarities and differences. Jitasena believes that form (Rupa) and mind (Citta) both have three characteristics (Three Characteristics). The Thera does not think so. The similarities can be understood. Some argue that there are differences between the Thera and Jitasena: the Thera believes that mind and mental factors (Mental Factors) have two times of arising and ceasing (Two Times of Arising and Ceasing). The two times are one in essence, and when it is about to cease, it is called ceasing. Jitasena's explanation, based on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others, is that what has already ceased is called ceasing. If form and mind both have three characteristics, although the three characteristics are different, their essence is the same.
Treatise. Saying that the present refers to the two times of arising and ceasing. Question: What does that (referring to the sutra text) mean? Answer: Because the sutra only says 'it is a dharma of arising and ceasing,' therefore, the two times of arising and ceasing are established. If that is the case, then why does form have three characteristics? Answer: Form-dharma (Rupa-dharma) is slow, and in reality, it has three times. The sutra, based on a definitive statement, only speaks of arising and ceasing. Because the characteristic of duration (Duration) is uncertain in its existence or non-existence, it is not mentioned.
Commentary. 'When a dharma arises, it responds to the cause,' and 'two dharmas are two times.' It implicitly points out the cause-and-effect relationship of two dharmas in two times, and comparatively reveals the cause-and-effect relationship of one dharma in two times, hoping to clarify the difference between one and two.
Commentary. 'When it is the time of result, it is equal to the previous dharma.' Question: Since the time of cause and result is juxtaposed, why is it called the discernment of one dharma? Answer: Although the time of cause and result is juxtaposed, based on its own essence, there are two times of arising and ceasing in the present. It does not expect another dharma to distinguish the two times, so it is called one dharma. Question: When this one dharma is the cause and result, is it relative to itself or relative to another dharma? Answer: Relative to another dharma. From oneself to arising, another dharma to ceasing, relative to ceasing is called result. One's own flow to ceasing, another dharma to arising, relative to arising is called cause. If that is the case, what is the difference from the later two dharmas? Answer: The latter refers to the combination of oneself and another dharma to speak of arising and ceasing, while here...
唯望自分為二時。后舉自他為生滅二。隱自一法二時不論。前唯舉自一法二時。隱自他二生滅不說。文影略也。
論。生滅相違寧同現在者。問他若救云生．滅非因果相違不同世。滅．生因果收相順故同世 答若言生．滅而相順者。便有世間．自教等違。
疏。除二乘金剛等者。二乘金剛亦無賴耶。時分促少但云無學。問何故不云三乘金剛 答大乘八地已舍賴耶。不同二運故不言也。
疏。若說習氣四位不成者。若說習氣名為粗重。二乘無學．八地菩薩悉皆有之。即不得言賴耶之名四位舍也。
論。云何知然者。疏釋問意而有兩種。有義今不依此。所以者何。此前但釋阿羅漢名。既未釋舍如何先問。故此但問三乘無學通名羅漢之所以也 詳曰。初云羅漢方究竟舍。遠騰彼問何過而有。又若不問三乘舍者。何故舉彼決釋分說三乘舍義以答前徴。若云雖說舍阿賴耶名。意釋三乘皆名羅漢。亦不成救。論自明言諸阿羅漢．獨覺．如來。何理能證同是羅漢。又若取彼瑜伽本文亦為不可。彼論但云三乘無學。不言三乘同名羅漢。又彼本明斷阿賴耶故。故知疏文牢籠始終深悟本旨。
疏。二乘不然至令通二乘者。問若如來名不通二乘。何故瑜伽言如來號而是共德 答通餘九號名為共德。非是一切有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：只希望將自體區分為兩個時間階段。後面提出自體和他體，作為生滅的兩種表現。隱藏了自體一法在兩個時間階段的不同，沒有討論。前面只提出了自體一法在兩個時間階段的不同，隱藏了自體和他體的兩種生滅變化，沒有說明。這是文中的省略。
論：生滅兩種狀態相互違背，怎麼能同時存在於現在呢？（這是）提問者如果辯解說，生和滅不是因果關係，所以相互違背但不同時存在於同一世。滅和生作為因果關係，可以被認為是相順的，所以可以同時存在於同一世。（回答）如果說生和滅是相順的，那麼就與世俗的觀點和佛教自身的教義相違背。
疏：排除二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）和金剛乘等，因為二乘和金剛乘都沒有阿賴耶識（第八識，藏識）。時間短暫，只能說是無學（不再需要學習的階段）。問：為什麼不說三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）金剛乘？答：大乘（菩薩乘）八地菩薩已經捨棄了阿賴耶識，與二乘的修行方式不同，所以不提。
疏：如果說習氣（煩惱的殘餘力量）有四種位次，那就無法成立。如果說習氣被稱為粗重，那麼二乘的無學和八地菩薩都具有這種粗重，就不能說阿賴耶識之名在四種位次上被捨棄。
論：怎麼知道是這樣的呢？疏文解釋提問的意圖有兩種。有一種觀點現在不採用。為什麼呢？因為前面只是解釋了阿羅漢（斷盡煩惱，證得解脫的聖者）的名稱，既然還沒有解釋捨棄，怎麼能先提問呢？所以這裡只是提問三乘的無學都可以通稱為阿羅漢的原因。詳細地說，最初說只有阿羅漢才能究竟捨棄，遠遠地提出那個問題有什麼過錯呢？又如果不是提問三乘捨棄的問題，為什麼舉出那個問題，詳細解釋和分別說明三乘捨棄的意義來回答前面的征問呢？如果說雖然說了捨棄阿賴耶識之名，但意思是解釋三乘都可以稱為阿羅漢，也無法成立。論中明確說諸阿羅漢、獨覺（無需依賴他人教導，通過自身努力證悟的聖者）、如來（佛），有什麼道理能夠證明他們都是阿羅漢呢？又如果採用《瑜伽師地論》的原文也是不可以的。那部論只說了三乘無學，沒有說三乘都稱為阿羅漢。而且那部論明確說明斷除阿賴耶識的緣故。所以知道疏文始終牢牢把握，深刻領悟了本來的旨意。
疏：二乘不是這樣，直到使之通於二乘。問：如果如來之名不通於二乘，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》說如來的稱號是共同的功德？答：通於其餘九種稱號，稱為共同的功德，不是一切都有。
【English Translation】 English version: It is only hoped that the self can be divided into two time phases. Later, the self and others are presented as two aspects of arising and ceasing. The difference of the self as one dharma in two time phases is hidden and not discussed. Previously, only the difference of the self as one dharma in two time phases was presented, and the two aspects of arising and ceasing of the self and others were hidden and not mentioned. This is an abbreviation in the text.
Treatise: How can arising and ceasing, which are contradictory states, coexist in the present? (This is) if the questioner argues that arising and ceasing are not cause and effect, so they contradict each other but do not coexist in the same time. Ceasing and arising, as cause and effect, can be considered to be in accordance, so they can coexist in the same time. (Answer) If you say that arising and ceasing are in accordance, then it contradicts worldly views and the teachings of Buddhism itself.
Commentary: Excluding the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) and Vajrayāna, etc., because the Two Vehicles and Vajrayāna do not have the Ālaya-vijñāna (the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness). The time is short, so it can only be said to be no-more-learning (the stage where no further learning is needed). Question: Why not say the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) Vajrayāna? Answer: The eighth-ground Bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna (Bodhisattvayāna) has already abandoned the Ālaya-vijñāna, which is different from the practice of the Two Vehicles, so it is not mentioned.
Commentary: If it is said that the residual energy (the remaining power of afflictions) has four stages, then it cannot be established. If it is said that the residual energy is called coarse and heavy, then the no-more-learners of the Two Vehicles and the eighth-ground Bodhisattvas all have this coarseness and heaviness, and it cannot be said that the name of Ālaya-vijñāna is abandoned in the four stages.
Treatise: How do we know this is the case? The commentary explains that there are two intentions of the question. One view is not adopted now. Why? Because previously only the name of Arhat (a saint who has exhausted afflictions and attained liberation) was explained, and since abandonment has not yet been explained, how can we ask first? Therefore, here it is only asked why the no-more-learners of the Three Vehicles can all be generally called Arhats. In detail, it was initially said that only Arhats can ultimately abandon, what is wrong with raising that question from afar? Also, if it is not a question of the Three Vehicles abandoning, why raise that question, explain in detail, and separately explain the meaning of the Three Vehicles abandoning to answer the previous question? If it is said that although the name of abandoning the Ālaya-vijñāna is mentioned, the intention is to explain that the Three Vehicles can all be called Arhats, it cannot be established either. The treatise clearly states that all Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas (saints who attain enlightenment through their own efforts without relying on the teachings of others), and Tathāgatas (Buddhas), what reason can prove that they are all Arhats? Also, if the original text of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is adopted, it is also not possible. That treatise only mentions the no-more-learners of the Three Vehicles, and does not say that the Three Vehicles are all called Arhats. Moreover, that treatise clearly explains the reason for cutting off the Ālaya-vijñāna. Therefore, it is known that the commentary firmly grasps from beginning to end and deeply understands the original intention.
Commentary: The Two Vehicles are not like this, until it is made to apply to the Two Vehicles. Question: If the name of Tathāgata does not apply to the Two Vehicles, why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that the title of Tathāgata is a common virtue? Answer: It applies to the other nine titles and is called a common virtue, not that everything has it.
應義者。皆名如來名為共德。
疏。若現行一分無故等者。此第一師而取次下第二師意以興研核。有際有徴思之可悉。
疏已全未舍故者。第二師答。以下合有第一師難。難云前七未全舍不名舍賴耶。八地種未除。是以賴耶在。疏不言者以第一師于意如是故略不具。
疏。若爾至不能捨賴耶故者。第二師難。
疏。若爾至未舍賴耶故者。即第一師舉例質也。初地聖教名不退故。故知不退不約賴耶舍．不捨說。
疏。瑜伽四十八初劫名波羅密多等者。撿四十八無。七十八有。四七聲濫撿文誤也。又解深密經第四亦同。經云云何波羅密多。云何近波羅密多。云何大波羅密多。善男子若諸菩薩于無量時修行施等成就善法。而諸煩惱猶故現行未能制伏然為彼伏。謂于解行地耎中勝解轉時是名波羅密多。復于無量時修行施等漸復增上成就善法。而諸煩惱猶故現行。然能制伏非彼所伏。謂從初地已上名近波羅密多。復于無量時修行施等轉復增上成就善法。一切煩惱皆不現行。謂從八地已上。是名大波羅密多 釋曰。初純有漏去無相遠。帶相修習由此但名波羅密多。次通無漏鄰無相故而得近名。后位無相任運長時故名為大 或言近者近無加行。雖有兩釋后釋為勝 所以者何 答七地之中亦有無相。而
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『應義者（符合真理的人）。都名為如來，名為共德（共同的功德）。』 疏（註釋）：如果現行一分無故等者（如果一部分行為沒有理由等等）。這是第一位論師，然後取用第二位論師的觀點來引發研究和核實。其中有界限，有徵兆，可以詳細思考。 疏（註釋）已全未舍故者（註釋已經完整但沒有捨棄的原因）。這是第二位論師的回答。以下結合了第一位論師的提問。提問說，前七地沒有完全捨棄，不能稱為捨棄阿賴耶識。八地（第八地菩薩）的種子還沒有去除。因此阿賴耶識仍然存在。註釋沒有說明，是因為第一位論師認為情況就是這樣，所以省略了細節。 疏（註釋）：若爾至不能捨賴耶故者（如果這樣直到不能捨棄阿賴耶識的原因）。這是第二位論師的提問。 疏（註釋）：若爾至未舍賴耶故者（如果這樣直到沒有捨棄阿賴耶識的原因）。這是第一位論師舉例反駁。初地（初地菩薩）的聖教名為不退轉。因此可知，不退轉不是根據阿賴耶識的捨棄與否來定義的。 疏（註釋）：瑜伽四十八初劫名波羅密多等者（《瑜伽師地論》第四十八卷初劫名為波羅蜜多等等）。檢查第四十八卷沒有，第七十八卷有。四和七聲音相近，檢查文字有誤。另外，《解深密經》第四卷也相同。經文說：『什麼是波羅蜜多？什麼是近波羅蜜多？什麼是羅密多？』善男子，如果諸位菩薩在無量的時間裡修行佈施等等，成就善法。但是諸種煩惱仍然顯現，未能制伏，然而被它們所伏。指的是在解行地（解行地菩薩）的柔軟中，勝解轉的時候，這叫做波羅蜜多。又在無量的時間裡修行佈施等等，逐漸更加增上，成就善法。但是諸種煩惱仍然顯現，然而能夠制伏，不是被它們所伏。指的是從初地以上，叫做近波羅蜜多。又在無量的時間裡修行佈施等等，更加增上，成就善法。一切煩惱都不顯現。指的是從八地以上。這叫做羅密多。』解釋說：最初純粹是有漏，距離無相很遠。帶著相狀修習，因此只能叫做波羅蜜多。其次通達無漏，接近無相，因此得到近的名字。後面的階段是無相，任運長時，因此叫做大。或者說，近指的是接近無加行。雖然有兩種解釋，後面的解釋更好。為什麼呢？回答說，七地（第七地菩薩）之中也有無相，但是
【English Translation】 English version:
'Those who accord with the meaning (those who conform to the truth). All are called Tathagata, called common virtues (shared merits).' Commentary: 'If the present action is partly without cause, etc.' This is the first teacher, and then the second teacher's intention is taken to initiate research and verification. There are boundaries and signs that can be thoroughly considered. Commentary: 'The commentary is complete but the reason for not abandoning.' This is the second teacher's answer. The following combines the first teacher's question. The question says that the first seven bhumis (stages) have not been completely abandoned, so they cannot be called abandoning the Alaya-consciousness. The seeds of the eighth bhumi (eighth-stage Bodhisattva) have not been removed. Therefore, the Alaya-consciousness still exists. The commentary does not explain this because the first teacher thinks that this is the case, so the details are omitted. Commentary: 'If so, until the reason for not abandoning the Alaya-consciousness.' This is the second teacher's question. Commentary: 'If so, until the reason for not abandoning the Alaya-consciousness.' This is the first teacher refuting with an example. The holy teachings of the first bhumi (first-stage Bodhisattva) are called non-retrogression. Therefore, it can be known that non-retrogression is not defined based on whether the Alaya-consciousness is abandoned or not. Commentary: 'Yoga forty-eight, the first kalpa is called Paramita, etc.' Checking the forty-eighth volume, it is not there, but the seventy-eighth volume has it. The sounds of four and seven are similar, and there is an error in checking the text. In addition, the fourth volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra is also the same. The sutra says: 'What is Paramita? What is near Paramita? What is Paramita?' Good man, if the Bodhisattvas practice giving, etc., for immeasurable time and achieve good dharmas. But all kinds of afflictions still appear, and they cannot be subdued, but they are subdued by them. It refers to when the superior understanding turns in the softness of the stage of understanding and practice (Bodhisattva in the stage of understanding and practice), this is called Paramita. Also, for immeasurable time, they practice giving, etc., and gradually increase and achieve good dharmas. But all kinds of afflictions still appear, but they can be subdued, not subdued by them. It refers to from the first bhumi and above, it is called near Paramita. Also, for immeasurable time, they practice giving, etc., and further increase and achieve good dharmas. All afflictions do not appear. It refers to from the eighth bhumi and above. This is called Paramita.' The explanation says: Initially, it is purely contaminated and far from the absence of characteristics. Practicing with characteristics, therefore it can only be called Paramita. Secondly, it is connected to the uncontaminated, close to the absence of characteristics, so it gets the name near. The later stage is the absence of characteristics, and it is naturally long-lasting, so it is called great. Or, near refers to approaching without additional effort. Although there are two explanations, the latter explanation is better. Why? The answer is that there is also the absence of characteristics in the seventh bhumi (seventh-stage Bodhisattva), but
云何言近無相故名近耶。故后釋善。
論。然阿羅漢至為自內我者。有義解頌舍言疏說釋羅漢名此非理也 詳曰。前雖破他。今更申正理亦何偏。豈但斥他不樹己義。又下文中而自明舍。故今此文對破於他申正義也。不爾辨舍有重言失。
疏。攝論云心體第三等者。按無性論第一釋云。心體第三若離阿賴耶識無別可得者。謂如意聲說染污意無間滅意。識聲則說六種轉識。如是心聲離彼二種無體可得。
非無有體而有能詮。亦非異門。意．識二聲所詮異故。此中體聲意取所詮。是故成就阿賴耶識 等者。顯阿賴耶識是心聲所詮道理決定。
疏。對法第二亦有心義等者。按彼論云。心者謂蘊．處．界習氣所熏一切種子 詳曰。觀彼論意亦以積集而明心義。舉彼三科所熏習氣。顯彼能集識為心也。此論亦唯以積集義而明心也。下文方以積集．集起二義解心。
論。或名所知依等者。按攝論云。唯大乘中處處見說。謂阿賴耶識說名所知依體。依他．遍計．圓成實等三種自性說名所知相 無性釋云。所應可知故名所知。依謂所依。此所依聲簡取能依雜染清凈諸有為法。不取無為。由彼無有所依義故。所依即是阿賴耶識。是彼因故。能引彼故。
論。或亦種子識者。對法亦云。一切種子識者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如何說因為接近無相的緣故而稱為『近』呢？所以後面解釋得很詳盡。
論：然而阿羅漢對於執著于自我的內在本質。有人解釋頌文，捨棄言語疏解，解釋阿羅漢的名稱，這是不合理的。詳細地說，前面雖然駁斥了他人，現在更要闡述正確的道理，又有什麼偏頗呢？難道只是斥責他人而不建立自己的觀點嗎？而且下文中會自己明白捨棄。所以現在這篇文章是爲了駁斥他人而闡述正確的意義。否則，辨別捨棄就會有重複的錯誤。
疏：攝論說『心體第三』等等。按照無性論第一的解釋說，『心體第三，如果離開阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存識）就沒有其他可以得到的』。意指如意聲所說的染污意（kliṣṭa-manas，末那識）、無間滅意。識聲則說六種轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。像這樣，心聲離開那兩種就沒有本體可以得到。
並非沒有本體卻有能詮釋的功能，也不是不同的說法。因為意、識二聲所詮釋的意義不同。這裡體聲的意思是取所詮釋的意義。所以成就阿賴耶識等等，顯示阿賴耶識是心聲所詮釋的道理是確定的。
疏：對法第二也有心的意義等等。按照那部論所說，『心，是指蘊（skandha，五蘊）、處（āyatana，十二處）、界（dhātu，十八界）的習氣所薰染的一切種子』。詳細地說，觀察那部論的意義，也是用積集來闡明心的意義。舉出那三科所熏習的氣息，顯示那能積集的識就是心。這部論也只是用積集的意義來闡明心。下文才用積集、集起兩種意義來解釋心。
論：或者名為所知依等等。按照攝論所說，『只有在大乘（Mahāyāna）中處處見到這種說法，即阿賴耶識被稱為所知依體（ālambana），依他（paratantra，依他起性）、遍計（parikalpita，遍計所執性）、圓成實（pariniṣpanna，圓成實性）等三種自性被稱為所知相』。無性解釋說，『所應該知道的所以名為所知。依是指所依賴。這個所依的聲音簡要地選取能依賴的雜染清凈的各種有為法，不選取無為法，因為無為法沒有所依賴的意義。所依就是阿賴耶識，是它們的原因，能引導它們。』
論：或者也稱為種子識。對法也說，『一切種子識』
【English Translation】 English version: How is it said that it is called 'near' because it is close to being without characteristics? Therefore, the subsequent explanation is thorough.
Treatise: However, Arhats (Ārhant, one who is worthy) are attached to their inner self. Some interpret the verse, abandoning verbal explanations, and explain the name of Arhat, which is unreasonable. In detail, although the previous refuted others, now it is even more necessary to expound the correct principles, so what is biased? Is it just criticizing others without establishing one's own point of view? Moreover, the following text will clarify the abandonment itself. Therefore, this article is to refute others and expound the correct meaning. Otherwise, distinguishing abandonment will have a repetitive error.
Commentary: The Saṃgraha-śāstra says 'the third of the mind-essence' etc. According to the first explanation of the Asaṅga's Commentary, 'the third of the mind-essence, if separated from the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), nothing else can be obtained'. It refers to the defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas, afflicted mind or manas) mentioned by the 'as desired' sound, and the immediately ceasing mind. The 'consciousness' sound refers to the six active consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna, the six sense consciousnesses). Like this, the 'mind' sound, separated from those two, has no essence to be obtained.
It is not that there is no essence but there is the function of being able to explain, nor is it a different saying. Because the meanings explained by the two sounds of 'mind' and 'consciousness' are different. Here, the meaning of the 'essence' sound is to take the meaning that is explained. Therefore, the accomplishment of Ālaya-vijñāna etc. shows that the principle that Ālaya-vijñāna is what the 'mind' sound explains is definite.
Commentary: The second Abhidharma also has the meaning of mind etc. According to that treatise, 'mind refers to all the seeds that are perfumed by the habitual energies of the aggregates (skandha, the five aggregates), the sense bases (āyatana, the twelve sense bases), and the realms (dhātu, the eighteen realms)'. In detail, observing the meaning of that treatise, it also uses accumulation to clarify the meaning of mind. It cites the energies perfumed by those three categories to show that the consciousness that can accumulate is the mind. This treatise also only uses the meaning of accumulation to clarify the mind. The following text will use the two meanings of accumulation and arising to explain the mind.
Treatise: Or it is called the basis of what is knowable etc. According to the Saṃgraha-śāstra, 'Only in Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) is this saying seen everywhere, that Ālaya-vijñāna is called the essence of the basis of what is knowable (ālambana), and the three natures of other-dependent (paratantra, dependent nature), conceptual (parikalpita, the imagined nature), and perfectly accomplished (pariniṣpanna, the perfected nature) are called the characteristics of what is knowable'. Asaṅga's Commentary explains, 'What should be known is called what is knowable. Basis refers to what is relied upon. This sound of basis briefly selects the conditioned phenomena of defilement and purity that can be relied upon, and does not select the unconditioned phenomena, because the unconditioned phenomena do not have the meaning of being relied upon. The basis is Ālaya-vijñāna, which is their cause and can guide them.'
Treatise: Or it is also called seed consciousness. The Abhidharma also says, 'All seed consciousness'.
。謂能生蘊等諸法種子所積集故。大論亦同。
疏。始終而論等者。凡始佛終。
疏。此中名藏不取能藏等者。不取染法以為能藏。意明不取八為所藏染法能藏。
唯因等者。釋所以也。此文即以執藏．能藏二義釋藏。
疏。是無漏涅槃者。疏說如字。應云如涅槃等。
論。如來無垢識等者。有義今頌意者證第八識在如來地名無垢識 詳曰。證無垢識名之所從。通疏．有義合為三釋。優劣思之。
疏。阿賴為性者。按彼論云。如是所知依說阿賴耶識為性。阿陀那識為性。心為性。阿賴耶為性。根本識為性。窮生死蘊為性 釋曰。彼論廣明阿賴耶識至窮生死蘊六識之名為所知依體。所以一一皆言為性。疏意牒彼后三之名以為問也。余文同來。以上三名前已列竟不在問限。
疏。一云種生現同時等者。余染種等無間道起彼已舍矣。第八種．現金剛心俱。異熟無記容俱無失。
疏。菩提約成就等者。意遮外難。外難意云。若無間道舍異熟識。此時何為不名為佛。故約成就以釋彼疑。彼時初得未圓滿成不名為佛。
疏。種生現異時同前初師者。問初師種．現而得俱時。今此不爾何得同初 答取無間道有異熟識少爾同也。不言種．現俱名為同。若種．現俱即不得言種．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
意思是說，阿賴耶識能夠產生蘊等諸法的種子，並且是這些種子的積聚之處。《大乘阿毗達磨集論》也是同樣的觀點。
疏：『始終而論等者』，指的是從凡夫到成佛的整個過程。
疏：『此中名藏不取能藏等者』，這裡所說的『藏』，不包括染法作為能藏。意思是說，不包括第八識作為所藏的染法和能藏。
『唯因等者』，解釋原因。這段文字用執藏和能藏兩種含義來解釋『藏』。
疏：『是無漏涅槃者』，疏文的說法應該按照原文，寫作『如涅槃等』。
論：『如來無垢識等者』，有一種觀點認為，這首偈頌的意思是證明第八識在如來地被稱為無垢識。詳細地說，證明無垢識名稱的由來。結合疏文和『有義』的觀點，共有三種解釋，可以仔細思考哪種更合理。
疏：『阿賴為性者』，按照《攝大乘論》的說法，『如是所知依說阿賴耶識為性，阿陀那識（Adana-vijnana，執持識）為性，心為性，阿賴耶為性，根本識為性，窮生死蘊為性』。解釋說，《攝大乘論》廣泛地闡明了阿賴耶識乃至窮生死蘊這六種識的名稱是所知依的本體。所以每一個都說是『為性』。疏文的意思是引用了後面三種名稱來提問。其餘的文字也是同樣的用法。以上三種名稱已經在前面列舉完畢，不在提問的範圍之內。
疏：『一云種生現同時等者』，其餘的染污種子等在無間道（Anantarya-marga，無間道）生起時就已經捨棄了。第八識的種子和金剛心（Vajra-citta，金剛心）是同時存在的。異熟無記（Vipaka-avyakrta，異熟無記）容許同時存在也沒有過失。
疏：『菩提約成就等者』，這是爲了遮止外人的詰難。外人的詰難是說，如果無間道捨棄了異熟識，那麼這個時候為什麼不稱為佛呢？所以用成就來解釋這個疑問。那個時候只是初步獲得，還沒有圓滿成就，所以不能稱為佛。
疏：『種生現異時同前初師者』，提問說，最初的老師認為種子和現行是同時的，現在這裡不是這樣，怎麼能說和最初的老師相同呢？回答說，取無間道有異熟識這一點來說是相同的。並不是說種子和現行完全相同才叫做相同。如果種子和現行完全相同，就不能說種子。
【English Translation】 English version:
It means that the Alaya-vijnana (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) is capable of producing the seeds of the skandhas (skandhas, aggregates) and other dharmas (dharmas, phenomena), and it is the accumulation of these seeds. The Mahayana Abhidharma Samuccaya holds the same view.
Commentary: 'Speaking of beginning and end, etc.' refers to the entire process from ordinary being to becoming a Buddha.
Commentary: 'Here, the name 'store' does not include the 'capable of storing', etc.' means that the 'store' mentioned here does not include defiled dharmas as the 'capable of storing'. It means that it does not include the eighth consciousness as the defiled dharmas that are 'stored' and the 'capable of storing'.
'Only the cause, etc.' explains the reason. This passage uses the two meanings of 'holding' and 'capable of storing' to explain 'store'.
Commentary: 'Is the non-outflow Nirvana' The commentary should follow the original text and write 'like Nirvana, etc.'
Treatise: 'The Tathagata's (Tathagata, Thus Come One) stainless consciousness, etc.' One view holds that the meaning of this verse is to prove that the eighth consciousness is called stainless consciousness in the Tathagata's stage. In detail, it proves the origin of the name of stainless consciousness. Combining the commentary and the view of 'some say', there are three explanations. One can carefully consider which one is more reasonable.
Commentary: 'Alaya as its nature' According to the Mahayana-samgraha, 'Thus, the knowable basis is said to be Alaya-vijnana as its nature, Adana-vijnana (Adana-vijnana, grasping consciousness) as its nature, mind as its nature, Alaya-vijnana as its nature, fundamental consciousness as its nature, and the aggregates that exhaust life and death as its nature.' It is explained that the Mahayana-samgraha extensively clarifies that the names of these six consciousnesses, from Alaya-vijnana to the aggregates that exhaust life and death, are the substance of the knowable basis. Therefore, each one is said to be 'as its nature'. The meaning of the commentary is to quote the last three names to ask a question. The remaining text uses the same method. The above three names have already been listed and are not within the scope of the question.
Commentary: 'One says that seed production and manifestation are simultaneous, etc.' The remaining defiled seeds, etc., have already been abandoned when the Anantarya-marga (Anantarya-marga, path of immediate consequence) arises. The seed of the eighth consciousness and the Vajra-citta (Vajra-citta, diamond mind) exist simultaneously. It is permissible for the Vipaka-avyakrta (Vipaka-avyakrta, result of maturation, neither good nor bad) to exist simultaneously without fault.
Commentary: 'Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment) is about accomplishment, etc.' This is to prevent external challenges. The external challenge is that if the Anantarya-marga abandons the Vipaka-vijnana, then why is it not called a Buddha at this time? Therefore, the doubt is explained by using accomplishment. At that time, it is only the initial attainment and has not yet been fully accomplished, so it cannot be called a Buddha.
Commentary: 'Seed production and manifestation at different times are the same as the initial teacher' The question is, the initial teacher believed that the seed and manifestation are simultaneous, but this is not the case here. How can it be said to be the same as the initial teacher? The answer is that it is the same in that the Anantarya-marga has Vipaka-vijnana. It is not said to be the same if the seed and manifestation are completely the same. If the seed and manifestation are completely the same, then one cannot say seed.
現異時。
疏。非無色界至緣一切者。不能具緣色．心．心所．及下地等。此不盡理。聖教有說無色界心了一切故。故第二云不能唸唸遍緣一切。此釋為勝。
疏。必不現起如三類邊所有等智者。此以有宗等智為喻。三類智者。謂苦．集．滅三諦類智。起此類智現觀后已而能兼修有漏知苦．斷集．證滅所有俗智。即此俗智因此三類智現觀後邊而修習故故名現觀。故俱舍論二十六云。唯苦．集．滅三類智時能兼修未來現觀邊俗智。於一一諦現觀後邊方能兼修故立斯號 問道類智時何不兼修智 答以世俗智無始時來數曾知苦．斷集．證滅。三類亦爾。事業同故所以兼修。又苦等三遍知．斷．證故得兼修。道智不爾。道理現觀而唯無漏。無始未起。又未遍修。故除道智。故俱舍云。曾於道無事現觀故。又必無于道遍事現觀故。謂于苦．集．滅可遍知．斷．證 問修道煩惱及所顯滅猶未斷．證。云何得言遍知．斷．證 答當自諦下智等皆遍。故俱舍云。雖集．滅邊未遍斷．證。而於當位斷．證已周 問道何不爾 答以道無此遍事觀故。又修不遍。如六種性入見道時。修當自性不能修余。故俱舍云。道則不然。種性多故 問所修俗智後起不耶 答準有宗義畢竟不起。正立見道無容而起。得勝舍劣后亦不起。故俱舍云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 現異時。
疏。非無至緣一切者（並非沒有能力同時認知一切事物）。不能具緣色（rupa，物質）．心（citta，意識）．心所（cetasika，心所法）．及下地等（以及較低層次的境界等等）。此不盡理（這種說法不完全合理）。聖教有說無心了一切故（聖教經典中說，沒有不能以一心了知一切事物的）。故第二云不能唸唸遍緣一切（所以第二種說法是，不能在每個念頭中都普遍地認知一切事物）。此釋為勝（這種解釋更為合理）。
疏。必不現起如三類邊所有等智者（必定不會像在三種類別的邊緣所生起的智慧那樣）。此以有宗等智為喻（這裡以有宗的智慧為例）。三類智者（三種類別的智慧是指）。謂苦（dukkha，苦諦）．集（samudaya，集諦）．滅（nirodha，滅諦）三諦類智（三種真理的類別智）。起此類智現觀后已而能兼修有漏知苦．斷集．證滅所有俗智（生起這類智慧的現觀之後，能夠同時修習有漏的知苦、斷集、證滅的所有世俗智慧）。即此俗智因此三類智現觀後邊而修習故故名現觀（這些世俗智慧因此三種類別智慧的現觀之後而修習，所以稱為現觀）。故俱舍論二十六云（所以《俱舍論》第二十六卷說）。唯苦．集．滅三類智時能兼修未來現觀邊俗智（只有在苦、集、滅三種類別智的時候，才能同時修習未來現觀邊緣的世俗智慧）。於一一諦現觀後邊方能兼修故立斯號（在每一種真理的現觀之後才能同時修習，所以設立這個名稱）。問道類智時何不兼修智（問道類智的時候為什麼不能同時修習智慧）。答以世俗智無始時來數曾知苦．斷集．證滅（回答說，因為世俗智慧從無始以來已經多次知道苦、斷集、證滅）。三類亦爾（三種類別也是如此）。事業同故所以兼修（事業相同，所以可以同時修習）。又苦等三遍知．斷．證故得兼修（又因為苦等三種真理可以普遍地知、斷、證，所以可以同時修習）。道智不爾（道智則不然）。道理現觀而唯無漏（道理的現觀只是無漏的）。無始未起（無始以來沒有生起）。又未遍修（又沒有普遍地修習）。故除道智（所以排除道智）。故俱舍云（所以《俱舍論》說）。曾於道無事現觀故（曾經在道上沒有現觀的事情）。又必無于道遍事現觀故（又必定沒有在道上普遍現觀的事情）。謂于苦．集．滅可遍知．斷．證（也就是說，對於苦、集、滅可以普遍地知、斷、證）。問修道煩惱及所顯滅猶未斷．證（問道，修道時煩惱以及所顯現的滅還沒有斷、證）。云何得言遍知．斷．證（怎麼能說普遍地知、斷、證）。答當自諦下智等皆遍（回答說，在各自的真理之下，智慧等都是普遍的）。故俱舍云（所以《俱舍論》說）。雖集．滅邊未遍斷．證（雖然在集、滅的邊緣沒有普遍地斷、證）。而於當位斷．證已周（但在各自的位置上，斷、證已經完備）。問道何不爾（問道，道為什麼不是這樣）。答以道無此遍事觀故（回答說，因為道沒有這種普遍的事情的觀察）。又修不遍（又修習不普遍）。如六種性入見道時（比如六種根性進入見道時）。修當自性不能修余（修習自己的根性不能修習其他的）。故俱舍云（所以《俱舍論》說）。道則不然（道則不然）。種性多故（因為根性很多）。問所修俗智後起不耶（問道，所修習的世俗智慧後來會生起嗎）。答準有宗義畢竟不起（回答說，按照有宗的觀點，畢竟不會生起）。正立見道無容而起（正確地建立見道沒有容許生起）。得勝舍劣后亦不起（得到殊勝的，捨棄低劣的，後來也不會生起）。故俱舍云（所以《俱舍論》說）
【English Translation】 English version Present and Different Times.
Commentary: 'Not without ** to perceive all' means not being able to fully perceive form (rupa), mind (citta), mental factors (cetasika), and lower realms, etc. This is not entirely reasonable. The sacred teachings state that there is no ** mind that does not understand everything. Therefore, the second statement, 'not able to universally perceive everything in every moment,' is a better explanation.
Commentary: 'Certainly not arising like the wisdom possessed at the edge of the three categories' uses the wisdom of the Sarvastivada school as an analogy. The 'three categories of wisdom' refer to the wisdom related to the three truths: suffering (dukkha), origin (samudaya), and cessation (nirodha). After generating the direct realization (abhisamaya) of these categories of wisdom, one can concurrently cultivate defiled mundane wisdom related to knowing suffering, abandoning the origin, and realizing cessation. This mundane wisdom is cultivated after the direct realization of these three categories of wisdom, hence it is called 'direct realization.' Therefore, the Abhidharmakosha, volume 26, states: 'Only during the wisdom of the three categories of suffering, origin, and cessation can one concurrently cultivate mundane wisdom at the edge of future direct realization.' Only after the direct realization of each truth can one concurrently cultivate, hence this designation. Question: Why not concurrently cultivate wisdom during the wisdom of the path category? Answer: Because mundane wisdom has known suffering, abandoning the origin, and realizing cessation numerous times since beginningless time. The three categories are also similar. Because the activities are the same, they can be cultivated concurrently. Furthermore, because suffering, etc., are universally known, abandoned, and realized, they can be cultivated concurrently. The wisdom of the path is not like this. The direct realization of the principle is only undefiled. It has not arisen since beginningless time, nor has it been universally cultivated. Therefore, the wisdom of the path is excluded. Therefore, the Kosha states: 'Because there has never been an event of direct realization on the path.' And 'certainly there has never been a universal event of direct realization on the path.' That is to say, suffering, origin, and cessation can be universally known, abandoned, and realized. Question: When cultivating the path, afflictions and the cessation manifested are still not abandoned or realized. How can it be said that they are universally known, abandoned, and realized? Answer: The wisdom, etc., under each truth are all universal. Therefore, the Kosha states: 'Although abandoning and realization are not universal at the edge of origin and cessation, abandoning and realization are complete in their respective positions.' Question: Why is the path not like this? Answer: Because the path does not have this universal event of observation. Furthermore, cultivation is not universal. For example, when the six types of beings enter the path of seeing, cultivating their own nature cannot cultivate others. Therefore, the Kosha states: 'The path is not like this, because there are many natures.' Question: Does the mundane wisdom cultivated arise later? Answer: According to the Sarvastivada school, it certainly does not arise. Correctly establishing the path of seeing does not allow it to arise. Gaining the superior and abandoning the inferior, it does not arise later either. Therefore, the Kosha states:
。此世俗智是不生法。於一切時無容起故 問此所修智已前起不。若言起者云何論云兼修未來觀現俗智。若未曾起復如何云與三類智知．斷．證同故兼修耶 答未曾起。據彼同類已前起者名為同也 問彼曾起者此時修不 答據實亦修。以非希奇故論不說。如俱舍鈔廣分別之。
疏第四
疏。此顯依初至通諸位者。此者。即此斷．常位名 彼者。彼彼至轉依位及第八號。
疏。是離共許五取蘊外無別有體者。指彼心所．色．不相應。此等即是兩家共許五蘊中攝。
疏。此離識蘊不共許故者。此者。即此第八識也。共許蘊外而別有體名之為離。非他許之名不共也。
論。界是因義等者。有云。界有三義。一者因義。二是性義。三者種也。今依因義以釋界言。疏唯取種。今取現行。與所得種體不異故。說現親生名之為因。現識亦名種子識故。因相唯取現行識故。故下依用但說現依不說種也 詳曰。界若現識即依無別。論主何故別解二耶。界置親生諸法之言依不云耶。夫言親者是因緣義。現八如何能為因緣不能熏故。又現與種雖不名異。亦不得一。一既不成。取種何失。又前因相亦非唯現。又義不同。不可為證。既有多違今還依疏。
疏。此所隨一者。若先成末那用轉識因。因中便有所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這種世俗智慧是不生之法（anutpāda-dharma）。因為它在任何時候都不可能生起。問：這種所修的智慧在之前已經生起過嗎？如果說已經生起，那麼為什麼經論中說要兼修未來觀和現世俗智？如果從未生起，又如何說它與三類智慧（知、斷、證）相同，所以要兼修呢？答：從未生起。只是根據同類智慧已經生起的情況，稱之為相同。問：那些曾經生起的智慧，現在還在修習嗎？答：實際上也在修習。因為這並非稀奇之事，所以經論中沒有說明。如同《俱舍論》的鈔本中廣泛地分別說明的那樣。
疏第四
疏：這顯示了從最初到通達各個階段的人。『此』指的是斷、常的位名。『彼』指的是轉依位以及第八識的名稱。
疏：這是指在普遍認可的五取蘊之外，沒有其他獨立的實體。指的是心所、色、不相應行。這些都是兩家（唯識宗和他宗）共同認可的，包含在五蘊之中。
疏：這指的是第八識（ālaya-vijñāna）不被普遍認可，所以說『離識蘊』。『此』指的是第八識。在普遍認可的蘊之外，另外存在一個獨立的實體，就叫做『離』。不是他人認可的，就叫做『不共』。
論：『界是因義』等等。有人說，『界』有三種含義：一是因義，二是性義，三是種義。現在依據因義來解釋『界』這個詞。疏只取了『種』的含義，現在取『現行』的含義。因為現行與所得的種子體性沒有差別，所以說現行直接產生，稱之為『因』。現行識也叫做種子識。因相只取現行識。所以下面依據作用，只說現行，不說種子。詳曰：如果『界』是現行識，那麼『依』就沒有區別了。論主為什麼還要分別解釋這兩個概念呢？『界』可以用來表示直接產生諸法的含義，為什麼『依』不能這樣說呢？所謂『親』，就是因緣的意思。現行的第八識如何能作為因緣呢？因為它不能熏習。而且，現行與種子雖然名稱不同，但也不能說它們是完全一樣的。既然不能說它們是完全一樣，那麼取『種』的含義又有什麼錯呢？而且，前面的『因相』也不僅僅指現行。而且，含義不同，不能作為證據。既然有這麼多不符之處，現在還是依據疏的解釋。
疏：『此所隨一者』，如果先成就了末那識（manas）的作用，作為轉識的因，那麼在因中就有所...
【English Translation】 English version: This mundane wisdom is the dharma of non-arising (anutpāda-dharma). It cannot arise at any time. Question: Has this wisdom that is being cultivated arisen before? If it has arisen, then why does the scripture say to concurrently cultivate future contemplation and present mundane wisdom? If it has never arisen, then how can it be said that it is the same as the three types of wisdom (knowing, cutting off, and realizing), and therefore should be cultivated concurrently? Answer: It has never arisen. It is called the same based on the fact that similar types of wisdom have arisen before. Question: Are those wisdoms that have arisen before still being cultivated now? Answer: In reality, they are also being cultivated. Because this is not a rare occurrence, it is not mentioned in the scriptures. As explained extensively in the commentary on the Abhidharmakośa.
Commentary 4
Commentary: This shows those who, from the beginning to the attainment of all stages. 'This' refers to the name of the position of cessation and permanence. 'That' refers to the position of transformation of the basis and the eighth consciousness.
Commentary: This refers to that which, outside of the universally accepted five aggregates of clinging, has no separate independent entity. It refers to mental factors, form, and non-associated formations. These are all universally accepted by both schools (Yogācāra and other schools) and are included within the five aggregates.
Commentary: This refers to the fact that the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) is not universally accepted, hence the term 'apart from the consciousness aggregate'. 'This' refers to the eighth consciousness. Existing as a separate independent entity outside of the universally accepted aggregates is called 'apart'. That which is not accepted by others is called 'not common'.
Treatise: 'Realm is the meaning of cause,' etc. Some say that 'realm' has three meanings: first, the meaning of cause; second, the meaning of nature; and third, the meaning of seed. Now, we explain the word 'realm' according to the meaning of cause. The commentary only takes the meaning of 'seed', but now we take the meaning of 'manifestation'. Because the manifestation and the nature of the seed obtained are not different, it is said that the manifestation directly produces, and is called 'cause'. The manifestation consciousness is also called the seed consciousness. The characteristic of cause only takes the manifestation consciousness. Therefore, below, based on function, only the manifestation is mentioned, not the seed. Detailed explanation: If 'realm' is the manifestation consciousness, then 'basis' has no difference. Why does the author of the treatise explain these two concepts separately? 'Realm' can be used to express the meaning of directly producing all dharmas, why can't 'basis' be used in this way? The so-called 'direct' is the meaning of cause and condition. How can the manifestation of the eighth consciousness be the cause and condition? Because it cannot perfuse. Moreover, although the manifestation and the seed have different names, they cannot be said to be completely the same. Since they cannot be said to be completely the same, then what is wrong with taking the meaning of 'seed'? Moreover, the previous 'characteristic of cause' does not only refer to the manifestation. Moreover, the meanings are different and cannot be used as evidence. Since there are so many inconsistencies, we will now rely on the explanation of the commentary.
Commentary: 'This, following one of them,' If the function of manas (manas) is accomplished first, as the cause of the transformation consciousness, then there is something in the cause...
依．隨一二不成過 或所字錯應為因字。前解為正。以末那識他不許故。故有二過。
疏。或若不爾至有不定過等者。詳曰。此乃深防迷因明者。恐見前因有識言故輒為不定 又真實理八有此依因而立之。理實前因無不定過。因中說云轉識攝故。
疏。此解與前別者。此解唯以五趣之報名之為趣前後俱通惑業苦等併名為趣。
論。順還滅法者。問何故道諦名之為還 答還者趣向。由道而趣所證涅槃故名為還 或舍妄歸真是還義也。亦猶返樸還薄之謂。
論。此中但說能證得道者。同無性論。彼第一云。所知依者簡取能依雜染．清凈諸有為法。不取無為。由彼無有所依義故 釋曰。有為之法皆依識生故名為依。涅槃無為非識生故故名無依。
論。或此但說所證涅槃等者。同世親攝論。彼第一云。亦由此故證得涅槃 無性亦云。生等雜染畢竟止息名為涅槃。若離阿賴耶不應證得 釋曰。涅槃雖不依此識生。然由此識持惑．道種。道生斷惑證得涅槃。展轉言之亦依于識方能證得。
疏。或俱現行界性因義故者。重釋初句。初同第二名俱現行 言界性等。釋所以也。
疏。又大乘中有苦非集等者。此異熟法。酬因是苦。非重非集。若依有宗苦．集是一物。因果故說二。
疏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果依據（依）和隨一（隨一）二者不能成立，或者『所』字錯誤，應為『因』字。之前的解釋是正確的，因為末那識（末那識）不被允許，所以存在兩個過失。
疏：如果不是這樣，就會有不確定的過失等等。詳細地說，這是爲了深刻防止迷惑于因明（因明）的人，恐怕他們看到前面的『因』字有『識』的含義，就輕易地認為是不確定的。而且，真實的道理（真實理）有八個，都是依據這個『因』而建立的。實際上，前面的『因』沒有不確定的過失，因為在『因』中說，它被轉識（轉識）所攝持。
疏：這個解釋與之前的解釋不同，這個解釋僅僅以五趣（五趣）的報名作為趣，前後都包括迷惑、業和苦等等，都稱為趣。
論：順還滅法（順還滅法）。問：為什麼道諦（道諦）被稱為『還』？答：『還』是趣向的意思。通過道而趣向所證得的涅槃（涅槃），所以稱為『還』。或者，捨棄虛妄而歸向真實，也是『還』的含義。就像返璞歸真一樣。
論：這裡只說能夠證得道的人。與《無性論》（無性論）相同。該論第一卷說：『所知依』是簡要地選取能夠依靠的雜染（雜染）、清凈（清凈）的各種有為法（有為法），不選取無為法（無為法），因為無為法沒有所依靠的含義。釋：有為法都依靠識而生，所以稱為『依』。涅槃是無為法，不是識所生，所以稱為『無依』。
論：或者這裡只說所證得的涅槃等等。與世親（世親）的《攝論》（攝論）相同。該論第一卷說：『也因此證得涅槃。』《無性論》也說：『生等雜染徹底止息稱為涅槃。如果離開阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識），就不應該證得。』釋：涅槃雖然不依靠這個識而生，但是這個識持有迷惑和道的種子。道產生，斷除迷惑，證得涅槃。輾轉而言，也依靠于識才能證得。
疏：或者同時具有現行、界性、因的含義。重新解釋第一句。第一個『同』與第二個『名』是同時現行。『界性』等等，解釋原因。
疏：又大乘（大乘）中有苦不是集等等。這是異熟法（異熟法），酬報因是苦，不是重疊的，也不是集。如果依據有宗（有宗），苦和集是一回事，因為是因果關係，所以說是二。
疏：
【English Translation】 English version: If the 'reliance' (依) and 'following one' (隨一) cannot be established, or if the character '所' (suo) is incorrect and should be '因' (yin). The previous explanation is correct because the Manas consciousness (末那識) is not permitted, so there are two faults.
Commentary: If not so, there would be uncertain faults, etc. In detail, this is to deeply prevent those who are confused about Hetu-vidya (因明), fearing that they would easily consider it uncertain because they see the character '因' (yin) in the previous cause has the meaning of 'consciousness' (識). Moreover, the eight real principles (真實理) are all established based on this 'cause' (因). In reality, the previous 'cause' (因) does not have uncertain faults because it is said in the 'cause' (因) that it is embraced by the transformed consciousness (轉識).
Commentary: This explanation is different from the previous one. This explanation only takes the names of the five realms (五趣) as realms, including delusion, karma, and suffering, etc., both before and after, all called realms.
Treatise: Following the Dharma of Cessation (順還滅法). Question: Why is the Truth of the Path (道諦) called 'return' (還)? Answer: 'Return' (還) means to move towards. Because one moves towards Nirvana (涅槃) attained through the path, it is called 'return' (還). Or, abandoning falsehood and returning to truth is also the meaning of 'return' (還). It's like returning to simplicity and plainness.
Treatise: Here, it only speaks of those who can attain the path. It is the same as the Treatise on Non-Nature (無性論). The first volume of that treatise says: 'The basis of what is known' (所知依) is to briefly select the defiled (雜染) and pure (清凈) conditioned dharmas (有為法) that can be relied upon, and not to select unconditioned dharmas (無為法), because unconditioned dharmas do not have the meaning of being relied upon. Explanation: Conditioned dharmas all arise relying on consciousness, so they are called 'reliance' (依). Nirvana is an unconditioned dharma, not arising from consciousness, so it is called 'non-reliance' (無依).
Treatise: Or here it only speaks of the Nirvana (涅槃) attained, etc. It is the same as Vasubandhu's (世親) Compendium of Abhidharma (攝論). The first volume of that treatise says: 'Also, because of this, Nirvana is attained.' The Treatise on Non-Nature (無性論) also says: 'The complete cessation of defilements such as birth is called Nirvana. If one is apart from the Alaya consciousness (阿賴耶識), one should not attain it.' Explanation: Although Nirvana does not arise relying on this consciousness, this consciousness holds the seeds of delusion and the path. The path arises, cutting off delusion, and attaining Nirvana. In other words, it also relies on consciousness to be attained.
Commentary: Or it has the meaning of co-occurring, nature, and cause. Re-explaining the first sentence. The first 'same' (同) and the second 'name' (名) are co-occurring.
Commentary: Also, in Mahayana (大乘), there is suffering that is not accumulation, etc. This is the Vipaka Dharma (異熟法). The retribution for the cause is suffering, not repeated, nor accumulation. If based on the Sarvastivada school (有宗), suffering and accumulation are the same thing, but because of the cause-and-effect relationship, they are said to be two.
Commentary:
。此由起彼等者。此謂遍計。彼謂諸趣。從所遍計得諸趣名。
疏。四清凈為成實性者。如法苑決釋明。
疏。非唯能藏以解賴耶等者。正以執藏以明賴耶。若以能藏為賴耶者。八地亦有能藏之義。云何得言舍賴耶名 言舍八地等等諸無礙。如來亦有能藏義故。
疏。或為種依至名為執取者。問與前何別 答中與前同。初．後有別。思可知矣。
論。解深密經等者。問此經迨今總廷四譯。魏所譯本名相續解脫。梁．隨二本名解節經。今唐所譯名解深密。何乃不同 答此經梵本名曰珊地涅暮折那。涅暮折那此翻名解。珊地之聲含於三義。一諸物相續。二骨節相連。三深密之義。西方土俗呼此三種併名珊地。亦如薩達摩聲包於二義。仙陀婆號通詮四名。前後譯人各取一義以立經題。皆不相違。然據經旨解深密名理為優矣。
論。亦能執取結生相續者。問云何執取。何時結生。結生何義 答取有三義 一云取者因義。即當生果五蘊之因。由今第八持當果因方有結生當果相續。故說第八名為執取。結生相續即取之執名為執取 二云由種子故。現行第八受一期生名為執取。故世親攝論第一云。由阿賴耶識中一期自體熏習位故彼體起故說名彼生。受彼生故名取彼生 三云取謂能取。由今現八執彼當
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由此而生彼等。此指遍計（parikalpita，虛妄分別），彼指諸趣（gati，輪迴的去處）。從所遍計的事物得到諸趣的名稱。
疏：四清凈成為成實性（parinispanna，圓成實性）的原因，如法苑決釋所闡明。
疏：不僅僅是能藏（ālaya，阿賴耶識的別名）以解釋賴耶（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）等。正是以執藏（ādāna，執取）來闡明賴耶。如果以能藏作為賴耶，那麼八地菩薩也有能藏的含義。怎麼能說捨棄賴耶之名呢？說捨棄八地等等諸無礙。如來也有能藏的含義。
疏：或者作為種子所依，直到名為執取。問：這與前面有什麼區別？答：中間與前面相同。初、後有區別。思考可知。
論：解深密經等。問：此經直到現在總共有四種譯本。魏朝所譯的版本名為《相續解脫》。梁朝和隋朝的兩個版本名為《解節經》。現在唐朝所譯的版本名為《解深密》。為什麼不同呢？答：此經的梵文字名為珊地涅暮折那（Saṃdhinirmocana）。涅暮折那（Nirmocana）翻譯為解。珊地（Saṃdhi）的聲音包含三種含義：一、諸物相續；二、骨節相連；三、深密之義。西方土俗稱這三種都名為珊地（Saṃdhi）。也像薩達摩（Saddharma）的聲音包含兩種含義。仙陀婆（Saindhava）的稱呼可以詮釋四種名稱。前後的譯者各自取一種含義來立經題，都不相違背。然而根據經旨，《解深密》這個名稱在道理上更為優勝。
論：也能執取結生相續。問：如何執取？何時結生？結生是什麼意思？答：取有三種含義：一、云取者，是因的含義。即是當生果五蘊（skandha，構成個體的五種要素）的因。由於現在的第八識（阿賴耶識）持有當來果的因，才有結生當來果的相續。所以說第八識名為執取。結生相續即是取的執，名為執取。二、云由種子故。現行的第八識接受一期生命，名為執取。所以世親（Vasubandhu）《攝論》第一說：『由阿賴耶識中一期自體熏習的緣故，那個自體生起，所以說名為彼生。接受彼生，所以名為取彼生。』三、云取謂能取。由現在第八識執取當來
【English Translation】 English version: From this, those arise. This refers to parikalpita (imagination, conceptualization). That refers to the gatis (destinations, realms of rebirth). From what is imagined, the names of the gatis are obtained.
Commentary: The reason why the four purities become the parinispanna (perfected nature) is as explained in the Fa Yuan Jue Shi.
Commentary: It is not only the ālaya (storehouse) that explains the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), etc. It is precisely the ādāna (grasping) that clarifies the ālayavijñāna. If the ālaya is taken as the ālayavijñāna, then the eighth bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva) also has the meaning of ālaya. How can it be said to abandon the name of ālayavijñāna? It is said to abandon the eighth bhumi, etc., all unobstructed. The Tathagata (Thus Come One, Buddha) also has the meaning of ālaya.
Commentary: Or as the basis of seeds, until it is named grasping. Question: What is the difference between this and the previous? Answer: The middle is the same as the previous. The beginning and the end are different. It can be understood through reflection.
Treatise: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經) etc. Question: This sutra has a total of four translations up to now. The version translated during the Wei dynasty is named 'Continuation of Liberation' (相續解脫). The two versions from the Liang and Sui dynasties are named 'Sutra of Unraveling Knots' (解節經). The current version translated during the Tang dynasty is named 'Saṃdhinirmocana Sutra' (解深密經). Why are they different? Answer: The Sanskrit name of this sutra is Saṃdhinirmocana (珊地涅暮折那). Nirmocana (涅暮折那) is translated as 'unraveling'. The sound of Saṃdhi (珊地) contains three meanings: 1. the continuation of things; 2. the connection of joints; 3. the meaning of profound secrecy. The local customs of the West call all three of these Saṃdhi (珊地). It is also like the sound of Saddharma (薩達摩) which contains two meanings. The term Saindhava (仙陀婆) can explain four names. The translators of different times each took one meaning to establish the title of the sutra, and they do not contradict each other. However, according to the meaning of the sutra, the name 'Saṃdhinirmocana' is superior in terms of reason.
Treatise: Also able to grasp the continuation of rebirth. Question: How does it grasp? When does rebirth occur? What is the meaning of rebirth? Answer: Grasping has three meanings: 1. 'Grasping' means the cause. That is, the cause of the five skandhas (五蘊, aggregates) of the future fruit. Because the current eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) holds the cause of the future fruit, there is the continuation of the future fruit of rebirth. Therefore, the eighth consciousness is said to be grasping. The continuation of rebirth is the grasping of grasping, called grasping. 2. 'Because of the seeds.' The current eighth consciousness receiving a lifetime is called grasping. Therefore, Vasubandhu's (世親) 'Treatise on the Compendium of Abhidharma' (攝論) says: 'Because of the perfuming of a lifetime's self-nature in the ālayavijñāna, that self arises, so it is said to be born. Because of receiving that birth, it is called grasping that birth.' 3. 'Grasping' means able to grasp. Because the current eighth consciousness grasps the future
生因果等種故。故有結生當相續義。執即是取名為執取。故攝論云。又于相續正結生時取彼生故執受自體。是故此識名阿陀那 世親所釋如第二引。經是一文義意通二。第二三釋俱以為證。證意可悉 言結生時而有四釋。一云結生是潤生也。若生無色命終之位名為結生。若生欲．色中有末心名為結生。故攝論云。依中有位起染意識結生相續。又云。中有沒心名結生心 二云正受生時名為結生。故瑜伽第一云。於此時中說識已住結生相續即此名為羯邏藍位 三云合前二義名結生也。𨷂一不可 四即命終心及中有末心俱名結生。皆能潤故。中有之心如攝論說。又瑜伽論六十六云。若結生相續無間之心亦是異熟 釋曰。結生心者即中有心。無間心者即是生有。生有之心唯是異熟 命終心者。對法第五。謂從欲界沒還生欲界者。即以欲界自體愛相應命終心結生相續。余界準知 問準瑜伽論六十六臨命終時最後念心是異熟法。云何對法雲愛相應 答既言最後是異熟法。不障初中而得愛俱。二論意別故不相違。又起愛故而能結生。命終．中有皆能起愛。故取二位亦無失矣 雖有四釋初．后為勝。中二違理。染意結生。正受生時羯邏藍位無染意故。瑜伽第一依已結生故作是說。非正結生故無失也。即瑜伽論五十九云。又將受生時于自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『生因果等種故』，因此有『結生』（連線生命）的說法，表示相續的意義。『執』就是『取』，名為『執取』。所以《攝大乘論》說：『又在相續中，于正結生時，取彼生故，執受自體。』因此這個識名為『阿陀那』（執持識）。世親菩薩的解釋如同前面第二處引用的經文。經文的一句話包含了兩種意思。第二種和第三種解釋都可以作為證明，證明的含義可以理解。 關於『結生時』，有四種解釋。第一種說法是，『結生』就是『潤生』。如果眾生在無色界死亡，其死亡的時刻稱為『結生』。如果眾生在欲界或色界死亡，其中有身的最後時刻稱為『結生』。所以《攝大乘論》說：『依中有位，起染污意識，結生相續。』又說：『中有沒心名結生心』。 第二種說法是，正要受生的時候稱為『結生』。所以《瑜伽師地論》第一卷說：『於此時中，說識已住，結生相續，即此名為羯邏藍位（受精卵）。』 第三種說法是，將前兩種含義合併起來稱為『結生』，但這種說法不太可取。 第四種說法是，臨終的心和中有身的最後時刻的心都可以稱為『結生』，因為它們都能夠潤生。關於中有身的心，《攝大乘論》中有說明。另外，《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：『若結生相續無間之心，亦是異熟（果報）。』解釋說：『結生心』就是『中有心』，『無間心』就是『生有』（出生時的心）。『生有』的心只是異熟果報。 關於臨終的心，《對法論》第五卷說：『如果從欲界死亡又回到欲界投生，那麼就以與欲界自體愛相應的臨終心來結生相續。』其他各界可以類推。 問：按照《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷的說法，臨命終時的最後一念心是異熟法，為什麼《對法論》卻說是與愛相應的？ 答：既然說是最後是異熟法，就不妨礙在最初和中間有愛相伴。兩種論典的側重點不同，所以沒有矛盾。而且因為生起愛才能結生，臨終和中有都能生起愛，所以取這兩個階段也沒有問題。 雖然有四種解釋，但第一種和最後一種更好。中間兩種不合道理，因為染污的意識才能結生，而正要受生的時候，羯邏藍位沒有染污的意識。另外，《瑜伽師地論》第一卷是依據已經結生的狀態而說的，不是指正要結生的時候，所以沒有問題。也就是《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷所說：『又將受生時，于自』
【English Translation】 English version 'Because of the causes and conditions of birth, etc.,' hence there is the term 'rebirth-linking' (結生, jie sheng), which signifies the continuation of existence. 'Grasping' (執, zhi) is the same as 'taking' (取, qu), and is called 'grasping' (執取, zhi qu). Therefore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) says: 'Moreover, in the continuum, at the moment of proper rebirth-linking, because it grasps that birth, it grasps the self-nature.' Therefore, this consciousness is called 'Ādāna' (阿陀那, a tuo na) [consciousness, the storehouse consciousness]. Vasubandhu's (世親, Shi Qin) explanation is as quoted in the second reference above. One sentence in the scripture conveys two meanings. The second and third explanations can both serve as proof, and the meaning of the proof can be understood. Regarding the 'time of rebirth-linking,' there are four explanations. The first explanation is that 'rebirth-linking' is the same as 'moistening birth' (潤生, run sheng). If a being dies in the Formless Realm, the moment of death is called 'rebirth-linking.' If a being dies in the Desire Realm or Form Realm, the final moment of the intermediate state (中有, zhong you) is called 'rebirth-linking.' Therefore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Relying on the intermediate state, defiled consciousness arises, linking rebirth in a continuum.' It also says: 'The mind ceasing in the intermediate state is called the rebirth-linking mind.' The second explanation is that the moment of properly receiving birth is called 'rebirth-linking.' Therefore, the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) says: 'At this time, it is said that consciousness has already abided, linking rebirth in a continuum, and this is called the kalala (羯邏藍, jie luo lan) state [embryo].' The third explanation is that combining the previous two meanings is called 'rebirth-linking,' but this explanation is not preferable. The fourth explanation is that both the mind at the moment of death and the final moment of the intermediate state can be called 'rebirth-linking,' because they are both capable of moistening birth. Regarding the mind of the intermediate state, there is an explanation in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Furthermore, the sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If the mind that links rebirth in a continuous stream is without interruption, it is also vipāka (異熟, yi shu) [result].' The explanation says: 'The rebirth-linking mind' is the 'intermediate state mind,' and 'the uninterrupted mind' is the 'birth-becoming' (生有, sheng you) [mind at the moment of birth]. The 'birth-becoming' mind is only vipāka. Regarding the mind at the moment of death, the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa (對法論) says: 'If one dies in the Desire Realm and is reborn in the Desire Realm, then the rebirth-linking is linked with the mind at the moment of death that is associated with self-love of the Desire Realm.' The other realms can be inferred accordingly. Question: According to the sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the last thought at the moment of death is a vipāka dharma, so why does the Abhidharmakośa say that it is associated with love? Answer: Since it is said that the last is a vipāka dharma, it does not prevent love from being present in the beginning and middle. The two treatises have different focuses, so there is no contradiction. Moreover, because love arises, rebirth-linking can occur. Both death and the intermediate state can give rise to love, so taking these two stages is also not a mistake. Although there are four explanations, the first and last are better. The middle two are unreasonable, because defiled consciousness can link rebirth, but at the moment of properly receiving birth, the kalala state does not have defiled consciousness. Furthermore, the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra speaks based on the state of already being reborn, not referring to the moment of properly linking rebirth, so there is no problem. That is, as the fifty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Moreover, when about to receive birth, in one's own'
體上貪愛現行。于男．于女若愛．若恚亦在現行。由此因緣當知一切煩惱皆得結生相續 言將受生及起愛等。明非生有為結生位 結生等義者以因取果。如花結實。故名結生。故無性攝論第三云。攝受生故名為結生 后報續前今生不斷。如子嗣父。故名相續。即彼論云。連持生故名為相續。
論。此等無量大乘經等者。等余經中賴耶異名。如顯揚論而引經云。云何知有此識。如薄伽梵說。無明所覆愛結所繫愚夫感得有識之身。此言意顯。有異熟阿賴耶識 釋曰。經既說云發業．潤生二種煩惱而感得識。明所感識定唯賴耶真異熟故 又云。又說如五種子。此則名為有取之識。此言顯有一切種子阿賴耶識 釋曰。按涅槃經有五種子。一者根子。二者莖子。三者種子。四者節子。五者子子。以外五法比于內種故云如也。內五種者謂識．名色．六處．觸．受。又五道種。此種皆依阿賴耶為取等潤能有當果。所以故云有取之識。
疏。前四因為宗者。問順無我等既有八句而為八宗。竟有何過合為四耶 答無我．我等相待而立。故合為四 詳曰。理實無我．我等義別。句句為宗亦應無爽。為宗既八。作因亦爾。宗．因皆有二三合等。其比量數為宗別總有三十六。為因別總有四十五。合計總有八十一量。若約超間超一二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在身體上貪愛的情緒會顯現出來。對於男人和女人，愛慕和憎恨的情緒也會顯現出來。由於這些原因，應當明白一切煩惱都能導致結生相續（klesha hetu sambhava，煩惱導致生命延續）。 『將受生』和『起愛』等說法，表明並非是有生之位（bhava，存在），而是結生位（pratisandhi，投生）。結生等含義是指以因取果，就像花結成果實，所以稱為結生。因此，《無性攝論》（Asanga's Compendium of Determinations）第三卷說：『攝受生故名為結生』（receiving birth is called pratisandhi）。 后報（vipaka，果報）延續前生，今生不斷，就像兒子繼承父親，所以稱為相續。該論又說：『連持生故名為相續』（connecting births is called sambhava）。
論：此等無量大乘經等（Mahayana sutras，大乘經典）指的是，在其他經典中，阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識）有不同的名稱。例如，《顯揚論》（Asanga's Exposition of the Scripture）引用經文說：『云何知有此識？如薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）說，無明（avidya，無明）所覆，愛結（trsna bandhana，愛結）所繫，愚夫感得有識之身。』這句話的意思是說，存在異熟阿賴耶識（vipaka Alaya-vijnana，異熟藏識）。 釋：經文既然說由發業（karma，業）和潤生（bhava，有）兩種煩惱而感得識，說明所感得的識必定只是阿賴耶識這種真實的異熟果報。 又說：『又說如五種子。此則名為有取之識。』這句話表明存在一切種子阿賴耶識（sarva bijaka Alaya-vijnana，一切種子藏識）。 釋：按照《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）的說法，有五種子：一者根子，二者莖子，三者種子，四者節子，五者子子。用外在的五法比喻內在的種子，所以說『如』。內在的五種是指識、名色（nama-rupa，名色）、六處（ayatana，六處）、觸（sparsha，觸）、受（vedana，受）。還有五道種。這些種子都依賴阿賴耶識作為取等潤生的條件，才能產生未來的果報，所以說『有取之識』。
疏：前四因為宗指的是，如果順無我等已經有八句而成為八宗，那麼合併爲四有什麼過失呢？ 答：無我（anatman，無我）、我（atman，我）等是相對而立的，所以合併爲四。 詳：實際上，無我、我等的含義是不同的，句句為宗也應該沒有問題。既然宗有八種，那麼因（hetu，因）也是如此。宗和因都有二三合等情況。其比量的數量，宗分別共有三十六種，因為分別共有四十五種，合計共有八十一種量。如果按照超間超一二（術語，含義待考）……
【English Translation】 English version: Attachment manifests in the body. For men and women, feelings of love and hatred also manifest. Due to these causes, it should be understood that all afflictions can lead to klesha hetu sambhava (the continuation of rebirth due to afflictions). The phrases 'about to be born' and 'arising of love' indicate that it is not the bhava (existence), but the pratisandhi (rebirth). The meaning of pratisandhi and so on refers to taking the result from the cause, just as a flower bears fruit, so it is called pratisandhi. Therefore, the third volume of Asanga's Compendium of Determinations says: 'Receiving birth is called pratisandhi'. The vipaka (karmic result) continues from the previous life, without interruption in this life, just as a son inherits from his father, so it is called sambhava. That treatise also says: 'Connecting births is called sambhava'.
Treatise: These immeasurable Mahayana sutras (Mahayana sutras) refer to the fact that the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness) has different names in other scriptures. For example, Asanga's Exposition of the Scripture quotes a sutra saying: 'How do we know there is this consciousness? As the Bhagavan (World Honored One) said, covered by avidya (ignorance), bound by trsna bandhana (the bond of craving), foolish beings experience a body with consciousness.' This sentence means to show that there is a vipaka Alaya-vijnana (resultant store consciousness). Explanation: Since the sutra says that the two kinds of afflictions, karma (action) and bhava (existence), cause the consciousness to be experienced, it is clear that the consciousness experienced must only be the Alaya-vijnana, the true resultant fruit. It also says: 'It also speaks of the five seeds. This is called the consciousness that takes hold.' This sentence shows that there is a sarva bijaka Alaya-vijnana (all-seeds store consciousness). Explanation: According to the Nirvana Sutra, there are five seeds: first, root seed; second, stem seed; third, seed; fourth, node seed; fifth, seed of seed. The external five dharmas are compared to the internal seeds, so it is said 'like'. The internal five are vijnana (consciousness), nama-rupa (name and form), ayatana (six sense bases), sparsha (contact), and vedana (feeling). There are also the five paths of seeds. These seeds all rely on the Alaya-vijnana as the condition for taking hold and nourishing, so that future results can be produced, so it is called 'consciousness that takes hold'.
Commentary: 'The former four reasons are the thesis' refers to the question of if following non-self etc. already has eight sentences and becomes eight theses, then what is the fault of combining them into four? Answer: Anatman (non-self), atman (self), etc. are established in relation to each other, so they are combined into four. Detailed: In reality, the meanings of non-self, self, etc. are different, and each sentence as a thesis should also be without problem. Since there are eight theses, so are the hetu (reasons). The theses and reasons both have two or three combinations, etc. The number of inferences, the theses separately have a total of thirty-six kinds, and the reasons separately have a total of forty-five kinds, totaling eighty-one inferences. If according to super-interval super one two (terminology, meaning to be examined)...
等為量乃多。義準可知。恐繁不具。
疏。且發智論至非如憎一等者。然非佛語而有多義。一外道等教名非佛語。內教三藏併名佛語。大小乘論雖非佛說。后諸聖等集佛言成得名佛語。二佛親說者名為佛語。大小乘論雖集佛言非佛所說。皆非佛語 若準前義。佛說為宗。大小乘論皆為異品。因於彼轉故成不定。若言佛語即是佛說無不定者。理亦不然。非大小論皆是如來在世親談親自印證。縱集如來昔日少言然今懸論。非佛親談名非佛說。終成異品何非不定 又縱立者許皆佛語。小乘敵者如發智等一分不許。此亦於他異喻因轉何無過耶。依后義因於異品一分轉也。以發智論婆沙二說。一云發智而是佛語。一云不是。是迦他延尼子所造。對於前師因於彼轉故亦不定。疏依后義 問小乘有言大乘經者懷正法者之所說故。對此即是非佛語攝。因言不攝豈非隨一 答言兩極成意簡隨一。敵雖說大非佛語收。立者不許故不得言兩俱極成非佛語攝。敵者亦許兩俱極成非佛語中不攝大乘。彼既許之何成隨一可熟思之 問夫言兩俱對立．敵說。外道非敵云何得言外道大乘名兩俱耶 答外道等言等小乘也。雖舉外道。意取所等一分小乘名兩俱也。以彼外道是立論余。乘便云矣。
疏。因犯兩俱不成等者。因．宗皆犯一分過也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：數量之多就像這樣。意義根據準則可以推知，恐怕過於繁瑣，所以不全部列舉。
疏：且如《發智論》中『不像憎恨一樣』等例子。然而，不是佛說的話卻有很多意義。第一種，外道等的教義被稱為非佛語，內教的三藏都稱為佛語。大小乘的論著雖然不是佛親口所說，但後來的聖者等集結佛的言語而成，也可以稱為佛語。第二種，佛親自說的話稱為佛語，大小乘的論著雖然集結了佛的言語，但不是佛親自所說，都屬於非佛語。如果按照前面的意義，以佛說為根本，大小乘的論著都屬於不同的類別，因為因於它們而轉變，所以成為不定。如果說佛語就是佛所說，就沒有不定之處，這個道理也不成立。不是大小乘的論著都是如來在世時親自宣講、親自印證的。即使集結了如來昔日少許的言語，但現在懸空討論，不是佛親自宣講，就不能稱為佛說，最終還是屬於不同的類別，為什麼不是不定呢？又，即使立論者承認都是佛語，小乘的敵論者如《發智論》等一部分不承認，這也在他者的異喻因上轉變，為什麼沒有過失呢？依據後面的意義，因於異品的一部分而轉變。因為《發智論》和《婆沙論》有兩種說法，一種說《發智論》是佛語，一種說不是，是迦旃延尼子所造。對於前一位師父，因於他而轉變，所以也是不定。疏文依據的是後面的意義。
問：小乘有人說大乘經典是懷有正法的人所說的，對此來說，就屬於非佛語所包含的，因的言語不包含，難道不是隨一嗎？答：說是『兩極成意』是爲了簡別『隨一』。敵論者雖然說大乘是非佛語所收攝，但立論者不承認，所以不能說是兩方都完全承認非佛語包含大乘。敵論者也承認兩方都完全承認非佛語中不包含大乘，他們既然承認這一點，怎麼能成為隨一呢？應該仔細思考。問：所說的『兩方都對立』，是立論者和敵論者說的，外道不是敵論者，怎麼能說外道和大乘是兩方呢？答：外道等，『等』的是小乘。雖然舉了外道，但意思是取所『等』的一部分小乘，稱為兩方。因為外道是立論的剩餘，順便這樣說了。
疏：因犯『兩俱不成』等，是指因和宗都犯了一部分過失。
【English Translation】 English version: Such is the extent of the quantity. The meaning can be inferred according to the principles; fearing it would be too verbose, it is not fully listed.
Commentary: For example, in the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Knowledge) there are examples such as 'not like hatred'. However, what is not spoken by the Buddha has many meanings. Firstly, the teachings of external paths (外道, wàidào, non-Buddhist schools) are called non-Buddha-words, while the Tripiṭaka (三藏, sānzàng, the three collections of Buddhist texts) of the internal teachings are all called Buddha-words. Although the treatises of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are not spoken by the Buddha himself, they can be called Buddha-words because later sages and others compiled them from the Buddha's words. Secondly, what the Buddha personally spoke is called Buddha-words. Although the treatises of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are compiled from the Buddha's words, they are not spoken by the Buddha himself, and thus belong to non-Buddha-words. If according to the previous meaning, taking the Buddha's words as the foundation, the treatises of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna all belong to different categories, and because they change based on them, they become uncertain. If it is said that Buddha-words are what the Buddha spoke, then there is no uncertainty, but this reasoning is not valid. Not all treatises of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna were personally preached and certified by the Tathāgata (如來, rúlái, 'Thus Gone One', an epithet of the Buddha) during his lifetime. Even if they compile a few words from the Tathāgata's past, but now discuss them in the abstract, they are not personally preached by the Buddha and cannot be called Buddha-words, and ultimately still belong to different categories, so why are they not uncertain? Furthermore, even if the proponent admits that they are all Buddha-words, the opponents of the Hīnayāna, such as those of the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra, do not admit a portion of them. This also changes based on the other's dissimilar example, so why is there no fault? According to the later meaning, it changes based on a portion of the dissimilar category. Because the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra and the Vibhāṣā (婆沙, póshā, commentary) have two views, one saying that the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra is Buddha-words, and one saying that it is not, but was created by Kātyāyanīputra (迦旃延尼子, jiāzhānyánnízǐ, a disciple of the Buddha). Regarding the former teacher, it changes based on him, so it is also uncertain. The commentary is based on the later meaning.
Question: Some in the Hīnayāna say that the Mahāyāna sutras are spoken by those who cherish the true Dharma, so in this regard, they belong to what is included in non-Buddha-words. Does the statement of the cause not including them not constitute 'following one'? Answer: Saying 'both extremes are established' is to distinguish 'following one'. Although the opponent says that the Mahāyāna is included in non-Buddha-words, the proponent does not admit it, so it cannot be said that both sides completely admit that non-Buddha-words include the Mahāyāna. The opponent also admits that both sides completely admit that non-Buddha-words do not include the Mahāyāna. Since they admit this point, how can it become 'following one'? This should be carefully considered. Question: The so-called 'both sides are opposed' refers to the proponent and the opponent. The external paths are not opponents, so how can it be said that the external paths and the Mahāyāna are both sides? Answer: 'External paths, etc.' 'etc.' refers to the Hīnayāna. Although the external paths are mentioned, the intention is to take a portion of the Hīnayāna that is 'equaled', and call them both sides. Because the external paths are a remainder of the proposition, it is said in passing.
Commentary: The cause commits 'both are not established', etc., means that both the cause and the thesis commit the fault of being partially unestablished.
因中亦犯兩俱一分所依不成。因不遍彼宗中發智。兩俱名同。故疏不開 問所依不成有法必無。發智既有。何成此過 答發智一分不許大乘是佛說也。何有所依。故成一分所依不成。或但兩俱無所依失。理如前辨。
疏。一一念蘊謂剎那生滅法者。問夫有為法皆剎那滅。即后二蘊何須別立 答有二釋 一云雖后二蘊實剎那滅。初據攢克。后依相續。約義分之故有三蘊 二云方便所起善惡色心由三性間故名一念 詳曰初釋為勝。豈三性間但一念耶。
疏。二一期生蘊等者。但據異熟一期分限相續說也。或同正量長時四相。如命根等。初生名生。終歿名滅。中間更無生滅相也。
疏。三窮生死蘊等者。至金剛定斷煩惱盡生死永息名窮生死 問何故梁論云至無餘名窮生死 答惑盡理證皆窮生死。二論互言。故無失矣 或生死因果皆名生死。金剛因窮無餘果盡。斯亦二論綺互平言也。
論。謂阿賴耶是貪總別等者。二攝論釋具如疏引。又按大般若經四十七說愛．樂等法。彼經雖復不言賴耶。取彼釋其愛．樂等名。而解於此愛賴耶等亦應無失。故彼經云。言愛法者謂於此法起欲希求。言樂法者。謂於此法稱讚功德。言欣法者。謂於此法歡喜信受。言喜法者。謂於此法冀多修習。又按瑜伽九十二云。於三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『因中亦犯兩俱一分所依不成』。因為不普遍，在對方宗派中，《發智論》（Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra）中存在這種情況。『兩俱』是指名稱相同，所以註釋中沒有展開說明。問：『所依不成』意味著作為依據的事物必然不存在，《發智論》既然存在，怎麼會構成這種過失？答：因為《發智論》的一部分不承認大乘是佛所說，所以沒有所依據的事物，因此構成『一分所依不成』的過失。或者只是『兩俱』都失去所依據的事物，道理和前面辨析的一樣。
註釋：『一一念蘊謂剎那生滅法者』。問：如果一切有為法都是剎那生滅的，那麼後面的兩個蘊（受蘊、想蘊）為什麼還要單獨設立？答：有兩種解釋：第一種說法是，雖然後面的兩個蘊實際上也是剎那生滅的，但最初是根據聚集和剋制來劃分，後面是依據相續來劃分，根據意義來區分，所以有三個蘊。第二種說法是，方便所產生的善惡色心，由於處於三性（善、惡、無記）之間，所以稱為『一念』。詳細地說，第一種解釋更好。難道三性之間只有一念嗎？
註釋：『二一期生蘊等者』。只是根據異熟果報的一個生命週期的界限相續來說的。或者像正量部的長時四相一樣，如命根等。最初產生稱為『生』，最終死亡稱為『滅』，中間再沒有生滅的相狀。
註釋：『三窮生死蘊等者』。直到金剛定斷盡煩惱，生死永遠止息，稱為『窮生死』。問：為什麼梁朝的《攝大乘論釋》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya）說，達到無餘涅槃才稱為『窮生死』？答：惑盡和理證都可以稱為『窮生死』，兩部論著互相補充，所以沒有錯誤。或者生死因果都可以稱為生死，金剛定使因窮盡，無餘涅槃使果報窮盡，這也是兩部論著互相補充的說法。
論：『謂阿賴耶是貪總別等者』。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的兩種解釋都像註釋所引用的那樣。又根據《大般若經》（Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra）第四十七卷所說的愛、樂等法，這部經雖然沒有提到阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna），但可以取用它來解釋愛、樂等名稱，用來解釋這裡的愛阿賴耶等也應該沒有錯誤。所以這部經說：『所說的愛法，是指對於此法產生慾望和希求。所說的樂法，是指對於此法稱讚功德。所說的欣法，是指對於此法歡喜信受。所說的喜法，是指對於此法希望多多修習。』又根據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第九十二卷所說，對於三
【English Translation】 English version: 'In the cause, there is also the fault of 'both, one part, the basis, not established'.' Because it is not universal, in the opponent's school, this situation exists in the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (Treatise on the Foundation of Knowledge). 'Both' refers to the same name, so the commentary does not elaborate. Question: 'The basis not established' means that the thing being relied upon must not exist. Since the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra exists, how can this fault be constituted? Answer: Because a part of the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra does not acknowledge that Mahayana is spoken by the Buddha, there is no thing being relied upon, therefore constituting the fault of 'one part, the basis, not established'. Or it is simply that 'both' lose the thing being relied upon, the reasoning is the same as the previous analysis.
Commentary: ''Each thought-moment aggregate refers to the dharma of momentary arising and ceasing'.' Question: If all conditioned dharmas are of momentary arising and ceasing, then why are the latter two aggregates (feeling and perception) established separately? Answer: There are two explanations: The first explanation is that although the latter two aggregates are actually of momentary arising and ceasing, initially they are divided according to accumulation and restraint, and later they are divided according to continuity. They are divided according to meaning, so there are three aggregates. The second explanation is that the wholesome and unwholesome form and mind arising from skillful means are called 'one thought-moment' because they are between the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). In detail, the first explanation is better. Is there only one thought-moment between the three natures?
Commentary: ''The second, the aggregates of one lifetime, etc.' It is only spoken of according to the limits of the continuity of one lifetime of maturation. Or like the long-time four characteristics of the Vaibhāṣika school, such as the life-force, etc. The initial arising is called 'birth', the final death is called 'cessation', and there are no more characteristics of arising and ceasing in between.
Commentary: ''The third, the aggregates exhausting birth and death, etc.' Until the Vajra Samadhi (diamond concentration) cuts off all afflictions, and birth and death are forever extinguished, it is called 'exhausting birth and death'. Question: Why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya (Commentary on the Summary of the Great Vehicle) of the Liang Dynasty say that reaching Nirvāṇa without remainder is called 'exhausting birth and death'? Answer: Exhaustion of afflictions and realization of truth can both be called 'exhausting birth and death'. The two treatises complement each other, so there is no error. Or the cause and effect of birth and death can both be called birth and death. The Vajra Samadhi exhausts the cause, and Nirvāṇa without remainder exhausts the effect. This is also a complementary statement between the two treatises.
Treatise: ''That the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is the general and specific of greed, etc.' The two explanations of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Summary of the Great Vehicle) are as cited in the commentary. Also, according to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), volume 47, which speaks of love, joy, etc., although this sutra does not mention the Ālaya-vijñāna, it can be used to explain the names of love, joy, etc., and it should be without error to use it to explain love-Ālaya, etc. here. Therefore, this sutra says: 'What is called the dharma of love refers to generating desire and seeking for this dharma. What is called the dharma of joy refers to praising the merits of this dharma. What is called the dharma of delight refers to joyfully believing and accepting this dharma. What is called the dharma of happiness refers to hoping to cultivate this dharma more.' Also, according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume 92, regarding the three
世境生愛．樂等。亦可以彼連類釋。此故彼論云。謂於人天住境界愛依現在世故。住境界樂依過去世故。住境界欣于現在世依過去境生愛樂故。住境界喜于未來世依現在境生愛樂故。若於如是三世境中住染污者。當知彼為稱讚所欲有遺乏苦。依彼瑜伽釋愛．樂等釋四賴耶亦有一家之行相也。兼正合言總成四釋 問言賴耶者執藏之義。為第七執稱為賴耶。二攝論中約三世解。即唯第六。一何乖返 答有義三釋 一云阿賴耶名唯依第七我愛以得。彼論唯依第六釋者對他宗故 二云通六．七識我愛得名。我愛執藏無簡別故。設有處說但依第七。應知彼依相續顯說。第四地中不捨其名。要至八地方說舍者。依其究竟盡處說故。然彼二論依對他釋 三云得名如前第二師說。二論之中通依六．七。且無性釋愛阿賴耶不約三世。由總說故即通第七。世親后釋釋其愛名亦通第七。緣現藏識愛為我故。于理無違。
論。謂生一向若愛處等者。問若有宗云。言愛著者據善趣說。而云苦受不愛著者乃有相扶。答彼經中雲。世間眾生愛賴耶等。豈彼苦處非世間耶。既是世間。云何無有所著之法。故苦之處即我賴耶為真著處。
疏。攝論不言除等者。以彼有宗說諸聖者皆無我見不但無學。為對彼宗故不別除無學人也。即無性論第三云
【現代漢語翻譯】 世間境界產生愛和樂等情緒，也可以用類似的方法來解釋。因此，相關論著中說：對於人天所居住的境界，產生愛是由於現在世的緣故；產生樂是由於過去世的緣故；產生欣喜是由於現在世，但依賴過去世的境界而產生愛和樂的緣故；產生喜悅是由於未來世，但依賴現在世的境界而產生愛和樂的緣故。如果對於這三世的境界心懷染污，應當知道他們是爲了稱讚所希望擁有的事物而遺留下匱乏的痛苦。依據《瑜伽師地論》解釋愛和樂等，解釋四種賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）也有一種類似的行相。將這些解釋綜合起來，總共形成了四種解釋。 有人問：『賴耶』（Ālaya，藏識）的意思是執藏，那麼是第七識的執取才被稱為賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）嗎？《攝大乘論》中從三世的角度解釋，認為只有第六識才是賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）。這兩種說法有什麼矛盾嗎？ 回答說：有三種解釋：第一種解釋認為，阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）這個名稱僅僅是依據第七識的我愛而得來的。《攝大乘論》中僅僅依據第六識來解釋，是爲了駁斥其他宗派的觀點。第二種解釋認為，第六識和第七識都可以通過我愛而得名，因為我愛執藏沒有簡別。即使有些地方說僅僅依據第七識，也應該知道那是依據相續來顯說的。在第四地中沒有捨棄這個名稱，要到第八地才說捨棄，這是依據其究竟的盡頭來說的。然而，這兩部論著都是依據駁斥其他宗派的觀點來解釋的。第三種解釋認為，得名的方式如前面第二位法師所說。這兩部論著都依據第六識和第七識。而且，無性（Asaṅga）解釋愛阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）時不從三世的角度解釋，因為是總的說明，所以也包括第七識。世親（Vasubandhu）後來的解釋，解釋其愛的名稱也包括第七識，因為緣于現藏識愛為我，在道理上沒有違背。 論中說：『所謂產生一向的愛處等』。有人問：如果有的宗派說，說愛著者是根據善趣來說的，而說苦受不愛著者，這樣才能互相扶持。回答說：那部經中說：『世間眾生愛賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）等』。難道那些痛苦的地方不是世間嗎？既然是世間，怎麼會沒有所執著的法呢？所以痛苦的地方就是我賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）的真實執著之處。 疏文中說，《攝大乘論》沒有說『除』等字，是因為有的宗派認為，所有的聖者都沒有我見，不僅僅是無學。爲了駁斥那個宗派，所以沒有特別排除無學之人。就像無性（Asaṅga）的論著第三卷中說的那樣。
【English Translation】 The world's circumstances give rise to emotions such as love and joy, which can also be explained in a similar manner. Therefore, related treatises state: Regarding the realms where humans and gods reside, love arises due to the present life; joy arises due to the past life; delight arises in the present life but depends on the realms of the past life to generate love and joy; happiness arises in the future life but depends on the realms of the present life to generate love and joy. If one harbors defilements towards these realms of the three times, know that they are leaving behind the suffering of deficiency in order to praise what they desire to possess. Explaining love and joy based on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), there is also a similar aspect in explaining the four Ālayas (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness). Combining these explanations comprehensively forms four interpretations. Someone asks: 'Ālaya' (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness) means to grasp and store. Is it the grasping of the seventh consciousness that is called Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness)? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) explains it from the perspective of the three times, considering only the sixth consciousness as Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness). Are these two statements contradictory?' The answer is: There are three explanations: The first explanation is that the name Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness) is derived solely from the seventh consciousness's love of self. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) explains it solely based on the sixth consciousness to refute the views of other schools. The second explanation is that both the sixth and seventh consciousnesses can be named through love of self, as the grasping and storing of love of self does not differentiate. Even if some places say it is based solely on the seventh consciousness, it should be understood that it is explained based on continuity. The name is not abandoned in the fourth stage; it is said to be abandoned only in the eighth stage, which is based on its ultimate end. However, both of these treatises explain it based on refuting the views of other schools. The third explanation is that the way of obtaining the name is as the second Dharma master mentioned earlier. Both treatises rely on the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Moreover, Asaṅga (無性) does not explain love of Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness) from the perspective of the three times because it is a general explanation, so it also includes the seventh consciousness. Vasubandhu's (世親) later explanation, explaining the name of love, also includes the seventh consciousness because it is based on the present storehouse consciousness loving itself, which is not contrary to reason. The treatise states: 'So-called generating a one-sided place of love, etc.' Someone asks: If some schools say that speaking of those who love is based on the good realms, and speaking of those who do not love suffering is to support each other. The answer is: That sutra says: 'Sentient beings in the world love Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness), etc.' Are those places of suffering not the world? Since they are the world, how can there be no Dharma to be attached to? Therefore, the place of suffering is the true place of attachment for my Ālaya (Ālaya, 藏識, storehouse consciousness). The commentary states that the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) does not mention words like 'except' because some schools believe that all sages are without self-view, not just those who are beyond learning. To refute that school, those who are beyond learning are not specifically excluded. Just as Asaṅga's (無性) treatise states in the third volume.
。雖于正法信解無我厭逆我見。然彼恒于阿賴耶識我愛隨轉。
疏。識受想蘊全等者。行蘊之中不相應等非心所者。非所等故故云少分。問標言轉識明簡賴耶。云何得言識蘊全耶。若有賴耶識蘊。云何不是著處 答舉彼極成識蘊說也。
疏。已上總取蘊別中樂受身見三等者。總指前文。對彼攝論辨多少也。總別合言有三種也。即上論云。不應執餘五取蘊等名總取蘊。五欲以下於總蘊中。而別離出名別中也。
疏。下別遮五等者。明今識等所等心所與前樂受及身見等有寬狹也。思之可悉。
疏。然於此中總敘諸部等者。具如燈辨。故不重言。
疏。又心相續至流轉不息者。按對法論第二。又心相續長時間斷經久流轉不息。是故轉識能持種子不應道理。今疏中雲不應經文。剩不應字。文誤為文 或是疏主取彼論意。加彼不應經文之言。釋彼論文云。心相續是藏識。長時間斷即滅定等。經文流轉不息即種子也。又按瑜伽五十一云。又彼諸識長時間斷。不應相續長時流轉。
疏。攝論第二無性釋等者。按彼論云。又諸轉識定非所熏。以彼六識無定相應。何以故。以三差別互相違故。若六轉識定俱有者。不應所依．所緣．作意三種各別。以各別故六種轉識不定俱生。不俱生故無定相應。無
【現代漢語翻譯】 雖然對於正法已經信解，並且因為無我的道理而厭惡執著於我的見解（我見：認為存在真實不變的「我」的錯誤觀念）。然而，他們仍然總是隨著阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識：佛教唯識宗所說的第八識，是儲存一切種子的地方）的我愛（我愛：對自我的執著和愛戀）而流轉。
疏解：『識、受、想蘊完全相同』，指的是行蘊（行蘊：心理活動和行為的總稱）中不相應行等非心所法（非心所法：既不屬於心法，也不屬於色法的存在）的部分，因為不是完全相同，所以說是『少分』。問：標題說的是轉識（轉識：指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意這六種識），明明是爲了簡別于阿賴耶識，為什麼又說識蘊完全相同呢？如果說有阿賴耶識的識蘊，為什麼又不是執著之處呢？答：這裡是舉出他們（指其他學派）所極力主張的識蘊來說的。
疏解：『以上總括地取蘊、別中樂受、身見等三種』，總括地指代前面的文句。這是針對《攝大乘論》（《攝大乘論》：佛教唯識宗的重要論著）來辨別多少。總括和分別合起來說，有三種。也就是上面論中說的：『不應該執著其餘五取蘊等，稱作總取蘊。五欲（五欲：色、聲、香、味、觸五種感官慾望）以下，在總蘊中，而特別分離出來，稱作別中。』
疏解：『下面分別遮止五等』，說明現在的識等所相應的心所法（心所法：心理活動），與前面的樂受以及身見等，在範圍上有寬有窄。仔細思考就可以明白。
疏解：『然而在此中總括地敘述各部』，詳細情況如《燈》（指某種註釋或論著）中所辨析的。所以不再重複說明。
疏解：『又心相續到流轉不息』，按照《對法論》（《對法論》：佛教論書，全稱《阿毗達摩集論》）第二，『又心相續長時間間斷，經過長久時間流轉不息。』因此，轉識能夠執持種子是不合道理的。現在疏解中說『不應經文』，多了一個『不應』字。『文誤為文』，或者說是疏主採用了《對法論》的意義，加上了『不應經文』的說法，來解釋《對法論》的論文，說『心相續』是藏識（藏識：即阿賴耶識），『長時間間斷』就是滅盡定等（滅盡定：一種甚深的禪定狀態），『經文流轉不息』就是種子。又按照《瑜伽師地論》（《瑜伽師地論》：佛教瑜伽行派的根本論書）第五十一，『又那些識長時間間斷，不應該相續長時流轉。』
疏解：『《攝大乘論》第二無性釋等』，按照《攝大乘論》中說：『又各種轉識必定不是被熏習的，因為這六識沒有固定的相應。為什麼呢？因為三種差別互相違背的緣故。如果六轉識必定同時存在，就不應該在所依（所依：指識所依賴的根，如眼識所依的眼根）、所緣（所緣：指識所認識的對象，如眼識所緣的色）、作意（作意：心理活動中引起注意力的作用）這三種方面各有差別。因為各有差別，所以六種轉識不是固定同時產生的。不一起產生，就沒有固定的相應。沒有
【English Translation】 Although they have faith and understanding in the Correct Dharma and, due to the doctrine of no-self,厭惡 (yànwù: detest) the view of self (我見 wǒjiàn: the erroneous view of believing in a real and unchanging 'self'). Nevertheless, they constantly revolve along with the self-love (我愛 wǒài: attachment and love for oneself) of the Ālaya Consciousness (阿賴耶識 Ālāyéshì: the eighth consciousness in Buddhist Yogācāra, the storehouse of all seeds).
Commentary: 'The aggregates of consciousness, feeling, and perception are completely the same,' refers to the non-corresponding formations and other non-mental factors (非心所法 fēi xīn suǒ fǎ: entities that are neither mental nor material) within the aggregate of formations (行蘊 xíng yùn: the totality of mental activities and behaviors), because they are not completely the same, it is said to be 'a small part.' Question: The title speaks of the transforming consciousnesses (轉識 zhuǎnshì: the six consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), clearly to distinguish them from the Ālaya Consciousness, so how can it be said that the aggregate of consciousness is completely the same? If there is an aggregate of consciousness in the Ālaya Consciousness, why is it not a place of attachment? Answer: Here, it is referring to the aggregate of consciousness that they (referring to other schools) strongly advocate.
Commentary: 'Above, generally taking the aggregates, specifically the feeling of pleasure, the view of self, etc., as three types,' generally refers to the preceding text. This is to distinguish the quantity in relation to the Compendium on the Mahāyāna (《攝大乘論》 Shè Dàchéng Lùn: an important treatise of the Buddhist Yogācāra school). Combining the general and the specific, there are three types. That is, as the above treatise says: 'One should not cling to the remaining five aggregates of grasping, etc., as the general aggregates of grasping. The five desires (五欲 wǔyù: the five sensory desires of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) and below, within the general aggregates, are separately distinguished and called specific.'
Commentary: 'Below, separately refuting the five, etc.,' explains that the mental factors (心所法 xīn suǒ fǎ: mental activities) corresponding to the present consciousnesses, etc., have a wider or narrower scope than the preceding feeling of pleasure and the view of self, etc. Careful consideration will make it clear.
Commentary: 'However, here, generally narrating the various schools, etc.,' the details are as explained in the Lamp (referring to a certain commentary or treatise). Therefore, it will not be repeated.
Commentary: 'Moreover, the continuity of mind to the unceasing flow,' according to the second chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya (《對法論》 Duìfǎ Lùn: a Buddhist treatise, full name Abhidharma-samuccaya), 'Moreover, the continuity of mind is interrupted for a long time, and after a long time, it flows without ceasing.' Therefore, it is unreasonable for the transforming consciousnesses to hold the seeds. Now, the commentary says 'should not scripture,' there is an extra 'should not' character. 'Text mistaken for text,' or it can be said that the commentator adopted the meaning of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, adding the statement 'should not scripture' to explain the paper of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, saying 'the continuity of mind' is the storehouse consciousness (藏識 cángshì: i.e., the Ālaya Consciousness), 'interrupted for a long time' is the cessation attainment, etc. (滅盡定 mièjìndìng: a very deep state of meditative absorption), 'scripture flows without ceasing' is the seeds. Also, according to the fifty-first chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (《瑜伽師地論》 Yújiāshī Dìlùn: the fundamental treatise of the Buddhist Yogācāra school), 'Moreover, those consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time, and should not continuously flow for a long time.'
Commentary: 'The Compendium on the Mahāyāna, second chapter, Asanga's commentary, etc.,' according to the Compendium on the Mahāyāna, it says: 'Moreover, the various transforming consciousnesses are definitely not perfumed, because these six consciousnesses have no fixed correspondence. Why? Because the three differences contradict each other. If the six transforming consciousnesses definitely exist simultaneously, then there should not be differences in the support (所依 suǒyī: the base upon which consciousness relies, such as the eye-consciousness relying on the eye-organ), the object (所緣 suǒyuán: the object that consciousness cognizes, such as the eye-consciousness cognizing form), and the attention (作意 zuòyì: the mental function of directing attention). Because there are differences, the six transforming consciousnesses are not fixed to arise simultaneously. Not arising together, there is no fixed correspondence. No
相應故何有所熏．能熏之義。
疏。此中言至互相違故者。此中論言根．境．作意即是攝論以三差別互相違也。言異意同。疏中多言互相熏者。熏字恐錯。合為違字。
疏。攝論唯有此中一因者。此論因四。彼但有此根．境．作意類別因也 問按彼論意。以無相應而為因義。豈不相違 答無相應者是彼正因。根．境等別是成因因。當此正因據成因因亦無失矣。
疏前解至俱時受熏者。即前標云此破經部設許六俱至令不得互相熏總是前解。同攝論也。中間引彼攝論為證。難彼六識不互相熏。
疏。今解但遮六識體非受熏等者。即前說云或如他自身等已下是也。唯依此論不取攝論。故疏結云不同無性。
疏。不作此解自為不定等者。問八識三別。第八識體應非受熏。豈非過耶 答由有此失故疏下云。又六與八非一向異。意簡前失。若準此簡。亦乃遮彼互相熏量不定過也。由是兩釋理皆通矣。故疏不判二解優劣 問八識云何互相熏耶 答能所相藉名之為互。非是遍為能熏所熏名為互也。
論。善等類別易脫起故者。按瑜伽論五十一云。若無阿賴耶識有種子性不應道理。謂六識身展轉異故。所以者何。從善無間不善性生。不善無間復善性生。從二無間無記性生。劣界無間中界生。中界無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：相應之法憑藉什麼被熏習，才具有能熏習的意義呢？
疏：這裡所說的『互相違故』，是指本論所說的根、境、作意，與《攝大乘論》所說的三種差別互相違背。這是說兩者意思不同，但本質相同。疏中多次提到『互相熏』，『熏』字可能是錯字，應為『違』字。
疏：《攝大乘論》只有本論中的一種因。本論中有四種因，而《攝大乘論》只有根、境、作意這幾種類別因。問：按照《攝大乘論》的觀點，以無相應作為因的意義，豈不是與本論相違背？答：無相應是《攝大乘論》的正因，根、境等差別是成就因的因。當我們把正因建立在成就因的因的基礎上時，也就沒有過失了。
疏：前面解釋『俱時受熏』，就是前面所說的『此破經部設許六俱至令不得互相熏』，這都是前面的解釋，與《攝大乘論》相同。中間引用《攝大乘論》作為證據，是爲了駁斥六識不互相熏的觀點。
疏：現在的解釋只是遮止六識的體性不是受熏等等，就是前面所說的『或如他自身等』以下的內容。只依據本論，不採用《攝大乘論》的觀點，所以疏中總結說『不同無性』。
疏：如果不這樣解釋，就會出現自相矛盾等問題。問：八識有三種差別，第八識的體性應該不是受熏，這難道不是一種過失嗎？答：正因為有這種過失，所以疏中下面說：『又六與八非一向異』，意思是簡化前面的過失。如果按照這種簡化，也可以遮止互相熏的量不確定的過失。因此，這兩種解釋在道理上都是可以成立的，所以疏中沒有判斷哪種解釋更好。問：八識是如何互相熏習的呢？答：能熏和所熏互相依存，就叫做『互』，而不是普遍地作為能熏和所熏才叫做『互』。
論：善等類別容易脫離和生起，是因為按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說，如果沒有阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識），有種子性就不合道理。這是因為六識身（意識）會不斷變化。為什麼呢？因為從善念之後可能產生不善的念頭，從不善的念頭之後又可能產生善念，從善與不善之後可能產生無記（neither good nor bad）的念頭，從下等的境界之後可能產生中等的境界，從中等的境界之後
【English Translation】 English version: Accordingly, by what is it conditioned that it has the meaning of being able to condition?
Commentary: The 'mutually contradictory' mentioned here refers to the root, object, and attention mentioned in this treatise, which contradict the three differences mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). This means that the meanings are different, but the essence is the same. The commentary often mentions 'mutually conditioning,' but the word 'conditioning' might be a mistake and should be 'contradictory.'
Commentary: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only has one cause mentioned in this treatise. This treatise has four causes, while the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only has the causes of root, object, and attention. Question: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, isn't the meaning of taking non-correspondence as a cause contradictory to this treatise? Answer: Non-correspondence is the direct cause in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, while the differences in root, object, etc., are the causes of the cause of accomplishment. When we establish the direct cause on the basis of the cause of the cause of accomplishment, there is no fault.
Commentary: The previous explanation of 'simultaneous conditioning' is the same as the previous statement 'this refutes the Sautrāntika school's (a Buddhist school that emphasizes the importance of the sutras) assertion that the six consciousnesses cannot condition each other,' which is all the previous explanation and is the same as the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The citation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra in the middle is to refute the view that the six consciousnesses do not condition each other.
Commentary: The current explanation only prevents the nature of the six consciousnesses from being conditioned, etc., which is the content from 'or like his own self, etc.' below. It only relies on this treatise and does not adopt the viewpoint of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, so the commentary concludes 'different from Asanga (a major exponent of the Yogacara school of Buddhism)'.
Commentary: If this explanation is not made, there will be problems such as self-contradiction. Question: The eight consciousnesses have three differences. The nature of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) should not be conditioned. Isn't this a fault? Answer: Precisely because of this fault, the commentary below says: 'Also, the six and eight are not always different,' meaning to simplify the previous fault. If we simplify according to this, we can also prevent the fault of the uncertain amount of mutual conditioning. Therefore, both explanations are reasonable, so the commentary does not judge which explanation is better. Question: How do the eight consciousnesses condition each other? Answer: The conditioner and the conditioned rely on each other, which is called 'mutual,' rather than universally acting as the conditioner and the conditioned.
Treatise: The reason why good and other categories easily detach and arise is that, according to the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, if there is no Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), it would be unreasonable to have seed nature. This is because the six consciousness bodies (consciousness) are constantly changing. Why? Because from a good thought, an unwholesome thought may arise; from an unwholesome thought, a good thought may arise again; from good and unwholesome, a neutral (neither good nor bad) thought may arise; from an inferior realm, a middle realm may arise; from a middle realm
間妙界生。如是妙界無間乃至劣界生。有漏無間無漏生。無漏無間有漏生。世間無間出世間生。出世無間世間生。非如是相。有種子性應正道理 釋曰。三性．三界一一為首對餘二．二有無間義。論中宗法作不具也。思之可知 問有漏．世間。無漏．出世。竟有何別分為二對 答世間義寬。有漏義局。無漏后智聖教亦名為世間智。無漏亦寬。出世義狹。無漏通於本．后二智。出世多分但攝根本。寬狹既殊故分二對。
論。不堅住故者。問此不堅住與前間斷易𡙸等因而有何別 答不堅總望不相續義。間斷易𡙸偏約五位．三性等明。由對第八堅住之因故別明也。
論。色不相應至豈能持種者。若隨轉理許色持種。若真實理建賴耶已。即唯第八能持種也。故瑜伽論五十一云。云何因緣。謂諸色根根依及識。此二略說能持一切諸法種子。隨逐色根有諸色根種子．及余色法種子．一切心心法等種子。若隨逐識有一切識種子．及余無色法種子．諸色根種子．所餘色法種子。當知所餘色法自性。唯自種子之所隨逐。除大種色。由大種色二種種子所隨逐故。謂大種種子．及造色種子。即此所立隨逐差別種子相續。隨其所應望所說法是名因緣。若諸色根及自大種非心．心法種子隨者。入滅盡定。入無想定。生無想天。后時不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：間妙界（指色界、無色界中殊勝的境界）生。如是妙界無間乃至劣界（指欲界）生。有漏（指有煩惱的）無間無漏（指沒有煩惱的）生。無漏無間有漏生。世間（指凡俗的）無間出世間（指超凡脫俗的）生。出世無間世間生。非如是相。有種子性應正道理。釋曰：三性（指善、惡、無記三性）、三界（指欲界、色界、無色界）一一為首對餘二，二有無間義。論中宗法作不具也。思之可知。問：有漏、世間，無漏、出世，竟有何別分為二對？答：世間義寬，有漏義局。無漏后智聖教亦名為世間智。無漏亦寬，出世義狹。無漏通於本、后二智。出世多分但攝根本。寬狹既殊故分二對。 論：不堅住故者。問：此不堅住與前間斷易𡙸等因而有何別？答：不堅總望不相續義。間斷易𡙸偏約五位（五種心識活動狀態）、三性等明。由對第八（阿賴耶識）堅住之因故別明也。 論：色不相應至豈能持種者。若隨轉理許色持種。若真實理建賴耶已。即唯第八能持種也。故瑜伽論五十一云：云何因緣。謂諸色根根依及識。此二略說能持一切諸法種子。隨逐色根有諸色根種子、及余色法種子、一切心心法等種子。若隨逐識有一切識種子、及余無色法種子、諸色根種子、所餘色法種子。當知所餘色法自性。唯自種子之所隨逐。除大種色。由大種色二種種子所隨逐故。謂大種種子、及造色種子。即此所立隨逐差別種子相續。隨其所應望所說法是名因緣。若諸色根及自大種非心、心法種子隨者。入滅盡定。入無想定。生無想天。后時不
【English Translation】 English version: The intermediate wonderful realm (referring to the superior realms in the Form Realm and Formless Realm) arises. Thus, the intermediate wonderful realm arises, even to the inferior realm (referring to the Desire Realm). The defiled (having afflictions) arises without interval from the undefiled (without afflictions). The undefiled arises without interval from the defiled. The mundane (referring to the worldly) arises without interval from the supramundane (referring to the transcendent). The supramundane arises without interval from the mundane. It is not like this. Having seed nature accords with correct reasoning. Explanation: The three natures (referring to the three natures of good, evil, and neutral), the three realms (referring to the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm), each takes the lead in relation to the other two, and the two have the meaning of without interval. The proposition in the treatise is incomplete. It can be understood by thinking about it. Question: What is the difference between the defiled and the mundane, and the undefiled and the supramundane, that they are divided into two pairs? Answer: The meaning of 'mundane' is broad, while the meaning of 'defiled' is narrow. The undefiled subsequent wisdom and sacred teachings are also called mundane wisdom. 'Undefiled' is also broad, while the meaning of 'supramundane' is narrow. 'Undefiled' encompasses both the original and subsequent wisdom. 'Supramundane' mostly encompasses only the fundamental. Since the breadth and narrowness are different, they are divided into two pairs. Treatise: 'Because it is not firm and abiding.' Question: What is the difference between this 'not firm and abiding' and the previous 'intermittent, easily perishable,' etc.? Answer: 'Not firm' generally refers to the meaning of non-continuity. 'Intermittent, easily perishable' specifically explains in terms of the five positions (five states of consciousness activity), the three natures, etc. It is specifically explained because it is in contrast to the cause of the eighth (Ālaya Consciousness) being firm and abiding. Treatise: 'Since form is not corresponding, how can it hold seeds?' If following the principle of transformation, it is permissible for form to hold seeds. If, according to the principle of reality, the Ālaya has been established, then only the eighth (consciousness) can hold seeds. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fifty-first section, says: 'What are the causes and conditions? They are the sense faculties of form, the bases of the faculties, and consciousness. These two briefly can hold the seeds of all dharmas. Following the sense faculties of form, there are the seeds of the sense faculties of form, and the seeds of other form dharmas, and the seeds of all mental functions. If following consciousness, there are the seeds of all consciousness, and the seeds of other formless dharmas, the seeds of the sense faculties of form, and the seeds of the remaining form dharmas. It should be known that the nature of the remaining form dharmas is only followed by its own seeds, except for the primary elements. Because the primary elements are followed by two kinds of seeds, namely the seeds of the primary elements and the seeds of the derived form. This established continuity of seeds that follow and differentiate, according to what is appropriate in relation to what is being taught, is called cause and condition. If the sense faculties of form and the primary elements themselves are not followed by the seeds of mental functions, then one enters the cessation of perception and sensation, enters the non-perceptual samādhi, and is born in the realm of non-perception. Later, at the time of...'
應識等更生。若諸識非色種子所隨逐者。生無色界異生。從彼壽盡業盡沒已還生下時。色無種子應不更生。彼心．色等然必更生。是故當知心．色等種隨逐心．色。以此為緣心．色更生 此所建立種子道理。當知且依未建立阿賴耶識聖教而說。若已建立阿賴耶識。當知略說諸法種子一切皆依阿賴耶。
論。有說六識至而無別者。然準諸教。經部師計總有四類。一本經部許內六根是所熏性。如瑜伽論五十一末言。色持種隨彼言也。如前引矣。又順正理第十八云。此舊隨界體不可說。但可說言是業煩惱所熏六處。感餘生果 釋曰。隨界即是種子異名。新舊師別名舊隨界 二六識展轉而互相熏。三前念熏后 四類受熏。故無性論第二云。且有爾所熏習異計。或說六識展轉相熏。或說前念熏於後念。或說熏識剎那種類 問此論下云。又六識身若事．若類前後二念腕既不俱有非互相熏。準此他許前後事．類更互相熏。不爾破他有相扶失。既不相扶計何非五 答有三釋。一云據此誠有五類。言四不正。二云此論雙破於前第三．四計。非是別計。三云設遮。非是本計 詳曰。第三為勝。余大小乘無有說故。若言雙破三．四計者。如何難云非互相熏。豈三．四計許互熏耶。
論。識轉變者。有言轉變而有三義。一自類不俱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 應識等繼續產生。如果各種識不是由色的種子所隨逐，那麼就不會有異生（異生：不同於前生的生命形式）的產生。當衆生從壽命終結、業力耗盡而死亡后，再次投生到下一世時，如果沒有色的種子，色就不應該再次產生。然而，他們的心、色等必然會再次產生。因此，應當知道心、色等的種子是隨逐心、色的。以這個為緣，心、色才能再次產生。這所建立的種子道理，應當知道是依據尚未建立阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識：佛教唯識宗所說的第八識，又稱藏識，是儲存一切事物種子的識）的聖教而說的。如果已經建立了阿賴耶識，應當知道簡略地說，諸法的種子一切都依存於阿賴耶識。
論：有人說六識（六識：眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）輾轉熏習，而沒有其他不同的說法。然而，根據各種教義，經部師（經部師：佛教部派之一，主張實有論）總共有四類觀點：第一種，經部承認內在的六根（六根：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）是所熏習的性質，如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷末尾所說：『色持種隨彼』，就像前面引用的那樣。又如《順正理論》第十八卷說：『此舊隨界體不可說，但可說言是業煩惱所熏六處，感餘生果。』釋義說：隨界就是種子的異名，新舊師分別稱之為舊隨界。第二種，六識輾轉互相熏習。第三種，前念熏習后念。第四種，種類受熏。所以無性論第二卷說：『且有爾所熏習異計，或說六識展轉相熏，或說前念熏於後念，或說熏識剎那種類。』問：此論下面說：『又六識身若事、若類前後二念腕既不俱有非互相熏。』按照這個說法，他人允許前後事、類互相熏習。如果不這樣，那麼破斥他人就會有互相扶持的過失。既然不互相扶持，為什麼不認為是五種呢？答：有三種解釋。第一種說法認為，根據這個說法，確實有五類，說四類是不正確的。第二種說法認為，此論同時破斥了前面的第三、四種觀點，而不是單獨的觀點。第三種說法是假設性的遮止，而不是根本的觀點。詳細地說，第三種說法最為殊勝，因為其他大小乘佛教都沒有這種說法。如果說是同時破斥第三、四種觀點，那麼如何反駁說不是互相熏習呢？難道第三、四種觀點允許互相熏習嗎？
論：識的轉變，有人說轉變有三種含義：第一種，自類不俱。
【English Translation】 English version The continuations of consciousness etc. should be recognized. If the various consciousnesses were not accompanied by the seeds of form, there would be no birth of different beings (different beings: life forms different from the previous life). When beings die after their lifespan ends and their karma is exhausted, and are reborn in the next life, if there were no seeds of form, form should not be reborn. However, their mind, form, etc., will inevitably be reborn. Therefore, it should be known that the seeds of mind, form, etc., accompany mind and form. With this as the condition, mind and form can be reborn. This established principle of seeds should be understood as being based on the teachings that have not yet established the Alaya consciousness (Alaya consciousness: the eighth consciousness in Buddhist Yogacara, also known as the storehouse consciousness, which stores the seeds of all things). If the Alaya consciousness has been established, it should be known that, briefly speaking, the seeds of all dharmas all depend on the Alaya consciousness.
Treatise: Some say that the six consciousnesses (six consciousnesses: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) mutually perfume each other, and there are no other different views. However, according to various teachings, the Sautrantikas (Sautrantikas: one of the Buddhist schools, advocating the theory of realism) have a total of four types of views: The first type is that the Sautrantikas admit that the inner six roots (six roots: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) are the nature to be perfumed, as stated at the end of the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'Form holds the seed and follows it,' just like the previous quotation. Also, as stated in the eighteenth volume of the Abhidharmakosabhasyam: 'This old following realm body cannot be described, but it can be said that it is the six places perfumed by karma and afflictions that cause the fruits of other lives.' The explanation says: The following realm is another name for the seed, and the new and old teachers respectively call it the old following realm. The second type is that the six consciousnesses mutually perfume each other. The third type is that the previous thought perfumes the subsequent thought. The fourth type is that the category is perfumed. Therefore, the second volume of the Asanga's Commentary says: 'There are so many different views on perfuming, some say that the six consciousnesses mutually perfume each other, some say that the previous thought perfumes the subsequent thought, and some say that the seed category of the consciousness moment is perfumed.' Question: This treatise says below: 'Also, the six consciousness bodies, whether they are events or categories, the previous and subsequent thoughts do not exist together, so they do not mutually perfume each other.' According to this statement, others allow the previous and subsequent events and categories to mutually perfume each other. If this is not the case, then refuting others will have the fault of mutual support. Since they do not mutually support each other, why not consider it as five types? Answer: There are three explanations. The first explanation is that, according to this statement, there are indeed five types, and saying four types is incorrect. The second explanation is that this treatise simultaneously refutes the previous third and fourth views, rather than a separate view. The third explanation is a hypothetical negation, not a fundamental view. In detail, the third explanation is the most excellent, because other Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism do not have this statement. If it is said that the third and fourth views are refuted simultaneously, then how can it be refuted that they do not mutually perfume each other? Do the third and fourth views allow mutual perfuming?
Treatise: The transformation of consciousness, some say that transformation has three meanings: The first is that the self-category does not exist together.
前後轉變。二自他不俱前後轉變。三性．界．地等前後轉變。故識體事不能持種。若許持種。所依心滅。種亦隨亡。后念果起應無因故。故於識上假立一類。識體雖別。而識類同。貫通前後二念之中。于其二念無有轉變持種受熏如上座部因果生滅。如初念識在生相時其類亦示。至第二念識居滅相無體非因。類在異相能生后識及生相類。與此後念識體同時有其二類。因在異相。果在生相。此俱時識熏生相類。前類力微但持舊種不能受熏。如是此類唸唸相續。前至異相。后至生相持種不斷。若於五種無心位中。雖不生心而類不斷。下文破云又無心位此類定無者。依自宗破。或有心位如前相生。若無心位其類亦無。假必依實無所依故 詳曰。據大小乘經論等藏．及古今德所有章紀。皆不說言經部現在許有二時。恐自穿鑿以意定也。準彼宗計。前後二識同一識類。不言現在分二時也。故無性論第二云。六種轉識或二剎那同一識類。若言似彼依少分言。不說現在同彼分二。若作此救理可少通。然立不明故難依唯。
論。若是善惡應不受熏等者。問若善．惡法不能受熏應不持種。如何瑜伽許三性法互持種耶。故五十一云。若起善心．或染污心．或無記心。此一切心皆善種子．染污種子．無記種子之所隨逐。此所建立 答隨轉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 前後轉變：一、自體（svabhāva）不俱（asambhinna）前後轉變。二、自他不俱前後轉變。三、性（prakṛti）、界（dhātu）、地（bhūmi）等前後轉變。故識（vijñāna）的體（svabhāva）和事（artha）不能持種（bīja）。若允許持種，所依之心（citta）滅，種子也隨之消亡，后念（anutpāda）的果（phala）生起應無因（hetu）故。故於識上假立一類（sajati）。識體雖別，而識類同，貫通前後二念之中，于其二念無有轉變，持種受熏（vāsanā）如上座部（Sthavira nikāya）因果生滅。如初念識在生相（utpāda-lakṣaṇa）時其類亦示，至第二念識居滅相（nirodha-lakṣaṇa），無體非因，類在異相（anyathātva-lakṣaṇa）能生后識及生相類。與此後念識體同時有其二類，因在異相，果在生相，此俱時識熏生相類。前類力微，但持舊種不能受熏。如是此類唸唸相續，前至異相，后至生相，持種不斷。若於五種無心位中，雖不生心而類不斷。下文破云：『又無心位此類定無』者，依自宗破。或有心位如前相生，若無心位其類亦無，假必依實無所依故。詳曰：據大小乘經論等藏、及古今德所有章紀，皆不說言經部（Sautrāntika）現在許有二時，恐自穿鑿以意定也。準彼宗計，前後二識同一識類，不言現在分二時也。故無性論（Asaṅga's commentary）第二云：『六種轉識或二剎那同一識類。』若言似彼依少分言，不說現在同彼分二。若作此救理可少通，然立不明故難依唯。 論：若是善惡應不受熏等者，問：若善、惡法不能受熏應不持種，如何瑜伽（Yoga）許三性法互持種耶？故五十一云：『若起善心、或染污心、或無記心，此一切心皆善種子、染污種子、無記種子之所隨逐，此所建立。』答：隨轉（anuvṛtti）。
【English Translation】 English version Changes in sequence: 1. The self-nature (svabhāva) does not co-exist (asambhinna) with changes in sequence. 2. The self and other do not co-exist with changes in sequence. 3. Nature (prakṛti), realm (dhātu), ground (bhūmi), etc., change in sequence. Therefore, the substance (svabhāva) and function (artha) of consciousness (vijñāna) cannot maintain seeds (bīja). If maintaining seeds is allowed, the mind (citta) on which it relies will cease, and the seeds will also perish along with it. The arising of the fruit (phala) in the subsequent thought (anutpāda) should be without cause (hetu). Therefore, a category (sajati) is provisionally established on consciousness. Although the substances of consciousness are different, the categories of consciousness are the same, connecting the preceding and subsequent thoughts. There is no change in these two thoughts, and the maintaining of seeds and receiving of impressions (vāsanā) are like the arising and ceasing of cause and effect in the Sthavira nikāya (上座部). For example, when the initial thought of consciousness is in the phase of arising (utpāda-lakṣaṇa), its category is also shown. When the second thought of consciousness is in the phase of cessation (nirodha-lakṣaṇa), it has no substance and is not a cause. The category is in the phase of change (anyathātva-lakṣaṇa) and can generate subsequent consciousness and the category of the phase of arising. Simultaneously with the substance of this subsequent thought of consciousness, there are two categories. The cause is in the phase of change, and the fruit is in the phase of arising. This simultaneous consciousness impresses and generates the category of the phase of arising. The power of the previous category is weak, and it can only maintain the old seeds and cannot receive impressions. Thus, these categories continue in thought after thought. The preceding reaches the phase of change, and the subsequent reaches the phase of arising, and the maintaining of seeds is uninterrupted. Even in the five kinds of mindless states, although no mind arises, the category is uninterrupted. The following text refutes, saying, 'Moreover, in the mindless state, this category is definitely absent,' which is refuted based on one's own school. Or, in the mindful state, they arise as before. If there is no mindful state, the category is also absent, because the provisional must rely on the real, and there is nothing to rely on. Detailed explanation: According to the collections of scriptures and treatises of both Mahayana and Hinayana, and the chapters and records of virtuous individuals of ancient and modern times, none say that the Sautrāntika (經部) school now admits two times. It is feared that one is arbitrarily determining it based on one's own ideas. According to their school's calculation, the preceding and subsequent two consciousnesses belong to the same category of consciousness, and it is not said that the present is divided into two times. Therefore, Asaṅga's commentary (無性論) says, 'The six kinds of transformed consciousnesses may be the same category of consciousness in two kṣaṇas.' If it is said to be similar to them, it is based on a small part of the statement, and it is not said that the present is divided into two like them. If this rescue is made, the reasoning can be somewhat understood, but the establishment is unclear, so it is difficult to rely on it solely. Treatise: If it is good or evil, it should not receive impressions, etc. Question: If good and evil dharmas cannot receive impressions, they should not maintain seeds. How does Yoga (瑜伽) allow the three natures to maintain seeds mutually? Therefore, chapter fifty-one says, 'If a good mind, a defiled mind, or a neutral mind arises, all these minds are accompanied by good seeds, defiled seeds, and neutral seeds. This is what is established.' Answer: Following along (anuvṛtti).
理門。非真實義。瑜伽自會文如前引。
論。阿羅漢至無漏法熏等者。問準疏中判。或據自身凡聖前後。或約他自凡聖相熏。有何所以為斯難耶 答由本計識二念不俱無相應義。初三大乘破熏習不成。故未計類前後二識而類是一。類是一故前識熏類。能熏所熏無不俱失。能所依別。亦得名為能所熏二。文類離識而無別體。亦得名為以前熏后。故無性論第二云。若言依止種類句義。六種轉識或二剎那同一識類。由異品故有相熏習。非一切者 釋曰。前後識別能所熏異名為異品。又謂鄰次前後相熏不說一切。云非一切 問但識熏類何得云互 答假實能所形待名互。亦如世言父子相生。又類既一后識熏時亦得名為熏前念也。如前熏后識義意同也 或可彼許類．識相熏同此論說。不爾云何名為互耶。既許前後多識雖異而類是同。故前熏后前凡后聖類同識異。何不同彼前熏后耶 問若爾但可難自前後。如何難令異身相熏 答自識前後異類同得相熏。他身類亦同。故難更熏習。故無性論云。阿羅漢心不出識類。彼亦應是不善所熏。與此同也。
疏。以彼本計至是此本意者。此斷意云前後識異而識類同識類受熏。識名根．法余之根．法同識根．法亦得名為識類同也。此之類法應互相熏。同彼前後識之類也 問前後俱識同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 理門：指在理上進行分析和辨析。這裡所說的『非真實義』，指的是不符合真實意義的觀點。關於『瑜伽自會文如前引』，指的是《瑜伽師地論》等經論中已經引用過的相關文句，這裡不再贅述。
論：關於阿羅漢（Arhat，已證得解脫的聖者）乃至無漏法（Anasrava-dharma，沒有煩惱的法）的熏習等問題。問：根據疏文中的判斷，或者根據自身凡夫和聖人的前後階段，或者根據他人和自身凡夫和聖人的相互熏習，有什麼理由提出這樣的疑問呢？答：由於原本認為識的兩個念頭不能同時存在，因此沒有相應的意義。最初的三大乘（Mahayana，大乘佛教）破斥熏習不能成立，因此沒有考慮類別前後兩個識，而認為類別是一樣的。因為類別是一樣的，所以前識熏習類別，能熏和所熏都完全喪失。能依和所依不同，也可以稱為能熏和所熏二者。文句的類別離開了識就沒有別的本體，也可以稱為以前熏后。所以無性論（Asanga's commentary）第二卷說：『如果說依止種類句義，六種轉識（Vijnana，意識的六種轉變形式，即眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）或者兩個剎那（Ksana，極短的時間單位）是同一識類。因為品類不同，所以有相互熏習。並非一切都是如此。』釋：前後識識別能熏和所熏的不同，稱為異品。又說鄰近的先後相互熏習，不是說一切都是如此，所以說『非一切』。問：僅僅是識熏習類別，怎麼能說是相互的呢？答：假立和真實、能和所，都是相對待而存在的，所以稱為相互。也像世俗所說的父子相生。而且類別既然是一樣的，后識熏習的時候也可以稱為熏習前念。如同前熏后識的意義一樣。或者他們認為類別和識相互熏習，和此論所說的一樣。否則怎麼能稱為相互呢？既然認為前後多個識雖然不同，但是類別是相同的。所以前熏后，前凡后聖，類別相同而識不同。為什麼不同於他們所說的前熏后呢？問：如果這樣，只能責難自身的前後，如何責難令異身相互熏習呢？答：自身識的前後，異類相同，可以相互熏習。他人身的類別也相同。所以責難更熏習。所以無性論說：『阿羅漢的心不出識類。他們也應該被不善所熏。』與此相同。
疏：以他們原本認為……是此本意。這裡斷定的意思是前後識不同，而識的類別相同，識的類別接受熏習。識稱為根、法，其餘的根、法和識的根、法相同，也可以稱為識的類別相同。這些類別法應該互相熏習，如同他們前後識的類別一樣。問：前後都是識，相同
【English Translation】 English version: 『Ri men』 (理門): Refers to analyzing and distinguishing based on reason. The 『non-true meaning』 mentioned here refers to views that do not conform to the true meaning. Regarding 『Yoga self-meeting text as previously cited,』 it refers to relevant sentences that have already been cited in scriptures and treatises such as the 『Yogacarabhumi-sastra』 (瑜伽師地論), and will not be repeated here.
Treatise: Regarding the Arhat (阿羅漢, a saint who has attained liberation) and even the Anasrava-dharma (無漏法, undefiled dharma) and other issues of熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation). Question: According to the judgment in the commentary, either based on the previous and subsequent stages of ordinary people and saints themselves, or based on the mutual熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) of ordinary people and saints of others and themselves, what reason is there to raise such a question? Answer: Because it was originally believed that two thoughts of consciousness cannot exist simultaneously, there is no corresponding meaning. The initial three Mahayana (三大乘, Great Vehicle Buddhism) refuted that熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) cannot be established, so they did not consider the two consciousnesses before and after the category, but believed that the category was the same. Because the category is the same, the previous consciousness熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) the category, and both the influencer and the influenced are completely lost. The dependent and the depended are different, and can also be called the influencer and the influenced. The category of sentences has no other entity apart from consciousness, and can also be called the former influencing the latter. Therefore, the second volume of Asanga's commentary (無性論) says: 『If it is said to rely on the meaning of the category of sentences, the six Vijnana (六種轉識, six transformations of consciousness, namely eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) or two Ksana (剎那, extremely short units of time) are the same category of consciousness. Because the categories are different, there is mutual熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation). Not everything is like this.』 Explanation: Distinguishing the difference between the influencer and the influenced of the previous and subsequent consciousnesses is called different categories. It is also said that the adjacent previous and subsequent influence each other, not saying that everything is like this, so it is said 『not everything.』 Question: How can it be said to be mutual if only consciousness熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) the category? Answer: Hypothetical and real, able and 所, exist relatively, so it is called mutual. It is also like the worldly saying that fathers and sons are born of each other. Moreover, since the category is the same, when the latter consciousness熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation), it can also be called熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) the previous thought. It is the same as the meaning of the former influencing the latter consciousness. Or they believe that the category and consciousness influence each other, just like what this theory says. Otherwise, how can it be called mutual? Since it is believed that although the previous and subsequent multiple consciousnesses are different, the category is the same. Therefore, the former influences the latter, the former is ordinary and the latter is holy, the category is the same but the consciousness is different. Why is it not the same as what they said that the former influences the latter? Question: If so, you can only blame yourself for the previous and subsequent, how can you blame the different bodies for influencing each other? Answer: The previous and subsequent of one's own consciousness, different categories are the same, can influence each other. The categories of other people's bodies are also the same. So it is difficult to熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation) again. Therefore, the Asanga's commentary (無性論) says: 『The Arhat's (阿羅漢) mind does not go beyond the category of consciousness. They should also be influenced by unwholesome things.』 It is the same as this.
Commentary: They originally thought... is the original intention here. The meaning determined here is that the previous and subsequent consciousnesses are different, but the category of consciousness is the same, and the category of consciousness accepts熏習(Xunxi, influence or habituation). Consciousness is called root and dharma, and the remaining roots and dharmas are the same as the roots and dharmas of consciousness, and can also be called the same category of consciousness. These category dharmas should influence each other, just like the category of their previous and subsequent consciousnesses. Question: The previous and subsequent are all consciousnesses, the same
類可熏。余之根．法非識同類。何得例熏 答類者相似。識有根．法。余根．法似。既似於識何非識類。識類既同。何不相熏。
疏。或應意根成造色性等者。按彼論第二云。謂眼等根清凈色性。皆根種類之所隨逐。意根亦應成造色性。根義等故 問類同分收即行蘊攝。何故難意令成造色 答且五根類假實別論法同分攝。攝假從實色界所收。識類亦爾。論據攝假隨實門明。亦無有失。而難意云。兩心前後異識同類。一俱識蘊。色．心二法殊根同類。一俱色蘊。若言色．心別不得同造色。亦可心．色殊根類不應等。廣破如余。
疏。后無記可爾者。此設許也。無記中容容前重后。理實不然。熏習俱時不得前後。后無記者非皆第八。故知設許。
論。亦不應執色心展轉互為種生者。如五十一廣敘彼計。具如前引。
論。依似比量等者。如疏．樞要．義燈具明 問如佛法者對聲論師立聲無常。聲有法宗不為其過。真性有為既是有法。何故疏等判為過耶。以有法中不言空故 答如數論師對佛法者說我是思。雖佛法中許有假我。彼不分別。意談思我故所別過。此類亦然。故有法失 若爾聲宗亦不分別對聲常宗。應所別過 答沈爾言聲。立敵皆許。真性有為道理差互。立敵乃別。故有法失。不同聲宗。準
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果按照類別可以熏習，那麼『余之根』（除了識以外的其他根）和『法』（法處所攝之法）與識不是同類，怎麼能用熏習的例子來解釋呢？ 答：這裡說的『類』是指相似。識有根和法，其他的根和法與識相似。既然與識相似，為什麼不能說是識的同類呢？識的類別既然相同，為什麼不能互相熏習呢？
疏：或者應該說意根可以產生造色性等。按照《彼論》第二卷所說，眼等根的清凈色性，都是根的種類所隨逐的。意根也應該可以產生造色性，因為根的意義是相同的。問：如果按照類別相同來分，就應該被攝入行蘊，為什麼還要為難意根，讓它產生造色呢？答：暫且不論五根的類別是假是實，從法同分的角度來說，應該被攝入法處所攝。攝入時，假法依從實法。識的類別也是這樣。論據依據攝假隨實的原則來說明，也沒有什麼過失。而為難意根說，兩個心識前後不同，但識的類別相同，都是俱時的識蘊。色法和心法兩種法不同，但根的類別相同，都是俱時的色蘊。如果說色法和心法不同，就不能共同產生造色。也可以說心和色的根不同，類別不應該相同。更廣泛的破斥如同其他地方所說。
疏：『后無記可爾者』，這是假設允許的情況。無記中容許前重后。但實際上並非如此。熏習是同時發生的，不能有前後。『后無記者』並非都是第八識，所以知道這是假設允許的情況。
論：也不應該執著色法和心法輾轉互相作為種子產生。如同第五十一卷廣泛敘述了他們的觀點，具體內容如前面所引用。
論：依據相似比量等。如同疏、樞要、義燈等處詳細說明。問：如果像佛法那樣，針對聲論師立論說聲音是無常的，聲音作為有法宗，不會被認為是過失。真性有為既然是有法，為什麼疏等判為過失呢？因為在有法中沒有說空性。答：如同數論師針對佛法的人說『我是思』。雖然佛法中允許有假我，但他們沒有分別，意在談論思我，所以是所別過。這種情況也是一樣，所以是有法上的過失。如果這樣，聲音宗也沒有分別，針對聲常宗，應該也是所別過。答：沈爾所說的聲音，立論和對方都允許。真性有為的道理有差異，立論和對方有所區別，所以是有法上的過失，不同於聲音宗，以此類推。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If according to categories, there can be熏習 (xunxi, influence by habit), then '余之根' (yuzhigen, the other roots besides consciousness) and '法' (fa, dharmas belonging to the sphere of 法處 (fachu, dharma realm)) are not of the same category as consciousness. How can you use the example of 熏習 (xunxi, influence by habit) to explain this? Answer: The '類' (lei, category) here refers to similarity. Consciousness has roots and dharmas, and other roots and dharmas are similar to consciousness. Since they are similar to consciousness, why can't they be said to be of the same category as consciousness? Since the categories of consciousness are the same, why can't they influence each other?
Commentary: Or it should be said that the意根 (yigen, mind-root) can produce 造色性 (zaosexing, the nature of creating form) etc. According to the second volume of '彼論' (bilun, that treatise), the pure form-nature of the eye-root etc. are all followed by the categories of the roots. The 意根 (yigen, mind-root) should also be able to produce 造色性 (zaosexing, the nature of creating form), because the meaning of roots is the same. Question: If classified according to the same category, it should be included in the 行蘊 (xingyun, aggregate of formations). Why make it difficult for the 意根 (yigen, mind-root) and make it produce 造色 (zaose, creating form)? Answer: Let's not discuss whether the categories of the five roots are provisional or real. From the perspective of 法同分 (fatongfen, dharma-sameness), it should be included in the 所攝 (suoshe, that which is included) of 法處 (fachu, dharma realm). When including, provisional dharmas follow real dharmas. The categories of consciousness are also like this. The argument is based on the principle of including the provisional following the real to explain, and there is no fault. And making it difficult for the 意根 (yigen, mind-root) says that two consciousnesses are different before and after, but the categories of consciousness are the same, and they are both simultaneous 識蘊 (shiyun, aggregate of consciousness). 色法 (sefa, form-dharma) and 心法 (xinfa, mind-dharma) are two different dharmas, but the categories of roots are the same, and they are both simultaneous 色蘊 (seyun, aggregate of form). If you say that 色法 (sefa, form-dharma) and 心法 (xinfa, mind-dharma) are different, they cannot jointly produce 造色 (zaose, creating form). It can also be said that the roots of 心 (xin, mind) and 色 (se, form) are different, and the categories should not be the same. More extensive refutations are as stated elsewhere.
Commentary: '后無記可爾者' (houwujikeerzhe, the latter indeterminate is permissible), this is a hypothetical allowance. Indeterminate allows the former to be heavier than the latter. But in reality, this is not the case. 熏習 (xunxi, influence by habit) occurs simultaneously and cannot have before and after. '后無記者' (houwujizhe, the latter indeterminate) are not all the eighth consciousness, so we know that this is a hypothetical allowance.
Treatise: One should also not cling to the idea that 色法 (sefa, form-dharma) and 心法 (xinfa, mind-dharma) transform and mutually act as seeds to produce each other. As the fifty-first volume extensively narrates their views, the specific content is as quoted earlier.
Treatise: Based on similar analogies etc. As the commentary, key points, and meaning lamps etc. explain in detail. Question: If, like the Buddha-dharma, the 聲論師 (shenglunshi, sound theorists) are targeted to argue that sound is impermanent, sound as 有法宗 (youfazong, subject of the argument), it will not be considered a fault. Since 真性有為 (zhenxingyouwei, true nature of conditioned things) is 有法 (youfa, subject of the argument), why do the commentary etc. judge it as a fault? Because 空性 (kongxing, emptiness) is not mentioned in 有法 (youfa, subject of the argument). Answer: It is like the 數論師 (shulunshi, Samkhya theorists) saying 'I am thought' to those of the Buddha-dharma. Although the Buddha-dharma allows for a provisional self, they do not distinguish, intending to talk about the thinking self, so it is a 所別過 (suobieguo, fault of the distinguished). This situation is also the same, so it is a fault in 有法 (youfa, subject of the argument). If so, the sound school also does not distinguish, targeting the sound-eternal school, it should also be a 所別過 (suobieguo, fault of the distinguished). Answer: The sound mentioned by 沈爾 (Shen Er) is allowed by both the proponent and the opponent. The reasoning of 真性有為 (zhenxingyouwei, true nature of conditioned things) has differences, and the proponent and the opponent are different, so it is a fault in 有法 (youfa, subject of the argument), which is different from the sound school. Infer from this.
掌珍論有廣紛諍。如因明鈔。
論。外道至成大邪見者。有義若言此破彼救令同外道者。自宗依他亦非實有。二失既同如何偏責。故今別解。外道譭謗但言非實不為全無非大邪見。汝今說無成大邪見。釋成大邪見不是破救也。
詳曰。實言唯屬常寂之法可如所判。若因招果道理非謬名之為實。自宗依他何不名實。即次下云趣生體者謂要實有。此趣生體豈非依他。聖教說實處非一也。由斯破救道理無違。又若無救。如何論云外道譭謗亦不謂全無。亦言亦誰。故知疏解深得奧旨。
論。若一切法至菩提資糧者。問按掌珍論云。依世俗福智資糧二種不無依他亦有。今難無彼豈不失宗 答為二釋。一難非實不責其無。即次論云不謂全無但執非實。故知彼宗世俗雖有而非實也。不爾便有他隨一過。二就勝義。本被資糧極歸真諦。真諦即無。資糧何用。
疏。及攝論第二至第三中義者。無性攝論第二卷中廣明熏習。熏習之中而辨染凈由心義也 又明安立第八識相略有三種。一者自相。二者因相。三者果相。果相等中亦明雜染清凈由心。如下抄引。故此不具。
論。彼命根等無此事故者。等等眼等根。眼等根斷有宗正義不許更續。何以明之 答按大婆沙論一百五十云。問若天眼現前時。生得眼為斷不
。若斷者云何不說異熟生色斷已後續。若不斷者二俱見色何不錯亂。答應言不斷。以異熟色斷已更不續故。有說天眼起時生得眼斷。斷有二種。一暫時斷。二究竟斷。暫時斷者可續。究竟斷者不續。故無有過。有說生得．天眼互相續生未曾空故不可謂斷。有說彼時生得眼斷亦無有過。亦有異熟色斷已而續故。云何知然。如契經說。一切施王自挑兩目施婆羅門。由勝思愿令眼平復。又如經說。惡行爾時以竭地羅鉤挑善行眼。亦由勝思故還得眼根。施設論說。地獄有山壓迮有情令身體破壞。於後不久諸根復生。諸地獄中此類非一。故知異熟色斷已更續 詳曰如是說者。起天眼時生得不滅。異熟色斷亦無續義。問前所引事當云何通。答實未挑眼。其事云何。謂佛昔日為菩薩時。曾作國王名一切施。能滿一切來求者意。天上人中此名流佈。時天帝釋即往驗之知其施意。便自化作婆羅門身。來詣王前咒愿二言。愿常尊勝。王言梵志來何所求。答言我正須王眼。王以四實為眼施之。彼不肯受言。我須王眼何用此為。王聞此已便舉兩手欲自挑眼。帝釋知王施心決定便止王言。欲何所求。王言唯諸如來應正等覺是我所求。帝釋聞已便複本形讚歎王言。真是菩薩不久定得無上菩提。作是言已忽然不現。故彼爾時實未挑眼。又彼所引善惡行
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說生得眼（與天生具有的眼睛）斷滅了，為什麼不說由異熟（業力成熟所感得的果報）所生的色法斷滅后還會繼續產生呢？如果說沒有斷滅，那麼二者都能見到色法，為什麼不會錯亂呢？回答是：生得眼並沒有斷滅。因為由異熟所生的色法斷滅后，不會再繼續產生。有一種說法是，當生起天眼（通過禪定等修得的超自然視覺能力）時，生得眼就斷滅了。斷滅有兩種：一是暫時斷滅，二是究竟斷滅。暫時斷滅的可以繼續產生，究竟斷滅的不會繼續產生，所以沒有過失。有一種說法是，生得眼和天眼互相連續產生，從未間斷，所以不能說是斷滅。有一種說法是，那時生得眼斷滅也沒有過失。也有異熟所生的色法斷滅后又繼續產生的例子。怎麼知道是這樣呢？如契經（佛經）所說，一切施王（過去世的佛陀）親自挖出雙眼佈施給婆羅門，由於殊勝的思愿，使眼睛恢復了。又如經中所說，惡行（人名）當時用竭地羅鉤挑出善行（人名）的眼睛，也由於殊勝的思愿，所以又恢復了眼根。《施設論》中說，地獄裡有山壓迫眾生，使身體破壞，之後不久，諸根又重新生長出來。諸地獄中此類事情不止一件。所以知道由異熟所生的色法斷滅后還會繼續產生。 詳細地說，如果這樣說，那麼在生起天眼時，生得眼並沒有滅。異熟所生的色法斷滅也沒有繼續產生的意義。問：前面所引用的事例應當如何解釋呢？答：實際上並沒有挖眼。事情是怎樣的呢？佛陀過去作為菩薩時，曾做國王，名叫一切施王，能滿足一切前來請求者的意願。天上人間都流傳著他的名聲。當時天帝釋（佛教的護法神）就去驗證他，知道他的佈施之心。便自己變化成婆羅門的身，來到國王面前說了兩句祝福的話：『愿常尊勝。』國王說：『梵志（對婆羅門的一種尊稱），來有什麼要求？』回答說：『我正需要您的眼睛。』國王用四種真實（指佛法的四種真諦）作為眼睛佈施給他。他不肯接受，說：『我需要您的眼睛，要這些做什麼？』國王聽了這話，便舉起雙手想要自己挖眼。帝釋知道國王的佈施之心已經決定，便阻止國王說：『想要什麼？』國王說：『只有諸如來應正等覺（佛陀的十種稱號之一）是我所求的。』帝釋聽了這話，便恢復了本來的面貌，讚歎國王說：『真是菩薩，不久必定能得到無上菩提（最高的覺悟）。』說了這些話后，忽然消失不見。所以他當時實際上並沒有挖眼。又，前面所引用的善惡行（的故事）
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that the innate eye (the eye one is born with) is extinguished, why isn't it said that the form produced by vipāka (the maturation of karma) is extinguished and then continues to arise? If it is said that it is not extinguished, then both can see forms, why isn't there confusion? The answer is: the innate eye is not extinguished. Because the form produced by vipāka is extinguished and does not continue to arise. One explanation is that when the divine eye (supernatural vision attained through meditation, etc.) arises, the innate eye is extinguished. There are two types of extinction: temporary extinction and ultimate extinction. That which is temporarily extinguished can continue to arise; that which is ultimately extinguished does not continue to arise, so there is no fault. One explanation is that the innate eye and the divine eye arise in continuous succession, never ceasing, so it cannot be said to be extinguished. One explanation is that there is no fault even if the innate eye is extinguished at that time. There are also examples of the form produced by vipāka being extinguished and then continuing to arise. How do we know this? As the sūtra (Buddhist scripture) says, King Viśvantara (a past life of the Buddha) personally gouged out his eyes and gave them to a Brahmin, and due to his superior aspiration, his eyes were restored. Also, as the sūtra says, Duskrtya (name of a person) at that time used a khadira hook to gouge out the eyes of Sukrtya (name of a person), and also due to his superior aspiration, he regained his eye faculties. The Prajñāpanāśāstra says that in hell, mountains press upon sentient beings, causing their bodies to be destroyed, and after a short time, their faculties are reborn. There are more than just one such instance in the hells. Therefore, it is known that the form produced by vipāka is extinguished and then continues to arise. In detail, if it is said in this way, then when the divine eye arises, the innate eye is not extinguished. The extinction of the form produced by vipāka also has no meaning of continuing to arise. Question: How should the previously cited examples be explained? Answer: In reality, the eyes were not gouged out. What was the matter? When the Buddha was a bodhisattva in the past, he was a king named Viśvantara, who could fulfill the wishes of all who came to him. His name was spread throughout the heavens and the human realm. At that time, Śakra Devānām Indra (a protector deity in Buddhism) went to verify him and knew his intention to give. He transformed himself into the body of a Brahmin and came before the king and said two words of blessing: 'May you always be victorious.' The king said, 'Brahmin (a respectful term for a Brahmin), what do you seek?' He replied, 'I need your eyes.' The king offered him his eyes with the four truths (referring to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism). He refused to accept them, saying, 'I need your eyes, what do I need these for?' When the king heard this, he raised both hands and wanted to gouge out his own eyes. Śakra knew that the king's intention to give was determined, so he stopped the king and said, 'What do you want?' The king said, 'Only the Tathāgata Arhat Samyaksaṃbuddha (one of the ten titles of the Buddha) is what I seek.' When Śakra heard this, he restored his original form and praised the king, saying, 'Truly a bodhisattva, you will surely attain anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi (supreme enlightenment) soon.' After saying these words, he suddenly disappeared. So, he did not actually gouge out his eyes at that time. Also, the previously cited story of Sukrtya and Duskrtya.
經。諸地獄等有餘種子。不爾斷已更不生故 釋云。此說種子。如第九十說。即彼云。若地獄中解諸支節。乃至糜爛亦有身根。有說爾時亦有眼等。異熟斷已更不續故。有說眼等斷已更續。業所引故趣法爾故。身根必無斷已更續。是諸色根所依止故。有餘師說諸地獄中雖解支節為百千分。而諸分內皆有身根諸分中間相連續故。如碎杜仲．及藕根莖。亦如破瓜蒂不相離。若相離者身根亦無。非一有情有二身故。而世現見諸蟲身為多分已猶動行者。風力所轉。非有身根 釋云。此當評家種子也。若依經部。異熟色法斷已更續。今依大乘。諸異熟色雖斷已續。若離諸根更不執受。亦名不續。然根斷已后從種生亦名為續。施王等事理無違也 然于地獄傳有二說。一云一切地獄眼等諸根必無斷義。相續受苦無間斷故。二云無間地獄諸根不斷。六識明利苦相續故。餘地獄中亦有間斷。隨斷隨生。契經說故。有義雖未見文后說應勝 詳曰。既無文判前何即劣。由斯取捨當隨意樂。
論。又在定中等者。按瑜伽論五十一云。謂如理思至定及散總有六位。具如疏引。其行相者思量安立．非安立諦。正思惟者名如理思。外道等類耶思度者名不如理思。諸任運緣及無心位名不思惟。若簡擇心名為推求。定．散二位義可知也。此論但四。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 經文說：『諸地獄等還有殘餘的種子。』如果不是這樣，斷滅之後就不會再生起了。解釋說：這裡說的是種子，就像第九十卷所說的那樣。那裡說：『如果在地獄中肢解身體，乃至糜爛，也還有身根。』有人說：『那時也有眼等諸根，因為異熟果報斷滅之後還會繼續產生。』有人說：『眼等諸根斷滅之後還會繼續產生，這是業力所牽引，是法爾如是的。』身根必定不會斷滅之後又繼續產生，因為它是諸色根所依止的。』有其他老師說：『在地獄中，即使肢解身體為成百上千份，每一份內都有身根，各部分之間相互連續。』就像破碎的杜仲和藕的根莖，也像破開的瓜蒂不會分離。如果分離了，就沒有身根了，因為一個有情不會有兩個身體。』而世間現見的昆蟲身體被分成多份后仍然能動能行，那是風力所轉動，並非有身根。』解釋說：這應當是評論家的種子。如果依據經部宗義，異熟色法斷滅之後還會繼續產生。現在依據大乘宗義，諸異熟色雖然斷滅之後還會繼續產生，但如果離開了諸根，就不會再執取受用，也叫做不繼續產生。然而根斷滅之後，又從種子中生起，也叫做繼續產生。施王等事蹟在道理上沒有違背。』 然而對於地獄的傳聞有兩種說法。一種說法是：一切地獄的眼等諸根必定沒有斷滅的情況，因為相續不斷地遭受痛苦。另一種說法是：無間地獄的諸根不會斷滅，因為六識明利，苦相續不斷。其餘地獄中也有間斷，隨斷隨生，經典是這樣說的。有人認為雖然沒有見到經文，但後面的說法應該更勝一籌。詳細地說：既然沒有經文判斷，那麼前面的說法為什麼就劣呢？因此，取捨應當隨自己的意樂。 論中說：『又在定中等。』按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說：『如理作意直到禪定以及散亂，總共有六個位次。』具體內容如疏文所引用。其行相是：思量安立、非安立諦。正確思惟的叫做如理作意。外道等類錯誤思量的叫做不如理作意。諸任運緣以及無心位叫做不思惟。如果簡擇心，就叫做推求。禪定和散亂二個位次的含義可以知道。』此論只有四個。
【English Translation】 English version: The sutra says: 'The various hells, etc., still have residual seeds.' If this were not the case, they would not be reborn after being cut off. The explanation says: This refers to seeds, as mentioned in the ninetieth section. It says there: 'If the body is dismembered in hell, even to the point of being pulverized, there is still a body faculty.' Some say: 'At that time, there are also faculties such as the eye, etc., because the fruition of karma continues to arise even after it has been cut off.' Some say: 'The faculties such as the eye, etc., continue to arise even after being cut off, because this is driven by karma, it is the nature of things.' The body faculty will certainly not continue to arise after being cut off, because it is what all the sense faculties rely on.' Other teachers say: 'In hell, even if the body is dismembered into hundreds or thousands of pieces, each piece still has a body faculty, and the parts are continuous with each other.' It is like broken eucommia and the stems of lotus roots, or like a broken melon stem that does not separate. If they are separated, there is no body faculty, because one sentient being cannot have two bodies.' And it is seen in the world that insects whose bodies have been divided into many parts can still move and walk, which is due to the force of the wind, not because they have a body faculty.' The explanation says: This should be the seed of the commentators. According to the Sautrantika (Sutra School) view, the fruition of form continues to arise after being cut off. Now, according to the Mahayana view, although the various fruition forms continue to arise after being cut off, if they are separated from the faculties, they will no longer be grasped and experienced, which is also called not continuing to arise. However, when a faculty is cut off and then arises from a seed, it is also called continuing to arise. The deeds of King Shibi (Śibi) and others are not contradictory in principle.' However, there are two views regarding the transmission of hells. One view is: In all hells, the faculties such as the eye, etc., certainly do not have the meaning of being cut off, because suffering is continuously experienced without interruption. The other view is: The faculties of the Avici Hell (Avīci) are not cut off, because the six consciousnesses are clear and suffering is continuous. In other hells, there are also interruptions, arising as they are cut off, as the sutras say. Some believe that although they have not seen the sutra text, the latter view should be superior. In detail: Since there is no sutra to judge, why is the former view inferior? Therefore, acceptance and rejection should be according to one's own inclination. The treatise says: 'Also, in samadhi (samādhi), etc.' According to the fifty-first section of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra): 'Rational attention up to samadhi and distraction, there are a total of six stages.' The specific content is as quoted in the commentary. Its characteristics are: contemplating and establishing, and not establishing truth. Correct thinking is called rational attention. Wrong thinking by non-Buddhists is called irrational attention. All spontaneous conditions and the state of no-mind are called non-thinking. If the mind is selective, it is called investigation. The meanings of the two stages of samadhi and distraction can be known.' This treatise only has four.
廣略異爾。與彼相攝思之可悟。
論。理有眾多身生起者。此身受者即定等中是第八識所緣觸境。是後身識所取本質。如疏所明。復有說云。入定等位有五識身身受生起證有第八。謂以第八變本質觸。身識依彼起影像觸。若無本質影像亦無。云何在定將有身識。明受彼境勞適事成。有義斷云。疏釋為正。令身勞損非影像故。余時亦有影像相。故於一切位應皆可說 詳曰。余釋及斷理皆有餘。豈無心後身識起時無覺勞適。若爾云何唯約定中有識而說。五識理得因緣變收。影像之觸云何無用。若言五識是分別變。便違正理。如前具辨。
疏。身所受故非謂受數者。勞適等觸是身所受。所受名受。非能受受。
疏。此簡起異熟心至無同喻者。若不言余簡異熟心。而但說云非佛有情應起異熟。此便相扶。他亦有起異熟心故。又由不簡余異熟心。便在宗中不可取宗而以為喻。故闕喻失。
疏。不爾便有所立不成等。若也不致許言爾者。論主喻有自所立過。以自不許六種轉識真異熟故。
疏。彼說無故無俱不成者。彼小乘者不許第八。第八既無便無喻體。由無喻依二立便無。名無俱不成。
論。非異熟法趣生雜亂等者。簡色．心．心所。具辨如燈 問招三塗業起必人中。此之業惑而屬何趣。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
廣略有所不同，但彼此相互關聯，思考之後可以領悟。
論：有眾多身體生起的原因。這個身體的感受者，即在禪定等狀態中，是第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）所緣的觸境。是後世身體的意識所取的本質，如疏文所闡明。還有一種說法是，進入禪定等狀態時，有五識身（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）和身體感受生起，這可以證明第八識的存在。這是因為第八識變現本質觸，身識依靠它而生起影像觸。如果沒有本質，影像也不會存在。如果在禪定中將有身識，就能明白感受那個境界，勞累和舒適的事情才能成立。有一種觀點果斷地說，疏文的解釋是正確的，因為使身體勞損的不是影像。其他時候也有影像相，所以在一切狀態下都應該可以這樣說。詳細地說，其他的解釋和果斷的說法都有不足之處。難道沒有心識之後，身體意識生起時沒有感覺勞累和舒適嗎？如果這樣，為什麼只約定在禪定中才有意識而這樣說呢？五識的道理可以通過因緣變現來解釋，影像的觸覺怎麼會沒有用呢？如果說五識是分別變現，就違背了正理，如前面詳細辨析的那樣。
疏：因為是身體所感受的，所以不是指受數（vedana-skandha，受蘊）。勞累和舒適等觸覺是身體所感受的，所感受的叫做受，不是能感受的受。
疏：這裡是爲了簡別由異熟心（vipaka-citta，異熟心）而生起，以至於沒有相同的比喻。如果不說『其餘』來簡別異熟心，而只是說『非佛的有情應該生起異熟』，這就會互相扶持，因為其他人也有生起異熟心的情況。又因為不簡別其餘的異熟心，所以在宗（paksa，論題）中不能取宗作為比喻，所以缺少比喻的過失。
疏：如果不這樣，就會有所立不成等過失。如果也不允許說『爾者』，論主的比喻就有自己所立的過失，因為自己不承認六種轉識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意識）是真正的異熟。
疏：他們說沒有，所以沒有俱不成過失。那些小乘論者不承認第八識。第八識既然沒有，就沒有比喻的本體。由於沒有比喻的依據，兩種立論就沒有了，叫做無俱不成。
論：不是異熟法，趣向生雜亂等。簡別色（rupa，色）、心（citta，心）、心所（caitasika，心所）。詳細辨析如燈的例子。問：招感三惡道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）的業，一定是在人道中造作的。那麼，這種業和煩惱屬於哪一道呢？
【English Translation】 English version:
The scope of the broad and the concise differs, yet they are interconnected, and understanding can be attained through contemplation.
Treatise: There are numerous causes for the arising of the body. The experiencer of this body, namely, in states such as samadhi (dhyana, 禪定), is the touch-object (sparsha-visaya, 觸境) cognized by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, 阿賴耶識). It is the essence taken by the consciousness of the subsequent body, as explained in the commentary. There is also a saying that when entering states such as samadhi, the five sense consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) and bodily sensations arise, which proves the existence of the eighth consciousness. This is because the eighth consciousness transforms the essential touch, and the body consciousness relies on it to generate image-touch. If there is no essence, there will be no image either. If there is body consciousness in samadhi, it can be understood that experiencing that realm allows for the establishment of matters of fatigue and comfort. One view decisively states that the commentary's explanation is correct because what causes bodily fatigue is not an image. There are also image-aspects at other times, so it should be possible to say this in all states. In detail, other explanations and decisive statements all have shortcomings. Is it not the case that when body consciousness arises after the mind, there is no feeling of fatigue and comfort? If so, why is it said that consciousness only exists in samadhi? The principle of the five consciousnesses can be explained by the transformation of conditions, so how can image-touch be useless? If it is said that the five consciousnesses are discriminatory transformations, it contradicts the correct principle, as explained in detail earlier.
Commentary: Because it is what the body experiences, it is not referring to the feeling aggregate (vedana-skandha, 受蘊). Touch such as fatigue and comfort is what the body experiences. What is experienced is called experience, not the experiencer of experience.
Commentary: This is to distinguish arising from the resultant mind (vipaka-citta, 異熟心), to the point where there is no similar analogy. If one does not say 'other' to distinguish the resultant mind, but only says 'non-Buddha sentient beings should give rise to resultants,' this would be mutually supportive, because others also have the arising of resultant minds. Also, because one does not distinguish other resultant minds, one cannot take the thesis (paksa, 論題) as an analogy within the proposition, so there is the fault of lacking an analogy.
Commentary: If not, there would be the fault of the unestablished proposition, etc. If one does not allow the statement 'that which is,' the proponent's analogy has the fault of his own proposition, because he himself does not acknowledge the six transformed consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousnesses) as true resultants.
Commentary: They say there is none, so there is no mutual non-establishment. Those Hinayana proponents do not acknowledge the eighth consciousness. Since the eighth consciousness does not exist, there is no basis for the analogy. Because there is no basis for the analogy, the two propositions do not exist, which is called mutual non-establishment.
Treatise: It is not a resultant dharma (vipaka-dharma, 異熟法), tending towards birth, confusion, etc. Distinguishing form (rupa, 色), mind (citta, 心), and mental factors (caitasika, 心所). Explained in detail like the example of a lamp. Question: The karma that invites the three evil destinies (hell, hungry ghosts, animals) must arise in the human realm. To which destiny do this karma and affliction belong?
若屬於人豈可人業招三惡耶。若屬三塗感三塗業分別惑發。彼無分別何得屬彼 答相傳兩釋。一云既人等中造惡趣業而感彼報。能招業惑故屬於人。以三惡趣無分別故 二云雖於人趣起彼惑業。惑業還屬所招報趣。不可異趣業惑招異趣果。而言惡趣無分別惑據不現說。不障成就 詳曰。二皆有理。且依后釋。如於人中起上界業業屬上故。又人中業為彼遠緣亦應無失。如因欲善得上定故。若依前釋闕定異因。
疏。異熟色中有九處除聲者。以他不許聲為異熟。今簡共許。所以除聲。
疏。然此雖復說不共因者。即恒因也。生得善等無名不共。
疏。亦說共等者。即遍無雜。生得善等自他皆有名為共也。
疏。有體通上亦有故者。其實有因通前所說非異熟等．及異熟色五識業感。故今不舉。
論。亦非界攝非有漏故者。問趣生有漏以證第八。界非無漏何不將明第八識有。答界雖有漏。然通三性．及情．非情。故不可以證於有情異熟識也。
疏。五根在自身者。顯自五根是自八相第八執受。
疏。非已相分他身五根依等者。此明他身五根．及依。不是自己第八相分自八不執。
疏。薩婆多非過未者。在過．未世不名執受名非過未。不說過．未而無體故名非過．未。故俱舍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果屬於人，怎麼會由人的業力招致三惡道呢？如果屬於三惡道，那麼感受的應該是三惡道的業力，這是由分別妄念引發的。但三惡道沒有分別心，怎麼能說屬於它們呢？回答說，對此有兩種解釋。一種說法是，既然人在人道中造作了惡趣的業，因此會感受惡趣的果報。人能招感業力與妄念，所以（此業）屬於人。因為三惡道沒有分別心。另一種說法是，雖然在人道中生起了惡趣的妄念和業力，但妄念和業力仍然屬於所招感的果報之趣。不可能出現異趣的業力和妄念招感異趣的果報。說惡趣沒有分別妄念，是指其不顯現，但這並不妨礙業力的成就。詳細地說，這兩種解釋都有道理。暫且依照后一種解釋，就像在人道中造作上界的業力，業力就屬於上界。而且，人道中的業力是上界的遠因，這應該沒有問題。就像因為欲界的善行而獲得上界的禪定一樣。如果依照前一種解釋，就缺少了確定的不同原因。 異熟色中有九處，排除了聲塵，是因為其他宗派不承認聲音是異熟果。現在爲了簡要說明共同認可的部分，所以排除了聲塵。 雖然這裡說的是不共因，指的就是恒常因。生得的善等沒有名稱，所以是不共的。 也說了共因等，指的就是普遍而無雜染。生得的善等，自己和他人都有名稱，所以是共的。 有自體能通於上文所說的，也有原因的。實際上，有因能通於前面所說的非異熟等，以及異熟色中的五識業感，所以現在不舉出。 論中說：『也不是界所攝，因為不是有漏法。』有人問：用趣生是有漏的來證明第八識的存在，界不是無漏的，為什麼不用界來證明第八識的存在呢？回答說：界雖然是有漏的，但它通於三性（善、惡、無記），以及有情和非有情。所以不能用它來證明有情異熟識的存在。 五根在自身，顯示自己的五根是自己的第八識所執受的相分。 不是已滅相分和他身的五根和所依處等，這是說明他身的五根和所依處，不是自己的第八識的相分，自己的第八識不執受。 薩婆多宗認為不是過去和未來，在過去和未來世不稱為執受，所以稱為非過去和未來。不說過去和未來就沒有自體，所以稱為非過去和未來。這是《俱舍論》的觀點。
【English Translation】 English version: If it belongs to humans, how can the three evil destinies be caused by the karma of humans? If it belongs to the three evil destinies (Sān È Dào - three evil paths/realms), then one should experience the karma of the three evil destinies, which is caused by discriminating delusions. But the three evil destinies have no discrimination, how can it be said to belong to them? The answer is, there are two explanations for this. One explanation is that since humans create the karma of evil destinies in the human realm, they will experience the retribution of evil destinies. Humans can attract karma and delusions, so (this karma) belongs to humans because the three evil destinies have no discrimination. The other explanation is that although delusions and karma of evil destinies arise in the human realm, the delusions and karma still belong to the destiny of retribution that is attracted. It is impossible for the karma and delusions of different destinies to attract the fruit of different destinies. Saying that evil destinies have no discriminating delusions refers to their non-manifestation, but this does not hinder the accomplishment of karma. In detail, both explanations make sense. For now, according to the latter explanation, just as creating the karma of higher realms in the human realm, the karma belongs to the higher realms. Moreover, the karma in the human realm is a distant cause of the higher realms, which should be no problem. Just like obtaining the samadhi (chán dìng - meditative absorption) of the higher realms because of the good deeds of the desire realm. If according to the former explanation, there is a lack of definite different causes. Among the nine places in the differentiated result (yì shú sè - differentiated result form), sound is excluded because other schools do not recognize sound as a differentiated result. Now, in order to briefly explain the commonly recognized parts, sound is excluded. Although it is said here that the non-common cause is the constant cause. Innate goodness, etc., has no name, so it is non-common. It also speaks of common causes, etc., which means universal and without impurities. Innate goodness, etc., has a name for oneself and others, so it is common. The substance that can communicate to the above also has a reason. In fact, there is a cause that can communicate to the non-differentiated results, etc., mentioned above, as well as the five consciousnesses' karmic sensations in the differentiated result form, so it is not mentioned now. The treatise says: 'It is also not included in the realm because it is not a contaminated dharma.' Someone asked: Use the fact that the destinies of rebirth are contaminated to prove the existence of the eighth consciousness. The realm is not uncontaminated, why not use the realm to prove the existence of the eighth consciousness? The answer is: Although the realm is contaminated, it is common to the three natures (good, evil, and neutral), as well as sentient and non-sentient beings. Therefore, it cannot be used to prove the existence of the sentient differentiated result consciousness. The five roots in oneself show that one's own five roots are the image-component (xiàng fēn - image component) grasped by one's own eighth consciousness. It is not the extinguished image-component and the five roots and supports of other bodies, etc. This explains that the five roots and supports of other bodies are not the image-component of one's own eighth consciousness, and one's own eighth consciousness does not grasp them. The Sarvastivada (Sà pó duō - Sarvastivada) school believes that it is not the past and the future. In the past and future lives, it is not called grasping, so it is called non-past and non-future. If the past and the future are not mentioned, there is no substance, so it is called non-past and non-future. This is the view of the Abhidharma-kosa (Jù shě lùn - Abhidharma-kosa).
云。十八界中九無執受。謂七心界．聲界．法界。所餘九界各通二種。謂眼等根住現在世名有執受。過去．未來名無執受。色．香．味．觸住現在世不離五根名有執受。若住現在非不離根。過去．未來名無執受。如在身內除與根合發毛爪齒大小便利洟唾血等。及在身外故地．水等中色．香．味．觸。雖復現在而無執受 正理論云。有餘師說不離根聲五有執受 問住無心位現在五根何名執受 答執受類故亦名執受 若爾過．未應名執受 此難不然現在五根容有發識名有執受。過．未不然 又解現根識不起時名無執受。依現發識說有執受。不言現在唯執受故。如定道戒能造大種。雖不離身亦是現在。而無執受。五根亦爾 前師釋方。定道大種在定即有。出定即無。名無執受。五根相續與彼不同 疏依前義。有斷後勝 詳曰。既未明文二皆有理。任意取之。
疏。縱第七識亦現緣起者。此釋伏難。難方。若任運生即能執受第七應爾。故此文生。由第七識有覆無記非先業引。故現緣生不名能執。
論。唯異熟心至無如是義者。按瑜伽論五十一中。由五因故顯能執受是阿賴耶。疏雖已引然與本文多小有異。乍披難辨故重引之。論云謂阿賴耶識先世所造業行為因。眼等轉識于現在世眾緣為因。如說根及境界作意力故諸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：十八界（dhatus）中，有九界沒有執受（upadana）。哪些呢？答：七個心界（citta-dhatu）、聲界（sadda-dhatu）、法界（dhamma-dhatu）。其餘九界各有兩種情況：眼等根（eye, etc., faculties）住在現在世（present time）時，稱為有執受；過去世（past time）、未來世（future time）時，稱為無執受。色（rupa）、香（gandha）、味（rasa）、觸（photthabba）住在現在世，不離五根（five faculties）時，稱為有執受；如果住在現在世，但並非不離五根，或者住在過去世、未來世時，稱為無執受。例如，在身內，除了與根結合的發毛爪齒大小便利涕唾血等，以及在身外，如地（earth）、水（water）等中的色、香、味、觸，即使是現在世，也沒有執受。《正理論》（Abhidharma-nyayanusara）說：『有其他老師說，不離根的聲，也屬於五種有執受。』問：住在無心位（no-mind state）時，現在的五根，如何稱為執受？答：因為是執受的同類，所以也稱為執受。問：如果這樣，過去、未來也應該稱為執受？答：這個難點不對。現在的五根，容許有發識（consciousness arising）的情況，所以稱為有執受；過去、未來則不然。又有一種解釋，現在的根，在識不起作用時，稱為無執受。依據現在發識的情況，說為有執受，並非說現在只有執受。例如，定（samadhi）、道（path）、戒（sila）能造大種（mahābhūta），雖然不離身，也是現在世，但沒有執受。五根也是如此。』前一位老師解釋說：『定、道的大種，在入定時就有，出定時就沒有，所以稱為無執受。五根的相續與此不同。』疏文依據前一種意義，認為后一種解釋更好。詳細地說，既然沒有明確的文字說明，兩種說法都有道理，可以任意選擇。 疏文：『即使第七識（manas）也是現緣生起，』這是爲了解釋一個潛在的難題。難題是：如果第七識是任運生（spontaneous arising），那麼它也應該能執受。因此，這段文字就產生了。由於第七識是有覆無記（obscured and indeterminate），不是由先前的業力（karma）所引導，所以現緣生起不能稱為能執。 《論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）：『只有異熟心（vipaka-citta）……沒有這樣的意義。』按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十一卷中的說法，由於五個原因，顯示能執受的是阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana）。疏文雖然已經引用，但與本文多多少少有些不同，乍一看難以分辨，所以重新引用。論中說：『阿賴耶識以先世所造的業行為因，眼等轉識（transforming consciousness）以現在世的各種因緣為因，如所說，根（root）、境界（object）、作意（attention）的力量，都是諸
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Among the eighteen realms (dhatus), nine have no grasping (upadana). Which are they? Answer: The seven mind-realms (citta-dhatu), the sound-realm (sadda-dhatu), and the dharma-realm (dhamma-dhatu). The remaining nine realms each have two conditions: when the faculties such as the eye (eye, etc., faculties) reside in the present time, they are called having grasping; when they are in the past time or future time, they are called without grasping. Form (rupa), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), and touch (photthabba) when residing in the present time and not separate from the five faculties (five faculties), are called having grasping; if they reside in the present time but are not inseparable from the five faculties, or if they reside in the past time or future time, they are called without grasping. For example, within the body, except for hair, body hair, nails, teeth, feces, urine, mucus, saliva, blood, etc., which are combined with the faculties, and outside the body, such as form, smell, taste, and touch in earth (earth), water (water), etc., even if they are in the present time, they have no grasping. The Abhidharma-nyayanusara says: 'Some other teachers say that sound, which is inseparable from the faculties, also belongs to the five types of having grasping.' Question: When residing in a state of no-mind (no-mind state), how are the present five faculties called grasping? Answer: Because they are of the same kind as grasping, they are also called grasping. Question: If so, should the past and future also be called grasping? Answer: This difficulty is not correct. The present five faculties allow for the condition of consciousness arising (consciousness arising), so they are called having grasping; the past and future are not so. Another explanation is that the present faculties, when consciousness does not arise, are called without grasping. Based on the condition of consciousness arising in the present, it is said to have grasping, not that only grasping exists in the present. For example, samadhi (samadhi), the path (path), and precepts (sila) can create the great elements (mahābhūta), although they are inseparable from the body and are also in the present time, they have no grasping. The five faculties are also like this.' The previous teacher explained: 'The great elements of samadhi and the path exist when entering samadhi, and do not exist when exiting samadhi, so they are called without grasping. The continuity of the five faculties is different from this.' The commentary relies on the former meaning, considering the latter explanation to be better. In detail, since there is no clear textual explanation, both statements are reasonable and can be chosen arbitrarily. Commentary: 'Even if the seventh consciousness (manas) also arises from present conditions,' this is to explain a potential difficulty. The difficulty is: if the seventh consciousness arises spontaneously (spontaneous arising), then it should also be able to grasp. Therefore, this passage arises. Because the seventh consciousness is obscured and indeterminate (obscured and indeterminate), and is not guided by previous karma (karma), its arising from present conditions cannot be called able to grasp. The Abhidharma-samuccaya: 'Only the resultant consciousness (vipaka-citta)... does not have such a meaning.' According to the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, due to five reasons, it is shown that the Alaya-consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is able to grasp. Although the commentary has already quoted it, it is more or less different from this text, and it is difficult to distinguish at first glance, so it is quoted again. The treatise says: 'The Alaya-consciousness takes the actions of karma created in previous lives as its cause, and the transforming consciousness (transforming consciousness) such as the eye takes various conditions in the present life as its cause, as it is said, the power of the root (root), object (object), and attention (attention) are all
轉識生。乃至廣說。
是名初因 又六識身有善．不善等性可得 是第二因 又六識身無覆無記異熟所攝類不可得 是第三因 又六識身各別依轉。于彼彼依彼彼識轉。即彼所依應有執受余無執受不應道理。設許執受亦不應理。識遠離故 是第四因 又所依止應成數數執受過失。所以者何。由彼眼識於一時轉一時不轉余識亦爾 是第五因。
論。此言意顯至執受等者。問前正執具此簡言濫何但有三 答具如疏．燈。有義簡濫文中應先標難。謂外難云。若唯異熟能執受者。諸佛報身應無執受。無異熟故。故答如論。但三義者前顯執受有漏根故。故五義簡。今顯執受無漏根身故但說三。佛凈第八非業所引。是善性故無初二因。若依疏說。此但應言眼等轉識無如是義。何須重舉。一類等三與燈所說大意相似。然少有異。思可知也。
論。非諸色根等者。對破二宗具如疏明。有義疏說色根。正破經部本計色根亦能持種及受熏故。不相應行別說命根．及眾同分。正破一切有部。經部無別不相應故 今解不然。經部色根雖能持種。既無所緣。理不應是能執受故。一切有宗但說色根．及根依處是有執受。命根．同分非能所受。亦不說是能執受故。故今別說色根非執。遮破經部。不相應行。遮薩婆多 又解此文通遮
【現代漢語翻譯】 轉識生，乃至廣說。
是名初因。又六識身有善、不善等性可得，是第二因。又六識身無覆無記異熟所攝類不可得，是第三因。又六識身各別依轉。于彼彼依彼彼識轉，即彼所依應有執受，余無執受不應道理。設許執受亦不應理，識遠離故，是第四因。又所依止應成數數執受過失。所以者何？由彼眼識於一時轉一時不轉，余識亦爾，是第五因。
論：此言意顯至執受等者。問：前正執具此簡言濫何但有三？答：具如疏、燈。有義簡濫文中應先標難，謂外難云：『若唯異熟能執受者，諸佛報身應無執受，無異熟故。』故答如論。但三義者前顯執受有漏根故，故五義簡。今顯執受無漏根身故但說三。佛凈第八非業所引，是善性故無初二因。若依疏說，此但應言眼等轉識無如是義，何須重舉？一類等三與燈所說大意相似，然少有異，思可知也。
論：非諸色根等者。對破二宗具如疏明。有義疏說色根，正破經部本計色根亦能持種及受熏故。不相應行別說命根、及眾同分，正破一切有部。經部無別不相應故。今解不然，經部色根雖能持種，既無所緣，理不應是能執受故。一切有宗但說色根、及根依處是有執受。命根、同分非能所受，亦不說是能執受故。故今別說色根非執，遮破經部。不相應行，遮薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）。又解此文通遮
【English Translation】 The transformation of consciousness arises, and so on, as extensively explained.
This is called the first cause. Furthermore, the six consciousnesses (六識身) have the nature of good and non-good, which can be obtained; this is the second cause. Furthermore, the category of the six consciousnesses that are neither obscured nor indeterminate and are included in the fruition of karma (異熟) cannot be obtained; this is the third cause. Furthermore, the six consciousnesses each rely on a separate basis for their transformation. Upon that basis, that consciousness transforms. That which is relied upon should have apprehension (執受), while that which does not rely should not have apprehension, which is unreasonable. Even if apprehension is permitted, it is still unreasonable because consciousness is far removed; this is the fourth cause. Furthermore, the basis of reliance should become a fault of repeated apprehension. Why? Because that eye consciousness transforms at one time and does not transform at another time, and the same is true for the other consciousnesses; this is the fifth cause.
Treatise: 'These words mean to clarify up to apprehension, etc.' Question: 'The previous correct apprehension possesses this concise statement, but why are there only three faults?' Answer: 'It is fully explained in the commentary and the lamp.' Some say that the difficulty should be stated first in the section on concise faults, namely, the external difficulty: 'If only the fruition of karma can apprehend, then the reward body of all Buddhas should have no apprehension because there is no fruition of karma.' Therefore, the answer is as in the treatise. The reason for only three meanings is that the previous apprehension reveals the root of leakage (有漏根), so the five meanings are concise. Now it reveals the root body of non-leakage (無漏根) of apprehension, so only three are mentioned. The pure eighth consciousness of the Buddha is not induced by karma and is of good nature, so there are no first two causes. If based on the commentary, it should only be said that the transformation of consciousness of the eye, etc., does not have such a meaning. Why repeat it? The three, such as 'one category,' are similar in general meaning to what is said in the lamp, but there are slight differences, which can be understood through thought.
Treatise: 'Not the material roots, etc.' It refutes the two schools in detail, as explained in the commentary. Some say that the commentary speaks of the material roots to directly refute the fundamental view of the Sautrantika (經部), which holds that the material roots can also hold seeds and receive熏習. The non-corresponding formations separately mention the life faculty (命根) and the commonality of beings (眾同分) to directly refute the Sarvastivada (一切有部). The Sautrantika has no separate non-corresponding formations. Now, the explanation is not so. Although the material roots of the Sautrantika can hold seeds, since they have no object of cognition, it is unreasonable for them to be able to apprehend. The Sarvastivada only says that the material roots and the place where the roots rely have apprehension. The life faculty and the commonality of beings are not what is received, nor are they said to be able to apprehend. Therefore, it is now separately stated that the material roots are not apprehension to refute the Sautrantika. The non-corresponding formations refute the Sarvastivada. Another explanation is that this text universally refutes.
二部。但非正破。皆無有失 詳曰。疏中但云破經．有部而無正言。此乃加言妄出過也。又設言正。理亦何爽。由經部師許色根等持種受熏故。色根等對彼名正。不言他許色根執受對之名正。有部準此。又言通遮亦為不可。不相應行持種之事二部無差。何假雙遮。無義而言恐繁翰墨。
疏。身僵仆者。僵猶作也。仆猶合也。
疏。此喻有失至非能持識故者。問喻何失耶 答所立不成。依論量云。異熟識者是宗有法。可立為持壽．暖識是法。猶如壽．暖而是其喻。因法可知。壽．暖喻上無彼可持壽暖識法。以彼壽．暖而體不是持壽．暖識故成其過。故疏釋云以壽．暖非持壽．暖識故。
疏。我前所言至以暖為理者。我前若言轉識不遍而不能持。汝可舉暖不遍為例。但說轉識間斷不持。何得以暖不遍為例。
疏。此亦不然至及非無漏者。外質意云。若識．壽．暖俱能持故。難識同餘不通三性．及於無漏。亦應壽．暖俱能持故。暖同於壽暖不是暖。暖雖能持不同於壽。而得名暖。識雖能持不同餘二。而通三性及於無漏。
疏。此意不然至例成失者。此解意云。前難意者不可無漏能持有漏。餘二能持有漏之法。既是有漏識應同彼。難三性意義亦同前。豈可以將三性等難。乘難壽等一切合同。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二部（指經量部和有部，佛教中的兩個部派）。但並非直接駁斥，都沒有錯誤。詳細地說，疏文中只說駁斥經部和有部，而沒有正面言辭。這乃是妄加言辭的過失。又假設有正面言辭，道理又有什麼損害呢？由於經部師（Sautrāntika）允許色根（Śukla-indriya，凈色根）等持有種子並接受熏習的緣故，色根等對於他們來說可以稱為『正』。並不是說其他人允許色根執受才稱之為『正』。有部（Sarvāstivāda）也照此推論。又說全部遮止也是不可以的，不相應行（Citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra）持有種子這件事，二部沒有差別，為何要全部遮止呢？沒有意義而言說，恐怕只是徒增筆墨。
疏：身僵仆者。僵，就是作的意思；仆，就是合的意思。
疏：此比喻有缺失，以至於不能持有識的緣故。問：比喻有什麼缺失呢？答：所要建立的不能成立。依照論的量式來說：異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）是宗（Pakṣa，論題）上的有法（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物），可以立為持有壽（Āyus，壽命）、暖（Uṣman，體溫）、識（Vijñāna，意識）的法（dharma，性質），猶如壽、暖是它的比喻。因法（hetu-dharma，作為理由的性質）可以知道。壽、暖這個比喻上沒有那個可以持有壽暖識的法，因為壽、暖的體性不是持有壽暖識的緣故，所以構成了過失。所以疏文解釋說，因為壽、暖不是持有壽暖識的緣故。
疏：我前面所說，以至於以暖為理由。我前面如果說轉識（Pravṛtti-vijñāna，現行識）不周遍而不能持有，你可以舉暖不周遍為例。但（我）只是說轉識間斷而不持有，怎麼可以用暖不周遍為例呢？
疏：這也是不對的，以至於及非無漏。外質（對方）的意思是：如果識、壽、暖都能持有，那麼難（責難）識和其餘的不通三性（善、惡、無記），以及不能成為無漏。也應該壽、暖都能持有，暖和壽暖不同，不是暖。暖雖然能持有，但和壽不同，而得名為暖。識雖然能持有，但和其餘二者不同，而通於三性以及成為無漏。
疏：這個意思不對，以至於例成失。這個解釋的意思是：前面責難的意思是不可無漏能持有漏，其餘二者能持有漏的法。既然是有漏，識應該和它們一樣。責難三性的意義也和前面一樣。怎麼可以將三性等責難，乘著責難壽等一切都相同？
【English Translation】 English version: The two schools (referring to Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda, two schools in Buddhism). But it's not a direct refutation, and there are no errors. In detail, the commentary only says it refutes the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda, without any positive statements. This is an excessive and unfounded statement. Furthermore, even if there were positive statements, what harm would it cause to the reasoning? Because the Sautrāntika masters allow Śukla-indriya (pure sense faculties) and others to hold seeds and receive熏習 (vāsanā, influence), Śukla-indriya and others can be called 'correct' for them. It doesn't mean that others allow Śukla-indriya to grasp and then call it 'correct.' The Sarvāstivāda should also be inferred in this way. Furthermore, saying that all are negated is also unacceptable. There is no difference between the two schools regarding the matter of Citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra (non-associated formations) holding seeds. Why should all be negated? Speaking without meaning only increases the ink.
Commentary: 'The body is stiff and fallen.' 'Stiff' means 'to do'; 'fallen' means 'to combine'.
Commentary: 'This analogy has a flaw, to the point that it cannot hold consciousness.' Question: What is the flaw in the analogy? Answer: What is to be established cannot be established. According to the logical form of the treatise: Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is the dharmin (subject possessing a certain property) on the Pakṣa (thesis), and can be established as the dharma (property) of holding Āyus (lifespan), Uṣman (warmth), and Vijñāna (consciousness), just like Āyus and Uṣman are its analogy. The hetu-dharma (reasoning property) can be known. On the analogy of Āyus and Uṣman, there is no dharma that can hold Āyus, Uṣman, and Vijñāna, because the nature of Āyus and Uṣman is not to hold Āyus, Uṣman, and Vijñāna, so it constitutes a flaw. Therefore, the commentary explains that it is because Āyus and Uṣman do not hold Āyus, Uṣman, and Vijñāna.
Commentary: 'What I said before, to the point of using warmth as a reason.' If I said before that Pravṛtti-vijñāna (active consciousness) is not pervasive and cannot hold, you can cite the example of warmth not being pervasive. But (I) only said that Pravṛtti-vijñāna is intermittent and does not hold, how can you use the example of warmth not being pervasive?
Commentary: 'This is also incorrect, to the point of and not being unconditioned.' The meaning of the external questioner is: If consciousness, lifespan, and warmth can all hold, then it is difficult (to argue) that consciousness is the same as the others, not encompassing the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), and not being able to become unconditioned. It should also be that lifespan and warmth can all hold, warmth is different from lifespan and warmth, and is not warmth. Although warmth can hold, it is different from lifespan, and is named warmth. Although consciousness can hold, it is different from the other two, and encompasses the three natures and becomes unconditioned.
Commentary: 'This meaning is incorrect, to the point of the example becoming a flaw.' The meaning of this explanation is: The meaning of the previous criticism is that it is impossible for the unconditioned to hold the conditioned, and the other two can hold the conditioned dharma. Since it is conditioned, consciousness should be the same as them. The meaning of criticizing the three natures is also the same as before. How can the criticism of the three natures, along with the criticism of lifespan, etc., all be the same?
疏。若無持者即便失壞者。種若無彼現識持之。即便失壞。
疏。心惛昧闇劣性者。有義此位無心如何闇劣。解云。即於前位身心惛昧故至后念心等不行。此說所因非無心位。然此立因應云身心極惛昧故。不爾不定。有心睡眠亦惛昧故 詳曰。非無其義。然對有心明勝之位。無心名闇劣。劣謂無力不生現故。如呼日沒名為闇者。復爽何理。若言后念方無心者。喻闕能立。文中既云極悶絕時。極言通上。文巧便也。不煩更置。
疏。此文可然言無餘故者。此唯識文望第一釋理可然也 言無餘者釋可然理。即此論云。謂生．死時顯無轉識 而有疏本云宗無餘。宗字誤也。合是言字。
疏。即以此文證有第六者。此對法論以無記心命終之文而為證也 或可。即以此所引經而為證也。經云生．死必住散心。散心之言而目第六。若不爾者第八元有。何勞更說。前說為本。順疏文也。若別為釋后亦無違。
疏。次難陀等至譽美方今者。此舉信彼惛昧因人。對上諸賢故云次也。
疏。無識之以儔等者。此乃生下大乘異說信彼之人 或難陀等下總明是信大乘異說。前釋為正。
疏。無心別起至必應爾故者。親疏合說不離三因。如聞教等緣于塵等。即疏依三。親可知也。
疏。若彼伏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
疏：如果不存在『持者』（dhāraka，能保持事物不失壞者），事物就會失壞。種子如果沒有『現識』（vartamāna-vijñāna，當下生起的意識）的保持，就會失壞。 疏：『心惛昧闇劣性者』（citta mūrchāndha durbala svabhāva，心昏沉、昧暗、低劣的狀態）。有人認為，在這種狀態下沒有心，怎麼會有昏沉低劣呢？解釋說：正因為前一刻身心昏沉昧暗，所以導致后一念心等無法運作。這裡說的是原因，並非無心狀態。然而，這裡立論的原因應該說是『身心極度昏沉昧暗』。否則，這個原因不成立，因為有心睡眠時也會昏沉昧暗。詳細地說，並非沒有道理。然而，相對於有心明勝的狀態，無心就被稱為昏沉低劣。『劣』指的是無力，無法產生顯現。就像稱太陽落山為『黑暗』一樣，又有什麼不合理呢？如果說后一念才沒有心，這個比喻就缺乏能成立的條件。文中既然說『極悶絕時』，『極』字貫通上下，這是文辭的巧妙之處，不必再作更改。 疏：『此文可然言無餘故者』（idam vacanam yuktam niravaśeṣatvāt uktam，這句話是正確的，因為它說的是沒有剩餘）。這段《唯識》的文字，從第一種解釋的道理來看是正確的。『言無餘者』（niravaśeṣatvāt uktam，說的是沒有剩餘），解釋了『可然』（yuktam，正確）的道理。即此論說：『所謂生、死時，顯現沒有轉識』（janma maraṇa kāle sphuṭam vijñāna nāsti，在出生和死亡的時候，沒有轉識顯現）。而有的疏本寫的是『宗無餘』（pakṣa niravaśeṣa，宗沒有剩餘），『宗』字是錯誤的，應該是『言』字。 疏：『即以此文證有第六者』（anena vacanena ṣaṣṭham vijñānam asti iti siddham，用這段文字來證明有第六識）。這段《對法論》用無記心命終的文字作為證據。或者，也可以說，就是用這段引用的經文作為證據。經文說：『生、死必住散心』（janma maraṇa kāle vikṣipta cittam bhavati，出生和死亡的時候，一定是處在散亂的心中）。『散心』（vikṣipta cittam，散亂的心）指的就是第六識。如果不是這樣，第八識本來就存在，何必多說呢？前面的解釋是根本，順應疏文。如果另外解釋，後面也沒有衝突。 疏：『次難陀等至譽美方今者』（tataḥ nanda ādi stutiḥ adhunā，接下來是讚美難陀等人）。這裡舉出相信昏昧因果的人，與上面的諸位賢者相對，所以說是『次』。 疏：『無識之以儔等者』（acetanāḥ sadṛśāḥ，無意識的同伴）。這是生起下乘佛教不同說法，相信那些說法的人。或者說，『難陀等下』（nanda ādi，難陀等）總的來說是相信大乘佛教的不同說法。前面的解釋是正確的。 疏：『無心別起至必應爾故者』（acetanāḥ pṛthag utpadyante avaśyam eva，無心狀態分別生起，必然如此）。親疏結合起來說，不離三種原因，如聽聞教法等，緣于塵等。疏文依據這三種原因，親近的原因是可以知道的。 疏：如果他們屈服
【English Translation】 English version
Commentary: If there is no 'holder' (dhāraka, that which maintains things from being destroyed), then things will be destroyed. If a seed does not have the maintenance of 'present consciousness' (vartamāna-vijñāna, the consciousness that arises in the present moment), it will be destroyed. Commentary: 'The nature of a mind that is confused, darkened, and inferior' (citta mūrchāndha durbala svabhāva, the state of mind being confused, darkened, and inferior). Some argue that in this state there is no mind, so how can there be confusion and inferiority? The explanation is that it is precisely because the body and mind were confused and darkened in the previous moment that the subsequent moment's mind and so on cannot function. This speaks of the cause, not a state of no-mind. However, the reason for this argument should be 'the body and mind are extremely confused and darkened'. Otherwise, this reason is not established, because even in mindful sleep, there is confusion and darkness. In detail, it is not without reason. However, relative to the state of having a mindful and superior mind, no-mind is called confused and inferior. 'Inferior' refers to being powerless, unable to produce manifestation. Just as calling the sunset 'darkness', what is unreasonable about that? If it is said that there is no mind only in the subsequent moment, this metaphor lacks the conditions to be established. Since the text says 'at the time of extreme faintness and cessation', the word 'extreme' connects above and below, which is the subtlety of the text, and there is no need to change it. Commentary: 'This statement is acceptable because it speaks of nothing remaining' (idam vacanam yuktam niravaśeṣatvāt uktam, this statement is correct because it speaks of nothing remaining). This passage from the Consciousness-Only text is acceptable from the perspective of the first interpretation. 'Speaks of nothing remaining' (niravaśeṣatvāt uktam, speaks of nothing remaining) explains the reason for 'acceptable' (yuktam, correct). That is, this treatise says: 'So-called at the time of birth and death, it is evident that there is no transforming consciousness' (janma maraṇa kāle sphuṭam vijñāna nāsti, at the time of birth and death, there is no transforming consciousness manifested). And some commentary versions write 'doctrine of nothing remaining' (pakṣa niravaśeṣa, doctrine of nothing remaining), the word 'doctrine' is wrong, it should be the word 'statement'. Commentary: 'That is, using this passage to prove that there is a sixth consciousness' (anena vacanena ṣaṣṭham vijñānam asti iti siddham, using this passage to prove that there is a sixth consciousness). This Abhidharma treatise uses the passage about dying with an indeterminate mind as evidence. Or, it can be said that it is using this quoted scripture as evidence. The scripture says: 'At the time of birth and death, one must dwell in a scattered mind' (janma maraṇa kāle vikṣipta cittam bhavati, at the time of birth and death, one must dwell in a scattered mind). 'Scattered mind' (vikṣipta cittam, scattered mind) refers to the sixth consciousness. If it were not so, the eighth consciousness would already exist, why say more? The previous explanation is fundamental, in accordance with the commentary text. If explained separately, there is no conflict later. Commentary: 'Next, Nanda and others praise the present' (tataḥ nanda ādi stutiḥ adhunā, next, Nanda and others praise the present). Here, those who believe in the cause and effect of confusion are mentioned, in contrast to the virtuous ones above, so it is said 'next'. Commentary: 'Unconscious companions' (acetanāḥ sadṛśāḥ, unconscious companions). This is the arising of different teachings of the Lesser Vehicle, those who believe in those teachings. Or, 'Nanda and others' (nanda ādi, Nanda and others) generally refers to believing in different teachings of the Mahayana. The previous explanation is correct. Commentary: 'Unconscious states arise separately, it must be so' (acetanāḥ pṛthag utpadyante avaśyam eva, unconscious states arise separately, it must be so). Combining the close and distant causes, it does not depart from the three causes, such as hearing the teachings, which are conditioned by dust and so on. The commentary relies on these three causes, and the close cause can be known. Commentary: If they succumb
言至無散意者。此救意云。即第八識受彼生已不起散意已次第六即起定心。定心既有複意得生。
疏。或生得善引生方起者。問此生得善豈非思等。何須別說 答生得因修。思等加行。何得同也。又寬狹別。生得善心通於三界。思等不遍。
疏。即以汝因還復破汝者。彼言意識行．緣難了。今者取彼難了之義。破彼所執。而非意識。
論。應知即是此第八識等者。無著攝論三因破之。此論但一故。彼論第三云。又即與彼和合之識是意識性不應道理。依染污故。時無斷故。意識所緣不可得故 無性釋云。依染污者由立宗門。顯與彼法自相相違。謂共決定故有三釋。一云依染污者而是宗法。今以為因與彼小乘意識宗法。作法自相相違過也。二云大乘立和合識非是意為宗法門。小乘所立是意識性為法自相。依染污因違彼自相。三云依染污等實是因門。為宗門者。由論主立初和合識依染污示彼外人。外人即許更不立因。以此所立依染污宗門。與彼外人作是意識宗法自相相違之過。依正道理初和合識有法宗上有二種法。一依染污。二非意識。有染污處必有非意宗法性隨。外人雖許初和合識恒依染污。然和合識即是意識。猶如聲上有所作因。無常宗隨即與聲上常宗之法自相相違 問若依染污為宗中法立量云何。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『言至無散意者』。這是救意（sāvae意指第七識，末那識）的說法。意思是說，第八識（ālaya識，阿賴耶識）接受了那個生（指新的生命或存在）之後，不再產生散亂的意念，然後第六識（manovijñāna，意識）就生起定心。既然有了定心，複意（指第七識，末那識）才能產生。
疏：『或生得善引生方起者』。問：這種生得的善（sahaja-kuśala，與生俱來的善）難道不是思等（指思惟等心理活動）嗎？為什麼需要特別說明？答：生得是因修（hetu-bhāvanā，通過修行產生的因），而思等是加行（prayoga，努力），怎麼能相同呢？而且，範圍也不同。生得的善心遍及三界（trayo dhātavaḥ，欲界、色界、無色界），而思等則不遍及。
疏：『即以汝因還復破汝者』。他們說意識（vijñāna，意識）的行相和所緣難以瞭解。現在我們取用他們所說的難以瞭解的意義，來破斥他們的執著，但並非說這就是意識。
論：『應知即是此第八識等者』。無著（Asaṅga）在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中用三種理由來破斥。而此論只用一種理由。彼論（指《攝大乘論》）第三種理由說：『又與彼和合的識是意識的性質，這不合道理，因為它依染污（kliṣṭa，煩惱）的緣故，因為時間上沒有間斷的緣故，因為意識所緣是不可得的緣故。』無性（Asvabhāva）解釋說：『依染污者，是通過立宗門（pakṣa，論題）來顯示與彼法（指小乘的意識）自相矛盾。所謂共同決定，有三種解釋。第一種解釋是，依染污者，而是宗法（pakṣa-dharma，論題的性質）。現在把它作為因（hetu，理由），與小乘的意識宗法，構成法自相矛盾的過失。第二種解釋是，大乘所立的和合識不是意（manas，末那識）作為宗法門。小乘所立的是意識性作為法自相。依染污的因違反了他們的自相。第三種解釋是，依染污等實際上是因門。作為宗門，是因為論主（指作者）所立的最初和合識依染污來向外人展示。外人立即認可，不再立因。因此，這個所立的依染污宗門，與外人所說的意識宗法構成自相矛盾的過失。依照正確的道理，最初的和合識在有法宗（dharmin，具有性質的事物）上有兩種法：一是依染污，二是非意識。有染污的地方必然有非意的宗法性質相隨。外人雖然承認最初的和合識恒常依染污，然而和合識就是意識，猶如聲音上有能作的因，無常的宗法隨即與聲音上有常的宗法自相矛盾。』問：如果依染污作為宗中的法來立量（anumāna，推理），應該怎麼說？』
【English Translation】 English version:
『Words reaching a state without scattered intention.』 This is the explanation of Sāvae (意, referring to the seventh consciousness, Manas). It means that after the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) receives that birth (referring to a new life or existence), it no longer generates scattered thoughts, and then the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna) arises with a concentrated mind. Since there is a concentrated mind, the returning intention (referring to the seventh consciousness, Manas) can arise.
Commentary: 『Or those who are born with goodness, leading to arising.』 Question: Isn't this innate goodness (Sahaja-kuśala) the same as thinking and so on? Why is it necessary to explain it separately? Answer: Innate goodness is the cause of cultivation (Hetu-bhāvanā), while thinking and so on are efforts (Prayoga). How can they be the same? Moreover, the scope is different. Innate goodness pervades the three realms (Trayo Dhātavaḥ: the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm), while thinking and so on do not pervade them.
Commentary: 『Using your own cause to refute you.』 They say that the activities and objects of consciousness (Vijñāna) are difficult to understand. Now we take the meaning of what they say is difficult to understand to refute their attachment, but it does not mean that this is consciousness.
Treatise: 『It should be known that this is the eighth consciousness and so on.』 Asaṅga refuted it with three reasons in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana). This treatise only uses one reason. The third reason in that treatise says: 『Moreover, the consciousness that is combined with it is the nature of consciousness, which is unreasonable because it relies on defilement (Kliṣṭa), because there is no interruption in time, and because the object of consciousness is unattainable.』 Asvabhāva explains: 『Relying on defilement is to show the contradiction between the establishment of the thesis (Pakṣa) and the nature of that Dharma (referring to the consciousness of the Hinayana). The so-called common decision has three explanations. The first explanation is that relying on defilement is the property of the thesis (Pakṣa-dharma). Now, taking it as a reason (Hetu), it constitutes a fault of self-contradiction with the consciousness doctrine of the Hinayana. The second explanation is that the combined consciousness established by the Mahayana is not the mind (Manas) as the thesis. What the Hinayana establishes is the nature of consciousness as its own nature. The cause of relying on defilement violates their own nature. The third explanation is that relying on defilement is actually the cause. As the thesis, it is because the author establishes the initial combined consciousness relying on defilement to show it to outsiders. The outsiders immediately agree and no longer establish a cause. Therefore, this established thesis of relying on defilement constitutes a fault of self-contradiction with the consciousness doctrine stated by the outsiders. According to the correct reasoning, the initial combined consciousness has two properties in the subject (Dharmin): one is relying on defilement, and the other is non-consciousness. Where there is defilement, there must be the property of non-mind following. Although outsiders admit that the initial combined consciousness always relies on defilement, the combined consciousness is consciousness, just as there is a cause of action on sound, and the property of impermanence immediately contradicts the property of permanence on sound.』 Question: If relying on defilement is established as a property in the thesis, how should the inference (Anumāna) be stated?'
答量云。初和合識定依染污。由能執持名色等故。猶如命根。由此依彼染污之言。于望論主自立即宗。若望破他即是因也 問破他云何 答量云。初和合識非是意識。依染污故。猶如命根 詳曰。第二理勝。以本論云又即與彼和合之識是意識性不應道理依染污故故知依染但名為因。是意識性不應理者乃是宗法。然釋于文。語猶未備。故今釋云。由前兩家立於宗法。顯知染污與敵宗法自相相違。何以爾者。夫相違因與宗相違法作因也。若也不見二之別宗。因望於何名相違也。由此故說由立宗言。又相違因立敵共許。不爾其因即隨一攝。為簡隨一言共決定。故本論云。識羯邏藍更相和合若即意識。此牒他宗。又云若此和合識是一切種識。即是阿賴耶識。此即破他自立宗也。故知無性言立宗門。不說染污是宗法也。又無性云。如是結生相續時識於一切處．種類．時分皆依染污。即中有攝後心為依。此所依心生有為境。於一切處．種類．時分是染污故。能依之識非是意識。由此越于意識法故。或有說言。與四煩惱恒相應心名染污依。釋曰。初受生時與羯邏藍和合之識。於三界處．四生種類．三世時分皆依染污。言中有等此出所依染污之體 問生無色界既無中有以何為依 答此中且據故色者說。若生無色以命終心俱生我愛為遠所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：答：量（pramāṇa，衡量）。最初的和合識（samudaya-vijñāna，集合意識）是基於染污（klesha，煩惱）的。因為它能夠執持名色（nāma-rūpa，精神和物質），就像命根（jīvitendriya，生命力）一樣。因此，基於染污的說法，對於望論主（vādī，辯論者）來說，是自己成立的宗（paksha，主張）。如果用來駁斥他人，那就是因（hetu，理由）。 問：如何駁斥他人？答：量云：最初的和合識不是意識（vijñāna，心識），因為它基於染污，就像命根一樣。 詳釋：第二種理由更勝一籌。因為本論（原經文）說：『又，與彼和合之識是意識性，不應道理，依染污故。』由此可知，基於染污僅僅是作為因。『是意識性，不應理者』才是宗法。然而，解釋這段文字，言語還不夠完備。所以現在解釋說，由於前兩家（指之前的兩種觀點）立於宗法，就明顯知道染污與敵宗的宗法自相矛盾。為什麼這樣說呢？因為相違因（viruddha-hetu，矛盾因）是與宗相違的法作為因。如果看不見二者的宗的差別，因又望向何處才能稱之為相違呢？因此才說由立宗而言。又，相違因的成立是敵方和己方都認可的。否則，這個因就屬於隨一（anya-tara，不確定）了。爲了簡別隨一，所以說是共同決定的。所以本論說：『識（vijñāna，心識）羯邏藍（kalala，凝滑）更相和合若即意識。』這是指責他宗。又說：『若此和合識是一切種識（sarva-bīja-vijñāna，一切種子識），即是阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，藏識）。』這就是駁斥他人，自己成立宗。 所以可知無性（Asanga，無著）所說的立宗門，並沒有說染污是宗法。又，無性說：『如是結生相續時識於一切處．種類．時分皆依染污。』即中有（antarābhava，中陰）攝取後心作為所依。這個所依的心生起有為境（saṃskṛta-dharma，有為法），在一切處．種類．時分都是染污的。能依的識不是意識。由此超越了意識的法。或者有人說，與四煩惱（catvāri kleśāḥ，四種煩惱）恒常相應的心叫做染污依。 解釋：最初受生時與羯邏藍和合的識，在三界處．四生種類．三世時分都基於染污。說中有等等，這是指出所依的染污的本體。問：生無色（arūpa，無色界）既然沒有中有，以什麼作為所依？答：這裡且根據故色者（有色身者）來說。如果生無色，以命終心俱生的我愛（ātma-sneha，對自我的執著）作為遠所依。
【English Translation】 English version: Answer: Pramāṇa (means of knowledge). The initial samudaya-vijñāna (aggregate consciousness) is based on kleśa (defilement). Because it can hold nāma-rūpa (name and form), just like jīvitendriya (life faculty). Therefore, the statement 'based on defilement' is the proponent's own established paksha (thesis). If used to refute others, it is a hetu (reason). Question: How to refute others? Answer: Pramāṇa says: The initial samudaya-vijñāna is not consciousness, because it is based on defilement, just like the life faculty. Detailed explanation: The second reason is superior. Because the original text says: 'Moreover, the consciousness that combines with it is of the nature of consciousness, which is unreasonable, because it is based on defilement.' From this, it can be known that 'based on defilement' is only used as a hetu. 'Being of the nature of consciousness is unreasonable' is the paksha-dharma (property of the thesis). However, the explanation of this text is not complete enough. Therefore, it is now explained that since the previous two views are based on paksha-dharma, it is clear that defilement contradicts the opponent's paksha-dharma. Why is this so? Because viruddha-hetu (contradictory reason) is a dharma that contradicts the thesis and serves as a reason. If the difference between the two theses is not seen, where does the reason look to be called contradictory? Therefore, it is said that it is based on the establishment of the thesis. Moreover, the establishment of viruddha-hetu is recognized by both the opponent and oneself. Otherwise, this reason belongs to anyatara (uncertainty). In order to distinguish anyatara, it is said to be jointly determined. Therefore, the original text says: 'If the vijñāna (consciousness) and kalala (embryo) combine and are consciousness.' This is to criticize the opponent's thesis. It also says: 'If this combined consciousness is sarva-bīja-vijñāna (all-seed consciousness), it is ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness).' This is to refute others and establish one's own thesis. Therefore, it can be known that Asanga's statement of establishing the thesis does not say that defilement is paksha-dharma. Furthermore, Asanga says: 'Thus, the consciousness at the time of rebirth and continuity is based on defilement in all places, types, and times.' That is, antarābhava (intermediate existence) takes the subsequent mind as its basis. This mind, which is the basis, gives rise to saṃskṛta-dharma (conditioned phenomena), and is defiled in all places, types, and times. The consciousness that relies on it is not consciousness. Therefore, it transcends the dharma of consciousness. Or some say that the mind that is constantly associated with the four kleśāḥ (four defilements) is called the defiled basis. Explanation: The consciousness that combines with kalala at the time of initial rebirth is based on defilement in the three realms, four types of birth, and three times. Saying 'antarābhava' etc., this points out the substance of the defilement on which it is based. Question: Since there is no antarābhava in arūpa (formless realm), what is the basis? Answer: Here, it is based on those with rūpa (form). If one is born in arūpa, ātma-sneha (self-love) that arises together with the dying mind is taken as the distant basis.
依。由此染因越彼所立意識宗法。以彼意識非一切處．種類．時分皆依染污。余師之義文可知也 問二師何意致此不同 答無間．俱有二依不同。各隨取一 問既是異類。何名無間 答望護法宗即為不可。余師無違。如下自釋。
時無斷者。無性釋云。由異熟性時無間斷。由此亦是遮是意識性。釋曰不但前因遮其意識。此亦是遮。若是意識時有間斷。初和合識即不如是。若初之識有間斷者。后時若起應名更生。廣如下引 意識所緣不可得知者。無性釋云。此義重增遮意識因。若是意識決定可得自所緣境。謂可了知。如中有位最後意識。已相續心所緣境界不可了知。故非意識。釋曰。染污因初。無斷第二。是第一增。故不可知是第二增故名重增。初和合位若是意識。自所緣境即令了知。既不可知。明知彼位識非是意。論文示法。思可知也 詳曰。觀論本．釋。量無明文。所以疏主斷前二因但直責也。古德以彼命根為喻而立其量。量如前辨。喻既論無。不假為量。又自第八亦不得成。他量破云。初生時識。非是第八。依染污故。猶如命根。彼此既同。何能遣過。由此故知直責為善 或可。作量論示方隅。略不言喻。我宗命根不定異八。汝命根喻所立不成。由斯作量理亦應通。義既多途任情取捨。時無斷因亦可以彼命
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：根據這一點，這種染污之因超越了他們所建立的意識宗的法則。因為他們的意識並非在所有處所、種類和時間段都依賴染污。其他老師的意義可以從文字中理解。問：兩位老師為何導致這種不同？答：無間和俱有這兩種依賴不同。各自選取其中一種。問：既然是異類，為何稱為無間？答：對於護法宗來說，這確實是不可以的。其他老師沒有違背，如下文的解釋。時間上沒有間斷。無性（Vasubandhu's commentator）的解釋是：由於異熟的性質，時間上沒有間斷。由此也遮止了它是意識的性質。解釋說：不僅是前面的原因遮止了它是意識，這個原因也遮止了。如果是意識，時間上會有間斷。最初的和合識就不是這樣。如果最初的識有間斷，那麼之後再產生就應該叫做更生。詳細內容如下文引用。意識所緣不可得知。無性解釋說：這個意義再次增加了遮止意識的原因。如果是意識，一定可以得到自己所緣的境界，也就是可以了知。比如中陰身（antarabhava）的最後意識。已經相續的心所緣的境界是不可了知的，所以不是意識。解釋說：染污因的最初，無間是第二。是第一重增加。所以不可知是第二重增加，所以叫做重增。最初和合的階段如果是意識，自己所緣的境界就應該可以了知。既然不可知，明顯知道那個階段的識不是意識。論文中展示了方法，可以思考得知。詳細地說，觀察論的原文和解釋，沒有明確的量（pramana）。所以疏主斷定前兩個原因只是直接責難。古代的賢者用命根（jīvitendriya）來比喻而建立量。量如前面辨析。比喻既然論中沒有，就不需要作為量。而且自己的第八識（ālaya-vijñāna）也無法成立。他人用量來破斥說：初生時的識，不是第八識，因為它依賴染污，就像命根一樣。彼此既然相同，怎麼能排除過失？因此知道直接責難是好的。或者，可以作量來論證，展示方法，省略了比喻。我宗的命根不一定是異於第八識的。你的命根比喻所立的觀點不能成立。因此作量在道理上也應該可以行得通。意義多種多樣，可以根據情況取捨。時間上沒有間斷的原因也可以用命根來比喻。 English version: Accordingly, this defiled cause transcends the established tenets of the Consciousness-only school (Vijñānavāda). This is because their consciousness is not dependent on defilement in all places, categories, and time periods. The meaning of other teachers can be understood from the text. Question: Why do these two teachers arrive at this difference? Answer: The difference lies in the two types of dependence: without interval (anantara) and co-existent (sahabhū). Each chooses one of them. Question: Since it is a different category, why is it called 'without interval'? Answer: From the perspective of the Dharma-protecting school (Dharmapāla's school), this is indeed unacceptable. Other teachers have no contradiction, as explained below. There is no interruption in time. Vasubandhu's commentator explains: Because of the nature of resultant maturation (vipāka), there is no interruption in time. This also negates that it is the nature of consciousness. The explanation says: Not only does the previous cause negate that it is consciousness, but this cause also negates it. If it were consciousness, there would be interruptions in time. The initial coalescent consciousness (prathama-samprayukta-citta) is not like that. If the initial consciousness has interruptions, then its subsequent arising should be called 're-birth'. The details are quoted below. The object of consciousness is unknowable. Vasubandhu's commentator explains: This meaning further increases the negation of the cause of consciousness. If it were consciousness, one would definitely be able to obtain the object of one's own perception, that is, it would be knowable. For example, the last consciousness in the intermediate state (antarabhava). The object of perception of the mind that has already continued is unknowable, therefore it is not consciousness. The explanation says: The initial defiled cause, without interruption, is the second. It is the first increase. Therefore, 'unknowable' is the second increase, so it is called 'double increase'. If the initial coalescent stage were consciousness, the object of its own perception should be knowable. Since it is unknowable, it is clear that the consciousness at that stage is not consciousness. The treatise demonstrates the method, which can be understood through contemplation. In detail, observing the original text and explanation of the treatise, there is no explicit proof (pramana). Therefore, the commentator concludes that the first two causes are merely direct accusations. Ancient sages used the life-faculty (jīvitendriya) as a metaphor to establish proof. The proof is as analyzed earlier. Since the metaphor is not in the treatise, it is not necessary to use it as proof. Moreover, one's own eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) cannot be established either. Others use proof to refute, saying: The consciousness at the time of initial birth is not the eighth consciousness, because it depends on defilement, just like the life-faculty. Since they are the same, how can one eliminate the fault? Therefore, it is known that direct accusation is good. Alternatively, one can make proof to demonstrate the method, omitting the metaphor. In our school, the life-faculty is not necessarily different from the eighth consciousness. Your metaphor of the life-faculty cannot establish the point. Therefore, making proof should also be logically valid. The meanings are diverse, and one can choose according to the situation. The cause of 'no interruption in time' can also be exemplified by the life-faculty.
【English Translation】 Accordingly, this defiled cause transcends the established tenets of the Consciousness-only school (Vijñānavāda). This is because their consciousness is not dependent on defilement in all places, categories, and time periods. The meaning of other teachers can be understood from the text. Question: Why do these two teachers arrive at this difference? Answer: The difference lies in the two types of dependence: without interval (anantara) and co-existent (sahabhū). Each chooses one of them. Question: Since it is a different category, why is it called 'without interval'? Answer: From the perspective of the Dharma-protecting school (Dharmapāla's school), this is indeed unacceptable. Other teachers have no contradiction, as explained below. There is no interruption in time. Vasubandhu's commentator explains: Because of the nature of resultant maturation (vipāka), there is no interruption in time. This also negates that it is the nature of consciousness. The explanation says: Not only does the previous cause negate that it is consciousness, but this cause also negates it. If it were consciousness, there would be interruptions in time. The initial coalescent consciousness (prathama-samprayukta-citta) is not like that. If the initial consciousness has interruptions, then its subsequent arising should be called 're-birth'. The details are quoted below. The object of consciousness is unknowable. Vasubandhu's commentator explains: This meaning further increases the negation of the cause of consciousness. If it were consciousness, one would definitely be able to obtain the object of one's own perception, that is, it would be knowable. For example, the last consciousness in the intermediate state (antarabhava). The object of perception of the mind that has already continued is unknowable, therefore it is not consciousness. The explanation says: The initial defiled cause, without interruption, is the second. It is the first increase. Therefore, 'unknowable' is the second increase, so it is called 'double increase'. If the initial coalescent stage were consciousness, the object of its own perception should be knowable. Since it is unknowable, it is clear that the consciousness at that stage is not consciousness. The treatise demonstrates the method, which can be understood through contemplation. In detail, observing the original text and explanation of the treatise, there is no explicit proof (pramana). Therefore, the commentator concludes that the first two causes are merely direct accusations. Ancient sages used the life-faculty (jīvitendriya) as a metaphor to establish proof. The proof is as analyzed earlier. Since the metaphor is not in the treatise, it is not necessary to use it as proof. Moreover, one's own eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) cannot be established either. Others use proof to refute, saying: The consciousness at the time of initial birth is not the eighth consciousness, because it depends on defilement, just like the life-faculty. Since they are the same, how can one eliminate the fault? Therefore, it is known that direct accusation is good. Alternatively, one can make proof to demonstrate the method, omitting the metaphor. In our school, the life-faculty is not necessarily different from the eighth consciousness. Your metaphor of the life-faculty cannot establish the point. Therefore, making proof should also be logically valid. The meanings are diverse, and one can choose according to the situation. The cause of 'no interruption in time' can also be exemplified by the life-faculty.
根為喻。
疏。又此所依是種子識等者。無著攝論云。設和合識即是意識。為此和合意識即是一切種子識。為依止此識所生余意識是一切種子識。若此和合識是一切種子識。即是阿賴耶識。汝以異名立為意識。
論。又將死時等者。按無著攝論云。又將沒時造善造惡。或下或上所依漸冷。無性釋云。若造善者即于其身下分漸冷。若造惡者與此相違。天親釋云。以造善者必定上升。若造惡者必定下墜。釋曰。表造善．惡生上下趣。所以冷觸上下有異 問瑜伽論云。識初托處即名完心。即從此處最後捨命。何乃不同 答有二釋。一云外相冷觸下上不同。識於心處與其上下一時頓舍。二云若造善者從下漸舍至完心藏后從上舍。造惡翻善。由此完心實最後舍。上下據彼捨命前相。理亦無違 問眾生未然。三界經云。人臨終時將生地獄神識從足出。生畜生者從膝出。墜餓鬼者從腹出。生人者從心出。生天者從眼出。作聖人者從頂出。與瑜伽等何故差異 答有說經約面板外相。攝論就膚。瑜伽心藏最後舍故 詳曰。準何得知經依外相。論觸上下外亦不無。如何攝論唯就膚內。又經言心何異瑜伽所說心藏斷唯皮外。故知所會難可憑準。今復釋云。經約聖凡勝劣有別分云舍相。理實心處最後舍也。不據面板內外差異。三相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以根作為比喻。
疏解：此外，所依賴的是種子識等。無著（Asanga）的《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中說：『假設和合識就是意識，那麼這個和合意識就是一切種子識嗎？還是依止這個識所生的其餘意識是一切種子識？』如果這個和合識是一切種子識，那就是阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）。你只是用不同的名稱把它稱為意識。
論述：又如將死之時等。按照無著的《攝大乘論》中說：『又如將要死亡時，造善或造惡，身體或者從下往上，或者從上往下，所依靠的地方逐漸變冷。』無性（Asvabhāva）的解釋說：『如果造善，那麼身體的下半部分會逐漸變冷；如果造惡，情況則相反。』天親（Vasubandhu）的解釋說：『因為造善的人必定上升，造惡的人必定下墜。』解釋說：這表明造善或造惡會導致往生到上方或下方的趣向，所以冷觸在上下有所不同。問題：瑜伽論（Yogaśāstra）中說，識最初託身之處稱為完心，最後也是從此處捨命，為什麼不同呢？回答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是外在的冷觸上下不同，識在心處與其上下同時捨棄。另一種說法是，如果造善，從下逐漸捨棄，直到完心藏，然後從上舍棄；造惡則與此相反。因此，完心實際上是最後捨棄的。上下是根據捨命前的現象來說的，道理上也沒有衝突。問題：眾生未然，三界經（Trailokya Sūtra）中說，人臨終時，如果將要生地獄，神識從腳底出去；生畜生道的，從膝蓋出去；墮餓鬼道的，從腹部出去；生人道的，從心臟出去；生天道的，從眼睛出去；成為聖人的，從頭頂出去。這與瑜伽論等有什麼不同呢？回答：有人說，經文是根據面板外在的現象來說的，而《攝大乘論》是就面板內部而言的，瑜伽論是說心藏最後捨棄。詳細說明：根據什麼得知經文是依據外在現象呢？論述的觸感上下不同，外在也不是沒有。為什麼《攝大乘論》只就面板內部而言呢？而且經文說的心，與瑜伽論所說的心藏有什麼不同呢？斷定只是面板外在的說法，所以知道所會通的說法難以憑信。現在重新解釋說，經文是根據聖凡勝劣的不同，分別說明捨棄的現象，實際上心處是最後捨棄的，不是根據面板內外差異。這三種現象。
【English Translation】 English version: The Root as a Metaphor.
Commentary: Furthermore, what is relied upon are the seed-consciousness (bīja-vijñāna) and so forth. Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Suppose the combined consciousness (samhata-vijñāna) is the same as the mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna), is this combined consciousness the all-seed consciousness (sarva-bījaka-vijñāna)? Or is it that the remaining consciousnesses arising in dependence on this consciousness are the all-seed consciousness?' If this combined consciousness is the all-seed consciousness, then it is the Ālaya-vijñāna. You are simply calling it mind-consciousness by a different name.
Treatise: Also, such as at the time of death, etc. According to Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it says: 'Also, when about to die, having created good or evil, the support gradually cools either from the bottom up or from the top down.' Asvabhāva's explanation says: 'If one has created good, then the lower part of the body will gradually cool; if one has created evil, the opposite will occur.' Vasubandhu's explanation says: 'Because those who create good are certain to ascend, and those who create evil are certain to descend.' Explanation: This indicates that creating good or evil leads to rebirth in higher or lower realms, so the cold touch differs in the upper and lower parts. Question: The Yogaśāstra says that the place where consciousness first takes hold is called the complete heart (完心), and one finally relinquishes life from this place. Why is it different? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the external cold touch differs in the upper and lower parts, and consciousness relinquishes the heart and its upper and lower parts simultaneously. The other explanation is that if one has created good, one gradually relinquishes from the bottom up until the complete heart is reached, and then one relinquishes from the top down; creating evil is the opposite of this. Therefore, the complete heart is actually the last to be relinquished. The upper and lower parts refer to the phenomena before relinquishing life, and there is no conflict in principle. Question: Before sentient beings are born, the Trailokya Sūtra says that when a person is about to be born in hell, the consciousness exits from the soles of the feet; when born as an animal, it exits from the knees; when falling into the realm of hungry ghosts, it exits from the abdomen; when born as a human, it exits from the heart; when born in the heavens, it exits from the eyes; when becoming a sage, it exits from the crown of the head. How does this differ from the Yogaśāstra and others? Answer: Some say that the sutra speaks in terms of external phenomena of the skin, while the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks in terms of the inside of the skin, and the Yogaśāstra speaks of the heart being the last to be relinquished. Detailed explanation: How do we know that the sutra is based on external phenomena? The treatise's touch differs in the upper and lower parts, and the external is not without it either. Why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only speak in terms of the inside of the skin? Moreover, how does the heart mentioned in the sutra differ from the heart mentioned in the Yogaśāstra? Determining that it is only the outside of the skin, we know that the explanations that try to reconcile them are difficult to rely on. Now, we re-explain that the sutra speaks in terms of the differences between sages and ordinary beings, superior and inferior, separately explaining the phenomena of relinquishment. In reality, the heart is the last to be relinquished, not based on differences between the inside and outside of the skin. These are the three phenomena.
下舍。二相從上。一正舍處。同瑜伽等上下漸等。但是經論開合有別。義不違也。
論。遍寄身中等者。傳有兩解。一云顯第六識相續遍依。非如第八恒。相續言應在初說。語法故。二云此舉賴耶行相返顯第六無是行相。故不可依冷觸漸起。有義遮轉識中總有六因。第六因中余德兩釋前解為正。破本疏云。逢境即緣是第五因。逢依即止是第四因。離四．五因如何別說 詳曰。若解四．五與第六同。可如所責。釋既有差。義乃不同。別說何咎。設同四．五。前別後總。釋結不同。復亦何失。若準余釋不約依．境。更據何理云績遍依。若據根．境與疏何殊。愛憎斯異。
疏。七日後身識等生者。問五七日已方名具根。已前無根如何有識 答五七日去五根皆具。已前未具得有身根。故七日後得有身識。不言七日已后諸識悉皆具也。
疏。齊識退還至皆此中攝者。齊識退還具如義燈。復有異同如法華攝釋 不斷壞等。按無性攝論第三云。又如經說。阿難陀。或男或女。識若斷壞滅者。名色得增長廣大不。不也。世尊如是等此若欲離阿賴耶識。理不可成。釋曰。既云識壞名色不增。明為緣識必相續也。相續識者即我賴耶。此等文義今第七證。義皆攝之。
成唯識論演秘卷第三(末終) 大正藏第 43
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 下舍（較低的住所）。二相（兩種特徵）從上（從上面開始）。一正舍處（一個正確的住所之處）。與《瑜伽師地論》等相同，上下漸等（上下逐漸相等）。但是經論的開合（展開和收合）有所不同，意義上沒有違背。
論（《成唯識論》）。『遍寄身中等者』（普遍寄託于身中等等）有兩種解釋。一種說法是，顯現第六識（末那識）相續普遍依附，不像第八識（阿賴耶識）那樣恒常。『相續』這個詞應該在最初說，因為符合語法。另一種說法是，這裡舉出阿賴耶識的行相，反過來顯現第六識沒有這種行相，所以不可依附。冷觸（寒冷的觸感）逐漸生起。有一種觀點認為，遮止轉識（轉變的意識）中總共有六個原因，第六個原因中有餘德（剩餘的功德），兩種解釋以前一種為正確。駁斥本疏（《成唯識論述記》）說，『逢境即緣是第五因，逢依即止是第四因』（遇到境界就是緣是第五個原因，遇到所依就是止是第四個原因）。離開第四、第五個原因，如何分別說明？詳細地說，如果理解第四、第五個原因與第六識相同，可以像所責備的那樣。解釋既然有差別，意義就不同，分別說明有什麼過錯？即使與第四、第五個原因相同，前面分別，後面總括，解釋的結論不同，又有什麼損失？如果按照其他的解釋，不依據所依和境界，又根據什麼道理說普遍依附？如果根據根和境界，與疏（《成唯識論述記》）有什麼區別？愛和憎恨因此不同。
疏（《成唯識論述記》）。『七日後身識等生者』（七天後身識等產生）有人問，五七日（三十五天）以後才叫做具根（具備根），以前沒有根，怎麼會有識？回答說，五七日以後五根都具備，以前沒有具備，但有身根，所以七天後才會有身識。沒有說七天以後各種識都具備。
疏（《成唯識論述記》）。『齊識退還至皆此中攝者』（所有識退還到這裡都包含在其中）所有識退還，詳細情況如《義燈》（《成唯識論義燈》）。還有異同，如《法華攝釋》（《妙法蓮華經攝釋》）。『不斷壞等』（不斷壞等等）。按照無性（菩薩）的《攝大乘論》（《攝大乘論釋》）第三說，『又如經說，阿難陀（Ananda，阿難）。或男或女，識若斷壞滅者，名色（nama-rupa，名色）得增長廣大不？不也，世尊（Bhagavan，佛陀）。』像這樣，如果想要離開阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識），道理上不能成立。解釋說，既然說識壞了，名色不增長，說明作為緣的識必定相續。相續的識就是我的阿賴耶識。這些文義現在用第七識（末那識）來證明，意義都包含在其中。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第三（末尾結束） 《大正藏》第43卷
【English Translation】 English version: Lower abode. The two characteristics are from above. One correct abode place. Similar to the Yoga [Yogacara] etc., gradually equal above and below. However, the opening and closing of the sutras and treatises differ, but the meaning is not contradictory.
Treatise [Commentary on Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra]. 'Universally dwelling in the body etc.' There are two interpretations transmitted. One says it manifests the sixth consciousness [Manas] continuously relying everywhere, not like the eighth consciousness [Alaya] which is constant. The word 'continuous' should be said at the beginning because of grammar. The second says this cites the characteristics of Alaya to conversely show that the sixth consciousness does not have these characteristics, so it cannot rely on it. Cold touch gradually arises. One view is that there are a total of six causes in the transformation consciousness, and the sixth cause has remaining merits. The two interpretations consider the former to be correct. Refuting the original commentary [Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji] says, 'Meeting the object is the condition, which is the fifth cause; meeting the reliance is stopping, which is the fourth cause.' How can one separately explain if one leaves the fourth and fifth causes? In detail, if one understands the fourth and fifth causes to be the same as the sixth consciousness, one can be like the accusation. Since the explanations have differences, the meanings are different. What fault is there in explaining them separately? Even if they are the same as the fourth and fifth causes, the former is separate and the latter is general. The conclusions of the explanations are different, so what loss is there? If one follows other explanations and does not rely on the reliance and object, then according to what principle does one say it universally relies? If one relies on the root and object, what is the difference from the commentary [Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji]? Love and hate are different because of this.
Commentary [Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji]. 'After seven days, the body consciousness etc. arise.' Someone asks, only after five sevens of days [thirty-five days] is it called having complete roots. Before that, without roots, how can there be consciousness? The answer is that after five sevens of days, all five roots are complete. Before that, they are not complete, but there is a body root, so after seven days there can be body consciousness. It is not said that after seven days all consciousnesses are complete.
Commentary [Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji]. 'All consciousnesses returning to be included in this.' All consciousnesses returning, the details are as in the Yideng [Commentary on Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra]. There are also similarities and differences, as in the Lotus Sutra Commentary. 'Not ceasing, decaying etc.' According to Asanga's [Asanga] Commentary on the Mahayana-samgraha [Mahayana-samgraha-bhasya] third, 'Also as the sutra says, Ananda [Ananda]. Whether male or female, if consciousness ceases, decays, and perishes, will name and form [nama-rupa] increase and become great? No, Bhagavan [Bhagavan].' Like this, if one wants to leave the Alaya consciousness [Alaya-vijnana], it cannot be established in principle. The explanation says, since it says that if consciousness decays, name and form do not increase, it shows that consciousness as a condition must be continuous. The continuous consciousness is my Alaya consciousness. These texts and meanings are now proven with the seventh consciousness [Manas], and the meanings are all included in it.
Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra-yanbi Volume 3 (End) Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43
冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第四(本)
沙門智周撰
疏。外道笑曰愚者亦解等者。問如來說法離於四非。外道聞經云何起謗 答大士行化多益。是徒雖有少輕得利者廣。由是如來四非稱離 又彼外道初雖暫謗。畢竟乘此以為出要。先損后益。正合化宜。是以動靜無非佛事。
疏。六十六云攝食由諸句者。按彼論云。問若有段物亦是食耶。設是食者亦段物耶。答如其所應當作四句。或有段物而非是食。謂諸段物不能長養諸根大種。或有是食而非段物。謂若有觸．意思．及識。能令諸根大種長養。或有是食亦是段物。謂諸段物能令諸根大種長養。或非段物亦非是食。謂若有觸．意思．及識。不能長養諸根大種。如是所餘觸乃至識隨其所應皆作四句。
疏。六十六說名為觸食者。為境能生四中觸食。因從果稱名觸食也。若準有宗。初未變壞亦得名食。除饑．渴故。故婆沙云。食於二時能為食事俱得名食。一初食時能除饑．渴。二消化已資根．及大 有義大乘理實初食能除饑．渴亦得名食。義同有宗。瑜伽．對法且說勝食云變壞時名為食也 詳曰。理雖可爾明教難違。故瑜伽云。若諸段物于吞嚥時令心歡喜．諸根悅豫。當於爾時不名段食但名觸食。若受用已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《成唯識論演秘》卷第四（本）
沙門智周 撰
疏：外道嘲笑說『愚者也理解』等等。問：如來說法遠離四非（斷見、常見、亦斷亦常、非常非斷）。外道聽聞佛經，為何反而生起誹謗？答：大士（菩薩）行化，利益眾多。雖然有少數輕視佛法的人，但得到利益的人更多。因此，如來說法才被稱為遠離四非。又，那些外道最初雖然暫時誹謗，最終還是會憑藉佛法作為出離輪迴的關鍵。先損害后利益，正符合教化的適宜。所以，動靜之間，無不是佛事。
疏：第六十六頁說『攝食由諸句』。按《瑜伽師地論》所說：問：如果是有段（粗糙）的食物也是食嗎？假設是食，也是有段的嗎？答：應當按照情況作出四句回答：或者是有段的，但不是食，指的是那些不能滋養諸根（眼耳鼻舌身意）和大種（地水火風）的段食。或者是食，但不是有段的，指的是觸（感覺）、意思（思念）、以及識（意識），能夠使諸根和大種得到滋養。或者既是食，也是有段的，指的是那些能夠滋養諸根和大種的段食。或者既不是有段的，也不是食，指的是那些不能滋養諸根和大種的觸、意思、以及識。像這樣，其餘的觸乃至識，都應當按照情況作出四句回答。
疏：第六十六頁說名為觸食。因為境界能夠產生四種食中的觸食，這是因從果的角度來稱呼，所以名為觸食。如果按照有宗（說一切有部）的觀點，即使最初沒有變壞，也可以稱為食，因為可以解除飢餓和乾渴。所以《婆沙論》說：食物在兩個時間點可以稱為食，都能起到食物的作用：一是最初食用時，能夠解除飢餓和乾渴；二是消化之後，能夠資養諸根和大種。有義（某些大乘論師）認為，從道理上說，最初食用時能夠解除飢餓和乾渴，也可以稱為食，義理與有宗相同。《瑜伽師地論》、《對法論》等只是就殊勝的食物而言，說變壞時才稱為食。詳細地說，道理上雖然可以這樣說，但違背了佛陀的教誨是困難的。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：如果各種段食在吞嚥時，能使內心歡喜、諸根愉悅，那麼在這個時候不稱為段食，只能稱為觸食。如果受用之後，
【English Translation】 English version Chapter Four (Original) of the Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only
Composed by the Sramana Zhizhou
Commentary: The heretics laugh, saying, 'Even fools understand,' etc. Question: The Tathagata's (如來) teaching is free from the four extremes (四非) [annihilationism (斷見), eternalism (常見), both (亦斷亦常), and neither (非常非斷)]. Why do heretics, upon hearing the sutras, give rise to slander? Answer: The Bodhisattva's (大士) activities of conversion benefit many. Although there are a few who belittle the Dharma, the number of those who benefit is vast. Therefore, the Tathagata's teaching is said to be free from the four extremes. Furthermore, although those heretics initially slander, they will ultimately rely on this [Dharma] as the key to liberation. First harm, then benefit, which is perfectly suited to the needs of conversion. Thus, in movement and stillness, there is nothing that is not a Buddha-activity.
Commentary: Page sixty-six says, 'The intake of food is explained through various phrases.' According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論): Question: If coarse food (段物) is also food, then if it is food, is it also coarse? Answer: One should answer with four phrases according to the situation: Sometimes it is coarse but not food, referring to coarse food that cannot nourish the faculties (諸根) [eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind] and the great elements (大種) [earth, water, fire, wind]. Sometimes it is food but not coarse, referring to contact (觸), volition (意思), and consciousness (識) that can nourish the faculties and the great elements. Sometimes it is both food and coarse, referring to coarse food that can nourish the faculties and the great elements. Sometimes it is neither coarse nor food, referring to contact, volition, and consciousness that cannot nourish the faculties and the great elements. Likewise, the remaining [elements] from contact to consciousness should all be answered with four phrases according to the situation.
Commentary: Page sixty-six speaks of it being named 'contact-food' (觸食). Because the object can produce contact-food among the four kinds of food, it is named contact-food from the perspective of the cause being named after the effect. According to the Sarvastivada school (說一切有部), even if it has not initially changed, it can still be called food because it can relieve hunger and thirst. Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (婆沙論) says: Food can be called food at two times, both of which serve the function of food: first, when it is initially eaten, it can relieve hunger and thirst; second, after it is digested, it can nourish the faculties and the great elements. Some Mahayana (大乘) masters believe that, in principle, when it is initially eaten and can relieve hunger and thirst, it can also be called food, which is the same as the Sarvastivada school. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) only speak of superior food, saying that it is called food when it has changed. In detail, although this may be true in principle, it is difficult to go against the Buddha's teachings. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: If various coarse foods, when swallowed, cause the mind to be joyful and the faculties to be pleased, then at that time they are not called coarse food but only contact-food. If after being consumed,
安隱消變增長喜樂。于消變時乃名段食。若有熟變不能長養諸根安樂。彼雖熟變不名段食。若諸段物于吞嚥時不生歡喜。亦不能令諸根悅豫。當於爾時都不名食。文既鄭重而簡略之。何得會云就勝且說。又瑜伽等望長諸根資益變壞方名為食。暫除饑．渴。未益諸根變壞．消化食義焉在。由斯理故不為之取 問欲香．味．觸得有段食。色界觸有。彼立段食 答按俱舍論。三界分別十八界云。色界所繫唯十四種。除香．味境及鼻．舌識。除香．味者段食性故。離段食慾方得生彼。除鼻．舌識無所緣故。若爾觸界于彼應無如香．味境段食性故。彼所有觸非段食性。若爾香．味類亦應然。香．味離段食無別受用。觸有別用。持根．衣等。彼離食慾。香．味無用。有根．衣等故觸非無。由斯色界雖有觸塵無段食。余廣問答如章．及燈。
論。由此色處非段食者。又俱舍論第十亦釋色非食云。色亦可成段別飲啖。何緣非食。此不能益自所對根．解脫者故。夫名食者必先資益自根大種后乃及余。飲啖色時于自根大尚不為益。況能及余。由彼諸根境各別故。有時見色生喜樂者緣色觸生。是食非色。又不還者．及阿羅漢解脫食貪。雖見種種上妙飲食而無益故。由此色處不名為食 又傳經部而有兩釋。一云除聲四塵為體。以聲虛疏無
資用故。二云但用三塵為體。色．聲變時無資用故 問聲及根等皆不名食。何獨簡色 答可段飲啖有資益者名之為食。色可段啖有濫簡之。聲體虛疏。意等無段。根是所資。無飲啖義。無濫不簡。
論。三意思食希望為相者。問思者造作正因等相。云何今說為希望耶 答如燈辨 有義兩釋。初解同燈。第二釋云。由相應法令思于境起行希望。若爾心等與欲等俱。心亦應由相應之法希望為相 答心等因思希望無失。如是心等與受等俱。起領納等皆不違理。心等皆容起多行故。然自相行正行非余。故依正行心等無雜 詳曰。理恐未然。瑜伽．此論皆云心等所緣等同不同行相。故此論云心與心所同所依根。所緣相似。行相各別。了別．領納等作用各異故。亦不可言據自相說。如所緣相相分各別即說相似。行相有同何即不說。教既無憑臆斷難準。可從初釋。
疏。五十七說令識增盛者。具如燈引。故此不重。
疏。又彼通等流等者。別有四食章門廣明。
論。此四能持有情身命等者。又按婆沙百二十九云。食是何義。受有義。續有義。持有義。生有義。養有義。增有義。與此大同。
論。觸意思食至隨識有無者。有義但應說依六識有無。七．八二識既非共有。今對他宗陳共許義。故不應言隨七
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為它們提供資助和效用。有人說，只有三種塵（色、聲、香、味、觸中的色、聲、觸）可以作為食的本體。因為色和聲在變化時沒有資助和效用。問：聲音和根等都不被稱為食，為什麼唯獨選擇了色？答：可以分段食用，並且有資助和益處的東西才被稱為食。色可以分段食用，所以容易被選擇。聲音的本體虛無疏散。意等沒有分段。根是所資助的對象，沒有飲啖的意義，沒有混淆，所以不選擇。
論：三種意思食以希望為特徵。問：思的特徵是造作正因等，為什麼現在說它是希望呢？答：就像燈一樣。有兩種解釋。第一種解釋如同燈。第二種解釋說，由於相應的法則，使思對境產生行為和希望。如果這樣，心等與欲等同時存在，心也應該由相應的法以希望為特徵。答：心等依靠思而產生希望沒有過失。像這樣，心等與受等同時存在，產生領納等都不違背道理。心等都容許產生多種行為。然而自相行是正行，不是其他的。所以依靠正行，心等沒有混雜。詳細地說，這個道理恐怕不成立。《瑜伽師地論》和這部論都說心等所緣等同，但行相不同。所以這部論說心與心所同所依根，所緣相似，行相各別，了別、領納等作用各異。也不可以說依據自相來說。比如所緣相和相分各別，就說相似，行相有相同，為什麼不說呢？教義既然沒有憑據，臆斷難以準確。可以採用第一種解釋。
疏：第五十七頁說使識增盛，就像燈的引導一樣。所以這裡不再重複。
疏：還有，那通等流等，在另外的四食章節中有詳細說明。
論：這四種食能夠維持有情的身命等。又根據《婆沙論》第一百二十九卷說，食是什麼意思？是受有的意思，續有的意思，持有的意思，生有的意思，養有的意思，增有的意思。與這裡的意思大致相同。
論：觸、意思食直到隨識有無。有人認為應該只說依據六識的有無。第七、第八識既然不是共有的，現在是對其他宗派陳述共同認可的意義，所以不應該說隨七識。
【English Translation】 English version: Because they provide sustenance and utility. Some say that only three 'dusts' (rupa (form), sabda (sound), and sparsa (touch) among rupa, sabda, gandha (smell), rasa (taste), and sparsa) can be the substance of nutriment. Because rupa and sabda do not have sustenance and utility when they change. Question: Sound and the roots (indriya) are not called nutriment, why is rupa singled out? Answer: What can be eaten in portions and has sustenance and benefit is called nutriment. Rupa can be eaten in portions, so it is easily singled out. The substance of sound is empty and sparse. Manas (mind) etc. are not in portions. The roots are what is sustained, and there is no meaning of eating and drinking. There is no confusion, so it is not singled out.
Treatise: The three mental nutriments (manas-ahara) are characterized by hope. Question: The characteristic of manas is to create the cause, etc., why is it now said to be hope? Answer: It is like a lamp. There are two explanations. The first explanation is like a lamp. The second explanation says that due to the corresponding dharma, it causes manas to generate action and hope towards the object. If so, manas etc. exist simultaneously with desire etc., and manas should also be characterized by hope due to the corresponding dharma. Answer: It is not a fault that manas etc. rely on thought to generate hope. Like this, manas etc. exist simultaneously with vedana (feeling) etc., and generating reception etc. does not contradict the principle. Manas etc. all allow the generation of multiple actions. However, the self-characteristic action is the correct action, not others. Therefore, relying on the correct action, manas etc. are not mixed. In detail, this principle is probably not established. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra and this treatise both say that the objects of manas etc. are the same, but the characteristics of the actions are different. Therefore, this treatise says that the mind and mental factors have the same supporting root, the objects are similar, the characteristics of the actions are different, and the functions of discernment, reception, etc. are different. It cannot be said that it is based on the self-characteristic. For example, if the object and the aspect are different, it is said to be similar, if the characteristics of the actions are the same, why not say it? Since the teachings have no basis, it is difficult to accurately judge based on speculation. The first explanation can be adopted.
Commentary: Page 57 says that it makes consciousness increase, just like the guidance of a lamp. Therefore, it is not repeated here.
Commentary: Also, those that are common, equal flow, etc., are explained in detail in another chapter on the four nutriments.
Treatise: These four nutriments can maintain the life of sentient beings, etc. Also, according to the Mahavibhasa, volume 129, what is the meaning of nutriment? It means 'receiving existence', 'continuing existence', 'maintaining existence', 'generating existence', 'nourishing existence', and 'increasing existence'. It is roughly the same as the meaning here.
Treatise: Contact, mental nutriment, until the presence or absence of consciousness. Some think that it should only be said that it depends on the presence or absence of the six consciousnesses. Since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not common, now it is stating the commonly accepted meaning to other schools, so it should not be said that it depends on the seven consciousnesses.
．八也 詳曰。觀前文勢。明自宗致無對他意。依七．八識辨隨自言想亦何咎。若言前文並對於他故除七．八。辨識食體亦應但六。如何即云第八為體。由此定委前文是自對七．八言。理無爽矣。
疏。雖現在者至得成正因者。釋伏難也。難云。若非現在即非是食。豈諸現在即皆是食。現在即是食量因故。故此答生。思可解也。
論。亦不可執至有漏種故者。正釋如疏。復助釋云。他救意云。即無漏識持有漏種。即以所持漏種為食。斯亦何過。故牒破云。無漏既不持有漏種。有漏種無食亦不立。若不爾者。前已難彼無漏非食。何煩此難。義無別故。若言約彼持種有別為后難者。豈唯望于持種名食。故知彼取漏種為食。設彼本宗不立斯義。假敘彼計。彼轉計之理俱無爽 問無漏違漏。不許無漏持有漏種。漏違無漏。應因第八不持無漏 答現無漏法正破有漏故。不得以無漏持漏。無漏法種既非能治。故因本識持無漏種。
論。身語心行等者。問定心．語寂。二行可無。云何而無身行息耶 答依毗婆沙論二十六云。有四緣故身行方轉。一謂入出息所依身。二風道通。謂口．鼻等。三毛孔開。四依息地粗心現前。於四緣中若隨闕一身行不轉。如生欲界羯剌藍．頞部談．閉戶．鍵南四位之中。但有第四粗心現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 八也詳述道：『觀察前面的文勢，明顯是闡明自己宗派的宗旨，沒有排斥其他宗派的意思。依照第七、第八識來辨別隨各自言語思想的道理，又有什麼過錯呢？如果說前面的文字是針對其他宗派，所以排除第七、第八識，那麼辨別識食的本體也應該只有前六識。為何又說第八識是本體呢？由此可以確定前面的文字是自己針對第七、第八識所說，道理上沒有差錯。』
疏文中說：『即使是現在者』到『得以成就正因者』，這是爲了解釋先前埋下的疑問。疑問是：如果不是現在存在的，就不是食。難道所有現在存在的都是食嗎？因為現在存在的就是食量的原因。所以這裡作答，仔細思考就可以理解。
論中說：『也不可執著』到『因為有有漏種子』，這是正面解釋，如同疏文所說。又輔助解釋說：其他宗派辯解說：『即使是無漏識持有有漏種子，就以所持有的有漏種子作為食，這又有什麼過錯呢？』所以駁斥說：『無漏識既然不持有有漏種子，有漏種子沒有食也就不能成立。』如果不是這樣，前面已經駁斥過他們無漏不是食，何必再這樣駁斥呢？意義沒有區別。如果說因為他們持有種子有所區別，作為後面的駁斥，難道僅僅是希望持有種子才稱為食嗎？所以知道他們是取有漏種子作為食。假設他們的本宗不建立這種意義，假設敘述他們的計較，他們轉變計較的道理都沒有差錯。』問：無漏與有漏相違背，不允許無漏持有有漏種子，有漏與無漏相違背，應該因為第八識不持有無漏種子。答：現在無漏法正是爲了破除有漏，所以不能用無漏持有有漏。無漏法的種子既然不是能對治的，所以因為本識持有無漏種子。
論中說：『身語心行等』，問：定心和語言寂靜，這兩種行為可以沒有，為什麼身體的行為也會停止呢？答：依據《毗婆沙論》第二十六卷所說，有四種因緣身體的行為才會運轉。一是入息和出息所依靠的身體，二是風道暢通，指口、鼻等，三是毛孔張開，四是依靠氣息的粗心現前。在這四種因緣中，如果缺少任何一種，身體的行為就不會運轉。如同生於欲界的羯剌藍（kalala，受精卵）、頞部曇（arbuda，凝滑位）、閉戶（pesi，肉團位）、鍵南（ghana，凝厚位）這四個階段之中，只有第四個粗心現前。
【English Translation】 English version: Ba Ye elaborates: 'Observing the preceding text, it clearly elucidates the tenets of one's own school, without intending to reject other schools. What fault is there in discerning the principles of following one's own words and thoughts based on the seventh and eighth consciousnesses? If it is said that the preceding text is directed at other schools, thus excluding the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, then the discernment of the substance of consciousness-food should also be limited to the first six consciousnesses. Why then is it said that the eighth consciousness is the substance? From this, it can be determined that the preceding text is oneself speaking about the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, and there is no error in principle.'
The commentary states: 'Even the present one' to 'can achieve the right cause', this is to explain the previously laid question. The question is: If it is not presently existing, then it is not food. Are all presently existing things food? Because what is presently existing is the cause of the amount of food. Therefore, this is the answer, and it can be understood with careful thought.
The treatise states: 'Nor should one cling to' to 'because there are defiled seeds', this is a direct explanation, as the commentary says. It further assists in explaining: Other schools argue: 'Even if the undefiled consciousness holds defiled seeds, and the defiled seeds held are taken as food, what fault is there in this?' Therefore, it refutes: 'Since the undefiled consciousness does not hold defiled seeds, the defiled seeds cannot be established without food.' If it were not so, it has already been refuted that their undefiled is not food, why bother refuting it again? The meaning is no different. If it is said that because they hold seeds differently, as a later refutation, is it merely hoping that holding seeds is called food? Therefore, it is known that they take defiled seeds as food. Assuming that their original school does not establish this meaning, assuming the narration of their calculations, there is no error in the principle of their changing calculations.' Question: The undefiled contradicts the defiled, and it is not allowed for the undefiled to hold defiled seeds. The defiled contradicts the undefiled, should it be because the eighth consciousness does not hold undefiled seeds? Answer: The present undefiled dharma is precisely to eliminate the defiled, so one cannot use the undefiled to hold the defiled. Since the seeds of undefiled dharma are not able to cure, therefore the fundamental consciousness holds undefiled seeds.
The treatise states: 'Body, speech, mind actions, etc.', Question: Meditative mind and speech are silent, these two actions can be absent, why would the actions of the body also cease? Answer: According to the twenty-sixth volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, there are four conditions for the actions of the body to operate. First, the body on which inhalation and exhalation rely. Second, the wind passages are clear, referring to the mouth, nose, etc. Third, the pores are open. Fourth, the coarse mind relying on breath manifests. Among these four conditions, if any one is missing, the actions of the body will not operate. Just like in the four stages of being born in the desire realm: kalala (受精卵, fertilized egg), arbuda (凝滑位, gelatinous stage), pesi (肉團位, fleshy mass stage), ghana (凝厚位, solid stage), only the fourth coarse mind manifests.
前。無前三事故息不轉。缽羅奢佉等位根形具足。四事具故方有息轉。如生欲界及下三定入無心定及無色定。雖有前三無有第四故息不轉。入第四定雖有前二。然無後二。息亦不轉。又入出息依粗心轉。第四靜慮已上諸地。心極微細故息不轉 又順正理云。入第四定身無毛孔。以彼等持極淳厚故。引第四定大種遍身。即由此緣尊者世友說。入彼定身毛孔合。入漏．無漏定皆如是 若生第四定起下三定及欲界心。雖有第一．第二．及第四緣。闕第三緣故息不轉。起自地心及無色心並無心定。雖有初二無後二事故息不轉。若生無色四事俱無故息不轉。所以滅定身行亦無。準大乘義身行不轉。更同有宗。亦應無失。
疏。然欲出經同法為例等者。而壽不滅亦不離暖。此是同法。舉此為喻而例識體在定令有。心行等者文同來爾。
疏。成業論至如彼論等者。下滅定中疏已引訖。此故不重。
疏。應是重生者。死而復生。
論。諸定皆無五識身故者。問此因豈非自隨一過。下許定中耳聞聲故 答今隨他宗。下依自義。以小乘者出定聞聲。又疏作量 有義破云。疏說此因依悶絕等有不定者。此義不然。立宗若云應一切定皆名無心定。悶絕等位非無心定。可說前因有不定過。宗法之中既無定字故無不定 詳
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 先前。如果沒有前三種情況，呼吸就不會轉變。缽羅奢佉（Baluoshake，指某種狀態）等位，根和形都完備。具備這四種條件，才會有呼吸的轉變。例如，生於欲界以及下三禪定，進入無心定以及無色定，雖然有前三種條件，但沒有第四種條件，所以呼吸不會轉變。進入第四禪定，雖然有前兩種條件，但沒有後兩種條件，呼吸也不會轉變。而且，入息和出息是依靠粗糙的心來轉變的。第四靜慮以上的各個層次，心極其微細，所以呼吸不會轉變。此外，《順正理論》中說，進入第四禪定，身體沒有毛孔，因為那時的等持（Dengchi，指禪定中的專注狀態）極其純厚。第四禪定的大種（Dazhong，指構成物質世界的元素）遍佈全身。正因為這個緣故，尊者世友（Zunzhe Shiyou，人名）說，進入那種禪定，身體的毛孔會閉合。進入有漏定和無漏定都是這樣。如果生於第四禪定，生起下三禪定以及欲界的心，雖然有第一、第二以及第四種條件，但缺少第三種條件，所以呼吸不會轉變。生起自身所處的禪定層次的心以及無色界的心，以及無心定，雖然有最初的兩種條件，但沒有後面的兩種條件，所以呼吸不會轉變。如果生於無色界，四種條件都不具備，所以呼吸不會轉變。因此，滅盡定的身行也消失了。按照大乘的觀點，身行不會轉變，更何況與有宗相同，也應該沒有過失。 疏：然而想要用出經和同法來作為例子等等，而壽命不會消失，也不會離開暖氣，這就是同法。舉這個作為比喻，來類推識體在禪定中存在，使得心行等等存在，文句也是這樣說的。 疏：成業論到像那部論等等，在下面的滅定中，疏已經引用完畢，這裡就不重複了。 疏：應該是重生，指死而復生。 論：各種禪定都沒有五識身，問：這個原因難道不是自相矛盾的過失嗎？因為下面允許在禪定中聽到聲音。答：現在是隨順他宗的觀點，下面是依據自己的觀點。因為小乘修行者出定後會聽到聲音。而且疏還做了衡量。有人反駁說：疏說這個原因依據悶絕等等情況，有不確定的過失。這個說法不對。如果立宗說應該一切禪定都叫做無心定，悶絕等等狀態不是無心定，可以說前面的原因有不確定的過失。宗法之中既然沒有『定』字，所以沒有不確定性。詳細分析。
【English Translation】 English version: Previously. If the first three conditions are not present, the breath will not change. In positions such as Baluoshake (Baluoshake, referring to a certain state), the roots and forms are complete. Only when these four conditions are met will there be a change in breath. For example, being born in the desire realm and the lower three dhyanas (Dhyanas, referring to meditative states), entering the non-mind state and the formless realm, although the first three conditions are present, the fourth condition is absent, so the breath will not change. Entering the fourth dhyana, although the first two conditions are present, the latter two conditions are absent, so the breath will not change either. Moreover, inhalation and exhalation rely on the coarse mind to change. In the realms above the fourth dhyana, the mind is extremely subtle, so the breath will not change. Furthermore, the Shun Zheng Li Lun says that in the fourth dhyana, the body has no pores because the samadhi (Samadhi, referring to a state of concentrated meditation) is extremely pure. The great elements (Dazhong, referring to the elements that constitute the material world) of the fourth dhyana pervade the entire body. It is for this reason that Venerable Shiyou (Zunzhe Shiyou, a person's name) said that when entering that dhyana, the body's pores close. This is the same for entering defiled and undefiled samadhi. If one is born in the fourth dhyana and arises the mind of the lower three dhyanas and the desire realm, although the first, second, and fourth conditions are present, the third condition is lacking, so the breath will not change. If one arises the mind of one's own dhyana level and the formless realm, as well as the non-mind state, although the first two conditions are present, the latter two conditions are absent, so the breath will not change. If one is born in the formless realm, all four conditions are absent, so the breath will not change. Therefore, the bodily activities in the cessation attainment also disappear. According to the Mahayana view, bodily activities do not change, and even more so, being the same as the Sarvastivadins, there should be no fault. Commentary: However, wanting to use the sutra and similar dharmas as examples, etc., while life does not cease and warmth does not depart, this is a similar dharma. Using this as a metaphor to analogize that the consciousness body exists in samadhi, causing mental activities, etc., the wording is just like that. Commentary: The Cheng Ye Lun to like that treatise, etc., in the section on cessation attainment below, the commentary has already cited it, so it will not be repeated here. Commentary: It should be rebirth, referring to dying and being reborn. Treatise: All samadhis do not have the five consciousnesses, question: Isn't this reason a self-contradictory fault? Because it is allowed below that one can hear sounds in samadhi. Answer: Now it is following the views of other schools, below it is based on one's own views. Because Hinayana practitioners hear sounds after emerging from samadhi. Moreover, the commentary also makes a measurement. Someone refutes: The commentary says that this reason, based on fainting and other situations, has an uncertain fault. This statement is incorrect. If one establishes the proposition that all samadhis should be called non-mind samadhi, fainting and other states are not non-mind samadhi, one can say that the previous reason has an uncertain fault. Since there is no word 'samadhi' in the proposition, there is no uncertainty. Detailed analysis.
曰。直觀言陳似如所斥。若尋意許疏旨精遠。謂定無心。非定無心。而是差別。因不言定。即悶絕等。因於彼轉。與意許宗便成不定。因致定言斯過方遣。故義然也。
疏。今應助難至名為心行滅者。此難意云。定云無心及心行滅。無心即據五名無心。心行滅言亦應但約五識相應受．想等說 又云然有心所至滅言等故者。重成難意。以彼二家心行滅言皆據第六不依五識。故知滅識不約五言。
論。或此位至非第六識者。有義疏所作量有自語過。故但應言滅定位識非第六識 詳曰。疏既云汝。明簡斯失。不爾汝言復何所用。下第四量雖亦破之。亦同此釋 問他亦以此壽．暖為喻。難大乘宗滅定第八應非是識。自既有違何責他過 答我壽暖識不即不離。應非識宗于壽等喻而不轉也。不可相例。
疏。彼亦自說自位無識行相等者。雖有識體但無行相。以微細故。長連讀之。若不爾者他許定中而有識故。何得說云自位無識。
疏。于靜慮無色修行勝故者。習此等定。受想等法有勝功用。
論。若無心所至離心所故者。有說無餘涅槃為喻。彼宗滅定既許有心。余無心位亦應爾故。故成業云。諸無心位亦有心耶。應如一類經為量者所許細心彼位猶有。故不應以悶絕為喻 有義若爾因成不定。悶絕等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
問：直接按照字面意思理解陳述，就像你所駁斥的那樣。如果探尋其意，或許疏文的旨意精妙深遠，說『定』中沒有『心』，並非真的沒有『心』，而是有所差別。因為沒有說『定』，所以會與悶絕等同。因為在這一點上轉變，與你所認可的宗義便會變得不確定。因此需要明確說明是『定』，才能消除這個過失。所以義理自然如此。
疏文：現在應該幫助辯論，直到『名為心行滅者』。這個辯論的意思是說，說『定』中沒有『心』以及『心行滅』，『無心』就是指五種『名』沒有『心』。『心行滅』也應該只是就與五識相應的受、想等來說。又說『然有心所至滅言等故者』，這是再次構成辯論的意思。因為他們兩家所說的『心行滅』都是指第六識，而不是依據五識。所以可知『滅識』不是就五種『名』來說的。
論：或者這個位置，直到『非第六識者』。有一種說法是疏文所作的量存在自語過失。所以應該只說『滅定位識』不是第六識。詳細地說，疏文既然用了『汝』（你），就表明已經簡略了這個失誤。否則，『汝』字又有什麼用呢？下面的第四個量雖然也駁斥了它，也同樣這樣解釋。問：對方也用壽命、暖氣作為比喻，來反駁大乘宗，認為滅定中的第八識應該不是識。自己既然有違背之處，為什麼還要責怪對方的過失呢？答：我的壽命、暖氣和識是不即不離的。如果認為不是識，那麼對於壽命等的比喻就不成立了。不能相互類比。
疏文：對方也自己說自己的位置沒有識的行相等，雖然有識的本體，但是沒有行相，因為非常微細。要連起來讀。如果不是這樣，對方就承認『定』中有識，怎麼能說自己的位置沒有識呢？
疏文：在靜慮（Dhyana，禪定）和無色（Arupa，無色界）的修行中，因為修行殊勝的緣故。修習這些禪定，受、想等法有殊勝的功用。
論：如果沒有心所，直到『離心所故者』。有一種說法是用無餘涅槃（nirvana，寂滅）作為比喻。對方的宗義既然承認滅定中有心，那麼其餘無心的位置也應該如此。所以成業說，各種無心的位置也有心嗎？應該像某些經文作為衡量標準那樣，所認可的細微的心在那個位置仍然存在。所以不應該用悶絕作為比喻。有一種觀點認為，如果這樣，因就變得不確定了，悶絕等。 English version:
Question: To interpret the statement literally is like what you refuted. If one seeks its meaning, perhaps the intention of the commentary is subtle and profound, saying that there is no 'mind' in 'Samadhi' (定, meditative absorption), but it is not truly without 'mind,' but rather there is a difference. Because 'Samadhi' is not specified, it would be equated with fainting, etc. Because of shifting on this point, it would become uncertain with the doctrine you acknowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly state that it is 'Samadhi' to eliminate this fault. So the principle is naturally so.
Commentary: Now one should assist in the debate until 'named the cessation of mental activities.' The meaning of this debate is that saying there is no 'mind' and 'cessation of mental activities' in 'Samadhi,' 'no mind' refers to the absence of 'mind' in the five 'names' (五名, five aggregates). 'Cessation of mental activities' should also only refer to the feelings, perceptions, etc., that are associated with the five consciousnesses. Also, saying 'However, there are mental factors until the statement of cessation, etc.,' this is to form the debate again. Because both of their schools say that 'cessation of mental activities' refers to the sixth consciousness, not based on the five consciousnesses. Therefore, it can be known that 'cessation of consciousness' does not refer to the five 'names.'
Treatise: Or this position, until 'not the sixth consciousness.' One view is that the measure made by the commentary has the fault of self-contradiction. Therefore, one should only say that 'the consciousness in the Samadhi of cessation' is not the sixth consciousness. In detail, since the commentary uses 'you,' it indicates that this error has been simplified. Otherwise, what is the use of the word 'you'? The fourth measure below, although it also refutes it, is explained in the same way. Question: The other party also uses lifespan and warmth as metaphors to refute the Mahayana school, arguing that the eighth consciousness in the Samadhi of cessation should not be consciousness. Since one has contradictions, why blame the other party's fault? Answer: My lifespan, warmth, and consciousness are neither identical nor separate. If it is considered not consciousness, then the metaphor of lifespan, etc., would not hold. They cannot be compared analogously.
Commentary: The other party also says that in their own position, there are no characteristics of consciousness, although there is the essence of consciousness, there are no characteristics because it is very subtle. It should be read continuously. If not, the other party would admit that there is consciousness in 'Samadhi,' how could they say that there is no consciousness in their own position?
Commentary: In the practice of Dhyana (靜慮, meditative absorption) and Arupa (無色, formless realm), because the practice is superior. Practicing these Samadhis, feelings, perceptions, etc., have superior functions.
Treatise: If there are no mental factors, until 'because of being separated from mental factors.' One view is to use nirvana (涅槃, cessation) without remainder as a metaphor. Since the other party's doctrine admits that there is mind in the Samadhi of cessation, then the remaining positions without mind should also be so. Therefore, the Karma says, are there also minds in various positions without mind? It should be like certain sutras as a measure, the subtle mind that is acknowledged still exists in that position. Therefore, one should not use fainting as a metaphor. One view is that if so, the cause becomes uncertain, fainting, etc.
【English Translation】 Question: To interpret the statement literally is like what you refuted. If one seeks its meaning, perhaps the intention of the commentary is subtle and profound, saying that there is no 'mind' in 'Samadhi' (定, meditative absorption), but it is not truly without 'mind,' but rather there is a difference. Because 'Samadhi' is not specified, it would be equated with fainting, etc. Because of shifting on this point, it would become uncertain with the doctrine you acknowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly state that it is 'Samadhi' to eliminate this fault. So the principle is naturally so. Commentary: Now one should assist in the debate until 'named the cessation of mental activities.' The meaning of this debate is that saying there is no 'mind' and 'cessation of mental activities' in 'Samadhi,' 'no mind' refers to the absence of 'mind' in the five 'names' (五名, five aggregates). 'Cessation of mental activities' should also only refer to the feelings, perceptions, etc., that are associated with the five consciousnesses. Also, saying 'However, there are mental factors until the statement of cessation, etc.,' this is to form the debate again. Because both of their schools say that 'cessation of mental activities' refers to the sixth consciousness, not based on the five consciousnesses. Therefore, it can be known that 'cessation of consciousness' does not refer to the five 'names.' Treatise: Or this position, until 'not the sixth consciousness.' One view is that the measure made by the commentary has the fault of self-contradiction. Therefore, one should only say that 'the consciousness in the Samadhi of cessation' is not the sixth consciousness. In detail, since the commentary uses 'you,' it indicates that this error has been simplified. Otherwise, what is the use of the word 'you'? The fourth measure below, although it also refutes it, is explained in the same way. Question: The other party also uses lifespan and warmth as metaphors to refute the Mahayana school, arguing that the eighth consciousness in the Samadhi of cessation should not be consciousness. Since one has contradictions, why blame the other party's fault? Answer: My lifespan, warmth, and consciousness are neither identical nor separate. If it is considered not consciousness, then the metaphor of lifespan, etc., would not hold. They cannot be compared analogously. Commentary: The other party also says that in their own position, there are no characteristics of consciousness, although there is the essence of consciousness, there are no characteristics because it is very subtle. It should be read continuously. If not, the other party would admit that there is consciousness in 'Samadhi,' how could they say that there is no consciousness in their own position? Commentary: In the practice of Dhyana (靜慮, meditative absorption) and Arupa (無色, formless realm), because the practice is superior. Practicing these Samadhis, feelings, perceptions, etc., have superior functions. Treatise: If there are no mental factors, until 'because of being separated from mental factors.' One view is to use nirvana (涅槃, cessation) without remainder as a metaphor. Since the other party's doctrine admits that there is mind in the Samadhi of cessation, then the remaining positions without mind should also be so. Therefore, the Karma says, are there also minds in various positions without mind? It should be like certain sutras as a measure, the subtle mind that is acknowledged still exists in that position. Therefore, one should not use fainting as a metaphor. One view is that if so, the cause becomes uncertain, fainting, etc.
位心所無故。故應合成。滅盡等位應無意識。無大地心所故。如眼等識不行位中。或無餘依亦得為喻。或死屍等為喻亦得 詳曰。前數破無細意識。已悶絕等喻亦何有失。又破無餘喻有不定理如所明。若以眼等識不行位而為喻者。理亦不定。獨意識轉亦是眼等不行位故。今取尸喻成諸無心位第六無。雖余無心非是所諍。為止不定為宗無失。
疏。如無表色非有質礙者。此救意云。質礙名為色無表無礙尚名色。心法雖相應。縱不相應亦心法。若不相應即非心。應無質礙即非色。
疏。然除眠悶絕者。以薩婆多不許眠等無心位攝對共許者所以除之。
疏。以無所厭故至心王猶在者。眾釋此文明除眠悶之所以故。今釋不爾。但辨無想等無心也 言以無所厭故者。舉彼由無所厭心所顯心亦無 言有所厭心所心便不滅者。翻成於前無所厭所心滅所以 言非不厭故心王猶在者。釋外伏難。外伏難云。心所是所厭彼位可言無。心王既非厭。彼處應猶在。故乃釋云。非是不厭即令其在。以心所無故隨同滅。
論。心雜染故等者。雖維摩經亦有此文。今引阿含。以維摩經非共許故。
疏。言心染故有情染等如瑜伽五十四者。按彼論云。由所潤識能取能滿當來內身。由此展轉能取能滿。不能棄捨諸異生性。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為在無心位中沒有心所，所以應該說是合成的。在滅盡定等狀態下，應該沒有意識，因為沒有大地心所（普遍存在的心所），就像眼識等不起作用的狀態一樣。或者可以用無餘依涅槃作為比喻，或者用死屍等作為比喻也可以。詳細地說，前面已經多次破斥了有細微意識的說法，用悶絕等作為比喻又有什麼過失呢？而且，破斥用無餘依涅槃作為比喻，存在不定理，正如所闡明的那樣。如果用眼識等不起作用的狀態作為比喻，道理也不確定，因為獨頭意識的運轉也是眼識等不起作用的狀態。現在用屍體作為比喻，成立了諸無心位的第六個無心位。雖然其餘的無心位不是所爭論的，但爲了防止不定，作為宗（論題）並沒有過失。 疏：『如無表色非有質礙者』，這是爲了辯護說，質礙被稱為色，無表色沒有質礙尚且稱為色，心法即使不相應，也還是心法。如果不相應就不是心法，應該說沒有質礙就不是色。 疏：『然除眠悶絕者』，因為薩婆多部（一切有部）不承認睡眠等是無心位，爲了應對共同承認的觀點，所以排除了這些情況。 疏：『以無所厭故至心王猶在者』，許多解釋都認為這段文字是爲了說明排除睡眠和悶絕的原因。現在解釋不是這樣，只是辨別無想等無心位。『言以無所厭故者』，舉出因為沒有厭惡的心所，顯示心也就不存在。『言有所厭心所心便不滅者』，反過來說明，因為沒有厭惡的心所，所以心滅。『非不厭故心王猶在者』，解釋外人的詰難。外人詰難說，心所是所厭惡的，所以在那個狀態下可以說沒有心所。心王既然不是厭惡的對象，那麼在那個狀態下應該仍然存在。所以解釋說，不是因為不厭惡就讓它存在，因為沒有心所，所以心王也隨之一起滅亡。 論：『心雜染故等者』，雖然《維摩詰經》中也有這段文字，但現在引用《阿含經》，因為《維摩詰經》不是共同認可的經典。 疏：『言心染故有情染等如瑜伽五十四者』，按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷所說，由於所潤識能夠攝取和圓滿未來的內身，因此輾轉相續地攝取和圓滿，不能捨棄各種異生性。
【English Translation】 English version: Because there are no mental factors (citta-caitasika) in the state of no-mind, it should be said to be composite. In states such as cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti), there should be no consciousness because there are no universal mental factors (mahābhūmika-caitasika), just like in states where eye-consciousness (cakṣu-vijñāna) and other consciousnesses are not functioning. Or, one could use nirvana with no remainder (anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa) as a metaphor, or even a corpse. In detail, the previous refutations have repeatedly refuted the idea of subtle consciousness, so what fault is there in using fainting as a metaphor? Moreover, refuting the use of nirvana with no remainder as a metaphor has an uncertain reason, as has been explained. If one uses the state where eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses are not functioning as a metaphor, the reasoning is also uncertain, because the functioning of independent consciousness (kevala-manovijñāna) is also a state where eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses are not functioning. Now, using a corpse as a metaphor establishes the sixth state of no-mind among the various states of no-mind. Although the other states of no-mind are not what is being debated, in order to prevent uncertainty, there is no fault in using it as the subject (thesis). Commentary: 'As unmanifested form (avijñapti-rūpa) is not obstructive,' this is to defend the idea that obstruction is called form, and unmanifested form, which is not obstructive, is still called form. Mental phenomena (citta-dharma), even if they are not associated, are still mental phenomena. If they are not associated, then they are not mental phenomena; it should be said that if there is no obstruction, then it is not form. Commentary: 'However, excluding sleep, fainting, and cessation,' because the Sarvāstivāda school (Sarvāstivāda) does not recognize sleep, etc., as states of no-mind, these cases are excluded in order to address commonly accepted views. Commentary: 'Because there is no aversion, the mind-king (citta) still remains,' many explanations consider this passage to explain the reason for excluding sleep and fainting. The current explanation is not like this; it only distinguishes the states of no-mind such as the state of non-perception (asaṃjñā). 'The statement 'because there is no aversion' means that because there is no mental factor of aversion, it shows that the mind also does not exist. 'The statement 'if there is a mental factor of aversion, the mind does not cease' explains the opposite, that because there is no mental factor of aversion, the mind ceases. 'The statement 'it is not because there is no aversion that the mind-king still remains' explains the external objection. The external objection is that mental factors are what are averse, so it can be said that there are no mental factors in that state. Since the mind-king is not an object of aversion, it should still remain in that state. Therefore, the explanation is that it is not because there is no aversion that it remains; because there are no mental factors, the mind-king also ceases along with them. Treatise: 'Because the mind is defiled,' although this passage also appears in the Vimalakīrti Sutra (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra), the Agama Sutras (Āgama) are cited here because the Vimalakīrti Sutra is not a commonly accepted scripture. Commentary: 'The statement 'because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled,' as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi) 54,' according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 54, the consciousness that is moistened is able to grasp and fulfill the future inner body, and therefore continuously grasps and fulfills, and cannot abandon the various natures of ordinary beings (pṛthagjana).
以于內身能求滿故。于流轉中相續決定 又云。又由彼識永清凈故不待余因。任運自然入于寂滅。此識相續究竟斷故。於十方界不復流轉。于命及死不希求故名永離欲 釋曰。前由心染有情雜染。後由心凈有情解脫。
論。謂染凈以心為本等者。疏有四釋。余有五釋。具如余辨 有義復釋。謂染凈法以心為本。有漏．無漏．有為．無為總句。然應說心有染．凈二。有漏染心通漏．無漏．有為．無為總合為本。無漏凈心但與無漏有為．無為為其根本。非有漏本。因心而生。合釋有漏．無漏現行因染心生。以心為本。別釋無漏現行諸法因凈心生亦心為本。凈心不生有漏法故。依心住故者。合釋有漏．無漏本有種子依染心住。故心為本。別釋無漏本有種子依凈心住故心為本。心受彼熏持彼種故者。合釋有漏．無漏新熏種子染心為本。別釋無漏新熏種子凈心為本。凈第八心雖不受熏。因位曾熏果持種故。前後二疏雖有多釋。義皆不具。未方此解。並無凈心為本等故 詳曰。觀經文云心雜染故有情雜染。但約有情不依佛說。若兼佛者即不應云有情等也。而如來者非有情故。故前說云唯依取蘊建立有情。佛無有漏非有情攝。論既釋經。應同經意。若云示現稱有情者。亦為不可。準論釋經染．凈二門破他申自。皆並不言佛果凈
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為在內在的自身中能夠尋求圓滿的緣故，所以在流轉之中相續是決定的。又說：『又因為那個識永遠清凈的緣故，不等待其他的因緣，自然而然地進入寂滅。這個識的相續究竟斷滅的緣故，在十方世界不再流轉。對於生命和死亡不希求的緣故，名為永遠脫離慾望。』解釋說：前面由於心的染污，有情（Sattva，眾生）雜染；後面由於心的清凈，有情解脫。
論：所謂染污和清凈以心為根本等等。疏有四種解釋，其他有五種解釋，詳細的在其他地方辨析。有一種解釋說：染污和清凈的法以心為根本，包括有漏（āsrava，煩惱）和無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱），有為（saṃskṛta，有生滅變化）和無為（asaṃskṛta，無生滅變化）的總括。然而應該說心有染污和清凈兩種。有漏的染污心通於有漏、無漏、有為、無為的總合作為根本。無漏的清凈心只與無漏的有為、無為作為它的根本，不是有漏的根本。因為心而生。合起來解釋有漏、無漏現行（prādur-bhūta，顯現）的法因染污心而生，以心為根本。分別解釋無漏現行的諸法因清凈心而生，也是以心為根本。清凈心不生有漏的法，依靠心而住的緣故。合起來解釋有漏、無漏本有的種子依靠染污心而住，所以心為根本。分別解釋無漏本有的種子依靠清凈心而住，所以心為根本。心接受它的熏習，保持它的種子的緣故。合起來解釋有漏、無漏新熏的種子以染污心為根本。分別解釋無漏新熏的種子以清凈心為根本。清凈的第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）雖然不接受熏習，因為在因位曾經熏習，所以在果位保持種子。前後兩個疏雖然有很多解釋，意義都不完備。沒有說明這個解釋，並且沒有清凈心為根本等等的說法。詳細地說，觀察經文說『心雜染的緣故有情雜染』，只是就有情來說，不依據佛（Buddha）來說。如果兼顧佛，就不應該說有情等等。而如來（Tathāgata，佛的稱號）不是有情，所以前面說只依據取蘊（upādānaskandha，執取之蘊）建立有情。佛沒有有漏，不是有情所攝。論既然解釋經，應該和經的意義相同。如果說示現而稱為有情，也是不可以的。按照論解釋經的染污、清凈兩個方面，破斥他人，申明自己，都不說佛果的清凈。
【English Translation】 English version: Because one can seek fulfillment within the inner self, the continuity in transmigration is determined. It is also said: 'Furthermore, because that consciousness is eternally pure, it does not await other causes; it naturally enters into quiescence. Because the continuity of this consciousness is ultimately severed, it no longer transmigrates in the ten directions. Because it does not seek life and death, it is called eternally free from desire.' The explanation says: Previously, due to the defilement of the mind, sentient beings (Sattva) are defiled; later, due to the purity of the mind, sentient beings are liberated.
Treatise: The so-called defilement and purity take the mind as their basis, etc. The commentary has four explanations, and others have five explanations, which are discussed in detail elsewhere. One explanation says: Defiled and pure dharmas take the mind as their basis, including the totality of defiled (āsrava) and undefiled (anāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). However, it should be said that the mind has two aspects: defiled and pure. The defiled mind with outflows encompasses the totality of defiled, undefiled, conditioned, and unconditioned as its basis. The pure mind without outflows only takes the undefiled conditioned and unconditioned as its basis; it is not the basis of the defiled. It arises because of the mind. Combining the explanations, the manifest dharmas of defiled and undefiled arise from the defiled mind, taking the mind as their basis. Separately explaining, the manifest dharmas of undefiled arise from the pure mind, also taking the mind as their basis. The pure mind does not give rise to defiled dharmas, because it abides in the mind. Combining the explanations, the inherent seeds of defiled and undefiled abide in the defiled mind, so the mind is the basis. Separately explaining, the inherent seeds of undefiled abide in the pure mind, so the mind is the basis. Because the mind receives its熏習 (xūnxí, influence) and maintains its seeds. Combining the explanations, the newly熏習 (xūnxí, influenced) seeds of defiled and undefiled take the defiled mind as their basis. Separately explaining, the newly熏習 (xūnxí, influenced) seeds of undefiled take the pure mind as their basis. Although the pure eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) does not receive熏習 (xūnxí, influence), because it was once熏習 (xūnxí, influenced) in the causal stage, it maintains the seeds in the resultant stage. Although the two commentaries before and after have many explanations, their meanings are not complete. They do not explain this interpretation, and there is no statement that the pure mind is the basis, etc. In detail, observing the sutra text says 'Because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled,' it only speaks of sentient beings and does not rely on the Buddha (Buddha). If the Buddha is also considered, then it should not be said that sentient beings, etc. And the Tathāgata (Tathāgata) is not a sentient being, so it was previously said that sentient beings are established only based on the aggregates of grasping (upādānaskandha). The Buddha has no outflows and is not included among sentient beings. Since the treatise explains the sutra, it should have the same meaning as the sutra. If it is said that it is called a sentient being by manifestation, that is also not acceptable. According to the treatise's explanation of the sutra, the two aspects of defilement and purity refute others and state their own position, and neither speaks of the purity of the Buddha's fruit.
識。故知二疏善悟奧旨。又設兼據凈心釋者。亦成繁見。何所以者。言心為本。即是染．凈有為．無為之總句也。后復對彼因心而生。復云以心為本。別釋無漏現行諸法因凈心生亦心為本。前既言總后何云別。若言據彼別凈心說。若爾別染何不是彼別染本耶。若許是者。云何不是別釋染現。又若別釋容有斯理。但一釋中何得矛楯。余準此非。
論。若無此識至皆應無因者。無著本論具如疏引 無性釋云。從無想等者。從上界沒來生欲界。爾時煩惱等者。謂貪．嗔等。所染初識者。謂續生時生有初識。爾時自地一切煩惱所染污故 問何故舉彼無想沒耶。豈余處沒有識持種 答有兩釋。一如燈辨。一云按正法念處經．及俱舍論。北郁單越定有生天后報之業。無想諸天定有欲界后報業也。餘地不定。所以偏說。
論。無染心后等者。無著本論如疏所明。無性解者今亦略敘。對治煩惱等者。謂如最初預流果．向。見斷煩惱對治道生。一切世間余識已滅。爾時若離阿賴耶識。修斷煩惱所有隨眠何所依住。非對治識帶彼種子應正道理。由此對治識自性解脫故者。即是自性極清凈義。與煩惱不俱等者。能治．所治互相違故。猶如明．闇。復於後時等者。謂見道后修道位中。余文可解。
論。若無此識持業果種等者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此可知二疏（指《成唯識論述記》和《成唯識論演秘》的作者窺基和遁倫）善於領悟精深的旨意。又假設兼顧以清凈心來解釋，也會變得繁瑣多見。為什麼這樣說呢？說『心為本』，就是染污、清凈、有為、無為的總括性語句。後來又針對因心而生，再次說『以心為本』，分別解釋無漏現行諸法因清凈心而生也是以心為本。前面已經說了總括，後面為何又說是分別呢？如果說這是根據那分別的清凈心來說的，那麼分別的染污為何不是那分別的染污之本呢？如果允許是的話，怎麼不是分別解釋染污現行呢？又如果分別解釋或許有這個道理，但是在一個解釋中怎麼能自相矛盾呢？其餘的可以依此類推，都是錯誤的。
論：如果沒有此識（阿賴耶識）乃至都應該沒有原因，無著（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》中就像疏中引用的那樣。無性（Asanga）解釋說：『從無想等』，是從上界（色界或無色界）死亡後來到欲界。『爾時煩惱等』，是指貪、嗔等。『所染初識』，是指持續生命時產生的生有初識。那時被自地的一切煩惱所染污。問：為什麼舉出那無想天死亡的例子呢？難道其他地方死亡沒有識持有種子嗎？答：有兩種解釋。一是如燈的比喻。一是說按照《正法念處經》以及《俱舍論》，北俱盧洲（Uttarakuru）一定有生天后報的業。無想諸天一定有欲界后報的業。其他地方不一定。所以偏說。
論：沒有染污心之後等，無著（Vasubandhu）的本論就像疏中所說明的。無性（Asanga）的解釋現在也簡略敘述。『對治煩惱等』，是指如最初預流果、向，見斷煩惱的對治道產生。一切世間的其餘識已經滅盡。這時如果離開阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna），修斷煩惱的所有隨眠依什麼而住？不是對治識帶著那些種子才合乎道理。『由此對治識自性解脫故』，就是自性極其清凈的意思。『與煩惱不俱等』，是能治和所治互相違背的緣故，猶如光明和黑暗。『復於後時等』，是指見道后修道位中。其餘的文字可以理解。
論：如果沒有此識持有業果種子等
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it can be known that the two commentaries (referring to Kuiji's Commentary on the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra and Dunlun's Secret Meaning of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra) are good at understanding profound meanings. Furthermore, assuming a comprehensive explanation based on the pure mind would also become verbose and excessive. Why is this so? Saying 'mind is the root' is a general statement encompassing defilement, purity, conditioned, and unconditioned. Later, in response to arising from the mind, it is again said 'taking mind as the root,' separately explaining that the arising of undefiled manifest dharmas is also rooted in the pure mind. If the former already stated the general, why does the latter say it is separate? If it is said that this is based on that separate pure mind, then why isn't separate defilement the root of that separate defilement? If it is allowed to be so, how is it not a separate explanation of defiled manifestation? Furthermore, if separate explanations are permissible, perhaps there is reason to this, but how can there be contradiction within a single explanation? The rest can be inferred accordingly, and are all incorrect.
Treatise: If there were no such consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), then everything would be without cause. Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle is as quoted in the commentary. Asanga explains: 'From the non-perceptual, etc.,' refers to coming to the desire realm after dying from the upper realms (form realm or formless realm). 'At that time, afflictions, etc.,' refers to greed, hatred, etc. 'The initially defiled consciousness' refers to the initial consciousness of existence arising when continuing life. At that time, it is defiled by all the afflictions of its own realm. Question: Why is the example of dying from the non-perceptual realm given? Is it that dying in other places does not have consciousness holding the seeds? Answer: There are two explanations. One is like the analogy of a lamp. The other is that according to the Sutra on the Establishment of Mindfulness of the True Dharma and the Abhidharmakosa, Uttarakuru certainly has the karma of rebirth in the heavens. The non-perceptual heavens certainly have the karma of rebirth in the desire realm. Other places are uncertain. Therefore, it is specifically mentioned.
Treatise: After the non-defiled mind, etc., Vasubandhu's original treatise is as explained in the commentary. Asanga's explanation is now briefly narrated. 'Counteracting afflictions, etc.,' refers to, for example, the arising of the path of counteracting afflictions to be severed by seeing, such as the initial stream-enterer fruit and path. All other consciousnesses of the world have already ceased. At this time, if separated from the Ālayavijñāna, what do all the latent tendencies of afflictions to be severed by cultivation rely on? It is not reasonable that the counteracting consciousness carries those seeds. 'Therefore, the self-nature of this counteracting consciousness is liberated,' which means that its self-nature is extremely pure. 'Not together with afflictions, etc.,' is because the counteracting and the counteracted are mutually contradictory, like light and darkness. 'Again, at a later time, etc.,' refers to the stage of cultivation after the path of seeing. The rest of the text can be understood.
Treatise: If there were no such consciousness holding the seeds of karmic results, etc.
。無著攝論疏中粗引。無性等釋疏蓋不言。令初學者馳回難進。今本及釋取要引之。冀諸習徒無滯略漏 無著論云。若有於此非等引地沒已生時。依中有位意起染污意識結生相續。此染污意識于中有中滅。于母胎中識羯羅藍更相和合。若即意識與彼和合。既和合已依止此識。于母胎中有意識轉。若爾即應有二意識于母胎中同時而轉 無性釋云。非等引地所謂欲界 沒即是死 依中有位者。謂依死．生二有中間 起染污者。與愛恚俱有顛倒故。釋曰。男女互於父母之處起貪恚也 言意識者。余識爾時久已沒故。釋曰。余眼等識中有末位而久已滅。唯意識在。中有初中六識皆有 連持生故名為相續 攝受生故名為結生。此染污意識者。緣生有故。釋曰。父母不凈是識托處。說名為生。緣此不凈謂為己有而生貪愛。或緣當生有果起愛故得潤生。
于中有中滅者。此若不滅無生有故 于母胎中等者。謂此滅時于母胎中有異熟識與其赤．白同一安．危令相和雜成羯羅藍。釋曰識與赤．白損益共俱和雜成身 若即意識者。謂此若非阿賴耶識 既和合已者。謂受生已 依止此識者。依異熟識。釋曰細意識也 有意識轉者。有別轉識。謂與信等．貪等相應。樂苦受俱分別意識後後位轉。釋曰三性三受並皆易了。從初受生乃至老時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是無著（Asanga）《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）疏中的簡略引用。無性（Vasubandhu）等的註釋疏中沒有詳細說明，導致初學者感到困惑難以深入。現在這個版本和註釋提取了要點進行引用，希望學習者能夠順利理解，避免遺漏。
無著的論中說：『如果有人在非等引地（非禪定之地）死亡並即將出生時，依賴於中有的狀態，意（manas）生起染污的意識，從而結生相續。這個染污的意識在中有的狀態中滅去，在母胎中，識與羯羅藍（kalala，受精卵）相互結合。如果就是這個意識與羯羅藍結合，結合之後，就依賴於這個識，在母胎中就有意識的轉變。如果這樣，就應該有兩個意識在母胎中同時存在。』
無性解釋說：『非等引地，就是指欲界（kāmadhātu）。』『死亡』就是指『死去』。『依賴於中有位』，是指依賴於死亡和出生兩個『有』（bhava）的中間狀態。『生起染污』，是因為與愛（rāga）、恚（dveṣa）同時存在顛倒（viparyāsa）的緣故。註釋說：『男女雙方在父母之處互相產生貪愛和嗔恨。』
『意識』，是因為其他的識在那個時候已經滅去了。註釋說：『其他的眼識等在中有末位時就已經滅去了，只有意識存在。中有初中六識都有。』『連持生』所以叫做『相續』。『攝受生』所以叫做『結生』。這個染污的意識，是因為緣于生『有』的緣故。註釋說：『父母的不凈是識所依託的地方，所以稱為『生』。緣于這個不凈，認為是自己的，從而產生貪愛。或者緣于將要出生的果報而生起愛，因此得到潤生。』
『在中有的狀態中滅去』，如果這個意識不滅去，就不會有生『有』。『在母胎中等』，是指這個意識滅去的時候，在母胎中有異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna）與父母的赤白（精血）一同安危，相互混合成為羯羅藍。註釋說：『識與赤白相互損益，共同混合形成身體。』『如果就是這個意識』，是指如果這個不是阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna）。『結合之後』，是指受生之後。『依賴於這個識』，是指依賴於異熟識。註釋說：『是細微的意識。』『有意識轉變』，是有其他的轉變識，是指與信等（śraddhādi）、貪等（rāgādi）相應，與樂受（sukha-vedanā）、苦受（duḥkha-vedanā）俱生的分別意識，在後后的階段轉變。註釋說：『三性（善、惡、無記）、三受（樂、苦、舍）都容易理解，從最初受生一直到老。』
【English Translation】 English version: This is a brief excerpt from the commentary on Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana). Vasubandhu and others' commentaries did not elaborate, causing confusion and difficulty for beginners. This version and commentary extract the key points for citation, hoping that learners can understand smoothly and avoid omissions.
Asanga's treatise states: 'If someone dies in a non-samādhi ground (a place without meditative absorption) and is about to be born, relying on the intermediate state (antarābhava), the manas (mind) arises with defiled consciousness, thus connecting the continuity of rebirth. This defiled consciousness ceases in the intermediate state, and in the mother's womb, the consciousness combines with the kalala (embryo). If this consciousness combines with the kalala, after combining, it relies on this consciousness, and there is a transformation of consciousness in the mother's womb. If so, there should be two consciousnesses existing simultaneously in the mother's womb.'
Vasubandhu explains: 'The non-samādhi ground refers to the kāmadhātu (desire realm).' 'Death' means 'dying.' 'Relying on the intermediate state' refers to relying on the intermediate state between the two 'bhava' (existences) of death and birth. 'Arising defilement' is because it exists simultaneously with rāga (attachment) and dveṣa (aversion), and viparyāsa (perversion). The commentary says: 'Both men and women mutually generate attachment and aversion towards their parents.'
'Consciousness' is because the other consciousnesses have already ceased at that time. The commentary says: 'The other eye-consciousness, etc., have already ceased at the end of the intermediate state, only consciousness exists. All six consciousnesses are present in the initial and middle stages of the intermediate state.' 'Connecting and holding birth' is called 'continuity.' 'Embracing and receiving birth' is called 'rebirth.' This defiled consciousness is because it is conditioned by the arising of 'bhava.' The commentary says: 'The impurity of the parents is the place where consciousness relies, so it is called 'birth.' Conditioned by this impurity, it is considered one's own, thus generating attachment. Or, attachment arises from the fruit of the future birth, thus obtaining the moisture of rebirth.'
'Ceases in the intermediate state,' if this consciousness does not cease, there will be no arising of 'bhava.' 'In the mother's womb, etc.,' refers to when this consciousness ceases, in the mother's womb, there is vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) together with the parents' red and white (sperm and egg), sharing the same safety and danger, mutually mixing to become kalala. The commentary says: 'Consciousness and red and white mutually benefit and harm each other, jointly mixing to form the body.' 'If it is this consciousness' refers to if this is not ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness). 'After combining' refers to after receiving birth. 'Relying on this consciousness' refers to relying on vipāka-vijñāna. The commentary says: 'It is subtle consciousness.' 'There is a transformation of consciousness' refers to there being other transformed consciousnesses, referring to the differentiating consciousness that corresponds with śraddhādi (faith, etc.) and rāgādi (attachment, etc.), and arises together with sukha-vedanā (pleasant feeling) and duḥkha-vedanā (unpleasant feeling), transforming in subsequent stages. The commentary says: 'The three natures (good, evil, and neutral) and the three feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) are all easy to understand, from the initial reception of birth until old age.'
。此分別意展轉而起。故言後後位轉 有二意識轉等者。謂異熟體有情本事。不待今時加行而轉無記意識。及可了知所緣行相樂．苦受等相應意識。是二意識。釋曰。異熟識者即細意識。可了知識。即粗意識 應一身中一時而轉。然不應許。經相違故。如是頌言。無處無容非前非后同身同類二識並生。釋曰。外人救云。二並何違。故引經難。經意說云。無受身處。無容道理。非約前後。同一身中同類二識一時並生 又不應許此二是一。自性別故。釋曰。外又救云。此之二識體同義分。其體是一亦不違經無同類並。故今破云。自性別故如眼等五識 又異熟識不應間斷。結相續已后應余處更結生故。釋曰。外又救云。和合意識別生意識前後間起。亦不違經無同類並。故復破云。和合識體許是異熟。若間生者體便間斷。若爾後續應名更生。故量破云。和合意識不應間生。許是異熟故。猶如報色 又異熟體唯恒相續更無異趣。釋曰。外復救云。何妨報色不斷。異熟心斷。復此破云。因同於前。命根為喻。逐難粗釋。余易不論。
疏。又若從此沒至定不可得者。此無著文 無性釋云。如是已辨于欲界中若離阿賴耶識結生相續不成。於色．無色亦不得成今當顯示。若從此沒等者。是欲界死上生時義。由非等引等者。謂與彼地
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這種分別的意義是輾轉產生的，所以說『後後位轉』。關於『有二意識轉等者』，指的是異熟果報之體的有情眾生的自身，不需要現在的行為而運轉的無記意識，以及可以瞭解所緣境的行相、樂受、苦受等相應的意識。這兩種意識，解釋說，異熟識就是細微的意識，可以瞭解的意識就是粗顯的意識。應該在一個身體中一時運轉，但是不應該允許這種情況發生，因為與經文相違背。就像頌文所說：『沒有處所，沒有道理，不是前，不是后，同一個身體，同一種類，兩個識同時產生。』解釋說，外人辯解說，兩個識同時產生有什麼違背呢？所以引用經文來反駁。經文的意思是說，沒有感受的處所，沒有道理，不是指前後，同一個身體中，同一類的兩個識同時產生。又不應該允許這兩種識是一個，因為它們的自性不同。解釋說，外人又辯解說，這兩種識的體性相同，只是作用不同，它們的體性是一個，也不違背經文沒有同類識同時產生的說法。所以現在反駁說，因為它們的自性不同，就像眼識等五識一樣。而且異熟識不應該間斷，在結生相續之後，應該在其他地方再次結生。解釋說，外人又辯解說，和合意識和別生意識前後間斷產生，也不違背經文沒有同類識同時產生的說法。所以再次反駁說，和合識的體性被認為是異熟識，如果間斷產生，那麼它的體性就會間斷。如果是這樣，後續的結生應該叫做更生。所以用量來破斥說，和合意識不應該間斷產生，因為它被認為是異熟識，就像報色一樣。而且異熟的體性只有恒常相續，沒有其他的去處。解釋說，外人再次辯解說，為什麼報色不能斷，而異熟心可以斷呢？再次用前面的原因來反駁，用命根作為比喻。粗略地解釋了這些辯難，其他的容易理解的就不再論述了。 疏：又如果從此死亡到一定不能得到（結生相續）的情況，這是無著（Asanga）的文。無性（Vasubandhu）解釋說：像這樣已經辨明在欲界中，如果離開阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，storehouse consciousness）結生相續就不能成立。在色界（Rūpadhātu，form realm）、無色界（Arūpadhātu，formless realm）也不能成立，現在應當顯示。如果從此死亡等情況，是欲界死亡向上生時的情況。由於不是等引等情況，指的是與那個地（的禪定）
【English Translation】 English version: This meaning of differentiation arises through successive transformations, hence the saying 'successive positions transform'. Regarding 'there are two consciousnesses transforming, etc.', this refers to the self of sentient beings with a body of ripened karma (Vipāka, result of karma), the non-defiled consciousness that operates without present actions, and the consciousness that corresponds to knowable objects, aspects, pleasant feelings, painful feelings, etc. These are the two consciousnesses. The explanation is that the ripened consciousness is the subtle consciousness, and the knowable consciousness is the coarse consciousness. They should operate simultaneously in one body, but this should not be allowed because it contradicts the scriptures. As the verse says: 'There is no place, no reason, not before, not after, in the same body, of the same kind, two consciousnesses arise simultaneously.' The explanation is that an outsider argues, 'What is the contradiction in two consciousnesses arising simultaneously?' Therefore, the scriptures are cited to refute this. The meaning of the scriptures is that there is no place for feeling, no reason, not referring to before and after, two consciousnesses of the same kind arise simultaneously in the same body. Furthermore, it should not be allowed that these two consciousnesses are one, because their self-natures are different. The explanation is that the outsider further argues that the nature of these two consciousnesses is the same, only their functions are different, their nature is one, and it does not contradict the scriptures that no consciousnesses of the same kind arise simultaneously. Therefore, it is now refuted that because their self-natures are different, like the five consciousnesses of eye, etc. Moreover, the ripened consciousness should not be interrupted, after the connection of rebirth, it should be reborn elsewhere again. The explanation is that the outsider further argues that the combined consciousness and the separately born consciousness arise intermittently, and it does not contradict the scriptures that no consciousnesses of the same kind arise simultaneously. Therefore, it is refuted again that the nature of the combined consciousness is considered to be ripened. If it arises intermittently, then its nature will be interrupted. If that is the case, the subsequent rebirth should be called a new birth. Therefore, it is refuted by inference that the combined consciousness should not arise intermittently, because it is considered to be ripened, like the karmic result of form. Moreover, the nature of ripened karma only has constant continuity, and there is no other destination. The explanation is that the outsider argues again, 'Why can't the karmic result of form be interrupted, but the ripened consciousness can be interrupted?' The same reason as before is used to refute this, using the life force as an analogy. These difficulties have been roughly explained, and the other easily understood points will not be discussed further. Commentary: Furthermore, if from this death to a certain point it is impossible to obtain (rebirth continuity), this is the text of Asanga (無著). Vasubandhu (無性) explains: As such, it has already been clarified that in the desire realm (Kāmadhātu, 欲界), if one departs from the storehouse consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識) the continuity of rebirth cannot be established. In the form realm (Rūpadhātu, 色界) and the formless realm (Arūpadhātu, 無色界) it also cannot be established, now it should be shown. If from this death, etc., it refers to the situation of death in the desire realm and rebirth upwards. Because it is not equal concentration, etc., it refers to being with that realm (of meditative concentration).
貪定味等煩惱相應 釋曰。于上二界緣定起愛方得潤生 離異熟識餘種子體定不可得者。非欲廛沒心有彼種子體。生滅不俱故 釋曰。而外救云。于彼欲廛沒心之中。有彼定地染心種子。故有斯破。定散二心不俱生故。不成熏習故。下心中無上染種 又云。非定地生心為彼種子體。即於一心種有種性不相應故 釋曰。外又救云。即定生心為彼種體。故此破云。種者是因。有種是果。此果含種故名有種。于生剎那因果俱有理不相應。雖大乘宗因果俱有。就彼宗難亦不相違 又云。非餘生中先所獲得色廛等心為種子體。持彼熏習余識無故 釋曰。外又救云。過去生中得色界心為彼種子斯有何失故牒非之。汝無能持彼種之識。何有所持種子體耶 又云。非色相續為種子體無因緣故 釋云。外又救云。過去熏習依色根中為今時種。復敘斥云。無因緣言而有三釋。一地獄根非上心因。二下色中無上地種。三持種者體必所熏。色根無彼所熏因緣。故無彼種。言因緣者即道理也。
論。異類法后至亦應無因者。無著論文具如疏引 無性解云。即無色界無漏心生世間心滅。彼趣所攝異熟無故。不由功用自然應得無餘涅槃。能治現前一切所治皆永斷故 又釋滅二趣等云。生第一有欲斷彼地諸煩惱時。想微劣故自地無道。無所有處地
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『貪定味等煩惱相應』，釋義：在上二界（指色界和無色界）中，因為對禪定的滋味生起貪愛，才能得到輪迴的因緣。如果離開了異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識），其餘的種子（bīja）自體就無法獲得。並非說在欲界沉沒的心中，有那些種子自體。因為生起和滅去不是同時的。 釋義：而外道辯解說：在那些欲界沉沒的心中，有那些定地染污心的種子，所以有這樣的駁斥。因為定心和散心不會同時生起，所以不能形成熏習。地獄心中沒有上界染污的種子。 又說：不是定地生起的心作為那些種子自體。因為在一個心中，種子和種性不相應。 釋義：外道又辯解說：就是定中生起的心作為那些種子自體。所以這樣駁斥說：種子是因，有種子是果。這個果包含種子，所以名為『有種』。在生起的那一剎那，因果同時存在，道理上不相應。雖然大乘宗認為因果同時存在，但即使按照他們的觀點來辯駁，也沒有什麼不相符之處。 又說：不是在其餘生命中先前所獲得的色界等心作為種子自體，因為沒有能夠持有那些熏習的其餘識。 釋義：外道又辯解說：過去生命中獲得的心作為那些種子，這有什麼過失呢？所以特別指出『非』。你沒有能夠持有那些種子的識，哪裡有所持的種子自體呢？ 又說：不是色相續作為種子自體，因為沒有因緣。 釋義：外道又辯解說：過去的熏習依靠色根中作為現在的種子。又敘述並駁斥說：沒有因緣，有三種解釋：一是地獄根不是上界心的因；二是地獄色中沒有上界地的種子；三是持有種子者，其體必定被熏習。色根沒有被那些所熏習的因緣，所以沒有那些種子。所說的因緣，就是道理。 『異類法后至也應該沒有因』，無著（Asaṅga）的論文具體內容如疏文所引用。 無性（Asvabhāva）解釋說：就是沒有沒有無漏心生起，世間心滅去。那些趣向所包含的異熟沒有了，所以不用通過功用，自然應該獲得無餘涅槃（nirvāṇa）。因為能夠對治現前一切所要對治的，都永遠斷除了。 又解釋滅二趣等說：在生到第一有（Bhavāgra，有頂天）想要斷除那個地的各種煩惱時，因為想念非常微弱，所以在自己的地沒有道。在無所有處地（Ākiṃcanyāyatana）
【English Translation】 English version 『Corresponding to afflictions such as craving for the taste of samādhi (定)』 Explanation: In the upper two realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm), only by generating craving for the taste of dhyāna (禪定, samādhi) can one obtain the cause for rebirth. If one departs from the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness), the self-nature of the remaining seeds (bīja, 種子) cannot be obtained. It is not that within the mind submerged in the Desire Realm, there are those seed self-natures, because arising and ceasing do not occur simultaneously. Explanation: And the externalists argue, 『Within those minds submerged in the Desire Realm, there are the seeds of defiled minds of the dhyāna grounds, therefore there is this refutation.』 Because the mind in dhyāna and the distracted mind do not arise simultaneously, they cannot form habituation (熏習, vāsanā). In the lower realm mind, there are no seeds of defilement from the higher realm. It is also said: 『It is not that the mind arising from the dhyāna ground serves as those seed self-natures.』 Because within one mind, the seed and the seed-nature are not corresponding. Explanation: The externalists further argue, 『It is precisely the mind arising from dhyāna that serves as those seed-natures.』 Therefore, this refutation says: 『A seed is a cause, having a seed is a result. This result contains the seed, therefore it is called 『having a seed.』 In the moment of arising, cause and effect exist simultaneously, which is not logically consistent. Although the Mahāyāna school believes that cause and effect exist simultaneously, even refuting according to their view, there is nothing contradictory.』 It is also said: 『It is not that the mind of the Form Realm, etc., previously obtained in other lives serves as the seed self-nature, because there is no remaining consciousness capable of holding those habituations.』 Explanation: The externalists further argue, 『The ** mind obtained in past lives serves as those seeds, what fault is there in this?』 Therefore, it is specifically pointed out 『not』. You do not have the consciousness capable of holding those seeds, where is the seed self-nature that is held? It is also said: 『It is not that the continuity of form serves as the seed self-nature, because there is no cause and condition.』 Explanation: The externalists further argue, 『Past habituation relies on the root of form as the seed for the present time.』 Again, it is narrated and refuted, saying: 『There is no cause and condition,』 there are three explanations: First, the root of the lower realm is not the cause of the higher realm mind; second, in the lower realm form, there are no seeds of the upper realm ground; third, the one who holds the seed, its essence must be habituated. The root of form does not have the cause and condition of being habituated by those, therefore there are no those seeds. The so-called cause and condition is the principle. 『The subsequent arrival of dissimilar dharmas should also have no cause,』 Asaṅga's (無著) treatise is detailed as quoted in the commentary. Asvabhāva (無性) explains: 『That is, there is no ** no un-outflow mind arising, the worldly mind ceases. Those destinies included in the resultant are gone, so without effort, one should naturally attain nirvana (涅槃, nirvāṇa) without remainder. Because everything to be treated that can treat the present is permanently cut off.』 It also explains the cessation of the two destinies, etc., saying: 『When one is born in the First Existence (Bhavāgra, 有頂天, the peak of existence) and wants to cut off the various afflictions of that ground, because thought is very weak, there is no path in one's own ground. In the Realm of Nothing Whatsoever (Ākiṃcanyāyatana, 無所有處地)』
明利故起彼無漏心現在前。爾時二趣俱應滅離。謂第一有．無所有處二趣滅離。爾時有情應成死滅。二趣所依俱無有故。非無漏法是趣所攝。是不繫故。對治趣故 問準攝論難滅二趣失。此論乃責後起無因。二論既殊。何得引彼而證於此 答揚文廢旨似乎涇．渭。取理長披誠同水乳。彼論本意責無本識善染無種。無種即是無因異名。乘斯便責滅離二趣。故本論云。複次生無色界若離一切種子異熟識染污．善心應無種子。染污．善心應無依持。次下方責應滅二趣。故知兩論實乃同也。取證無失。
疏。且復業中者。論中前來雙破果．業。下唯斥業而廢于果。故云且復生起下文。
論。又行緣識應不得成等者。無性攝論如燈具辨 世親釋云。業為緣識不相應者。謂福．非福．及不動行生已謝滅。若不信有阿賴耶識當於何處安立熏習。如六識身不能任持所有熏習 釋曰。明賴耶無無持種識。即行熏識名緣不成 問經部識支克體取何 答依二攝論相傳三釋。一云三業所熏能持種識以為識支。二云所持業種以為識支。三云能持種識及所持種皆為識支。或說結生染識亦是 有義斷云。雖有三釋唯取種子為識支者以之為正。然同大乘取名言種為識支者以為正。故俱舍論說同類因所行與等流果功能將為識支正相當故 詳曰
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果因為明利（指智慧）的緣故，使彼無漏心（指沒有煩惱的心）現在前，那麼這時兩種『趣』（指眾生輪迴的去處）都應該滅離。這兩種『趣』是指第一有（指色界天），和無所有處（指無色界天）這兩種『趣』的滅離。這時，有情（指眾生）應該成為死滅，因為這兩種『趣』所依賴的都已不存在。但無漏法（指脫離煩惱的法）不是『趣』所包含的，因為它是不繫縛的，是對治『趣』的。問：如果按照《攝大乘論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）來責難，會失去滅掉兩種『趣』的意義。但此論（指本論）是責備後來生起的沒有原因。既然兩部論不同，怎麼能引用彼論來證明此論呢？答：揚棄文句而廢棄宗旨，就像涇水和渭水一樣（指雖然接近但有區別）。採取道理的長處，真誠地融合，就像水和乳一樣（指完全融合）。彼論的本意是責備沒有本識（指阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna），善和染污沒有種子。沒有種子就是沒有原因的另一種說法。因此就責備滅離兩種『趣』。所以本論說：『再次，生無**，如果離開一切種子異熟識（指阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna），染污和善心應該沒有種子，染污和善心應該沒有所依賴的。』接下來就責備應該滅掉兩種『趣』。所以知道兩部論實際上是相同的。取證沒有錯誤。
疏：『且復業中』，論中前面同時破斥果和業，下面只斥責業而廢棄果，所以說『且復生起下文』。
論：『又行緣識應不得成等』，無性《攝大乘論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）如燈具一樣辨析。世親（Vasubandhu）解釋說：『業作為識的緣不相應，是指福、非福和不動行生起后謝滅。如果不相信有阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna），應當在何處安立熏習？』就像六識身不能勝任任持所有的熏習。釋曰：說明賴耶（指阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）沒有沒有持種的識，即行熏識名緣不成。問：經部（Sautrāntika）的識支具體取什麼？答：依據二《攝論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）相傳有三種解釋。第一種說法是三業所熏能持種識作為識支。第二種說法是所持業種作為識支。第三種說法是能持種識和所持種都作為識支。或者說結生染識也是。有義斷言：雖然有三種解釋，但只取種子作為識支是正確的。然而如同大乘（Mahāyāna）取名言種作為識支是正確的。所以《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya）說，同類因所行與等流果的功能將作為識支，正相當。詳曰：
【English Translation】 English version: If, because of clear wisdom, that undefiled mind (referring to a mind free from afflictions) is present, then at that time, both 'destinations' (referring to the realms of rebirth for sentient beings) should be extinguished. These two 'destinations' refer to the first existence (referring to the Form Realm heavens) and the Realm of No-thingness (referring to the Formless Realm heavens). At this time, sentient beings should become extinct, because what these two 'destinations' rely on no longer exists. However, undefiled dharmas (referring to teachings that lead to freedom from afflictions) are not included in 'destinations', because they are unbound and counteract 'destinations'. Question: If we criticize according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, we would lose the meaning of extinguishing the two 'destinations'. But this treatise (referring to the present treatise) criticizes the later arising without a cause. Since the two treatises are different, how can we cite that treatise to prove this treatise? Answer: Abandoning the words and discarding the purpose is like the Jing and Wei rivers (referring to being close but distinct). Taking the strengths of the reasoning and sincerely integrating them is like water and milk (referring to complete integration). The original intention of that treatise is to criticize the absence of a fundamental consciousness (referring to Ālaya-vijñāna), and the absence of seeds for good and defilement. The absence of seeds is another way of saying the absence of a cause. Therefore, it criticizes the extinction of the two 'destinations'. So this treatise says: 'Again, birth without **, if separated from all seeds, the Vipāka-vijñāna (referring to Ālaya-vijñāna), defilement, and good mind should have no seeds, and defilement and good mind should have nothing to rely on.' Next, it criticizes that the two 'destinations' should be extinguished. So we know that the two treatises are actually the same. There is no mistake in citing the evidence.
Commentary: 'Moreover, in karma,' the treatise previously refuted both result and karma together. Below, it only criticizes karma and abandons the result. Therefore, it says, 'Moreover, arising, the following text.'
Treatise: 'Also, the condition of action should not be established, etc.,' Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra analyzes it like a lamp. Vasubandhu explains: 'Karma as a condition for consciousness is not corresponding, referring to the fact that merit, demerit, and unwavering actions arise and then cease. If one does not believe in the existence of Ālaya-vijñāna, where should the impressions be established?' Just like the six consciousnesses cannot bear all the impressions. Explanation: Explaining that Ālaya-vijñāna has no consciousness that does not hold seeds, that is, the name of the condition of action-perfumed consciousness is not established. Question: What does the Sautrāntika school specifically take as the element of consciousness? Answer: According to the transmitted explanations of the two Yogācārabhūmi-śāstras, there are three explanations. The first explanation is that the seed-holding consciousness perfumed by the three karmas is taken as the element of consciousness. The second explanation is that the held seed of karma is taken as the element of consciousness. The third explanation is that both the seed-holding consciousness and the held seed are taken as the element of consciousness. Or it is said that the defiled consciousness at the time of rebirth is also. Some define it by saying: Although there are three explanations, it is correct to only take the seed as the element of consciousness. However, like the Mahāyāna school, it is correct to take the seed of names and concepts as the element of consciousness. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says that the function of the same kind of cause and the result of outflow will be taken as the element of consciousness, which is quite appropriate. Detailed explanation:
。若唯種者即第二釋。此論下云。業種為識非克實體。云何斷言同大乘正。若言取彼第三釋者。第三既取能所二持。云何斷言唯種正耶。進退有違恐筆誤也。又依俱舍似有種義。若依攝論種相難明。故無性云。謂行為緣貪等俱生眼等諸識許為識支 又云。許續生識為識支者。此亦不然。按斯兩文牒彼宗計。識支但現。世親亦現。文如前引 今應說云。據大小乘合為三釋。依無性論二文不同即為兩釋。並依現說。準俱舍文。復為一釋。但依種說。文如上引 或為四釋第四通取種．現為支。如世親論文言總故義可通也。文如前云。審觀可悉。
論。時分懸隔等者。有助論主更難彼云。欲．色界有色。行感可名緣。無色界色無。如何云感色。
疏。色果在未來至八萬劫等者。問縱果未來何得去因許多劫耶 答若生報業果未必遙。若后報業果遠何感。如受非想八萬劫已後方受彼人趣等報。報望昔因隔八萬劫豈匪遠耶 問生報之業如謗滅等。果既不遙應名行緣 答略為二釋。一但言懸故不得為緣。非許近者即成緣義。遮他論故。二縱生報業因果異世。道理疏遠。亦名懸隔。縱無其遠有隔非緣。第二釋善 若爾自宗如何 答有所感識斯有何過。
疏。如外法等非異熟因者。舉喻釋成。既汝行支由懸隔故不能感果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果只承認種子，那就是第二種解釋。本論在後面說：『業的種子是識，不是實在的個體。』怎麼能斷言這與大乘的觀點相同呢？如果說採取第三種解釋，第三種解釋既包括能持和所持兩方面，怎麼能斷言只有種子是正確的呢？這樣進退兩難，恐怕是筆誤吧。而且依據《俱舍論》，似乎有種子的含義；如果依據《攝大乘論》，種子的相狀難以明白。所以無性論師說：『所謂以行為緣，貪等煩惱同時生起，眼等諸識被認為是識支。』又說：『允許相續的識作為識支。』這也是不對的。按照這兩段文字，是記錄對方宗派的觀點，識支只是顯現。世親菩薩也只是顯現。文字如前面所引用。現在應該說，根據大乘和小乘，總共有三種解釋。依據無性論師的兩段不同的文字，就是兩種解釋。並且依據顯現而說。按照《俱舍論》的文字，又是一種解釋。只是依據種子而說。文字如上面所引用。或者有四種解釋，第四種是同時包括種子和顯現作為識支。如世親菩薩的論文所說，言語總括，所以意義可以貫通。文字如前面所說，仔細觀察就可以明白。 論：時間間隔遙遠等等。』這是爲了幫助論主進一步反駁對方：『欲界、色界的行為感受可以稱為緣，無色界沒有色，怎麼能說感受色呢？』 疏：色果在未來，甚至八萬劫等等。』問：即使果在未來，怎麼能距離因這麼多個劫呢？答：如果是現世報的業，果報未必遙遠；如果是後世報的業，果報遙遠，怎麼能感受呢？比如受非想非非想處天的果報，在八萬劫以後才感受彼人趣等的果報。果報相對於以前的因，間隔八萬劫，難道不遙遠嗎？問：現世報的業，比如誹謗滅盡定等，果報既然不遙遠，應該稱為行緣。答：簡單地有兩種解釋。一是隻說遙遠，所以不能作為緣，並非允許近的就成為緣的含義。這是爲了駁斥對方的觀點。二是即使是現世報的業，因果異世，道理疏遠，也稱為遙遠。即使沒有那麼遙遠，有間隔就不是緣。第二種解釋更好。如果這樣，我們自己的宗派怎麼樣呢？答：有所感受的識，這有什麼過錯呢？ 疏：如外法等不是異熟因。』這是舉例說明。既然你的行支由於間隔遙遠，所以不能感受果報。
【English Translation】 English version: If only the seed is acknowledged, then that is the second explanation. This treatise states later: 'The seed of karma is consciousness, not a substantial entity.' How can it be asserted that this is the same as the Mahayana view? If it is said that the third explanation is adopted, the third explanation includes both the able-to-hold and the held. How can it be asserted that only the seed is correct? This is a dilemma, perhaps a writing error. Moreover, according to the Abhidharmakośa, there seems to be the meaning of seed; if according to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the appearance of the seed is difficult to understand. Therefore, Asaṅga says: 'So-called actions as conditions, with greed and other afflictions arising simultaneously, the eye and other consciousnesses are considered consciousness-constituents.' It also says: 'Allowing the continuing consciousness as a consciousness-constituent.' This is also incorrect. According to these two texts, it is recording the views of the opposing school, the consciousness-constituents are only manifest. Vasubandhu is also only manifest. The text is as quoted earlier. Now it should be said that, according to the Mahayana and Hinayana, there are a total of three explanations. According to Asaṅga's two different texts, there are two explanations. And it is based on the manifest. According to the text of the Abhidharmakośa, it is again one explanation. It is only based on the seed. The text is as quoted above. Or there are four explanations, the fourth is to include both seed and manifestation as consciousness-constituents. As Vasubandhu's treatise says, the language is comprehensive, so the meaning can be connected. The text is as mentioned earlier, careful observation will reveal it. Treatise: 'The time interval is distant, etc.' This is to help the treatise master further refute the opponent: 'Actions and feelings in the desire realm and the form realm can be called conditions, but the formless realm has no form, how can it be said to feel form?' Commentary: 'The fruit of form is in the future, even eighty thousand kalpas (aeon) etc.' Question: Even if the fruit is in the future, how can it be so many kalpas away from the cause? Answer: If it is karma with immediate retribution, the fruit is not necessarily distant; if it is karma with later retribution, the fruit is distant, how can it be felt? For example, receiving the fruit of the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, only after eighty thousand kalpas will one receive the retribution of the human realm, etc. The retribution is separated from the previous cause by eighty thousand kalpas, is it not distant? Question: Karma with immediate retribution, such as slandering the extinction of cessation, since the fruit is not distant, it should be called action-condition. Answer: There are two simple explanations. One is that it is only said to be distant, so it cannot be a condition, it is not allowed that what is near becomes the meaning of condition. This is to refute the opponent's view. Two, even if it is karma with immediate retribution, the cause and effect are in different lifetimes, the principle is distant, it is also called distant. Even if it is not so distant, having a separation is not a condition. The second explanation is better. If so, what about our own school? Answer: There is consciousness that is felt, what is wrong with that? Commentary: 'Like external dharmas are not the cause of different maturation.' This is to give an example to explain. Since your action-constituent cannot feel the fruit because of the distant interval.
。應同外法不得名為異熟之因。
論。此不成故后亦不成者。按無性云。取為緣有亦不相應者。謂熏習位諸業種子。異熟現前轉名為有。或復轉得生果功能故說名有。行所熏識若不成就。何處安立彼業種子。而復得言生果現前轉名為有。釋謂異熟果將現前故名現前也。或因現前有感果能。勢力成熟而異前位名為異熟 問鄰次相望緣亦不成。何意越言取緣于有 答攝論意明業染之義。有有業種。余支不然。故不明也 或舉前後以示方隅。前釋為正。
疏。非但說所緣而無依等者。非以頌文但說第八有所緣境不說所依。即云第八無所依法。理實有故。不說所以如疏具云。
疏。意名無有義者。疏主取彼明意文意以為其句。非彼論中有此全語。故彼論中廣明其意而立理云。謂若不說有染污意。於一切時義不符順 疏云無有即牒彼論不說有意 義即牒彼義不符順 心體第三。如前具引。
疏。又若無七至依八現種者。此據護法五必依七。由下具明此不顯說。
疏。依瑜伽至說無量名等者。按彼論云。問諸心．心法凡有幾種差別名耶。答有眾多名。謂有所緣．相應．有行．有所依等無量差別。問何故眼等亦有境界。而但說彼名有所緣。非眼等耶。答由彼眼等離所取境亦得生起。心與心法則不如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：應與外道之法相同，不能稱作異熟（Vipāka，果報）之因。
論：因為這個觀點不成立，所以後面的推論也不成立。按照無性（Asaṅga）的說法：『以取為緣而有也不相應』，意思是說在熏習位（vāsanā），諸業的種子，當異熟（Vipāka，果報）現前時，轉名為『有』。或者轉而獲得產生果報的功能，所以說名為『有』。行所熏習的識如果不成就，在哪裡安立那些業的種子？又怎麼能說產生果報現前，轉名為『有』呢？』解釋說，異熟果將要現前，所以名為現前。或者因為現前有感果的功能，勢力成熟而與之前的狀態不同，名為異熟（Vipāka，果報）。問：鄰次相望的緣也不成立，為什麼特別說取緣于有？答：《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的意圖在於闡明業染的意義，有有業種，其餘的支分不是這樣，所以不說明。或者舉前後以表示方隅。前面的解釋是正確的。
疏：不僅僅是說所緣而沒有所依等，不是因為頌文只說了第八識有所緣境，而沒有說所依，就說第八識沒有所依之法。實際上是有所依之法的，不說是因為這個原因，就像疏中詳細說明的那樣。
疏：意名為無有義，疏主取彼《明意》文的意義作為其句，不是那部論中有這句完整的話。所以那部論中廣泛地闡明其意義，並且立論說：『如果說沒有染污意（kliṣṭa-manas），在任何時候義理都不符合順應。』疏中說『無有』，就是摘錄那部論中『不說有意』。『義』就是摘錄那部論中『義不符順』。心體第三，就像前面詳細引用的那樣。
疏：又如果無七識，第八識就無法依七識而顯現種子，這是根據護法（Dharmapāla）的觀點，五識必須依靠七識。因為下面詳細說明了，所以這裡不明顯地說。
疏：依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說無量名等，按照那部論的說法：『問：諸心、心法總共有幾種差別的名稱呢？答：有很多名稱，比如有所緣（ālambana，所緣境）、相應（saṃprayukta，相應法）、有行（saṃskāra，行蘊）、有所依（āśraya，所依）等無量差別。問：為什麼眼等也有境界，卻只說心和心法名為有所緣，而不是眼等呢？答：因為眼等離開所取境也能生起，心與心法則不是這樣。』
【English Translation】 English version: It should be the same as the doctrines of external paths and cannot be called the cause of Vipāka (ripening, retribution).
Treatise: Because this view is not established, the subsequent reasoning is also not established. According to Asaṅga: 'Taking as a condition for existence is also not corresponding,' meaning that in the stage of vāsanā (habitual energy), the seeds of all karmas, when Vipāka (ripening, retribution) manifests, are transformed and called 'existence.' Or they are transformed and acquire the function of producing results, so they are called 'existence.' If the consciousness (vijñāna) influenced by actions is not accomplished, where are those seeds of karma established? And how can it be said that the manifestation of results is transformed and called 'existence'?' The explanation is that the Vipāka (ripening, retribution) fruit is about to manifest, so it is called manifestation. Or because there is a function of sensing the fruit in the present, the power matures and is different from the previous state, and it is called Vipāka (ripening, retribution). Question: The condition of adjacent succession is also not established, why specifically say that taking is conditioned by existence? Answer: The intention of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) is to clarify the meaning of karmic defilement. There are seeds of karma, but the other parts are not like this, so it is not explained. Or it uses before and after to indicate directions. The previous explanation is correct.
Commentary: It is not just saying what is conditioned without a basis, etc. It is not because the verse only says that the eighth consciousness has a conditioned object and does not say what it relies on, that the eighth consciousness has no dharma to rely on. In reality, there is a dharma to rely on, and it is not said because of this reason, just as the commentary explains in detail.
Commentary: 'Intention' means the meaning of 'non-existence.' The author of the commentary takes the meaning of the text of Mingyi as its sentence, but that treatise does not have this complete sentence. Therefore, that treatise extensively clarifies its meaning and establishes the theory, saying: 'If it is said that there is no Kliṣṭa-manas (defiled mind), the meaning will not be consistent at any time.' The commentary says 'non-existence,' which is excerpted from that treatise's 'not saying there is intention.' 'Meaning' is excerpted from that treatise's 'meaning is not consistent.' The third of the mind-essence, as quoted in detail earlier.
Commentary: Also, if there are no seven consciousnesses, the eighth consciousness cannot rely on the seven consciousnesses to manifest seeds. This is based on Dharmapāla's view that the five consciousnesses must rely on the seven consciousnesses. Because it is explained in detail below, it is not explicitly stated here.
Commentary: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), it says countless names, etc. According to that treatise: 'Question: How many different names are there for all minds and mental dharmas? Answer: There are many names, such as ālambana (object of cognition), saṃprayukta (associated mental factors), saṃskāra (formations), āśraya (basis), etc., countless differences. Question: Why do the eyes, etc., also have objects, but only the mind and mental dharmas are said to have objects, and not the eyes, etc.? Answer: Because the eyes, etc., can arise even without the object being taken, but the mind and mental dharmas are not like this.'
。問何故名相應。答由事．處．時．所作等故。問何名有行。答於一切所緣作無量種差別行相轉故。
釋同緣一質相雖相似。見行各殊。名差別轉 問何故名有所依。答由一種類托眾所依差別轉故。雖有為法無無依者。然非此中所說依義。唯恒所依為此量故 釋有兩家。一云如一眼識托三根生。謂眼等一．次第滅意．及以末那。雖有為下而釋伏難。難意可知。今約根依色非依根。所以不得名有所依。二云相應王．所名一種類。如眼王．所同托眼根 詳曰。二互不足。前家闕釋種類之言。明眾所依理亦不盡。后家不辨眾所依義。今者應云。如眼等識俱有依根總有四種。謂同境．分別．染凈．根本。如此論中護法所說。以依非一名眾所依。論意唯依俱有根說。不得取彼無間滅依顯心王．所。簡彼色等名一種類 問七．八二識依何言眾 答從多而說 或彼心所依亦名眾。眾非一義。兼自心王依成二故。王．所同類。故總合言托眾所依。
疏。然彼言所依總有三種等者。彼瑜伽第一．及唯識論由隔所引。五十五后故言彼也。乍觀似彼五十五文 問心．心所起三依恒定。何得說云三中合說不恒不定 答略為兩釋。一云依下諸師釋俱有依。除護法外有通恒定不恒不定名為所依。非據因緣．及等無間有不恒等。二云依下
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：為什麼叫做相應？答：由於事物、處所、時間、所作等原因。 問：什麼叫做有行？答：對於一切所緣境，產生無量種差別的行相轉變。 解釋：同緣一質相雖然相似，但見解和行為各有不同，所以叫做差別轉變。問：為什麼叫做有所依？答：由於同一種類依託眾多所依而產生差別轉變。雖然有為法沒有不依託的，但並非這裡所說的依託之義，只有恒常的所依才符合這個衡量標準。 解釋：有兩種說法。一種說法是，比如一眼識依託三種根而生，即眼根等、次第滅的意根、以及末那識。雖然在有為法之下解釋，但其中隱藏的困難是可以理解的。現在的意思是，就根來說，是依於色塵，而不是色塵依于根，所以不能叫做有所依。另一種說法是，相應的心王和心所，名稱是一種種類，比如眼識心王和心所共同依託眼根。詳細地說，這兩種說法都有不足之處。前一種說法缺少對『種類』的解釋，說明眾多所依的道理也不夠全面。后一種說法沒有辨明眾多所依的含義。現在應該這樣說，比如眼等識都有依根，總共有四種，即同境依、分別依、染凈依、根本依。就像《瑜伽師地論》中護法菩薩所說的那樣，因為依託並非只有一種，所以叫做眾多所依。論中的意思是隻依俱有根來說，不能取無間滅依來顯示心王和心所。簡別於色等，稱為一種種類。問：第七識和第八識依託什麼而稱為『眾』？答：從數量多來說。或者彼心所依託也叫做『眾』。『眾』不是單一的意思，兼有自心王依託而成為二重關係。心王和心所是同類，所以總合起來說依託眾多所依。 疏解：然而，他們所說的所依總共有三種等等，是《瑜伽師地論》第一卷和《唯識論》由於間隔所引用的，在第五十五卷之後，所以說『彼』。乍一看好像是第五十五卷的文字。問：心和心所生起的三依是恒常不變的，為什麼說在三者中合說不恒常和不確定的？答：大概有兩種解釋。一種說法是，依下諸師解釋俱有依，除了護法菩薩之外，有通於恒常和不恒常、不確定的，叫做所依。不是根據因緣和等無間緣有不恒常等等。另一種說法是，依下。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why is it called 'corresponding' (xiangying)? Answer: Because of things (shi), places (chu), times (shi), actions (suozuo), etc. Question: What is called 'having activity' (youxing)? Answer: Because, with respect to all objects of cognition (suoyuan), it produces countless kinds of differentiated aspects of activity (xingxiang zhuan). Explanation: Although the single aspect of the same object (tongyuan yizhi xiang) is similar, the views and actions are different, so it is called differentiated transformation (chabie zhuan). Question: Why is it called 'having a basis' (yousuoyi)? Answer: Because the same kind (yizhonglei) relies on many bases (zhongsuoyi) and produces differentiated transformations. Although conditioned dharmas (youwei fa) have nothing that they do not rely on, this is not the meaning of reliance spoken of here; only constant reliance (hengsuoyi) meets this standard. Explanation: There are two explanations. One explanation is that, for example, eye consciousness (yansh) relies on three roots (gen) to arise, namely the eye root (yegen), etc., the immediately ceasing mind root (cidi mie yi), and manas (末那). Although explained under conditioned dharmas, the hidden difficulty is understandable. The current meaning is that, in terms of roots, it relies on form (se), rather than form relying on the root, so it cannot be called 'having a basis'. The other explanation is that the corresponding king (wang) and its retinue (suo), the name is one kind (yizhonglei), such as the eye consciousness king and its retinue relying on the eye root together. In detail, both explanations have shortcomings. The former explanation lacks an explanation of 'kind', and the explanation of many bases is not comprehensive enough. The latter explanation does not clarify the meaning of many bases. Now it should be said that, for example, eye consciousness, etc., all have relying roots, and there are four types in total, namely, reliance on the same object (tongjing yi), reliance on discrimination (fenbie yi), reliance on purity and impurity (ranjing yi), and fundamental reliance (genben yi). Just as what Dharmapala (護法) said in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), because reliance is not just one kind, it is called many bases. The meaning in the treatise is only speaking of reliance on co-existent roots (juyou gen), and one cannot take the immediately ceasing reliance to reveal the mind king (xinwang) and its retinue. Distinguishing it from form, etc., it is called one kind. Question: What do the seventh and eighth consciousnesses rely on to be called 'many'? Answer: Speaking from the perspective of a large quantity. Or the mental factors (xin suo) that it relies on are also called 'many'. 'Many' is not a single meaning, and it also includes the reliance of one's own mind king, becoming a dual relationship. The mind king and its retinue are of the same kind, so it is collectively said that they rely on many bases. Commentary: However, what they say about the total of three kinds of reliance, etc., is quoted from the first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra (唯識論) due to the separation, after the fifty-fifth volume, so it is said 'they'. At first glance, it seems like the text of the fifty-fifth volume. Question: The three reliances that arise from the mind and mental factors are constant and unchanging, so why is it said that among the three, it is collectively said to be inconstant and uncertain? Answer: There are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that the teachers below explain co-existent reliance, and apart from Dharmapala, there is something that is common to constant and inconstant, uncertain, and is called reliance. It is not based on causes and conditions (yin yuan) and immediately contiguous conditions (dengwujian yuan) that there is inconstancy, etc. The other explanation is that, below.
正義具四義者方名所依。等無間緣闕決定等。無時不依名為決定雖由之生世既不同。不得名為無時不依 又云恒者俱轉之義。既是過去恒義便無。其因緣依有不恒定。如現熏種是種因緣。然後現無而種不絕。故非恒定。亦非所依。疏總相談不恒不定。亦無有失。二義俱得后釋順疏 有義斥疏恒不等已自會五十五．及唯識云。故但應言依有二種。謂種及現。瑜伽且依現行者說。現依有二。俱有．無間。彼論且約俱有依說。但由言略無別所由。此論具明通舉三種 詳曰。疏之所云恒不恒等。如前兩釋過亦無有。斷言依二恐乃雷同。此論．彼論皆言所依不言依故。若言依者一切皆許種．現皆是。更何須會。若言依與所依無異。豈不違下護法所明。由此故知伽五十五正明所依。此論真．假而兼說也。不可以彼廣略會之。
疏。現望種子應無此依者。現行熏種雖是種依體既是現。故不得名為種子也。若言因緣理即可攝。有疏本云。種望種子種字誤也。何以知者。答后種既托前種而起。何得云無。故知誤也 有義彈云。非但此論說心．心所名有所依。彼瑜伽論亦說眼等識有三種所依。既彼此論皆說心等名有所依。不說種子能有所依。名種子依有何過失。此中不欲釋因緣故。故下廣文言種依也。如增上緣依非攝一切增上緣盡此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果一個事物具備四種意義，才能被稱為『所依』（āśraya，支援、依靠）。『等無間緣』（samanantarapratyaya，直接且無間斷的條件）缺少了『決定』（niyata，確定性）等要素。如果不是在所有時間都依賴，就不能稱為『決定』。即使由它產生，但因為世代不同，也不能稱為『無時不依』。 又有人說，『恒』（nitya，恒常）意味著共同運轉。既然是過去，就沒有『恒』的意義。其因緣依賴具有不恒定性。例如，現在的熏習是種子的因緣，然後現在消失，而種子不絕，因此不是恒定，也不是『所依』。疏文從總體上談論不恒定，也沒有什麼過失，兩種解釋都說得通，後面的解釋順應了疏文。 有觀點反駁疏文，認為『恒』和『不恒』等已經包含在第五十五卷以及《唯識論》中。因此，應該說『依』（āśraya，依靠）有兩種，即種子和現行。瑜伽行派是依據現行來說的。現行依賴有兩種，即『俱有』（sahabhava，共同存在）和『無間』（anantara，無間斷）。該論只說了『俱有依』，只是因為語言簡略，沒有其他原因。此論述詳細說明，涵蓋了三種。 詳細來說，疏文所說的『恒』和『不恒』等，如前兩種解釋，也沒有過失。斷言只有兩種『依』，恐怕過於雷同。此論和彼論都說『所依』，沒有說『依』。如果說是『依』，那麼一切都承認種子和現行都是。又何必會通？如果說『依』和『所依』沒有區別，豈不違反了下面護法菩薩所闡明的？因此可知，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷明確說明了『所依』。此論述說了真和假，兼而有之，不可以彼論的廣略來會通此論。 疏文：現行相對於種子，應該沒有這種『依』。現行熏習種子，雖然是種子的『依』，但本體是現行，因此不能稱為種子。如果說是因緣，道理上可以包含。有的疏文字說：種子相對於種子，『種』字是錯誤的。為什麼知道是錯誤的呢？回答是：後面的種子依賴於前面的種子而生起，怎麼能說沒有呢？因此知道是錯誤的。 有觀點反駁說：不僅此論說心和心所名為『有所依』（sa-āśraya，具有所依），《瑜伽師地論》也說眼等識有三種『所依』。既然彼此論述都說心等名為『有所依』，沒有說種子能成為『有所依』，名為『種子依』有什麼過失？此中不想解釋因緣的緣故，所以下面的廣文中說了『種依』。例如，『增上緣依』（adhipati-pratyayāśraya，增上緣所依）並非包含一切增上緣。
【English Translation】 English version: Only when a thing possesses four meanings can it be called 'āśraya' (support, basis). 'Samanantarapratyaya' (immediately preceding condition) lacks elements such as 'niyata' (definiteness). If it is not relied upon at all times, it cannot be called 'niyata'. Even if it arises from it, because the generations are different, it cannot be called 'not relying at all times'. Furthermore, some say that 'nitya' (constant) means co-functioning. Since it is in the past, there is no meaning of 'nitya'. Its causal dependence has impermanence. For example, present perfuming is the cause of the seed, then the present disappears, but the seed is not cut off, so it is not constant, nor is it 'āśraya'. The commentary generally discusses impermanence, and there is no fault, both explanations make sense, and the later explanation follows the commentary. Some argue against the commentary, believing that 'nitya' and 'anitya' (impermanent) etc. are already included in volume 55 and the 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'. Therefore, it should be said that 'āśraya' (basis) has two types, namely seed and manifestation. The Yogācāra school speaks based on manifestation. Manifestation has two dependencies, namely 'sahabhava' (co-existence) and 'anantara' (immediately preceding). That treatise only speaks of 'sahabhava-āśraya', simply because the language is brief, there is no other reason. This treatise explains in detail, covering all three. In detail, the 'nitya' and 'anitya' etc. mentioned in the commentary, like the previous two explanations, also have no fault. Asserting that there are only two 'āśraya' is probably too similar. This treatise and that treatise both speak of 'āśraya', not 'āśraya'. If it is said to be 'āśraya', then everything admits that both seed and manifestation are. Why bother reconciling? If it is said that 'āśraya' and 'sa-āśraya' (having a basis) are no different, wouldn't that violate what Bodhisattva Dharmapāla clarifies below? Therefore, it can be known that 'Yogācārabhūmi' volume 55 clearly explains 'āśraya'. This treatise speaks of true and false, combining both, and cannot be reconciled with this treatise by the broad and narrow of that treatise. Commentary: Manifestation relative to the seed, there should be no such 'āśraya'. Manifestation perfumes the seed, although it is the 'āśraya' of the seed, but the substance is manifestation, so it cannot be called a seed. If it is said to be a cause, the principle can be included. Some commentary texts say: seed relative to seed, the word 'seed' is wrong. How do you know it's wrong? The answer is: the later seed depends on the previous seed to arise, how can it be said that there is none? Therefore, it is known to be wrong. Some argue that not only does this treatise say that mind and mental factors are called 'sa-āśraya' (having a basis), but the 'Yogācārabhūmi' also says that eye consciousness etc. have three types of 'āśraya'. Since both treatises say that mind etc. are called 'sa-āśraya', and do not say that the seed can become 'sa-āśraya', what fault is there in calling it 'seed-āśraya'? It is because I don't want to explain the cause, so the following broad text says 'seed-āśraya'. For example, 'adhipati-pratyayāśraya' (basis of the dominant condition) does not include all dominant conditions.
亦應爾。不攝一切因緣因緣盡也 詳曰。雖本欲明心等所依。及列釋中據寬立號。何以明者。即此論云。諸有為法皆托此依。故知據遍。若唯約心。何不說云諸心．心所皆托此依言諸有為。又疏若云三依一一攝因緣盡。可如所責。但云初依依寬立號。何得以彼增上緣例。故知疏斷實無其咎。
疏。若爾俱時至王是所依者。此問答意種．現俱時非增上緣置增上簡。同時心所既是增上。更無別簡應得名為增上緣依 夫俱有依要有主義。所既非主不簡無失 有義彈云。此亦不然。由俱有名有前濫故說增上言者。根種望現業種子等及扶根塵等應是此依。既同有濫如何偏責。故於尊教不應顯失 詳曰。濫有親疏。親難辨故可須簡之。疏者易知不假分別。故下凈月種．現相例為俱有也。又疏但明兩俱寬狡對望有差。何處有顯慈尊過處構虛指斥。
疏。唯種相似者。唯現俱種似俱有依。所等不似。增上緣言故簡種也。
疏。故復簡之如下當辨者。下凈月云。既許現識以種為依等文是也。
疏。設如小乘至無增上者。問若依自義三依並無。既假同他。何但有二。俱舍頌云。心．心所由四。二定但由三。三者四中除所緣緣。故不唯二 答非增上緣皆俱有依。雖有增上無俱有依亦無失也 問不相應據自三無。何故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 也應當這樣。不包括一切因緣，因緣就窮盡了。詳細地說，雖然本來想要闡明心等所依賴的，以及在解釋中根據寬泛而立名號，憑什麼闡明呢？就是這部論典說：『一切有為法都依託這個而存在。』所以知道是根據普遍性。如果僅僅侷限於心，為什麼不說『一切心、心所都依託這個而存在』，而說『一切有為』呢？而且疏文中如果說『三依一一包括因緣窮盡』，就可以像你所責備的那樣。但疏文只說最初的『依』是根據寬泛而立名號，怎麼能用增上緣來類比呢？所以知道疏文的判斷確實沒有過失。
疏文：『如果這樣，俱時至王是所依賴的』，這個問答的意思是，種子、現行同時存在，不是增上緣，設定增上來簡別。同時存在的心所既然是增上緣，就沒有其他的簡別，應該可以稱為增上緣依。俱有依一定要有主導者，所依賴的既然不是主導，不簡別也沒有過失。有人反駁說：『這也是不對的。因為俱有這個名稱有前面的混淆，所以說增上這個詞。』根、種子相對於現行，業種子等以及扶根塵等應該是這個所依賴的。既然同樣有混淆，為什麼偏偏責備呢？所以在尊者的教誨中不應該顯出過失。詳細地說，混淆有親疏之分，親近的難以分辨，所以需要簡別。疏遠的容易知道，不需要分別。所以下面的凈月將種子、現行相比，作為俱有。而且疏文只是說明兩者都寬泛，狡猾地相對，有差別。哪裡有顯出慈尊過失的地方，虛構指責。
疏文：『只有種子相似』，只有現行、俱時、種子相似俱有依，所等不相似，增上緣這個詞就是爲了簡別種子。
疏文：『所以再次簡別，如下面將要辨析的』，下面的凈月說：『既然允許現識以種子為所依』等文就是。
疏文：『假設像小乘一樣，沒有增上』，問：如果按照自己的觀點，三依都沒有。既然假借同於他人，為什麼只有兩種？《俱舍論》的頌文說：『心、心所由四緣生起，二定只有三緣，三緣是四緣中除去所緣緣。』所以不只是兩種。答：不是增上緣的都是俱有依，雖然有增上緣，沒有俱有依也沒有過失。問：不相應法按照自己的觀點，三依都沒有，為什麼？
【English Translation】 English version: It should be so. Not including all causes and conditions, the causes and conditions are exhausted. In detail, although the original intention was to clarify what the mind and others rely on, and to establish the name based on breadth in the explanation, how is it clarified? It is this treatise that says: 'All conditioned dharmas rely on this.' Therefore, it is known to be based on universality. If it is only limited to the mind, why not say 'All minds and mental factors rely on this,' but say 'All conditioned'? Moreover, if the commentary said 'The three supports each include the exhaustion of causes and conditions,' it could be like what you blame. But the commentary only says that the initial 'support' is established based on breadth, how can it be compared to the Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition)? Therefore, it is known that the commentary's judgment is indeed without fault.
Commentary: 'If so, simultaneous to the king is what is relied upon,' the meaning of this question and answer is that the seed and manifestation exist simultaneously, not Adhipati-pratyaya, setting up Adhipati to distinguish. Since the mental factors that exist simultaneously are Adhipati-pratyaya, there is no other distinction, and it should be called Adhipati-pratyaya support. The co-existent support must have a leader, since what is relied upon is not the leader, there is no fault in not distinguishing. Someone retorted: 'This is also not right. Because the name co-existent has previous confusion, so the word Adhipati is said.' Roots, seeds relative to manifestation, karma seeds, etc., and supporting roots and dust, etc., should be what is relied upon. Since there is also confusion, why blame only? Therefore, one should not show fault in the venerable's teachings. In detail, confusion has degrees of closeness and distance, the close ones are difficult to distinguish, so it needs to be distinguished. The distant ones are easy to know, no need to distinguish. Therefore, the following Pure Moon compares seeds and manifestations as co-existent. Moreover, the commentary only explains that both are broad, cunningly relative, and have differences. Where is there a place to show the fault of the venerable, fabricating accusations.
Commentary: 'Only seeds are similar,' only manifestation, simultaneous, seeds are similar to co-existent support, what is relied upon, etc., are not similar, the word Adhipati-pratyaya is to distinguish seeds.
Commentary: 'So distinguish again, as will be analyzed below,' the following Pure Moon says: 'Since it is allowed that manifest consciousness takes seeds as what is relied upon,' etc., is the text.
Commentary: 'Suppose like the Hinayana, there is no Adhipati,' question: If according to one's own view, the three supports do not exist. Since borrowing is the same as others, why are there only two? The verse in the Abhidharmakośa says: 'Mind and mental factors arise from four conditions, the two samadhis only have three conditions, the three conditions are the four conditions minus the Alambana-pratyaya (object condition).' So it is not just two. Answer: Not all Adhipati-pratyaya are co-existent supports, although there is Adhipati-pratyaya, there is no co-existent support, there is no fault. Question: Non-corresponding dharmas, according to one's own view, the three supports do not exist, why?
前云諸有為法皆托此因。豈不相應非有為耶 答有義依他實法而得生故說從因生。非別生也 詳曰。或依有法多分而言。
論。無種已生集論說故者。按對法雲。無種已生者。謂最後蘊。釋無種已生是本論也。謂最後蘊是釋論也。今難陀師取彼論意以之為證。彼意云何。難陀釋云。二乘無學鄰無餘心名最後蘊。生此蘊種已入過去名為無種。所生法在。名為已生。既因已滅而果現在。明知因果時必不同。
疏。此中文略者。不引彼釋最後蘊文故稱略也。
疏。今釋家取以為證者。即難陀師名為釋家。取彼論意以為證也。
疏。或有眼非眼界等者。如燈第一。故不引也。
疏。此前後俱者。前後體有名為俱有。非俱時有名俱有也。
疏。此時闕緣等者。無緣更生后念之種名為無種 若爾云何名為已生 答而能生彼俱時現訖名為已生 或種現在簡彼未來名為已生。取前為正 有義彈云。若作此解彼論應言無種已不生。此論應言彼依不引生后種說故。如何乃言據不能生后種而說 今別解云。無種已生依引生后自類種說。若生現行即前十一有種已生 若爾如何雜集論釋有種已生。謂除羅漢最後蘊也。無種已生謂最後蘊。答覺師子意余時種子為因能生后念種．現。此末後心前念種因唯能生現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 前文說一切有為法都依賴於此因，難道不也相應于非有為法嗎？回答說：從某種意義上說，有為法依賴於依他起性（Paratantra）（指事物依賴於其他條件而生起的性質）的真實法而得以產生，所以說是從因產生，而不是獨立產生。詳細地說，或許是依據有法的大部分情況而言。 論：『無種已生』，《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中這樣說。按照《對法》（Abhidharma）的說法，『無種已生』指的是最後的蘊（skandha）（構成個體存在的要素）。解釋『無種已生』是本論的內容，說最後的蘊是解釋論的內容。現在難陀（Nanda）論師採用那部論的意義作為證據。那部論的意義是什麼呢？難陀解釋說：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無學（Arhat）鄰近無餘涅槃（Parinirvana）的心識稱為最後的蘊。產生這個蘊的種子已經進入過去，稱為『無種』。所產生的法仍然存在，稱為『已生』。既然因已經滅去而果現在，明顯可知因果在時間上必定不同。 疏：這裡文中省略了，因為沒有引用那部論中解釋最後蘊的文字，所以稱為省略。 疏：現在釋家採用它作為證據，這位難陀論師被稱為釋家，採用那部論的意義作為證據。 疏：或者有眼並非眼界等等，例如燈的第一剎那，所以不引用。 疏：這裡前後俱有，前後體性有名為俱有，並非俱時有名為俱有。 疏：這時缺少緣等等，沒有緣可以再生起后唸的種子，稱為『無種』。如果這樣，為什麼稱為『已生』呢？回答說：能夠產生與它同時生滅的法，稱為『已生』。或者種子現在，區別于未來，稱為『已生』。採用前一種解釋是正確的。有人反駁說：如果這樣解釋，那部論應該說『無種已不生』，這部論應該說它依賴於不產生后種而說，為什麼說根據不能產生后種而說呢？現在另外解釋說：『無種已生』是依據引生後來自類種子而說的。如果生起現行，就是前面的十一有種已生。如果這樣，為什麼《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）解釋『有種已生』，說是除了羅漢（Arhat）的最後蘊之外呢？『無種已生』說是最後的蘊。回答說：覺獅子（Buddhasimha）的意思是，其餘時候的種子作為因，能夠產生后唸的種子和現行。這最後的心的前念種子作為因，只能產生現行。
【English Translation】 English version: It was previously stated that all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta) (phenomena subject to causes and conditions) rely on this cause. Does this not also correspond to unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta) (phenomena not subject to causes and conditions)? The answer is: In a certain sense, conditioned dharmas arise relying on the real dharma of dependent origination (Paratantra) (the nature of things arising dependent on other conditions), so it is said to arise from a cause, not independently. To elaborate, it may be based on the majority of cases where dharmas exist. Treatise: 『No seed already arisen,』 as stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). According to the Abhidharma, 『no seed already arisen』 refers to the final skandha (aggregate) (the elements constituting individual existence). Explaining 『no seed already arisen』 is the content of this treatise, saying the final skandha is the content of the explanation. Now, Master Nanda (Nanda) adopts the meaning of that treatise as evidence. What is the meaning of that treatise? Nanda explains: The mind of a non-learner (Arhat) (one who has completed the path) of the Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) (the Hearer Vehicle and the Solitary Realizer Vehicle) nearing Parinirvana (final nirvana) is called the final skandha. The seed that produces this skandha has already entered the past, called 『no seed.』 The dharma that is produced still exists, called 『already arisen.』 Since the cause has ceased and the effect is present, it is clear that cause and effect must be different in time. Commentary: Here the text is abbreviated, because it does not cite the text explaining the final skandha in that treatise, so it is called abbreviated. Commentary: Now the commentator adopts it as evidence, this Master Nanda is called the commentator, adopting the meaning of that treatise as evidence. Commentary: Or there is eye not being the eye realm, etc., such as the first moment of a lamp, so it is not cited. Commentary: Here, both before and after exist together, the nature of before and after is named existing together, not existing at the same time is named existing together. Commentary: At this time, there is a lack of conditions, etc., there is no condition to regenerate the seed of the subsequent thought, called 『no seed.』 If so, why is it called 『already arisen』? The answer is: It is able to produce the dharma that arises and ceases simultaneously with it, called 『already arisen.』 Or the seed is present, distinguishing it from the future, called 『already arisen.』 Adopting the former explanation is correct. Someone refutes: If explained this way, that treatise should say 『no seed not already arisen,』 this treatise should say it relies on not producing the subsequent seed and speaks, why say it speaks based on not being able to produce the subsequent seed? Now another explanation: 『No seed already arisen』 is based on leading to the subsequent seed of its own kind. If arising and manifesting, it is the preceding eleven existing seeds already arisen. If so, why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) explain 『existing seed already arisen,』 saying it is apart from the final skandha of an Arhat (Arhat)? 『No seed already arisen』 is said to be the final skandha. The answer is: Buddhasimha』s (Buddhasimha) meaning is that the seeds at other times, as a cause, are able to produce the seeds and manifestations of subsequent thoughts. The preceding thought seed of this final mind, as a cause, can only produce the manifestation.
故。論本名無種已生。由無種故后便斷滅。今難陀意亦即同彼。其護法等不依彼故。故但如前依種子說。非汝難陀．覺師子等所知見也。無著大師意說種子前後相生云無種已生 詳曰。義有萬途豈無此理。若順二論疏釋為優。云無種者彰無後類。已生之言明與現俱。更有何求須安不字。此論應云彼依不能而更引生后種說故。義繁文約省不等字。故彼論釋言后蘊也。若但據種自類相引余時皆然。何假以彼后蘊而釋。亦不可言釋家不得無著之意。何所以者。而師子覺樞衣北面伏膺函杖而造其釋。豈誤本旨。以此而推優劣知矣。
疏。此下比量等者。前師量云。種生于果必定前後。以因果故。如麥種等。出彼過者。麥種等喻能立不成。麥等而非勝義因果。設云我許有他隨一。據實喻亦所立不成。由下論云非極成故。故不出也。
論。種滅牙生非極成等者。彼量同前。據實芽．種而非異時。喻闕所立。若云我許即喻所立他隨一過。又因不定。焰．燈．荷根而俱時故。
論。次有俱依至必有故者。瑜伽七十六是此證也。故彼論云。阿陀那識為依止為建立故六識身轉。此中有識眼及色為緣生眼識。與眼識俱隨行同時同境有分別意識轉。余耳等識亦爾。若於爾時一眼識轉。即於此時唯有一分別意識與眼識同所行轉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，論典的根本意思是說，如果種子不存在，那麼已經產生的果（『已生』）也就不可能存在。因為沒有種子，所以後續的相續就會斷滅。現在難陀（Nanda，人名，佛陀的堂弟）的觀點也和他們一樣。護法（Dharmapala，佛教論師）等人不依從他們的觀點，所以只是像前面那樣，依據種子來說明。這不是你難陀、覺師子（Buddhasimha，佛教論師）等人所能理解的。無著（Asanga，佛教論師，唯識宗創始人之一）大師的意思是說，種子前後相生，所以說沒有種子就已經產生（『無種已生』）。 詳細地說，義理有萬千條途徑，難道沒有這種道理嗎？如果順從二論的疏釋，就更為優越。說『無種』，是爲了彰顯沒有後續的同類；說『已生』，是爲了表明與現在同時存在。還有什麼需要補充的呢？不需要再加一個『不』字。這個論典應該說，他們依據不能產生後續種子的說法，而進一步引生後續的種子。義理繁多，文字簡略，省略了『不』字。所以那個論典的解釋說，是後來的蘊。如果只是依據種子自身類別相引，那麼任何時候都是這樣，為什麼還要用『后蘊』來解釋呢？也不能說解釋者不理解無著的意思。為什麼這麼說呢？因為師子覺（Simhasena，佛教論師）樞衣北面，伏膺函杖，來造這個解釋，難道會誤解根本宗旨嗎？用這個來推斷，優劣就知道了。 疏釋：下面是比量等。前面的論師立量說：種子產生果，必定是前後相續的，因為是因果關係，就像麥種等。指出他們的過失是：麥種等比喻不能成立。麥等不是勝義的因果。假設他們說：我承認有他隨一（『他隨一』，邏輯學概念），但實際上，這個比喻也不能成立。因為下面的論典說，這不是極成（『極成』，邏輯學概念），所以沒有指出。 論：種子滅了，牙（『牙』，指植物的幼芽）才產生，這不是極成等。他們的量和前面一樣。實際上，芽和種子不是異時的，比喻缺少所立（『所立』，邏輯學概念）。如果他們說：我承認，那就是比喻所立的他隨一過。而且，因也不確定，因為火焰、燈、荷根等都是同時的。 論：其次，有俱依（『俱依』，邏輯學概念）直到必定有，瑜伽師地論第七十六卷就是這個證明。所以那個論典說：阿陀那識（ālayavijñāna，又稱阿賴耶識，藏識，含藏一切事物種子的根本識）作為依止，作為建立，所以六識身（『六識身』，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）才能運轉。這裡面，有識、眼和色作為緣，產生眼識。與眼識同時，隨行，同時同境，有分別意識運轉。其餘的耳識等也是這樣。如果在那個時候，只有一個眼識運轉，那麼在這個時候，只有一個分別意識與眼識同所行運轉。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the fundamental meaning of the treatise is that if the seed does not exist, then the 'already arisen' result is impossible. Because there is no seed, the subsequent continuity will be cut off. Now, Nanda's (Nanda, a person's name, Buddha's cousin) view is the same as theirs. Dharmapala (Dharmapala, a Buddhist master) and others do not follow their view, so they only explain based on the seed, as before. This is not something that you Nanda, Buddhasimha (Buddhasimha, a Buddhist master) and others can understand. Master Asanga's (Asanga, a Buddhist master, one of the founders of the Yogacara school) meaning is that seeds arise one after another, so it is said that there is no seed that has already arisen ('no seed already arisen'). In detail, there are myriad paths of reasoning, is there not this principle? If one follows the commentaries of the two treatises, it is even more superior. Saying 'no seed' is to highlight that there is no subsequent similar kind; saying 'already arisen' is to indicate that it exists simultaneously with the present. What else needs to be added? There is no need to add a 'not' character. This treatise should say that they rely on the statement that they cannot produce subsequent seeds, and further induce the subsequent seeds. The reasoning is abundant, the text is concise, and the 'not' character is omitted. Therefore, the explanation of that treatise says that it is the later skandha (skandha, aggregates). If it is only based on the seed's own category attracting each other, then it is always like this, why use 'later skandha' to explain it? It cannot be said that the interpreter does not understand Asanga's meaning. Why is that? Because Simhasena (Simhasena, a Buddhist master) with his robe facing north, leaning over the case, created this explanation, would he misunderstand the fundamental purpose? Using this to infer, the superiority and inferiority can be known. Commentary: Below are the analogies, etc. The previous master established the analogy saying: the seed produces the fruit, it must be successive, because it is a cause-and-effect relationship, like wheat seeds, etc. Pointing out their fault is: the wheat seed analogy cannot be established. Wheat, etc. are not ultimate cause and effect. Suppose they say: I admit that there is 'any one of the others' ('any one of the others', a concept in logic), but in reality, this analogy cannot be established either. Because the following treatise says that this is not 'established' ('established', a concept in logic), so it is not pointed out. Treatise: The seed is extinguished, and the sprout ('sprout', referring to the young sprout of a plant) is produced, this is not established, etc. Their analogy is the same as before. In reality, the sprout and the seed are not at different times, the analogy lacks the 'to be established' ('to be established', a concept in logic). If they say: I admit it, then that is the fault of 'any one of the others' of the analogy to be established. Moreover, the cause is also uncertain, because flames, lamps, lotus roots, etc. are all simultaneous. Treatise: Secondly, there is 'co-dependence' ('co-dependence', a concept in logic) until there must be, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume seventy-six is the proof of this. Therefore, that treatise says: the Ālayavijñāna (Ālayavijñāna, also known as the storehouse consciousness, the fundamental consciousness containing the seeds of all things) as the support, as the establishment, so the six consciousnesses (the six consciousnesses, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) can operate. In this, there is consciousness, the eye and the form as conditions, producing eye consciousness. Simultaneously with the eye consciousness, following, simultaneously in the same realm, there is discriminating consciousness operating. The remaining ear consciousness, etc. are also like this. If at that time, only one eye consciousness is operating, then at this time, there is only one discriminating consciousness operating in the same realm as the eye consciousness.
。若於爾時二三四五諸識身轉。即於此時唯有分別意識與五識身同所行轉。
釋此中有識有陀那識。以陀那識為諸識依。同境之言而有二義。一據本質。質一名同。二據相分。相似名同。
疏。由三因故等者。意識本欲緣於前境名作意也 言資養者。即本論云。二依資養故 疏脫二字。云何二依 答謹按疏主瑜伽鈔中而有兩釋。一同此疏。二云。一依意根。即是末那。二眼等根。由彼眼識依眼取境。令彼意識取境分明。由是五根名長養意。五隨舉一名二依也。問正義意識不依眼等。何得取眼名二依耶。答據眼為門取境明瞭名之為依。不得俱有依名為依也 詳曰。如疏所明而不顯彼二依之義。取瑜伽鈔第二義釋。釋彼文具。
疏。根離識故不別說有者 問不許別根云何離識 答不同自境是自相分名為離識。非言識外別有實體名為離識。
論。識從自種生等者。按彼論釋云。此說何義。似色現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。佛依彼種及所現色。如次說為眼處．色處。如是乃至身處．觸處 釋謂即眼識而能現似境相轉矣。識外理無真實色體。故名似色。識現似色故說眼識名似色現。從能生已識體之種。此種復由境界等緣合已異舊名為轉變。由斯識體方從自種差別得生。
疏。不用前識為今所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果在這個時候，第二、第三、第四、第五個識身（vijnanakaya，指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）轉變，那麼在這個時候，只有分別意識（manovijnana，指第六識）與五個識身共同運作。
解釋：這裡面有識（vijnana，總稱），有阿陀那識（adanavijnana，指第八識阿賴耶識），以阿陀那識作為所有識的所依。『同境』這個詞有兩種含義：一是根據本質（svabhava），本質相同叫做『同』；二是根據相分（nimitta-bhaga，識所呈現的影像），相似叫做『同』。
疏：因為三個原因而相等。意識本來想要緣於前面的境界，這叫做作意（manaskara，心理活動）。『資養』是指《瑜伽師地論》所說的：『二者互相資養』。疏文中省略了『二依』兩個字。什麼是二依呢？回答：仔細查閱疏主的《瑜伽師地論鈔》，其中有兩種解釋：一種與這個疏文相同；另一種解釋是：一是依意根（manas-indriya，指末那識，第七識），二是眼等根（cakshur-indriya，指眼根等五根）。因為眼識依靠眼根來取境，使得意識取境更加分明。因此，五根被稱為長養意。五根隨便舉一個作為代表，就叫做二依。問：按照正義，意識不依靠眼等根，怎麼能說取眼根為二依呢？答：根據眼根作為門戶，取境明瞭，所以稱為依。不是說俱有依（sahabhava-asraya，同時存在的依靠）才叫做依。詳細地說，疏文所說明的並不明顯，可以參考《瑜伽師地論鈔》的第二種解釋，那裡面解釋得更詳細。
疏：因為根離開了識，所以不另外說明有。問：如果不允許有另外的根，怎麼能說離開了識呢？答：不同於自己的境界，是自己的相分，這叫做離開了識。不是說在識之外另外有一個實體叫做離開了識。
論：識從自己的種子生起等等。按照《瑜伽師地論》的解釋說：這說明什麼意義呢？相似於色的現識（rupa-vijnana，眼識）從自己的種子，因緣和合，轉變差別而生起。佛依據那個種子以及所顯現的色，依次說為眼處（cakshur-ayatana，眼根）和色處（rupa-ayatana，色境）。像這樣乃至身處（kaya-ayatana，身根）和觸處（sprashtavya-ayatana，觸境）。解釋說，就是眼識能夠顯現相似於境界的相。識之外沒有真實的色體，所以叫做『似色』。識顯現相似於色，所以說眼識叫做『似色現』。從能夠生起識體的種子，這個種子又因為境界等因緣和合，與舊的不同，叫做轉變。因此，識體才從自己的種子差別而生起。
疏：不用前識作為現在所...
【English Translation】 English version: If at that time the second, third, fourth, and fifth vijnanakayas (vijnanakaya, referring to eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness) transform, then at this time, only the discriminating consciousness (manovijnana, referring to the sixth consciousness) operates together with the five vijnanakayas.
Explanation: Here, there is vijnana (vijnana, a general term), and there is adanavijnana (adanavijnana, referring to the eighth consciousness, Alaya-consciousness), with adanavijnana as the basis for all consciousnesses. The term 'same object' has two meanings: one is based on essence (svabhava), where the essence being the same is called 'same'; the other is based on the appearance-aspect (nimitta-bhaga, the image presented by consciousness), where similarity is called 'same'.
Commentary: 'Equal due to three causes' means that consciousness originally intends to focus on the preceding object, which is called attention (manaskara, mental activity). 'Nourishment' refers to what is said in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'The two nourish each other.' The commentary omits the words 'two supports'. What are the two supports? Answer: Upon careful examination of the commentary on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra by the commentator, there are two explanations: one is the same as this commentary; the other explanation is: one is based on the mind-organ (manas-indriya, referring to manas-consciousness, the seventh consciousness), and the other is the eye-organ, etc. (cakshur-indriya, referring to the five sense organs). Because eye-consciousness relies on the eye-organ to grasp objects, it makes the consciousness's grasping of objects clearer. Therefore, the five organs are called nourishing the mind. Taking any one of the five organs as a representative is called the two supports. Question: According to the correct meaning, consciousness does not rely on the eye-organ, etc., so how can it be said that grasping the eye-organ is the two supports? Answer: Based on the eye-organ as a gateway, grasping objects clearly is called support. It is not that co-existing reliance (sahabhava-asraya, reliance on simultaneous existence) is called support. In detail, what the commentary explains is not clear, you can refer to the second explanation in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, which explains it in more detail.
Commentary: Because the organ is separate from consciousness, it is not separately stated as existing. Question: If it is not allowed to have a separate organ, how can it be said to be separate from consciousness? Answer: Different from its own object, being its own appearance-aspect, is called separate from consciousness. It is not saying that there is a separate entity outside of consciousness that is called separate from consciousness.
Treatise: Consciousness arises from its own seed, etc. According to the explanation in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, it says: What meaning does this explain? The appearance-consciousness similar to form (rupa-vijnana, eye-consciousness) arises from its own seed, with conditions coming together, transforming and differentiating. The Buddha, based on that seed and the form that appears, sequentially speaks of the eye-sphere (cakshur-ayatana, eye-organ) and the form-sphere (rupa-ayatana, form-object). Like this, up to the body-sphere (kaya-ayatana, body-organ) and the touch-sphere (sprashtavya-ayatana, touch-object). The explanation says that it is eye-consciousness that can manifest an appearance similar to the object. There is no real form-entity outside of consciousness, so it is called 'similar to form'. Consciousness manifests similar to form, so it is said that eye-consciousness is called 'appearance similar to form'. From the seed that can generate the consciousness-entity, this seed, due to the coming together of conditions such as objects, is different from the old, which is called transformation. Therefore, the consciousness-entity arises from its own seed with differentiation.
Commentary: Not using the previous consciousness as the current...
緣者。顯五不緣心．心所故。
疏。前相亦然至亦為所緣者。此顯前相具二支故成所緣緣。前相體有名之為緣。識帶彼相成所緣義。故觀所緣論云。所緣緣者。謂能緣識帶彼相起。及有實體令能緣識托彼而生。
疏。又此所言至亦無違者。此釋外難總標無違。即次下言從前念等顯無違理 外難意云。頌言境色。長行色識。而色是同。境．識河漢。長行釋頌。一何矛楯。
疏。從前念后至更互為因者。此意以境有前及俱。故頌．長行對望說異。立名亦差。理實前境亦名色識。俱時之境亦名境色。
疏。即顯二念相似種是一故者。后念相分是前現相所熏種生名一種也 問名言相種在識無邊。如何后相要前種起 答設不以前相種生者。即相似故名之為一。勘彼頌云。決定相隨故。俱時亦作緣。或前為後緣引彼功能故。彼論釋云。境相與識定相隨故。雖俱時起亦作識緣。因明者說。若此與彼有無相隨。雖俱時生而亦得有因果相故 或前識相為后識緣引本識中生似自果功能令起不違理故。論中雖不言種一等以意而言疏亦無失。
疏。若以此見分至遞為因故者。道理根．境須相因起名為須用 問見種不生現行色相。相復不熏見分種子。如何得有遞為緣義 答由境為緣見方得起熏成自種。識種為緣生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『緣』指的是，顯現五種不緣之心（不緣：不作為所緣對像），以及心所（citta-saṃprayutta，與心相應的心理現象）的緣故。
疏解：『前相亦然至亦為所緣者』，這表明前相具備兩種條件，因此成為所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，作為所緣對象的因緣）。前相的體性有名，稱之為『緣』。識（vijñāna，意識）帶著那個相，成就了所緣的意義。所以《觀所緣論》說：『所緣緣指的是，能緣識（作為能認知的主體）帶著那個相而生起，以及有實體使能緣識依託它而產生。』
疏解：『又此所言至亦無違者』，這是爲了解釋外來的疑問，總的來說明沒有矛盾之處。接下來所說的『從前念等』，就顯示了沒有矛盾的道理。外來的疑問是說：頌文中說的是『境色』，長行文中說的是『色識』，而『色』是相同的，『境』和『識』卻有天壤之別。用長行文來解釋頌文，怎麼會沒有矛盾呢？
疏解：『從前念后至更互為因者』，這裡的意思是，因為境有前念和俱時（同時）兩種情況，所以頌文和長行文相對照著說，說法不同，立名也有差異。實際上，前唸的境也可以稱為『色識』，俱時的境也可以稱為『境色』。
疏解：『即顯二念相似種是一故者』，后唸的相分（rūpa-skandha，色蘊）是前念現相所熏習的種子所生，所以稱為『一種』。有人問：名言相（nāma-rūpa，名色）的種子在識中是無邊的，為什麼后相一定要由前唸的種子生起呢？回答是：即使不是以前相的種子所生，也因為相似的緣故，稱之為『一』。考察那首頌文說：『決定相隨故，俱時亦作緣，或前為後緣，引彼功能故。』那部論的解釋是：境相與識必定相隨，所以即使是同時生起，也可以作為識的緣。因明（hetu-vidyā，邏輯學）學者說，如果這個與那個有無相隨，即使是同時生起，也可以有因果關係。或者前識的相作為后識的緣，引出本識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）中產生類似自身果的功能，使之生起，這並不違背道理。論中雖然沒有說種子是一等等，但這是從意思上來說的，疏解也沒有錯誤。
疏解：『若以此見分至遞為因故者』，道理上，根（indriya，感覺器官）、境（viṣaya，感覺對像）必須互相依存才能生起，這叫做『須用』。有人問：見分（darśana-bhāga，能見的部分）的種子不生起現行的色相，色相也不熏習見分的種子，怎麼會有互相作為因緣的意義呢？回答是：由於境作為緣，見分才能生起，熏習成為自己的種子。識的種子作為緣，才能生起
【English Translation】 English version 'Condition' refers to the manifestation of the five non-conditioning minds (non-conditioning: not acting as an object of cognition), and because of the mental concomitants (citta-saṃprayutta, mental phenomena associated with the mind).
Commentary: 'The preceding aspect is also so, up to also being the conditioned object.' This shows that the preceding aspect possesses two conditions, thus becoming the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya, the condition as the object of cognition). The substance of the preceding aspect has a name, called 'condition.' The consciousness (vijñāna, consciousness) carries that aspect, thus fulfilling the meaning of the conditioned object. Therefore, the Treatise on the Observation of Conditioned Objects says: 'The objective condition refers to the arising of the cognizing consciousness (as the cognizing subject) carrying that aspect, and the existence of a substance that allows the cognizing consciousness to rely on it to arise.'
Commentary: 'Furthermore, what is said here, up to also being without contradiction.' This is to explain external doubts, generally stating that there is no contradiction. The following statement, 'from the preceding thought, etc.,' shows the reason for no contradiction. The external doubt is: The verse speaks of 'object-form,' while the prose speaks of 'form-consciousness,' but 'form' is the same, while 'object' and 'consciousness' are vastly different. How can there be no contradiction in using the prose to explain the verse?
Commentary: 'From the preceding thought to mutually being causes.' The meaning here is that because objects have both preceding and simultaneous aspects, the verse and prose speak differently in comparison, and the names established also differ. In reality, the preceding object can also be called 'form-consciousness,' and the simultaneous object can also be called 'object-form.'
Commentary: 'This shows that the seeds of two similar thoughts are one.' The aspect-division (rūpa-skandha, form aggregate) of the subsequent thought is born from the seed perfumed by the manifested aspect of the preceding thought, so it is called 'one seed.' Someone asks: The seeds of name and form (nāma-rūpa, name and form) are boundless in consciousness, why must the subsequent aspect arise from the seed of the preceding thought? The answer is: Even if it is not born from the seed of the preceding aspect, it is called 'one' because of its similarity. Examine that verse which says: 'Because of the determination of mutual following, simultaneous arising also acts as a condition, or the preceding is a condition for the subsequent, drawing out its function.' That treatise explains: Because the object-aspect and consciousness definitely follow each other, even if they arise simultaneously, they can also act as a condition for consciousness. Those skilled in logic (hetu-vidyā, logic) say that if the existence or non-existence of this and that follow each other, even if they arise simultaneously, there can still be a cause-and-effect relationship. Or the aspect of the preceding consciousness acts as a condition for the subsequent consciousness, drawing out the function of producing a result similar to itself from the fundamental consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), causing it to arise, which is not contrary to reason. Although the treatise does not say that the seeds are one, etc., it is implied, and the commentary is not mistaken.
Commentary: 'If the seeing-division is used in this way, up to mutually being causes.' In principle, the sense faculty (indriya, sense organ) and the sense object (viṣaya, object of sense) must depend on each other to arise, which is called 'necessary use.' Someone asks: The seed of the seeing-division (darśana-bhāga, seeing part) does not give rise to the manifest form-aspect, and the form-aspect does not perfume the seed of the seeing-division, how can there be the meaning of mutually being conditions? The answer is: Because the object acts as a condition, the seeing-division can arise, perfuming and becoming its own seed. The seed of consciousness acts as a condition, and then it can arise.
識見分變相分生。境若不有見分不生。見分不生誰熏見種。見種若無見從何起。見若不有相因何生。未有無心獨有境故。由斯遠望得互為因 詳曰。觀疏釋此種與色識一段之文。總有三節 初以見種名之為種。現名色識 二或相下。相種名種。現名色識。然此有二。初總相明。又此所言等下。釋於伏難顯頌．長行二意別也 三若以此見分種下。見種名種。現相名色識 今助一義。翻前第三相種名種。現見名色識 問四中何勝 答理雖皆通。若順彼論第二應善。正順頌文。頌文既云功能．境色無始為因。明即相分種．現分二。故彼釋云。以能發識比知有根。此但功能非外所造。故本識上五色功能名眼等根亦不違理。功能發識理無違故。在識在余雖不可說。而外諸法理非有故。定應許此在識非余。此根功能與前境色。從無始際展轉為因。謂此功能至成就位。生現識上五內境色。此內境色后能引起異熟識上五根功能。根．境二色與識一異。或非一異。隨樂應說。既言生彼五內色境。復雲根．境二色。明知功能即相分種。現名色識。
論。然十八界至處處說故者。按瑜伽五十一云。依此一切種子阿賴耶識故。薄伽梵說有眼界．色界．眼識界乃至有意界．法界．意識界。由於阿賴耶識中有種種界故。又如經說惡叉聚喻。由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 識見分（認知的主觀部分）和變相分（認知的客觀部分）相互產生。如果外境不存在，見分就不會產生。如果見分不產生，誰來熏習見分之種子？如果沒有見分之種子，見分又從何而起？如果見分不存在，變相分又因何而生？因為在沒有心識之前，不可能只有外境存在。因此，從長遠來看，它們可以互為因果。 詳細解釋：觀察《瑜伽師地論》疏對『種與色識』這段文字的解釋，總共有三個部分： 首先，以見分之種子命名為『種』，以顯現的見分和色分命名為『色識』。 其次，或者在『相』之下，以相分之種子命名為『種』，以顯現的見分和色分命名為『色識』。然而，這又分為兩種情況。首先是總體的說明，然後是『此所言等下』，解釋了伏難（潛在的疑問）並闡明了頌文和長行的兩種含義。 第三，如果以『此見分種下』，以見分之種子命名為『種』，以顯現的相分命名為『色識』。 現在我再補充一種觀點，將前面的第三種觀點翻轉過來，以相分之種子命名為『種』，以顯現的見分命名為『色識』。 問：這四種觀點中哪一種更好？ 答：從道理上講，都說得通。但如果順應《瑜伽師地論》的觀點，第二種觀點應該更好。因為它最符合頌文的含義。頌文既然說『功能、境色無始為因』，就表明是相分之種子和現分兩種。所以《瑜伽師地論》的解釋說：『通過能引發識來推知有根。』這只是功能，不是外物所造。因此，在本識上的五色功能被稱為眼等根，也不違背道理。因為功能引發識在道理上沒有違背。無論說它在識中還是在其他地方，都不可說，但外在的諸法在道理上是不存在的。所以一定要允許它在識中而不是在其他地方。這種根的功能與之前的境色，從無始以來就輾轉為因。也就是說，這種功能到了成就的階段，就會在現識上產生五種內在的境色。這種內在的境色之後又能引起異熟識上的五根功能。根和境這兩種色與識是一還是異？或者說非一非異？可以根據自己的喜好來回答。既然說產生彼五種內在的色境，又說根和境這兩種色，就明確地表明功能就是相分之種子，顯現的相分和見分被稱為色識。 論：『然十八界至處處說故者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說：『依靠這含藏一切種子的阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijñana，含藏一切種子之識），所以薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）說有眼界（eye realm）、**（form realm）、眼識界（eye consciousness realm），乃至有意界（mind realm）、法界（dharma realm）、意識界（mind consciousness realm）。』因為在阿賴耶識中有種種界。又如經中所說的惡叉聚喻（Aksha cluster metaphor，一種比喻），由於...
【English Translation】 English version The seeing-division (subjective aspect of cognition) and the appearance-division (objective aspect of cognition) arise mutually. If the object does not exist, the seeing-division will not arise. If the seeing-division does not arise, who will perfume the seed of the seeing-division? If there is no seed of the seeing-division, from where does the seeing-division arise? If the seeing-division does not exist, how does the appearance-division arise? Because it is impossible for the object to exist alone before there is mind. Therefore, in the long run, they can be mutually causal. Detailed explanation: Observing the commentary on the section of 'seed and form-consciousness' in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra commentary, there are three parts in total: First, the seed of the seeing-division is named 'seed', and the manifested seeing-division and form-division are named 'form-consciousness'. Second, or under 'appearance', the seed of the appearance-division is named 'seed', and the manifested seeing-division and form-division are named 'form-consciousness'. However, this is further divided into two situations. The first is a general explanation, and then 'this statement etc. below' explains the potential difficulty and clarifies the two meanings of the verse and the prose. Third, if 'this seed of the seeing-division below', the seed of the seeing-division is named 'seed', and the manifested appearance-division is named 'form-consciousness'. Now I will add another view, reversing the previous third view, naming the seed of the appearance-division as 'seed', and the manifested seeing-division as 'form-consciousness'. Question: Which of these four views is better? Answer: In terms of principle, they are all valid. But if we follow the view of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the second view should be better. Because it best fits the meaning of the verse. Since the verse says 'function, object-form are the cause from beginningless time', it indicates that it is the seed of the appearance-division and the manifested division. Therefore, the explanation of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'By inferring that there are roots through the ability to generate consciousness.' This is only a function, not created by external things. Therefore, it is not against reason that the five form-functions on the basic consciousness are called eye-roots, etc. Because the function generating consciousness is not against reason. Whether it is said to be in consciousness or elsewhere, it cannot be said, but external dharmas do not exist in principle. Therefore, it must be allowed that it is in consciousness and not elsewhere. This function of the root and the previous object-form have been mutually causal from beginningless time. That is, when this function reaches the stage of accomplishment, it will produce five internal object-forms on the manifested consciousness. This internal object-form can then cause the function of the five roots on the resultant consciousness. Are the two forms of root and object the same or different from consciousness? Or are they neither the same nor different? You can answer according to your preference. Since it is said that it produces those five internal form-objects, and it is also said that the two forms of root and object, it clearly shows that the function is the seed of the appearance-division, and the manifested appearance-division and seeing-division are called form-consciousness. Treatise: 'However, the eighteen realms to everywhere are said to be so'. According to the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'Relying on this Alaya-vijñana (storehouse consciousness, the consciousness that contains all seeds) that contains all seeds, the Bhagavan (World-Honored One) said that there are eye realm, form realm, eye consciousness realm, and even mind realm, dharma realm, and mind consciousness realm.' Because there are various realms in the Alaya-vijñana. Also, as in the sutra, the Aksha cluster metaphor (a metaphor), because...
于阿賴耶識中有多界故 又六十六云。云何種種界。謂即十八界展轉異相性。云何非一界。謂即彼界無量有情種種差別所依住性。云何無量界。謂總彼二名無量界 又九十六攝事分云。住自性界者。謂十八界墮自相續。各各決定差別種子。複次以要言之。雖界種類十八可得。然一一界業趣有情種種品類有差別故當知無量。譬如世間大惡叉聚。於此聚中有多品類種類一故。雖說為一而有無量。如是于其一一界中各有無量品類差別。種類一故雖各說一。而實無量 又對法論第一云。問眼界何相。答謂曾．現見色及此種子。如眼界相耳．鼻．舌．身．意界相亦爾 準上諸文。十八界別。故不可以識等種子以為根也。對法既云及此種子。明眼等根別有種現。非識等種事乃明矣。
論。便違聖教至內處所攝者。按瑜伽論五十四七等云。複次色蘊攝幾蘊幾界幾處。謂色蘊攝一蘊全．十界十處全．一界一處少分。準此故非見種為根。又五十五等文如疏上下屢有別處。故不重也。
論。不應說為增上緣者。按對法第五。解增上緣略有九類。第一任持增上。師子覺釋。謂風輪等於冰輪等。器世間于有情世間。大種于所造。諸根于諸識。釋風能持水。水能持地。故風．水輪皆言等也。由器世間．大種．諸根。能持有情．所遠．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在阿賴耶識（ālāya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）中存在多種界（dhātu，構成要素）的說法。瑜伽師地論第六十六卷說：『什麼是種種界？』指的是十八界（dhātu，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、色、聲、香、味、觸、法、眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）各自不同的性質和狀態。『什麼是非一界？』指的是這些界作為無量有情眾生種種差別的所依之處的性質。『什麼是無量界？』指的是總括以上兩種情況，稱為無量界。』 瑜伽師地論第九十六卷《攝事分》中說：『安住于自性的界』，指的是十八界屬於各自的相續，各自具有決定的差別種子。進一步說，總而言之，雖然界的種類只有十八種，但是因為每一個界所對應的業、趣（gati，輪迴的去處）、有情（sattva，眾生）的品類有種種差別，所以應當知道界是無量的。譬如世間上一個大的惡叉聚（akṣa-pūga，骰子堆），在這個聚中有很多品類，雖然種類只有一種，所以說是一個，但實際上是無量的。同樣，在每一個界中，各有無量的品類差別，雖然種類只有一種，所以各自說是一個，但實際上是無量的。 《對法論》（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）第一卷中說：『問：眼界（cakṣu-dhātu，視覺要素）的相是什麼？』答：指的是曾經和現在所見的色（rūpa，顏色和形狀）以及這些色的種子。眼界的相是這樣，耳界（śrotra-dhātu，聽覺要素）、鼻界（ghrāṇa-dhātu，嗅覺要素）、舌界（jihvā-dhātu，味覺要素）、身界（kāya-dhātu，觸覺要素）、意界（mano-dhātu，意識要素）的相也是這樣。』 根據以上經文，十八界是各不相同的，所以不能把識（vijñāna，意識）等的種子作為根（indriya，感覺器官）。《對法論》既然說『以及這些種子』，就說明眼等根有其自身的種子和顯現，而不是識等的種子，這一點是很明顯的。 論：『就違背了聖教，乃至被包含在內處所攝』。根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷和第七卷等所說：『進一步說，色蘊（rūpa-skandha，色蘊）包含幾個蘊（skandha，蘊）、幾個界、幾個處（āyatana，處）？』答：色蘊包含一個完整的蘊，十個完整的界，十個完整的處，以及一個界和一個處的部分。根據這一點，所以不能認為見（darśana，視覺）的種子是根。另外，第五十五卷等經文在疏鈔的上下文中屢次提到，所以這裡不再重複。 論：『不應該說為增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）』。根據《對法論》第五卷，對增上緣的解釋略有九類。第一種是任持增上。師子覺（Siṃhajñāna，人名）的解釋是：『風輪（vāyu-maṇḍala，風輪）對於冰輪（hima-maṇḍala，冰輪）等，器世間（bhājana-loka，容納有情的世界）對於有情世間（sattva-loka，有情眾生居住的世界），大種（mahā-bhūta，地、水、火、風四大元素）對於所造（upādāna，由四大產生的物質），諸根（indriya，感覺器官）對於諸識（vijñāna，各種意識）。』解釋說風能托住水，水能托住地，所以風輪和水輪都用『等』字。由於器世間、大種、諸根，能夠持有情、所遠、
【English Translation】 English version: It is said that in the Ālāya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), there are multiple dhātus (elements). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 66, states: 'What are the various dhātus?' It refers to the eighteen dhātus (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness) each having different natures and states. 'What is the non-singular dhātu?' It refers to the nature of these dhātus as the basis for the various differences of countless sentient beings. 'What is the immeasurable dhātu?' It refers to the generalization of the above two situations, called the immeasurable dhātu.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 96, 'Compendium of Matters,' states: 'The dhātu that abides in its own nature' refers to the eighteen dhātus belonging to their respective continuums, each possessing determined and distinct seeds. Furthermore, in short, although there are only eighteen types of dhātus, because each dhātu corresponds to different categories of karma, gati (destinations of rebirth), and sattvas (sentient beings), it should be understood that the dhātus are immeasurable. For example, in the world, there is a large akṣa-pūga (pile of dice). In this pile, there are many categories, but since there is only one type, it is said to be one, but in reality, it is immeasurable. Similarly, in each dhātu, there are countless categories of differences, but since there is only one type, each is said to be one, but in reality, they are immeasurable.' The Abhidharma (Treatise on Dharma), volume 1, states: 'Question: What is the characteristic of the eye-dhātu (visual element)?' Answer: It refers to the form (rūpa, color and shape) that has been and is currently seen, as well as the seeds of these forms. The characteristic of the eye-dhātu is like this, and the characteristics of the ear-dhātu (auditory element), nose-dhātu (olfactory element), tongue-dhātu (gustatory element), body-dhātu (tactile element), and mano-dhātu (mind element) are also like this.' According to the above scriptures, the eighteen dhātus are distinct from each other, so the seeds of vijñāna (consciousness) etc., cannot be taken as indriyas (sense organs). Since the Abhidharma states 'as well as these seeds,' it clarifies that the eye and other indriyas have their own seeds and manifestations, and not the seeds of vijñāna etc. This point is very clear. Treatise: 'It contradicts the holy teachings, and is even included within the scope of the inner āyatana (sense bases).' According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volumes 54 and 7, etc.: 'Furthermore, how many skandhas (aggregates), dhātus, and āyatanas does the rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form) contain?' Answer: The rūpa-skandha contains one complete skandha, ten complete dhātus, ten complete āyatanas, and a portion of one dhātu and one āyatana. Based on this, the seed of darśana (seeing) cannot be considered an indriya. In addition, the texts in volume 55, etc., are repeatedly mentioned in the commentary above and below, so they are not repeated here. Treatise: 'It should not be said to be an adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition).' According to the Abhidharma, volume 5, the explanation of adhipati-pratyaya is roughly divided into nine categories. The first is the sustaining adhipati. Simhajñāna (name of a person) explains: 'The vāyu-maṇḍala (wind-wheel) is for the hima-maṇḍala (ice-wheel) etc., the bhājana-loka (world that contains sentient beings) is for the sattva-loka (world inhabited by sentient beings), the mahā-bhūtas (great elements: earth, water, fire, wind) are for the upādāna (matter produced by the four elements), the indriyas (sense organs) are for the vijñānas (various consciousnesses).' The explanation says that wind can support water, and water can support earth, so the wind-wheel and water-wheel both use the word 'etc.' Because the bhājana-loka, mahā-bhūtas, and indriyas can sustain sentient beings, the distant,
諸識故。器．大種．根等三類亦名增上。又瑜伽論五十六云。眼與眼識非正生因。唯建立因。是故此二俱時而有。余根．余識當知亦爾 釋建立因者是增上緣。若五識種即是五根。故違諸文增上緣也。
疏。十一唯欲色二界系者。謂五色根．色聲觸三．眼耳身識．舌鼻．香味色界不有。意．意識界．及法界三通三界故。由斯欲．色唯有十一。
疏。上地無尋伺起眼識等難是者。亦是此中所違文也。按彼論云。問生第二靜慮或生上地。若有尋有伺眼等識現在前。云何此地無尋無伺。若不現前云何于彼有色諸根而領受彼地境界。答由有尋有伺諸識種子隨逐無尋無伺三摩地。從彼起已此得現前。又此起已識現行時。復為無尋無伺三摩地種子之所隨逐。是故此地非是一向無尋無伺。由彼有情于諸尋．伺以性離欲。而離欲故彼地雖名無尋無伺。此復現行亦無過失既云有尋有伺諸識種子隨逐而彼得起。明知識種不即是根。若是根者前問后答皆不應理。思之可悟。理既無違。故知識種非根明矣。
疏。諸識亦應唯種子妨者。此難意云。論云眼界通種．現。執言唯種不取現。亦言眼識有眼．種。亦應同根唯取種。即對法雲。問眼識界何相。答謂依眼緣色似色了別。及此種子積集異熟阿賴耶識是眼識界相。耳．鼻．舌
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為各種『識』的緣故，『器』（指物質世界）、『大種』（四大元素：地、水、火、風）、『根』（感覺器官）等三類也被稱為『增上』（adhipati，增上緣）。此外，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，眼和眼識不是直接的生起之因，只是建立之因。因此，眼和眼識是同時存在的。其他的根和識也應當知道是同樣的道理。解釋『建立因』就是『增上緣』。如果五識的種子就是五根，那就違背了許多經文所說的增上緣的含義。
疏：十一，只有欲界和色界才有這十一法，指的是五色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）、色、聲、觸三種所緣境，以及眼識、耳識、身識。舌識、鼻識、香味則不存在於色界。意界、意識界和法界則通於三界。因此，欲界和色界只有十一法。
疏：上地（指更高的禪定境界）沒有尋和伺，卻能生起眼識等，這種說法是錯誤的。這也是此疏所要反駁的。《瑜伽師地論》中說：『問：如果生到第二禪或更高的境界，如果有尋有伺的眼識等在面前顯現，那麼這個境界怎麼能說是無尋無伺呢？如果眼識等不顯現，那麼在這個境界中，有情眾生又如何通過色根來領受這個境界呢？答：因為有尋有伺的各種識的種子跟隨無尋無伺的三摩地。從三摩地出來后，這些種子才能顯現。而且，這些種子顯現時，又被無尋無伺的三摩地的種子所跟隨。所以，這個境界不是完全沒有尋和伺的。因為有情眾生對於尋和伺已經生起了離欲之心，所以這個境界才被稱為無尋無伺。即使眼識等顯現，也沒有過失。』既然說有尋有伺的各種識的種子跟隨，並且能夠生起，就說明識的種子不是根。如果是根的話，那麼前面的提問和後面的回答就都不合理了。仔細思考就能明白。既然道理上沒有衝突，那麼識的種子就不是根，這一點就很明顯了。
疏：各種識也應該只有種子，這種說法是有妨礙的。這個難點的意思是說，《論》中說眼界通於種子和現行。如果執著于只有種子而不取現行，那麼也說眼識有眼根和眼識種子，也應該像根一樣只取種子。就像《對法論》中說：『問：眼識界的相是什麼？答：是依靠眼根，緣於色境，類似色境的了別作用，以及這種子的積集、異熟和阿賴耶識，這就是眼識界的相。』耳、鼻、舌也是如此。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the various 『Vijnanas』 (consciousness), the three categories of 『Bhajana』 (receptacle, i.e., the material world), 『Mahabhuta』 (the four great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind), and 『Indriya』 (sense organs) are also called 『Adhipati』 (Dominant Condition). Furthermore, the fifty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra states that the eye and eye-consciousness are not the direct cause of arising, but only the cause of establishment. Therefore, the eye and eye-consciousness exist simultaneously. It should be understood that the other sense organs and consciousnesses are the same. Explaining 『cause of establishment』 is 『Adhipati-pratyaya』 (Dominant Condition). If the seeds of the five consciousnesses are the five sense organs, then it contradicts the meaning of Dominant Condition as stated in many sutras.
Commentary: Eleven, only the Desire Realm and the Form Realm have these eleven dharmas, referring to the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), the three sense objects of form, sound, and touch, as well as eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, and body-consciousness. Tongue-consciousness, nose-consciousness, and the objects of taste and smell do not exist in the Form Realm. The Mind Realm, Mind-consciousness Realm, and Dharma Realm are common to the three realms. Therefore, the Desire Realm and the Form Realm only have eleven dharmas.
Commentary: The statement that higher realms (referring to higher states of meditative absorption) do not have 『Vitarka』 (initial application of thought) and 『Vicara』 (sustained application of thought), yet can give rise to eye-consciousness, etc., is incorrect. This is also what this commentary refutes. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra states: 『Question: If one is born in the Second Dhyana or higher realms, and if eye-consciousness, etc., with Vitarka and Vicara manifest before them, then how can this realm be said to be without Vitarka and Vicara? If eye-consciousness, etc., do not manifest, then how can sentient beings in this realm perceive the objects of this realm through the sense organs?』 『Answer: Because the seeds of various consciousnesses with Vitarka and Vicara follow the Samadhi without Vitarka and Vicara. After emerging from Samadhi, these seeds can manifest. Moreover, when these seeds manifest, they are again followed by the seeds of Samadhi without Vitarka and Vicara. Therefore, this realm is not completely without Vitarka and Vicara. Because sentient beings have developed detachment from Vitarka and Vicara, this realm is called without Vitarka and Vicara. Even if eye-consciousness, etc., manifest, there is no fault.』 Since it is said that the seeds of various consciousnesses with Vitarka and Vicara follow and can arise, it shows that the seeds of consciousness are not the sense organs. If they were the sense organs, then the previous question and the subsequent answer would not be reasonable. Careful consideration will make it clear. Since there is no contradiction in principle, it is clear that the seeds of consciousness are not the sense organs.
Commentary: The statement that various consciousnesses should also only be seeds is problematic. The meaning of this difficulty is that the Sastra states that the eye-sphere is common to both seeds and manifestations. If one insists on only seeds and does not take manifestations, then it is also said that eye-consciousness has the eye-organ and eye-consciousness seeds, and should also only take seeds like the sense organ. Just as the Abhidharma-sastra says: 『Question: What is the characteristic of the eye-consciousness sphere? Answer: It is the function of relying on the eye-organ, cognizing the object of form, resembling the object of form, as well as the accumulation, maturation, and Alaya-consciousness of this seed. This is the characteristic of the eye-consciousness sphere.』 The same applies to the ear, nose, and tongue.
．身．意識界相亦爾。
疏。六亦無根唯種失者。問兼取現業可無其失。但取業種過如何避。亦違根通種．現文故 答業既有三。明種不一。不同於前唯一種也。據此一邊以為言矣 或雖言業種亦取現業。后釋為正。如燈具明。
疏。若言至非唯無記者。此救意云。若業已熟所招五識。理唯無記。業未熟時所起五識既非業感。故通善．惡。
論。應無眼等為俱有因者。即善．染眼而以何法為俱有因。非業招故不可業種而為因也 問難陀既許根．識異時。責無俱有豈不相符 答有義兩釋。一云依教難彼不就宗責。瑜伽等說眼等為識俱依故。二此難救家。救家雖假以種為根。至實自許根．識同時。故難無失 詳曰。今觀論意。由善．染識非業所招。不依業種。偏難此二無俱有依。而元不論同異時也。
疏。今西方至實有別根者。此師意據偏增說故得為正義。
論。又諸聖教至器世間等者。按瑜伽論五十一云。云何建立所緣轉相。謂若略說阿賴耶識由於二種所緣境轉。一由了別內執受故。二由了別外無分別器相故。了別內執受者。謂能了別遍計所執自性妄執習氣．及諸色根．根所依處。了別外無分別器相者。謂能了別依止緣內執受阿羅耶識故。於一時無有間斷器世間相。又七十六．解密經等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 身、意識界（指第六意識所認識的境界）的相也是如此。
疏：六識也沒有根本，只有種子遺失。問：如果兼取現行業，可以避免這個過失嗎？只取業種，如何避免過失？也違反了根本通於種子和現行的說法。答：業既然有三種（指善業、惡業、無記業），說明種子不只一種，不同於前面所說的只有一種。這是根據一邊的情況來說的。或者雖然說是業種，也取現行業，後來的解釋是正確的，就像燈具一樣明亮。
疏：如果說乃至非唯無記，這是爲了補救而說。如果業已經成熟，所招感的五識，理應只是無記。業未成熟時所產生的五識，既然不是業感所致，所以通於善和惡。
論：應無眼等為俱有因，就是說善和染污的眼識，以什麼法作為俱有因呢？因為不是業力招感的，所以不能以業種作為原因。問：難陀既然允許根和識不同時存在，責備沒有俱有因，豈不是符合邏輯？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是依據教義來責難對方，而不是根據自己的宗派來責難。瑜伽等論典說眼等是識的俱依。第二種說法是為救家辯護。救家雖然假託以種子為根，但實際上承認根和識是同時存在的，所以責難沒有過失。詳：現在觀察論的意圖，由於善和染污的識不是業力所招感的，不依賴於業種，所以專門責難這兩種識沒有俱有依，而根本不討論同時或不同時的問題。
疏：現在西方乃至實有別根，這位師父的意思是根據偏增的說法，所以可以作為正確的解釋。
論：又各種聖教乃至器世間等，按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說：『如何建立所緣轉相？如果簡略地說，阿賴耶識由於兩種所緣境而運轉。一是由於了別內在的執受，二是由於了別外在的無分別器世間相。了別內在的執受，是指能夠了別遍計所執自性（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別的自性），妄執習氣，以及各種色根（Rūpa-indriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根），根所依之處。了別外在的無分別器世間相，是指能夠了別依止緣于內在執受的阿賴耶識，所以在同一時間沒有間斷的器世間相。』又見《解深密經》第七十六卷等。
【English Translation】 English version The same applies to the characteristics of the realm of body and consciousness (referring to the realm perceived by the sixth consciousness).
Commentary: The six consciousnesses also have no root, only the seeds are lost. Question: If we also take into account present karma, can we avoid this fault? If we only take the karma seeds, how can we avoid the fault? It also violates the statement that the root is common to both seeds and present actions. Answer: Since there are three types of karma (referring to good karma, bad karma, and neutral karma), it indicates that there is more than one type of seed, unlike the previous statement that there is only one type. This is based on one aspect of the situation. Or, although it is said to be karma seeds, it also takes into account present karma, and the later explanation is correct, just like a lamp that is bright.
Commentary: If it is said that 'even not only neutral,' this is said for remedy. If the karma has matured, the five consciousnesses that are summoned should only be neutral. The five consciousnesses that arise when the karma has not matured, since they are not caused by karma, are common to both good and evil.
Treatise: There should be no eyes, etc., as co-existing causes, which means, what dharma is the co-existing cause of good and defiled eye consciousness? Because it is not summoned by karma, it cannot be caused by karma seeds. Question: Since Nanda (釋難陀，Śrī Nanda) allows the root and consciousness to exist at different times, isn't it logical to blame the lack of co-existing causes? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is to blame the other party based on doctrine, not based on one's own sect. The Yoga (瑜伽師地論，Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) and other treatises say that the eyes, etc., are the co-existing basis of consciousness. The second explanation is to defend the defender. Although the defender pretends to take the seed as the root, he actually admits that the root and consciousness exist at the same time, so there is no fault in blaming. Detailed: Now observing the intention of the treatise, because good and defiled consciousness are not summoned by karma and do not depend on karma seeds, it specifically blames these two types of consciousness for not having co-existing bases, and does not discuss the issue of simultaneous or non-simultaneous existence at all.
Commentary: Now the Westerners even have real separate roots. This master's intention is based on the theory of partial increase, so it can be regarded as a correct explanation.
Treatise: Also, various sacred teachings, even the world of vessels, etc., according to the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論): 'How to establish the aspect of the object of perception? If we say it briefly, the Ālaya consciousness (阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna) operates due to two types of objects of perception. One is due to the discrimination of internal appropriation, and the other is due to the discrimination of external non-discriminating vessel world aspect. Discriminating internal appropriation refers to the ability to discriminate the self-nature of the Parikalpita-svabhava (遍計所執自性，Parikalpita-svabhava, the nature of false discrimination), the habitual tendencies of false clinging, and the various Rūpa-indriya (色根，Rūpa-indriya, the five roots of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), and the places where the roots depend. Discriminating the external non-discriminating vessel world aspect refers to the ability to discriminate the Ālaya consciousness that depends on the internal appropriation, so at the same time there is an uninterrupted vessel world aspect.' Also see the seventy-sixth volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) and others.
說處非一。大同不錄。中邊所明疏上下引。
疏。即是可止之辭者。止者止住。此言即是止近辭。故此次說不及前師 或字誤也。應為指字。
疏。若不言他至不能自依故者。不定過云。為如第七恒轉依他證八有依。為如第七雖復恒轉而不自依證八無依 問因於同．異二喻轉等名為不定。今唯第七何成不定 答雖體無二義即有差。對二義故亦無有失。
疏。故今此師令成俱有依義者。問令心．心所取自所緣方成所依。種既不能取自所緣。現望于彼何成所依 答所依四義是護法宗。非此師意。不可為難。
疏。又諸識現行至今略不述者。異熟六識而不能熏。現望于種亦同第八而非因緣。論略不說。
疏。今不說依至望現是依者。異熟六識雖不能熏同於第八。然現望種無能持力。不同八現與種為依。故不取也。
疏。始末為論者。本有．新熏如次始末。
論。如契經至恒相續轉故者。按楞伽第九。人體及五蘊。諸緣及微塵。勝人自在作。唯是心分別。心遍一切處。一切處皆心 又云。依父母和合阿梨耶．意合。如蘇瓶中鼠。共赤白增長。薜尸．父厚．泡．創。不凈依節盡。業風長四大。如諸果成就 詳曰。與論所引文雖不同。理旨同也。所以疏云勘彼文同。或可疏勘梵本云同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『說處非一。大同不錄。中邊所明疏上下引。』
疏：『即是可止之辭者。止者止住。此言即是止近辭。故此次說不及前師。或字誤也。應為指字。』
疏：『若不言他至不能自依故者。不定過云。為如第七恒轉依他證八有依。為如第七雖復恒轉而不自依證八無依。問因於同．異二喻轉等名為不定。今唯第七何成不定。答雖體無二義即有差。對二義故亦無有失。』
疏：『故今此師令成俱有依義者。問令心．心所取自所緣方成所依。種既不能取自所緣。現望于彼何成所依。答所依四義是護法宗（護法學派）。非此師意。不可為難。』
疏：『又諸識現行至今略不述者。異熟六識而不能熏。現望于種亦同第八而非因緣。論略不說。』
疏：『今不說依至望現是依者。異熟六識雖不能熏同於第八。然現望種無能持力。不同八現與種為依。故不取也。』
疏：『始末為論者。本有．新熏如次始末。』
論：『如契經至恒相續轉故者。按楞伽（Lankavatara Sutra）第九。人體及五蘊（skandhas）。諸緣及微塵。勝人自在作。唯是心分別。心遍一切處。一切處皆心。又云。依父母和合阿梨耶（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）.意合。如蘇瓶中鼠。共赤白增長。薜尸．父厚．泡．創。不凈依節盡。業風長四大（mahābhūta）。如諸果成就。詳曰。與論所引文雖不同。理旨同也。所以疏云勘彼文同。或可疏勘梵本云同。』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Saying the place is not one. The great similarities are not recorded. The commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes) cites above and below.'
Commentary: 'That is, it is a statement that can be stopped. 'Stopping' means to cease and dwell. This statement is a statement that stops near. Therefore, this explanation does not reach the previous teacher. Perhaps the character is wrong. It should be the character '指' (zhǐ, point).'
Commentary: 'If it is not said that others cannot rely on themselves, then it is an uncertain fault. For example, the seventh consciousness constantly relies on others to prove that the eighth consciousness has reliance. For example, although the seventh consciousness constantly turns, it does not rely on itself to prove that the eighth consciousness has no reliance. Question: Because the cause turns on the analogy of similarity and difference, it is called uncertain. Now, why is only the seventh consciousness uncertain? Answer: Although the substance has no two meanings, there is a difference. Because it is against two meanings, there is no loss.'
Commentary: 'Therefore, this teacher now makes it a co-existent reliance meaning. Question: Making the mind and mental factors take their own objects to become reliance. Since the seed cannot take its own object, how can the present be reliance on it? Answer: The four meanings of reliance are the doctrines of the Dharmapāla School (護法宗). It is not the intention of this teacher. It cannot be difficult.'
Commentary: 'Moreover, the present activities of the consciousnesses are not mentioned much until now. The resultant six consciousnesses cannot perfume. The present looking at the seed is also the same as the eighth consciousness and not a cause and condition. The treatise does not mention it briefly.'
Commentary: 'Now, not saying that reliance until looking at the present is reliance. Although the resultant six consciousnesses cannot perfume, they are the same as the eighth consciousness. However, the present looking at the seed has no holding power. It is not the same as the present of the eighth consciousness being reliance on the seed. Therefore, it is not taken.'
Commentary: 'Beginning and end are the discussion. Originally existing and newly perfumed are the beginning and end in order.'
Treatise: 'As the sutra says, until it constantly continues to turn. According to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (楞伽經) ninth. The human body and the five skandhas (五蘊). All conditions and dust particles. Superior people freely create. Only the mind distinguishes. The mind pervades all places. All places are the mind. Also, it says. Relying on the union of parents, the ālaya-vijñāna (阿梨耶識, store consciousness) and the mind unite. Like a rat in a jar of ghee. Together, red and white grow. Flesh, father's thickness, bubbles, sores. Impurities rely on the exhaustion of joints. Karmic winds grow the four mahābhūtas (四大, great elements). Like the accomplishment of all fruits. Detailed explanation: Although the text quoted by the treatise is different, the principle is the same. Therefore, the commentary says that the examination of that text is the same. Or perhaps the commentary examines the Sanskrit version and says it is the same.'
。不據漢本。漢本闕此論所引文。
疏。從下而微解亦應爾者。本明心等而有所依。今者先徴所依等義。名從下也。解文同徴故云應爾。故后解中先解二別。后明心等具依多少。
疏。若爾四大種及五根扶塵四大者。初四大種造五根者。后即造彼扶塵四大。
疏。除識蘊少分相望者。諸識相望有決定者。然非一切。故云少分。此決定識不取為難。以決定識是所依故。故除之也。
疏。此簡受想蘊全行蘊少分者。但簡行蘊心所法故。又行蘊命亦是主故。故言少分。此文不次。結前第三所簡法故。
疏。皆須此者。置此令心取自緣言。
疏。彼論言有依此言是故者。彼瑜伽論言。有所依即是此論所說者是。
疏。即前有境眼等為果等者。以有所緣與有境義而有別也。若有所緣體唯能緣。若言有境即通五根。要有所緣方有所依。故除根也。
疏。此解所有能依等者。此釋伏難。伏難意云。本明所依何故乃辨能依心等。故釋所有能依法者。意欲翻出能依之體顯彼所依。疏言此解所有能依者。此牒定也。
疏。此是依外至故重言之者。此總結前出所簡法之所以也。依謂所依。色．心所等是所依外所簡之法。故所依后而方指簡名重言也。或唯顯明心所所以以釋外疑。外疑
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不依據漢文版本。漢文版本缺少此論所引用的文字。
疏：從下文稍微解釋也應該是這樣，因為原本說明心等有所依賴。現在先提出所依賴等的意義，名稱是從下文來的。解釋文字與提出問題相同，所以說『應該是這樣』。因此後面的解釋中先解釋兩種差別，然後說明心等具體依賴多少。
疏：如果這樣，四大種（地、水、火、風四種基本元素）以及五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）扶塵四大（由四大種產生的，支援五根的物質）是什麼關係呢？最初是四大種產生五根，然後五根產生扶塵四大。
疏：排除識蘊（意識的集合）少部分相互比較的情況，各種識相互比較有確定性的情況，但不是所有情況都這樣，所以說是『少部分』。這種確定性的識不作為難題提出，因為確定性的識是所依賴的，所以排除它。
疏：這裡簡略受蘊（感受的集合）、想蘊（概念的集合）全部，行蘊（意志的集合）少部分，只是簡略行蘊中的心所法（心理活動）。而且行蘊中的命也是主要因素，所以說是『少部分』。這段文字順序不合邏輯，總結前面第三點所簡略的法。
疏：都需要這個，設定這個是爲了讓心取自己的緣。
疏：那部論典說『有所依』，這句話的意思是，那部《瑜伽師地論》所說的『有所依』就是這部論典所說的。
疏：就是前面有境的眼等作為結果等，因為『有所緣』（有對象）與『有境』（有境界）的意義有所區別。如果說『有所緣』，其本體只能緣取對象。如果說『有境』，就包括五根。必須有所緣才能有所依，所以排除五根。
疏：這裡解釋所有能依賴等，這是爲了消除疑問。疑問的意思是，原本說明所依，為什麼卻要辨別能依賴的心等？所以解釋所有能依賴的法，意思是想要翻出能依賴的本體，來顯示那個所依。疏文說『這裡解釋所有能依賴』，這是確定。
疏：這是依據外法，所以重複說它，這是總結前面，說明簡略法的理由。『依』指的是所依。色（物質）、心所等是所依之外所簡略的法，所以所依之後才指出簡略的名稱，是重複說明。或者只是爲了顯明心所，以此來解釋外面的疑問。外面的疑問是……
【English Translation】 English version: Not based on the Han version. The Han version lacks the text quoted in this treatise.
Commentary: Slightly explaining from below should also be the case, because originally it explains that the mind and so on have something to rely on. Now, first raise the meaning of what is relied upon, etc. The name comes from below. The explanation of the text is the same as raising the question, so it is said 'should be the case'. Therefore, in the later explanation, first explain the two differences, and then explain how much the mind and so on specifically rely on.
Commentary: If so, what is the relationship between the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) and the five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) supporting the four great elements (the material produced by the four great elements that support the five roots)? Initially, the four great elements produce the five roots, and then the five roots produce the supporting four great elements.
Commentary: Excluding the case where a small part of the skandha (aggregate) of consciousness (the collection of consciousness) is compared to each other, there are definite cases where various consciousnesses are compared to each other, but this is not the case in all situations, so it is said 'small part'. This definite consciousness is not raised as a difficult question, because definite consciousness is what is relied upon, so it is excluded.
Commentary: Here, the skandha of feeling (the collection of feelings), the skandha of perception (the collection of concepts) are completely abbreviated, and a small part of the skandha of volition (the collection of will) is abbreviated, only the mental factors (mental activities) in the skandha of volition are abbreviated. Moreover, life in the skandha of volition is also a major factor, so it is said 'small part'. This text is not in logical order, summarizing the law abbreviated in the third point above.
Commentary: All need this, setting this is to let the mind take its own condition.
Commentary: That treatise says 'there is reliance', the meaning of this sentence is that what the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says 'there is reliance' is what this treatise says.
Commentary: That is, the eyes, etc. with objects in front are the results, etc., because there is a difference in meaning between 'having an object' and 'having a realm'. If it is said 'having an object', its substance can only grasp the object. If it is said 'having a realm', it includes the five roots. There must be something to be grasped in order to have something to rely on, so the five roots are excluded.
Commentary: Here explaining all that can be relied upon, etc., this is to eliminate doubts. The meaning of the doubt is, originally explaining what is relied upon, why should we distinguish the mind, etc. that can be relied upon? Therefore, explaining all the laws that can be relied upon, the meaning is to bring out the substance that can be relied upon to show what is relied upon. The commentary says 'Here explaining all that can be relied upon', this is definite.
Commentary: This is based on external dharmas, so it is repeated, this is to summarize the above and explain the reason for abbreviating the dharmas. 'Reliance' refers to what is relied upon. Form (matter), mental factors, etc. are the dharmas abbreviated outside of what is relied upon, so after what is relied upon, the abbreviated name is pointed out, which is a repetition. Or it is only to clarify the mind and mental factors, in order to explain external doubts. The external doubt is...
意云。聖教既云唯心．心所名有所依。即應心所亦所依攝。故有斯釋。斯釋意云。此者此所依謂所依。所是依外別所簡法之一數也。若不簡之恐疑同主亦是所依。故更分別名重言也。對次前文心．心所處故名重言 有義問何故別簡但簡心所非所餘耶 答立論者意不應徴責。由前引教說心．心所名有所依。即恐心所亦是所依故次簡之。雖皆有所依。所依唯心。余非所依。相顯不說。
疏。然諸識至略而不論者。而有不得為所依者。即四義中而闕第一決定義也。
論。同境至所依別故者。問眼等五識得自在位通緣五境。成事智品緣十八界。五根云何與識同境 答據因位中未自在說。更有餘釋。如下當辨。
疏。亦作此義無相違故者。三位無七家亦同安惠成八無依。亦作此義亦顯安惠三位無七。
疏。問至應設劬勞者。答六依於七。七依親故。親依轉六亦轉。八依於七。七非親故。七無漏八不轉。有執．無執行有相似．不相似故名親．不親 答第二云。若由八轉七方轉。可難七轉八亦轉。第八轉位七先轉故。七轉時八不轉。由親疏別。準前應知 又釋。六．七二執違非執故。七轉位六亦轉。第八無執不全違。所以不隨所依轉思之。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第四(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有人問：聖教既然說『唯心』（一切法由心生），心和心所（心的附屬作用）名為『有所依』（有依靠的對象），那麼心所也應該被『所依』（被依靠的對象）所包含，所以有這樣的解釋。這個解釋的意思是：『此』指的是『此所依』，也就是『所依』。『所』是『依』之外，爲了區分而設立的一個概念，是眾多法中的一個。如果不加以區分，恐怕會誤以為同一個主體的不同方面也是『所依』。所以再次分別說明，是重複強調。因為對應前面的心和心所的部分，所以說是重複強調。 有人問：為什麼要特別區分，只區分心所，而不區分其他的呢？ 回答：立論者的意圖不應該被質疑。因為前面引用的經文說心和心所名為『有所依』，所以擔心心所也被認為是『所依』，因此接著區分它。雖然都有所依靠，但『所依』只有心，其他的不是『所依』，這種區別很明顯，所以沒有說。
疏：然而各種識（認識作用）……省略而不論述的原因是，有些識不能作為『所依』，是因為在四種含義中缺少了第一種決定義。
論：同境……所依不同。有人問：眼等五識（視覺等五種感覺）在得自在位（獲得自由的狀態）可以普遍緣五境（五種感覺對像），成事智品（成就事業的智慧）可以緣十八界（十八種要素），那麼五根（五種感覺器官）如何與識同境呢？ 回答：這是根據因位（原因階段）中未得自在的情況來說的。還有其他的解釋，下面會詳細說明。
疏：也可以這樣解釋，沒有矛盾。三位沒有七家，也和安慧一樣，認為八識沒有依靠。也可以這樣解釋，也表明安慧認為三位沒有七識。
疏：有人問……應該多費力氣。回答：六識依靠七識，因為七識是親近的依靠。因為親近的依靠轉變，所以六識也轉變。八識依靠七識，但七識不是親近的依靠。因為七識沒有漏，所以八識不轉變。有執著和沒有執著，有相似和不相似，所以稱為親近和不親近。回答二：如果因為八識轉變七識才轉變，可以反駁說七識轉變八識也應該轉變。但第八識轉變的時候，七識先轉變，所以七識轉變的時候，八識不轉變。這是因為親疏的區別。參照前面的解釋應該明白。又一種解釋：六識和七識的執著是違背非執著的，所以七識轉變的時候，六識也轉變。第八識沒有執著，不完全違背，所以不隨著所依轉變。仔細思考。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第四（完）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第
【English Translation】 English version: Someone asks: Since the sacred teachings say 'Only Mind' (everything arises from the mind), and mind and mental functions (the mind's subsidiary activities) are called 'having a basis' (having an object of reliance), then mental functions should also be included in 'that which is relied upon' (the object being relied upon). Therefore, there is this explanation. The meaning of this explanation is: 'This' refers to 'this basis', which is 'that which is relied upon'. 'That which' is a concept established outside of 'reliance' to distinguish it, and is one of many dharmas. If it is not distinguished, there is a fear of mistakenly thinking that different aspects of the same subject are also 'that which is relied upon'. Therefore, explaining it again is a repeated emphasis. Because it corresponds to the previous section on mind and mental functions, it is called a repeated emphasis. Someone asks: Why specifically distinguish, only distinguishing mental functions, and not distinguishing others? Answer: The intention of the proponent should not be questioned. Because the previously cited scripture says that mind and mental functions are called 'having a basis', there is a concern that mental functions are also considered 'that which is relied upon', so it is then distinguished. Although all have something to rely on, 'that which is relied upon' is only the mind, and the others are not 'that which is relied upon'. This distinction is obvious, so it was not mentioned.
Commentary: However, the reason why various consciousnesses (cognitive functions)... are omitted and not discussed is that some consciousnesses cannot serve as 'that which is relied upon' because they lack the first definitive meaning among the four meanings.
Treatise: Same object... different basis. Someone asks: The five consciousnesses (five senses) such as eye consciousness, etc., in the state of attaining freedom, can universally cognize the five objects (five sense objects), and the Accomplishment of Action Wisdom (wisdom of accomplishing actions) can cognize the eighteen realms (eighteen elements), so how can the five roots (five sense organs) have the same object as consciousness? Answer: This is based on the situation in the causal stage (stage of cause) where freedom has not been attained. There are other explanations, which will be explained in detail below.
Commentary: It can also be explained this way, without contradiction. The three positions do not have the seven families, and like Anhui, they believe that the eight consciousnesses have no reliance. It can also be explained this way, also indicating that Anhui believes that the three positions do not have the seven consciousnesses.
Commentary: Someone asks... should put in more effort. Answer: The six consciousnesses rely on the seventh consciousness because the seventh consciousness is a close reliance. Because the close reliance transforms, the six consciousnesses also transform. The eighth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness, but the seventh consciousness is not a close reliance. Because the seventh consciousness has no outflows, the eighth consciousness does not transform. Having attachment and not having attachment, having similarity and not having similarity, are called close and not close. Answer two: If the seventh consciousness transforms because the eighth consciousness transforms, it can be refuted that the eighth consciousness should also transform when the seventh consciousness transforms. But when the eighth consciousness transforms, the seventh consciousness transforms first, so when the seventh consciousness transforms, the eighth consciousness does not transform. This is because of the difference between closeness and distance. Refer to the previous explanation and you should understand. Another explanation: The attachment of the six and seventh consciousnesses is contrary to non-attachment, so when the seventh consciousness transforms, the six consciousnesses also transform. The eighth consciousness has no attachment and is not completely contrary, so it does not transform according to what it relies on. Think carefully.
'Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only' Volume Four (End)
'Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only' Volume
四(末)
◎疏。二率爾遇境位者。問論無率爾。何乃加之 答準下奪中既有三位。明今縱處三位不無。故遇言中含率爾也。有義遇非勝境即攝率爾。要遇非勝境率爾心後方不續故。若遇勝境率爾心后相續而生。若別言率爾。即顯率爾後皆不續。既率爾後非皆不續。故即攝在第二位中。由此應有四句分別。一心勝境非勝。謂於劣境起等流心。二境勝心非勝。謂于勝境起率爾心。三心．境俱勝。謂于勝境起等流心。四俱非勝。于非勝境起率爾心。唯依第四說不相續 詳曰。義恐未然。現見人有偏注意者。雖勝境至不捨先緣。豈非勝境率爾心后而不續耶。雖境非盛。以心先無偏所注處。遇而緣之相續不息。豈非境劣心得相續。由此故知。所縱三位多分不續。未可即以句數定之。
論。若自在位者。施為無擁名為自在。夫將變現隨欲而成。有所觀察莫不明悟。
疏。八地已去皆能任運者。據自利說。若依利他于諸藥．病有未悟者。
疏。為非此過至得相續者。為非唯此第一之過。而更有下等流等難。為生下論故致此言。有疏言初。理亦得也。今從此字。
疏。遞相續生者。眼識與意落謝過去。后意續起意落謝已。眼等復與意識續起名遞相續。非意識滅后獨眼生名互相續。以五必與意俱起故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 ◎疏。關於率爾遇境位的情況。問：論中沒有提到率爾，為什麼這裡要加上？答：參照下奪中既有三位的情況，說明即使處於這三位，也並非沒有率爾。所以『遇』字中包含了率爾的意思。有一種解釋是，『遇』到的如果不是殊勝的境界，就包含了率爾。重要的是，遇到的如果不是殊勝的境界，率爾心之後才不會持續。如果遇到殊勝的境界，率爾心之後會相續而生。如果單獨說率爾，就顯示率爾之後都不會持續。既然率爾之後並非都不持續，所以就包含在第二位中。由此應該有四句分別：一心勝境非勝，指對於低劣的境界生起等流心；二境勝心非勝，指對於殊勝的境界生起率爾心；三心境俱勝，指對於殊勝的境界生起等流心；四俱非勝，指對於非殊勝的境界生起率爾心。只有依據第四種情況說不相續。詳細地說，這種解釋恐怕不妥當。現在看到有人特別專注，即使殊勝的境界到來也不捨棄先前的緣。難道不是殊勝境界，率爾心后而不持續嗎？即使境界不殊勝，因為心中先前沒有特別專注的地方，遇到而緣之，相續不息。難道不是境界低劣，心卻能相續嗎？由此可知，所說的三位，大多是不持續的，不能立即用句數來確定。
論。如果處於自在位，施為沒有阻礙，名為自在。將要變現，隨心所欲就能成就。有所觀察，沒有不明白領悟的。
疏。八地菩薩以上都能任運，這是從自利的角度來說。如果依據利他，對於諸藥、病，還有未領悟的地方。
疏。爲了避免『並非只有此過』而得到相續的結論。爲了避免並非只有這第一種過失，而更有下等流等困難，爲了引出下面的論述，所以才這樣說。有的疏解說『初』，道理也說得通。現在從此字開始。
疏。遞相續生，眼識與意識落謝過去，之後意識繼續生起，意識落謝之後，眼等又與意識繼續生起，名為遞相續。不是意識滅后，單獨眼識生起，名為互相續。因為五識必定與意識一同生起。
【English Translation】 English version ◎Commentary: Regarding the situation of encountering a state of mind impulsively. Question: The treatise does not mention 'impulsively,' so why add it here? Answer: Referring to the situation where 'inferior overcomes middle' already has three positions, it clarifies that even when in these three positions, 'impulsively' is not absent. Therefore, the word 'encounter' includes the meaning of 'impulsively.' One interpretation is that if what is 'encountered' is not a superior state, it includes 'impulsively.' What's important is that if what is encountered is not a superior state, the impulsive mind will not continue. If a superior state is encountered, the impulsive mind will arise and continue. If 'impulsively' is mentioned separately, it shows that it will not continue after 'impulsively.' Since it is not the case that it never continues after 'impulsively,' it is included in the second position. From this, there should be four sentences to distinguish: 1. The mind is superior, but the state is not, referring to generating an outflow mind towards an inferior state. 2. The state is superior, but the mind is not, referring to generating an impulsive mind towards a superior state. 3. Both the mind and the state are superior, referring to generating an outflow mind towards a superior state. 4. Neither is superior, referring to generating an impulsive mind towards a non-superior state. Only based on the fourth situation is it said that it does not continue. In detail, this explanation is probably not appropriate. Now we see people who are particularly focused, and even when a superior state arrives, they do not abandon their previous condition. Isn't it the case that with a superior state, the impulsive mind does not continue? Even if the state is not superior, because the mind previously had no particular focus, when it encounters and conditions it, it continues without ceasing. Isn't it the case that with an inferior state, the mind can continue? From this, it can be known that the mentioned three positions mostly do not continue, and it cannot be immediately determined by the number of sentences.
Treatise: If one is in the position of freedom (zizai wei), actions are without obstruction, which is called freedom. When about to transform, it can be accomplished as desired. Whatever is observed, there is nothing that is not understood.
Commentary: Bodhisattvas of the Eighth Ground (badi) and above can all act effortlessly, which is said from the perspective of self-benefit. If based on benefiting others, there are still things not understood regarding various medicines and illnesses.
Commentary: To avoid the conclusion of 'not only this fault' leading to continuity. To avoid not only this first fault, but also having difficulties such as lower outflows, this is said to introduce the following discussion. Some commentaries say 'initially,' which also makes sense. Now, starting from this word.
Commentary: 'Arising in successive order' (di xiangxu sheng) means that the eye consciousness (yanshi) and mind consciousness (yishi) decline and pass away, and then the mind consciousness continues to arise. After the mind consciousness declines, the eye, etc., again continue to arise with the consciousness, which is called 'arising in successive order.' It is not that after the mind consciousness ceases, the eye consciousness arises alone, which is called 'arising mutually.' Because the five consciousnesses (wushi) must arise together with the mind consciousness.
論。戲妄天等者。按瑜伽云。謂有欲界諸天名遊戲妄念。彼諸天眾或時耽著種種戲樂久相續住。由久住故妄失正念。由失念故從彼天沒。或復有天名曰意憤。彼諸天眾有時展轉角眼相視。由相視故意憤轉增。意憤增故從彼處沒 又按對法第三云。清凈已生者。謂遊戲妄念．意相憤怨．樂變化天．他化自在．色無色界諸天。多放逸故墮其所應于所受用境及所住定自在而轉 詳曰。準對法論。妄念．意憤．變化．他化次第而言。妄念．意憤即當時分．知足二也。又憤恚者多因色境 欲上二天于諸妻室無所攝屬何因相視生憤恚耶。何以明者。瑜伽第五云。三洲攝受妻．妾施設嫁娶。而除北洲。無我所故。如是大力鬼及欲界天亦爾。唯除樂化．及他化自在天。既無攝屬理應無有相視憤怨 問何所以者 答以此二天外境多化。故於內情亦無配攝。由此取下二空天者。不違自他害等四句。亦順對法。理應無爽 問何故智論云欲六天中間別復有天謂戲妄念．心恚天等 答雖處中間。何妨得是二天所攝。智論自云皆六天攝。亦猶梵王中間禪者初定攝故 或通六天。智論明言此諸天等皆六天攝。瑜伽復說欲界諸天。故可通六 若爾四句豈不違耶 答非彼六天總是戲．恚。取彼戲．恚名為自害。如總名人唯佛使等方俱不害。六雖總
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：關於戲妄天等。按照《瑜伽師地論》所說，欲界諸天中有一種叫做遊戲妄念天。這些天眾有時沉溺於各種嬉戲娛樂，長久地持續下去。由於長久地沉溺，便會喪失正確的念頭。由於喪失正念，便會從那個天界墮落。或者還有一種天叫做意憤天。這些天眾有時會互相怒目而視。由於互相怒視，故意憤的情緒不斷增長。由於意憤增長，便會從那個天界墮落。又按照《阿毗達磨對法論》第三卷所說，『清凈已生者』，指的是遊戲妄念天、意相憤怨天、樂變化天、他化自在天、色無色界諸天。他們大多放逸，因此會墮落到他們所應去的地方，在所受用的境界和所安住的禪定中，不能自在地運轉。 詳細地說，根據《對法論》，妄念天、意憤天、變化天、他化天是依次排列的。妄念天和意憤天就是當時的分天和知足天。而且，憤恚大多是因為色境引起的。欲界上面的兩個天，對於妻室並沒有任何的攝屬關係，為什麼會因為互相怒視而產生憤恚呢？根據《瑜伽師地論》第五卷所說，三洲（東勝身洲、南贍部洲、西牛貨洲）有攝受妻妾、施設嫁娶的習俗，而北俱盧洲則沒有，因為那裡沒有『我所』的觀念。大力鬼以及欲界天也是如此。只有樂變化天和他化自在天例外。既然沒有攝屬關係，理應不會有互相怒視而產生憤怨的情況。 問：為什麼呢？ 答：因為這兩種天界的外境大多是變化出來的，所以在內心的情感上也沒有配偶的攝屬。因此，取下面的兩個空天，就不會違背自害、他害等四句，也順應了《對法論》的說法，理應沒有差錯。 問：為什麼《大智度論》說欲界六天中間另外有天，叫做戲妄念天、心恚天等？ 答：雖然處在中間，又有什麼妨礙它們被這兩種天所攝呢？《大智度論》自己也說這些天都屬於六天所攝。就像梵王中間的禪者被初禪所攝一樣。或者可以通指六天。《大智度論》明確地說這些天等都屬於六天所攝。《瑜伽師地論》又說欲界諸天，所以可以通指六天。 如果這樣，那麼四句的說法豈不是就違背了嗎？ 答：並非那六天全部都是戲、恚。取其中的戲、恚，稱之為自害。就像總稱人為『佛使』等，才全部不害。六天雖然是總稱。
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Concerning the Playful Delusion Heavens and others. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), among the Desire Realm heavens, there are those called the Playful Delusion Heavens (遊戲妄念). These heavenly beings sometimes indulge in various playful amusements, continuing for a long time. Because of this prolonged indulgence, they lose their correct mindfulness. Because of losing their correct mindfulness, they fall from that heaven. Or there are also heavens called the Irascible Heavens (意憤). These heavenly beings sometimes glare at each other. Because of glaring at each other, the emotion of anger increases. Because of the increase in anger, they fall from that heaven. Furthermore, according to the third volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya (阿毗達磨對法論), 'Those who have already attained purity' refers to the Playful Delusion Heavens, the Heavens of Mutual Anger and Resentment (意相憤怨), the Heavens of Delight in Transformation (樂變化天), the Heavens of Enjoying Others' Transformations (他化自在), and the Formless Realm heavens (色無色界). They are mostly negligent and therefore fall to where they should go, unable to freely operate in the realms they enjoy and the samadhi they abide in. In detail, according to the Abhidharma-samuccaya, the Delusion Heavens, the Irascible Heavens, the Transformation Heavens, and the Others' Transformation Heavens are listed in order. The Delusion Heavens and the Irascible Heavens are the Contentment Heavens (知足) of that time. Moreover, anger and resentment are mostly caused by the realm of form. The two heavens above in the Desire Realm do not have any control over wives and concubines, so why would they glare at each other and generate anger? According to the fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the three continents (East Videha, South Jambudvipa, West Godaniya) have the custom of taking wives and concubines and arranging marriages, while North Kuru does not, because there is no concept of 'mine'. The powerful ghosts and the Desire Realm heavens are also like this. Only the Heavens of Delight in Transformation and the Heavens of Enjoying Others' Transformations are exceptions. Since there is no control, there should be no situation of glaring at each other and generating anger. Question: Why is that? Answer: Because the external realms of these two heavens are mostly transformed, they do not have the control of spouses in their inner emotions. Therefore, taking the two lower Formless Realm heavens will not violate the four statements of self-harm, other-harm, etc., and it also accords with the Abhidharma-samuccaya, so there should be no mistake. Question: Why does the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (大智度論) say that in between the six Desire Realm heavens, there are other heavens called the Playful Delusion Heavens, the Heavens of Mental Anger, etc.? Answer: Although they are in between, what prevents them from being included in these two heavens? The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra itself says that these heavens are all included in the six heavens. Just like the meditators in between Brahma are included in the first dhyana. Or it can generally refer to the six heavens. The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra clearly says that these heavens are all included in the six heavens. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra also speaks of the Desire Realm heavens, so it can generally refer to the six heavens. If that is the case, wouldn't the four statements be violated? Answer: It is not that all of the six heavens are play and anger. Taking the play and anger among them is called self-harm. Just like generally calling people 'Buddha's messengers' and so on, then all are harmless. Although the six heavens are a general term.
天。唯戲．恚者是唯自害亦何爽理。依實有情少分而言。上二空居亦有攝受。如魔王女攝歸魔故。
論。故瑜伽至名為意根者。有義第二師釋文有其二。初正翻三位破。二引瑜伽為證。疏說引證屬第三文。今不依也。引瑜伽文證五得以自類為依。不證第三遇勝境故 詳曰。乍觀論勢誠有斯理。若審理披文即疏為正。何所以者。舉增盛境證五相續。引瑜伽論自類為依。豈不顯五是相續耶。故下結云故知五識有相續義。雖復三因皆明相續。隨自因下所引之文以為別證斯亦何失。
疏。雖即六識至實非第七者。平等智體雖是第六。由轉去彼染污末那此智方得。故從所轉第七為名 問何為七無智名平等 答由我．無我有平．不平。故七我亡平等方立。
論。或由悲願相應善心者。按瑜伽論五十九云。智所引發結生相續。謂諸菩薩。又有能引發義利結生相續。謂智所引發結生相續 又集論第三云。已得究竟菩薩摩訶薩等。乘大悲願力故生諸有中 又對法雲。若諸菩薩願力受生者。命終等心當知一切一向是善。疏主釋。若分段．變易亦由二智善心為緣第八得起。言二智者即七．六識相應之智。有義但取第六為勝 詳曰。雙取為優 將何以驗 答按佛地論第五云。無待大悲平等法性者。如來大悲普能拔濟一切有情
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 天（Deva）。唯獨發怒、憎恨，實際上只是在傷害自己，這有什麼道理呢？就實際存在的有情眾生少部分而言，上二空居天（指無色界天）也有被攝受的情況，比如魔王之女被攝歸魔道一樣。
論：所以《瑜伽師地論》說名為意根。有義是第二位法師解釋經文時有兩種說法。第一種是正確地從三個方面來破斥。第二種是引用《瑜伽師地論》作為證據。疏鈔說引用的證據屬於第三段文字。現在不採用這種說法。引用《瑜伽師地論》的文字來證明五識以自類為所依，不能證明第三識遇到殊勝境界的緣故。
詳曰：乍一看論述的態勢，確實有這種道理。如果仔細審理經文，就覺得疏鈔的說法是正確的。為什麼這麼說呢？舉出增盛的境界來證明五識的相續，引用《瑜伽師地論》說明以自類為所依，豈不是明顯說明五識是相續的嗎？所以下面總結說，因此知道五識有相續的意義。雖然三個原因都說明了相續，但隨自因下所引用的文字作為特別的證據，這又有什麼錯呢？
疏鈔：雖然第六識就是平等智，但實際上不是第七識。平等智的本體雖然是第六識，但由於轉變了第七識的染污末那識，這個智慧才能獲得。所以從所轉變的第七識來命名。
問：為什麼第七識沒有智慧卻名為平等呢？答：由於有『我』和『無我』，所以有『平』和『不平』。因此，第七識的『我』消失了，平等才能成立。
論：或者由於與悲願相應的善心。按《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說，由智慧所引發的結生相續，指的是諸位菩薩。又有能引發義利結生相續，指的是由智慧所引發的結生相續。又《集論》第三卷說，已經獲得究竟的菩薩摩訶薩等，憑藉大悲願力的緣故，而生於諸有之中。又《對法論》說，如果諸位菩薩憑藉願力而受生，那麼命終等心應當知道一切都是一向是善的。疏主解釋說，如果是分段生死、變易生死，也是由二智善心作為因緣，第八識才能生起。所說的二智，就是第七識、第六識相應的智慧。有義認為只取第六識為殊勝。
詳曰：雙取為優。用什麼來驗證呢？答：按《佛地論》第五卷說，無待大悲平等法性，如來大悲普遍能夠拔濟一切有情眾生。
【English Translation】 English version Deva (Celestial being). Only anger and hatred, in reality, only harm oneself. What is the reason in that? Speaking of a small portion of actually existing sentient beings, the upper two formless realms (referring to the formless realm heavens) also have cases of being embraced, just like the daughter of the demon king being brought back to the path of demons.
Treatise: Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says it is called the mind-root. There are two explanations by the second teacher when interpreting the text. The first is to correctly refute from three aspects. The second is to cite the Yogacarabhumi-sastra as evidence. The commentary says that the cited evidence belongs to the third section of the text. Now, this view is not adopted. Citing the text of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra to prove that the five consciousnesses rely on their own category as the basis, it cannot prove that the third consciousness encounters a superior state.
Detailed explanation: At first glance at the trend of the argument, there is indeed this reason. If carefully examining the text, it is felt that the commentary's statement is correct. Why is this said? To cite the increasing state to prove the continuity of the five consciousnesses, citing the Yogacarabhumi-sastra to explain that relying on their own category as the basis, doesn't it clearly explain that the five consciousnesses are continuous? Therefore, the conclusion below says, 'Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses have the meaning of continuity.' Although the three reasons all explain continuity, the text cited under 'following its own cause' is taken as special evidence, what is wrong with that?
Commentary: Although the sixth consciousness is the wisdom of equality, in reality, it is not the seventh consciousness. Although the essence of the wisdom of equality is the sixth consciousness, because the defiled manas consciousness of the seventh consciousness is transformed, this wisdom can be obtained. Therefore, it is named from the transformed seventh consciousness.
Question: Why is the seventh consciousness, which has no wisdom, called equality? Answer: Because there is 'self' and 'no-self', there is 'equal' and 'unequal'. Therefore, when the 'self' of the seventh consciousness disappears, equality can be established.
Treatise: Or due to the good mind corresponding to compassion and vows. According to the fifty-ninth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the rebirth continuity caused by wisdom refers to the Bodhisattvas. There is also the rebirth continuity that can cause benefit and interest, which refers to the rebirth continuity caused by wisdom. Also, the third volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says that Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas who have attained ultimate attainment, etc., rely on the power of great compassion and vows, and are born in all existences. Also, the Abhidharmakosha says that if Bodhisattvas are reborn by the power of vows, then the mind at the end of life, etc., should know that everything is always good. The commentator explains that if it is segmented birth and death, or transformational birth and death, it is also due to the two wisdoms and good mind as the cause, that the eighth consciousness can arise. The so-called two wisdoms are the wisdom corresponding to the seventh and sixth consciousnesses. Some believe that only the sixth consciousness is taken as superior.
Detailed explanation: Taking both is superior. How to verify it? Answer: According to the fifth volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra, the non-dependent great compassion and equal Dharma-nature, the Tathagata's great compassion can universally rescue all sentient beings.
通緣三界 又云。隨諸眾生所樂示現。平等法性者隨諸有情樂見如來色身差別如來示現 釋既云菩薩於十地中一地得一。明知而用平等性智為緣受生而救物也。不爾云何地地證得。釋中言佛舉成就者。顯彼分得故不相違。如下廣引。
論。開導依至非心所等者。有義科云。開導依者至名開導依者辨依義。此但屬心下。示其依體遮簡非依。初辨依義有四義簡。此後心等是第四義。簡自類識後心不為前心作依。無引導故。或雖是心。同時不為心所作依。非開避故又言此者。此前滅心於后所生心及心所為依故。然為四義將為勝也 詳曰。言等無間。何理不遮自類後心同時心所。豈復有許後心為前及俱時所無間緣耶。又第四義簡後心等。其第三而簡何法。故三義勝。又云此者此前滅心者。意即可通。望文不順。文中不言前滅心故。云何此此。故今應云。此於後心至名開導依者。辨其名義。此言此前具三義法。此但屬心下。出體遮余。
疏。簡異類他識者。自身八識名為異類。
論。便聖教至心心所者。按瑜伽論三十八云。等無間緣．及所緣緣。唯望一切心法說。由彼一切心．及心法。前生開導所攝受故。所緣境界所攝受故。方生方轉。
論。然攝大乘至奪因緣故者。按無性攝論云。謂經部師作如是執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：通緣三界（指菩薩的智慧和慈悲能夠遍及欲界、色界、無色界），又說：『隨著各種眾生所喜好的而示現。』平等法性（Dharmata，指諸法實相）是指隨著各種有情（Sentient beings，指一切有情識的生命）樂於見到如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號）色身的差別而如來示現。解釋說菩薩在十地（Bhumi，菩薩修行的十個階段）中每一地得到一種智慧。明確知道菩薩運用平等性智（Samatajnana，四智之一，轉化第七識末那識）作為因緣而受生，從而救度眾生。如果不是這樣，怎麼能說在每一地都證得智慧呢？解釋中說佛陀舉出成就者，是爲了顯示他們只是部分地獲得，所以並不矛盾。如下文將廣泛引用。
論：『開導依』（Upastambha，支援）直到『非心所等』，有一種解釋將這段分為：『開導依』直到『名開導依』，是辨別『依』的含義。這僅僅屬於心（Citta，指八識中的心識）。下面指出它的本體，遮止不是『依』的情況。最初辨別『依』的含義有四種含義來簡別。此後的心等是第四種含義，簡別同類識（Vijnana，指八識）的後心不作為前心的『依』，因為沒有引導的作用。或者即使是心，同時也不作為心所（Caitasika，與心同時生起的心理現象）的『依』，因為沒有開闢道路的作用。又說『此』，是指此前滅去的心對於後來所生的心和心所作為『依』。然而，將四種含義作為勝義。
詳細地說，『等無間』（Samanantarapratyaya，無間緣）的含義，有什麼道理不能遮止同類後心和同時的心所呢？難道會有人允許後心作為前心以及俱時心所的無間緣嗎？又，第四種含義簡別後心等，那麼第三種含義簡別什麼法呢？所以三種含義更為殊勝。又說『此於此前滅心』，意思是可以通過。但是從文面上看並不順暢，因為文中沒有說『前滅心』。怎麼能說『此此』呢？所以現在應該說：『此於後心』直到『名開導依』，是辨別它的名義。『此』是指此前具備三種含義的法。『此但屬心下』，是指出本體，遮止其餘。
疏：『簡異類他識』，自身八識（Astvijnana，指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）名為異類。
論：『便聖教』直到『心心所』，按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第三十八卷所說：『等無間緣以及所緣緣（Alambanapratyaya，境界緣），只是針對一切心法（Citta-dharma，指心及心所法）而說。因為它們一切心以及心法，由於前生開導所攝受，由於所緣境界所攝受，才得以產生和轉變。』
論：『然攝大乘』直到『奪因緣故』，按照無性《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）所說：『經部師（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）作這樣的主張。』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Extending to the Three Realms' (refers to the wisdom and compassion of Bodhisattvas reaching the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm), and it is also said: 'Manifesting according to what various beings delight in.' 'Equality of Dharmata' (Dharmata, refers to the true nature of all phenomena) means that Tathagatas (Tathagata, an epithet of the Buddha) manifest according to what various sentient beings (Sentient beings, refers to all living beings with consciousness) delight in seeing in the differences of the Tathagata's physical body. The explanation says that Bodhisattvas attain one wisdom in each of the Ten Bhumis (Bhumi, the ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). It is clearly known that Bodhisattvas use Samatajnana (Samatajnana, one of the Four Wisdoms, transforming the seventh consciousness, Manas) as the condition for rebirth, thereby saving sentient beings. If it were not so, how could it be said that wisdom is attained in each Bhumi? The explanation says that the Buddha cites those who have achieved it to show that they have only partially attained it, so there is no contradiction. It will be widely quoted below.
Treatise: 'Upastambha (Support) of Guidance' until 'not mental factors, etc.,' one interpretation divides this section as: 'Upastambha of Guidance' until 'named Upastambha of Guidance,' which distinguishes the meaning of 'support.' This belongs only to Citta (Citta, refers to consciousness in the Eight Consciousnesses). Below, it points out its substance, preventing cases that are not 'support.' Initially, distinguishing the meaning of 'support' has four meanings for differentiation. The subsequent mind, etc., is the fourth meaning, differentiating that the subsequent mind of the same type of consciousness (Vijnana, refers to the Eight Consciousnesses) does not act as the 'support' of the previous mind because it has no guiding function. Or even if it is a mind, it does not simultaneously act as the 'support' of mental factors (Caitasika, mental phenomena arising simultaneously with the mind) because it has no function of paving the way. Also, 'this' refers to the previously ceased mind acting as the 'support' for the subsequently arising mind and mental factors. However, taking the four meanings as the supreme meaning.
In detail, regarding the meaning of 'Samanantarapratyaya (Immediate Condition),' what reason is there that it cannot prevent the subsequent mind of the same type and simultaneous mental factors? Would anyone allow the subsequent mind to be the immediate condition of the previous mind and simultaneous mental factors? Also, the fourth meaning differentiates the subsequent mind, etc., so what dharma does the third meaning differentiate? Therefore, the three meanings are more superior. Also, 'this in the previously ceased mind' means that it can be understood. However, it is not smooth from the wording, because the text does not say 'previously ceased mind.' How can it be said 'this this'? Therefore, it should now be said: 'This in the subsequent mind' until 'named Upastambha of Guidance,' which distinguishes its nominal meaning. 'This' refers to the dharma that previously possesses three meanings. 'This belongs only to Citta below' points out the substance, preventing the rest.
Commentary: 'Differentiating other types of consciousness,' the Eight Consciousnesses (Astvijnana, refers to eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, Manas consciousness, Alaya consciousness) of oneself are called different types.
Treatise: 'Then the Holy Teaching' until 'mind and mental factors,' according to the thirty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra): 'Samanantarapratyaya and Alambanapratyaya (Objective Condition) are only spoken of in relation to all Citta-dharma (Citta-dharma, refers to mind and mental factors). Because all these minds and mental factors are received and guided by the previous birth, and received by the objective realm, they can arise and transform.'
Treatise: 'However, the Mahayanasamgraha' until 'because of depriving the condition,' according to the Mahayanasamgraha (Mahayanasamgraha) by Asanga: 'The Sautrantika (Sautrantika, one of the Buddhist schools) makes such a claim.'
。色．心無間生者。謂諸色．心前後次第相續而生。是諸法種子者。是諸有為能生因性。謂彼執言。從前剎那色后剎那色無間而生。從前剎那心后剎那心及相應法無間而生。此中因果道理而成就。何用復計阿賴耶識是諸法因。為遮此執故次說云。此不得成如前已說。如說二念不俱有等復有何過。謂無色沒色界生時。前色種子能生今色理不得成。久斷滅故。從無想沒心想生時。及滅定等出心生時。前心種子能生後心皆不應理。久斷滅故。又若離其俱生．俱滅攝受種子相應道理。但執唯有前剎那心能為種子引生無間后剎那心。即阿羅漢後心不成。不應得入無有餘依妙涅槃界。由最後心能為種子等無間緣生余心故。如是即應無無餘依妙涅槃界。是故色．心前後相生。但容有等無間緣．及增上緣。無有因緣 釋色．心前後各自相生。非互相生為無間緣。
論。雖心心所至余亦開導者。按瑜伽云。問如經言此四無色蘊當言和合。非不和合。不可說言如是諸法可分可折令其差別 問何故彼法異相成就。而說和合無差別耶 答眾多和合于所緣境受用領解方圓滿故。若不爾者隨闕一種于所為事應不圓滿。
論。無心等位至即前自類者。對法同此。按彼論第五云。等無間緣者。謂中無間隔等無間故 釋論云。不必剎那中無間
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『色』（Rūpa，物質）和『心』（Citta，精神）無間生起，指的是各種『色』和『心』以前後次第相續而生。『是諸法種子者』，指的是各種『有為法』（Saṃskṛta，有條件的事物）的能生之因的性質。他們執著認為，從前一剎那的『色』到后一剎那的『色』是無間生起，從前一剎那的『心』到后一剎那的『心』以及相應的法也是無間生起。這樣因果道理就成立了，何必再計較『阿賴耶識』（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識）是諸法的因呢？爲了遮止這種執著，所以接著說：『此不得成如前已說』，就像前面所說的『二念不俱有』等等，又有什麼過失呢？指的是，在無色界死亡而生到色界時，前一刻的『色』的種子能夠生出現在的『色』，這個道理是不能成立的，因為已經斷滅很久了。從無想定死亡而生出有心想時，以及從滅盡定等狀態出來而生出『心』時，前一刻的『心』的種子能夠生出后一刻的『心』，這都不合道理，因為已經斷滅很久了。而且，如果離開俱生、俱滅的攝受種子相應的道理，只執著於前一剎那的『心』能夠作為種子，引生無間的后一剎那的『心』，那麼阿羅漢的後心就不能成立，不應該能夠進入無有餘依的妙涅槃界（nirvāṇa）。因為最後的心能夠作為種子，以等無間緣生出其餘的心。這樣就應該沒有無餘依的妙涅槃界了。所以，『色』和『心』前後相生，只容許有等無間緣和增上緣，沒有因緣。解釋『色』和『心』前後各自相生，不是互相生起作為無間緣。 『論』：『雖心心所至余亦開導者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》所說：『問：如經文所說，這四種無色蘊（Arūpaskandha，非物質蘊）應該說是和合的，還是不和合的？不可說這些法可以分開、可以折斷，使它們有差別。問：為什麼這些法異相成就，卻說它們和合沒有差別呢？答：眾多和合才能在所緣境上受用領解圓滿。如果不是這樣，缺少任何一種，所要做的事情就不圓滿。』 『論』：『無心等位至即前自類者』。《對法論》也是這樣說的。按照《對法論》第五卷所說：『等無間緣者，指的是中間沒有間隔的等無間。』釋論說：『不必剎那中無間。』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Rūpa' (matter) and 'Citta' (mind) arise without interval, referring to the successive arising of various 'Rūpa' and 'Citta' in a sequential manner. 'Is the seed of all dharmas' refers to the nature of the productive cause of various 'Saṃskṛta' (conditioned things). They insist that from the previous moment's 'Rūpa' to the next moment's 'Rūpa' arises without interval, and from the previous moment's 'Citta' to the next moment's 'Citta' and corresponding dharmas also arise without interval. In this way, the principle of cause and effect is established, so why bother considering 'Ālaya-vijñāna' (store consciousness) as the cause of all dharmas? To prevent this attachment, it is then said: 'This cannot be established as previously stated,' just like the previously mentioned 'two thoughts do not coexist,' and so on, what fault is there? It refers to the fact that when dying in the formless realm and being born in the realm of form, the seed of the previous moment's 'Rūpa' can produce the present 'Rūpa,' this principle cannot be established because it has been extinguished for a long time. When dying from the state of non-perception and being born with perception, and when emerging from states such as cessation meditation and producing 'Citta,' the seed of the previous moment's 'Citta' can produce the next moment's 'Citta,' all of this is unreasonable because it has been extinguished for a long time. Moreover, if one departs from the principle of the corresponding seeds of co-arising and co-ceasing, and only insists that the 'Citta' of the previous moment can serve as a seed, leading to the uninterrupted 'Citta' of the next moment, then the final 'Citta' of an Arhat cannot be established, and one should not be able to enter the wonderful realm of nirvana (nirvāṇa) without remainder. Because the last 'Citta' can serve as a seed, producing other 'Citta' through the immediately preceding condition. In this way, there should be no wonderful realm of nirvana without remainder. Therefore, the successive arising of 'Rūpa' and 'Citta' only allows for the immediately preceding condition and the dominant condition, but not the causal condition. Explaining that 'Rūpa' and 'Citta' arise separately before and after, not arising mutually as the immediately preceding condition. 'Treatise': 'Although the mind and mental factors reach, the rest are also enlightened.' According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: 'Question: As the sutra says, should these four immaterial aggregates (Arūpaskandha, non-material aggregates) be said to be combined or not combined? It cannot be said that these dharmas can be separated or broken to make them different. Question: Why do these dharmas achieve different aspects, but it is said that they are combined without difference? Answer: Many combinations can fully receive and understand in the object of perception. If not, lacking any one, the things to be done will not be complete.' 'Treatise': 'The position of no-mind, etc., reaches the previous category.' The Abhidharma also says this. According to the fifth volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya: 'The immediately preceding condition refers to the immediately preceding without interval in the middle.' The commentary says: 'Not necessarily without interval in a moment.'
隔。雖隔剎那。但于中間無異心隔。亦名中無間隔。若不爾入無心定心。望出定心應非等無間緣。然是彼緣。是故於一相續中。前心望後心。中間無餘心隔故。是等無間緣 釋無餘自類心來隔也。即余自類類雖是同。而非即此。亦名異也。若言異識名余異者。住無心位有七．八間。云何得言入．出二心無間耶。故如前釋。
論。先滅時至為開導依者。問前難小乘行緣于識。時分懸隔無緣義故。今同於彼應不能開 答夫開導者。前開其路引后令生。今避其途是施功已。由斯後起而無見遮。縱曰長時固亦無咎。不同於彼過去為緣。過去法無緣義焉立。
疏。問如解深密至今何翻解等者。此等諸教疏．燈上下而屢引矣。然唱導者臨論時披撿。非不勞神。今略重舉。初師難云。瑜伽第一云。謂眼識生三心可得。率爾．尋求．及以決定。又第三云。又一剎那五識生已。從此無間必意識生。此即五識引生意識 又初師．及第二師難云。瑜伽又云。決定心後方有染凈。此後方有等流眼識善．不善轉 又解深密等亦云五識由意引也。此即五識由意引生 第二師云。又如攝論．及莊嚴論．佛地經等。彼意皆說。轉第七識得平等智。轉第八識得圓鏡智。此即由彼世第一法第六意識。引生平等性智相應凈識。觀察．平等二智相應
第六．七識。引生鏡智相應凈識。又異熟識依染污意。如對法說。或依悲願相應善心。此即有漏．無漏六．七引有漏八。
疏。如一法未達未遍知意者。無著明八不為小說。無性舉外以經為難而為通之。今略引云。彼本論云。複次何故聲聞乘中不說此心名阿賴耶識名阿陀那識。由此深細境所攝故 無性牒外引經難云。如說我不說一法未達未遍知等者 釋外難意云。賴耶深細不為小說。即小乘人不見第八。云何斷惑成阿羅漢。何所以者。如世尊說。我不說一法未達未遍知成阿羅漢。我唯說言於一切法已達已遍知方能斷惑成阿羅漢 釋既云遍知．方成羅漢。羅漢云何不堪聞八。八若不聞即非遍知。何名無學。進退有失 論此密意說不斷煩惱。以別相聲說總相處。釋兩義答彼。此第一解。據真諦釋。聲者名也。處者義也。生空真理名總相義。以彼別相一法之名。詮于總相生空之理。故稱為密。經意總云。若生空理未以無間．解脫二道達遍知故。不能斷惑成阿羅漢。不言一切皆須達知方斷得果。由斯第八羅漢不知亦無失矣 外伏難云。何以得知別聲詮總 無性答云。非諸煩惱有各別斷 釋緣色等法別相之智名為各別。煩惱既非別相智斷。故知經云達遍知者是總相智 問以別詮總其意云何 答顯總是別真實性故 論或取共
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第六、七識（第六和第七意識）引生與鏡智相應的清凈識。另外，異熟識（Alaya識，第八識）依賴染污意（末那識，第七識），正如《對法論》所說。或者，它依賴於與悲願相應的善心。這就是有漏（有煩惱）和無漏（無煩惱）的第六、七識引生有漏的第八識。
疏：如果有人對一種法（dharma，佛法）未能通達和遍知，無著（Asanga）說明第八識不是小乘教法。無性（Vasubandhu）引用外道經典來質疑並解釋。現在簡要引用如下：那本論典說：『另外，為什麼聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna，小乘）中不說此心名為阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，第八識）或阿陀那識（Ādāna-vijñāna，執持識）呢？因為此識深奧細微，屬於甚深境界所攝。』無性引用外道經典來質疑說：『如經所說，我不說對一種法未能通達和遍知就能成就阿羅漢（Arhat）等。』解釋外道質疑的含義是：阿賴耶識深奧細微，不是小乘教法所說。既然小乘人不見第八識，如何斷除煩惱成就阿羅漢呢？原因是什麼呢？如世尊（Śākyamuni Buddha）所說：『我不說對一種法未能通達和遍知就能成就阿羅漢，我只說對於一切法已經通達和遍知才能斷除煩惱成就阿羅漢。』既然解釋說遍知才能成就阿羅漢，阿羅漢怎麼能不堪聽聞第八識呢？如果第八識不被聽聞，那就不是遍知，怎麼能稱為無學（Asaiksa，無須再學的聖者）呢？進退兩難。
論典用隱秘的含義說不斷煩惱，用別相（ विशिष्ट लक्षण，個別特徵）之聲說總相（सामान्य लक्षण，普遍特徵）之處。解釋這兩種含義來回答他們。這是第一種解釋，根據真諦（Paramārtha）的解釋。聲，指的是名稱。處，指的是意義。生空真理（Śūnyatā，空性）名為總相義。用那別相一種法的名稱，詮釋總相生空的道理，所以稱為隱秘。經文的總意思是說，如果生空的道理沒有用無間道（Anantarya-marga）和解脫道（Vimukti-marga）通達和遍知，就不能斷除煩惱成就阿羅漢。但並沒有說一切都必須通達和知曉才能斷除煩惱證得果位。因此，阿羅漢不知道第八識也沒有過失。外道進一步質疑說：『怎麼知道別聲詮釋總相呢？』無性回答說：『並非諸煩惱有各自個別的斷除。』解釋說，緣色等法的別相之智名為各自個別。煩惱既然不是用別相智斷除的，所以知道經文所說的通達和遍知是總相智。問：用別相詮釋總相，它的含義是什麼呢？答：爲了顯示總相是別相的真實體性。論典或者取共同之處。
【English Translation】 English version: The sixth and seventh consciousnesses give rise to pure consciousnesses corresponding to Mirror Wisdom. Furthermore, the Alaya-consciousness (eighth consciousness) relies on the defiled mind (Manas-consciousness, seventh consciousness), as stated in the Abhidharma. Alternatively, it relies on wholesome thoughts corresponding to compassion and vows. This is how the defiled and undefiled sixth and seventh consciousnesses give rise to the defiled eighth consciousness.
Commentary: If someone has not understood or completely known one dharma, Asanga explains that the eighth consciousness is not a teaching of the Śrāvakayāna (Hinayana). Vasubandhu quotes external scriptures to question and explain. Now, a brief quote: That treatise says: 'Furthermore, why is this mind not called Alaya-vijñāna (eighth consciousness) or Ādāna-vijñāna (clinging consciousness) in the Śrāvakayāna? Because this consciousness is profound and subtle, belonging to the realm of the profound.' Vasubandhu quotes external scriptures to question, saying: 'As the sutra says, I do not say that one can attain Arhatship (Arhat) by not understanding or completely knowing one dharma, etc.' Explaining the meaning of the external questioning is: The Alaya-consciousness is profound and subtle, not spoken of in the Śrāvakayāna. Since the followers of Śrāvakayāna do not see the eighth consciousness, how can they cut off afflictions and attain Arhatship? What is the reason? As the World Honored One (Śākyamuni Buddha) said: 'I do not say that one can attain Arhatship by not understanding or completely knowing one dharma; I only say that one can cut off afflictions and attain Arhatship by having already understood and completely known all dharmas.' Since the explanation says that complete knowledge is required to attain Arhatship, how can an Arhat be unworthy of hearing about the eighth consciousness? If the eighth consciousness is not heard about, then it is not complete knowledge; how can it be called Asaiksa (beyond learning)? There is a dilemma either way.
The treatise uses a hidden meaning to say that afflictions are not cut off, using the sound of specific characteristics (viśiṣṭa lakṣaṇa) to speak of the place of general characteristics (sāmānya lakṣaṇa). Explain these two meanings to answer them. This is the first explanation, according to Paramārtha's explanation. 'Sound' refers to name. 'Place' refers to meaning. The truth of emptiness (Śūnyatā) is called the meaning of general characteristics. Using the name of one dharma with specific characteristics, it explains the principle of emptiness of general characteristics, so it is called hidden. The general meaning of the sutra is that if the principle of emptiness is not understood and completely known through the path of immediate succession (Anantarya-marga) and the path of liberation (Vimukti-marga), then one cannot cut off afflictions and attain Arhatship. But it does not say that everything must be understood and known in order to cut off afflictions and attain the fruit. Therefore, there is no fault if an Arhat does not know the eighth consciousness. The external party further questions: 'How do we know that the specific sound explains the general characteristics?' Vasubandhu answers: 'Not all afflictions are cut off individually.' The explanation is that the wisdom of the specific characteristics of dharmas such as form is called individual. Since afflictions are not cut off by the wisdom of specific characteristics, we know that the complete knowledge mentioned in the sutra is the wisdom of general characteristics. Question: What is the meaning of explaining the general characteristics with the specific characteristics? Answer: To show that the general characteristics are the true nature of the specific characteristics. The treatise may take the common ground.
相無常等行者 此第二釋。依俗諦解二乘之人依十六行觀於四諦。賴耶既在苦諦中收。無常等行亦該第八。據斯共相二乘亦知。所以聖教望共．不共二相而說知．不知也。
疏。即是不緣種子等義者。若緣種家以依緣同簡無間訖。不煩約勝而重簡之。義明定故。由此故知非是彼義。
論。論說末那我我所執恒相應故者。即瑜伽論六十三云。末那名意。於一切時執我．我所。及我慢等思量為性。又按對法第二云。意者謂一切時緣阿賴耶識思度為性。與四煩惱恒相應。謂我見．我愛．我慢．無明。準對法論無我．我所。但可證意之所緣也。
疏。不可緣彼立此義者。彼者彼境。此義我所。
疏。故知我境等者。我即是境。末那緣故。
論。相見俱以識為體者。有義即心自體說名見分。非四分中第二見分。世親同時唯二分故。
疏。五亦應然等流境故者。言等流者相似之義。七．五所緣本質之境。皆是本識相分攝故。
疏。若言識體能生故者。豈色等法體非能生 答識為餘本能變生余。色等不爾。
論。論說種子實物有者。按大論五十二云。云何略說安立種子。謂于阿賴耶識中。一切諸法遍計自性．妄執習氣。是名安立種子。然此習氣是實物有。是世俗有。望彼諸法不可
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『相無常等行者，此第二釋。』這是第二種解釋。依據世俗諦的觀點，二乘之人通過十六行相來觀四諦。阿賴耶識既然被歸入苦諦之中，那麼無常等行相也包含在第八識（阿賴耶識）中。根據這種共相，二乘之人也是知道的。因此，聖教是根據共相和不共相兩種角度來說明知道或不知道的。
疏：『即是不緣種子等義者。』如果緣的是種子之家，那麼依靠緣的相同性來區分無間就已經足夠了，不需要再從殊勝的角度來重複區分。因為意義已經很明確了。因此可知，這不是那個意思。
論：『論說末那我我所執恒相應故者。』瑜伽論第六十三卷說：『末那（manas，意）名為意，在任何時候都執著於我、我所，以及我慢等，以思量為特性。』又根據對法第二卷說：『意是指任何時候都緣著阿賴耶識進行思量，與四種煩惱恒常相應，即我見、我愛、我慢、無明。』根據對法論，無我、我所只能證明是意的所緣。
疏：『不可緣彼立此義者。』彼，指的是彼境；此義，指的是我所。
疏：『故知我境等者。』我就是境，因為末那緣著它。
論：『相見俱以識為體者。』有一種觀點認為，心自體就叫做見分，而不是四分中的第二見分。因為世親（Vasubandhu）的觀點是隻有二分。
疏：『五亦應然等流境故者。』等流，指的是相似的意義。第七識（末那識）和第五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所緣的本質之境，都是本識（阿賴耶識）的相分所攝。
疏：『若言識體能生故者。』難道色等法的體性就不能生嗎？答：識是其餘的根本，能夠變化產生其餘的法，而色等不是這樣。
論：『論說種子實物有者。』根據大論第五十二卷說：『如何簡略地說安立種子？就是在阿賴耶識中，一切諸法的遍計自性、妄執習氣，這叫做安立種子。』然而，這種習氣是實物存在的，是世俗諦存在的，相對於那些法來說，是不可...
【English Translation】 English version: 『The practitioner of impermanence and other characteristics, this is the second explanation.』 This is the second explanation. According to the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), those of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) contemplate the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni) through the sixteen aspects. Since the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) is included within the Truth of Suffering (duḥkha satya), the characteristics of impermanence (anitya) and others are also encompassed within the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). Based on this shared characteristic, those of the Two Vehicles also know it. Therefore, the holy teachings explain knowing or not knowing based on the two aspects of shared and unshared characteristics.
Commentary: 『That is, it does not condition seeds, etc.』 If it conditions the family of seeds, then distinguishing the uninterrupted (nirantara) by relying on the sameness of conditions is sufficient; there is no need to repeatedly distinguish it from the perspective of superiority. Because the meaning is clear and definite. Therefore, it can be known that this is not that meaning.
Treatise: 『The treatise says that the clinging to 『self』 (ātman) and 『what belongs to self』 (ātmīya) by the Manas (末那, mind) is constantly associated.』 That is, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume sixty-three, says: 『Manas is called mind, and at all times it clings to 『self』 and 『what belongs to self,』 and its nature is to think of arrogance (māna) and so on.』 Also, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, volume two, 『Mind means that at all times it conditions the Ālaya-vijñāna and its nature is to think. It is constantly associated with the four afflictions (kleśas), namely, self-view (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), self-love (ātma-sneha), self-conceit (ātma-māna), and ignorance (avidyā).』 According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 『no-self』 (anātman) and 『what belongs to self』 can only prove what the Manas conditions.
Commentary: 『It is not possible to establish this meaning by conditioning that.』 『That』 refers to that object; 『this meaning』 refers to 『what belongs to self.』
Commentary: 『Therefore, it is known that 『self』 is the object, etc.』 『Self』 is the object, because the Manas conditions it.
Treatise: 『Both the aspect (nimitta) and the seeing (darśana) have consciousness (vijñāna) as their substance.』 Some argue that the self-nature of the mind is called the seeing aspect, not the second seeing aspect among the four aspects. Because Vasubandhu only holds two aspects simultaneously.
Commentary: 『The fifth (five consciousnesses) should also be the same, because they are outflowing objects.』 『Outflowing』 means similar. The essential objects conditioned by the seventh consciousness (Manas) and the fifth consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) are all included within the aspect division of the fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).
Commentary: 『If it is said that the substance of consciousness can produce.』 Could it be that the substance of forms (rūpa) and other dharmas cannot produce? Answer: Consciousness is the root of the rest and can transform and produce the rest. Forms and others are not like this.
Treatise: 『The treatise says that seeds are real entities.』 According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, volume fifty-two: 『How can seeds be established briefly? That is, in the Ālaya-vijñāna, the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) and the habitual energies (vāsanā) of false clinging of all dharmas are called the establishment of seeds.』 However, these habitual energies are real entities, they exist in the conventional truth, and relative to those dharmas, they are not...
定說異．不異相。猶如真如 又按攝論第二云。又若略說阿賴耶識用異熟識一切種子為其自性 又云。阿賴耶識是實種子。是一切種子實因緣性 準此多文種子是有 問若實有何故瑜伽五十二云。複次種子云何。非折諸行別有實物名為種子。亦非余處。然即諸行如是種性。如是等生。如是安布名為種子。如穀麥等物所有芽．莖．葉等種子。于彼物中磨搗分折。求異種子了不可得。亦非余處。然諸大種如是種性。如是等生。如是安布。穀麥等物能為彼緣令彼得生說名種子。又云。是世俗有。又攝論第二云。非彼種子有別實物於此中住。亦非不異。二論皆云無別實物。復云世俗。云何定斷論說實有 答世俗有言非定詮假。如下論釋。因果道理不即不異。為對異熟因果定異故云無別。又不同現心．色之法緣慮．質礙。云無別實故無違也。
論。似常一故者。依疏所簡可為四句。一似常非一。第八心所。似一非常。眼等轉識。似一似常。賴耶識體。非似一．常。轉識俱所諸種色等者 問我猶主義可計一．常。所既不然計多何過。如計諸蘊我一所四此何不然 答俱生分別有差別故。又雖俱生緣內外別。何得為例。
疏。是我之我者。如疏四釋。有義二釋。一云是我顯第七計第八為我。之我者義顯第七更不計余。唯執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於『定說異』（確定地說不同）和『不異相』（不是不同的相）的問題，這就像真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）。此外，根據《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第二卷所說：『如果簡略地說，阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存識）的作用是，以異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）和一切種子（Sarva-bīja，所有潛在的可能性）作為其自性。』又說：『阿賴耶識是真實的種子，是一切種子的真實因緣性。』根據這些經文，種子是存在的。 問：如果種子是真實存在的，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十二卷說：『種子是什麼呢？不是在破折諸行（Dharma，事物）之後，另外有一個真實的物體叫做種子，也不是在其他地方。而是這些行具有這樣的種性（Bīja-svabhāva，種子性質），這樣產生，這樣安排，叫做種子。』就像穀物、麥子等物的所有芽、莖、葉等種子，在這些穀物、麥子等物中磨搗分折，尋求不同的種子是完全不可能得到的，也不是在其他地方。而是諸大種（Mahābhūta，四大元素）具有這樣的種性，這樣產生，這樣安排，穀物、麥子等物能作為它們的緣，使它們得以產生，這叫做種子。』又說：『這是世俗有（Saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）。』此外，《攝大乘論》第二卷說：『不是那些種子有另外的真實物體住在這裡面，也不是不異。』兩部論都說沒有另外的真實物體，又說是世俗有，為什麼能確定地說論中說種子是真實存在的呢？ 答：『世俗有』這句話不是一定表示虛假。如下面的論述解釋，因果的道理不是即（相同）也不是異（不同）。爲了對治異熟的因果是確定的不同，所以說『沒有另外的』。又不同於現心（現在的心識）、色的法緣慮（色法的緣慮作用）、質礙（質礙性），所以說『沒有另外的真實』，因此沒有矛盾。 論：『似常一故者』（因為看起來像是常和一）。根據疏文所簡略的，可以分為四句：一是『似常非一』（看起來像是常，但不是一），指第八識的心所（Citta-samprayukta，相應的心法）。二是『似一非常』（看起來像是一，但不是常），指眼識等轉識（Pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變識）。三是『似一似常』（看起來像是一，也像是常），指阿賴耶識的體性。四是『非似一、常』（既不像是一，也不像是常），指轉識的俱有所（Citta-samprayukta，相應的心法）、諸種色等。 問：我（Ātman，自我）仍然是主張可以計為一和常的，所（所有物）既然不是這樣，計為多有什麼過錯呢？就像計諸蘊（Skandha，五蘊）為我的一和所的四，為什麼不可以這樣呢？答：因為俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）和分別（Vikalpa，分別產生的）有差別。而且，雖然俱生，但緣（條件）有內外之別，怎麼能作為例子呢？ 疏：『是我之我者』（是我的我）。如疏文的四種解釋。有一種解釋分為兩種：一種是說『是我』，顯示第七識（末那識，Manas-vijñāna）計第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）為我。『之我者』的意思是顯示第七識不再計其他，只執著第八識。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the question of 'definitely saying different' (定說異) and 'not different aspect' (不異相), it is like the Suchness (真如, Tathata, the true nature of things). Furthermore, according to the second volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論): 'If briefly stated, the function of the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) is to take the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness) and all seeds (一切種子, Sarva-bīja, all potential possibilities) as its own nature.' It also says: 'The Ālaya-vijñāna is the real seed, and it is the real causal nature of all seeds.' According to these texts, seeds exist. Question: If seeds are real, why does the fifty-second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) say: 'What are seeds? It is not that after breaking and separating all dharmas (諸行, things), there is another real object called seed, nor is it in other places. Rather, these dharmas have such a seed nature (種性, Bīja-svabhāva), are produced in this way, and arranged in this way, which is called seed.' Just like the seeds of all sprouts, stems, leaves, etc. of grains, wheat, etc., it is completely impossible to obtain different seeds by grinding and separating them in these grains, wheat, etc., nor are they in other places. Rather, the great elements (諸大種, Mahābhūta, the four great elements) have such a seed nature, are produced in this way, and arranged in this way, and grains, wheat, etc. can be their condition (緣), causing them to be produced, which is called seed.' It also says: 'This is conventional truth (世俗有, Saṃvṛti-satya).' Furthermore, the second volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'It is not that those seeds have another real object residing in them, nor are they not different.' Both treatises say that there is no other real object, and also say that it is conventional truth, so how can it be definitely concluded that the treatise says that seeds are real? Answer: The phrase 'conventional truth' does not necessarily mean false. As the following discussion explains, the principle of cause and effect is neither identical nor different. In order to counter the definite difference between the cause and effect of Vipāka (異熟, result), it is said 'there is no other.' Moreover, it is different from the present mind (現心), the perceptual function of form (色法緣慮), and the obstructive nature (質礙性), so it is said 'there is no other reality,' therefore there is no contradiction. Treatise: 'Because it appears to be constant and one' (似常一故者). According to the summary in the commentary, it can be divided into four sentences: First, 'appears to be constant but is not one' (似常非一), referring to the mental concomitants (心所, Citta-samprayukta) of the eighth consciousness. Second, 'appears to be one but is not constant' (似一非常), referring to the transforming consciousnesses (轉識, Pravṛtti-vijñāna) such as eye consciousness. Third, 'appears to be one and appears to be constant' (似一似常), referring to the nature of the Ālaya-vijñāna. Fourth, 'neither appears to be one nor appears to be constant' (非似一、常), referring to the mental concomitants of the transforming consciousnesses and various forms, etc. Question: The self (我, Ātman) is still asserted to be able to be counted as one and constant. Since what is possessed (所) is not like this, what is wrong with counting it as many? Just like counting the aggregates (諸蘊, Skandha, the five aggregates) as one self and four possessions, why can't it be like this? Answer: Because there are differences between what is innate (俱生, Sahaja) and what is conceptually constructed (分別, Vikalpa). Moreover, although innate, the conditions (緣) are different internally and externally, so how can it be taken as an example? Commentary: 'Is the self of my self' (是我之我者). As in the four explanations in the commentary. One explanation is divided into two: one is saying 'is the self,' showing that the seventh consciousness (末那識, Manas-vijñāna) counts the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālaya-vijñāna) as the self. The meaning of 'of my self' is to show that the seventh consciousness no longer counts other things, but only clings to the eighth consciousness.
第八以之為我。二云是我者義簡他我。之我者義簡非我 詳曰。復助一釋。義言第七執所執我是我許我。初我第七假者名我。后我第八。即所執我。之言與許我意我相似。
論。多處唯言有我見故者。按大論五十一云。阿賴耶識或於一時。唯與一種轉識俱轉。所謂末那。何以故。由此末那我見．慢等恒共相應思量行相。若有心位。若無心位。常與阿賴耶識一時俱轉。緣阿賴耶識以為境界。執我起慢思量行相。顯揚所明如疏具引。
疏。即除四人等者。三乘無學．不退菩薩。此四決定不緣藏識。所以除之。四外餘人有緣．不緣當須分別。分別可知。有漏．無漏緣．不緣故。
論。證得十種平等性故者。如佛地論一一具明。今牒彼經略引論釋 經複次妙生平等性智者。由十種相圓滿成就 論應知即是十地修果。一一地中略說。各證一平等性修習圓滿成就佛地 經證得諸相．增上．喜愛平等法性 論謂諸大士相．及諸隨好相差別故皆名為相。如是諸相遠離遍計所執自性說名平等。增上者謂富貴自在。色等諸蘊各別皆非富貴自在。和合亦非富貴自在。離計所執說名平等。喜愛者由遍計力于順彼法發生觀喜。于違彼法發生憂戚。遍計所執諸法無故。于計所執喜．愛亦無說名平等。達解如是所說諸相．增上．喜
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第八識執取阿賴耶識為『我』。如果只說『是我』，那麼含義過於簡單，容易與其他『我』混淆。如果說『之我』，那麼含義過於寬泛，容易與『非我』混淆。詳細解釋如下：再次輔助解釋一下，意思是說第七識執取並認為自己所執著的『我』就是『我』，允許有『我』存在。最初的『我』是第七識所假立的『我』，後面的『我』是第八識，也就是被執著的『我』。『之』和『許我』的含義與『意我』相似。
論：在很多地方只說有『我見』的原因是：根據《大論》第五十一卷所說，阿賴耶識有時只與一種轉識同時運轉，這種轉識就是末那識（Manas, 意為『意』）。為什麼呢？因為這種末那識總是與『我見』、『慢』（Mana, 意為『慢』）等煩惱相應，進行思量活動。無論是有心位還是無心位，它總是與阿賴耶識同時運轉，以阿賴耶識為境界，執著于『我』，生起『慢』，進行思量活動。顯揚論所闡述的內容如疏文中詳細引述。
疏：『即除四人等』的意思是：三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的無學果位者、不退轉的菩薩。這四種人決定不會緣取阿賴耶識，所以排除他們。除了這四種人之外，其他人是否緣取阿賴耶識需要分別討論，具體情況可以根據有漏、無漏等情況來判斷。
論：『證得十種平等性故』的意思是：如同《佛地論》中一一詳細說明的那樣。現在引用《佛地經》，並簡略地引用論的解釋。《經》中說：『複次，妙生，平等性智（Samatajnana, 意為『平等性智』）是由十種相圓滿成就的。』《論》中說：『應當知道，這就是十地（Bhumi, 意為『地』）修行的結果。每一地中略說，各自證得一種平等性，修習圓滿成就佛地（Buddhabhumi, 意為『佛地』）。』《經》中說：『證得諸相、增上、喜愛平等法性。』《論》中說：『所謂的諸相，是指諸大士的相好以及各種隨形好，因為這些相好有差別，所以都稱為相。這些相好遠離了遍計所執的自性，就叫做平等。增上，是指富貴自在。色等諸蘊各自都不是富貴自在，和合在一起也不是富貴自在，離開了遍計所執，就叫做平等。喜愛，是指由於遍計力的作用，對於順應自己的法就產生歡喜，對於違背自己的法就產生憂愁。遍計所執的諸法本來就沒有，所以對於遍計所執的喜、愛也沒有，這就叫做平等。』通達理解這些所說的諸相、增上、喜愛。
【English Translation】 English version: The eighth consciousness grasps the Alaya consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) as 'I'. If it is only said 'is I', then the meaning is too simple and easily confused with other 'I's. If it is said 'of I', then the meaning is too broad and easily confused with 'non-I'. A detailed explanation is as follows: Again, to assist in the explanation, it means that the seventh consciousness grasps and believes that the 'I' it clings to is 'I', allowing the existence of 'I'. The initial 'I' is the 'I' falsely established by the seventh consciousness, and the latter 'I' is the eighth consciousness, which is the 'I' that is clung to. The meaning of 'of' and 'allowing I' is similar to 'intentional I'.
Treatise: The reason why it is only said in many places that there is 'view of self' is: According to the fifty-first volume of the Great Treatise, the Alaya consciousness sometimes only operates simultaneously with one type of transforming consciousness, which is the Manas (意為『意』). Why? Because this Manas is always associated with afflictions such as 'view of self', 'conceit' (Mana, 意為『慢』), and engages in thinking activities. Whether in a state of mind or a state of no-mind, it always operates simultaneously with the Alaya consciousness, taking the Alaya consciousness as its object, clinging to 'I', giving rise to 'conceit', and engaging in thinking activities. The content explained in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra is as detailedly quoted in the commentary.
Commentary: 'That is, excluding the four types of people, etc.' means: those who have attained the state of no-more-learning in the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna), and the non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas. These four types of people will definitely not grasp the Alaya consciousness, so they are excluded. Apart from these four types of people, whether others grasp the Alaya consciousness needs to be discussed separately, and the specific situation can be judged based on whether it is defiled or undefiled.
Treatise: 'Because they have attained the ten kinds of equality' means: as explained in detail in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Now, the Sutra of Buddha Land is quoted, and the explanation of the treatise is briefly quoted. The Sutra says: 'Furthermore, Wonderful Being, Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana, 意為『平等性智』) is perfectly accomplished by ten aspects.' The Treatise says: 'It should be known that this is the result of the ten Bhumis (Bhumi, 意為『地』) of practice. Briefly speaking, in each Bhumi, one kind of equality is attained, and the practice is perfectly accomplished to achieve the Buddhabhumi (Buddhabhumi, 意為『佛地』).' The Sutra says: 'Attaining the equality of Dharma-nature of all characteristics, increase, and love.' The Treatise says: 'The so-called all characteristics refer to the characteristics of the great beings and the various minor marks, because these characteristics are different, so they are all called characteristics. These characteristics are free from the self-nature of what is conceptually constructed, and are called equality. Increase refers to wealth and freedom. The aggregates of form, etc., are not wealth and freedom individually, nor are they wealth and freedom when combined. Being free from what is conceptually constructed is called equality. Love refers to the fact that due to the power of conceptual construction, joy arises for the Dharma that accords with oneself, and sorrow arises for the Dharma that contradicts oneself. Since the phenomena that are conceptually constructed do not exist, there is also no joy or love for what is conceptually constructed, and this is called equality.' Thoroughly understanding these characteristics, increase, and love that have been spoken of.
愛平等法性故名證得。初地菩薩最初證得。後後地中漸漸方便修合增長。最後佛地圓滿成就 經證得一切領受緣起平等法性 論緣起有二。謂內．及外。內緣起者謂無明等十二有支。外緣起者謂種．芽等一切外物。此二緣起一切皆由因有故果有。因生故果生。無作用義。空．無我義。無補特伽羅義。是緣起義。如是等義緣起自相是所領受。故名領受。緣起等義離計所執說名平等。達解如是所說一切領受緣起平等法性故名證得 經證得遠離異相非相平等法性 論色等諸法變壞等相。不相似故名為異相。遠離如是各別異相即是共相。如是共相以何為相。非相為相。如契經言。一切法性唯有一相。所謂非相。非相即是平等法性。達解如是計所執法畢竟永無平等法性故名證得 經弘濟大慈平等法性 論慈有三種。謂有情．法及無緣慈。由此三種平等救濟一切有情。不同凡夫及二乘故。故名大慈。救度一切長時積集福慧成滿故故名弘濟。如是所說弘濟大慈。遍一切處無差別轉。故名平等。弘濟大慈平等法性為所緣故。就境說名平等法性 經無待大悲平等法性 論聲聞等非不能拔濟一切有情。小分行相暫時而轉。如來大悲普能拔濟一切有情。通緣三界遍滿行相恒時而轉。無所觀待恒救不捨。隨其所應拔濟三界所苦有情。無待大悲無
差別轉。故名平等。此即法性。或緣平等法性為境 經隨諸眾生所樂。示現平等法性 論隨諸有情樂見如來色身差別。如來示現如是色身。如是示現一切如來形相平等。如是平等即是法性。是故說名平等法性 經一切眾生敬受所說平等法性 論若有如是種類語業。能令有情善根成就。聞生歡喜得凈信樂。如來便現如是語業令彼得聞。如來所出一切語言稱機宜故。諸人．天等皆無違逆故名敬受。雖有眾生不順佛語此是化作。或當有益后必信受。就總為語故言一切敬受所說。如是語言由前道理諸佛同現。故名平等。如是平等即名法性 經世間寂靜皆同一味平等法性 論有漏五蘊說名世間。唸唸．對治二種壞故 釋一有為故唸唸壞。二有漏故對治壞。唯苦．集二具斯二壞 論即彼息滅名為寂靜 釋彼苦．集二 論由此於此而寂靜故。即是聖道及以涅槃。依他起性世間寂靜同歸真如圓成實性。故名一味。此即名為平等法性 經世間諸法苦樂一味平等法性 論世間諸法略有八種。謂利衰等。如是八種總有二品。四違名苦。四順名樂。生欣．戚故。聖者居中恒常一味。得利不高。遇衰不下。如是乃至樂而無愛。苦而無恚。由彼遠離遍計所執世間八法。於一切處皆同一味。即此說名平等法性 經修殖無量功德究竟平等法性 論功德即
是菩提分法等諸功德。熏修長養成就解脫說名修殖。平等性智雖無分別。由佛．菩薩智增上力。如如意珠令異身中功德生長成就解脫 言究竟者能得三乘般涅槃故。如是智名平等法性。遠離遍計所執性故。
疏。其實思量但是行相者。識自體分實非思量。今舉見分思量行相顯彼自體 問云何顯耶 答是思量體名為思量。舉末顯本。如花果樹。
疏。其體即是識蘊攝故者。問豈彼行相非識蘊耶 答雖亦識蘊遮彼外難而有此言。為外難云行相思量與思何別。故今答云。行相體者既是識蘊。相亦同之。思即行蘊。故不相例。
論。由斯兼釋所立別名者。心．意．識三皆有通別。若緣慮名心。依止名意。了別名識。此即通名。八識皆有此三名故。若積集名心。思量為意了粗名識。乃是別名。如次別屬第八．七．六 問心行相者而是阿賴耶 答緣慮是也 問何故意以別相為行。心通行耶 答有義雖標總稱即是別名。如十一色色得名故 詳曰。此不為例。色無餘名不同香等。故取總名以標別稱。心有別號何得例同。故今解云。行相何要取別相耶。取總何失。前解第八了別為行。亦取總也。故不須例隨應說故。
論。未轉依位至無我相故者。按瑜伽論六十三云。問若彼末那於一切時思量為性相續而轉。如世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是菩提分法（bodhipaksa-dharma，菩提的組成部分）等各種功德，通過熏習修養增長，成就解脫，這被稱為修殖。平等性智（samatajnana，平等性智）雖然沒有分別，但由於佛和菩薩的智慧增上的力量，就像如意珠一樣，能使不同身中的功德生長，成就解脫。說到究竟，是因為能夠證得三乘（triyana，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的般涅槃（parinirvana，完全的涅槃）的緣故。這樣的智慧名為平等法性（samata-dharmata，平等的法性），遠離了遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別的自性）的緣故。
疏：實際上思量只是行相，識的自體分實際上不是思量。現在舉見分的思量行相來顯現那個自體。問：如何顯現呢？答：這個思量的體就名為思量，這是舉末顯本，就像花、果、樹一樣。
疏：它的體就是識蘊所攝的緣故。問：難道那個行相不是識蘊嗎？答：雖然也是識蘊，這是爲了遮止外人的詰難而這樣說。因為外人詰難說，行相思量和思有什麼區別？所以現在回答說，行相的體既然是識蘊，那麼相也相同。思就是行蘊，所以不能相比。
論：因此兼帶解釋所立的別名。心（citta，心）、意（manas，意）、識（vijnana，識）三者都有共通和不共通之處。如果以緣慮為名，就叫做心；以依止為名，就叫做意；以了別為名，就叫做識。這是通名，八識都有這三個名稱的緣故。如果以積集為名，就叫做心；以思量為意；以了粗為識，這就是別名，依次分別屬於第八識（阿賴耶識，alayavijnana）、第七識（末那識，manas）、第六識（意識，vijnana）。問：心的行相就是阿賴耶識嗎？答：緣慮就是。問：為什麼故意以別相作為行相，而心是通用的呢？答：有的說法是，雖然標明總稱，但實際上是別名，就像十一**（指十一面觀音）得到名稱一樣。詳細地說，這不能作為例子。色沒有其餘的名稱，不同於香等，所以取總名來標明別稱。心有別號，怎麼能和它相同呢？所以現在解釋說，行相為什麼要取別相呢？取總相有什麼過失呢？前面的解釋中，第八識的了別作為行相，也是取總相。所以不需要舉例，隨應而說就可以了。
論：在沒有轉依（asraya-parivrtti，轉依）的階段，是因為還沒有達到無我相的緣故。按照瑜伽論第六十三卷所說，問：如果那個末那（manas，意）在一切時都以思量為自性相續不斷地運轉，就像世
【English Translation】 English version: These are the merits such as the bodhipaksa-dharma (components of enlightenment). Through cultivation and nurturing, they achieve liberation, which is called 'cultivation and growth'. Although Samatajnana (wisdom of equality) has no distinctions, due to the power of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas' wisdom, it is like a Cintamani jewel (wish-fulfilling jewel), enabling the growth of merits in different bodies and achieving liberation. 'Ultimate' is said because it can attain the parinirvana (complete nirvana) of the Three Vehicles (triyana: Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana). Such wisdom is called Samata-dharmata (equality of suchness), because it is far from the Parikalpita-svabhava (imputed nature).
Commentary: In reality, thinking is only an aspect, the self-nature division of consciousness is not actually thinking. Now, the thinking aspect of the seeing division is used to reveal that self-nature. Question: How is it revealed? Answer: The substance of this thinking is called 'thinking', which is using the end to reveal the origin, like flowers, fruits, and trees.
Commentary: Its substance is included in the Skandha of consciousness. Question: Isn't that aspect also a Skandha of consciousness? Answer: Although it is also a Skandha of consciousness, this is said to prevent external objections. Because external people object, saying, 'What is the difference between the thinking aspect and thinking?' So now the answer is, 'Since the substance of the thinking aspect is a Skandha of consciousness, the aspect is the same.' Thinking is the Skandha of volition, so they cannot be compared.
Treatise: Therefore, it also explains the established specific names. Citta (mind), Manas (intellect), and Vijnana (consciousness) all have common and uncommon aspects. If named by 'cognition', it is called Citta; if named by 'reliance', it is called Manas; if named by 'discrimination', it is called Vijnana. These are common names, because all eight consciousnesses have these three names. If named by 'accumulation', it is called Citta; 'thinking' is Manas; 'discriminating the coarse' is Vijnana. These are specific names, respectively belonging to the eighth consciousness (Alayavijnana), the seventh consciousness (Manas), and the sixth consciousness (Vijnana). Question: Is the aspect of mind the Alayavijnana? Answer: Cognition is. Question: Why intentionally take the specific aspect as the aspect, while mind is universal? Answer: Some say that although the general term is marked, it is actually a specific name, just like the Eleven-Faced Avalokitesvara (Ekadasamukha) gets its name. In detail, this cannot be taken as an example. Form has no other names, unlike fragrance, etc., so the general name is taken to mark the specific name. Mind has a specific name, how can it be the same? So now it is explained that why does the aspect have to take the specific aspect? What is the fault in taking the general aspect? In the previous explanation, the discrimination of the eighth consciousness as the aspect also takes the general aspect. So there is no need to give examples, just say it accordingly.
Treatise: In the stage before Asraya-parivrtti (transformation of the basis), it is because the characteristic of no-self has not yet been reached. According to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Question: If that Manas (intellect) constantly operates with thinking as its nature, continuously, like the world
尊說。出世末那云何建立 名假施設不必如義 又對治彼遠離顛倒正思量故 釋此中難意。若四惑俱恒思量者。即出世位而無四惑。復不思量。何名末那。初答意云。夫立名者但假施設未必稱義。故出世意雖不思量亦得名意。與疏稍別。
論。此四常起擾濁內心者。內心之義傳有兩釋。一云內心體即第八。由第七識相應四惑緣第八識令成有漏故名擾濁。二云內心即第七識。由相應惑而成染污名為擾濁 詳曰。今同后釋 所以者何 答言擾內心令外轉識恒成雜染雜染者不由第八第七能故 又別釋者。內心通取七．八二識。第八由之成有漏故。
疏。說四種愛至七慢分別者。相攝如燈。具明四愛如法華攝釋第三．第四。
論。瑜伽論至寧不相違者。按五十八云。貪染令心卑下。憍慢令心高舉。是故貪．慢更互相違。撿兩本論皆五十八。疏云五十五撿文者誤。
論。分別俱生至義乖返者。按五十五。貪．嗔互相無。此惑與慢．見。謂染愛時或高舉或推求。慢之與見或更相應。謂高舉時復邪推構 撿兩本論。並五十五。疏云五十八亦恐撿錯。又按對法第六云。謂貪不與瞋相應。如瞋疑亦爾。余皆相應。故知貪與見．慢相應 又云。見慢皆不得與瞋．疑相應。不障見．慢自相應也。
疏。文與前
【現代漢語翻譯】 尊者問道：『出世間的末那（manas，意根）是如何建立的？』回答說：『名號只是假借施設，不必完全符合實際意義。』又因為要對治那些遠離顛倒的正思量，所以解釋其中的難點。如果四種煩惱一直都在思量，那麼在出世間位就沒有四種煩惱了。如果又不思量，那還叫什麼末那呢？最初的回答是說，建立名稱只是假借施設，未必完全符合實際意義。所以出世間的意根即使不思量，也可以叫做意根。這與疏鈔的解釋稍有不同。
論中說：『這四種煩惱常常生起，擾亂不清凈的內心。』關於『內心』的意義，有兩種解釋。一種說法是，內心指的就是第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）。由於第七識（kliṣṭa-manas，末那識）相應於四種煩惱，緣于第八識，使之成為有漏法，所以叫做擾濁。另一種說法是，內心指的就是第七識。由於相應于煩惱而變得染污，所以叫做擾濁。我認為后一種解釋更合理。為什麼呢？回答說，擾亂內心，使外在的轉識常常成為雜染。雜染不是第八識和第七識本身的功能。還有一種解釋是，內心可以包括第七識和第八識。第八識因此成為有漏法。
疏鈔中說：『說到四種愛到七慢的分別，它們之間的相互包含就像燈一樣。』詳細說明四愛，就像《法華經》攝釋第三和第四品所說的那樣。
論中說：《瑜伽師地論》中說，『難道不相違背嗎？』按照第五十八卷所說，貪染使心卑下，憍慢使心高舉。所以貪和慢是互相違背的。檢查兩本論，都是第五十八卷。疏鈔中說是第五十五卷，是檢查文字時出現的錯誤。
論中說：『分別俱生的煩惱，意義上是矛盾的。』按照第五十五卷所說，貪和嗔是互相沒有的。這些煩惱與慢和見也是如此。也就是說，在染愛的時候，或者高舉，或者推求。慢和見有時會互相相應，也就是說，在高舉的時候，又會邪惡地推求。檢查兩本論，都是第五十五卷。疏鈔中說是第五十八卷，也可能是檢查錯誤。又按照《對法論》第六卷所說，貪不與嗔相應，嗔和疑也是如此，其餘的都相應。所以知道貪與見和慢相應。又說，見和慢都不能與嗔和疑相應，但不妨礙見和慢自身相應。
疏鈔中的文字與前面的內容一致。
【English Translation】 The Venerable asked: 'How is the manas (mind-basis) established in the transcendental world?' The answer is: 'Names are merely provisional designations and need not perfectly match the meaning.' Furthermore, in order to counteract those correct thoughts that are far from delusion, the difficulty herein is explained. If the four afflictions are constantly thinking, then in the transcendental state there are no four afflictions. If there is no thinking, then what is it called manas? The initial answer is that establishing names is merely a provisional designation and need not perfectly match the meaning. Therefore, even if the transcendental mind-basis does not think, it can still be called mind-basis. This is slightly different from the commentary in the subcommentary.
The treatise says: 'These four afflictions often arise, disturbing and defiling the inner mind.' Regarding the meaning of 'inner mind,' there are two explanations. One explanation is that the inner mind refers to the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness). Because the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭa-manas, afflicted mind) corresponds to the four afflictions and is conditioned by the eighth consciousness, it becomes a conditioned dharma, hence it is called disturbed and defiled. Another explanation is that the inner mind refers to the seventh consciousness. Because it corresponds to afflictions, it becomes defiled, hence it is called disturbed and defiled. I think the latter explanation is more reasonable. Why? The answer is that it disturbs the inner mind, causing the external transforming consciousness to constantly become impure. Impurity is not a function of the eighth and seventh consciousnesses themselves. Another explanation is that the inner mind can include the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. The eighth consciousness thus becomes a conditioned dharma.
The subcommentary says: 'Speaking of the distinction between the four kinds of love and the seven kinds of pride, their mutual inclusion is like a lamp.' The four loves are explained in detail, just as explained in the third and fourth chapters of the Lotus Sutra.
The treatise says: 'The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, 'Isn't it contradictory?' According to the fifty-eighth volume, greed makes the mind humble, and arrogance makes the mind haughty. Therefore, greed and pride are contradictory. Checking both treatises, they are both in the fifty-eighth volume. The subcommentary says it is the fifty-fifth volume, which is a mistake in checking the text.
The treatise says: 'Distinguishing the co-arisen afflictions, the meanings are contradictory.' According to the fifty-fifth volume, greed and anger are mutually exclusive. These afflictions are also like this with pride and view. That is to say, when there is attachment and love, there is either haughtiness or seeking. Pride and view sometimes correspond to each other, that is to say, when there is haughtiness, there is also evil seeking. Checking both treatises, they are both in the fifty-fifth volume. The subcommentary says it is the fifty-eighth volume, which may also be a mistake in checking. Furthermore, according to the sixth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, greed does not correspond to anger, and anger and doubt are also like this, and the rest correspond. Therefore, it is known that greed corresponds to view and pride. It also says that view and pride cannot correspond to anger and doubt, but it does not prevent view and pride from corresponding to each other.
The text in the subcommentary is consistent with the previous content.
別者。與前第三所明文別。
疏。與第八識所簡乃同者。同彼簡去別境．及善．隨惑．不定。
論。定唯繫心至剎那別緣者 問若據有為定境不一。依相續說八非間斷。如何說七剎那別緣。七繫於八。由八而有似一常故 答定有專注一境之相。境對稱一。第七不爾。據境有為故云別緣而非第七作別緣解。而似一常依相續說 若爾本智相應無定。無一相故 答一解雖無。有深專義有定無失。諸師上下或云別緣。或說緣一。準此應悉。
疏。問如定變化障者。依定得通能起變化。由彼硬澀無堪任性。能障于彼變化等事。變化之障。依主得名。
疏。或父外意者。瑜伽文外。彼論不言世俗有者有實體故。
疏。然忘念一至不別說者。與別境念行相相似。念前說無。忘念同念故不說也。有義若爾不正知亦爾何須解之。故此但是論主遺忘 詳曰。疏若斷云忘念別境念分攝故不說之。可如所責。疏撿行相有似．不似。故說．不說。一何輒斥。豈自不得論之妙旨。推過論主言遺忘乎。次前疏云是別境故此不說者。對邪欲解攝相說也。此方悉陳。
疏。耶欲耶解至故此不說者。有義非由別境。但依二十故不說之 詳曰。五遍染家亦不說言而依二十隨煩惱說。如何簡略依二十耶。若言雖不說依二十
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『別者』，與前面第三節所闡明的『文別』不同。
疏：與第八識所簡別相同，都是簡別去除『別境』（五個別境心所之一，即欲、勝解、念、定、慧）、以及『善』（善心所）、『隨惑』（隨煩惱）、『不定』（不定心所）。
論：『定唯繫心至剎那別緣者』，問：如果根據有為法的角度來看，定的境界並非單一不變。如果依據相續的說法，第八識並非間斷。那麼，為什麼說第七識剎那剎那緣別異之境呢？第七識系屬於第八識，由於第八識的作用而呈現出看似恒常不變的狀態。答：定的狀態具有專注一境的特性，境界與定相應而顯得單一。第七識則不然，就境界的有為性而言，所以說是『別緣』，而不是將第七識理解為『作別緣』。而看似恒常不變的狀態是依據相續的說法。如果這樣，那麼與根本智相應的定，就沒有定境，因為沒有單一的相狀。答：一種解釋是，雖然沒有單一的相狀，但有深刻專注的意義，有定也沒有過失。諸位論師的解釋或高或低，有的說是『別緣』，有的說是『緣一』，應該參照這些說法來理解。
疏：問：如『定變化障者』，依據禪定獲得神通，能夠引發變化。由於禪定具有硬澀、不柔順的特性，所以能夠障礙變化等事。『變化之障』，依據所依的主體而得名。
疏：或『父外意者』，瑜伽論的文句之外，該論典沒有說世俗諦所承認的事物具有實體。
疏：然而，『忘念一至不別說者』，與別境心所中的『念』的行相相似。前面已經說過『念』，『忘念』與『念』相同，所以不再單獨說明。有一種觀點認為，如果這樣，那麼『不正知』也應該如此，何必還要解釋呢？因此，這只是論主的遺忘。詳細地說，如果疏文斷定說『忘念』屬於別境心所中的『念』，所以不再說明，那麼就可以像所責備的那樣。疏文考察了行相的相似與不相似，所以有的說明，有的不說明，為什麼隨便指責呢？難道是沒有領會論典的精妙之處，而將過失推給論主，說是他遺忘了嗎？前面疏文說『是別境故此不說者』，是針對邪欲的解釋而說的。這裡全部陳述。
疏：『耶欲耶解至故此不說者』，有一種觀點認為，不是由於屬於別境心所，只是依據二十隨煩惱心所，所以不再說明。詳細地說，五遍行心所和五別境心所的染污法中也沒有說，而是依據二十隨煩惱心所來說明，為什麼要簡略地依據二十隨煩惱心所呢？如果說雖然沒有說，但也是依據二十隨煩惱心所。
English version 『Differentiation』 here is different from the 『textual differentiation』 explained in the third section earlier.
Commentary: It is the same as what the eighth consciousness distinguishes, which is distinguishing and removing 『Specific Object』 (one of the five specific object mental factors, namely desire, certainty, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), as well as 『Goodness』 (wholesome mental factors), 『Secondary Afflictions』 (subsidiary defilements), and 『Indeterminate』 (indeterminate mental factors).
Treatise: 『Concentration exclusively focuses the mind to momentarily differentiate objects.』 Question: If based on the perspective of conditioned phenomena, the objects of concentration are not singular and unchanging. If based on the continuous flow, the eighth consciousness is not intermittent. So, why is it said that the seventh consciousness differentiates objects moment by moment? The seventh consciousness is dependent on the eighth consciousness, and due to the function of the eighth consciousness, it appears to be constant and unchanging. Answer: The state of concentration has the characteristic of focusing on a single object, and the object corresponds to the concentration, appearing singular. The seventh consciousness is not like this. Regarding the conditioned nature of the object, it is said to be 『differentiating objects,』 not understanding the seventh consciousness as 『creating differentiation.』 The appearance of constancy is based on the continuous flow. If so, then the concentration corresponding to fundamental wisdom would not have a fixed object, because it does not have a singular appearance. Answer: One explanation is that although there is no singular appearance, there is a profound meaning of focus, and there is no fault in having concentration. The explanations of the various masters are either higher or lower, some saying 『differentiating objects,』 some saying 『focusing on one.』 These explanations should be referred to for understanding.
Commentary: Question: Such as 『obstacles to transformation through concentration,』 based on obtaining supernatural powers through meditation, one can initiate transformations. Because the meditation has the characteristics of being rigid and unyielding, it can obstruct transformations and other things. 『Obstacles to transformation』 are named based on the subject they depend on.
Commentary: Or 『meaning outside the Father,』 outside the text of the Yoga treatise. That treatise does not say that things acknowledged by conventional truth have substance.
Commentary: However, 『forgetfulness and mindfulness are not separately explained,』 because they are similar in characteristics to 『mindfulness』 among the specific object mental factors. 『Mindfulness』 has been explained earlier, and 『forgetfulness』 is the same as 『mindfulness,』 so it is not explained separately. One view is that if this is the case, then 『incorrect knowledge』 should also be the same, so why explain it? Therefore, this is just a forgetfulness of the treatise master. In detail, if the commentary definitively said that 『forgetfulness』 belongs to 『mindfulness』 among the specific object mental factors, so it is not explained, then it could be like what is being blamed. The commentary examines the similarity and dissimilarity of characteristics, so some are explained, and some are not. Why arbitrarily criticize? Could it be that you have not grasped the subtle meaning of the treatise and are pushing the fault to the treatise master, saying that he forgot? The earlier commentary said 『because it is a specific object, it is not explained here,』 which is in response to the explanation of wrong desire. Here, everything is stated.
Commentary: 『Desire and understanding are not explained here,』 one view is that it is not because they belong to specific object mental factors, but only based on the twenty subsidiary afflictions, so they are not explained. In detail, the defiled aspects of the five pervasive mental factors and the five specific object mental factors are also not mentioned, but are explained based on the twenty subsidiary afflictions. Why simplify and rely on the twenty subsidiary afflictions? If it is said that although it is not mentioned, it is also based on the twenty subsidiary afflictions.
【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2
。二十隨中有不遍故故須簡者。若爾二十二中亦有不遍。何不依簡。故如疏說理甚無違。
論。要緣曾受境界種類等者。有義如等流五識所緣現境。雖非曾受而是率爾五識所得境之種類名曾受境。五識既爾意識準知。此之後心緣前類境亦得念起。今第七識唯緣類故。故說有念。所執賴耶是無始時曾受類故。緣現境故非緣曾受 問設緣過去。彼已滅故但緣現影。此即一切皆緣境類。如何曾受與境類別 答理實二境皆是現在。本質過去名為曾受。質若現在但名為類。七與五境質唯現故但名緣類。意識有時質久滅故。名緣曾受故有別也 詳曰。現在等流五識之境。豈非過去等流識等境之類耶。若許是者何乃不言。若不許者有何所以。又現意識緣久滅境。境體既無何是曾受。故雖重釋尚疏遺也。故今應云。是前率爾．等流識等境之類也。過去本質雖體實無。而變相緣。相似於彼名緣曾受。
疏。能發惡者等是者。釋前師難。前師難云。不正知者謂起外門能發惡業。豈第七識能有此事不正知俱。故今會云彼約六識非據第七。
論。瑜伽論至三界系故者。按彼五十八云。云何名隨煩惱。略由四相差別建立。一通一切不善心起。謂無慚．無愧二通一切染污心起。謂放逸等。三于各別不善心起。小十隨惑。若一生時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：二十隨煩惱中，有些不是普遍存在的，所以需要進行簡別。如果這樣說，那麼二十二隨煩惱中也有不普遍存在的，為什麼不依據這個進行簡別呢？所以如《瑜伽師地論》的疏文所說，在道理上並沒有什麼違背。
論：『要緣曾受境界種類等者』，有一種解釋是，就像等流五識所緣的現境，雖然不是曾經領受過的，但是作為率爾五識所得到的境界的種類，可以稱為『曾受境』。五識既然如此，意識也可以類推得知。此後的心緣於之前的同類境界，也可以生起念頭。現在第七識只是緣于種類，所以說有念。所執著的阿賴耶識是無始以來曾經領受過的種類，因為緣于現境，所以不是緣于曾受。
問：假設緣於過去，那個過去已經滅亡了，只是緣于現在的影像。這樣說來，一切都是緣于境界的種類。那麼『曾受』和『境界類別』有什麼區別呢？
答：道理上說，兩種境界都是現在的。本質是過去的，稱為『曾受』。本質是現在的，只稱為『種類』。第七識和五識的境界本質只是現在的，所以只稱為緣于種類。意識有時境界的本質已經很久滅亡了，所以稱為緣于曾受，因此有區別。
詳細地說，現在的等流五識的境界，難道不是過去的等流識等的境界的種類嗎？如果允許這樣說，為什麼不說呢？如果不允許這樣說，有什麼原因呢？還有，現在的意識緣于很久以前滅亡的境界，境界的本體既然沒有了，什麼是『曾受』呢？所以即使重新解釋，仍然有疏漏。所以現在應該說，是之前的率爾識、等流識等的境界的種類。過去的本質雖然本體實際上沒有了，但是變現的相緣，相似於那個過去，稱為緣于曾受。
疏：『能發惡者等是者』，這是解釋前人的責難。前人的責難是：『不正知』是指生起外在的、能夠引發惡業的行為。難道第七識會有這種事情，和不正知同時存在嗎？所以現在解釋說，那是針對六識說的，不是針對第七識說的。
論：『瑜伽論至三界系故者』，按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷所說：『什麼叫做隨煩惱？』大概由四種相的差別來建立。第一，通於一切不善心生起，指無慚（Ahri）和無愧（Anapatrapya）；第二，通於一切染污心生起，指放逸等；第三，對於各個別的不善心生起，指小十隨煩惱。如果一生起時
【English Translation】 English version: Among the twenty secondary afflictions (Upaklesha), some are not universally present, hence the need for differentiation. If that's the case, then among the twenty-two secondary afflictions, some are also not universally present. Why not differentiate based on that? Therefore, as the commentary on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, there is no contradiction in principle.
Treatise: 'That which necessarily cognizes previously experienced realms, categories, etc.' One interpretation is that, like the present realm cognized by the outflowing (Nisyanda) five consciousnesses, although it is not something previously experienced, as the category of realm obtained by the initial (Manasikara) five consciousnesses, it can be called a 'previously experienced realm'. Since it is so for the five consciousnesses, the same can be inferred for the consciousness (Manovijnana). Subsequent minds cognizing previous similar realms can also give rise to thoughts. Now, the seventh consciousness (Manas) only cognizes categories, so it is said to have thought. The Alaya-vijnana that is clung to is a category that has been previously experienced since beginningless time, because it cognizes the present realm, so it does not cognize the previously experienced.
Question: Suppose it cognizes the past, that past has already perished, and it only cognizes the present image. In that case, everything cognizes the category of realm. Then what is the difference between 'previously experienced' and 'category of realm'?
Answer: In principle, both realms are present. The essence (vastu) that is past is called 'previously experienced'. The essence that is present is only called 'category'. The essence of the realms of the seventh consciousness and the five consciousnesses is only present, so it is only called cognizing the category. Sometimes the essence of the realm of the consciousness has perished for a long time, so it is called cognizing the previously experienced, therefore there is a difference.
In detail, isn't the present realm of the outflowing five consciousnesses the category of the realm of the past outflowing consciousnesses, etc.? If it is permissible to say so, why not say it? If it is not permissible to say so, what is the reason? Also, the present consciousness cognizes a realm that perished a long time ago. Since the substance of the realm is gone, what is 'previously experienced'? Therefore, even with re-explanation, there are still omissions. So now it should be said that it is the category of the realm of the previous initial consciousness, outflowing consciousness, etc. Although the past essence has no substance in reality, the manifested image is cognized, similar to that past, and is called cognizing the previously experienced.
Commentary: 'Those that can generate evil, etc.' This explains the previous teacher's criticism. The previous teacher's criticism was: 'Incorrect knowledge (Asamparajanya)' refers to external actions that can generate evil karma. Could the seventh consciousness have such a thing, coexisting with incorrect knowledge? So now it is explained that it is said in reference to the six consciousnesses, not in reference to the seventh consciousness.
Treatise: 'The Yogacarabhumi-sastra to the three realms bound, etc.' According to the fifty-eighth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'What are called secondary afflictions (Upaklesha)?' They are established roughly by the differences of four characteristics. First, arising in common with all unwholesome minds, referring to shamelessness (Ahri) and lack of consideration (Anapatrapya); second, arising in common with all defiled minds, referring to laxity (Styana), etc.; third, arising in each individual unwholesome mind, referring to the ten minor secondary afflictions (Upaklesha). If, at the time of arising
必無第二。四善．不善．無記心起謂不定四。不定四法瑜伽亦名隨煩惱也。放逸等十既云遍染。明知第七有不定惑。
論。諸疑理者至亦勝解者。問何故疑理事須印 答事理雖別然必相依。如於苦諦即有苦事．苦理．苦如。由此疑理於事有印。
疏。事決不生疑等者。此難意云。疑與勝解俱時而生境有理事。疑緣于理。勝解緣事。既不同取。便違同一所緣之義。
疏。理疑亦解生者。此釋意云。勝解于彼所疑之理而亦解生。即所緣同行相有別 問疑所疑理而勝解生可同所緣。印所印事疑不緣之所緣還異 答事亦有疑。但相微隱。疏示一隅故不言備。
疏。前解但約事疑者。即前引彼五十八云。疑由五相至如何有欲勝解二數。此解約彼事疑為難。
疏。以疑理所引等者。外䠱前難故此釋之。外難意云。若緣事疑是煩惱者應非見斷。見斷唯是迷理惑故 答意易詳。
論第五
論。違聖言故者。即違瑜伽第十一說諸禪出受。疏云十二二字誤也。按彼論云。無相者經中說為無相心定。於此定中舍根永滅但害隨眠。彼品粗重無餘斷故。非滅現纏。住無想定必有受故。於此定中容有三受。謂喜．樂．舍 釋曰。無漏定心而緣真如名無想定。或相應舍被惑所雜。或為緣縛。能雜能緣舍根
。惑種名舍粗重。斷此惑種名斷隨眠。據此等斷名斷舍根。非斷現受。余文可悉。
疏。若許喜樂等者。問前師但言喜受相應。如何牒言許喜．樂耶 答為二釋。一依三受而以明之。二就理言喜粗．樂細。粗猶上有。細必不無。
疏。第七所緣至為境界故者。此釋意云。隨緣何地所引果識。第七俱受即與先世引業受同。何所以者。緣彼引業所感果故。疏云相應是隨順義。若與彼業受不隨順。即不能緣彼業之果。
疏。又地所有至與彼受俱者。此第二釋。隨所緣識所生之地。七與彼地第六意識增上受俱。俱者即是喜．憂等同。何所以然。由緣彼地引業之果。故與當地增上受同。如生惡處憂受增上。余趣準知。前據與彼能引受同。后同所緣當地增受。故二別也。有義隨第六識增上受俱。如初轉依隨六增上。故受俱起亦隨第六。
論。任運一類等者。如阿賴耶任運一類而無轉易。不與思惟所引之受而共相應。此何不爾。何知以然 答按瑜伽論六十三云。阿賴耶識相應受於一切時唯是不苦不樂受。於一切識三受位中恒相續流。乃至命終無有斷絕。所餘二受當知思惟之所引發非是俱生。時時作意引發現前。以八例七七同唯舍。
疏。彼是自相別義者。異熟果相。種子因相。是阿賴耶識自相別義。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『惑種』（煩惱的種子）指的是粗重的煩惱。斷除這種『惑種』，稱為斷除『隨眠』（潛在的煩惱）。根據這些斷除，稱為斷除『舍根』（舍受的根本）。並非斷除現行的感受。其餘的文字可以理解。
疏：如果允許有喜受和樂受等。問：前一位論師只說與喜受相應，為什麼註釋中說允許有喜受和樂受呢？答：有兩種解釋。一是依據三種感受（苦、樂、舍）來闡明。二是就道理而言，喜受是粗的，樂受是細的。粗的感受仍然存在於上面（指更高的層次），細的感受必定不會沒有。
疏：第七識所緣的境界，是作為境界的緣故。這裡的解釋是說，隨所緣的哪個地的業所引發的果報識，第七識俱生的感受就與前世所引的業的感受相同。為什麼呢？因為緣的是那個引業所感的果報。疏中說『相應』是隨順的意思。如果與那個業的感受不隨順，就不能緣那個業的果報。
疏：又，地所有，乃至與那個感受俱生。這是第二種解釋。隨著所緣的識所生之地，第七識與那個地的第六意識增上的感受俱生。俱生，就是喜受、憂受等相同。為什麼這樣呢？因為緣的是那個地的引業的果報，所以與當地增上的感受相同。比如生在惡處，憂受增上。其餘的趣（道）可以類推得知。前面是根據與那個能引業的感受相同，後面是與所緣的當地增上的感受相同。所以這兩種解釋是不同的。有一種觀點認為，隨著第六識增上的感受俱生，如同最初的轉依隨著第六識增上一樣。所以感受的俱起也隨著第六識。
論：任運一類等。如同阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識）任運一類，沒有轉變和改變，不與思惟所引發的感受共同相應。為什麼不是這樣呢？怎麼知道是這樣呢？答：按照《瑜伽師地論》第六十三卷所說，阿賴耶識相應的感受在一切時侯都是不苦不樂受（舍受）。在一切識的三種感受的位次中，恒常相續流注，乃至命終都沒有斷絕。其餘的兩種感受（苦受和樂受）應當知道是思惟所引發的，不是俱生的。時時作意引發才顯現出來。用第八識來類比第七識，第七識同樣只有舍受。
疏：那是自相的差別義。異熟果的相，種子因的相，是阿賴耶識自相的差別義。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Seeds of delusion' (Huo Zhong, the seeds of afflictions) refer to coarse and heavy afflictions. Cutting off these 'seeds of delusion' is called cutting off 'latent tendencies' (Sui Mian, dormant afflictions). Based on these severances, it is called cutting off the 'root of equanimity' (She Gen, the root of neutral feeling). It does not mean cutting off the present feeling. The rest of the text can be understood.
Commentary: If joy and pleasure, etc., are allowed. Question: The previous teacher only said it corresponds to joy. How does the commentary say it allows joy and pleasure? Answer: There are two explanations. One is based on the three feelings (suffering, pleasure, and equanimity) to clarify it. The second is in terms of principle, joy is coarse, and pleasure is subtle. Coarse still exists above (referring to higher levels), and subtle will certainly not be absent.
Commentary: The seventh consciousness's object of perception is the reason for being the object. This explanation means that depending on which realm's karma the resulting consciousness is drawn from, the seventh consciousness's co-arisen feeling is the same as the feeling of the karma drawn from the previous life. Why? Because it is perceiving the result felt by that drawing karma. The commentary says 'correspondence' is the meaning of compliance. If it does not comply with the feeling of that karma, it cannot perceive the result of that karma.
Commentary: Also, all that exists in a realm, up to arising together with that feeling. This is the second explanation. Depending on the realm where the perceived consciousness arises, the seventh consciousness arises together with the sixth consciousness's dominant feeling in that realm. Arising together means that joy, sorrow, etc., are the same. Why is this so? Because it is perceiving the result of the drawing karma of that realm, so it is the same as the dominant feeling of that local realm. For example, being born in an evil place, sorrow is dominant. The other destinies can be inferred. The former is based on being the same as the feeling of that drawing karma, and the latter is the same as the dominant feeling of the local realm of the perceived object. So these two explanations are different. Some argue that it arises together with the sixth consciousness's dominant feeling, just like the initial transformation relies on the sixth consciousness's dominance. So the co-arising of feelings also follows the sixth consciousness.
Treatise: Spontaneous and uniform, etc. Just like the Alaya-vijnana (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) is spontaneously uniform, without transformation or change, and does not correspond with feelings drawn from thought. Why is this not so? How do we know this is so? Answer: According to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the feeling corresponding to the Alaya-vijnana is always neutral (neither suffering nor pleasure). Among the three feelings of all consciousnesses, it constantly and continuously flows, without interruption until the end of life. The other two feelings (suffering and pleasure) should be known to be drawn from thought, not co-arisen. They only appear when intention is aroused. Using the eighth consciousness as an example for the seventh consciousness, the seventh consciousness also only has equanimity.
Commentary: That is the meaning of the difference in self-nature. The characteristic of the result of maturation, the characteristic of the seed cause, is the meaning of the difference in the Alaya-vijnana's self-nature.
攝持因果為自相故。
疏。欲界中不伏修惑等者。即欲意識俱生我見依不斷問。依斷家答。
疏。彼定心至為有頂依者。意明平等通諸地有。法觀第六引彼平等智以為所依。生空第六即以隨身界系第七而為所依。故云不定 問無漏第七與能依識即許同地。有漏末那而與第六地系許別。竟何意耶 答有漏末那而有二義。一隨依系。緣彼依故。二非六引。故與第六地不必同。無漏亦二。一不繫故。而隨觀察通緣理事。二由六引。故隨能依而同地也。
疏。不可以因數等難者。不可以受因．果是同。便難因．果令似所等。
疏。此微細言攝論二本皆第一說者。按無性論牒本論云。此意染污故有覆無記性。與四煩惱常共相應。如色．無色二廛煩惱。是其有覆無記性攝。色．無色廛為奢摩他所攝藏故。此意一切時微細隨逐故 釋三界者有情所歸所集之所。猶彼市廛。而梵云阿縛遮羅。
論。謂生欲界至應知亦然者。按瑜伽論六十三中明亦同此。故彼論云。隨所生處是諸煩惱即此地攝 釋隨第七識所生之處。彼相應惑亦同地攝 又顯揚十九云。若生此界中補特伽羅。當知此意相應煩惱。即是此界體性所攝 釋瑜伽約地。顯揚據界。粗細少差大意一種。
論。阿羅漢滅定等者。準瑜伽六十三中
【現代漢語翻譯】 攝持因果為自相故。 （意思是）因為攝持因果是其自身的特性。
疏。（解釋）欲界中不伏修惑等者，即欲意識俱生我見依不斷問。依斷家答。 （意思是）在欲界中，那些沒有降伏修惑等煩惱的人，就是指與欲界意識同時產生的我見，依據『不斷』的觀點提問，依據『已斷』的觀點回答。
疏。彼定心至為有頂依者。意明平等通諸地有。法觀第六引彼平等智以為所依。生空第六即以隨身界系第七而為所依。故云不定 問無漏第七與能依識即許同地。有漏末那而與第六地系許別。竟何意耶 答有漏末那而有二義。一隨依系。緣彼依故。二非六引。故與第六地不必同。無漏亦二。一不繫故。而隨觀察通緣理事。二由六引。故隨能依而同地也。 （意思是）那些禪定之心乃至以有頂天為所依的，意思是說平等心普遍存在於各個地。法觀的第六意識引導那平等智作為所依。生空的第六意識就以隨身的界系第七識作為所依。所以說是不定的。問：無漏的第七識與能依的識被允許在同一地。有漏的末那識（Manas, 末那識）卻與第六意識的地繫有所區別，這到底是什麼意思呢？答：有漏的末那識有兩種含義。一是隨所依而繫縛，因為它緣于那個所依。二不是由第六意識引導，所以與第六意識的地不一定相同。無漏的末那識也有兩種含義。一是不被繫縛，所以隨著觀察而普遍緣於事和理。二是由第六意識引導，所以隨著能依的識而在同一地。
疏。不可以因數等難者。不可以受因．果是同。便難因．果令似所等。 （意思是）不可以用因的數量等來責難，不可以因為受的因和果是相同的，就責難因和果，使它們看起來像是所等。
疏。此微細言攝論二本皆第一說者。按無性論牒本論云。此意染污故有覆無記性。與四煩惱常共相應。如色．無色二廛煩惱。是其有覆無記性攝。色．無色廛為奢摩他（Samatha, 止觀）所攝藏故。此意一切時微細隨逐故 釋三界者有情所歸所集之所。猶彼市廛。而梵云阿縛遮羅。 （意思是）這段關於微細的言論在《攝大乘論》的兩個版本中都是首先說的。按照無性論引用本論所說，這個意識因為被染污，所以具有有覆無記的性質，與四種煩惱常常共同相應。比如色界和無色界的煩惱，是被有覆無記的性質所攝。色界和無色界被奢摩他所攝藏，這個意識在一切時都微細地隨逐。解釋三界，是有情眾生所歸宿和聚集的地方，就像那市場一樣。梵語叫做阿縛遮羅（Avacara）。
論。謂生欲界至應知亦然者。按瑜伽論六十三中明亦同此。故彼論云。隨所生處是諸煩惱即此地攝 釋隨第七識所生之處。彼相應惑亦同地攝 又顯揚十九云。若生此界中補特伽羅（Pudgala, 補特伽羅，意為「人」或「有情」）。當知此意相應煩惱。即是此界體性所攝 釋瑜伽約地。顯揚據界。粗細少差大意一種。 （意思是）說的是生於欲界乃至也應該知道是這樣。按照《瑜伽師地論》第六十三卷中所說，也與此相同。所以那部論中說，隨著所生之處，那些煩惱就是此地所攝。解釋：隨著第七識所生之處，那些相應的迷惑也屬於同一地所攝。另外，《顯揚聖教論》第十九卷中說，如果生於此界中的補特伽羅，應當知道這個意識相應的煩惱，就是此界的體性所攝。解釋：《瑜伽師地論》是就地來說的，《顯揚聖教論》是就界來說的，粗細略有差別，大意是一種。
論。阿羅漢滅定等者。準瑜伽六十三中 （意思是）阿羅漢（Arhat, 阿羅漢）的滅盡定等等，依據《瑜伽師地論》第六十三卷中
【English Translation】 Holding to cause and effect is its self-nature. (Meaning) Because holding to cause and effect is its own characteristic.
Commentary: 'Those in the desire realm who do not subdue afflictions of cultivation, etc.' refers to the ego-view that arises simultaneously with the consciousness of the desire realm, based on the question of 'uninterrupted.' Answer based on the perspective of 'already interrupted'. (Meaning) In the desire realm, those who have not subdued afflictions of cultivation, etc., refer to the ego-view that arises simultaneously with the consciousness of the desire realm, asking based on the viewpoint of 'uninterrupted' and answering based on the viewpoint of 'already interrupted'.
Commentary: 'Those whose mind of samadhi relies on the peak of existence' means that equality is universal in all realms. The sixth consciousness of Dharmalaksana (法觀) guides that wisdom of equality as its basis. The sixth consciousness of emptiness of inherent existence takes the seventh consciousness of the realm-bound body as its basis. Therefore, it is said to be uncertain. Question: The undefiled seventh consciousness and the consciousness it relies on are allowed to be in the same realm. The defiled Manas (末那識) is different from the realm-bound sixth consciousness. What does this mean? Answer: The defiled Manas has two meanings. First, it is bound by what it relies on because it is conditioned by that. Second, it is not guided by the sixth consciousness, so it does not necessarily have to be in the same realm as the sixth consciousness. The undefiled Manas also has two meanings. First, it is not bound, so it universally conditions on phenomena and principles as it observes. Second, it is guided by the sixth consciousness, so it is in the same realm as the consciousness it relies on. (Meaning) Those whose mind of samadhi and even rely on the peak of existence, it means that the mind of equality is universal in all realms. The sixth consciousness of Dharmalaksana guides that wisdom of equality as its basis. The sixth consciousness of emptiness of inherent existence takes the seventh consciousness of the realm-bound body as its basis. Therefore, it is said to be uncertain. Question: The undefiled seventh consciousness and the consciousness it relies on are allowed to be in the same realm. The defiled Manas is different from the realm-bound sixth consciousness. What does this mean? Answer: The defiled Manas has two meanings. First, it is bound by what it relies on because it is conditioned by that. Second, it is not guided by the sixth consciousness, so it does not necessarily have to be in the same realm as the sixth consciousness. The undefiled Manas also has two meanings. First, it is not bound, so it universally conditions on phenomena and principles as it observes. Second, it is guided by the sixth consciousness, so it is in the same realm as the consciousness it relies on.
Commentary: 'One cannot criticize based on the number of causes, etc.' One cannot criticize cause and effect to make them seem equal simply because the cause and effect of feeling are the same. (Meaning) One cannot criticize based on the number of causes, etc. One cannot criticize cause and effect to make them seem equal simply because the cause and effect of feeling are the same.
Commentary: 'This subtle statement is the first statement in both versions of the Compendium.' According to Asanga's commentary quoting the original text, 'This mind is defiled, so it has the nature of obscured and indeterminate. It is always associated with the four afflictions. Like the afflictions of the form and formless realms, it is included in the nature of obscured and indeterminate. The form and formless realms are contained by Samatha (止觀). This mind subtly follows at all times.' Explanation: The three realms are where sentient beings return and gather, like a marketplace. In Sanskrit, it is called Avacara (阿縛遮羅). (Meaning) This subtle statement is the first statement in both versions of the Compendium of Mahayana. According to Asanga's commentary quoting the original text, 'This mind is defiled, so it has the nature of obscured and indeterminate. It is always associated with the four afflictions. Like the afflictions of the form and formless realms, it is included in the nature of obscured and indeterminate. The form and formless realms are contained by Samatha. This mind subtly follows at all times.' Explanation: The three realms are where sentient beings return and gather, like a marketplace. In Sanskrit, it is called Avacara.
Treatise: 'That is, being born in the desire realm, etc., should also be known to be the same.' According to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, it is also the same. Therefore, that treatise says, 'Wherever one is born, those afflictions are included in that realm.' Explanation: Wherever the seventh consciousness is born, those corresponding delusions are also included in the same realm. Also, the nineteenth volume of the Exposition of the Meaning says, 'If a Pudgala (補特伽羅) is born in this realm, know that the afflictions corresponding to this mind are included in the nature of this realm.' Explanation: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks in terms of realms, while the Exposition of the Meaning speaks in terms of worlds. The difference is slight, but the general meaning is the same. (Meaning) That is, being born in the desire realm, etc., should also be known to be the same. According to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, it is also the same. Therefore, that treatise says, 'Wherever one is born, those afflictions are included in that realm.' Explanation: Wherever the seventh consciousness is born, those corresponding delusions are also included in the same realm. Also, the nineteenth volume of the Exposition of the Meaning says, 'If a Pudgala is born in this realm, know that the afflictions corresponding to this mind are included in the nature of this realm.' Explanation: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks in terms of realms, while the Exposition of the Meaning speaks in terms of worlds. The difference is slight, but the general meaning is the same.
Treatise: 'Arhat's cessation samadhi, etc.' According to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Meaning) Arhat's cessation samadhi, etc., according to the sixty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra
不言滅定。故彼論云。諸離欲者世間治道。若現在前。若不現前。此諸煩惱現行不絕。若諸有學已見跡者。出世間道現在前時。此諸煩惱不得現行。從彼出已還復現行。善通達故。未永斷故。若諸無學此一切種皆不現行。是諸煩惱當知唯離非想非非想處欲故一時頓斷。非如余惑漸漸而斷 釋言此煩惱者。此第七識相應四惑。與此論別。會釋如疏。
疏。八十八至不伏相似等者。六．七惑別。金剛斷異是不同也。然俱世道不能伏之。名不伏相似。按彼論云。又見雜染得解脫時。亦能于余畢竟解脫。非余雜染得解脫時。即能解脫諸見雜染。所以者何。由生此者依世間道。乃至能離無所有處所有貪慾。于諸下地其餘煩惱心得解脫。而未能脫薩迦耶見。由此見故於下．上地所有諸行和雜自體不觀差別。遍計為我。或計為所。由此因緣雖升有頂而復退還。由出．世道先斷一切薩迦耶見。后能永斷所餘煩惱。由此因緣無復退轉。
疏。問至能緣此識亦應斷者。此中徴意。若不許斷而違其理。若隨所緣亦名斷者。如何論云與有頂地下下煩惱一時頓斷。先已斷故。何名頓斷耶。
疏。實理解至以此例彼者。更無惡業所招之果。第八言除。修惑猶在。我執未亡。能緣第七不得言斷 問見道但無一分第八第八名舍。亦闕
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不言說滅盡的禪定。所以那部論典中說：『那些已經遠離慾望的人，他們的世間修行之道，無論現在是否顯現，這些煩惱的現行都不會斷絕。如果是有學的修行者，已經證得聖道，當出世間的道顯現時，這些煩惱就無法現行。一旦離開那種狀態，又會再次現行，這是因為他們對煩惱的通達還不夠徹底，尚未徹底斷除。如果是無學的修行者，所有這些煩惱都不會現行。』應當知道，這些煩惱只有在遠離非想非非想處（既不是有想，也不是無想的禪定境界）的慾望時，才能一時頓斷，而不是像其他的迷惑那樣逐漸斷除。解釋說，這裡的煩惱指的是與第七識相應的四種迷惑。這與之前的論述有所不同，具體的解釋可以參考疏文。 疏文：『八十八使至不伏相似等』，指的是第六識和第七識的迷惑有所區別。用金剛喻定斷除煩惱的方式也不同。但相同的是，世間的道都無法降伏它們，所以稱為『不伏相似』。按照那部論典的說法：『當通過觀見雜染而獲得解脫時，也能徹底解脫其他的雜染。但通過其他的雜染獲得解脫時，卻不能立即解脫見雜染。』這是為什麼呢？因為生起這種解脫的人，依靠世間的道，乃至能夠遠離無所有處（禪定境界）的所有貪慾，對於下地的其他煩惱，他們的心能夠獲得解脫，但卻無法解脫薩迦耶見（身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）。因為有這種薩迦耶見，所以對於下地和上地所有的行蘊，他們無法觀照其差別，普遍地執著為『我』，或者執著為『我所擁有』。因為這個原因，即使上升到有頂天（色界最高的禪定境界），還會退還。通過出世間的道，先斷除一切薩迦耶見，之後才能永遠斷除其餘的煩惱。因為這個原因，就不會再退轉。 疏文：『問：至能緣此識亦應斷者』，這裡提出了一個疑問。如果不允許斷除第七識，就違背了道理。如果隨著所緣境的斷除，第七識也算作斷除，那麼論典中說『與有頂地下下煩惱一時頓斷』又該如何解釋呢？因為在到達有頂天之前就已經斷除了（下地煩惱），又怎麼能稱之為『頓斷』呢？ 疏文：『實理解至以此例彼者』，指的是不再有惡業所招感的果報。第八識說『除』，指的是修惑仍然存在，我執沒有消失，所以不能說能緣第七識已經斷除。問：見道只是沒有一分第八識，第八識就稱為捨棄，也缺少了（什麼）。
【English Translation】 English version: It does not speak of extinction samadhi. Therefore, that treatise says: 'For those who have abandoned desire, the worldly path, whether it is present or not, the activity of these afflictions will not cease. If there are learners who have seen the path, when the supramundane path is present, these afflictions cannot be active. Once they leave that state, they will be active again, because their understanding of afflictions is not thorough enough and they have not been completely eradicated. If there are non-learners, all these afflictions will not be active.' It should be known that these afflictions can only be instantly cut off when desire for the realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (the state of meditation that is neither with perception nor without perception) is abandoned, rather than being gradually cut off like other delusions. It is explained that the afflictions here refer to the four delusions corresponding to the seventh consciousness. This is different from the previous discussion, and the specific explanation can be found in the commentary. Commentary: 'The eighty-eight bonds to non-subjugation similarity, etc.' refers to the difference between the delusions of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. The method of cutting off afflictions with the Vajra-like Samadhi is also different. But what is the same is that the worldly path cannot subdue them, so it is called 'non-subjugation similarity'. According to that treatise: 'When liberation is obtained by seeing defilements, other defilements can also be completely liberated. But when liberation is obtained by other defilements, the defilements of views cannot be immediately liberated.' Why is this? Because the person who generates this liberation, relying on the worldly path, can even abandon all desires for the realm of No-thingness (a state of meditation), and their mind can be liberated from other afflictions of the lower realms, but they cannot liberate the Satkayadristi (the view of self, thinking that the body composed of the five aggregates is the real self). Because of this Satkayadristi, they cannot observe the difference between all the aggregates of the lower and upper realms, and universally cling to them as 'I' or 'what I own'. For this reason, even if they ascend to the Peak of Existence (the highest state of meditation in the Form Realm), they will still regress. Through the supramundane path, all Satkayadristi are first cut off, and then the remaining afflictions can be permanently cut off. For this reason, there will be no more regression. Commentary: 'Question: To the ability to cognize this consciousness should also be cut off', this raises a question. If it is not allowed to cut off the seventh consciousness, it violates the principle. If the seventh consciousness is also considered cut off along with the cutting off of the object of cognition, then how can the treatise say 'the afflictions of the Peak of Existence and the lower realms are instantly cut off'? Because they have already been cut off (the afflictions of the lower realms) before reaching the Peak of Existence, how can it be called 'instantaneous cutting off'? Commentary: 'The true understanding to using this as an example for that' refers to no longer having the karmic consequences of evil deeds. The eighth consciousness says 'except', referring to the fact that the afflictions of cultivation still exist, and the ego-attachment has not disappeared, so it cannot be said that the ability to cognize the seventh consciousness has been cut off. Question: The path of seeing only lacks a portion of the eighth consciousness, and the eighth consciousness is called abandonment, and it also lacks (something).
一分能執第七第七應舍 答因亡果喪第八可舍。七非業招。執體不無。何得名舍。
疏。今此不依。至亦通無漏故者。雖復佛地．無性二論說有凈識。然佛地經．及無著論不說有之。由斯不取末論為證。
論。顯揚論至平等行等者。按彼論云。意者謂從阿賴耶識種子所生還緣彼識。我癡．我愛．我我所執．我慢相應。或翻彼相應。一切時恃舉為行。或平等行與彼俱轉了別為性。
疏。然所引識至無藏識故者。以瑜伽論而言藏識或二轉等。所以此論不難無學以彼無學無藏識故 有義文略不說 詳曰。非為略也。為引大論識起多少以之為難。本論既舉藏識為法。所以不得難於無學。故疏為正。若也不取彼文為理。而難無學即無傷也。
疏。第八至如餘七識者。問前師自許聖道．無學第六無依。識性因轉。豈非犯於他不定耶 答俱有依中含共不共。聖道等位第六意識。彼亦許有共俱有依。宗法之中既不別言故無不定。
疏。若成前總宗至意識無依者。有義彈云。無學．聖道意識皆在有法中收。豈得約宗有法之中有不定耶 詳曰。夫五不定因於二喻。或有或無無所立處即為異喻。立者雖立聖道等意在有法中。然後陳宗聖意非有。以理而言合居異喻。因既于轉。何非不定。誰望有法出不定耶。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果一部分人堅持認為第七識（末那識，Manas）和第七識所執著的法都應該捨棄，該如何迴應？ 答：因為導致煩惱的因已經滅亡，所以導致煩惱的果也消失了，第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya）是可以捨棄的。第七識並非由業力招感而來，執著於它的本體並非完全沒有意義，怎麼能說捨棄呢？
疏：現在這種說法並不依據佛地經論。即使佛地經和無性二論都說有清凈識，但佛地經和無著的論著中並沒有提到。因此，不採用末論作為證據。
論：顯揚論中說到的『平等行』等，按照該論的說法，意是指從阿賴耶識的種子所生起，又反過來緣于阿賴耶識。與我癡（無明），我愛（貪愛），我我所執（對屬於我的東西的執著），我慢（傲慢）相應。或者翻譯為與這些相應。一切時都依靠這些而行動。或者說平等行與這些一起運轉，以了別為特性。
疏：然而，所引用的識，最終歸於沒有藏識。以瑜伽論來說，藏識有二轉等說法。因此，這個論點並不難倒無學位的聖者，因為他們沒有藏識。有人認為這是因為文字省略了沒有說明。詳細地說，並非省略，而是爲了引用大論中識的生起多少來作為難題。本論既然舉出藏識作為法，所以不能用它來為難無學位的人。因此，疏的解釋是正確的。如果也不採用該文作為依據，那麼為難無學位的人也就沒有問題了。
疏：第八識如同其餘七識。問：之前的老師自己承認聖道和無學位的第六識（意識，Vijnana）沒有所依，識的性質因為轉依而改變，這難道不是犯了他不定的過失嗎？答：俱有依中包含共同和不共同。聖道等位的第六意識，他們也承認有共同的俱有依。宗法之中既然沒有特別說明，所以沒有不定。
疏：如果成立前面的總宗，那麼意識就沒有所依。有人反駁說：無學位和聖道的意識都包含在有法之中，怎麼能說在宗的有法之中有不定呢？詳細地說，五不定因在於二喻。或者有或者沒有，沒有所立之處，這就是異喻。立論者雖然立論聖道等意在有法中，然後陳述宗義，聖意並非有。以理而言，應該歸於異喻。因既然在於轉依，為什麼不是不定？誰希望有法能超出不定呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If some insist that the seventh consciousness (Manas) and what the seventh consciousness clings to should be abandoned, how should one respond? Answer: Because the cause of affliction has ceased, the result of affliction also disappears. The eighth consciousness (Alaya) can be abandoned. The seventh consciousness is not caused by karma. Clinging to its essence is not entirely meaningless. How can one say to abandon it?
Commentary: This statement does not rely on the Sutra on Buddha-land. Although the Sutra on Buddha-land and the Two Treatises of Asanga both say there is pure consciousness, the Sutra on Buddha-land and the treatises of Vasubandhu do not mention it. Therefore, the later treatises are not used as evidence.
Treatise: The 'Equal Conduct' mentioned in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, according to that treatise, means that it arises from the seeds of the Alaya consciousness and in turn conditions the Alaya consciousness. It is associated with self-ignorance (Avidya), self-love (Tanha), clinging to what belongs to oneself (Atmiya), and self-conceit (Mana). Or it can be translated as being associated with these. At all times, it relies on these to act. Or it can be said that equal conduct operates with these, with discernment as its characteristic.
Commentary: However, the consciousness cited ultimately leads to no storehouse consciousness. According to the Yogacara school, the storehouse consciousness has two transformations, etc. Therefore, this argument does not pose a problem for those in the state of No-More-Learning (Arhat), because they do not have a storehouse consciousness. Some argue that this is because the text omits the explanation. In detail, it is not an omission, but rather to cite the amount of consciousness arising in the great treatises as a difficulty. Since this treatise cites the storehouse consciousness as a Dharma, it cannot be used to challenge those in the state of No-More-Learning. Therefore, the commentary is correct. If one does not take that text as a basis, then challenging those in the state of No-More-Learning is not a problem.
Commentary: The eighth consciousness is like the other seven consciousnesses. Question: The previous teacher himself admitted that the sixth consciousness (Vijnana) in the state of the Holy Path and No-More-Learning has no basis, and the nature of consciousness changes due to transformation. Doesn't this commit the fault of being uncertain? Answer: The co-existing basis includes both common and uncommon. The sixth consciousness in the state of the Holy Path, etc., they also admit has a common co-existing basis. Since it is not specifically stated in the doctrine, there is no uncertainty.
Commentary: If the preceding general proposition is established, then consciousness has no basis. Some argue: The consciousness of those in the state of No-More-Learning and the Holy Path are both included in the existent Dharma. How can one say that there is uncertainty in the existent Dharma of the proposition? In detail, the five uncertain causes lie in the two metaphors. Either it exists or it does not exist, and there is no place to establish it, which is a dissimilar metaphor. Although the proponent establishes that the intention of the Holy Path, etc., is in the existent Dharma, and then states the doctrine, the intention of the Holy Path is not existent. Logically speaking, it should belong to the dissimilar metaphor. Since the cause lies in transformation, why is it not uncertain? Who expects the existent Dharma to exceed uncertainty?
言前立在有法中。如何復言是異法者。斯亦無爽。前依總立云有法收。出過據理合居異品。亦如古立宗因違云。如立聲常一切皆是無常故因。陳那正云。一切皆是無常故者而是異喻。非是因也。彼既以理正因為喻。今亦以理正宗為異亦何失乎 又因明論云。異法者若於是處說所立無 釋除所立外所餘法處。但無所立即宗異法。聖道等意既無所立為異何咎。若不爾者。於是處言攝無所立法不盡也。止濫不窮便諸過起。由斯疏判理固無違。
疏。若以六識至無第七者。有義彈云。別宗如前宗違比量。因無不定已成似量。外量如前之支無過。因云第六意識攝故。如無學等第六意識。外人豈將真量與似量為不定過耶。若彼外量取因量因云六識攝。亦有不定之失。此即共不定。如何說有決定過耶。此彈意云。相違決定前後兩家之支並具。今者前量六識攝因已犯不定。所立別宗復違比量之文便缺。后．家舉彼第六意因之支乃具。闕不闕別。何理得成相違決定。若也敵者還取前因。即是六中共不定攝。何成第六不定過耶 詳曰。直觀疏文誠有斯失。論疏主意據改其因。前因之中而言略也。如義燈正故疏無失。
疏。此為初元者。第七我執初不起位。
疏。不可說彼得互舍者。不得以八同七令舍。以七同八而亦不捨
何以不得 答染污過尤。暫滅名舍。凈法他縛永無名舍。
疏若定爾者至非法觀果者。此難意云。若也定許法觀及果皆平等者。八他已去無非法觀及法果時。即應恒時起平等智。
疏。由此應說鄰近果者。此答意云。雖二后得皆名為果。遠近既殊。故平等智而不恒起。
疏。或八地已去無分別智至無妨者。此第二解。以二本智自入二觀。二后得智各望自本名之為果。
疏。若約后義即果全論者。但法空果即起平等。更不遠果而以去之。故云全論。
疏。或第八未舍名至此解難知者。以執藏義正名賴耶。平等非執。故所緣八何名賴耶。
疏。既無能藏藏義應暫舍者。此乃䠱前難知意難 若無能藏所緣第八不名賴耶。既無能藏賴耶應舍 答此難意如初位辨故不重云 詳曰。賴耶之名而既未舍。許緣何失。若要起執方名賴耶。既不執時名何不捨。由此理論許緣無咎。
疏。深喻至人中起事執者。法空理深迷斯至理名為深也 問謂人是人執。而與淺喻竟何別耶 答據迷於杌分成淺深 問謂人設喻迷生空理名深何失 答意明我．法相依而起寬狹不等。事理相托故不喻之。
疏。彼雖非執等者。雖言兼于得失。今取得也。
疏。若不然者至無有漏心隔者。若也不許細障
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：為什麼不能獲得（平等智）？ 答：因為有染污的過失。暫時的滅除稱為『舍』（Śesha，滅除）。清凈的法被其他事物束縛，永遠不能稱為『舍』。
疏解：如果確定是這樣，直到『非法觀果』（非正見的果報）。這個疑問的意思是說，如果確定地認為法觀（Dharma-dṛṣṭi，對法的觀察）和果報都是平等的，那麼從八地（Aṣṭamī-bhūmi，第八地）開始，就沒有『非法觀』和『法果』的時候，就應該恒常生起平等智（Samatā-jñāna，平等智慧）。
疏解：因此應該說鄰近的果報。這個回答的意思是說，雖然第二種后得智（Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna，后得智）都可以稱為果報，但遠近不同，所以平等智不會恒常生起。
疏解：或者八地以後沒有分別智（Vikalpa-jñāna，分別智慧），直到沒有妨礙。這是第二種解釋。用兩種根本智（Mūla-jñāna，根本智慧）自己進入兩種觀（Dṛṣṭi，觀察）。兩種后得智各自期望自己的根本智，稱之為果報。
疏解：如果按照後面的意義，就是果報的全部理論。只有法空果（Dharma-śūnyatā-phala，法空性的果報）才能生起平等智，不再有遙遠的果報而去除它，所以說是全部理論。
疏解：或者第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）沒有捨棄名稱，直到這個解釋難以理解。因為執藏的意義正是名為阿賴耶識。平等不是執著，所以所緣的第八識為什麼叫阿賴耶識？
疏解：既然沒有能藏，藏的意義應該暫時捨棄。這是向前一個難以理解的意義提出疑問：如果沒有能藏，所緣的第八識就不能稱為阿賴耶識。既然沒有能藏，阿賴耶識應該捨棄。回答這個疑問的意思和最初的辨析一樣，所以不再重複。詳細地說，阿賴耶識的名稱既然沒有捨棄，允許緣取有什麼過失？如果要生起執著才叫阿賴耶識，既然不執著的時候，為什麼不捨棄這個名稱？由此理論允許緣取沒有過失。
疏解：深刻的比喻直到人中產生事物執著。法空的道理深奧，迷惑這個至理名為深奧。問：所謂人是人執著，和淺顯的比喻有什麼區別？答：根據迷惑于木樁而分成淺深。問：所謂人設比喻迷惑生空理（Jīva-śūnyatā，眾生空性）名為深奧有什麼過失？答：意思是說明我（Ātman，自我）、法（Dharma，法）相互依靠而生起，寬窄不等。事物和道理相互依託，所以不作比喻。
疏解：他雖然不是執著等等。雖然說兼顧得失，現在取得（得）。
疏解：如果不是這樣，直到沒有有漏心（Sāsrava-citta，有煩惱的心）的間隔。如果不允許細微的障礙。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why is it not possible to attain (Samatā-jñāna, the wisdom of equality)? Answer: Because there is the fault of defilement. Temporary cessation is called 'Śesha' (cessation). Pure Dharma (law, teaching) is bound by other things and can never be called 'Śesha'.
Commentary: If it is definitely so, up to 'illegal observation result' (the result of incorrect views). The meaning of this question is: if it is definitely accepted that Dharma-dṛṣṭi (observation of Dharma) and the result are equal, then from the eighth Bhūmi (Aṣṭamī-bhūmi, eighth ground) onwards, there is no time for 'illegal observation' and 'Dharma result', then Samatā-jñāna (wisdom of equality) should arise constantly.
Commentary: Therefore, it should be said that the nearby result. The meaning of this answer is that although the second Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna (wisdom attained afterwards) can be called a result, the distance is different, so Samatā-jñāna does not arise constantly.
Commentary: Or after the eighth Bhūmi, there is no Vikalpa-jñāna (discriminating wisdom), until there is no hindrance. This is the second explanation. The two Mūla-jñāna (fundamental wisdoms) themselves enter the two Dṛṣṭis (observations). The two Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñānas each expect their own fundamental wisdom and call it a result.
Commentary: If according to the latter meaning, it is the complete theory of the result. Only Dharma-śūnyatā-phala (the result of Dharma emptiness) can give rise to Samatā-jñāna, and there is no longer a distant result to remove it, so it is called the complete theory.
Commentary: Or the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) has not abandoned its name, until this explanation is difficult to understand. Because the meaning of clinging and storing is precisely called Ālaya-vijñāna. Equality is not clinging, so why is the eighth consciousness that is the object of cognition called Ālaya-vijñāna?
Commentary: Since there is no ability to store, the meaning of storing should be temporarily abandoned. This is a question to the previous difficult-to-understand meaning: if there is no ability to store, the eighth consciousness that is the object of cognition cannot be called Ālaya-vijñāna. Since there is no ability to store, Ālaya-vijñāna should be abandoned. The meaning of answering this question is the same as the initial analysis, so it is not repeated. In detail, since the name of Ālaya-vijñāna has not been abandoned, what fault is there in allowing it to be cognized? If it is necessary to give rise to clinging to be called Ālaya-vijñāna, then when there is no clinging, why not abandon this name? Therefore, this theory allows cognition without fault.
Commentary: The profound metaphor until people develop object clinging. The principle of Dharma emptiness is profound, and being confused by this ultimate truth is called profound. Question: What is the difference between the so-called clinging to a person as a person and a superficial metaphor? Answer: It is divided into superficial and profound based on confusion about a wooden stake. Question: What is the fault in using the metaphor of a person to confuse the principle of Jīva-śūnyatā (emptiness of beings) and calling it profound? Answer: The intention is to explain that Ātman (self) and Dharma (law, teaching) arise in dependence on each other, and the width and narrowness are not equal. Things and principles rely on each other, so no metaphor is made.
Commentary: Although he is not clinging, etc. Although it is said to consider both gains and losses, now it is taken (gain).
Commentary: If not so, until there is no interval of Sāsrava-citta (defiled mind). If subtle obstacles are not allowed.
行爾。即應三地法觀恒行。以無有漏而為隔故。或不然者。顯彼細障有不行時即法觀起。前解為勝。
疏。以此為證者。以八地上法觀不恒。證上三地而第七識得有法執 或以此論而為證也。即此文云。猶起法執不相違故。
疏。說彼地地皆能斷故者。第六法執地地既斷。云何得言所知障在。若言言有據小有者。此亦不然。既法執起煩惱應行。如疏下難。
疏。問何故上言至全言有也者。生起下論。
疏。四阿含不攝等者。詳曰。解解脫義名解脫經。于理為勝。故經頌云。若解脫諸惑等。故諸經論從其所說以立名者。其類寔繁。若不爾者。凡是經名是如來建。或集法立。豈佛．阿難據后零落而立斯號。若後人立名。亦為未可。便合經因難為楷準。
論。此依六識皆不得成者。如無性論。疏．燈略引。學者猶迷故今具錄 論云。此於五識無容說有。是處無有能對治故。若處有能治。此處有所治。非五識中有彼能治。於此見道不生起故 釋曰。以五識中無能治見。故不得有所治無明。言見道者簡餘二道。以成事智佛果有故。問第六應有不共無明。有見道故。答六有通治。非別治故。問七有見道。七相應惑應名見斷。答雖不斷之。伏暫不起亦見力也。由斯見道有平等智。據大乘說 論非於不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
可以這樣認為。即第八地菩薩應當持續不斷地進行三地（指八地、九地、十地）的法觀，因為沒有煩惱的遺漏作為阻隔。或者，如果不是這樣，就表明那些微細的障礙有時會停止，法觀才會生起。前一種解釋更為優勝。
疏解：用這個作為證據，是因為八地菩薩的法觀不是恒常的，以此來證明上三地（八地、九地、十地）的第七識仍然可能存在法執。或者，也可以用這部論著作為證據，即此文所說：『仍然生起法執，這並不矛盾』。
疏解：說那個地（指每一地）都能斷除法執，是因為第六識的法執在每一地都已經斷除，怎麼能說所知障仍然存在呢？如果說『說有，但只是小部分存在』，這也是不對的。既然法執生起，煩惱就應該執行，就像疏解下面所提出的疑問一樣。
疏解：問：為什麼上面說到了『全言有』呢？這是爲了引出下面的論述。
疏解：四阿含不包含等等。詳細地說，解釋解脫之義的稱為解脫經，在義理上更為殊勝。所以經中的偈頌說：『如果解脫了各種迷惑等等』。因此，各種經論根據其所說的內容來立名，這種情況非常多。如果不是這樣，凡是經的名字都是如來所建立，或者是由集合的法所建立。難道佛陀和阿難會根據後來的零星情況來建立這些名稱嗎？如果是後人立名，也是不可取的。應該以經文的因緣和困難作為標準。
論：這裡依據的是六識都不能成立的情況。就像《無性論》中一樣，疏解和燈略有引用，學者仍然迷惑，所以現在全部記錄下來。論中說：『這在五識中是不能說有的，因為這裡沒有能對治的。如果某個地方有能對治的，那麼這個地方就有被對治的。五識中沒有能對治的，因此見道不會在五識中生起。』解釋說：因為五識中沒有能對治的見，所以不能有被對治的無明。說『見道』是爲了區別于其餘二道（修道和無學道），因為成事智在佛果中是存在的。問：第六識應該有不共的無明，因為有見道。答：第六識有通用的對治，而不是特別的對治。問：第七識有見道，第七識相應的迷惑應該稱為見斷。答：雖然不斷除，但只是暫時不起作用，也是見的力量。因此，見道有平等智，這是根據大乘的說法。論中並非不
【English Translation】 English version:
It can be considered in this way: the Bodhisattva of the eighth ground should continuously practice the Dharma contemplation of the three grounds (referring to the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds), because there is no leakage of afflictions as an obstruction. Alternatively, if it is not like this, it indicates that those subtle obstacles sometimes cease, and then the Dharma contemplation arises. The former explanation is superior.
Commentary: Using this as evidence is because the Dharma contemplation of the eighth ground Bodhisattva is not constant, thereby proving that the seventh consciousness of the upper three grounds (eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds) may still have attachment to Dharma. Alternatively, this treatise can also be used as evidence, as this text says: 'Still arising attachment to Dharma, this is not contradictory.'
Commentary: Saying that each ground can eliminate attachment to Dharma is because the attachment to Dharma of the sixth consciousness has already been eliminated in each ground. How can it be said that the cognitive obscuration still exists? If it is said 'It exists, but only a small part exists,' this is also incorrect. Since attachment to Dharma arises, afflictions should operate, just like the question raised in the commentary below.
Commentary: Question: Why did the above mention 'completely exists'? This is to introduce the following discussion.
Commentary: The Four Agamas do not include, etc. In detail, what explains the meaning of liberation is called the Liberation Sutra, which is more superior in terms of doctrine. Therefore, the verses in the sutra say: 'If one is liberated from various delusions, etc.' Therefore, various sutras and treatises establish names based on what they say, and this situation is very numerous. If it is not like this, all the names of the sutras are established by the Tathagata (Thus Come One), or established by the collection of Dharma. Could it be that the Buddha and Ananda established these names based on later sporadic situations? If the names are established by later people, it is also not advisable. The causes and difficulties of the sutras should be used as the standard.
Treatise: Here, it is based on the situation that all six consciousnesses cannot be established. Just like in the Wu Xing Lun (Treatise on the Absence of Nature), the commentary and lamp slightly quote it, and scholars are still confused, so now it is fully recorded. The treatise says: 'This cannot be said to exist in the five consciousnesses, because there is no counteracting force here. If there is a counteracting force in a certain place, then there is something to be counteracted in this place. There is no counteracting force in the five consciousnesses, therefore the path of seeing does not arise in the five consciousnesses.' The explanation says: Because there is no seeing that can counteract in the five consciousnesses, there cannot be ignorance to be counteracted. Saying 'path of seeing' is to distinguish it from the other two paths (path of cultivation and path of no more learning), because the wisdom of accomplishing things exists in the Buddha fruit. Question: The sixth consciousness should have uncommon ignorance, because there is a path of seeing. Answer: The sixth consciousness has a common counteracting force, not a special counteracting force. Question: The seventh consciousness has a path of seeing, and the delusions corresponding to the seventh consciousness should be called seen-abandoned. Answer: Although it is not abandoned, it is only temporarily not functioning, and it is also the power of seeing. Therefore, the path of seeing has equal wisdom, which is based on the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) perspective. The treatise is not
染意識中有。由彼此應成染性故 釋曰。外人計云。在凈六中。以凈六中無餘煩惱。相應無知得名不共。故難凈意既有無明應成其染 論亦非染污意識中有。與煩惱共相應時不共無明名不成故 釋曰牒轉計破。意有餘惑方名為染。不共既與彼意惑俱。便是相應何名不共 論若立意識由彼煩惱成染污者。今應畢竟成染污性 釋曰。不共無明恒行不絕。意識何有而得凈時 論諸施等心應不成善。彼煩惱相恒相應故 釋曰。破文外救。外救既云意恒成染亦何爽耶。故斯難起 論若復有說善心俱轉有彼煩惱 釋曰。余小乘救。施等善心與煩惱俱。由是不共無明恒行竟有何失 論是即一向與彼相應。余不得有。此染意識引生對治不應道理 釋曰。正難前救。意既一向恒有無明。無明外余善等之法此意非有。既無信等意名世善而不得成。又意恒染不可能引無漏善生。所治不為能治因故。故出世善亦不得有 論若有說言染污意俱有別善心能引對治。能治生故所治即滅應正道理者 釋曰。顯正義也。有大乘說。染污意外有別世善。世善能引能治見道。應彼相生治障理也 論若爾所立不共無明亦不成就。與身見等所餘煩惱恒相應故 釋曰。此外難也。其難意云。七俱無明有餘見等三惑相應。應亦不得名為不共。若雖見俱猶名不共。我前染
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：染污意識中有。由彼此應成染性故。 釋曰：外人計云。在凈六中。以凈六中無餘煩惱。相應無知得名不共（指不與其他煩惱共同生起）。故難凈意既有無明（指對事物真相的迷惑），應成其染。 論：亦非染污意識中有。與煩惱共相應時不共無明名不成故。 釋曰：牒轉計破。意有餘惑方名為染。不共既與彼意惑俱。便是相應何名不共。 論：若立意識由彼煩惱成染污者。今應畢竟成染污性。 釋曰：不共無明恒行不絕。意識何有而得凈時。 論：諸施等心應不成善。彼煩惱相恒相應故。 釋曰：破文外救。外救既云意恒成染亦何爽耶。故斯難起。 論：若復有說善心俱轉有彼煩惱。 釋曰：余小乘救。施等善心與煩惱俱。由是不共無明恒行竟有何失。 論：是即一向與彼相應。余不得有。此染意識引生對治不應道理。 釋曰：正難前救。意既一向恒有無明。無明外余善等之法此意非有。既無信等意名世善而不得成。又意恒染不可能引無漏善生。所治不為能治因故。故出世善亦不得有。 論：若有說言染污意俱有別善心能引對治。能治生故所治即滅應正道理者。 釋曰：顯正義也。有大乘說。染污意外有別世善。世善能引能治見道。應彼相生治障理也。 論：若爾所立不共無明亦不成就。與身見等所餘煩惱恒相應故。 釋曰：此外難也。其難意云。七俱無明有餘見等三惑相應。應亦不得名為不共。若雖見俱猶名不共。我前染
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: It exists in the defiled consciousness. Because they mutually become defiled in nature. Explanation: An outsider argues that it exists in the pure six consciousnesses. Because there are no remaining afflictions in the pure six consciousnesses, the corresponding ignorance is named 'uncommon' (meaning it does not arise together with other afflictions). Therefore, it is difficult to accept that the pure mind, having ignorance (referring to delusion about the true nature of things), should become defiled. Treatise: It is also not in the defiled consciousness. Because when it corresponds with afflictions, the name 'uncommon ignorance' cannot be established. Explanation: Refuting the repeated argument. Only when the mind has remaining delusions is it called defiled. Since the 'uncommon' is together with those delusions of the mind, it is corresponding. Why is it called 'uncommon'? Treatise: If it is established that consciousness becomes defiled by those afflictions, then it should ultimately become defiled in nature. Explanation: Uncommon ignorance is constantly active and unceasing. How can consciousness ever be pure? Treatise: Acts of generosity and other virtuous deeds should not become good. Because the aspect of those afflictions is constantly corresponding. Explanation: Refuting an external defense. Since the external defense says that the mind is constantly defiled, what difference does it make? Therefore, this difficulty arises. Treatise: If someone further says that virtuous thoughts arise together with those afflictions. Explanation: A remaining Hinayana defense. Virtuous thoughts such as generosity arise together with afflictions. Therefore, what is lost by uncommon ignorance being constantly active? Treatise: That is, it is always corresponding with them. Nothing else can exist. It is unreasonable for this defiled consciousness to give rise to antidotes. Explanation: Directly refuting the previous defense. Since the mind always has ignorance, apart from ignorance, this mind has no other virtuous qualities. Since there is no faith or other such qualities, the mind is not considered worldly good and cannot be established. Furthermore, since the mind is constantly defiled, it is impossible to give rise to uncontaminated virtue. Because what is to be treated is not the cause of what can treat it. Therefore, supramundane virtue cannot exist either. Treatise: If someone says that together with the defiled mind, there is a separate virtuous mind that can give rise to antidotes. Because what can treat it arises, what is to be treated is extinguished, which should be reasonable. Explanation: Revealing the correct meaning. Some Mahayana teachings say that apart from the defiled mind, there is a separate worldly virtue. Worldly virtue can give rise to the path of seeing that can treat it. It is reasonable for them to arise mutually and treat the obstacles. Treatise: If so, the established uncommon ignorance is also not accomplished. Because it is constantly corresponding with the remaining afflictions such as the view of self. Explanation: This is an external difficulty. The meaning of the difficulty is that the seven co-arising ignorances correspond with the three delusions such as the view of self. Therefore, they should also not be called 'uncommon'. If, even though they arise together with views, they are still called 'uncommon', then my previous defilement
意俱時無明。雖余惑俱何乃不許名為不共 論汝難不平。非我說彼與余煩惱不相應故名為不共。然說彼惑余處所無故名不共。譬如十八不共佛法。前說與余煩惱相應名不成者。觀他所立顯彼過故 釋曰。答前外難。平猶齊也。前觀汝宗言余惑俱失不共號。非我大乘許是義也。
疏。不見不正知至掉名我掉者。問前師但云以隨惑中不正知等。是此識中我見慢等。誰言隨中說不正知為我憍等 答若隨惑中不說我憍我掉等者。何理得知。隨中憍等是第七識相應慢等。若言說者教無文故。故為斯難。
疏。唯此俱貪至不為主故者。略為二釋。一云此第七貪不與六識慢等俱故方曰相應 問豈六識貪非相應耶而言唯此 答六相應貪通其二種有共．不共。第七不爾故唯言簡 問七貪非主即明相應。何言與六慢等不俱名相應乎 答為遮外難故對六明。恐有難云第七貪等既不與六慢等相應應名不共故今對顯。二云此者此六識也。疏不字誤也。應為亦字。此六識貪亦與六識慢等俱者或名相應 問相應貪等第七豈無言唯此六 答簡自六識不共貪等而置唯言。非對唯識言唯此也。
疏。此十增上至唯無明增者。由十增上十得主名。俱時無明不得主號曰相應也。
論。又契經說眼色為緣等者。按無著攝論云。又五同法亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『意俱時無明』（與意識同時生起的無明）。即使其他煩惱同時生起，為何不允許稱其為『不共』呢？論：你的責難是不公平的。我之所以說它是『不共』的，是因為它不與其他煩惱相應。然而，說這種迷惑在其他地方沒有，所以稱為『不共』，譬如十八不共佛法。前面說與其它煩惱相應就不能成立『不共』，是爲了觀察對方的立論，從而顯示他們的過失。釋：回答前面外道的責難。『平』，就是『齊』的意思。前面觀察你的宗派，說其他煩惱同時生起就失去了『不共』的稱號，這不是我大乘所認可的道理。
疏：『不見不正知』到『掉名我掉』（掉舉名為我掉）。問：前一位法師只是說，隨著隨煩惱中的不正知等，是此識中的我見、慢等。誰說在隨煩惱中說不正知為我憍（傲慢）等？答：如果隨煩惱中不說我憍、我掉等，又有什麼道理得知，隨煩惱中的憍等是第七識相應的慢等呢？如果說有這種情況，但教典中沒有依據，所以才提出這個疑問。
疏：『唯此俱貪』到『不為主故』（只有與此俱生的貪，因為不是主導，所以稱為相應）。略微作兩種解釋。一種說法是，此第七識的貪不與六識的慢等同時生起，所以才稱為『相應』。問：難道六識的貪不是相應的嗎？為什麼要說『唯此』？答：六識相應的貪，普遍具有共與不共兩種。第七識不是這樣，所以用『唯』字來簡別。問：第七識的貪不是主導，這已經說明了是相應的。為什麼說與六識的慢等不俱生才稱為相應呢？答：爲了遮止外道的責難，所以針對六識來闡明。恐怕有人會責難說，第七識的貪等既然不與六識的慢等相應，就應該稱為『不共』，所以現在針對六識來顯示。另一種說法是，『此』指的是這六識。疏文中『不』字是錯誤的，應該是『亦』字。這六識的貪也與六識的慢等俱生，或者稱為相應。問：相應的貪等，第七識難道沒有嗎？為什麼要說『唯此六』？答：簡別六識自身的不共貪等，所以才用『唯』字。不是針對唯識宗說『唯此』。
疏：『此十增上』到『唯無明增』（這十種增上，只有無明增長）。由於十種增上，十種得到主導的名稱。俱時生起的無明，沒有得到主導的稱號，所以稱為『相應』。
論：『又契經說眼色為緣等』（另外，契經上說，以眼和色為緣等等）。按照無著菩薩的《攝大乘論》所說：『又五同法亦』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Simultaneous ignorance' (avidyā) arising simultaneously with consciousness. Even if other afflictions arise simultaneously, why is it not allowed to be called 'non-common' (asaṃskṛta)? Treatise: Your criticism is unfair. The reason I say it is 'non-common' is because it does not correspond with other afflictions. However, it is said that this delusion does not exist elsewhere, so it is called 'non-common', like the eighteen uncommon qualities of a Buddha (aṣṭādaśa āveṇikadharmāḥ). The previous statement that being associated with other afflictions cannot establish 'non-common' is to observe the opponent's position and thereby reveal their faults. Explanation: Responding to the previous objection from externalists. 'Fair' means 'equal'. Previously, observing your school, saying that other afflictions arising simultaneously lose the title of 'non-common', this is not a principle recognized by my Mahayana.
Commentary: 'Not seeing incorrect knowledge' to 'restlessness is called my restlessness'. Question: The previous master only said that following the incorrect knowledge etc. in the secondary afflictions are the self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi), pride (māna) etc. in this consciousness. Who said that in the secondary afflictions, incorrect knowledge is said to be my arrogance (mada) etc.? Answer: If the secondary afflictions do not mention my arrogance, my restlessness etc., what reason is there to know that the arrogance etc. in the secondary afflictions are the pride etc. corresponding to the seventh consciousness? If it is said that there is such a situation, but there is no basis in the teachings, so this question is raised.
Commentary: 'Only this simultaneous greed' to 'not being the master'. Briefly, there are two explanations. One explanation is that the greed of this seventh consciousness does not arise simultaneously with the pride etc. of the six consciousnesses, so it is called 'corresponding'. Question: Is the greed of the six consciousnesses not corresponding? Why say 'only this'? Answer: The greed corresponding to the six consciousnesses universally has both common and non-common types. The seventh consciousness is not like this, so the word 'only' is used to distinguish it. Question: The greed of the seventh consciousness not being the master already explains that it is corresponding. Why say that not arising simultaneously with the pride etc. of the six consciousnesses is called corresponding? Answer: To prevent the criticism of externalists, it is explained in relation to the six consciousnesses. Fearing that someone would criticize that since the greed etc. of the seventh consciousness do not correspond with the pride etc. of the six consciousnesses, they should be called 'non-common', so now it is shown in relation to the six consciousnesses. Another explanation is that 'this' refers to these six consciousnesses. The word 'not' in the commentary is a mistake, it should be 'also'. The greed of these six consciousnesses also arises simultaneously with the pride etc. of the six consciousnesses, or it is called corresponding. Question: Do the corresponding greed etc. not exist in the seventh consciousness? Why say 'only these six'? Answer: Distinguishing the non-common greed etc. of the six consciousnesses themselves, so the word 'only' is used. It is not said 'only this' in relation to the Yogacara school.
Commentary: 'These ten enhancements' to 'only ignorance increases'. Due to the ten enhancements, the ten obtain the name of being the master. The ignorance arising simultaneously does not obtain the title of being the master, so it is called 'corresponding'.
Treatise: 'Also, the sutra says that eye and form are the conditions etc.' According to Asanga's Compendium on the Mahayana (Mahāyānasaṃgraha): 'Also, the five similar dharmas also'
不得有。成過失故。所以者何。以五識身必有眼等俱有依故 世親論解與此別說。無性論同 世親論云。言同法者第六意識與五識有相似法故。彼有五根．及阿賴耶為俱有依。此亦如是有染污意．阿賴耶識為俱有依。此五同法。離染污意決定非有 釋曰。所依有二名為二緣。無性攝論根．境二種名為二緣。根中不取阿賴耶識。以共依故 故彼論云。五識與彼意識有同法性。謂從二緣而得生起。彼染污意若無有者。與此相違。所謂俱生增上緣依無有別故。阿賴耶識雖是意識俱生所依。然不應立為此別依。是共依故。因緣性故。
論。謂如五識至俱有所依者。有義彈疏釋云。若是宗法何故乃云必有眼等。今解。謂如至俱有依皆同法喻。即以此喻所簡別法為其宗法 詳曰。依義寬通。舉眼所以簡余非者。斯亦何違。若言喻者何假置彼必有之言。觀諸因明未見喻中有此例故。必有定義。宗有無失。下總量云。必有不共顯自名處是宗法也。又總是喻。更有何法是所簡者。將以為宗。若言意根即是所簡。文既不言應是意許。若如是者。豈此宗法唯有意許無言陳耶。又未曾見以喻所簡別法為宗。準此則應先舉于喻後方言宗。以喻簡彼宗法過故。以此而言知疏無謬。
論。不可說色至二分別者。據無性論。此文雙破經部．
上座亦應無失。故彼論云。經部所立色為意識俱生別依。此不成就不應道理。以就思擇．隨念分別應一切時無分別故。傳釋云。肉摶心藏四塵色法為意識依 又云。由此道理餘部所立胸中色物意識別依亦不成就 釋類破上座。同是色故。故此論初含于兩宗。后破經部理應允矣。
疏。如瑜伽抄會等者。下自具辨。義燈復明也。
疏。生所依者。親能發起名之為生。非同種子辨體生果名為生也。
疏。法但為境等者。即五十二明彼無法得為意境。是此證也。彼文廣辨。今略引之。
論云。問如世尊說過．未諸行為緣生意。過．未非有何故說彼為緣生意。若意亦緣非有事境。云何佛說由二種緣諸識得生。答由執持諸五識身所不行義。故佛世尊假說名法。是故說言緣意．及法意識得生 釋曰。持自無體令五識不行令意識轉。故假名法。非言為法即有實體 論云。又有性者安立有義能持有義。若無性者安立無義能持無義故皆名法。由彼意識于有性義。若由此義而得安立。即以此義起識了別。若於二種不由二義起了別者。不應說意緣一切義取一切義 釋曰。相分雖有。據本質說得言緣無。
論。若謂現在至寧說為意者。問有部十八界通三世。如何難言現但名識。答意具思量．依止二義。而現在識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 上座部的觀點也應該沒有錯誤。因此，他們的論著中說：『經部（Sautrantika）所主張的色法是與意識同時產生且各自獨立的所依。』這種說法不能成立，不合道理。因為如果按照思擇、隨念、分別來看，那麼一切時候都應該沒有分別。傳釋中說：『肉團心（fleshly heart）和心藏（heart-organ）中的四種微塵色法是意識的所依。』又說：『根據這個道理，其他部派所主張的胸中色物是意識的獨立所依，也不能成立。』這是釋經者通過類似的論證來駁斥上座部，因為它們都屬於色法。所以，這部論著一開始就包含了對兩個宗派的批評，之後駁斥經部在理應上是允許的。 疏：如《瑜伽師地論抄會》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra-samgraha）等，下面會具體辨析，義燈會再次闡明。 疏：『生所依』指的是親近能夠引發（意識）的，稱為『生』。這不同於種子辨別本體、產生果實，那種才叫做『生』。 疏：『法但為境』等，即五十二心所（Caitasikas）表明了『法』不能作為意（Manas）的境界。這就是證據。相關內容在原文中有詳細辨析，這裡只簡略引用。 論：問：如果世尊說過，過去、未來諸行為緣（Hetu）生意識，但過去、未來並非實有，為何說它們是緣生意識？如果意（Manas）也緣非實有的事物作為境界，那麼佛陀為何說由兩種緣（Hetu）諸識才能生起？答：因為執持諸五識身（Panca-vijnanakaya）所不能行之義，所以佛陀世尊假說名為『法』（Dharma）。因此說，緣意（Manas）及法（Dharma），意識（Vijnana）才能生起。釋：執持自身無體的狀態，使五識不行，使意識運轉，所以假名為『法』。並非說因為是『法』，就一定有實體。論：又，有自性者，安立有義，能持有義；若無自性者，安立無義，能持無義，故都名為『法』。因為彼意識（Vijnana）對於有自性的意義，如果由此意義而得以安立，就以此意義生起識的了別。如果對於兩種（有自性、無自性）不由這兩種意義而生起了別，就不應該說意（Manas）緣一切義，取一切義。釋：相分（Nimitta-bhaga）雖然存在，但根據本質來說，可以說緣的是『無』。 論：如果說現在……乃至說為意（Manas）？問：有部（Sarvastivada）的十八界（Dhatus）貫通三世，如何能說現在只名為識（Vijnana）？答：意（Manas）具有思量、依止兩種含義，而現在的識（Vijnana）...
【English Translation】 English version: The view of the Sthaviras (Elders) should also be without error. Therefore, their treatises state: 'The Rupadhatu (form element) posited by the Sautrantikas (Scripturalists) is a co-arising and separate support of consciousness.' This statement is untenable and unreasonable because, according to consideration, recollection, and discrimination, there should be no discrimination at any time. The commentary states: 'The fleshy heart and the four dust-like form elements in the heart-organ are the support of consciousness.' It also states: 'According to this reasoning, the material object in the chest posited by other schools as a separate support of consciousness is also untenable.' This is the commentator refuting the Sthaviras through similar arguments, because they both belong to Rupadhatu (form element). Therefore, this treatise initially contains criticisms of both schools, and later refuting the Sautrantikas is logically permissible. Commentary: As in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra-samgraha (Compendium of the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), etc., it will be specifically analyzed below, and the 'Meaning Lamp' will clarify it again. Commentary: 'Support for arising' refers to that which closely enables the arising (of consciousness), which is called 'arising.' This is different from the seed distinguishing the essence and producing the fruit, which is called 'arising.' Commentary: 'Dharma is only an object,' etc., that is, the fifty-two mental factors (Caitasikas) indicate that 'Dharma' cannot be the object of Manas (mind). This is the evidence. The relevant content is analyzed in detail in the original text, and only a brief excerpt is quoted here. Treatise: Question: If the World-Honored One said that past and future actions are the Hetu (cause) for the arising of consciousness, but the past and future are not real, why are they said to be the Hetu for the arising of consciousness? If Manas (mind) also takes unreal things as its object, then why did the Buddha say that consciousness arises from two kinds of Hetu (cause)? Answer: Because it holds the meaning that the five aggregates of consciousness (Panca-vijnanakaya) cannot act upon, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, nominally calls it 'Dharma.' Therefore, it is said that consciousness arises from Manas (mind) and Dharma. Commentary: Holding the state of being without self-nature, causing the five consciousnesses not to act, and causing consciousness to operate, so it is nominally called 'Dharma.' It is not that because it is 'Dharma,' it must have substance. Treatise: Also, those with self-nature establish meaning with existence, capable of holding meaning; if without self-nature, they establish meaning with non-existence, capable of holding non-existence, so they are all called 'Dharma.' Because that consciousness (Vijnana) is for the meaning of self-nature, if it can be established by this meaning, then the discrimination of consciousness arises from this meaning. If discrimination arises for the two kinds (with self-nature, without self-nature) without these two meanings, then it should not be said that Manas (mind) cognizes all meanings and takes all meanings. Commentary: Although the Nimitta-bhaga (image-aspect) exists, according to the essence, it can be said that what is cognized is 'non-existence.' Treatise: If it is said that the present... even to say it is Manas (mind)? Question: How can it be said that the eighteen Dhatus (elements) of the Sarvastivada (the school of "all exists") pervade the three times, and that the present is only called Vijnana (consciousness)? Answer: Manas (mind) has two meanings: thinking and reliance, while the present Vijnana (consciousness)...
雖未起用為依生識。然住意性亦得意名。不據思量現名為意。故亦無過。
論。已滅依此假立意名者。有義依止名意自望假說。非依第七。思量名意依第七立。故云已滅依此假名思量意也。立宗但諍思量意故 詳曰。已滅雖無。然開其路。彼識依此而可得生。似現依止假立意名。已滅之意與現思量殊不相似。如何依七假立思量。雖思量意是本所諍。為外難云滅非思量何得名意。故論答云滅似現意依止一邊依之假立。若言依止自望說者。如何自望。若望現在。現在名識。似何稱意。若望以前。以前體無。似似於誰。論破於他假依真立。義應不成 又按世親攝論第一云。過去已滅無所思量。云何當有能思量性。準此文意。不以思量為過去意。可審詳之。
疏。無想滅一識等者。以五轉識前位已舍。故言但滅一二識也。
疏。攝論難云俱滅何異者。按彼論云。由二自相無差別故。心．及心法俱滅何異。
論。若謂加行等者。按無性攝論第一云。不可說在第四靜慮。在第一有地差別故。出離．靜住欲差別故。二定差別。但舉加行及地二別 又準俱舍第五卷論。有十差別。一地有異。謂第四禪．有頂別故。二加行異。出離．止息二想別故。三相續異。異生．聖者身不同故。四感果異。五蘊．四蘊報差別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即使沒有實際作用而成為產生意識的所依，但安住于意性也仍然可以得到『意』這個名稱。因為不執著于思量顯現，所以稱之為『意』，因此也沒有過失。
論：已經滅去的『意』，依此假立『意』這個名稱。有一種觀點認為，依靠自身而假說為『意』，而不是依靠第七識（末那識，Manas）來假立。因為思量被稱為『意』，是依第七識而建立的。所以說，已經滅去的『意』，依此假名為思量之『意』。立宗只是爲了辯論思量之『意』。
詳述：已經滅去的『意』雖然不存在了，但它開闢了道路，使後來的意識可以依此而生。它看起來像是現在的所依，所以假立為『意』這個名稱。已經滅去的『意』與現在的思量截然不同，怎麼能依靠第七識來假立思量呢？雖然思量之『意』是原本所爭論的，但爲了反駁外人的質疑，即滅去的『意』不是思量，怎麼能稱為『意』呢？所以論中回答說，滅去的『意』類似於現在的『意』，依靠它的一邊而假立。如果說依靠自身而說，那麼如何依靠自身呢？如果指望現在，現在名為『識』，像什麼而稱之為『意』呢？如果指望以前，以前的體性已經不存在了，又像誰呢？論破斥了他人假借真實而建立的觀點，義理上應該是不成立的。另外，按照世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一卷所說，過去已經滅去的『意』無法思量，怎麼會有能思量的性質呢？根據這段文字的意思，不應該把思量作為過去之『意』，應該仔細審察。
疏：無想定（Asañjñāsamāpatti）、滅盡定（Nirodhasamāpatti）中滅一識等，是因為五轉識（五根識，five sense consciousnesses）在前位已經捨棄，所以說只是滅了一二識。
疏：《攝大乘論》中提出的疑問是，如果都滅盡了，有什麼不同呢？按照該論的說法，由於二者的自相沒有差別，心（Citta）和心法（Caitasikas）都滅盡了，有什麼不同呢？
論：如果說是加行（Prayoga）等不同，按照無性（Asaṅga）的《攝大乘論》第一卷所說，不能說在第四禪（Fourth Dhyana）中，因為在第一禪（First Dhyana）中有地的差別。由於出離和靜住的慾望不同，所以二者有差別。只是舉了加行和地這兩種差別。另外，按照《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）第五卷的說法，有十種差別：一是地有差異，即第四禪和有頂天（Akanistha）不同；二是加行有差異，出離和止息二想不同；三是相續有差異，異生（Prthagjana）和聖者（Arya）的身體不同；四是感果有差異，五蘊（Skandha）和四蘊（Skandha）的果報有差別。
【English Translation】 English version: Even if it doesn't function as the direct basis for the arising of consciousness, residing in the nature of 'mind' (意, yi) still allows it to be called 'mind'. Because it doesn't cling to the appearance of thought, it's called 'mind', and therefore there's no fault.
Treatise: The 'mind' that has already ceased, based on this, the name 'mind' is provisionally established. One view holds that it's provisionally spoken of as 'mind' based on itself, not relying on the seventh consciousness (Manas). Because thinking is called 'mind', it's established based on the seventh consciousness. Therefore, it's said that the 'mind' that has already ceased is provisionally named the 'mind' of thought. Establishing the thesis is solely for debating the 'mind' of thought.
Detailed Explanation: Although the 'mind' that has already ceased no longer exists, it opens the path so that later consciousness can arise based on it. It appears like the present basis, so it's provisionally established as 'mind'. The 'mind' that has already ceased is completely different from present thought. How can it rely on the seventh consciousness to provisionally establish thought? Although the 'mind' of thought is what's originally being debated, it's to refute the outsider's question: the 'mind' that has ceased isn't thought, so how can it be called 'mind'? Therefore, the treatise answers that the 'mind' that has ceased is similar to the present 'mind', provisionally established based on one aspect of it. If it's said to be based on itself, then how does it rely on itself? If it refers to the present, the present is called 'consciousness' (識, vijnana), what does it resemble to be called 'mind'? If it refers to the past, the nature of the past no longer exists, so what does it resemble? The treatise refutes the other's view of establishing based on the real by borrowing the false, which should not be valid in principle. Furthermore, according to Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasaṃgraha), volume one, the 'mind' that has ceased in the past cannot think, so how can it have the nature of being able to think? According to the meaning of this passage, one shouldn't regard thought as the past 'mind'; it should be carefully examined.
Commentary: In the Asañjñāsamāpatti (無想定, Samadhi of Non-Perception) and Nirodhasamāpatti (滅盡定, Cessation Samadhi), the cessation of one consciousness, etc., is because the five sense consciousnesses (五轉識, five sense consciousnesses) have already been abandoned in the previous stage, so it's said that only one or two consciousnesses cease.
Commentary: The question raised in the Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle is, if they all cease, what's the difference? According to that treatise, since there's no difference in their self-nature, what's the difference if both the mind (Citta) and mental factors (Caitasikas) cease?
Treatise: If it's said that the preliminary practices (Prayoga) are different, according to Asaṅga's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle, volume one, it cannot be said to be in the Fourth Dhyana (第四禪), because there's a difference in the ground in the First Dhyana (第一禪). Because the desire for detachment and quiet abiding are different, there's a difference between the two. Only these two differences, preliminary practices and ground, are mentioned. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論), volume five, there are ten differences: first, the ground is different, that is, the Fourth Dhyana and Akanistha (有頂天) are different; second, the preliminary practices are different, the two thoughts of detachment and cessation are different; third, the continuity is different, the bodies of ordinary beings (Prthagjana) and noble ones (Arya) are different; fourth, the results felt are different, the retribution of the five aggregates (Skandha) and four aggregates (Skandha) are different.
故。五順受異。唯順生受通生后等時差別故。六初起異。無想二界。滅定唯人。七退有異。得不經生．經生別故。八名號異。九還不還異。如箭射空無惑不返。十二得異。初唯加行。后通二得。離染唯佛。加行余聖。如次配彼無想．滅定。是二差別。
疏。此中通言至第六相縛者。此論引彼文不足也。無意識言。今按彼云。又複意識染污末那以為依止。此脫初句。余文悉同。
疏。對法等云漏所隨逐等者。等瑜伽論文。如樞要辨。對法所說如義燈解。故此不言。
疏。即是攝論我執不有失等者。此文與彼第六大同。其中委曲而徴逐者彼不及此。故言極差。
疏。大乘之中至以此理通者。雖八識別總得名意。以對六境故合為一 問何故不釋十八界耶 此文正釋故疏不云。
疏。初句即是此識得名者。即對法雲。依眼緣色。依所依眼識得眼名。
疏。此各有種如瑜伽者。按彼第一云。云何眼識自性。謂依眼了別色。彼所依者俱有依。謂眼等。無間依謂意。種子依謂即此一切種子執受所依所攝阿賴耶識。乃至意識亦復如是。又云。俱有相應一一而轉。又彼一切各各從自種子而生。
疏。且據粗相至識不必生者。問今盲冥者有境無根而識不生。證識依眼。如有眼者由境無故而識不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，五種順后受業存在差異。只有順生受業才普遍存在於生時、其後等時間上的差別。六、初起不同：無想定和二無色界，以及滅盡定只有人才可以獲得。七、退失不同：分為得果后不再受生和得果后還要受生兩種情況。八、名稱不同。九、還與不還不同：就像箭射向天空，沒有疑惑就不會返回。十二、獲得不同：最初只有加行位才能獲得，之後則包括加行位和正行位兩種。斷除染污只有佛才能做到，加行位則由其他聖者完成。依次將無想定和滅盡定與這些情況對應，這就是二者的差別。
疏：這裡總的來說到第六相縛，是因為此論引用彼文不夠完整。關於『無意識』的說法，現在查閱彼文，上面說：『又，意識以染污的末那（Manas，意根）為依託。』這裡脫漏了第一句，其餘文字完全相同。
疏：《對法》等經中說『為煩惱所隨逐』等，還包括《瑜伽師地論》。正如《樞要》所辨析的。《對法》中所說的，如《義燈》所解釋，因此這裡不再贅述。
疏：即是《攝大乘論》中『我執不有失』等，這段文字與彼論第六部分非常相似。其中詳細的辨析和追問，彼論不及此論，所以說差別很大。
疏：在大乘佛法中，乃至用這個道理來解釋，雖然八識總的來說都可以稱為『意』，但因為它們所對的六境不同，所以合為一個『意』。問：為什麼不解釋十八界呢？因為本文主要解釋『意』，所以疏中沒有提及。
疏：第一句就是這個識得名的原因。即《對法》中說：『依靠眼根緣取色塵，所依的眼根使識得到眼識的名稱。』
疏：這些各自有種子，如《瑜伽師地論》所說。按照彼論第一卷所說：『什麼是眼識的自性？就是依靠眼根來了別色塵。它的所依是俱有依，即眼根等；無間依是意；種子依就是一切種子執持的阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識）。』乃至意識也是如此。又說：『俱有相應，一一而轉。』又說：『一切各自從自己的種子而生。』
疏：暫且根據粗略的現象來說，即使有境，沒有根，識也不一定產生。問：現在盲人和處於黑暗中的人，有境而無根，所以識不產生，這可以證明識是依靠眼根的。如果有人有眼根，因為沒有境，所以識也不產生。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there are differences in the five types of karma to be experienced later. Only karma to be experienced in the present life is universally present in the differences of time, such as at the time of birth and thereafter. Sixth, the initial arising is different: the state of No-Thought, the two formless realms, and the Cessation Attainment can only be attained by humans. Seventh, the decline is different: divided into those who will not be reborn after attaining the fruit and those who will still be reborn after attaining the fruit. Eighth, the names are different. Ninth, returning and non-returning are different: like an arrow shot into the sky, it will not return if there is no doubt. Twelfth, the attainment is different: initially, only the stage of application can attain it, and later it includes both the stage of application and the stage of actual practice. Only the Buddha can eliminate defilements, while other sages complete the stage of application. Correspond these situations to the state of No-Thought and the Cessation Attainment in order, and this is the difference between the two.
Commentary: The general statement here about the sixth binding is because this treatise does not quote that text completely. Regarding the statement 'no consciousness,' now examining that text, it says: 'Moreover, consciousness relies on the defiled Manas (意根, mind-consciousness).』 The first sentence is missing here, and the rest of the text is exactly the same.
Commentary: The statement in the Abhidharma (對法, Higher Dharma) and other scriptures, such as 'followed by afflictions,' also includes the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). As analyzed in the Essentials. What is said in the Abhidharma is explained in the Lamp of Meaning, so it is not repeated here.
Commentary: That is, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana), 'the ego-grasping is not lost,' etc. This text is very similar to the sixth part of that treatise. The detailed analysis and questioning in that treatise are not as thorough as in this treatise, so it is said that the difference is very great.
Commentary: In Mahayana Buddhism, even using this principle to explain, although all eight consciousnesses can generally be called 'mind,' because they face different six objects, they are combined into one 'mind.' Question: Why are the eighteen realms not explained? Because this text mainly explains 'mind,' so it is not mentioned in the commentary.
Commentary: The first sentence is the reason why this consciousness is named. That is, the Abhidharma says: 'Relying on the eye faculty to perceive form, the eye faculty on which it relies gives the consciousness the name of eye-consciousness.'
Commentary: These each have seeds, as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. According to the first volume of that treatise: 'What is the nature of eye-consciousness? It is to discriminate form by relying on the eye faculty. Its support is the co-existent support, which is the eye faculty, etc.; the immediate support is the mind; the seed support is the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) held by all seeds.' And so on for consciousness as well. It also says: 'Co-existent and corresponding, each transforms individually.' It also says: 'Everything arises from its own seeds.'
Commentary: For the time being, according to the rough phenomenon, even if there is an object, without a root, consciousness may not arise. Question: Now, blind people and those in darkness have an object but no root, so consciousness does not arise, which proves that consciousness relies on the eye faculty. If someone has an eye faculty, because there is no object, consciousness also does not arise.
生。應識依境。又但有根識即依生。色界應有鼻舌兩識 答至理識生實藉根．境。就勝緣說依眼非色。亦猶識．境互相因生。而依主勝稱為唯識又濟巨川匪唯一筏。假諸帆橈方堪利涉。世就勝言舟為度矣。
疏。如迦末羅病等者。問非黃見黃自是意識。如何以此證眼識耶 答由根損故令初眼識而不分明。而後意識見有錯亂。故舉壞意證眼識變。
疏。謂由根合識令根有損益等者。由根識合觀日．月光。如次於根而有損益 又按俱舍論第二云。由二因故從根立號。一由根是所依性故。境即不爾。二由所依是不共故唯自識依。色亦通為他身眼識．及自意識而所取故。餘四準此。由斯不從色等立稱。雖即二義簡濫亦畢。
疏。意識不然眼等可爾者。據等無間六皆名意。今目第六故為不然。五識根別。依根立名無濫可爾。
論。惑名色識等者。有義疏說亦依主釋。今解通有財釋。以能有境名色識等。即有財釋 詳曰。若泛爾言非無此義。辨論所說但依主釋。故論斷云隨境立名。順識義故。謂於六境了別名識。不言有境而名為識。
疏。蛇眼聞聲等者。按彼經六十四云。瞿陀尼人眼識聞聲。如閻浮提中蛇蚖之類眼中聞聲。瞿陀尼人亦復如是。如隔障礙聞眾音聲。見眾色像亦復如是。以法勝故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生。應知（五）識的產生依賴於（各自的）境。而且只有根識才依賴於（各自的）境而產生。應該（只有眼識和意識，）有鼻識和舌識嗎？回答是，至理（而言，五）識的產生確實依賴於根和境。就殊勝的因緣來說，（眼）識依賴於眼根而不是（直接依賴於）色境。這也就像識和境互相依賴而產生一樣，但因為（眼）識主要依賴於眼根，所以稱為『唯識』。又如要渡過巨大的河流，不能只靠一隻木筏，還要藉助風帆和船槳才能順利渡過。世俗（之人）就殊勝的方面來說，（認為）船是用來渡河的。
疏：如迦末羅病等情況。問：非黃色而見黃色，這本身就是意識的作用。如何用這個來證明眼識的作用呢？答：因為根（眼根）受損，導致最初的眼識不能分明地辨別（顏色），然後意識所見到的（顏色）也就有了錯亂。所以用（眼）根損壞的例子來證明眼識的變異。
疏：所謂根與識結合，使根有損益等情況，是指根識結合觀察日月光芒，依次對根產生損害或增益。又按《俱舍論》第二卷所說，由於兩個原因，從根來立名。一是由於根是（五）識所依賴的性質，境就不是這樣。二是由於所依賴的（根）是不共的，只依賴於自己的識。色境也可以被他人眼識以及自己的意識所取。其餘四識可以依此類推。因此不從色等（境）來立名。雖然這兩個含義（既）簡明（又）完整。
疏：意識不是這樣，眼等（五識）可以這樣。是說就等無間緣來說，六識都可以稱為意。現在說的是第六識，所以說『不然』。五識的根（各有）區別，依據根來立名，沒有混淆的可能，所以說『可爾』。
論：迷惑地稱（眼）識為色識等。有一種解釋說，（這種說法）也是依主釋。現在解釋為通用的有財釋，因為能擁有境，所以稱為色識等，這就是有財釋。詳細地說，如果泛泛地說，並非沒有這個道理。《辨論》所說的只是依主釋。所以論中判斷說，（五）識是隨境立名，順應了識的定義。說的是對於六境的了別稱為識，而不是說擁有境而稱為識。
疏：蛇眼聽到聲音等情況。按照那部經第六十四卷所說，瞿陀尼（Ghūta-dānī）地方的人，眼識可以聽到聲音，就像閻浮提（Jambudvīpa）中的蛇和蚖（一種小蛇）一樣，用眼睛聽到聲音。瞿陀尼（Ghūta-dānī）地方的人也是這樣，就像隔著障礙聽到各種聲音，看到各種色像一樣。這是因為他們具有殊勝的法力。
【English Translation】 English version: Birth. It should be known that the (five) consciousnesses arise dependent on (their respective) objects. Moreover, only the root consciousnesses arise dependent on (their respective) objects. Should there be (only eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness,) and have nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness? The answer is, in ultimate truth, the arising of the (five) consciousnesses truly relies on the root and the object. Speaking of the superior condition, (eye-)consciousness relies on the eye-root and not (directly on) the color-object. This is just like consciousness and object arising interdependently, but because (eye-)consciousness primarily relies on the eye-root, it is called 'Vijnaptimatrata' (Consciousness-only). Furthermore, to cross a great river, one cannot rely solely on a raft; one must also use sails and oars to cross smoothly. Worldly (people), speaking of the superior aspect, (believe that) the boat is for crossing the river.
Commentary: Such as the case of Kamala disease, etc. Question: Seeing yellow when it is not yellow is itself the function of mind-consciousness. How can this be used to prove the function of eye-consciousness? Answer: Because the root (eye-root) is damaged, the initial eye-consciousness cannot clearly distinguish (colors), and then the colors seen by mind-consciousness become confused. Therefore, the example of the damaged (eye-)root is used to prove the transformation of eye-consciousness.
Commentary: The so-called combination of root and consciousness, causing the root to have gain or loss, refers to the combination of root-consciousness observing the light of the sun and moon, successively causing damage or benefit to the root. Furthermore, according to the second volume of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, names are established from the root for two reasons. First, because the root is the nature on which (the five) consciousnesses rely, which is not the case for the object. Second, because the (root) on which it relies is uncommon, relying only on its own consciousness. The color-object can also be taken by the eye-consciousness of others and one's own mind-consciousness. The remaining four consciousnesses can be inferred by analogy. Therefore, names are not established from color, etc. Although these two meanings are both concise and complete.
Commentary: Mind-consciousness is not like this; eye-consciousness, etc., can be like this. It means that in terms of contiguity, all six consciousnesses can be called mind. Now we are talking about the sixth consciousness, so it is said 'not so'. The roots of the five consciousnesses are different; establishing names based on the root has no possibility of confusion, so it is said 'can be so'.
Treatise: Confusedly calling (eye-)consciousness color-consciousness, etc. One explanation says that (this statement) is also an appositional compound. Now it is explained as a common possessive compound, because it can possess the object, so it is called color-consciousness, etc., which is a possessive compound. In detail, if speaking generally, it is not without this reason. What the Vibhasa says is only an appositional compound. Therefore, the treatise judges that (the five) consciousnesses are named according to the object, in accordance with the definition of consciousness. It says that the discernment of the six objects is called consciousness, not that possessing the object is called consciousness.
Commentary: Snake eyes hearing sounds, etc. According to the sixty-fourth volume of that sutra, people in Ghūta-dānī (瞿陀尼) can hear sounds with their eye-consciousness, just like snakes and small snakes in Jambudvīpa (閻浮提) hear sounds with their eyes. The people of Ghūta-dānī (瞿陀尼) are also like this, hearing various sounds and seeing various colors as if through obstacles. This is because they possess superior Dharma power.
論。莊嚴論至同類境故者。按彼論第三偈云。如是五根轉。變化得增上。諸義遍所作。功德千二百 釋曰。此偈顯示轉五根變化。此變化得二種增上。一者得諸義遍所作。謂一一根皆能互用一切境界故。二者得功德千二百。謂一一根各得千二百功德故。
疏。或即初地至此是本義者。佛地論中義有本．別。舉本簡別。如次前疏而以明之。
論。佛地經說至作四記等者。疏及樞要雖皆引之。學未博者披猶難悟。今撮彼要隨難釋之。冀諸後學臨文不惑 經由是如來示現種種工巧等處。摧伏諸伎傲慢眾生。以是善巧方便力故。引諸眾生令入聖教成就解脫 釋曰。餘九化下皆有以是善巧等言。下同不錄 論此中顯示現神通化。為菩薩時示現種種陶師等類工巧等處。此是智上身業相現。為摧傲慢故現斯事。善巧方便即是悲慧平等。運道先現神通先令生信。故名引生令入聖教。如現神通度迦葉等。次令調順有所堪能故名成就。引令長養諸善根故。后令解脫三界惡趣。
經由是如來往諸眾生種種生處示同類生。而居道位。攝伏一切異類眾生 論曰。此中顯示現受生化。謂現化身於天人中一切生處示同類生。居剎帝利．婆羅門種。伏下諸類令得利樂 經由是如來示現領受本事本生難修諸行。論此中顯示現業果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論。莊嚴論至同類境故者。按照《莊嚴經論》第三偈所說：『如此五根轉變，變化得到增上，諸義普遍所作，功德千二百。』 解釋說：這首偈頌顯示了轉變五根的變化。這種變化得到兩種增上：一是得到諸義普遍所作，即每一根都能互相使用一切境界；二是得到功德千二百，即每一根各自得到千二百種功德。
疏。或者說初地到這裡是本義。《佛地論》中，義有『本』和『別』。舉出『本』是爲了簡別『別』。按照之前的疏文來闡明。
論。《佛地經》說到『作四記等』。疏文和樞要都引用了它，但學識不廣的人讀起來仍然難以理解。現在摘取其中的要點，隨著難點進行解釋，希望後來的學習者在閱讀時不會感到困惑。《佛地經》說：『因此，如來示現種種工巧等處，摧伏諸伎傲慢眾生，以是善巧方便力故，引諸眾生令入聖教成就解脫。』 解釋說：其餘九種變化下都有『以是善巧等言』，下面不再重複記錄。 論：這裡顯示了示現神通變化。爲了菩薩時示現種種陶師等類的工巧等處。這是智上的身業相現，爲了摧伏傲慢而示現這些事情。善巧方便就是悲慧平等。運用佛道先示現神通，先讓眾生生起信心，所以叫做『引生』，使他們進入聖教。就像示現神通來度化迦葉(Kasyapa)等人。其次讓他們調伏順從，有所堪能，所以叫做『成就』。引導他們長養各種善根。最後讓他們解脫三界惡趣。
經。因此，如來前往各種眾生的各種生處，示現同類生，而居於道位，攝伏一切異類眾生。 論曰：這裡顯示了示現受生變化。即示現化身於天人中一切生處，示現同類生。居住在剎帝利(Ksatriya)、婆羅門(Brahmana)種姓中，降伏下等各類眾生，使他們得到利益和快樂。 經。因此，如來示現領受本事本生難修諸行。 論：這裡顯示了示現業果。
【English Translation】 English version Treatise. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, 'Because of the similar realm.' According to the third verse of that treatise: 'Thus, the five roots transform, and the transformation attains increase. All meanings are universally accomplished, and merits are twelve hundred.' Explanation: This verse shows the transformation of the five roots. This transformation attains two kinds of increase: first, it attains the universal accomplishment of all meanings, meaning that each root can mutually use all realms; second, it attains twelve hundred merits, meaning that each root individually attains twelve hundred merits.
Commentary. Or, the initial stage to here is the original meaning. In the Buddhabhumi Sutra, the meaning has 'original' and 'distinct'. Citing the 'original' is to distinguish the 'distinct'. Explain it according to the previous commentary.
Treatise. The Buddhabhumi Sutra says, 'Making four predictions, etc.' Although the commentary and essential points both cite it, those who are not widely learned still find it difficult to understand. Now, extract the essential points and explain them according to the difficulties, hoping that later learners will not be confused when reading the text. The Sutra says: 'Therefore, the Tathagata manifests various skillful means, etc., to subdue arrogant beings of various skills. Because of this skillful means, he leads all beings to enter the holy teachings and achieve liberation.' Explanation: The remaining nine transformations all have 'because of this skillful means, etc.' The following will not be repeated. Treatise: This shows the manifestation of miraculous transformations. For the Bodhisattva to manifest various skillful means such as potters, etc. This is the manifestation of the body karma of wisdom, manifesting these things to subdue arrogance. Skillful means are the equality of compassion and wisdom. Using the Buddha's path, first manifest miracles to first generate faith in beings, so it is called 'leading to birth', causing them to enter the holy teachings. Like manifesting miracles to liberate Kasyapa (Kasyapa) and others. Secondly, let them be tamed and obedient, capable of something, so it is called 'achievement'. Guiding them to nurture various good roots. Finally, let them be liberated from the evil realms of the three realms.
Sutra. Therefore, the Tathagata goes to various birth places of various beings, manifesting similar births, and resides in the position of the path, subduing all different kinds of beings. Treatise: This shows the manifestation of the transformation of receiving birth. That is, manifesting a transformation body in all birth places of gods and humans, manifesting similar births. Residing in the Ksatriya (Ksatriya) and Brahmana (Brahmana) castes, subduing the lower classes of beings, causing them to obtain benefit and happiness. Sutra. Therefore, the Tathagata manifests the acceptance of the difficult practices of past lives and previous births. Treatise: This shows the manifestation of the results of karma.
化。成所作智現以化身領受化業。由此業故示受一切本事本生難修諸行。先世相應所有餘事名為本事。先世所受生類差別名為本生。如毗濕飯怛啰等。依此本生先所修行種種苦行名難修行 釋曰。領者攝撿。受謂納受。乘斯化業攝納化果故名領受。與身相應非身之事名為本事。所受身事名為本生。毗濕等者此云眾異。有多德伎異眾人故。即須達拏太子別名。舉事明也。論或於今世依變化身先修苦行。后舍彼行修處中行方得菩提。有契經說。如來先世迦葉佛時作是罵言。何處沙門剃鬚發者有大菩提。無上菩提極難得故。由彼惡業今受如是難行苦果 釋曰。今生六年苦行之事亦得名為示業果也。經言過去罵迦葉佛今受六年苦行報者亦化之耳。化宜聞故止余惡故 經由是如來宣暢種種隨所樂法文義巧妙。小智眾生初聞尚信 論曰。此中顯示慶慰語化。慶慰即是喜悅差別。語能生彼故名慶慰。成所作智化作語業自現妙音。令化心變謂聞佛語生歡喜故。隨所樂法者。隨彼因力所應。樂聞人天三乘諸差別法。文巧妙者。字句顯美令樂聞故。義巧妙者。理趣分明易解了故。小智聞信。況聰慜者 經由是如來立正學處。毀諸放逸贊不放逸。又復建立隨信行人．隨法行人 論此中顯示方便語化。如來大悲為諸有情安立學處。令伏諸惡修世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：化身領受成所作智所顯現的化業。由於這種化業，佛示現領受一切本事（與過去世自身相應的事件）和本生（過去世所受的生命類別差異），以及難修的諸種苦行。先世相應的其他事情稱為本事，先世所受的生命類別差異稱為本生，例如毗濕飯怛啰（Vishvantara，意為『給予一切的人』）。依據這些本生，先前所修行的種種苦行稱為難修行。 解釋：『領』是攝取、撿擇的意思，『受』是納受的意思。憑藉這種化業來攝取和納受化果，所以稱為『領受』。與身體相應的、並非身體本身的事情稱為本事，所受的身體之事稱為本生。『毗濕等者』，這裡的意思是『眾異』，因為他具有多種德行和異於常人的技能。他就是須達拏（Sudāna）太子，這是他的別名。這是舉例說明。論中或者說，在今生，佛依據變化身先修行苦行，然後捨棄那種苦行，修行中道，才得以證得菩提。有契經說，如來在過去世迦葉佛（Kāśyapa Buddha）時期曾罵道：『哪裡有剃除鬚髮的沙門能證得大菩提？』因為無上菩提極難獲得。由於那時的惡業，今生才承受如此難行的苦果。 解釋：今生六年苦行之事也可以稱為示現業果。經中說過去罵迦葉佛，今生承受六年苦行報應，這也是化現。爲了使人樂於聽聞，爲了止息其他惡行。 經文：因此，如來宣講種種隨順眾生所樂的佛法，文辭和義理都非常巧妙，小智慧的眾生初次聽聞尚且相信。 論：這裡顯示的是慶慰語化。慶慰就是喜悅的差別。語言能夠產生喜悅，所以稱為慶慰。成所作智化作語業，親自顯現妙音，使化身的心發生變化，意思是聽聞佛語而生歡喜。『隨所樂法』，是隨順眾生因緣和能力，所應該樂於聽聞的人天三乘各種差別佛法。『文巧妙』，是說字句顯明美好，使人樂於聽聞。『義巧妙』，是說義理清晰明白，容易理解。 小智慧的人聽了都相信，更何況是聰敏的人呢！ 經文：因此，如來建立正學之處，毀斥各種放逸，讚歎不放逸。又建立隨信行人、隨法行人。 論：這裡顯示的是方便語化。如來以大悲心為一切有情安立學處，使他們降伏各種惡行，修習世間和出世間的善行。
【English Translation】 English version: The Transformation Body receives the transformative activities manifested by the Wisdom of Accomplishment. Due to these transformative activities, the Buddha demonstrates the reception of all 'Prior Deeds' (events corresponding to one's past lives), 'Birth Stories' (differences in the types of lives experienced in past lives), and the various difficult ascetic practices. Other events corresponding to past lives are called 'Prior Deeds,' and differences in the types of lives experienced in past lives are called 'Birth Stories,' such as Vishvantara (meaning 'giver of all'). Based on these Birth Stories, the various difficult ascetic practices previously undertaken are called 'Difficult Practices'. Explanation: 'Receiving' means to gather and select, and 'accepting' means to receive and embrace. Relying on these transformative activities to gather and accept the fruits of transformation is why it is called 'receiving.' Events corresponding to the body that are not the body itself are called 'Prior Deeds,' and matters related to the body experienced are called 'Birth Stories.' 'Vishvantara, etc.' here means 'various differences,' because he possesses many virtues and skills different from ordinary people. He is Sudāna (Sudāna) prince, which is his other name. This is an illustrative example. The treatise may also say that in this life, the Buddha, based on a transformation body, first practices asceticism, then abandons that practice, and cultivates the Middle Way, thereby attaining Bodhi. There is a sutra that says that in a past life, during the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, the Tathagata cursed, saying, 'Where is there a śrāmaṇa who shaves his head and beard who can attain Great Bodhi?' Because Supreme Bodhi is extremely difficult to obtain. Due to that evil karma, in this life, he endures such difficult ascetic practices. Explanation: The six years of ascetic practice in this life can also be called a manifestation of karmic results. The sutra says that in the past, he cursed Kāśyapa Buddha, and in this life, he receives the retribution of six years of ascetic practice, which is also a transformation. It is to make people happy to hear and to stop other evil deeds. Sutra: Therefore, the Tathagata proclaims various Dharma teachings that accord with what beings delight in, with skillful wording and profound meanings, so that even beings of small wisdom believe upon first hearing. Treatise: Here, the transformation of congratulatory speech is displayed. Congratulation is a difference of joy. Language can produce joy, so it is called congratulation. The Wisdom of Accomplishment transforms into speech activities, personally manifesting wonderful sounds, causing the minds of the transformed to change, meaning that they hear the Buddha's words and generate joy. 'Dharma that accords with what beings delight in' refers to the various different Dharmas of the human, celestial, and three vehicles that beings should delight in hearing according to their conditions and abilities. 'Skillful wording' means that the words and sentences are clear and beautiful, making people happy to hear. 'Skillful meaning' means that the principles are clear and easy to understand. Even people of small wisdom believe upon hearing, let alone those who are intelligent! Sutra: Therefore, the Tathagata establishes the place of right learning, denounces various forms of indulgence, and praises non-indulgence. He also establishes those who follow by faith and those who follow by Dharma. Treatise: Here, the transformation of expedient speech is displayed. The Tathagata, with great compassion, establishes a place of learning for all sentient beings, enabling them to subdue various evil deeds and cultivate worldly and supramundane good deeds.
間善。安立聖道分位差別。令入聖道出離三界經由是如來斷諸眾生無量疑惑 論此中顯示辨揚語化。成所作智隨諸眾生意樂差別。現化語業說種種義斷諸疑惑。謂發一音表一切義。令諸有情隨類獲益。
經由是抉擇眾生八萬四千心行差別 論此中顯示抉擇意化。成所作智相應意業能起化故名化意業 此能抉擇所化眾生八萬四千心行差別。心行差別如疏具錄。此不重記 經由是如來觀諸眾生所行之行行與不行若德若失。為令取捨造作對治 論此中顯示造作意化。隨所觀察一切有情所行之行。若諸惡行不行有德。行即有失。若諸善行行即有德。不行有失。如是觀察為欲令彼取德舍失 于德造作任持對治。于失造作遠離對治 經由是如來為欲宣說彼對治故。顯彼所樂名．句．字身 論此中顯示發起意化。成所作智相應意業能發身語。或此意業由智發起。或智相分現似彼故。是故說名發起意業。為說有情諸行對治。此所說法名．句．字身以為自性。是故顯示名．句．字身。令起愛樂發生對治 經由是如來於定不定反問置記為記別故。隨其所應受領去來現在等義 論此中顯示受領意化。受相應思能動其心令受苦樂。是故說名受領意業。成所作智受相應思。能起化故名化意業。於四記問為記別故。隨其所應如實了知一切問已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 間善（Jianshan）。安立聖道分位差別，令入聖道出離三界，經由是如來斷諸眾生無量疑惑。論述此中顯示辨揚語化，成所作智（accomplishment-wisdom）隨諸眾生意樂差別，現化語業說種種義斷諸疑惑，謂發一音表一切義，令諸有情隨類獲益。
經由是抉擇眾生八萬四千心行差別。論述此中顯示抉擇意化，成所作智相應意業能起化故名化意業。此能抉擇所化眾生八萬四千心行差別。心行差別如疏具錄，此不重記。經由是如來觀諸眾生所行之行，行與不行若德若失，為令取捨造作對治。論述此中顯示造作意化，隨所觀察一切有情所行之行，若諸惡行不行有德，行即有失；若諸善行行即有德，不行有失。如是觀察為欲令彼取德舍失，于德造作任持對治，于失造作遠離對治。
經由是如來為欲宣說彼對治故，顯彼所樂名．句．字身。論述此中顯示發起意化，成所作智相應意業能發身語，或此意業由智發起，或智相分現似彼故，是故說名發起意業。為說有情諸行對治，此所說法名．句．字身以為自性，是故顯示名．句．字身，令起愛樂發生對治。經由是如來於定不定反問置記為記別故，隨其所應受領去來現在等義。論述此中顯示受領意化，受相應思能動其心令受苦樂，是故說名受領意業。成所作智受相應思，能起化故名化意業。於四記問為記別故，隨其所應如實了知一切問已。
【English Translation】 English version: Jianshan. Establishing the differences in the stages of the Holy Path, enabling entry into the Holy Path and liberation from the Three Realms, thereby the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One) eliminates the immeasurable doubts of all sentient beings. This discusses and elucidates the transformation of speech, with the Accomplishment-Wisdom (成所作智) varying according to the inclinations of sentient beings, manifesting transformed verbal actions, speaking various meanings, and eliminating all doubts, that is, uttering one sound to express all meanings, enabling all sentient beings to benefit according to their kind.
Thereby discerning the eighty-four thousand different mental activities of sentient beings. This discusses and elucidates the transformation of intention, with the Accomplishment-Wisdom (成所作智) corresponding to intentional actions that can initiate transformation, hence called transformed intentional actions. This can discern the eighty-four thousand different mental activities of sentient beings to be transformed. The differences in mental activities are fully recorded in the commentary, and will not be repeated here. Thereby the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One) observes the actions performed by all sentient beings, whether the actions are performed or not, whether there is merit or loss, in order to enable them to adopt or reject, create or counteract. This discusses and elucidates the transformation of creation, following the observation of the actions performed by all sentient beings, if evil actions are not performed, there is merit; if performed, there is loss; if good actions are performed, there is merit; if not performed, there is loss. Such observation is to enable them to adopt merit and reject loss, to create and maintain countermeasures for merit, and to create and distance countermeasures for loss.
Thereby the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One), in order to proclaim those countermeasures, reveals the names, phrases, and letter-bodies that they delight in. This discusses and elucidates the initiation of intentional transformation, with the Accomplishment-Wisdom (成所作智) corresponding to intentional actions that can initiate body and speech, or these intentional actions are initiated by wisdom, or the aspect of wisdom appears similar to them, therefore it is called initiating intentional actions. To speak of the countermeasures for the actions of sentient beings, the names, phrases, and letter-bodies of what is spoken are taken as their nature, therefore the names, phrases, and letter-bodies are revealed, to arouse love and joy and generate countermeasures. Thereby the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One), in response to definite, indefinite, and rhetorical questions, establishes records for the sake of distinction, and appropriately receives and understands the meanings of past, present, and future. This discusses and elucidates the reception of intentional transformation, with receptive thought able to move their minds to receive suffering and joy, therefore it is called receptive intentional actions. The Accomplishment-Wisdom (成所作智) corresponds to receptive thought, which can initiate transformation, hence called transformed intentional actions. For the sake of distinguishing the four types of questions, appropriately and truthfully knowing all questions.
。領三世等無量義。如實知已隨其所應一一記別無有顛倒 言四記者。一一向記。如有問言。一切生者決定滅耶。佛法僧寶良福田耶。如是等問應一向記。此義決定 二分別記。如有問言。一切滅者定更生耶。佛法僧寶唯有一耶 釋所問法中而不一向應為分別。有惑死者而必更生。無惑死者必不生也。若約真理三寶唯一。若據有為三寶有別 三反問記。如有問言。菩薩十地為上為下。佛法僧寶為勝為劣。應反問記汝望何問 釋曰所問之法相形待言勝劣不定故須反問。且三寶中師資而言法為最勝。起說次第即佛為勝。由佛出世方說法故。又內外道皆有三寶。望外三寶內三皆勝。十地相形勝劣可悉。為斯不同故須返問。若不返問而為答者。隨言勝劣而有難生問即難息 四默置記。如有問言。實有性我為善為惡。石女兒色為黑為白。如是等問應默置記。不應記故長戲論故 釋曰。應謂彼言。此不應記。不解彼問名為默記。非總亡言名默記也。
疏。最初修習至三百五十者。從初修習到彼岸法。至終分佈到彼岸法。總計三百五十到彼岸法。一一到彼岸中皆具六度。三十七道．六波羅密．四攝．無畏．十力．十八不共法。皆是三百五十中法。
疏。六無義者。此六塵等。有情耽染而無義利。或名六衰能衰有情所有善
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：領悟貫穿過去、現在、未來三世的無量意義。如實地瞭解之後，根據具體情況一一加以辨別記錄，沒有顛倒錯亂。 所說的四種記錄方式是：第一，直截了當的記錄。例如有人問：『一切眾生最終都會滅亡嗎？』『佛法僧三寶是真正的福田嗎？』對於這類問題，應該直接肯定地回答。因為這些道理是確定的。 第二，分別記錄。例如有人問：『一切滅亡的眾生一定會再次轉生嗎？』『佛法僧三寶是唯一的嗎？』對於所提出的問題，不應一概而論，而應加以分別說明。有惑業的眾生死後一定會再次轉生，沒有惑業的眾生死後一定不會再次轉生。如果從真理的角度來說，三寶是唯一的；如果從現象的角度來說，三寶是有區別的。 第三，反問式記錄。例如有人問：『菩薩十地是上面的高還是下面的高？』『佛法僧三寶是殊勝的還是低劣的？』應該反問：『你從哪個角度來問？』 解釋：所問的問題，是相對而言的，勝劣不定，所以需要反問。比如三寶中，從師資關係來說，法最為殊勝；從開示的先後次序來說，佛最為殊勝，因為佛出世才宣說佛法。而且，內外道都有三寶，相對於外道的三寶，內道的三寶都殊勝。十地之間的勝劣關係也是如此，因為情況不同，所以需要反問。如果不反問就直接回答，無論回答殊勝還是低劣，都會產生疑問，反問則可以消除疑問。 第四，默然不答的記錄。例如有人問：『實有的自性我是善還是惡？』『石女兒的顏色是黑還是白？』對於這類問題，應該保持沉默，不作回答。因為這些問題不應該回答，只會增長無意義的戲論。 解釋：應該告訴提問者，這個問題不應該回答。不理解對方的問題而保持沉默，才叫做默然不答，而不是完全不說話叫做默然不答。
疏：最初修習到三百五十種到彼岸法，是指從最初的修習到彼岸法，到最終的分佈到彼岸法，總共計算有三百五十種到彼岸法。每一種到彼岸法都具備六度（Lục độ，Six Perfections）。三十七道品（Tam thập thất đạo phẩm，Thirty-seven Factors of Enlightenment）、六波羅蜜（Lục Ba La Mật，Six Paramitas）、四攝法（Tứ nhiếp pháp，Four Embracing Dharmas）、無畏（Vô úy，Fearlessness）、十力（Thập lực，Ten Powers of a Buddha）、十八不共法（Thập bát bất cộng pháp，Eighteen Unique Qualities of a Buddha），都是這三百五十種法中的內容。
疏：六無義是指色、聲、香、味、觸、法這六塵（Lục trần，Six sense objects）等。眾生沉溺於這些事物，卻沒有任何益處。或者說，這六塵能衰減眾生所有的善。
【English Translation】 English version: Comprehending the immeasurable meanings that encompass the three periods of time—past, present, and future. Having truly understood them, record and distinguish them accordingly, without any confusion or inversion. The four types of recording are: First, direct recording. For example, if someone asks, 'Will all beings ultimately perish?' 'Are the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha the true fields of merit?' To such questions, one should answer directly and affirmatively, because these principles are certain. Second, differentiated recording. For example, if someone asks, 'Will all beings who have perished necessarily be reborn?' 'Are the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha the only ones?' To the questions posed, one should not answer categorically but should provide differentiated explanations. Beings with karmic obscurations will certainly be reborn after death, while those without karmic obscurations will certainly not be reborn. If viewed from the perspective of ultimate truth, the Three Jewels are one; if viewed from the perspective of phenomena, the Three Jewels are distinct. Third, interrogative recording. For example, if someone asks, 'Are the higher or lower levels of the ten Bodhisattva grounds superior?' 'Are the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha superior or inferior?' One should respond with a counter-question: 'From what perspective are you asking?' Explanation: The questions asked are relative, and superiority or inferiority is not fixed, so a counter-question is necessary. For example, among the Three Jewels, from the perspective of the teacher-student relationship, the Dharma is the most superior; from the perspective of the order of teaching, the Buddha is the most superior, because the Buddha appears in the world to expound the Dharma. Moreover, both internal and external paths have the Three Jewels. Compared to the Three Jewels of external paths, the Three Jewels of internal paths are all superior. The relationship of superiority and inferiority among the ten grounds is similar. Because the circumstances are different, a counter-question is necessary. If one answers directly without a counter-question, whether one answers superior or inferior, doubts will arise. A counter-question can dispel doubts. Fourth, silent recording. For example, if someone asks, 'Is the truly existent self-nature good or evil?' 'Is the color of a barren woman's child black or white?' To such questions, one should remain silent and not answer, because these questions should not be answered and will only increase meaningless speculation. Explanation: One should tell the questioner that the question should not be answered. Remaining silent without understanding the other person's question is called silent recording, not complete silence.
Commentary: 'Initially cultivating up to three hundred and fifty to-the-other-shore dharmas' refers to the total count of three hundred and fifty to-the-other-shore dharmas, from the initial cultivation to the to-the-other-shore dharmas, to the final distribution to the to-the-other-shore dharmas. Each to-the-other-shore dharma possesses the Six Perfections (Lục độ, Six Perfections). The Thirty-seven Factors of Enlightenment (Tam thập thất đạo phẩm, Thirty-seven Factors of Enlightenment), the Six Paramitas (Lục Ba La Mật, Six Paramitas), the Four Embracing Dharmas (Tứ nhiếp pháp, Four Embracing Dharmas), Fearlessness (Vô úy, Fearlessness), the Ten Powers of a Buddha (Thập lực, Ten Powers of a Buddha), and the Eighteen Unique Qualities of a Buddha (Thập bát bất cộng pháp, Eighteen Unique Qualities of a Buddha) are all included within these three hundred and fifty dharmas.
Commentary: 'The six meaningless things' refers to the six sense objects (Lục trần, Six sense objects) such as form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma. Sentient beings indulge in these things, but there is no benefit. Alternatively, these six sense objects can diminish all the goodness of sentient beings.
法。
疏。如瑜伽說眼謂四大等者。法苑具明。故此不引。
論。能為此世他世順益等者。問且修六度于現有苦。廣捨竭財有飢寒等。乃至修慧流血裂心。云何而言二世皆益。不善返此為難亦然。答有善惡名即成益損。又於他處而有益損。不唯約自。又能彼慳而長於貪亦名益損。故損益義二世亦成。
疏。如雜集善有十三者。按彼第三云。一自性善。謂信等十一。二相屬善。謂彼相應法。三隨逐善。謂彼諸法習氣。四發起善。謂彼所發身業．語業。五第一義善。謂真如。六生得善。由先串習生便即起。不假思惟。七方便善。親近善友思惟方起。八現前供養善。謂對三寶興供養業。九饒益善。謂以四攝饒益有情。十引攝善。以施戒福引攝生天樂異熟等。十一對治善。謂厭壞對治等對治二障。十二寂靜善。謂永斷煩惱得想受滅有無餘依涅槃界等。十三等流善。謂已得寂靜者。由此增上力故發起勝品神通等世出世共不共功德。
疏。不善十二者。按彼第四云。一自性不善。謂欲界系不任運起。及任運起能發惡行一切煩惱。二相屬不善。謂即此煩惱．隨煩惱相應法。三隨逐不善。謂彼習氣。四發起不善。謂彼所起身業．語業。五第一義不善。謂一切流轉。六生得不善。謂由串習生便自起不假思惟。七
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 法。
疏。（科文）如《瑜伽師地論》說眼謂四大等者，《法苑珠林》中已詳細說明，故此處不引用。
論。能為此世他世順益等者。問：且修六度于現有苦，廣捨竭財有飢寒等，乃至修慧流血裂心，云何而言二世皆益？不善返此為難亦然。答：有善惡名即成益損，又於他處而有益損，不唯約自。又能彼慳而長於貪亦名益損，故損益義二世亦成。
疏。（科文）如《雜集論》善有十三者。按彼第三云：一、自性善，謂信等十一；二、相屬善，謂彼相應法；三、隨逐善，謂彼諸法習氣；四、發起善，謂彼所發身業、語業；五、第一義善，謂真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）；六、生得善，由先串習生便即起，不假思惟；七、方便善，親近善友思惟方起；八、現前供養善，謂對三寶興供養業；九、饒益善，謂以四攝饒益有情（sentient beings）；十、引攝善，以施戒福引攝生天樂異熟等；十一、對治善，謂厭壞對治等對治二障；十二、寂靜善，謂永斷煩惱得想受滅有無餘依涅槃界等；十三、等流善，謂已得寂靜者，由此增上力故發起勝品神通等世出世共不共功德。
疏。（科文）不善十二者。按彼第四云：一、自性不善，謂欲界系不任運起，及任運起能發惡行一切煩惱；二、相屬不善，謂即此煩惱、隨煩惱相應法；三、隨逐不善，謂彼習氣；四、發起不善，謂彼所起身業、語業；五、第一義不善，謂一切流轉；六、生得不善，謂由串習生便自起不假思惟；七
【English Translation】 English version: Dharma.
Commentary: As the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the eye is composed of the four great elements, the Fa Yuan Zhu Lin explains it in detail, so it is not quoted here.
Treatise: 'Being able to benefit this life and the next life, etc.' Question: If one practices the six perfections (Paramitas) in the present suffering, widely giving away wealth to the point of hunger and cold, and even shedding blood and tearing the heart when cultivating wisdom, how can it be said that both lives are benefited? The opposite of goodness causing difficulty is also the same. Answer: Having the names of good and evil constitutes benefit and harm. Moreover, benefit and harm can occur in other places, not only in oneself. Furthermore, causing someone to be stingy and increasing their greed is also called benefit and harm. Therefore, the meaning of benefit and harm is established in both lives.
Commentary: As the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that there are thirteen kinds of good. According to the third section of that text: 1. Intrinsic good: referring to the eleven, such as faith; 2. Associated good: referring to the dharmas corresponding to them; 3. Concomitant good: referring to the habitual energies of those dharmas; 4. Initiating good: referring to the physical and verbal actions initiated by them; 5. Ultimate good: referring to Tathata (真如, the true nature of things); 6. Innate good: arising spontaneously from prior habituation, without the need for thought; 7. Expedient good: arising from thinking through close association with good friends; 8. Good of present offerings: referring to the act of making offerings to the Triple Gem (三寶); 9. Benefiting good: referring to benefiting sentient beings with the four means of attraction (四攝); 10. Attracting good: attracting rebirth in the heavens and the enjoyment of pleasant results through generosity, morality, and merit; 11. Antidotal good: referring to counteracting the two obscurations (二障) with antidotes such as aversion and destruction; 12. Tranquil good: referring to the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling, with or without remainder, the realm of Nirvana (涅槃) and so on, through the permanent cutting off of afflictions; 13. Equally flowing good: referring to those who have already attained tranquility, who, through this increased power, initiate superior qualities, such as mundane and supramundane, common and uncommon merits and virtues.
Commentary: There are twelve kinds of non-good. According to the fourth section of that text: 1. Intrinsic non-good: referring to all afflictions of the desire realm (欲界) that arise either spontaneously or non-spontaneously and can initiate evil actions; 2. Associated non-good: referring to the dharmas corresponding to these afflictions and secondary afflictions; 3. Concomitant non-good: referring to their habitual energies; 4. Initiating non-good: referring to the physical and verbal actions initiated by them; 5. Ultimate non-good: referring to all transmigrations; 6. Innate non-good: arising spontaneously from habituation without the need for thought; 7.
方便不善。近不善友思惟方起。八現前供養不善。相對歸依隨一天眾殺害。邪見建立祠廟興供養業。九損害不善。謂於一切處起身．語．意種種邪行。十引攝不善。行惡三業引不愛異熟。十一所治不善。謂諸對治所對治法。十二障礙不善。謂能障礙諸善品法。如數眾集等。
疏。無記十四者。按彼第四云。一自性無記。謂八色界處意相應品．命根．眾同分．名．句．文身也。二相屬無記。謂懷非穢凈心。所有名等名等所攝受心．及心所。三隨逐無記。謂彼戲論習氣。四發起無記。謂彼所攝諸心．心所發身業．語業。五第一義無記。謂虛空．非擇滅。六生得無記。謂諸不善有漏善異熟。七方便無記。謂非染善心者所有威儀路．工巧處。八現前供養無記。謂如有一想對歸依隨一天眾遠離殺害意．邪惡見。而建立祠廟興供養業。令無量眾于如是處不生長福．非福。九饒益無記。謂如有一于自僕使妻子等所。以非穢凈心而行惠施。十受用無記。謂如有一以無間擇無染污心受用資具。十一引攝無記。謂如有一于工巧處由串習故。于當來世復引如是相身。由此身故習工巧處。速疾究竟。十二對治無記。謂如有一為治疾病得安樂故。以簡擇心好服醫藥。十三寂靜無記。謂色．無色界諸煩惱等。由奢摩他所藏伏故。十四等流無記
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一、方便不善（Upāya-akuśala）：接近不善的朋友，並因此產生不正確的思考。 二、現前供養不善（Pratyakṣa-pūjā-akuśala）：以錯誤的方式進行供養，例如歸依于非正統的天眾，甚至爲了他們而殺害生命。以邪見為基礎建立祠廟，並進行供養活動。 三、損害不善（Vihiṃsā-akuśala）：在任何情況下，通過身、語、意做出各種不正當的行為。 四、引攝不善（Ākarṣaṇa-akuśala）：造作惡的三業（身、語、意），導致不愉快的異熟果報。 五、所治不善（Pratiṣedha-akuśala）：指那些需要被對治的法，也就是與對治法相對立的法。 六、障礙不善（Āvaraṇa-akuśala）：指那些能夠障礙善法生起的法，例如各種集會等。
疏解： 無記法有十四種： 一、自性無記（Svabhāva-avyākṛta）：指八處（Aṣṭa-āyatana），與意相應的品類，命根（Jīvita），眾同分（Nikāya-sabhāga），名（Nāma），句（Pada），文身（Vyañjana-kāya）。 二、相屬無記（Sambandha-avyākṛta）：指以非清凈也非不清凈的心，所擁有的名等，以及被名等所攝受的心和心所。 三、隨逐無記（Anubandha-avyākṛta）：指戲論的習氣。 四、發起無記（Prabhava-avyākṛta）：指被戲論習氣所攝的心和心所，以及由它們所發起的身體行為和語言行為。 五、第一義無記（Paramārtha-avyākṛta）：指虛空（Ākāśa）和非擇滅（Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）。 六、生得無記（Nisarga-avyākṛta）：指那些不善的有漏善的異熟果報。 七、方便無記（Upāya-avyākṛta）：指那些非染污也非善良的人所表現出的威儀和在工藝方面的行為。 八、現前供養無記（Pratyakṣa-pūjā-avyākṛta）：例如，有人以錯誤的想法，歸依于某個天眾，遠離殺害的意圖，但卻以邪惡的見解建立祠廟，並進行供養活動，導致無數眾生在這種地方既不增長福德，也不增長非福德。 九、饒益無記（Anugraha-avyākṛta）：例如，有人以非清凈也非不清凈的心，對自己的僕人、妻子等進行佈施。 十、受用無記（Paribhoga-avyākṛta）：例如，有人以無間斷的、經過選擇的、無染污的心來享用資具。 十一、引攝無記（Ākarṣaṇa-avyākṛta）：例如，有人因為對工藝方面的長期練習，在未來世再次獲得具有這種特徵的身體，並因此能夠迅速而徹底地掌握工藝。 十二、對治無記（Pratiṣedha-avyākṛta）：例如，有人爲了治療疾病、獲得安樂，以謹慎選擇的心態服用藥物。 十三、寂靜無記（Śānta-avyākṛta）：指色（Rūpa）、無（Arūpa）等煩惱，因為奢摩他（Śamatha）的緣故而被隱藏。 十四、等流無記（Niṣyanda-avyākṛta）
【English Translation】 English version 1. Expedient Unwholesomeness (Upāya-akuśala): Approaching unwholesome friends and consequently generating incorrect thoughts. 2. Present Offering Unwholesomeness (Pratyakṣa-pūjā-akuśala): Making offerings in an incorrect manner, such as taking refuge in unorthodox deities and even killing living beings for them. Establishing temples based on wrong views and engaging in offering activities. 3. Harmful Unwholesomeness (Vihiṃsā-akuśala): Engaging in various improper actions through body, speech, and mind in any situation. 4. Attracting Unwholesomeness (Ākarṣaṇa-akuśala): Committing evil deeds through the three karmas (body, speech, and mind), leading to unpleasant results. 5. Counteracted Unwholesomeness (Pratiṣedha-akuśala): Refers to those dharmas that need to be counteracted, which are the dharmas that oppose the counteracting dharmas. 6. Obstructing Unwholesomeness (Āvaraṇa-akuśala): Refers to those dharmas that can obstruct the arising of wholesome dharmas, such as various gatherings, etc.
Commentary: There are fourteen types of indeterminate (avyākṛta) dharmas: 1. Self-Nature Indeterminate (Svabhāva-avyākṛta): Refers to the eight **places (Aṣṭa-āyatana), categories corresponding to mind, life force (Jīvita), commonality of beings (Nikāya-sabhāga), name (Nāma), sentence (Pada), and body of letters (Vyañjana-kāya). 2. Related Indeterminate (Sambandha-avyākṛta): Refers to the names possessed by a mind that is neither pure nor impure, as well as the mind and mental factors encompassed by those names. 3. Following Indeterminate (Anubandha-avyākṛta): Refers to the habitual tendencies of discursive thoughts. 4. Arising Indeterminate (Prabhava-avyākṛta): Refers to the mind and mental factors encompassed by the habitual tendencies of discursive thoughts, as well as the bodily and verbal actions arising from them. 5. Ultimate Meaning Indeterminate (Paramārtha-avyākṛta): Refers to space (Ākāśa) and cessation through non-discrimination (Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). 6. Innate Indeterminate (Nisarga-avyākṛta): Refers to the results of impure wholesome karma that are still subject to outflows. 7. Expedient Indeterminate (Upāya-avyākṛta): Refers to the demeanor and skillful actions exhibited by those who are neither defiled nor virtuous. 8. Present Offering Indeterminate (Pratyakṣa-pūjā-avyākṛta): For example, someone with incorrect thoughts takes refuge in a certain deity, refrains from the intention to kill, but establishes temples with wrong views and engages in offering activities, causing countless beings in such places to neither increase merit nor demerit. 9. Benefiting Indeterminate (Anugraha-avyākṛta): For example, someone makes offerings to their servants, wives, etc., with a mind that is neither pure nor impure. 10. Enjoying Indeterminate (Paribhoga-avyākṛta): For example, someone enjoys resources with an uninterrupted, selective, and undefiled mind. 11. Attracting Indeterminate (Ākarṣaṇa-avyākṛta): For example, someone, due to long-term practice in craftsmanship, obtains a body with such characteristics in the future, and thus can quickly and thoroughly master the craft. 12. Counteracting Indeterminate (Pratiṣedha-avyākṛta): For example, someone takes medicine with a carefully chosen mindset in order to treat illness and obtain comfort. 13. Tranquil Indeterminate (Śānta-avyākṛta): Refers to afflictions such as form (Rūpa) and formless (Arūpa), which are hidden due to Śamatha. 14. Resulting Indeterminate (Niṣyanda-avyākṛta)
謂變化相應共有等法名俱生品。此心．心法謂嬉戲故發起變化是無記性。若為利樂有情當知是善。
疏。五識不能轉心發業者。按彼論云。眼等五識謂隨意識轉。隨善染轉。隨發業轉 釋曰。隨意引生隨意善染五凈垢轉。五識但隨發業意轉自非轉也。轉謂發起。即因等起發業心也。隨轉謂隨前之轉業勢力而生。即剎那等起。
論。有義六識三性不俱者。準瑜伽釋家總有三義。一云五識唯一剎那。五復不俱。二云雖一剎那五得俱起。三云五得俱起復多剎那。三皆不許五三性俱。有義疏中唯依初難。今別解云。此中但依第二所說五性不俱。所以者何。且此論中上下無說五不俱生。又瑜伽等云。若起五識則七俱轉。如是等文諸師共了。如何說有五識不俱。又即此文說眼等識成善．染者必由意引。許五性俱六亦應爾。明知即許五識俱生。又第二難率爾．等流眼等五識。或多或少言容俱起。初師若其不許俱者。何故第二如是立難 詳曰。既無明教別釋理通。而援教斥疏未見其可所以然者。瑜伽釋家三義許不。不許何引。許即何故而非疏言。順第一故。又此論云。瑜伽等說轉識相應三性俱起依多念等。此豈不是雙會三性及諸識俱。若言唯會三性俱者。亦不應理。論云性俱依多念會。多念會彼識俱何失。性及識俱皆是彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所謂的『變化相應共有等法』，被稱為『俱生品』。這種心和心法，因為嬉戲的緣故而發起變化，其性質是『無記』（既非善亦非惡）。如果爲了利益和快樂有情眾生，應當知道這是『善』。
疏：五識不能轉變心而發起業。按照《瑜伽師地論》所說：眼等五識是隨著意識轉變的，隨著善或染污轉變的，隨著發起業轉變的。釋義：隨著意識的引導而生起，隨著善或染污而轉變，五凈（眼耳鼻舌身）和垢（不凈）也隨之轉變。五識只是隨著發起業的意識而轉變，自身並不能轉變。『轉』的意思是發起，也就是作為因等而發起業的心。『隨轉』的意思是隨著之前的轉變業的勢力而生起，也就是剎那等起。
論：有一種觀點認為六識的三性（善、惡、無記）不能同時具備。根據《瑜伽師地論》的解釋，總共有三種觀點。第一種觀點認為五識只有一個剎那，而且五識不能同時生起。第二種觀點認為，即使只有一個剎那，五識也可以同時生起。第三種觀點認為，五識可以同時生起，而且可以持續多個剎那。這三種觀點都不允許五識同時具備三種性質。有一種觀點認為，註釋中只依據第一種觀點進行駁難。現在另外解釋說，這裡只是依據第二種觀點所說的五性不能同時具備。為什麼這樣說呢？因為這部論中，從頭到尾都沒有說五識不能同時生起。而且《瑜伽師地論》等經論中說，如果生起五識，那麼第七識（末那識）也會同時轉變。像這樣的經文，各位法師都清楚明白。怎麼能說有五識不能同時生起呢？而且這段經文說，眼等識成就善或染污，必定是由意識引導的。如果允許五性同時具備，那麼六識也應該如此。這明明就是允許五識同時生起。而且第二種駁難說，率爾（無分別）和等流（相似相續）的眼等五識，或者多或者少，都可能同時生起。如果最初的法師不允許五識同時生起，那麼為什麼第二種駁難要這樣立論呢？詳細地說，既然沒有明確的教義，那麼就應該按照通用的道理來解釋。而引用教義來駁斥註釋，我看不出有什麼道理。瑜伽師的解釋允許不允許這三種觀點？如果不允許，為什麼要引用？如果允許，為什麼又說註釋不對？是爲了順應第一種觀點嗎？而且這部論中說，《瑜伽師地論》等經論說，轉變識相應的三性同時生起，是依據多個念頭等。這難道不是同時具備了三種性質和各種識嗎？如果說只是同時具備了三種性質，那也不應該這樣說。論中說，性質同時具備是依據多個念頭同時具備。多個念頭同時具備，那些識同時具備又有什麼損失呢？性質和識同時具備，都是《瑜伽師地論》等經論所說的。
【English Translation】 English version: The so-called 'transformation-corresponding common dharmas' are named 'Co-existent Categories'. This mind and mental dharmas, because of playfulness, initiate transformations, and their nature is 'avyākrta' (neither good nor bad). If it is for the benefit and happiness of sentient beings, it should be known as 'good'.
Commentary: The five consciousnesses cannot transform the mind and initiate karma. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: the five consciousnesses such as eye consciousness follow the transformation of the mind consciousness, follow the transformation of good or defilement, and follow the initiation of karma. Explanation: They arise following the guidance of the mind consciousness, transform following good or defilement, and the five pure (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and impure (defiled) also transform accordingly. The five consciousnesses only follow the transformation of the mind that initiates karma, and they themselves cannot transform. 'Transform' means to initiate, that is, the mind that initiates karma as a cause, etc. 'Follow the transformation' means to arise following the power of the previous transformation karma, that is, momentary arising.
Treatise: Some argue that the three natures (good, evil, neutral) of the six consciousnesses cannot be simultaneous. According to the interpretation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, there are three views in total. The first view is that the five consciousnesses have only one moment, and the five consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously. The second view is that even if there is only one moment, the five consciousnesses can arise simultaneously. The third view is that the five consciousnesses can arise simultaneously and can last for multiple moments. None of these three views allow the five consciousnesses to simultaneously possess three natures. One view argues that the commentary only relies on the first view to refute. Now, another explanation is that here it only relies on the second view that the five natures cannot be simultaneous. Why is this so? Because in this treatise, from beginning to end, it does not say that the five consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously. Moreover, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other scriptures say that if the five consciousnesses arise, then the seventh consciousness (manas) will also transform simultaneously. Such scriptures are clear to all Dharma masters. How can it be said that there are five consciousnesses that cannot arise simultaneously? Moreover, this passage says that the eye consciousness, etc., achieve good or defilement, which must be guided by the mind consciousness. If the five natures are allowed to be simultaneous, then the six consciousnesses should also be like this. This clearly allows the five consciousnesses to arise simultaneously. Moreover, the second refutation says that the impulsive (non-discriminating) and homogenous (similar continuous) eye consciousness, etc., whether more or less, may arise simultaneously. If the initial Dharma master does not allow the five consciousnesses to arise simultaneously, then why does the second refutation establish the argument in this way? In detail, since there is no clear teaching, it should be explained according to the general principle. However, I don't see the reason for refuting the commentary by quoting the teachings. Does the interpretation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra allow these three views or not? If it does not allow, why quote it? If it allows, why say that the commentary is wrong? Is it to comply with the first view? Moreover, this treatise says that the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other scriptures say that the three natures corresponding to the transforming consciousness arise simultaneously, based on multiple thoughts, etc. Isn't this simultaneously possessing the three natures and various consciousnesses? If it is said that only the three natures are simultaneously possessed, then it should not be said like this. The treatise says that the natures are simultaneously possessed based on multiple thoughts being simultaneously possessed. What is the loss if those consciousnesses are simultaneously possessed when multiple thoughts are simultaneously possessed? The natures and consciousnesses being simultaneously possessed are all stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other scriptures.
論。會許不許。何乃儻耶。設若此文唯會三性。以性例識會亦無違。況覆文中義通性識。又論不言五識不俱證疏非者。此論何處言五識俱唯一剎那。取第二是。又論但云五由意引成乎善．染。何理即證五識俱耶。五識不俱豈妨意引。若以文中言五識故即證五俱。亦應五識無非俱時。言五識故。次云第六通三性者。是就他難。非許五俱破他第六。又后師難言容俱。顯其五識非恒時並。簡常俱起置容俱言。非顯前師許五俱起言容俱也。由斯疏義理無違也。
疏。顯揚論十九至俱生耳者 了別定所緣等。是第一因 由此俱生耳識。是第二因。顯定意識能緣定境及非定境。故說種種所緣境言。定境法處。種種境者。通五塵等。
論。有義至容俱起者。或多或少疏有二解。第一據念多少。第二約識多少。有多妨難具如燈辨。
論。瑜伽至后時方出者。按彼論云。非即彼定相應意識。而無唯字。唯之與即義少相似。此論意證不獨意取。改即為唯。亦無者字。又疏中雲謂有行人。亦意加也。余文並同。
疏。若遇聲緣至即是耳識者。有義疏有二說。今別解之。從定後起散心名從定起 詳曰。此亦可然。然論既云後方出定。起屬在定。起意．耳識義意幽遠。
疏。散意入舍者。此答前問。總有兩解。散
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論：會許還是不許？為何如此模棱兩可？假設此文僅會通三性（善性、惡性、無記性），以性來類推識的會通也沒有違背之處。更何況文中義理貫通性與識。又論中沒有說五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）不俱時生起是爲了否定證疏的觀點。此論何處說過五識俱時唯一剎那？取第二種觀點是正確的。又論中只說五識由意（意識）引導而成就善或染，憑什麼道理就證明五識俱時生起呢？五識不俱時生起，難道就妨礙意的引導了嗎？如果因為文中說了五識，就證明五識俱時生起，也應該五識沒有不是俱時生起的。因為說了五識的緣故。接下來又說第六識（意識）通三性，這是就他人提出的疑問而說的，不是允許五識俱時生起而破斥他人的第六識。又後來的論師提出疑問說容許俱時生起，顯明瞭五識不是恒常同時生起的。用容許俱時生起來簡別于恒常俱時生起，不是爲了顯明前一位論師允許五識俱時生起而說容許俱時生起。因此疏的義理沒有違背之處。 疏：顯揚論第十九說，與俱生耳識相關的是了別定所緣等。這是第一因。由此俱生耳識，是第二因。顯明瞭定意識能夠緣定境以及非定境。所以說種種所緣境。定境指法處（意識所緣之境），種種境指通五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）等。 論：有義至容俱起者。或者多或者少，疏中有兩種解釋。第一種是根據唸的多少，第二種是根據識的多少。有很多妨礙和疑問，詳細的辨析在燈中。 論：瑜伽至后時方出者。按照那部論所說，並非即彼定相應意識，而且沒有『唯』字。『唯』與『即』意思稍微相似。此論的用意在於證明不單單是意取。將『即』改為『唯』，也沒有『者』字。又疏中說『謂有行人』，也是意譯新增的。其餘文字都相同。 疏：若遇聲緣至即是耳識者。有義疏有兩種說法。現在分別解釋它。從定後生起散亂心叫做從定起。詳細地說，這也可以。然而論中既然說後來才出定，生起屬於在定中。生起意、耳識的意義深遠。 疏：散意入舍者。這是回答前面的問題。總共有兩種解釋。散
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Should it be permitted or not? Why is it so ambiguous? Suppose this text only harmonizes the three natures (good, evil, and neutral), there is no contradiction in analogizing the harmonization of consciousness based on nature. Moreover, the meaning in the text connects nature and consciousness. Furthermore, the treatise does not mention that the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) do not arise simultaneously in order to deny the commentary's view. Where in this treatise does it say that the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously in a single moment? Taking the second view is correct. Also, the treatise only says that the five consciousnesses are guided by the mind (consciousness) to achieve good or defilement. What reason proves that the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously? Does the non-simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses hinder the mind's guidance? If, because the text mentions the five consciousnesses, it proves that the five arise simultaneously, then it should also be that none of the five consciousnesses arise non-simultaneously. Because it mentions the five consciousnesses. Next, saying that the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) connects to the three natures is in response to others' questions, not to permit the simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses to refute others' sixth consciousness. Also, later masters questioned whether simultaneous arising is permissible, clarifying that the five consciousnesses do not constantly arise simultaneously. Using 'permissible simultaneous arising' to distinguish it from 'constant simultaneous arising' is not to clarify that the previous master permitted the simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses by saying 'permissible simultaneous arising'. Therefore, the meaning of the commentary has no contradictions. Commentary: The 19th section of the Xianyang Lun (Compendium of Determinations) states that what is related to the co-arising ear-consciousness is the distinguishing of the determined object, etc. This is the first cause. From this, the co-arising ear-consciousness is the second cause. It clarifies that the fixed consciousness is able to cognize fixed and non-fixed objects. Therefore, it speaks of various objects. Fixed objects refer to dharma-dhatu (the object of mind-consciousness), and various objects refer to the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), etc. Treatise: 'Some say that the capacity for simultaneous arising' refers to either more or less. The commentary has two explanations. The first is based on the amount of thoughts, and the second is based on the amount of consciousnesses. There are many obstacles and questions, and detailed analysis is in the Deng (Lamp). Treatise: Yoga (Yogacara-bhumi-sastra) states that 'only after a while does it emerge'. According to that treatise, it is not exactly the fixed corresponding consciousness, and there is no word 'only'. 'Only' and 'exactly' have slightly similar meanings. The intention of this treatise is to prove that it is not just the mind that takes it. Changing 'exactly' to 'only' also removes the word 'person'. Also, the commentary says 'referring to a practitioner', which is also an intentional addition. The rest of the text is the same. Commentary: 'If encountering sound conditions, it is the ear-consciousness'. The commentary has two explanations. Now, let's explain them separately. The scattered mind arising after meditation is called arising from meditation. In detail, this is also possible. However, since the treatise says that one only emerges from meditation later, arising belongs to being in meditation. The meaning of arising mind and ear-consciousness is profound. Commentary: 'The scattered mind enters abandonment'. This answers the previous question. There are two explanations in total. Scattered
意入舍至耳必不生。是第一解。二解雖復至其性亦許有不同。是第二解。就第一解復有二意。一入舍定。二初起定。起定即是將出定時。此二時意與耳同緣。
疏。六十九言欲界有變化等者。具如燈辨。
疏。四識緣威儀等者。略有三釋。以彼威儀多依道路故得路名 一云威儀即是表色。路體四塵。四塵是彼威儀所託名威儀路 二云威儀四塵為性。即發彼心名之為路。為彼依故。二皆依主 三云四塵總名威儀。與威儀色不相離故。是心所託即名為路。持業釋也。緣彼威儀路之心皆依主釋 工巧處者亦有三釋。以彼工巧多依處所而施設之故得處號 一云工巧謂身．語二。身巧即以造殿堂等長等表色而為其體。處即表色。所依色．香．味．觸為性。語巧歌等。即以所發聲為其體。處即歌等所依五塵 二云四塵．五塵名為工巧。能發彼心名之為處。為彼依故。二並依主 三云工巧即名為處。以四．五塵是心所託。持業為目。緣工巧處心皆依主釋。
成唯識論演秘卷第四(末終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第五(本)
沙門知周撰
論。恒依心起等者。有義難云。受等依心起受等名心所。心依受等生應名受等所。又受等四義具受等名心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果意識進入舍（Skt. griha，住所）時，耳識必然不會產生。這是第一種解釋。第二種解釋是，即使意識進入舍，其性質也可能有所不同。這是第二種解釋。在第一種解釋中，又有兩種含義：一是進入舍時已確定，二是初起時已確定。初起時已確定，指的是即將出定時。這兩個時間點的意識與耳識所緣相同。
疏（對經文的註釋）。六十九頁說欲界有變化等，具體內容如《燈辨》中所述。
疏。四識緣威儀等，略有三種解釋。因為這些威儀大多依賴道路，所以得名『路』：第一種說法是，威儀就是表色（Skt. rūpa-vijñapti，顯色），路的本體是四塵（Skt. catūr-mahābhūta，四大），四塵是威儀所依託的，所以稱為威儀路。第二種說法是，威儀的本體是四塵，能引發彼心，所以稱為路，因為是彼心所依賴的。這兩種說法都屬於依主釋（Skt. tat-puruṣa）。第三種說法是，四塵總稱為威儀，與威儀色不相離，是心所依託的，所以稱為路，這是持業釋（Skt. karma-dhāraya）。緣彼威儀路之心都屬於依主釋。工巧處也有三種解釋。因為這些工巧大多依賴處所而施設，所以得名『處』：第一種說法是，工巧指的是身、語二業。身巧就是以建造殿堂等長等表色作為其本體，處就是表色所依賴的色、香、味、觸為本體。語巧如歌等，就是以所發出的聲音作為其本體，處就是歌等所依賴的五塵（Skt. pañca-bhūta，五大）。第二種說法是，四塵、五塵稱為工巧，能引發彼心，所以稱為處，因為是彼心所依賴的。這兩種說法都屬於依主釋。第三種說法是，工巧就稱為處，因為四塵、五塵是心所依託的，這是持業釋。緣工巧處之心都屬於依主釋。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第四（末終） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1833 《成唯識論演秘》
《成唯識論演秘》卷第五（本）
沙門知周 撰
論。恒依心起等，有義難云：受等依心起，受等名心所。心依受等生，應名受等所。又受等四義具，受等名心
【English Translation】 English version: If consciousness enters the griha (Skt. griha, dwelling), the ear consciousness will necessarily not arise. This is the first explanation. The second explanation is that even if consciousness enters the griha, its nature may still be different. This is the second explanation. Within the first explanation, there are two meanings: one is that it is determined upon entering the griha, and the other is that it is determined upon initial arising. 'Determined upon initial arising' refers to the time when one is about to exit samadhi (Skt. samādhi, meditative absorption). The consciousness at these two times shares the same object of perception as the ear consciousness.
Commentary (a commentary on the sutra). Page sixty-nine states that the desire realm has transformations, etc., as detailed in the 'Lamp Discrimination'.
Commentary. 'The four consciousnesses cognize deportment, etc.' There are roughly three explanations. Because these deportments mostly rely on roads, they are named 'road': The first explanation is that deportment is rūpa-vijñapti (Skt. rūpa-vijñapti, revealing form), and the substance of the road is the catūr-mahābhūta (Skt. catūr-mahābhūta, four great elements). The four elements are what the deportment relies on, so it is called the 'deportment road'. The second explanation is that the nature of deportment is the four elements, which can give rise to that mind, so it is called the 'road' because it is what that mind relies on. Both of these explanations are tat-puruṣa (Skt. tat-puruṣa, possessive compound). The third explanation is that the four elements are collectively called 'deportment', and because they are inseparable from the deportment form, they are what the mind relies on, so it is called 'road'. This is karma-dhāraya (Skt. karma-dhāraya, appositional compound). The mind that cognizes that deportment road is all tat-puruṣa. There are also three explanations for skillful activities. Because these skillful activities are mostly established depending on locations, they are named 'place': The first explanation is that skillful activities refer to the two karmas of body and speech. Skillful body activity takes the revealing form of constructing palaces, etc., as its substance, and the 'place' is the form, smell, taste, and touch that the revealing form relies on as its substance. Skillful speech activity, such as singing, takes the sound produced as its substance, and the 'place' is the five elements (Skt. pañca-bhūta, five great elements) that the singing relies on. The second explanation is that the four elements and five elements are called 'skillful activities', which can give rise to that mind, so it is called 'place' because it is what that mind relies on. Both of these explanations are tat-puruṣa. The third explanation is that skillful activities are called 'place' because the four elements and five elements are what the mind relies on. This is karma-dhāraya. The mind that cognizes the skillful activity place is all tat-puruṣa.
The End of the Fourth Scroll of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-vyākhyā Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43, No. 1833 Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-vyākhyā
The Fifth Scroll of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-vyākhyā (This Volume)
Composed by Śramaṇa Zhizhou
Treatise: 'Constantly arising depending on the mind, etc.' Some argue: 'Feelings, etc., arise depending on the mind, so feelings, etc., are called mental factors. If the mind arises depending on feelings, etc., it should be called what feelings, etc., depend on. Furthermore, feelings, etc., possess the four meanings, so feelings, etc., are called mind.'
所。心亦四義具應名受等所。如疏以彼二三義簡。然疏中說應名心所此即不然。既以心王望受等說。如何仍說名作心所 詳曰。心所總名由依於他四義具立。疏以王．所總名相例。以心依他具四義故。不據別別受等為難 問論既自云恒依心等名為心所。心不依心如何難云應名心所 答云依於心顯依非己依非己故得心所名。心依亦爾何非心所。疏依理責。不爾心總。而受等別。別總不切。難不切也。今助一難。受等依心起。從依名心所。心依心所生應名心所。所餘難準此。此不違論。亦無別總不均之過。
論。即諸心所所取別相者。問瑜伽但云作意了此所未了相。如何得知。所未了者是諸心所所取別相 答諸心所等所取別相。皆是心王所未了相。既言作意了此未了。明知余所所取別相皆能了之。
疏。顯揚十八有頌等者。按彼頌云。依多境了別各為自業生。心法不應思。相似境轉故。論曰心所有法依止能緣多境八種識故。各各造作自業而起。依心而有故名心所有法。不應更思彼所緣境。由彼與識等緣轉故 釋曰。唯以一義立心所名。言等緣轉。顯彼心所亦緣總相。
論。余處復說至德失等相者。中邊第一但云心所亦緣別相。瑜伽第三但說別境緣可樂等。而無亦字。二論合引故云亦能了可樂等 問心取
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所。心也具備四種含義，因此可以被稱作『受』等『所』（心所）。就像疏文中用那二三種含義來簡化一樣。然而疏文中說應該稱作心所，這就不對了。既然以心王（心識的主要部分）來對待受等（感受等心所），為什麼仍然說名稱是心所呢？詳細地說，心所的總稱是因為依靠于其他四種含義而建立的。疏文以王（心王）、所（心所）的總稱來類比，因為心依靠于其他四種含義。不要根據個別的受等來提出疑問。問：論中既然自己說總是依靠心等，才被稱為心所。心不依靠心，如何反駁說應該稱作心所呢？答：說依靠於心，是爲了顯示依靠的不是自己，因為不是依靠自己，所以才得到心所的名稱。心依靠也是這樣，為什麼不是心所呢？疏文是依據道理來責備。否則，心是總的，而受等是別的，個別和總的並不貼切，反駁也就不貼切了。現在我來補充一個反駁：受等依靠心而生起，因為依靠而得名心所。心依靠心所而生，也應該稱作心所。其餘的疑問可以參照這個。這不違反論述，也沒有個別和總的不均等的過失。
論：即是各種心所所取的不同表相。問：瑜伽論只說『作意』（manasikara，心理活動）瞭解這個未了解的表相。如何得知，所未了解的是各種心所所取的不同表相呢？答：各種心所等所取的不同表相，都是心王所未了解的表相。既然說作意瞭解這個未了解的，就明確知道其餘心所所取的不同表相都能瞭解它。
疏：顯揚聖教論第十八卷有頌等。按照那首頌說：『依靠多個境界，各自爲了自己的作用而生。心法不應該思慮，因為相似的境界而運轉。』論中說，心所有法依靠並且能夠緣取多個境界的八種識，因此各自造作自己的作用而生起。因為依靠心而存在，所以叫做心所有法。不應該再思慮它所緣取的境界，因為它和識等同等地緣取而運轉。』解釋說：只用一種含義來建立心所的名稱。說『等緣轉』，顯示那些心所也緣取總相。
論：其他地方又說到德失等表相。中邊分別論第一卷只說心所也緣取不同的表相。瑜伽師地論第三卷只說別境（prthag-visaya，特殊對像）緣取可喜等。而沒有『也』字。把這兩個論合起來引用，所以說也能瞭解可喜等。問：心取
【English Translation】 English version: So. The mind also possesses four meanings, therefore it can be called 'reception' (受) and other 'possessions' (所) (mental factors). It's like how the commentary simplifies it with those two or three meanings. However, the commentary says it should be called mental factors, which is incorrect. Since the mind-king (the main part of consciousness) is used to treat reception and other mental factors, why still say the name is mental factors? In detail, the general name of mental factors is established because it relies on the other four meanings. The commentary uses the general names of king (mind-king) and possessions (mental factors) as an analogy, because the mind relies on the other four meanings. Do not raise questions based on individual receptions, etc. Question: Since the treatise itself says that it always relies on the mind, etc., to be called mental factors, how can it be argued that it should be called mental factors when the mind does not rely on the mind? Answer: Saying it relies on the mind is to show that what is relied on is not oneself, and because it is not relying on oneself, it gets the name of mental factors. The mind relying is also like this, why is it not a mental factor? The commentary rebukes based on reason. Otherwise, the mind is general, while reception, etc., are specific, and the individual and the general are not relevant, and the rebuttal is also not relevant. Now I will add a rebuttal: Reception, etc., arise relying on the mind, and are named mental factors because of reliance. The mind relies on mental factors to arise, and should also be called mental factors. The remaining questions can be referred to this. This does not violate the argument, and there is no fault of inequality between the individual and the general.
Treatise: That is, the different appearances taken by various mental factors. Question: The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) only says that 'attention' (manasikara, mental activity) understands this ununderstood appearance. How do we know that what is not understood is the different appearances taken by various mental factors? Answer: The different appearances taken by various mental factors, etc., are all appearances not understood by the mind-king. Since it says that attention understands this ununderstood, it is clear that the different appearances taken by the remaining mental factors can all understand it.
Commentary: The eighteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論) has verses, etc. According to that verse, 'Relying on multiple objects, each is born for its own function. Mental phenomena should not be contemplated, because they revolve around similar objects.' The treatise says that mental phenomena rely on and can grasp the eight consciousnesses of multiple objects, therefore each creates its own function and arises. Because they exist relying on the mind, they are called mental phenomena. One should not further contemplate the objects they grasp, because they revolve equally grasping with consciousness, etc.' The explanation says: Only one meaning is used to establish the name of mental factors. Saying 'equally grasping and revolving' shows that those mental factors also grasp the general appearance.
Treatise: Other places also mention the appearances of virtues, faults, etc. The Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (中邊分別論) first volume only says that mental factors also grasp different appearances. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) third volume only says that specific objects (prthag-visaya, special objects) grasp the pleasant, etc. And there is no 'also' word. Quoting these two treatises together, it is said that they can also understand the pleasant, etc. Question: The mind takes
總相。所通總別。云何得言同一所緣 答有義說同所緣總論此境。不言此境別相亦同。又心王．所取總別義總而為四釋 一云心唯取總。心所唯別。諸論皆說識了總相。瑜伽但說心所了此所未了相。不言了總。此論雖云此表心所亦緣總相。釋論者意即不依之 二云心王唯取總相。所取總別。大論．中邊如論主釋。既有誠說理不可違 三云心所同前第二師說。心王亦緣總別二相。故下論云。受能領納順．違．中境。令心等起歡．戚．舍相。若也不了違．順．中境。如何能起歡．戚．舍相。解余心所皆有令心取別相義。論中上下文有眾多。故知心王亦緣別相。大論等說皆約心王自力而說。設無心所自力不能取別相故。如王因臣能知別事。若不因者即不能知 四云心王同前第三師說。心所非。但緣自別相。如心能緣一切別相。諸相應法法爾同緣。唯境一事。不爾如何說令心等起歡．戚等。既說等言。故知心所別相皆取。雖有四解令依后說。諸相應法相望力齊。有緣．不緣不應理故。論說受等所取別者。且約自行所取者說。以實而言。由相應力互取所緣。皆不違理 問由相應力互取所緣。亦由相應行相互起。受等應起取像等行 解云心等境同相應力取。行相說別。受等不同 又釋由相應力能起諸行。受令心等起歡等故。且依勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 總相（總體特徵）。所通總別（共同之處的總體和區別）。如何能說它們是同一所緣（所緣，認識的對象）呢？ 回答：有一種觀點認為，『同所緣』是指總體上共同的境界。並沒有說這個境界的各個別相（別相，具體特徵）也相同。而且，心王（心王，主要的意識）和所取（所取，被認識的對象）的總體和區別，總共有四種解釋： 第一種觀點認為，心王只取總相，心所（心所，心理活動）只取別相。各種論典都說『識』了知總相。《瑜伽師地論》只說心所了知這個『所未了相』，並沒有說了知總相。雖然此論說這表明心所也緣總相，但解釋論典的人的意圖是不依據這種說法的。 第二種觀點認為，心王只取總相，所取有總相和別相。《大毗婆沙論》、《中邊分別論》等都如論主的解釋。既然有明確的說法，道理上不可違背。 第三種觀點認為，心所與前面第二種觀點相同。心王也緣總相和別相兩種相。所以下面的論典說：『受』（受，感受）能領納順境、違境、中境（順境，喜歡的環境；違境，不喜歡的環境；中境，中性的環境），使心等生起歡喜、憂愁、舍（歡喜，快樂；憂愁，悲傷；舍，不苦不樂）等相。如果不了知違境、順境、中境，如何能生起歡喜、憂愁、舍等相？解釋其餘心所都有使心取別相的意義。論典中上下文有很多這樣的例子。所以知道心王也緣別相。《大毗婆沙論》等的說法都是就心王自身的力量而說的。假設沒有心所，心王自身的力量不能取別相。就像國王依靠臣子才能知道具體的事情，如果不依靠臣子就不能知道。 第四種觀點認為，心王與前面第三種觀點相同。心所不是這樣，只是緣自己的別相。就像心能緣一切別相，諸相應法（相應法，與心王相應的心理現象）自然而然地共同緣取。只是境界是同一件事。否則，如何說使心等生起歡喜、憂愁等？既然說了『等』字，就知道心所的別相都取。雖然有四種解釋，但應該依據後面的說法。諸相應法相互之間的力量是相等的。有緣和不緣是不合道理的。論典說受等所取的別相，只是就各自的行相所取的來說。實際上，由於相應力的作用，互相取所緣，都不違背道理。 問：由於相應力的作用，互相取所緣，也由於相應行相互相生起，受等應該生起取像等行相（取像等行相，認知等心理活動）？ 解釋說：心等境界相同，由於相應力的作用而取，行相的說法不同。受等不同。 又解釋說：由於相應力的作用，能生起諸行。受使心等生起歡喜等。只是依據殊勝的方面來說。
【English Translation】 General characteristics. The generality and particularity of what is commonly accessed. How can it be said that they share the same object of cognition (所緣, 所緣, object of cognition)? Answer: Some argue that 'shared object of cognition' refers to the common realm in general. It doesn't imply that the specific characteristics (別相, specific characteristics) of this realm are also identical. Furthermore, there are four interpretations regarding the generality and particularity of the mind-king (心王, main consciousness) and the object taken (所取, object taken): The first view holds that the mind-king only grasps general characteristics, while mental factors (心所, mental activities) only grasp specific characteristics. Various treatises state that 'consciousness' understands general characteristics. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra only states that mental factors understand this 'uncomprehended aspect,' without mentioning the understanding of general characteristics. Although this treatise suggests that mental factors also cognize general characteristics, the intention of those who interpret the treatises does not rely on this view. The second view holds that the mind-king only grasps general characteristics, while the object taken has both general and specific characteristics. The Mahavibhasa-sastra, Madhyantavibhaga-karika, and others follow the interpretation of the treatise's author. Since there is a clear statement, it is unreasonable to contradict it. The third view holds that mental factors are the same as the second view mentioned earlier. The mind-king also cognizes both general and specific characteristics. Therefore, the following treatise states: 'Feeling (受, feeling) can receive agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral environments (順境, agreeable environment; 違境, disagreeable environment; 中境, neutral environment), causing the mind and others to arise with joy, sorrow, and equanimity (歡喜, joy; 憂愁, sorrow; 舍, equanimity).' If one does not understand disagreeable, agreeable, and neutral environments, how can joy, sorrow, and equanimity arise? Explanations of other mental factors all have the meaning of enabling the mind to grasp specific characteristics. There are many such examples in the context of the treatise. Therefore, it is known that the mind-king also cognizes specific characteristics. The statements in the Mahavibhasa-sastra and others are all based on the mind-king's own power. Assuming there are no mental factors, the mind-king's own power cannot grasp specific characteristics. Just as a king relies on ministers to know specific matters; if he does not rely on them, he cannot know. The fourth view holds that the mind-king is the same as the third view mentioned earlier. Mental factors are not like this; they only cognize their own specific characteristics. Just as the mind can cognize all specific characteristics, the associated phenomena (相應法, mental phenomena associated with the mind-king) naturally cognize them together. Only the realm is the same matter. Otherwise, how can it be said that the mind and others arise with joy, sorrow, etc.? Since the word 'etc.' is used, it is known that the specific characteristics of mental factors are all grasped. Although there are four interpretations, one should rely on the later one. The powers of the associated phenomena are equal to each other. It is unreasonable to say that some cognize and others do not. The treatise says that the specific characteristics taken by feeling, etc., are only in terms of what is taken by their own activities. In reality, due to the power of association, they mutually take the objects of cognition, which is not contrary to reason. Question: Since they mutually take the objects of cognition due to the power of association, and also since the associated characteristics arise mutually, should feeling, etc., arise with cognitive activities, etc. (取像等行相, cognitive and other mental activities)? The explanation says: The realms of the mind, etc., are the same, and they are taken due to the power of association. The statements about the characteristics are different. Feeling, etc., are different. Another explanation says: Due to the power of association, various activities can arise. Feeling causes the mind, etc., to arise with joy, etc. This is only based on the superior aspect.
說。但言令心。理實亦令受等明記 問既爾同聚心．心所行。行相皆同應成雜亂 答行相．境相兼正不同故不違理。第二捲雲心．心取法行相各別。第三卷說勿觸等五能了別者。依正行說。並不相違 詳曰。今依第二。瑜伽．中邊．此唯識等文明具故。余之三釋既無誠說。固難依準。不可凡情強會聖旨。下文自云受能領納順．違．中境。不言心取順．違境故。余心所等言令心等。至文當會。又準何知據其正行。前第二三云。心．心所行相各別。勿觸等五能了別耶。本教無說。豈非意乎。請審詳諸。無惑後學。
論領順境相至不苦不樂者。問身識一時領順．違境。何受相應 答傳有二釋。一云無有一時能領二境故隨一俱。二云即一時中能領二境境俱至故。隨其勝境但一受俱。如五俱意隨何境勝而受俱。故此亦應爾 問受有五受。何意合之 答喜．樂憂．苦歡．感相似。故合為三 若爾何不言喜．憂舍 答以輕從重。以狹從寬。樂．苦通於多地識故。
疏。對法至集色所依等者。按彼論云。集色所依建立身受。集無色所依建立心受 釋曰。身心皆以積集為義。故色．無色皆雲集也。從二所依得身心稱 問第六依七。七何名心無集義故 答剎那相續前後眾多得名積集。或據本識。或意根中通七．八識。故名集心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說。但言語要符合心意，道理上也要讓受等（Vedanā，感受）明記於心。問：既然如此，同聚之心和心所（Caitasika，心所法）的行相（Ākāra，相狀）都相同，那麼行相應該會變得雜亂吧？答：行相、境相（Viṣaya-ākāra，對像相狀）兼有正行（Yogācāra，瑜伽行）的不同，所以不違背道理。《瑜伽師地論》第二卷說，心和心所取法的行相各自不同。第三卷說，勿觸等五種能了別者，是依據正行所說，並不互相違背。詳細地說，現在依據第二卷，《瑜伽師地論》、《中邊分別論》、《唯識論》等經文明文具備，其餘三種解釋既然沒有確鑿的說法，就難以依據。不可以凡夫的感情強行會通聖人的旨意。下文自己說，受能領納順境、違境、中境，沒有說心取順境、違境，所以其餘心所等言語要符合心意等，到正文時應當會通。又根據什麼知道是依據其正行呢？前面第二、三卷說，心和心所的行相各自不同，勿觸等五種能了別，本教沒有說，難道不是意指嗎？請仔細詳審，不要迷惑後來的學習者。 論述領納順境的相至不苦不樂（Adhukha-asukha，非苦非樂）的感受。問：身識（Kāya-vijñāna，身體的意識）一時領納順境、違境，什麼受相應？答：傳承有兩種解釋。一種說法是，沒有一時能領納兩種境，所以隨一種俱生。另一種說法是，即一時中能領納兩種境，境都到來，所以隨其殊勝的境，但一種受俱生。如五俱意（Pañca-samana-citta，五同生心）隨何境殊勝而受俱生，所以這裡也應該這樣。問：受有五受，為什麼合為三受？答：喜、樂（Sukha，快樂），憂、苦（Dukkha，痛苦）歡感相似，所以合為三受。如果這樣，為什麼不說喜、憂、舍（Upekṣā，舍受）？答：以輕從重，以狹從寬，樂、苦通於多地識（Bhūmi-vijñāna，不同層次的意識）的緣故。 疏解。《對法論》至集色所依等。按《對法論》說，集色所依建立身受，集無色所依建立心受。解釋說，身心都以積集為義，所以色、無色都說集。從二種所依得到身心之稱。問：第六識（Mano-vijñāna，意識）依第七識（Manas，末那識），第七識為什麼名為心，沒有積集的意義？答：剎那相續，前後眾多，得名積集。或者根據本識（Mūla-vijñāna，根本識），或者意根（Manendriya，意根）中通於七、八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識），所以名為集心。
【English Translation】 English version: Said. But the words should accord with the mind, and the principles should also allow Vedanā (feeling) to be clearly remembered. Question: Since the minds and mental factors (Caitasika) that gather together have the same characteristics (Ākāra), shouldn't these characteristics become chaotic? Answer: The characteristics and object-characteristics (Viṣaya-ākāra) also have different aspects of Yogācāra (practice), so it does not violate reason. The second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the characteristics of the mind and mental factors taking dharmas are different from each other. The third volume says that the five that can distinguish 'do not touch' etc. are based on Yogācāra, and they do not contradict each other. In detail, now based on the second volume, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other scriptures have clear statements, so the other three explanations are difficult to rely on since they do not have conclusive statements. One should not forcibly reconcile the intentions of the sages with ordinary emotions. The following text itself says that feeling can receive pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral objects, but it does not say that the mind takes pleasant and unpleasant objects, so the other mental factors, etc., should be reconciled when we get to the main text. Also, how do we know that it is based on its Yogācāra? The previous second and third volumes say that the characteristics of the mind and mental factors are different from each other, and the five that can distinguish 'do not touch' etc. The original teaching does not say this, so isn't it implied? Please examine it carefully and do not confuse later learners. The discussion on receiving pleasant objects to the feeling of neither pain nor pleasure (Adhukha-asukha). Question: When the body consciousness (Kāya-vijñāna) receives pleasant and unpleasant objects at the same time, what feeling corresponds to it? Answer: There are two interpretations passed down. One says that one cannot receive two objects at the same time, so it arises with one of them. The other says that one can receive two objects at the same time, and since both objects arrive, it arises with the superior object. For example, the five co-arisen minds (Pañca-samana-citta) arise with the feeling that corresponds to the superior object, so it should be the same here. Question: There are five feelings, why are they combined into three? Answer: Joy and pleasure (Sukha), sorrow and pain (Dukkha) are similar to joy and sensation, so they are combined into three. If so, why not say joy, sorrow, and equanimity (Upekṣā)? Answer: Taking the light from the heavy, and the narrow from the wide, pleasure and pain are common to consciousnesses of many levels (Bhūmi-vijñāna). Commentary. The Abhidharma to the basis of accumulated form, etc. According to the Abhidharma, the basis of accumulated form establishes bodily feeling, and the basis of accumulated formlessness establishes mental feeling. The explanation says that both body and mind have the meaning of accumulation, so both form and formlessness are said to be accumulated. The names of body and mind are obtained from the two bases. Question: The sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna) relies on the seventh consciousness (Manas), why is the seventh consciousness called mind, since it has no meaning of accumulation? Answer: Momentary continuity, many before and after, is named accumulation. Or based on the fundamental consciousness (Mūla-vijñāna), or the root of mind (Manendriya), it connects to the seventh and eighth consciousnesses (Ālaya-vijñāna), so it is called accumulated mind.
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疏。受寬根狹者。如三受門。苦．樂二受含憂．喜故。而言根者即不如是。二十二根喜．樂．憂．苦各別立故。故寬狹異。
疏。不俱起故非無漏攝者。問夫無漏心必有輕安。輕安調暢。俱時五識何得有苦 答相應之識調暢苦無。五非相應。有苦何失。
疏。若互相顯隨其所應者。七色．命根據不生斷。以顯信等亦通見斷難。地前信等八見道已永不生故。信等緣縛斷顯七色．命不名見斷。能縛有故。
疏。不可說六至無學身有故者。牒外所明。所明意云。無學學圓得名非斷。命在彼身非斷何失。
疏。五根亦應爾等者。疏主質也。無學亦有色等五根。五根亦應通不斷攝。此既不爾彼何乃然 問非所斷者理有二義。一無學身中有漏性者。在無漏身名為無漏。亦名非斷。二體無漏亦為無漏。而非是斷。無學色根許非斷攝斯亦何過 答據體無漏乃順無漏名為非斷。不依初義 問佛色．命根豈非無漏。云何八根不通非斷。答通三乘明故非非斷。
論。又學無學非二為三者。按瑜伽論五十七云。幾學學為義 釋曰。二十二根中幾學等三。復以學等而為境義 論答九學．無學．非學非無學。以三種為義 釋曰。信等五根．意．喜．樂．舍還以學等三種為義 一通三種非學非無學為義 釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏：感受範圍寬廣但根基狹窄的，例如三受門（three kinds of feeling）。苦受（suffering）、樂受（happiness）二者包含憂受（sorrow）和喜受（joy），所以說根基不如二十二根（twenty-two roots）。二十二根中，喜、樂、憂、苦各自獨立存在，因此感受範圍的寬廣程度不同。 疏：因為不是同時生起，所以不屬於無漏（untainted）的範疇。問：如果無漏心（untainted mind）必然伴隨輕安（tranquility），輕安調和暢順，那麼同時生起的五識（five consciousnesses）怎麼會有苦受呢？答：與（無漏心）相應的識（consciousness）是調和暢順的，沒有苦受。五識不是相應的，有苦受又有什麼問題呢？ 疏：如果互相顯現，隨其所應的，七色根（seven sense organs）和命根（life faculty）根據不生起斷滅。用（七色根和命根）來顯現信根（faith）等也通於見斷（view to be abandoned），這是困難的。因為地前（before the path of seeing）的信根等八個在見道（path of seeing）之後就永遠不會生起。信根等緣于煩惱的束縛而斷滅，顯現七色根和命根不稱為見斷，因為它們能夠束縛眾生。 疏：不可說六根到無學身（body of an Arhat）仍然存在，這是對外道的解釋。解釋的意思是，無學（Arhat）通過學習圓滿而得名，並非斷滅。命根存在於他的身體中，並非斷滅又有什麼問題呢？ 疏：五根也應該如此等等，這是疏主的質疑。無學（Arhat）也有色根（sense organs）等五根。五根也應該都屬於不斷滅的範疇。既然（命根等）不是這樣，那麼五根又為何如此呢？問：不是所斷滅的，道理上有兩種含義。一是無學身中具有有漏（tainted）的性質，在無漏身中稱為無漏，也稱為非斷滅。二是本體是無漏的，也屬於無漏，而不是斷滅。允許無學的色根屬於非斷滅的範疇，這又有什麼過錯呢？答：根據本體是無漏的，才順應無漏而稱為非斷滅，不依據第一種含義。問：佛的色根和命根難道不是無漏的嗎？為什麼八根不屬於非斷滅的範疇？答：因為（八根）通於三乘（three vehicles）而說，所以不是非斷滅。 論：又，學（learner）、無學（Arhat）之外，分為第三種，這是因為瑜伽論第五十七卷說：什麼是學所要表達的意義？解釋說：二十二根中，哪些是學等三種。又以學等三種作為所觀照的境界。論回答說：有學（learner）、無學（Arhat）、非學非無學（neither learner nor Arhat），以這三種作為意義。解釋說：信根等五根、意根（mind）、喜根（joy）、樂根（happiness）、舍根（equanimity），仍然以學等三種作為意義。一是通於三種，非學非無學作為意義。解釋說：
【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: Those that receive broadly but have narrow roots, such as the three kinds of feeling (vedanā). Suffering (duḥkha) and happiness (sukha) include sorrow (daurmanasya) and joy (prīti), so it is said that the roots are not like the twenty-two roots (dvāviṃśati indriyāṇi). Among the twenty-two roots, joy, happiness, sorrow, and suffering each stand independently, therefore the breadth of reception is different. Commentary: Because they do not arise simultaneously, they are not included in the category of untainted (anāsrava). Question: If an untainted mind (anāsrava-citta) necessarily accompanies tranquility (praśrabdhi), and tranquility is harmonious and smooth, then how can the five consciousnesses (pañca vijñāna) that arise simultaneously have suffering? Answer: The consciousness (vijñāna) that corresponds to (the untainted mind) is harmonious and smooth, and there is no suffering. The five consciousnesses are not corresponding, so what is wrong with having suffering? Commentary: If they manifest each other, according to what is appropriate, the seven sense organs (sapta rūpendriyāṇi) and the life faculty (jīvitendriya) are based on not arising and being cut off. Using (the seven sense organs and the life faculty) to manifest the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya) etc. also applies to views to be abandoned (darśana-heya), which is difficult. Because the eight faculties of faith etc. before the path of seeing (darśana-mārga) will never arise again after the path of seeing. The faculty of faith etc. are cut off due to the bondage of afflictions, and manifesting the seven sense organs and the life faculty is not called views to be abandoned, because they are able to bind sentient beings. Commentary: It cannot be said that the six faculties still exist in the body of an Arhat (arhat-kāya), this is an explanation for externalists. The meaning of the explanation is that an Arhat is named through the perfection of learning, not through annihilation. The life faculty exists in his body, so what is wrong with it not being annihilated? Commentary: The five sense faculties should also be like this, etc., this is the question of the commentator. An Arhat also has the five sense faculties (pañca rūpendriyāṇi) such as the sense organs. The five sense faculties should also all belong to the category of non-annihilation. Since (the life faculty etc.) are not like this, then why are the five sense faculties like this? Question: There are two meanings to the principle of not being annihilated. First, the nature of being tainted (sāsrava) in the body of an Arhat is called untainted in an untainted body, and is also called non-annihilation. Second, the substance is untainted and also belongs to the untainted, but it is not annihilation. Allowing the sense organs of an Arhat to belong to the category of non-annihilation, what fault is there in this? Answer: According to the substance being untainted, it conforms to the untainted and is called non-annihilation, not based on the first meaning. Question: Are the sense organs and life faculty of the Buddha not untainted? Why do the eight faculties not belong to the category of non-annihilation? Answer: Because (the eight faculties) are explained in common to the three vehicles (triyāna), they are not non-annihilation. Treatise: Furthermore, apart from learner (śaikṣa) and Arhat (aśaikṣa), it is divided into a third category, this is because the fifty-seventh volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: What is the meaning that a learner wants to express? The explanation says: Among the twenty-two roots, which are the three kinds of learner etc. Also, the three kinds of learner etc. are used as the object of contemplation. The treatise answers: There are learner, Arhat, neither learner nor Arhat, using these three as the meaning. The explanation says: The five faculties of faith etc., the mind faculty (manendriya), joy (prīti), happiness (sukha), equanimity (upekṣā), still use the three kinds of learner etc. as the meaning. One is common to the three kinds, neither learner nor Arhat as the meaning. The explanation says:
曰。一謂苦根。五識相應故不以學．無學為義。準此故知三受通三 問苦等體漏。何名學．無學 答在學等身有所進向亦名學等。故六十六云。云何學法。謂預流等有學補特伽羅。若出世有為法。若世間善法是名學法。何以故。依止此法於時時中精進修學戒等三學故。云何無學。謂阿羅漢諸漏已盡。若出世有為法。若世間善法是名無學法。謂除先所說學．無學法。所餘預流乃至羅漢法。若墮一切異生所有諸法。當知是名非學非無學法 又對法第二云。求解脫者所有善法是學義。于諸學處已得究竟者所有善法是無學。謂諸異生所有三性法。及諸學者染污無記諸無學者諸無記法。及無為法。是非學非無學 對法通前言求解脫。瑜伽據勝說見道上。作論者意亦不相違 問無學身中世間之法。何義而亦名無漏耶 答據無煩惱。故六十六云。問羅漢世善以何因緣說名無漏。答墮三有故名有所攝。諸漏隨眠永解脫故說名無漏。
疏。所餘不發惡行等者。彼論但云所餘是有覆無記不發惡行。身邊等言疏釋彼也。
疏。五十八至準不發業者。按彼論云。俱生薩迦耶見唯無記性。數現行故。非極損惱自他處故。對法論云。余無記者是發業余。俱生身見既無記性。明余中攝。不能發業。身見既然。邊見亦爾。定隨有故。故不論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：一是苦根（duhkha-mula，痛苦的根源），與五識（panca-vijnana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺）相應，因此不以『學』（saiksa，有學位的修行者）或『無學』（asiksa，無學位的修行者）來定義。按照這個原則，可知三種感受（三受，苦受、樂受、不苦不樂受）遍通三類（有學、無學、非學非無學）。問：苦等的本體是煩惱（klesha，指苦等煩惱的本質是具有染污性的），為何又稱為『學』、『無學』？答：在有學等人的身上，有所進步和趨向，也可以稱為『學』等。所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：『什麼是學法？』是指預流果（srota-apanna，入流者）等有學位的人，如果是出世間的有為法（samskrta-dharma，通過努力而產生的法），或是世間的善法，這稱為學法。為什麼呢？因為依靠這些法，在時時中精進修學戒（sila，戒律）、定（samadhi，禪定）、慧（prajna，智慧）三學。『什麼是無學？』是指阿羅漢（arhat，已證悟者），各種煩惱已經斷盡。如果是出世間的有為法，或是世間的善法，這稱為無學法。所謂除去先前所說的學法、無學法，其餘的預流果乃至阿羅漢的法，如果屬於一切凡夫所有的各種法，應當知道這稱為非學非無學法。此外，《阿毗達磨對法論》第二卷說：『求解脫的人所有的善法，是學的意義。』對於各種學處已經得到究竟的人所有的善法，是無學的意義。所謂各種凡夫所有的三性法（三種性質的法，善、惡、無記），以及各種有學者的染污法和無記法，各種無學者的各種無記法，以及無為法（asamskrta-dharma，不通過努力而產生的法），是非學非無學。對法論總括前文所說求解脫，瑜伽師地論根據殊勝的見道位以上而說。作者的意圖並不互相違背。問：無學者的身中世間的法，以什麼意義也稱為無漏法（anasrava-dharma，沒有煩惱的法）呢？答：根據沒有煩惱的緣故。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：『問：阿羅漢的世間善法以什麼因緣說名為無漏？答：因為屬於三有（三界，欲界、色界、無色界）的緣故，名為有所攝。各種煩惱的隨眠（anusaya，煩惱的潛在形式）永遠解脫的緣故，說名為無漏。』 疏：所餘不發惡行等，彼論但云所餘是有覆無記不發惡行。身邊等言疏釋彼也。 疏：五十八至準不發業者，按彼論云：俱生薩迦耶見（sahaja-satkayadrsti，與生俱來的有身見）唯無記性，數現行故，非極損惱自他處故。對法論云：余無記者是發業余。俱生身見既無記性，明余中攝，不能發業。身見既然，邊見（antagraha-drsti，邊見，執斷常等極端之見）亦爾，定隨有故，故不論。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: The first is the root of suffering (duhkha-mula), corresponding to the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana), so it is not defined by 'learner' (saiksa) or 'non-learner' (asiksa). According to this principle, it can be known that the three feelings (three sensations: painful, pleasant, and neutral) pervade the three categories (learner, non-learner, neither learner nor non-learner). Question: The essence of suffering and so on is affliction (klesha, referring to the nature of suffering and other afflictions as having defilement), why are they also called 'learner' and 'non-learner'? Answer: In the body of learners and so on, there is progress and tendency, which can also be called 'learner' and so on. Therefore, the sixty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'What is the Dharma of the learner?' It refers to the stream-enterer (srota-apanna) and other learners. If it is conditioned Dharma (samskrta-dharma) that is supramundane, or worldly wholesome Dharma, this is called the Dharma of the learner. Why? Because relying on these Dharmas, one diligently studies the three learnings of morality (sila), concentration (samadhi), and wisdom (prajna) at all times. 'What is non-learning?' It refers to the Arhat (arhat), whose various afflictions have been completely extinguished. If it is conditioned Dharma that is supramundane, or worldly wholesome Dharma, this is called the Dharma of the non-learner. What is called removing the previously mentioned Dharma of the learner and Dharma of the non-learner, the remaining Dharmas of the stream-enterer up to the Arhat, if they belong to all the various Dharmas possessed by ordinary beings, it should be known that this is called neither the Dharma of the learner nor the Dharma of the non-learner. Furthermore, the second volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'All the wholesome Dharmas possessed by those who seek liberation are the meaning of learning.' All the wholesome Dharmas possessed by those who have attained the ultimate in various places of learning are the meaning of non-learning. What are called the three-natured Dharmas (three natures of Dharmas: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) possessed by various ordinary beings, as well as the defiled Dharmas and neutral Dharmas of various learners, the various neutral Dharmas of various non-learners, and unconditioned Dharma (asamskrta-dharma), are neither the Dharma of the learner nor the Dharma of the non-learner. The Abhidharma-samuccaya summarizes what was said earlier about seeking liberation, while the Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks according to the superior stage of seeing the path and above. The intentions of the authors do not contradict each other. Question: In the body of a non-learner, in what sense is worldly Dharma also called unconditioned Dharma (anasrava-dharma)? Answer: According to the reason of having no afflictions. The sixty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Question: For what reason are the worldly wholesome Dharmas of the Arhats said to be unconditioned? Answer: Because they belong to the three realms (three realms: desire realm, form realm, formless realm), they are called being included in something. Because the latent tendencies (anusaya) of various afflictions are permanently liberated, they are said to be unconditioned.' Commentary: 'The remaining non-arising of evil actions, etc.' That treatise only says that the remaining are obscured neutral, not arising evil actions. The words 'body and side' are an explanation of that. Commentary: 'Fifty-eight to according to not arising karma', according to that treatise: 'The co-arisen view of self (sahaja-satkayadrsti) is only of neutral nature, because it frequently manifests, and because it does not extremely harm oneself and others.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'The remaining neutral are the remaining that arise karma.' Since the co-arisen view of self is of neutral nature, it is clear that it is included in the remaining and cannot arise karma. Since the view of self is like this, so is the extreme view (antagraha-drsti), because it is definitely accompanied, so it is not discussed.
之。
疏。意識爾時至不善無覆者。問若所引五識要與能引第六同性。如何五識三性容俱 答今此中意不得所引與能引意一向異性。非是必定令其同性。或順三性不俱師義。
論。由無分別至有分別故者。疏中所釋意明約識迫悅等差。故成樂．喜．苦．憂等別。不障意識有無分別．輕微。唯動名為苦．樂。
有不悟者而輒彈云。后師釋云。非但五識逼悅尤重無分別故。意中苦．樂亦無分別．及尤重故。如下論明。故應總云分別．尤重名為憂．喜。無別．輕微名為苦．樂 詳曰。尋前疏明。知后破非。
論。不苦不樂至平等轉故者。問舍有違順。即成逼悅。何言平等 答有義。理實非無差別之義。相微隱故。故不開之。
疏。瑜伽五十七未至十一根者。按彼論云。問未至地幾根可得。答十一 釋曰。謂信等五．三無漏根．及意．喜．舍 有云。除意取樂。理實應說有十二根。亦有意故。而不說者意根通顯八識自性。未至地中唯有第六故略不說 詳曰。今取前釋。夫有心所如有心王。若不云意恐疑有所而無王也。縱無其樂。理無妨故 問何不言有眼等及命 答無托彼生故不說有 問但言十一云何得知喜八其數 答即彼論云。喜于彼有。何教為證。答如世尊言。如是苾芻離生喜樂滋潤其身。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
疏：意識爾時至不善無覆者。問：如果所引用的前五識必須與能引生的第六識（意識）同性，那麼為什麼前五識的三性（善、惡、無記）可以同時存在？答：現在這裡的意思是，所引用的和能引生的意識並非完全異性，但也不是必定要求它們同性。或者順應三性不俱的師說。
論：由無分別至有分別故者。疏中的解釋意在說明，根據識所感受的逼迫和愉悅程度的差別，形成了樂、喜、苦、憂等不同的感受。這並不妨礙意識有無分別、輕微的特性。只有強烈的觸動才稱為苦、樂。
有人不理解，就隨意反駁說：後來的法師解釋說，不僅僅是前五識的逼迫和愉悅特別強烈，沒有分別，意識中的苦、樂也沒有分別，而且也特別強烈。如下面的論述所表明的。所以應該總的說，分別、特別強烈的感受稱為憂、喜，沒有分別、輕微的感受稱為苦、樂。詳細考察前面的疏文，就知道後面的反駁是不對的。
論：不苦不樂至平等轉故者。問：舍（不苦不樂）有違逆和順從，就形成了逼迫和愉悅，為什麼說是平等？答：有一種說法是，實際上並非沒有差別的意義，只是相狀非常細微隱蔽，所以沒有展開說明。
疏：瑜伽五十七未至十一根者。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷所說，問：未至定（未至定）中可以獲得幾種根（根，指生理和心理機能）？答：十一種。解釋說：指信等五根（信、精進、念、定、慧五根），三無漏根（未知當知根、已知根、具知根），以及意根（意根，六根之一）、喜根（喜根，感受快樂的機能）、舍根（舍根，感受不苦不樂的機能）。有人說：除去意根而取樂根。實際上應該說有十二根，因為也有意根。而不說十二根的原因是，意根普遍顯現八識的自性，未至定中只有第六識（意識），所以省略不說。詳細考察，現在採用前面的解釋。心所（心所，心理活動）就像心王（心王，指第八識阿賴耶識），如果不說意根，恐怕會懷疑有心所而沒有心王。即使沒有樂根，道理上也沒有妨礙。問：為什麼不說有眼根等以及命根（命根，維持生命的機能）？答：因為沒有依託它們而生起，所以不說有。問：只說十一種，怎麼知道喜根佔了八種？答：就是那部論中說：喜根在那裡存在，有什麼教證？答：如世尊所說：如此比丘（比丘，佛教出家男眾），離開欲界而生起的喜樂滋潤他的身體。
【English Translation】 English version:
Commentary: 'Consciousness at that time' to 'non-virtuous and neutral'. Question: If the five sense consciousnesses that are drawn upon must be of the same nature as the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) that draws them forth, how can the three natures (virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral) of the five sense consciousnesses exist simultaneously? Answer: The meaning here is not that the consciousnesses drawn upon and the consciousness that draws them forth are entirely different in nature, but it is not necessarily required that they be of the same nature. Or, it accords with the teaching that the three natures do not occur together.
Treatise: 'Because of the absence of discrimination' to 'because of the presence of discrimination'. The explanation in the commentary intends to clarify that, according to the differences in the degree of pressure and pleasure felt by consciousness, different feelings such as pleasure, joy, suffering, and sorrow are formed. This does not prevent consciousness from having the characteristics of being non-discriminating or subtle. Only strong sensations are called suffering or pleasure.
Some people, without understanding, rashly retort: 'Later masters explain that it is not only that the pressure and pleasure of the five sense consciousnesses are particularly strong and without discrimination, but also that the suffering and pleasure in the mind consciousness are also without discrimination and particularly strong, as the following discussion clarifies. Therefore, it should be said in general that discrimination and particularly strong sensations are called sorrow and joy, while non-discrimination and subtle sensations are called suffering and pleasure.' Upon careful examination of the previous commentary, it is known that the later refutation is incorrect.
Treatise: 'Neither suffering nor pleasure' to 'because of equal turning'. Question: 'Equanimity' (neither suffering nor pleasure) has opposition and compliance, which forms pressure and pleasure, so why is it said to be equal? Answer: One explanation is that, in reality, it is not without the meaning of difference, but the characteristics are very subtle and hidden, so it is not elaborated upon.
Commentary: 'Yoga Fifty-Seven, Unattained Eleven Roots'. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) Volume 57, Question: How many roots (根, faculties) can be obtained in the Unattained Concentration (未至定)? Answer: Eleven. The explanation is: referring to the five roots of faith, etc. (信等五根, the five roots of faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), the three unconditioned roots (三無漏根, the three roots of knowing the unknown, knowing, and complete knowing), as well as the mind root (意根, manas-indriya, one of the six roots), the joy root (喜根, priti-indriya, the faculty of experiencing joy), and the equanimity root (舍根, upeksha-indriya, the faculty of experiencing neither suffering nor pleasure). Some say: excluding the mind root and taking the pleasure root. In reality, it should be said that there are twelve roots, because there is also the mind root. The reason for not saying twelve roots is that the mind root universally manifests the nature of the eight consciousnesses, and in the Unattained Concentration there is only the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), so it is omitted. Upon careful examination, we now adopt the previous explanation. Mental factors (心所, caitasika) are like the mind king (心王, citta, referring to the eighth consciousness, ālayavijñāna), if the mind root is not mentioned, there would be suspicion that there are mental factors without a mind king. Even if there is no pleasure root, there is no obstacle in principle. Question: Why not say that there are eye roots, etc., and the life root (命根, jīvitendriya, the faculty of maintaining life)? Answer: Because they do not arise relying on them, it is not said that they exist. Question: Only saying eleven, how do we know that the joy root accounts for eight? Answer: That is, that treatise says: the joy root exists there, what is the scriptural proof? Answer: As the World-Honored One (世尊, lokanātha) said: 'Thus, the bhikshu (比丘, Buddhist monk) who has abandoned the desire realm and generated joy and pleasure nourishes his body.'
周遍滋潤．遍流遍悅。無有少分不死不滿。如是名為離生喜樂。此中初門說未至位。後門說根本位 釋曰。經中雙明未至．根本。離生喜樂滋潤其身。是初門也。周遍等下是後門也。故知十一喜是其一。顯揚．對法大同不錄 問初根本定如何一受分成喜．樂 答如燈具辨。有義應前後起時差別故。謂若有時悅身不遍但名為喜。乃時周遍說名為樂 詳曰。此論自云悅身心故。辨喜．樂二既違所學故叵依也 問初二根本身心兩悅分成喜樂。雜受苦處逼迫身心應分憂苦 答如義燈云。違順差別。種有同別應釋此疑 又解初二根本五識歡悅根動勇意分二。雜受五全意迫微。意憂故不成分二。
論第三靜慮等者。問第三分本豈不悅根。根若悅者何不云乎 答前之二定當動勇故悅根方樂。故舉言之。第三安靜不唯對根方稱為樂。故不言也。理實悅根逾於前矣。
疏。六十六有此中通論者。六十六中亦言傍生苦．憂相續。故彼論云。生那落迦諸有情類。異熟無間有異熟生苦．憂相續。如是若生一分餓鬼．及傍生中。當知亦爾。
疏。五十七說與地獄同者。即彼論云。餘三現行故不成熟。種子故成熟。如生那落迦趣於一向苦。傍生．餓鬼當知亦爾。又六十六異熟無間等。亦三趣同。如前所引。
疏。一根善不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『周遍滋潤，遍流遍悅。無有少分不死不滿。如是名為離生喜樂。』（指禪定帶來的喜樂，充滿全身，沒有絲毫的缺失和不滿足，這被稱為脫離欲界而生的喜樂。）這裡，『初門』（指初禪的開始階段）說的是未至定（Kuhan），『後門』（指初禪的深入階段）說的是根本定（Mula-samapatti）。 釋曰：經文中同時說明了未至定和根本定。脫離欲界而生的喜樂滋潤身心，這是『初門』所指。『周遍等下』是『後門』所指。因此可知十一喜（Ekadasa Pitis）是其中的一部分。《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）、《對法論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）大體相同，沒有記錄。 問：初禪和根本定，如何將感受分成喜和樂？ 答：如同燈具的比喻一樣。有一種觀點認為，這是因為喜和樂生起的時間有先後差別。也就是說，如果有時悅樂只在身體的一部分，沒有周遍全身，就稱為喜；當悅樂周遍全身時，就稱為樂。 詳曰：此論自己說，因為悅樂身心，所以區分喜和樂。既然這與所學不符，所以不可依從。 問：初禪和二禪，身心都感到悅樂，所以分成喜和樂。那麼，在雜受苦處，身心受到逼迫，是否應該分成憂和苦？ 答：如同《義燈》所說，這是因為違背和順應的差別。種子有相同和不同的，應該這樣解釋這個疑問。 又有一種解釋是，初禪和二禪，五識（Panca-vijnana）歡悅，根（Indriya）動，勇意（Udyata-citta）分為兩種。雜受中，五識完全，意（Manas）受到逼迫，意憂（Manodukkha），所以不分成兩種。
論：第三靜慮（Tatiya-jhana）等。問：第三禪難道不悅樂根嗎？如果悅樂根，為什麼不說呢？ 答：因為前兩個禪定有動和勇，所以悅樂根才稱為樂，因此才特別說明。第三禪安靜，不只是對根才稱為樂，所以不說。實際上，第三禪悅樂根的程度超過了前兩個禪定。
疏：《六十六有》（Sastisasthana）中，這裡通論的是，六十六有中也說傍生（Tiracchana）有苦和憂相續。所以該論說：『生在那落迦（Naraka）的眾生，異熟（Vipaka）無間，有異熟生苦和憂相續。如果生在一分餓鬼（Preta）和傍生中，應當知道也是這樣。』
疏：《五十七說》（Saptapancasat）中說與地獄相同的是，即該論說：『其餘三種（指樂、喜、舍）現行，所以不成熟。種子（Bija）成熟，如同生在那落迦趣向一向苦，傍生和餓鬼應當知道也是這樣。』又《六十六異熟無間等》，也是三趣相同，如同前面所引。
疏：一根善不（Eka-mula-kusala）
【English Translation】 English version 'Pervasive moistening, flowing and pleasing everywhere. Without any part being undying or unfulfilled. Such is called joy and pleasure born of detachment.' (Referring to the joy and pleasure brought by Samadhi, filling the whole body, without any lack or dissatisfaction, this is called the joy and pleasure born of detachment from the desire realm.) Here, 'the initial gate' (referring to the beginning stage of the first Dhyana) speaks of Kuhan (preliminary concentration), and 'the later gate' (referring to the deeper stage of the first Dhyana) speaks of Mula-samapatti (fundamental attainment). Explanation: The scripture simultaneously explains both Kuhan and Mula-samapatti. The joy and pleasure born of detachment from the desire realm moisten the body and mind, which is what 'the initial gate' refers to. 'Pervasive, etc. below' is what 'the later gate' refers to. Therefore, it can be known that the Eleven Joys (Ekadasa Pitis) are a part of it. The Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharma-samuccaya are largely the same and do not record it. Question: How do the first Dhyana and fundamental attainment divide the feeling into joy and pleasure? Answer: It is like the analogy of a lamp. One view is that this is because there is a difference in the timing of the arising of joy and pleasure. That is to say, if sometimes the pleasure is only in a part of the body and does not pervade the whole body, it is called joy; when the pleasure pervades the whole body, it is called pleasure. Detailed explanation: This treatise itself says that because it pleases the body and mind, joy and pleasure are distinguished. Since this is inconsistent with what has been learned, it should not be relied upon. Question: In the first and second Dhyanas, both the body and mind feel pleasure, so they are divided into joy and pleasure. Then, in the mixed experience of suffering, when the body and mind are oppressed, should they be divided into sorrow and suffering? Answer: As the 'Lamp of Meaning' says, this is because of the difference between opposition and compliance. Seeds have the same and different, and this doubt should be explained in this way. Another explanation is that in the first and second Dhyanas, the five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana) are joyful, the senses (Indriya) move, and the courageous mind (Udyata-citta) is divided into two. In the mixed experience, the five consciousnesses are complete, the mind (Manas) is oppressed, and there is mental sorrow (Manodukkha), so it is not divided into two.
Treatise: The third Jhana (Tatiya-jhana), etc. Question: Does the third Dhyana not please the senses? If it pleases the senses, why is it not said? Answer: Because the first two Dhyanas have movement and courage, pleasing the senses is called pleasure, so it is specifically stated. The third Dhyana is quiet, and it is not only pleasing to the senses that is called pleasure, so it is not said. In fact, the degree to which the third Dhyana pleases the senses exceeds the first two Dhyanas.
Commentary: In the 'Sixty-Six Existences' (Sastisasthana), what is generally discussed here is that the Sixty-Six Existences also say that animals (Tiracchana) have continuous suffering and sorrow. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Beings born in Naraka (Naraka), with uninterrupted Vipaka (Vipaka), have continuous suffering and sorrow born of Vipaka. If they are born in a part of the Pretas (Preta) and animals, it should be known that it is also like this.'
Commentary: What the 'Fifty-Seven Sayings' (Saptapancasat) says is the same as hell is that the treatise says: 'The other three (referring to pleasure, joy, and equanimity) are currently active, so they are not mature. The seed (Bija) is mature, just as being born in Naraka leads to one-sided suffering, animals and Pretas should also know that it is like this.' Also, 'Sixty-Six Uninterrupted Vipaka, etc.' is also the same for the three destinies, as quoted earlier.
Commentary: One-root wholesome (Eka-mula-kusala)
善等者。按彼論云。八唯善。善．不善．無記為義。五善．不善．無記。善．不善．無記為義。一善．不善。善．不善．無記為義。五無記。無記為義。二無記。善．不善．無記為義 釋曰八謂信等．及三無漏。五謂五受。除憂取意。一謂憂根。又五謂身．男．女．鼻．舌。一謂眼．耳。據表業說。命不相應故不言義。
論。論說憂根非無記故至傍生亦爾者。有義今助前師救初難云。論隨轉理言善．不善。實通無記。救后難云。憂為第八。舍為第三。說憂定成依多分說。謂除生死餘位憂根恒相續故 詳曰。今助后師責前師曰。論據何事須隨少意。又復主舍何擯不取。豈不主意而相例乎。又餘七成不據多分。何獨憂根約多分耶。故救未可。
疏。八根現種皆成就者。問命根依彼第八種立。如何言八皆現種成 答現八名命。八種名根。合云命根故通種．現。
疏。為純苦映等者。按彼論云。若那落迦等中他所映奪。不苦不樂受與純苦無雜受俱時而轉。當知此受被映奪故難可了知。如那落迦等中一向苦受俱轉 釋曰。等言等彼純苦鬼畜。彼中賴耶雖有舍受。為余識中苦受猛盛。映奪不現故言苦受。一向苦受據容受言。略不云舍。
論。無異熟樂名純苦者。此釋伏難。伏難意云。有等流樂何名純苦。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 善等者。《按彼論》說，八個是唯善，指的是善、不善、無記三種性質。五個是善、不善、無記，指的是善、不善、無記三種性質。一個是善、不善，指的是善、不善、無記三種性質。五個是無記，指的是無記的性質。兩個是無記，指的是善、不善、無記三種性質。 解釋：八個指的是信等（śraddhā-ādi，信等）以及三個無漏根。五個指的是五種感受，即捨棄憂根而取意根。一個指的是憂根。另外五個指的是身根、男根、女根、鼻根、舌根。一個指的是眼根、耳根。這是根據表業來說的。命根不相應，所以沒有提到它的性質。
論：《論》中說憂根不是無記，乃至傍生（tiryak，旁生）也是這樣。有一種觀點是，現在幫助之前的論師來解決最初的難題，說《論》是隨著轉變的道理來說善、不善，實際上也包括無記。爲了解決後面的難題，說憂根是第八個，舍受是第三個，說憂根必定成就，是根據大多數情況來說的，意思是除了生死之外，其餘時候憂根總是相續不斷。 詳細說明：現在幫助後面的論師來責備之前的論師說，《論》根據什麼事情需要順從少數人的意思？又為什麼要捨棄主意而不採納呢？難道不是以主意來相互類比嗎？另外，其餘七個成就不是根據大多數情況，為什麼只有憂根要根據大多數情況呢？所以這種解釋不可靠。
疏：八根的現行和種子都成就。問：命根是依據第八識的種子而建立的，為什麼說八個都是現行和種子成就呢？答：現行的八個稱為命，八個種子稱為根，合起來稱為命根，所以包括種子和現行。
疏：爲了純粹的苦映奪等等。《按彼論》說，如果在納落迦（naraka，地獄）等地方，被其他所映奪，不苦不樂受與純粹的苦無雜受同時運轉，應當知道這種感受因為被映奪所以難以瞭解，就像納落迦等地方只有苦受一起運轉。解釋：等等包括純粹的苦鬼和畜生。他們那裡阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）雖然有舍受，但是因為其他識中的苦受猛烈，映奪而不顯現，所以說是苦受。只有苦受是根據容受來說的，省略了舍受。
論：沒有異熟樂稱為純粹的苦。這種解釋是爲了消除疑問。消除疑問的意思是，有等流樂，為什麼稱為純粹的苦？
【English Translation】 English version 'Good' and so on. According to that treatise, eight are exclusively good, referring to the nature of good, non-good, and neutral. Five are good, non-good, and neutral, referring to the nature of good, non-good, and neutral. One is good, non-good, referring to the nature of good, non-good, and neutral. Five are neutral, referring to the nature of neutral. Two are neutral, referring to the nature of good, non-good, and neutral. Explanation: The eight refer to faith and so on (śraddhā-ādi, faith and so on), and the three unconditioned roots. The five refer to the five types of feeling, namely, abandoning the sorrow root and taking the mental root. One refers to the sorrow root. The other five refer to the body root, male root, female root, nose root, and tongue root. One refers to the eye root and ear root. This is according to the manifested karma. The life root is not corresponding, so its nature is not mentioned.
Treatise: The treatise says that the sorrow root is not neutral, and even sentient beings (tiryak, animals) are the same. One view is that we now help the previous teacher to solve the initial difficulty, saying that the treatise follows the principle of transformation to speak of good and non-good, but in reality, it also includes neutral. To solve the later difficulty, it says that the sorrow root is the eighth, and equanimity is the third, saying that the sorrow root is definitely accomplished, which is according to most situations, meaning that except for birth and death, the sorrow root is always continuous at other times. Detailed explanation: Now, helping the later teacher to rebuke the previous teacher, saying, according to what does the treatise need to follow the meaning of a few people? And why abandon the main idea and not adopt it? Isn't it to compare with the main idea? In addition, the other seven accomplishments are not based on most situations, why only the sorrow root is based on most situations? Therefore, this explanation is unreliable.
Commentary: The manifestation and seeds of the eight roots are all accomplished. Question: The life root is established based on the seed of the eighth consciousness, so why say that the eight are all accomplished in manifestation and seeds? Answer: The manifested eight are called life, and the eight seeds are called roots, combinedly called life root, so it includes seeds and manifestation.
Commentary: For pure suffering to overshadow, etc. According to that treatise, if in places like Naraka (naraka, hell), it is overshadowed by others, the neither-suffering-nor-pleasure feeling and the pure suffering without mixed feeling operate simultaneously, one should know that this feeling is difficult to understand because it is overshadowed, just like in places like Naraka, only suffering operates together. Explanation: 'Etc.' includes pure suffering ghosts and animals. Although there is equanimity in their Alaya consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), because the suffering in other consciousnesses is intense, it is overshadowed and does not appear, so it is said to be suffering. Only suffering is according to acceptance, omitting equanimity.
Treatise: No Vipāka (Vipāka, fruition) pleasure is called pure suffering. This explanation is to eliminate doubts. The meaning of eliminating doubts is, there is outflowing pleasure, why is it called pure suffering?
故今答云。望無異熟得純苦名。
疏。故瑜伽五十九說彼五十八等者。顯五十九會五十八。言意中嗔憂相應者。依隨轉等。按五十八云。又十煩惱七唯意地。貪．恚．無明亦通五識。又于欲界貪。樂．喜．舍相應。恚苦．憂．舍相應 釋曰。苦據五識。憂唯第六。舍通六識。又五十九云。若任運生一切煩惱。皆於三受現行可得。是故通一切識身者。與一切根相應。不通一切識身者。與意地一切根相應。不任運生一切煩惱。隨其所應諸根相應。先辨煩惱諸根相應。但約粗相道理建立。令初行者解無亂故。今約鉅細道理建立。令久行者了自他身種種行解差別轉故。廣作其法大同此論第六所明。故不錄也。疏指此文云五十八說依隨轉．及粗相也。
疏。六十六說地獄亦有食者。按彼論云。若粗段食于欲界五趣中皆現可得。此於一分各別那落迦。非大那落迦 問文既明簡。許之何失 答五十七云。那落迦中無有段食。定地諸天亦復如是。諸那落迦多由先業力所任持而得久住。雖有廣大諸根大種損害因緣。而不能死。然彼亦有諸微細風隨入身份。以之為食。難可了知是故不說。此文既云諸那落迦。故知後文而假說也。不爾前後豈魚肉乎。言風等食假說應知。
疏。謂大眾部諸識並生等者。由識並生故。異熟后
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此現在回答說：期望沒有異熟果報，才能得到純粹的苦的名稱。
疏解：因此《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說彼五十八卷等，是爲了會合第五十九卷和第五十八卷。說『意中嗔恨與憂愁相應』，是依據隨轉等。按照第五十八卷所說：『又有十種煩惱只有七種在意識層面，貪、嗔、無明也通於五識。又在欲界中，貪與樂、喜、舍相應，嗔與苦、憂、舍相應。』解釋說：苦是根據五識，憂唯有第六識，舍通於六識。又第五十九卷說：『如果任運而生的一切煩惱，都可以在三種感受中現行得到。』因此通於一切識身，是與一切根相應；不通於一切識身，是與意地的一切根相應。不任運而生的一切煩惱，隨其所應與諸根相應。先前辨別煩惱與諸根的相應，只是依據粗略的表相道理建立，爲了讓初學者理解沒有錯亂的緣故。現在依據精細的道理建立，爲了讓修行已久的人瞭解自身和他身種種行解的差別轉變的緣故。廣泛地闡述其方法，大體上與此論第六卷所闡明的內容相同，所以不記錄了。疏解指此文說第五十八卷說依隨轉以及粗相。
疏解：第六十六卷說地獄也有食物，按照該論所說：『如果粗糙的段食在欲界的五趣中都顯現可以得到，這在一部分個別的Narakas（地獄）中，不是大的Narakas（大地獄）。』問：經文既然已經明確簡略地允許了，有什麼過失呢？答：第五十七卷說：『在Narakas（地獄）中沒有段食，一定的禪定地的諸天也是這樣。諸Narakas（地獄）大多由於先前的業力所任持而得以長久居住，即使有廣大的諸根大種損害的因緣，也不能死亡。然而他們也有諸微細的風隨入身份，以此作為食物，難以瞭解，所以不說。』此文既然說諸Narakas（地獄），所以知道後文是假說。不然前後豈不是自相矛盾嗎？說風等食物是假說，應該知道。
疏解：所謂大眾部諸識並生等，由於識同時產生，所以異熟果報在後。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, the answer now is: only by hoping for no Vipaka (異熟, result of actions) can one obtain the name of pure suffering.
Commentary: Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) Chapter 59 says 'that Chapter 58 etc.' to reconcile Chapter 59 with Chapter 58. Saying 'anger and sorrow in the mind correspond' is based on following along etc. According to Chapter 58: 'Furthermore, seven out of the ten Kleshas (煩惱, afflictions) are only in the mind realm, while greed, hatred, and ignorance also extend to the five consciousnesses. Also, in the desire realm, greed corresponds to pleasure, joy, and equanimity, while hatred corresponds to suffering, sorrow, and equanimity.' Explanation: Suffering is based on the five consciousnesses, sorrow is only in the sixth consciousness, and equanimity extends to the six consciousnesses. Furthermore, Chapter 59 says: 'If all the Kleshas (煩惱, afflictions) that arise spontaneously can be obtained in the three feelings.' Therefore, extending to all consciousness bodies corresponds to all roots; not extending to all consciousness bodies corresponds to all roots in the mind realm. All the Kleshas (煩惱, afflictions) that do not arise spontaneously correspond to the roots as appropriate. Previously, distinguishing the correspondence between Kleshas (煩惱, afflictions) and roots was only established based on rough appearances, so that beginners could understand without confusion. Now, it is established based on subtle principles, so that those who have practiced for a long time can understand the differences in their own and others' practices and understandings. The method is extensively elaborated, largely the same as what is explained in Chapter 6 of this treatise, so it is not recorded. The commentary refers to this passage, saying that Chapter 58 speaks of following along and rough appearances.
Commentary: Chapter 66 says that hells also have food. According to that treatise: 'If coarse food is manifested and obtainable in the five realms of desire, this is in a portion of individual Narakas (地獄, hells), not the great Narakas (大地獄, great hells).' Question: Since the text has already clearly and concisely permitted it, what is the fault? Answer: Chapter 57 says: 'In Narakas (地獄, hells) there is no coarse food, and the same is true for the Devas (天, gods) in fixed Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption). Most Narakas (地獄, hells) are sustained for a long time by the power of previous Karma (業, actions), and even with vast causes of damage to the roots and great elements, they cannot die. However, they also have subtle winds entering the body, which they use as food, which is difficult to understand, so it is not mentioned.' Since this text says 'Narakas (地獄, hells),' it is known that the later text is a provisional statement. Otherwise, wouldn't it be contradictory? Saying that wind and other foods are provisional statements should be known.
Commentary: The Sarvastivadins (大眾部, a Buddhist school) say that all consciousnesses arise simultaneously, because consciousnesses arise simultaneously, therefore the Vipaka (異熟, result of actions) is later.
五識苦意憂得之相續。余準可知。
疏卷第六
疏。總歡教興者。論云今應廣說是勸之辭。有疏言顯。顯．勸俱得 問論既自述。云何自勸 答假興賓主。或自獎發。
論。如契經至四是遍行者。有義初起盡經及此所引。皆云乃至廣說。廣說何事。由此誠證明知心王亦緣別相。不爾如何心王由思取正因等。由此定說亦緣別相。而無心所自不能緣。故諸論說但緣總相。心所緣別。準此應知有等言故者 詳曰。經示方隅。舉眼識生不言余識故云乃至。或論略引置乃至言。故顯揚論第一亦引此經云如是應知乃至身識。此中差別者。謂各依自根各緣自境。各別了別一切。應引如前二經。非乃至言顯王緣別。又相有彼邪正及俱。故等言等。故論自云無心起位無此隨一。故知等言不表心王而亦取別。取別前後便為河漢。又心起時未曾無所。何得據無心取說總。若無心所總亦不緣。何但別相。順理教者。王取總相可為善談。邪正等者即總相也。
論。此等聖教成證非一者。按瑜伽論五十五。亦說此名遍行也。即彼論云。問諸識生時與幾遍行心法俱起。答五。謂作意等。
論。理謂至必有思等者。問何以得知。觸謂三和。乃至思者令心造作 答按瑜伽論五十五云。作意云何謂能引發心法。觸云何謂三和
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所感受的痛苦、憂愁等不悅之意，會相續不斷地產生。其餘的（六識、七識、八識）可以依此類推得知。
疏卷第六
疏：總的來說，爲了使人歡喜而興起教法，論中說『今應廣說』是勸勉之辭。有疏文說『顯』，『顯』和『勸』都可以理解。問：論既然是自己陳述，為何還要自己勸勉自己？答：這是假借賓主問答的形式，或者說是自我激勵。
論：如契經乃至『四是遍行者』。有一種觀點認為，最初的經文以及這裡所引用的經文，都說『乃至廣說』。『廣說』什麼呢？由此可以誠實地證明，心王（第八識，阿賴耶識）也緣取別相（詳細的、個別的相）。否則，心王如何通過思心所取正因等？由此可以確定地說，心王也緣取別相，而心所（伴隨心王生起的心理活動）自己不能緣取別相。所以，各種論典都說心所只緣取總相（總體的、概括的相），心所緣取別相。根據這個道理，應該知道有『等』字的原因。詳細地說，經文只是揭示了一個方面，只說了眼識生起，沒有說其他的識，所以說『乃至』。或者論典只是簡略地引用，所以用『乃至』來表示。所以《顯揚論》第一卷也引用此經說：『如是應知乃至身識』。這裡面的差別在於，每個識都依靠自己的根（眼根、耳根等），各自緣取自己的境（色、聲等），各自了別一切。應該引用前面兩部經。不是用『乃至』來顯示心王緣取別相。而且，相有彼（指對方）、邪（不正）、正（正確）以及俱（同時具備）等。所以用『等』字來表示。所以論典自己說，在無心位（沒有心識活動的狀態）沒有這些隨一的情況。所以知道『等』字不是表示心王也取別相。如果取別相，前後就會矛盾。而且，心識生起的時候，從來沒有無所緣的情況，怎麼能根據無心位來取說總相呢？如果無心所連總相也不緣取，又怎麼只是別相呢？順應道理和教義的說法是，心王取總相是可以接受的說法。邪正等，就是總相。
論：這些聖教可以作為證明，並非只有一種。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷，也說這個名稱是遍行。也就是那部論典說：『問：諸識生起的時候，與幾種遍行心法（普遍存在的心理活動）同時生起？答：五種。即作意等。』
論：理是指必定有思等。問：如何得知觸是指三和合？乃至思是指令心造作？答：按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說：『作意是什麼？是指能夠引發心法。觸是什麼？是指三和合。』
【English Translation】 English version: The suffering, sorrow, and other unpleasant feelings experienced by the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness) arise in continuous succession. The rest (the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses) can be understood by analogy.
Commentary Scroll Six
Commentary: Generally speaking, the teaching is initiated to bring joy, and the treatise says 'Now it should be explained extensively,' which is a word of encouragement. Some commentaries say 'reveal,' and both 'reveal' and 'encourage' are acceptable. Question: Since the treatise is self-narrated, why does it need to encourage itself? Answer: This is done by borrowing the form of guest and host questioning, or it is self-motivation.
Treatise: As in the sutras, up to 'the four are pervasive.' One view is that the initial sutra and the sutra quoted here all say 'up to extensive explanation.' What is 'extensive explanation'? From this, it can be honestly proven that the mind-king (the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-vijñāna) also apprehends specific characteristics (detailed, individual aspects). Otherwise, how would the mind-king grasp the correct cause, etc., through the mental function of thought? From this, it can be definitively said that the mind-king also apprehends specific characteristics, while the mental factors (mental activities that arise with the mind-king) themselves cannot apprehend specific characteristics. Therefore, various treatises say that mental factors only apprehend general characteristics (overall, generalized aspects), while the mind-king apprehends specific characteristics. According to this principle, it should be known that there is a reason for the word 'etc.' In detail, the sutra only reveals one aspect, only mentioning the arising of eye-consciousness without mentioning other consciousnesses, so it says 'etc.' Or the treatise only quotes briefly, so it uses 'etc.' to indicate. Therefore, the first volume of the Śūnyatā-sampatti also quotes this sutra, saying: 'Thus it should be known, up to body-consciousness.' The difference here is that each consciousness relies on its own root (eye-organ, ear-organ, etc.), each apprehends its own object (form, sound, etc.), and each distinctly cognizes everything. The previous two sutras should be quoted. It is not using 'etc.' to show that the mind-king apprehends specific characteristics. Moreover, characteristics have 'other' (referring to the opponent), 'wrong,' 'right,' and 'both' (simultaneously possessing) etc. Therefore, the word 'etc.' is used to indicate. Therefore, the treatise itself says that in the state of no-mind (a state without mental activity), none of these occur. Therefore, it is known that the word 'etc.' does not indicate that the mind-king also apprehends specific characteristics. If it apprehends specific characteristics, there would be contradictions before and after. Moreover, when consciousness arises, there is never a time when there is nothing apprehended, so how can one take the state of no-mind to speak of general characteristics? If mental factors do not even apprehend general characteristics in the state of no-mind, then how is it only specific characteristics? The statement that accords with reason and doctrine is that the mind-king apprehending general characteristics is an acceptable statement. Wrong and right, etc., are general characteristics.
Treatise: These sacred teachings can be used as proof, and there is not only one. According to the fifty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, this name is also said to be pervasive. That is, that treatise says: 'Question: When the consciousnesses arise, how many pervasive mental factors (universally present mental activities) arise simultaneously? Answer: Five. Namely, attention, etc.'
Treatise: Reason means that there must be thought, etc. Question: How is it known that contact refers to the union of three? And that thought refers to causing the mind to act? Answer: According to the fifty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: 'What is attention? It refers to being able to initiate mental factors. What is contact? It refers to the union of three.'
合故能攝受義。受云何謂三和合故能領納義。想云何謂三和合故施設所緣假合而取。思云何謂三和合故令心造作。于所緣境與隨領納和合乖離。
疏。顯楊第一引證說有者。證有遍行。即彼論云。如經中說。苦於此作意等。又說由彼所生作意正起。如是所生眼等識生。如經說有六觸身。又說眼．色為緣能起眼識。如是三法聚集合故能有所觸。又說觸為受緣。如經說有六受身。又說受為愛緣。如經說有六想身。又說如其所想而起言議如經說有六思身。又說當知我今六觸處。即前世思所造故業。
論。次別境等者。瑜伽五十五．顯揚第一明五體業。與此大同。故不錄也 然顯揚論引經為證。此論所無。故引之云。如經說欲為一切諸法根本。如經說我等今者心生勝解。是內六處必定無我 釋曰。以無我觀緣無我境而生勝解定知六處皆無我故 如經說諸念與隨念。別念念及憶。不忘不失法。心明記為性 釋曰。追憶曾境名為隨念。憶別別境名為別念。或初總相念。后別相念。憶不忘等念之別名 如經說諸令心住與等住。安住近住及定住。不亂不散攝寂止。等持心住一緣性 釋曰。繫心住內不外馳散名令心住。挫制其心漸細異前遍攝令住名與等住。然為失念于外散動復還撿攝而住內境名為安住。先親近念住即由此念
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『合』的含義是能夠攝取和接受。『受』的含義是什麼呢？是指三種要素和合，從而能夠領納境界。『想』的含義是什麼呢？是指三種要素和合，從而對所緣境施設假合之相而取著。『思』的含義是什麼呢？是指三種要素和合，使心造作，對於所緣境，或與領納和合，或與領納乖離。
疏解：《顯揚聖教論》第一卷引經證明『有』，是爲了證明遍行心所。該論說：『如經中所說，苦受在此作意等。』又說：『由彼所生作意正起。』如是所生的眼等識生起。如經所說，有六觸身。又說：『眼、色為緣，能生起眼識。』這樣，三種法聚合，才能有所觸。又說：『觸為受緣。』如經所說，有六受身。又說：『受為愛緣。』如經所說，有六想身。又說：『如其所想而起言議。』如經所說，有六思身。又說：『應當知道我今的六觸處，是前世思所造的業。』
論：其次是別境等。《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷和《顯揚聖教論》第一卷闡明五種體性之業，與此大同小異，所以不在此處記錄。然而《顯揚聖教論》引經為證，是本論所沒有的，所以引用如下：如經所說：『欲為一切諸法根本。』如經所說：『我等現在心中生起殊勝的理解，是內在六處必定無我。』 解釋：以無我之觀，緣無我之境，而生起殊勝的理解，必定知道六處皆無我。
如經所說：『諸念與隨念，別念念及憶，不忘不失法，心明記為性。』 解釋：追憶曾經經歷的境界，名為隨念。憶念各個不同的境界，名為別念。或者最初是總相的念，然後是別相的念。憶不忘等，是念的不同名稱。如經所說：『諸令心住與等住，安住近住及定住，不亂不散攝寂止，等持心住一緣性。』 解釋：將心繫縛在內，不向外馳散，名為令心住。挫折抑制其心，使其逐漸細微，與之前的狀態不同，普遍地攝持使其安住，名為與等住。如果因為失念而向外散動，又重新撿擇攝持，使其安住在內境，名為安住。先前親近於念而住，即由此念。
【English Translation】 English version: 'He' (合) means the ability to gather and receive. What does 'Shou' (受) mean? It refers to the combination of three elements, enabling the reception of a realm. What does 'Xiang' (想) mean? It refers to the combination of three elements, thereby imposing a false composite appearance on the object of thought and grasping it. What does 'Si' (思) mean? It refers to the combination of three elements, causing the mind to create, either harmonizing with reception or diverging from it in relation to the object of thought.
Commentary: The first volume of the 『Xianyang Shengjiao Lun』 (顯揚聖教論, Exposition of the Holy Teaching Treatise) cites scriptures to prove 『existence』 in order to prove the pervasive mental factors. The treatise states: 『As it is said in the scriptures, suffering arises from this attention, etc.』 It also says: 『The attention arising from that arises correctly.』 Thus, the arising of eye consciousness, etc., arises. As the scripture says, there are six bodies of contact (觸身, chù shēn). It also says: 『Eye and form are the conditions for the arising of eye consciousness.』 In this way, the aggregation of these three dharmas can lead to contact. It also says: 『Contact is the condition for sensation.』 As the scripture says, there are six bodies of sensation (受身, shòu shēn). It also says: 『Sensation is the condition for love.』 As the scripture says, there are six bodies of perception (想身, xiǎng shēn). It also says: 『According to what is perceived, speech arises.』 As the scripture says, there are six bodies of volition (思身, sī shēn). It also says: 『You should know that my present six sense bases (六觸處, liù chù chù) are the karma created by past volition.』
Treatise: Next are the specific objects, etc. The fifty-fifth volume of the 『Yogacarabhumi-sastra』 (瑜伽師地論, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) and the first volume of the 『Xianyang Shengjiao Lun』 (顯揚聖教論, Exposition of the Holy Teaching Treatise) clarify the five types of karmas, which are largely the same as this, so they are not recorded here. However, the 『Xianyang Shengjiao Lun』 (顯揚聖教論, Exposition of the Holy Teaching Treatise) cites scriptures as proof, which this treatise does not have, so it is quoted as follows: As the scripture says: 『Desire is the root of all dharmas.』 As the scripture says: 『We now generate superior understanding in our minds, that the inner six bases are definitely without self.』 Explanation: By observing the absence of self, focusing on the realm of no-self, and generating superior understanding, it is certain that the six bases are all without self.
As the scripture says: 『Various kinds of mindfulness and subsequent mindfulness, separate mindfulness and recollection, non-forgetting and non-losing of the Dharma, the mind's clear remembrance is its nature.』 Explanation: Recalling past experiences is called subsequent mindfulness. Recalling each different realm is called separate mindfulness. Or, initially, it is general mindfulness, and then it is specific mindfulness. Remembering non-forgetting, etc., are different names for mindfulness. As the scripture says: 『Various kinds of causing the mind to abide and abiding equally, dwelling peacefully, dwelling closely, and dwelling fixedly, without disturbance or scattering, gathering in stillness, equanimity, the mind abiding in one-pointedness.』 Explanation: Binding the mind internally, not scattering outward, is called causing the mind to abide. Frustrating and suppressing the mind, making it gradually subtle, different from the previous state, universally gathering and causing it to abide, is called abiding equally. If, due to forgetfulness, it scatters outward, and then re-examines and gathers it, causing it to abide in the inner realm, it is called dwelling peacefully. Previously, dwelling close to mindfulness, that is, by this mindfulness.
。數數作意內住其心。不令此心遠住于外名為近住。五塵等相令心散亂。先於彼相為過患相。相增上力挫折其心。不令流蕩名為定住。欲恚害等令心擾動。故先於彼為過患想。想之力故。故於尋思諸隨惑等。正直其心而不流逸名為不亂。由極寂靜故心不散。即正攝持名攝寂止。平等持心名為等持。明前諸心悉於一境繫心令住名住所緣 如經說簡擇諸法最極簡擇．極簡擇法遍了．近了．點了．通達．審察．聽敏．覺．明．惠行．毗缽舍那 釋曰能正思擇彼凈所緣．善巧所緣．或二所緣名簡擇法 於前三境而簡擇彼真如實性名最極擇 謂于苦諦及差別苦相簡擇契經諸苦體性名極簡擇法 于所緣境周遍尋思名為遍了 於前遍了所緣之境委細推求漸真漸近名近了也 了心．心法名點了也 知心．心法所緣之事名為通達 謂能定取盡其所有名為審察 先後漸次於彼義中無忘失故名為聰睿 堪能簡擇俱生之惠名之為覺 習所得惠名之為明 謂能披誦．問論．抉擇。而於其義轉增明瞭故名惠行 毗缽舍那此翻為觀。如大論中具廣釋也。
疏。若言如愛至為諸法本者。牒彼外難生起下文。外難意云。汝既以愛例欲非遍。如何經說欲為本。
論。此應復待余便有無窮失者。有義論下釋念令心明記。彼宗亦云能明記者。約心等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：數數作意（通過計數來集中注意力）使內心安住，不讓心向外遊離，這叫做『近住』。五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）等外境會使心散亂，首先要認識到這些外境的過患，通過這種認識的力量來挫敗內心對外境的追求，不讓心隨意外境流蕩，這叫做『定住』。貪慾、嗔恚、傷害等情緒會擾亂內心，所以首先要認識到這些情緒的過患，通過這種認識的力量，對於尋思（尋覓、思考）以及各種隨煩惱等，正直內心，不讓它放縱散逸，這叫做『不亂』。由於極度的寂靜，內心不會散亂，這就是正確的攝持，叫做『攝寂止』。平等地保持內心，叫做『等持』。明確前面所說的各種心，都專注于同一個境界，使心安住于所緣境，這叫做『住所緣』。 如經文所說：簡擇諸法（辨別各種法）是最極簡擇（最徹底的辨別），極簡擇法（徹底辨別法）是普遍瞭解、接近了解、點滴了解、通達、審察、聽敏、覺、明、惠行、毗缽舍那（觀）。 解釋：能夠正確地思擇清凈的所緣境、善巧的所緣境，或者兩種所緣境，叫做『簡擇法』。對於前面三種境界，辨別它們的真如實性，叫做『最極擇』。對於苦諦（苦的真理）以及各種不同的苦相，辨別契經（佛經）中各種苦的體性，叫做『極簡擇法』。對於所緣境，周遍地尋思，叫做『遍了』。對於前面已經普遍瞭解的所緣境，委細地推求，逐漸接近真實，叫做『近了』。瞭解心和心法，叫做『點了』。知道心和心法所緣的事情，叫做『通達』。能夠確定地獲取所有內容，叫做『審察』。先後漸次地在這些義理中沒有忘失，叫做『聰睿』。能夠辨別俱生之慧（與生俱來的智慧），叫做『覺』。通過學習獲得的智慧，叫做『明』。能夠披閱、誦讀、問論、抉擇，並且對於其中的義理越來越明白，所以叫做『惠行』。毗缽舍那，翻譯成漢語就是『觀』。如《大論》中有詳細的解釋。 疏：如果說『如愛至為諸法本』，這是引用對方的提問，引出下面的內容。對方提問的意思是：你既然用愛來比喻慾望不是普遍存在的，那麼為什麼經典上說慾望是根本呢？ 論：這應該繼續等待其他條件，就會有無窮的過失。有義論下解釋念，使內心明記。他們的宗派也說能夠明記，是就心等而言的。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Numbering and focusing intention (concentrating attention through counting) causes the mind to dwell internally, preventing it from wandering outward, which is called 'near dwelling'. The five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) and other external objects can distract the mind. First, one must recognize the faults of these external objects, and through the power of this recognition, thwart the mind's pursuit of external objects, preventing the mind from wandering with external objects, which is called 'fixed dwelling'. Greed, anger, harm, and other emotions can disturb the mind, so first one must recognize the faults of these emotions, and through the power of this recognition, for thoughts (seeking, thinking) and various secondary afflictions, straighten the mind and prevent it from indulging and dissipating, which is called 'non-distraction'. Because of extreme tranquility, the mind will not be scattered, which is the correct holding, called 'gathering stillness'. Maintaining the mind equally is called 'equal holding'. Clearly, the various minds mentioned earlier are focused on the same realm, causing the mind to dwell on the object of focus, which is called 'dwelling on the object of focus'.' As the sutra says: 'Discriminating all dharmas (distinguishing various dharmas) is the most extreme discrimination, and extremely discriminating dharmas is universally understanding, closely understanding, understanding bit by bit, penetrating, examining, listening attentively, awakening, clarifying, practicing wisdom, Vipassanā (insight).' Explanation: Being able to correctly contemplate pure objects of focus, skillful objects of focus, or both objects of focus is called 'discriminating dharmas'. For the first three realms, distinguishing their suchness and true nature is called 'most extreme discrimination'. For the truth of suffering (the truth of suffering) and various different aspects of suffering, distinguishing the nature of various sufferings in the sutras is called 'extremely discriminating dharmas'. Pervasively contemplating the object of focus is called 'universal understanding'. For the object of focus that has been universally understood, meticulously seeking and gradually approaching the truth is called 'close understanding'. Understanding the mind and mental dharmas is called 'understanding bit by bit'. Knowing the things that the mind and mental dharmas focus on is called 'penetrating'. Being able to definitively obtain all content is called 'examining'. Gradually not forgetting these meanings is called 'attentive listening'. Being able to distinguish innate wisdom is called 'awakening'. Wisdom gained through learning is called 'clarifying'. Being able to read, recite, question, debate, and decide, and becoming increasingly clear about the meaning, is called 'practicing wisdom'. Vipassanā, translated into Chinese, is 'insight'. As explained in detail in the Mahayana Treatise. Commentary: If it is said 'like love, it is the root of all dharmas', this is quoting the other party's question to introduce the following content. The meaning of the other party's question is: Since you use love to compare desire as not universally existing, then why do the scriptures say that desire is the root? Treatise: This should continue to wait for other conditions, and there will be infinite faults. The commentary below explains mindfulness, causing the mind to remember clearly. Their sect also says that being able to remember clearly is in terms of the mind, etc.
故。所明記者即諸法故。若由此故心等明記。此應復待余。便有無窮失。樂論宗者應善思擇 詳曰。彼勝發起本是作意根之業用故。然復待余勝解有喻故無窮失。我宗明記非心本業。故雖待余念無其類。無無窮失。
疏。心許前有體上更立用等者。問心體立用自許非他。何得為證 答前已廣成。為證無失。
論。根力覺支至非即心者。問破何計耶。若破本師本師心所皆體是心。惠等同喻所立不成。若破末計有相扶失。未許心所離心有故 答準疏所明破末計中立三四等心所之師。惠等依思非即心故。喻無其過。有義但破本計。然喻無過。前來成立惠等別有故得為喻。又解彼宗以經為量。說定即心餘別有體 詳曰。前雖屢言惠等心所。而未成立離心有體。何非喻過。又未見教經部師中唯不立定許余心所。二釋俱難。故依疏善。
論。如是至三十一句者。總別之言傳有二釋。一云二二至五名之為總。一一別起說名為別。二云起一至四名之為別。合起五種說名為總 詳曰。后解為正 問且合緣者。境二或四。豈不違彼同聚心法一所緣耶 答本質境一。對能緣者。義分四等名所樂等。理固無違。且如一境。謂欲觀察即名所樂。勝解印持即名決定。念明記時即名曾習。定注惠擇即名所觀。由斯同聚心法境一。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，如果所明記的事物就是諸法，那麼如果因為這個原因，心等能夠明記，那麼這又需要依賴其他的因素，這樣就會有無窮的過失。樂論宗（Lokāyata，順世論）的人應該好好思考這一點。 詳細解釋：他們認為勝解（adhimoksha，確認）的發起，其根本是作意（manaskāra，專注）和根（indriya，感官）的業用。然而，這又需要依賴其他的勝解，因此會有無窮的過失。我宗認為明記不是心的根本業用，所以即使依賴其他的念（smṛti，記憶），也不會有同類的無窮過失。
疏：心許諾在心體上建立作用等。問：心體建立作用是自己承認的，不是別人承認的，怎麼能作為證據呢？答：前面已經廣泛地闡述過了，作為證據沒有過失。
論：根、力、覺支等不是即心。問：這是爲了破斥哪種觀點呢？如果破斥本師（根本的老師）的觀點，本師認為心和心所（caitasika，心理活動）的體性都是心，用惠（prajñā，智慧）等作為比喻，所建立的論點就不能成立。如果破斥後來的觀點，就會有互相扶持的過失，因為他們沒有承認心所離開心而存在。答：根據疏的說明，這是爲了破斥後來的觀點中，主張建立三、四等心所的老師。惠等是依賴於思（cetanā，意志）的，不是即心，所以比喻沒有過失。有一種觀點認為，這只是爲了破斥根本的觀點，然而比喻沒有過失。前面已經成立了惠等是別有的，所以可以作為比喻。又有一種解釋認為，他們的宗派以經（sūtra，佛經）為衡量標準，說定（samādhi，禪定）就是心，其他的則是別有的體性。詳細解釋：前面雖然多次提到惠等心所，但是沒有成立它們離開心而有體性，怎麼能說不是比喻的過失呢？又沒有看到經部師（Sautrāntika，經量部）中只有不建立定，而承認其他心所的。這兩種解釋都有困難，所以依照疏的解釋是好的。
論：像這樣直到第三十一句。總和別這兩個詞有兩種解釋。一種說法是，二二到五種合起來稱為總，一一單獨生起稱為別。另一種說法是，生起一到四種稱為別，合起來生起五種稱為總。詳細解釋：后一種解釋是正確的。問：暫且說合緣，境（viṣaya，對像）有二種或四種，難道不違揹他們所說的同聚心法只有一個所緣（ālambana，所緣境）嗎？答：本質境只有一個。對於能緣（citta，心）來說，意義上分為四等，稱為所樂等。道理上沒有違背。比如一個境，想要觀察它，就叫做所樂；勝解印持它，就叫做決定；念明記它時，就叫做曾習；定注惠擇它時，就叫做所觀。因此，同聚心法的境是一個。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, if what is clearly remembered is indeed all dharmas (phenomena), then if because of this, the mind and so on can clearly remember, then this would again need to rely on other factors, and thus there would be an infinite fault. The Lokāyata (materialist) school should carefully consider this. Detailed explanation: They believe that the arising of adhimoksha (ascertainment) is fundamentally the function of manaskāra (attention) and the indriyas (senses). However, this again needs to rely on other adhimokshas, and thus there would be an infinite fault. Our school believes that clear remembering is not the fundamental function of the mind, so even if it relies on other smṛti (memory), there would not be the same kind of infinite fault.
Commentary: The mind acknowledges establishing functions and so on on the mind-essence. Question: The establishment of functions on the mind-essence is acknowledged by oneself, not by others, so how can it be used as evidence? Answer: It has already been extensively explained earlier, so there is no fault in using it as evidence.
Treatise: The faculties, powers, limbs of enlightenment, etc., are not identical to the mind. Question: What view is this refuting? If it is refuting the view of the original teacher, who believes that the essence of the mind and the caitasikas (mental activities) are all the mind, then using prajñā (wisdom) and so on as metaphors, the established argument cannot be established. If it is refuting the later view, there would be a fault of mutual support, because they have not acknowledged that caitasikas exist apart from the mind. Answer: According to the commentary's explanation, this is to refute the teachers in the later view who advocate establishing three or four kinds of caitasikas. Prajñā and so on rely on cetanā (volition), and are not identical to the mind, so the metaphor has no fault. One view is that this is only to refute the fundamental view, but the metaphor has no fault. It has already been established earlier that prajñā and so on are separate, so they can be used as metaphors. Another explanation is that their school takes the sūtras (Buddhist scriptures) as the standard, saying that samādhi (meditative concentration) is the mind, and the others have separate essences. Detailed explanation: Although prajñā and so on have been mentioned many times earlier, it has not been established that they have an essence apart from the mind, so how can it be said that there is no fault in the metaphor? Also, it has not been seen that among the Sautrāntikas (Sūtra school), only samādhi is not established, while the other caitasikas are acknowledged. Both of these explanations have difficulties, so it is better to follow the commentary's explanation.
Treatise: Like this, up to the thirty-first line. There are two explanations for the terms 'general' and 'specific'. One explanation is that combining two, two, up to five is called 'general', and each one arising separately is called 'specific'. Another explanation is that arising one to four is called 'specific', and combining to arise five is called 'general'. Detailed explanation: The latter explanation is correct. Question: Let's say that combining conditions, the viṣaya (object) has two or four kinds, doesn't this contradict their saying that the mind-dharmas in the same group have only one ālambana (object of focus)? Answer: The essential object is only one. For the citta (mind) that is able to cognize, it is divided into four kinds in meaning, called what is desired and so on. There is no contradiction in principle. For example, for one object, wanting to observe it is called what is desired; adhimoksha (ascertainment) sealing and holding it is called determination; when smṛti (memory) clearly remembers it, it is called what has been practiced; when samādhi (meditative concentration) focuses and prajñā (wisdom) chooses it, it is called what is being observed. Therefore, the object of the mind-dharmas in the same group is one.
疏。此師以天眼耳通是意識相應惠等者。準此師意非但二通。即成事智亦非五識相應之惠。因果五識皆無惠也。或但因無。果位許有。是故后師以佛五識成事智難。后釋理優。
論。遮等引故至故客有定者。定差別者而有多種。如燈具辨。更有同異。如瑜伽抄。
疏。佛地論說除漏盡通等者。按彼論第三云。如是其餘靜慮解脫無諍愿智通無礙等。多分攝在妙觀察智。神境智通多分攝在成所作智。漏盡智通．漏盡智力。若說漏盡相續中有四智所攝。若說彼緣漏盡涅槃。多分攝在大圓鏡智．平等性智 釋曰。妙觀察智作用強勝攝多功德。神境智通緣外塵發。有同五識多在成事 相續者身 在漏盡身名為漏盡。故四智收 若緣漏盡涅槃法故名為漏盡。故平．鏡攝 二緣真強。又得二智具涅槃故。疏所引文撿者誤也。應依今敘。
論第六
論。善謂信漸等者。問此善等法為論自施。為論經說 答本經所明。后論引釋。故顯揚第一引經證云。如契經說。于如來所起堅固信。慚于所慚。愧於所愧。無貪瞋癡三種善根。起精進住。有勢勤等適悅于意身及心安。所有無量善法生起。一切皆依不放逸相。又除貪憂心依止舍由不害故。知彼聰睿。
疏。此約立依至理須相合者。三根．精進頌鄰次言名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏：這位論師認為天眼通和天耳通是與意識相應的智慧等等。按照這位論師的觀點，不僅僅是這兩種神通，即使是成所作智也不是與前五識相應的智慧。因為無論是因位的五識還是果位的五識，都沒有智慧。或者說只有因位沒有智慧，果位才允許有。因此，後來的論師用佛的五識具有成所作智來提出疑問，後來的解釋更有道理。 論：因為遮止等等的引導，所以說客人有定。定的差別有很多種，就像燈具一樣可以分辨。更有相同和不同之處，就像《瑜伽師地論》的抄本一樣。 疏：《佛地經論》說，除了漏盡通等等。按照那部論的第三卷所說：『像這樣，其餘的靜慮（Dhyana，禪定），解脫（Moksha，解脫），無諍（Arana，無諍三昧），愿智（Pranidhana-jnana，愿智），通（Abhijnana，神通），無礙解（Pratisamvidā，無礙解）等等，大部分都包含在妙觀察智（Pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna，妙觀察智）中，神境智通（Rddhi-bala-jnana，神境智通）大部分包含在成所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，成所作智）中，漏盡智通（Asrava-ksaya-jnana-abhijna，漏盡智通）、漏盡智力（Asrava-ksaya-bala，漏盡智力），如果說漏盡的相續中有四智所攝，如果說它緣于漏盡涅槃（Nirvana，涅槃），大部分包含在大圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，大圓鏡智）和平等性智（Samatā-jñāna，平等性智）中。』解釋說：妙觀察智的作用強大，包含了很多功德。神境智通緣于外塵而生髮，有和前五識相同的地方，所以多在成所作智中。相續指的是身體，在漏盡的身體中名為漏盡，所以被四智所攝。如果緣于漏盡涅槃的法，所以名為漏盡，所以被平等性智和大圓鏡智所攝。這兩種都緣于真如，力量強大。又因為得到兩種智慧，具備涅槃的緣故。疏中所引用的文字，檢查的人搞錯了，應該按照現在所敘述的。 論第六 論：善指的是信（Śrāddha，信）、漸（Krama，漸次）等等。問：這些善法等等是論自己設立的，還是經書上說的？答：是本經所闡明的，後來的論著引用並解釋。所以《顯揚聖教論》第一卷引用經文證明說：『就像契經上所說，對於如來（Tathagata，如來）生起堅固的信心，對於應該慚愧的事情感到慚愧，對於應該羞愧的事情感到羞愧，沒有貪（Raga，貪慾）、嗔（Dvesha，嗔恚）、癡（Moha，愚癡）這三種善根，生起精進（Vīrya，精進），安住于有勢勤等等，使身心感到舒適安樂，所有無量的善法生起，一切都依靠不放逸（Apramada，不放逸）的相。』又因為除去貪慾和憂愁，心依靠舍（Upekṣā，舍），因為不損害的緣故，知道他是聰明的。 疏：這裡是依據建立，道理必須相互符合。三根（三種善根）、精進的頌文鄰近排列，所以這樣稱呼。
【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: This teacher believes that clairvoyance and clairaudience are wisdoms corresponding to consciousness, etc. According to this teacher's view, not only these two supernormal powers, but even Accomplishment Wisdom is not wisdom corresponding to the first five consciousnesses. Because neither the five consciousnesses in the causal stage nor the five consciousnesses in the resultant stage have wisdom. Or it can be said that only the causal stage lacks wisdom, and the resultant stage is allowed to have it. Therefore, later teachers questioned the Buddha's five consciousnesses having Accomplishment Wisdom, and the later explanation is more reasonable. Treatise: Because of the guidance of prevention, etc., it is said that the guest has certainty. There are many kinds of differences in certainty, just like lamps can be distinguished. There are even more similarities and differences, just like the copy of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Commentary: The Buddhabhumi Sutra Sastra says, 'Except for the Exhaustion of Outflows Supernormal Power, etc.' According to the third volume of that treatise: 'Like this, the remaining Dhyana (meditation), Moksha (liberation), Arana (non-contention), Pranidhana-jnana (wisdom of vows), Abhijnana (supernormal powers), Pratisamvidā (unimpeded eloquence), etc., are mostly included in Pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna (Wonderful Contemplation Wisdom). Rddhi-bala-jnana (Supernatural Power Wisdom) is mostly included in Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (Accomplishment Wisdom). Asrava-ksaya-jnana-abhijna (Exhaustion of Outflows Supernormal Power) and Asrava-ksaya-bala (Power of Exhaustion of Outflows), if it is said that the continuum of the exhaustion of outflows is included in the four wisdoms, if it is said that it is related to the exhaustion of outflows Nirvana, it is mostly included in Ādarśa-jñāna (Great Mirror Wisdom) and Samatā-jñāna (Equality Wisdom).' The explanation says: Wonderful Contemplation Wisdom has a strong function and includes many merits. Supernatural Power Wisdom arises from external dust, and has similarities with the first five consciousnesses, so it is mostly in Accomplishment Wisdom. Continuum refers to the body, and in the body of the exhaustion of outflows, it is called the exhaustion of outflows, so it is included in the four wisdoms. If it is related to the Dharma of the exhaustion of outflows Nirvana, it is called the exhaustion of outflows, so it is included in Equality Wisdom and Great Mirror Wisdom. These two are related to Suchness, and their power is strong. Also, because they obtain two wisdoms, they possess the conditions for Nirvana. The text quoted in the commentary was mistaken by the checker and should be based on the current narrative. Treatise Sixth Treatise: Good refers to Śrāddha (faith), Krama (gradual), etc. Question: Are these good Dharmas, etc., established by the treatise itself, or are they mentioned in the sutras? Answer: They are clarified in this sutra, and later treatises quote and explain them. Therefore, the first volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations quotes sutra texts to prove: 'Just like what is said in the sutras, for the Tathagata (Thus Come One), one generates firm faith, feels ashamed of what should be ashamed of, feels embarrassed about what should be embarrassed about, and lacks the three good roots of Raga (greed), Dvesha (hatred), and Moha (delusion). One generates Vīrya (diligence), abides in energetic effort, etc., making the body and mind feel comfortable and peaceful. All the immeasurable good Dharmas arise, and everything relies on the aspect of Apramada (non-negligence).' Also, because of removing greed and sorrow, the mind relies on Upekṣā (equanimity), and because of not harming, one knows that he is intelligent. Commentary: This is based on establishment, and the principles must be consistent with each other. The verses of the three roots and diligence are arranged adjacently, so they are called this way.
為合說。四俱為依立舍等故。不爾不悟四皆為依。名理須合。
疏。除無癡者。彼說無癡以惠為性。非自性善。所以但十。
疏。正理論師說有十二等者。即彼論云。頌說及言兼攝欣．厭。厭謂厭背。如緣苦．集。欣謂欣向。如緣滅．道。此二互起必於一心不得俱生。雖唯是善非遍善心。故善大地法中不別標顯。
疏。婆沙別說有欣厭者。彼二十八云。有別法名厭。非惠非無貪。是心所法與心相應。有別法名欣。非欲非無嗔。是心所法與心相應。然見道說苦．集忍智名為能厭。滅道忍智名能欣者。由彼忍智厭．欣相應名能欣厭。忍智實非欣．厭自性。
論。唯善者。亦遮經部信．精進二通三性故。故成實論信品中雲。信通三性。精進亦爾。
疏。是境第七者。問既為信依何非依七 答雖信依起。然信所緣。名境第七。
論。樂善為業者。按顯揚第一。信業有五云。斷不信障為業。能得菩提資糧圓滿為業。利益自他為業。能趣善道為業。增長凈信為業。后之四種此樂善攝。為樂於善方起四故。
疏。即是論中堅固信者。即攝大乘第七頌云。清凈增上力堅固心勝進。名菩薩初修無數三大劫。又按瑜伽五十七云。問世尊依何根處說如是言。于如來所凈信深固根生建立。一切世間
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了使說法合理，四者（信、精進、慚、愧）必須共同作為所依，才能成立舍等（舍受、舍無量心等）。否則，就無法領悟到四者都是所依。名稱和道理必須相符。
疏：除了沒有愚癡的人（無癡，moha）之外，因為他們認為無癡的自性是智慧（慧，prajna），並非自性本善，所以只有十個（大地法）。
疏：正理論師（Sautrāntika）說有十二個等，就是他們的論典中說：『頌說和言語兼攝了欣和厭。厭是指厭背，例如緣于苦諦（苦，duhkha）和集諦（集，samudaya）。欣是指欣向，例如緣于滅諦（滅，nirodha）和道諦（道，marga）。這二者相互生起，必定不能在同一個心中同時產生。雖然僅僅是善，但並非普遍的善心，所以在善的大地法中不特別標明顯示。』
疏：婆沙（Vibhasa）另外說有欣和厭，他們的《二十八》中說：『有另外的法名為厭，不是智慧（慧，prajna），也不是無貪（無貪，alobha），是與心相應的心的作用。有另外的法名為欣，不是欲（欲，chanda），也不是無嗔（無嗔，advesa），是與心相應的心的作用。』然而，見道（見道，darshana-marga）中說苦諦和集諦的忍智（忍智，ksanti-jnana）名為能厭，滅諦和道諦的忍智名為能欣，是因為那些忍智與厭和欣相應，所以名為能欣厭。忍智實際上不是欣和厭的自性。
論：唯有善的（信、精進、慚、愧），也遮止了經部（經部，Sautrāntika）的信和精進通於三性（善、惡、無記）的說法。所以成實論（成實論，Satyasiddhi-śāstra）的信品中說：『信通於三性，精進也是如此。』
疏：是境第七，問：既然是信的所依，為什麼不是依七？答：雖然信依此而生起，但信所緣的，名為境第七。
論：以樂於善為事業，按照《顯揚》（顯揚，Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一，信的業有五種，即：斷除不信的障礙為業，能夠獲得菩提（菩提，bodhi）資糧圓滿為業，利益自己和他人為業，能夠趨向善道為業，增長清凈的信心為業。後面的四種都包含在此處的樂善之中，因為樂於善才能生起後面的四種。
疏：就是論中的堅固的信。即《攝大乘》（攝大乘，Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第七頌說：『清凈增上力，堅固心勝進，名菩薩初修無數三大劫。』又按照《瑜伽》（瑜伽，Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十七說：『問：世尊（世尊，Bhagavan）依據什麼根源處說這樣的話：在如來（如來，Tathagata）處，清凈的信心深固地生根建立，一切世間。』
【English Translation】 English version: To make the statement coherent, the four (faith, diligence, shame, and embarrassment) must jointly serve as the basis for establishing equanimity, etc. Otherwise, it would be impossible to understand that all four are the basis. The name and the principle must be consistent.
Commentary: Except for those without ignorance (moha), because they consider the nature of non-ignorance to be wisdom (prajna), not inherently good, so there are only ten (universal mental factors).
Commentary: The Sautrāntikas (Sautrāntika) say there are twelve, etc., that is, their treatise says: 'Verses and words encompass both joy and aversion. Aversion refers to turning away, such as from suffering (duhkha) and its origin (samudaya). Joy refers to inclining towards, such as towards cessation (nirodha) and the path (marga). These two arise mutually and cannot occur simultaneously in the same mind. Although it is only good, it is not a universally good mind, so it is not specifically highlighted in the universal wholesome mental factors.'
Commentary: The Vibhasa (Vibhasa) separately says there are joy and aversion, their Twenty-eight says: 'There is another dharma called aversion, which is neither wisdom (prajna) nor non-greed (alobha), it is a mental factor associated with the mind. There is another dharma called joy, which is neither desire (chanda) nor non-hatred (advesa), it is a mental factor associated with the mind.' However, in the path of seeing (darshana-marga), the forbearance-wisdom (ksanti-jnana) regarding suffering and its origin is said to be capable of aversion, and the forbearance-wisdom regarding cessation and the path is said to be capable of joy, because those forbearance-wisdom are associated with aversion and joy, so they are called capable of joy and aversion. Forbearance-wisdom is actually not the nature of joy and aversion.
Treatise: Only the wholesome (faith, diligence, shame, and embarrassment) also prevents the Sautrāntikas' (Sautrāntika) view that faith and diligence are of three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Therefore, the chapter on faith in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (Satyasiddhi-śāstra) says: 'Faith is of three natures, and so is diligence.'
Commentary: It is the seventh object. Question: Since it is the basis of faith, why is it not based on seven? Answer: Although faith arises based on this, what faith cognizes is called the seventh object.
Treatise: Taking pleasure in the wholesome as the activity, according to the first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya), there are five activities of faith, namely: taking the removal of the obstacle of disbelief as the activity, being able to obtain the complete accumulation of the resources for enlightenment (bodhi) as the activity, benefiting oneself and others as the activity, being able to proceed towards the good path as the activity, and increasing pure faith as the activity. The latter four are all included in taking pleasure in the wholesome here, because only by taking pleasure in the wholesome can the latter four arise.
Commentary: It is the firm faith in the treatise. That is, the seventh verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) says: 'Pure increased power, firm mind advances, is called the bodhisattva's initial cultivation for countless great kalpas.' Also, according to the fifty-seventh chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra): 'Question: Based on what source did the World Honored One (Bhagavan) say such words: In the Tathagata (Tathagata), pure faith is deeply rooted and established, in all the world.'
若諸沙門。若婆羅門。若天魔．梵。無有如法能引奪者。答依信根說。此顯其信于聞．思．修勝堅固義。
論。一信有實等者。具如疏明。有義彈云。或如古師。言實事者因果體事。如四諦事。言實理者四諦真理。即因果理。故五蘊云。謂于業果諦實。極正符順名信業果。大乘虛空滅諦所收。非如有宗。故無有失。疏說為攝虛空但總言實。此非大乘。不可依據 詳曰。疏說本空空無有故故非諦攝。不言識變．依如立者諦不攝之。故第二疏言。識變虛空三諦所攝。又依識．如所立虛空假名虛空。非實空也。設據依如．識變虛空言諦攝者。亦不盡理。隨能變心何不苦．集．道諦三攝。又七真如許四諦攝。依如立空何唯滅諦。又本空本無。何得名為因果理耶。若言非是因果理者。如何說云四諦真理即因果理。由斯從寬不言諦故。于理無妨。此論總談。五蘊別列。亦不相違 問于所依境何故次第起忍．樂．希 答要決方希。又因果爾有斯次第 問于實等三信有起．不可如所說。既信皆起。但舉因果而以明之。如何忍．欲．而有．不有 答初約總知法體理事故但信忍。后別觀德．自他有能故信樂欲。又初實中亦包四諦。苦．集不樂故總言忍。
論。三信有能等者。信有力言總有二釋。一依人辨。如疏所明。二約法說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果任何沙門（出家修道者），婆羅門（祭司），天魔或梵天，都無法如法地奪走他的信心，這表明他的信心在聽聞、思考和修行方面都非常堅定。這是依據信根（信心的根本）而說的。
論：關於『信有實等』，詳細內容如疏文所說。有人反駁說，或者像古代的老師一樣，說『實事』指的是因果的本體和事件，例如四諦（苦、集、滅、道）的事實；『實理』指的是四諦的真理，也就是因果的道理。因此，《五蘊論》說：『對於業果的真實性，極其正確地符合，這稱為信業果。』大乘的虛空和滅諦所包含的，不像有宗（實在論宗派）那樣，所以沒有過失。疏文說爲了包含虛空而只總說『實』，這不是大乘的觀點，不可作為依據。詳細地說，疏文說本性是空，因為空無所有，所以不屬於諦所包含的。沒有說識變（意識的轉變）和依如（如來藏）所建立的虛空不屬於諦所包含的。所以第二疏文說：『識變、虛空為三諦所攝。』又依據識和如所建立的虛空是假名虛空，不是真實的空。假設依據如和識變虛空說是諦所包含的，也不完全合理。隨著能變的心，為什麼不被苦諦、集諦、道諦三者所包含？又七真如（七種真如）允許被四諦所包含，依據如所建立的空，為什麼只有滅諦？又本性空無，怎麼能稱為因果的道理呢？如果說不是因果的道理，又怎麼說四諦的真理就是因果的道理呢？因此，從寬泛的角度來說，不說是諦，在道理上沒有妨礙。此論是總的談論，而《五蘊論》是分別列舉，也不互相違背。問：對於所依的境界，為什麼依次生起忍（認可）、樂（喜樂）、希（希望）？答：必須要決斷才能有希望。而且因果本來就是這樣，有這樣的次第。問：對於實等三種信心，有生起和不生起，不能像所說的那樣。既然信心都生起，只是舉出因果來加以說明，那麼忍和欲，怎麼會有和沒有呢？答：最初是總的了解法體和理的事情，所以只是信忍。後來分別觀察功德、自己和他人有能力，所以信樂欲。而且最初的『實』中也包含四諦，因為不樂於苦諦和集諦，所以總的說為忍。
論：關於『三信有能等』，『信有力』總共有兩種解釋。一種是依據人來辨別，如疏文所說明的。另一種是約法來說。
【English Translation】 English version: If any Śramaṇa (ascetic), Brāhmaṇa (priest), Māra (demon), or Brahmā (god) cannot rightfully take away his faith, this indicates that his faith is very firm in hearing, thinking, and practicing. This is said based on the śraddhā-indriya (root of faith).
Treatise: Regarding 'faith in reality, etc.,' the details are as explained in the commentary. Someone objects, saying that, like the ancient teachers, 'real things' refer to the essence and events of cause and effect, such as the facts of the Four Noble Truths (duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, and mārga); 'real principle' refers to the truth of the Four Noble Truths, which is the principle of cause and effect. Therefore, the Five Skandhas Treatise says: 'Regarding the truth of karmic results, being extremely correct and in accordance, this is called faith in karmic results.' What is contained in the emptiness and cessation truth of Mahāyāna is not like that of the Sarvāstivāda school (a realist school), so there is no fault. The commentary says that in order to include emptiness, it only generally speaks of 'reality,' which is not the view of Mahāyāna and should not be relied upon. In detail, the commentary says that the nature is empty because emptiness is without anything, so it is not included in the truths. It does not say that the emptiness established by consciousness transformation (vijñāna-pariṇāma) and reliance on Suchness (tathatā) is not included in the truths. Therefore, the second commentary says: 'Consciousness transformation and emptiness are contained in the three truths.' Moreover, the emptiness established based on consciousness and Suchness is nominal emptiness, not real emptiness. Assuming that the emptiness based on Suchness and consciousness transformation is said to be contained in the truths, it is not entirely reasonable. Along with the mind that can transform, why is it not contained in the three truths of suffering, accumulation, and the path? Furthermore, the seven kinds of Suchness (sapta-tathatā) are allowed to be contained in the Four Noble Truths, so why is the emptiness established based on Suchness only the cessation truth? Moreover, the nature is empty and without anything, so how can it be called the principle of cause and effect? If it is said that it is not the principle of cause and effect, then how can it be said that the truth of the Four Noble Truths is the principle of cause and effect? Therefore, from a broad perspective, not speaking of truths does not hinder the principle. This treatise is a general discussion, while the Five Skandhas Treatise lists them separately, and they do not contradict each other. Question: Regarding the object of reliance, why do acceptance (kṣānti), joy (sukha), and hope (āśa) arise in sequence? Answer: It is necessary to make a decision in order to have hope. Moreover, cause and effect are originally like this, having such a sequence. Question: Regarding the three kinds of faith in reality, etc., there is arising and non-arising, which cannot be as said. Since faith all arises, only cause and effect are cited to explain it, so how can there be acceptance and desire, and having and not having? Answer: Initially, it is a general understanding of the essence of the Dharma and the principle, so it is only acceptance of faith. Later, separately observing the merits and the ability of oneself and others, there is joy and desire of faith. Moreover, the initial 'reality' also contains the Four Noble Truths, and because there is no joy in the truth of suffering and the truth of accumulation, it is generally said to be acceptance.
Treatise: Regarding 'the three kinds of faith have ability, etc.,' 'faith has power' has two explanations in total. One is to distinguish based on people, as explained in the commentary. The other is to speak about the Dharma.
。故有義云。或有力言即所信善。謂信善法能得能成有為無為．世．出世果。起希望故而修習之。雖非論文亦不違理。
論。忍謂勝解等者。問此信因果為俱異時 答釋具燈．疏。有義準下俱起。初師必同時。推尋事理。未決定時信不生故。由此信等必欲．解俱。若依后師亦許異時。設於事理未決定時信亦生故 詳曰。后師因果同異無違。前師必同。理便焉有何所以耶。但言決定方有信生。不說言欲．解要俱時起。先決后信。豈失於決方生信義。設依彼文但可因並。準何說果亦俱生耶。由此言之否臧可暏。
論。慚等雖善非凈為相者。問若慚非凈。如何前難云若令心凈慚等何別 答慚既稱善。何得非凈。然不似彼凈為其相。與信不同。由斯難．答望義不同。故無有失。
論。止諸惡行為業者。準顯揚論第一。業有五種。一斷無慚障為業。第五增長慚為其業。中間三種同信中三。故彼論中指同前信。
疏。即是二緣者。顯揚自法等二是慚緣也。
論。止息惡為業者。顯揚業五。初斷無愧。后增長愧。中三同前。余善之業皆有五種。但初．后業望除自障能自增長。中三皆同復不錄之。準前可解。
論。謂依世間訶厭增上者。有義訶謂訶責。厭謂厭離。見世間人及世間法。訶責暴人。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此有一種觀點認為，或者說有力的說法是，所信的即是善。意思是相信善法能夠獲得和成就'有為'（saṃskṛta，指有生滅變化的事物）和'無為'（asaṃskṛta，指沒有生滅變化的事物）、'世間'（loka，指凡俗世界）和'出世間'（lokottara，指超越凡俗世界）的果報。因為生起希望，所以修習它。即使不是論文中的說法，也不違背道理。
論：'忍'（kṣānti，指安忍）是指勝解等。問：這種信的因果是同時還是不同時？答：參考《具燈疏》。有一種觀點認為，根據下文，因果是同時生起的。最初的說法一定是同時的，因為在推尋事理、尚未決定的時候，信是不會產生的。因此，信等必然與'欲'（chanda，指意欲）和'解'（adhimokṣa，指勝解）同時生起。如果依照後來的說法，也允許不同時。假設對於事理尚未決定的時候，信也可能產生。詳細地說，後來的說法認為因果同異沒有衝突，最初的說法一定是相同的。道理上又有什麼原因呢？只是說決定之後才有信產生，沒有說意欲和勝解一定要同時生起。先決定后產生信，難道就失去了決定之後才產生信的意義嗎？假設依據那段文字，只可以說是因並存，根據什麼說果也同時產生呢？由此來說，好壞是可以預見的。
論：'慚'（hrī，指對自身惡行的羞恥）等雖然是善，但不是以清凈為相。問：如果慚不是清凈，那麼前面如何質問說，如果令心清凈，慚等有什麼區別？答：慚既然被稱為善，怎麼能說不是清凈呢？然而它不像清凈那樣以清凈為相，與信不同。因此，質問和回答所期望的意義不同，所以沒有過失。
論：以止息諸惡行為業。參考《顯揚論》第一，業有五種：一是斷除無慚的障礙為業，第五是增長慚為業。中間三種與信中的三種相同。所以該論中指出與前面的信相同。
疏：即是二緣。'自法'（svadharma，指自身的正法）等是慚的緣。
論：以止息惡為業。《顯揚論》中業有五種：最初是斷除無愧（apatrāpya，指對他人惡行的羞恥），最後是增長愧。中間三種與前面相同。其餘善的業都有五種，但最初和最後的業是希望去除自身的障礙，能夠自我增長。中間三種都相同，不再記錄。參考前面可以理解。
論：是指依靠世間的訶厭增上。有一種觀點認為，訶是指訶責，厭是指厭離。見到世間的人和世間法，訶責暴人。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there is a view that, or a strong statement that, what is believed is good. It means believing that good dharmas can obtain and accomplish 'saṃskṛta' (conditioned phenomena, referring to things with birth and death) and 'asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned phenomena, referring to things without birth and death), 'loka' (the mundane world) and 'lokottara' (the supramundane world) results. Because hope arises, one cultivates it. Even if it is not a statement in the treatise, it does not contradict reason.
Treatise: 'Kṣānti' (patience, referring to forbearance) refers to adhimokṣa (resolution) and so on. Question: Are the cause and effect of this belief simultaneous or at different times? Answer: Refer to the 'Lamp Commentary'. One view is that, according to the following text, cause and effect arise simultaneously. The initial statement must be simultaneous, because belief does not arise when investigating principles and not yet decided. Therefore, belief and so on must arise simultaneously with 'chanda' (desire, referring to volition) and 'adhimokṣa' (resolution, referring to understanding). If according to the later statement, it is also allowed to be at different times. Suppose that belief may also arise when principles have not yet been decided. In detail, the later statement believes that there is no conflict between the same and different cause and effect, and the initial statement must be the same. What is the reason in principle? It only says that belief arises after a decision, and does not say that desire and resolution must arise simultaneously. Does deciding first and then generating belief lose the meaning of generating belief only after a decision? Suppose according to that text, it can only be said that the causes coexist, according to what does it say that the effects also arise simultaneously? From this, good and bad can be foreseen.
Treatise: 'Hrī' (shame, referring to embarrassment about one's own bad deeds) and so on, although good, are not characterized by purity. Question: If shame is not purity, then how did the previous question ask, if the mind is purified, what is the difference between shame and so on? Answer: Since shame is called good, how can it be said that it is not pure? However, it is not characterized by purity like purity, and is different from belief. Therefore, the meanings expected by the question and answer are different, so there is no fault.
Treatise: Taking stopping all evil actions as its function. Refer to the first of the 'Exposition of the Meaning Treatise', there are five types of karma: one is taking cutting off the obstacle of shamelessness as its function, and the fifth is taking increasing shame as its function. The three in the middle are the same as the three in belief. Therefore, that treatise points out that it is the same as the previous belief.
Commentary: That is, the two conditions. 'Svadharma' (one's own dharma, referring to one's own righteous dharma) and so on are the conditions for shame.
Treatise: Taking stopping evil as its function. In the 'Exposition of the Meaning Treatise', there are five types of karma: the first is cutting off apatrāpya (embarrassment about others' bad deeds), and the last is increasing shame. The three in the middle are the same as before. All other good karmas have five types, but the initial and final karmas hope to remove their own obstacles and be able to self-increase. The three in the middle are the same and are no longer recorded. It can be understood by referring to the previous.
Treatise: It refers to relying on the increase of worldly censure and aversion. One view is that censure refers to censure, and aversion refers to aversion. Seeing worldly people and worldly dharmas, censure violent people.
厭離惡法。故於暴惡而生輕拒。而彈疏云。謂自厭惡此定不然。自厭惡者即是輕拒。愧之自性。非世間故。今者既顯世間訶厭故前為正 詳曰。惡法違己得世間名。為先厭之後方輕拒。何理不得。故下文云於己益損名自他故。故惡名他名世間者而無有失。又厭．輕拒二義不同。若不先厭何乃拒之。
疏。由前一理二教者。即前標宗而是理也。二教可知。
論。然集論說至理必應爾者。此說彼論據因果言。非彼論自約因果辨。彼論所明如前疏引。
疏。若爾即三念住等亦爾者。此質意云。念住亦用無嗔為體。應同大悲非根所攝。
疏。念住依惠故根所攝者。此師以彼對法為正。按彼第十四出念住體云。於一切種愛．恚俱煩惱並習氣不現行具足中所有定惠等為體 釋曰。總以五法。無貪．無嗔．大舍．定．惠而為體也。
疏。且依約影顯非真理文者。會瑜伽也。按五十七云。念住非根攝。無貪嗔所攝故。會之雲影顯非實。舉佛余德依惠根收。顯此念住理亦爾也。
疏。此亦不然者。后師非前。未出所以。
疏。如五見至此無癡亦爾者。前師舉見證無癡實。
疏。或作善事至非要聖果者。隨因果位所修事畢即名為滿。非唯聖極方得滿名。
疏。若言勤至然此中者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 厭惡背離佛法的行為。因此，對於暴虐邪惡的事物會產生輕視和抗拒。而彈疏中說，如果說自己厭惡，那肯定不是這樣。自己厭惡就是輕視和抗拒。慚愧的自性，不是世俗的。現在既然已經顯現了世俗的訶責和厭惡，所以前面說的才是正確的。詳細地說，惡法違背自己的意願，得到了世俗的名稱，先厭惡之後才輕視和抗拒，有什麼道理不行呢？所以下文說，對於自己有益或有損害，才稱為自或他。所以惡名、他名、世間名，並沒有什麼錯誤。而且厭惡和輕拒是兩種不同的含義。如果不先厭惡，又怎麼會抗拒呢？
疏：由前一理二教的原因，就是前面標明的宗旨是理。二教是可以理解的。
論：然而《集論》說達到真理必然是這樣的，這是說《集論》根據因果來說的。不是《集論》自己約定用因果來辨析。該論所闡明的，如前面疏中引用的。
疏：如果這樣，那麼三念住等也是這樣嗎？這是質問的意思，說念住也用無嗔作為本體，應該和大悲一樣，不是根所攝。
疏：念住依靠智慧，所以被根所攝。這位法師以《對法》為依據。按照《對法》第十四卷，念住的本體是：在一切種類的愛、恚（huì，嗔怒）兩種煩惱以及習氣都不現行，具足的狀態中，所有的定、慧等作為本體。解釋說：總共以五法，無貪、無嗔、大舍、定、慧作為本體。
疏：暫且依據影顯而非真理的文句，是會合《瑜伽師地論》。按照第五十七卷說，念住不是根所攝，因為是無貪、無嗔所攝。會合說這是影顯而非真實。舉出佛的其他功德，依靠智慧根來收攝。顯示這念住的道理也是這樣。
疏：這樣也不對。後來的法師否定了前面的說法，但沒有說明原因。
疏：如五見，達到此地，無癡也是這樣。前面的法師舉出見來證明無癡是真實的。
疏：或者做善事，達到非一定要聖果的程度。隨著因果的位次，所修的事完畢了，就稱為圓滿。不是隻有達到聖位的極致，才能得到圓滿的名稱。
疏：如果說勤奮，然而這其中。
【English Translation】 English version: To detest and turn away from evil dharmas (teachings/principles). Therefore, one generates contempt and resistance towards violence and wickedness. However, the commentary on the commentary states, 'To say that one detests oneself is certainly not the case. Self-detestation is precisely contempt and resistance. The nature of shame is not worldly.' Now that worldly censure and detestation have been revealed, what was said earlier is correct. In detail, evil dharmas go against one's own will and gain a worldly name; one detests first and then despises and resists. What principle is not permissible? Therefore, the following text says that what benefits or harms oneself is called 'self' or 'other.' Thus, the names 'evil,' 'other,' and 'worldly' are without error. Moreover, 'detestation' and 'resistance' have different meanings. If one does not detest first, how can one resist?
Commentary: The reason for the preceding one principle and two teachings is that the previously stated tenet is the principle. The two teachings are understandable.
Treatise: However, the Samgraha-vastu (Compendium of Topics) says that reaching the ultimate truth must be like this; this says that the Samgraha-vastu speaks based on cause and effect. It is not that the Samgraha-vastu itself stipulates using cause and effect to analyze. What that treatise clarifies is as quoted in the preceding commentary.
Commentary: If so, then are the three smṛtyupasthānas (foundations of mindfulness) also like this? This is a question implying that the smṛtyupasthānas also use non-anger as their essence and should be like great compassion, not included in the roots.
Commentary: Smṛtyupasthānas are included in the roots because they rely on wisdom. This master uses the Abhidharma (collection of Buddhist scriptures) as the basis. According to the fourteenth volume of that text, the essence of smṛtyupasthānas is: in the state where all kinds of attachment, dveṣa (hatred/anger), and habitual tendencies are not manifest, all dhyāna (meditative absorption), prajñā (wisdom), etc., are the essence. The explanation says: In total, the five dharmas—non-greed, non-anger, great equanimity, dhyāna, and prajñā—are the essence.
Commentary: To temporarily rely on the phrases that show a reflection rather than the true principle is to reconcile with the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). According to the fifty-seventh volume, smṛtyupasthānas are not included in the roots because they are included in non-greed and non-anger. Reconciling this, it says that this is a reflection rather than reality. It cites the Buddha's other virtues, relying on the root of wisdom to gather them. It shows that the principle of these smṛtyupasthānas is also like this.
Commentary: This is also not correct. The later master negates the previous statement but does not explain the reason.
Commentary: Like the five views, reaching this point, non-ignorance is also like this. The previous master cites views to prove that non-ignorance is real.
Commentary: Or doing good deeds, reaching the point where it is not necessarily a noble fruit. As the stages of cause and effect progress, the deeds cultivated are completed and are called 'fulfilled.' It is not only when reaching the extreme of the noble stage that one obtains the name 'fulfilled.'
Commentary: If one speaks of diligence, however, within this.
問起生下。言然此中者意云。此中勤者是何勤耶。文省略也。
疏。乍可名純者。雖非是精猶勝染法名乍可純。
論。二乘究竟道欣大菩提者。有義欣大菩提名無足者。且依勝說。理實數數入無漏觀令觀增明亦名無足。不爾定姓無無足故。
疏。並前合為五解者。前者論．經所列五名 問后之四義解前五位。何得所釋為能解耶 答即所列五即是解彼精進之義。故合為五。
疏。問何故此中以無貪為首者。其難意云。前摽不放以勤為初。何故后結無貪為首。
疏。答以前至從近而結者。此答意云。依次前云若善依持之文結故。無貪為首。
論。靜住為業者。有義問寂靜住者但可名性如何名業。以性顯業前後無。故集論中但云。不容雜染所依為業。故此論主應是錯也 詳曰。若以令心平等三種而為其業。可如所責。靜住既非平等等三。如何難云以性為業。又靜住即是不容染義。對法何殊獨責此論由斯諸論文雖少異義理大同。幸不致惑。又性顯業亦復何違。如第七八識思量．了別為性相故。若云心所無如是者。理亦不然。如此論中忿以憤發而為其性。對法即以憤發為業。豈不性．業同憤發故二論互舉。又此明惱暴等為性。蛆螫為業。五蘊論云。發舉惡言尤蛆為性。亦是性．業二論互明
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：什麼是『生下』（Utpada，產生）？答：就是指這裡所說的意思。問：這裡所說的『勤』（ātapa，努力）是什麼樣的勤？（答：）這是省略了原文的說法。
疏：『乍可名純』（śuddha，純凈）是什麼意思？答：雖然不是最精純的，但勝過被染污的法，所以稱為『乍可純』。
論：『二乘究竟道欣大菩提』（聲聞乘和緣覺乘最終欣求大菩提）是什麼意思？答：有一種解釋是欣求大菩提就叫做『無足』（apūrṇa，不圓滿）。這只是依殊勝的說法。實際上，數數進入無漏觀，使觀智增明，也叫做『無足』。否則，如果斷定有這種根性的人永遠無法滿足，那就錯了。
疏：『並前合為五解』是什麼意思？答：就是把前面論和經中所列的五個名稱合起來。問：後面的四種解釋如何解釋前面的五個位次？難道被解釋的反而成了能解釋的嗎？答：所列的五個名稱本身就是解釋精進的意義，所以合起來是五個。
疏：問：為什麼這裡以『無貪』（alobha，不貪婪）為首？答：提問者的意思是，前面標舉『不放逸』（apramāda，不放逸）以『勤』為開始，為什麼後面總結時以『無貪』為首？
疏：答：『以前至從近而結』是什麼意思？答：回答者的意思是，因為是按照前面『若善依持』的文句來總結的，所以以『無貪』為首。
論：『靜住為業』（śamatha-sthiti-karma，以止住為事業）是什麼意思？答：有人問，寂靜住（śamatha-sthiti，止住）只能稱為『性』（svabhāva，自性），怎麼能稱為『業』（karma，作用）呢？因為自性顯現作用前後沒有差別。所以《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中只說，『不容雜染所依為業』。所以這個論主應該是錯了。詳察：如果以令心平等三種作為它的作用，那就可以像你所責問的那樣。靜住既然不是平等三種，怎麼能責難說以自性為作用呢？而且靜住就是不容許染污的意思，《對法》（Abhidharma）有什麼不同，為什麼要單獨責難這個論呢？由此可見，各種論文雖然有少許差異，但義理大同，希望不會造成迷惑。而且自性顯現作用又有什麼違背呢？比如第七、第八識以思量、了別為自性。如果說心所沒有這樣的情況，道理也不對。比如這個論中，『忿』（krodha，忿怒）以憤發作為它的自性，《對法》就以憤發作為它的作用。難道不是自性和作用都相同于憤發嗎？所以兩部論互相舉例說明。又這部論說明惱、暴等為自性，蛆螫為作用。《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandhaprakarana）說，發舉惡言尤蛆為自性，也是自性和作用兩部論互相說明。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is 『Utpada』 (生下, arising)? Answer: It refers to the meaning mentioned here. Question: What kind of 『ātapa』 (勤, diligence) is mentioned here? (Answer:) This is an abbreviated way of saying it.
Commentary: What does 『śuddha』 (乍可名純, provisionally pure) mean? Answer: Although it is not the most refined, it is superior to defiled dharmas, so it is called 『provisionally pure.』
Treatise: What does 『the two vehicles ultimately aspire to Mahābodhi』 (二乘究竟道欣大菩提, Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna ultimately aspire to Mahābodhi) mean? Answer: One explanation is that aspiring to Mahābodhi is called 『apūrṇa』 (無足, incomplete). This is just according to a superior explanation. In reality, repeatedly entering into anāsrava-darśana (無漏觀, observation free from outflows), causing the wisdom of observation to increase, is also called 『apūrṇa.』 Otherwise, if it is determined that people with this kind of nature can never be satisfied, then it is wrong.
Commentary: What does 『combining the previous into five explanations』 (並前合為五解) mean? Answer: It means combining the five names listed in the previous treatise and sutra. Question: How do the latter four explanations explain the previous five positions? Is it possible that what is being explained becomes the explainer? Answer: The five names listed themselves explain the meaning of diligence, so combined, there are five.
Commentary: Question: Why is 『alobha』 (無貪, non-greed) taken as the first here? Answer: The questioner means that the previous mention of 『apramāda』 (不放逸, non-negligence) began with 『diligence,』 so why does the conclusion later begin with 『non-greed?』
Commentary: Answer: What does 『concluding from the previous to the near』 (以前至從近而結) mean? Answer: The answerer means that because it is concluded according to the previous sentence 『if one relies well,』 『non-greed』 is taken as the first.
Treatise: What does 『śamatha-sthiti-karma』 (靜住為業, abiding in tranquility as action) mean? Answer: Someone asks, how can śamatha-sthiti (寂靜住, abiding in tranquility) only be called 『svabhāva』 (性, nature), and how can it be called 『karma』 (業, action)? Because there is no difference before and after nature manifests action. Therefore, in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論), it is only said that 『not allowing the basis of mixed defilements is action.』 So this treatise master must be wrong. Detailed examination: If the three aspects of making the mind equal are taken as its action, then it can be like what you questioned. Since abiding in tranquility is not the three aspects of equality, how can you criticize it by saying that nature is action? Moreover, abiding in tranquility means not allowing defilement. What is the difference from the Abhidharma (對法)? Why single out this treatise for criticism? From this, it can be seen that although the various treatises have slight differences, the meanings are largely the same, and hopefully, it will not cause confusion. Moreover, how does nature manifesting action contradict anything? For example, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses take thinking and discernment as their nature. If it is said that mental factors do not have such a situation, the reasoning is also incorrect. For example, in this treatise, 『krodha』 (忿, anger) takes resentment as its nature, and the Abhidharma takes resentment as its action. Isn't it that nature and action are both the same as resentment? Therefore, the two treatises give examples to illustrate each other. Also, this treatise explains that annoyance, violence, etc., are nature, and stinging like a gadfly is action. The Pañcaskandhaprakarana (五蘊論) says that uttering evil words is especially like stinging as nature, which is also the nature and action explained by the two treatises.
。此何不許。由此觀之論實非錯。
疏。非謂行也者。行非平聲。應從去聲讀。
論。初中復位辨舍差別者。顯平等三別之所以。故雜集第一云。心平等性者。謂以初中后位辨舍差別。所以者何。由舍與心相應離沉沒等不平等性故。最初證得心平等性。由心平等遠離加行自然相續故。次復證得心正直性。由心正直於諸雜染無怯慮故。最後證得心無功用住性。
疏。對法第十至為貪憂者。按彼論。解七覺支中舍覺支云。舍是不染污體。永除貪憂不染污位為自性故。有疏本云對法第十八道支中說者誤也。
疏。以憂根亦有舍者憂通善故。
論。雖有義別至故不別立者。準瑜伽論五十六中。依嗔．貪等立余染法 應翻為凈。為無異故。故此不言。即彼論云。多隨嗔恚自在轉義一切一分是有諍。多隨愛見自在轉義一切一分是有愛味。多隨貪自在轉義一切一分是依耽嗜。余處有文類知不錄。
論。欣謂欲俱等者。問何故根本．隨惑不次而翻之耶 答同類鄰明。欣．不忿等無嗔分故。故次欣后明不忿等。厭．不慳等俱無貪分。故次厭后明不慳等。余準可悟。
論。不恨惱嫉等者。準瑜伽論八十九。依嗔而立七差別法。亦合翻之依于無嗔立於善法。故言等也。即彼論云。若煩惱纏能令發
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這有什麼不允許的呢？由此看來，這個論點實際上並沒有錯。
疏：這裡說的『行』，不是指『xíng』，而應該讀作去聲『xìng』。
論：最初、中間、最後階段，通過辨別捨棄的差別，來顯示平等的三種不同之處。所以《雜集論》第一卷說：『心的平等性，是指通過最初、中間、最後階段來辨別捨棄的差別。』為什麼呢？因為舍與心相應，遠離沉沒等不平等性。最初證得心的平等性，由於心的平等，遠離了人為的努力，自然而然地相續。其次證得心的正直性，由於心的正直，對於各種雜染沒有怯懦和顧慮。最後證得心無功用住性。
疏：《對法論》第十卷到『因為貪憂』。按照《對法論》的說法，解釋七覺支中的舍覺支時說：『舍是不染污的體性，永遠去除貪慾和憂愁等不染污的狀態，是它的自性。』有的疏本說在《對法論》第十八卷道支中說的，是錯誤的。
疏：因為憂根也有舍的成分，憂是通於善的。
論：雖然意義上有區別，所以沒有單獨設立。根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷，依據嗔恚、貪慾等設立其餘的染污法，應該翻譯為清凈。因為沒有不同之處，所以這裡沒有說。也就是那部論中說：『多數隨著嗔恚自在轉動的意思，一切的一部分是有諍。多數隨著愛見自在轉動的意思，一切的一部分是有愛味。多數隨著貪慾自在轉動的意思，一切的一部分是依賴耽嗜。』其他地方有類似的文句，就不一一記錄了。
論：欣，是指與欲俱等。問：為什麼根本煩惱和隨煩惱不按照順序翻譯呢？答：因為同類的放在一起說明。欣、不忿等沒有嗔恚的成分，所以先說明欣，再說明不忿等。厭、不慳等都沒有貪慾的成分，所以先說明厭，再說明不慳等。其餘的可以類推領悟。
論：不恨、惱、嫉等。根據《瑜伽師地論》第八十九卷，依據嗔恚而設立七種差別法，也應該翻譯成依據無嗔設立善法，所以說是『等』。也就是那部論中說：如果煩惱纏繞能夠使人發
【English Translation】 English version: What is not permitted about this? From this perspective, the argument is actually not wrong.
Commentary: The '行 (xíng)' here does not refer to 'xíng' (to walk, to do), but should be read in the departing tone as 'xìng' (nature, character).
Treatise: The initial, middle, and final stages, through distinguishing the differences in abandonment, reveal the three distinctions of equality. Therefore, the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'The equality of mind refers to distinguishing the differences in abandonment through the initial, middle, and final stages.' Why? Because upeksha (舍, equanimity) corresponds with the mind, and is far from the non-equal nature of sinking, etc. Initially, one attains the equality of mind; due to the equality of mind, one is far from artificial effort and naturally continues. Secondly, one attains the uprightness of mind; due to the uprightness of mind, one has no timidity or concern for various defilements. Finally, one attains the state of dwelling in non-effort.
Commentary: Abhidharma Volume 10 to 'because of greed and sorrow'. According to the Abhidharma, when explaining upeksha sambojjhanga (舍覺支, equanimity enlightenment factor) among the seven enlightenment factors, it says: 'Upeksha is a non-defiled nature; permanently removing greed, sorrow, and other non-defiled states is its self-nature.' Some commentaries mistakenly say it is mentioned in the Abhidharma Volume 18, the limb of the path.
Commentary: Because the root of sorrow also has the element of upeksha (舍, equanimity), sorrow is common to goodness.
Treatise: Although there are differences in meaning, they are not established separately. According to Volume 56 of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, based on anger, greed, etc., the remaining defiled dharmas are established; it should be translated as pure. Because there is no difference, it is not mentioned here. That is, that treatise says: 'Most of the meaning that follows anger freely, all or a portion of it is contentious. Most of the meaning that follows love and views freely, all or a portion of it is loving flavor. Most of the meaning that follows greed freely, all or a portion of it is dependent on attachment.' There are similar sentences elsewhere, so they are not recorded one by one.
Treatise: Hri (欣, joy) refers to being together with desire, etc. Question: Why are the root afflictions and secondary afflictions not translated in order? Answer: Because similar categories are explained together. Hri (欣, joy), non-resentment, etc., do not have the element of anger, so first hri (欣, joy) is explained, and then non-resentment, etc. Apatrapya (厭, shame), non-stinginess, etc., do not have the element of greed, so first apatrapya (厭, shame) is explained, and then non-stinginess, etc. The rest can be understood by analogy.
Treatise: Non-hatred, annoyance, jealousy, etc. According to Volume 89 of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, based on anger, seven different dharmas are established, and it should also be translated as establishing good dharmas based on non-anger, so it is said 'etc.'. That is, that treatise says: If the affliction entanglement can cause one to emit
起執持刀杖斗訟違諍故名憤發。于不順言性不堪忍故名惡說。于罵反罵于嗔反嗔等名為不忍。為性惱他故名抵突。性好譏嫌故名諀訿。心懷憎惡。於他攀緣不饒益相起發意言隨順隨轉名恚尋思。心懷損惱。於他攀緣惱亂之相起發意言。余如前說名害尋思。
論。不慳憍等者。亦等瑜伽八十九說依貪所立諸煩惱法翻立善中。即彼論云。現行遮逼有所乞丐故名研求。于所得利不生喜足。設獲他利更求勝利。名以利求利。耽著財利顯不實德。欲令他知故名惡欲。于大人所欲求廣大利養恭敬故名大欲。懷染污心顯不實德。欲令他知名自希欲。于自諸欲深生貪愛名為耽嗜。於他諸欲深生貪著名遍耽嗜。于諸境界深生耽著說名為貪。于諸惡行深生耽著名非法貪。于自父母等諸財寶不正受用名為執著。於他委寄所有財物規欲抵拒故名惡貪。于所緣境深生繫縛。猶如美睡隱翳其心名不應理轉。心懷愛染攀緣諸欲起發意言。隨順隨轉名欲尋思。心懷染污攀緣親感起發意言。余如前說名親里尋思。心懷染污攀緣國土起發意言。余如前說名國土尋思。心懷染污攀緣自義推託遷近后時望得發起意言。余如前說名不死尋思。心懷染污攀緣自他。若劣若勝起發意言。余如前說是名輕蔑相應尋思。心懷染污攀緣施主。往還家勢起發意言。隨順隨
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
因執持刀杖、爭鬥訴訟、違背爭執，所以叫做『憤發』。對於不順耳的話語，天性不能忍受，所以叫做『惡說』。對於謾罵進行反罵，對於嗔怒進行反嗔等等，叫做『不忍』。天性喜歡惱害他人，所以叫做『抵突』。天性喜歡譏諷嫌棄，所以叫做『諀訿』。心中懷有憎惡，對於他人進行攀緣，不饒益對方，從而生起意念，並隨順這個意念而轉，叫做『恚尋思』。心中懷有損害惱亂，對於他人進行攀緣，以惱亂之相生起意念。其餘的如同前面所說，叫做『害尋思』。 論：『不慳憍等』，也如同《瑜伽師地論》第八十九卷所說，依據貪慾所建立的各種煩惱法，反過來建立善法。該論中說：『爲了遮蔽他人，強行索取，所以叫做研求。對於已經獲得的利益不生喜悅滿足，即使獲得了他人的利益，還想要求得更大的利益，叫做以利求利。貪戀執著于財利，顯現不真實的功德，想要讓別人知道，所以叫做惡欲。對於大人物，想要尋求廣大的利益供養和恭敬，所以叫做大欲。懷著染污的心，顯現不真實的功德，想要讓別人知道，這叫做自希欲。對於自己的各種慾望，深深地產生貪愛，叫做耽嗜。對於他人的各種慾望，深深地產生貪著，叫做遍耽嗜。對於各種境界，深深地產生耽著，就叫做貪。對於各種惡行，深深地產生耽著，叫做非法貪。對於自己的父母等各種財寶，不正當地受用，叫做執著。對於他人委託寄放的財物，計劃著抵賴拒不歸還，所以叫做惡貪。對於所緣的境界，深深地產生繫縛，就像美好的睡眠一樣，遮蔽了他的心，叫做不應理轉。心中懷著愛染，攀緣各種慾望，生起意念，並隨順這個意念而轉，叫做欲尋思。心中懷著染污，攀緣親屬朋友，生起意念，其餘的如同前面所說，叫做親里尋思。心中懷著染污，攀緣國土，生起意念，其餘的如同前面所說，叫做國土尋思。心中懷著染污，攀緣自己的利益，推託拖延，想要在以後得到，從而生起意念，其餘的如同前面所說，叫做不死尋思。心中懷著染污，攀緣自己和他人，無論是低劣還是殊勝，生起意念，其餘的如同前面所說，這叫做輕蔑相應尋思。心中懷著染污，攀緣施主，往來於施主家，生起意念，並隨順這個意念而轉。
【English Translation】 English version:
Because of holding knives and staffs, engaging in fighting and lawsuits, and opposing disputes, it is called 'wrath' (憤發 - fèn fā). Because of being unable to tolerate unpleasant words by nature, it is called 'evil speech' (惡說 - è shuō). Replying to insults with insults, replying to anger with anger, and so on, is called 'intolerance' (不忍 - bù rěn). Because of naturally liking to annoy others, it is called 'obstruction' (抵突 - dǐ tū). Because of naturally liking to ridicule and despise, it is called 'criticism' (諀訿 - pǐ zī). Harboring hatred in the heart, clinging to others, not benefiting them, and thus generating thoughts and following those thoughts, is called 'anger-related thinking' (恚尋思 - huì xún sī). Harboring harm and annoyance in the heart, clinging to others, generating thoughts with the appearance of annoyance. The rest is as described before, called 'harmful thinking' (害尋思 - hài xún sī). Treatise: 'Not stingy, arrogant, etc.,' is also as stated in the eighty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, establishing good dharmas by reversing the various afflictions established based on greed. That treatise says: 'For the sake of concealing and forcibly demanding from others, it is called 'seeking' (研求 - yán qiú). Not feeling joy and satisfaction with the benefits already obtained, and even if obtaining benefits from others, still wanting to seek greater benefits, is called 'seeking profit with profit' (以利求利 - yǐ lì qiú lì). Being attached to wealth and profit, displaying untrue virtues, wanting others to know, is called 'evil desire' (惡欲 - è yù). Wanting to seek great benefits, offerings, and respect from great people, is called 'great desire' (大欲 - dà yù). Harboring a defiled mind, displaying untrue virtues, wanting others to know, this is called 'self-seeking desire' (自希欲 - zì xī yù). Deeply generating love and attachment to one's own desires is called 'addiction' (耽嗜 - dān shì). Deeply generating attachment to the desires of others is called 'universal addiction' (遍耽嗜 - biàn dān shì). Deeply generating attachment to various realms is called 'greed' (貪 - tān). Deeply generating attachment to various evil deeds is called 'unlawful greed' (非法貪 - fēi fǎ tān). Improperly using one's own parents and other treasures is called 'attachment' (執著 - zhí zhuó). Planning to deny and refuse to return property entrusted by others is called 'evil greed' (惡貪 - è tān). Deeply generating bondage to the object of focus, like a beautiful sleep obscuring the mind, is called 'irrational turning' (不應理轉 - bù yìng lǐ zhuǎn). Harboring love and attachment, clinging to various desires, generating thoughts, and following those thoughts, is called 'desire-related thinking' (欲尋思 - yù xún sī). Harboring defilement, clinging to relatives and friends, generating thoughts, the rest is as described before, called 'kin-related thinking' (親里尋思 - qīn lǐ xún sī). Harboring defilement, clinging to the country, generating thoughts, the rest is as described before, called 'country-related thinking' (國土尋思 - guó tǔ xún sī). Harboring defilement, clinging to one's own interests, procrastinating and delaying, wanting to obtain them later, and thus generating thoughts, the rest is as described before, called 'immortality-related thinking' (不死尋思 - bù sǐ xún sī). Harboring defilement, clinging to oneself and others, whether inferior or superior, generating thoughts, the rest is as described before, this is called 'contempt-related thinking' (輕蔑相應尋思 - qīng miè xiāng yìng xún sī). Harboring defilement, clinging to the benefactor, going back and forth to the benefactor's home, generating thoughts, and following those thoughts.
轉是名家勢相應尋思 問此中言貪與根本貪而何別耶 答彼根本貪名不善根。此即不爾故有別也。
論。不覆誑諂等者。即瑜伽論六十二中．及八十九憍許亦是入所翻中。六十二云。云何為憍。謂于增上惑毀犯尸羅由見聞疑他所舉時。遂托餘事假他餘事惑設外言而相誘引。云何為許。謂怖他故。或復于彼有所希故。雖有犯重而不發露。亦不現行。非實意樂詐于有智同梵行所現行。親愛恭敬耎善身．語二業。八十九云。心懷染污為顯己德假現威儀故名為憍。心懷染污為顯己德。或現親事或行耎語故名為詐 問二文何別 答初約覆罪。后為顯德。故二文別。
疏。對法解慢等者。按彼釋云。不敬者謂于師長及有德所而生憍傲。苦生者謂生後有故。
疏。合根本二十六隨煩惱中者。意云。本．隨總二十六。于中十一翻入其善。疏文倒也。應云合根本．隨煩惱二十六中。
論。相用別者便立之者。問不放逸等無別相用云何立之 答前云無用無彼四外別體之用。今云有用有彼同體差別之用 問雖用有別體相還同。如何別立 答相之與用隨有一別即立善中。非相．用二全別方立。
疏。下之八法或復十法者。八謂大隨。十加邪欲．解。
論。論說十一六位中起等者。問此師善法極多幾俱 答
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 轉是名家勢相應尋思：這是指名家（Nāma-kāya，指五蘊）的勢力相互關聯，需要仔細思考。 問：這裡所說的『貪』與根本貪（Mūla-lobha）有什麼區別？ 答：那個根本貪被稱為不善根（Akuśala-mūla）。而這裡所說的『貪』並非如此，因此有所區別。 論：『不覆誑諂等者』，即指《瑜伽師地論》（Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra）第六十二卷和第八十九卷中，以及入所翻譯的經文中。第六十二卷說：『什麼是憍（Māna，驕慢）？』是指對於增上的迷惑，毀犯戒律，由於見到、聽到或懷疑他人所說時，於是假託其他事情，虛設外在言語來相互誘導。『什麼是許（Śathya，諂媚）？』是指因為害怕他人，或者對於他人有所希求，即使犯了重罪也不發露，也不表現出來，並非真心實意，而是欺騙有智慧的同梵行者，表現出親愛、恭敬、柔和善良的身語二業。第八十九卷說：『心中懷有染污，爲了顯示自己的德行而假裝威儀，所以稱為憍。心中懷有染污，爲了顯示自己的德行，或者表現出親近的樣子，或者說柔和的語言，所以稱為詐（Māyā，虛偽）。』 問：這兩段文字有什麼區別？ 答：第一段是關於隱瞞罪過，后一段是爲了顯示德行。所以這兩段文字有所區別。 疏：『對法解慢等者』，按照《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）的解釋說：『不敬』是指對於師長和有德之人產生驕傲自大。『苦生』是指產生後有（Punarbhava，來世）。 疏：『合根本二十六隨煩惱中者』，意思是說，根本煩惱（Mūla-kleśa）和隨煩惱（Upakleśa）總共有二十六種。其中有十一種翻入其善法中。疏文顛倒了，應該說『合根本、隨煩惱二十六中』。 論：『相用別者便立之者』，問：不放逸（Apramāda）等沒有別的體相和作用，如何安立？ 答：前面說沒有作用，是指沒有與彼四外（指信等四法）不同的獨立體性的作用。現在說有用，是指有與彼同體差別的作用。 問：即使作用有區別，體相還是相同，如何分別安立？ 答：體相和作用只要有一個區別，就可以安立在善法中。不是體相和作用完全不同才安立。 疏：『下之八法或復十法者』，八是指大隨煩惱（Mahā-upakleśa）。十是指加上邪欲（Mithyā-kāma）和解（Dṛṣṭi，邪見）。 論：『論說十一六位中起等者』，問：這位論師的善法最多能同時有多少？ 答：
【English Translation】 English version 'Turning is contemplating in accordance with the power of the Name-kāya (Nāma-kāya, referring to the five skandhas)': This refers to the interconnected power of the Name-kāya, which requires careful consideration. Question: What is the difference between 'greed' mentioned here and fundamental greed (Mūla-lobha)? Answer: That fundamental greed is called an unwholesome root (Akuśala-mūla). This 'greed' is not like that, so there is a difference. Treatise: 'Not concealing, deceiving, flattering, etc.' refers to what is in the sixty-second and eighty-ninth volumes of the Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra (Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra), and in the scriptures translated by Ru-Suo. The sixty-second volume says: 'What is Māna (Māna, pride)?' It refers to being deluded by increase, violating precepts, and when seeing, hearing, or suspecting what others say, then feigning other matters, falsely setting up external words to mutually entice. 'What is Śathya (Śathya, flattery)?' It refers to, because of fearing others, or hoping for something from them, even if one has committed a serious offense, one does not reveal it, nor does one show it. It is not a genuine intention, but deceiving wise fellow practitioners, showing loving, respectful, gentle, and kind actions of body and speech. The eighty-ninth volume says: 'Harboring defilement in the heart, pretending to be dignified in order to show one's virtues, is called Māna. Harboring defilement in the heart, in order to show one's virtues, either showing intimacy or speaking gentle words, is called Māyā (Māyā, deceit).' Question: What is the difference between these two passages? Answer: The first passage is about concealing offenses, and the second passage is about showing virtues. So there is a difference between these two passages. Commentary: 'The Abhidharma (Abhidharma) explains Māna, etc.' According to the explanation, 'disrespect' refers to generating arrogance and pride towards teachers and virtuous people. 'Birth of suffering' refers to the arising of Punarbhava (Punarbhava, rebirth). Commentary: 'Combining the twenty-six fundamental and secondary afflictions' means that there are a total of twenty-six fundamental afflictions (Mūla-kleśa) and secondary afflictions (Upakleśa). Among them, eleven are turned into wholesome dharmas. The commentary is reversed; it should say 'Combining the twenty-six fundamental and secondary afflictions'. Treatise: 'Establishing it when the characteristics and functions are different.' Question: Apramāda (Apramāda, non-negligence) and others do not have different characteristics and functions, so how are they established? Answer: The previous statement that there is no function means that there is no independent function different from those four others (referring to faith, etc.). The current statement that there is a function means that there is a function that is different in nature but of the same essence. Question: Even if the functions are different, the characteristics are still the same, so how are they separately established? Answer: As long as there is one difference between the characteristics and the functions, it can be established in wholesome dharmas. It is not necessary for the characteristics and functions to be completely different to be established. Commentary: 'The following eight dharmas or ten dharmas' refers to the eight Mahā-upakleśas (Mahā-upakleśa). Ten refers to adding Mithyā-kāma (Mithyā-kāma, wrong desire) and Dṛṣṭi (Dṛṣṭi, wrong view). Treatise: 'The treatise says that eleven arise in the six positions, etc.' Question: How many wholesome dharmas can this master have simultaneously at most? Answer:
如疏具明 有義于無漏位容九俱起。輕安有漏。慚．愧起一。無第二故。有漏定心容八俱起。除舍．不逸．慚．愧隨一。散善容七。前八之中除輕安故 詳曰。此望疏談隨顯少差義無越也。而疏意云。由此師引六位為證。恐惑者云此師許彼決定等位。但一信等故。云此師而皆許俱也。即顯六位一一容與余所等併名皆許也。非說十一俱起名皆。九．八．七俱理準可悉。故不縷言故亦無咎 有云。疏主許十一俱此乖本旨 豈可疏主不解前師慚等不併言十一俱。
疏。雖慚與愧至合一位攝者。此釋伏難。難意云。慚．愧二法起既不俱。何故六位合居一處。故此答生。
論。應說信等至十遍善心者。問忿等依嗔立。瞋位忿等無。行舍等依他。四法無方起 答設爾何失 若爾云何十遍善心 有義問答展轉釋之。文多不錄。但寫意云。忿等嗔分。與嗔不俱。舍等義別。故得俱起。難捨等義別可名為假。忿既別生應非假攝。答以體即嗔無別名假。難嗔既不俱云何體嗔。答即說嗔體名忿等故。難既忿即嗔。如瞋非假。答說嗔作忿。忿何不假。難忿時無嗔。云何說嗔以之為忿。答從瞋種生說嗔作忿。難受受種生名受非想。忿嗔種生名嗔非忿。答忿嗔種起義別名忿。受受種生領納非想 詳曰。忿嗔種生假不俱者。不害應然。離
無瞋無應二不併。豈可不害別有種生。由斯不得言瞋．忿二種同不俱。故應說云。忿等依瞋境行粗違而不俱起。不害不爾。隨何善位皆不損物。故得俱生。行舍等二準此應知 問瑜伽五十六云。問諸法誰相應。答他性相應非自性。既不相應云何俱起 答但是相應而必俱起。自有俱起不是相應。色．不相應雖有心俱非相應故 問四事闕何 答相應四義闕事等也。不害．無瞋無別體事。舍．不放逸對勤．三根亦準此知。望余信等可名相應。用不離體不害舍等亦具四義。
論。有義定加行亦得定地名等者。問何故瑜伽五十六云。謂輕安俱三摩地及彼眷屬。並彼果法所不攝義。是欲界系。既云輕安所不攝故方名欲界。云何言欲得有輕安 答如疏明。
疏。然自有尋伺等有長短者。遍三地有名之為長。雖三地有而不遍者故說為短。即如輕安初尋伺地。而不遍有故名為短。
疏。第二又解定所引善等者。此解定引證因五識。成事智俱通證因果。
疏。此據因位者。結定引因。
疏。若在佛果此為正義者。明其第二成事智因以下。正義許成事智在佛方有。
疏。或初地時等者。顯成事因亦證因五。
疏。若作此解至有輕安故者。顯釋成事在因位非。及明非理。
疏。彼前但據至非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無瞋』（advesa，不嗔恨）和『無應』（apratigha，無對抗）二者不能並存。難道沒有不傷害眾生的其他方式嗎？因此，不能說嗔恨和忿怒兩種狀態相同且不會同時出現。所以應該說，忿怒等情緒依賴於嗔恨的對象，行為粗暴且不會同時生起。而不傷害眾生則不然，無論處於何種善的狀態，都不會損害眾生，所以可以同時生起。『行舍』（tatramadhyasthata，平等舍）等二者可以參照這個道理來理解。 問：在《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷中說：『諸法與什麼相應？』答：『與他性相應，而非自性。』既然不與自性相應，為何能同時生起？答：只是相應不一定同時生起，而同時生起也不一定是相應。例如，色法不與心相應，雖然與心同時存在，但並非相應。問：四種相應關係缺少什麼？答：相應四義缺少『事等』（samatā，平等性）。『不害』（avihimsa，不傷害）和『無瞋』沒有不同的實體。『舍』（upeksha，舍）和『不放逸』（apramada，不放逸）對於『勤』（virya，精進）和『三根』（kusalamula，三善根）也應參照此理來理解。相對於其餘的『信』（sraddha，信仰）等，可以稱之為相應。因為作用不離本體，所以『不害』、『舍』等也具備四種相應的含義。 論：有人認為，通過特定的加行也能獲得『定地』（samāhita-bhūmi，禪定之地）的名稱等。問：為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷中說：『與輕安（prasrabdhi，輕快安適）同時存在的三摩地（samadhi，禪定）及其眷屬，以及它們所不包含的意義，屬於欲界系。』既然說不被輕安所包含才稱為欲界，那麼怎麼能說欲界中會有輕安呢？答：如疏文所說。 疏：然而，『有尋伺』（savitarka-savicara，有尋有伺）等禪定有長短之分。遍及三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的稱為『長』。雖然三界都有，但不普遍存在的，就稱為『短』。例如，輕安只存在於初禪的『尋伺地』（vitarka-vicara-bhumi，有尋有伺地），而不普遍存在，所以稱為『短』。 疏：第二種解釋是，禪定所引發的善等。這種解釋認為，禪定可以引發五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。『成事智』（krtyanusthana-jnana，作事智）既可以通達因，也可以通達果。 疏：這裡是根據因位來說的，結論是禪定可以引發因。 疏：如果在佛果位，這才是正確的解釋。說明第二種『成事智』的因以下，正確的觀點認為『成事智』只有在佛的果位才存在。 疏：或者在初地（prthivi，歡喜地）的時候等。顯示『成事因』也可以證明五識。 疏：如果這樣解釋，直到有輕安為止。顯示解釋『成事』在因位是不正確的，並且說明了不合理的之處。 疏：前面只是根據……來說，並非……
【English Translation】 English version 'Advesa' (non-hatred) and 'apratigha' (non-opposition) cannot coexist. Is there no other way to avoid harming beings? Therefore, it cannot be said that hatred and anger are the same and do not occur simultaneously. So it should be said that anger and other emotions depend on the object of hatred, are rough in behavior, and do not arise simultaneously. But non-harming is not like that; no matter what good state one is in, it does not harm beings, so it can arise simultaneously. 'Tatramadhyasthata' (equanimity) and the like can be understood in light of this principle. Question: In the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, section 56, it says: 'What do dharmas correspond to?' Answer: 'They correspond to otherness, not self-nature.' Since they do not correspond to self-nature, how can they arise simultaneously? Answer: Correspondence does not necessarily mean simultaneous arising, and simultaneous arising does not necessarily mean correspondence. For example, form does not correspond to mind, although it exists simultaneously with mind, it is not correspondence. Question: What is lacking in the four aspects of correspondence? Answer: The four aspects of correspondence lack 'samatā' (equality). 'Avihimsa' (non-harming) and 'advesa' (non-hatred) do not have different entities. 'Upeksha' (equanimity) and 'apramada' (non-negligence) with respect to 'virya' (diligence) and 'kusalamula' (three wholesome roots) should also be understood in light of this principle. Relative to the remaining 'sraddha' (faith) and the like, they can be called correspondence. Because the function does not depart from the substance, 'avihimsa' (non-harming), 'upeksha' (equanimity), etc., also possess the four meanings of correspondence. Treatise: Some argue that through specific application, one can also obtain the name of 'samāhita-bhūmi' (the ground of samadhi), etc. Question: Why does the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, section 56, say: 'The samadhi (concentration) that exists simultaneously with prasrabdhi (ease and pliancy) and its retinue, as well as the meanings that they do not encompass, belong to the desire realm.' Since it is said that only what is not encompassed by prasrabdhi is called the desire realm, how can it be said that there is prasrabdhi in the desire realm? Answer: As explained in the commentary. Commentary: However, 'savitarka-savicara' (with initial and sustained thought) and other samadhis have lengths. What pervades the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) is called 'long'. Although it exists in the three realms, what is not universally present is called 'short'. For example, prasrabdhi only exists in the 'vitarka-vicara-bhumi' (ground of initial and sustained thought) of the first dhyana, and is not universally present, so it is called 'short'. Commentary: The second explanation is that the good, etc., are induced by samadhi. This explanation holds that samadhi can induce the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). 'Krtyanusthana-jnana' (knowledge of accomplishing tasks) can penetrate both cause and effect. Commentary: This is based on the causal position, concluding that samadhi can induce the cause. Commentary: If it is in the Buddha's fruition, this is the correct explanation. It explains that below the cause of the second 'krtyanusthana-jnana' (knowledge of accomplishing tasks), the correct view is that 'krtyanusthana-jnana' (knowledge of accomplishing tasks) only exists in the Buddha's fruition. Commentary: Or at the time of the first bhumi (prthivi, the ground of joy), etc. It shows that the 'cause of accomplishment' can also prove the five consciousnesses. Commentary: If explained in this way, until there is prasrabdhi. It shows that explaining 'accomplishment' in the causal position is incorrect, and it explains the unreasonable points. Commentary: The previous one was only based on... and not...
為盡理者。釋前難也。並會前釋欲無輕安之所以也。
疏。第三又解等者。此釋意云。文雖總言五有輕安。意談三識。輕安在色。鼻．舌唯欲故但三識。言總意別故不違前 問三解何正 答而有斷云。第三為正。初說違文。果位唯善自他共許。何煩更說定所引言。第二違理。前言欲界無有輕安。今覆成有故違理也 有義釋云。三皆無違。初標宗故。未論因果故說善言。大地菩薩生欲界中無漏引生亦無有失。會前文者如疏具明 詳曰。第二釋中定所引善在因可然。成所作智不唯果者違護法義。三釋優劣思可知之。
疏。余受可有即通果心者。余樂舍受得有輕安。言即通果指有之心。
疏。若爾鼻舌至如何通者。顯是通果方有輕安理非善正。有相例失。
疏。苦根雖名無漏至五識不俱者。五識不俱而有二義。一五總不與輕安俱也。由有苦故。二但苦受相應不俱非余舍樂不容俱也。前釋善也。故疏下云。然實菩薩至但除苦受。若準后解以顯菩薩五得有訖。然實等文豈不煩剩。故知前善。
疏。不斷違文者。違對法論惡趣之報皆見斷文。
疏。善染二因至皆名為斷者。總望因果皆得斷名。約四斷義別別明之。如下．及燈。故此不敘。
疏。不生名斷其因亦斷者。據不生故以釋斷義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了窮盡其理。這是爲了解釋前面的難題，並且會合前面所說的沒有輕安的原因。
疏：第三個解釋等等。這是解釋其含義說，文句雖然總說五識都有輕安，但意在談論三個識。輕安存在於色蘊中，鼻識和舌識僅僅與慾望相關，所以只有三個識。說是總的，但意在區分，所以不違背前面的說法。問：三種解釋哪個是正確的？答：最終斷定說，第三種解釋是正確的。最初的說法違背了經文。果位（Phala，證悟的果位）唯有善，這是自他和合都認可的，何必再說由禪定所引發的呢？第二種解釋違背了道理。前面說欲界（Kāmadhātu，眾生輪迴的欲界）沒有輕安，現在又說有，所以違背了道理。有一種解釋說，三種解釋都沒有違背。最初是標明宗旨，沒有討論因果，所以說善。大地菩薩（Mahā-bodhisattva，偉大的菩薩）生在欲界中，無漏（Anāsrava，沒有煩惱）引生，也沒有缺失。會合前面的經文，如疏中詳細說明。詳細地說，第二種解釋中，禪定所引發的善在因上是可行的。成就所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，為利益一切眾生，示現種種化身，成就一切事業的智慧）不只是果位，這違背了護法的觀點。三種解釋的優劣，思考就可以知道。
疏：其餘的受可以有，即通達果心。其餘的樂受和舍受可以有輕安。說『即通果』，指的是有之心。
疏：如果這樣，那麼鼻識和舌識如何通達呢？顯示這是通達果位才有輕安，道理並非完全正確。有相似的例子會出錯。
疏：苦根雖然名為無漏，但與五識不俱。五識不俱有兩種含義。一是五識總體上不與輕安同時存在，因為有苦的緣故。二是隻有苦受相應不俱，不是其餘的舍受和樂受不能同時存在。前面的解釋是善的。所以疏下文說：『然而實際上菩薩，但除了苦受。』如果按照後面的解釋，來顯示菩薩五識可以有輕安，那麼『然而實際上』等等的文字豈不是多餘的？所以知道前面的解釋是善的。
疏：不斷違背經文。違背了《對法論》（Abhidharma，佛教論藏）中惡趣（Durgati，三惡道）的報應都是見斷（Darśana-prahātavya，通過見道斷除的煩惱）的說法。
疏：善染兩種因，都名為斷。總的來說，從因果的角度都可以稱為斷。按照四種斷的含義分別說明，如下文和《燈論》。所以這裡不敘述。
疏：不生名為斷，其因也斷。根據不生，來解釋斷的含義。
【English Translation】 English version: 'To exhaust the principle.' This is to explain the previous difficulties and to reconcile the reasons for the absence of light ease mentioned earlier.
Commentary: 'The third explanation, etc.' This explains the meaning, saying that although the text generally states that the five consciousnesses have light ease, it intends to discuss the three consciousnesses. Light ease exists in the form aggregate (Rūpa-skandha, the aggregate of material form), and the nose and tongue consciousnesses are only related to desire, so only the three consciousnesses are involved. It is said to be general, but it intends to differentiate, so it does not contradict the previous statement. Question: Which of the three explanations is correct? Answer: It is ultimately concluded that the third explanation is correct. The initial statement contradicts the text. The fruit position (Phala, the fruit of enlightenment) is only good, which is recognized by both oneself and others, so why bother saying that it is caused by meditation? The second explanation contradicts the principle. The previous statement said that the desire realm (Kāmadhātu, the realm of desire where beings transmigrate) has no light ease, but now it says it does, so it contradicts the principle. One explanation says that none of the three explanations contradict. The initial one marks the purpose, without discussing cause and effect, so it says good. Great Bodhisattvas (Mahā-bodhisattva, great Bodhisattvas) are born in the desire realm, and the unconditioned (Anāsrava, without afflictions) arises, without any loss. Reconciling the previous text, as explained in detail in the commentary. In detail, in the second explanation, the good caused by meditation is feasible in the cause. The wisdom of accomplishing actions (Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna, the wisdom of manifesting various bodies to benefit all beings and accomplish all actions) is not only in the fruit position, which contradicts the view of Dharmapāla. The merits and demerits of the three explanations can be known by thinking.
Commentary: 'The remaining feelings can have, that is, reaching the fruit mind.' The remaining pleasant and neutral feelings can have light ease. Saying 'reaching the fruit' refers to the mind that has.
Commentary: 'If so, how do the nose and tongue consciousnesses reach it?' It shows that it is only by reaching the fruit position that there is light ease, and the principle is not entirely correct. Similar examples will go wrong.
Commentary: 'Although the root of suffering is called unconditioned, it is not simultaneous with the five consciousnesses.' The five consciousnesses not being simultaneous has two meanings. First, the five consciousnesses as a whole do not exist simultaneously with light ease, because there is suffering. Second, only the feeling of suffering is corresponding and not simultaneous, not that the remaining neutral and pleasant feelings cannot exist simultaneously. The previous explanation is good. Therefore, the commentary below says: 'However, in reality, Bodhisattvas, except for the feeling of suffering.' If we follow the later explanation to show that Bodhisattvas' five consciousnesses can have light ease, then wouldn't the words 'However, in reality,' etc., be redundant? So we know that the previous explanation is good.
Commentary: 'Continuously contradicting the text.' It contradicts the statement in the Abhidharma (Abhidharma, Buddhist treatises) that the retribution of the evil realms (Durgati, the three evil paths) is all seen and severed (Darśana-prahātavya, afflictions severed through the path of seeing).
Commentary: 'The two causes of good and defilement are both called severance.' Generally speaking, from the perspective of cause and effect, both can be called severance. Explain separately according to the meaning of the four severances, as in the following text and the 'Lamp Treatise.' Therefore, it is not described here.
Commentary: 'Not arising is called severance, and its cause is also severed.' According to not arising, explain the meaning of severance.
。無想天因入見名斷。永不生故。
疏。百法等說者。百法顯癡通於利鈍。故安鈍利兩惑中間。唯識明癡是不善根。故貪．嗔下慢等上列。
疏。愛佛貪滅皆染污收者。有義今解此等非是法執。若不堅著但起欣求。此既善心不可名執。可同有部名善法欲。若起染愛是煩惱貪 詳曰。如名起義既云貪佛。豈有貪法非是染執名為善耶。若但欣求不起染執。誰言此等名之為貪。又誰不知是善法欲勞為分別。
論。謂由愛力取蘊生故者。釋此貪等聖教非一。大意無著但廣略異。蓋作者意取尚不同。今引異要同繁不取。顯揚第一云。業有五能障無貪為業。障得菩提資糧圓滿為業。損害自他為業。能趣惡道為業增長貪慾為業。余嗔等業皆有五種。初后二別。中三並同。思作可悉 五十五中貪由十事生。一取蘊。二諸見。三未得境界。四已得境界。五已所受用過去境界。六惡行。七男女。八親支。九資具。十後有及無有。
論。云何嗔等者。五十五中由十事生。一己身。二所愛有情。三非所愛有情。四過去怨親。五未來怨親。六現在怨親。七不可意境。八嫉妒。九宿習。十他見 又五十八云。謂有四種。具如疏列。略為二釋。一云。一于損己他見。二損己他有情。上損己言談下兩處。一云于損己。二他見他
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：無想天因為入定而顯現，名稱因此斷絕，永遠不會產生。
疏解：『百法』等論述中，『癡』（moha，無明）通用於根器敏銳和遲鈍之人，因此被安放在遲鈍和敏銳兩種迷惑的中間。唯識宗認為『癡』是不善的根本，因此貪（lobha，貪慾）、嗔（dosa，嗔恚）、慢（mana，我慢）等被列在上面。
疏解：愛慕佛陀和貪求涅槃都被歸為染污，有一種解釋認為這些並非是法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）。如果不是堅固地執著，只是生起欣求之心，這既然是善心，就不能稱為執著，可以像有部宗一樣稱為善法欲（kusala-chanda，對善法的慾望）。如果生起染污的愛，那就是煩惱貪（klesa-lobha，煩惱性的貪慾）。詳細地說，既然名為『貪佛』，怎麼會有貪法不是染污執著而能稱為善呢？如果只是欣求而不生起染污的執著，誰會說這些是貪呢？又有誰不知道這是善法欲而要多此一舉地加以分別呢？
論：因為愛的力量而執取五蘊（skandha，構成個體的五種要素）而產生。解釋這種貪等，聖教的說法不一，大意是無著菩薩的論述只是廣略不同。大概作者的意圖和取捨也不同，現在只引用不同的要點，相同而繁瑣的就不取了。《顯揚聖教論》第一卷說，業有五種能力：障礙無貪為業，障礙獲得菩提資糧圓滿為業，損害自己和他人為業，能夠趨向惡道為業，增長貪慾為業。其餘嗔等業都有五種，最初和最後兩種不同，中間三種相同。思考後可以明白。第五十五卷中，貪由十種原因產生：一、執取五蘊；二、各種見解；三、未得到的境界；四、已得到的境界；五、已受用過的過去境界；六、惡行；七、男女；八、親屬；九、資具；十、後有和無有。
論：什麼是嗔等呢？第五十五卷中，嗔由十種原因產生：一、自身；二、所愛的有情（sattva，眾生）；三、非所愛的有情；四、過去的怨親；五、未來的怨親；六、現在的怨親；七、不可意的境界；八、嫉妒；九、宿習；十、他人的見解。另外，第五十八卷說，嗔有四種，具體如疏解所列。簡略地解釋為兩種：一種說法是，一是對損害自己和他人的見解，二是損害自己和他人的有情。上面『損害自己』是言語上的，下面兩處，一種說法是對損害自己，二是他人見他人。
【English Translation】 English version: The Realm of Non-Perception (Asaññasatta) is named as such because perception ceases upon entering it. Therefore, it is never reborn.
Commentary: In treatises such as the 『Hundred Dharmas』 (Śata Dharma Prakāśa Mukha Śāstra), 『ignorance』 (moha) is common to both sharp and dull faculties. Therefore, it is placed in the middle of the two types of delusion, dull and sharp. The Consciousness-Only school (Vijñānavāda) considers 『ignorance』 to be the root of unwholesomeness. Therefore, greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), pride (mana), etc., are listed above.
Commentary: Loving the Buddha and craving extinction are both classified as defilements. One interpretation is that these are not attachments to the Dharma (dharma-graha). If there is no firm attachment, but only a desire for it, since this is a wholesome mind, it cannot be called attachment. It can be called wholesome desire (kusala-chanda), like the Sarvāstivāda school. If defiled love arises, it is afflictive greed (klesa-lobha). In detail, since it is called 『greed for the Buddha,』 how can there be greed for the Dharma that is not a defiled attachment and can be called wholesome? If there is only desire without defiled attachment, who would say that these are greed? And who does not know that this is wholesome desire and needs to make a distinction?
Treatise: Because of the power of love, the aggregates (skandha) are grasped and arise. Explanations of this greed, etc., in the sacred teachings are not uniform. The general idea is that the treatises of Asanga (無著) differ only in breadth and brevity. Perhaps the author's intentions and choices are also different. Now, only different key points are cited, and those that are the same and verbose are not taken. The first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論) states that karma has five abilities: obstructing non-greed as its function, obstructing the attainment of the perfection of the accumulation of merit for enlightenment as its function, harming oneself and others as its function, being able to lead to evil paths as its function, and increasing greed as its function. The remaining karmas of hatred, etc., all have five types. The first and last two are different, and the middle three are the same. It can be understood after reflection. In the fifty-fifth volume, greed arises from ten causes: 1. grasping the aggregates; 2. various views; 3. unattained realms; 4. attained realms; 5. past realms that have been experienced; 6. evil deeds; 7. men and women; 8. relatives; 9. resources; 10. future existence and non-existence.
Treatise: What are hatred, etc.? In the fifty-fifth volume, hatred arises from ten causes: 1. oneself; 2. beloved sentient beings (sattva); 3. unloved sentient beings; 4. past enemies and relatives; 5. future enemies and relatives; 6. present enemies and relatives; 7. unpleasant realms; 8. jealousy; 9. latent habits; 10. the views of others. Furthermore, the fifty-eighth volume states that there are four types of hatred, as detailed in the commentary. Briefly explained as two types: one explanation is, one is the view of harming oneself and others, and the other is harming oneself and other sentient beings. Above, 『harming oneself』 is verbal, and in the following two places, one explanation is harming oneself, and the other is others seeing others.
有情。餘二可悉。
疏。獨頭無明迷理等者。問前第五云。獨行無明而有兩種。謂主．非主。非主無明通於見修。云何今判唯迷理耶 答且然。瑜伽是主者說。五十八云。又此無明總有二種。一煩惱相纏相應。二獨行。若無貪等諸煩惱纏。但于苦等諸諦境中。不如理作意力故鈍惠士夫諸不如實簡擇。覆障纏裹闇昧等心所性名獨行無明 又非主者。多迷理起。從多分言。由斯疏中不言唯也。
疏。邪見撥無至諸雜染者。有云。邪見總顯五見。若云邪定唯顯邪見。余之四見何以不說。若等言等。何邪見后舉鈍等利 又雜集云。邪決定者謂顛倒智。而總相說不言邪見。故知邪定同彼通五。有義救云。疏無有失。邪見多由疑惑生故。故邪定言但說邪見余見等等。戒禁取等設無疑者而亦生故。故此不說 詳曰。更助救云。疏邪見言通含五見。見不正故並得邪名。問何教為證。答瑜伽五十八云。邪見者一切倒見。于所知事顛倒而轉皆名邪見。當知此見略有二種。一者增益。薩迦耶等四見。二者損減。謗因果諸見 亦如雜集顛倒智言包於五見。疏若不置邪見言。而恐惑者不知邪定因於見也。若五別說復繁言論。但云邪見文約旨明理固無爽 又五十八云。有四無明。若於不見聞覺知義中所有無知名無解愚。若於見聞覺知所
【現代漢語翻譯】 有情。其餘兩種（煩惱）都可以詳盡解釋。
疏（《成唯識論述記》）。『獨頭無明迷理等者』，有人問：前面第五卷說，『獨行無明有兩種，即主和非主。非主無明通於見道和修道。』為什麼現在判斷（獨頭無明）只迷於理呢？答：這是暫且這樣說。《瑜伽師地論》是主張者所說。第五十八卷說：『又這種無明總共有兩種，一是與煩惱相互纏繞相應，二是獨行。如果沒有貪等各種煩惱纏繞，只是在苦等各種諦境中，由於不如理作意的力量，遲鈍的智慧者不能如實地簡擇，覆蓋、障礙、纏裹、闇昧等心所的性質，名為獨行無明。』又非主無明，多由迷理而生起。這是從大多數情況來說。因此，《述記》中沒有說『唯』。
疏（《成唯識論述記》）。『邪見撥無至諸雜染者』，有人說：邪見總括了五種見（薩迦耶見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）。如果說邪定只顯示邪見，那麼其餘四種見為什麼不說呢？如果用『等』字，那麼為什麼邪見之後要舉出遲鈍等和敏銳等？又《雜集論》說：『邪決定者，是指顛倒智。』而總相上說，沒有說邪見。因此可知邪定和顛倒智一樣，通於五種見。有人辯解說，《述記》沒有錯誤。邪見多由疑惑而生，所以邪定只說邪見，其餘的見等等。戒禁取見等即使沒有疑惑也會產生，所以這裡不說。詳細地說，可以進一步辯解說，《述記》中的『邪見』一詞，包含五種見。見解不正，都可以稱為邪。問：有什麼經典可以作為證據？答：《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說：『邪見，是指一切顛倒的見解。對於所知的事物顛倒而轉，都可以稱為邪見。』應當知道這種見解略有二種，一是增益，即薩迦耶見等四種見；二是損減，即誹謗因果的各種見解。也像《雜集論》中『顛倒智』一詞包含五種見一樣。疏（《成唯識論述記》）如果不用『邪見』一詞，恐怕迷惑者不知道邪定是由於見解而產生的。如果五種見分別來說，又會顯得繁瑣。只說『邪見』，文字簡練，旨意明確，道理確實沒有差錯。又第五十八卷說：有四種無明。如果對於不見、不聞、不覺、不知的意義中所有的無知，名為無解愚。如果對於見聞覺知所……
【English Translation】 Sentient beings. The remaining two (afflictions) can be fully explained.
Commentary (Shu, from Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji). 'Dutou wuming mi li deng zhe (獨頭無明迷理等者, those such as independent ignorance deluded about principle),' someone asks: In the fifth volume, it says, 'Independent ignorance has two types, namely principal and non-principal. Non-principal ignorance is common to the paths of seeing and cultivation.' Why is it now judged that (independent ignorance) only deludes about principle? Answer: This is said for the time being. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra is what the proponent says. The fifty-eighth volume says: 'Also, this ignorance has two types in total, one is intertwined and corresponding with afflictions, and the other is independent. If there are no entanglements of various afflictions such as greed, but only in the various truths such as suffering, due to the power of non-reasoning attention, dull-witted individuals cannot truly discern, and the nature of mental functions such as covering, obstructing, entangling, and obscuring is called independent ignorance.' Also, non-principal ignorance mostly arises from delusion about principle. This is speaking from the majority of cases. Therefore, the Commentary does not say 'only'.
Commentary (Shu, from Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji). 'Xiejian bo wu zhi zhu za ran zhe (邪見撥無至諸雜染者, those such as wrong views denying to various defilements),' someone says: Wrong view encompasses all five views (Satkayadrishti, Antagrahadrishti, Mithyadrishti, Drstiparమర్శadrishti, Silavrataparamarమర్శadrishti). If it is said that wrong determination only shows wrong view, then why are the other four views not mentioned? If the word 'etc.' is used, then why are dullness etc. and sharpness etc. mentioned after wrong view? Also, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Wrong determination refers to inverted wisdom.' And generally speaking, it does not mention wrong view. Therefore, it can be known that wrong determination, like inverted wisdom, is common to the five views. Someone defends by saying that the Commentary is not mistaken. Wrong view mostly arises from doubt, so wrong determination only speaks of wrong view, the other views etc. The Silavrataparamarమర్శadrishti etc. can arise even without doubt, so it is not mentioned here. In detail, it can be further defended by saying that the term 'wrong view' in the Commentary includes the five views. Incorrect views can all be called wrong. Question: What scripture can be used as evidence? Answer: The fifty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Wrong view refers to all inverted views. Turning inverted towards the objects of knowledge can all be called wrong view.' It should be known that this view has roughly two types, one is augmentation, namely the four views such as Satkayadrishti; the other is diminution, namely various views that slander cause and effect. It is also like the term 'inverted wisdom' in the Abhidharmasamuccaya encompassing the five views. Commentary (Shu, from Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji) If the term 'wrong view' is not used, it is feared that those who are confused will not know that wrong determination arises from views. If the five views are spoken of separately, it would appear verbose. Only speaking of 'wrong view' is concise in wording, clear in meaning, and the principle is indeed without error. Also, the fifty-eighth volume says: There are four types of ignorance. If there is ignorance in the meaning of not seeing, not hearing, not perceiving, and not knowing, it is called ignorance of non-understanding. If regarding what is seen, heard, perceived, and known...
知義中。散亂失念所有無智名放逸愚。于顛倒心所有無智名染污愚。不顛倒心所有無智名不染污愚 釋曰。四倒等惑相應無明名為染污。所知障者名不染污。對二乘說更有餘釋。如瑜伽鈔。
疏。或遠從根本說者。對法論言。依止薩迦耶見心高舉為體者。據本說也。
論。此慢差別至我德處生者。問三品．我．德合有五事。按瑜伽論五十五中。七慢依六事。前四同此。五已得未得顛倒。六功德顛倒。何乃不同 答此合彼開。德分二種故不相違。 問又彼論云。當知二慢依勝有情事生。余各依一事。釋曰。二謂卑慢及慢過慢。五蘊于彼何意別耶 答五蘊委陳。瑜伽粗示。又慢有二。故五十八云。慢略有二。謂亂．不亂。不惑亂者謂于下劣計己為勝。于等計等。而生憍慢。惑亂慢者謂餘六慢 又由受用鄙劣資具自謂尊貴名惑亂慢。若由受用勝妙資具者自謂富樂名不亂慢。亦由邪行謂後有勝名為惑亂。若由正行謂後有勝名不惑亂 問於劣謂勝。于等謂等。此稱境知。無高舉故。何名為慢 答順正理云。如是雖實劣等處生。而能令心高舉染惱名慢煩惱。于理何失。又正理論邪．增上慢各為二釋。增上二者。一云于未證得殊勝德中謂已證得。二云于證少德謂已證多。邪慢二者。一云謂諸惡行名為無德。彼成此法謂已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：知，在散亂和失唸的狀態下，所有的無知被稱為『放逸愚』（Pramada）。與顛倒之心相應的無知被稱為『染污愚』（Klista）。與不顛倒之心相應的無知被稱為『不染污愚』（Aklista）。釋義：與四種顛倒等迷惑相應的無明被稱為染污，所知障被稱為不染污。這是對二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的說法，還有其他的解釋，如《瑜伽師地論》的註釋。
疏：或者從根本上來說，《對法論》說：『以依止薩迦耶見（Satkayadristi，有身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）而心生高舉為體』，這是從根本上說的。
論：此慢的差別在於，當『我』（Atman）認為自己有功德時產生。問：三品（上、中、下）、『我』、功德，合起來有五件事。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷中，七慢（七種慢）依賴於六件事，前四種與此相同，第五種是已得或未得的顛倒，第六種是功德的顛倒。為什麼不同呢？答：這是合併和分開的區別。功德分為兩種，所以不矛盾。問：又，《瑜伽師地論》說：『應當知道，兩種慢依賴於殊勝的有情事而生，其餘的各自依賴於一件事。』釋義：兩種慢是指卑慢（Hina-mana）和慢過慢（Ati-mana）。五蘊（Panca-skandha）在那裡有什麼區別呢？答：五蘊是詳細陳述，而《瑜伽師地論》是粗略顯示。而且慢有兩種，所以第五十八卷說：『慢略有二種，即亂和不亂。』不迷惑的慢是指，對於下劣的，認為自己是殊勝的；對於相等的，認為自己是相等的，從而產生憍慢。迷惑的慢是指其餘的六種慢。又，由於受用鄙劣的資具，而自認為尊貴，這叫做迷惑的慢。如果由於受用殊勝美妙的資具，而自認為富樂，這叫做不亂的慢。也由於邪行，認為後世會有殊勝，這叫做迷惑的慢。如果由於正行，認為後世會有殊勝，這叫做不迷惑的慢。問：對於下劣的，認為殊勝；對於相等的，認為相等，這符合實際情況，沒有高舉，為什麼叫做慢呢？答：《順正理論》說：『像這樣，即使實際上是在下劣或相等的情況下產生，但能夠使心高舉和染污，這叫做慢煩惱。』在道理上有什麼過失呢？又，《正理論》對邪慢和增上慢各有兩種解釋。增上慢有兩種：一種是對於未證得的殊勝功德，認為已經證得；另一種是對於證得少許功德，認為已經證得多。邪慢有兩種：一種是認為諸惡行是沒有功德的，他們成就這種法，認為已經...
【English Translation】 English version: Knowing, all ignorance in a state of distraction and loss of mindfulness is called 'Pramada' (negligence). Ignorance associated with a deluded mind is called 'Klista' (defiled). Ignorance associated with a non-deluded mind is called 'Aklista' (undefiled). Explanation: Ignorance associated with the four inversions and other delusions is called defiled. The knowledge obscurations are called undefiled. This is said in relation to the Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana). There are other explanations, such as in the commentary on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.
Commentary: Or, speaking from the root, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'That which has as its essence the mind being uplifted based on reliance on Satkayadristi (the view of a real self, considering the aggregation of the five skandhas as a real self)' is speaking from the root.
Treatise: The difference in this conceit arises when 'I' (Atman) thinks that it has merit. Question: The three qualities (superior, middling, inferior), 'I', and merit, together make five things. According to the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the seven conceits (Sapta-mana) rely on six things. The first four are the same as these. The fifth is the inversion of what has been attained or not attained, and the sixth is the inversion of merit. Why are they different? Answer: This is the difference between combining and separating. Merit is divided into two types, so there is no contradiction. Question: Also, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'It should be known that two conceits arise dependent on superior sentient beings, and the rest each depend on one thing.' Explanation: The two conceits refer to Hina-mana (inferiority conceit) and Ati-mana (excessive conceit). What is the difference in the five aggregates (Panca-skandha) there? Answer: The five aggregates are a detailed explanation, while the Yogacarabhumi-sastra is a rough indication. Moreover, there are two types of conceit, so the fifty-eighth fascicle says: 'Conceit is briefly of two types, namely, confused and unconfused.' Unconfused conceit refers to, in relation to the inferior, thinking oneself to be superior; in relation to the equal, thinking oneself to be equal, thereby giving rise to pride. Confused conceit refers to the remaining six conceits. Also, due to using inferior resources, considering oneself to be noble is called confused conceit. If due to using superior and wonderful resources, considering oneself to be wealthy and happy is called unconfused conceit. Also, due to wrong conduct, thinking that there will be superiority in the future is called confused conceit. If due to right conduct, thinking that there will be superiority in the future is called unconfused conceit. Question: In relation to the inferior, thinking oneself to be superior; in relation to the equal, thinking oneself to be equal, this accords with reality, and there is no uplifting, so why is it called conceit? Answer: The Nyayanusara-sastra says: 'Like this, even if it actually arises in inferior or equal circumstances, but is able to make the mind uplifted and defiled, this is called the affliction of conceit.' What fault is there in the principle? Also, the Nyayasiddhanta-sastra gives two explanations each for false conceit and super-conceit. There are two types of super-conceit: one is thinking that one has attained superior qualities that have not been attained; the other is thinking that one has attained many qualities when one has attained few. There are two types of false conceit: one is thinking that evil deeds are without merit, and they accomplish this dharma, thinking that they have...
有斯殊勝功德特惡高舉。二即如前全無謂有。然即大乘義不同者思可知矣。慢類等義具如燈也。
論。云何為疑等者。問瑜伽五十八云。當知此疑略由五相差別建立。謂於他世．作用．因果．諸諦．寶中心懷猶預。此中何唯云諦理耶 答即此諦中攝彼五盡 相攝云何 答寶滅道收。作用謂業。即是其因。及於皆過去集諦攝。總相而言過為現因。未來及果苦諦所攝。故雜集論第一云。諦猶豫者亦攝於寶猶預。如其所應滅道諦攝。
論。猶豫簡擇說為疑故者。即瑜伽論第八說云。謂親近不善丈夫聞非正法故。即于所知事唯用分別異覺為體。
論。謂惡見者多受苦者。有義多受苦者通五趣苦。一切苦果無不皆由惡見生。故佛地論說。業．惑．及果一切皆由我見生故。處處皆說由惡見力生死輪迴無休息故 詳曰。若通五趣三苦遠因。而有義無失。若依欲界三塗等苦為近因發。今依疏辨。然觀此論疏說為優。論云招苦。招苦之者是分別故。
疏。分別俱生如顯揚第一說者。意顯俱生．分別二我皆緣五蘊。即彼論云。一薩迦耶見。謂於五取蘊計我．我所染污惠為體。或是俱生。或分別起。
論。此見差別有二十句等者。如對法論。疏．燈雖引讀猶難悟。今重略明。彼論問云。何因十五是我所見。相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有這種殊勝功德卻特別惡劣地高舉自己。第二種（慢）就像前面所說的那樣，完全沒有道理卻自以為有。然而，這與大乘的意義不同，仔細思考就可以明白。各種慢的含義，都詳細地記載在《燈論》中。
論：什麼是疑等呢？問：《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說：『應當知道，疑略由五種相的差別而建立。即對於他世、作用、因果、諸諦、寶中心懷猶豫。』這裡為什麼只說諦理呢？答：因為這諦理中包含了那五種（猶豫）的全部。相攝的情況是怎樣的呢？答：寶（指佛法僧三寶）被滅諦和道諦所包含。作用指的是業，也就是因。以及對於過去的猶豫，都被集諦所包含。總的來說，過去是現在的因，未來是果，都被苦諦所包含。所以《雜集論》第一卷說：『對於諦的猶豫，也包含了對於寶的猶豫。』如其所應，被滅諦和道諦所包含。
論：因為猶豫簡擇才說是疑，即《瑜伽師地論》第八卷說：『因為親近不善之人，聽聞不正之法，所以對於所知之事，只用分別的異覺作為本體。』
論：所謂惡見者多受苦，有一種解釋是，多受苦包含五趣的苦。一切苦果沒有不是由惡見產生的。所以《佛地論》說：『業、惑、及果，一切都是由我見產生的。』處處都說由惡見的力量，生死輪迴沒有停止的時候。詳細地說，如果說通於五趣三苦的遠因，這種解釋沒有錯誤。如果依據欲界三塗等苦作為近因引發，現在依據疏文來辨析。然而觀察此論的疏文，認為疏文的說法更好。論中說招致苦果，招致苦果的是分別。'
疏：分別俱生，如《顯揚聖教論》第一卷所說，意思是說俱生我和分別我都是緣於五蘊。即該論說：『一、薩迦耶見（認為五蘊是我的見解），即對於五取蘊計為我、我所的染污智慧為本體。』或是俱生，或是分別生起。
論：這種見的差別有二十句等，如《對法論》。疏文和燈論雖然引用了，但仍然難以理解。現在重新簡略地說明。該論問道：『為什麼十五種是我所見（認為是我所有的見解）的相？』
【English Translation】 English version: Having such supreme merit, yet arrogantly exalting oneself. The second (conceit) is just as previously stated, completely without reason yet presuming to have it. However, the meaning of this differs from that of the Mahayana, which can be understood through careful consideration. The meanings of various types of conceit are detailed in the 'Lamp Treatise'.
Treatise: What are doubt, etc.? Question: The fifty-eighth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says: 'It should be known that doubt is established through the differences of five aspects. Namely, having hesitation in mind regarding other worlds, actions, cause and effect, the various Truths (Arya Satyas), and the Jewels (Triratna).' Why is it only said here to be about the principle of Truth? Answer: Because the entirety of those five (hesitations) are contained within this principle of Truth. How are they mutually contained? Answer: The Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) are contained by the Truth of Cessation (Nirodha Satya) and the Truth of the Path (Marga Satya). Action refers to karma, which is the cause. And hesitation regarding the past is contained by the Truth of Origin (Samudaya Satya). Generally speaking, the past is the cause of the present, and the future is the result, which are contained by the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha Satya). Therefore, the first volume of the 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' says: 'Hesitation regarding the Truths also includes hesitation regarding the Jewels.' As appropriate, they are contained by the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of the Path.
Treatise: Because hesitation and discernment are said to be doubt, as the eighth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says: 'Because of associating with bad people and hearing incorrect teachings, one only uses discriminating perception as the essence of what is known.'
Treatise: It is said that those with evil views suffer greatly. One explanation is that suffering greatly includes the suffering of the five realms. All suffering results from evil views. Therefore, the 'Buddhabhumi-sastra' says: 'Karma, afflictions, and results all arise from the view of self.' Everywhere it is said that due to the power of evil views, the cycle of birth and death continues without rest. In detail, if it refers to the distant cause of the three sufferings of the five realms, this explanation is not wrong. If it relies on the suffering of the three evil paths of the desire realm as the proximate cause, we now analyze it according to the commentary. However, observing the commentary of this treatise, the commentary's explanation is considered better. The treatise says it invites suffering; what invites suffering is discrimination.
Commentary: Discrimination and innate (self-view), as the first volume of the 'Asanga's Exposition of the Holy Teachings' says, means that both innate and discriminating self-views are based on the five aggregates (Skandhas). That is, the treatise says: 'One, Satkayadrishti (the view that the five aggregates are 'I'), which takes the defiled wisdom that considers the five aggregates of clinging to be 'I' and 'mine' as its essence.' It is either innate or arises from discrimination.
Treatise: The differences in this view include twenty statements, etc., as in the 'Abhidharma-sastra'. Although the commentary and the 'Lamp Treatise' cite it, it is still difficult to understand. Now, I will briefly explain it again. The treatise asks: 'Why are fifteen aspects the view of what is mine (the view that something belongs to me)?'
應我所故。隨轉我所故。不離我所故。相應我所者。謂我有色。由我與彼相應說有彼故。隨轉我所者。謂色屬我。若彼由此自在力轉。或舍或役。世間說彼是我所故。不離我所者。謂我在色中彼計實我處在蘊中遍體隨行故。余蘊各然 問我與我所行相不同。如何是我復即所耶 答有二釋。一云如色蘊中根塵等別。且身為我余色為所。二云談一一蘊皆有一我三所差別。不言三所即是當蘊我之所也。而是別蘊我之所故。后釋為正 問若爾如何我在中住遍體隨行 答且色為所。是受等我在中而住 問色受等別如何遍體稱隨行 答如藥處銅隨行體遍理亦何失。由斯說云分別行緣蘊等。顯二十句．六十五句有差別也 問分別行等誰所說耶 答是佛法者談彼外道計我差別。有斯不同令學者知說斯言也。亦非外道自說計我有二十等句之差別也。皆內談外為令遍知有棄捨故。
疏。六十二見等者。按大智度論第十五云。身邊見以為根本。五蘊各四我．我所見。三世各成二十句見。並本身見．邊見二種合六十二。
疏。以為何證等者。按五十八云。愚夫於此五取蘊中起二十句薩迦耶見。五句我見。余見我所。是名迷苦薩迦耶見。又總結云。此十煩惱皆迷苦諦見苦所斷。既云迷苦見苦所斷。故分別惑其理極成。
疏。等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為『應我所』，因為『隨轉我所』，因為『不離我所』，因為『相應我所』。所謂『我有色』，是因為我與色相應，所以說有色。所謂『隨轉我所』，是指色屬於我，如果色由於我的自在力量而轉變，或者被捨棄，或者被役使，世間就會說那是『我所』。所謂『不離我所』，是指我存在於色之中，他們認為真實的我處在蘊中，遍佈全身隨之而行。其餘的蘊也是這樣。 問：『我』和『我所』的行相不同，為什麼說『我』就是『我所』呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，就像色蘊中根、塵等有區別一樣，身體是『我』，其餘的色是『我所』。另一種說法是，談論每一個蘊都有一『我』三『所』的差別，不是說三『所』就是當蘊『我』的『所』，而是別的蘊『我』的『所』。后一種解釋是正確的。 問：如果這樣，『我』如何在其中住，遍佈全身隨之而行呢？ 答：暫且說色是『所』，是受等『我』在其中而住。 問：色、受等有區別，如何遍佈全身稱之為隨行呢？ 答：就像藥放在銅里，隨之而遍佈，道理上有什麼缺失呢？因此說分別行緣蘊等，顯示二十句、六十五句有差別。 問：分別行等是誰說的呢？ 答：是佛法修行者談論那些外道計度『我』的差別，有這些不同，讓學習的人知道，所以說這些話。也不是外道自己說計度『我』有二十等句的差別。都是內部談論外部，爲了讓大家普遍知道而捨棄。
疏：六十二見等，按照《大智度論》第十五卷說，以身邊見作為根本，五蘊各有四種『我』、『我所』見，三世各自形成二十句見，加上本身見、邊見兩種，合起來是六十二種。
疏：以為何證等，按照第五十八卷說，愚夫在此五取蘊中生起二十句薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi，有身見），五句我見，其餘見是我所。這叫做迷惑苦諦的薩迦耶見。又總結說，這十種煩惱都是迷惑苦諦，見苦所斷。既然說是迷惑苦，見苦所斷，所以分別惑亂的道理非常明顯。
疏：等
【English Translation】 English version: Because of 'belonging to me' (應我所), because of 'changing according to me' (隨轉我所), because of 'not separate from me' (不離我所), because of 'corresponding to me' (相應我所). What is called 'I have form' (我有色) is because I correspond with form, therefore it is said that there is form. What is called 'changing according to me' means that form belongs to me; if form changes due to my power of freedom, or is discarded, or is employed, the world will say that it is 'mine' (我所). What is called 'not separate from me' means that I exist within form; they believe that the real 'I' is located within the skandha (蘊, aggregates), pervading the whole body and following it. The other skandhas are the same. Question: The characteristics of 'I' (我) and 'mine' (我所) are different, so why is it said that 'I' is 'mine'? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that, just as there are distinctions such as roots and dust in the form skandha, the body is 'I', and the remaining forms are 'mine'. Another explanation is that, when discussing each skandha, there is a difference between one 'I' and three 'mine'; it is not said that the three 'mine' are the 'mine' of the 'I' of that skandha, but rather the 'mine' of the 'I' of another skandha. The latter explanation is correct. Question: If so, how does 'I' reside within it, pervading the whole body and following it? Answer: For the time being, let's say that form is 'mine', and the 'I' such as feeling resides within it. Question: Form, feeling, etc., are different, so how can they be called pervasive and following? Answer: Just as medicine is placed in copper, it pervades it; what is lacking in the principle? Therefore, it is said that distinguishing the actions and conditions of the skandhas shows the difference between the twenty sentences and the sixty-five sentences. Question: Who said the distinguishing actions, etc.? Answer: It is the practitioners of Buddhism who talk about the differences in how those externalists measure 'I'. There are these differences, so that learners know, so these words are spoken. It is not that the externalists themselves say that measuring 'I' has the difference of twenty sentences, etc. It is all internal talk about the external, in order to let everyone know and discard it.
Commentary: The sixty-two views, etc., according to the fifteenth volume of the Mahaprajnaparamita Shastra (大智度論), take the view of the body as the root. Each of the five skandhas has four views of 'I' and 'mine'. The three times (past, present, future) each form twenty sentences of views. Adding the two kinds of views of the self and the extreme, there are sixty-two in total.
Commentary: What is the proof, etc., according to the fifty-eighth volume, foolish people generate twenty sentences of Sakkāya-ditthi (薩迦耶見, personality belief) in these five aggregates of clinging. Five sentences are the view of 'I', and the remaining views are 'mine'. This is called Sakkāya-ditthi that is deluded about the truth of suffering. And in conclusion, these ten afflictions are all deluded about the truth of suffering, and are severed by seeing suffering. Since it is said that they are deluded about suffering and severed by seeing suffering, the principle of distinguishing and confusing is extremely clear.
Commentary: Etc.
十四不可記事者。如有問彼十四事者不應為釋。無義利故名不可記。其十四者按大般若經云。世界常耶。無常耶。亦常無常耶。非常非無常耶。為四。世間有邊無邊等為四。如來死後有耶。無耶。亦有亦無耶。非有非無耶。為四。命與身一為一。命與身異為一。合為十四。
疏。此六十二見唯分別起等者。按彼論云。邊執見者。謂六十二諸見趣中。計度前際諸遍常論。一分常論。及計后際諸有想論。無想論。非想非非想論。斷見所攝。邊執見者。謂七事斷論。此邊執見唯分別起。邪見分別不待言成故不錄也。
疏。彼文又說梵王常等者。彼五十八云。有諸見妄計自在．世主．釋梵．及余物類為常。為恒。無有變易。如是邪見亦迷苦諦。
疏。依現在至過者。即瑜伽論八十七云。云何當有前後際俱行者。謂如有一作是思惟。我曾有誰。誰當有我。今此有情來何所從。於此沒已去何所至。又毗婆沙百九十九。若依現在起分別見或名前際。或名后際。是未來前過去後故。或未來因過去果故。
論。四遍常者。問瑜伽第六云謂或依三品靜慮起宿住念或依天眼。不言劫數。顯揚．梵網亦然。按長阿含云。或有沙門．婆羅門等。以三昧力能憶四十八成壞劫事。其中眾生不增不減常聚不散。第四直以捷疾智
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 十四種不可記錄之事。如果有人問及這十四件事，不應為他們解釋，因為沒有意義和利益，所以稱為不可記錄。這十四件事按照《大般若經》所說：世界是常（恒常不變）嗎？是無常（變化不定）嗎？亦常亦無常（既恒常又變化不定）嗎？非常非無常（既非恒常也非變化不定）嗎？這是四種。世間有邊（有限）嗎？無邊（無限）嗎？等等，這是四種。如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號）死後存在嗎？不存在嗎？亦存在亦不存在嗎？非存在非不存在嗎？這是四種。命（生命）與身（身體）是一體的嗎？命與身是異體的嗎？合起來是十四種。
疏解：這六十二種見解僅僅是分別產生的等等。按照《瑜伽師地論》所說：『邊執見』是指六十二種見解中，計度過去（前際）的諸種遍常論、一分常論，以及計度未來（后際）的諸種有想論、無想論、非想非非想論，屬於斷見所包含的。『邊執見』是指七事斷論。這種邊執見僅僅是分別產生的，因為邪見的分辨不需要言語就能形成，所以不記錄。
疏解：原文又說梵王（Brahma，印度教的創世神）是常等等。那五十八種見解說：『有一些見解錯誤地認為自在天（Isvara，印度教的最高神）、世主（Lord of the World）、釋梵（梵天）、以及其他事物是恒常的，沒有變化。』這樣的邪見也是迷惑于苦諦（Dukkha Satya，佛教四聖諦之一）。
疏解：依據現在推論過去和未來。也就是《瑜伽師地論》第八十七卷所說：『什麼是當有前後際俱行者？』就是說，如果有人這樣思考：『我曾經是誰？誰將會是我？現在這些有情眾生從哪裡來？死後將去往哪裡？』另外，《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》第一百九十九卷說：『如果依據現在產生分別見，或者稱為前際，或者稱為后際。』這是因為未來是過去的原因，過去是未來的結果。
論：四種遍常論。問：《瑜伽師地論》第六卷說：『或者依據三品靜慮（三種禪定）產生宿住念（回憶前世的能力），或者依據天眼（ दिव्यचक्षु，divyacakṣu，超人的視力）。』沒有說劫數（kalpa，時間單位）。《顯揚聖教論》和《梵網經》也是這樣。按照《長阿含經》所說：『或者有一些沙門（śrāmaṇa，出家修行者）、婆羅門（brāhmaṇa，祭司），以三昧力（samādhi，禪定力）能夠回憶四十八成壞劫的事。』其中的眾生不增不減，常聚不散。第四種直接以敏捷的智慧。
【English Translation】 English version: The fourteen unrecordable matters. If someone asks about these fourteen matters, one should not explain them, because they are without meaning and benefit, hence called unrecordable. These fourteen, according to the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, are: Is the world eternal (constant and unchanging)? Is it impermanent (changing and unstable)? Is it both eternal and impermanent (both constant and changing)? Is it neither eternal nor impermanent (neither constant nor changing)? These are four. Is the world finite (limited)? Is it infinite (unlimited)? And so on, these are four. Does the Tathagata (the title of the Buddha) exist after death? Does he not exist? Does he both exist and not exist? Does he neither exist nor not exist? These are four. Is the life (jiva) identical with the body (sarira)? Is the life different from the body? Combined, these are fourteen.
Commentary: These sixty-two views are merely produced by discrimination, and so on. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'The view of clinging to extremes' refers to, among the sixty-two views, those that speculate on the past (former limit) with various theories of complete permanence, partial permanence, and those that speculate on the future (latter limit) with various theories of having thought, not having thought, neither having thought nor not having thought, which are included in the view of annihilation. 'The view of clinging to extremes' refers to the theory of seven annihilations. This view of clinging to extremes is merely produced by discrimination, because the discrimination of wrong views can be formed without words, so it is not recorded.
Commentary: The text also says that Brahma (the Hindu god of creation) is permanent, and so on. Those fifty-eight views say: 'There are some views that falsely consider Isvara (the supreme god in Hinduism), the Lord of the World, Brahma, and other things to be constant, without change.' Such wrong views are also deluded about the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha Satya, one of the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism).
Commentary: Relying on the present to infer the past and future. That is, as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume eighty-seven, says: 'What is meant by those who have both former and latter limits?' It means that if someone thinks like this: 'Who was I in the past? Who will I be in the future? Where do these sentient beings come from now? Where will they go after death?' Also, the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, volume one hundred and ninety-nine, says: 'If one generates discriminatory views based on the present, it is either called the former limit or the latter limit.' This is because the future is the cause of the past, and the past is the result of the future.
Treatise: The four theories of complete permanence. Question: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume six, says: 'Either relying on the three types of dhyana (three kinds of meditation) to generate the recollection of past lives (smṛti), or relying on the divine eye ( दिव्यचक्षु, divyacakṣu, superhuman vision).' It does not mention kalpas (kalpa, unit of time). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Brahma Net Sutra are also like this. According to the Dirgha Agama Sutra: 'Or there are some śrāmaṇas (śrāmaṇa, renunciates), brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇa, priests), who, with the power of samadhi (samādhi, meditative concentration), are able to recall the events of forty-eight cycles of formation and destruction.' The beings within them neither increase nor decrease, constantly gathering and not dispersing. The fourth directly uses quick intelligence.
見說一切常。何乃不同 答宗計既殊。不煩和會。或外道執品類不一各敘一計。故瑜伽云。或依天眼 既置或言明計非一。且敘一也。婆沙等別準此應知。不同無失。瑜伽等論不言劫數。但略故爾。故第六云如經廣說。故知略也。說余見差類此應悉 有義會云。瑜伽論等依梵網經。謂本計師說依定心。以伊師迦等本上古仙。由得五通不如實知而起計故。毗婆沙論依阿含經通本未計說依散心。諸後學徒依先傳授別起計故。二經影略義無失故。
疏。大種常無常等者。問既不云我。云何邊收。非我后故 答文雖不言。理實是彼計蘊我者起斯計也。故得邊收。
疏。其全常至如何全常者。亦有本云如前全常。疏既不同。略為三釋。一應云如何。如何即是隨何之義。隨何全常皆有自我。二應云如四。如四全常中皆有自我。三應云如前。如前常言結指前也。三皆有理。應從多本。
疏。一個邊見至是何見者。而有解云。一個邊見緣上下生。屬前文者不然此屬下也。牒以為問緣上為常。下為無常。從多分說。四分常中大種與心非上下故。或依梵說名上無失。然闕下義。
疏。此雖非斷至是染惠者。非無常解皆名斷見。撥后永無方名斷見。故此非斷。問緣下無常與緣上常。二見俱耶 答不俱。無一心中有二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：既然說一切都是常，為什麼會有不同的說法呢？ 答：因為各宗派的理論依據不同，所以不必強求一致。或許外道執著于品類不一，各自敘述一種理論。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『或者依據天眼』，既然用了『或者』，就表明理論並非只有一種，這裡只是敘述其中一種。其他的，如《婆沙論》等，可以依此類推。不同說法並沒有錯。《瑜伽師地論》等論典沒有提到劫數，只是省略了而已。所以第六卷說：『如經廣說』，可知是省略了。其他類似的差異，也應依此類推。 有義法師解釋說，《瑜伽師地論》等論典依據《梵網經》，認為最初的立論者是依據禪定之心，因為伊師迦（Isika，古仙人名）等最初的古代仙人，由於獲得了五神通，但不如實了知真相，因而產生了各種理論。而《毗婆沙論》依據《阿含經》，貫通了最初和後來的理論，認為立論是依據散亂之心，那些後來的學徒是依據先前的傳授，另外產生了各種理論。兩部經文只是略有不同，義理上並沒有缺失。
疏：『大種常無常等』，問：既然沒有提到『我』（Atman，靈魂），怎麼能歸入邊見呢？因為不是在『非我』之後說的。 答：文句雖然沒有說，但實際上是那些計執五蘊為『我』的人，才產生了這種理論，所以可以歸入邊見。
疏：『其全常至如何全常者』，也有版本寫作『如前全常』。疏鈔既然不同，就略作三種解釋：一，應該寫作『如何』，『如何』就是『隨何』的意思，『隨何全常』都認為有自我（Atman，靈魂）；二，應該寫作『如四』，『如四全常』中都有自我；三，應該寫作『如前』，『如前常言』是總結指代前面的內容。這三種解釋都有道理，應該參考多數版本。
疏：『一個邊見至是何見者』，有人解釋說：『一個邊見緣上下生，屬於前文』，這種說法不對，這應該屬於下文。把這個理解為提問，認為緣于上界為常，地獄為無常，這是從多數情況來說的。四分常中，大種（Mahabhuta，四大元素）和心不是上下關係。或者依據梵天（Brahma，印度教主神）來說，稱之為『上』也沒有錯，但缺少了『下』的含義。
疏：『此雖非斷至是染惠者』，不是所有認為無常的理解都叫做斷見（Ucchedaditthi，斷滅見），只有撥無後世，認為死後永遠不存在的，才叫做斷見，所以這裡不是斷見。問：緣于地獄為無常，與緣于上界為常，這兩種見解同時存在嗎？ 答：不同時存在，因為一個心中不可能同時存在兩種對立的見解。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Since it is said that everything is permanent, why are there different views? Answer: Because the theoretical basis of each school is different, there is no need to force consistency. Perhaps non-Buddhists are attached to the idea that categories are not uniform, and each narrates a different theory. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Or based on the divine eye.' Since 'or' is used, it indicates that there is more than one theory; here, only one is narrated. Other texts, such as the Vibhasa, etc., can be understood by analogy. There is nothing wrong with different views. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra and other treatises do not mention kalpas (aeons), but only omit them. Therefore, the sixth volume says: 'As explained in detail in the sutras,' which shows that it is an omission. Other similar differences should also be understood by analogy. The Dharma master Youyi explains that the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and other treatises are based on the Brahmajala Sutra, believing that the original theorists relied on the mind in meditation, because Isika (an ancient sage) and other ancient sages initially obtained the five supernormal powers, but did not truly understand the truth, and thus generated various theories. The Vibhasa is based on the Agama Sutras, connecting the initial and later theories, believing that the theorizing is based on the distracted mind, and those later disciples rely on previous transmissions and generate other theories. The two scriptures are only slightly different, and there is no loss in meaning.
Commentary: 'The great elements are permanent or impermanent, etc.' Question: Since 'self' (Atman) is not mentioned, how can it be classified as a biased view? Because it is not said after 'non-self'. Answer: Although the sentence does not say so, in reality, it is those who consider the five aggregates as 'self' (Atman) who generate this theory, so it can be classified as a biased view.
Commentary: 'Its complete permanence to how is it completely permanent,' some versions write 'as before completely permanent.' Since the commentary is different, three explanations are briefly given: First, it should be written as 'how,' 'how' is the meaning of 'according to what,' 'according to what is completely permanent' all believe in the existence of a self (Atman); second, it should be written as 'like four,' in 'like four completely permanent' there is a self; third, it should be written as 'as before,' 'as before permanent words' is a summary reference to the previous content. All three explanations are reasonable and should be based on the majority of versions.
Commentary: 'One biased view to what view is it,' some explain: 'One biased view arises from above and below, belonging to the previous text,' this is not correct, this should belong to the following text. Understanding this as a question, believing that what is related to the upper realm is permanent, and the lower realm is impermanent, this is from the majority of cases. In the four-part permanence, the great elements (Mahabhuta) and the mind are not in an upper and lower relationship. Or, according to Brahma (the Hindu god), it is not wrong to call it 'above,' but it lacks the meaning of 'below'.
Commentary: 'Although this is not annihilation to is it defiled wisdom,' not all understandings that consider impermanence are called annihilationism (Ucchedaditthi), only those who deny the afterlife and believe that there is no existence after death are called annihilationism, so this is not annihilationism. Question: Do the two views of being related to the lower realm as impermanent and being related to the upper realm as permanent exist simultaneously? Answer: They do not exist simultaneously, because two opposing views cannot exist in one mind at the same time.
惠故。
疏。此總是我等者。總計五蘊。而作一我。更無差異。蘊無不遍。如次名為遍滿．無二．無異．無缺。
疏。我有色等者。即有色我有彼想故名為有想。問既云死後而有于想。復約于地如何得云我有于想名有想耶 答由我有想后隨生處名為有想。非今時無後方有也。不爾無想俱非八論不應各八。
疏。二我無色等者。問四無色蘊總為一我。為別為四 答別計為四 若爾想蘊而為我者。云何得言我有想耶。必有於他方名有故 答有彼想用名為有想。
疏。一想者在前三無色等者。問何為名一 答唯一意識餘五無故。故婆沙論云。由彼諸想一門轉故說名一想。
疏。種種想在欲色界等者。故婆沙云。由彼諸想六四門轉。及緣種種境界。起故。
疏。純有苦至尋伺皆客得起者。由依等至而能起通。見苦樂等而後起執。依尋．伺者憑邪師教說樂等事處所差別因執而生。或見現世苦樂等。因茲構盡計論而起。此世既苦。他世亦然。樂等亦然。
論。無想俱非各有八論者。問何故有相具有十六無想俱非俱除后八 答后之八種云小樂等。明皆有想。故無想無想復明利。俱非亦闕 疏。見他得定等者。問何故有想不言見他得定生等。答無想處一。故要見他自方生執。有想不爾何得
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 惠故。
疏：這裡總說『我等』，是總計五蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）而認為是一個『我』，沒有其他差異。五蘊無所不遍及，依次被稱為遍滿、無二、無異、無缺。
疏：『我有色等』，即有色蘊，我對此有想，所以稱為『有想』。問：既然說是死後才有想，又依據于地，怎麼能說『我有于想』，名為『有想』呢？答：由於『我有想』，之後隨著所生之處而名為『有想』，不是說現在沒有，以後才有。否則，『無想』和『俱非』都不應各有八種論點。
疏：『二我無色等』，問：四無色蘊（arupa-skandha，沒有物質形態的四種蘊：受、想、行、識）總共是一個『我』，還是分別有四個？答：分別計算為四個。若這樣，想蘊作為『我』，怎麼能說『我有想』呢？必定有對於他者，才名為『有』。答：有對於彼想的作用，名為『有想』。
疏：『一想』，指在前面三種無色等處。問：為什麼稱為『一』？答：因為只有意識，其餘五種（指色、受、行、識、空）都沒有。所以《婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra）說，由於那些想從一個門徑運轉，所以稱為『一想』。
疏：『種種想』，指在欲界（kama-dhatu，眾生對感官享樂有慾望的界）等處。所以《婆沙論》說，由於那些想從六個或四個門徑運轉，以及緣于種種境界而生起。
疏：『純有苦』，乃至『尋伺皆客得起』，由於依靠等至（samapatti，通過禪定達到的狀態）而能生起神通，見到苦樂等之後才生起執著。依靠尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicara，精細的思考），憑藉邪師的教導，說樂等事物的處所差別，因為執著而生。或者見到現世的苦樂等，因此構思窮盡，計較理論而生起。認為此世既然是苦，他世也是這樣，樂等也是這樣。
論：『無想』和『俱非』各有八種論點。問：為什麼『有想』具有十六種，而『無想』和『俱非』都去除了後面的八種？答：後面的八種說的是小樂等，表明都有想。所以『無想』和『無想』又表明了利，『俱非』也缺少。疏：見到他人得定等。問：為什麼『有想』不說見到他人得定而生起等？答：因為『無想處』是唯一的，所以要見到他人自己才能生起執著，『有想』不是這樣，怎麼能……
【English Translation】 English version: Huigu.
Commentary: 'We and others' here refers to the aggregate of the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) considered as one 'self,' with no other difference. The skandhas are all-pervasive, and are successively called all-encompassing, non-dual, non-different, and complete.
Commentary: 'I have form, etc.,' means having the form skandha, and I have thoughts about it, so it is called 'having thought.' Question: Since it is said that thoughts arise after death, and based on the earth, how can it be said that 'I have thoughts,' and be called 'having thought'? Answer: Because 'I have thoughts,' and then according to where I am born, it is called 'having thought.' It is not that there is none now, and only later there will be. Otherwise, 'no thought' and 'neither thought nor non-thought' should not each have eight arguments.
Commentary: 'Two, I have no form, etc.,' Question: Are the four formless skandhas (feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) collectively one 'self,' or are they separately four? Answer: They are separately counted as four. If so, with the perception skandha as the 'self,' how can it be said 'I have perception'? It must be in relation to others to be called 'having.' Answer: Having the function of that perception is called 'having perception.'
Commentary: 'One thought' refers to the first three formless realms, etc. Question: Why is it called 'one'? Answer: Because there is only consciousness, and the other five (form, feeling, mental formations, consciousness, and space) are not present. Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra says that because those thoughts operate through one gateway, they are called 'one thought.'
Commentary: 'Various thoughts' refers to the realm of desire (kama-dhatu) etc. Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra says that because those thoughts operate through six or four gateways, and arise from various realms.
Commentary: 'Purely having suffering' up to 'initial and sustained application of thought are obtained as guests,' because relying on samapatti (attainment through meditation) can generate supernatural powers, and after seeing suffering and pleasure, attachment arises. Relying on vitarka (initial application of thought) and vicara (sustained application of thought), based on the teachings of evil teachers, speaking of the differences in the places of pleasure and other things, arises because of attachment. Or seeing suffering and pleasure in this world, therefore conceiving exhaustively, calculating theories arise. Believing that since this world is suffering, the other world is also like that, and pleasure and other things are also like that.
Treatise: 'No thought' and 'neither thought nor non-thought' each have eight arguments. Question: Why does 'having thought' have sixteen, while 'no thought' and 'neither thought nor non-thought' both remove the last eight? Answer: The last eight speak of minor pleasures, etc., indicating that they all have thought. Therefore, 'no thought' and 'no thought' also indicate benefit, and 'neither thought nor non-thought' is also lacking. Commentary: Seeing others attain samadhi, etc. Question: Why does 'having thought' not say seeing others attain samadhi and arise, etc.? Answer: Because the 'realm of no thought' is unique, so one must see others for oneself to generate attachment, 'having thought' is not like this, how can...
為例。或影顯也。不及前釋。
疏。等至尋伺皆客等起者。按婆沙云。諸尋伺者執色為我。見或有時熟眠．悶絕苦受所切似全無想便作是念。我雖有色而無其想。如於此世他世亦爾。由此故云死後無想。準此未必計生無想方名無想。與前得定計無想別。前有苦等亦準此知。
論。俱非八者。列之如疏。按婆沙論略拾要云。一諸尋伺者執色為我。彼見有情想不明瞭便作是念。說我有色非有想非無想。如於此世他世亦爾。非由彼定可起此執。所以者何。要離無所有處染者。方執非想非非想處諸蘊為我。彼既無色此執理無。有依別義說得彼定亦有此執。謂生故色已離無所有處染者。執彼非想非非相處諸蘊為我。彼所執我體雖非色。而與色合名有色我。如說仿人人體有仿。彼雖不執以色為我。而所執我未離色故。乃至命終猶隨身故。故說有色。由所入定想不明瞭。故執我現非有想非無想死後亦然。許無色界亦有色者。彼許有執非想非非想處。我實有色而非有想亦非無想。二得彼定者執彼非想非非想處諸無色蘊以之為我。或為我所。彼所執我無色為性。或有無色名無色我。由入彼定想不明瞭故。執我現非有想非無相死後亦然。諸尋伺者執無色為我。彼見有情想不明瞭便作是念。我無色非有想非無想。第三句中而有三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 例如，或者（通過）影像顯現。這與之前的解釋不同。
疏：『等至』（Samāpatti，禪定）和『尋伺』（Vitarka-vicāra，粗細分別的思考）都屬於『客等起』（Kilesa-samutthāna，煩惱生起）的情況。按照《婆沙論》（Vibhāṣā）的說法，那些『尋伺者』執著于『色』（Rūpa，物質）為『我』（Ātman，靈魂）。他們看到（有情）有時在熟睡、昏迷或遭受劇烈痛苦時，似乎完全沒有思想，便會這樣認為：『我』雖然有『色』，卻沒有思想。就像在這個世界一樣，在其他世界也是如此。因此，他們認為死後是『無想』（Asañña，無想）。按照這個說法，不一定只有認為會生到『無想天』（Asaññasatta，無想有情天）才叫做『無想』，這與之前通過禪定而認為的『無想』不同。之前提到的『苦』等情況，也可以依此類推。
論：『俱非八者』（Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana，非想非非想處）的情況，像疏文中列舉的那樣。《婆沙論》略拾要義中說：一、那些『尋伺者』執著于『色』為『我』。他們看到有情的思想不清晰，便會這樣認為：我說『我』有『色』，但既非『有想』（Sañña，有想），也非『無想』。就像在這個世界一樣，在其他世界也是如此。這不是因為他們證得了某種禪定才產生這種執著。為什麼呢？因為只有離開了『無所有處』（Ākiñcaññāyatana，無所有處）的染污的人，才會執著于『非想非非想處』的諸『蘊』（Skandha，五蘊）為『我』。他們既然沒有『色』，這種執著就沒有道理。有一種依據其他意義的說法認為，證得那種禪定的人也會有這種執著，即如果有人因為前世的『色』，已經離開了『無所有處』的染污，那麼他們就會執著于『非想非非想處』的諸『蘊』為『我』。他們所執著的『我』的本體雖然不是『色』，但與『色』結合在一起，可以稱為『有色我』。就像說模仿人，人體有模仿一樣。他們雖然不執著于以『色』為『我』，但他們所執著的『我』並沒有離開『色』，乃至到生命終結時仍然伴隨著身體，所以說『有色』。由於他們所進入的禪定思想不清晰，所以認為『我』現在既非『有想』也非『無想』，死後也是如此。允許『無**』也有『色』的情況，是因為他們允許執著于『非想非非想處』，『我』實際上有『色』，但既非『有想』也非『無想』。二、證得那種禪定的人，執著于『非想非非想處』的諸『無色蘊』（Arūpa-skandha，無色蘊）作為『我』，或者作為『我所』（Attaniya，我所擁有）。他們所執著的『我』以『無色』為性質，或者說『有無色』，稱為『無色我』。由於進入那種禪定后思想不清晰，所以認為『我』現在既非『有想』也非『無想』，死後也是如此。那些『尋伺者』執著于『無色』為『我』。他們看到有情的思想不清晰，便會這樣認為：『我』沒有『色』，既非『有想』也非『無想』。第三句中有三種情況……
【English Translation】 English version: For example, or manifested through images. This differs from the previous explanation.
Commentary: 'Samāpatti' (attainment, meditative absorption) and 'Vitarka-vicāra' (initial and sustained application of thought) both belong to the category of 'Kilesa-samutthāna' (arising from defilements). According to the Vibhāṣā, those who engage in 'Vitarka-vicāra' cling to 'Rūpa' (form, matter) as 'Ātman' (self, soul). When they see sentient beings sometimes in deep sleep, unconsciousness, or experiencing intense suffering, appearing to have no thoughts at all, they think: 'I' though possessing 'Rūpa', have no thought. Just as in this world, so it is in other worlds. Therefore, they believe that after death there is 'Asañña' (non-perception, no-thought). According to this, it is not necessarily the case that only those who believe they will be born in the 'Asaññasatta' (beings of no perception realm) are called 'Asañña'; this is different from the 'Asañña' previously considered through meditative attainment. The previously mentioned situations of 'suffering' etc., can be understood in the same way.
Treatise: The case of 'Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana' (neither perception nor non-perception), is as listed in the commentary. The essential points of the Vibhāṣā state: 1. Those who engage in 'Vitarka-vicāra' cling to 'Rūpa' as 'self'. When they see the thoughts of sentient beings are unclear, they think: I say 'I' have 'Rūpa', but am neither 'Sañña' (perception, having thought) nor 'non-perception'. Just as in this world, so it is in other worlds. This clinging does not arise because they have attained a certain meditative state. Why? Because only those who have abandoned the defilements of 'Ākiñcaññāyatana' (the sphere of nothingness) cling to the 'Skandha' (aggregates, the five aggregates) of 'Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana' as 'self'. Since they have no 'Rūpa', this clinging is unreasonable. There is a view based on other meanings that those who have attained that meditative state also have this clinging, that is, if someone, because of the 'Rūpa' of a previous life, has abandoned the defilements of 'Ākiñcaññāyatana', then they will cling to the 'Skandha' of 'Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana' as 'self'. Although the essence of the 'self' they cling to is not 'Rūpa', it is combined with 'Rūpa', and can be called 'Rūpa-self'. Just as it is said that imitating a person, the human body has imitation. Although they do not cling to 'Rūpa' as 'self', the 'self' they cling to has not left 'Rūpa', and even until the end of life still accompanies the body, so it is said to have 'Rūpa'. Because the thoughts of the meditative state they have entered are unclear, they think that 'I' am now neither 'Sañña' nor 'non-perception', and so it is after death. Allowing the case of 'no **' also having 'Rūpa' is because they allow clinging to 'Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana', 'I' actually have 'Rūpa', but am neither 'Sañña' nor 'non-perception'. 2. Those who have attained that meditative state cling to the 'Arūpa-skandha' (formless aggregates) of 'Neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatana' as 'self', or as 'Attaniya' (belonging to self, what is possessed by self). The 'self' they cling to has the nature of 'formlessness', or it can be said to 'have formlessness', and is called 'formless self'. Because the thoughts are unclear after entering that meditative state, they think that 'I' am now neither 'Sañña' nor 'non-perception', and so it is after death. Those who engage in 'Vitarka-vicāra' cling to 'formlessness' as 'self'. When they see the thoughts of sentient beings are unclear, they think: 'I' have no 'Rūpa', and am neither 'Sañña' nor 'non-perception'. There are three situations in the third sentence...
節。初唯尋伺中許依定。后許有色。所有喻等並同初句。
疏。一由彼定時分促等者。由時促故隨緣一蘊名一一也。故後起等得有邊名。余準此知。
論。七斷滅者。具如疏明。又阿含經云。有沙門．婆羅門作如是見。起如是論。一云我身四大從父母生。孔鋪長養。然是無常。二云此我不得名斷滅。我欲界諸天斷滅無餘。三此非斷滅。色界化生諸根具足。斷滅無餘。四此非斷滅。我無邊空處斷滅乃至非想。皆后非前立為斷滅。
成唯識論演秘卷第五(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第五(末)
論。三邪見等者。謗因果等。瑜伽第七．五十五．五十八．對法第一互有不同。如瑜伽鈔會 問五十八云。邪見者一切倒見皆名邪見。當知此見略有二種。除邪見外餘四。一切皆名增益邪見。謗因及謗果等所有諸見皆名損減。對法第一云。四是增益。于所知境增益自性．及差別故。即邪見外余之四見。一多分是損減見。一多分者由邪分別不必損減故。一言全損。一云多分。何乃乖角 答五十八中偏指謗因果等邪見云皆損減。對法通說一切邪見。故云多分。如計釋梵常恒不易為物等因。非損減故對望不同故無有失。更有異同。如二論鈔會。
論。無二因論者。依宿住計如疏所明 依尋．伺者按婆沙
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：節。最初唯有尋伺時允許依靠禪定。之後允許有色法。所有的比喻等都與第一句相同。
疏。一、由於彼定時分短暫等原因。由於時間短暫，隨因緣而生的一蘊被稱為一一。因此，後起的等等可以有邊際的名稱。其餘的可以依此類推得知。
論。七斷滅者。具體如疏文所說明。另外，《阿含經》中說：有沙門（出家修行者）、婆羅門（古印度祭司）作出這樣的見解，提出這樣的論斷。第一種觀點認為，我的身體由四大（地、水、火、風）構成，從父母那裡獲得，通過飲食滋養。但它是無常的。第二種觀點認為，這個我不會斷滅，我欲界諸天（位於欲界的諸天神）會斷滅無餘。第三種觀點認為，這並非斷滅，化生（非胎生、卵生、濕生）的諸根具足的眾生會斷滅無餘。第四種觀點認為，這並非斷滅，我無邊空處（四禪定之一）斷滅，乃至非想非非想處（最高禪定），都是以後者否定前者，並將其立為斷滅。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第五（本終）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第五（末）
論。三邪見等者。誹謗因果等。瑜伽（《瑜伽師地論》）第七、五十五、五十八、對法（《阿毗達摩集論》）第一互有不同。如瑜伽鈔會。問：五十八中說，邪見者，一切顛倒的見解都稱為邪見。應當知道這種見解略有二種。除了邪見之外，其餘四種見解，一切都稱為增益邪見。誹謗因以及誹謗果等所有的見解都稱為損減。對法第一中說，四種是增益，對於所知境增益自性以及差別。即邪見之外其餘的四種見解。一種大部分是損減見。一種大部分是因為邪分別不一定損減的緣故。一個說是完全損減，一個說是大部分。為什麼會矛盾呢？答：五十八中偏指誹謗因果等的邪見說是完全損減。對法通說一切邪見。所以說是大部分。例如計度釋梵（帝釋天和梵天）常恒不變為萬物之因，不是損減的緣故，對望不同所以沒有過失。更有異同，如二論鈔會。
論。無二因論者。依靠宿住（過去世）來計度，如疏文所說明。依靠尋、伺（尋思和伺察）者，按照《婆沙》（《大毗婆沙論》）。
【English Translation】 English version: Section: Initially, only during initial application of sustained application of thought and discursive thinking is reliance on concentration allowed. Later, material form is allowed. All metaphors and the like are the same as the first sentence.
Commentary: 1. Because the time during that concentration is short, etc. Because the time is short, each skandha (aggregate) that arises due to conditions is called 'one by one.' Therefore, subsequent arising, etc., can have the name 'finite.' The rest can be known by analogy.
Treatise: The seven annihilations are as explained in detail in the commentary. Furthermore, the Agama Sutra says: There are Sramanas (wandering ascetics) and Brahmanas (priests) who hold such views and make such arguments. The first view is that my body is composed of the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind), born from parents, and nourished by food. However, it is impermanent. The second view is that this 'I' will not be annihilated; the devas (gods) of the desire realm will be completely annihilated. The third view is that this is not annihilation; beings born by transformation (not by womb, egg, or moisture) with complete faculties will be completely annihilated. The fourth view is that this is not annihilation; my realm of infinite space (one of the four dhyanas) will be annihilated, up to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (the highest dhyana). They establish annihilation by negating the former with the latter.
Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 5 (End of the Main Text)
Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 5 (End)
Treatise: The three false views, etc., are those that slander cause and effect, etc. Yoga (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) VII, 55, 58, and Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya) I differ from each other. As explained in the Yoga commentary. Question: In 58, it says that false views are all inverted views. It should be known that these views are roughly of two types. Except for false views, the remaining four are all called views of increase. All views that slander cause and slander effect, etc., are called views of decrease. Abhidharma I says that four are views of increase, because they increase self-nature and distinctions in the object of knowledge. That is, the four views other than false view. One is mostly a view of decrease. One is mostly because wrong discrimination does not necessarily decrease. One says complete decrease, and one says mostly. Why is there a contradiction? Answer: 58 specifically refers to false views that slander cause and effect, etc., as complete decrease. Abhidharma generally speaks of all false views. Therefore, it says mostly. For example, considering Ishvara (Shiva) and Brahma (Brahma) as the constant and unchanging cause of all things is not a decrease. Because the perspectives are different, there is no fault. There are more similarities and differences, as explained in the commentaries of the two treatises.
Treatise: The theory of no two causes relies on recollection of past lives, as explained in the commentary. Those who rely on sustained application of thought and discursive thinking, according to the Vibhasa (Mahavibhasa-sastra).
云。二由尋．伺虛妄推求今身所更既皆能憶。前身若有彼所更事今亦應憶。既不能憶故知彼無。余如章辨 問既曰宿通何不能憶出心前事 答外道極知不逾八十。彼入時心望后出心隔五百劫故不能憶。中五百劫而無心故復何所憶。由此猶執生 問彼心雖無色身是有。豈不見耶。若云不見。便違宿住憶八事義。若許見者因彼身生。此何無因 答雖見色身不知彼身有之所因。以見不逾五百劫故。既彼身有不見因生。所以今身不以所見。即身而起 有惑者云。宿命．尋伺皆不能憶無想沒後出心前事。名二無因。此由見疏答問之中而以二義。唯約無想以答前難。因致斯迷。學者應知。
論。或計自在等者。問此等邪見及我我所見戒二取。皆非六十二見所攝。豈不違經。故阿含經云。諸有沙門．婆羅門等本見．末見無數種種隨意所說盡入六十二見。儘是不過。猶如巧捕魚師以細目網覆小水上。當知池中水性之類皆入網內無逃避處 答有義解云。理實別迷四諦邪見。隨應攝入全常等中。然今此論于邊見中說全常等。故全常等不攝邪見。由此應知但邊見者全常等攝。非全常等皆邊見攝。四諦邪見在全常等。非邊見故 詳曰。釋猶未盡。理亦難詳。經云本末無數之見。入六十二。豈我我所見戒取等而非邪見。是何不明。又云。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云：二由尋伺的虛妄推求，今生所經歷的事情都能憶起。如果前世有經歷過的事情，現在也應該能憶起。既然不能憶起，就知道前世沒有。其餘的道理如同之前的章節所辨析。
問：既然說是宿命通，為什麼不能憶起入定之前的事情？
答：外道最多隻能知道不超過八十劫的事情。他們入定時的心，想要追溯到出定之前的心，中間隔了五百劫，所以不能憶起。中間五百劫沒有心識，又怎麼能憶起呢？因此仍然執著于生。
問：即使那個時候沒有心識，色身還是存在的。難道你沒看見嗎？如果說沒看見，就違背了宿住智憶八事的定義。如果允許看見，因為那個身體而生，這個又怎麼能說是沒有原因呢？
答：雖然看見了色身，但不知道那個身體存在的因由。因為看見的範圍不超過五百劫。既然那個身體的存在，沒有看見其產生的因由，所以今生的身體，不能因為所看見的，就認為是自身而生。
有迷惑的人說：宿命通、尋伺都不能憶起無想定結束后，出定之前的事情，稱為二無因。這是因為理解疏漏，在回答問題時，只用無想定的例子來回答之前的難題，因此導致了這種迷惑。學者應該明白。
論：或者計執自在天等。問：這些邪見以及我見、我所見、戒禁取見這二取，都不屬於六十二見所包含的，難道不違背佛經嗎？所以《阿含經》說：『所有沙門、婆羅門等，從根本見、到末見，無數種隨意所說的，都包含在六十二見之中，沒有超出這個範圍的。』就像善於捕魚的漁夫，用細密的網覆蓋在小水面上，應當知道池中所有水生動物都進入網內，沒有逃脫的地方。
答：有一種解釋說：實際上是對於四諦的邪見，根據情況可以歸入全常等見中。然而現在這部論典在邊見中說全常等見，所以全常等見不包含邪見。由此應該知道，只有邊見才被全常等見包含，而不是全常等見都包含邊見。對於四諦的邪見屬於全常等見，而不是邊見。
詳曰：這種解釋仍然不夠完善，道理也很難理解。《阿含經》說從根本到末的無數種見解，都包含在六十二見中。難道我見、我所見、戒禁取見等不是邪見嗎？為什麼不明確說明？又說：此 English version Regarding the cloud: The false seeking and pondering of the two, through seeking and pondering, can recall the experiences of this present life. If there were experiences in a previous life, they should also be recalled now. Since they cannot be recalled, it is known that there was no previous life. The remaining reasoning is as discussed in the previous chapters.
Question: Since it is said to be the 'power of knowing past lives' (宿命通, Sùmìng Tōng), why can't one recall events before entering concentration?
Answer: Non-Buddhists can at most know events up to eighty kalpas (劫, jié). Their mind in concentration, wanting to trace back to the mind before entering concentration, is separated by five hundred kalpas, so they cannot recall it. In the middle five hundred kalpas, there is no mind, so what can be recalled? Therefore, they still cling to birth.
Question: Even if there is no mind at that time, the physical body still exists. Don't you see it? If you say you don't see it, you contradict the definition of the 'wisdom of abiding in past lives' (宿住智, Sù zhù zhì) recalling eight things. If you allow seeing, and it is born because of that body, how can this be said to be without cause?
Answer: Although the physical body is seen, the cause of that body's existence is not known. Because the range of seeing does not exceed five hundred kalpas. Since the existence of that body is not seen to have a cause, the present body cannot be said to arise from what is seen, as if it were the self.
Some confused people say: The 'power of knowing past lives' (宿命通, Sùmìng Tōng) and seeking and pondering cannot recall events after the end of the 'state of non-perception' (無想定, Wúxiǎng dìng) and before exiting concentration, which is called 'two without cause'. This is due to a superficial understanding, using only the example of the 'state of non-perception' (無想定, Wúxiǎng dìng) to answer the previous difficult question, thus leading to this confusion. Scholars should understand this.
Treatise: Or those who calculate and cling to 'Maheśvara' (自在天, Zìzài tiān) etc. Question: These wrong views, as well as the views of 'self' (我, wǒ), 'what belongs to self' (我所, wǒ suǒ), and 'holding to precepts and vows' (戒禁取, Jièjìn qǔ), these two kinds of clinging are not included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn), doesn't this contradict the sutras? Therefore, the 'Agama Sutra' says: 'All 'śrāmaṇas' (沙門, Shāmén), 'brahmins' (婆羅門, Póluómén), etc., from fundamental views to final views, countless kinds of arbitrary sayings, are all included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn), without exceeding this scope.' It is like a fisherman skilled at catching fish, covering a small water surface with a fine-meshed net, one should know that all aquatic creatures in the pond enter the net, with no place to escape.
Answer: One explanation says: In reality, it is a wrong view of the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, Sìdì), which can be included in the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., according to the situation. However, this treatise now speaks of the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., in the context of 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn), so the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., does not include wrong views. From this, it should be known that only 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn) are included in the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., but not all 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) views, etc., include 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn). Wrong views of the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, Sìdì) belong to the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., and not to 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn).
Detailed explanation: This explanation is still not complete, and the reasoning is also difficult to understand. The 'Agama Sutra' says that countless views from fundamental to final are included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn). Are the views of 'self' (我, wǒ), 'what belongs to self' (我所, wǒ suǒ), and 'holding to precepts and vows' (戒禁取, Jièjìn qǔ), etc., not wrong views? Why is it not clearly stated? It also says: This
【English Translation】 English version Regarding the cloud: The false seeking and pondering of the two, through seeking and pondering, can recall the experiences of this present life. If there were experiences in a previous life, they should also be recalled now. Since they cannot be recalled, it is known that there was no previous life. The remaining reasoning is as discussed in the previous chapters.
Question: Since it is said to be the 'power of knowing past lives' (宿命通, Sùmìng Tōng), why can't one recall events before entering concentration?
Answer: Non-Buddhists can at most know events up to eighty kalpas (劫, jié). Their mind in concentration, wanting to trace back to the mind before entering concentration, is separated by five hundred kalpas, so they cannot recall it. In the middle five hundred kalpas, there is no mind, so what can be recalled? Therefore, they still cling to birth.
Question: Even if there is no mind at that time, the physical body still exists. Don't you see it? If you say you don't see it, you contradict the definition of the 'wisdom of abiding in past lives' (宿住智, Sù zhù zhì) recalling eight things. If you allow seeing, and it is born because of that body, how can this be said to be without cause?
Answer: Although the physical body is seen, the cause of that body's existence is not known. Because the range of seeing does not exceed five hundred kalpas. Since the existence of that body is not seen to have a cause, the present body cannot be said to arise from what is seen, as if it were the self.
Some confused people say: The 'power of knowing past lives' (宿命通, Sùmìng Tōng) and seeking and pondering cannot recall events after the end of the 'state of non-perception' (無想定, Wúxiǎng dìng) and before exiting concentration, which is called 'two without cause'. This is due to a superficial understanding, using only the example of the 'state of non-perception' (無想定, Wúxiǎng dìng) to answer the previous difficult question, thus leading to this confusion. Scholars should understand this.
Treatise: Or those who calculate and cling to 'Maheśvara' (自在天, Zìzài tiān) etc. Question: These wrong views, as well as the views of 'self' (我, wǒ), 'what belongs to self' (我所, wǒ suǒ), and 'holding to precepts and vows' (戒禁取, Jièjìn qǔ), these two kinds of clinging are not included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn), doesn't this contradict the sutras? Therefore, the 'Agama Sutra' says: 'All 'śrāmaṇas' (沙門, Shāmén), 'brahmins' (婆羅門, Póluómén), etc., from fundamental views to final views, countless kinds of arbitrary sayings, are all included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn), without exceeding this scope.' It is like a fisherman skilled at catching fish, covering a small water surface with a fine-meshed net, one should know that all aquatic creatures in the pond enter the net, with no place to escape.
Answer: One explanation says: In reality, it is a wrong view of the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, Sìdì), which can be included in the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., according to the situation. However, this treatise now speaks of the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., in the context of 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn), so the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., does not include wrong views. From this, it should be known that only 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn) are included in the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., but not all 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) views, etc., include 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn). Wrong views of the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, Sìdì) belong to the 'eternalist' (全常, Quáncháng) view, etc., and not to 'extreme views' (邊見, Biānjiàn).
Detailed explanation: This explanation is still not complete, and the reasoning is also difficult to understand. The 'Agama Sutra' says that countless views from fundamental to final are included in the 'sixty-two views' (六十二見, Liùshí'èr jiàn). Are the views of 'self' (我, wǒ), 'what belongs to self' (我所, wǒ suǒ), and 'holding to precepts and vows' (戒禁取, Jièjìn qǔ), etc., not wrong views? Why is it not clearly stated? It also says: This
論于邊見中說全常等。此亦不然。觀彼經中。四遍常等亦依邊見。何得唯斷論依邊說。今為二釋 一云六十二外余邊邪見依前後際。以六十二而起執者。亦皆攝入六十二中。如四全常。經等但約依定等起。亦有不依等至起執。雖依尋伺復多差別。此等皆入四全常中。余準此知。經據此理名攝余見。此即少分一切之義。亦如四諦攝一切法。苦稱眾苦。余諦亦然。言攝余見。亦據同類相攝說也 二依品類以輕從重名攝一切。余見是彼六十二見見類同故。同類見中復有同異。我見即是邊見之類。邊依起故。邪見計彼自在常。等常邊之類。雖非我后而計。于常常相似故。余準可知 二取隨執何見法等即是彼類。由此二取及我我所。應皆攝入六十二中。亦如五見總名邪見。邪見類故。又輕從重如言王臣。臣亦名王。經作法中但據重說。
疏。既無邊見中攝諦斷文者。五十八中而有文說。但撿文者而疏略故致有斯斷。故彼論云。即用如是薩迦耶見以為依止。於五趣蘊見我斷常。故邊執見亦迷於苦。
論。四見取等者。然準有宗但執劣法以為勝者。即名見取不唯執見及同時蘊。故俱舍論十九云。於劣謂勝名為見取。執劣為勝總名見取。理實應立見等取名。略去等言但名見取。
論。五戒禁取等者。又準有宗但執非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於在邊見中說全常等，這也是不對的。觀察那些經典，四種遍常等也是依據邊見而產生的。為什麼只斷定論述是依據邊見而說的呢？現在作兩種解釋：第一種解釋是，六十二種外道的其餘邊見，是依據前後際而產生的。以六十二種見解而產生執著的，也都被攝入六十二種見解之中。例如四種全常，經典等只是依據禪定等而產生。也有不依據等至而產生執著的。即使依據尋伺，也有很多差別。這些都被歸入四種全常之中。其餘的可以依此類推。經典依據這個道理，稱為攝取其餘的見解。這就是少分即一切的意義。也像四諦攝取一切法一樣，苦諦被稱為眾苦，其餘的諦也是這樣。說攝取其餘的見解，也是依據同類相攝而說的。第二種解釋是，依據品類，以輕從重，稱為攝取一切。其餘的見解是那六十二種見解的同類，因為見解的種類相同。同類的見解中又有相同和不同。我見就是邊見的種類。因為邊見是依據邊而產生的。邪見認為自在是常，等常是常邊的種類。雖然不是在我之後，但認為與常相似。其餘的可以依此類推。第二種是取隨執，無論什麼見解或法等，就是那一類。由此二取以及我、我所，都應該被攝入六十二種見解之中。也像五見總稱為邪見一樣，因為是邪見的種類。又如輕從重，像說王臣，臣也可以稱為王。經典在說法中只是依據重要的來說。 疏：既然沒有在邊見中攝取締斷的文句，那麼在五十八種見解中就有文句說明。只是檢查文句的人疏忽了，才導致這樣的斷定。所以那部論典說：『就是用這樣的薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi，有身見）作為依據，在五趣蘊中見到我、斷、常。』所以邊執見也迷惑于苦諦。 論：四見取等，然而依據有宗的觀點，只是執著低劣的法，認為它是殊勝的，就稱為見取，不只是執著見解以及同時的蘊。所以《俱舍論》第十九卷說：『對於低劣的認為是殊勝的，稱為見取。』執著低劣的為殊勝的總稱為見取。理應建立見等取的名字，省略了『等』字，只稱為見取。 論：五戒禁取等，又依據有宗的觀點，只是執著非
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the statement in the 'views of extremes' (邊見, bian jian) about 'eternalism' (全常, quan chang) and so on, this is also incorrect. Observing those sutras, the 'four kinds of pervasive eternality' (四遍常, si bian chang) and so on also arise based on 'views of extremes'. Why only assert that the discussion is based on 'views of extremes'? Now, there are two explanations: The first explanation is that the remaining 'views of extremes' of the sixty-two heretical views arise based on 'prior and posterior limits' (前後際, qian hou ji). Those who develop attachments based on the sixty-two views are also included within the sixty-two views. For example, the 'four kinds of complete eternality' (四全常, si quan chang), the sutras, etc., only arise based on 'meditative attainments' (禪定, chan ding) and so on. There are also those who develop attachments without relying on 'equal attainments' (等至, deng zhi). Even if relying on 'investigation and analysis' (尋伺, xun si), there are still many differences. All of these are included within the 'four kinds of complete eternality'. The rest can be understood by analogy. The sutras, based on this principle, are called 'encompassing the remaining views'. This is the meaning of 'a small part is everything'. It is also like the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, si di) encompassing all dharmas, with the 'Truth of Suffering' (苦諦, ku di) being called 'manifold suffering' (眾苦, zhong ku), and the remaining truths being the same. Saying 'encompassing the remaining views' is also based on encompassing similar categories. The second explanation is that, based on categories, the light follows the heavy, and it is called 'encompassing everything'. The remaining views are of the same category as those sixty-two views, because the types of views are the same. Within the same category of views, there are similarities and differences. 'Self-view' (我見, wo jian) is a type of 'view of extremes'. Because 'views of extremes' arise based on extremes. 'Heretical views' (邪見, xie jian) consider 'self-existent' (自在, zi zai) to be eternal, and 'equal eternality' (等常, deng chang) is a type of 'eternal extreme'. Although it is not after 'me', it is considered similar to eternity. The rest can be understood by analogy. The second is 'grasping attachment' (取隨執, qu sui zhi), whatever view or dharma, etc., it is of that category. Therefore, these two kinds of grasping, as well as 'self' (我, wo) and 'what belongs to self' (我所, wo suo), should all be included within the sixty-two views. It is also like the 'five views' (五見, wu jian) being collectively called 'heretical views', because they are of the category of 'heretical views'. Furthermore, the light follows the heavy, like saying 'king and ministers' (王臣, wang chen), a minister can also be called a king. The sutras, in teaching the Dharma, only speak based on what is important. Commentary: Since there is no statement about encompassing the 'Truth of Cessation' (諦斷, di duan) in the 'views of extremes', there is a statement in the fifty-eight views. It is only because those who examine the texts are negligent that such a conclusion is reached. Therefore, that treatise says: 'It is precisely using such 'Sakkāya-ditthi' (薩迦耶見, Sakkāya-ditthi, view of self) as a basis, seeing 'self', 'cessation', and 'eternality' in the five aggregates. Therefore, 'clinging to extreme views' (邊執見, bian zhi jian) is also deluded about suffering. Treatise: The 'four kinds of grasping at views' (四見取, si jian qu), etc., however, according to the perspective of the Sarvastivada school (有宗, you zong), simply clinging to inferior dharmas and considering them superior is called 'grasping at views', not just clinging to views and simultaneous aggregates. Therefore, the nineteenth volume of the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論, ju she lun) says: 'Considering the inferior to be superior is called 'grasping at views'.' Generally, clinging to the inferior as superior is called 'grasping at views'. In reality, the name 'grasping at views, etc.' should be established, omitting the word 'etc.', and simply calling it 'grasping at views'. Treatise: The 'five kinds of grasping at precepts and vows' (五戒禁取, wu jie jin qu), etc., furthermore, according to the perspective of the Sarvastivada school, simply clinging to non-
因以為因者即名戒取。不唯執戒及同時蘊。故但舍云。于非因．道謂因．道見。一切總說名戒禁取。非解脫道妄起道執。理實應立戒禁等取名。略去等言但名戒禁取。
疏。然於一聚至言等亦得者。雖見眷屬而不別計。然戒聚中見最為勝。舉勝等劣而置等言亦無有失。不同小乘而立等字。
論。然有處說至名戒取者。按顯揚論第一云。四見取謂於前三見及見所依蘊。計最勝上及與第一。對法第一云。謂于諸目及所依五取蘊等。隨觀執為最勝。為上為妙。五蘊同之 又顯揚第一云。五戒禁取。謂於前諸見及所依蘊計為清凈解脫出離。對法第一云。于諸戒及戒禁所依五取蘊等。隨觀執為清凈為解脫為出離。五蘊大同。瑜伽第八大意同彼顯揚等說。
論。不爾如何非滅計滅等者。按五十八云。又沙門等謂說現法涅槃論者所有邪見。又有橫計諸邪解脫所有邪見。如是諸見是迷滅諦所起邪見 又云。又彼外道作如是計。我等所行若行若道是真行道。能盡能出一切諸苦。如是亦名迷道邪見。非涅槃法計為涅槃。名非勝計勝。非無漏道實非離苦。計為真道能出於苦。名非凈計凈。
論。如是總別等者。釋如疏．燈。今助一釋言貪等六名之為總。惡見開五名之為別。今雙言之名為總別十煩惱也 或可。疏云若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
如果認為不是原因的事物是原因，就叫做戒取（認為持戒等行為是解脫的原因）。不僅僅是執著于戒律以及同時存在的五蘊，所以只說是『舍』。對於非因、非道的事物，認為是因、是道，這種見解總的來說叫做戒禁取（認為持戒禁等行為是解脫之道）。對於不是解脫之道的事物，錯誤地認為它是道而執著，實際上應該立名為戒禁等取，省略了『等』字，只叫做戒禁取。 疏：然而對於一類事物，乃至說『等』字也可以用，即使看到了眷屬，也不特別計較。然而在戒聚中，見解最為重要。舉出最殊勝的，省略次要的，而省略『等』字也沒有什麼過失。這不同於小乘佛教而設立『等』字。 論：然而有些地方說叫做戒取。按照《顯揚論》第一卷所說，四種見取是指對於前三種見解以及見解所依賴的五蘊，認為是最好、最上以及第一。《對法論》第一卷說，是指對於各種目標以及所依賴的五取蘊等，隨之觀察執著，認為是最好、最上、最妙。五蘊的說法大致相同。另外，《顯揚論》第一卷說，五種戒禁取是指對於前面的各種見解以及所依賴的五蘊，認為是清凈、解脫、出離。《對法論》第一卷說，是指對於各種戒律以及戒禁所依賴的五取蘊等，隨之觀察執著，認為是清凈、解脫、出離。五蘊的說法大致相同。《瑜伽師地論》第八卷的大意與《顯揚論》等所說相同。 論：如果不是這樣，那麼如何解釋把非寂滅的事物認為是寂滅等呢？按照五十八卷所說，有些沙門等宣說現法涅槃論者的所有邪見，還有橫加揣測各種邪解脫的所有邪見。像這樣的各種見解，是迷惑于滅諦所產生的邪見。又說，有些外道這樣認為，我們所修行的，無論是行還是道，都是真正的行道，能夠窮盡、能夠脫離一切諸苦。像這樣也叫做迷惑于道諦的邪見。把不是涅槃的法認為是涅槃，叫做非殊勝認為是殊勝。不是無漏道，實際上不能脫離痛苦，卻認為是真正的道，能夠脫離痛苦，叫做非清凈認為是清凈。 論：像這樣總說和別說等。解釋如同疏和燈所說。現在我再補充一種解釋，貪等六種煩惱叫做總，惡見開出的五種煩惱叫做別。現在一起說，就叫做總別十種煩惱。或者可以這樣理解，疏中說如果
【English Translation】 English version
Considering something that is not a cause as a cause is called 'Śīla-parāmarśa' (clinging to precepts and vows). It's not just clinging to precepts and the co-existing skandhas (aggregates), hence the term 'abandoning'. Regarding what is not a cause or a path as a cause or a path, all such views are generally called 'Śīla-vrata-parāmarśa' (clinging to precepts and vows as the path to liberation). Falsely assuming something that is not the path to liberation as the path, one is actually establishing the name as 'Śīla-vrata-ādi-parāmarśa' (clinging to precepts, vows, etc.), but the 'ādi' (etc.) is omitted, and it's simply called 'Śīla-vrata-parāmarśa'. Commentary: However, regarding a collection of things, even saying 'etc.' is acceptable, even if one sees the retinue but doesn't particularly fixate on them. However, within the collection of precepts, the view is the most important. Mentioning the most superior and omitting the inferior, omitting 'etc.' is also not a mistake. This is different from the Theravada school, which establishes the word 'etc.' Treatise: However, there are places that say it is called 'Śīla-parāmarśa'. According to the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the four kinds of 'view-clinging' refer to considering the previous three views and the skandhas on which the views are based as the best, the highest, and the foremost. The first volume of the Abhidharma says that it refers to observing and clinging to various objects and the five aggregates of clinging on which they are based, considering them as the best, the highest, and the most wonderful. The descriptions of the five aggregates are largely the same. Furthermore, the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the five kinds of 'Śīla-vrata-parāmarśa' refer to considering the previous views and the skandhas on which they are based as pure, liberating, and freeing. The first volume of the Abhidharma says that it refers to observing and clinging to various precepts and the five aggregates of clinging on which the precepts and vows are based, considering them as pure, liberating, and freeing. The descriptions of the five aggregates are largely the same. The main idea of the eighth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is the same as that of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others. Treatise: If it's not like this, then how do you explain considering what is not cessation as cessation, etc.? According to the fifty-eighth volume, some śrāmaṇas (ascetics) and others who preach the doctrine of dṛṣṭadharma-nirvāṇa (nirvana in this life) have all kinds of wrong views. There are also all kinds of wrong views that arbitrarily speculate about various wrong liberations. Such views are wrong views arising from delusion about the truth of cessation (nirodha-satya). It also says that some heretics think like this: 'What we practice, whether it is conduct or the path, is the true conduct and path, which can exhaust and liberate from all sufferings.' Such is also called wrong views deluded about the truth of the path (mārga-satya). Considering what is not nirvāṇa as nirvāṇa is called considering what is not superior as superior. What is not the unconditioned path, and actually cannot liberate from suffering, is considered the true path that can liberate from suffering, which is called considering what is not pure as pure. Treatise: Like this, general and specific, etc. The explanation is like that in the commentary and the lamp. Now I will add another explanation: the six afflictions such as greed are called general, and the five afflictions derived from evil views are called specific. Now, speaking of them together, they are called the ten afflictions, general and specific. Or it can be understood like this: the commentary says if
總若別意亦同此。
疏。謂要不違至我新不常者。假興于難生下引教及世事文。
論。學現觀者起如是怖等者。是八十六．對法第七二論文也。故瑜伽云。又由二緣依止無我勝解之慾。于彼涅槃由驚恐故其心退逐。一由於此欲不善串習未到究竟故。二于作意時由彼因緣念忘失故。當爾之時于諸行中了唯行智其心愚昧。數數思惟我我爾時當何所在。尋求我行微細俱行障礙而轉。由此緣故彼作是思。我當不有。不作是念唯有諸行當來不有。彼由如是隨逐身見為依止故。發生變易隨轉之識。由驚恐故於彼寂滅其心退還 釋曰。雖了唯有諸行無我。由緣行心尚昧劣故。數數思惟我何所在。即思我心能為障礙。便執我無更不念言唯有諸行。故於涅槃而生驚恐 對法論云。俱生邊見者斷見所攝。由此見故於涅槃界。其心退轉生大怖畏。謂我我今者何在耶 然疏中雲八十八者。而有二義。一錯六為八。二舉八等六。六正所引。八中亦有斷見之文。故兼言矣。舉兼顯正不言六也 問引證俱生對法可爾。瑜伽如何 答八十八文如燈已釋。八十六者亦是俱生 何以為明 答論云尋求我行微細俱行。又云彼由如是隨逐身見為依止故。故知俱生。或通二見。尋文可悉 問二論俱生為凡聖起 答俱通凡聖 若爾何故八十六云。複次為
【現代漢語翻譯】 總而言之，如果理解有差異，也與此類似。
疏解：意思是說，要不違背達到『至我』（ātman，真我）的『新不常』（anitya，無常）的道理。這裡借用難以理解的『生』（birth）來引發下文的教義以及世俗之事。
論：學習現觀（abhisamaya，現觀）的人產生這樣的恐懼等，這是《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）第八十六和《對法》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第七十二論文中的內容。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）中說：『又由於兩種原因，依止無我（anātman，非我）的殊勝理解的慾望，對於涅槃（nirvāṇa）由於驚恐而使心退卻。一是由於對此慾望不善於串習，沒有達到究竟的緣故；二是在作意（manasikara，作意）時，由於那些因緣，念頭忘失的緣故。當這個時候，對於諸行（saṃskāra，行）中，只有行智（saṃskāra-jñāna，行之智慧）使心愚昧。數數思惟『我我』（ātman-ātman，我我）爾時當在何所在。尋求我行微細俱行障礙而轉。由此緣故，他作這樣的思考：我當不有。不作這樣的念頭：唯有諸行當來不有。他由於這樣隨逐身見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，有身見）為依止的緣故，發生變易隨轉之識。由於驚恐的緣故，對於那個寂滅，他的心退還。』
解釋說：雖然瞭解只有諸行無我，由於緣行心還昧劣的緣故，數數思惟『我在何所在』。即思惟『我』的心能成為障礙，便執著『我』沒有了，更不念說只有諸行。所以對於涅槃而生驚恐。
《對法論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）說：『俱生邊見（sahaja-antagrāha-dṛṣṭi，俱生邊見）是斷見（uccheda-dṛṣṭi，斷見）所攝。由於這種見解的緣故，對於涅槃界（nirvāṇa-dhātu，涅槃界），他的心退轉，生大怖畏，說『我我』（ātman-ātman，我我）現在在哪裡呀？』
然而疏解中說第八十八，而有兩種意義。一是把六錯寫成八，二是舉八等同於六。六是正所引用的，八中也有斷見的文字，所以兼說了。舉兼顯正，不只說六。
問：引用俱生《對法》（Abhidharma）可以這樣說，那《瑜伽》（Yoga）如何解釋？
答：第八十八文如燈已經解釋了，第八十六也是俱生的。
憑什麼說明？
答：論中說『尋求我行微細俱行』，又說『他由於這樣隨逐身見為依止的緣故』，所以知道是俱生的。或者通於兩種見解，尋文就可以知道。
問：兩種論中的俱生是為凡夫還是聖人而起？
答：都通於凡夫和聖人。
如果是這樣，為什麼第八十六說：複次為...
【English Translation】 In general, if there are different interpretations, they are similar to this.
Commentary: This means that it should not contradict the principle of 'new impermanence' (anitya, impermanence) reaching 'ātman' (ātman, self). Here, the difficult-to-understand 'birth' (birth) is used to introduce the teachings and worldly matters below.
Treatise: Those who study Abhisamaya (abhisamaya, direct realization) develop such fears, etc. This is the content of the eighty-sixth Abhidharma (Abhidharma) and the seventy-second Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) treatises. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says: 'Furthermore, due to two reasons, relying on the desire for the superior understanding of non-self (anātman, no-self), the mind retreats from Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa) due to fear. One is because of not being good at practicing this desire and not reaching the ultimate; the second is that when focusing the mind (manasikara, attention), due to those causes, the thought is forgotten. At this time, regarding all saṃskāras (saṃskāra, formations), only saṃskāra-jñāna (saṃskāra-jñāna, wisdom of formations) makes the mind ignorant. Thinking again and again, 'ātman-ātman' (ātman-ātman, self-self), where will it be at that time? Seeking the subtle co-occurring obstacles of my actions, it turns. For this reason, he thinks like this: I will not exist. He does not think like this: only the saṃskāras will not exist in the future. Because he relies on following the view of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, view of self), the consciousness of change and transformation arises. Due to fear, his mind retreats from that quiescence.'
Explanation: Although it is understood that there are only saṃskāras and no-self, because the mind that conditions the saṃskāras is still ignorant, thinking again and again, 'Where am I?' That is, thinking that the mind of 'I' can become an obstacle, then he clings to the idea that 'I' does not exist, and no longer thinks that there are only saṃskāras. Therefore, he becomes frightened of Nirvāṇa.
The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) says: 'The innate extreme view (sahaja-antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, innate extreme view) is included in the annihilationist view (uccheda-dṛṣṭi, annihilationist view). Because of this view, regarding the realm of Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa-dhātu, realm of Nirvāṇa), his mind retreats, and great fear arises, saying, 'Where is 'ātman-ātman' (ātman-ātman, self-self) now?''
However, the commentary says eighty-eight, but there are two meanings. One is that six is mistakenly written as eight, and the other is that eight is the same as six. Six is what is directly cited, and there are also words of annihilationist view in eight, so it is mentioned together. Mentioning both shows the correct one, not just saying six.
Question: Quoting the innate Abhidharma (Abhidharma) can be said like this, but how to explain Yoga (Yoga)?
Answer: The eighty-eighth text has already been explained like a lamp, and the eighty-sixth is also innate.
What is the proof?
Answer: The treatise says, 'Seeking the subtle co-occurring of my actions,' and also says, 'Because he relies on following the view of self,' so it is known to be innate. Or it applies to both views, and it can be known by examining the text.
Question: Is the innate in the two treatises for ordinary people or sages?
Answer: It applies to both ordinary people and sages.
If so, why does the eighty-sixth say: Furthermore, for...
斷如是驚恐。有二種法多有所作。乃至云。若已引發聖諦現觀。由正見故方得出離。對法復云。今者我我何所在耶。準此瑜伽唯凡所起。對法唯聖 答瑜伽且據斷凡起者 或兼斷彼凡聖起者。聖諦現觀其言通故 又云。由於此欲不善串習未到究竟而起驚恐。即有學聖亦未究竟起亦何失。對法言今我何在者。凡．聖作彼無我解時俱得名今 又解。瑜伽據凡。對法約聖。二解任取應更審思。
論。此十煩惱誰幾相應者。諸論辨此相應不同。今略引之。五十五云。無明與一切。疑都無所有。貪．嗔不相應。此或與慢．見。謂染愛時或高舉或推求。如染愛憎恚亦爾。慢之與見我更相應。謂高舉時邪復推構 五十八云。五見是惠性故互不相應。自性自性不相應故。貪．恚．慢疑更相違故互不相應。貪染令心卑下。憍慢令心高舉。是故貪．慢更互相違 對法第六云。貪不與嗔相應。一向相違法必不俱故。又貪不與疑相應。由惠于境不決定必無染著故。余得相應。如貪嗔亦爾。謂嗔不與貪．慢．見相應。若於此事起憎恚。即不於此生於高舉及推求。與余相應如理應知。慢不與嗔．疑相應。無明有二。相應．不共。不共不與嗔．疑相應。疑不與貪．慢．見相應。會如此論及疏。故不重云。
論疑遮順等者。苦．集由是因依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果像這樣感到驚恐，有兩種法門可以發揮很大的作用。乃至說，如果已經引發了對聖諦（ariya-sacca）的現觀（abhisamaya，直接的理解），那麼通過正見（sammā-diṭṭhi）才能得以解脫。對法（Abhidhamma）又說：『現在，我（atta）在哪裡呢？』按照瑜伽（Yoga）的觀點，這僅僅是凡夫（puthujjana）所產生的。而對法的觀點，則是聖者（ariya）所產生的。回答是：瑜伽的觀點，姑且認為是斷除凡夫所產生的驚恐；或者兼顧斷除凡夫和聖者所產生的驚恐。『聖諦現觀』這個說法是通用的。又說，由於對此慾望沒有好好串習，沒有達到究竟而產生驚恐，即使是有學聖者（sekha-ariya）沒有究竟，又有什麼損失呢？對法所說的『現在，我在哪裡』，凡夫和聖者在作無我（anatta）的理解時，都可以稱為『現在』。另一種解釋是，瑜伽的觀點是針對凡夫，對法的觀點是針對聖者。這兩種解釋可以任選其一，應該更仔細地思考。 論：這十種煩惱（kilesa），哪些和哪些相應呢？各種論典對這種相應的辨析不同。現在簡略地引用一下。《五十五》說：『無明（avijjā）與一切相應，疑（vicikicchā）都無所有，貪（lobha）、嗔（dosa）不相應，貪或許與慢（māna）、見（diṭṭhi）相應。』意思是說，在染愛（rāga）的時候，或許會高舉或者推求。像染愛憎恨（paṭigha）也是這樣。慢和見與我（atta）更加相應，意思是說，在高舉的時候，邪見（micchā-diṭṭhi）又會推求。《五十八》說：『五見（pañca diṭṭhi）是智慧（paññā）的性質，所以互相不相應。自性（sabhāva）和自性不相應。貪、嗔、慢、疑，因為互相違背，所以互相不相應。貪染使心卑下，憍慢使心高舉，所以貪和慢互相違背。』對法第六說：『貪不與嗔相應，因為一向相反的法必定不能同時存在。』又說，貪不與疑相應，因為智慧對於境界不決定，必定沒有染著。其餘的可以相應。像貪嗔也是這樣。意思是說，嗔不與貪、慢、見相應。如果對於這件事產生憎恨，就不會對於這件事產生高舉和推求。與其餘的相應，應該如理地知道。慢不與嗔、疑相應。無明有兩種，相應和不共。不共的不與嗔、疑相應。疑不與貪、慢、見相應。』會合這些論和疏，所以不再重複說明。 論：疑遮順等，苦、集由是因依。
【English Translation】 English version: If one feels such fear, there are two Dharmas that can be of great help. It is even said that if one has already initiated the direct realization (abhisamaya) of the Noble Truths (ariya-sacca), then one can be liberated through Right View (sammā-diṭṭhi). The Abhidhamma (Abhidhamma) also says: 'Now, where is the self (atta)?' According to Yoga, this is only generated by ordinary people (puthujjana). But according to the Abhidhamma, it is generated by the noble ones (ariya). The answer is: Yoga's view is tentatively considered to be the cessation of fear generated by ordinary people; or it also includes the cessation of fear generated by both ordinary people and noble ones. The term 'direct realization of the Noble Truths' is universal. It is also said that because one has not properly cultivated this desire and has not reached the ultimate, one feels fear. Even if a noble one who is still learning (sekha-ariya) has not reached the ultimate, what is the loss? The Abhidhamma says, 'Now, where is the self?' Both ordinary people and noble ones can be called 'now' when they understand non-self (anatta). Another explanation is that Yoga's view is for ordinary people, and the Abhidhamma's view is for noble ones. Either of these two explanations can be chosen, and should be considered more carefully. Question: Which of these ten afflictions (kilesa) are compatible with each other? The analysis of this compatibility varies in different treatises. Now, let me briefly quote some. 'Fifty-five' says: 'Ignorance (avijjā) is compatible with everything, doubt (vicikicchā) has nothing, greed (lobha) and hatred (dosa) are not compatible, greed may be compatible with pride (māna) and views (diṭṭhi).' This means that when there is attachment (rāga), one may be arrogant or seek. The same is true for attachment and aversion (paṭigha). Pride and views are more compatible with the self (atta), meaning that when one is arrogant, wrong views (micchā-diṭṭhi) will seek. 'Fifty-eight' says: 'The five views (pañca diṭṭhi) are the nature of wisdom (paññā), so they are not compatible with each other. Self-nature (sabhāva) and self-nature are not compatible. Greed, hatred, pride, and doubt are incompatible with each other because they contradict each other. Greed makes the mind humble, and pride makes the mind arrogant, so greed and pride contradict each other.' The sixth of the Abhidhamma says: 'Greed is not compatible with hatred, because laws that are always opposite cannot exist at the same time.' It also says that greed is not compatible with doubt, because wisdom is not determined by the realm, and there must be no attachment. The rest can be compatible. The same is true for greed and hatred. This means that hatred is not compatible with greed, pride, and views. If one has hatred for this matter, one will not be arrogant or seek for this matter. It should be known that it is compatible with the rest as it should be. Pride is not compatible with hatred and doubt. There are two kinds of ignorance, compatible and incompatible. The incompatible is not compatible with hatred and doubt. Doubt is not compatible with greed, pride, and views.' Combining these treatises and commentaries, I will not repeat them. Question: Doubt obstructs compliance, etc. Suffering (dukkha) and accumulation (samudaya) are the causes and conditions.
處故有情染著。疑有不嗔滅．道是彼怖畏處故有情不愛。疑有便恚。疑無翻此理可準知。
論。此與三見或得相應等者。有義分別身．邊二見而與嗔俱。由俱生者唯無記性嗔唯不善故非彼俱。論云苦蘊但于善趣有苦受俱名有苦蘊。疏說苦處又通二見。此定不然 詳曰。乍觀疏文誠如所存。細尋其理理即無違 無違理何 答有苦之處即名苦處。誰云要在三塗苦處 又下二見五受俱門。初師三塗有分別惑。今依彼說亦不相違 此通下言顯此論中明極苦處通有分別．俱生二惑故指如下。非說俱生．分別二見皆與嗔俱。由此苦處分別二見嗔俱無妨。若不爾者更有何義云如下耶。
論。五識唯三等者。問稱量．推求五識無有說見慢無。第七應爾 答稱量解慢七同五無 所恃慢生故七許有。見義準知 問五見斷惑六引得生。慢等由他五亦應起 答行不違．違故起．不起。
論。貪嗔癡三至五受俱者。五十九中。分別貪等樂等相應別別作法。即此論云貪會違緣嗔遇順境略已攝彼。余準可尋。故不引也。
論。欲無苦等者。有義簡薩婆多欲疑唯憂。故顯宗二十七云。何緣二疑俱不決定而上得與喜．樂相應。非欲界疑與喜俱起。以諸煩惱在離欲地。雖不決定亦不憂滅。雖壞疑網無癡情怡。如在人間求得所愛。雖
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
問：因為有情眾生執著於事物，所以產生染污。懷疑沒有嗔恨之心就能滅除染污嗎？（外道認為）道是由於害怕某些事物，所以有情眾生不喜愛它們。懷疑有（怖畏處）就會產生嗔恨。懷疑沒有（怖畏處）則反之，這個道理可以類推得知。 論：『此與三見或得相應等者』，有人認為，分別生起的『身見』（Satkayadristi，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）和『邊見』（Antagrahadristi，執著于斷常二邊的極端見解）可以與嗔恨同時生起。因為俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）的嗔恨只有無記性（不善不惡的性質），而嗔恨本身是不善的，所以它們不能同時生起。論中說，『苦蘊』（Dukkha-skandha，苦受聚集）只有在善趣（Sugati，好的去處）中與苦受同時生起時，才能稱為『苦蘊』。疏文中說，『苦處』（Dukkha-ayatana，產生痛苦的處所）也包括了兩種見解。這種說法肯定是不對的。詳細地說，乍一看疏文似乎是正確的，但仔細研究其道理，就會發現並沒有矛盾之處。沒有矛盾的道理是什麼呢？回答是，有苦的地方就叫做苦處，誰說一定要在三惡道（Tiryak-yoni，畜生道；Preta-yoni，餓鬼道；Naraka-yoni，地獄道）的苦處才算呢？而且，在『下二見五受俱門』（關於下兩種見解與五種感受同時生起的情況）中，最初的說法是三惡道中有分別的迷惑。現在按照他的說法，也沒有什麼矛盾。這裡說『此通下言』，是爲了表明此論中說明極苦之處，既有分別的迷惑，也有俱生的迷惑，所以才指出了下面的內容。並不是說俱生的和分別的兩種見解都與嗔恨同時生起。因此，苦處與分別的兩種見解和嗔恨同時生起是沒有問題的。如果不是這樣，又有什麼意義說『如下』呢？ 論：『五識唯三等者』，問：稱量、推求，五識（Panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）沒有，（為什麼）說見、慢沒有？第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）也應該如此。答：稱量、理解，慢，第七識與五識相同，沒有。因為依靠慢才能產生，所以第七識允許有慢。見解的道理可以類推得知。問：五種見解（五利使，五種根本煩惱中的見惑部分）斷除迷惑，第六識（意識，Mano-vijnana）引導產生。慢等依靠其他（識）才能產生，五識也應該如此。答：行為不違背（規律），所以產生；違背（規律），所以不產生。 論：『貪嗔癡三至五受俱者』，在五十九種情況中，分別的貪等與樂等相應，分別地進行處理。此論說，貪遇到違逆的因緣，嗔遇到順境，已經概括了它們。其餘的可以類推得知，所以不再引用。 論：『欲無苦等者』，有人認為，簡別薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的觀點，（認為）欲界的懷疑只有憂愁。所以《顯宗論》（Abhidharmakosabhasyam，俱舍論）第二十七卷說：『為什麼兩種懷疑都不能決定，而上面的（色界和無色界）卻可以與喜、樂相應？』因為欲界的懷疑不能與喜同時生起。因為各種煩惱在遠離慾望的境界中，即使不能決定，也不會憂愁滅除。即使破壞了懷疑之網，也沒有愚癡的情感。就像在人間求得所愛一樣，雖然...
【English Translation】 English version:
Question: Because sentient beings are attached to things, defilements arise. Is it suspected that defilements can be extinguished without hatred? (Externalists believe that) the path is because sentient beings fear certain things, so they do not like them. It is suspected that hatred arises if there is (a place of fear). It is suspected that if there is no (place of fear), then the opposite is true, and this principle can be inferred. Treatise: 'This and the three views may be in accordance, etc.' Some argue that the 'view of self' (Satkayadristi, the view that the aggregate of the five skandhas is a real self) and the 'extreme view' (Antagrahadristi, the attachment to the extreme views of permanence and annihilation) that arise separately can arise simultaneously with anger. Because innate (Sahaja, inborn) anger is only of an indeterminate nature (neither good nor bad), and anger itself is unwholesome, they cannot arise simultaneously. The treatise says that the 'aggregate of suffering' (Dukkha-skandha, the accumulation of suffering) can only be called the 'aggregate of suffering' when it arises simultaneously with suffering in the good realms (Sugati, good destinations). The commentary says that the 'place of suffering' (Dukkha-ayatana, the place where suffering arises) also includes the two views. This statement is definitely incorrect. In detail, at first glance, the commentary seems correct, but upon careful study of its principles, it is found that there is no contradiction. What is the principle of no contradiction? The answer is that a place of suffering is called a place of suffering. Who says that it must be in the three evil realms (Tiryak-yoni, animal realm; Preta-yoni, hungry ghost realm; Naraka-yoni, hell realm) to be considered a place of suffering? Moreover, in the 'section on the simultaneous arising of the lower two views and the five feelings' (regarding the simultaneous arising of the lower two views and the five feelings), the initial statement is that there are separate delusions in the three evil realms. Now, according to his statement, there is no contradiction. The statement 'this includes the following words' is to indicate that this treatise explains that the place of extreme suffering includes both separate and innate delusions, so it points out the following content. It is not saying that both innate and separate views arise simultaneously with anger. Therefore, there is no problem with the place of suffering and the separate two views arising simultaneously with anger. If this is not the case, what is the meaning of saying 'as follows'? Treatise: 'The three of greed, hatred, and delusion are associated with the five feelings, etc.' In the fifty-nine cases, separate greed, etc., are associated with pleasure, etc., and are dealt with separately. This treatise says that greed encounters adverse conditions, and hatred encounters favorable conditions, which has already summarized them. The rest can be inferred, so it is no longer quoted. Treatise: 'Desire has no suffering, etc.' Some argue that, distinguishing the views of the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'Doctrine That All Exists' school), doubt in the desire realm is only sorrowful. Therefore, the twenty-seventh volume of the Abhidharmakosabhasyam (Abhidharmakosabhasyam, Treasury of Metaphysics) says: 'Why can't the two doubts be determined, while the upper (form and formless realms) can be associated with joy and pleasure?' Because doubt in the desire realm cannot arise simultaneously with joy. Because various afflictions are in the realm of detachment from desire, even if they cannot be determined, sorrow will not be extinguished. Even if the net of doubt is destroyed, there is no foolish emotion. Just like obtaining what is loved in the human realm, although...
多勞倦而生樂想。疏說上界不如欲疑有喜受者。欲似不得此中文意。上地何故不與喜俱 詳曰。疏意說云疑無苦果方與喜俱。上無此疑。由上無造彼惡行故。故疑苦無方喜俱者。但在欲界不障上界疑得喜俱。下粗相中疏言上界疑有喜故。自義既立他計便遮。不言成矣。此自不得疏之本意。非疏不得論之意也。
論。二取至憂相應者。五十九云。見取．戒取取彼見故。隨其所應如彼相應者。如彼身．邊二見相應所有受說。
論。此依實義等者 問所依教何。何意須有粗．細二說 答委曲而談名為實義。即五十九。梗概而說名為粗相。即五十五．對法第七。故五十九結十煩惱受相應云。先辨煩惱諸根相應。但約粗相道理建立。令初行者解無亂故。今即約鉅細道理建立。令之行者了自他身種種行解差別轉故。
論。貪癡俱樂等者。對法具明。大意疏中而以牒訖。然明意識舍相應云。在意識身舍相應者。在一切處於相續未位 釋曰。由樂．喜．舍通第六識。六識樂．喜未位之時而亦有舍。故云一切未位等也 又云。疑于欲界非喜相應者。不決定心若未息滅喜不生故 又云。何故煩惱皆舍相應。以一切煩惱隨中庸位方息沒故。所以者何。煩惱生起展轉相續漸漸微薄勢力將盡隨處中位。於此位中必舍相應。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 應在辛勤勞作中產生快樂的想法。如果有人懷疑上界（指色界和無色界）不如欲界（指六慾天）快樂，是因為他們認為上界可能沒有能感受到快樂的眾生。這種認為欲界更快樂的想法，似乎是因為欲界眾生不容易獲得快樂。那麼，為什麼上界的眾生不能與快樂同在呢？ 詳細解釋說，這種懷疑是因為認為只有沒有痛苦結果的地方才能與快樂同在。而上界沒有這種懷疑，因為上界的眾生不會造作惡行。因此，認為只有懷疑沒有痛苦才能與快樂同在的想法，只存在於欲界。這種懷疑並不能阻礙上界獲得快樂。在粗略的表相中，疏文說上界懷疑有快樂。這種說法既確立了自己的觀點，也反駁了其他的觀點，不需要再多加解釋。這實際上是沒有理解疏文的本意，而不是疏文沒有理解論的本意。
論：『二取與憂相應』，在《五十九》中說：『見取（認為錯誤的見解是正確的）和戒取（認為錯誤的戒律是正確的）是因為執取了那些錯誤的見解。』根據情況，它們與憂相應，就像身見（認為身體是真實存在的）和邊見（認為存在永恒或斷滅的極端）這兩種見解所相應的感受一樣。
論：『這依據的是真實的意義』。問：所依據的教義是什麼？為什麼需要有粗略和細緻兩種說法？答：詳細地談論稱為真實的意義，即《五十九》所說的。概括地談論稱為粗略的表相，即《五十五》和《對法第七》所說的。因此，《五十九》總結說，十種煩惱與感受相應，只是根據粗略的表相來建立道理，爲了讓初學者理解時不會產生混亂。現在是根據細緻的道理來建立，爲了讓修行者瞭解自己和他人的種種行為和理解的差別。
論：『貪和癡一起出現』，《對法》中有詳細說明，大意已經在疏文中引用完畢。然而，關於意識與舍受相應，疏文說：『在意識身中，舍受相應，存在於一切處於相續未位的狀態。』解釋說：由於樂受、喜受和舍受都與第六意識相通，因此在第六意識的樂受和喜受未生起的時候，也會有舍受，所以說『一切未位』等等。又說：『懷疑在欲界與喜受不相應』，因為不決定的心如果還沒有止息，喜受就不會產生。又說：『為什麼煩惱都與舍受相應？』因為一切煩惱隨著中庸的狀態才會止息。原因是什麼呢？煩惱生起、逐漸相續、漸漸微弱、勢力將盡，隨處處於中庸的狀態，在這個狀態中必然與舍受相應。
【English Translation】 English version One should generate thoughts of joy from diligent labor. The commentary explains that the upper realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm) are not as enjoyable as the Desire Realm (referring to the Six Desire Heavens) because there's a suspicion that there might not be beings in the upper realms who can experience joy. This idea that the Desire Realm is more enjoyable seems to stem from the difficulty Desire Realm beings have in attaining joy. So, why can't beings in the upper realms coexist with joy? The detailed explanation says that this suspicion arises from the belief that only places without painful consequences can coexist with joy. The upper realms don't have this suspicion because beings in the upper realms don't create evil deeds. Therefore, the idea that only the absence of suffering allows for joy only exists in the Desire Realm. This suspicion doesn't hinder the upper realms from attaining joy. In a rough appearance, the commentary says that the upper realms suspect having joy. This statement both establishes its own view and refutes other views, requiring no further explanation. This actually misunderstands the commentary's original intention, rather than the commentary misunderstanding the treatise's intention.
Treatise: 'The two attachments are associated with sorrow.' In the 'Fifty-ninth,' it says: 'Grasping at views (believing incorrect views to be correct) and grasping at precepts (believing incorrect precepts to be correct) are because of clinging to those incorrect views.' Depending on the situation, they are associated with sorrow, just like the feelings associated with the views of self (believing the body to be real) and extreme views (believing in eternalism or annihilationism).'
Treatise: 'This is based on the real meaning.' Question: What is the teaching it is based on? Why is it necessary to have both rough and detailed explanations? Answer: Talking about it in detail is called the real meaning, which is what is said in the 'Fifty-ninth.' Talking about it in a general way is called the rough appearance, which is what is said in the 'Fifty-fifth' and 'Against the Dharma Seventh.' Therefore, the 'Fifty-ninth' concludes that the ten afflictions are associated with feelings, but only establishes the principle based on the rough appearance, so that beginners won't be confused when understanding. Now it is established based on the detailed principle, so that practitioners can understand the differences in their own and others' actions and understandings.
Treatise: 'Greed and delusion arise together.' The 'Against the Dharma' has a detailed explanation, the main idea of which has already been quoted in the commentary. However, regarding the consciousness being associated with neutral feeling, the commentary says: 'In the body of consciousness, neutral feeling is associated, existing in all states that are not yet in the continuum.' The explanation says: Since pleasant feeling, joyful feeling, and neutral feeling are all connected to the sixth consciousness, there will also be neutral feeling when the pleasant feeling and joyful feeling of the sixth consciousness have not yet arisen, so it says 'all states that are not yet' and so on. It also says: 'Suspecting that in the Desire Realm it is not associated with joyful feeling,' because if the undecided mind has not yet ceased, joyful feeling will not arise. It also says: 'Why are all afflictions associated with neutral feeling?' Because all afflictions cease with the state of equanimity. What is the reason? Afflictions arise, gradually continue, gradually weaken, and their power is about to end, being in a state of equanimity everywhere, and in this state they are necessarily associated with neutral feeling.
論。當知俱生身邊二見等者 問何以知然 答按五十八云。複次俱生薩迦耶見唯無記性。數現行故。非極損惱自他處故。彼雖不說俱生邊見。理同我見亦無記性。
疏。若如后解至體有九品故者。此有二意。一顯后非。如色界等煩惱無記。體有九品九品別斷。我見九品何一品除。除既一品明無九類 二明後是。如上界惑體雖無記得有九品。我見九品亦復何違。又今疏斷且隨一相。疏上下文皆以九品為類說也。
疏。無有染污至方自在故者。必無慾染第九品在。能入根本起未至惑。要欲染盡入根本定。方容起彼未至惑也。
疏。由是至亦不能起者。不能起彼未至定惑 問得本定已未至定惑為實起不 答有兩釋。一許得起 若爾何故六十二。云下地諸法若生上地不現在前 答異地不爾。同地容起。未至亦是初禪攝故。又下地身得初根本起未至惑亦復無違 二不得起。無所須故。得勝舍劣故 若爾畢竟無有起義何用有為 答如三無色得有見道無漏第八餘九地有。雖無起義地法得有。此亦應然。任情取捨。然多許起。
疏。唯定非生煩惱等者。潤生時起名生煩惱。惑生彼地所起之者亦名生惑。非今所說。除此余時但緣定起皆名定生。如遍常見因定後起名定煩惱。余準此知 然疏說云。如遍常者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：應當知道俱生薩迦耶見（與生俱來的認為「我」存在的錯誤觀念）和俱生邊見（與生俱來的認為事物是極端對立的錯誤觀念）等等—— 問：憑什麼知道是這樣呢？ 答：根據第五十八卷所說：『其次，俱生薩迦耶見只有無記性（非善非惡的性質），因為它經常現行，而且不會嚴重損害自己或他人。』雖然那裡沒有說俱生邊見，但道理與我見相同，也是無記性。
疏：如果像後面的解釋那樣，直到『體有九品』的緣故——這裡有兩種意思。一是顯示後面的說法不對。像**等煩惱是無記性，體有九品，九品分別斷除。我見的九品，要如何斷除其中一品呢？既然斷除只有一品，就說明沒有九類。二是說明後面的說法是對的。像上界的迷惑，體雖然是無記性，但有九品。我見的九品，又有什麼相違背的呢？而且現在的疏文判斷，只是隨順一種相狀。疏文的上下文都是以九品作為類別來說的。
疏：沒有染污，直到『方自在』的緣故——必定沒有欲染的第九品存在。能夠進入根本定，才能生起未至定的迷惑。一定要欲染斷盡，進入根本定，才可能生起那未至定的迷惑。
疏：由此，直到『也不能起』——不能生起那未至定的迷惑。 問：得到本定之後，未至定的迷惑是實際生起還是不生起呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一是允許生起。如果這樣，為什麼《六十二見經》說：『下地的諸法如果生到上地，就不會現在前』？答：不同地的情況不是這樣。同一地的情況可以生起。未至定也是初禪所攝。而且下地身得到初禪根本定，生起未至定的迷惑也沒有相違背。二是不得生起。因為沒有需要，得到殊勝的就捨棄低劣的。如果這樣，畢竟沒有生起的意義，為什麼要有為呢？答：就像三無色界得到有見道的無漏第八定，其餘九地也有。雖然沒有生起的意義，但地法可以有。這裡也應該這樣。可以隨意取捨。但多數允許生起。
疏：只有定，不是生煩惱等——潤生時生起的，叫做生煩惱。迷惑生在那個地所生起的，也叫生惑。不是現在所說的。除了這些以外，只是緣定生起的，都叫定生。像普遍的常見，因為定後生起，叫做定煩惱。其餘的可以依此類推。然而疏文說：『像普遍的常見』——
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: It should be known that the co-arisen Sakkaya-ditthi (the inherent misconception of 'self' or 'I') and co-arisen bhava-ditthi (the inherent misconception of extremes) etc. -- Question: How is this known? Answer: According to the fifty-eighth skandha, 'Furthermore, co-arisen Sakkaya-ditthi is only of indeterminate nature (avyākrta), because it frequently manifests and does not severely harm oneself or others.' Although it does not mention co-arisen bhava-ditthi, the principle is the same as Sakkaya-ditthi; it is also of indeterminate nature.
Commentary: If it is like the later explanation, up to 'because the substance has nine grades' -- there are two meanings here. One is to show that the later view is incorrect. Like ** and other afflictions are of indeterminate nature, the substance has nine grades, and the nine grades are separately eliminated. How can one eliminate one grade of the nine grades of Sakkaya-ditthi? Since only one grade is eliminated, it shows that there are not nine categories. The second is to show that the later view is correct. Like the delusions of the upper realms, although the substance is of indeterminate nature, it has nine grades. What contradicts the nine grades of Sakkaya-ditthi? Moreover, the current commentary's judgment is only in accordance with one aspect. The context of the commentary all uses nine grades as categories to explain.
Commentary: There is no defilement, up to 'then one is free' -- there must be no ninth grade of desire-realm defilement present. To be able to enter the fundamental samadhi, one must generate the afflictions of the upacāra samādhi. One must exhaust desire-realm defilement and enter the fundamental samadhi to be able to generate those afflictions of the upacāra samādhi.
Commentary: Therefore, up to 'also cannot arise' -- cannot generate those afflictions of the upacāra samādhi. Question: After attaining the fundamental samadhi, do the afflictions of the upacāra samādhi actually arise or not? Answer: There are two explanations. One is to allow them to arise. If so, why does the Sixty-two Views Sutra say, 'If the dharmas of the lower realms arise in the upper realms, they will not manifest'? Answer: It is not so in different realms. It is possible to arise in the same realm. Upacāra samādhi is also included in the first dhyana. Moreover, there is no contradiction in the lower-realm body attaining the fundamental samadhi of the first dhyana and generating the afflictions of the upacāra samādhi. The second is that they cannot arise, because there is no need, and one abandons the inferior for the superior. If so, there is ultimately no meaning in arising, so why have it? Answer: It is like the three formless realms attaining the eighth samadhi of the path of seeing, and the other nine realms also have it. Although there is no meaning in arising, the realm's dharma can have it. It should be like this here as well. One can choose to accept or reject it as one pleases. However, most allow it to arise.
Commentary: Only samadhi, not the arising of afflictions etc. -- What arises at the time of rebirth is called the arising of afflictions. What arises in that realm due to delusion is also called the arising of delusion. This is not what is being discussed now. Apart from these, what arises solely from samadhi is called samadhi-born. Like the pervasive view of permanence, because it arises after samadhi, it is called samadhi-born affliction. The rest can be inferred accordingly. However, the commentary says, 'Like the pervasive view of permanence' --
乍觀似證生煩惱也。理證定惑。
論。諸有漏道雖不能伏分別惑等者 問下第九云。資糧．加行能伏分別。二位豈非有漏道耶 答后約菩薩。今據二乘．及外道等 有義二釋。初義同前。二云后據理觀。今依事觀。有漏六行名為事觀。觀無我等名為理觀。又分別惑有迷事者。世道亦伏。能障定故。論約迷理說不伏言。若不伏者俱生應然。俱迷事故。若見事惑見理惑引故不伏者。應修事惑修理惑引同彼不伏。又見事惑散亂粗動逾于俱生。障定應勝。何乃不伏。故知論中且據迷理言不伏也。
祥曰。理恐未然。修惑為例有相符失。故瑜伽論五十八云。若諸異生離欲界欲惑色界欲。但由修道無有見道。彼于欲界得離欲時。貪慾．瞋恚．及彼隨法鄰近憍慢。若諸煩惱相應無明。不現行故皆說名斷。唯言貪等鄰近之法異生斷之。不說見等鄰近之法彼亦能斷。故知世道不能伏彼迷理所引所有事惑。不爾何意瑜伽不說。修道既然見惑定爾。豈不相符。然審詳諸。
疏。今解亦斷等者。有義難云。未伏說斷。次第之人應于見道亦斷彼故。亦不可說先伏助伴。論說俱生微細難斷修道位方除。說見道除理將未可。由彼微細不障見故。而自救云。次第之人道依未至。由道劣故不能斷修。超越之人根本入故。云隨所伏皆能永
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：乍一看好像是產生了煩惱。用理證才能確定疑惑。
論：所有有漏道雖然不能降伏分別惑等等。問：在下文第九卷中說，資糧位和加行位能夠降伏分別惑。這兩個位次難道不是有漏道嗎？答：下文指的是菩薩。現在說的是二乘（聲聞、緣覺）以及外道等等。有一種解釋分為兩種。第一種解釋和前面相同。第二種解釋說，下文指的是理觀，現在指的是事觀。有漏的六行名為事觀，觀察無我等等名為理觀。而且分別惑中有迷惑於事相的，世間道也能降伏，因為它能障礙禪定。論中是針對迷惑于理體的情況說不能降伏。如果不能降伏，俱生惑也應該如此，因為它們都迷惑於事相。如果說見事惑是由見理惑引導的，所以不能降伏，那麼修事惑也應該由修理惑引導，和見事惑一樣不能降伏。而且見事惑散亂粗動，超過俱生惑，應該更能障礙禪定，為什麼反而不能降伏呢？所以要知道論中只是針對迷惑于理體的情況說不能降伏。
祥曰：這種說法恐怕不對。以修惑為例，有不相符的缺失。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說，如果異生離開了欲界的欲惑，只是通過修道，沒有通過見道，那麼他在欲界獲得離欲時，貪慾、瞋恚以及與它們相關的鄰近的憍慢，如果這些煩惱與無明相應，因為不現行，所以都稱為斷。只是說貪慾等鄰近的法，異生能夠斷除，沒有說見惑等鄰近的法，他們也能斷除。所以要知道世間道不能降伏那些由迷惑于理體所引發的所有事惑。否則，《瑜伽師地論》為什麼不說呢？修道既然如此，見惑肯定也是這樣，難道不相符嗎？然而仔細審查各種說法。
疏：現在解釋『也斷』等等。有一種觀點提出疑問說，在沒有降伏的情況下就說斷除，那麼次第修證的人應該在見道時也斷除這些惑。也不能說先降伏助伴，論中說俱生惑微細難以斷除，要到修道位才能除掉，說見道能除掉，這個道理恐怕還不能成立，因為它們微細，不障礙見道。而自己辯解說，次第修證的人所依止的道是未至定，因為道力弱，所以不能斷除修惑。超越修證的人根本入定，所以說隨所降伏的都能永遠斷除。
【English Translation】 English version: At first glance, it seems to generate afflictions. Only through logical reasoning can doubts be settled.
Treatise: Although all contaminated paths cannot subdue the afflictions of discrimination, etc. Question: In the ninth section below, it says that the stages of accumulation and application can subdue discrimination. Are these two stages not contaminated paths? Answer: The following refers to Bodhisattvas. The present refers to the two vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas) and externalists, etc. One interpretation is divided into two. The first interpretation is the same as before. The second says that the following refers to the contemplation of principle (理觀, lǐ guān), while the present refers to the contemplation of phenomena (事觀, shì guān). The six contaminated practices are called the contemplation of phenomena, while observing no-self, etc., is called the contemplation of principle. Moreover, among the afflictions of discrimination, there are those who are deluded about phenomena, which the worldly path can also subdue because it can obstruct meditation. The treatise speaks of non-subdual in the case of delusion about principle. If it cannot be subdued, then co-arisen afflictions should also be the same, because they are all deluded about phenomena. If it is said that afflictions of seeing phenomena are guided by afflictions of seeing principle, so they cannot be subdued, then afflictions of cultivating phenomena should also be guided by afflictions of cultivating principle, and like afflictions of seeing phenomena, they cannot be subdued. Moreover, afflictions of seeing phenomena are scattered, coarse, and agitated, surpassing co-arisen afflictions, and should be more obstructive to meditation. Why then can they not be subdued? Therefore, it should be known that the treatise only speaks of non-subdual in the case of delusion about principle.
Xiang said: This statement is probably not correct. Taking afflictions of cultivation as an example, there is a discrepancy. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 58, says, 'If ordinary beings leave the desire-realm desire-afflictions, but only through the path of cultivation, without the path of seeing, then when they attain detachment from desire in the desire realm, greed, hatred, and the related nearby arrogance, if these afflictions are associated with ignorance, because they do not manifest, they are all called severed. It is only said that ordinary beings can sever greed, etc., the nearby dharmas, but it is not said that they can also sever afflictions of seeing, etc., the nearby dharmas.' Therefore, it should be known that the worldly path cannot subdue all the afflictions of phenomena that are caused by delusion about principle. Otherwise, why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra not say so? Since the path of cultivation is like this, afflictions of seeing must also be like this. Is it not consistent? However, carefully examine the various statements.
Commentary: Now explaining 'also severed', etc. One view raises the question, saying that to speak of severance without subduing, then those who cultivate in sequence should also sever these afflictions in the path of seeing. It cannot be said that the assistants are subdued first, as the treatise says that co-arisen afflictions are subtle and difficult to sever, and can only be removed in the stage of cultivation. The principle that the path of seeing can remove them is probably not yet established, because they are subtle and do not obstruct the path of seeing. And they defend themselves by saying that those who cultivate in sequence rely on the path of the unarrived meditation (未至定, wèizhì dìng), and because the power of the path is weak, they cannot sever the afflictions of cultivation. Those who cultivate by transcending enter fundamental meditation (根本入定, gēnběn rùdìng), so it is said that whatever is subdued can be permanently severed.
斷 詳曰。若以未至而以釋難恐未除。次第不還能依未至斷修惑故。若云我依見道說者。菩薩見道依根本定亦應斷修。若云但據小聖說者。超初果人慾六品惑應不能除。依未至故。若云曾伏故能斷者。此即由伏．不伏有殊。何關根本．未至依別。由斯伴伏見斷何失。論云修除據次第者。然依定敘其理亦通。據伴以明而為勝也。思可知矣。
疏。若爾見惑至為起不起者。義燈第六心相起中敘有兩釋。今觀瑜伽五十八文應許得起。故彼論云。由彼諸惑住此身中。從定起已有時現行。非生上者彼復現起 釋曰。彼前未斷見道之惑。身在下地而得起之。若生上已。下地見惑而不起也。準斯文意許起應善更思。
論。生第四定中有中者。此即經文。大小乘論解之各別。大乘．經部許天中有轉生地獄。有宗不爾。故對法雲。或時移轉者。謂於此位往餘生處強緣現前。如得第四靜慮起阿羅漢增上慢比丘。彼地中有生時。由謗解脫邪見故。轉生地獄 經部師者。婆沙論云。譬喻者說中有可轉。以一切業皆可轉故 有宗計者。如婆沙論六十九云。問若中有于界不轉。無聞苾芻事云何通。彼佛法中適出家已。修世俗定初靜慮時謂得初果。乃至第四謂得阿羅漢。起增上慢未得謂得。彼命終時第四靜慮中有現前。便作是念。一切系
縛我已永盡。應般涅槃更無生處。何緣有此中有現前。遂起邪見撥無解脫。由謗見力彼中有滅。無間地獄中有現前生無間獄。答住本有時有此移轉。非中有位。謂彼將死由業勢力。第四靜慮生相現前。故起邪見生無間獄。
論。而言生上不起下等者。按瑜伽論五十八云。諸煩惱纏未離自地煩惱欲者自地現起。已離欲者即不現起。若在下地上地諸纏亦得成就。非在上地得說成就下地諸纏 又六十二云。下地諸法若生上地不現在前。上地諸法若生下地。其離欲者或現在前。有違此文故論通也 問言多分者為據時言。為約惑數 答理該於二 問時即何然。若約惑說如何前言皆容現前。復幾不起 答起通見．脩名為皆也。起數增減略有三種。一云起三。謂邪見．貪．及俱無明。二云起六。如疏所明。三云起十。故論標云下地諸惑分別．俱生皆容現起 有義斷云。于第二說然更推求起五為勝。除我見一。不見世間執他地法以為我故。故分別見非緣他地。當生處色尚未起故。潤生之愛緣當生處增上果生。既唯迷事亦不可說與理惑俱 詳曰。潤生我見據總緣說。又此潤位非一剎那。理．事二惑前後間起。而言潤生迷增上果。據彼愛境正潤位說。理應無爽。樞要．燈中有此意也。故五．六釋取捨任情。
論。下地煩惱亦緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：既然我已經永遠斷絕了束縛，應該進入涅槃，不再有輪迴轉生之處，為什麼還會有中陰身顯現呢？因此產生邪見，否定解脫，由於這種誹謗的邪見的力量，中陰身就消失了，緊接著無間地獄的中陰身就顯現，直接墮入無間地獄。答：這是因為他原本所處的境界中有這種轉變的因素，而不是在中陰身階段發生的。這是說，那個人臨死的時候，由於業力的作用，第四禪定的境界顯現，因此產生了邪見，墮入無間地獄。
論：關於『生到更高的境界就不會再產生較低境界的煩惱』的說法，根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷的說法，各種煩惱纏縛，如果還沒有斷離自己所在境界的煩惱慾望，那麼自己所在境界的煩惱就會顯現；如果已經斷離了慾望，就不會再顯現。如果在較低的境界，較高的境界的各種纏縛也可以成就；但是在較高的境界，就不能說成就較低境界的各種纏縛。另外，第六十二卷說，較低境界的各種法，如果生到較高的境界，就不會再顯現；較高境界的各種法，如果生到較低的境界，那些已經斷離慾望的人，或者會再次顯現。因為有與此相違背的經文，所以本論的解釋是通用的。
問：『多分』是指時間上的多數，還是指迷惑的數量？答：道理上兩者都包括。問：時間上是指什麼呢？如果從迷惑的數量來說，為什麼前面說各種迷惑都可能顯現呢？又有多少不會顯現呢？答：『起』包括見惑和修惑，『皆』是都的意思。生起的數量增減大概有三種說法。第一種說法是生起三種，即邪見、貪慾和俱生無明。第二種說法是生起六種，如疏中所說。第三種說法是生起十種，所以本論標明說，較低境界的各種迷惑，分別生起和俱生生起的都可能顯現。有一種解釋認為，在第二種說法的基礎上，再進一步推求，認為生起五種更為合適，去除我見一種。因為世間上沒有人會執著其他境界的法為我，所以分別生起的見惑不會緣于其他境界，因為將要出生的境界的色法還沒有生起。潤生的愛緣于將要出生的境界的增上果而生起，既然只是迷惑於事相，也就不能說是與理惑同時生起。
詳細地說，潤生和我見是就總的緣起而言的。而且這種潤生的階段不是一剎那，理惑和事惑是前後相間生起的。說潤生迷惑于增上果，是就那個愛所緣的境界，在正潤生的時候說的，道理上應該沒有衝突。《樞要》、《燈中》有這個意思。所以五種和六種的解釋，取捨可以根據情況而定。
論：較低境界的煩惱也可以緣于...
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Since my bonds have been completely severed, and I should enter Nirvana with no further rebirth, why does the intermediate state (Antarabhava) still appear? Consequently, one develops wrong views, denying liberation. Due to the power of this slanderous view, the intermediate state vanishes, and immediately the intermediate state of Avici Hell appears, leading directly to Avici Hell. Answer: This is because there was a potential for this transformation in the original state, not something that occurs in the intermediate state. It means that when that person was dying, due to the force of karma, the state of the Fourth Dhyana (Fourth Meditation) appeared, leading to the development of wrong views and descent into Avici Hell.
Treatise: Regarding the statement 'One who is born in a higher realm will no longer generate afflictions of a lower realm,' according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), Volume 58, if the entanglements of afflictions have not been separated from the desire for afflictions in one's own realm, then the afflictions of one's own realm will arise. If one has already separated from desire, then they will not arise. If one is in a lower realm, the entanglements of higher realms can also be achieved; however, in a higher realm, it cannot be said that the entanglements of lower realms are achieved. Furthermore, Volume 62 states that if the dharmas (phenomena) of a lower realm are born in a higher realm, they will not manifest. If the dharmas of a higher realm are born in a lower realm, those who have separated from desire may or may not manifest them. Because there are texts that contradict this, the interpretation of this treatise is universal.
Question: Does 'mostly' refer to the majority of time or the majority of afflictions? Answer: In principle, it includes both. Question: What does it refer to in terms of time? If it refers to the number of afflictions, why did the previous statement say that all afflictions could manifest? And how many would not arise? Answer: 'Arise' includes both the afflictions of view (Dristi) and the afflictions of cultivation (Bhavana), and 'all' means all. There are roughly three ways to describe the increase or decrease in the number of arising afflictions. The first is that three arise: wrong view (Mithya-dristi), greed (Lobha), and co-arisen ignorance (Sahaja-ajnana). The second is that six arise, as explained in the commentary. The third is that ten arise, as the treatise indicates, stating that various afflictions of the lower realm, both those that arise through discrimination (Parikalpita) and those that arise co-naturally (Sahaja), can manifest. Some interpretations argue that, based on the second explanation, further investigation suggests that five arising is more appropriate, removing the view of self (Atma-dristi). This is because no one in the world would cling to the dharmas of another realm as self. Therefore, the views that arise through discrimination do not originate from other realms, as the form of the realm to be born into has not yet arisen. The love that nourishes rebirth (Bhavatrishna) arises from the enhanced result of the realm to be born into. Since it is merely deluded about phenomena, it cannot be said to arise simultaneously with the afflictions of reason.
In detail, the love that nourishes rebirth and the view of self are discussed in terms of the overall arising. Moreover, this stage of nourishing rebirth is not a single moment; afflictions of reason and afflictions of phenomena arise intermittently. Saying that nourishing rebirth is deluded about the enhanced result refers to the object of that love, at the time of nourishing rebirth. In principle, there should be no conflict. The 'Essentials' and 'Lamp Within' have this meaning. Therefore, the interpretations of five and six can be chosen according to the situation.
Treatise: Afflictions of a lower realm can also be related to...
上地等者。按瑜伽五十八云。如是所說十種煩惱。亦緣事轉。亦緣煩惱。下地煩惱能緣上地煩惱及事 六十二中五愛緣上。如樞要引。
論。而有處言至或依別緣等者。按集論云。欲界煩惱除無明．見．疑。余不能緣上地為境。此無明等雖亦有能緣上地者。然彼不能親緣上地。雜集釋云。所言無明緣上地者。謂與見等相應。見者除薩迦耶見。不見世間緣他地諸法執為我故。又瑜伽論五十八云。非上地惑能緣下地煩惱及事。
疏。此中例邊同於我見必依起故者。以全常見得緣他地。例彼我見亦得緣他。無有邊見不依我見。邊見緣他。我見亦爾。
疏。執欲界聞思昔所起等者。有義斷云。欲界聞．思既非三見及所起戒。如何二取說緣下地。故不緣者以之為勝 詳曰。意說二取憶于下戒。因聞．思起所有二取名緣于下。不言聞．思即是二取所執見．戒。余難如燈。
論。分別起者唯見所斷等者。對法第四亦同於此。故彼論云。分別所起染污見．疑．見處．疑處是見所斷 雜集釋曰。見處者謂諸見相應共有法．及種子。疑處亦爾。
論。見所斷十實俱頓斷等者。按瑜伽論五十九云。見斷煩惱頓斷非漸。所以者何。由現觀智諦現觀故。能斷見道所斷煩惱。然此現觀與懷緣諦作意相應。是故三心頓
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 上地（更高禪定層級）等煩惱：根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷所說，如前所述的十種煩惱，既能緣於事（事物），也能緣于煩惱。下地（較低禪定層級）的煩惱能緣于上地（較高禪定層級）的煩惱及事物。《六十二中五愛緣上》，如《樞要》所引。 論：『而有處言至或依別緣等者』，根據《集論》所說，欲界（慾望界）的煩惱，除了無明（無知）、見（錯誤的見解）、疑（懷疑）之外，其餘的不能緣于上地（更高禪定層級）作為境界。此無明等雖然也有能緣于上地（更高禪定層級）的，然而它們不能直接緣于上地（更高禪定層級）。《雜集釋》解釋說，所說的無明緣于上地（更高禪定層級），是指與見等相應。見（錯誤的見解）中，除了薩迦耶見（身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）之外，因為不見世間緣於他地（其他禪定層級）的諸法執著為我，所以不能緣于上地（更高禪定層級）。另外，《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說，非上地（更高禪定層級）的迷惑能緣于下地（較低禪定層級）的煩惱及事物。 疏：『此中例邊同於我見必依起故者』，因為全常見（認為一切都是永恒不變的常見）能夠緣於他地（其他禪定層級），所以類比於此，我見（認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）也能夠緣於他地（其他禪定層級）。沒有邊見（認為事物要麼是永恒的，要麼是斷滅的）不依賴於我見（認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）而生起，邊見（認為事物要麼是永恒的，要麼是斷滅的）緣於他地（其他禪定層級），我見（認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）也是如此。 疏：『執欲界聞思昔所起等者』，有一種觀點認為，欲界（慾望界）的聞（聽聞佛法）、思（思考佛法）既然不是三見（薩迦耶見、邊見、邪見）及由其所產生的戒禁取見（執著于錯誤的戒律和禁忌），為什麼二取（見取見和戒禁取見）會說緣于下地（較低禪定層級）呢？因此，認為不緣于下地（較低禪定層級）的觀點更為殊勝。詳細解釋：意思是說二取（見取見和戒禁取見）憶念下地（較低禪定層級）的戒律，因為聽聞和思考而生起的所有二取（見取見和戒禁取見）名為緣于下地（較低禪定層級），而不是說聽聞和思考就是二取（見取見和戒禁取見）所執著的見解和戒律。其餘的疑問如同《燈》中所說。 論：『分別起者唯見所斷等者』，《對法論》第四卷也與此相同。所以該論說，分別所生起的染污的見（錯誤的見解）、疑（懷疑）、見處（與見相應的處所）、疑處（與疑相應的處所）是見所斷。雜集釋解釋說，見處（與見相應的處所）是指與諸見（錯誤的見解）相應的共有法及種子，疑處（與疑相應的處所）也是如此。 論：『見所斷十實俱頓斷等者』，根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷所說，見斷（通過見道斷除的）煩惱是頓斷（一次性斷除）而非漸斷（逐漸斷除）。為什麼呢？因為通過現觀智（直接證悟真理的智慧）對諦（四聖諦）進行現觀，能夠斷除見道（證悟真理的道路）所斷的煩惱。然而，這種現觀與懷緣諦（以四聖諦為所緣）的作意（心理活動）相應，因此是三心頓（三個心念同時）
【English Translation】 English version Superior Grounds and the Like: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 58, the ten afflictions mentioned previously arise in relation to both objects and afflictions. Afflictions of lower grounds can be related to afflictions and objects of higher grounds. As the Essentials states, 'The five attachments in the sixty-second [section] are related to higher [grounds].' Treatise: 'And in some places it is said that it depends on other conditions, etc.' According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, afflictions of the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu), except for ignorance (avidyā), views (dṛṣṭi), and doubt (vicikitsā), cannot take higher grounds as their objects. Although these ignorance, etc., can also be related to higher grounds, they cannot be directly related to them. The Commentary on the Compendium explains that ignorance being related to higher grounds means that it is associated with views, etc. Among views, except for the view of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), because one does not see the phenomena of other grounds as 'I' in the world, they cannot be related to higher grounds. Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 58, states that afflictions of higher grounds cannot be related to afflictions and objects of lower grounds. Commentary: 'Here, the example of extreme views is the same as the view of self, because it necessarily arises dependent on it.' Because the complete eternalist view (śāśvata-dṛṣṭi) can be related to other grounds, by analogy, the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) can also be related to others. There is no extreme view (anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi) that does not depend on the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) to arise. Extreme views (anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi) are related to others, and so is the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi). Commentary: 'Clinging to what arises from hearing and thinking in the Desire Realm, etc.' One view asserts that since hearing (śruta) and thinking (cintā) in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu) are not the three views (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi, mithyā-dṛṣṭi) or the precepts and vows derived from them, why would the two kinds of grasping (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa) be said to be related to lower grounds? Therefore, the view that they are not related to lower grounds is considered superior. Detailed explanation: It means that the two kinds of grasping (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa) remember the precepts of the lower grounds, and all the two kinds of grasping (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa) that arise from hearing and thinking are called being related to lower grounds, not that hearing and thinking are the views and precepts clung to by the two kinds of grasping (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa). Other difficulties are as explained in the Lamp. Treatise: 'Those that arise from discrimination are only severed by seeing, etc.' The Abhidharma, section 4, is also the same as this. Therefore, that treatise states that defiled views, doubt, places of views, and places of doubt that arise from discrimination are severed by seeing. The Commentary on the Compendium explains that 'places of views' refers to the shared dharmas and seeds associated with various views, and the same is true for 'places of doubt'. Treatise: 'The ten actually severed by seeing are severed all at once, etc.' According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 59, afflictions severed by seeing (darśana-heya) are severed all at once, not gradually. Why? Because through the wisdom of direct perception (abhisamaya-jñāna), one directly perceives the Truths (āryasatyas), and can sever the afflictions to be severed by the Path of Seeing (darśana-mārga). However, this direct perception is associated with the mental activity (manaskāra) of focusing on the Truths (āryasatyas), and therefore it is a sudden [process of] three moments of thought.
斷一切迷苦諦等見斷煩惱 釋曰。總緣四諦共相作意名壞緣諦。遍緣諸諦作無我觀方能斷惑 問無分別智豈有緣總無我等行 答一釋如疏。又有釋云。據彼共相方便所引。名緣諸諦作無我觀。非真見道有此行相。
疏。如壞念住等者。壞猶雜也。身．受．心．法二三四合而以觀之名壞念住。
疏。對法第七等者。按彼論云。又十煩惱皆迷苦．集起諸邪行。是彼因緣．所依處故。所以者何。苦．集二諦皆是十種煩惱因緣。又為依處。是故一切迷此因緣．依處起諸邪行。又十煩惱皆迷滅．道起諸邪行。由此能生彼怖畏故。所以者何。由煩惱力樂著生死。于清凈法起懸崖想生大怖畏。又諸外道于滅．道諦妄起種種顛倒分別。是故十惑皆迷滅．道起諸邪行。
疏。其煩惱起皆具此二緣者。因依．怖畏是二緣也。
疏。答執彼下見眷屬戒等者。按五十八云。若於隨順此見諸法所受戒禁。取為第一能得清凈解脫出離。是迷集諦戒禁取。
論。別謂別迷等者。有義問云。見修道惑百二十八依何者說。有云依別迷說。以總迷者體既是一。不可別配四諦異故。依粗相說。隨轉理門說身．邊見唯迷苦諦。委細說者亦迷三諦。雖不親迷。緣三諦惑為我．我所及斷．常故 惑可。此依總迷者說。體雖是一。隨所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：斷除一切對苦諦等的迷惑，從而斷除煩惱。解釋說：總體上以四諦（苦、集、滅、道）的共同特徵作為觀想對象，這被稱為『壞緣諦』。普遍地以諸諦作為對象，進行無我觀，才能斷除迷惑。有人問：無分別智難道會以總體上的無我等行為對象嗎？回答：一種解釋如疏文所說。還有一種解釋說，這是根據共同特徵的方便引導，稱為以諸諦作為對像進行無我觀。並非真正的見道位有這種行為特徵。
疏文說：『如壞念住等』，『壞』的意思是雜。將身、受、心、法二者、三者、四者合在一起進行觀想，稱為『壞念住』。
疏文說：『對法第七等』，按照《對法論》第七卷所說：『又有十種煩惱，都迷惑于苦諦、集諦而生起各種邪行，因為苦諦、集諦是這些煩惱的因緣和所依之處。』為什麼這樣說呢？苦諦、集諦二諦都是十種煩惱的因緣，又是它們的所依之處。因此，一切迷惑于這種因緣和所依之處而生起的各種邪行，又十種煩惱都迷惑于滅諦、道諦而生起各種邪行，由此能夠產生對它們的怖畏。為什麼這樣說呢？由於煩惱的力量，人們貪戀執著于生死，對於清凈的涅槃之法產生如臨懸崖般的想法，從而產生巨大的怖畏。另外，各種外道對於滅諦、道諦錯誤地產生種種顛倒的分別，因此，十種煩惱都迷惑于滅諦、道諦而生起各種邪行。
疏文說：『其煩惱生起都具備這兩種因緣』，因緣和怖畏就是這兩種因緣。
疏文回答說：『執著于那些下劣見解的眷屬、戒律等』，按照第五十八卷所說：『如果對於隨順這些見解的各種法，所受持的戒律和禁制，認為是最殊勝的，能夠得到清凈、解脫、出離，這就是迷惑于集諦的戒禁取（認為持戒可以得解脫的錯誤見解）。』
論中說：『別謂別迷等』，有人提問說：見道和修道所斷的128種煩惱，是依據什麼而說的？有人說，是依據分別的迷惑而說的。因為總體的迷惑，其本體既然是一個，就不能分別地對應四諦的差別。是依據粗略的相狀而說的。隨順轉理之門而說，身見（認為身體是我的錯誤見解）、邊見（認為有斷滅或常恒的錯誤見解）僅僅迷惑于苦諦。如果詳細地說，也迷惑於三諦（苦、集、滅）。雖然不是直接迷惑，但以三諦的迷惑作為我、我所及斷、常的緣故。迷惑是可以的。這是依據總體的迷惑而說的，本體雖然是一個，但隨所緣的對象不同而有差別。
【English Translation】 English version: Cutting off all delusions regarding the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha Satya) etc., thereby cutting off afflictions. Explanation: Generally focusing on the common characteristics of the Four Noble Truths (Suffering, Origin, Cessation, Path) is called 'corrupting the object of the Truths'. Only by universally contemplating the Truths with the view of no-self (Anatta) can one cut off delusions. Question: Does non-discriminating wisdom really take the overall no-self etc. as its object? Answer: One explanation is as the commentary says. Another explanation is that it is based on the convenient guidance of the common characteristics, called contemplating the Truths with the view of no-self. It is not that the true Path of Seeing (Darshana-marga) has this characteristic.
The commentary says: 'Like corrupting the mindfulness establishments etc.', 'corrupting' means mixing. Combining the body, feeling, mind, and phenomena in twos, threes, or fours and contemplating them is called 'corrupting the mindfulness establishments'.
The commentary says: 'Abhidharma (Prajnaparamita) Seventh etc.', according to the seventh volume of the Abhidharma: 'Also, the ten afflictions all delude the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Origin, giving rise to various wrong practices, because the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Origin are the causes and conditions and the basis of these afflictions.' Why is this so? The Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Origin are both the causes and conditions of the ten afflictions, and they are also their basis. Therefore, all wrong practices that arise from delusion about this cause and condition and basis, and the ten afflictions all delude the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of Path, giving rise to various wrong practices, thereby generating fear of them. Why is this so? Due to the power of afflictions, people are attached to birth and death, and they have the idea of being on a cliff for the pure Dharma of Nirvana, thus generating great fear. In addition, various non-Buddhist paths wrongly generate various inverted discriminations about the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of Path, therefore, the ten afflictions all delude the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of Path, giving rise to various wrong practices.
The commentary says: 'The arising of afflictions all possesses these two causes', cause and condition and fear are the two causes.
The commentary answers: 'Attachment to the retinue, precepts, etc. of those inferior views', according to the fifty-eighth volume: 'If, for the various dharmas that accord with these views, the precepts and prohibitions that are received are regarded as the most supreme, capable of attaining purity, liberation, and deliverance, this is the delusion of the Truth of Origin, taking precepts and prohibitions (as the wrong view that holding precepts can attain liberation).'
The treatise says: 'Separate means separate delusion etc.', someone asked: What are the 128 afflictions severed in the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation based on? Someone said that it is based on separate delusions. Because the overall delusion, since its essence is one, cannot be separately matched with the differences of the Four Noble Truths. It is based on the coarse appearance. Following the principle of transformation, the view of self (the wrong view that the body is me) and the extreme view (the wrong view that there is annihilation or permanence) only delude the Truth of Suffering. If explained in detail, they also delude the three Truths (Suffering, Origin, Cessation). Although not directly deluded, it is because the delusion of the three Truths is the cause of 'I', 'mine', and 'annihilation' and 'permanence'. Delusion is possible. This is based on the overall delusion, although the essence is one, it differs according to the object of focus.
迷境四諦亦殊故無有失。然疏說云唯依數總別緣而說此義不然。若別緣者其數亦別。其數總者緣亦非別。既無數總而別緣者。如何約此以明其數 又疏云。對法第七．瑜伽第八約總迷諦說十迷四。五十八約別迷諦。二唯迷苦。八通迷四。百二十八即是對法．瑜伽七八。如何乃言約別緣說有爾所數。故所立文自相違也 詳曰。若許別迷以為正者。所言別迷為據數總行別名別。為約數行俱別名別。若數總行別即同疏明。一何取捨愛憎不等。若數行別百二十八數何得有。又何須云委細粗相。若言約總亦無失者。豈二三合緣非總耶。若是總者百二十八數亦增減。若非是總應在別收。即前別迷百二十八數還增減。進退有違。如何斷云別總無失。又若云別依十各各別緣諦說言。總約十通緣四諦。不據自余總別說者。理亦不然。前解與疏竟有何別。后說其數但是假施。擯實取假未見其可 又彈疏說理亦未可。且諦各十十數豈非總。各緣自諦何非行別。故對法雲。欲界見苦所斷具十煩惱如見苦所斷。集．滅．道所斷亦爾。此即明證。云何破言無有數總而別緣耶 又破會違亦不得意。云對法等約總迷者數總名總。五十八中據別迷者數別名別。以此而言矛楯焉有枉見披剝。余義如燈。
論。二取執彼等者。此等用緣三見等起。望苦．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於在迷境中對四聖諦的理解存在差異，因此不會有錯誤。然而，《瑜伽師地論疏》（以下簡稱『疏』）中說，只有依據總相、別相的因緣才能說明這個道理，這種說法是不對的。如果是別相的因緣，那麼其數量也會有所不同；如果其數量是總相，那麼因緣也就不是別相。既然沒有數量上的總相卻有別相的因緣，又如何依據這個來說明其數量呢？ 此外，『疏』中說，《阿毗達磨集論》（以下簡稱『對法』）第七卷和《瑜伽師地論》（以下簡稱『瑜伽』）第八卷是依據總相迷於諦理而說十種迷惑和四種迷惑；第五十八卷是依據別相迷於諦理，其中兩種迷惑僅迷於苦諦，八種迷惑普遍迷於四諦。第一百二十八種迷惑就是《對法》和《瑜伽》七八卷所說的。怎麼能說依據別相的因緣而說有這麼多的數量呢？因此，所立的論點自相矛盾。 詳細分析：如果允許別相的迷惑作為正確的觀點，那麼所說的別相迷惑，是依據數量總相而行相別相，名稱是別相呢？還是依據數量和行相都別相，名稱是別相呢？如果數量是總相而行相是別相，那就和『疏』的說明相同。為何要採取一種而捨棄另一種，愛憎不平等呢？如果數量和行相都別相，那麼一百二十八種數量又怎麼能成立呢？又何必說委細和粗相呢？如果說依據總相也沒有錯誤，難道二種或三種因緣的結合不是總相嗎？如果是總相，那麼一百二十八種數量也會增加或減少。如果不是總相，就應該歸入別相，那麼前面說的別相迷惑的一百二十八種數量還是會增加或減少。進退都有矛盾，怎麼能斷言別相和總相都沒有錯誤呢？ 此外，如果說別相是依據十種各自不同的因緣來分別說明諦理，總相是依據十種普遍的因緣來通達四諦，不依據其餘的總相和別相來說明，那麼這個道理也是不對的。前面的解釋和『疏』的說法到底有什麼區別呢？後面的說法，其數量只不過是假立的施設，拋棄真實的而取用虛假的，我沒有看到有什麼可以贊同的。 此外，反駁『疏』的說法，道理也不可取。且說諦理各有十種，這十種數量難道不是總相嗎？各自緣于自己的諦理，難道不是行相別相嗎？所以《對法》中說：『欲界見苦所斷的煩惱，具有十種煩惱，如同見苦所斷。見集諦、見滅諦、見道諦所斷的煩惱也是這樣。』這就可以明確地證明。為什麼要反駁說沒有數量上的總相而行相別相的說法呢？ 此外，反駁會通的說法也不得要領。說《對法》等是依據總相迷惑，是數量總相，名稱是總相；第五十八卷中依據別相迷惑，是數量別相，名稱是別相。以此而言，矛盾在哪裡呢？枉自披剝。其餘的道理就像燈一樣明顯。 論：二取執彼等者。這些（三見等）以苦等為所緣而生起。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the understanding of the Four Noble Truths in the realm of delusion, there are differences, so there will be no errors. However, the commentary on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commentary') states that only based on the general and specific conditions can this principle be explained, which is incorrect. If it is a specific condition, then its number will also be different; if its number is general, then the condition will not be specific. Since there is no general number but there are specific conditions, how can one use this to explain its number? Furthermore, 'the Commentary' states that the seventh volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya (hereinafter referred to as 'the Abhidharma') and the eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (hereinafter referred to as 'the Yoga') speak of ten delusions and four delusions based on the general aspect of being deluded about the Truths; the fifty-eighth volume speaks of being deluded about the Truths based on the specific aspect, in which two delusions are only deluded about the Truth of Suffering, and eight delusions are universally deluded about the Four Truths. The one hundred and twenty-eight delusions are what are spoken of in the seventh and eighth volumes of 'the Abhidharma' and 'the Yoga'. How can it be said that based on specific conditions, there are so many numbers? Therefore, the established argument contradicts itself. Detailed analysis: If specific delusions are allowed as the correct view, then what is said about specific delusions, is it based on the general number and specific characteristics, with the name being specific? Or is it based on both the number and characteristics being specific, with the name being specific? If the number is general and the characteristics are specific, then it is the same as the explanation in 'the Commentary'. Why take one and abandon the other, with unequal love and hate? If both the number and characteristics are specific, then how can the one hundred and twenty-eight numbers be established? And why is it necessary to speak of subtle and coarse aspects? If it is said that there is no error based on the general aspect, is it not the case that the combination of two or three conditions is a general aspect? If it is a general aspect, then the one hundred and twenty-eight numbers will also increase or decrease. If it is not a general aspect, it should be included in the specific aspect, then the one hundred and twenty-eight numbers of the previously mentioned specific delusions will still increase or decrease. There are contradictions in both advancing and retreating, how can it be asserted that there is no error in either the specific or general aspects? Furthermore, if it is said that the specific aspect is based on ten different conditions to separately explain the Truths, and the general aspect is based on ten universal conditions to understand the Four Truths, without relying on other general and specific aspects to explain, then this principle is also incorrect. What is the difference between the previous explanation and the statement in 'the Commentary'? The later statement, its number is merely a provisional establishment, abandoning the real and taking the false, I have not seen anything to approve of. Furthermore, refuting the statement in 'the Commentary' is also unreasonable. Let's say that each Truth has ten types, are these ten types not a general aspect? Each being conditioned by its own Truth, is it not a specific characteristic? Therefore, 'the Abhidharma' says: 'The afflictions severed by seeing the Truth of Suffering in the Desire Realm have ten afflictions, just like those severed by seeing the Truth of Suffering. The afflictions severed by seeing the Truth of Accumulation, the Truth of Cessation, and the Truth of the Path are also like this.' This is clear evidence. Why refute the statement that there is no general number but there are specific characteristics? Furthermore, refuting the explanation of reconciliation is also not to the point. Saying that 'the Abhidharma', etc., is based on general delusions, which is a general number, and the name is general; in the fifty-eighth volume, it is based on specific delusions, which is a specific number, and the name is specific. With this said, where is the contradiction? It is a futile stripping away. The remaining principles are as clear as a lamp. Treatise: 'Two, grasping and clinging to them, etc.' These (three views, etc.) arise with suffering, etc., as their objects.
集理有所隔故名之為疏。是重緣惑。
疏。即餘四見及疑無法執等者。疑與四見我見不俱。汝云我見攝法執盡。即四見．疑便無法執。便無法執者便成大過。豈有煩惱不依法執而得起耶。
疏。若除影外等者。有義今不依此。影外所枝未必同時。如先聞有過．未等名後方緣故。後後心生無名相故。又簡境等無有名故。設遠假名但可許說名增上緣。何成本質。俱時發影名為質故。先心緣名隨名分別。後心緣義影像方生。能詮所詮全不相似。豈得說名為后義質。故知影像亦有全無所杖之質。不爾便違前第一卷。說自心外蘊或有或無 詳曰。疏此問答意簡有宗。有宗心生無不杖質。縱緣空花龜毛兔角。亦以名等為質生起。縱而以簡。由彼名等是能緣心近遠所託似於真實故。云即無無本質者。非許名等同實塵等本質之體云無無者。何得乃以實質為難 又能詮所詮全不相似等者。此亦不然。豈諸質．相皆相似耶。如礙．不礙．慮．不慮等而非一故。余難準斯德失可悉。無俟言矣。
疏。今無漏緣中不得作后解者。漏無漏緣質影雙說。例事．無事不唯望質。
疏。瑜伽云又十煩惱等者。五十八文。
疏。滅道廣大佛法等者 分別滅道。緣安立諦 廣大佛法。緣非安立真如為境。
疏。對法第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『集理有所隔故名之為疏』。這是指重重緣于迷惑。
『疏』，指的是剩餘的四種邪見以及懷疑、無法執等。懷疑與四種邪見（我見）不同時存在。你認為我見涵蓋了所有的法執，那麼四種邪見和懷疑就不屬於法執了。如果不是法執，那就犯了大錯。難道煩惱不是依靠法執而產生的嗎？
『疏』，如果排除影像之外等等。有一種觀點現在不依從這種說法。影像之外所生髮的未必是同時的。比如先聽到過失、未等等，這被稱為後來的緣故。後來的心生起沒有名稱和相狀的緣故。又因為簡擇境界等沒有名稱的緣故。即使遙遠地假借名稱，也只能允許說是增上緣，怎麼能成為本質呢？同時發起的影像才被稱為本質。先前的意識緣于名稱，隨著名稱進行分別，後來的意識緣于意義，影像才產生。能詮釋的和所詮釋的完全不相似。怎麼能說名稱是後來的意義的本質呢？所以要知道影像也有完全沒有所依賴的本質的情況。不然就違背了前面第一卷所說的自心之外的蘊或者有或者無。詳細地說，疏文中的這個問答是爲了簡別有宗（認為一切法皆有自性的宗派）。有宗認為心生起沒有不依賴本質的。即使緣于空花、龜毛、兔角，也是以名稱等作為本質而生起。即使是簡別，也是因為那些名稱等是能緣的心所依託的，類似於真實的事物。所以說『即無無本質者』，並不是允許名稱等同於真實的塵等本質的本體，說沒有沒有本質的。怎麼能用實質來責難呢？而且，能詮釋的和所詮釋的完全不相似等等，這也是不對的。難道所有的本質和相狀都相似嗎？比如阻礙和不阻礙、思慮和不思慮等等，都不是一樣的。其餘的責難可以參照這個例子來了解得失，不需要多說了。
『疏』，現在無漏的緣中不能做後面的解釋，有漏和無漏的緣都同時說本質和影像，例事和無事不僅僅是針對本質。
『疏』，《瑜伽師地論》說又有十種煩惱等等，在第五十八卷。
『疏』，滅道廣大佛法等等，分別滅道，緣于安立諦（Samvrti-satya，世俗諦）；廣大佛法，緣于非安立的真如為境界。
『疏』，《對法論》第...
【English Translation】 English version: 『The collection of principles is separated, hence it is called sparseness.』 This refers to repeatedly clinging to delusion.
『Sparseness』 refers to the remaining four wrong views, as well as doubt and the inability to grasp the Dharma, etc. Doubt and the four wrong views (self-view) do not coexist. You claim that self-view encompasses all Dharma attachments, then the four wrong views and doubt would not belong to Dharma attachments. If it is not a Dharma attachment, then a great mistake is made. How can afflictions arise without relying on Dharma attachments?
『Sparseness』, if excluding images, etc. There is a view that does not follow this statement now. What arises outside of the image may not be simultaneous. For example, first hearing of faults, not yet, etc., this is called a later cause. Later arising minds have no name or form. Also, because selecting realms, etc., have no name. Even if remotely borrowing a name, it can only be allowed to be called an enhancing condition, how can it become the essence? Images that arise simultaneously are called the essence. The previous consciousness clings to the name, and distinguishes according to the name. The later consciousness clings to the meaning, and the image then arises. What explains and what is explained are completely dissimilar. How can it be said that the name is the essence of the later meaning? Therefore, know that images also have cases where there is no essence to rely on at all. Otherwise, it would contradict the first volume, which says that the aggregates outside of one's own mind may or may not exist. In detail, this question and answer in the commentary is to distinguish the Sarvastivada school (a school that believes all dharmas have self-nature). The Sarvastivada school believes that the arising of the mind does not rely on an essence. Even if clinging to empty flowers, tortoise hair, or rabbit horns, it arises with names, etc., as the essence. Even if it is a distinction, it is because those names, etc., are what the clinging mind relies on, similar to real things. Therefore, saying 『that there is no non-essential』 does not allow names, etc., to be the same as the essence of real dust, etc., saying there is no non-essential. How can one use substance to criticize? Moreover, what explains and what is explained are completely dissimilar, etc., this is also not right. Are all essences and forms similar? For example, obstruction and non-obstruction, thought and non-thought, etc., are not the same. Other criticisms can be understood by referring to this example to understand the gains and losses, there is no need to say more.
『Sparseness』, now in the unconditioned condition, one cannot make the later explanation. Conditioned and unconditioned conditions both speak of essence and image simultaneously. Examples and non-examples are not only directed at the essence.
『Sparseness』, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says there are also ten afflictions, etc., in the fifty-eighth fascicle.
『Sparseness』, extinction, path, vast Buddha Dharma, etc., distinguish extinction and path, clinging to conventional truth (Samvrti-satya); vast Buddha Dharma, clinging to the unestablished Suchness (Tathata) as the object.
『Sparseness』, Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) the...
五至同五十九初文者。有義疏說是同。今解有別。慢．見六同。貪．嗔二種五十九文從多分故唯名有事。對法盡理與見．慢俱亦名無事。然疑一種瑜伽盡理說通二種。對法既云與見．慢俱方名無事。疑非彼俱不通無事故理不盡。無明一種二論無違 詳曰。疏括諸文考量其理。理文順者云不相違。若文參差取旨以會。初五十九觀文有乖。以如前會。對法第五理亦有闕。談理同彼不盡名同。非據彼文一一同也。又如所斷理亦有餘。對法貪．嗔何得盡理。邪見．見．戒豈唯無事。言見相應併名無事。何非大過。太過失存理盡焉在。若言據見無事者說。若爾文濫何名盡理。以此而言疏無違也。
論。彼親所緣雖皆有漏等者。按對法論第六說云。又緣滅．道諦諸煩惱。不能親緣滅．道為境。由滅．道諦出世間智及后得智內所證故。唯由依彼妄起分別說為所緣。分別所計境不離分別故。
疏。與有事緣別不可為例者。此有二意。一成有事緣第一釋。二成無漏必約影．質不可。以彼有事緣中初釋相例 問云何名別。答有事緣惑能所二緣而皆有漏有相順義。可直據質而以明之。無漏緣惑能所二緣唯違無順。故不唯質得此緣稱。
論。緣自地至所起名境者。相．名．分別三名為事。事依分別之所起故。依主受稱。滅．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於與五十九初文相同的問題。有義疏說它們是相同的。現在解釋它們之間的區別：慢（驕慢）、見（錯誤的見解）這六種煩惱是相同的。貪（貪慾）、嗔（嗔恨）這兩種煩惱在五十九種文句中，因為它們佔多數，所以被稱為『有事』（與事物相關）。《阿毗達磨對法論》完全按照道理，與見、慢一起也被稱為『無事』（與事物無關）。然而，疑（懷疑）這種煩惱，《瑜伽師地論》完全按照道理來說，是貫通兩種情況的。《阿毗達磨對法論》既然說與見、慢一起才被稱為『無事』，那麼懷疑如果不是與它們一起，就不貫通無事，所以道理不完全。無明（愚癡）這一種煩惱，兩部論典沒有衝突。詳細地說，義疏概括了各種文句，考量其中的道理，道理和文句相順的，就說沒有衝突。如果文句參差不齊，就採取要旨來會通。最初的五十九觀文句有不一致的地方，就像前面那樣會通。《阿毗達磨對法論》第五的道理也有欠缺，談論道理與它相同，不完全相同，只是名稱相同，不是根據那部論典的每一處文句都相同。又如所斷的道理也有剩餘。《阿毗達磨對法論》中，貪、嗔怎麼能完全按照道理？邪見、見、戒怎麼能僅僅是無事？說與見相應都稱為無事，難道不是很大的過失嗎？太過和失存，道理怎麼能完全呢？如果說根據見是無事來說，如果這樣，文句就氾濫了，怎麼能稱為完全按照道理呢？因此說義疏沒有衝突。 論：『彼親所緣雖皆有漏』等等。按照《阿毗達磨對法論》第六卷所說：『又緣滅（涅槃）、道諦（通往涅槃的道路）的各種煩惱，不能直接以滅、道為境界來緣取，因為滅、道諦是出世間智（超越世俗的智慧）以及后得智（證悟后獲得的智慧）在內心所證得的。只能通過依靠它們，虛妄地生起分別，說它們是所緣。分別所計度的境界不離開分別的緣故。』 疏：『與有事緣不同，不可以作為例子』。這裡有兩種意思：一是成就『有事緣』的第一種解釋，二是成就無漏一定需要影子和實體，不可以。因為在『有事緣』中，最初的解釋可以作為例子。問：怎麼稱為不同？答：『有事緣』的迷惑，能緣和所緣都是有漏的，有相順的意義，可以直接根據實體來闡明。無漏緣的迷惑，能緣和所緣只有違背沒有相順，所以不只是實體才能得到這個緣的稱呼。 論：『緣自地至所起名境者』。相（現象）、名（名稱）、分別（分別念）這三者稱為事。事依靠分別的所生起，所以依附於主而接受稱呼。滅（涅槃）……
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the question of being the same as the initial texts of the fifty-nine. There are commentaries that say they are the same. Now, explaining the differences: the six afflictions of Māna (pride) and Dṛṣṭi (wrong views) are the same. The two afflictions of Tṛṣṇā (greed) and Dveṣa (hatred) in the fifty-nine texts are called 'having affairs' (related to things) because they are the majority. The Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya (Treasury of Manifest Knowledge) completely follows the principle, and together with Dṛṣṭi and Māna, is also called 'having no affairs' (unrelated to things). However, the affliction of Vicikitsā (doubt), the Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) completely follows the principle and says that it penetrates both situations. Since the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya says that it is called 'having no affairs' only when it is together with Dṛṣṭi and Māna, then if doubt is not together with them, it does not penetrate 'having no affairs', so the principle is not complete. The one affliction of Avidyā (ignorance), the two treatises have no conflict. In detail, the commentaries summarize the various texts and consider the principles within them. If the principle and the text are in accordance, it is said that there is no conflict. If the texts are inconsistent, then the main points are taken to reconcile them. The initial fifty-nine views have inconsistencies in the texts, which are reconciled as before. The principle in the fifth of the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya also has shortcomings. Talking about the principle being the same as it is not completely the same, only the name is the same, not based on every sentence of that treatise being the same. Also, the principle of what is to be severed also has remainders. In the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya, how can Tṛṣṇā and Dveṣa completely follow the principle? How can Mithyā-dṛṣṭi (wrong view), Dṛṣṭi, and Śīla (precepts) only be 'having no affairs'? Saying that being associated with Dṛṣṭi is called 'having no affairs', isn't that a big mistake? If there are too many mistakes and omissions, how can the principle be complete? If it is said that it is based on Dṛṣṭi being 'having no affairs', then if that is the case, the text is overflowing, how can it be called completely following the principle? Therefore, it is said that the commentaries have no conflict. The Treatise: 'Although their directly conditioned objects are all defiled,' etc. According to the sixth volume of the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya: 'Also, the various afflictions that condition Nirodha (cessation) and Mārga-satya (the truth of the path), cannot directly condition Nirodha and Mārga as objects, because Nirodha and Mārga-satya are realized internally by the Lokottara-jñāna (transcendental wisdom) and the Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna (wisdom attained after enlightenment). They can only rely on them to falsely generate discrimination, saying that they are conditioned objects. Because the objects measured by discrimination do not leave discrimination.' The Commentary: 'Different from 'having affairs' conditions, it cannot be taken as an example.' There are two meanings here: one is to accomplish the first explanation of 'having affairs' conditions, and the other is to accomplish that undefiled must require shadow and substance, which is not possible. Because in 'having affairs' conditions, the initial explanation can be taken as an example. Question: How is it called different? Answer: The delusion of 'having affairs' conditions, both the conditioning and conditioned are defiled, and there is a meaning of mutual agreement, which can be directly explained based on the substance. The delusion of undefiled conditions, the conditioning and conditioned only have disagreement and no mutual agreement, so it is not just the substance that can obtain the name of this condition. The Treatise: 'That which conditions from its own realm to what arises is called an object.' Lakṣaṇa (characteristics), Nāma (name), Vikalpa (discrimination) are called things. Things rely on what arises from discrimination, so they rely on the subject and receive the name. Nirodha (cessation)...
道等名依分別起。依主同前為境可知。故瑜伽論五十八云。若緣苦．集事境所有諸漏。是緣邪分別所起事境。緣滅．道境及緣不同分界境所有諸漏。是緣自分別所起名境。何以故。非此煩惱能緣滅．道。亦不能能緣不同分界。非無所緣 釋曰。言不能緣。顯不相似。非無所緣。顯雖不似而托于名亦復緣之。
論。唯是煩惱分位等流性等者。問各何分位是何等流 答按瑜伽論五十八云。諸隨煩惱當知皆是煩惱品類。且如放逸是一切煩惱品類。所以者何。于染愛時多生放逸。乃至疑時亦有放逸。貪著．慳吝．憍高．掉舉等皆貪品類。皆貪等流。忿．恨．惱．嫉．害等是嗔品類。是嗔等流。諂．誑是邪見品類見邪是等流。覆是誑品類。當知即彼品類等流。余隨煩惱是癡品類。是癡等流 諸論不同如下隨文疏自會釋。故不重云。
論。此二十種類別有三者。有義忿等十種唯意識俱名之為小。無慚等二通六識故名之為中。掉舉等八遍七識故說名為大 詳曰亦有斯理。然無所憑且依論釋。
論。能障不忿執杖為業者。顯揚第一二十隨惑皆具五業。忿業五者能障無嗔為業。乃至增長忿為業 釋曰中間三業與本惑同故云乃至。余準此知。后廢不言。
疏。此因不定亦不遍故者。異品闕彼遍無性也。
論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『道』等名稱是依分別而生起的。依『主』（adhipati，增上）的道理與之前相同，可以了知作為所緣境。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說：『如果緣于苦、集的事境而生起的所有煩惱，是緣于邪分別所生起的事境。緣于滅、道之境以及緣于不同分界之境的所有煩惱，是緣于自（sva，自身）分別所生起的名境。』為什麼這樣說呢？因為這些煩惱不能緣于滅、道，也不能緣于不同分界，也不是沒有所緣境。解釋說：『不能緣』，顯示了不相似。『非無所緣』，顯示了雖然不相似，但依託于名稱也還是緣取的。
論：『唯是煩惱分位等流性等』。問：各個是什麼分位，是什麼等流？答：按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷所說：『所有隨煩惱應當知道都是煩惱的品類。比如放逸是一切煩惱的品類。為什麼這樣說呢？在染愛時多生放逸，乃至疑惑時也有放逸。貪著、慳吝、憍高、掉舉等都是貪的品類，都是貪的等流。忿、恨、惱、嫉、害等是嗔的品類，是嗔的等流。諂、誑是邪見的品類，見邪是等流。覆是誑的品類，應當知道就是那個品類的等流。其餘隨煩惱是癡的品類，是癡的等流。』各種論典的說法不同，在下面的文疏中會自行解釋，所以不再重複說明。
論：『這二十種類別有三種』。有一種觀點認為，忿等十種只與意識俱起，所以稱為『小』。無慚等二者通於六識，所以稱為『中』。掉舉等八者遍於七識，所以說稱為『大』。詳細地說，也有這種道理，但沒有依據，暫且依照論典來解釋。
論：『能障礙不忿，執杖為業』。顯揚第一說二十種隨煩惱都具有五種業。忿的五種業是：能障礙無嗔為業，乃至增長忿為業。解釋說：中間三種業與根本煩惱相同，所以說『乃至』。其餘的依此類推可知。後面省略不再說明。
疏：『此因不定，也不普遍』。異品缺少它，普遍沒有這種性質。
論
【English Translation】 English version: 『Path』 and other names arise dependent on discrimination. The principle of dependence on the 『Lord』 (adhipati, predominating condition) is the same as before, and it can be understood as the object. Therefore, the fifty-eighth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『If all the defilements that arise from the object-realm of suffering and accumulation are the object-realm arising from wrong discrimination. All the defilements that arise from the realm of cessation and path, and from the realm of different boundaries, are the name-object arising from self (sva, own) discrimination.』 Why is this so? Because these defilements cannot be directed towards cessation and path, nor can they be directed towards different boundaries, nor are they without an object. The explanation says: 『Cannot be directed』 shows dissimilarity. 『Not without an object』 shows that although dissimilar, they still apprehend it by relying on the name.
Treatise: 『Only the defilements are of the nature of outflow of division, etc.』 Question: What are the divisions and outflows of each? Answer: According to the fifty-eighth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: 『All secondary defilements should be known as categories of defilements. For example, laxity is a category of all defilements. Why is this so? Laxity often arises during attachment, and even during doubt there is laxity. Attachment, stinginess, arrogance, excitement, etc., are all categories of greed, and are all outflows of greed. Anger, resentment, vexation, jealousy, harm, etc., are categories of hatred, and are outflows of hatred. Flattery and deceit are categories of wrong views, and wrong views are outflows. Concealment is a category of deceit, and it should be known as the outflow of that category. The remaining secondary defilements are categories of ignorance, and are outflows of ignorance.』 The various treatises differ, and the commentaries below will explain them themselves, so I will not repeat them.
Treatise: 『These twenty types have three categories.』 One view holds that the ten types such as anger only arise with consciousness, so they are called 『small』. The two, such as shamelessness, are common to the six consciousnesses, so they are called 『medium』. The eight, such as excitement, pervade the seven consciousnesses, so they are said to be 『large』. In detail, there is also this reason, but there is no basis, so I will temporarily explain according to the treatise.
Treatise: 『Able to obstruct non-anger, taking up a staff as its function.』 The first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the twenty secondary defilements all have five functions. The five functions of anger are: able to obstruct non-anger as its function, and even increase anger as its function. The explanation says: The three middle functions are the same as the root defilements, so it says 『even』. The rest can be known by analogy. The latter is omitted and not mentioned.
Commentary: 『This cause is uncertain and not universal.』 The different category lacks it, and universally lacks this nature.
Treatise
。雜事等至多隨煩惱故者。按瑜伽論五十八中而亦引云。若雜事中世尊前說諸隨煩惱廣說乃至。愁．嘆．憂．苦隨擾惱等 又八十六云。貪煩惱異名者有十五種。嗔亦十五。癡有七種。具如彼列。
論。謂隨煩惱名亦攝煩惱者。按對法第七云。隨煩惱者謂所有諸煩惱皆是隨煩惱。有隨煩惱非煩惱。謂除煩惱所餘染污行蘊所攝一切心法。此復云何。謂除貪等六煩惱所餘染污行蘊所攝忿等諸心法。又貪．嗔．癡名隨煩惱心法。由此隨煩惱隨惱於心。令不離染。令不解脫。令不斷障故。亦名隨煩惱。
疏。趣向前行等者。按彼論云。謂受僧祇或復別人諸衣服等所有利養 或請僧祇及與別人皆名趣向。若諸苾芻于如是事最初前行故名趣向前行。
論。有義忿等四俱除樂者 問那落迦中方有苦受。彼何有慳云通四受 答傳有兩釋 一云彼雖無有財等。于自苦具亦有慳故 二云于自所知之法容有慳也 曰初釋全非。誰于苦具見愛惜耶。第二理通。按大般若。菩薩于彼以三乘道化彼有情。明容聞法。故知於法慳亦何失 今復釋云。但言慳法得苦受俱。非言有苦皆有慳也 純苦鬼．畜苦得慳俱不違論旨。
疏。非言不共無明至惡惠俱者。不共無明既有不與惡見俱時。此無明位不正知等依何而立。由此故知。依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：至於雜事等屬於隨煩惱的原因，根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷中引用說：『如果在雜事中，世尊之前所說的各種隨煩惱，廣泛地說，乃至愁、嘆、憂、苦等，都屬於隨擾惱。』又第八十六卷說：『貪煩惱的異名有十五種，嗔也有十五種，癡有七種。』具體內容如該處所列。 論：說隨煩惱之名也包含煩惱，根據《對法論》第七卷說：『隨煩惱是指所有煩惱都是隨煩惱。有隨煩惱不是煩惱，是指除了煩惱之外，其餘染污的行蘊所包含的一切心法。』這又是什麼呢？是指除了貪等六種煩惱之外，其餘染污的行蘊所包含的忿等各種心法。又貪、嗔、癡被稱為隨煩惱心法。因此，隨煩惱會隨之惱亂內心，使內心不能遠離染污，不能解脫，不能斷除障礙，所以也稱為隨煩惱。 疏：趣向前行等，根據該論說：『指接受僧眾或其他人所施捨的各種衣服等利益供養，或者邀請僧眾以及其他人，都稱為趣向。如果各位比丘對於這些事情最初向前行進，所以稱為趣向前行。』 論：有觀點認為忿等四種（煩惱）都排除了樂受。問：那落迦（Naraka，地獄）中只有苦受，那裡怎麼會有慳吝，從而通達四種感受？答：流傳有兩種解釋：一種說法是，雖然那裡沒有財物等，但對於自己的痛苦之具也有慳吝。另一種說法是，對於自己所知之法，容許有慳吝。評論說：第一種解釋完全不對，誰會對痛苦之具產生愛惜呢？第二種解釋在理上是通順的。根據《大般若經》，菩薩在那裡以三乘道教化那些有情，說明容許聽聞佛法。所以可知對於佛法慳吝也沒有什麼過失。現在再次解釋說：只是說慳吝佛法會得到苦受，並非說有苦受就一定有慳吝。純粹只有苦受的鬼道和畜生道，得到苦受和慳吝同時存在，並不違背論旨。 疏：並非說不共無明和惡慧不會同時出現。不共無明既然有不與惡見同時出現的時候，那麼這種無明狀態下的不正知等，又依據什麼而成立呢？由此可知，是依據...
【English Translation】 English version: As for why miscellaneous matters and the like belong to secondary afflictions, according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Volume 58, it is quoted: 'If in miscellaneous matters, the various secondary afflictions previously mentioned by the World Honored One, broadly speaking, even sorrow, lamentation, suffering, distress, etc., all belong to secondary disturbances.' Furthermore, Volume 86 states: 'There are fifteen different names for the affliction of greed, fifteen for anger, and seven for delusion.' The specific content is as listed there. Treatise: Saying that the name of secondary afflictions also includes afflictions, according to the Abhidharma-samuccaya, Volume 7, it states: 'Secondary afflictions refer to all afflictions being secondary afflictions. There are secondary afflictions that are not afflictions, referring to all mental dharmas contained in the contaminated form aggregate other than afflictions.' What is this? It refers to the various mental dharmas such as anger contained in the contaminated form aggregate other than the six afflictions such as greed. Furthermore, greed, anger, and delusion are called secondary affliction mental dharmas. Therefore, secondary afflictions consequently disturb the mind, causing the mind to be unable to be free from contamination, unable to be liberated, and unable to cut off obstacles, so they are also called secondary afflictions. Commentary: 'Approaching and proceeding forward,' etc., according to that treatise, it states: 'Referring to receiving various benefits and offerings such as clothes given by the Sangha or others, or inviting the Sangha and others, all are called approaching. If the various Bhikshus initially proceed forward in these matters, they are called approaching and proceeding forward.' Treatise: Some argue that anger and the other three (afflictions) all exclude pleasant feeling. Question: In Naraka (hell), there is only painful feeling, so how can there be stinginess there, thereby comprehending the four feelings? Answer: There are two explanations passed down: One explanation is that although there are no possessions there, there is also stinginess towards one's own instruments of suffering. Another explanation is that stinginess towards the dharmas one knows is permissible. Commentary: The first explanation is completely incorrect; who would cherish the instruments of suffering? The second explanation is logically sound. According to the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, the Bodhisattva teaches those sentient beings there with the Three Vehicle path, indicating that hearing the Dharma is permissible. Therefore, it can be known that there is no fault in being stingy with the Dharma. Now, explaining again: It is only said that stinginess with the Dharma will result in painful feeling, not that having painful feeling necessarily means there is stinginess. The ghost realm and animal realm, which are purely painful, having painful feeling and stinginess simultaneously does not contradict the treatise's intent. Commentary: It is not said that non-concurrent ignorance and evil wisdom will not occur simultaneously. Since non-concurrent ignorance has times when it does not occur simultaneously with evil views, then what does incorrect knowledge, etc., in this state of ignorance rely on to be established? From this, it can be known that it relies on...
無明立不正知等方名遍染。
疏。此無明聚余法與此俱者。此遮外難。外難意云。不共無明惡惠不有豈唯獨一。故今答云。雖無惡惠與余法俱。亦不唯已。
疏。即于無明假建立故者。此義如前第四論末八遍染中疏燈俱釋。尋之可明。此不復云。
論。梵于釋子起諂誑故者。按婆沙論百二十九引經說云。如佛昔在室羅筏城住誓多林。時有苾芻名曰馬勝。是阿羅漢。作是思惟。諸四大種當於何位盡滅無餘。煩惱繫縛為欲知故入勝等持。即以定心於誓多林沒於四大王眾天出從定而起問彼天眾。諸四大種當於何位盡滅無餘等。答曰不知。如是欲界六慾天等展轉相推。乃至他化自在天所被複作推梵眾諸天。欲往梵世復入勝定復以定心自在宮沒梵眾天出從定而起還作上問。梵眾咸曰。我等不知復推大梵。馬勝尋問如前所問。彼大梵王處自梵眾忽被馬勝苾芻所問。梵王不知便矯亂答。我於此眾是大梵．自在．作者．化者．生者．養者．是一切父。故知有誑。作是語已引出眾外。諂言愧謝還令問佛。故知有誑。
論。然忿等十至方得生故者。有義別釋前十名為有事。非是大門。疏說非也。下有漏等方第十三 詳曰。若非大門此屬何門。若云屬前前門但明迷諦親疏。門義全差何得屬彼 又有事等自是一義。文
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『無明』（avidyā，指對事物真相的無知）建立在『不正知』（ayathā-jñāna，不如實知見）等基礎上，這種狀態被稱為『遍染』（paryavasthāna，煩惱的遍佈和染污）。 疏：這段話是爲了反駁外道的詰難。外道認為，不共無明（asaṃprajñāta-avidyā，與心不相應的無明）和惡慧（dus-prajñā，錯誤的智慧）並非只有一種。因此，這裡回答說，雖然沒有惡慧與無明同時存在，但無明也並非只有一種。 疏：『即于無明假建立故者』，這個含義如同之前第四論末尾『八遍染』中的疏燈所解釋的那樣，可以查閱原文來理解，這裡不再贅述。 論：『梵于釋子起諂誑故者』，根據《婆沙論》（Vibhāṣā，佛教論書）第一百二十九卷引用的經文說，過去佛陀在室羅筏城（Śrāvastī，古印度城市）的誓多林（Jetavana，祇園精舍）居住時，有一位名叫馬勝（Aśvajit，佛陀弟子）的比丘，他是阿羅漢（arhat，已證得解脫的聖者）。他思考著：『四大種（catvāri mahābhūtāni，地、水、火、風四大元素）應當在何處完全滅盡？』爲了瞭解煩惱的繫縛，他進入勝等持（adhimokṣa-samādhi，殊勝的等持）。然後，他以定心從誓多林消失，出現在四大王眾天（Cāturmahārājika-deva，四大天王所居之天）中，從定中起身，詢問那些天眾：『四大種應當在何處完全滅盡？』他們回答說不知道。就這樣，欲界（kāmadhātu，充滿慾望的界）的六慾天（ṣaṭ-kāmadeva，六個欲界天）等互相推諉，直到他化自在天（Paranirmita-vaśavartin，欲界頂天的天人）那裡。他又想去梵眾諸天（Brahma-pāriṣadya-deva，色界初禪天的天眾），於是再次進入勝定，以定心從自在宮消失，出現在梵眾天中，起身再次提出上述問題。梵眾天眾都說：『我們不知道。』然後推諉給大梵天（Mahābrahmā，色界初禪天的主）。馬勝詢問大梵天同樣的問題。大梵天王（Brahmadeva，梵天之王）身處自己的梵眾之中，突然被馬勝比丘詢問，因為不知道答案，就虛假地回答說：『我在此眾中是大梵、自在、作者、化者、生者、養者，是一切的父親。』由此可知他說了謊。說完這些話后，他把馬勝引到眾人之外，諂媚地道歉，並讓他去問佛陀。由此可知他說了謊。 論：『然忿等十至方得生故者』，有一種解釋認為，前面的十種煩惱（指忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、害、憍）被稱為『有事』，並非是大門（指通往惡趣的主要途徑）。但疏中說並非如此。下面關於有漏等第十三的解釋會詳細說明。如果不是大門，那麼這屬於什麼門呢？如果說是屬於前面的門，但前面的門只是說明迷惑真諦的親疏關係，門的含義完全不同，怎麼能屬於前面的門呢？又有事等本身就是一個含義，文義。
【English Translation】 English version:
『Avidyā』 (ignorance) is established upon 『ayathā-jñāna』 (incorrect knowledge) and other factors, and this state is called 『paryavasthāna』 (pervasion, the pervasiveness and defilement of afflictions). Commentary: This refutes the objections of externalists. Externalists argue that asaṃprajñāta-avidyā (non-cognitive ignorance) and dus-prajñā (wrong wisdom) are not singular. Therefore, the response is that although dus-prajñā does not coexist with avidyā, avidyā is also not singular. Commentary: 『That it is falsely established upon avidyā』 means the same as explained in the commentary on the 『eight pervasions』 at the end of the fourth treatise. It can be understood by consulting the original text, and will not be repeated here. Treatise: 『Because Brahmā spoke deceitfully to the Śākya son,』 according to the sūtra quoted in the Vibhāṣā (Buddhist treatise), volume 129, in the past, when the Buddha was residing in Jetavana (Jetavana Monastery) in Śrāvastī (ancient Indian city), there was a bhikṣu (Buddhist monk) named Aśvajit (one of the Buddha's first five disciples), who was an arhat (liberated being). He contemplated: 『Where will the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) be completely extinguished?』 To understand the bondage of afflictions, he entered adhimokṣa-samādhi (superior concentration). Then, with a concentrated mind, he disappeared from Jetavana and appeared in the Cāturmahārājika-deva (heaven of the Four Great Kings), arose from samādhi, and asked those devas (gods): 『Where will the four great elements be completely extinguished?』 They replied that they did not know. Thus, the six desire heavens (realms of desire) of the kāmadhātu (desire realm) passed the question around until they reached the Paranirmita-vaśavartin (heaven of the gods who delight in creating illusions for others). He then wanted to go to the Brahma-pāriṣadya-deva (heaven of Brahma's retinue), so he entered samādhi again, disappeared from the Paranirmita-vaśavartin heaven, and appeared in the Brahma-pāriṣadya heaven, where he arose and asked the same question. The Brahma-pāriṣadya devas all said: 『We do not know.』 Then they passed the question to Mahābrahmā (Great Brahmā). Aśvajit asked Mahābrahmā the same question. Brahmadeva (King of Brahmā), being among his Brahma retinue, was suddenly asked by the bhikṣu Aśvajit, and because he did not know the answer, he falsely replied: 『In this assembly, I am Brahmā, the sovereign, the creator, the transformer, the generator, the nourisher, the father of all.』 From this, it is known that he lied. After saying these words, he led Aśvajit outside the assembly, flatteringly apologized, and told him to ask the Buddha. From this, it is known that he lied. Treatise: 『That anger and the ten others are the means by which one is born,』 one interpretation is that the preceding ten afflictions (referring to anger, resentment, concealment, vexation, jealousy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harm, and arrogance) are called 『having affairs』 and are not the main gate (referring to the primary path to evil destinies). However, the commentary says this is not the case. The explanation below regarding the thirteenth, concerning the contaminated, will explain in detail. If it is not the main gate, then to what gate does it belong? If it is said to belong to the preceding gate, but the preceding gate only explains the closeness or distance of delusion from the truth, the meaning of the gate is completely different, so how can it belong to the preceding gate? Furthermore, 『having affairs』 and so on are themselves one meaning, the meaning of the text.
明有事自為其門。竟違何理而見不許。不言后十。后十遍染．不善之心。隨彼所遍通事無事易故不說。緣有漏等既云準上而不作法。即當第二例余門也。
疏卷第七
疏。次五字列名者。第一謂字列名所須。亦名列名。
疏。是我惡邊作者。言我邊者顯自指己。然疏文倒。而應說云我邊惡作。有本云措今從錯字。故瑜伽論第十一云。又于應作．不應作事。隨其所應或已曾作。或未曾作心生追悔。云何我昔應作不作。非作返作。
論。如余蓋纏者。所言蓋者按對法第七云。能令善品不得顯了是蓋義。覆蔽其心障諸善品令不轉故 問於何等位障諸善法 答於樂出家位．覺正行位．止舉舍位。謂於樂出家時貪慾蓋為障。希求受用外境界門。于彼不欣樂故 于覺正行時瞋恚蓋為障。于所犯學處同梵行者正發覺時由心瞋恚不正學故 于止舉兩位惛沈．睡眠．掉舉．惡作蓋為障。如前所說能引沉沒及散亂故。于舍位疑蓋為障。遠離決定不能捨故 疏中所辨言中少別意同於此 問惛沈等四合為二蓋其意云何 答惛沈．睡眠行相相似。睡眠復為惛沈近緣生諸煩惱故合為蓋。故瑜伽論第十一云。無堪任性名惛沈。惛昧心極略性名睡眠。由此惛沉生諸煩惱隨煩惱時。無餘近緣如睡眠者。掉舉．惡作所起處等。設處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果某件事明顯屬於自己的職責範圍，但最終卻不被允許，這違背了什麼道理呢？（這裡）沒有提到『后十』（指後面的十種煩惱）。『后十』是普遍存在的、令人厭惡的心念。由於它們普遍存在，無論發生什麼事都很容易理解，所以沒有特別說明。既然說『緣有漏等』（以有煩惱為緣而生起的法）是參照前面的內容而不另立法則，那麼就應該屬於第二種情況，即適用於其他情況。
《疏》卷第七
《疏》：接下來用五個字來列出名稱，第一種情況是說，列出名稱是必要的，也可以叫做『列名』。
《疏》：『是我惡邊作者』，說『我邊』是爲了表明是指自己。然而，《疏》的文字順序顛倒了，應該說成『我邊惡作』。有的版本寫作『措』，現在按照『錯』字來理解。所以，《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷說：『對於應該做和不應該做的事情，根據情況，或者已經做過，或者還沒有做過，心中產生追悔。心想：我過去為什麼應該做卻沒有做，不應該做反而做了呢？』
《論》：『如余蓋纏者』，所說的『蓋』，按照《對法論》第七卷的說法，是指能夠使善法不能顯現的東西，這就是『蓋』的含義。它覆蓋了我們的心，阻礙了各種善法的生起和發展。問：在什麼情況下會阻礙各種善法呢？答：在樂於出家的時候、覺悟正行的時候、止息和捨棄的時候。具體來說，在樂於出家的時候，貪慾蓋會成為障礙，因為貪求享用外在的境界，所以對出家不感到欣樂。在覺悟正行的時候，瞋恚蓋會成為障礙，因為對於違反戒律的行為，同修梵行的人進行指正時，由於心中瞋恚，不能正確地學習。在止息和捨棄兩種狀態下，惛沉、睡眠、掉舉、惡作蓋會成為障礙，就像前面所說的那樣，它們能夠導致沉沒和散亂。在捨棄的狀態下，疑蓋會成為障礙，因為遠離了決斷，就不能捨棄。疏文中所辨析的內容，意思大致相同。問：為什麼惛沉等四種煩惱合為兩種蓋呢？答：因為惛沉和睡眠的行相相似，而且睡眠又是惛沉產生各種煩惱的近因，所以合為一種蓋。所以，《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷說：『沒有堪能性叫做惛沉，惛昧、心極度收縮的狀態叫做睡眠。由於惛沉會產生各種煩惱和隨煩惱，沒有比睡眠更近的因緣了。』掉舉和惡作的生起之處等等，假設有生起之處……
【English Translation】 English version: If something clearly falls within one's own responsibility, but is ultimately not allowed, what principle is being violated? There is no mention of 'the latter ten' (referring to the latter ten afflictions). 'The latter ten' are pervasive and unpleasant thoughts. Because they are pervasive, it is easy to understand whatever happens, so it is not specifically explained. Since it is said that 'conditioned by the afflicted, etc.' (dharmas arising conditioned by afflictions) refers to the preceding content without establishing separate rules, then it should belong to the second case, which applies to other situations.
Commentary, Scroll 7
Commentary: Next, listing the names with five characters, the first case is saying that listing the names is necessary, and it can also be called 'listing names'.
Commentary: 'The one who creates evil on my side', saying 'my side' is to indicate oneself. However, the text of the Commentary is reversed, and it should be said 'evil creation on my side'. Some versions write it as 'cuo', now understood according to the character 'cuo' (mistake). Therefore, the eleventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Regarding things that should be done and should not be done, according to the situation, either having been done or not yet done, regret arises in the mind. Thinking: Why did I not do what I should have done in the past, and instead did what I should not have done?'
Treatise: 'Like others covered by the hindrances', the 'hindrances' mentioned, according to the seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, refer to things that can prevent good dharmas from manifesting, which is the meaning of 'hindrance'. It covers our minds, hindering the arising and development of various good dharmas. Question: Under what circumstances will it hinder various good dharmas? Answer: At the time of delighting in renunciation, at the time of awakening to right practice, and at the time of cessation and abandonment. Specifically, at the time of delighting in renunciation, the hindrance of greed will become an obstacle, because of craving for the enjoyment of external realms, so one does not feel joy in renunciation. At the time of awakening to right practice, the hindrance of anger will become an obstacle, because when fellow practitioners of the pure life correct behaviors that violate the precepts, due to anger in the mind, one cannot learn correctly. In the two states of cessation and abandonment, the hindrances of torpor, sleep, restlessness, and remorse will become obstacles, just as mentioned earlier, they can lead to sinking and scattering. In the state of abandonment, the hindrance of doubt will become an obstacle, because being far from decisiveness, one cannot abandon. The content analyzed in the Commentary has roughly the same meaning. Question: Why are the four afflictions of torpor, etc., combined into two hindrances? Answer: Because the characteristics of torpor and sleep are similar, and sleep is also a proximate cause of torpor producing various afflictions and secondary afflictions, so they are combined into one hindrance. Therefore, the eleventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'The state of being incapable is called torpor, the state of being dull and the mind being extremely contracted is called sleep. Because torpor will produce various afflictions and secondary afflictions, there is no closer cause than sleep.' The place where restlessness and remorse arise, etc., assuming there is a place where they arise...
不等由掉諠動．惡作憂變相相似故合立一蓋。即瑜伽云。掉舉．惡作俱因親屬尋思國等昔所經事而起之也。故總結云。由前掉舉與此惡作處所等故合說一蓋。處所不等然如彼相騰躍諠動。今此亦是憂變之相。是故與彼雜說一蓋 問止．舉．舍行相云何耶 答按大論七十七云。若心掉舉或恐掉舉時諸可厭法作意。及彼無間心作意是名止相。若心沉沒或恐沉沒時諸可欣法作意。及彼心相作意是名舉相。若於一向止道或於一向觀道或雙運轉道二隨煩惱所染污時。諸無功用作意及心任運轉中所有作意是名舍相。
論。說隨煩惱及癡分故者。按瑜伽論五十五云。隨煩惱自性者。謂忿至惡作．睡眠．尋伺 又云。睡眠．惡作是癡分故皆世俗有。
論。非思惠想纏彼性故者。具如疏辨。有義復云。或彼睡眠皆應說云染不染中隨一攝故。若說前因自隨一不成。自說非是思惠想故。若說后因有法為因違理門故 詳曰。觀疏染凈前後二因實無過矣。且前有法不言思惠直云睡眠。可如所責。前既標云染思惠已后因牒彼。何有過乎 又若后因全取有法可違理門。今者有法與因增減全有不同何有違論。若如所立染非染因乃非論意。如疏所明理通文順。又睡及眠皆有染凈。染凈別開便成四量。疏合言二 疏名不已及如涅槃等者。若但云
境無非境者。言緣名境名境便局。以名不及如涅槃等。今云意境意境乃寬。以意內證真如等故。
論。此二俱以至義類別故者。問對法第一云。尋依思依惠者。于推度．不推度位。如其次第追求行相意言分別。伺依思依惠者。于推度．不推度位。如其次第伺察行相意言分別。如是二種安．不安住所依為業。今言深推不深推者豈不相違 答會如疏．燈。
疏。所對別故者。尋．伺約彼假實相對。悔．眠據于真俗相形。故雖總假立名有別。
疏。但所對別至一切定假者。雖實有體。非勝義故得世俗名。
論。依于尋伺有染離染等者。此同瑜伽第四所說。按彼論云。此中欲界及色界初靜慮。除靜慮中間。若定若生名有尋有伺地。即靜慮中間若定若生名無尋唯伺地。隨一有情由修此故得為大梵。從第二靜慮余有色界及無色界全名無尋無伺地。此中由離尋．伺欲道理說名無尋無伺地。不由不現行故。所以者何。未離欲界欲者。由教導作意差別故。於一時間亦有無尋無伺意現行。已離尋．伺欲者亦有尋．伺現行。如出彼定及生彼者。若無漏界有為定所攝初靜慮。亦名有尋有伺地。依尋．伺處法緣真如為境。入此定故不由分別現行故。余如前說。
論。論說五識有尋伺故者。即瑜伽論五十六也。彼有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『境無非境』的意思是，如果僅僅因為緣起而稱之為『境』，那麼這個『境』的定義就變得狹隘了。因為有些東西，比如涅槃（Nirvana，解脫的境界），是無法用名稱來完全描述的。現在說『意境』，這個概念就寬泛多了，因為『意』可以向內證悟真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）等等。 論：『此二俱以至義類別故者』的意思是，在《對法》第一中說：『尋依思依惠者』，在推度（推理）和不推度（不推理）的狀態下，依次追求行相（事物的外在表現）和意言分別（內心的語言分別）。『伺依思依惠者』，在推度和不推度的狀態下，依次伺察行相和意言分別。這兩種狀態，都以安住和不安住作為所依之業。現在說『深推不深推』，這難道不是相互矛盾嗎？答：可以參照疏和燈的解釋。 疏：『所對別故者』的意思是，尋和伺是相對於假和實而言的，而悔和眠是根據真和俗來區分的。所以雖然都是假立的名詞，但還是有區別的。 疏：『但所對別至一切定假者』的意思是，雖然實際上有實體，但因為不是勝義（ परमार्थ satya，終極真理），所以可以稱為世俗名。 論：『依于尋伺有染離染等者』的意思是，這和《瑜伽師地論》第四所說的一樣。按照那部論的說法，欲界（Kāmadhātu，眾生對感官享樂有慾望的界域）和色界（Rūpadhātu，脫離了粗糙的感官慾望但仍然與物質形式相關的界域）的初禪（初靜慮，Dhyāna，禪定）中，除了靜慮中間（兩個禪定之間的狀態）之外，無論是禪定還是生命狀態，都稱為有尋有伺地（有尋有伺的狀態）。靜慮中間，無論是禪定還是生命狀態，都稱為無尋唯伺地（沒有尋但有伺的狀態）。任何一個有情，通過修習這些禪定，可以成為大梵天（Mahābrahmā，色界天的統治者）。從第二禪（第二靜慮）開始，其餘的色界天和無色界天（Arūpadhātu，完全脫離物質形式的界域）都稱為無尋無伺地（沒有尋也沒有伺的狀態）。這裡說沒有尋和伺，是因為離開了對尋和伺的慾望，而不是因為尋和伺沒有顯現。為什麼這麼說呢？因為沒有離開欲界慾望的人，由於教導和作意的不同，在同一時間也可能出現無尋無伺的意念。而已經離開了尋和伺慾望的人，也可能出現尋和伺的意念，比如出定或者生到那些天界的時候。如果無漏界（Anāsrava-dhātu，沒有煩惱的界域）的有為定（有為法，Saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的法）所包含的初禪，也稱為有尋有伺地。依靠尋和伺，以法緣真如（Dharmadhātu-tathatā，法界的真實本性）為境界，進入這種禪定，不是因為分別現行。其餘的就像前面所說的那樣。 論：『論說五識有尋伺故者』的意思是，就是《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷所說的。那裡有相關內容。
【English Translation】 English version:
'A state is nothing but a state.' To say that a state is named 'state' because of conditions makes the definition narrow. This is because names cannot fully encompass things like Nirvana (the state of liberation). Now, when we say 'mental state,' the concept is much broader, because the 'mind' can inwardly realize Tathata (the true nature of things), and so on. Treatise: 'These two are categorized by their ultimate meaning.' In the first chapter of Abhidharmasamuccaya, it says: 'Seeking relies on thinking and wisdom.' In the states of inference and non-inference, one sequentially seeks the characteristics and mental verbalizations. 'Investigation relies on thinking and wisdom.' In the states of inference and non-inference, one sequentially investigates the characteristics and mental verbalizations. These two states have the function of providing a stable or unstable dwelling place. Now, if we say 'deep investigation' and 'not deep investigation,' isn't this contradictory? Answer: Refer to the commentaries and explanations. Commentary: 'Because the objects are different.' Seeking and investigation are relative to the false and the real, while regret and sleep are based on the true and the conventional. Therefore, although they are all nominally established, there are differences. Commentary: 'But the objects are different, leading to all determinations being false.' Although there is a real substance, it is not ultimate truth (Paramārtha satya), so it is called a conventional name. Treatise: 'Depending on seeking and investigation, there are defilements and non-defilements.' This is the same as what is said in the fourth chapter of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. According to that treatise, in the desire realm (Kāmadhātu) and the first dhyāna (first meditative absorption) of the form realm (Rūpadhātu), except for the intermediate dhyāna (the state between two dhyānas), whether it is a meditative state or a state of existence, it is called the 'state of seeking and investigation.' The intermediate dhyāna, whether it is a meditative state or a state of existence, is called the 'state of no seeking but only investigation.' Any sentient being, by cultivating these dhyānas, can become Mahābrahmā (the ruler of the form realm heavens). From the second dhyāna onwards, the remaining form realm heavens and the formless realm heavens (Arūpadhātu) are all called the 'state of no seeking and no investigation.' Here, the absence of seeking and investigation is said because of the abandonment of the desire for seeking and investigation, not because seeking and investigation do not manifest. Why is this so? Because those who have not abandoned the desires of the desire realm may still have moments of no seeking and no investigation due to different teachings and mental efforts. And those who have abandoned the desires for seeking and investigation may still have moments of seeking and investigation, such as when emerging from meditation or being born in those realms. If the first dhyāna, which is included in the conditioned (Saṃskṛta) state of the unconditioned realm (Anāsrava-dhātu), is also called the 'state of seeking and investigation.' Relying on seeking and investigation, taking Dharmadhātu-tathatā (the true nature of the realm of phenomena) as the object, entering this meditation is not because of the manifestation of discrimination. The rest is as previously stated. Treatise: 'The treatise says that the five consciousnesses have seeking and investigation.' This refers to the fifty-sixth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. There is relevant content there.
問答。問辭疏引。答文今引云。由有尋有伺諸識種子隨逐無尋無伺三摩地故。從彼起已此得現前。又此起已識現行時。復為無尋無伺三摩地種子之所隨逐。是故此地非是一向無尋無伺。由彼有情于諸尋．伺以性離欲而離欲故。彼地雖名無尋無伺。此復現行亦無過失。準斯問答五識故得有尋．伺也。
疏。雖無自性至亦有尋伺者。雖復無文說彼自性即是尋伺。然對法論說彼自性即是有相。有相瑜伽說是尋．伺。以此展轉而談之者。故知五識有尋．伺矣。
論。顯多由彼起。疏有二解。有義彈彼第二解云。疏說生上必尋．伺引方能起下眼等識者。豈起五識要下意引生。在下地尚用上定能引五識。如何生上要起地獄尋．伺識引。未必盡理。然將起上諸地意識能引下眼識等為勝。如大菩薩豈不能以上諸地心引下五識起。故五十六云從無尋伺三摩地起已此得現前。不言更起下地心故。此論且依前後引生說。從定起此得現前。理實八地已去菩薩于諸地心具五識故。故多由言亦在生上而起下者 詳曰。若許上意引下眼等。二定上意尋．伺不有。如何得云顯多由起。又五十六不云出定更起下心。便證上心引下識者。此第二師而據何理云多由起。若云下地多由起者。此不為救。本通於上不會地獄。若云但遮疏云必定不障有時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：為什麼說辭句的疏解是引導性的？ 答：現在引用原文說，由於存在有尋有伺（vitarka-vicara，粗細分別的思考）的各種識（vijñāna，意識）的種子，它們伴隨著無尋無伺三摩地（avitarka-avicara-samādhi，無粗細分別的禪定）。因此，從那個禪定出來之後，這些識才能顯現。而且，當這些識顯現活動時，又會被無尋無伺三摩地的種子所伴隨。所以，這個地（bhūmi，境界）並非完全沒有尋和伺。因為那些有情（sattva，眾生）對於各種尋和伺，通過本性上的離欲而達到離欲。所以，即使那個地被稱為無尋無伺，這些識的再次顯現活動也沒有過失。根據這個問答，五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）確實可以具有尋和伺。
疏解：雖然沒有自性，但也有尋伺。雖然沒有經文直接說五識的自性就是尋伺，但是《對法論》（Abhidharma）說五識的自性就是有相（sa-ākāra，有表象）。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說有相就是尋和伺。通過這種輾轉的論述，可知五識具有尋和伺。
論：經文說，五識的顯現多由彼（指尋伺）而起。疏解對此有兩種解釋。有一種觀點反駁第二種解釋說，疏解說生起上地（ūrdhvabhūmi，更高的境界）的尋伺才能引導生起下地（adho-bhūmi，較低的境界）的眼等識（cakṣur-ādīni-vijñāna，眼等五識），難道生起五識需要下地的意識來引導嗎？即使在下地，尚且可以用上地的禪定來引導五識。為什麼生起上地的識，反而要生起地獄的尋伺識來引導呢？這未必完全合理。然而，將生起上地各種意識（manovijñāna，意識）能夠引導下地眼識等作為更勝一籌的解釋。例如，大菩薩（mahā-bodhisattva）難道不能用上地的心來引導下地五識的生起嗎？所以，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，從無尋伺三摩地出來之後，這些識才能顯現，並沒有說還要生起下地的心。這個論述只是依據前後引導生起來說的。從禪定出來之後，這些識才能顯現。實際上，八地（aṣṭamī bhūmi，第八地）以後的菩薩，對於各個地的心都具備五識。所以，經文中的『多由』也包括在上地生起而引導下地的情況。 詳細地說，如果允許上地的意識引導下地的眼等識，那麼二禪定（dhyāna，禪定）以上的上地意識中沒有尋伺，如何能說『顯現多由彼而起』呢？而且，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷沒有說出定后還要生起下地的心，就以此來證明上地的心可以引導下地的識，這種說法有什麼道理呢？如果說下地的五識多由尋伺而起，這並不能解決問題，因為本來的意思是普遍適用於上地，而不是隻針對地獄。如果說只是爲了遮止疏解中『必定』的說法，那並不妨礙『有時』的情況。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why is it said that the commentary's explanation is guiding? Answer: Now, quoting the original text, it says, 'Because there are seeds of various consciousnesses (vijñāna) with discursive thought and analysis (vitarka-vicara), they accompany the samādhi (concentration) without discursive thought and analysis (avitarka-avicara-samādhi). Therefore, after arising from that samādhi, these consciousnesses can manifest. Moreover, when these consciousnesses manifest and function, they are again accompanied by the seeds of the samādhi without discursive thought and analysis. Therefore, this ground (bhūmi) is not entirely without discursive thought and analysis. Because those sentient beings (sattva), through detachment from desires regarding various discursive thoughts and analysis by their very nature, achieve detachment. Therefore, even though that ground is called without discursive thought and analysis, there is no fault in these consciousnesses manifesting and functioning again.' According to this question and answer, the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) can indeed have discursive thought and analysis.
Commentary: Although there is no self-nature, there is also discursive thought and analysis. Although there is no sutra text that directly says that the self-nature of the five consciousnesses is discursive thought and analysis, the Abhidharma says that the self-nature of the five consciousnesses is with appearance (sa-ākāra). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that with appearance is discursive thought and analysis. Through this roundabout discussion, it is known that the five consciousnesses have discursive thought and analysis.
Treatise: The scripture says that the manifestation of the five consciousnesses mostly arises from that (referring to discursive thought and analysis). The commentary has two explanations for this. One view refutes the second explanation, saying, 'The commentary says that generating discursive thought and analysis of the higher ground (ūrdhvabhūmi) can guide the generation of the eye consciousness, etc. (cakṣur-ādīni-vijñāna) of the lower ground (adho-bhūmi). Does generating the five consciousnesses require the guidance of the consciousness of the lower ground? Even in the lower ground, one can use the samādhi of the higher ground to guide the five consciousnesses. Why, when generating the consciousness of the higher ground, is it necessary to generate the discursive thought and analysis consciousness of the lower realm to guide it? This is not entirely reasonable. However, taking the generation of various consciousnesses (manovijñāna) of the higher ground as being able to guide the eye consciousness, etc. of the lower ground is a superior explanation. For example, can't a great Bodhisattva (mahā-bodhisattva) use the mind of the higher ground to guide the arising of the five consciousnesses of the lower ground? Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 56, says that after arising from the samādhi without discursive thought and analysis, these consciousnesses can manifest, without saying that it is necessary to generate the mind of the lower ground again.' This treatise only speaks based on the sequential guidance of arising. After arising from samādhi, these consciousnesses can manifest. In reality, Bodhisattvas after the eighth ground (aṣṭamī bhūmi) possess the five consciousnesses in the minds of all grounds. Therefore, the phrase 'mostly arises from' in the scripture also includes the situation where the higher ground arises and guides the lower ground. In detail, if it is allowed that the consciousness of the higher ground guides the eye consciousness, etc. of the lower ground, then the consciousness of the higher ground above the second dhyāna (meditative state) does not have discursive thought and analysis. How can it be said that 'manifestation mostly arises from that'? Moreover, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 56, does not say that after emerging from samādhi, it is necessary to generate the mind of the lower ground again, and to use this to prove that the mind of the higher ground can guide the consciousness of the lower ground, what is the basis for this statement? If it is said that the five consciousnesses of the lower ground mostly arise from discursive thought and analysis, this does not solve the problem, because the original meaning is universally applicable to the higher ground, not just targeting the lower realm. If it is said that it is only to prevent the 'necessarily' statement in the commentary, that does not hinder the 'sometimes' situation.
下識引者。若爾云何引五十六不起下心以之為證。本會彼文云多由起。既以彼證不由下引。云何而能會彼文耶。復更何時而由起乎。設言余時無異因故。又云生下當用上定引五識者。引何五識。若引上地。便為自害返證他義。若引下識。下識自地串習可然。上身引下地既不同。何得相例。又菩薩例例亦未可法理合。然起下何過。豈起下識失自在義。如來事智不親證理。豈失如來遍智義乎。又疏且對所諍以明不言一切。未可即以菩薩為例。
疏。此違定中聞聲等者。詳曰。深密據散多分而說。故亦無違。
論。悔但容與無明相應者 問此俱無明應唯不共。不共迷理。此迷不迷。答設爾何違 二俱有失。若不迷者何名相應。所緣異故。若言迷者而因邪見之所引生。親義焉在 答傳有三釋。一云但言不共有親迷理。非皆親迷。二云雖邪見力之所引生。不緣見起故亦親迷。三云悔俱無明亦是非主。由此染悔非親迷攝 有義斷云。然悔親迷其理難見。故說不共有非親迷。雖違論文理相順也 詳曰。夫染悔者悔修于善悔不作惡。此豈非迷苦諦理耶。雖復邪見前後引生。不緣為境。親迷何失。無文遮故。
論。聞思位中有悔眠故者 問眠無五識何得有聞 答有二釋。一云緣所受境聞說法等亦得名聞。二云眠但有思
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：下識的『引』是什麼意思？如果這樣，為什麼用五十六種不起下心的情況來作為證據呢？《瑜伽師地論》的原文說『多由起』，既然用它來證明不是由下識引導，又怎麼能符合原文的意思呢？又在什麼時候是由『起』產生的呢？如果說在其他時候，因為沒有其他原因。又說產生下地時應當用上地來決定引導五識，那麼引導的是哪五識呢？如果引導上地的五識，就成了自相矛盾，反而證明了對方的觀點。如果引導下識，下識在自己的地界串習是可以理解的。上身引導下地的情況不同，怎麼能相提並論呢？又用菩薩來舉例也不符合法理。然而，生起下識有什麼過錯呢？難道生起下識就失去了自在的意義嗎？如來的事智不親自證悟真理，難道就失去了如來的遍智嗎？而且疏文只是針對所爭論的點來說明，並沒有說一切情況都如此，不能立即用菩薩來作為例子。
疏文說：『這與在禪定中聽到聲音等情況相違背。』詳細解釋說：《深密解脫經》是根據散亂狀態下的大部分情況來說的，所以也沒有違背。
論：『悔恨只與無明相應。』問：這種相應只是與不共無明相應嗎？不共無明迷惑真理，而這種悔恨是迷惑還是不迷惑真理呢？答：如果這樣，有什麼違背呢？二者都有過失。如果不迷惑真理，那怎麼能說是相應呢？因為所緣的境界不同。如果說是迷惑真理，但是由邪見的勢力所引導產生，那麼『親』的意義在哪裡呢？答：傳承中有三種解釋。第一種解釋說：只是說不共無明有直接迷惑真理的作用，並非所有情況都是直接迷惑。第二種解釋說：雖然是由邪見的勢力所引導產生，但是不緣于見而生起，所以也是直接迷惑。第三種解釋說：與悔恨相應的無明也不是主要的，因此這種染污的悔恨不屬於直接迷惑。有一種觀點斷定說：然而，悔恨直接迷惑真理這一點難以理解，所以說不共無明並非直接迷惑，雖然違背了論文，但道理上是順暢的。詳細解釋說：所謂的染污的悔恨，是悔恨修習善法，悔恨沒有作惡。這難道不是迷惑了苦諦的道理嗎？即使有邪見在前後引導產生，但悔恨並不以邪見為境界，直接迷惑真理又有什麼過失呢？因為沒有經文遮止。
論：『在聞思位中有悔恨和睡眠。』問：睡眠時沒有五識，怎麼會有聽聞呢？答：有兩種解釋。第一種解釋說：緣于所領受的境界，聽聞說法等也可以稱為聽聞。第二種解釋說：睡眠時只有思。
【English Translation】 English version: What does the 'leading' of the lower consciousness (adhah-citta) mean? If so, why use the fifty-six instances of not generating lower thoughts as evidence? The original text of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says 'mostly arises from'. Since it is used to prove that it is not led by the lower consciousness, how can it be consistent with the meaning of the original text? And when does it arise from 'arising'? If it is said that at other times, because there is no other reason. Also, it is said that when generating the lower realm, the upper realm should be used to determine the leading of the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna), then which five consciousnesses are being led? If the five consciousnesses of the upper realm are being led, it becomes self-contradictory and instead proves the other party's point. If the lower consciousness is being led, it is understandable that the lower consciousness is familiar with its own realm. The situation of the upper body leading the lower realm is different, so how can they be compared? Furthermore, using the example of a Bodhisattva (bodhisattva) is not in accordance with the Dharma (dharma). However, what is wrong with generating lower consciousness? Does generating lower consciousness lose the meaning of freedom? If the Tathāgata's (tathāgata) knowledge of affairs does not personally realize the truth, does it lose the Tathāgata's omniscient meaning? Moreover, the commentary only explains the point of contention and does not say that everything is like this, so one cannot immediately use the Bodhisattva as an example.
The commentary says: 'This contradicts the situation of hearing sounds etc. in meditation (dhyāna).' A detailed explanation says: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra is based on most situations in a scattered state, so there is no contradiction.
Treatise: 'Regret (kaukṛtya) is only associated with ignorance (avidyā).' Question: Is this association only with non-common ignorance? Non-common ignorance confuses the truth, but does this regret confuse the truth or not? Answer: If so, what is the contradiction? Both have faults. If it does not confuse the truth, then how can it be said to be associated? Because the object of focus is different. If it is said to confuse the truth, but it is generated by the power of wrong views (mithyā-dṛṣṭi), then where is the meaning of 'direct'? Answer: There are three explanations in the tradition. The first explanation says: It only says that non-common ignorance has the direct function of confusing the truth, not that all situations are direct confusion. The second explanation says: Although it is generated by the power of wrong views, it does not arise from seeing, so it is also direct confusion. The third explanation says: The ignorance associated with regret is not the main one, so this defiled regret does not belong to direct confusion. One view asserts: However, it is difficult to understand that regret directly confuses the truth, so it is said that non-common ignorance is not direct confusion, although it contradicts the treatise, it is logically consistent. A detailed explanation says: The so-called defiled regret is regretting practicing good deeds and regretting not doing evil. Isn't this confusing the truth of the suffering (duḥkha)? Even if wrong views guide and generate it before and after, regret does not take wrong views as its object, so what is wrong with directly confusing the truth? Because there is no sutra (sūtra) that prohibits it.
Treatise: 'In the stages of hearing (śruta) and thinking (cinta), there is regret and sleep (middha).' Question: There are no five consciousnesses during sleep, so how can there be hearing? Answer: There are two explanations. The first explanation says: Focusing on the received realm, hearing the Dharma (dharma) being taught can also be called hearing. The second explanation says: There is only thinking during sleep.
。文中總舉非顯眠位得名聞也。今取前釋。
論。亦非如憂深求解脫故者。憂求解脫是無漏根。故通不斷。故對法論第十云。未知根者謂信等五意．喜．樂．憂．舍。已知根體數亦同之。
論。若已斷故非所斷攝者 問不還斷眠。何故唯言無學斷已名非所斷 答不還能緣縛未盡故不同無學。
論。說正思惟至尋求等故者。按顯揚第二說為無漏及為尋也。即彼論云。二正思惟謂依正見．與彼俱行離欲思惟．無恚思惟．無害思惟。于修道中相續作意思惟諸諦。與無漏作意相應令心趣入．極趣入．尋求．極尋求 釋曰。趣猶向也。入是解也。尋謂推尋。此趣．尋等各有勝劣故有極言。余文可悉。
問伺何不入八道支耶 答未見大乘所明之文。且依有宗。婆沙論九十九云。伺無彼相是故不立。複次菩提分法行相猛利。伺用微劣是故不立。複次伺用為尋所覆損故。于策正見尋用偏增。故伺不立菩提分法 有義顯揚論云尋求．極尋求此即是尋。趣入．極趣入此即是伺。二種總名正思惟支。與小乘別故亦無失。又瑜伽二十九云。由此正見增上力故。所起出離無恚．無害分別思惟名正思惟。若心趣入諸所尋伺。彼唯尋思如是相狀所有尋伺。若心趣入諸所言論。
論。又說彼是言說因者。對法論云。正思
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 文中總是舉出非顯眠位（指非明顯的睡眠狀態）來獲得名聲和聞達。現在採用之前的解釋。
論：也不是像因為憂愁而深刻尋求解脫的緣故。因為憂愁而尋求解脫是無漏根（指超越煩惱的根源），所以普遍存在而不會被斷除。因此，《對法論》第十卷說：『未知根者，是指信等五意（指信、精進、念、定、慧五種心理作用）、喜、樂、憂、舍。已知根的體性和數量也與此相同。』
論：如果因為已經斷除而不屬於所斷的範疇，那麼，問：不還者（指不再返回欲界的人）斷除了睡眠，為什麼只說無學者（指已證阿羅漢果的人）斷除后才稱為非所斷呢？答：因為不還者所能緣的束縛還沒有完全斷盡，所以與無學者不同。
論：經文說正思惟乃至尋求等，是這個緣故。按照《顯揚聖教論》第二卷所說，這是爲了無漏以及爲了尋（指尋求真理）。即該論說：『二正思惟，是指依靠正見，與正見同時生起的離欲思惟、無恚思惟、無害思惟。在修道中，相續不斷地作意思惟諸諦（指苦、集、滅、道四聖諦），與無漏作意相應，使心趣入、極趣入、尋求、極尋求。』解釋說：趣，就像是趨向。入，是理解。尋，是推尋。這趣、尋等各有勝劣，所以有『極』字。其餘的文字都可以理解。
問：為什麼伺（指細緻的觀察）不進入八道支（指八正道）呢？答：沒有見到大乘所闡明的相關經文。暫且依據有宗（指說一切有部）。《婆沙論》第九十九卷說：『因為伺沒有那種猛利的特性，所以不設立。』又，菩提分法（指三十七道品）的行相猛利，伺的作用微弱，所以不設立。又，伺的作用被尋所覆蓋和減損，所以在策正見時，尋的作用偏重增加，所以伺不設立為菩提分法。有義認為，《顯揚聖教論》說尋求、極尋求，這就是尋。趣入、極趣入，這就是伺。這兩種總稱為正思惟支。與小乘有所區別，所以也沒有過失。又，《瑜伽師地論》第二十九卷說：『由於正見的增強作用，所產生的出離、無恚、無害的分別思惟，稱為正思惟。如果心趨向于各種尋伺，那麼這些只是尋思這些相狀的所有尋伺。如果心趨向于各種言論，』
論：又說它是言說的原因。《對法論》說：正思
【English Translation】 English version: The text often cites non-manifest sleep states to gain fame and reputation. Now, we adopt the previous explanation.
Treatise: It is not like seeking liberation due to deep sorrow. Seeking liberation due to sorrow is a non-outflow root (an untainted root), so it is universal and not severed. Therefore, the tenth volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'The unknown root refers to the five mental activities of faith, etc. (faith, diligence, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), joy, pleasure, sorrow, and equanimity. The substance and number of the known root are also the same.'
Treatise: If it is not included in what is to be severed because it has already been severed, then, Question: The Anāgāmin (Non-Returner) severs sleep, why is it only said that the Arhat (one who has attained Arhatship) severs it and it is called non-severed? Answer: Because the bonds that the Anāgāmin can still cling to have not been completely severed, so it is different from the Arhat.
Treatise: The scripture says right thought, even seeking, etc., is the reason for this. According to the second volume of the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations, this is for the non-outflow and for seeking (seeking the truth). That is, the treatise says: 'Two right thoughts refer to relying on right view, and the thoughts of detachment, non-anger, and non-harm that arise simultaneously with right view. In the practice of the path, continuously directing the mind to contemplate the Four Noble Truths (suffering, accumulation, cessation, and the path), corresponding to the non-outflow attention, causing the mind to approach, extremely approach, seek, and extremely seek.' The explanation says: Approaching is like tending towards. Entering is understanding. Seeking is investigating. These approaching, seeking, etc., each have their own strengths and weaknesses, so there is the word 'extremely'. The rest of the text can be understood.
Question: Why doesn't Vicāra (subtle discernment) enter the Eightfold Path? Answer: I have not seen the texts clarified by the Mahāyāna. For now, based on the Sarvāstivāda school, the ninety-ninth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā says: 'Because Vicāra does not have that intense characteristic, it is not established.' Also, the characteristics of the limbs of enlightenment (the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment) are intense, and the function of Vicāra is weak, so it is not established. Also, the function of Vicāra is covered and diminished by Vitarka (initial application of thought), so when urging right view, the function of Vitarka is emphasized and increased, so Vicāra is not established as a limb of enlightenment. Some argue that the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations says seeking, extremely seeking, this is Vitarka. Approaching, extremely approaching, this is Vicāra. These two are collectively called the limb of right thought. It is different from the Hīnayāna, so there is no fault. Also, the twenty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Due to the increased power of right view, the thoughts of renunciation, non-anger, and non-harm that arise are called right thought. If the mind tends towards various Vitarka and Vicāra, then these are only the Vitarka and Vicāra of these characteristics. If the mind tends towards various speech,'
Treatise: It is also said that it is the cause of speech. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: Right thoug
惟者是悔示他支。如其所證方便安立發語言故。即瑜伽云。若心趣入諸所言論亦言說因。
疏。十地第一至尋無漏者 問彼論無有正思惟言。據何說有 答彼論牒頌凈覺人者。依梵論本云思惟也。疏依梵文故無有失 問經云思惟云何即證尋成無漏 答言思惟者八道支一。體即是尋。故得為證。又解脫月諸菩薩眾。請金剛藏釋十地義。準十地經嘆菩薩德。金剛藏等八地上位。上位意識唯是無漏。解脫月等嘆云凈覺。凈覺明知體非有漏。
疏。問既引十地至語言因故者。此難意云。言思惟者是本經頌。論家釋云。何故唯嘆凈覺。凈覺是言說因故。覺名覺觀。是口言行。準其論文亦得為證。何故不引。
疏。故引不同彼但應云凈思惟者。顯今論家但引本經不引論釋。不引論意具辨如燈 問若引本經經頌不云正思惟者是語言因。何得引之證是說因 答文雖不言理必可故。故經頌云。何故凈覺人念智功德具。說諸上妙地有力不解釋。既云凈覺說上妙地今何不釋。明知凈覺即是說因。不爾如何敘有凈覺責不釋耶 詳曰。觀文察理兼論無傷。何所以者。且覺觀言。若梵本有。即不應責譯主加增。若梵本無。想唯識師不引此謬。取彼正論思惟之言。通證因果言說之由竟有何失。論說說因甚明著故。更思。
論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：只有悔示他支（hetu-pratyaya-nidarsana-hetu，原因顯示的支分）。如果根據所證悟的方便法門安立和發起語言的緣故。正如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）所說：『如果心趣入于各種言論，也是言說的原因。』
疏：十地（Dasabhumika）從第一地到尋無漏（vitarka-nirvedha）的問題：有人問，該論典中沒有『正思惟』（samyak-smrti）的說法，根據什麼說有正思惟呢？回答說，該論典引用頌文『凈覺人』（visuddha-buddhi-man），依據梵文原本說是『思惟』。疏釋依據梵文，所以沒有錯誤。有人問，經文說思惟如何就能證成尋而成為無漏呢？回答說，所說的思惟是八正道（astangika-marga）之一，其體性就是尋，所以可以作為證成。另外，解脫月（Vimukticandra）等諸菩薩眾，請問金剛藏（Vajragarbha）解釋十地之義，依據《十地經》（Dasabhumika-sutra）讚歎菩薩的功德。金剛藏等八地以上的菩薩，上位意識唯是無漏。解脫月等讚歎為『凈覺』，凈覺明確知道其體性不是有漏。
疏：有人問，既然引用十地到『語言因故』，這個提問的意思是說，所說的思惟是本經的頌文，論家的解釋說，為什麼只讚歎凈覺？凈覺是言說的原因。覺名為覺觀（vitarka-vicara），是口頭語言的行為，依據其論文也可以作為證據，為什麼不引用？
疏：所以引用不同，他們只應該說『凈思惟』，顯示現在的論家只引用本經而不引用論釋，不引用論釋的意義詳細辨析如燈火般清楚。有人問，如果引用本經，經文頌詞沒有說『正思惟』是語言的原因，怎麼能引用它來證明是言說的原因呢？回答說，文句雖然沒有說，但道理必然可以這樣推斷。所以經文頌詞說：『為什麼凈覺人具有念智功德，卻不解釋諸上妙地（adhimatra-bhumi）的有力之處？』既然說凈覺能說上妙地，現在為什麼不解釋呢？明明知道凈覺就是言說的原因。不然，如何敘述有凈覺卻責怪不解釋呢？詳細地說，觀察文句，考察道理，兼顧論典，沒有損害。為什麼這樣說呢？且說覺觀，如果梵文字有，就不應該責怪譯者增加。如果梵文字沒有，想必唯識師（vijnanavada）不會引用這個錯誤，而採取他們正論中思惟的說法，來貫通證明因果言說的由來，究竟有什麼過失呢？論典中說言說的原因非常明顯，再思考一下。
論
【English Translation】 English version: Only the hetu-pratyaya-nidarsana-hetu (the condition that shows the cause). Because it is based on the means of realization to establish and initiate language. As the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'If the mind is interested in all kinds of speech, it is also the cause of speech.'
Commentary: The Dasabhumika (Ten Stages) from the first stage to vitarka-nirvedha (seeking without outflows): Someone asks, there is no mention of 'samyak-smrti' (right mindfulness) in that treatise, according to what is it said to exist? The answer is that the treatise quotes the verse 'visuddha-buddhi-man' (purely enlightened person), which according to the Sanskrit original is 'thinking'. The commentary is based on the Sanskrit text, so there is no error. Someone asks, how can thinking, as stated in the sutra, prove seeking and become without outflows? The answer is that thinking is one of the astangika-marga (Eightfold Path), and its essence is seeking, so it can be used as proof. In addition, the bodhisattvas such as Vimukticandra (Moon of Liberation) asked Vajragarbha (Diamond Womb) to explain the meaning of the Ten Stages, and praised the merits of the bodhisattvas according to the Dasabhumika-sutra. Bodhisattvas such as Vajragarbha who are above the eighth stage, their higher consciousness is only without outflows. Vimukticandra and others praised them as 'visuddha-buddhi' (pure enlightenment), and pure enlightenment clearly knows that its essence is not with outflows.
Commentary: Someone asks, since the Ten Stages are quoted up to 'because of the cause of language', the meaning of this question is that the thinking mentioned is a verse from this sutra, and the commentator explains, why only praise pure enlightenment? Pure enlightenment is the cause of language. The name of enlightenment is vitarka-vicara (seeking and examining), which is the behavior of oral language, and according to its thesis, it can also be used as evidence, why not quote it?
Commentary: Therefore, the quotations are different, they should only say 'pure thinking', showing that the current commentators only quote the sutra and not the commentary, and the meaning of not quoting the commentary is clearly distinguished like a lamp. Someone asks, if the sutra is quoted, the verse does not say that 'right thinking' is the cause of language, how can it be quoted to prove that it is the cause of speech? The answer is that although the sentence does not say it, the principle must be inferred in this way. Therefore, the sutra verse says: 'Why do purely enlightened people have the merits of mindfulness and wisdom, but do not explain the powerful aspects of the adhimatra-bhumi (superior stages)?' Since it is said that pure enlightenment can speak of the superior stages, why not explain it now? It is clear that pure enlightenment is the cause of speech. Otherwise, how can one describe having pure enlightenment but blame not explaining it? In detail, observing the sentences, examining the principles, and considering the treatises, there is no harm. Why is this so? Moreover, regarding seeking and examining, if the Sanskrit original has it, one should not blame the translator for adding it. If the Sanskrit original does not have it, presumably the vijnanavada (Consciousness-only) masters would not quote this error, but take the statement of thinking in their correct treatise to connect and prove the origin of causal speech, what fault is there after all? The treatise says that the cause of speech is very clear, think about it again.
Treatise
。后得智至必假尋伺者。問根本智中有尋．伺耶 答無。故瑜伽論七十三云。問若思惟真如即觀真如耶。設觀真如即思惟真如耶。答應作四句。有思惟真如非觀真如。謂以分別所攝如理作意思惟真如。但見真如相不見實真如。乃至未至正通達位。及通達後作意思惟安立真如。有觀真如非思惟真如。謂通達真如時由勝義故思惟其相。有思惟真如亦觀真如。謂通達后相續思惟非安立真如。有不思惟真如亦不觀真如。謂離如理所引作意思惟諸相 釋曰。其第二句即根本智。言非思惟。明無尋．伺 若爾云何言由勝義思惟其相 答不同加行．后得智等云非思惟。然親證真言由勝義名思惟其相。思惟乃是能緣異名 亦如出世末那之名。非染意故不名思量。無漏正思亦名為意。
成唯識論演秘卷第五(終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第六(疏第七餘)
沙門智周撰
論。莊嚴論許心似二現等者。按隋所譯論第五云。能取．及所取此二唯心光。貪光．及信光二光無二法 釋曰。求唯識人應知能取．所取此之二種唯是心光。如是貪等煩惱光．及信等善法光。如是二光亦無染．凈二法。何以故。不離心光別有貪等染．凈法故 詳曰。準此疏云能取．所取名似二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：后得智的獲得是否必須依賴尋伺（Vitarka-vicara，粗略和精細的心理活動）？ 答：並非如此。問：根本智（Mula-jnana，根本的智慧）中是否有尋（Vitarka）和伺（Vicara）？ 答：沒有。所以《瑜伽師地論》第七十三卷說：『問：如果思惟真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性），就是觀真如嗎？如果觀真如，就是思惟真如嗎？』 答：應該作四句回答： 1. 有思惟真如而非觀真如的情況。這是指以分別心所攝持的如理作意（Yoniso-manasikara，如理作意）來思惟真如，只能見到真如的表相，而不能見到真如的真實體性，直到未達到真正通達的階段，以及通達之後，作意思惟安立的真如。 2. 有觀真如而非思惟真如的情況。這是指在通達真如時，由於勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，最高的真理）的緣故，思惟真如的體相。 3. 有思惟真如也觀真如的情況。這是指在通達之後，相續思惟真如，但不是安立的真如。 4. 有不思惟真如也不觀真如的情況。這是指遠離如理作意所引發的作意思惟的各種表相。 解釋：其中的第二句就是指根本智，說『非思惟』，表明沒有尋和伺。 如果這樣，為什麼說『由於勝義諦思惟其相』呢？ 答：這與加行位（Prayoga-marga，修行位）和后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，獲得根本智后所產生的智慧）等不同，所以說『非思惟』。然而，親證真如時，由於勝義諦的緣故，稱為『思惟其相』。這裡的『思惟』只是能緣（Alambana，所緣境）的另一種名稱。也像出世間的末那識（Manas，末那識）的名稱一樣，因為它不是染污的意，所以不稱為思量。無漏的正思也稱為意。 問： 《成唯識論演秘》卷第五（終） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1833 《成唯識論演秘》
《成唯識論演秘》卷第六（疏第七餘） 沙門智周撰
論：莊嚴論允許心識顯現為能取和所取二相等等。按照隋朝所翻譯的《攝大乘論》第五卷所說：『能取和所取，這二者都只是心光。貪的光和信的光，這兩種光沒有染污和清凈的差別。』 解釋：學習唯識的人應該知道，能取（Grahaka，能取者）和所取（Grahya，所取者）這兩種都只是心光。像貪等煩惱的光，以及信等善法的光，這兩種光也沒有染污和清凈的差別。為什麼呢？因為離開心光，就沒有另外的貪等染污和清凈的法。詳細地說，根據這個疏文，能取和所取被稱為『似二』。
【English Translation】 English version: Q: Is the attainment of Prsthalabdha-jnana (subsequent wisdom) necessarily dependent on Vitarka-vicara (gross and subtle mental activity)? A: Not necessarily. Q: Are Vitarka (gross mental activity) and Vicara (subtle mental activity) present in Mula-jnana (fundamental wisdom)? A: No. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 73, says: 'Q: If one contemplates Tathata (suchness, the true nature of things), is that the same as observing Tathata? If one observes Tathata, is that the same as contemplating Tathata?' A: The answer should be in four parts: 1. There is contemplation of Tathata that is not observation of Tathata. This refers to contemplating Tathata with Yoniso-manasikara (reasoned attention) governed by discrimination, only seeing the appearance of Tathata but not seeing the true essence of Tathata, until the stage of genuine understanding is reached, and after understanding, contemplating the established Tathata with reasoned attention. 2. There is observation of Tathata that is not contemplation of Tathata. This refers to contemplating the characteristics of Tathata due to Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth) when understanding Tathata. 3. There is contemplation of Tathata that is also observation of Tathata. This refers to continuously contemplating Tathata after understanding, but not the established Tathata. 4. There is neither contemplation of Tathata nor observation of Tathata. This refers to being apart from the various appearances of reasoned attention induced by Yoniso-manasikara. Explanation: The second statement refers to Mula-jnana, saying 'not contemplation,' indicating the absence of Vitarka and Vicara. If so, why is it said 'contemplating its characteristics due to Paramartha-satya'? A: This is different from the Prayoga-marga (path of practice) and Prsthalabdha-jnana, so it is said 'not contemplation.' However, when directly realizing Tathata, it is called 'contemplating its characteristics' due to Paramartha-satya. 'Contemplation' here is just another name for Alambana (object of cognition). It is also like the name of the supramundane Manas (mind), because it is not a defiled mind, it is not called thinking. Non-defiled right thought is also called mind. Q: Verses from Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra-vyakhya, Volume 5 (End) T43, No. 1833 Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra-vyakhya
Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra-vyakhya, Volume 6 (Commentary 7 Remaining) Composed by Sramana Zhizhou
Treatise: The Ornament Sastra allows the mind to appear as the dual aspects of grasper and grasped, etc. According to the fifth volume of the Mahayana-samgraha-sastra translated during the Sui dynasty: 'The grasper and the grasped, these two are only the light of the mind. The light of greed and the light of faith, these two lights have no difference between defilement and purity.' Explanation: Those who study Vijnapti (consciousness-only) should know that the Grahaka (grasper) and the Grahya (grasped) are both only the light of the mind. Like the light of afflictions such as greed, and the light of virtuous dharmas such as faith, these two lights also have no difference between defilement and purity. Why? Because apart from the light of the mind, there are no separate defiled and pure dharmas such as greed. In detail, according to this commentary, the grasper and the grasped are called 'seemingly two'.
現。文理相順。
論。他性相應非自性者。按對法雲。同行相應者。謂心．心法於一所緣展轉同行。此相應復有多義。謂他性相應非己性。如心不與余心相應。受不與受相應。瑜伽所明如前已引。
論。又如何說至如與日光等者。按楞伽經第七云。心．心數法一時非前後。如日共光明一時而有。分別種種相。
疏。彼計六識體一等者。有義彈云。此未必然。彼意但說同是了別。前後分位六識不同 詳曰。識若有六喻豈得成。所喻四蘊體計一故。若了別同約位分六。體實別者應所比蘊蘊義是同約位分四。體應各別同能喻識。由斯過故故計體一。縱非本計然為前難故轉計也。況復經論明一心詩。
疏。經說燈明喻者。略有二釋。一云燈明及炷以喻同時心．心所法。二云如燃眾燈其明和合。諸心．心所和合亦爾 詳曰。前釋為善。何以所然。瑜伽論云。又余經說。如是諸法恒共和合。又佛世尊為欲成立此和合義說燈明喻。若如后解喻有不遍。以燃燈事或一或多而不定故。燈明與炷必定相隨和合義盡。
論。緣謂作意等緣者。有義然說取色必藉明者。依闇所障瓶瓦等說。理實暗色眼亦能見。又夜行類不藉明生。水行之類不待空發。又于琉璃．頗眤迦等障色之中亦不藉空。天眼發識空．明不藉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
論：他性相應非自性者（指心和心所之間的相互依存關係，而不是各自獨立的自性）。按照《阿毗達磨對法論》所說：『同行相應者，謂心、心法於一所緣展轉同行。』（同行相應指的是心和心所法在同一個所緣境上相互作用，共同執行。）這種相應有很多含義，指的是他性相應而非己性。比如心不會和另一個心相應，受（感受）不會和另一個受相應。《瑜伽師地論》所闡明的道理如前文已經引用。
論：又如何說至如與日光等者（又如何解釋心和心所同時生起，如陽光和光芒同時存在）？按照《楞伽經》第七卷所說：『心、心數法一時非前後，如日共光明一時而有，分別種種相。』（心和心所法是同時產生的，不是有先後順序的，就像太陽和它的光芒同時存在，能夠分辨種種不同的現象。）
疏：彼計六識體一等者（他們認為六識的本體是一樣的）？有一種觀點反駁說：『這不一定。』他們的意思是說，只是都具有了別的作用，前後不同階段的六識是不同的。詳細地說，如果識有六種，這個比喻怎麼能成立呢？所比喻的四蘊（色、受、想、行）的本體被認為是一個，如果了別作用相同，只是在不同階段分為六識，本體實際上是不同的，那麼所比喻的蘊的意義也應該是相同，只是在不同階段分為四蘊，本體應該各自不同，如同能比喻的識一樣。因為這個過失，所以認為本體是一個。即使不是他們原本的觀點，也是爲了應對之前的難題而轉變的觀點。更何況經典和論典都闡明一心。
疏：經說燈明喻者（經中用燈的光明來作比喻）？大概有兩種解釋。一種解釋是，燈的光明和燈芯用來比喻同時存在的心和心所法。另一種解釋是，就像點燃許多燈，它們的光明融合在一起一樣，各種心和心所也融合在一起。詳細地說，前一種解釋更好。為什麼這麼說呢？《瑜伽師地論》說：『又余經說，如是諸法恒共和合。』（其他經典也說，這些法總是共同和合的。）而且佛世尊爲了成立這種和合的意義，才說了燈明的比喻。如果像后一種解釋，這個比喻就不夠普遍。因為點燈這件事，可以是一盞燈，也可以是多盞燈，不確定。燈的光明和燈芯必定相隨，和合的意義就完備了。
論：緣謂作意等緣者（緣指的是作意等緣），有一種觀點認為，看到顏色必須藉助光明。這是依據黑暗遮蔽瓶子、瓦片等情況來說的。實際上，在沒有光的情況下，眼睛也能看到顏色。而且夜間活動的生物不需要光也能看見。水中的生物不需要空間也能活動。而且在琉璃、頗胝迦等能阻礙顏色的物體中，也不需要空間。天眼產生意識，不需要空間和光明。
【English Translation】 English version
Treatise: 'Other-nature correspondence, not self-nature' (refers to the interdependent relationship between mind and mental factors, rather than their respective independent self-natures). According to the Abhidharma-samuccaya, 'Co-occurring correspondence refers to mind and mental factors co-occurring and interacting with each other on a single object.' This correspondence has many meanings, referring to other-nature correspondence rather than self-nature. For example, mind does not correspond with another mind, and feeling (sensation) does not correspond with another feeling. The principles explained in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra have already been cited earlier.
Treatise: 'Furthermore, how to explain that it is like sunlight, etc.?' (How to explain that mind and mental factors arise simultaneously, like sunlight and its rays existing at the same time?) According to the seventh volume of the Lankavatara Sutra, 'Mind and mental factors are simultaneous, not sequential, like the sun and its light existing at the same time, distinguishing various phenomena.'
Commentary: 'They believe that the substance of the six consciousnesses is the same?' One view refutes, 'This is not necessarily so.' Their intention is only to say that they all have the function of discernment, and the six consciousnesses are different in different stages. In detail, if there are six consciousnesses, how can this analogy be established? The substance of the four aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition) that are being compared is considered to be one. If the function of discernment is the same, but divided into six consciousnesses in different stages, and the substance is actually different, then the meaning of the aggregates being compared should also be the same, but divided into four aggregates in different stages, and the substance should be different from each other, just like the consciousnesses that can be compared. Because of this fault, it is believed that the substance is one. Even if it is not their original view, it is a changed view to deal with the previous difficulty. Moreover, the sutras and treatises all clarify the one mind.
Commentary: 'The sutra uses the analogy of the light of a lamp?' There are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that the light of the lamp and the wick are used to illustrate the mind and mental factors that exist simultaneously. The other explanation is that just as many lamps are lit and their light merges together, so too do the various minds and mental factors merge together. In detail, the former explanation is better. Why is that? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, 'Also, other sutras say that these dharmas are always together and harmonious.' Moreover, the World-Honored One, in order to establish this meaning of harmony, spoke of the analogy of the light of a lamp. If it is like the latter explanation, this analogy is not universal enough. Because the act of lighting a lamp can be one lamp or many lamps, it is uncertain. The light of the lamp and the wick must accompany each other, and the meaning of harmony is complete.
Treatise: 'Conditions refer to attention, etc.?' One view believes that seeing color must rely on light. This is based on the situation where darkness obscures bottles, tiles, etc. In reality, the eyes can also see color without light. Moreover, nocturnal creatures can see without light. Aquatic creatures can move without space. Moreover, in objects that obstruct color, such as crystal and sphatika, space is also not needed. The divine eye produces consciousness without needing space and light.
詳曰。或夜行等亦待明等。望於人等雖即是暗。對鵂鹠等何廢是明。如於一境四見異故。人觀琉璃障外之色。要彼琉璃而遠於眼方能見之。若近於眼中無空者亦不能見。以此而言還待于空。魚等類悉。
論。謂五識身內依本識等者。問今言內外依何義明 答有二釋。一云約十二處。本識意處之所攝故名之為內。作意法處故名外也。二唯第八識。若種若現生根本故獨名為內。所餘諸緣非根本故皆名為外。論依后說。
疏。雖總言六遠三近一者。有二釋。一云當地名近。異地名遠。眼．耳身三下地法故。二云先滅名遠。后滅名近。由生彼天四識不生有前後故。前釋為正。本意顯彼所滅之識非皆當地。置遠近言。
論。聖教說彼無轉識故者。即顯揚論第一云。無想天者謂先於此間得無想定。由此後生無想有情天處。不恒現行諸心．心法滅性。又五蘊論亦云不恒現行心．心法滅。對法亦同。
論。必起潤生煩惱故者。按瑜伽論五十九云。結生相續略有七種。一纏及隨眠結生相續。謂諸異生。二唯隨眠結生相續。謂見聖蹟。三正知入胎結生。謂輪王。四正知入住結生。謂獨覺。五於一切位不失正念結生。謂諸菩薩。六業所引發結生。謂除菩薩。七智所引發結生。謂諸菩薩 又對法論第五云。中有初相續
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 詳曰：或者夜間行走等情況也需要等待天亮等條件。對於人來說，即使是黑暗，但對於鵂鹠（xiū liú，一種貓頭鷹）等動物來說，又怎麼能說是黑暗呢？就像在同一個境界中，四種不同的生物所見到的景象不同一樣。人觀看琉璃（liú lí，一種有色玻璃）屏障外的顏色，需要琉璃遠離眼睛才能看到。如果琉璃靠近眼睛，沒有空隙，也無法看到。由此來說，還是需要空間的。魚等也是如此。
論：所謂五識身內在根本識等處所依，請問現在所說的內外，是依據什麼意義來闡明的？回答有兩種解釋。一種說法是依據十二處（十二處：眼處、耳處、鼻處、舌處、身處、意處、色處、聲處、香處、味處、觸處、法處）來解釋。根本識屬於意處所管轄，所以稱為內。作意屬於法處，所以稱為外。另一種解釋是唯有第八識（第八識：阿賴耶識），無論是種子還是現行，都是根本，所以單獨稱為內。其餘的各種因緣，不是根本，所以都稱為外。論中依據后一種說法。
疏：雖然總的來說有六遠三近，這裡有兩種解釋。一種說法是當地稱為近，異地稱為遠。眼、耳、身這三種屬於下地法，所以是近。另一種說法是先滅的稱為遠，后滅的稱為近。因為生到彼天時，四識（四識：眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識）不生，有先後順序。前一種解釋是正確的。本意是顯示那些滅去的識並非都在當地，所以設定遠近的說法。
論：聖教說彼處沒有轉識（轉識：轉變的意識）的緣故。即《顯揚論》第一卷說：無想天（無想天：佛教二十八天中的一種）是指先在此間獲得無想定（無想定：一種禪定狀態），由此後來生到無想有情天處。不恒常現行的各種心、心法（心法：心理現象）的滅性。另外，《五蘊論》也說不恒常現行的心、心法滅。《對法論》的說法也相同。
論：必定會生起潤生煩惱（潤生煩惱：能使眾生再次投胎的煩惱）的緣故。按照《瑜伽論》第五十九卷所說，結生相續（結生相續：生命延續）大致有七種。一是纏（纏：煩惱的束縛）及隨眠（隨眠：潛在的煩惱）結生相續，指的是各種異生（異生：不同種類的眾生）。二是唯有隨眠結生相續，指的是見聖蹟（見聖蹟：證悟的跡象）。三是正知入胎結生，指的是輪王（輪王：擁有統治世界的輪寶的國王）。四是正知入住結生，指的是獨覺（獨覺：獨自覺悟的人）。五是在一切位置都不失去正念結生，指的是各種菩薩（菩薩：立志成佛的修行者）。六是業所引發的結生，指的是除了菩薩之外的眾生。七是智所引發的結生，指的是各種菩薩。另外，《對法論》第五卷說，中有（中有：死亡到投胎之間的過渡狀態）最初的相續。
【English Translation】 English version: Detailed explanation: Or walking at night, etc., also requires waiting for daylight, etc. Although it is dark for humans, how can it be said to be dark for owls (xiū liú, a type of owl) and other animals? Just as in the same realm, the scenes seen by four different creatures are different. When a person views the color outside a lapis lazuli (liú lí, a type of colored glass) barrier, the lapis lazuli needs to be far from the eyes to be seen. If the lapis lazuli is close to the eyes and there is no space, it cannot be seen either. From this, it still needs space. The same applies to fish and so on.
Treatise: The so-called five consciousness bodies rely on the fundamental consciousness, etc. Now, what is the meaning of 'internal' and 'external' that is being explained? There are two explanations. One explanation is based on the twelve entrances (twelve entrances: eye entrance, ear entrance, nose entrance, tongue entrance, body entrance, mind entrance, form entrance, sound entrance, smell entrance, taste entrance, touch entrance, dharma entrance). The fundamental consciousness is governed by the mind entrance, so it is called internal. Attention belongs to the dharma entrance, so it is called external. Another explanation is only the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness: Ālaya consciousness). Whether it is a seed or a manifestation, it is fundamental, so it is called internal alone. The rest of the various conditions are not fundamental, so they are all called external. The treatise is based on the latter explanation.
Commentary: Although generally speaking, there are six distant and three near, there are two explanations here. One explanation is that the local area is called near, and a different area is called far. The eye, ear, and body belong to the lower realm dharma, so they are near. Another explanation is that what is extinguished first is called far, and what is extinguished later is called near. Because when born in that heaven, the four consciousnesses (four consciousnesses: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness) do not arise, there is a sequence. The former explanation is correct. The original intention is to show that those extinguished consciousnesses are not all in the local area, so the statement of distant and near is set up.
Treatise: The sacred teachings say that there is no transforming consciousness (transforming consciousness: transforming consciousness) there. That is, the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: The Heaven of Non-Perception (Heaven of Non-Perception: one of the twenty-eight heavens in Buddhism) refers to first obtaining the non-perception samādhi (non-perception samādhi: a state of meditation) in this world, and then being born in the realm of sentient beings in the Heaven of Non-Perception. The extinguishing nature of various minds and mental phenomena (mental phenomena: psychological phenomena) that do not constantly manifest. In addition, the Skandha-sūtra also says that the minds and mental phenomena that do not constantly manifest are extinguished. The Abhidharma-samuccaya has the same statement.
Treatise: Because it will definitely give rise to afflictions that moisten rebirth (afflictions that moisten rebirth: afflictions that cause sentient beings to be reborn again). According to the fifty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, there are roughly seven types of linking rebirth (linking rebirth: continuation of life). One is the entanglement (entanglement: the bondage of afflictions) and latent afflictions (latent afflictions: potential afflictions) linking rebirth, which refers to various different beings (different beings: different kinds of sentient beings). The second is only latent afflictions linking rebirth, which refers to seeing the traces of the saints (seeing the traces of the saints: signs of enlightenment). The third is consciously entering the womb linking rebirth, which refers to the wheel-turning king (wheel-turning king: a king who possesses the wheel treasure that rules the world). The fourth is consciously residing in the womb linking rebirth, which refers to the solitary Buddha (solitary Buddha: a person who attains enlightenment alone). The fifth is not losing mindfulness in all positions linking rebirth, which refers to various Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattvas: practitioners who aspire to become Buddhas). The sixth is rebirth caused by karma, which refers to sentient beings other than Bodhisattvas. The seventh is rebirth caused by wisdom, which refers to various Bodhisattvas. In addition, the fifth volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says that the initial continuation of the intermediate state (intermediate state: the transitional state between death and rebirth).
剎那唯無覆無記。以是異熟攝故。從此已后或善．不善．無記。隨其所應除彼沒心。以中有沒心常是染污。故知中有而有心也。
疏。非然即次至第一念心者。即本有初名第二念。對前生有得第二名。此顯所除。
疏。不爾至有意故者。顯除所以。由彼卵生初在胎藏無意識故。
論。即能引發至異熟果故者。問彼天初生異熟六識。有無二心何心能感 答招總別報名為行支。故感第八業而亦招彼也。若初六識是善等者。省斯問答 問準小乘宗彼沒生欲。欲有五趣生何趣耶 答按婆沙論總有三說。有說定生地獄。有說定生惡趣。如是說者定生欲界處所不定。
論。有義至究竟故者。準有宗義順正理論第十二說。通欲．色起。色界之中而有兩釋。一云唯下三靜慮。非在第四。勿因與果極相鄰逼。有說亦在第四靜慮。除無想天。已生彼天受彼果故 俱舍論同 婆沙一百五十二中有三說別。有說唯欲人心猛利有說力故。后之二說同順正理色界二義。雜心論說同婆沙論初師所明。
疏。雖知離染諸地皆然等者。此遮外難外難意云第四定中諸地皆同離遍凈染。退後重得第四定時。無想天染亦必離矣。後生何不即在彼天住下三處 疏答意云。若離染同令生彼者。若爾彼天應無九處。離染同故。九處既差
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 剎那（ksana，極短的時間單位）唯是無覆無記（neither moral nor immoral and does not obscure the mind）。因為它是異熟（vipāka，果報）所攝。從此之後，可以是善、不善、無記，隨其所應，除了彼沒心（death consciousness）。因為中有（antarābhava，中陰身）的沒心總是染污的。所以可知中有是有心的。
疏：並非如此，緊接著到達第一念心，即本有（bhava，生命）的開始，名為第二念。相對於前生有（pūrva-bhava，前世），得到第二名。這顯示了所要排除的情況。
疏：如果不這樣，直到有意故，顯示了排除的原因。因為卵生（aṇḍaja，從卵中出生）最初在胎藏（garbha，子宮）中沒有意識。
論：即能引發異熟果故，問：彼天（deva，天人）初生異熟六識（six consciousnesses）有無二心，何心能感？答：招總別報名為行支（saṃskāra-skandha，行蘊），所以感第八業（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識），也招彼。如果初六識是善等，省略此問答。問：準小乘宗（Hīnayāna，小乘）彼沒生欲，欲有五趣（pañca-gati，五道）生何趣耶？答：按婆沙論（Vibhāṣā，阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論）總有三說。有說定生地獄（naraka，地獄）。有說定生惡趣（durgati，惡道）。如此說者，定生欲界（kāma-dhātu，欲界）處所不定。
論：有義至究竟故，準有宗義（Yogācāra，瑜伽行派）順正理論（Nyāyānusāra-śāstra）第十二說，通欲、色起。中有之中而有兩釋。一云唯下三靜慮（dhyāna，禪定），非在第四。勿因與果極相鄰逼。有說亦在第四靜慮。除無想天（asaṃjñā-deva，無想天）。已生彼天受彼果故。俱舍論（Abhidharma-kośa，阿毗達磨俱舍論）同。婆沙一百五十二中有三說別。有說唯欲人心猛利有說力故。后之二說同順正理二義。雜心論（Saṃyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra）說同婆沙論初師所明。
疏：雖知離染諸地皆然等，此遮外難，外難意云：第四定中諸地皆同離遍凈染（Śuddhāvāsa，凈居天）。退後重得第四定時，無想天染亦必離矣。後生何不即在彼天住下三處？疏答意云：若離染同令生彼者，若爾彼天應無九處。離染同故。九處既差。
【English Translation】 English version A kṣaṇa (moment) is only neither moral nor immoral and does not obscure the mind (avyākṛta). Because it is included in vipāka (result of karma). From then on, it can be moral, immoral, or neither, as appropriate, except for the death consciousness (cuticitta). Because the death consciousness of the antarābhava (intermediate state) is always defiled. Therefore, it is known that the intermediate state has consciousness.
Commentary: It is not so, immediately reaching the first thought-moment, which is the beginning of bhava (existence), called the second thought-moment. Relative to the pūrva-bhava (previous existence), it is called the second name. This shows what is to be excluded.
Commentary: If not so, until 'because of having consciousness,' it shows the reason for exclusion. Because the aṇḍaja (egg-born) initially has no consciousness in the garbha (womb).
Treatise: That is, it can cause the vipāka-fruit. Question: When a deva (god) is first born, do the six vipāka consciousnesses have one or two minds, and which mind can cause it? Answer: 'Inviting the general and specific names' is called the saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of mental formations), so it causes the eighth karma (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) and also invites that. If the first six consciousnesses are moral, etc., omit this question and answer. Question: According to the Hīnayāna (Smaller Vehicle), when one dies and desires to be born, which of the pañca-gati (five realms) does one desire to be born into? Answer: According to the Vibhāṣā (Great Commentary), there are three general views. Some say one is definitely born into naraka (hell). Some say one is definitely born into durgati (evil realms). Those who say so, say that one is definitely born into the kāma-dhātu (desire realm), but the location is uncertain.
Treatise: 'Some say until the end,' according to the Yogācāra (Mind-Only school), the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra (Treatise Following the Principles) says in the twelfth chapter that it applies to both the desire and form realms. Within the intermediate state, there are two explanations. One says it is only in the lower three dhyānas (meditative states), not in the fourth. Do not let the cause and effect be too close to each other. Some say it is also in the fourth dhyāna, except for the asaṃjñā-deva (non-percipient heaven). Because one has already been born in that heaven and received its fruit. The Abhidharma-kośa (Treasury of Abhidharma) agrees. The Vibhāṣā in one hundred and fifty-two has three different views. Some say only the desire realm people's minds are fierce, so they have power. The latter two views are the same as the two meanings in the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra. The Saṃyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra (Miscellaneous Abhidharma Heart Treatise) says the same as the first teacher in the Vibhāṣā.
Commentary: Although it is known that all the lands free from defilement are the same, etc., this refutes an external difficulty. The meaning of the external difficulty is: in the fourth dhyāna, all the lands are the same in being free from the Śuddhāvāsa (Pure Abodes) defilement. If one regresses and re-obtains the fourth dhyāna, the defilement of the non-percipient heaven must also be removed. Why is one not immediately born in that heaven and dwells in the lower three places? The meaning of the commentary's answer is: if being free from defilement is the same as being born there, then that heaven should not have nine places. Because being free from defilement is the same. The nine places are different.
。明離染同熏修而異。雖復重得第四靜慮。其無想定未暇熏修。即便命終生彼下三竟有何失。
疏。又解至說名為退者。問豈離下染即得彼定 設爾何失 若爾初得第四定時應得無想 答初得第四由未先得彼無想定。故假熏習後方得之。退由先得故不相例 問退第四定后還作意。厭遍凈染方得引生。無想重得何即不爾。若亦須修未修命謝生下三天何理不許 答必於此生而能修成方命終故。故不生下 問疏二釋中何師為勝 答有義斷云后解為勝。不明所以 詳曰。前解應善。后義雖云此生必得彼無想定。而無文證。設不得者復連何理。
論。此由厭想至非聖所起者。按瑜伽論五十三云。前無想定非學所入亦非無學。何以故。此中無有惠現行故。此上有勝寂靜住及生故。又復此定不能證得所未證得諸勝善法。由是稽留誑幻處故 釋曰。如求滅定起無漏惠。無想不爾故云無惠。以滅盡定在無想上。名此上有勝寂靜住。上有無色四處可生名為生也。或五凈居是聖生處名為生也。如阿羅漢必依滅定證無餘依。無想不然。云未證得諸勝善法。或入滅盡前方便中入色．無色諸有漏定名證善法。無想不爾。由此多因故聖不入。
論。令不恒行恒行染污心心所滅者。顯揚第一云。不恒現行諸心心法。及恒行一分諸心．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：明瞭脫離染污和熏修是相同而又不同的。即使重新獲得第四禪定（catuttha jhāna），如果還沒有來得及熏修無想定（asaññāsamāpatti），就命終並投生到下三梵天（lower three Brahmā heavens），會有什麼過失呢？
疏：又解釋說，稱之為『退』的原因是：問：難道脫離下方的染污就能獲得那個禪定嗎？假設是這樣，會有什麼過失呢？如果這樣，最初獲得第四禪定時就應該獲得無想定。答：最初獲得第四禪定，是因為之前沒有獲得那個無想定，所以需要通過熏修才能獲得。而退失是因為之前已經獲得過，所以不能相提並論。問：退失第四禪定后，還需要作意（manasikara），厭惡遍凈天（Subhakinha）的染污才能引發（無想定）的產生。重新獲得無想定為什麼就不是這樣呢？如果也需要熏修，但還沒有熏修完成就命終，投生到下三天（lower three heavens），有什麼道理不允許呢？答：必須在此生能夠修成，才能命終，所以不會投生到下方。問：疏的兩種解釋中，哪一種更好？答：有人斷言說後面的解釋更好，但沒有說明原因。詳細來說，前面的解釋應該更好。後面的解釋雖然說此生必定能獲得那個無想定，但沒有文獻證據。如果不能獲得，又有什麼道理呢？
論：這是由於厭惡想（saññā）……不是聖者（ariya）所生起的。按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十三卷所說，之前的無想定不是有學（sekha）所入，也不是無學（asekha）。為什麼呢？因為其中沒有智慧（paññā）現行。因為此上有更殊勝的寂靜住（upaśama-vihāra）以及生處。而且此定不能證得尚未證得的諸殊勝善法（kusala-dhammā），因此是稽留、誑幻之處。釋：例如求滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）會生起無漏慧（anāsava-paññā），無想定不是這樣，所以說沒有智慧。因為滅盡定在無想定的上方，所以說此上有更殊勝的寂靜住。上方有無色界四處（arūpadhātu）可以投生，這稱為『生』。或者五凈居天（Suddhāvāsa）是聖者投生之處，稱為『生』。例如阿羅漢（arhat）必定依靠滅盡定證得無餘依涅槃（anupādisesa-nibbāna），無想定不是這樣，所以說不能證得尚未證得的諸殊勝善法。或者進入滅盡定前的方便中，進入色界（rūpadhātu）、無色界（arūpadhātu）的諸有漏定（sāsava-samādhi），這稱為證得善法，無想定不是這樣。因為這些原因，所以聖者不進入無想定。
論：使不恒常生起（anabhisaṅkhāra）和恒常生起（abhisaṅkhāra）的染污心（kilesa-citta）和心所（cetasika）滅除。 《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一卷說：不恒常現行的諸心和心法，以及恒常生起的一部分心……
【English Translation】 English version: It is clear that detachment from defilement and cultivation are similar yet different. Even if one regains the fourth dhyana (catuttha jhāna), if there is no time to cultivate the non-perception attainment (asaññāsamāpatti), and one dies and is reborn in the lower three Brahmā heavens (lower three Brahmā heavens), what fault is there?
Commentary: Furthermore, the explanation that it is called 'regression' is: Question: Could it be that one attains that samadhi (concentration) simply by detaching from the lower defilements? If so, what fault would there be? If that were the case, one should attain the non-perception attainment upon initially attaining the fourth dhyana. Answer: Initially attaining the fourth dhyana is because one has not previously attained that non-perception attainment, so it is necessary to cultivate it to attain it later. Regression is because one has already attained it before, so they cannot be compared. Question: After regressing from the fourth dhyana, one still needs to apply effort (manasikara), disliking the defilements of the Subhakinha heaven (Subhakinha) in order to induce the arising (of the non-perception attainment). Why is it not the same when regaining the non-perception attainment? If it also requires cultivation, but one dies before completing the cultivation and is reborn in the lower three heavens (lower three heavens), what reason is there to disallow it? Answer: One must be able to cultivate and complete it in this life in order to die, so one will not be reborn below. Question: Which of the two explanations in the commentary is superior? Answer: Some assert that the latter explanation is superior, but without explaining the reason. In detail, the former explanation should be better. Although the latter explanation says that one will definitely attain that non-perception attainment in this life, there is no textual evidence. If one cannot attain it, what reason is there?
Treatise: This is because of the aversion to perception (saññā)... not arisen by the noble ones (ariya). According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), volume 53, the previous non-perception attainment is neither entered by the learners (sekha) nor the non-learners (asekha). Why? Because there is no wisdom (paññā) manifesting in it. Because above this, there is a more superior dwelling in tranquility (upaśama-vihāra) and place of birth. Moreover, this samadhi cannot attain the superior wholesome dharmas (kusala-dhammā) that have not yet been attained, therefore it is a place of delay and deception. Explanation: For example, seeking the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti) will give rise to non-outflow wisdom (anāsava-paññā), the non-perception attainment is not like this, so it is said that there is no wisdom. Because the cessation attainment is above the non-perception attainment, it is said that above this, there is a more superior dwelling in tranquility. Above, there are the four realms of the formless sphere (arūpadhātu) where one can be reborn, this is called 'birth'. Or the five pure abodes (Suddhāvāsa) are the places where noble ones are born, this is called 'birth'. For example, an arhat (arhat) must rely on the cessation attainment to attain the nirvana without remainder (anupādisesa-nibbāna), the non-perception attainment is not like this, so it is said that it cannot attain the superior wholesome dharmas that have not yet been attained. Or entering the expedient before entering the cessation attainment, entering the defiled samadhi (sāsava-samādhi) of the form realm (rūpadhātu) and formless realm (arūpadhātu), this is called attaining wholesome dharmas, the non-perception attainment is not like this. Because of these reasons, the noble ones do not enter the non-perception attainment.
Treatise: Causing the non-constantly arising (anabhisaṅkhāra) and constantly arising (abhisaṅkhāra) defiled mind (kilesa-citta) and mental factors (cetasika) to cease. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya), volume 1, says: The minds and mental factors that do not constantly manifest, and a portion of the minds that constantly arise...
心法滅 對法第一．五蘊等同。與唯識別。如疏所辨。
論。此定初修等者。七地已前二乘等得名為初也。故瑜伽論第十二云。複次云何超越入諸等至。謂即于已得圓滿清白故。從初靜慮無間超入第三靜慮。第三無間超入空無邊處。空處無間超入無所有處。乃至逆超亦爾。以極遠故無有能超第三等至。唯除如來及出第二阿僧企耶諸大菩薩。彼隨所欲入諸定故 釋曰 言清白者。顯超加行而離染等 無超第三者。明無超二能至第三。余文可悉。而疏云唯得超一地無漏入故者。未自在者依瑜伽論唯超一地。故超越者將入滅定。而從初禪漸次超一至無所有而超非想入于滅定。名超一地 若爾如何言依非想而入滅定 答依非超說。依非想種兩釋如疏。
論。遊觀無漏者。有義疏簡本智。今解通簡根本．后得。后得之中亦有斷道故。遊觀者簡根本全．后得斷道。又根本智亦有遊觀。若言無者豈根本心皆能斷惑。如無學者不斷惑故。八地已去純無漏心。豈唸唸中皆能斷惑。故今說者根本。后得俱有遊觀。為加行入亦無違也。諸論皆云有二緣故然初修者可唯后得 詳曰。今依教理取疏為正。且遊觀名非不斷惑獨得其稱 設然何失 若爾佛位應唯遊觀。不斷惑故。由此故知若不斷惑及不觀理總名遊觀。故佛位中有非遊觀。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心法滅，對於法相唯識宗來說，五蘊等同於唯識的觀點，正如《瑜伽師地論》的疏解中所辨析的那樣。
論：『此定初修等者』，指的是七地（菩薩修行過程中的第七個階段）之前的二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）修行者等，可以被稱作『初修』。因此，《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說：『複次，云何超越入諸等至？』意思是說，對於已經獲得圓滿清凈的禪定，可以從初禪無間斷地超越進入第三禪，從第三禪無間斷地超越進入空無邊處，從空無邊處無間斷地超越進入無所有處，乃至逆向超越也是如此。因為禪定之間的距離非常遙遠，所以沒有人能夠超越第三禪等禪定，除非是如來（佛）和已經歷第二阿僧祇劫（極長的時間單位）的大菩薩。他們可以隨心所欲地進入各種禪定。
釋：『清白』指的是超越禪定時的加行（準備階段），遠離了染污等障礙。『無超第三者』，說明沒有超越第二禪就能直接進入第三禪的情況。其餘的文字可以自行理解。而疏解中說『唯得超一地無漏入故者』，指的是未自在的修行者依據《瑜伽師地論》只能超越一個禪定層次。因此，超越者將要進入滅盡定時，從初禪開始，逐漸超越一個禪定層次，直到無所有處，然後超越非想非非想處，進入滅盡定，這被稱為『超一地』。如果這樣說，那麼如何解釋依據非想非非想處而進入滅盡定呢？回答是，這是依據非超越的情況來說的。依據非想非非想處的兩種解釋，正如疏解中所說。
論：『遊觀無漏者』，有一種觀點認為疏解中簡化了根本智（根本智慧）。現在解釋為，既包括根本智，也包括后得智（后得智慧）。在後得智中，也有斷道（斷除煩惱的道路）。『遊觀』指的是不包括完全的根本智和后得智中的斷道。而且，根本智中也有遊觀。如果說根本智中沒有遊觀，那麼難道所有的根本智都能斷除迷惑嗎？就像無學（已經證得阿羅漢果位的人）一樣，他們不再斷除迷惑。八地（菩薩修行過程中的第八個階段）之後的菩薩，他們的心純粹是無漏的，難道每一個念頭都能斷除迷惑嗎？所以現在所說的是，根本智和后得智都存在遊觀，作為進入禪定的加行也沒有什麼衝突。各種論典都說有兩種因緣，但是對於初修者來說，可能只有后得智。
詳曰：現在依據教理，採納疏解的觀點是正確的。而且，『遊觀』這個名稱並非只有不斷除迷惑才能獲得。假設是這樣，會有什麼問題呢？如果這樣，那麼佛的果位就應該只有遊觀，因為佛不再斷除迷惑。因此可知，如果不斷除迷惑或者不觀察真理，都總稱為『遊觀』。所以佛的果位中存在非遊觀的狀態。
【English Translation】 English version The extinction of the mind-dharma, in relation to the Dharma-lakṣaṇa and Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only) schools, the five skandhas (aggregates) are equivalent to Vijñāna (consciousness), as analyzed in the commentaries on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice).
Treatise: 'This dhyāna (meditative absorption) initially cultivated, etc.,' refers to Śrāvakas (Hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas) before the seventh bhūmi (stage of a Bodhisattva's path), who can be called 'initial cultivators.' Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in its twelfth fascicle, states: 'Furthermore, how does one transcend and enter various samāpattis (attainments)?' It means that for those who have already attained complete purity, they can transcend from the first dhyāna without interruption into the third dhyāna, from the third without interruption into the ākāśānantyāyatana (sphere of infinite space), from the sphere of infinite space without interruption into the ākiñcanyāyatana (sphere of nothingness), and even reverse transcendence is the same. Because the distance between dhyānas is very far, no one can transcend the third dhyāna, etc., except for the Tathāgata (Buddha) and great Bodhisattvas who have gone through the second asaṃkhyeya-kalpa (incalculable eons). They can enter various dhyānas as they wish.
Explanation: 'Purity' refers to the preparatory practice (adhikāra) for transcendence, which is free from defilements, etc. 'No transcendence of the third' indicates that one cannot directly enter the third dhyāna without transcending the second. The rest of the text can be understood on its own. And the commentary states, 'Only able to transcend one bhūmi to enter the unconditioned,' which means that those who are not yet free can only transcend one dhyāna level according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Therefore, when a transcender is about to enter cessation, they gradually transcend one dhyāna level from the first dhyāna until they reach the sphere of nothingness, and then transcend the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception to enter cessation. This is called 'transcending one bhūmi.' If so, how can it be said that one enters cessation based on the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception? The answer is that this is based on the non-transcendence situation. The two explanations based on the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception are as stated in the commentary.
Treatise: 'Wandering observation of the unconditioned'—one view simplifies it to fundamental wisdom (mūla-jñāna) in the commentary. Now it is explained as including both fundamental and subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna). In subsequent wisdom, there is also the path of cutting off (the path of eliminating afflictions). 'Wandering observation' excludes the complete fundamental wisdom and the path of cutting off in subsequent wisdom. Moreover, there is also wandering observation in fundamental wisdom. If it is said that there is no wandering observation in fundamental wisdom, then can all fundamental minds cut off delusions? Like those who are beyond learning (arhats), they no longer cut off delusions. Bodhisattvas after the eighth bhūmi have purely unconditioned minds. Can they cut off delusions in every moment? Therefore, what is being said now is that both fundamental and subsequent wisdom have wandering observation, and there is no conflict in using it as a preparatory practice for entering dhyāna. Various treatises say that there are two causes, but for initial cultivators, it may only be subsequent wisdom.
Detailed explanation: Now, based on doctrine and reason, adopting the commentary's view is correct. Moreover, the name 'wandering observation' is not exclusively obtained by those who do not cut off delusions. Suppose it is so, what would be the problem? If so, then the Buddha's state should only have wandering observation, because the Buddha no longer cuts off delusions. Therefore, it can be known that if one does not cut off delusions or does not observe the truth, it is generally called 'wandering observation.' Therefore, there is a state of non-wandering observation in the Buddha's state.
遊觀既非根本智攝。明定加行必后得智 設根本智為加行引。復有何失 答既云加行。本智何得有加行相。縱至佛果雖任運起。亦必須依滅盡相入。觀滅盡相非本智用。不爾二因顯不盡失 若云二因據因位說。亦為不可。果位滅定教何不論。亦無文斷二唯因位。緣滅盡相任運者依通果何失 若云依彼滅盡相者即是本智此亦不然。瑟恥羅經云。正思惟無相界故。正思惟者諸文皆說是后得智。況此下云要證二空隨應后得所引發故。何得隨情而強會耶。由斯理準唯依后得為加行也 問有頂既無根本之智。云何得有後得智耶 答有三釋。一云無所有處根本智引。二云初靜慮中根本智后。三云后智本智後生。若不證正不了俗故。非要鄰次後生方是。由此彼處有後得智。智者當思 又按瑜伽第十二中依二因入。即彼論問。以何方便入此等至。答若諸聖者已離無所有處欲。或依非想非非想處相而入于定。或依滅盡相而入于定。依非想非非想處相而入定者。謂於此上心深生厭舍。非想非非想處進趣所緣皆滅盡故心便寂滅。依滅盡相而入定者亦復如是 釋曰。緣非非想心．心所法生厭離心而入彼定。此依初修。依滅盡者即任運緣非非想處心．心所法生厭離等。與前相似云亦如是。此依久習 又釋初緣有為行厭舍想心。後緣無為行厭舍想心
。厭舍義同云亦如是。亦約初久二修別也。
疏。以下品有心勝者。勝字疑誤。合為緣字。無心用彼有心為緣而後方起。又語亦略。思之可悉。
疏。體即無漏種者。依無漏種之所立故名無漏種。
疏。非相應者。非心．心所故非相應。
論。已得自在等者。問準大般若超等至者欲界等心。而能入出滅盡定等。瑜伽十二八地已去．及於如來方能超定。八地已去意純無漏。云何得起欲界心耶 答正會如疏。復有說云。經中既云起欲界心。明知八地得起有漏。而言無漏依多分說 詳曰。若八地去許第六識起有漏者。即第七識我執乃行。如何瑜伽言八地等唯成轉識不成賴耶。若據多分。二乘無學應亦同之。同一句故。又大般若云。不退位得漏盡通。以彼諸漏永不起故。若許更起豈不違經。若據多分即第七地應名漏盡及舍賴耶。多不起故。若云第七方八不及。亦應第八不如后地。應第九等方名舍執得漏盡通。若云第八是不退故七不例者。既齊容有我執等行。亦應同七不名不退。若依勝劣還第九等合名不退。由此定知不起有漏。疏會為善 今助一釋。大般若言起欲界心通實及似。彼經但言菩薩能超諸等至等。不言唯是不退位故。故通諸地皆能超定。隨應真．似。瑜伽且據唯無漏者自在人說。亦不相違欲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『厭舍』（厭離和捨棄）的意義與『云』（如是說）相同。這也是根據初修和久修的兩種不同情況來區分的。
疏：以下品中，有心勝者。『勝』字可能是個錯誤，應該合為『緣』字。意思是無心定需要以有心為緣才能生起。這裡語句比較簡略，仔細思考就能明白。
疏：『體即無漏種者』，意思是依無漏種所建立的，所以稱為無漏種。
疏：『非相應者』，因為不是心或心所，所以不是相應法。
論：『已得自在等者』，問：按照《大般若經》，超越等至的人，可以用欲界等心，而能入出滅盡定等。但《瑜伽師地論》第十二和第八地以後，以及如來才能超越禪定。第八地以後，意識純粹是無漏的，怎麼能生起欲界心呢？答：正確的解釋如疏中所說。還有一種說法是，經中既然說能生起欲界心，就說明第八地可以生起有漏心，說無漏只是從大多數情況來說。詳細分析：如果第八地允許第六識生起有漏，那麼第七識的我執就會執行。那麼《瑜伽師地論》中說的第八地等只是轉識，而不是阿賴耶識，又該如何解釋呢？如果按照大多數情況來說，二乘的無學也應該相同，因為是同一句話。而且《大般若經》說，不退位能得到漏盡通，因為那些煩惱永遠不會生起。如果允許再次生起，豈不是違背了經文？如果按照大多數情況來說，那麼第七地就應該稱為漏盡和捨棄阿賴耶識，因為大多數情況下都不會生起煩惱。如果說第七地不如第八地，那麼第八地也應該不如後面的地，應該第九地等才能稱為捨棄執著，得到漏盡通。如果說第八地是不退轉的，所以不能和第七地相比，既然都可能存在我執等執行，也應該和第七地一樣不能稱為不退轉。如果按照勝劣來說，還應該第九地等才能合稱為不退轉。由此可以確定不會生起有漏。疏的解釋很好。現在我再補充一種解釋。《大般若經》說生起欲界心，包括真實的和相似的。那部經只是說菩薩能超越各種禪定等，沒有說只有不退位才能做到，所以各個地位的菩薩都能超越禪定，隨其所應，有真有似。《瑜伽師地論》只是根據只有無漏的人才能自在來說的，並不矛盾。
【English Translation】 English version: The meaning of '厭舍' (yan she, aversion and abandonment) is the same as '云' (yun, thus it is said). This is also distinguished according to the two different situations of initial practice and long-term practice.
Commentary: In the following lower grades, there are those whose minds are superior. The word '勝' (sheng, superior) is suspected to be an error and should be combined into the word '緣' (yuan, condition). It means that the mindless samadhi needs to take the mindful as a condition to arise. The statement here is relatively brief, and careful consideration will make it clear.
Commentary: '體即無漏種者' (ti ji wu lou zhong zhe, the substance is the seed of non-outflow), means that it is established based on the seed of non-outflow, so it is called the seed of non-outflow.
Commentary: '非相應者' (fei xiang ying zhe, non-corresponding), because it is neither mind nor mental factors, it is not a corresponding dharma.
Treatise: '已得自在等者' (yi de zi zai deng zhe, those who have attained freedom, etc.), Question: According to the Maha-prajnaparamita Sutra, those who transcend samadhi can use the mind of the desire realm, etc., to enter and exit the cessation samadhi, etc. However, according to the Yoga-carabhumi-sastra, only those from the twelfth and eighth bhumis (stages) onwards, as well as the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One), can transcend samadhi. After the eighth bhumi, consciousness is purely non-outflow, how can the mind of the desire realm arise? Answer: The correct explanation is as stated in the commentary. Another explanation is that since the sutra says that the mind of the desire realm can arise, it shows that the eighth bhumi can give rise to outflow mind, and saying non-outflow is only from the majority of cases. Detailed analysis: If the eighth bhumi allows the sixth consciousness to give rise to outflow, then the ego-attachment of the seventh consciousness will operate. Then how can the Yoga-carabhumi-sastra say that the eighth bhumi, etc., are only transformed consciousness and not Alaya (阿賴耶, storehouse) consciousness? If according to the majority of cases, the Arhats (無學, no more learning) of the two vehicles should also be the same, because it is the same sentence. Moreover, the Maha-prajnaparamita Sutra says that the non-retreating position can obtain the exhaustion of outflows, because those afflictions will never arise again. If it is allowed to arise again, wouldn't it violate the sutra? If according to the majority of cases, then the seventh bhumi should be called the exhaustion of outflows and the abandonment of Alaya consciousness, because afflictions will not arise in most cases. If it is said that the seventh bhumi is not as good as the eighth bhumi, then the eighth bhumi should also be inferior to the later bhumis, and the ninth bhumi, etc., should be called the abandonment of attachment and the attainment of the exhaustion of outflows. If it is said that the eighth bhumi is non-retreating, so it cannot be compared with the seventh bhumi, since there may be ego-attachment, etc., operating, it should also be the same as the seventh bhumi and cannot be called non-retreating. If according to superiority and inferiority, it should be the ninth bhumi, etc., that can be collectively called non-retreating. From this, it can be determined that outflow will not arise. The commentary's explanation is very good. Now I will add another explanation. The Maha-prajnaparamita Sutra says that the arising of the mind of the desire realm includes both the real and the similar. That sutra only says that the Bodhisattva (菩薩, enlightened being) can transcend various samadhis, etc., and does not say that only the non-retreating position can do it, so Bodhisattvas of various positions can transcend samadhi, as appropriate, there are real and similar. The Yoga-carabhumi-sastra is only based on the fact that only those who are non-outflow can be free, and it is not contradictory.
界心 問心．心所法界系自別。準何得知而似於彼便立彼名 答按瑜伽論六十九云。又從欲界無記無間色界善心生。如色界果欲界變化心。即從色界善心無間此欲界無記心生。又說此心為欲界者。當知是彼影像類故。非自性故。既云是彼影像類故非自性等。云何得是實欲界心。實欲界心何須云類非自性耶。論既自釋是影像類非自性故。明變化心似欲名欲。不爾云何言影像類非自性耶。此既色界似欲界。菩薩似欲名欲何失。
疏。第二解至仍非想地為依等者。問即無學等應恒住此。以非想種恒時有故 答曾得彼定后余定心引無心位。方依彼種建立斯定。豈但有種即得定耶 問準超定者身中理有厭．不厭種。由初習時厭勞慮故今依何立 答因位可通昔厭種立。果位不然。得勝舍劣無厭種故。
疏。無進趣止息行相者。無進不同有學。無止不同無學。
疏。不同餘種非止息故者。此釋外難。外難可悉。此談其定有止心等不起之能。名為不止息不同無學學窮名止。
疏。通有為無為有為中通有無漏者。顯學．無學被法通局。
論。後上二界至意成天故者。問七地以前未變易者。往還二界理教無遮。云何欲界不得後起 答且談二乘不據菩薩。由斯但引鄔陀夷經以之為證。疏據此理云欲不起 鄔陀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 界心（Dhatu-citta，指不同界的心）問：心和心所法（Caitasika-dhamma，與心相關的心理現象）的界限是各自獨立的嗎？根據什麼可以得知，它們只是相似於彼，便因此而建立彼之名呢？ 答：按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六十九卷所說：『又從欲界（Kāmadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中的慾望領域）無記（Avyākṛta，非善非惡的狀態）無間（無間隔）善心生。如幻果（Māyā-phala，虛幻的果實）欲界變化心。即從善心無間，此欲界無記心生。又說此心為欲界者，當知是彼影像類故，非自性故。』既然說是彼之影像，而非自性，又怎麼能說是真實的欲界心呢？如果是真實的欲界心，又何須說是『類』而非『自性』呢？論中已經自己解釋說是影像之類，而非自性。說明變化心相似於欲界，所以名為欲。不然，又怎麼能說是影像之類，而非自性呢？既然此心相似於欲界，菩薩（Bodhisattva，追求覺悟的個體）相似於欲界而名為欲，又有什麼過失呢？
疏：第二種解釋，直到『仍然以非想地（Naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana，既非有想也非無想的境界）為依據』等。問：那麼無學（Aśaikṣa，已達到最高修行階段的人）等應該恒常住於此地，因為非想的種子恒時存在。答：曾經獲得彼定（Samāpatti，禪定）后，其餘定心引導進入無心位（Acitta-bhūmi，沒有心的狀態），才依據彼種建立此定。難道僅僅有種子就能獲得禪定嗎？問：按照超越定（Samāpatti，禪定）的人來說，身中理應有厭惡和不厭惡的種子。因為最初修習時，厭倦勞累的緣故，現在依據什麼而建立呢？答：在因位（Hetu-avasthā，修行階段）可以通達過去的厭惡種子而建立。在果位（Phala-avasthā，證悟階段）則不然。因為獲得殊勝的境界，捨棄低劣的境界，沒有厭惡的種子。
疏：沒有進趣、止息的行相。沒有進趣，不同於有學（Śaikṣa，還在學習修行的人）；沒有止息，不同於無學。
疏：不同於其餘的種子，因為不是止息的緣故。這是解釋外人的疑問。外人的疑問可以全部消除。這裡談論的是此定有停止心等不起作用的能力，名為不止息，不同於無學，因為學習窮盡而名為止。
疏：通於有為（Saṃskṛta，因緣和合而成的現象）和無為（Asaṃskṛta，非因緣和合而成的現象），有為中通於有漏（Sāsrava，有煩惱的）和無漏（Anāsrava，沒有煩惱的）。顯示了有學和無學所被之法的普遍性和侷限性。
論：后兩個界（指色界和無色界）直到意成天（Manomaya-deva，由意念形成的眾生）的緣故。問：七地（第七個菩薩地）以前沒有變易（轉變）的人，往還於兩個界，道理和教義上都沒有遮止。為什麼欲界不能在後面生起？答：這裡只談論二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），不包括菩薩。因此只引用鄔陀夷經（Udayi-sutta）作為證據。疏中依據這個道理說欲界不起。 鄔陀（Udayi，人名）
【English Translation】 English version: Question by Dhatu-citta (Mind of realms): Are the boundaries of mind and mental factors (Caitasika-dhamma) separate and independent? According to what can we know that they are merely similar to those, and thus establish their names? Answer: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume sixty-nine: 'Furthermore, from the desire realm (Kāmadhātu), neutral (Avyākṛta), without interval, wholesome mind arises. Like the illusory fruit (Māyā-phala), the transformation mind of the desire realm. That is, from the wholesome mind without interval, this neutral mind of the desire realm arises. Moreover, saying that this mind belongs to the desire realm, one should know that it is because it is a likeness of it, not its own nature.' Since it is said to be a likeness of it, not its own nature, how can it be said to be a real mind of the desire realm? If it were a real mind of the desire realm, why would it need to be said to be a 'likeness' and not 'its own nature'? The treatise itself explains that it is a likeness, not its own nature. It explains that the transformation mind is similar to the desire realm, so it is named desire. Otherwise, how could it be said to be a likeness and not its own nature? Since this mind is similar to the desire realm, what fault is there in a Bodhisattva (Bodhisattva) being similar to the desire realm and being named desire?
Commentary: The second explanation, up to 'still based on the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (Naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana)' etc. Question: Then the Arhats (Aśaikṣa) etc. should constantly reside in this realm, because the seed of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception is always present. Answer: After having attained that Samāpatti (Samāpatti), the remaining mind of meditation leads to the state of no-mind (Acitta-bhūmi), and then this Samāpatti is established based on that seed. Is it that one can attain Samāpatti merely by having the seed? Question: According to those who transcend Samāpatti, there should be seeds of aversion and non-aversion in the body. Because of the weariness and toil during the initial practice, what is it based on now? Answer: In the causal stage (Hetu-avasthā), it can be understood and established based on the past seeds of aversion. It is not so in the fruition stage (Phala-avasthā). Because one attains a superior state and abandons the inferior state, there is no seed of aversion.
Commentary: There are no characteristics of progress or cessation. No progress, different from those still learning (Śaikṣa); no cessation, different from those who have completed learning.
Commentary: Different from other seeds, because it is not cessation. This explains the doubts of outsiders. The doubts of outsiders can be completely eliminated. This discusses that this Samāpatti has the ability to stop the mind and other functions from arising, called non-cessation, different from those who have completed learning, because learning is exhausted and called cessation.
Commentary: Common to conditioned (Saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (Asaṃskṛta), and among the conditioned, common to defiled (Sāsrava) and undefiled (Anāsrava). It shows the universality and limitations of the Dharma received by those still learning and those who have completed learning.
Treatise: The latter two realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm) up to the Mind-Made Devas (Manomaya-deva). Question: For those who have not transformed before the seventh Bhumi (seventh Bodhisattva stage), there is no prohibition in doctrine or teaching for going back and forth between the two realms. Why can't the desire realm arise later? Answer: Here we only discuss the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), not including Bodhisattvas. Therefore, only the Udayi-sutta is cited as evidence. The commentary, based on this principle, says that the desire realm does not arise. Udayi (Udayi)
夷事如婆沙論一百五十三云。如契經說。尊者舍利子告苾芻眾言。戒定惠具足者能數數入滅受想定。彼于現法及將死時。若不能辨如來聖旨。命終起段食天生在意成天中。于彼復能數數入出滅想受定。斯有是處應如實知。具壽鄔陀夷在彼會坐語尊者舍利子言。彼苾芻生意成身天能數入出滅想受定無有是處。第二第三亦如是說。佛告鄔陀夷。汝以何等為意成天。豈不欲說非非想處為意成耶。彼答如是。世尊告曰。汝是愚人盲無惠眼。云何乃與上座苾芻共論甚深阿毗達磨。廣如彼說 問準所引經不言無色得起滅定何為誠證 答由經隱秘大小乘解各有不同。取證亦別。故有宗云。意成天者是色界系。故佛見訶沙彌所說。若經部計通無色界中。無色界中亦起滅定。故婆沙論一百五十二云。譬喻者說戒定惠具由斯無色起無有失 有義大乘者說。舍利子說色．無色界名意成天皆得起定。故佛便訶鄔陀夷云。二果八地如身子說皆能現起。汝今云何將非想地為意成天而不起耶。故今引證無色起定 詳曰。今觀論意引經證彼色．無色界是意成天。意成天成即得證彼無色入定 證理云何 答若無色界非意成天。沙彌不合難捨利子。佛不應云汝豈不謂非非想處為意成耶。準佛沙彌訶難之辭。明知先許意成天者通無色界。次證定云。身子但言意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《夷事如婆沙論》第一百五十三卷記載：如契經所說，尊者舍利子告訴比丘眾說：『戒、定、慧具足的人，能夠多次進入滅受想定。』這樣的人在現世以及將要去世的時候，如果不能辨別如來的聖旨，命終後會轉生到段食天，並在意成天（Manokaya-deva，由意念形成的身體的天人）中。在那邊，他們又能多次進入和出離滅想受定。這種情況是可能發生的，應該如實地瞭解。 具壽鄔陀夷在那次集會中，對尊者舍利子說：『那位比丘在意成身天中，能夠多次進入和出離滅想受定，這是不可能的。』第二次、第三次也這樣說。佛陀告訴鄔陀夷：『你認為什麼是意成天？難道你想說非想非非想處（Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana，既非有想也非無想的境界）是意成天嗎？』他回答說：『是的。』世尊告訴他說：『你是愚人，盲昧而沒有智慧之眼。怎麼能與上座比丘共同討論甚深的阿毗達磨（Abhidharma，論藏）呢？』詳細的內容如彼論所說。 問：根據所引用的經典，沒有說無色界（Arupa，沒有物質的禪定境界）能夠進入和出離滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti，滅盡一切感受和想法的禪定），這有什麼確鑿的證據呢？ 答：由於經典隱晦，大乘和小乘的理解各有不同，取證的方式也不同。所以有宗派認為，意成天是系（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯）。因此，佛陀訶責沙彌所說。如果經部認為通於無中（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯），那麼在無中也能進入和出離滅盡定。所以《婆沙論》第一百五十二卷說：『譬喻者說，戒、定、慧具足，由此無色界能夠生起，沒有缺失。』 有一種大乘的觀點認為，舍利子所說的色界（Rupa，物質的禪定境界）和無（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯）都名為意成天，都能進入禪定。所以佛陀就訶責鄔陀夷說：『二果（Sakrdagamin，一來果）和八地（八種聖者地位）如舍利子所說，都能現起。你現在怎麼能將非想非非想處作為意成天，而認為不能生起禪定呢？』所以現在引用證據，說明無色界能夠生起禪定。 詳細地說，現在觀察論的意圖，引用經典來證明色界和無（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯）是意成天。意成天成立，就能證明無色界能夠入定。 證明的道理是什麼呢？ 答：如果無（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯）不是意成天，沙彌就不應該為難捨利子。佛陀不應該說『你難道認為非想非非想處是意成天嗎？』根據佛陀和沙彌訶責和質問的言辭，明確地知道先前已經允許意成天通於無**（此處原文有缺失，無法翻譯）。其次證明禪定說，舍利子只是說意
【English Translation】 English version: The Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra, volume 153, states: As the sutra says, the Venerable Sariputra told the Bhikshu assembly: 'Those who are complete in morality, concentration, and wisdom are able to frequently enter the Nirodha-samapatti (cessation of perception and feeling).' Such individuals, in their present life and at the time of death, if they cannot discern the Tathagata's (Thus Come One's) sacred teachings, will be reborn in the 'section-eating' heavens (those heavens where beings consume physical food), and among the Manokaya-devas (mind-made body devas, deities with bodies created by thought). There, they can again frequently enter and emerge from the Nirodha-samapatti. This is possible and should be understood as it is.' The Venerable Udayin, present in that assembly, said to the Venerable Sariputra: 'That Bhikshu in the Manokaya-deva heavens being able to frequently enter and emerge from the Nirodha-samapatti is impossible.' He said the same the second and third time. The Buddha told Udayin: 'What do you consider to be the Manokaya-devas? Do you mean to say that the Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception) is the Manokaya-deva?' He replied: 'Yes.' The World-Honored One said: 'You are foolish, blind, and without the eye of wisdom. How can you discuss the profound Abhidharma with senior Bhikshus?' The details are as described in that treatise. Question: According to the cited sutra, it does not say that the Arupa (formless realms) can enter and emerge from the Nirodha-samapatti. What is the concrete evidence for this? Answer: Because the sutras are obscure, the interpretations of the Mahayana and Hinayana differ, and the methods of proof also differ. Therefore, some schools believe that the Manokaya-devas are -related (text missing, untranslatable). Therefore, the Buddha rebuked what the novice said. If the Sautrantika school believes it extends to the non- (text missing, untranslatable), then in the non- (text missing, untranslatable), one can also enter and emerge from the Nirodha-samapatti. Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra, volume 152, says: 'The Exemplifiers say that those complete in morality, concentration, and wisdom can arise in the Arupa realms without loss.' One Mahayana view is that the Rupa (form realm) and non- (text missing, untranslatable) mentioned by Sariputra are both called Manokaya-devas, and both can enter samadhi. Therefore, the Buddha rebuked Udayin, saying: 'The second fruit (Sakrdagamin, Once-Returner) and the eight grounds (eight stages of noble beings), as Sariputra said, can all manifest. How can you now regard the Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana as the Manokaya-deva and think that it cannot arise in samadhi?' Therefore, we now cite evidence to show that the Arupa realms can arise in samadhi. In detail, observing the intention of the treatise, it cites the sutras to prove that the Rupa and non- (text missing, untranslatable) are Manokaya-devas. The establishment of Manokaya-devas proves that the Arupa realms can enter samadhi. What is the reasoning for this proof? Answer: If the non- (text missing, untranslatable) were not Manokaya-devas, the novice should not have challenged Sariputra. The Buddha should not have said, 'Do you think that the Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana is the Manokaya-deva?' According to the words of rebuke and questioning from the Buddha and the novice, it is clear that it was previously allowed that the Manokaya-devas extend to the non-** (text missing, untranslatable). Secondly, proving the samadhi, Sariputra only said that the mind
成天者即得重起。言不簡故故通無色。若云身子意談色界。此亦不然。文不言故。設縱爾者文既不遮。明知彼意但一時爾。佛訶但云不得尊意。不云無色無得起義。由斯論主依文約理引之為證。
疏。非不定人至無餘地說者。按彼論云。如迴向菩提聲聞由遇緣故乘無上乘而般涅槃。如是菩薩設為如來及諸菩薩之所棄捨因棄捨故。若遭尤重求下劣乘般涅槃緣。應乘下乘而般涅槃。然無處無容諸佛菩薩如是放逸棄捨于彼定無是處。
疏。與定性人有何別者。若不定性永入無餘與彼定性而有何別。
疏。或此文與五十六別等者。五十六意據建立已一切皆起。此據少分。即彼論云。在聖相續通學．無學起者。先於此起。後於色界重現在前。托色所依方現前故。此據未建立阿賴耶識教。若已建立於一切處皆得現前。
論。要斷三界至所引發故者。有義此依有頂善心等說。謂于有頂意識。粗動不能厭患制伏息滅。非謂制伏染心．心所。有頂染法全未伏斷。亦能現起滅盡定故。前論亦言有頂上貪若伏若斷不決定故。又若依染即下八地見所斷全修斷迷理。異生有漏亦不伏故 詳曰。本明滅定要斷見惑而方得起。故說異生不能伏滅見道煩惱顯彼不得。今者乃云不伏彼善。說之何為。與論文意殊不相當。又辨見惑
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
成就天身者就能再次生起。因為言語不簡潔的緣故，所以能通達無色界。如果說這是身子的意思在談論，這也是不對的，因為經文中沒有這樣說。即使假設是這樣，經文也沒有否定這種可能性，明顯可知那只是暫時的意思。佛陀呵斥只是說不得尊崇其意，並沒有說無色界沒有生起的道理。因此，論主依據經文和義理，引用它作為證據。
疏：不是指不定性的人會進入無餘涅槃。按照那部論的說法，如同迴向菩提的聲聞，因為遇到因緣的緣故，乘坐無上乘而般涅槃。如同菩薩被如來和諸菩薩所拋棄，因為被拋棄的緣故，如果遭遇特別嚴重的、尋求下劣乘而般涅槃的因緣，就應該乘坐下乘而般涅槃。然而，沒有哪個地方、沒有哪種情況，諸佛菩薩會如此放縱，拋棄他們，絕對沒有這樣的情況。
疏：與定性的人有什麼區別？如果不定性的人永遠進入無餘涅槃，那麼與那些定性的人有什麼區別呢？
疏：或者這段經文與五十六種區別等等有關。五十六種區別的意思是，根據已經建立的觀點，一切都會生起。這裡指的是少部分。就像那部論所說，在聖者的相續中，通達有學和無學的人會生起。先在這裡生起，然後在**（此處原文有省略，無法確定含義）重新顯現。因為依託色所依才能顯現。這裡指的是沒有建立阿賴耶識教義的情況。如果已經建立了阿賴耶識，那麼在任何地方都可以顯現。
論：必須要斷除三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的煩惱，才能被其所引發。有一種觀點認為，這是依據有頂天（色界頂層天）的善心等來說的。指的是對於有頂天的意識，粗重的煩惱不能厭惡、制伏、息滅。並不是說制伏染污的心和心所。有頂天的染污法完全沒有被制伏和斷除，也能顯現滅盡定。之前的論述也說，有頂天的貪慾，是伏還是斷，是不確定的。又如果依據染污法來說，那麼下八地（欲界和色界）的見所斷（見道所斷的煩惱）和修所斷（修道所斷的煩惱）完全是迷惑真理的。異生（凡夫）的有漏法也沒有被制伏。詳細地說，本意是說明滅盡定必須要斷除見惑才能生起，所以說異生不能制伏和滅除見道的煩惱，顯示他們不能得到滅盡定。現在卻說不制伏他們的善心，這有什麼意義呢？與論文的意思很不相符。又辨析見惑
【English Translation】 English version
Those who achieve the state of Devas (celestial beings) can arise again. Because speech is not concise, they can penetrate the Formless Realm. If it is said that this is the meaning of the body discussing it, this is also not correct, because the text does not say so. Even if we assume it is so, the text does not negate this possibility, clearly indicating that it is only a temporary meaning. The Buddha rebukes only that one should not respect this meaning, not that there is no reason for the Formless Realm to arise. Therefore, the author of the treatise, based on the text and the principle, cites it as evidence.
Commentary: It does not refer to those of uncertain nature entering Nirvana without remainder. According to that treatise, just as Sravakas (hearers) who dedicate themselves to Bodhi (enlightenment) attain Parinirvana (complete Nirvana) by riding the Supreme Vehicle due to circumstances, similarly, if Bodhisattvas are abandoned by Tathagatas (Buddhas) and other Bodhisattvas, and if they encounter particularly severe circumstances seeking inferior vehicles to attain Parinirvana, they should ride the inferior vehicle to attain Parinirvana. However, there is no place, no situation, where Buddhas and Bodhisattvas would be so lax as to abandon them; there is absolutely no such situation.
Commentary: What is the difference between them and those of definite nature? If those of uncertain nature enter Nirvana without remainder forever, then what is the difference between them and those of definite nature?
Commentary: Or this passage is related to the fifty-six distinctions, etc. The meaning of the fifty-six distinctions is that, according to the established view, everything will arise. This refers to a small part. Just as that treatise says, in the continuum of the noble ones, those who have learning and those who have no learning will arise. They arise here first, and then reappear in ** (omitted in the original text, meaning cannot be determined). Because it relies on the material support to manifest. This refers to the situation where the doctrine of Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness) has not been established. If Alaya-vijnana has been established, then it can manifest everywhere.
Treatise: It is necessary to cut off the afflictions of the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm) in order to be induced by them. One view is that this is based on the good mind of the Peak of Existence (highest heaven in the Form Realm), etc. It refers to the fact that for the consciousness of the Peak of Existence, coarse afflictions cannot be厭惡(disgusted), 制伏(subdued), 息滅(extinguished). It does not mean subduing defiled mind and mental factors. The defiled dharmas of the Peak of Existence have not been completely subdued and cut off, and they can also manifest Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment). The previous discussion also said that the greed of the Peak of Existence, whether it is subdued or cut off, is uncertain. Furthermore, if based on defiled dharmas, then the 見所斷(afflictions severed by seeing the truth) and 修所斷(afflictions severed by cultivation) of the lower eight realms (Desire Realm and Form Realm) are completely deluded about the truth. The 有漏法(contaminated dharmas) of ordinary beings have also not been subdued. In detail, the original intention is to explain that Nirodha-samapatti must be arisen by cutting off the afflictions of the view path, so it is said that ordinary beings cannot subdue and extinguish the afflictions of the view path, showing that they cannot attain Nirodha-samapatti. Now it is said that they do not subdue their good mind, what is the meaning of this? It is very inconsistent with the meaning of the treatise. Also, analyze the afflictions of the view path.
如何以彼有頂修惑未滅為難。而細被之便成可笑。余過思之。
疏。有云至能入此定者。問彼人意何 答滅盡定者三乘同得。法空智者唯大乘有。故不許之。
論。唯不還至得此定故者。攝論第三云。又入滅定等言。除佛．獨覺．若阿羅漢．若不還果．及不退位諸菩薩等。余不能入。
論。彼隨應生上八地等者。問隨上八生。即顯不定得第四定。與對法論豈不相違。彼論第九作四句云。若已離色界欲者。一切皆能入無色界寂靜解脫定耶。設能入無色界寂靜解脫定者。一切已離色界欲耶 答此初句者謂依未至定已離色界欲。而不能得入無色界寂靜解脫定 釋曰。即那含人而不得彼色．無色界根本定者。能離色慾而不能入無色定也 言無色界寂靜解脫即無色定。離苦．樂等得解脫名。非滅定也 第二句者。謂諸聖者已得第四靜慮。不求生無色界。而起厭背第四靜慮行。恒現在前舍斷結道依勝進道。漸次能入無色界寂靜解脫定 釋曰。即那含人依六行道欣上厭下得無色定不斷色染。勝進道者即六行道。對前斷道得勝進名。然由能入無色解脫方入滅定。第三句者謂即此行者勤求離欲依斷結道。漸次能入無色界寂靜解脫定。第四句者謂除上爾所相。答如疏中會。或唯識師云。我不以雜集之言以為定量。何得以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如何用彼有頂天（Bhavagra，色界最高的有頂天）的煩惱尚未斷滅來作為詰難，而稍微觸及這些煩惱就顯得可笑。我對此進行了深入思考。
疏：有人說，能夠進入這種禪定的人。問：那人的意圖是什麼？答：滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種高級禪定狀態）是聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘三乘共同證得的。而通達法空的智慧只有大乘才有，所以不認可那種說法。
論：只有不還果（Anāgāmin，佛教修行的一個階段）才能證得這種禪定。攝論第三卷說：『又入滅定等語，除了佛、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，不依師而自悟的聖者）、阿羅漢（Arhat，已斷盡煩惱的聖者）、不還果，以及不退轉位的菩薩等，其餘人都不能進入。』
論：他們隨其所應生於上八地等。問：隨其所應生於上八地，就顯示不一定能得到第四禪（Dhyāna，禪定的一種），這與《對法論》（Abhidharma，佛教論藏）豈不是相違背？《對法論》第九卷作了四句：『如果已經離開了色界欲（Rūpadhātu-rāga，對色界的貪慾），是否一切都能進入無色界寂靜解脫定（Ārupyasamāpatti，無色界的禪定）？假設能進入無色界寂靜解脫定，是否一切都已離開了色界欲？』答：這第一句說的是，依據未至定（Anāgamya，一種禪定狀態）已經離開了色界欲，卻不能證得進入無色界寂靜解脫定。釋：也就是不還果的人而不能得到色界、無色界的根本定。
能離開色界欲而不能進入無色界定。所說的無色界寂靜解脫，就是無色界定，離開苦、樂等而得到解脫的名稱，不是滅盡定。第二句說的是，那些聖者已經證得第四禪，不求生於無色界，而生起厭惡第四禪的心行，恒常在面前舍斷煩惱結縛的道，依靠殊勝的進道，逐漸能夠進入無色界寂靜解脫定。釋：也就是不還果的人依靠六行道（一種修行方法），欣慕上界厭惡地獄而得到無色界定，沒有斷除色界的染著。勝進道就是六行道，相對於前面的斷道而得名勝進。然而由於能夠進入無色界解脫才能進入滅盡定。第三句說的是，就是這些修行者勤奮尋求離開欲界，依靠斷結道，逐漸能夠進入無色界寂靜解脫定。第四句說的是，除了上面所說的這些情況。回答如同疏中的解釋。或者唯識宗的法師說：『我不以《雜集論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra，瑜伽師地論）的言論作為定論，怎麼能用它來詰難？』
【English Translation】 English version: How can one use the fact that the afflictions of Bhavagra (the highest realm of form, the peak of existence) have not yet been extinguished as an objection, when even a slight touch of these afflictions is laughable? I have pondered this deeply.
Commentary: Some say that those who can enter this samādhi (state of meditative absorption). Question: What is that person's intention? Answer: Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment, a high state of meditative absorption) is attained by the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna) in common. However, the wisdom of understanding emptiness of phenomena is unique to Mahāyāna, so that view is not accepted.
Treatise: Only Anāgāmins (non-returners, a stage in Buddhist practice) attain this samādhi. The third volume of the Compendium of Determinations says: 'Moreover, regarding the phrase 'entering cessation,' apart from Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas (solitary realizers, enlightened beings who do not teach), Arhats (worthy ones, those who have extinguished all afflictions), Anāgāmins, and non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas, others cannot enter it.'
Treatise: They are born in the upper eight realms accordingly. Question: Being born in the upper eight realms accordingly shows that one does not necessarily attain the fourth Dhyāna (meditative absorption), doesn't this contradict the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical treatises)? The ninth volume of the Abhidharma makes four statements: 'If one has already abandoned desire for the realm of form (Rūpadhātu-rāga, desire for the form realm), can everyone enter the peaceful liberation of the formless realm (Ārupyasamāpatti, the formless realm's meditative absorption)? Supposing one can enter the peaceful liberation of the formless realm, has everyone already abandoned desire for the realm of form?' Answer: The first statement refers to those who, based on the Anāgamya (a state of meditative absorption), have already abandoned desire for the realm of form but cannot attain entry into the peaceful liberation of the formless realm. Explanation: That is, Anāgāmins who cannot attain the fundamental samādhis of the form and formless realms.
They can abandon desire for the realm of form but cannot enter the formless realm samādhi. The so-called peaceful liberation of the formless realm is the formless realm samādhi, named liberation from suffering, pleasure, etc., not cessation attainment. The second statement refers to those holy ones who have already attained the fourth Dhyāna, do not seek rebirth in the formless realm, and generate a mind of aversion towards the practice of the fourth Dhyāna, constantly abandoning the bonds of affliction through the path of cutting off defilements, relying on the path of superior progress, and gradually being able to enter the peaceful liberation of the formless realm. Explanation: That is, Anāgāmins who, relying on the six practices (a method of cultivation), admire the upper realms and dislike the lower realms, attain the formless realm samādhi without cutting off the attachment to the form realm. The path of superior progress is the six practices, named superior progress relative to the previous path of cutting off. However, one can only enter cessation attainment by being able to enter the formless realm liberation. The third statement refers to those practitioners who diligently seek to abandon desire, relying on the path of cutting off defilements, and gradually being able to enter the peaceful liberation of the formless realm. The fourth statement refers to cases other than those mentioned above. The answer is as explained in the commentary. Or, the Dharma master of the Yogācāra school says: 'I do not take the words of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) as definitive, how can one use it to object?'
彼而為難耶。
疏。若爾異生應唯種子潤者。此難意云。不還伏現即以種潤。異生亦爾。何非種潤 設爾何過 答即無異生得生上失。以下地種而未斷故。
疏。異生現行潤至應生上界者。其意難云。如言異生而以現潤。下雖有現不潤生上。聖言種潤下雖有種不潤生上 答如疏明 有義釋云。聖人種正潤。有種不上生。異生正潤惑不伏不生上。分別起者及細俱生。非正潤惑故。雖不伏而得生上。全界煩惱能潤生者。若有正潤亦能潤生。無正潤者余即不能。無所助故 詳曰第六意識俱生我見相應貪等豈非正潤。若言是者正潤惑在。云何言無故得生上。若言不是便違諸教。若云雖是由闕餘者。此即疏意何煩更云。又不得言及細俱生非正潤也。
疏。若伏下八地或五地等者。即前二師說伏八地．五地惑也。形滅定故併名為下。若伏八地二種無為皆非擇滅。若伏五地唯想受滅不得擇滅。不動無為擇滅所攝。下四地惑並皆斷故。疏文總也。應如此知 有疏本云一地．五地。一字錯也合為八字。有依一字作多解釋有多過難。故八字正。
論。說已入遠地菩薩等者。即瑜伽論六十二云。一切異生不能行故。唯除已入遠地菩薩。
論有從初地至皆入此定者。問對法但云永伏煩惱不言起定。此論指彼文何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 彼而為難耶？
疏：若爾，異生應唯種子潤者。此難意云：不還（Anagamin，不還果）伏現即以種潤，異生亦爾，何非種潤？設爾何過？答：即無異生得生上失，以下地種而未斷故。
疏：異生現行潤至應生上界者。其意難云：如言異生而以現潤，下雖有現不潤生上，聖言種潤，下雖有種不潤生上。答：如疏明。有義釋云：聖人種正潤，有種不上生。異生正潤惑不伏不生上。分別起者及細俱生，非正潤惑故，雖不伏而得生上。全界煩惱能潤生者，若有正潤亦能潤生，無正潤者余即不能，無所助故。詳曰：第六意識俱生我見相應貪等豈非正潤？若言是者，正潤惑在，云何言無故得生上？若言不是，便違諸教。若云雖是由闕餘者，此即疏意，何煩更云？又不得言及細俱生非正潤也。
疏：若伏下八地或五地等者，即前二師說伏八地、五地惑也。形滅定故併名為下。若伏八地，二種無為皆非擇滅。若伏五地，唯想受滅不得擇滅，不動無為擇滅所攝，下四地惑並皆斷故。疏文總也，應如此知。有疏本云一地、五地，一字錯也，合為八字。有依一字作多解釋，有多過難，故八字正。
論：說已入遠地菩薩等者，即瑜伽論六十二云：一切異生不能行故，唯除已入遠地菩薩。
論：有從初地至皆入此定者。問：對法但云永伏煩惱，不言起定。此論指彼文何？
【English Translation】 English version Is this a difficulty?
Commentary: If so, ordinary beings should only be those whose seeds are nourished. The meaning of this difficulty is: Anagamins (non-returners) subdue the manifest and are nourished by seeds; ordinary beings are also like this, so why aren't they nourished by seeds? If you assert this, what is the fault? Answer: Then no ordinary being could be born in the higher realms, because the seeds of the lower realms have not been severed.
Commentary: Ordinary beings whose present actions nourish them to be born in the higher realms. The meaning of this difficulty is: As it is said that ordinary beings are nourished by present actions, although there are present actions in the lower realms, they do not nourish birth in the higher realms; the holy ones are nourished by seeds, and although there are seeds in the lower realms, they do not nourish birth in the higher realms. Answer: As the commentary explains. Some interpret it as: The holy ones are rightly nourished by seeds, and those with seeds are not born in the higher realms. Ordinary beings are rightly nourished by afflictions, and if afflictions are not subdued, they are not born in the higher realms. Those that arise from discrimination and those that are subtly co-arisen are not rightly nourishing afflictions, so although they are not subdued, they can be born in the higher realms. Those afflictions that can nourish birth in the entire realm, if there is right nourishment, can also nourish birth; if there is no right nourishment, the rest cannot, because they have nothing to assist them. Detailed explanation: Are not the greed and other afflictions associated with the ego-view that are co-arisen with the sixth consciousness rightly nourishing? If you say they are, then rightly nourishing afflictions exist; how can you say there are none and thus one can be born in the higher realms? If you say they are not, then you contradict the teachings. If you say that although they are, they lack something else, then this is the meaning of the commentary; why bother saying more? Furthermore, you cannot say that those that are subtly co-arisen are not rightly nourishing.
Commentary: If one subdues the lower eight realms or five realms, etc., this refers to the previous two teachers who said that one subdues the afflictions of the eight realms or five realms. Because form and cessation are fixed, they are both called 'lower'. If one subdues the eight realms, the two kinds of unconditioned are both non-cessation. If one subdues the five realms, only the cessation of perception and feeling is not cessation; the immovable unconditioned is included in cessation, because the afflictions of the lower four realms are all severed. The commentary is general and should be understood in this way. Some commentary versions say 'one realm' and 'five realms'; the word 'one' is a mistake and should be 'eight'. Some rely on the word 'one' to make many explanations, which leads to many faults and difficulties, so 'eight' is correct.
Treatise: Saying that bodhisattvas who have already entered the Distant Ground, etc., refers to the sixty-second section of the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra, which says: 'All ordinary beings cannot practice this, except for bodhisattvas who have already entered the Distant Ground (Duraṅgama-bhūmi, the sixth Bodhisattva ground)'.
Treatise: Some say that from the first ground to all enter this samadhi. Question: The Abhidharma only speaks of permanently subduing afflictions and does not speak of arising from samadhi. To which text does this treatise refer?
不同 答文雖不言意必許起 何所以者 答煩惱未伏定無由得。既一切惑永伏不行何不能起。此論取彼論意而言皆起此定。亦無爽矣。
論。經說至滅盡定者。按楞伽經第七道品明前六地。第七地去與二乘人所入滅定有差別也。故彼經云。佛告大惠。菩薩從初地乃至六地入滅盡定。聲聞．辟支佛亦入滅定。大惠諸菩薩摩訶薩於七地中唸唸入滅盡定。以諸菩薩悉能遠離一切諸法有無相故。大惠聲聞．辟支佛不能唸唸入滅盡定。以聲聞．辟支佛緣有為行入滅盡定。隨在所取．能取境界。是故聲聞．辟支佛不能入七地中唸唸滅定。
疏。雖瑜伽論至無違者。此言意云。取彼實緣無相界者不取其似。故除二乘。故與八十義不相違。菩薩．二乘雖俱后得。變有親疏故分真似。今助一釋。七地以上緣無相界亦變相緣。不爾便非依后得智而入滅定。然二乘者不能唸唸而入彼定故名不共。按彼論云。於一切相不復思惟。唯正思惟真無相界。漸入滅定滅轉識等。次異熟識舍所依止。由異熟識無有取故。諸轉識等不復得生。唯余清凈無為離垢真法界在 問既住無心后何能出 答按瑜伽論第十二云。問入滅定時無有分別我當入定我當出定。正在定時心寂靜故遠離加行。將出定時心先滅故亦無作意。云何能出。答先於期心善修治故
【現代漢語翻譯】 不同。答：文雖未明確說，但其意必然允許生起（此定）。問：為什麼這樣說？答：因為煩惱未被降伏，所以肯定無法獲得（此定）。既然一切迷惑永遠降伏不再生起，為什麼不能生起（此定）？此論採用彼論的意義來說，都認為可以生起此定，也沒有什麼衝突。
論：經中說到達到滅盡定的人，按照《楞伽經》第七道品所說，前六地，第七地與二乘人所入的滅定是有差別的。所以該經說：佛告訴大慧，菩薩從初地乃至六地進入滅盡定，聲聞（聽聞佛法而悟道者）、辟支佛（不依師教，自己悟道者）也進入滅定。大慧，諸位菩薩摩訶薩（ महानसत्व， महानसत्त्व， महान् सत्त्व，偉大的菩薩）在第七地中唸唸進入滅盡定，因為諸位菩薩完全能夠遠離一切諸法的有無之相。大慧，聲聞、辟支佛不能唸唸進入滅盡定，因為聲聞、辟支佛憑藉有為之行進入滅盡定，隨其所取、能取的境界。因此聲聞、辟支佛不能進入七地中的唸唸滅定。
疏：即使《瑜伽師地論》說到沒有違背之處，這裡的意思是說，取彼實緣無相界的人不取其相似之處，所以排除了二乘。因此與八十義沒有違背。菩薩、二乘雖然都屬於后得智（पास्चात्लब्ध，पाश्चात्लब्ध，paścalabdha，后獲得的智慧），但變現的親疏不同，所以分為真和似。現在我來補充一種解釋，七地以上的菩薩緣無相界也是變相緣，否則就不是依靠後得智而進入滅定。然而二乘不能唸唸進入彼定，所以稱為不共。按照該論所說，對於一切相不再思惟，唯有正確思惟真無相界，逐漸進入滅定，滅除轉識等。其次異熟識（विपाक，vipāka，業果報應所形成的識）捨棄所依止。由於異熟識沒有取著，所以諸轉識等不再產生，唯有清凈無為離垢的真法界存在。問：既然住在無心之後，如何能夠出定？答：按照《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷所說，問：進入滅定時，沒有分別心，沒有『我當入定』、『我當出定』的想法。正在入定時，心寂靜，所以遠離加行。將要出定時，心先滅，所以也沒有作意。如何能夠出定？答：因為先前對於期限的心已經善加修治的緣故。
【English Translation】 Different. Answer: Although the text does not explicitly state it, its meaning necessarily allows for the arising (of this samadhi). Question: Why is this said? Answer: Because afflictions have not been subdued, there is definitely no way to attain (this samadhi). Since all delusions are forever subdued and no longer arise, why can't (this samadhi) arise? This treatise adopts the meaning of that treatise, saying that both consider it possible to arise from this samadhi, and there is no conflict.
Treatise: The sutra speaks of those who attain Nirodha-samāpatti (滅盡定, cessation attainment). According to the seventh stage of the Bodhisattva path in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (楞伽經), there is a difference between the first six stages and the Nirodha-samāpatti entered by the Two Vehicles (二乘). Therefore, the sutra says: The Buddha told Mahāmati (大慧), 'Bodhisattvas from the first stage up to the sixth stage enter Nirodha-samāpatti. Śrāvakas (聲聞, hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (辟支佛, solitary Buddhas) also enter cessation attainment. Mahāmati, all Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas (菩薩摩訶薩, great beings) in the seventh stage enter Nirodha-samāpatti in every moment, because all Bodhisattvas are able to completely abandon the appearance of existence and non-existence of all dharmas. Mahāmati, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot enter Nirodha-samāpatti in every moment, because Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas enter Nirodha-samāpatti through conditioned actions, following the objects they grasp and the grasping consciousness. Therefore, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot enter the momentary cessation attainment in the seventh stage.'
Commentary: Even though the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) says there is no contradiction, the meaning here is that those who take the real object of the realm of no-appearance do not take its semblance, thus excluding the Two Vehicles. Therefore, it does not contradict the eighty meanings. Although both Bodhisattvas and the Two Vehicles belong to the later-attained wisdom (后得智, paścalabdha), the transformations are different in closeness and distance, so they are divided into true and similar. Now I will add an explanation: Bodhisattvas above the seventh stage also perceive the realm of no-appearance through transformed appearances; otherwise, it would not be entering cessation attainment based on later-attained wisdom. However, the Two Vehicles cannot enter that samadhi in every moment, so it is called uncommon. According to that treatise, one no longer thinks about all appearances, but only correctly contemplates the true realm of no-appearance, gradually entering cessation attainment, extinguishing the transforming consciousnesses, etc. Next, the Ālaya-vijñāna (異熟識, vipāka, resultant consciousness) abandons its support. Because the Ālaya-vijñāna has no grasping, the transforming consciousnesses no longer arise, and only the pure, unconditioned, undefiled true Dharma-dhātu (法界, realm of Dharma) remains. Question: Since one dwells in no-mind, how can one emerge from it? Answer: According to the twelfth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Question: When entering cessation attainment, there is no discriminating mind, no thought of 'I will enter samadhi' or 'I will emerge from samadhi.' While in samadhi, the mind is tranquil, so it is far from effort. When about to emerge from samadhi, the mind ceases first, so there is no intention either. How can one emerge? Answer: Because the mind has been well-cultivated beforehand with a set time.
。若有諸行．諸狀諸相。能入于定能出於定。于彼修習極多修習。由修習故任運能入任運能出 釋曰。由修習力雖無分別而能任運出入此定。先由修習有心定故。有諸行．相．狀入出於定。于有心定由多修習厭離加行。加行力故任運入出 又釋此據自在。若未自在亦由期愿而方出定。今觀此文通初．久習。言先期心是初業者。善修治故是久業者。下文但釋久習出定。闕初不云 又十二云。出滅定時緣三種觸等。如樞要．燈並已具釋。今依婆沙百五十三。問如是三觸有何差別。彼有四說。第二說云。空是不動觸。無愿是無所有觸。無相是無相觸。依三解脫以配三觸。余繁不錄。
論。悶絕者。悶有二種。一者悶觸。二悶心所由悶觸故引生心悶。疏取前義。有義取后。所以者何。既言悶觸起時唯有意識。明知即是意識心聚名不共也。亦不可說雖觸引生非悶即心。眼由緣引尚別有體。悶由觸引心等不明名悶何失。下無心悶不言由引及似彼者。一云識聚不明之時名之為悶。非如眠有別心所法。故不言之。二云義準知故所以不說 詳曰觀乎有義引證為理。理恐未可。論但說云悶觸起時唯有意識。不言意聚而是悶攝。何以得證心聚為悶。以眠例者亦為不齊。如緣引眠眠不引眠。如緣引悶如何今悶更引心悶。又眠緣引立心所眠
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 若存在某些行（karma，行為），某些狀（characteristic，特徵），某些相（sign，表象），能夠進入禪定，能夠從禪定中出來，對於這些行、狀、相進行修習，極多地修習。由於修習的緣故，能夠自然而然地進入禪定，自然而然地從禪定中出來。釋迦牟尼佛解釋說：由於修習的力量，即使沒有分別心，也能自然而然地出入這種禪定。先前由於修習，有了有心定（mindful concentration）的緣故，才會有某些行、相、狀來進入和出於禪定。對於有心定，通過多次修習，產生厭離的加行（effort，努力）。由於加行的力量，就能自然而然地進入和出來。又解釋說，這指的是自在（mastery，掌握）。如果尚未自在，也需要通過期愿（intention，意願）才能出定。現在觀察這段文字，適用於初學者和長期修習者。說『先期心』指的是初學者，『善修治故』指的是長期修習者。下文只解釋了長期修習者出定的情況，缺少了初學者的情況，沒有說明。 另外，《十二門論》中說：出滅盡定時，緣於三種觸等。如同《樞要》和《燈論》都已經詳細解釋過。現在依據《婆沙論》第一百五十三卷，提問：像這樣的三種觸有什麼差別？其中有四種說法。第二種說法是：空（emptiness）是不動觸（immovable contact），無愿（wishlessness）是無所有觸（nothingness contact），無相（signlessness）是無相觸（signlessness contact）。依據三種解脫門（three doors of liberation）來配合這三種觸。其餘繁瑣的內容不記錄。 論中說：悶絕（fainting）有兩種，一種是悶觸（fainting contact），另一種是悶心所（fainting mental state），由於悶觸的緣故，引發了心的悶絕。疏鈔採用了前一種解釋。有一種觀點採用了后一種解釋。為什麼呢？既然說悶觸生起的時候只有意識（consciousness），就明確地知道這就是意識心聚（aggregate of consciousness），名稱是不共的。也不能說雖然是觸引發的，但悶絕不是心。眼睛由緣（condition，條件）引發尚且有別的自體（entity，實體）。悶絕由觸引發，心等不清晰，叫做悶絕，有什麼不對呢？下文沒有說無心悶是由引發以及類似的情況。一種說法是，識聚（aggregate of consciousness）不清晰的時候，稱之為悶絕，不是像睡眠一樣有別的心所法（mental factor）。所以沒有說。另一種說法是，義理上可以推知，所以沒有說。詳細地說，觀察有義的引證作為道理，恐怕是不可以的。論中只是說悶觸生起的時候只有意識，沒有說意識聚就是悶絕所攝。憑什麼能夠證明心聚就是悶絕呢？用睡眠來類比也是不恰當的。如同緣引發睡眠，睡眠不引發睡眠。如同緣引發悶絕，如何現在悶絕又引發心悶絕。而且睡眠由緣引發，可以安立心所睡眠。
【English Translation】 English version: If there exist certain 行 (karma, actions), certain 狀 (characteristic, features), certain 相 (sign, appearances) that can enter into samadhi (meditative absorption), that can emerge from samadhi, one cultivates these 行, 狀, and 相, cultivating them extensively. Due to cultivation, one can effortlessly enter into samadhi and effortlessly emerge from samadhi. The釋 (釋迦牟尼佛, Shakyamuni Buddha) explains: Due to the power of cultivation, even without conceptualization, one can naturally enter and emerge from this samadhi. Previously, due to cultivation, there is 有心定 (mindful concentration), hence there are certain 行, 相, and 狀 to enter and emerge from samadhi. Regarding 有心定, through repeated cultivation, one generates the 加行 (effort, exertion) of aversion. Due to the power of 加行, one can naturally enter and emerge. Furthermore, it is explained that this refers to 自在 (mastery, control). If one has not yet attained 自在, one also needs to rely on 期愿 (intention, aspiration) to emerge from samadhi. Now, observing this text, it applies to both beginners and those who have practiced for a long time. Saying '先期心' refers to beginners, '善修治故' refers to those who have practiced for a long time. The following text only explains the emergence from samadhi for those who have practiced for a long time, lacking the situation for beginners, not explaining it. Furthermore, the 《十二門論》 states: When emerging from extinction samadhi, one is conditioned by the three types of contact, etc. As the 《樞要》 and 《燈論》 have already explained in detail. Now, according to 《婆沙論》, volume 153, the question is: What are the differences between these three types of contact? There are four explanations. The second explanation is: 空 (emptiness) is 不動觸 (immovable contact), 無愿 (wishlessness) is 無所有觸 (nothingness contact), 無相 (signlessness) is 無相觸 (signlessness contact). These three contacts are matched with the three 解脫門 (three doors of liberation). The remaining complex details are not recorded. The 論 states: 悶絕 (fainting) has two types, one is 悶觸 (fainting contact), and the other is 悶心所 (fainting mental state). Due to 悶觸, it gives rise to mental 悶絕. The commentary adopts the former explanation. One view adopts the latter explanation. Why? Since it is said that when 悶觸 arises, there is only 意識 (consciousness), it is clearly known that this is the 意識心聚 (aggregate of consciousness), and the name is uncommon. It cannot be said that although it is induced by contact, 悶絕 is not the mind. The eye, induced by conditions, still has a separate 自體 (entity, essence). 悶絕 is induced by contact, the mind and so on are unclear, called 悶絕, what is wrong with that? The following text does not mention 無心悶 being induced or similar situations. One explanation is that when the 識聚 (aggregate of consciousness) is unclear, it is called 悶絕, it is not like sleep which has a separate 心所法 (mental factor). Therefore, it is not mentioned. Another explanation is that it can be inferred from the meaning, so it is not mentioned. In detail, observing the evidence cited by 有義 as the reason, it is feared that it is not acceptable. The 論 only says that when 悶觸 arises, there is only 意識, it does not say that the 意識聚 is included in 悶絕. How can it be proven that the 心聚 is 悶絕? Using sleep as an analogy is also inappropriate. Just as conditions induce sleep, sleep does not induce sleep. Just as conditions induce 悶絕, how can 悶絕 now induce mental 悶絕? Moreover, sleep is induced by conditions, and 心所睡眠 can be established.
。緣引心悶亦應別立悶為心所。既不別立。何以得眠而為其例。不相似故。然疏本意顯悶不同眠別有體。云悶非心。不障依于意識總聚而假立彼名心悶也。
疏。以觸末摩等者。末摩梵言此云死穴。或云死節。順正理論第三十云。末摩無別物。身有異支節觸便致死。
疏。第二解以觸處少分為體等者。即此唱文是第二解。以前論文是第一釋。
論。又如浪像起一惑等者。又按瑜伽五十一。於一剎那而有四業。諸識不俱四業不立。故彼論云。何故若無諸識俱轉。業用差別不應道理。謂若略說有四種業。一了別器業。二了別依業。三了別我業。四了別境業。此所了別剎那剎那俱轉可得。是故一識於一剎那有如是等業用差別不應道理 釋曰。器世界名器。五根．扶塵．及種名為依。是識因緣增上依故。此二第八所緣之境。末那恒計第一為我名了別我。余之六識各了自境名了別境。隨前四識有緣境能併名為業。其證意云。謂契經說第四了境一識現前。剎那剎那即四業轉。諸識不俱便違聖言四業轉義 問五位無心六識不有。如何剎那四業轉耶 答有第四業必四業俱。不言恒時皆四業並。故無其失。若恒時俱但前三業。
疏。此中意起至復助五生者。五俱意識而有二義。一明瞭取。二能助五。若二眼識雖
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果因為心煩意亂而應該另外設立一個『悶』作為心所，既然沒有另外設立，又怎麼能拿睡眠來做例子呢？這是因為兩者不相似。然而，疏鈔的本意是表明『悶』不同於睡眠，它有自己的本體。說『悶』不是心，是因為它並不妨礙依靠意識的總和而假立的『心悶』這個名稱。
疏鈔中說：『以觸末摩等』，『末摩』是梵語，這裡翻譯為『死穴』，或者『死節』。《順正理論》第三十卷說：『末摩』沒有別的什麼東西，身體的某個特殊部位被觸碰就會導致死亡。
疏鈔中說：『第二種解釋是以觸處的小部分為本體等』，這裡所說的唱文就是第二種解釋。前面的論文是第一種解釋。
論中說：『又如波浪和形象，生起一種迷惑等』，又根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷，在一個剎那間有四種作用。如果各個識不是同時運作，這四種作用就無法成立。所以該論中說：『如果各個識不是同時運作，那麼作用的差別就不合道理。』如果簡略地說，有四種作用：一是了別器業（了別器世界的作用），二是了別依業（了別所依的作用），三是了別我業（了別我的作用），四是了別境業（了別境界的作用）。這些所了別的剎那剎那同時運作是可以成立的。所以一個識在一個剎那間有這樣的作用差別是不合道理的。』解釋說：器世界稱為『器』，五根、扶塵根以及種子稱為『依』，因為它們是識的因緣和增上緣。這兩種是第八識所緣的境界。末那識恒常執著第一識為我，稱為『了別我』。其餘的六識各自了別自己的境界，稱為『了別境』。隨著前面的四識有緣境界的能力，都可以並稱為『業』。它的證明意思是說：經中說，第四了別境的識現前，剎那剎那就有四種作用運轉。如果各個識不是同時運作，就違背了聖言中四業運轉的含義。』問：在五位無心的時候，六識不存在，那麼如何在一個剎那間有四種作用運轉呢？答：只要有第四種作用，就一定有四種作用同時存在。並不是說任何時候都是四種作用同時存在，所以沒有過失。如果任何時候都同時存在，那麼只有前三種作用。
疏鈔中說：『此中意起乃至復助五生』，五俱意識有兩種含義：一是明瞭地取境，二是能夠輔助前五識生起。如果兩個眼識雖然
【English Translation】 English version: If, due to mental distress (心悶), one should separately establish 'distress' as a mental factor (心所), since it is not separately established, how can sleep be taken as an example? This is because they are dissimilar. However, the original intention of the commentary (疏鈔) is to show that 'distress' is different from sleep, having its own entity. Saying that 'distress' is not the mind (心) means that it does not hinder the provisional establishment of the name 'mental distress' based on the aggregate of consciousness (意識).
The commentary says: 'By touching the marma (末摩) etc.' 'Marma' (末摩) is a Sanskrit word, translated here as 'death point' (死穴) or 'death joint' (死節). The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (順正理論), volume 30, says: 'Marma' (末摩) is nothing separate; touching a certain special part of the body will lead to death.
The commentary says: 'The second explanation is that the essence is a small part of the touched place etc.' The statement mentioned here is the second explanation. The preceding text is the first explanation.
The treatise (論) says: 'Also, like waves and images, arising from one delusion etc.' Furthermore, according to Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), volume 51, there are four functions in one kṣaṇa (剎那, moment). If the consciousnesses (識) do not operate simultaneously, these four functions cannot be established. Therefore, the treatise says: 'If the consciousnesses do not operate simultaneously, then the difference in function is unreasonable.' Briefly speaking, there are four kinds of functions: first, the function of distinguishing the container world (了別器業), second, the function of distinguishing the support (了別依業), third, the function of distinguishing the self (了別我業), and fourth, the function of distinguishing the object (了別境業). These distinguished moments operating simultaneously can be established. Therefore, it is unreasonable for one consciousness to have such functional differences in one kṣaṇa.' The explanation says: The container world is called 'container' (器). The five roots (五根), the pure sense organs (扶塵根), and the seeds (種子) are called 'support' (依), because they are the causes and conditions and the dominant condition for consciousness. These two are the objects cognized by the eighth consciousness (第八識). The manas (末那識) constantly clings to the first consciousness as the self, called 'distinguishing the self' (了別我). The remaining six consciousnesses each distinguish their own objects, called 'distinguishing the object' (了別境). Along with the ability of the preceding four consciousnesses to cognize objects, they can all be called 'functions' (業). The meaning of its proof is: The sutra says that when the fourth consciousness of distinguishing the object appears, the four functions operate in every kṣaṇa. If the consciousnesses do not operate simultaneously, it violates the meaning of the four functions operating in the holy words.' Question: During the five states of no-mind (五位無心), the six consciousnesses do not exist, so how can the four functions operate in one kṣaṇa? Answer: As long as there is the fourth function, there must be four functions existing simultaneously. It is not said that the four functions always exist simultaneously, so there is no fault. If they always exist simultaneously, then there are only the first three functions.
The commentary says: 'Here, the arising of the mind, up to assisting the arising of the five...' The five simultaneous consciousnesses (五俱意識) have two meanings: first, to clearly grasp the object; second, to be able to assist the arising of the preceding five consciousnesses. If the two eye consciousnesses, although
有明瞭。無助引生故不為例。如定意識雖實復明了不能助五。
疏。理實俗真者。生起于下。第二俗等而對真等有四三二重數差別。
疏。或轉變者是變異義者。問初解何別 答所變之用是依他起故與前別。此用實非見相二分。依此二用計能所取方名二分。用是二分執所起處。二分之用用名二分。
疏。上文安惠說余非佛者。上言二分安惠明余不據佛說。佛無二分。下文明佛有二分者。護法適爾非惠本意。
論。又契經三界唯心者。此十地經。無性攝論廣釋其意。疏中雖引隨文兼釋。初學難分。今更引之冀令易悟 論云唯有心者心識是一。唯聲為遣所取境義。由彼無故能取亦無。不遮心法。由彼與心不相離故。如說若無心所有法心未曾轉。若爾滅定何故唯心 釋曰。此經部難。若言有心定有心法。如何滅定唯有心王。經部滅定唯有心故 論是彼宗過。我大乘宗若處有心必定亦有心相應法。若處無有心相應法心亦定無。如是三界皆唯有心。此言顯示三界唯識。言三界者。謂與欲等愛結相應墮在三界 釋曰。舉欲界愛等色．無色二界愛結。無漏清升。對彼有漏名之為隨 論此唯識言成立唯有諸心．心法。無有三界橫計所緣。此言不遣真如所緣依他所緣。謂道諦攝根本．后得二種所緣。由不為愛之
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有明瞭（指清晰的認知）。無助引生故不為例（因為沒有輔助因素產生，所以不作為例子）。例如，定意識（指禪定中的意識）雖然確實明瞭，但不能輔助五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官的意識）。
疏（指《成唯識論述記》）。理實俗真者（在理上是真實，在世俗上也是真實）。生起于下（產生於下文）。第二俗等而對真等有四三二重數差別（第二種世俗諦等，相對於真諦等，有四重、三重、二重的數量差別）。
疏。或轉變者是變異義者（或者說轉變，是變異的意思）。問初解何別（問：這與最初的解釋有什麼區別？）答所變之用是依他起故與前別（答：所轉變的作用是依他起性，所以與之前的解釋不同）。此用實非見相二分（這個作用實際上不是見分和相分）。依此二用計能所取方名二分（依靠這兩種作用，計度能取和所取，才稱為二分）。用是二分執所起處（作用是二分執著產生的地方）。二分之用用名二分（二分的作用，作用稱為二分）。
疏。上文安惠說余非佛者（上文安惠說其他宗派不是佛的教義）。上言二分安惠明余不據佛說（上面說二分，安惠說明其他宗派，不是根據佛的教義說的）。佛無二分（佛沒有二分）。下文明佛有二分者（下文說明佛有二分）。護法適爾非惠本意（護法的解釋只是如此，不是安惠的本意）。
論。又契經三界唯心者（《十地經》說三界唯心）。此十地經（指《十地經》）。無性攝論廣釋其意（無性《攝大乘論》廣泛解釋了它的含義）。疏中雖引隨文兼釋（《述記》中雖然引用並隨文解釋）。初學難分（初學者難以區分）。今更引之冀令易悟（現在再次引用，希望容易理解）。論云唯有心者心識是一（論中說，只有心，心和識是一樣的）。唯聲為遣所取境義（『唯』這個詞是爲了排除所取境的意義）。由彼無故能取亦無（因為所取境不存在，所以能取也不存在）。不遮心法（但不遮蔽心法）。由彼與心不相離故（因為心法與心不相分離）。如說若無心所有法心未曾轉（如經中所說，如果沒有心所有法，心就不會運轉）。若爾滅定何故唯心（如果這樣，滅盡定為什麼只有心呢？）釋曰（解釋說）。此經部難（這是經部的責難）。若言有心定有心法（如果說有心，一定有心法）。如何滅定唯有心王（為什麼滅盡定只有心王呢？）。經部滅定唯有心故（經部認為滅盡定只有心）。論是彼宗過（這是他們的宗派的過失）。我大乘宗若處有心必定亦有心相應法（我們大乘宗認為，凡是有心的地方，必定有心相應法）。若處無有心相應法心亦定無（凡是沒有心相應法的地方，心也一定沒有）。如是三界皆唯有心（這樣，三界都唯有心）。此言顯示三界唯識（這句話顯示三界唯識）。言三界者（說三界，是指）。謂與欲等愛結相應墮在三界（與欲界的愛等，以及色界、無色界的愛結相應，而墮落在三界）。釋曰（解釋說）。舉欲界愛等色．無色二界愛結（舉出欲界的愛等，以及色界、無色界的愛結）。無漏清升（沒有煩惱，清凈上升）。對彼有漏名之為隨（相對於有煩惱的，稱為隨）。論此唯識言成立唯有諸心．心法（論中說，這個唯識的說法成立了只有諸心和心法）。無有三界橫計所緣（沒有三界虛妄計度的所緣）。此言不遣真如所緣依他所緣（這句話不排除真如所緣和依他所緣）。謂道諦攝根本．后得二種所緣（指道諦所包含的根本智和后得智兩種所緣）。由不為愛之（因為不被愛所……）
【English Translation】 English version: There is clarity (referring to clear cognition). It is not taken as an example because it is not produced by auxiliary causes. For example, the consciousness in Samadhi (Dhyana-citta) (referring to consciousness in meditation), although truly clear, cannot assist the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses).
Commentary (referring to the 'Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only'). 'Real in principle and true in convention' (referring to being real in principle and true in conventional reality). 'Arising below' (referring to arising in the following text). 'The second conventional truth, etc., has four, three, and two levels of difference compared to the ultimate truth, etc.' (referring to the second type of conventional truth, etc., having four, three, and two levels of numerical difference compared to the ultimate truth, etc.).
Commentary. 'Or transformation' means 'the meaning of change.' Question: What is the difference from the initial explanation? Answer: The function of what is transformed is dependently arisen, so it is different from the previous explanation. This function is actually not the seeing-aspect and the object-aspect. Based on these two functions, the grasper and the grasped are conceived, and then they are called the two aspects. The function is where the attachment to the two aspects arises. The function of the two aspects is called the two aspects.
Commentary. 'In the previous text, Anhui said that other teachings are not the Buddha's.' The previous statement about the two aspects, Anhui clarified that other schools' teachings are not based on the Buddha's teachings. The Buddha has no two aspects. The following text clarifies that the Buddha has two aspects. Dharmapala's explanation is just that, not Anhui's original intention.
Treatise. Furthermore, the sutra says, 'The three realms are only mind' (referring to the 'Ten Stages Sutra' stating that the three realms are only mind). This is the 'Ten Stages Sutra' (Dasabhumika Sutra). Vasubandhu's Commentary on the Compendium of Mahayana (Mahayanasamgraha) extensively explains its meaning. Although the commentary quotes and explains it along with the text, it is difficult for beginners to distinguish. Now, it is quoted again in the hope of making it easier to understand. The treatise says, 'Only mind means that mind and consciousness are one.' The word 'only' is to eliminate the meaning of the object of grasping. Because it does not exist, the grasper also does not exist. It does not negate the mind-dharmas (mental phenomena). Because they are inseparable from the mind. As it is said, 'If there are no mental factors, the mind never functions.' If so, why is there only mind in cessation meditation (Nirodha-samapatti)?' Explanation: This is a challenge from the Sautrantika school. If it is said that there is mind, there must be mental factors. Why is there only the mind-king in cessation meditation? The Sautrantika school believes that there is only mind in cessation meditation. The treatise is a fault of their school. Our Mahayana school believes that wherever there is mind, there must also be mental factors. Wherever there are no mental factors, there is definitely no mind. Thus, the three realms are all only mind. This statement shows that the three realms are only consciousness. The three realms refer to being associated with desires, etc., and the bonds of love, falling into the three realms. Explanation: It mentions the love of the desire realm, etc., and the bonds of love of the form and formless realms. Without outflows, pure and ascending. Compared to those with outflows, it is called 'following.' The treatise says, 'This statement of consciousness-only establishes that there are only minds and mental factors.' There are no objects of false conceptualization in the three realms. This statement does not exclude the object of Suchness (Tathata) and the object of dependent origination. It refers to the two objects of fundamental wisdom and subsequent wisdom included in the path truth. Because it is not for love...
所執故。非所治故。非迷亂故。非三界攝。亦不離識故不待說。若爾應說如是二界。無色界中經部唯有心．心法故 釋曰。若以二智不執外境。二智所緣不離識故唯識自成故不待說。無色經部心不執外。彼界唯識不說應成。對彼應言二界唯識 論此難不然。識所取義皆無義故。非但色無說名唯識 釋曰。但識所取心外之境並皆是無名為唯識。不唯色無得唯識名 論何者 釋曰。外人問也。除色等外何者更是識所取耶 論亦無餘虛空等識所取義 釋曰。此出色外所取之義 論經部諸師許無色界諸心．心法是無色相無體無實所取境義顯現所依 釋曰。敘彼計也。彼計虛空是無色相。無體實等。然此空者由心．心所破色觀空虛空方顯。故心．心法是空所依 論恐彼執為非心．心法故說三界皆唯有心 釋曰。恐執虛空離心．心所名非心法。或恐彼執能依空無。所依心法亦復不有。由斯故說三界唯心。披此觀疏疏可悟矣。
論。又說所緣唯識所現者。按解深經。慈氏菩薩問世尊。諸毗缽舍那三摩地所行影像。彼與此心當言有異。當言無異。善男子當言無異。何以故。由彼影像唯是識故。善男子我說識所緣唯識所現故。世尊若彼所行影像即與此心無有異者。云何此心還見此心。善男子此中無有小法能見小法。然即此心如是生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：因為（二智）不執著于所執之境，因為（二智）不是被治理的對象，因為（二智）不是迷亂的，因為（二智）不被三界所攝，並且也不離於識，所以不需要特別說明。如果這樣，就應該說像這樣的二界（無色界和空無邊處），在中經部（佛教部派之一）中只有心和心法。
釋：如果用二智不執著外境，二智所緣的境界不離於識，因此唯識自然成立，所以不需要特別說明。無色界的經部的心不執著于外境，那個境界是唯識的，不說也應該成立。對於他們應該說二界是唯識的。
論：這個責難是不成立的。因為識所取的一切義都是虛無的，所以不僅僅是色無才稱為唯識。
釋：僅僅是識所取的心外之境都是虛無的，才名為唯識。不是隻有色無才能得到唯識的名稱。
論：什麼才是（識所取的）？
釋：這是外人的提問。除了色等之外，還有什麼是識所取的呢？
論：也沒有其餘的虛空等識所取的義。
釋：這是指出色之外所取的義。
論：經部的諸位師父認為虛空等諸心、心法是無色相、無體、無實的所取境義顯現的所依。
釋：這是敘述他們的觀點。他們認為虛空是無色相，沒有實體等。然而這個空，是由心、心所破除色之後，觀察虛空才顯現的。所以心、心法是空所依。
論：恐怕他們執著虛空不是心、心法，所以說三界都唯有心。
釋：恐怕他們執著虛空離開心、心所，名為非心法。或者恐怕他們執著能依的空無，所依的心法也不存在。因此才說三界唯心。披閱此觀疏可以領悟。
論：又說所緣唯識所現，按照《解深密經》，慈氏菩薩（Maitreya Bodhisattva）問世尊（釋迦摩尼佛的尊稱，指釋迦摩尼佛）：諸毗缽舍那（Vipassanā，內觀）三摩地（Samādhi，禪定）所行的影像，它與這個心，應該說是有差異，還是沒有差異？善男子，應該說沒有差異。為什麼呢？因為那些影像唯是識。善男子，我說識所緣唯識所現。世尊，如果那些所行的影像與這個心沒有差異，為什麼這個心還能見到這個心呢？善男子，這裡沒有微小的法能夠見到微小的法，然而就是這個心這樣生起。
【English Translation】 English version: Objection: Because (the two wisdoms) do not grasp the grasped object, because (the two wisdoms) are not the objects to be governed, because (the two wisdoms) are not confused, because (the two wisdoms) are not included in the Three Realms, and also because they are not separate from consciousness, there is no need for special explanation. If so, it should be said that in such two realms (the Formless Realm and the Realm of Infinite Space), in the Sautrāntika school, there are only mind and mental factors.
Explanation: If the two wisdoms do not grasp external objects, and the objects cognized by the two wisdoms are not separate from consciousness, then the theory of 'consciousness-only' is naturally established, so there is no need for special explanation. The mind of the Sautrāntika school in the Formless Realm does not grasp external objects; that realm is 'consciousness-only,' and it should be established without saying. To them, it should be said that the two realms are 'consciousness-only.'
Objection: This criticism is not valid. Because all meanings grasped by consciousness are unreal, it is not only the absence of form that is called 'consciousness-only.'
Explanation: Only the external objects grasped by consciousness are unreal, and this is called 'consciousness-only.' It is not only the absence of form that can obtain the name 'consciousness-only.'
Objection: What is (grasped by consciousness)?
Explanation: This is a question from an outsider. Besides form, what else is grasped by consciousness?
Objection: There are also no other meanings grasped by consciousness, such as space.
Explanation: This points out the meaning grasped outside of form.
Objection: The teachers of the Sautrāntika school consider that emptiness, etc., and all minds and mental factors are the basis upon which the meaning of the grasped object, which is without form, without substance, and unreal, appears.
Explanation: This is a narration of their view. They consider that emptiness is without form, without substance, etc. However, this emptiness is manifested only after the mind and mental factors have eliminated form and observed emptiness. Therefore, mind and mental factors are the basis of emptiness.
Objection: Fearing that they would hold that emptiness is not mind or mental factors, it is said that all three realms are only mind.
Explanation: Fearing that they would hold that emptiness is separate from mind and mental factors, and is called 'not mind-factors,' or fearing that they would hold that the emptiness that is relied upon does not exist, and the mind-factors that rely on it also do not exist, therefore it is said that the three realms are only mind. Reading this commentary can lead to understanding.
Objection: Furthermore, it is said that what is cognized is only what is manifested by consciousness. According to the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經), Maitreya Bodhisattva (慈氏菩薩) asked the World-Honored One (世尊, a title for the Buddha, referring to Shakyamuni Buddha): 'The images that are experienced in Vipassanā (毗缽舍那, insight meditation) Samādhi (三摩地, meditative absorption), should they be said to be different from this mind, or should they be said to be not different?' 'Good man, they should be said to be not different. Why? Because those images are only consciousness. Good man, I say that what is cognized by consciousness is only what is manifested by consciousness.' 'World-Honored One, if those images that are experienced are not different from this mind, how can this mind see this mind?' 'Good man, there is no small dharma (法, phenomenon) here that can see a small dharma, but it is just that this mind arises in this way.'
時。即有如是影像顯現。善男子如依善瑩清凈鏡面以質為緣還見本質。而謂我今見於影像。及謂離質別有所行影像如是顯現。此心生時相似。有異三摩地所行影像顯現。世尊若諸有情自性而住。緣色等心所行影像。彼與此心亦無異耶。善男子亦無有異。而諸愚夫由顛倒覺于諸影像。不能如實知唯是識。作顛倒解 無性攝論第四釋云。三摩地者是能令心住一境性。心法為體。此所緣境說名所行。本境名質。似彼現者說名影像。謂一切法作用作者皆不成故 名無小法能取小法。譬如依止自面等質。于鏡等中還見本質由迷亂故。謂我見影由鏡等緣威力大故。雖無異影而似別有影像顯現。此心亦爾 問此鏡中像為有無耶 答有兩釋。一云鏡中有別影像。眼識起時緣影而生。不爾便應有見無相。喻不似法。又攝論等映象況依他。空花類遍計。又七十六云。如凈鏡若有一影生緣現前唯一影起。多影亦然。準此別有。但無實用說離質無。攝影從質云見自質。一云離質無別影像。由迷亂故謂見影像 故佛地論第四說云。謂諸有情顛倒執著影像熏習成就力故。鏡面為緣自識變異似面影現。由是世間起增上慢。謂我鏡中見其面影。以無別影鏡中生故。經但說言眾像顯現不言生起。佛地第五言生起者依現假說 又無性攝論第五說云。又如影像
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時，就會有這樣的影像顯現。善男子，就像依靠光潔清凈的鏡面，以實物（質）為條件（緣），又反過來看到實物本身（本質）。（有人）卻說『我現在看到的是影像』，並且認為離開實物（質）另外有影像在起作用，像這樣顯現。此心生起時也相似，有不同於三摩地（Samadhi，定）所緣的影像顯現。世尊，如果各種有情安住于自性，緣於色等的心所緣的影像，那它與這個心也沒有區別嗎？善男子，也沒有區別。但是那些愚昧的人由於顛倒的覺知，對於各種影像，不能如實地知道那僅僅是識，而作顛倒的理解。《無性攝論》第四解釋說：『三摩地』是指能夠使心安住于單一境界的性質，以心法為本體。這個所緣的境界叫做『所行』。原本的境界叫做『質』，類似它而顯現的叫做『影像』。意思是說一切法的『作用』和『作者』都不能成立，所以說沒有微小的法能夠取微小的法。譬如依靠自己的面容等實物（質），在鏡子等中又反過來看到實物本身，由於迷惑顛倒的緣故，（人們）說『我看到了影像』，因為鏡子等條件（緣）的威力很大，雖然沒有不同的影像，卻好像另外有影像顯現。此心也是這樣。問：這鏡子中的影像是有還是沒有呢？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是鏡子中有另外的影像，眼識生起時緣于影像而生起，否則就應該有見到沒有相狀的東西，這個比喻不像法。而且《攝論》等把映象比作依他起性，空花比作遍計所執性。還有第七十六說：『如清凈的鏡子如果有一個影像生起的條件（緣）現前，就只有一個影像生起，多個影像也是這樣。』按照這個說法，（鏡中）是有另外的影像的，但是沒有實際的用處，所以說離開實物（質）就沒有（影像）。攝影來自實物（質），所以說見到的是自己的實物（質）。另一種說法是離開實物（質）就沒有另外的影像，由於迷惑顛倒的緣故，（人們）認為看到了影像。所以《佛地論》第四說：『各種有情由於顛倒執著影像的熏習成就的力量，以鏡面為條件（緣），自己的識變異而好像面容的影像顯現。因此世間產生增上慢，認為我在鏡子中看到了自己的面容影像。』因為沒有另外的影像在鏡子中生起，經中只是說各種影像顯現，沒有說生起。佛地第五說生起是依據顯現而假說的。還有《無性攝論》第五說：『又如影像』 English version: At that time, such images will appear. Good son, it is like relying on a smooth and clean mirror surface, using the substance (quality) as a condition (cause), and seeing the substance itself (essence) again. (Someone) says, 'I am seeing the image now,' and thinks that there is another image functioning apart from the substance (quality), appearing like this. The arising of this mind is similar, with images appearing that are different from those perceived in Samadhi (concentration). World Honored One, if all sentient beings abide in their own nature, and the images perceived by the mind that are conditioned by form, etc., are they no different from this mind? Good son, there is no difference. However, those foolish people, due to their inverted perception, cannot truly know that the various images are merely consciousness, and they make inverted interpretations. The fourth explanation of the Treatise on the Absence of Nature says: 'Samadhi' refers to the nature that enables the mind to abide in a single state, with the mental dharma as its essence. The object of this perception is called 'what is perceived.' The original state is called 'quality,' and what appears similar to it is called 'image.' It means that the 'function' and 'agent' of all dharmas cannot be established, so it is said that no small dharma can grasp a small dharma. For example, relying on one's own face, etc. (quality), one sees the substance itself again in mirrors, etc. Due to confusion and inversion, (people) say, 'I see the image,' because the power of the mirror, etc. (condition) is great. Although there is no different image, it seems as if another image appears. This mind is also like that. Question: Does this image in the mirror exist or not? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that there is another image in the mirror, and the eye consciousness arises by being conditioned by the image. Otherwise, there should be seeing something without a form, and this metaphor would not be like the Dharma. Moreover, the Treatise compares the image in the mirror to dependent origination, and the empty flower to conceptual construction. Also, the seventy-sixth says: 'If there is a condition (cause) for an image to arise in a clean mirror, only one image will arise, and the same is true for multiple images.' According to this explanation, there is another image (in the mirror), but it has no practical use, so it is said that there is no (image) apart from the substance (quality). The photograph comes from the substance (quality), so it is said that what is seen is one's own substance (quality). Another explanation is that there is no other image apart from the substance (quality). Due to confusion and inversion, (people) think they see the image. Therefore, the fourth of the Buddha-bhumi Sutra says: 'Due to the power of the habit of inverted attachment to images, various sentient beings, taking the mirror surface as a condition (cause), their own consciousness transforms and appears like the image of a face. Therefore, the world generates increased pride, thinking that I see my own face image in the mirror.' Because no other image arises in the mirror, the sutra only says that various images appear, and does not say that they arise. The fifth of the Buddha-bhumi Sutra says that arising is a provisional statement based on appearance. Furthermore, the fifth of the Treatise on the Absence of Nature says: 'Also, like an image.'
【English Translation】 At that time, such images will appear. Good son, it is like relying on a smooth and clean mirror surface, using the substance (quality) as a condition (cause), and seeing the substance itself (essence) again. (Someone) says, 'I am seeing the image now,' and thinks that there is another image functioning apart from the substance (quality), appearing like this. The arising of this mind is similar, with images appearing that are different from those perceived in Samadhi (定). World Honored One, if all sentient beings abide in their own nature, and the images perceived by the mind that are conditioned by form, etc., are they no different from this mind? Good son, there is no difference. However, those foolish people, due to their inverted perception, cannot truly know that the various images are merely consciousness, and they make inverted interpretations. The fourth explanation of the Treatise on the Absence of Nature says: 'Samadhi' refers to the nature that enables the mind to abide in a single state, with the mental dharma as its essence. The object of this perception is called 'what is perceived.' The original state is called 'quality,' and what appears similar to it is called 'image.' It means that the 'function' and 'agent' of all dharmas cannot be established, so it is said that no small dharma can grasp a small dharma. For example, relying on one's own face, etc. (quality), one sees the substance itself again in mirrors, etc. Due to confusion and inversion, (people) say, 'I see the image,' because the power of the mirror, etc. (condition) is great. Although there is no different image, it seems as if another image appears. This mind is also like that. Question: Does this image in the mirror exist or not? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that there is another image in the mirror, and the eye consciousness arises by being conditioned by the image. Otherwise, there should be seeing something without a form, and this metaphor would not be like the Dharma. Moreover, the Treatise compares the image in the mirror to dependent origination, and the empty flower to conceptual construction. Also, the seventy-sixth says: 'If there is a condition (cause) for an image to arise in a clean mirror, only one image will arise, and the same is true for multiple images.' According to this explanation, there is another image (in the mirror), but it has no practical use, so it is said that there is no (image) apart from the substance (quality). The photograph comes from the substance (quality), so it is said that what is seen is one's own substance (quality). Another explanation is that there is no other image apart from the substance (quality). Due to confusion and inversion, (people) think they see the image. Therefore, the fourth of the Buddha-bhumi Sutra says: 'Due to the power of the habit of inverted attachment to images, various sentient beings, taking the mirror surface as a condition (cause), their own consciousness transforms and appears like the image of a face. Therefore, the world generates increased pride, thinking that I see my own face image in the mirror.' Because no other image arises in the mirror, the sutra only says that various images appear, and does not say that they arise. The fifth of the Treatise on the Absence of Nature says: 'Also, like an image.'
于鏡等中還見本質。而謂我今見於影像。而此影像實無所有 又世親攝論亦第五云。譬如影像實無有義。即于本質起影像覺。然影像義無別可得 詳曰。后釋為勝。會余違文具義燈辨。小乘同異如瑜伽鈔。
疏。空定唯空等者。作觀行者而依空定觀境皆空。若餘人等即于其境而為其實既互相違。明境隨心種種見別。
論。二無所緣識智者。有義應云無所緣識相智。無所緣相識得生故。文略不言。待今說故 詳曰。意云無境而識得生。言無所緣顯境無矣。何繁相言。若言相者而是境相。故須置者四緣之中亦應說云所緣緣相。相是境故。彼不言相得知是境。故此何須。又相亦名所緣相也。論若言無所緣相者。豈不濫彼相分無耶。有相濫失故無為善。但見前文有識相言。便謂第二亦合有相。二文全別不可例同。
疏。應言境非真慮起者。有義舊說緣無得起慮者亦無有失。但約本質說此言故。影像即心非所說故。舊義勝疏 詳曰。若言緣無得起慮者。恐惑者言相無心生。故境非真便遣斯惑。何得非勝 又影像者但不離心。如何得云即是心耶。
疏。以是法故即有體法者。論云所緣法者。即是因法既云所緣。必須有體故所緣因除彼空花。疏云以是法者以是法緣法也。省所緣言但云是法。
疏。又
解除彼亦得者。因中應云除彼空花所緣法故。以言簡之亦無過也。
疏。據理而言四事皆通者。有義彈云。身不定難如何得說通非情耶。若言情．非情境于多相續皆不定屬說通非情。此亦不然。境通非情仍約有情名不定故。故應思之 詳曰。言四皆通通定不定 或通有情。不云四種通情非情名皆通也。
論。謂識所變至說為法空者。按二十唯識論云。非知諸法一切種無。乃得名為入法無我。然達愚夫遍計所執自性差別諸法無我。如是乃名八法無我。非諸佛境離言法性亦都無故名法無我。
論。是惡趣空諸佛說為不可治者。按寶積經云。一切諸見以空得脫。若起空見即不可除。
論。亂相及亂體等者。攝論第四無性釋云。亂相許為似色變識。亂體許為非色變識。順結頌法。故文隔越其義相屬。若無似色所變因識。非色果識不應得有。似若無境有境亦無 釋曰。言順結等而釋外難。外難意云。準長行釋與彼頌文何故不次。故答彼言約順結頌。取義相屬故文隔越亦不相違。其文隔越對看可悉。先因後果名之為順 又云。似若無境無似色境。有境亦無。能有彼境顛倒之心名為有境。
論。現量證時不執外等者。依二十論通破正量．及薩婆多。故彼論云。如夢等時雖無外境。而亦得有如是現覺。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：解除這種觀點也是可以的。因為在原因中應該說，排除了虛幻的空花所緣之法。用簡潔的語言表達也沒有問題。
疏：從道理上來說，四種情況都相通。有一種觀點反駁說：身體不定難以說相通於非情之物。如果說有情和非情之境在多種相續中都不確定屬於相通於非情之物，這也是不對的。境相通於非情仍然以有情之名而顯得不確定。所以應該仔細思考。詳細地說，四種情況都相通，相通於定與不定，或者相通於有情。這裡並沒有說四種相通於有情和非情之物的名稱都是相通的。
論：所謂由識所變，才說為法空（Dharmasunyata）的，按照《二十唯識論》所說：並非認知諸法一切種類都沒有，才能叫做進入法無我（Dharmanairatmya）。而是通達愚夫普遍計度執著的自性差別諸法無我，這樣才叫做八法無我。不是諸佛境界，離開言語的法性也都沒有，才叫做法無我。
論：這是惡趣空，諸佛說為不可救治的。按照《寶積經》所說：一切諸見以空（Sunyata）得以解脫，如果生起空見，就不可去除。
論：亂相和亂體等。攝論第四無性釋說：亂相允許是相似於色的變識，亂體允許是非色的變識。順著總結頌文的方法，所以文字隔開，但意義相互關聯。如果沒有相似於色所變的因識，非色的果識不應該存在。如果相似的境不存在，真實的境也不存在。釋義說：用『順結』等來解釋外來的疑問。外來疑問的意思是：按照長行的解釋，與那頌文為什麼不按順序排列？所以回答說，按照順著總結頌文的方法，取其意義相互關聯，所以文字隔開也沒有相互違背。文字隔開對照來看就可以明白。先因後果稱之為順。又說：如果相似的境不存在，就沒有相似於色的境，真實的境也不存在。能夠產生對那個境顛倒之心，稱為有境。
論：現量證驗時，不執著外境等。依據《二十唯識論》普遍破斥正量和薩婆多（Sarvastivada）。所以該論說：如夢等時候，即使沒有外境，也仍然可以有這樣的現覺。
【English Translation】 English version: This view can also be refuted. Because in the cause, it should be said that the object of illusory empty flowers is excluded. There is no problem in expressing it in concise language.
Commentary: In terms of principle, all four situations are interconnected. One view refutes: It is difficult to say that the body is uncertain and interconnected with non-sentient things. If it is said that the realms of sentient and non-sentient beings are uncertain in many continuations and belong to non-sentient things, this is also incorrect. The realm that is interconnected with non-sentient things still appears uncertain under the name of sentient beings. Therefore, it should be carefully considered. In detail, all four situations are interconnected, interconnected with the definite and indefinite, or interconnected with sentient beings. It is not said here that the names of the four types of interconnection with sentient and non-sentient things are all interconnected.
Treatise: What is called transformation by consciousness is said to be Dharmasunyata (emptiness of phenomena). According to the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, it is not that one must perceive that all kinds of dharmas do not exist in order to be called entering Dharmanairatmya (no-self of phenomena). Rather, it is understanding that the self-nature and differences of all dharmas that are universally conceived and clung to by foolish people are without self, and this is called the eightfold no-self of phenomena. It is not that the realm of all Buddhas, the nature of reality beyond words, does not exist at all, and therefore it is called Dharmasunyata.
Treatise: This is the emptiness of evil destinies, which the Buddhas say is incurable. According to the Ratnakuta Sutra, all views are liberated by Sunyata (emptiness), but if the view of emptiness arises, it cannot be removed.
Treatise: Confused appearances and confused substance, etc. The Anumana-samuccaya, fourth chapter, explains: Confused appearances are allowed to be consciousness transformed into something similar to form, and confused substance is allowed to be consciousness transformed into something non-form. Following the method of summarizing the verses, the words are separated, but the meanings are related to each other. If there is no cause consciousness transformed into something similar to form, there should be no result consciousness of non-form. If the similar realm does not exist, the real realm also does not exist. The explanation says: Using 'following the summary' etc. to explain external questions. The meaning of the external question is: According to the explanation of the long passage, why are the verses not arranged in order? Therefore, the answer is that according to the method of following the summary of the verses, taking the meaning that is related to each other, so the words are separated without contradicting each other. The separated words can be understood by comparing them. The cause comes first, and the result comes later, which is called following. It is also said: If the similar realm does not exist, there is no realm similar to form, and the real realm also does not exist. The ability to generate an inverted mind towards that realm is called having a realm.
Treatise: When directly verifying, one does not cling to external objects, etc. According to the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, it universally refutes the pramana (valid cognition) and the Sarvastivada school. Therefore, that treatise says: As in dreams, even if there is no external object, there can still be such direct perception.
余時現覺應知亦爾。故彼引此為證不成 釋曰。通破二宗 又若爾時有此現覺。我今現證如是色等。爾時于境能見已無。要在意識能分別故。時眼等識必已謝故 釋曰。破正量部。以彼計境相續有故。故但破見 又剎那論者有此覺時色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量 釋曰。此破有宗。有宗境．識皆剎那滅。
疏。后五識生何故執斷者。有何所以意執斷耶。執既不斷與五同緣。故知五俱第六意識有執無妨。
疏。若小乘等難至不是破他者。本雖破他設他有難。此文即成顯正義也 問設他有難依五識說。何乃不破彼五識耶 答前已顯五不執為外故不破之 有義彈云。疏說此但顯其正義不是破他。今解破他者 詳曰。疏意如前非不破他 問何以得知疏亦破他 答疏既說云不可執為是實外色。若不破他而誠于誰云不可執又。下方云若小乘等。若前不是破他說者。何乃中間言若等耶。以此而觀。疏意不唯明中自義顯對他難理通辨正。思之。
論。若覺時色等者。按攝論云。若於覺時一切時處皆如夢等唯有識者。如從夢覺便覺夢中皆唯有識。覺時何故不如是轉。
論。要至覺時等。按攝論云。真智覺時亦如是轉。如在夢中此覺不轉。從夢覺時此覺乃轉。如是未得真智覺時此覺不轉。得真智覺此覺乃
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『余時現覺應知亦爾。故彼引此為證不成』——釋曰：通破二宗。 『又若爾時有此現覺。我今現證如是色等。爾時于境能見已無。要在意識能分別故。時眼等識必已謝故』——釋曰：破正量部（Sautrāntika）。以彼計境相續有故。故但破見。 『又剎那論者有此覺時色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量』——釋曰：此破有宗（Sarvāstivāda）。有宗境．識皆剎那滅。
『疏。后五識生何故執斷者。有何所以意執斷耶。執既不斷與五同緣。故知五俱第六意識有執無妨。』
『疏。若小乘等難至不是破他者。本雖破他設他有難。此文即成顯正義也』——問：設他有難依五識說。何乃不破彼五識耶？——答：前已顯五不執為外故不破之。——有義彈云：疏說此但顯其正義不是破他。今解破他者——詳曰：疏意如前非不破他——問：何以得知疏亦破他？——答：疏既說云不可執為是實外色。若不破他而誠于誰云不可執又。下方云若小乘等。若前不是破他說者。何乃中間言若等耶。以此而觀。疏意不唯明中自義顯對他難理通辨正。思之。
『論。若覺時色等者。按攝論（Saṃgrahaṇī）云：若於覺時一切時處皆如夢等唯有識者。如從夢覺便覺夢中皆唯有識。覺時何故不如是轉。』
『論。要至覺時等。按攝論（Saṃgrahaṇī）云：真智覺時亦如是轉。如在夢中此覺不轉。從夢覺時此覺乃轉。如是未得真智覺時此覺不轉。得真智覺此覺乃』
【English Translation】 English version: 'The remaining time's present awareness should also be understood as such. Therefore, their citation of this as proof is unsuccessful' - Commentary: Universally refutes the two schools. 'Furthermore, if there was this present awareness at that time, and I now presently perceive such forms, etc., then the ability to see the object at that time no longer exists. It is necessary for the consciousness to be able to discriminate. Therefore, the eye consciousness, etc., must have already ceased' - Commentary: Refutes the Sautrāntika (正量部). Because they believe that objects exist continuously. Therefore, it only refutes the seeing. 'Moreover, for those who advocate momentariness, when this awareness arises, the present objects such as forms have already ceased. How can they allow for present perception at this time?' - Commentary: This refutes the Sarvāstivāda (有宗). For the Sarvāstivāda, both objects and consciousness cease momentarily.
'Commentary: Why do the latter five consciousnesses arise and then cease? What is the reason for the mind's clinging to cessation? Since clinging does not cease and shares the same object as the five consciousnesses, it is known that the sixth consciousness, along with the five, has no hindrance in clinging.'
'Commentary: If the challenges from the Hīnayāna, etc., do not constitute a refutation of others, although the original intent was to refute others, if they present a challenge, this text becomes a manifestation of the correct meaning' - Question: If the challenges from others are based on the five consciousnesses, why not refute those five consciousnesses? - Answer: It has already been shown that the five do not cling to external objects, so they are not refuted. - Some argue: The commentary says that this only reveals its correct meaning and does not refute others. Now, explaining the refutation of others - Detailed explanation: The commentary's intention, as before, is not to not refute others - Question: How can it be known that the commentary also refutes others? - Answer: The commentary says that it is not permissible to cling to it as a real external form. If it does not refute others, then to whom is it saying that it is not permissible to cling? Furthermore, the text below says 'if the Hīnayāna, etc.' If the previous text did not refute others, why does it say 'if, etc.' in the middle? From this perspective, the commentary's intention is not only to clarify its own meaning in the middle but also to reveal the difficulties for others, and to comprehensively distinguish and rectify. Consider this.
'Treatise: If forms, etc., exist at the time of awareness, according to the Saṃgrahaṇī (攝論), 'If at the time of awakening, all times and places are like dreams, only consciousness exists. Just as upon awakening from a dream, one realizes that everything in the dream was only consciousness, why does it not transform in the same way at the time of awakening?''
'Treatise: It is necessary to wait until the time of awakening, etc. According to the Saṃgrahaṇī (攝論), 'The time of awakening with true wisdom also transforms in the same way. Just as this awareness does not transform in a dream, but transforms upon awakening from a dream, similarly, this awareness does not transform before attaining the awakening of true wisdom, but transforms upon attaining the awakening of true wisdom.'
轉 又二十唯識論云。如未覺位不知夢境非外實有。覺時乃知。如是世間虛妄分別串習惛熟。如世夢中諸有所見皆非實有。未得真覺不能自知。若時得彼出世對治無分別智乃名真覺。此後所得世間凈智現在前位。如實了知彼境非實。
疏。彼間等流種等者。即彼第二而明等流異熟因處。
疏。若前解等者。解等流中第一釋也。對彼等流二種之義以辨余因。下疏準知。
疏。若約后解等流果等者。后解等流種親生現亦等流果。故取作意種子望心為士用也。
疏。若后解等流至亦增上者。亦等流果顯所生現望能生種有二果義。
論。有展轉力等者。有義今別敘難。難云豈不由種生現對治方證離系。何故不說故論通也 詳曰。種生能治望離系果但為疏緣。與疏所敘對增上緣為難何別云別敘難。請審披之。
疏。一切種子于彼四果攝果不盡者。不攝無漏有為果也。
論。有說異類至或隨轉門者。按對法雲。當知此中以自性等六種因相顯因緣義。具如彼辨。恐繁不錄。故顯楊論第十八中。廣非有宗六因不得為因緣云。且同類因有三過失。若言同類之因名同類因。有已成過。何以故。若善等法善等體性前已成就彼何用因。若言同類即因名同類因是即無果。有不定過。何以故。不示其果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 轉：又《二十唯識論》說：『如同未覺悟時，不知道夢境並非外在真實存在，覺悟時才知道。』 就像這樣，世間的虛妄分別串習昏熟，如同世間夢中所見的一切都不是真實存在。未得到真正的覺悟就不能自己知道。如果得到那出世的對治無分別智，才叫做真覺。此後所得的世間清凈智慧現在前位，如實了知那境界並非真實。 疏：『彼間等流種等』，就是指《瑜伽師地論》第二卷所闡明的等流因和異熟因之處。 疏：『若前解等』，是指解釋等流因中的第一種解釋。爲了辨別其餘的因，而針對等流因的兩種含義進行分析。下面的疏文可以類推得知。 疏：『若約后解等流果等』，是指按照後面的解釋，等流種子親生出現象也是等流果。所以，可以認為作意種子對於心來說是士用果。 疏：『若后解等流至亦增上』，也是等流果，顯示所生現象對於能生種子來說具有兩種果的含義。 論：『有展轉力等』，有一種觀點認為現在另外敘述一個難題。難題是：難道不是由種子生出現象，通過對治才能證得離系果嗎？為什麼不說呢？所以說本論是通達的。詳細地說，種子生出能對治的法，對於離系果來說只是疏遠的緣，這與疏文所說的針對增上緣提出難題有什麼區別呢？請仔細審閱。 疏：『一切種子于彼四果攝果不盡者』，沒有包括無漏有為果。 論：『有說異類至或隨轉門者』，按照《阿毗達磨》所說，應當知道這裡是用自性等六種因相來顯示因緣的含義，具體內容如彼處所辨，因為內容繁多所以不在此處記錄。所以在《顯揚論》第十八中，廣泛地否定有宗的六因不能作為因緣，說：『且同類因有三種過失。如果說同類之因叫做同類因，有已成過的過失。為什麼呢？如果善等法，善等體性，先前已經成就，那還需要什麼因呢？如果說同類就是因，叫做同類因，那就是沒有果，有不確定的過失。為什麼呢？因為它沒有顯示它的果。』
【English Translation】 English version: Translation: Furthermore, the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states: 'Just as in the state of non-awakening, one does not know that dreamscapes are not externally real, but upon awakening, one realizes this.' Similarly, the habitual practice of false discriminations in the world is deeply ingrained. Like all that is seen in a dream, it is not truly existent. Without attaining true awakening, one cannot know this oneself. Only when one attains the transcendental antidote of non-discriminating wisdom is it called true awakening. Thereafter, the pure worldly wisdom attained in the present moment allows one to know, in accordance with reality, that those realms are not real. Commentary: 'Between those, the outflowing seed, etc.' refers to the place in the second volume [of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice)] that clarifies the outflowing cause (niṣyanda-hetu) and the ripening cause (vipāka-hetu). Commentary: 'If the former explanation, etc.' refers to the first explanation within the explanation of the outflowing cause. It analyzes the two meanings of the outflowing cause in order to distinguish it from other causes. The following commentary can be understood by analogy. Commentary: 'If according to the latter explanation, the outflowing result, etc.' refers to the fact that, according to the latter explanation, the manifestation directly produced by the outflowing seed is also an outflowing result. Therefore, the seed of attention (manasikara) can be considered the agent cause (puruṣakāra-phala) in relation to the mind. Commentary: 'If according to the latter explanation, the outflowing, up to also being the augmenting cause.' The outflowing result also indicates that the manifested phenomenon produced has two meanings in relation to the seed that produces it. Treatise: 'There is reciprocal power, etc.' One view is that a difficulty is now being presented separately. The difficulty is: Is it not the case that the arising of the phenomenon from the seed, through the antidote, is how the result of separation (visaṃyoga-phala) is attained? Why is this not mentioned? Therefore, it is said that this treatise is comprehensive. In detail, the seed producing the antidote is only a distant condition for the result of separation. How is this different from the difficulty presented in the commentary regarding the augmenting condition? Please examine it carefully. Commentary: 'Not all seeds exhaustively encompass the four results within them.' It does not encompass the unconditioned conditioned result (anāsrava-saṃskṛta-phala). Treatise: 'Some say that different kinds, up to or following the transformation gate.' According to the Abhidharma, it should be known that here the meaning of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is shown using six aspects of causes, such as self-nature. The details are as explained there, but are not recorded here due to their complexity. Therefore, in the eighteenth chapter of the Compilation of Topics for Elucidation (Śabdavyākaraṇa), it is widely denied that the six causes of the non-existent school can be causes for dependent origination, saying: 'Furthermore, the homogenous cause has three faults. If it is said that the cause of the same kind is called the homogenous cause, there is the fault of being already accomplished. Why? If good dharmas, etc., the nature of goodness, etc., have already been accomplished, then what cause is needed? If it is said that the same kind is the cause, called the homogenous cause, then there is no result, there is the fault of uncertainty. Why? Because it does not show its result.'
是誰因耶。又非決定因體同類。不相似法亦為因故。若言非同類即因亦非同類之因。是即言名有虛設過。同類因言無有所生浪施設故。如是于餘四因三過。如理廣說 問與攝大乘豈不相違。彼許俱有是因緣故 答顯揚破彼現行相望俱有因義不同攝論。如前已會。
論。凈居天上大自在宮等者。十地論云。現報利益受佛位故。后報利益摩醯首羅智處生故 釋曰。行滿今生即證佛果名為現報。以前諸行但為遠因。所以佛位不名后報。菩薩後身地前業感故名后報。聖者不造招后業故。後身菩薩名之為智。因智最勝以智標名。即此菩薩處彼天中名智處生。處謂安處。然自在宮諸教不同。如燈略辨。瑜伽．對法二鈔之中更當會釋。
論。二乘回趣等者。問前三果回趣大乘。為更經生方受變易。為不經生 答有經不經而非一向。故佛地論第二云。若有學位迴向菩提。或隨煩惱感生勢力。感彼生已於最後生。伏諸煩惱起定願力。資現身因乃至成佛。或迴心已即伏煩惱起定願力。資現身因乃至成佛 問若經生者如初果人要受七生。為不爾耶。余問準此 答佛地論中但許經生不定生數。隨多小生未必具受 問既許經生取後果不 答佛地論云。經生伏惑而不言斷。故不取后所未得果。
論。第六轉識至更相引故者。諸心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是誰作為因呢？而且並非決定性的因，因為體性相同或不相似的法也可以作為因。如果說不是同類的法就不是因，那麼因也就不是同類的因了。這就是說，『同類因』這個名稱是虛設的，因為同類因並沒有產生任何東西，只是徒勞地安立。對於其餘四種因，也應該像這樣如理地廣泛解釋這三種過失。問：這與《攝大乘論》豈不是相違背嗎？因為《攝大乘論》允許俱有作為因緣。答：《顯揚聖教論》破斥了《攝大乘論》中現行相互觀望的俱有因的意義，這與《攝大乘論》不同，如前已經解釋過。 論：『凈居天上大自在宮等』，出自《十地經論》：『現世的果報是由於接受佛位，後世的果報是由於摩醯首羅（Maheśvara，大自在天）的智慧處所而生。』釋：修行圓滿，今生就證得佛果，這稱為現報。以前的各種修行只是作為遙遠的因，所以佛位不稱為后報。菩薩後世的身體是由於十地之前的業力所感，所以稱為后報。聖者不再造作招感後世的業，所以後世的菩薩被稱為智。因為智慧最為殊勝，所以用智慧來標明名稱。這位菩薩居住在彼天之中，稱為智處生。『處』是指安住之處。然而，關於自在宮的說法，各種經典有所不同，如《燈論》略作辨析。《瑜伽師地論》和《對法論》的二鈔之中，應當進一步會通解釋。 論：『二乘回趣等』。問：前三果（指須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含）迴向大乘，是需要經過再次投生才能接受變易生死，還是不需要經過再次投生？答：有需要經過再次投生的情況，也有不需要的情況，並非一概而論。所以《佛地經論》第二卷說：『如果有還在學習階段的人迴向菩提，或者隨順煩惱的感生勢力，感得那個生命之後，在最後一生中，降伏各種煩惱，發起堅定不移的願力，資助現世的因，乃至成就佛果。或者回心之後，立即降伏煩惱，發起堅定不移的願力，資助現世的因，乃至成就佛果。』問：如果需要經過再次投生，比如初果（須陀洹，Srota-apanna）的人需要經歷七次投生，是這樣嗎？其餘的問題可以依此類推。答：《佛地經論》中只允許經過再次投生，但不確定投生的次數，隨著投生次數的多少，未必全部經歷七次投生。問：既然允許經過再次投生，那麼會取得後來的果位嗎？答：《佛地經論》說：經過再次投生，只是降伏了迷惑，但沒有說斷除，所以不會取得後來尚未得到的果位。 論：『第六轉識乃至更相引故』。各種心
【English Translation】 English version: Who is the cause? Moreover, it is not a definitive cause, because entities of the same or dissimilar nature can also be causes. If it is said that dissimilar dharmas are not causes, then the cause is not a cause of the same kind. This means that the name 'homogeneous cause' is fictitious, because homogeneous causes do not produce anything, but are established in vain. Regarding the remaining four causes, these three faults should be explained extensively and rationally in this way. Question: Does this not contradict the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Great Vehicle)? Because the Mahāyānasaṃgraha allows co-existence as a cause. Answer: The Abhidharmasamuccaya refutes the meaning of co-existing causes that are mutually regarded as being in the present moment in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which is different from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as explained earlier. Treatise: 'The Pure Abode Heavens, the Great自在 Palace, etc.' From the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra): 'The benefit of present retribution is due to receiving the position of Buddha, and the benefit of future retribution is due to being born in the wisdom abode of Maheśvara (Great Sovereign).' Explanation: Perfecting practice and attaining Buddhahood in this life is called present retribution. The various practices of the past are only distant causes, so the position of Buddha is not called future retribution. The future body of a Bodhisattva is felt by the karma before the tenth ground, so it is called future retribution. Sages no longer create karma that invites future retribution, so the future body of a Bodhisattva is called wisdom. Because wisdom is the most supreme, it is named after wisdom. This Bodhisattva dwells in that heaven and is called 'born in the wisdom abode'. 'Abode' refers to the place of dwelling. However, the teachings regarding the Palace of自在 differ. As the Lamp Treatise briefly distinguishes. Further explanations should be made in the two commentaries of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). Treatise: 'The Two Vehicles turning towards, etc.' Question: When the first three fruits (Srota-apanna, Sakrdagamin, Anagamin) turn towards the Mahayana, is it necessary to be reborn again to accept the transformation of birth and death, or is it not necessary to be reborn again? Answer: There are cases where it is necessary to be reborn again, and there are cases where it is not necessary, it is not always the same. Therefore, the second volume of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-Land) says: 'If there are those who are still in the learning stage who turn towards Bodhi, or follow the power of the feeling of afflictions, and after feeling that life, in the last life, subdue all afflictions, generate steadfast vows, support the cause of the present life, and even achieve Buddhahood. Or after turning their minds, they immediately subdue afflictions, generate steadfast vows, support the cause of the present life, and even achieve Buddhahood.' Question: If it is necessary to be reborn again, such as a Srota-apanna (stream-enterer) who needs to experience seven rebirths, is that so? The remaining questions can be inferred from this. Answer: The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra only allows rebirth, but does not determine the number of rebirths. Depending on the number of rebirths, it is not necessary to experience all seven rebirths. Question: Since rebirth is allowed, will the later fruits be obtained? Answer: The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says: After rebirth, the delusions are only subdued, but it does not say that they are cut off, so the later fruits that have not yet been obtained will not be obtained. Treatise: 'The sixth consciousness, up to mutually attracting each other.' Various minds
相引具如燈辨。故此不云。
論。初起無漏至唯欲界者。顯楊論證如下當引。
論。三所緣緣至所慮所託者。具如疏明。有義人物等質雖體是有。水鏡等法能帶己相然無彼質水鏡亦有。彼質但能生鏡等影不生鏡等。非但生影名之為緣。要生能照方名緣故。故質非是鏡等所慮。亦非所託。是故應以二義雙簡 詳曰。理實慮托鏡望質無。然鏡中影非不由質。據此一邊云𨷂所慮亦何爽也。或鏡等體不待質生。能照之用因所照顯。若無所照將對於誰得名能照。亦猶真性本自無為。要待惑亡果義方顯。鏡之能照類亦應然。據此義言有所託者理亦應通 又疏云設本意可知。
疏。親所緣者。即謂見分是帶己相者。相分名己。見分帶相名帶己相。
疏。此疏中即影像相分是帶本質之相等者。有義彈云。若爾疏者應是相分之所緣緣。故應說云。親所緣緣己體之相。是能緣心親所帶故。彼疏所緣雖非親帶。然親所帶杖彼而生。與彼相似。展轉言之亦名所帶。所緣既爾緣義亦然。親所帶相藉彼而生方起心等。故展轉說名之為緣。然親所緣非無帶彼疏所緣義。然今論文言帶己相。意顯能緣帶彼所緣己體相故 詳曰。心帶境相據展轉言非疏不許。故前疏云。緣生於誰。誰帶己相。謂心相應明心帶境。若云疏據親所緣者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 相引用的例子就像燈的辨別一樣，因此這裡不再贅述。
論：最初生起的無漏智直到唯有欲界，這顯示了楊（姓名待考）的論證，如下文將引用。
論：三種所緣緣直到所慮所託，具體內容如疏文所闡明。有一種觀點認為，人物等實體雖然本體是存在的，水鏡等法能夠映帶自身的形象，但並沒有那些實體的本質。水鏡也具有那些實體的影像，但實體只能產生鏡子等的影像，而不能產生鏡子等本身。並非僅僅產生影像就能稱之為緣，必須能夠產生照見的功能才能稱之為緣。因此，實體不是鏡子等所慮及的，也不是鏡子等所依託的。所以應該用兩種含義來加以區分。詳細地說，從道理上講，鏡子觀望實體，確實沒有慮及或依託實體本身。然而，鏡中的影像並非不由實體產生。根據這一方面來說，說鏡子慮及實體又有什麼不對呢？或者說，鏡子等的本體並不依賴實體而生，其照見的功能是因為所照之物而顯現。如果沒有所照之物，將面對誰而得名能照呢？也就像真性（Tathata）本來就是無為的，要等到惑（Klesha）滅亡，果（Phala）的意義才顯現。鏡子的能照也應該類似這樣。根據這個意義來說，有所依託也是可以通融的。另外，疏文中說，假設本意可以知道。
疏：親所緣（Adhipati-pratyaya）是指見分（Darshana-bhaga），是帶己相的。相分（Nimitta-bhaga）名為己，見分帶相（Lakshana）名為帶己相。
疏：這個疏文中，即影像相分是帶本質之相等的。有一種觀點反駁說，如果這樣，那麼疏文就應該是相分的所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya）了，所以應該說：『親所緣緣是己體的相，是能緣之心（Citta）親自體帶的。』那個疏文中所緣雖然不是親自體帶的，但是親自體帶的杖（Danda）依靠它而生，與它相似。輾轉而言，也可以稱之為所帶。所緣既然如此，緣的意義也是這樣。親自體帶的相憑藉它而生，才生起心等，所以輾轉地說，稱之為緣。然而，親所緣並非沒有帶那個疏文中所緣的意義。然而，現在論文說帶己相，意思是顯示能緣帶那個所緣的己體之相。詳細地說，心帶境相，從輾轉而言，疏文並非不允許。所以前面的疏文說：『緣生於誰？誰帶己相？』說的是心相應（Citta-samprayukta）明瞭心帶境。如果說疏文是根據親所緣來說的。
【English Translation】 English version: The examples of mutual reference are like the discernment of a lamp, so they are not elaborated here.
Treatise: The initial arising of undefiled wisdom (Anasrava-jnana) up to only the Desire Realm (Kama-dhatu) demonstrates Yang's (name to be verified) argument, which will be cited below.
Treatise: The three kinds of object-condition (Alambana-pratyaya) up to 'what is considered and relied upon' are explained in detail in the commentary. One view holds that although entities such as people are substantial in themselves, laws such as water mirrors can reflect their own images, but do not have the essence of those entities. Water mirrors also have the images of those entities, but the entities can only produce images of mirrors, etc., and cannot produce the mirrors themselves. It is not enough to merely produce an image to be called a condition (Pratyaya); it must be able to produce the function of illumination to be called a condition. Therefore, entities are not what mirrors, etc., consider, nor are they what mirrors, etc., rely on. Therefore, a distinction should be made using both meanings. In detail, in principle, when a mirror observes an entity, it does not actually consider or rely on the entity itself. However, the image in the mirror is not produced without the entity. According to this aspect, what is wrong with saying that the mirror considers the entity? Or, the substance of mirrors, etc., does not depend on the entity for its existence; its function of illumination is manifested because of what is illuminated. If there is nothing to be illuminated, who will it face to be called illumination? It is also like the True Nature (Tathata), which is originally unconditioned (Asamskrita); only when delusion (Klesha) is extinguished does the meaning of the fruit (Phala) become manifest. The illumination of the mirror should be similar. According to this meaning, it is also reasonable to say that there is reliance. In addition, the commentary says, 'Suppose the original intention can be known.'
Commentary: The immediate object-condition (Adhipati-pratyaya) refers to the seeing-part (Darshana-bhaga), which carries its own image. The image-part (Nimitta-bhaga) is called 'self,' and the seeing-part carrying the image (Lakshana) is called 'carrying its own image.'
Commentary: In this commentary, the image-part of the image is equal to carrying the essence of the substance. One view refutes, saying, 'If so, then the commentary should be the object-condition of the image-part, so it should be said: 'The immediate object-condition is the image of the self-substance, which is intimately carried by the mind (Citta) that cognizes.' Although what is conditioned in that commentary is not intimately carried, the staff (Danda) that is intimately carried relies on it to arise, and is similar to it. Speaking in a roundabout way, it can also be called what is carried. Since the object is like this, the meaning of condition is also like this. The image that is intimately carried relies on it to arise, and then the mind, etc., arise, so speaking in a roundabout way, it is called a condition. However, the immediate object-condition is not without the meaning of carrying what is conditioned in that commentary. However, the treatise now says 'carrying its own image,' meaning to show that the cognizer carries the image of the self-substance of that object.' In detail, the mind carrying the image of the object, speaking in a roundabout way, the commentary does not disallow. So the previous commentary said: 'On whom does the condition arise? Who carries its own image?' It is said that the mind-associated (Citta-samprayukta) clearly understands that the mind carries the object. If it is said that the commentary is based on the immediate object-condition.
。在疏無文。又疏科云初釋出體。豈初段中疏主不許通疏親緣。以此故知。疏主許心帶境相也。今言影像是帶質者。帶謂狹帶親附之義。依此義言云相帶質。見望本質隔相疏遠故不言之。由斯前後望義不同理無有失 今又解者。帶有二義。一帶者挾帶親附之義。能緣親附所緣之境而不相離名為挾帶。而猶世言身佩釰矣。二帶者似也。能緣有似本質之相。相即相分。心質相離名為帶似。亦若世言面帶火也。雖境望心近遠不同。然心對彼總得名帶。如次名為二所緣緣。心因親疏二境起故。故論總中言帶己相。心或相應不遮何相。別中方說能所二緣不離相離。由斯不假據展轉說方名為帶。智者思之。
論。非諸有情種皆等故者。問設種不等變之何失 答他種為質自種為影。若有多少即有質影不同之失。若云不同亦何失者。應亦青質而相是黃種種之過 又變他種應有聖凡雜亂之失。如凡第八緣聖無漏凡應成聖。有無漏故。二乘聖等緣凡之種應還成凡。具惑種故。若云凡八不緣無漏。若爾凡可無違。聖緣有漏成惑種過 問佛緣凡夫不成於凡。二乘緣凡何令起惑 答有漏第八變即有用。無漏第八但現彼影非皆有用。故不相例。
論。能于余法等者。除自已外與餘一切皆為其緣不同所緣。所緣緣者唯對能緣以為緣故。
論。生住成得四事別故者。按顯揚論第十八云。問以誰為先。誰為建立。誰和合故。何法生耶。答自種子為先。除所依種。外所餘若色．非色所依及業以為建立。伴及所緣境為和合故。如其所應欲系．色系．無色系．及不繫諸法生 大論同之。所言住者對法第五云。任持增上者。謂風輪等於水輪等。器世間于有情世間。大種于所造。諸根于諸識 釋曰。風輪．器世．大種．諸根為依。令彼水輪．有情．所造．諸識而得住故。所言成者具如疏引 所言得者顯揚十八云。問以誰為先。誰為建立。誰和合故得何法耶。答三乘種姓為先。內因力為建立。外因力為和合故。證得煩惱離系涅槃。此中內因力者。謂如理作意小欲知足等內分善法。又得人身生在聖處諸根無缺無諸業障。于如來所具凈信心。如是等法是名內因力。外因力者謂諸佛出世宣說妙法。住正法者共為伴侶。具悲信者以為施主。如是等法名外因力 彼顯揚論又有作用。此論所無故彼論云。問辭同前。答自種為先。即彼前生為建立。彼生緣為和合故。自作業者自所作用。而得成辨。自所作業者。如眼之見業。如是所餘諸根當知各別作業。又如地能持．水能爛火能燒．風能燥。如是等類是名外法各別作業。此論所無。會如本疏。
論。然增上緣至二十二根
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：『生、住、成、得』四事各不相同的原因是：根據《顯揚論》第十八卷所說：『以什麼為先？什麼為建立？什麼和合的緣故，什麼法產生呢？』回答：『以自身種子為先。除了所依之種子外，其餘的色、非色所依以及業作為建立。伴侶以及所緣境作為和合的緣故。』如其所應，欲界系、色界系、無色界系以及不繫之諸法產生。《大論》的說法相同。所謂『住』，根據《對法論》第五卷所說：『任持增上』是指風輪對於水輪等，器世間對於有情世間，大種對於所造，諸根對於諸識。解釋說：風輪、器世、大種、諸根作為所依，使得水輪、有情、所造、諸識得以安住。所謂『成』，完全如疏中所引用。所謂『得』，《顯揚論》第十八卷說：『以什麼為先？什麼為建立？什麼和合的緣故，得到什麼法呢？』回答：『以三乘（Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana）種姓為先。內在因力作為建立。外在因力作為和合的緣故，證得煩惱離系涅槃（Nirvana）。』這裡所說的內在因力，是指如理作意、少欲知足等內在的善法。又得到人身，生在聖地，諸根沒有殘缺，沒有諸業障，對於如來（Tathagata）具有清凈的信心。像這樣的法就叫做內在因力。外在因力是指諸佛（Buddha）出世宣說妙法，安住于正法的人共同作為伴侶，具有悲心和信心的人作為施主。像這樣的法叫做外在因力。《顯揚論》還有作用，此論沒有，所以《顯揚論》說：『問辭同前。』回答：『以自身種子為先。即彼前生作為建立。彼生緣作為和合的緣故，自身作業者自身所作用，而得以成就。』自身所作業，如眼睛的見業。像這樣其餘的諸根應當知道各自有不同的作業。又如地能持載、水能腐爛、火能燃燒、風能幹燥。像這樣的種類叫做外法各自不同的作業。』此論沒有，會如本疏。
論：然而增上緣乃至二十二根（Indriya）。
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The reason why the four aspects of 'birth, abiding, decay, and attainment' are different is: According to the eighteenth volume of the Xianyang Lun (Exposition of the Meaning Sutra): 'What is the prerequisite? What is the establishment? Due to what combination, what dharma arises?' The answer is: 'The self-seed is the prerequisite. Apart from the seed on which it depends, the remaining form, formless dependencies, and karma serve as the establishment. Companions and the object of cognition serve as the reason for combination.' As appropriate, the dharmas of the desire realm, the form realm, the formless realm, and the unconditioned arise. The Da Lun (Mahayana-abhidharma-samuccaya) has the same explanation. The so-called 'abiding,' according to the fifth volume of the Duifa Lun (Abhidharmasamuccaya): 'Sustaining and enhancing' refers to the wind wheel in relation to the water wheel, etc., the container world in relation to the sentient beings' world, the great elements in relation to what is created, and the faculties in relation to the consciousnesses. The explanation says: The wind wheel, the container world, the great elements, and the faculties serve as the basis, allowing the water wheel, sentient beings, what is created, and the consciousnesses to abide. The so-called 'decay,' is entirely as quoted in the commentary. The so-called 'attainment,' the eighteenth volume of the Xianyang Lun says: 'What is the prerequisite? What is the establishment? Due to what combination, what dharma is attained?' The answer is: 'The lineage of the Three Vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana) is the prerequisite. Internal causal power serves as the establishment. External causal power serves as the reason for combination, attaining the Nirvana (Nirvana) that is the separation from afflictions.' The internal causal power here refers to internal good dharmas such as appropriate attention, having few desires and knowing contentment. Furthermore, obtaining a human body, being born in a sacred place, having complete faculties, being without karmic obstacles, and having pure faith in the Tathagata (Tathagata). Such dharmas are called internal causal power. External causal power refers to the Buddhas (Buddha) appearing in the world and expounding the wonderful Dharma, those who abide in the correct Dharma together as companions, and those with compassion and faith as benefactors. Such dharmas are called external causal power. The Xianyang Lun also has function, which this treatise does not have, so the Xianyang Lun says: 'The question is the same as before.' The answer is: 'The self-seed is the prerequisite. That previous life serves as the establishment. The conditions of that birth serve as the reason for combination, the self-acting agent acts on itself, and is thus accomplished.' What the self acts upon, such as the seeing action of the eyes. Likewise, the remaining faculties should be understood to have their respective actions. Furthermore, like the earth that can support, water that can rot, fire that can burn, and wind that can dry. Such categories are called the different actions of external dharmas.' This treatise does not have it, it will be as in the original commentary.
Treatise: However, the dominant condition extends to the twenty-two faculties (Indriya).
者。按對法第五。增上緣者有九增上。后六增上依彼二十二根建立。故彼論云。此後增上依二十二根建立。境界增上者。謂眼．耳．鼻．舌．身．意。由此增上力色等生故。產生增上者謂男．女根。由此增上力得入胎故。住持增上者謂命根。由此增上力眾同分得住故。受用果增上者謂苦．樂．憂．喜．舍根。依此能受愛．非愛異熟故。世間清凈離欲增上者謂信等五根。由此制伏諸煩惱故。出世清凈離欲增上者謂三無漏根。由此永害諸煩惱隨眠故 又云。云何根幾是根。為何義故觀根耶。謂取境增上故。種族不斷增上故。眾同分住增上故。受用凈不凈業果增上故。世間離欲增上故。出世離欲增上故。是根所境增上者謂眼等六。由此增上力於色等境心．心法轉故。種族不斷增上者謂男．女根。由此增上力子孫等胤流轉不絕故。余如前說。為舍執著增上我故故觀察根。
疏。云俗家族者。男女二根。余頌配論義可知也。又瑜伽論五十七。有八複次廢立斯義。初同對法。餘七有別。恐煩不錄。
論。除后剎那等者。如疏具明。諸論有違。義燈廣會。故此不云。
論。近能引發根本位故等者。顯得無漏根名所以。或釋外難。外難意云。三根無漏。資糧．加行何得名為未知當知。故以引生遠資等釋。
論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 再說，按照《對法》（Abhidharma）的第五種增上緣，有九種增上。后六種增上是依據那二十二根建立的。所以《彼論》說：『這後來的增上是依據二十二根建立的。』境界增上是指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意。由於這些的增上力，色等產生。產生增上是指男根、女根。由於這些的增上力，才能入胎。住持增上是指命根。由於這個的增上力，眾同分才能住留。受用果增上是指苦根、樂根、憂根、喜根、舍根。依靠這些能感受可愛和不可愛的異熟果。世間清凈離欲增上是指信等五根。由於這些能制伏各種煩惱。出世間清凈離欲增上是指三無漏根。由於這些能永遠斷除各種煩惱隨眠。 又說：『什麼是根？有多少是根？爲了什麼意義要觀察根呢？』這是因為取境增上的緣故，種族不斷增上的緣故，眾同分住增上的緣故，受用清凈與不清凈業果增上的緣故，世間離欲增上的緣故，出世間離欲增上的緣故。是根所境增上的是指眼等六根。由於這些的增上力，對於色等境界，心和心法才能運轉。種族不斷增上是指男根、女根。由於這些的增上力，子孫等後代才能流轉不絕。其餘的如前面所說。爲了捨棄執著增上我，所以要觀察根。 疏：所說的俗家族，就是指男女二根。其餘的頌文配合論的意義就可以理解了。另外，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十七卷，有八種『複次』來廢立這個意義。最初一種與《對法》相同，其餘七種有所區別，因為太繁瑣所以不記錄。 論：『除了后剎那等』，如疏文中詳細說明。各種論典有不一致的地方，《義燈》中有廣泛的解釋，所以這裡不詳細說明。 論：『接近能夠引發根本位』等，是爲了彰顯無漏根名稱的由來。或者解釋外來的疑問。外來疑問的意思是說，三根是無漏的，資糧位、加行位怎麼能稱為未知當知呢？所以用引生遠資等來解釋。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, according to the fifth Adhipati-pratyaya (Dominant Condition) in the Abhidharma, there are nine kinds of dominance. The latter six dominances are established based on the twenty-two indriyas (roots). Therefore, 『That Treatise』 says: 『These subsequent dominances are established based on the twenty-two indriyas (roots).』 The Adhipati-pratyaya of the object refers to the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Due to the dominant power of these, forms and so on arise. The Adhipati-pratyaya of generation refers to the male and female reproductive organs (Purusendriya and Striindriya). Due to the dominant power of these, one can enter the womb. The Adhipati-pratyaya of sustenance refers to the life force (Jivitendriya). Due to the dominant power of this, the commonality of beings can remain. The Adhipati-pratyaya of experiencing the result refers to the roots of suffering, pleasure, sorrow, joy, and equanimity (Duhkhendriya, Sukhendriya, Daurmanasyendriya, Saumanasyendriya, and Upekshindriya). Relying on these, one can experience the Vipaka (result) of what is lovable and unlovable. The Adhipati-pratyaya of worldly purity and detachment refers to the five roots of faith, etc. (Sraddhendriya, Viryendriya, Smrtindriya, Samadhindriya, and Prajnendriya). Due to these, one can subdue various afflictions. The Adhipati-pratyaya of supramundane purity and detachment refers to the three Anasrava-indriyas (non-outflow roots). Due to these, one can permanently destroy the latent tendencies of various afflictions. It is also said: 『What are the indriyas (roots)? How many are indriyas (roots)? For what purpose should one observe the indriyas (roots)?』 This is because of the dominance of grasping objects, the dominance of the unbroken lineage, the dominance of the abiding of the commonality of beings, the dominance of experiencing the results of pure and impure karma, the dominance of worldly detachment, and the dominance of supramundane detachment. The dominance of what is the object of the indriyas (roots) refers to the six indriyas (roots) such as the eye. Due to the dominant power of these, the mind and mental factors can operate on objects such as forms. The dominance of the unbroken lineage refers to the male and female reproductive organs (Purusendriya and Striindriya). Due to the dominant power of these, descendants and future generations can flow continuously without interruption. The rest is as mentioned before. In order to abandon the attachment to the dominant self, one should observe the indriyas (roots). Commentary: What is referred to as the 『mundane family』 refers to the male and female reproductive organs (Purusendriya and Striindriya). The meaning of the remaining verses can be understood by matching them with the meaning of the treatise. Furthermore, in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 57, there are eight 『again』 (punar api) to establish and refute this meaning. The first one is the same as the Abhidharma, while the remaining seven are different. Because it is too cumbersome, they are not recorded. Treatise: 『Except for the subsequent moment, etc.,』 as explained in detail in the commentary. There are inconsistencies in various treatises. The 『Yideng』 (義燈) has extensive explanations, so it is not explained in detail here. Treatise: 『Close to being able to induce the fundamental position, etc.,』 is to highlight the origin of the name of the Anasrava-indriyas (non-outflow roots). Or to explain external doubts. The meaning of the external doubts is that since the three roots are Anasrava (non-outflow), how can the stages of accumulation and application be called 『unknown to be known』? Therefore, it is explained by inducing distant resources, etc.
。於此三位至為此根性者。問菩薩要托第四靜慮。若據二乘三受不俱。如何此位得有九根 答通依三乘得有九根。不言九根而俱起也。
論。加行等位至故多不說者。問加行善根是色界法。離欲方得。云何此位猶有憂根 答抉擇分善通依色界本地．近分。近分起者既未離欲得有憂根。固無有失。故按對法第十本論說云。未知欲知根者。謂于方便道及於見道十五心剎那所有諸根 釋論云。諸根者謂意根．信等五根。由未至定等地所依差別故。如其所應有樂．喜．憂．舍。
疏。然此無漏根通三界等者。生起下論。今按彼云。問空無邊處地幾根可得。答十一。識無邊處．無所有處地應知亦爾 釋曰。信等五根．意捨命三．三無漏根合為十一 論云問非想非非想處地幾根可得。答八 釋曰前十一根中除三無漏。三無漏無如此下釋。此等皆約諸人容有現行而言。不依一切及種子說。凡無無漏。地獄種子上身有故。不唯八等。論七根入無色等。如義燈釋。
論。前三無色有勝見道等者。如疏具明。諸多同異燈中亦辨。三類邊智如前鈔說。故不重云。
疏。唯得修修非行修修者。得謂所得。修謂熏修。由現道力令所得法種子增明。故所得法名之為修。行謂現行。修謂習學亦名習修。疏第八。
成唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於這三位達到這種根性的人，問：菩薩要寄託于第四禪定（Dhyana）。如果按照二乘（Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna）的說法，三種感受（苦受、樂受、不苦不樂受）不會同時存在。那麼，這個階段怎麼會有九根（indriya）呢？答：普遍依據三乘（Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna）可以有九根。但並不是說九根同時生起。
論：加行位等，所以大多沒有說。問：加行善根是無漏（anāsrava）法，離開慾望才能得到。為什麼這個階段還有憂根（daurmanasya-indriya）？答：抉擇分善根普遍依據根本地（mūlabhūmi）、近分定（upaacāra-samādhi）。近分定生起的人既然沒有離開慾望，有憂根也沒有過失。所以按照《對法》（Abhidharma）第十本論說：『未知欲知根的人，是指在方便道（upāya-mārga）以及見道（darśana-mārga）十五個心剎那中所有的諸根。』釋論說：『諸根是指意根（manas-indriya）、信等五根（śraddhā-indriya, vīrya-indriya, smṛti-indriya, samādhi-indriya, prajñā-indriya）。由於未至定（anāgamya-samādhi）等地的所依差別，所以相應地有樂、喜、憂、舍。』
疏：然而這種無漏根普遍通於三界（trayo dhātava）等。生起下論。現在按照那裡說：問：空無邊處地（ākāśānantyāyatana）可以得到幾種根？答：十一種。識無邊處（vijñānānantyāyatana）、無所有處地（ākiṃcanyāyatana）應該知道也是這樣。釋曰：信等五根、意捨命三根（manas-indriya, upekṣā-indriya, jīvita-indriya）、三種無漏根（anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, ājñendriya, ājñātāvīndriya）合為十一種。論云：問：非想非非想處地（naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana）可以得到幾種根？答：八種。釋曰：前十一種根中除去三種無漏根。三種無漏根沒有如此下釋。這些都是就諸人容許有現行而言，不依據一切以及種子說。凡是沒有無漏，地獄種子在上身有，不只是八種等。論七根進入無色等，如《義燈》解釋。
論：前三個無色界（ārūpyadhātu）有殊勝的見道等。如疏中詳細說明。諸多同異在《燈》中也辨析過。三類邊智如前面鈔本所說，所以不再重複。
疏：唯獨得到修修，不是行修修。得是指所得，修是指熏修。由於現道的力量，使所得法的種子更加增明，所以所得法名為修。行是指現行，修是指習學，也叫習修。疏第八。
《成唯識論》
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding these three individuals who have attained this nature, the question is: Bodhisattvas rely on the fourth Dhyana (meditative absorption). If, according to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna), the three feelings (painful, pleasant, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant) do not occur simultaneously, how can there be nine indriyas (faculties) at this stage? The answer is: Universally, based on the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna), there can be nine indriyas. However, it is not said that all nine indriyas arise simultaneously.
Treatise: The stages of application, etc., are mostly not discussed. Question: The roots of good in the stage of application are unconditioned (anāsrava) dharmas, which can only be attained by abandoning desire. Why is there still the faculty of sorrow (daurmanasya-indriya) at this stage? Answer: The roots of good in the decisive division universally rely on the fundamental ground (mūlabhūmi) and the proximate concentration (upaacāra-samādhi). Since those who arise in proximate concentration have not yet abandoned desire, it is not a fault to have the faculty of sorrow. Therefore, according to the tenth book of the Abhidharma, it is said: 'Those who have not yet known the root of knowing desire refer to all the faculties in the fifteen moments of thought in the path of means (upāya-mārga) and the path of seeing (darśana-mārga).' The commentary says: 'The faculties refer to the mind faculty (manas-indriya) and the five faculties of faith, etc. (śraddhā-indriya, vīrya-indriya, smṛti-indriya, samādhi-indriya, prajñā-indriya). Due to the differences in the bases of reliance on the unarrived concentration (anāgamya-samādhi) and other levels, there are accordingly pleasure, joy, sorrow, and equanimity.'
Commentary: However, these unconditioned roots universally pervade the three realms (trayo dhātava), etc. The following treatise arises. Now, according to that, the question is: How many faculties can be obtained in the realm of the sphere of infinite space (ākāśānantyāyatana)? Answer: Eleven. It should be known that the realms of the sphere of infinite consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana) and the sphere of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana) are also the same. The explanation is: The five faculties of faith, etc., the three faculties of mind, equanimity, and life (manas-indriya, upekṣā-indriya, jīvita-indriya), and the three unconditioned faculties (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, ājñendriya, ājñātāvīndriya) together make eleven. The treatise says: Question: How many faculties can be obtained in the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana)? Answer: Eight. The explanation is: Among the previous eleven faculties, the three unconditioned faculties are removed. The three unconditioned faculties do not have such explanations below. These are all in terms of what people may have in actual practice, not based on everything and seeds. In general, there is no unconditioned, and the seeds of the lower realm are on the upper body, not just eight, etc. The treatise on the seven faculties entering the formless realms, etc., is explained in the 'Lamp of Meaning'.
Treatise: The first three formless realms (ārūpyadhātu) have the superior path of seeing, etc. As explained in detail in the commentary. Many similarities and differences have also been analyzed in the 'Lamp'. The three types of marginal wisdom are as mentioned in the previous notes, so they are not repeated.
Commentary: Only obtaining cultivation-cultivation, not practice-cultivation-cultivation. 'Obtaining' refers to what is obtained, and 'cultivation' refers to the cultivation through habituation. Due to the power of the present path, the seeds of the obtained dharma are further increased and illuminated, so the obtained dharma is called cultivation. 'Practice' refers to actual practice, and 'cultivation' refers to learning, also called habitual cultivation. Commentary 8.
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra
識論演秘卷第六(終)
成唯識論演秘卷第八
沙門智周撰
論。云何此依十五處立者。而有兩釋。一云云何此十因依十五處立。二云此者此前四緣。既云如是四緣依十五處義有差別建立十因。云何此緣依處立因 有義斷云。后解為勝。依處差別立緣為因。非離緣外別有因也。十因既然依處亦爾。即開四緣為十五處。非離緣外別有依處。由此義顯開前四緣為十五處。約十五處義有差別。建立四緣以為十因。然開四緣為十五處。義準應爾非此有文 詳曰。前勝。何所以者。下文別問四緣依處攝因等故。故下論云。所說四緣依何處立。復如何攝十因．二因。又前問已即舉依處而辨十因以答其問不言四緣。以此而言故前義勝。若取後者後文更問一何繁重。前文不答何乃闕乎 今又釋云。此言雙此四緣．十因。云何四緣及以十因俱依依處。下答先辨十因依處。后明緣依。明緣依中。以隔十因文勢遠故故更問起。亦不相違。
疏。然依者于義俱第七轉聲者。略為二釋。一云依．于俱第七轉。疏云者．義是助辭矣。非說依者是彼于義。依若於義云何得言俱第七轉。體無二故不可言俱。
二云依．于有同有別。如根．境者依．于不同。言依語處立隨說因依即于義。今依彼因云依于義。對依于名云俱第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《識論演秘》卷第六（終）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第八
沙門智周 撰
論：『云何此依十五處立者』（為什麼這[十因]是依據十五處而建立的呢？）而有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是：『云何此十因依十五處立』（為什麼這十因是依據十五處而建立的呢？）。第二種解釋是：『此者此前四緣』（這個『此』指的是前面的四緣）。既然說『如是四緣依十五處義有差別建立十因』（像這樣，四緣依據十五處在意義上的差別而建立十因），那麼『云何此緣依處立因』（為什麼這四緣依據這些處所而建立因呢？） 有義斷云（有一種觀點果斷地說）：后一種解釋更為優勝。依據處所的差別而建立緣為因，並非在緣之外另有因。十因既然如此，依據處所也是這樣。即是展開四緣為十五處，並非在緣之外另有依據處所。由此義理顯示，展開前面的四緣為十五處，根據十五處在意義上的差別，建立四緣而成為十因。然而，展開四緣為十五處，義理上應該如此，但這裡沒有明確的文字說明。 詳曰（詳細地說）：前一種解釋更為優勝。為什麼這樣說呢？因為下文分別詢問四緣依據處所、攝入因等問題。所以下文論述說：『所說四緣依何處立』（所說的四緣依據什麼處所而建立呢？），『復如何攝十因．二因』（又如何包含十因和二因呢？）。而且，前面的提問已經舉出依據處所來辨析十因以回答提問，沒有提到四緣。根據這些來說，所以前一種解釋更為優勝。如果採取后一種解釋，那麼後文再問一次，豈不是繁瑣重複？前文不回答，豈不是有所遺漏？ 今又釋云（現在又解釋說）：『此』字同時指四緣和十因。『云何四緣及以十因俱依依處』（為什麼四緣以及十因都依據依處呢？）。下面的回答先辨析十因依據處所，然後說明緣依據處所。在說明緣依據處所時，因為與十因的文字相隔較遠，所以再次提問，這也不相違背。
疏：然依者于義俱第七轉聲者（然而，『依』字在意義上都是第七轉聲的情況），略為二釋（大致有兩種解釋）。一種解釋是：『依』和『于』都是第七轉。疏中說：『者』字，在意義上是助詞。並非說『依』字就是『于』字的意義。『依』如果是『于』的意義，怎麼能說都是第七轉呢？因為本體沒有兩個，所以不能說都是。 二云（第二種解釋是）：『依』和『于』有相同之處，也有不同之處。例如根和境，『依』和『于』不同。說『依語處立隨說因』，『依』就是『于』的意義。現在依據那個因，說『依于義』。對『依于名』來說，就是『俱第』。
【English Translation】 English version Śikṣāsamuccaya-vyākhyāna (Explanation of the Compendium of Training) Scroll 6 (End)
Śikṣāsamuccaya-vyākhyāna (Explanation of the Compendium of Training) Scroll 8
Composed by the Śrāmaṇa Zhizhou
Treatise: 『How are these established based on the fifteen locations?』 There are two interpretations. The first interpretation is: 『How are these ten causes established based on the fifteen locations?』 The second interpretation is: 『'These' refers to the previous four conditions.』 Since it is said, 『Thus, the four conditions, based on the differences in meaning of the fifteen locations, establish the ten causes,』 then 『How do these conditions establish causes based on locations?』 One view decisively states: The latter interpretation is superior. Establishing conditions as causes based on the differences in locations, there is no cause separate from the conditions. Since the ten causes are like this, the basis is also like this. That is, expanding the four conditions into the fifteen locations, there is no separate basis outside of the conditions. From this meaning, it is clear that expanding the previous four conditions into the fifteen locations, based on the differences in meaning of the fifteen locations, establishes the four conditions as the ten causes. However, expanding the four conditions into the fifteen locations should be so in principle, but there is no explicit textual explanation here. Detailed explanation: The former interpretation is superior. Why is this so? Because the following text separately asks about the four conditions based on locations, including causes, etc. Therefore, the following treatise says: 『Based on what locations are the four conditions established?』 『And how do they include the ten causes and two causes?』 Moreover, the previous question has already cited the basis to analyze the ten causes in order to answer the question, without mentioning the four conditions. Based on these, the former interpretation is superior. If the latter interpretation is adopted, wouldn't asking again in the following text be redundant and cumbersome? Wouldn't the failure to answer in the previous text be a omission? Now, another explanation says: 『These』 refers to both the four conditions and the ten causes. 『How do the four conditions and the ten causes both rely on the basis?』 The following answer first analyzes the ten causes based on locations, and then explains the conditions based on locations. In explaining the conditions based on locations, because the text is far apart from the ten causes, the question is raised again, which is not contradictory.
Commentary: However, 『relying』 in the sense of being in the seventh case, there are roughly two explanations. One explanation is: 『relying』 and 『in』 are both in the seventh case. The commentary says: 『者』 (zhe), in meaning, is an auxiliary word. It is not saying that 『relying』 is the meaning of 『in』. If 『relying』 is the meaning of 『in』, how can it be said that both are in the seventh case? Because the substance is not two, it cannot be said that both are. The second explanation is: 『relying』 and 『in』 have similarities and differences. For example, roots and objects, 『relying』 and 『in』 are different. Saying 『relying on the place of speech establishes the cause of following speech,』 『relying』 is the meaning of 『in』. Now, relying on that cause, saying 『relying in meaning.』 Regarding 『relying in name,』 it is 『俱第』 (both the).
七。更思。
論。謂法名想所起語性者。此瑜伽論三十八文。具如疏引。今略釋云。法謂一切有為．無為系．不繫等為因起言併名為法。名謂法名。由聞諸法種種名已。或自據教尋名．句．文。而起于想取境分齊善．惡等已方起言說。亦依文．句而起于想。舉初攝余但云名也 問論說尋．伺名語遍行。云何由想方起言耶 答取境分齊方發於言。實由於想緣彼法義。而起于語亦賴尋．伺。今據取境起言之由但說于想。又復語因而有通局。親疏兩別。尋．伺雖親不遍佛有。想因雖疏為通因果。所以言也。
疏。但以三相及得例難等者。其例意云。彼得及相是依法立。隨所依法以判于性。名等亦然。何不隨聲通於善．惡。
疏。不可言共至不同名等者。此牒外救外救意云。得及生等為所依法俱有因義。名等不爾。何得相例。
疏。大乘共有因等者。此破救意。顯大乘因不唯得等。不可以爾自宗義救 問因本質聲可唯無記。以因第八唯無記故。若杖他變相分之聲其性是何 答可通於善。如以善心聽佛說法。本質既善能聽所變聲善無失。因聲無記據本質說。相分名等隨所依聲亦通善也。
疏。不是異體依體立義者。語依是體。說因是義。由語體上有能詮義。即以語依而為說因。不同眼識依根別有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 七。更思。
論。謂法名想所起語性者。此《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷的文，具體內容如疏文所引用。現在簡略解釋如下：『法』指一切有為（saṃskṛta，有生滅變化的事物）、無為（asaṃskṛta，沒有生滅變化的事物），系（saṃbandha，束縛）、不繫（asaṃbandha，解脫）等作為原因而產生的言語，都可稱為『法』。『名』指法的名稱。由於聽聞諸法種種名稱后，或者自己根據教義尋找名、句、文，從而產生對境的分別，區分善惡等之後才開始言說。也依據文、句而產生想法。這裡只舉『名』來概括其他（句、文）。
問：論中說尋（vitarka，粗略的觀察）、伺（vicāra，精細的觀察）名為語遍行（vāg-vyāhāra，語言的普遍活動），為什麼說由想（saṃjñā，認知）才能產生言語呢？
答：對境進行分別之後才能發出言語，實際上是由於想緣彼法義，才產生言語，也依賴於尋、伺。現在根據對境產生言語的原因，只說是由於想。而且，語的產生原因有共通和不共通、親近和疏遠的區別。尋、伺雖然親近，但不普遍存在於佛（Buddha）的境界中。想作為原因雖然疏遠，卻是共通於因和果。這就是言語產生的原因。
疏。但以三相及得例難等者。其例意云。彼得及相是依法立。隨所依法以判于性。名等亦然。何不隨聲通於善．惡。
疏。不可言共至不同名等者。此牒外救外救意云。得及生等為所依法俱有因義。名等不爾。何得相例。
疏。大乘共有因等者。此破救意。顯大乘因不唯得等。不可以爾自宗義救。問：因本質聲可唯無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）。以因第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）唯無記故。若杖他變相分之聲其性是何？答：可通於善。如以善心聽佛說法。本質既善，能聽所變之聲也為善，沒有過失。因聲無記是根據本質來說的。相分名等隨所依之聲，也通於善。
疏。不是異體依體立義者。語依是體。說因是義。由語體上有能詮義。即以語依而為說因。不同眼識（cakṣur-vijñāna，視覺意識）依根別有。
【English Translation】 English version Seven. Further Contemplation.
Treatise: Regarding the nature of speech arising from 'dharma' (law, phenomenon), 'name' (nāma), and 'thought' (saṃjñā), this is discussed in the 38th fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), as cited in the commentary. A brief explanation is as follows: 'Dharma' refers to all conditioned (saṃskṛta, things subject to arising and ceasing) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta, things not subject to arising and ceasing) phenomena, bound (saṃbandha, fettered) and unbound (asaṃbandha, liberated) states, etc., that give rise to speech. All speech arising from these causes is called 'dharma.' 'Name' refers to the names of dharmas. Because after hearing the various names of dharmas, or by oneself relying on the teachings to seek out names, phrases, and sentences, one then generates thoughts, discriminating the boundaries of objects, distinguishing good and evil, and then begins to speak. Also, thoughts arise based on sentences and phrases. Here, only 'name' is mentioned to encompass the others (phrases, sentences).
Question: The treatise states that 'seeking' (vitarka, gross investigation) and 'examining' (vicāra, subtle investigation) are pervasive activities of speech (vāg-vyāhāra, verbal expression). Why is it said that speech arises from thought (saṃjñā, perception)?
Answer: Only after discriminating the boundaries of objects can speech be uttered. In reality, speech arises because of thought contemplating the meaning of that dharma, and it also relies on seeking and examining. Now, based on the reason for speech arising from discriminating objects, it is only said to be due to thought. Moreover, the causes of speech have distinctions of commonality and uncommonality, proximity and distance. Although seeking and examining are close, they are not universally present in the realm of the Buddhas (Buddha). Although thought as a cause is distant, it is common to both cause and effect. This is the reason for speech.
Commentary: 'But using the three characteristics and 'attainment' (prāpti) as examples to create difficulties,' etc. The meaning of the example is: Those 'attainments' and 'characteristics' are established based on the law. Their nature is determined according to the law they rely on. The same is true for names, etc. Why not let the sound be common to both good and evil?
Commentary: 'It cannot be said that the shared cause is different from names,' etc. This refutes an external defense. The intention of the external defense is: 'Attainment' and 'birth,' etc., are causes that exist together in the law they rely on. Names, etc., are not like this. How can they be compared?
Commentary: 'The common cause in the Mahayana,' etc. This refutes the defense. It shows that the causes in Mahayana are not only 'attainment,' etc. One cannot use one's own doctrine to defend it. Question: The essential nature of the sound of the cause can only be 'unspecified' (avyākṛta, neither good nor evil), because the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is only unspecified. If the sound of the object-aspect transformed by another, what is its nature? Answer: It can be common to good. For example, listening to the Buddha's (Buddha) teachings with a good mind. Since the essential nature is good, the transformed sound that is heard is also good, without fault. The unspecified nature of the causal sound is based on its essential nature. The object-aspect names, etc., also become common to good, depending on the sound they rely on.
Commentary: 'It is not that the meaning is established by relying on a different entity.' The linguistic basis is the entity. The causal explanation is the meaning. Because the linguistic entity has the meaning of being able to express, the linguistic basis is used as the causal explanation. This is different from eye-consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna, visual consciousness) relying on a separate root.
。不同得等依法假施 問以語依義為隨說因如何而言語依即是隨說因體持業釋耶 答義不離體。持業何違。
疏。若爾即以言說為果者。設爾何失 答便違語依即說因義。
論。若依彼說至是語依處等者。二論不同。具如疏會。有義疏說論文雖無會者。此不應理。即此文中正是解釋相違義故。又助論主別立道理。菩薩地說三種十因。對法論說即顯初因。性唯是染 詳曰。論中何有以能詮．所詮．生起次第會違之處。據論無此言論無會。何有非理。又疏會云。對法唯依染分相生以說因果。而隱不云言助論主別立道理依初染因。一何蔽人彰自甚乎 問此文若非會相違者因何而致。復云何科此會相違 答但顯彼文以隨說因為語依處。明論意別云會違也。無能所詮．相生義會。云論無會亦無過也 問三性隨說因義云何 答披瑜伽論三十八云。謂於世間種種稼穡。墮諸谷數世資生物。所有種種名想言說。謂穀麥等即此望彼種種稼穡為隨說因。又於一切雜染緣起。所有種種名想言說無明行識。廣說乃至憂苦擾惱。即此望彼諸雜染法為隨說因。又於一切清凈品法及滅涅槃。所有種種名想言說。即此望彼諸清凈法為隨說因。
論。領受依處者。領謂領納。受謂攝受。謂能所受俱名領受。即領受處立觀待因。觀待因者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果不同意『等』字表示『依法假施』，那麼提問：以語言所依據的意義作為隨說因，為什麼說語言所依據的就是隨說因的自體，這是持業釋呢？回答：意義不離開自體，持業釋有什麼不對呢？
疏：如果這樣，就是以言說為結果了。假設這樣，有什麼過失呢？回答：那就違背了『語言所依據的就是隨說因』的意義。
論：如果依據他們的說法，直到『是語言所依據之處』等等，這兩部論典的觀點不同，詳細情況如疏文的解釋。有人認為疏文說論文沒有解釋，這是不合理的。因為這段文字正是解釋相違背的意義。而且輔助論主另外建立道理。《菩薩地論》說三種十因，《對法論》說，這顯示了最初的因，性質只是染污。詳細說明：論中哪裡有以能詮（能表達的）、所詮（所表達的）、生起次第來調和矛盾的地方？根據論典，沒有這些言論，沒有調和，怎麼能說不合理呢？而且疏文解釋說，《對法論》只是依據染污部分的相生來說因果，卻隱瞞不說輔助論主另外建立道理，依據最初的染污因。這不是很明顯地掩蓋別人，彰顯自己嗎？提問：這段文字如果不是調和矛盾，那是因為什麼而導致的？又該如何科判這種調和矛盾呢？回答：只是顯示那段文字以隨說因為語言所依據之處，表明論典的意義不同，說是調和矛盾。沒有能詮、所詮、相生的意義調和，說論典沒有調和也沒有過錯。提問：三性的隨說因的意義是什麼？回答：翻開《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷，說：對於世間種種莊稼，屬於各種穀物，世間資生物，所有種種名稱、思想、言說，比如穀子、麥子等，這就是相對於那些種種莊稼來說的隨說因。又對於一切雜染緣起，所有種種名稱、思想、言說，無明、行、識，廣泛地說乃至憂愁、痛苦、煩惱，這就是相對於那些各種雜染法來說的隨說因。又對於一切清凈品法以及滅盡涅槃，所有種種名稱、思想、言說，這就是相對於那些各種清凈法來說的隨說因。
論：領受所依據之處。領，是領納。受，是攝受。就是能領納的和所領納的都叫做領受。就是領受之處，建立觀待因（pratyaya-hetu）。觀待因是
【English Translation】 English version: If one disagrees with 'etc.' representing 'according to the Dharma, provisional establishment', then the question arises: Taking the meaning upon which language relies as the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' (cause of subsequent explanation), how can it be said that the basis of language is the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' itself, which is a 'karmadhāraya' (appositional compound)? The answer is: Meaning does not depart from the basis. What contradiction is there in 'karmadhāraya'?
Commentary: If that is the case, then speech is the result. Supposing that, what is the fault? The answer is: It would contradict the meaning that the basis of language is the cause of explanation.
Treatise: If according to their explanation, up to 'the place where language relies' etc., the two treatises differ, as explained in detail in the commentary. Some argue that the commentary states that the treatise does not explain, which is unreasonable. Because this passage precisely explains the contradictory meaning. Moreover, the assistant author establishes a separate principle. The Bodhisattvabhumi (Stages of a Bodhisattva) speaks of three types of ten causes, while the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) reveals the initial cause, whose nature is solely defiled. Detailed explanation: Where in the treatise is there a reconciliation of the contradiction between the signifier (vācaka), the signified (vācya), and the order of arising? According to the treatise, there are no such statements, no reconciliation. How can it be said to be unreasonable? Moreover, the commentary explains that the Abhidharmasamuccaya only relies on the arising of defiled aspects to explain cause and effect, while concealing the fact that the assistant author establishes a separate principle based on the initial defiled cause. Isn't this clearly concealing others and highlighting oneself? Question: If this passage is not a reconciliation of contradictions, then what caused it? And how should this reconciliation of contradictions be categorized? Answer: It merely shows that that passage takes the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' as the place where language relies, indicating that the meaning of the treatise is different, saying it is a reconciliation of contradictions. There is no reconciliation of the meaning of signifier, signified, and arising. It is not a fault to say that the treatise has no reconciliation. Question: What is the meaning of the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' in the three natures (trisvabhāva)? Answer: Open the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume thirty-eight, which says: Regarding the various crops in the world, belonging to various grains, worldly resources, all kinds of names, thoughts, and speech, such as rice, wheat, etc., these are the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' in relation to those various crops. Furthermore, regarding all defiled dependent origination, all kinds of names, thoughts, and speech, ignorance (avidyā), formations (samskāra), consciousness (vijnana), broadly speaking, up to sorrow, suffering, and affliction, these are the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' in relation to those various defiled dharmas. Moreover, regarding all pure qualities and the cessation of nirvana, all kinds of names, thoughts, and speech, these are the 'anuvyākhyāna-hetu' in relation to those various pure dharmas.
Treatise: The place of reliance for reception (vedanā). 'Reception' (vedanā) means receiving. 'Receiving' (grahana) means embracing. That which can be received and that which is received are both called 'reception'. The place of reception establishes the 'pratītya-hetu' (dependent cause). The 'pratītya-hetu' is
亦通能所。由此望彼應為四句。一能受為因所受為果。先希食等后食等得。二所受為因能受為果。因對於境方領受之。三能受為因能受為果。因二定喜生三禪樂等。四所受為因所受為果。如因風輪持水輪等。余類知之。故瑜伽論三十八云。觀待此故。此為因故。于彼彼事若求若取。此名彼觀待因。如觀待手故手為因故有執持業。觀待足故足為因故有往來業。觀待饑．渴故饑．渴為因故。于諸飲食若求若取 問此因三性其義云何 答瑜伽論云。觀待饑．渴羸劣身住。觀待段食所有愛味。于彼追求執取受用。即說彼法為觀待因。又觀待境界所有愛味。諸有支相續流轉。即彼望此諸雜染法為觀待因。又觀待諸行多過患故。樂求清凈攝受清凈成滿清凈。彼望於此為觀待因。
論。即依此處立牽引因者。此牽引因亦有三性。瑜伽論云。由彼各別自種子故。種種稼穡差別而生。即說彼種子為此牽引因。又于現法中無明等法所有已生已長種子。今此種子望于餘生生老死等為牽引因 釋曰。此望于果通近及遠 又安住種姓補特伽羅種姓具足能為上首。證有．無餘二涅槃界。望彼清凈為牽引因 釋曰。種望能證涅槃之智為牽引因非望涅槃。涅槃非是因所生故。舉所證理顯能證智。
疏。未為善友力等所潤者。問諸教但云惑為
能潤。言善友潤曾未有聞 答潤者資助令生長義。據生三有教說惑潤。若論出世多聞．善友能助名潤。斯亦何違。疏云等者等聞熏習。
論。生起因者。依瑜伽論亦通三性。論云即彼種子望所生芽。又無明等法各別種子。又種姓所攝一切無漏菩提分法所有種子。望彼一切菩提分法。無記．染．善如次三性生起因也。
論。謂于所作業者。所作者果。業即能作。即八九處能作業．用。乃于果處說業用聲云所作業。
疏。無記即因除無間緣等者。問變化無記無間得生學．無學心。云何無間果非無漏 答即變化心通善．無記。若為嬉戲所起變化無記性攝。為引道他或為利益諸有情故而起變化。當知是善。故善變化引無漏心。無記不爾。而昧劣故。余義類此故不繁云。
論。總依此六立攝受因者。此因三性瑜伽論云。地雨等緣能生於芽 又近不善士聞不正法非理作意。及先串習所引勢力生無明等 又親近善士聽聞正法如理作意。及先所作諸根成就。如次無記．染．善三性攝受因也。
論。引發因者。有三性別。瑜伽論云。芽．莖．葉等展轉相續。望彼稼穡若成若熟。
又從無明支乃至有。展轉引發後後相續。望于餘生生老死等 又自種子所生一切菩提分法。漸次能證有無餘依二涅槃界。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：『能潤』（Nengrun）是什麼意思？『言善友潤曾未有聞』是什麼意思？ 答：『潤』的意思是資助，使之生長。根據『生三有教』的說法，是煩惱惑潤。如果從出世法的角度來說，多聞、善友能夠幫助修行，可以稱為『潤』。這並沒有什麼衝突。《疏》中說的『等者』，指的是等同於聞熏習。
論：『生起因』（Shengqi Yin）是什麼？根據《瑜伽論》（Yujialun），『生起因』也通於三種性質。論中說：『即彼種子望所生芽』，又說無明等法各有各別的種子，又說種姓所攝的一切無漏菩提分法的所有種子，對於一切菩提分法來說，無記、染、善依次是三種性質的生起因。
論：『謂于所作業者』（Weiyu Suozuoyezhe）是什麼意思？『所作者果』是什麼意思？『業即能作』是什麼意思？指的是八識、九處能作業、用，所以在果的層面說『業用』，稱為『所作業』。
疏：『無記即因除無間緣等者』是什麼意思？問：變化無記的無間緣能夠產生學、無學心，為什麼無間果不是無漏的？答：變化心通於善和無記。如果是爲了嬉戲所產生的變化，屬於無記性質。如果是爲了引導他人或者爲了利益眾生而產生的變化，應當知道是善的。所以善的變化能夠引生無漏心，無記的變化則不能，因為它的力量微弱。其他的意義可以依此類推，所以不再贅述。
論：『總依此六立攝受因者』（Zongyi Ciliu Li Sheshou Yin Zhe）是什麼意思？此因的三種性質是什麼？《瑜伽論》中說：『地、雨等緣能夠生長出芽』，又說：『親近不善的人，聽聞不正的法，不如理作意，以及先前的串習所產生的勢力，會產生無明等』，又說：『親近善人，聽聞正法，如理作意，以及先前所作的諸根成就』，依次是無記、染、善三種性質的攝受因。
論：『引發因』（Yinfa Yin）是什麼？有幾種性質？《瑜伽論》中說：『芽、莖、葉等展轉相續，對於稼穡來說，無論是成長還是成熟』。
又說：『從無明支乃至有支，展轉引發後後相續，對於餘生來說，會產生生老死等』，又說：『從自種子所生的一切菩提分法，逐漸能夠證得有餘依涅槃界和無餘依涅槃界』。
【English Translation】 English version Question: What does 『Nengrun』 (能潤, literally 'able to moisten') mean? What does 『Yan Shanyou Run Ceng Wei You Wen』 (言善友潤曾未有聞, literally 'It has not been heard that good friends can moisten') mean? Answer: 『Run』 (潤, moisten) means to assist and cause to grow. According to the teaching of 『Sheng San You Jiao』 (生三有教, teaching of the three existences), it refers to the afflictions that moisten. From the perspective of transcending the world, much learning and good friends can help cultivation and can be called 『Run』. There is no conflict in this. The 『Deng Zhe』 (等者, those equal to) mentioned in the commentary refers to being equal to the practice of hearing and熏習 (Xunxi, perfuming).
Treatise: What is 『Shengqi Yin』 (生起因, arising cause)? According to the 『Yujialun』 (瑜伽論, Yogacara-bhumi-sastra), 『Shengqi Yin』 also applies to the three natures. The treatise says: 『That seed in relation to the sprout that arises from it,』 and also says that each of the dharmas such as ignorance has its own separate seed, and that all the seeds of the undefiled Bodhi-part-dharmas contained within the lineage, in relation to all the Bodhi-part-dharmas, are in turn the arising causes of the three natures of neutral, defiled, and virtuous.
Treatise: What does 『Weiyu Suozuoyezhe』 (謂于所作業者, referring to the one who performs the action) mean? What does 『Suozuozhe Guo』 (所作者果, the result of what is done) mean? What does 『Ye Ji Nengzuo』 (業即能作, karma is the ability to act) mean? It refers to the ability to act and function of the eight consciousnesses and the nine places, so the term 『Yeyong』 (業用, karmic function) is used at the level of the result, called 『Suozuoye』 (所作業, what is done).
Commentary: What does 『Wuji Ji Yin Chu Wujian Yuan Dengzhe』 (無記即因除無間緣等者, neutral is the cause except for the immediate condition, etc.) mean? Question: The immediate condition of neutral transformation can produce the mind of learning and no-more-learning, so why is the immediate result not undefiled? Answer: The mind of transformation is connected to both virtuous and neutral. If the transformation is produced for amusement, it belongs to the neutral nature. If the transformation is produced to guide others or to benefit sentient beings, it should be known that it is virtuous. Therefore, virtuous transformation can lead to the undefiled mind, while neutral transformation cannot, because its power is weak. Other meanings can be inferred similarly, so I will not elaborate further.
Treatise: What does 『Zongyi Ciliu Li Sheshou Yin Zhe』 (總依此六立攝受因者, generally based on these six to establish the receptive cause) mean? What are the three natures of this cause? The 『Yujialun』 says: 『The conditions such as earth and rain can grow sprouts,』 and also says: 『Approaching unwholesome people, hearing incorrect Dharma, non-rational attention, and the power generated by previous habits will produce ignorance, etc.,』 and also says: 『Approaching good people, hearing the correct Dharma, rational attention, and the accomplishment of the roots previously done,』 are in turn the receptive causes of the three natures of neutral, defiled, and virtuous.
Treatise: What is 『Yinfa Yin』 (引發因, inducing cause)? How many natures does it have? The 『Yujialun』 says: 『The sprouts, stems, leaves, etc., continue to develop in relation to the crops, whether they are growing or ripe.』
It also says: 『From the branch of ignorance to the branch of existence, each induces the subsequent continuation, which will produce birth, old age, death, etc., in future lives,』 and also says: 『All the Bodhi-part-dharmas arising from one's own seeds can gradually realize the Nirvana realm with remainder and the Nirvana realm without remainder.』
如次無記．染．善三性引發因也。
論。定異因者。瑜伽論說有三性別云。從大麥種生大麥芽。大麥苗稼不生余類。如是所餘當知亦爾。又余無明支及自種子乃至有支能生那落迦。各生余趣當知亦爾。即此望彼諸雜染法名定別因。又三乘性各于自乘能般涅槃。彼望清凈為定別因。
論。同事因者。三性異者。瑜伽論云。同爲稼穡而得成熟。非彼稼穡隨闕一因而得成就。是故一切和合說為此同事因。又即彼一切從觀待因至定別因名同事因 釋曰。從染觀待至染定別總名染法同事因也。又若清凈品觀待因乃至定別。彼望清凈為同事因。
論。相違不相違因者。其三性者瑜伽論云。霜雹災等諸障礙法。望彼滋稼為相違因。彼闕無障是諸滋稼不相違因 又此雜染法相違因者。謂出世間種姓具足。值佛出世演說正法。親近善士聽聞正法如理作意。即如所說種種善法若辟若離。是雜染法不相違因 又種姓不具足不值佛出世。生諸無暇處。不親近善士。不聽聞正法。不如理作意。數習諸邪行。彼望清凈為相違因。此相違因若闕若離是名清凈不相違因 問大乘滅法而不待因言相違因。豈非自噬 答如疏及燈俱明與彼相違之法而作因也。亦如因明四相違因 有義破云。若言與彼相違為因令彼生等。此正相順何名相違。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如是無記、染污、善三種性質，是引發之因。
論：決定異因是什麼？《瑜伽師地論》說有三種性質的差別，例如：從大麥種子生長出大麥芽、大麥苗稼，不會生長出其他種類。像這樣，其餘的情況也應當知道是類似的。另外，無明支以及各自的種子，乃至有支，能夠產生那落迦（Naraka，地獄）。各自產生其餘的趣（Gati，道），也應當知道是類似的。即此（雜染法）相對於彼（其他趣），稱為決定異因。另外，三乘（Triyana，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的性質各自能夠使自己在相應的乘中般涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃）。彼（三乘的性質）相對於清凈法，是決定異因。
論：同事因是什麼？三種性質的差別。《瑜伽師地論》說：共同爲了莊稼而使其成熟，如果這些莊稼缺少任何一個因，都不能成就。所以，一切和合在一起，稱為同事因。又，即彼一切，從觀待因到決定異因，都稱為同事因。釋曰：從染污的觀待因到染污的決定異因，總稱為染法同事因。另外，如果清凈品的觀待因乃至決定異因，彼（清凈品的因）相對於清凈法，是同事因。
論：相違因和不相違因是什麼？其三種性質。《瑜伽師地論》說：霜、雹、災害等各種障礙法，相對於滋養莊稼來說，是相違因。缺少這些障礙，是滋養莊稼的不相違因。又，此雜染法的相違因，是指具有出世間種姓（Gotra，根器），值遇佛陀出世演說正法，親近善知識，聽聞正法，如理作意。即如所說的種種善法，無論是避開還是遠離（惡法），都是雜染法的不相違因。又，種姓不具足，不值遇佛陀出世，生在各種沒有空閑修行的處所（無暇處），不親近善知識，不聽聞正法，不如理作意，經常習行各種邪行，彼（這些因素）相對於清凈法，是相違因。此相違因，如果缺少或者遠離，就稱為清凈的不相違因。問：大乘（Mahayana，大乘佛教）的滅法，而不待因，說是相違因，豈不是自相矛盾？答：如疏和燈都明白，與彼相違之法而作為因。也如因明（Hetuvidya，因明學）的四相違因。有義破斥說：如果說與彼相違作為因，令彼產生等，這正是相順，怎麼能稱為相違呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Thus, the three natures of indeterminate, defiled, and wholesome are the causes of origination.
Treatise: What is the determining different cause? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that there are three kinds of natures. For example, from barley seeds grow barley sprouts and barley seedlings, but not other kinds. Likewise, the rest should also be understood in the same way. Furthermore, the branch of ignorance and its own seeds, up to the branch of existence, can produce Naraka (hell). Each produces other Gatis (realms), which should also be understood in the same way. This (defiled dharmas) in relation to that (other realms) is called the determining different cause. Moreover, the natures of the three Yanas (vehicles: Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana) can each lead to Parinirvana (complete Nirvana) in their respective Yana. That (the nature of the three Yanas) in relation to pure dharmas is the determining different cause.
Treatise: What is the co-operative cause? The difference in the three natures. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: Together, they cause crops to mature. If any one of these causes is missing, the crops cannot be accomplished. Therefore, all that comes together is called the co-operative cause. Furthermore, all of that, from the dependent cause to the determining different cause, is called the co-operative cause. Explanation: From the defiled dependent cause to the defiled determining different cause, all are collectively called the co-operative cause of defiled dharmas. Moreover, if the dependent cause of pure qualities up to the determining different cause, that (the cause of pure qualities) in relation to pure dharmas is the co-operative cause.
Treatise: What are the conflicting and non-conflicting causes? Regarding the three natures, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: Frost, hail, disasters, and other obstructing dharmas are conflicting causes in relation to nourishing crops. The absence of these obstructions is the non-conflicting cause for nourishing crops. Furthermore, the conflicting cause of these defiled dharmas refers to having the Gotra (lineage, potential) for transcending the world, encountering the Buddha appearing in the world and expounding the Dharma, associating with virtuous friends, listening to the Dharma, and engaging in appropriate mental activity. That is, the various wholesome dharmas mentioned, whether avoiding or distancing oneself (from evil dharmas), are the non-conflicting causes of defiled dharmas. Moreover, not having the Gotra, not encountering the Buddha appearing in the world, being born in places without leisure for practice (places without leisure), not associating with virtuous friends, not listening to the Dharma, not engaging in appropriate mental activity, and constantly practicing various wrong actions, these (factors) in relation to pure dharmas are conflicting causes. If these conflicting causes are lacking or absent, they are called the non-conflicting causes of purity. Question: The extinction of dharmas in Mahayana (the Great Vehicle), without relying on causes, is said to be a conflicting cause. Isn't this self-contradictory? Answer: Just as a commentary and a lamp both illuminate, they act as causes in opposition to that which conflicts with them. It is also like the four conflicting causes in Hetuvidya (logic). Some refute this, saying: If it is said that what conflicts with it is the cause, causing it to arise, etc., this is precisely in accordance with it. How can it be called conflicting?
今解即與當應生等諸法為因。謂彼應生由因違彼令不得生。以彼所違不生住等而為果故相違即因 詳曰。理亦未可。當應生法彼既不生。即是無法。何得有法與無為因。若言以彼不生住等而為果者。既云與彼當應生法而為其因。何得以彼不生住等而為其果。乃果無因。因無果也。若言與彼應生法上不生住等。而為因故云與應生法為因者。若爾因望不生住等何名相違因。正順彼不生等故。故從疏正。文如燈引。
疏。六相違者。樞要．義燈二處皆引。故此不云。
疏。論二處至能生因者。即菩薩地及尋伺地二處說也。
疏。準謂彼言生起因等者。亦有疏本作誰字者。今隨準．誰以為兩釋 一者意云準彼瑜伽言生起因。是此論中生起因也。如此論中所引文是。此論既云生起因中而有業種。明知彼論生起因中有業決然 二者意云誰謂瑜伽言生起因唯是因緣。疏云此因此因緣也。疏云如此文是者釋菩薩地生起不唯因緣所以。所以者何。此論釋彼生起等因。釋中既云生起因中而有業種。明彼生起包業無疑。不爾此論便違彼本。二釋俱得當從多本。
疏。牽引因全等者。問牽引因中有非因種何得云全 答全未潤故名之為全。生起全言亦準此知。
疏。餘二合前以為體者。即彼和合不障礙二。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在解釋說，『當應生』（dāng yīng shēng，指即將產生）等諸法以其他法為因。也就是說，那個『應生』（yīng shēng，應該產生）之法，因為有違背它的因，才不能產生。因為那個被違背之法，以不生、不住等為結果，所以（這個違背之法）就是『相違因』（xiāng wéi yīn，相反的因）。詳細地說，這個道理也未必說得通。當應生的法，既然沒有產生，就是不存在的法。怎麼能說有法以不存在的法為因呢？如果說以那個不生、不住等為結果，既然說與那個當應生的法作為它的因，怎麼又以那個不生、不住等作為它的結果呢？這豈不是結果沒有原因，原因沒有結果嗎？如果說在那個應生之法上，以不生、不住等作為因，所以才說與應生之法作為因，如果是這樣，因對於不生、不住等，怎麼能叫做『相違因』（xiāng wéi yīn，相反的因）呢？這正是順應那個不生等啊。所以應該遵循疏文的正確含義，就像燈的引導一樣。 疏文說：『六相違者』（liù xiāng wéi zhě，六種相反的情況），《樞要》（Shūyào）和《義燈》（Yìdēng）兩處都引用了，所以這裡不再說明。 疏文說：『論二處至能生因者』（lùn èr chù zhì néng shēng yīn zhě，論典兩處說到能生因），就是指《菩薩地》（Púsà dì）和《尋伺地》（Xún sì dì）兩處所說的。 疏文說：『準謂彼言生起因等者』（zhǔn wèi bǐ yán shēng qǐ yīn děng zhě，依據他們所說的生起因等），也有疏文版本寫作『誰』（shuí）字的。現在根據『準』（zhǔn）和『誰』（shuí）字，分別作兩種解釋：第一種意思是說，依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yújiā shī dì lùn）所說的『生起因』（shēng qǐ yīn，產生的原因），就是此論中所說的『生起因』（shēng qǐ yīn，產生的原因）。就像此論中所引用的經文一樣。此論既然說『生起因中而有業種』（shēng qǐ yīn zhōng ér yǒu yè zhǒng，在生起因中存在業的種子），就明確地知道彼論的『生起因』（shēng qǐ yīn，產生的原因）中一定有業。第二種意思是說，誰說《瑜伽師地論》（Yújiā shī dì lùn）所說的『生起因』（shēng qǐ yīn，產生的原因）僅僅是因緣呢？疏文說『此因此因緣也』（cǐ yīn cǐ yīnyuán yě，這個原因是因緣）。疏文說『如此文是者』（rúcǐ wén shì zhě，就像這段經文一樣）解釋《菩薩地》（Púsà dì）的生起不僅僅是因緣的原因。原因是什麼呢？此論解釋他們的生起等因，解釋中既然說『生起因中而有業種』（shēng qǐ yīn zhōng ér yǒu yè zhǒng，在生起因中存在業的種子），就明確地知道他們的生起包含業無疑。否則，此論就違背了彼論的根本。兩種解釋都說得通，應當遵循多數版本。 疏文說：『牽引因全等者』（qiān yǐn yīn quán děng zhě，牽引因完全相同），問：『牽引因』（qiān yǐn yīn，牽引的原因）中存在非因的種子，怎麼能說是完全相同呢？答：因為還沒有被滋潤，所以稱為完全相同。『生起全言』（shēng qǐ quán yán，完全產生）也應該按照這個來理解。 疏文說：『餘二合前以為體者』（yú èr hé qián yǐ wéi tǐ zhě，剩餘的兩種與前面的合併作為本體），就是指那個『和合』（hé hé，結合）和『不障礙』（bù zhàng'ài，不障礙）兩種。
【English Translation】 English version: Now, it is explained that 『things that are about to arise』 (dāng yīng shēng, referring to things that are about to arise) and other dharmas take other dharmas as their cause. That is to say, that 『about to arise』 (yīng shēng, should arise) dharma, because there is a cause that contradicts it, cannot arise. Because that which is contradicted takes non-arising, non-abiding, etc., as its result, therefore (this contradicting dharma) is the 『contradictory cause』 (xiāng wéi yīn, opposite cause). In detail, this reasoning may not be valid. Since the dharma that is about to arise has not arisen, it is a non-existent dharma. How can it be said that a dharma takes a non-existent dharma as its cause? If it is said that it takes non-arising, non-abiding, etc., as its result, since it is said that the dharma that is about to arise is its cause, how can it take non-arising, non-abiding, etc., as its result? Isn't this a case of the result having no cause, and the cause having no result? If it is said that on that dharma that is about to arise, non-arising, non-abiding, etc., are taken as the cause, so it is said that the dharma that is about to arise is taken as the cause, if that is the case, how can the cause be called a 『contradictory cause』 (xiāng wéi yīn, opposite cause) with respect to non-arising, non-abiding, etc.? This is precisely in accordance with that non-arising, etc. Therefore, one should follow the correct meaning of the commentary, just like the guidance of a lamp. The commentary says: 『The six contradictions』 (liù xiāng wéi zhě, six kinds of opposite situations) are cited in both 『Essentials』 (Shūyào) and 『Meaning Lamp』 (Yìdēng), so they are not explained here. The commentary says: 『The two places in the treatise that mention the cause of arising』 (lùn èr chù zhì néng shēng yīn zhě, the two places in the treatise that mention the cause of arising) refer to what is said in 『Bodhisattva Grounds』 (Púsà dì) and 『Investigation Grounds』 (Xún sì dì). The commentary says: 『According to what they say about the cause of arising, etc.』 (zhǔn wèi bǐ yán shēng qǐ yīn děng zhě, according to what they say about the cause of arising, etc.), some versions of the commentary write the character 『who』 (shuí). Now, according to the characters 『according to』 (zhǔn) and 『who』 (shuí), two explanations are given: The first meaning is that, according to the 『Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra』 (Yújiā shī dì lùn), the 『cause of arising』 (shēng qǐ yīn, cause of arising) is the 『cause of arising』 (shēng qǐ yīn, cause of arising) in this treatise. Just like the scripture cited in this treatise. Since this treatise says 『within the cause of arising there are seeds of karma』 (shēng qǐ yīn zhōng ér yǒu yè zhǒng, within the cause of arising there are seeds of karma), it is clear that the 『cause of arising』 (shēng qǐ yīn, cause of arising) in that treatise certainly contains karma. The second meaning is, who says that the 『cause of arising』 (shēng qǐ yīn, cause of arising) in the 『Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra』 (Yújiā shī dì lùn) is only the cause and condition? The commentary says 『this cause is the cause and condition』 (cǐ yīn cǐ yīnyuán yě, this cause is the cause and condition). The commentary says 『like this text』 (rúcǐ wén shì zhě, like this text) explains that the arising of 『Bodhisattva Grounds』 (Púsà dì) is not only the reason for cause and condition. What is the reason? This treatise explains their cause of arising, etc., and since the explanation says 『within the cause of arising there are seeds of karma』 (shēng qǐ yīn zhōng ér yǒu yè zhǒng, within the cause of arising there are seeds of karma), it is clear that their arising undoubtedly includes karma. Otherwise, this treatise would contradict the root of that treatise. Both explanations are valid, and one should follow the majority of versions. The commentary says: 『The pulling cause is completely the same』 (qiān yǐn yīn quán děng zhě, the pulling cause is completely the same). Question: There are non-causal seeds in the 『pulling cause』 (qiān yǐn yīn, pulling cause), how can it be said to be completely the same? Answer: Because it has not yet been moistened, it is called completely the same. The phrase 『completely arising』 (shēng qǐ quán yán, completely arising) should also be understood in this way. The commentary says: 『The remaining two are combined with the previous ones as the substance』 (yú èr hé qián yǐ wéi tǐ zhě, the remaining two are combined with the previous ones as the substance), which refers to the two, 『combination』 (hé hé, combination) and 『non-obstruction』 (bù zhàng'ài, non-obstruction).
疏。若不爾者至具三緣也者。若離出體其方便中。不攝中間二緣爾者。論何不說中間二緣是能生收。論既不說能生因攝。明是增上。故知方便具攝三緣。增上即是方便攝故。
論。一者異熟果等者。問準本業經佛母品云。一切善受佛果。無明受有為生滅之果。是故善果從善因生。是故惡果從惡因生。名善不受生滅之果。唯受常佛之果。論云善惡俱招異熟豈不相違 答有釋云。感三界業若善．不善。皆無明引總名無明。資糧等道有無漏善皆向佛果。非無明發總名為善。非謂無明所發福等不感三界 詳曰。若資糧道有漏善法皆向佛果。十王果業在何位造。若許此位造彼業者。云何得言皆向佛果。故義有餘 今者會之略為二釋。一經隨轉隨化地部。化地部言。善非有因。二據三乘無漏資糧．加行正位漏善。遠近皆名佛果因也。明為緣故。無明惑本所引漏善亦名無明。故云無明感三界果。由斯不言諸餘煩惱及餘漏善感生滅果。若也執文不許余善感異熟果。亦應取文唯一無明能感漏果。自余煩惱皆不能招。文中唯說無明得故。此既不爾彼何則然。故知經論各據一義。並不相違。
疏。唯此一法非余皆是假說等者。略為二釋。一因果同性名為一法。一法因果是實等流。非余異性是等流也。縱言等流假說之耳 二唯此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏解：如果不是這樣，直到『具三緣』（具備三種緣）也成立。如果離開出體（產生自體）的方便，那麼方便之中，就不包含中間的兩種緣。如果這樣，論中為什麼不說中間的兩種緣是能生（產生結果）的收攝呢？論中既然沒有說能生因收攝，那麼就表明是增上緣。所以知道方便具攝三種緣，增上緣就是方便所攝。
論：『一者異熟果等』。問：按照《本業經·佛母品》所說，一切善都承受佛果，無明承受有為生滅的果報。所以善果從善因生，惡果從惡因生，稱為善不受生滅的果報，只承受常佛的果報。論中說善惡都招感異熟果，難道不是相違背嗎？答：有人解釋說，感三界業的，無論是善還是不善，都是無明引導，總稱為無明。資糧道等有無漏善，都趨向佛果，不是無明所發，總稱為善。不是說無明所發的福等不感三界果。詳細地說，如果資糧道有漏善法都趨向佛果，那麼十王果業是在什麼位次造作的？如果允許這個位次造作那個業，怎麼能說都趨向佛果呢？所以這個解釋還有餘地。現在會通一下，略作兩種解釋：一是經文隨順、隨順化地部（Sautrantika）的說法。化地部說，善不是有因。二是根據三乘（Triyana）無漏資糧、加行正位漏善，遠近都稱為佛果因。明為緣故，無明惑本所引導的漏善也稱為無明。所以說無明感三界果。因此不說其餘煩惱以及其餘漏善感生滅果。如果執著經文，不允許其餘善感異熟果，也應該取經文，只有無明能感漏果，其餘煩惱都不能招感。經文中只說了無明得到果報。既然這個不成立，那麼那個怎麼能成立呢？所以知道經論各自依據一個義理，並不相違背。
疏解：『唯此一法非余皆是假說等』。略作兩種解釋：一是因果同性，名為一法。一法因果是真實等流（nisyanda-phala），其餘異性不是等流。即使說是等流，也是假說罷了。二是唯此
【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: If it were not so, then 'possessing three conditions' would not be established. If one separates from the expedient of 'arising from its own entity', then the expedient would not include the two intermediate conditions. If so, why does the treatise not say that the two intermediate conditions are the 'able to produce' (cause of production) that is gathered in? Since the treatise does not say that the 'able to produce' cause is gathered in, it clearly indicates that it is an 'adhipati-pratyaya' (dominant condition). Therefore, it is known that the expedient fully gathers in the three conditions, and the 'adhipati-pratyaya' is gathered in by the expedient.
Treatise: 'The first is the vipaka-phala (result of maturation), etc.' Question: According to the 'Buddha-matrka-prakarana' (Chapter on the Mother of Buddhas) in the 'Mula-karma-vibhanga' (Fundamental Treatise on the Division of Karma), all good receives the fruit of Buddhahood, while ignorance receives the fruit of conditioned arising and ceasing. Therefore, good results arise from good causes, and evil results arise from evil causes. It is said that good does not receive the fruit of arising and ceasing, but only receives the fruit of the eternal Buddha. The treatise says that both good and evil attract the 'vipaka-phala', is this not contradictory? Answer: Some explain that the karma that attracts the three realms, whether good or bad, is all guided by ignorance and is generally called ignorance. The paths of accumulation, etc., have unconditioned good that all tends towards the fruit of Buddhahood, and is not produced by ignorance, and is generally called good. It is not that the blessings, etc., produced by ignorance do not attract the fruit of the three realms. In detail, if the conditioned good dharmas of the path of accumulation all tend towards the fruit of Buddhahood, then in what stage is the karma of the Ten Kings produced? If it is allowed that this stage produces that karma, how can it be said that all tend towards the fruit of Buddhahood? Therefore, this explanation has room for improvement. Now, to reconcile this, there are two brief explanations: First, the sutra follows and adapts to the Sautrantika school's view. The Sautrantika school says that good is not a cause of existence. Second, according to the unconditioned accumulation and application stages of the Three Vehicles (Triyana), conditioned good, whether near or far, is called the cause of the fruit of Buddhahood. Because 'ming' (knowledge) is a condition, the conditioned good guided by the fundamental delusion of ignorance is also called ignorance. Therefore, it is said that ignorance attracts the fruit of the three realms. Therefore, it is not said that other afflictions and other conditioned good attract the fruit of arising and ceasing. If one clings to the text and does not allow other good to attract the 'vipaka-phala', then one should also take the text to mean that only ignorance can attract conditioned results, and other afflictions cannot attract them. The text only says that ignorance obtains the result. Since this is not established, how can that be established? Therefore, it is known that the sutras and treatises each rely on one meaning and are not contradictory.
Commentary: 'Only this one dharma, not the others, are all provisional teachings, etc.' There are two brief explanations: First, the cause and effect are of the same nature, called one dharma. The cause and effect of one dharma are the real 'nisyanda-phala' (result of outflow). The other different natures are not 'nisyanda-phala'. Even if it is called 'nisyanda-phala', it is just a provisional teaching. Second, only this
報業相似一法假說等流。非自余法亦皆假說為等流也。不相似故。疏舉殺生一業因果。顯余善惡業報皆是假等流也。除斯以還不可假說。二解任取。
論。四士用果者。按瑜伽云。諸有一類于現法中。依止隨一工巧業處起士夫用。所謂農作．商賈．事王．書畫．算數．占卜等事。由此成辨諸稼穡等．財利等果名士用果。又依有宗順正理論第十八云。士用果四。一者俱生。謂於一時更互為因力所引起。二者無間。謂次後時由前念因而所引發。如世第一而能生彼苦法智忍。三者隔越。次隔遠時展轉為因所引起者。如農夫等於穀麥等。四者不生。所謂涅槃。由無間道力所得故。若無間道斷諸隨眠所證擇滅。而名離系及士用果。若不斷惑但重證滅但名士用。大乘無文義同於彼。應亦無失。
疏。余心心所至一切有漏者。此意說云。辨心心所具五依處。謂無間滅至士用處。辨余色等除前三依但取后二。后二通能辨色．心果。異熟既是有漏果收。何得不依作用士用。由斯義準可依六處。
論。隨順處言至一切功能者。疏有三說 有義何以無間不得等流。答九品相望成無間緣。此果不爾。下論但云二緣得故。于中非無能引上品同性之者。依全處說故不取也。若言全無。以現望現為等流果。豈唯他識。故許者勝。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：報業的相似性是一種假設的等流（nisyanda-phala，等流果，指由相似原因產生的相似結果）。不僅報業如此，其他一切事物也都可以被假設為等流，因為它們之間存在相似性。疏文引用了殺生這一行為的因果關係，以表明其餘的善惡行為的報應也都是假設的等流。除了這些，其他的就不能被假設為等流了。以上兩種解釋都可以接受。
論：四種士用果（puruṣthakāra-phala，士用果，指通過努力工作獲得的結果）的用法。根據《瑜伽師地論》所說，有些人依靠某種工藝技能來獲得士用果，例如農業、商業、為國王服務、書畫、算術、占卜等。通過這些活動，他們獲得了諸如莊稼、財富等結果，這些被稱為士用果。此外，根據有宗（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的《順正理論》第十八卷所說，士用果有四種：第一種是俱生（sahajāta），指在同一時間相互作為原因和力量而產生的；第二種是無間（anantara），指在下一個時間由前一個念頭作為原因而產生的，例如世第一法（laukikāgradharma，世間第一法，指修行者在見道前所達到的最高禪定狀態）能夠產生苦法智忍（kṣānti-jñāna，苦法智忍，指對苦諦的忍可和智慧）；第三種是隔越（viprakṛṣṭa），指在相隔很遠的時間，通過輾轉相因而產生的，例如農民通過耕種獲得穀物；第四種是不生（anutpāda），指涅槃（nirvāṇa，涅槃，指解脫輪迴的狀態），由於無間道（anantarā-mārga，無間道，指直接斷除煩惱的修行道路）的力量而獲得。如果無間道斷除了所有的隨眠（anuśaya，隨眠，指潛伏在心中的煩惱），所證得的擇滅（pratisamkhyā-nirodha，擇滅，指通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡狀態）被稱為離系（visaṃyoga，離系，指脫離煩惱束縛的狀態）和士用果。如果只是不斷地證得滅盡狀態，但沒有斷除煩惱，那麼只能被稱為士用。大乘佛教沒有相關的經文，但其含義與上述相同，因此應該沒有錯誤。
疏：其餘的心和心所，乃至一切有漏法（sāsrava-dharma，有漏法，指帶有煩惱和業力的法）都具有五種依處。這裡的意思是說，辨別心和心所具有的五種依處，即無間滅（anantara-nirodha，無間滅，指前一個心念滅盡后立即生起下一個心念）、乃至士用處。辨別其餘的色法等，則去除前三種依處，只取后兩種。后兩種依處可以辨別色法和心法的果報。異熟果（vipāka-phala，異熟果，指由善惡業產生的果報）既然是有漏法的果報，為什麼不能依靠作用和士用呢？因此，根據這個道理，可以依靠六種依處。
論：隨順處（anuvartanā-sthāna，隨順處，指與某種事物相隨順的處所）所說的一切功能。疏文有三種說法。有人問：為什麼無間不能成為等流果？回答是：九品（nava-prakāra，九品，指根據煩惱的輕重程度劃分的九個等級）相互比較，構成了無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya，無間緣，指前一個心念為后一個心念提供的無間斷的條件）。等流果不是這樣。下面的論述只說由兩種緣而獲得。其中並非沒有能夠引導上品（agrata，上品，指九品中的最高等級）同類性質的事物。這是根據整個處所來說的，所以不取。如果說完全沒有，那麼以現在望現在作為等流果，難道只有他識（para-citta，他識，指他人的意識）嗎？所以允許這種說法是更好的。
【English Translation】 English version: The similarity of retribution is a hypothetical nisyanda-phala (nisyanda-phala, result of outflow, referring to similar results produced by similar causes). Not only retribution is like this, but everything else can also be hypothesized as nisyanda because there is similarity between them. The commentary cites the cause and effect of killing to show that the retribution of the remaining good and evil deeds are all hypothetical nisyanda. Apart from these, others cannot be hypothesized as nisyanda. Both of the above explanations are acceptable.
Treatise: The usage of the four puruṣthakāra-phala (puruṣthakāra-phala, result of effort, referring to the results obtained through hard work). According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, some people rely on a certain craft skill to obtain puruṣthakāra-phala, such as agriculture, commerce, serving the king, calligraphy and painting, arithmetic, divination, etc. Through these activities, they obtain results such as crops, wealth, etc., which are called puruṣthakāra-phala. In addition, according to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya of the Sarvāstivāda school, the puruṣthakāra-phala are four types: The first is sahajāta (sahajāta, co-arising), which refers to those that arise at the same time as each other as cause and power; the second is anantara (anantara, immediate), which refers to those that are produced by the previous thought as a cause in the next time, such as the laukikāgradharma (laukikāgradharma, the highest worldly dharma, referring to the highest state of meditation reached by practitioners before entering the path of seeing) can produce kṣānti-jñāna (kṣānti-jñāna, forbearance-wisdom, referring to the acceptance and wisdom of the truth of suffering); the third is viprakṛṣṭa (viprakṛṣṭa, remote), which refers to those that are produced through indirect causes at a very distant time, such as farmers obtaining grains through cultivation; the fourth is anutpāda (anutpāda, non-arising), which refers to nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa, nirvana, referring to the state of liberation from samsara), which is obtained through the power of anantarā-mārga (anantarā-mārga, immediate path, referring to the path of practice that directly cuts off afflictions). If the anantarā-mārga cuts off all the anuśaya (anuśaya, latent tendencies, referring to the afflictions latent in the mind), the pratisamkhyā-nirodha (pratisamkhyā-nirodha, cessation by wisdom, referring to the state of extinction achieved through the choice of wisdom) attained is called visaṃyoga (visaṃyoga, detachment, referring to the state of being free from the bondage of afflictions) and puruṣthakāra-phala. If one only constantly attains the state of extinction, but does not cut off afflictions, then it can only be called puruṣthakāra. The Mahayana Buddhism does not have relevant scriptures, but its meaning is the same as the above, so there should be no error.
Commentary: The remaining mind and mental factors, and even all sāsrava-dharma (sāsrava-dharma, defiled dharmas, referring to dharmas with afflictions and karma) have five bases. The meaning here is to say that the mind and mental factors are distinguished as having five bases, namely anantara-nirodha (anantara-nirodha, immediate cessation, referring to the cessation of the previous thought immediately followed by the arising of the next thought), up to puruṣthakāra. To distinguish the remaining form, etc., remove the first three bases and only take the last two. The latter two bases can distinguish the retribution of form and mind. Since vipāka-phala (vipāka-phala, result of maturation, referring to the retribution produced by good and evil karma) is the retribution of defiled dharmas, why can't it rely on function and puruṣthakāra? Therefore, according to this principle, one can rely on six bases.
Treatise: All functions mentioned in anuvartanā-sthāna (anuvartanā-sthāna, place of conformity, referring to the place that conforms to something). The commentary has three explanations. Someone asked: Why can't anantara become nisyanda-phala? The answer is: The nine prakāras (nava-prakāra, nine types, referring to the nine levels divided according to the severity of afflictions) are compared with each other to form samanantara-pratyaya (samanantara-pratyaya, immediate condition, referring to the uninterrupted condition provided by the previous thought for the next thought). Nisyanda-phala is not like this. The following discussion only says that it is obtained by two conditions. Among them, there is not nothing that can guide the same nature of agrata (agrata, supreme, referring to the highest level among the nine levels). This is based on the entire place, so it is not taken. If it is said that there is nothing at all, then taking the present as the nisyanda-phala, is it only para-citta (para-citta, other's mind, referring to the consciousness of others)? So allowing this statement is better.
具說者依十處得 詳曰。若以全缺而會文者。理亦不然。且隨順處而亦不全。所引涅槃非等流故。余處準知。故依疏斷。以無間緣形對九品非定隨順。故論不取得等流果。又真等流種自相生。生自現行現行熏種。故等無間無真等流。似又不定故不取也。
論。真見處言至一切功能者。疏判七處得離系果。今以理準應八處得。既待能證方有所證。取領受處亦何爽理。下文不言觀待因得離系果者。據有為果隱無為果而不言也。疏依下文故云七處。亦不相違。
論。士用處言至一切功能者。疏云十一依處得者。實根依處亦得此果。疏中脫略但言十一非疏本意。何以明者 答疏前正解士用處中而作法雲。如眼根等生眼識等名法士用。所以知也。若不爾者豈疏前後不逾數紙即自[矛*牟]𥍿。故定脫略。既加根依合十二處 有義十三。加境界處 詳曰。不取境界望彼士用之果而勢疏遠。故后二師明士用果而皆不許所緣緣得。
論。前七於八至相見種故者。有義兩釋。
前七種識各各能熏彼七轉識自相．見種在本識中。第八緣彼相．見分種為親所緣。即彼所緣由能熏引。故說能熏是彼所緣。雖現與種二相不同體類同故 二云同疏彼相．見種生八見．相是親所緣。能熏七識是疏所緣。是彼引故。如是二釋皆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
有人說，證得果位要依據十個處所。對此詳加辨析：如果以全和缺來會通經文，道理也是不通的。而且隨順處也並不完全。所引用的《涅槃經》並非等流果的例子。其他地方可以類推得知。所以依照疏文的判斷，以無間緣來對應九品並非絕對隨順。因此，《論》中不取等流果。而且真正的等流果是種子自相產生，產生自現行，現行熏習種子。所以等無間緣沒有真正的等流果，似乎也不確定，所以不取。 《論》中，『真見處』說到『一切功能』，疏文中判為七個處所得離系果。現在以理推斷，應該八個處所得。既然要等待能證的條件，才能有所證得，那麼取領受處又有什麼不合道理呢？下文沒有說觀待因可以得到離系果，是根據有為果而隱藏了無為果，所以沒有說。疏文依據下文，所以說是七個處，也不相違背。 《論》中，『士用處』說到『一切功能』，疏文中說依據十一個處所得。實際上，根依處也可以得到這種果報。疏文中省略了，只說了十一個，並非疏文的本意。憑什麼證明呢？回答：疏文前面正確解釋士用處時，造作法說：『如眼根等產生眼識等，名為法士用。』所以知道這一點。如果不是這樣，難道疏文前後相隔不過幾頁紙，就自相矛盾了嗎？所以一定是省略了。既然加上根依處，就合為十二個處。有一種說法是十三個，加上境界處。詳加辨析：不取境界，是因為境界對於士用之果來說，關係疏遠。所以後來的兩位法師闡明士用果時，都不允許所緣緣可以得到。 《論》中，『前七於八』到『相見種故』，有一種說法是兩種解釋： 前七種識各自能夠熏習那七個轉識的自相和見分種子在本識中。第八識緣彼相分和見分種子作為親所緣，即彼所緣由能熏習而引生。所以說能熏是彼所緣。雖然現行和種子二相不同，但體類相同。第二種說法是同疏文，彼相分和見分種子產生第八識的見分和相分，是親所緣。能熏習的七識是疏所緣，是被第八識所引生的。像這樣的兩種解釋都可以。
【English Translation】 English version:
Some say that attaining fruition depends on ten places. Upon detailed analysis: if one tries to reconcile the text by considering completeness and incompleteness, the reasoning is also flawed. Moreover, the 'following along' places are not entirely complete either. The Nirvana Sutra example cited is not an example of an isha-phala (等流果, result of similar cause). Other places can be understood by analogy. Therefore, according to the commentary's judgment, using immediate condition to correspond to the nine grades is not absolutely consistent. Hence, the Treatise does not accept the isha-phala. Furthermore, the true isha-phala arises from the seed's own nature, arising from the manifest action, and the manifest action perfumes the seed. Therefore, there is no true isha-phala in the immediate condition, and it seems uncertain, so it is not accepted. In the Treatise, when the 'true seeing place' mentions 'all functions,' the commentary judges that the result of detachment is obtained from seven places. Now, reasoning logically, it should be obtained from eight places. Since one must wait for the conditions that can prove it in order to have something proven, then what is unreasonable about taking the receiving place? The following text does not say that dependent origination can obtain the result of detachment, it is based on the conditioned result and conceals the unconditioned result, so it is not mentioned. The commentary relies on the following text, so it says seven places, which is not contradictory. In the Treatise, when the 'agent place' mentions 'all functions,' the commentary says that it is obtained based on eleven places. In reality, the root-dependent place can also obtain this result. The commentary omits it, only saying eleven, which is not the commentary's original intention. How can this be proven? Answer: The commentary correctly explains the agent place earlier, creating a dharma saying: 'Like the eye-root, etc., producing eye-consciousness, etc., is called dharma-agent.' Therefore, this is known. If it were not so, wouldn't the commentary contradict itself within just a few pages? Therefore, it must be an omission. Since the root-dependent place is added, it combines into twelve places. One view is thirteen, adding the object place. Detailed analysis: The object is not taken because the relationship between the object and the result of the agent is distant. Therefore, the later two masters, when explaining the agent result, do not allow the objective condition to be obtained. In the Treatise, from 'the former seven in the eighth' to 'because of the seeing-aspect seed,' one view is two explanations: The former seven consciousnesses can each perfume the self-aspect and seeing-aspect seeds of those seven transformed consciousnesses in the alaya-consciousness (本識, root consciousness). The eighth consciousness conditions the aspect-division and seeing-division seeds as the direct object, that is, the object is produced by the perfuming. Therefore, it is said that the perfuming is the object. Although the manifest action and the seed have different aspects, they are of the same category. The second explanation is the same as the commentary: the aspect-division and seeing-division seeds produce the seeing-aspect and aspect-division of the eighth consciousness, which is the direct object. The perfuming seven consciousnesses are the indirect object, which is produced by the eighth consciousness. Both of these explanations are acceptable.
成所緣。然此後釋似義別言實亦違理。引因與果不同世故。又依引種立命根故。此念熏已后念即能生與彼相違故。設言隔身而能生故有緣義者。此亦不然。如此疏緣何成緣義。又第六於五．七此義非無何不說有。今準第六於五．七識亦有所緣。第六遍能熏五．七種。論不說者但略故也。諸人不說乃說熏彼第八相．見。前後校行既許里數 詳曰。披論觀疏疏實無違。有義初解乃非順教。論云能熏彼相．見種。能熏自種何得稱彼。又帶己相是所緣緣。八緣于種望七現行能熏見．相云何帶己。帶謂挾帶帶似之義。由此親緣似彼疏境。疏境方名疏所緣緣。不爾因何得所緣稱。豈以體類解所緣耶。又言前七識熏八見．相。豈能熏識皆引業耶。何得以彼引因因果不同為難。設避引因．與果同世。今有此生作業受過。余非業等既無斯失何意不取 又既疏緣隔生何失。論但言前不簡遠近。若不許者五緣前相亦應不成。亦異世故。故知此師有力隔世成緣義。近遠雖殊俱隔故 又觀疏意通於種．現。不障能熏見．相種子為八所緣。但以論有熏彼之言故。約熏於八相．見說。今既局斷故為難據 問前現識望八如何有所緣相 答第八新熏五塵境種五相熏得。故第八相似五相起。所以五相是第八見疏所緣緣。第七見分緣第八見而熏彼種。後生彼見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 成所緣（成就所依之緣）。然而，此後的解釋似乎意義不同，實際上也違背了道理。因為引因和果報不在同一世。而且，依據引種而立命根。此念熏習之後，后念就能產生與它相反的念頭。假設說隔世也能產生，所以有緣的意義。這種說法也不對。如此疏遠的緣，怎麼能成就緣的意義？而且第六識對於前五識和第七識的所緣，這個意義並非沒有，為什麼不說有？現在按照第六識對於前五識和第七識也有所緣。第六識普遍能夠熏習前五識和第七識的種子。論典不說，只是省略了。有些人不說第六識熏習前五識和第七識，反而說熏習第八識的相分和見分。前後校對，既然允許里數（距離），詳細地說，披閱論典和疏鈔，疏鈔實際上沒有違背論典。有一種解釋最初就不順應佛教的教義。論典說能夠熏習第八識的相分和見分的種子，能夠熏習自己的種子，怎麼能稱為『彼』（第八識的相分和見分）？而且帶著自己的相分是所緣緣。第八識緣于種子，相對於前七識的現行，能夠熏習見分和相分，怎麼能說帶著自己的相分？『帶』的意思是挾帶，帶著相似的意義。因此，親近的緣類似於疏遠的境界。疏遠的境界才稱為疏所緣緣。不然的話，怎麼能得到所緣的稱呼？難道用體類來解釋所緣嗎？又說前七識熏習第八識的見分和相分，難道能夠熏習識的都是引業嗎？怎麼能用引因和果報不同世來作為難點？假設避免引因和果報在同一世。現在有此生作業，來世受果報。其餘的非業等既然沒有這種過失，為什麼不採用？而且既然是疏遠的緣，隔世又有什麼過失？論典只是說『前』，沒有簡別遠近。如果不允許隔世成緣，那麼前五識緣於前五塵的相分也應該不能成立，因為也是異世的緣故。所以知道這位法師有力地主張隔世成就緣的意義。遠近雖然不同，都是隔世的緣故。而且觀察疏鈔的意思，貫通種子和現行。不妨礙能夠熏習見分和相分的種子作為第八識的所緣。只是因為論典有熏習『彼』（第八識的相分和見分）的說法，所以約略地說熏習第八識的相分和見分。現在既然侷限地斷定，所以作為難據。問：前現識相對於第八識，如何有所緣相？答：第八識新熏習五塵境的種子，五相熏習所得。所以第八識相似於五相而生起。所以五相是第八識見分的疏所緣緣。第七識的見分緣于第八識的見分而熏習它的種子，後來產生那個見分。
【English Translation】 English version The object-support condition (ālambana-pratyaya). However, the subsequent explanation seems to have a different meaning and actually contradicts the principle. This is because the inducing cause and the result are not in the same lifetime. Moreover, the life faculty is established based on the inducing seed. After this thought is imprinted, the subsequent thought can generate a thought contrary to it. If it is said that it can be generated even in a different lifetime, so there is the meaning of condition. This statement is also incorrect. How can such a distant condition achieve the meaning of condition? Moreover, the object-support of the sixth consciousness for the five consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness is not non-existent. Why not say it exists? Now, according to the sixth consciousness, it also has object-support for the five consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness. The sixth consciousness can universally imprint the seeds of the five consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness. The treatise does not mention it, but it is omitted. Some people do not say that the sixth consciousness imprints the five consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness, but instead say that it imprints the image-aspect (nimitta) and the seeing-aspect (darśana) of the eighth consciousness. After comparing the previous and subsequent explanations, since the number of 'li' (a unit of distance) is allowed, it is explained in detail that after reading the treatise and the commentary, the commentary actually does not contradict the treatise. One interpretation initially does not accord with the teachings of Buddhism. The treatise says that it can imprint the seeds of the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness. How can it be called 'that' (the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness) if it can imprint its own seeds? Moreover, carrying one's own image-aspect is the object-support condition. The eighth consciousness is conditioned by the seeds. Relative to the present activity of the first seven consciousnesses, it can imprint the seeing-aspect and the image-aspect. How can it be said to carry one's own image-aspect? 'Carry' means to carry along, carrying a similar meaning. Therefore, the close condition is similar to the distant realm. Only the distant realm is called the distant object-support condition. Otherwise, how can it get the name of object-support? Is it possible to explain object-support by the category of substance? It is also said that the first seven consciousnesses imprint the seeing-aspect and the image-aspect of the eighth consciousness. Can all the consciousnesses that can imprint be inducing karma? How can the point that the inducing cause and the result are not in the same lifetime be used as a difficulty? Suppose avoiding the inducing cause and the result being in the same lifetime. Now there is the creation of karma in this life and the receiving of the result in the next life. Since the remaining non-karma etc. do not have this fault, why not adopt it? Moreover, since it is a distant condition, what fault is there in being in a different lifetime? The treatise only says 'previous', without distinguishing between near and far. If it is not allowed to become a condition in a different lifetime, then the five consciousnesses being conditioned by the image-aspect of the five sense objects should also not be established, because it is also a condition in a different lifetime. Therefore, it is known that this Dharma master forcefully advocates the meaning of achieving a condition in a different lifetime. Although the near and far are different, they are all in different lifetimes. Moreover, observing the meaning of the commentary, it penetrates the seeds and the present activity. It does not hinder the seeds that can imprint the seeing-aspect and the image-aspect from being the object-support of the eighth consciousness. It is only because the treatise has the statement of imprinting 'that' (the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness) that it is briefly said to imprint the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness. Now that it is limitedly determined, it is used as a difficult basis. Question: How does the previous present consciousness have an object-support aspect relative to the eighth consciousness? Answer: The eighth consciousness newly imprints the seeds of the five sense objects, which are obtained by the imprinting of the five aspects. Therefore, the eighth consciousness arises similar to the five aspects. Therefore, the five aspects are the distant object-support condition of the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness. The seeing-aspect of the seventh consciousness is conditioned by the seeing-aspect of the eighth consciousness and imprints its seeds, and later that seeing-aspect arises.
為自證緣。八見有似第七之相。復七相生故現第七為八自證疏所緣緣。第六準知 又疏中雲。六望七等準此應知。意明第六熏五．七種得為五．七所緣緣也。疏以說訖。何言無說。論文不悉恐行逾邁。
疏。應作四句等者。第七唯熏見。前五唯熏相。其第六緣八見．相雙熏二種。若緣余心心所．無為二俱不熏。
論。同聚異體等者。有義問如前卷說同聚心等由互相應和合似一互為無間。如何今說但有增上。答由此應知此不盡理。又解此文依同時說。依前後者第六三緣余識有二 詳曰。此文定據同時而明。何惑致問繁乎翰墨。前後相望前已說故 又問同聚異體尚說互作等無間緣。同體四分除相餘三體既是一。一開導時余亦開導。何不許三前後互望為等無間。此義應思 詳曰。論同聚下至凈八來。皆依時同同聚四分而明緣義。不障前後自類三分為開導也。三分既於一識義分。義互開導相應無過。言論不許恐失論旨。
疏。即無前過但有後失者。若許同時見分相緣總有二失。一無同一所緣之過。若言自見得自緣者。二者即有心自緣妨。如刀自割。今有第二自緣之妨故名后失。非前疏中列有二過云后失也。或前疏云見分．相分不相緣故。今許自證得緣自見。無見．相望闕同緣失。然同時相心．心所見而不互
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了自證的緣故，第八識的見分（Vijnana，了別作用）看起來與第七識的相分（Nimitta，表象）相似。由於有七種相似的生起，所以顯現出第七識作為第八識自證分的疏所緣緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）。第六識的情況可以類推得知。此外，疏中說：『第六識對於第七識等的情況，應該依此來理解。』意思是說，第六識熏習第五識和第七識的種子，可以成為第五識和第七識的所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，所緣緣）。疏的解釋到此結束。為什麼說沒有解釋呢？論文沒有詳細說明，是恐怕行文過於冗長。
疏：『應該作四句等』的意思是，第七識只熏習見分，前五識只熏習相分。第六識緣取第八識的見分和相分，同時熏習這兩種。如果緣取其他心、心所（Caitasika，心所法）和無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，無為法），則兩種都不熏習。
論：『同聚異體等』的意思是，有人問：如前卷所說，同一聚合的心等，由於互相相應和合，看起來像一個整體，互相作為無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya，等無間緣）。為什麼現在說只有增上緣呢？回答是：由此可知，這種說法並不完全合理。另一種解釋是，這段文字是依據同時的情況來說的。依據前後相望的情況，第六識的三種緣對於其他識有兩種作用。詳細地說，這段文字一定是依據同時的情況來說明的。為什麼還要疑惑地提問，浪費筆墨呢？前後相望的情況，前面已經說過了。又有人問：同一聚合、不同本體的心等，尚且說互相作為等無間緣。同一本體的四分（Caturvidha，四分）中，除了相分之外，其餘三分的本體既然是同一個，一個開導時，其餘也開導。為什麼不允許這三分前後互相作為等無間緣呢？這個道理應該思考。詳細地說，論述從『同聚』到『清凈第八識』，都是依據同時、同一聚合的四分來說明緣的意義。不障礙前後自類三分作為開導。三分既然在一個識的意義範圍內，意義互相開導，沒有過失。言論不允許，是恐怕失去論旨。
疏：『即沒有前面的過失，但有後面的缺失』的意思是，如果允許同時的見分和相分互相緣取，總共有兩種缺失。一是沒有同一所緣的過失。如果說自見可以緣取自身，那麼二是會有心自緣的妨礙，就像刀自己割自己一樣。現在有第二種自緣的妨礙，所以叫做後面的缺失。不是前面疏中列舉的兩種過失，而是說後面的缺失。或者說，前面疏中說見分和相分不互相緣取，所以現在允許自證分緣取自己的見分，沒有見分和相分互相觀望而缺少共同所緣的缺失。然而，同時的相分、心和心所的見分不互相...
【English Translation】 English version: For the sake of self-cognition (Sva-samvedana), the seeing-aspect (Darśana-bhāga) of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) appears similar to the object-aspect (Nimitta-bhāga) of the seventh consciousness (Manas). Because seven similar aspects arise, the seventh consciousness manifests as the dominant object-condition (Adhipati-pratyaya) for the self-cognition aspect of the eighth consciousness. The situation of the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna) can be understood by analogy. Furthermore, the commentary states: 'The relationship of the sixth consciousness to the seventh consciousness, etc., should be understood accordingly.' This means that the sixth consciousness, by perfuming the seeds of the fifth and seventh consciousnesses, can become the object-condition (Ālambana-pratyaya) for the fifth and seventh consciousnesses. The commentary's explanation concludes here. Why say there is no explanation? The treatise does not elaborate for fear of excessive length.
Commentary: 'The phrase 'should make four sentences, etc.' means that the seventh consciousness only perfumes the seeing-aspect, while the first five consciousnesses only perfume the object-aspect. The sixth consciousness, in cognizing the seeing and object-aspects of the eighth consciousness, simultaneously perfumes both. If it cognizes other minds, mental factors (Caitasikas), and unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharmas), it does not perfume either.
Treatise: 'Same aggregate, different entities, etc.' means that someone asks: As stated in the previous chapter, minds, etc., in the same aggregate, due to mutual correspondence and combination, appear as a single whole, mutually acting as immediate conditions (Samanantara-pratyaya). Why is it now said that there is only a dominant condition? The answer is: From this, it can be known that this statement is not entirely reasonable. Another explanation is that this passage is based on simultaneous occurrences. Regarding the relationship between preceding and succeeding, the three conditions of the sixth consciousness have two functions for other consciousnesses. In detail, this passage must be explaining based on simultaneous occurrences. Why ask with doubt, wasting ink? The relationship between preceding and succeeding has already been discussed. Someone also asks: Minds, etc., of the same aggregate but different entities, are even said to mutually act as immediate conditions. Among the four aspects (Caturvidha) of the same entity, since the remaining three aspects besides the object-aspect are the same entity, when one guides, the others also guide. Why not allow these three aspects to mutually act as immediate conditions in a preceding and succeeding manner? This principle should be considered. In detail, the discussion from 'same aggregate' to 'pure eighth consciousness' explains the meaning of conditions based on the simultaneous, same aggregate four aspects. It does not hinder the preceding and succeeding three aspects of the same category from acting as guidance. Since the three aspects are within the scope of one consciousness, the meanings mutually guide each other without fault. The treatise does not allow it for fear of losing the treatise's intention.
Commentary: 'That is, there is no previous fault, but there is a subsequent defect' means that if simultaneous seeing and object-aspects are allowed to mutually cognize, there are two faults in total. First, there is the fault of not having the same object. If it is said that self-seeing can cognize itself, then second, there would be the hindrance of the mind cognizing itself, like a knife cutting itself. Now there is the second hindrance of self-cognition, so it is called the subsequent defect. It is not the two faults listed in the previous commentary, but rather refers to the subsequent defect. Or, the previous commentary said that the seeing and object-aspects do not mutually cognize, so now allowing the self-cognition aspect to cognize its own seeing-aspect avoids the fault of the seeing and object-aspects lacking a common object when looking at each other. However, the simultaneous object-aspect, mind, and the seeing-aspects of mental factors do not mutually...
緣。望彼相分同時王所不同緣過。相分見后故名后失。
疏。今依可爾至非要爾者。今依第八緣境。而說可有本質。非一切識皆要有質。如意緣空便無質故。
疏。若約疏所緣緣亦非等者。非但不得成親所緣。疏亦不得亦彼親也 又疏云。見與相分不相似故者。釋不得為疏所緣所以。夫親緣體似疏緣故。如相分色似質色也 詳曰。前釋為勝。或帶己相后亦理通。
疏。一云前依因依至不必同者。前言王．所同一所緣。據因位說。果不必同 何所以耶 答果位自在不同何失 又因緣外必同所緣。果亦自內緣相應法。由此所緣非必定同。后釋為本。
疏。此義雖勝然稍難知者。問難知理何 答以無同一所緣義故 何以無耶 答心王緣彼所變似見。心所乃以能緣心見而為其質。如何得成同所緣耶 問心王所緣托自心變。何得不同 答而無一時有二心王。心王如何有能所託。能所託二心王既無。故但一心緣似心境。同時心所變心為質。質．似不同。云何王．所同一所緣。若以相似名為同一。理雖可爾。然本論質名同一。故據見自緣相似名同名為義勝。本質不同故曰難知。
論。唯除見分非相所緣等者。如燈及疏具已明之 有義斷取西明第四而自問云。可許三分能緣餘三。如何自緣便同小乘大眾
【現代漢語翻譯】 緣（pratyaya，條件）。觀察彼相分（nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）時，心王（citta-rāja，主要意識）和心所（caitta，心理作用）所緣的條件不同。相分在見分（darśana-bhāga，能見部分）之後顯現，因此被稱為『后失』。
疏（註釋）：現在依據可爾（kaivalya，獨存）至非要爾（anirapekṣa，非必要）的觀點。現在依據第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）所緣的境界來說，可以有本質（vastu，實在）。並非一切識都需要有本質，例如意識緣于空（śūnyatā，空性）時就沒有本質。
疏（註釋）：如果按照疏所緣緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）來說，也不是相同的。不僅不能成為親所緣（upādāna-ālambana，近取所緣），疏所緣也不能成為彼親所緣。又疏（註釋）中說：『見分與相分不相似』，解釋了不能作為疏所緣的原因。親緣（親近的條件）在體性上相似，疏緣（疏遠的條件）也是如此，例如相分之色（rūpa，色法）類似於質色（dravya-rūpa，實物之色）。詳細地說，前面的解釋更為殊勝，或者帶著自己的相分，後面也合乎道理。
疏（註釋）：一種觀點認為，前面依據因依（hetu-pratyaya，因緣）至不必同的說法。前面說心王和心所同一所緣（ālambana，所緣），是根據因位（hetu-avasthā，因地）來說的，果位（phala-avasthā，果位）不必相同。為什麼呢？回答：果位自在不同，有什麼過失呢？又因緣之外必定相同所緣，果位也緣于自身內在相應的法（dharma，法）。由此，所緣並非必定相同。後面的解釋是根本。
疏（註釋）：這個意義雖然殊勝，但稍微難以理解。問：難以理解的道理是什麼？答：因為沒有同一所緣的意義。為什麼沒有呢？答：心王緣于彼所變現的，類似於見分。心所則以能緣的心見作為它的本質。如何能夠成為同一所緣呢？問：心王所緣的依託于自身心識的變現，為什麼不同呢？答：因為沒有一時有兩個心王。心王如何有能所依託呢？能所依託的兩個心王既然沒有，所以只是一心緣于類似於心識的境界。同時，心所變現心識作為本質。本質和相似不同，心王和心所怎麼能是同一所緣呢？如果以相似為名為同一，道理雖然可以成立，但是本論（瑜伽師地論）中本質名為同一。所以根據見分自緣相似名為同，這個意義殊勝。本質不同，所以說難以理解。
論（瑜伽師地論）：唯除見分非相所緣等。如燈及疏具已明之。有義斷取西明第四而自問云。可許三分能緣餘三。如何自緣便同小乘大眾（Mahāsaṃghika，大眾部）？
【English Translation】 緣 (pratyaya, condition). When observing that nimitta-bhāga (image-part), the conditions that citta-rāja (mind-king, main consciousness) and caitta (mental functions) rely on are different. The nimitta-bhāga appears after the darśana-bhāga (seeing-part), hence it is called 'posterior loss'.
疏 (commentary): Now, based on the view from kaivalya (solitariness) to anirapekṣa (non-necessity). Now, based on the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) and the realm it relies on, it can have vastu (essence, reality). Not all consciousnesses need to have an essence, for example, when consciousness relies on śūnyatā (emptiness), it has no essence.
疏 (commentary): If according to adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition), it is also not the same. Not only can it not become upādāna-ālambana (proximate object), the adhipati-pratyaya also cannot become that proximate object. Furthermore, the 疏 (commentary) says: 'The darśana-bhāga is not similar to the nimitta-bhāga,' explaining the reason why it cannot be the adhipati-pratyaya. The proximate condition is similar in nature, and so is the distant condition, for example, the rūpa (form) of the nimitta-bhāga is similar to the dravya-rūpa (matter-form). In detail, the previous explanation is more superior, or with its own nimitta-bhāga, the latter also makes sense.
疏 (commentary): One view is that the previous statement based on hetu-pratyaya (causal condition) to 'not necessarily the same'. The previous statement that the mind-king and mental functions rely on the same ālambana (object) is based on the hetu-avasthā (causal stage), the phala-avasthā (result stage) does not have to be the same. Why? Answer: The result stage has different independence, what fault is there? Also, outside of the causal condition, the object must be the same, the result stage also relies on its own internal corresponding dharma (law). Therefore, the object is not necessarily the same. The latter explanation is fundamental.
疏 (commentary): Although this meaning is superior, it is slightly difficult to understand. Question: What is the reason for the difficulty in understanding? Answer: Because there is no meaning of the same object. Why not? Answer: The mind-king relies on what is transformed by it, which is similar to the seeing-part. The mental functions then take the mind-seeing that can rely on it as its essence. How can it become the same object? Question: The mind-king relies on the transformation of its own mind, why is it different? Answer: Because there are not two mind-kings at the same time. How can the mind-king have something to rely on? Since there are no two mind-kings that can rely on each other, there is only one mind relying on a realm similar to the mind. At the same time, the mental functions transform the mind as the essence. The essence and the similarity are different, how can the mind-king and mental functions be the same object? If similarity is called the same, the reasoning can be established, but in this treatise (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), the essence is called the same. Therefore, according to the seeing-part relying on its own similarity as the same, this meaning is superior. The essence is different, so it is said to be difficult to understand.
論 (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra): Only excluding the seeing-part is not the object of the image-part, etc. As the lamp and commentary have already explained in detail. Some meanings cut off the fourth of Ximing and ask themselves: Can it be allowed that three parts can rely on the other three? How can self-reliance be the same as the Mahāsaṃghika (Great Assembly)?'
等義。解云。彼說心等親了自性。若爾一體分能所緣便成雜亂。今變影緣故不同彼。無自緣失。不爾諸佛應非遍知。又如何說同一境耶。故知如受緣想見分。想見即能變影自緣。所杖質同。影像相似。說名同也。又云第四緣第二分。如三．四分更互相緣。見緣后二而有兩解。一云變相。見緣后二既后得智。故必變相。二云不變似。后二分即自體故不同緣余。雖后得智亦不變相。今取后解 詳曰。雖有高斷恐為未可。未可理何。若以相似名同可爾。而云見等變影自緣。明所緣同。前疏已斷勝而難知。難知之理如次前明。臧否可悉 又以第四緣于第二。第二復緣后之二種。俱不變相者。二緣三．四與彼四．三緣三．四時而復何別。俱不變故。四緣第二責亦同之。由斯便有錯亂之過。故本疏明無雜可寶。
論。業之眷屬亦立業名者。有義彈云。疏說五蘊總名為業。今但可取相應之法為眷屬也。有色根．境既唯無記。雖業俱行不可能招引．滿異熟者 詳曰。律．不律儀既名為色。為業眷屬助招引．滿何理相違。諸教皆言由善．惡戒生善．惡故。疏亦不言五根．境等為眷屬也。自義不足彈疏有餘。
疏。不同小乘具十隨轉等者。由十因故得隨轉名。名十隨轉。隨轉體者。按俱舍論第六說云。一切所有心相應法．靜慮
無漏二種律儀。彼法及心之生等相。如是皆謂心隨轉法。如何此法名心隨轉。略說由時．果等．善等故說此法名心隨轉。且由時者。謂此與心同於四相及隨一世。由果等者。謂此與心一果異熟及一等流 由善等者。謂此與心同善．不善．無記性故。由此十因名心隨轉。今者大乘四相體非不招異熟。不同小乘隨轉能得異熟果也。
疏。化地部至現皆有體者。問大乘現體而亦不無何乃簡彼 答大乘現但有業習氣無業現體。與彼不同。故須簡也。
疏。前言相中亦通無為者。體相．相狀俱名相故。故攝無為。
疏。一切五蘊不離此二者。色蘊是心．心所相分。亦名心所。心所及心故攝五蘊。
疏。愛樂執取緣取也者。明取通二。執之與緣俱名為取。
疏。余識別報至一切法盡者。余識乃攝報與非報。七識心品不唯業感。故名攝盡。
疏。唯簡異熟以極狹故者。顯前釋末唯攝別報。不取余識及心所等。故為極狹 問相．見等四四皆攝得五蘊不耶 答皆攝得。見唯攝彼非色四蘊。相攝色全．余蘊少分。本末相分通色蘊收。能緣心等即餘四蘊。中二可知。
疏。即彼上四取者。彼即彼前見．相等四能．所取也。取彼四取故名彼取。
疏。取前第一至下三取亦然者。
問前
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無漏的兩種律儀（Vinaya，戒律）。那些法和心的生起等狀態，都稱為心隨轉法。為什麼這些法被稱為心隨轉呢？簡略地說，因為時間、果報等、善等原因，所以說這些法名為心隨轉。從時間上說，這些法與心在生、住、異、滅四相上相同，並且存在於同一世。從果報等上說，這些法與心具有相同的果報異熟和等流果。從善等上說，這些法與心具有相同的善、不善、無記性。由於這十個原因，被稱為心隨轉。現在大乘的四相體並非不招感異熟果報，這與小乘的隨轉法只能獲得異熟果報不同。
疏解：化地部（Mahīśāsaka，佛教部派之一）到現在都認為有實體。問：大乘的現行體也是存在的，為什麼這裡要排除大乘呢？答：大乘的現行只有業的習氣，沒有業的現行體，與化地部不同，所以需要排除。
疏解：前面說的『相』中也包括無為法（Asaṃskṛta，不生不滅的法），因為體相和相狀都叫做『相』，所以包含無為法。
疏解：一切五蘊（Skandha，構成個體存在的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）都離不開這兩種，色蘊（Rūpa-skandha，物質要素）是心和心所（Caitasika，心的附屬作用）的相分，也叫做心所。心所和心包含了五蘊。
疏解：愛樂執取就是緣取。說明『取』可以包括兩種，執和緣都可以叫做『取』。
疏解：其餘的識包含了果報和非果報。第七識（末那識，Manas-vijñāna）的心品不只是業力感生的，所以說包含了全部。
疏解：只排除異熟果報是因為它最狹隘。說明前面的解釋只包含了別報，不包括其餘的識和心所等，所以說是最狹隘的。問：相、見等四種是否都能包含五蘊？答：都能包含。見只能包含非色的四蘊。相包含全部的色蘊和少部分的其餘蘊。本末相分都包含在色蘊中。能緣的心等包含其餘四蘊。中間兩種可以自己理解。
疏解：就是前面說的四種『取』。『彼』就是指前面說的見、相等四種能取和所取。取這四種取，所以叫做『彼取』。
疏解：取前面的第一種，下面的三種取也是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version The two kinds of undefiled Vinaya (discipline). Those dharmas (phenomena) and the states of mind's arising, etc., are all called 'mind-concomitant dharmas'. Why are these dharmas called 'mind-concomitant'? Briefly speaking, it is because of time, result, etc., and goodness, etc., that these dharmas are called 'mind-concomitant'. In terms of time, these dharmas are the same as the mind in the four characteristics of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, and exist in the same lifetime. In terms of result, etc., these dharmas and the mind have the same result of Vipāka (karmic maturation) and Niṣyanda (causally outflowing result). In terms of goodness, etc., these dharmas and the mind have the same nature of being wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral. Due to these ten reasons, they are called 'mind-concomitant'. Now, the nature of the four characteristics in Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) does not fail to bring about Vipāka, which is different from the Saṃkrānti (transference) of the Śrāvakayāna (Vehicle of Hearers) that can only obtain Vipāka.
Commentary: The Mahīśāsaka (one of the early Buddhist schools) school believes that there is substance even now. Question: The manifest nature of Mahāyāna also exists, so why exclude it here? Answer: The manifest nature of Mahāyāna only has the habit-energy of karma, without the manifest substance of karma, which is different from the Mahīśāsaka school, so it needs to be excluded.
Commentary: The 'aspect' mentioned earlier also includes Asaṃskṛta (unconditioned dharma), because both the nature and characteristics are called 'aspect', so it includes Asaṃskṛta.
Commentary: All five Skandhas (aggregates of existence: form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) cannot be separated from these two. Rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form) is the objective aspect of the mind and mental factors (Caitasika), and is also called mental factor. Mental factors and the mind include the five Skandhas.
Commentary: 'Love, joy, attachment, and grasping' means 'dependent arising'. It explains that 'grasping' can include two types: attachment and dependent arising can both be called 'grasping'.
Commentary: The remaining consciousnesses include both Vipāka and non-Vipāka. The mental activities of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) are not only produced by karma, so it is said to include everything.
Commentary: Only excluding Vipāka is because it is the narrowest. It explains that the previous explanation only included specific results, not including the remaining consciousnesses and mental factors, etc., so it is the narrowest. Question: Can the four aspects, such as appearance and perception, all include the five Skandhas? Answer: They can all include them. Perception can only include the four non-form Skandhas. Appearance includes all of the form Skandha and a small part of the remaining Skandhas. The fundamental and derived aspects are both included in the form Skandha. The mind, etc., that can cognize include the remaining four Skandhas. The middle two can be understood by oneself.
Commentary: That is, the four 'graspings' mentioned above. 'That' refers to the four grasping and grasped aspects of appearance, perception, etc., mentioned earlier. Grasping these four graspings is called 'that grasping'.
Commentary: Grasping the first one mentioned earlier, the following three graspings are also the same.
之三對有能．所取理即可然。本末云何 答本末皆攝能．所緣二二取故有。或本為所取。末為能取。末緣于本熏本種故。據容有說。取言通於緣．執二種故無違故。
疏。故有八解者。單．重二取各有四也。
疏。本末至亦具二義者。自不能熏。但是所取名為取也。亦具能生．所生二義。
疏。即名言種至能生本識者。顯具二理。即本末二名言之種。而由能熏七識熏得此所熏種。而後能生本末現識。故本末二得有能生．所生二義。
疏。此中二取至相見分等者。問能熏七識非劣無記。云何能生本末異熟 答相分熏彼本末之種。相分與見性必不同。熏彼何失。
論。雖二取種至性同易感者。有義問親因緣種熏時望果。為定別世如異熟種。為亦許同一期身世 答疏云等流增上性同易感。此念熏已后即能生。非如異熟。彼難招故。二云此如業種定世不同。十因．二果不同世故。而立命根說依親種生第八識一期功能。若許世同隨熏生果。一期生種義即不成。所引．所生世各有異故。自種生果雖無有盡。隨業可說一期別故。若爾與業種子何別。說有盡相．無盡相耶 解云業招生已雖有種子。后更不能招異熟果。其延壽法聖生凈居。皆資受果未盡之業。業若受果已盡之者。設得勝緣終不更能受于果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 之三，能取和所取是對立存在的。所取的道理是合乎邏輯的。本和末是什麼呢？回答：本和末都包含能取和所取，因為它們是相互取用的。或者說，本是所取，末是能取。末緣于本，熏習本的種子。這是根據容許的情況來說的。『取』這個詞涵蓋了緣和執兩種含義，因此沒有矛盾。
疏：『故有八解者』，指的是單取和重取各有四種情況。
疏：『本末至亦具二義者』，自身不能熏習，只是作為所取，因此稱為『取』。也同時具有能生和所生的雙重含義。
疏：『即名言種至能生本識者』，顯示了兩種道理。即本和末兩種名言的種子，通過能熏的第七識的熏習，得到這種所熏的種子，然後才能產生本和末的現識。因此，本和末都具有能生和所生的雙重含義。
疏：『此中二取至相見分等者』，問：能熏的第七識並非低劣的無記性，怎麼能產生本和末的異熟果呢？答：是相分熏習了本和末的種子。相分和見性必然不同，熏習它有什麼過失呢？
論：『雖二取種至性同易感者』，有人問：親因緣種熏習時，從結果來看，是像異熟果一樣決定了世別，還是也允許同一期身世？回答：疏中說，等流和增上是性質相同容易感應的。這種念頭熏習后就能產生結果，不像異熟果那樣難以招感。另一種說法是，這就像業的種子決定了世別不同一樣，十因和二果的世別也不同。而立命根的說法是依據親種產生第八識（Alaya-識，阿賴耶識）一期的功能。如果允許世別相同，隨著熏習就產生結果，那麼一期生種的意義就不成立了。所引和所生的世別各有不同。雖然自種產生結果沒有窮盡，但可以根據業來說明一期的差別。如果這樣，那麼和業的種子有什麼區別呢？是說有窮盡相和無盡相嗎？解釋說，業招感果報后，即使有種子，以後也不能再招感異熟果。那些延長壽命的方法，聖人生於凈居天，都是憑藉接受果報未盡的業。如果業接受果報已經窮盡，即使得到殊勝的因緣，最終也不能再接受果報。
【English Translation】 English version Thirdly, the taker and the taken exist in opposition. The principle of what is taken is logical. What are the root and the branch? Answer: Both the root and the branch encompass the taker and the taken, because they are mutually taken. Alternatively, the root is what is taken, and the branch is the taker. The branch conditions the root, perfuming the seed of the root. This is according to what is permissible. The word 'taking' covers both conditioning and grasping, so there is no contradiction.
Commentary: 'Therefore, there are eight explanations' refers to the four cases each of single taking and double taking.
Commentary: 'The root and branch also possess two meanings' means that they cannot perfume themselves, but are only taken, hence the name 'taking'. They also possess the dual meanings of being able to produce and being produced.
Commentary: 'That is, the seeds of names and words can produce the root consciousness' reveals two principles. That is, the seeds of the names and words of the root and branch, through the perfuming of the seventh consciousness (Manas-識，末那識) which is able to perfume, obtain this perfumed seed, and then can produce the manifest consciousnesses of the root and branch. Therefore, the root and branch both possess the dual meanings of being able to produce and being produced.
Commentary: 'Among these two takings, the appearance and seeing divisions, etc.' Question: The seventh consciousness, which is able to perfume, is not inferior and non-recollective. How can it produce the differentiated fruition of the root and branch? Answer: It is the appearance division that perfumes the seeds of the root and branch. The appearance division and the seeing nature must be different. What fault is there in perfuming it?
Treatise: 'Although the seeds of the two takings have the same nature and are easily influenced' Someone asks: When the seed of the direct cause and condition is perfumed, from the perspective of the result, is it like the differentiated fruition that determines the separation of lifetimes, or is it also permissible in the same lifetime? Answer: The commentary says that the outflow and increase have the same nature and are easily influenced. After this thought is perfumed, it can produce the result immediately, unlike the differentiated fruition, which is difficult to attract. Another explanation is that this is like the seeds of karma that determine the difference in lifetimes, just as the ten causes and two results have different lifetimes. And the statement of establishing the life-root is based on the direct seed producing the function of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-識，阿賴耶識) for one lifetime. If it is permissible for the lifetimes to be the same, and the result is produced as soon as it is perfumed, then the meaning of the seed produced in one lifetime is not established. The lifetimes of what is led and what is produced are different. Although the self-seed producing the result is not exhausted, the difference in one lifetime can be explained according to karma. If so, then what is the difference between this and the seed of karma? Is it said that there are exhausted aspects and inexhaustible aspects? The explanation is that after karma attracts the retribution, even if there are seeds, it cannot attract the differentiated fruition again. Those methods of prolonging life, and the saints born in the Pure Abode Heavens, all rely on the karma that has not yet exhausted its retribution. If the karma has already exhausted its retribution, even if it obtains excellent conditions, it will ultimately not be able to receive the retribution again.
也。故名有盡。若名言種為一業引生一期果。后逢緣引復能生果故名無盡。非無生果一期功能名無盡也 詳曰。觀有義意取后釋也。今先議世后定優劣。世有剎那．分位．生死三時差別。若所熏種所生現果與能熏現。隨前諸世而必不同。無有一念有二現故。諸所熏種望所生果許有同世。種自相生亦名果故分位世同。諸名言種皆得名為二取習氣。善．惡等種生善等現剎那世並業所感識諸名言種。望生現果世可不同。疏據斯義說言同也。不爾論云性同易感等徒為設也。后義雷同總判世別理為未可。
論。然諸習氣總有三種者。無性攝論有三熏習。義不具此故不錄也。
疏。若依外者名錶義名者。有義彈云。五識一切皆依外故應名錶義 詳曰。由因他名自能熏修。以自他對立以外名。不約根．塵以明內外。何得謬以五識為難。智者應知。
疏。若依無漏至內名為緣者。問前明表義名之於外。今復云何名名為內 答顯其名因內而發立以內名。不望自他故無[矛*牟]𥍿。
論。隨二名言至各別因緣者。問表義聲界。顯境名言即七心界．法界一分。合但九界。云何能為諸法別因 答因二名言隨應相．見熏諸法種。為諸法因理無爽矣。疏具斯意尋之可悉。故世親攝論云。名言熏習差別者謂眼名言熏習。在
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，稱之為『有盡』。如果名言種子作為一種業力引發一期的果報，之後遇到因緣引發又能產生果報，因此稱之為『無盡』。並非沒有產生果報的一期功能稱之為『無盡』。詳細地說，觀察『有義』的意義，採取後面的解釋。現在先討論世俗的，之後再確定優劣。世俗有剎那（ksana，極短的時間）、分位、生死三種時間上的差別。如果所熏習的種子所產生的現行果，與能熏習的現行，隨著之前的各個世而必定不同。沒有一個念頭同時存在兩種現行。諸所熏習的種子，相對於所產生的果，允許有同世的情況，因為種子自身相生也稱為果。分位世相同。各種名言種子都可以稱為二取習氣。善、惡等種子產生善等現行，剎那世以及業力所感知的識，各種名言種子，相對於產生現行果，世可以不同。疏文依據這個意義說『同』。否則，論中說『性同易感』等就成了徒勞的設定。後面的意義雷同，總判斷世別，道理上是不可取的。 論：然而，各種習氣總共有三種。無性《攝論》有三種熏習，意義不完全具備，因此不引用。 疏：如果依據外者，稱之為『名錶義名』。有人提出疑問：五識一切都依賴於外境，因此應該稱為『名錶義』。詳細地說，由於憑藉他名自身能夠熏修，以自他對立來說明『外名』。不以根、塵來區分內外。怎麼能錯誤地用五識來作為難點呢？智者應該明白。 疏：如果依據無漏，稱之為『內名為緣』。問：前面說明『表義名』是對於外境的，現在又為什麼稱『名』為『內』呢？答：顯示其名因內心而發，建立為『內名』。不相對於自身和他者，因此沒有矛盾。 論：隨著二種名言，各自有不同的因緣。問：表義聲界，顯境名言即七心界、法界的一部分，合起來只有九界。怎麼能作為諸法的個別原因呢？答：因為二種名言隨著相應的相、見熏習諸法種子，作為諸法的原因，道理上沒有差錯。疏文具備這個意思，仔細尋思就可以明白。所以世親《攝論》說：『名言熏習的差別，是指眼名言熏習。』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is called 'finite'. If a seed of verbal expression, as a karma, gives rise to a single period of fruition, and later, when encountering conditions, can again produce fruition, it is called 'infinite'. It is not that the function of a single period without producing fruition is called 'infinite'. In detail, observing the meaning of 'having meaning', the later explanation is adopted. Now, let's first discuss the worldly, and then determine the merits. The worldly has three temporal distinctions: ksana (an extremely short period of time), phases, and birth and death. If the manifest fruit produced by the seeds that have been perfumed, and the perfuming manifest, must be different with each previous world. There is no single thought that has two manifests simultaneously. The seeds that have been perfumed, relative to the fruit they produce, are allowed to be in the same world, because the self-generation of seeds is also called fruit. The phase-world is the same. All kinds of verbal expression seeds can be called the habit-energy of the two graspings. Good, evil, and other seeds produce good and other manifests, the ksana-world, and the consciousnesses perceived by karma, all kinds of verbal expression seeds, relative to the production of manifest fruit, the world can be different. The commentary relies on this meaning to say 'same'. Otherwise, the treatise's statement that 'similarity in nature makes it easy to be affected' would be a futile setting. The later meaning is the same, and the general judgment of world-difference is not reasonable. Treatise: However, there are three types of habit-energy in total. Asanga's Samgraha has three perfumations, but the meaning is not fully present here, so it is not quoted. Commentary: If based on the external, it is called 'name expressing meaning'. Someone raises the question: All five consciousnesses rely on external objects, so they should be called 'name expressing meaning'. In detail, because one's own name can perfume and cultivate by relying on other names, 'external name' is explained in terms of the opposition between self and other. It does not distinguish between internal and external based on the sense organs and objects. How can one mistakenly use the five consciousnesses as a difficulty? The wise should understand. Commentary: If based on the unconditioned, it is called 'internal name as condition'. Question: Earlier, it was explained that 'name expressing meaning' is for external objects, so why is 'name' now called 'internal'? Answer: It shows that the name arises from the mind and is established as 'internal name'. It is not relative to oneself and others, so there is no contradiction. Treatise: Following the two verbal expressions, each has different causes and conditions. Question: The sound realm expressing meaning, and the verbal expression revealing the object, which is part of the seven mind realms and the dharma realm, together only make up nine realms. How can they be the individual causes of all dharmas? Answer: Because the two verbal expressions perfume the seeds of all dharmas according to the corresponding appearances and perceptions, they are the causes of all dharmas, and there is no error in this principle. The commentary has this meaning, and it can be understood by careful consideration. Therefore, Vasubandhu's Samgraha says: 'The difference in verbal expression perfumation refers to the eye verbal expression perfumation.'
異熟識中為眼生因。異熟生眼從彼生時。用彼為因還說名眼。如是耳等一切名言差別亦爾。
論。隨二我執至自他差別者。問凡夫．有學有我執者自他有差。無學等聖二執已亡自他體等 答由有橫計彼此情生起自他執。執見既斷物我心亡。得同體悲自他封息。依著．不著由我．我無。非我．我無體成同別。故無學聖體得成異。
論。應知我執至增上緣者。問此三熏習為定同．別 答其義不定。后二熏習定是名言。名言自有非后二者。即諸無記而非執者及無漏種。皆非后之二熏習故 若以我見對有支言應為四句 有我熏習而非有支。謂無記執所熏之種。有有支習而非我見。謂善．噁心不起執者。有二熏習。謂不善執。非二熏者。無覆無記．無漏種等 有具三習。如欲界中分別我見諸相應法。
論。俱等余文義如前說者。問上三習氣與十一識相攝云何 答按無性攝論第四．本論中雲。此中若身．身者．受者識．彼所受識．彼能受識．世識．數識．處識．言說識。此由名言熏習種子。若自他差別識。此由我見熏習種子。若善趣惡趣死生識。此由有支熏習種子。十一識名當如下解。故此不云。
疏。無明有十九七五六等者。按彼論具明十九。今略數之。於前際無知。於後際無知。於前后際無知。于內
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）是眼識生起的因。由異熟識所生的眼識，在它生起的時候，又反過來以異熟識為因，因此也被稱為眼識。同樣的道理，耳識等等一切名言概念的差別也是這樣產生的。
論：關於『隨著二種我執導致自他和他的差別』。問：凡夫和有學位的人有我執，所以能區分自己和他人。無學位的聖者因為兩種我執已經斷除，自己和他人的本體是相同的嗎？答：由於有虛妄分別的『彼此』情識產生，才會有自他的執著。當執著和邪見斷除后，物和我之間的界限消失，就能生起同體大悲，自他的界限也就停止了。是否會產生依戀和不依戀，取決於是否有『我』的執著。如果『我』不存在，那麼本體就既不是相同也不是不同。因此，無學位的聖者才能成就這種差異。
論：『應該知道我執是增上緣』。問：這三種熏習（名言熏習、我見熏習、有支熏習）是相同還是不同？答：它們的意義不確定。后兩種熏習一定是名言熏習。但名言熏習本身不一定是后兩種熏習，例如那些非執著的無記心，以及無漏種子，都不是后兩種熏習。如果用我見來對應有支，應該有四種情況：有我熏習但沒有有支熏習，比如無記執著所熏習的種子；有有支熏習但沒有我見熏習，比如善心和噁心但不起我執；兩種熏習都有，比如欲界中分別我見的相應法；兩種熏習都沒有，比如無覆無記、無漏種子等。有具備三種熏習的情況，比如欲界中分別我見的諸相應法。
論：『俱等其餘文義如前所說』。問：以上三種習氣與十一識的相互關係是怎樣的？答：根據無性《攝論》第四和本論中的說法：『其中，若身識、身者識、受者識、彼所受識、彼能受識、世識、數識、處識、言說識，這些是由名言熏習的種子所生。若自他差別識，這是由我見熏習的種子所生。若善趣惡趣死生識，這是由有支熏習的種子所生。』十一識的名稱將在後面解釋，所以這裡不詳細說明。
疏：『無明有十九、七、五、六等』。根據該論的詳細說明，無明有十九種。現在簡略地列舉一些：對於前際的無知，對於后際的無知，對於前後際的無知，對於內在的...
【English Translation】 English version: The Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is the cause for the arising of eye consciousness. When eye consciousness arises from Vipāka-vijñāna, it in turn uses Vipāka-vijñāna as its cause, and is therefore also called eye consciousness. Similarly, the differences in all conceptual designations such as ear consciousness arise in the same way.
Treatise: Regarding 'Following the two kinds of self-grasping leads to the differentiation of self and others.' Question: Ordinary people and those with learning have self-grasping, so they can distinguish between themselves and others. Since Arhats (those without further learning) have eliminated the two kinds of self-grasping, are the essence of self and others the same? Answer: Due to the arising of falsely discriminating 'this' and 'that' consciousness, there is attachment to self and others. When attachment and wrong views are severed, the boundary between things and self disappears, and one can generate great compassion for all beings, and the boundary between self and others ceases. Whether attachment or non-attachment arises depends on whether there is grasping of 'self'. If 'self' does not exist, then the essence is neither the same nor different. Therefore, Arhats can achieve this difference.
Treatise: 'It should be known that self-grasping is the dominant condition.' Question: Are these three types of habituation (habituation of language, habituation of self-view, habituation of existence) the same or different? Answer: Their meanings are uncertain. The latter two habituations are definitely habituations of language. However, habituation of language itself is not necessarily the latter two habituations, such as those non-attached neutral minds, and the seeds of non-outflow, are not the latter two habituations. If we use self-view to correspond to existence, there should be four situations: There is habituation of self but no habituation of existence, such as the seeds habituated by neutral attachment; there is habituation of existence but no habituation of self-view, such as good and evil minds but without arising self-grasping; both habituations exist, such as the corresponding dharmas of discriminating self-view in the desire realm; neither habituation exists, such as uncovered neutral, non-outflow seeds, etc. There are situations where all three habituations are present, such as the corresponding dharmas of discriminating self-view in the desire realm.
Treatise: 'The remaining meanings of 'together' and other texts are as previously stated.' Question: What is the relationship between the above three habit energies and the eleven consciousnesses? Answer: According to Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Compendium of Determinations and this treatise: 'Among them, if body consciousness, possessor consciousness, receiver consciousness, consciousness of what is possessed, consciousness of what can be possessed, world consciousness, number consciousness, place consciousness, speech consciousness, these are produced by the seeds of habituation of language. If consciousness of the difference between self and others, this is produced by the seeds of habituation of self-view. If consciousness of good realms, evil realms, death and birth, this is produced by the seeds of habituation of existence.' The names of the eleven consciousnesses will be explained later, so it is not detailed here.
Commentary: 'Ignorance has nineteen, seven, five, six, etc.' According to the detailed explanation in that treatise, there are nineteen types of ignorance. Now briefly list some: Ignorance of the past, ignorance of the future, ignorance of the past and future, ignorance of the internal...
無知。于外無知。諸行起無知。于業無知。于異熟無知。于業異熟無知。于佛無知。於法無知。于僧無知。于苦等四諦無知為四。于因無知。于從因所生諸行無知。於六觸處如實通達無知。于所證中顛倒思惟所有無知。如是略說十九無知 七無知者。一世愚。二事愚。三移轉愚。四最勝愚。五真實愚。六染凈愚。七增上慢愚 五種愚者。一義愚。二見愚。三放逸愚。四真實義愚。五增上慢愚 六無知者。無知。無見。無有現觀。黑闇。愚癡。及無明闇 問十九與彼七．五．六等相攝云何 答攝彼七者。初三攝第一。次三攝第二。次三攝第三。次三攝第四。次四攝第五。次二攝第六。后一攝第七 次攝五者。五中義愚通攝十九。見愚攝彼十九前六及因所生。放逸愚攝於業．異熟．及俱無知。真實義愚攝於佛等乃至道諦所有無知。增上慢愚攝最後無知。
次六相攝者。論中但以六．七相攝。不言十九。義準知故。故論云如是六種無明差別。隨前所說七無知事次第應知。於後二無知事總合為一起此最後無明黑闇。
疏。大論第十至皆言實有者。按第十云。九實三假。同此論明 五十六云。當知有．生．及老死支是假有。諸所有支是實有法 五十五中明諸煩惱假．實之支。如前數引。今闕不錄。
疏。發福
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無知。對外境的無知。由諸行引起的無知。對業（karma）無知。對異熟（vipāka，業的果報）無知。對業的異熟無知。對佛（Buddha）無知。對法（Dharma，佛法）無知。對僧（Saṃgha，僧團）無知。對苦等四聖諦（catvāri āryasatyāni）的無知，共有四種。對因（hetu，原因）無知。對從因所生的諸行無知。對六觸處（ṣaḍāyatana，六根與六塵相觸之處）如實通達的無知。對所證悟的境界中顛倒思惟的所有無知。這樣簡略地說，共有十九種無知。 七種無知是：一、世愚（對世俗諦的愚昧）。二、事愚（對事物真相的愚昧）。三、移轉愚（對因果轉變的愚昧）。四、最勝愚（對殊勝功德的愚昧）。五、真實愚（對真實存在的愚昧）。六、染凈愚（對染污和清凈的愚昧）。七、增上慢愚（自以為是的愚昧）。 五種愚是：一、義愚（對意義的愚昧）。二、見愚（對見解的愚昧）。三、放逸愚（對放縱懈怠的愚昧）。四、真實義愚（對真實意義的愚昧）。五、增上慢愚（自以為是的愚昧）。 六種無知是：無知。無見。沒有現觀（直接的證悟）。黑暗。愚癡。以及無明暗（無明的黑暗）。 問：十九種無知與那七種、五種、六種無知等是如何相互包含的呢？ 答：包含那七種無知的情況是：前三種包含第一種（世愚）。其次三種包含第二種（事愚）。再次三種包含第三種（移轉愚）。再次三種包含第四種（最勝愚）。再四種包含第五種（真實愚）。再兩種包含第六種（染凈愚）。最後一種包含第七種（增上慢愚）。 包含那五種無知的情況是：五種中的義愚全部包含十九種無知。見愚包含那十九種無知的前六種以及因所生的（諸行）。放逸愚包含對業、異熟以及對兩者都無知。真實義愚包含對佛等乃至道諦（mārga-satya，通往解脫的道路）的所有無知。增上慢愚包含最後一種無知。 接下來是六種無知相互包含的情況。論中只說了六種和七種無知相互包含，沒有說十九種無知。但根據文義可以推知。所以論中說，這六種無明的差別，應該按照前面所說的七種無知事的順序來理解。對於後面的兩種無知事，總合為一起，產生這最後的無明黑暗。 疏：大論第十至都說真實存在。按照第十卷所說，九種是真實存在，三種是假有，與此論的說明相同。第五十六卷說，應當知道有、生以及老死支是假有，所有支是實有法。第五十五卷中說明了諸煩惱的假有和實有之支，如前面多次引用。現在省略不記錄。 疏：發福
【English Translation】 English version Ignorance. Ignorance of external objects. Ignorance arising from actions. Ignorance of karma (karma). Ignorance of vipāka (vipāka, the result of karma). Ignorance of the vipāka of karma. Ignorance of the Buddha (Buddha). Ignorance of the Dharma (Dharma, the Buddha's teachings). Ignorance of the Saṃgha (Saṃgha, the monastic community). Ignorance of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni) such as suffering, totaling four types. Ignorance of the cause (hetu, cause). Ignorance of the actions arising from the cause. Ignorance of truly understanding the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana, the meeting points of the six senses and six sense objects). Ignorance of all distorted thinking in the realm of enlightenment. Thus, briefly speaking, there are nineteen types of ignorance. The seven types of ignorance are: 1. Worldly ignorance (ignorance of conventional truth). 2. Ignorance of facts (ignorance of the true nature of things). 3. Ignorance of transformation (ignorance of the transformation of cause and effect). 4. Ignorance of the supreme (ignorance of supreme merits). 5. Ignorance of reality (ignorance of true existence). 6. Ignorance of defilement and purity (ignorance of defilement and purity). 7. Ignorance of arrogance (conceited ignorance). The five types of ignorance are: 1. Ignorance of meaning (ignorance of meaning). 2. Ignorance of views (ignorance of views). 3. Ignorance of negligence (ignorance of indulgence and negligence). 4. Ignorance of true meaning (ignorance of true meaning). 5. Ignorance of arrogance (conceited ignorance). The six types of ignorance are: Ignorance. No vision. No direct realization (direct enlightenment). Darkness. Stupidity. And the darkness of ignorance (the darkness of ignorance). Question: How do the nineteen types of ignorance relate to the seven, five, and six types of ignorance, etc.? Answer: The inclusion of the seven types of ignorance is as follows: The first three include the first type (worldly ignorance). The next three include the second type (ignorance of facts). The next three include the third type (ignorance of transformation). The next three include the fourth type (ignorance of the supreme). The next four include the fifth type (ignorance of reality). The next two include the sixth type (ignorance of defilement and purity). The last one includes the seventh type (ignorance of arrogance). The inclusion of the five types of ignorance is as follows: Ignorance of meaning among the five includes all nineteen types of ignorance. Ignorance of views includes the first six of those nineteen types of ignorance and those arising from causes. Ignorance of negligence includes ignorance of karma, vipāka, and ignorance of both. Ignorance of true meaning includes all ignorance of the Buddha, etc., up to the Noble Truth of the Path (mārga-satya, the path to liberation). Ignorance of arrogance includes the last type of ignorance. Next is the mutual inclusion of the six types of ignorance. The treatise only speaks of the mutual inclusion of the six and seven types of ignorance, not the nineteen types. But it can be inferred from the meaning of the text. Therefore, the treatise says that the differences in these six types of ignorance should be understood in the order of the seven types of ignorance mentioned earlier. The latter two types of ignorance are combined together to produce this final darkness of ignorance. Commentary: The Great Treatise, from the tenth volume onwards, all say that they truly exist. According to the tenth volume, nine are truly existent, and three are provisionally existent, which is the same as the explanation in this treatise. The fifty-sixth volume says that it should be known that the branches of existence, birth, and old age and death are provisionally existent, and all branches are truly existent dharmas. The fifty-fifth volume explains the provisional and truly existent branches of the afflictions, as quoted many times before. Now omitted and not recorded. Commentary: Generating blessings.
非福不動三無明別等者。所發福等而有三種。能發無明但有二也。按對法雲。由異熟愚發非福行。由彼一向是染污性。無明合時必不容受信解異熟行相正見故。由真實義愚發福．不動行。真實義者。即四聖諦于彼愚癡名真實義愚。未見諦者。雖起善心。由彼隨眠所隨轉故亦名愚癡。由彼勢力於三界苦不如實知。便能發起後有因性福．不動行。
疏。三識支至恒隨轉故者。乍觀所引九十三等。似證識支唯取種子不取余識。理實但證賴耶為支。簡余轉識。非證種子。
疏。于母胎中因識為緣等者。過去行支所熏識種名為因識。因識能生於母胎中初結生識。結生識者即是果識。果識相續而能任持羯羅藍位諸名色等。乃至命終持令不絕。
疏。文云至之所隨逐者。言此識者中際識也。后際名色名曰當來。由中際識能引后際名色支故。故名色種逐彼識也 問言隨逐者明所引也。即彼論云。名色種子復為當來六處種子之所隨逐。乃至受支作法亦爾。如何能證是第八識 答識若第八。第八能持諸種子故。后際種子可為隨逐。中際之種若非賴耶。何有種子言相隨逐前引后耶。
疏。問至無色唯一者。按彼論云。眼識云何。謂于當來依止眼根了別色境識。所有福．非福．不動行所熏發種子識。及彼種子所生果識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『非福不動三無明別等者』，指的是由無明所引發的福行等有三種，而能引發無明的只有兩種。按照《對法論》的說法，由異熟愚（異熟：業力成熟所感的果報；愚：愚昧，不明事理）引發非福行（非福：指惡業，能招感不好的果報）。因為異熟愚完全是染污的性質，當它與無明結合時，必然不能容受信解異熟行相的正見。由真實義愚（真實義：指四聖諦；愚：愚昧，不明事理）引發福行（福：指善業，能招感好的果報）、不動行（不動：指禪定，能招感色界和無色界的果報）。真實義愚，就是對於四聖諦的愚癡。沒有證悟真理的人，即使生起善心，也因為被隨眠（隨眠：煩惱的異名，指潛伏在心中的煩惱）所牽引，所以也叫做愚癡。由於隨眠的力量，他們不能如實地瞭解三界（三界：欲界、色界、無色界）的苦，因此能夠發起後有（後有：指來世的生命）的因性的福行和不動行。
『疏。三識支至恒隨轉故者』，乍一看所引用的九十三等，好像證明識支只取種子，不取其餘的識。但實際上只是證明阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識：第八識，含藏一切種子）作為支，而簡略了其餘的轉識（轉識：指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。並不是證明種子。
『疏。于母胎中因識為緣等者』，過去行支所熏習的識種叫做因識。因識能夠產生在母胎中最初的結生識（結生識：投胎時的最初一念識）。結生識就是果識。果識相續不斷，能夠任持羯羅藍位（羯羅藍：指胎兒最初的凝結狀態）的諸名色（名色：指精神和物質），乃至到生命終結，使之不中斷。
『疏。文云至之所隨逐者』，說這個識是中際識（中際識：指生命過程中的識）。后際名色（后際名色：指未來的身心）叫做當來。由於中際識能夠引生后際的名色支，所以說名色的種子追逐著這個識。問：說追逐，是說明被引生。就像論中說的，名色的種子又被當來的六處（六處：指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根）的種子所追逐，乃至受支（受支：指感受）的生起也是這樣。如何能夠證明這是第八識呢？答：如果識是第八識，第八識能夠持有一切種子，所以後際的種子可以被追逐。如果中際的種子不是阿賴耶識，哪裡會有種子互相追逐，前引后的說法呢？
『疏。問至無色唯一者』，按照那部論的說法，什麼是眼識呢？就是對於當來依止眼根了別色境的識，所有福行、非福行、不動行所熏發的種子識，以及這些種子所生的果識。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Those who differentiate between non-meritorious, immovable, and the three kinds of ignorance' refers to the fact that the meritorious actions, etc., arising from ignorance are of three types, while that which can give rise to ignorance is only of two types. According to the Abhidharma, non-meritorious actions (non-meritorious: evil deeds that lead to bad consequences) arise from ignorance regarding the ripening of karma (ripening: the fruition of karmic forces; ignorance: lack of understanding). This is because ignorance regarding ripening is entirely of a defiled nature. When it combines with ignorance, it cannot accommodate the correct view of believing and understanding the characteristics of the ripening of karma. Meritorious actions (meritorious: good deeds that lead to good consequences) and immovable actions (immovable: meditative states that lead to rebirth in the realms of form and formlessness) arise from ignorance regarding the true meaning (true meaning: the Four Noble Truths; ignorance: lack of understanding). Ignorance regarding the true meaning is ignorance concerning the Four Noble Truths. Those who have not realized the truth, even if they generate good intentions, are still called ignorant because they are influenced by latent afflictions (latent afflictions: another name for afflictions, referring to afflictions latent in the mind). Due to the power of these latent afflictions, they do not truly understand the suffering of the three realms (three realms: the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm), and thus they can initiate meritorious and immovable actions that are the cause of future existence (future existence: life in the next rebirth).
'Commentary: The three consciousnesses up to 'constantly follow and transform'': At first glance, the cited ninety-three, etc., seem to prove that the consciousness factor only takes seeds and does not take the remaining consciousnesses. In reality, it only proves that the Alaya consciousness (Alaya consciousness: the eighth consciousness, containing all seeds) is the factor, while simplifying the remaining transforming consciousnesses (transforming consciousnesses: referring to eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness). It does not prove the seeds.
'Commentary: 'In the mother's womb, the cause consciousness is the condition, etc.': The seed of consciousness that is perfumed by past action is called the cause consciousness. The cause consciousness can produce the initial consciousness of rebirth in the mother's womb (consciousness of rebirth: the initial thought of consciousness at the time of conception). The consciousness of rebirth is the result consciousness. The continuous result consciousness can sustain the kalala stage (kalala: referring to the initial coagulation state of the fetus) of the various name and form (name and form: referring to mind and matter), and even until the end of life, it keeps them from ceasing.
'Commentary: The text says 'up to that which is followed': It says that this consciousness is the intermediate consciousness (intermediate consciousness: the consciousness during the life process). The name and form of the later stage (name and form of the later stage: referring to the future body and mind) is called the future. Because the intermediate consciousness can lead to the name and form factor of the later stage, it is said that the seeds of name and form follow that consciousness. Question: Saying 'follow' means to explain what is generated. Just as the treatise says, the seeds of name and form are again followed by the seeds of the future six sense bases (six sense bases: referring to the six roots of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), and even the arising of the feeling factor (feeling factor: referring to sensation) is the same. How can it be proven that this is the eighth consciousness? Answer: If the consciousness is the eighth consciousness, the eighth consciousness can hold all seeds, so the seeds of the later stage can be followed. If the seeds of the intermediate stage are not the Alaya consciousness, where would there be seeds following each other, with the former leading the latter?'
'Commentary: Question up to 'only in the formless realm': According to that treatise, what is eye consciousness? It is the consciousness that relies on the eye faculty to discriminate the object of sight in the future, the seed consciousness perfumed by all meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable actions, and the result consciousness produced by these seeds.'
。如眼識如是乃至意識應知亦爾。
疏。答至恒隨轉故者。按彼論云。當知此識于現法中但是因性。余文疏具。釋亦可知 復有釋云。若初受生唯是意識。故就相續有六識身 詳曰。大乘初生唯第八識。今云意識有違宗過。今助一釋。理實結生是第八識。據后相續容有六識。故說有六識。
疏。大論第十云胎藏苦者。按彼論云。幾能生苦謂五。幾苦胎藏謂五。幾唯是苦謂二 釋曰。謂無明．行．愛．取．有五。能生當苦名能生苦。其識．名色．六處．觸．受五是種子。是彼當來生老等因名苦胎藏。生．及老死二唯是苦。既云識等名苦胎藏。明非是現 問既云苦胎明能生苦。何不同有能生苦收 答潤．未潤別去果遠近得名不同。生．老死二正名為苦。是彼苦因名苦胎藏。依主釋也。疏本多雲胎藏苦者寫傳誤也 問設云胎藏苦持業得名復何爽耶 答雖有漏法體皆是苦。所引之文意明生等二果名苦。故無明等名能生苦生．老死二唯是苦。故知胎藏是苦之因。依主為勝。
疏。不爾便違至胎藏苦故者。顯違第十．及五十六文言總也。苦胎藏者即第十文。文如前引。五十六云。現法中識為福．非福．及不動業之所熏習。後後種子之所隨逐。能引當來余身識等生老死苦 又云。即識．名色．六處．觸．受先種子
【現代漢語翻譯】 眼識如此，乃至意識也應知是同樣的道理。
疏解：回答『乃至恒隨轉故』。按照那部論典所說，應當知道此識在現世中只是因的性質，其餘的文字疏解中都有詳細說明，解釋也容易理解。又有解釋說，如果最初受生只有意識，那麼就相續而言有六識身。詳細地說，大乘認為最初受生只有第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna），現在說意識就違背了宗義。現在我來補充一種解釋，理實上結生是第八識，但就後來的相續而言，可以有六識，所以說有六識。
疏解：《大論》第十卷說『胎藏苦』。按照那部論典所說，有幾種能生苦，有幾種苦胎藏，有幾種唯是苦？解釋說，無明（avidyā）、行（saṃskāra）、愛（tṛṣṇā）、取（upādāna）、有（bhava）這五種能生未來的苦，所以叫做能生苦。識（vijñāna）、名色（nāmarūpa）、六處（ṣaḍāyatana）、觸（sparśa）、受（vedanā）這五種是種子，是它們將來產生生老等苦的原因，所以叫做苦胎藏。生（jāti）和老死（jarā-maraṇa）這兩種唯是苦。既然說識等是苦胎藏，就說明不是現在的苦。問：既然說苦胎能生苦，為什麼不同時被能生苦所包含？答：潤和未潤的區別在於，取果的遠近導致了名稱的不同。生和老死這兩種直接被稱為苦，是那些苦的原因，所以叫做苦胎藏，這是依主釋。疏解本中多說『胎藏苦者』，是抄寫傳達的錯誤。問：假設說『胎藏苦』是持業釋，又有什麼不妥呢？答：雖然有漏法的本體都是苦，但所引用的文字意在說明生等二果叫做苦，所以無明等叫做能生苦，生和老死這兩種唯是苦，所以知道胎藏是苦的原因，依主釋更好。
疏解：『不爾便違乃至胎藏苦故』，顯示違背了第十卷和第五十六卷的文句總意。苦胎藏就是第十卷的文句，文字如前面所引用。第五十六卷說，現世中的識被福業、非福業和不動業所熏習，被後來的種子所跟隨，能引來未來的余身識等生老死苦。又說，就是識、名色、六處、觸、受這些先前的種子。
【English Translation】 Thus is eye-consciousness, and it should be understood that the same applies to mind-consciousness.
Commentary: The answer 'up to constantly following' is based on that treatise, which states, 'It should be known that this consciousness is only causal in the present life.' The remaining text is detailed in the commentary and the explanation is also understandable. Another explanation says that if only mind-consciousness arises at the initial rebirth, then there are six bodies of consciousness in terms of continuity. In detail, the Mahayana view is that only the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) arises at the initial rebirth, so saying mind-consciousness contradicts the doctrine. Now I will add an explanation: in reality, the linking of rebirth is the eighth consciousness, but in terms of the subsequent continuity, there can be six consciousnesses, so it is said that there are six consciousnesses.
Commentary: The tenth volume of the Mahāprājñāpāramitopadeśa says 'womb-store suffering'. According to that treatise, how many can produce suffering, how many are the womb-store of suffering, and how many are only suffering? The explanation is that ignorance (avidyā), formations (saṃskāra), craving (tṛṣṇā), grasping (upādāna), and becoming (bhava) are five that can produce future suffering, so they are called 'producing suffering'. Consciousness (vijñāna), name and form (nāmarūpa), the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana), contact (sparśa), and feeling (vedanā) are five seeds, which are the causes of future birth, aging, and so on, so they are called the 'womb-store of suffering'. Birth (jāti) and old age and death (jarā-maraṇa) are two that are only suffering. Since it is said that consciousness and so on are the womb-store of suffering, it indicates that they are not present suffering. Question: Since it is said that the suffering womb can produce suffering, why are they not included in the 'producing suffering'? Answer: The difference between moistened and unmoistened lies in the distance of taking the fruit, which leads to different names. Birth and old age and death are directly called suffering, and they are the causes of those sufferings, so they are called the 'womb-store of suffering', which is a dependent possessive compound. The commentary often says 'the womb-store of suffering', which is a mistake in copying and transmission. Question: Suppose it is said that 'womb-store suffering' is a determinative compound, what is wrong with that? Answer: Although the substance of all defiled dharmas is suffering, the meaning of the cited text is to clarify that the two fruits of birth and so on are called suffering, so ignorance and so on are called 'producing suffering', and birth and old age and death are only suffering, so it is known that the womb-store is the cause of suffering, and the dependent possessive compound is better.
Commentary: 'If not, it would contradict up to the womb-store of suffering', which shows a contradiction to the general meaning of the tenth and fifty-sixth volumes. The womb-store of suffering is the sentence in the tenth volume, and the text is as quoted before. The fifty-sixth volume says that in the present life, consciousness is influenced by meritorious, non-meritorious, and unmoving karma, and is followed by later seeds, which can lead to future rebirths and the suffering of birth, old age, and death. It also says that consciousness, name and form, the six sense bases, contact, and feeling are the previous seeds.
性。隨所依時曾得眾苦引因之名。今已與果名生．老死。復得名苦。準此等文明識等五唯取種子。
疏。此論下云至通取三性者。有義彈云。五蘊三性為此支者。如何得引此論第二複次說耶。別說五支既唯異熟。明知總攝不通三性。何得為證通攝三性 詳曰。別總既異。性何必同。若以別性例總性同。應以別體例于總體體令各等。體既不齊。性何令等 又大論第九名色三性。此第二釋那知不依彼義而談。不爾何須分為二釋。以此而言疏固無失。
疏。此約一時俱有五種者。問六處意無雲何俱有 答俱時識種對世名意故五種俱。燈有一釋與疏稍別。
疏。未名六處者。無六處用不名六處。
疏。釋緣起名者。按瑜伽第十云。由煩惱繫縛往諸趣中數數生起故名緣起。此依字釋名 複次依託眾緣速謝滅已續和合生故名緣起。此依剎那義釋 複次眾緣過去而不捨離依自相續而得生起故名緣起。如說此有故彼有。此生故彼生非余。此依義故釋名應知。複次數數謝滅復相續起故名緣起。此依數壞數滅義釋。複次於過去世覺緣性已等相續起故名緣起。如世尊言。我已覺悟正起宣說。即由此名展轉傳說故名緣起 疏中引略。初學難分故今具錄。
疏。此無明不斷等者。按彼論中。無明．行二而作法于余
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 性。隨著所依賴的條件，曾經獲得『眾苦引因』（導致眾多痛苦的原因）的名稱。現在已經與果結合，被稱為『生』（出生）、『老』（衰老）、『死』（死亡），又獲得了『苦』（痛苦）的名稱。按照這個道理，文明識等五者只取種子（潛在的可能性）。 疏（註釋）：此論下面說『通取三性』（普遍包含三種性質），有人反駁說：『五蘊（構成個體的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）的三性是這個支分，怎麼能引用此論第二複次的說法呢？』 別說五支既然只有異熟（果報），明明知道總攝不包含三性，怎麼能作為證據來證明它普遍包含三性呢？ 詳細地說，別說和總說既然不同，性質為什麼一定要相同呢？如果用別說的性質來類比總說的性質相同，就應該用別體的例子來類比總體，使總體也各自相等。體既然不相等，性質為什麼一定要相等呢？ 又，《大論》第九說名色（名：精神現象，色：物質現象）的三性，這第二種解釋怎麼知道不是依據那個意義而談論的呢？如果不是這樣，為什麼需要分為兩種解釋呢？因此說來，疏的解釋本來就沒有錯誤。 疏：『此約一時俱有五種』（這裡說的是同一時間具有五種）有人問：六處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官）中的意（意識）沒有云，怎麼能同時具有呢？ 回答：同時的識種（意識的種子）面對世間而得名意，所以五種同時具有。燈（指某種解釋）有一種解釋與疏略有不同。 疏：『未名六處者』（還沒有被稱為六處），沒有六處的作用，所以不稱為六處。 疏：『釋緣起名者』（解釋緣起的名稱），按照《瑜伽師地論》第十卷所說：『由於煩惱的繫縛，在各個趣（輪迴的去處）中不斷地生起，所以叫做緣起。』這是按照字面來解釋名稱。 其次，依託眾多的因緣，迅速地消逝滅亡，然後相續和合而生，所以叫做緣起。這是按照剎那（極短的時間）的意義來解釋。 再次，眾多的因緣過去而不捨離，依靠自身的相續而得以生起，所以叫做緣起。如經文所說：『此有故彼有，此生故彼生，不是其他的。』這是按照意義來解釋名稱，應當知道。 再次，不斷地消逝滅亡，又相續生起，所以叫做緣起。這是按照不斷壞滅的意義來解釋。 再次，在過去世覺悟緣的性質之後，等等相續生起，所以叫做緣起。如世尊所說：『我已經覺悟，正在開始宣說。』即由此名稱輾轉傳說，所以叫做緣起。 疏中引用得比較簡略，初學者難以分辨，所以現在全部記錄下來。 疏：『此無明不斷等者』（這裡說無明沒有斷滅等等），按照那部論中，無明（ignorance）和行（action）二者作為法，對於其餘的...
【English Translation】 English version: Nature. Depending on the conditions it relies upon, it once obtained the name 'cause of manifold suffering' (hetu of manifold suffering). Now, having combined with the result, it is called 'birth' (jati), 'aging' (jara), 'death' (marana), and again obtains the name 'suffering' (duhkha). According to this principle, the five, such as consciousness (vijnana), only take the seed (potentiality). Commentary: This treatise below says 'universally includes the three natures' (trisvabhava), someone objects, saying: 'The three natures of the five aggregates (skandha) are this branch, how can one cite the second repeated statement of this treatise?' Separately stating that the five branches are only the result of maturation (vipaka), clearly knowing that the general inclusion does not encompass the three natures, how can it be used as evidence to prove that it universally includes the three natures? In detail, since the separate and the general are different, why must the natures be the same? If one uses the nature of the separate to analogize that the nature of the general is the same, one should use the example of the separate entities to analogize the whole, making the whole also equal to each other. Since the entities are not equal, why must the natures be equal? Also, the ninth chapter of the Great Treatise speaks of the three natures of name and form (nama-rupa), how do we know that this second explanation is not based on that meaning? If it were not so, why would it need to be divided into two explanations? Therefore, the commentary is originally without error. Commentary: 'This refers to the five kinds existing simultaneously at one time,' someone asks: 'How can the mind (manas) of the six sense bases (sadayatana) exist simultaneously when there is no cloud?' The answer: 'The simultaneous seeds of consciousness (vijnana-bija) are named mind when facing the world, so the five kinds exist simultaneously.' One explanation in the Lamp (a certain commentary) is slightly different from the commentary. Commentary: 'Those not yet named the six sense bases' (sadayatana), without the function of the six sense bases, they are not called the six sense bases. Commentary: 'Explaining the name of dependent origination' (pratityasamutpada), according to the tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'Due to the bondage of afflictions (klesha), constantly arising in the various destinies (gati), it is called dependent origination.' This is explaining the name according to the literal meaning. Secondly, relying on numerous conditions (pratyaya), quickly vanishing and ceasing, and then continuously combining and arising, it is called dependent origination. This is explaining according to the meaning of an instant (ksana). Thirdly, numerous conditions have passed but do not abandon, relying on their own continuity to arise, it is called dependent origination. As the sutra says: 'Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises, not something else.' This is explaining the name according to the meaning, it should be known. Fourthly, constantly vanishing and ceasing, and then continuously arising, it is called dependent origination. This is explaining according to the meaning of constant destruction. Fifthly, after awakening to the nature of conditions in the past, and so on, continuously arising, it is called dependent origination. As the World Honored One (Bhagavan) said: 'I have awakened and am beginning to proclaim.' That is why this name is transmitted from one to another, so it is called dependent origination. The commentary quotes it briefly, which is difficult for beginners to distinguish, so I am now recording it all. Commentary: 'This ignorance (avidya) is not interrupted, etc.,' according to that treatise, ignorance (avidya) and action (karma) are the two that act as dharma for the rest...
例明也。無明如疏。其明行雲。諸行種子不斷故諸行得生。諸行生故得有識轉。余支準此。
疏。變礙有二者。按五十六云。此變礙義復有二種。一手等所觸便變壞義。二方處差別種種相義。
疏。第三次第等者。疏雖具引。文隱難知。今略問釋 問行通善．惡何總云邪 答有兩釋。一云據不善說。二云無明發行皆招三有。違于還滅故總稱邪 問識唯第八。云何顛倒 答有二釋。一云行有現．種。現行名行。種名為識。種因現熏云令顛倒。對法亦云。業種為識 問善業種子何名顛倒 答準行名邪二釋可悉 二云結生之時于父母等。互起嗔．愛相應之心名為顛倒。顛倒為因方結生故 詳曰。即第八種名為顛倒。有漏善行由違還滅尚得名邪。有漏無記生死根本。名顛倒何失。故諸論云三界虛妄心心所等。虛妄即是顛倒異名。或因倒發亦名為倒。言結生等即名色支。云二受用即觸．受二。此識等五據當起位說次第也。余支可悉 餘二複次。具如本論。恐煩不錄。釋有同異。亦如彼鈔。
疏。十地經至緣中癡者。按彼經云。是中無明有二種作。一者緣中癡令眾生惑。二者與行作因。行有二作。一生未來世果報。二與識作因。識有二作。一者能令有相續。二者與名色作因。名色有二作。一互相助成。二與六入
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『例明也。無明如疏。其明行雲。諸行種子不斷故諸行得生。諸行生故得有識轉。余支準此。』 解釋：『例』是說明的意思。『無明』就像疏漏一樣。『其明行雲』，說明了行的運作方式。因為諸行的種子沒有斷絕，所以諸行得以產生。諸行產生，因此就有了識的流轉。其餘的支分可以參照這個來理解。
『疏。變礙有二者。按五十六云。此變礙義復有二種。一手等所觸便變壞義。二方處差別種種相義。』 解釋：『變礙』有兩種。根據第五十六卷所說，這『變礙』的含義有兩種：一是手等觸碰就會變壞的意思；二是方位處所差別而產生種種不同的相狀的意思。
『疏。第三次第等者。疏雖具引。文隱難知。今略問釋 問行通善．惡何總云邪 答有兩釋。一云據不善說。二云無明發行皆招三有。違于還滅故總稱邪 問識唯第八。云何顛倒 答有二釋。一云行有現．種。現行名行。種名為識。種因現熏云令顛倒。對法亦云。業種為識 問善業種子何名顛倒 答準行名邪二釋可悉 二云結生之時于父母等。互起嗔．愛相應之心名為顛倒。顛倒為因方結生故 詳曰。即第八種名為顛倒。有漏善行由違還滅尚得名邪。有漏無記生死根本。名顛倒何失。故諸論云三界虛妄心心所等。虛妄即是顛倒異名。或因倒發亦名為倒。言結生等即名色支。云二受用即觸．受二。此識等五據當起位說次第也。余支可悉 餘二複次。具如本論。恐煩不錄。釋有同異。亦如彼鈔。』 解釋：『第三次第等者』，雖然疏中已經詳細引用，但文句隱晦難以理解。現在簡略地提問解釋：問：行既包括善行也包括惡行，為什麼總稱為『邪』？答：有兩種解釋。一是根據不善行來說的；二是無明發動所產生的行都會招感三有（欲界、色界、無色界），違背了還滅的道理，所以總稱為『邪』。問：識只有第八識（阿賴耶識），怎麼會顛倒？答：有兩種解釋。一是行有現行和種子兩種。現行名為行，種子名為識。種子因為現行的熏習而說是顛倒。對法論中也說，業的種子就是識。問：善業的種子為什麼也叫顛倒？答：參照行名為『邪』的兩種解釋就可以明白了。二是結生的時候，對於父母等，互相產生嗔恨、愛戀相應的心，這叫做顛倒。因為有顛倒作為原因，才能結生。詳細地說，就是第八識的種子名為顛倒。有漏的善行因為違背還滅的道理尚且可以稱為『邪』，有漏的無記是生死的根本，稱為顛倒又有什麼不妥呢？所以各種論典都說三界是虛妄的，心和心所等都是虛妄的，虛妄就是顛倒的另一種說法。或者因為顛倒而引發的也稱為顛倒。說到結生等，就是名色支。說『二受用』就是觸和受兩種。這裡說的識等五支是根據它們將要生起的位置來說的次第。其餘的支分可以參照理解。其餘兩次的解釋，詳細的都在本論中，恐怕繁瑣就不再記錄了。解釋的相同和不同之處，也都在那部鈔中。
『疏。十地經至緣中癡者。按彼經云。是中無明有二種作。一者緣中癡令眾生惑。二者與行作因。行有二作。一生未來世果報。二與識作因。識有二作。一者能令有相續。二者與名色作因。名色有二作。一互相助成。二與六入』 解釋：『十地經至緣中癡者』，根據那部經所說，這裡面的無明有兩種作用：一是緣取中間的愚癡，使眾生迷惑；二是與行作為因。行有兩種作用：一是產生未來世的果報；二是與識作為因。識有兩種作用：一是能夠使之有相續；二是與名色作為因。名色有兩種作用：一是互相幫助成就；二是與六入（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）...
【English Translation】 English version: 『Example is for clarification. Ignorance is like a gap. 『Its clear action says』 explains how actions operate. Because the seeds of actions are not cut off, actions can arise. Because actions arise, there is the transformation of consciousness. The remaining branches can be understood accordingly.』 Explanation: 『Example』 means to clarify. 『Ignorance』 is like a flaw. 『Its clear action says』 explains the operation of actions. Because the seeds of actions are not cut off, actions can arise. Because actions arise, there is the transformation of consciousness. The remaining branches can be understood accordingly.
『Commentary: 『Transformation and obstruction have two aspects.』 According to the fifty-sixth volume, the meaning of 『transformation and obstruction』 has two aspects: first, the meaning of being changed and destroyed by the touch of hands, etc.; second, the meaning of various different appearances due to differences in direction and location.』 Explanation: 『Transformation and obstruction』 have two aspects. According to the fifty-sixth volume, the meaning of 『transformation and obstruction』 has two aspects: first, the meaning of being changed and destroyed by the touch of hands, etc.; second, the meaning of various different appearances due to differences in direction and location.
『Commentary: 『The third sequence, etc.』 Although the commentary quotes it in detail, the text is obscure and difficult to understand. Now, let's briefly ask and explain: Question: Actions include both good and evil, why are they generally called 『evil』? Answer: There are two explanations. One is based on evil actions; the other is that actions arising from ignorance all invite the three realms of existence (desire realm, form realm, formless realm), which goes against the principle of cessation, so they are generally called 『evil』. Question: Consciousness is only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), how can it be inverted? Answer: There are two explanations. One is that actions have two types: manifest and seed. Manifest actions are called actions, and seeds are called consciousness. The seed is said to be inverted because of the influence of manifest actions. The Abhidharma also says that the seed of karma is consciousness. Question: Why are the seeds of good karma called inverted? Answer: The two explanations for why actions are called 『evil』 can be understood. The second explanation is that at the time of rebirth, mutual feelings of anger and love arise towards parents, etc., and this is called inversion. Because inversion is the cause, rebirth occurs. In detail, the seed of the eighth consciousness is called inversion. If leaky good actions can be called 『evil』 because they go against the principle of cessation, then what is wrong with calling leaky non-marked actions, which are the root of birth and death, inversion? Therefore, various treatises say that the three realms are illusory, and the mind and mental states are illusory. Illusion is another name for inversion. Or what arises from inversion is also called inversion. Speaking of rebirth, etc., refers to the branch of name and form. Saying 『two uses』 refers to the two: contact and feeling. The five branches of consciousness, etc., are spoken of in terms of the sequence of their arising positions. The remaining branches can be understood accordingly. The remaining two explanations are detailed in the original treatise. I am afraid of being verbose, so I will not record them. The similarities and differences in the explanations are also in that commentary.』 Explanation: 『The third sequence, etc.』 Although the commentary quotes it in detail, the text is obscure and difficult to understand. Now, let's briefly ask and explain: Question: Actions include both good and evil, why are they generally called 『evil』? Answer: There are two explanations. One is based on evil actions; the other is that actions arising from ignorance all invite the three realms of existence (desire realm, form realm, formless realm), which goes against the principle of cessation, so they are generally called 『evil』. Question: Consciousness is only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), how can it be inverted? Answer: There are two explanations. One is that actions have two types: manifest and seed. Manifest actions are called actions, and seeds are called consciousness. The seed is said to be inverted because of the influence of manifest actions. The Abhidharma also says that the seed of karma is consciousness. Question: Why are the seeds of good karma called inverted? Answer: The two explanations for why actions are called 『evil』 can be understood. The second explanation is that at the time of rebirth, mutual feelings of anger and love arise towards parents, etc., and this is called inversion. Because inversion is the cause, rebirth occurs. In detail, the seed of the eighth consciousness is called inversion. If leaky good actions can be called 『evil』 because they go against the principle of cessation, then what is wrong with calling leaky non-marked actions, which are the root of birth and death, inversion? Therefore, various treatises say that the three realms are illusory, and the mind and mental states are illusory. Illusion is another name for inversion. Or what arises from inversion is also called inversion. Speaking of rebirth, etc., refers to the branch of name and form. Saying 『two uses』 refers to the two: contact and feeling. The five branches of consciousness, etc., are spoken of in terms of the sequence of their arising positions. The remaining branches can be understood accordingly. The remaining two explanations are detailed in the original treatise. I am afraid of being verbose, so I will not record them. The similarities and differences in the explanations are also in that commentary.
『Commentary: 『The Ten Stages Sutra to the delusion in the middle.』 According to that sutra, ignorance has two functions here: first, it takes the delusion in the middle as its object, causing sentient beings to be confused; second, it acts as the cause for actions. Actions have two functions: first, they produce the results of future lives; second, they act as the cause for consciousness. Consciousness has two functions: first, it can cause continuity; second, it acts as the cause for name and form. Name and form have two functions: first, they help each other to achieve; second, they lead to the six entrances (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind)...』 Explanation: 『The Ten Stages Sutra to the delusion in the middle.』 According to that sutra, ignorance has two functions here: first, it takes the delusion in the middle as its object, causing sentient beings to be confused; second, it acts as the cause for actions. Actions have two functions: first, they produce the results of future lives; second, they act as the cause for consciousness. Consciousness has two functions: first, it can cause continuity; second, it acts as the cause for name and form. Name and form have two functions: first, they help each other to achieve; second, they lead to the six entrances (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind)...
作因。六入有二作。一能緣六塵。二與觸作因。觸有二作。一能觸所緣。二與受作因。受有二作。一覺憎愛等。二與愛作因。愛有二作。一于可染中生貪心。二與取作因。取有二作。一增長煩惱染縛。二與有作因。有有二作。一能于余道中生。二與生作因。生有二作。一增長五蘊。二與老死作因。老有二作。一令諸根熟。二與死作因。死有二作。一壞五陰身。二以不見知故而令相續不絕 彼論云。壞五陰作後生因。以不見知故能作後生因 釋曰。緣者所緣。于彼一切所緣境中而不悟故名緣中癡。諸惑因起名令眾生惑。由有能引余道得生名余道生。非已生訖名為生也。故對法第四云。令諸有情後有現前。義意同矣。余文可悉。對法大同故不引之。
疏。若爾即色無色無壞苦故者。此難意云。色．無色界非非福感。彼界應無壞苦法也 問無色無壞豈不相符 答顯彼俱非非福行招。所以雙舉。無壞苦言但對於色。文含理博。不相違也。
疏。若亦迷彼豈唯發非福者。此破外救。外救意云。色有壞苦於理何違。故此難云。若有壞苦豈唯迷彼唯發非福。若不爾者即違瑜伽迷世俗苦發非福義。復有欲界迷於壞苦發非福行相例之失。便違教理。若許爾者復違聖教上界唯是不動行招。故不得約三苦以分為二諦也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 作因：六入（Liuru，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官）有二種作用。一是能緣六塵（Liuchen，指色、聲、香、味、觸、法六種外境）。二是與觸（Chu，感覺）作因。觸有二種作用。一是能觸所緣。二是與受（Shou，感受）作因。受有二種作用。一是覺憎愛等。二是與愛（Ai，愛慾）作因。愛有二種作用。一是在可染中生貪心。二是與取（Qu，執取）作因。取有二種作用。一是增長煩惱染縛。二是與有（You，存在）作因。有有二種作用。一是能于余道中生。二是與生（Sheng，出生）作因。生有二種作用。一是增長五蘊（Wuyun，指色、受、想、行、識五種構成要素）。二是與老死（Laosi，衰老和死亡）作因。老有二種作用。一是令諸根熟。二是與死作因。死有二種作用。一是壞五陰身。二是以不見知故而令相續不絕。彼論云：壞五陰作後生因，以不見知故能作後生因。釋曰：緣者所緣，于彼一切所緣境中而不悟故名緣中癡。諸惑因起名令眾生惑。由有能引余道得生名余道生。非已生訖名為生也。故對法第四云：令諸有情後有現前。義意同矣。余文可悉。對法大同故不引之。
疏：若爾即色無色無壞苦故者。此難意云：色（Se，物質）．無色（Wuse，非物質）**非非福感。彼界應無壞苦法也。問無色無壞豈不相符？答顯彼俱非非福行招。所以雙舉。無壞苦言但對於色。文含理博。不相違也。
疏：若亦迷彼豈唯發非福者。此破外救。外救意云：色有壞苦於理何違。故此難云：若有壞苦豈唯迷彼唯發非福。若不爾者即違瑜伽迷世俗苦發非福義。復有欲界迷於壞苦發非福行相例之失。便違教理。若許爾者復違聖教上界唯是不動行招。故不得約三苦以分為二諦也。
【English Translation】 English version Causation: The six entrances (Liuru, referring to the six sense organs: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind) have two functions. First, they can perceive the six objects of sense (Liuchen, referring to the six external objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma). Second, they act as the cause for contact (Chu, sensation). Contact has two functions. First, it can touch what is perceived. Second, it acts as the cause for feeling (Shou, reception). Feeling has two functions. First, it is aware of love, hate, and so on. Second, it acts as the cause for craving (Ai, desire). Craving has two functions. First, it generates greed in what is defilable. Second, it acts as the cause for grasping (Qu, clinging). Grasping has two functions. First, it increases afflictions and entanglements. Second, it acts as the cause for existence (You, being). Existence has two functions. First, it can lead to rebirth in other realms. Second, it acts as the cause for birth (Sheng, birth). Birth has two functions. First, it increases the five aggregates (Wuyun, referring to the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness). Second, it acts as the cause for aging and death (Laosi, aging and death). Aging has two functions. First, it matures the faculties. Second, it acts as the cause for death. Death has two functions. First, it destroys the body of the five aggregates. Second, because of not seeing and knowing, it causes the continuation to be uninterrupted. That treatise says: 'The destruction of the five aggregates acts as the cause for future birth, and because of not seeing and knowing, it can act as the cause for future birth.' Explanation: 'Perceived' means what is perceived. Not being enlightened in all those perceived realms is called ignorance in perception. The arising of all delusions is called causing sentient beings to be deluded. Because there is the ability to lead to rebirth in other realms, it is called rebirth in other realms. It is not called birth after already being born. Therefore, the fourth chapter of the Abhidharma says: 'Causing sentient beings to have future existence manifest.' The meaning is the same. The rest of the text can be understood. The Abhidharma is largely the same, so it is not quoted.
Commentary: 'If so, then form and formlessness have no suffering of decay.' This difficulty means: Form (Se, matter) and formlessness (Wuse, immateriality) are not caused by non-meritorious actions. Those realms should have no dharma of the suffering of decay. Question: Isn't it consistent that formlessness has no decay? Answer: It shows that both are not caused by non-meritorious actions. Therefore, both are mentioned. The statement 'no suffering of decay' only applies to form. The text contains profound meaning and does not contradict itself.
Commentary: 'If one is also deluded about that, does it only give rise to non-merit?' This refutes an external defense. The external defense means: What is wrong with form having the suffering of decay? Therefore, this difficulty says: 'If there is the suffering of decay, does it only delude about that and only give rise to non-merit?' If not, it would contradict the Yogacara's meaning of being deluded about worldly suffering and giving rise to non-merit. There would also be the mistake of the desire realm being deluded about the suffering of decay and giving rise to non-meritorious actions as an example. This would violate doctrine and reason. If it is allowed, it would contradict the holy teachings that the upper realms are only caused by unwavering actions. Therefore, one cannot divide the two truths based on the three sufferings.
疏。至老問答皆然者。無明．行支如疏所引。余今略引。按彼論云。問識亦以名色為緣。何故此中但說行耶。答行為識雜染緣。能引能生後有果故。非如名色俱為所依。所緣生起。尚名色亦由大種所造及由觸生。何但說識。答識能為彼親生因故。彼既生已或正生時。大種及觸唯能與彼為建立因。問如經中說六界為緣得入母胎。此何唯識。答若有識界決定於母胎中精血大種腹穴無𨷂故。又識勝故。又依一切生一切有生時而說。問六處亦以飲食為緣。何故此中但說名色。答此說名色是彼生因。彼既生已亦以飲食為任持因。問觸以三和為緣。此何但說六處為緣。答若有六處定有餘二而無闕故。又六處勝攝二種故。問若自他所逼迫。若時變異先業所引皆得生受。此何但顯觸為彼緣。答觸是近因觸所引故。余緣所生亦從觸生。必不離觸是故偏說。問經中亦說無明為緣生愛。順愛境界亦得為緣。此何但受。答以受力故於相似境求合求離。由愚癡力但于諸受起盡等相不如實知。由此不能制御其心。問由隨眠未斷順彼諸法取皆得生。何但說愛。答由希望生故於追求時能發隨眠。及能發彼隨順法故。問前已說無明為緣發起業有。何故今者說取緣有。答由取力故即令彼業于彼彼生處引識等果。問生亦以精血等為緣。何唯說有。答由有有故定
【現代漢語翻譯】 疏文中，對於『至老問答皆然者』，無明（avidyā，指對事物真相的無知）和行（karma，指行為）的解釋如疏文所引用。我現在簡略地引用如下。根據該論的說法：『問：識（vijñāna，指意識）也以名色（nāmarūpa，指精神和物質現象）為緣，為什麼這裡只說行？』答：『因為行是識的雜染之緣，能夠引導和產生後有的結果。不像名色那樣，只是作為識所依賴和所緣而生起的基礎。而且，名色也是由大種（mahābhūta，指地、水、火、風四大元素）所造，以及由觸（sparśa，指感官接觸）所生。』問：『為什麼只說識？』答：『因為識能作為它們親生的原因。它們既然已經產生，或者正在產生時，大種和觸只能為它們提供建立的基礎。』問：『如經中所說，六界（dhātu，指六種元素：地、水、火、風、空、識）為緣才能進入母胎，這裡為什麼只說識？』答：『如果有了識界，就能決定在母胎中，精血、大種、腹穴都不會有缺失。而且，識是主要的。』又因為這是依據一切眾生在一切有（bhava，指存在）中出生時而說的。問：『六處（ṣaḍāyatana，指六種感官：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）也以飲食為緣，為什麼這裡只說名色？』答：『這裡說名色是它們產生的因。它們既然已經產生，也以飲食作為任持的因。』問：『觸以三和（tisro gatayo，指根、境、識三者的和合）為緣，這裡為什麼只說六處為緣？』答：『如果有了六處，就一定有其餘二者而不會缺失。而且，六處是主要的，能夠涵蓋兩種。』問：『如果由於自己或他人的逼迫，或者由於時節變異，或者由於先業的牽引，都能產生感受（vedanā，指苦、樂、舍三種感覺），為什麼這裡只顯示觸是感受的緣？』答：『因為觸是近因，感受是由觸所引導的。其餘的緣所產生的感受，也是從觸產生的，必定不離觸，所以偏重說明觸。』問：『經中也說無明為緣產生愛（tṛṣṇā，指渴愛、貪慾），順愛境界也能作為緣，為什麼這裡只說受？』答：『因為依靠感受的力量，就會在相似的境界中尋求結合或分離。由於愚癡的力量，只是對於諸受的生起、滅去等相不如實知。因此不能控制自己的心。』問：『由於隨眠（anuśaya，指潛在的煩惱）未斷，順應這些法的取（upādāna，指執取）都能產生，為什麼只說愛？』答：『因為由希望產生，所以在追求時能夠引發隨眠，以及能夠引發那些隨順的法。』問：『前面已經說了無明為緣發起業有（bhavana，指業力存在），為什麼現在說取緣有？』答：『因為依靠取的力量，就能使那些業在那些不同的生處引導識等果。』問：『生（jāti，指出生）也以精血等為緣，為什麼只說有？』答：『因為有了有，就一定...
【English Translation】 In the commentary, regarding '至老問答皆然者 (zhì lǎo wèn dá jiē rán zhě, meaning 'the same applies to questions and answers even in old age')', the explanations of 無明 (avidyā, ignorance) and 行 (karma, action) are as cited in the commentary. I will now briefly cite them. According to that treatise: 'Question: Consciousness (識, vijñāna) also takes 名色 (nāmarūpa, name and form) as its condition, why is only 行 mentioned here?' Answer: 'Because 行 is the defiled condition of consciousness, capable of leading to and producing the result of future existence. Unlike 名色, which only serves as the basis upon which consciousness relies and arises. Moreover, 名色 is also produced by the great elements (大種, mahābhūta, the four great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind) and arises from contact (觸, sparśa).' Question: 'Why only mention consciousness?' Answer: 'Because consciousness can serve as their direct cause of birth. Once they have arisen, or are in the process of arising, the great elements and contact can only provide the foundation for their establishment.' Question: 'As stated in the sutras, the six elements (六界, dhātu, the six elements of earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness) are the condition for entering the womb, why is only consciousness mentioned here?' Answer: 'If there is the element of consciousness, it can be determined that in the womb, the sperm, blood, great elements, and abdominal cavity will not be lacking. Moreover, consciousness is primary.' Also, this is spoken in accordance with the birth of all beings in all existences (有, bhava). Question: 'The six sense bases (六處, ṣaḍāyatana, the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) also take food as their condition, why is only 名色 mentioned here?' Answer: 'Here it is said that 名色 is the cause of their arising. Once they have arisen, they also take food as their sustaining condition.' Question: 'Contact takes the convergence of the three (三和, tisro gatayo, the convergence of the sense organ, object, and consciousness) as its condition, why is only the six sense bases mentioned here?' Answer: 'If there are the six sense bases, then the other two must be present without fail. Moreover, the six sense bases are primary and can encompass the two.' Question: 'If suffering (受, vedanā, feeling) can arise due to the coercion of oneself or others, or due to seasonal changes, or due to the influence of past karma, why is only contact shown as the condition for suffering?' Answer: 'Because contact is the proximate cause, and suffering is guided by contact. The suffering that arises from other conditions also arises from contact, and it is necessarily inseparable from contact, so contact is emphasized.' Question: 'The sutras also say that ignorance is the condition for the arising of craving (愛, tṛṣṇā, thirst, desire), and objects that accord with craving can also serve as conditions, why is only feeling mentioned here?' Answer: 'Because relying on the power of feeling, one will seek union or separation in similar realms. Due to the power of ignorance, one does not truly know the arising, ceasing, and other aspects of feelings. Therefore, one cannot control one's mind.' Question: 'Since the latent afflictions (隨眠, anuśaya, latent defilements) have not been severed, grasping (取, upādāna, clinging) that accords with these dharmas can arise, why is only craving mentioned?' Answer: 'Because it arises from hope, so in the pursuit, it can trigger latent afflictions and can trigger those dharmas that accord with them.' Question: 'It has already been said that ignorance is the condition for initiating karmic existence (業有, bhavana, existence of karma), why is it now said that grasping is the condition for existence?' Answer: 'Because relying on the power of grasping, those karmas can lead to the results of consciousness and so on in those different places of birth.' Question: 'Birth (生, jāti, birth) also takes sperm, blood, and so on as its condition, why is only existence mentioned?' Answer: 'Because if there is existence, then it is certain that...'
有餘緣。又有勝故。問亦由遠行不避不平等他所逼迫為緣老死。此何但說生為緣耶。答雖由諸緣必生為本。縱闕諸緣但生為緣定有死死。
疏。通二種者。按彼論云。前六愛．取．有三說為因分。后二為果分。所餘支說為雜分。所以者何。有二種受名為雜分。一謂后法以觸為緣因受。二謂現法與愛為緣果受。此二雜說 釋曰。謂受種子以觸為緣后際現受果之因故。故名因受。現起報受為緣生愛是前際果。故名果受 問識等五支皆通因果。何偏說受 答識等五支唯取種子。從受起愛多因現起果受而生。故於受中通說因果。識等四支不要起現方生后支。故不為例。
疏。既所有業皆非行支者。即感後有別報之業。
疏。現所有業亦非行體者。感后別業既非行支。明招現別亦非行支。
疏。不爾別報有相例失者。相例意云。招現別業得是行支。感后別業亦應行體。俱別業故。
疏。不爾即有如前理妨者。如前別報名色相例。
疏。所以除也者。但非感總不是正行故論除之。非除之故體便非行。
疏。一內異熟受至名為能生者。問設據當生。云何即名能生攝耶 答由當起受而領于境。由境起愚造作諸行愚因受起。受名能生。故瑜伽論九十三云。一者領受內異熟果。二者領受境界所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：還有其餘的因緣，以及更重要的原因。提問也是因為長途跋涉不迴避不平等，被他人逼迫，這些都是導致衰老和死亡的因緣。為什麼只說生是因緣呢？ 答：雖然由各種因緣導致，但根本在於生。即使缺少其他因緣，只要有生這個因緣，就必定會有死亡。
疏：貫通兩種受。按照《瑜伽師地論》的說法，前六支（愛、取、有）中的三種被認為是因的部分，后兩種（生、老死）是果的部分，其餘的支被認為是雜的部分。為什麼這樣說呢？因為有兩種受被稱為雜的部分。第一種是指后法以觸為緣而產生的因受，第二種是指現法與愛為緣而產生的果受。這兩種受混合在一起說明。 釋：意思是說，受的種子以觸為緣，是未來產生現受果的因，所以稱為因受。現在生起的報受以愛為緣，是過去產生果的因，所以稱為果受。 問：識等五支都貫通因果，為什麼偏偏說受呢？ 答：識等五支只取種子，從受生起愛，大多是因為現在生起的果受而產生。所以在受中貫通說明因果。識等四支不一定要生起現行才能產生後面的支，所以不能作為例子。
疏：既然所有的業都不是行支，那麼就是指感得後世果報的特別之業。
疏：現在所有的業也不是行體，感得後世果報的特別之業既然不是行支，那麼招感現世果報的特別之業也不是行支。
疏：如果不這樣，特別果報之間就會有互相類比的過失。互相類比的意思是說，招感現世果報的特別之業如果是行支，那麼感得後世果報的特別之業也應該是行體，因為都是特別之業。
疏：如果不這樣，就會有像前面所說的道理的妨礙。像前面所說的特別果報、名色互相類比。
疏：之所以排除它們，是因為它們不是感得總報的業，也不是真正的行，所以論中排除它們。不是因為排除它們，它們的體性就不是行。
疏：第一種，內在的異熟受達到能生的程度。問：如果根據當來生，為什麼就稱為能生所攝呢？ 答：因為將要生起的受領納境界，由於境界而產生愚癡，造作各種行為，愚癡的因是受生起，所以受稱為能生。所以《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷說：一是領受內在的異熟果，二是領受境界所……
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Are there other conditions and more important reasons? Is the question also due to long journeys, not avoiding inequality, and being forced by others, which are all conditions leading to aging and death? Why only say that birth is the condition? Answer: Although caused by various conditions, the root lies in birth. Even if other conditions are lacking, as long as there is the condition of birth, there will definitely be death.
Commentary: Comprehending the two types of feeling. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the first six limbs (craving, grasping, existence) are considered the causal part, the last two (birth, old age and death) are the result part, and the remaining limbs are considered the mixed part. Why is this said? Because there are two types of feeling called the mixed part. The first refers to the subsequent dharma, with contact as the condition for the causal feeling. The second refers to the present dharma, with craving as the condition for the resultant feeling. These two types of feeling are explained together. Explanation: It means that the seed of feeling, with contact as the condition, is the cause of the future manifestation of the feeling result, so it is called causal feeling. The present arising of retributive feeling, with craving as the condition, is the cause of the past result, so it is called resultant feeling. Question: The five limbs, such as consciousness, all comprehend cause and effect, why only talk about feeling? Answer: The five limbs, such as consciousness, only take the seed. The arising of craving from feeling is mostly due to the present arising of resultant feeling. Therefore, cause and effect are explained together in feeling. The four limbs, such as consciousness, do not necessarily need to arise in the present to produce the subsequent limbs, so they cannot be taken as examples.
Commentary: Since all karma is not a limb of formations, it refers to the special karma that causes retribution in future lives.
Commentary: The karma that exists in the present is also not the substance of formations. Since the special karma that causes retribution in future lives is not a limb of formations, it is clear that the special karma that invites retribution in the present is also not a limb of formations.
Commentary: If not, there would be the fault of analogy between special retributions. The meaning of analogy is that if the special karma that invites retribution in the present is a limb of formations, then the special karma that causes retribution in future lives should also be the substance of formations, because they are both special karma.
Commentary: If not, there would be the obstacle of the aforementioned principle. Like the aforementioned analogy between special retribution and name and form.
Commentary: The reason for excluding them is that they are not the karma that causes general retribution, nor are they the true formations, so they are excluded in the treatise. It is not because they are excluded that their substance is not formations.
Commentary: The first, the internal ripening feeling reaches the level of being able to produce. Question: If based on future birth, why is it called included in the able to produce? Answer: Because the feeling that is about to arise receives the object, and due to the object, ignorance arises, creating various actions. The cause of ignorance is the arising of feeling, so feeling is called the able to produce. Therefore, the ninety-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: First, it receives the internal ripening result; second, it receives the object...
生受增上果。由於內異熟果中有愚癡故。不能如實了知當來後有生苦。如前造作增長諸行。
疏。及實生果有前後者。據彼總報名色．觸．受而與其識實無前後。或有前後。總報新種諸識熏別。未必同時。第六熏者亦容前後。由此而言有俱前後。若別報識．名色．觸．受．及五根等非無前後。
論。復由此說生引同時者。問生．引各二。為四同時。為不爾耶 答有兩釋。如燈具說 然疏說云。其潤緣合至總名為有。觀其文勢。明能生．引二同時也。被潤業種體即是前能引因故。由被潤已名為能生。據體無異名為同時 若爾云何論言復由。復由之言明據現起 答果將起時名為現起。或初潤時雖果未起。后正生果亦有有支據此有支名生．引同。若不爾者。論何須說潤．未潤言。又疏會經或望所生果遠近故。明知疏意約能生．引名為同也 或復疏意顯所引．生二同時也。言潤緣等意明由潤果方得生。顯潤．未潤不俱起也。同義燈斷。由論會經據當現說。若能引．生便非現也 詳曰。前義為本。故彼經云。此能攝聚分及此能轉出分一時而生次第宣說 釋曰。彼經自云能攝聚分。謂無明等。能轉出分。謂愛．取等。故順經文前義為勝 問疏之上下取彼經意何乃不同 答教文雖一理有多途。故疏前後而釋有異。法歸分
別有此云云。
論。有處唯說業種名有者。按瑜伽論第十云。複次建立有支有二種。一就勝分建立。謂取取攝受業。二全分建立。謂業．及識等種 釋曰。取所熏發名取攝受。即是被潤業種名有。
論。謂中有至皆生支攝者。按緣起經。生有五種。一下種生。二次第增長生。三次第出胎生。四次第增長生。五增長生已能得受用世俗生 釋曰第二．第四據胎內外增長分二 死有六種。如疏具引 第三死者彼經釋云。自相死者。識于身中移出分別及色根滅沒 釋曰余之五死對彼第三行相可悉。故不繁云。
疏。五十六至於此無違等者。按彼論云。復由五相建立緣起差別。何等為五。一眾苦引因依處。二眾苦生因依處。三眾苦引因。四眾苦生因。五眾苦生起 釋曰。現身六處是前際果。由迷此果起無明．行．乃至於受。無明等七能引所引俱名引因。現在六處是無明等所緣起處名引依處。由貪現受起愛．取．有。故說現受為生因依。若引因體即前能依無明七是。生因亦前．愛．取．有三。未來生老名苦生起。
疏。由惑生惑業者。者按俱舍論第九釋云。從惑生惑。謂愛生取 從惑生業。謂取生有無明生行 從業生事。謂行生識及有生生 從事生事。謂從識支生於名色。乃至從觸生於受支。及從生支生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 別有此云云。
論：有處唯說業種名有者。按《瑜伽師地論》第十云：『複次建立有支有二種。一就勝分建立。謂取取攝受業。二全分建立。謂業及識等種。』釋曰：取所熏發名取攝受。即是被潤業種名有。
論：謂中有至皆生支攝者。按《緣起經》。生有五種。一下種生。二次第增長生。三次第出胎生。四次第增長生。五增長生已能得受用世俗生。釋曰：第二、第四據胎內外增長分二。死有六種。如疏具引。第三死者彼經釋云：自相死者。識于身中移出分別及色根滅沒。釋曰：余之五死對彼第三行相可悉。故不繁云。
疏：五十六至於此無違等者。按彼論云：『復由五相建立緣起差別。何等為五。一眾苦引因依處。二眾苦生因依處。三眾苦引因。四眾苦生因。五眾苦生起。』釋曰：現身六處是前際果。由迷此果起無明（ignorance）、行（action）、乃至於受（feeling）。無明等七能引所引俱名引因。現在六處是無明等所緣起處名引依處。由貪現受起愛（craving）、取（grasping）、有（becoming）。故說現受為生因依。若引因體即前能依無明七是。生因亦前愛、取、有三。未來生老名苦生起。
疏：由惑生惑業者。者按《俱舍論》第九釋云：從惑生惑。謂愛生取。從惑生業。謂取生有，無明生行。從業生事。謂行生識及有生生。從事生事。謂從識支生於名色。乃至從觸生於受支。及從生支生老死。
【English Translation】 English version: There is no such thing as this.
Treatise: In some places, only the seed of karma is said to be 'bhava' (有, becoming). According to the tenth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論): 'Furthermore, there are two ways to establish the 'bhava' (有, becoming) limb. One is to establish it based on the superior aspect, namely, 'upadana' (取, grasping) which gathers and receives karma. The second is to establish it based on the complete aspect, namely, karma, 'vijnana' (識, consciousness), and other seeds.' Explanation: What is perfumed and aroused by 'upadana' (取, grasping) is called 'upadana-samgraha' (取攝受, gathering and receiving). That is, the seed of karma that is being moistened is called 'bhava' (有, becoming).
Treatise: It is said that 'antarabhava' (中有, intermediate existence) is included in the 'jati' (生, birth) limb. According to the Pratityasamutpada Sutra (緣起經): There are five kinds of birth. First, seed birth. Second, gradual growth birth. Third, gradual emergence from the womb birth. Fourth, gradual growth birth. Fifth, birth that is able to enjoy worldly life after growth. Explanation: The second and fourth refer to growth inside and outside the womb, respectively. There are six kinds of death, as detailed in the commentary. The sutra explains the third death as: 'Death of self-nature means that consciousness moves out of the body, and the discrimination and the destruction of the sense organs.' Explanation: The remaining five deaths can be understood by comparing them to the third. Therefore, there is no need to elaborate.
Commentary: 'Fifty-six, there is no contradiction here, etc.' According to that treatise: 'Furthermore, the differentiation of dependent origination is established by five aspects. What are the five? First, the place of reliance for the cause that leads to all suffering. Second, the place of reliance for the cause that produces all suffering. Third, the cause that leads to all suffering. Fourth, the cause that produces all suffering. Fifth, the arising of all suffering.' Explanation: The six sense bases in the present body are the result of the past. Due to delusion about this result, 'avidya' (無明, ignorance), 'samskara' (行, action), and even 'vedana' (受, feeling) arise. 'Avidya' (無明, ignorance) and the other seven, both the cause and the effect, are called the 'leading cause'. The six sense bases in the present are the place where 'avidya' (無明, ignorance) and the others arise, and are called the 'place of reliance for the leading cause'. Due to craving for present feeling, 'trsna' (愛, craving), 'upadana' (取, grasping), and 'bhava' (有, becoming) arise. Therefore, present feeling is said to be the place of reliance for the cause of birth. If the substance of the leading cause is the aforementioned 'avidya' (無明, ignorance) and the other seven, then the cause of birth is also the aforementioned 'trsna' (愛, craving), 'upadana' (取, grasping), and 'bhava' (有, becoming). Future birth and aging are called the arising of suffering.
Commentary: 'From delusion arises delusion and karma.' According to the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya (俱舍論): 'From delusion arises delusion, namely, 'trsna' (愛, craving) arises from 'upadana' (取, grasping). From delusion arises karma, namely, 'upadana' (取, grasping) arises from 'bhava' (有, becoming), and 'avidya' (無明, ignorance) arises from 'samskara' (行, action). From karma arises effect, namely, 'samskara' (行, action) arises from 'vijnana' (識, consciousness), and 'bhava' (有, becoming) arises from 'jati' (生, birth). From effect arises effect, namely, from the 'vijnana' (識, consciousness) limb arises 'nama-rupa' (名色, name and form), and from 'sparsha' (觸, contact) arises 'vedana' (受, feeling), and from 'jati' (生, birth) arises old age and death.
于老死 從事生惑。謂受生愛。由立有支其理唯此。已顯老死為事．惑因。及顯無明為事．惑．果。無明．老死事．惑性故。豈假更立余緣起支。
論。由斯論說至上二界有者。按瑜伽云。在無色界諸有情類。識依于名及色種子。名及色種依識而轉。由彼識中有色種故。色雖間斷後當更生 詳曰。準其文意。唯依報種不取定種。于文理順 問異界名色云何相依 答如下無明發上地行。此亦同彼。
論。于現我境亦有愛故者。釋如燈．疏。有義生異界地既用當生處愛潤生。欲界異趣亦緣當生處愛潤也。業變苦具為樂令愛。令愛樂具現在我前名我現境。非現我身名我現境 詳曰。但愛得起即能潤生。所緣之境何局當處。如水溉田不簡此彼。又愛緣受。受通現受。境何不許現境為緣。故疏所明無有過也。
論。何緣發業至別立愛取者。準下答文問合有四。文約義繁故今展之。一問全界煩惱皆能發業。此何唯一。二問潤通諸惑。何但說愛。三問潤惑非一分愛．取支。發惑亦多支應不一。四問取攝眾惑。云何但說愛增名取。以下答文如次答也。思可知之。
疏。說四愛為集諦者。按瑜伽論五十五云。愛云何謂于自體親眤藏護。後有愛云何。謂求當來自體差別。喜貪俱行愛云何。謂于現前惑于已得可愛色
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於衰老和死亡，是從對生命的迷惑開始的。這被稱為對出生的愛。由於建立了『有』支，道理僅在於此。已經顯示了衰老和死亡是行為和迷惑的原因，以及顯示了無明是行為、迷惑和結果的原因。無明、衰老和死亡是行為和迷惑的性質，難道還需要另外建立其他的緣起支嗎？ 論：根據這個論述，對於上二界的存在者，按照《瑜伽師地論》所說，在無色界的有情眾生中，識依賴於名和色的種子，名和色的種子依賴於識而運轉。由於他們的識中有色法的種子，所以色法即使間斷，以後還會再次產生。詳細地說，根據文意，只依據果報的種子，不取決定的種子，這樣在文理上才順暢。問：不同界的名色如何相互依賴？答：如下面的無明引發上地的行為一樣，這裡也與此相同。 論：因為在現在的『我』的境界中也有愛。解釋如同燈的疏解。有一種觀點認為，生到不同的界地，既然用當生處的愛來滋潤生命，那麼欲界不同的趣向，也緣于當生處的愛來滋潤。將業力變現的痛苦之具轉變為快樂，從而產生愛，使人喜愛的器具出現在我的面前，這稱為『我現境』。不是現在的我身，稱為『我現境』。詳細地說，只要愛能夠生起，就能滋潤生命，所緣的境界為何侷限於當處呢？如同用水灌溉田地，不分彼此。而且愛緣于感受，感受貫通現在的感受，為何不允許現在的境界作為所緣呢？所以疏解所闡明的並沒有過失。 論：為何發起業力直到特別建立愛和取呢？根據下面的回答，問題總共有四個。文字簡略而意義繁多，所以現在展開來說。一問：所有的煩惱都能發起業力，為何只說愛？二問：滋潤貫通所有的迷惑，為何只說愛？三問：滋潤的迷惑不止愛和取兩個支，發起的迷惑也有很多支，不應該只有一個。四問：取涵蓋了眾多的迷惑，為何只說愛增長就稱為取？下面的回答依次回答這些問題。思考就可以知道。 疏：說四種愛為集諦。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷所說：愛是什麼？是指對於自身親近、珍惜和保護。後有愛是什麼？是指尋求未來自身的差別。喜貪俱行的愛是什麼？是指對於現在迷惑于已經得到的可愛之色。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding aging and death, it starts from the delusion of life. This is called 'love for birth'. Because the 'bhava' (becoming) link is established, the principle lies only in this. It has been shown that aging and death are the cause of action and delusion, and that ignorance is the cause of action, delusion, and result. Ignorance, aging, and death are the nature of action and delusion, so is it necessary to establish other links of dependent origination? Treatise: According to this discussion, for beings in the upper two realms, according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), in the sentient beings of the Arupadhatu (realm of formlessness), consciousness relies on the seeds of nama (name) and rupa (form), and the seeds of nama and rupa revolve depending on consciousness. Because there are seeds of rupa in their consciousness, even if rupa is interrupted, it will be produced again later. In detail, according to the meaning of the text, only the seeds of retribution are relied upon, not the determined seeds, so that it is smooth in terms of textual principles. Question: How do nama and rupa in different realms depend on each other? Answer: Just as ignorance triggers actions in the higher realms, it is the same here. Treatise: Because there is also love in the present 'I' realm. The explanation is like the commentary of the lamp. One view is that since one is born into different realms and lands, and life is nourished by love for the place of future birth, then different destinies in the Kamadhatu (desire realm) are also nourished by love for the place of future birth. Transforming the tools of suffering transformed by karma into happiness, thereby generating love, and making the instruments of happiness appear before me, this is called 'my present realm'. What is not the present 'I' body is called 'my present realm'. In detail, as long as love can arise, it can nourish life. Why is the object of focus limited to the present place? It is like irrigating fields with water, without distinguishing between this and that. Moreover, love is based on feeling, and feeling permeates present feeling. Why is it not permissible for the present realm to be the object of focus? Therefore, what the commentary clarifies has no fault. Treatise: Why initiate karma until love and grasping are specifically established? According to the answer below, there are a total of four questions. The text is concise but the meaning is abundant, so now it is expanded. First question: All afflictions can initiate karma, why only say love? Second question: Nourishment permeates all delusions, why only say love? Third question: The delusions that nourish are not just the two links of love and grasping, and there are many links that initiate delusions, so there should not be only one. Fourth question: Grasping encompasses many delusions, why is it only said that the increase of love is called grasping? The answers below answer these questions in order. Thinking about it will reveal the answers. Commentary: Saying that the four types of love are the Samudaya Satya (truth of the origin of suffering). According to the fifty-fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: What is love? It refers to being close to, cherishing, and protecting oneself. What is love for future existence? It refers to seeking differences in one's future self. What is love accompanied by joy and greed? It refers to being deluded by the lovely colors that have already been obtained in the present.
．聲．香．味．觸．法而起貪著。彼彼希樂愛云何。謂于所餘可愛色等起希望愛。
論。如下無明發上地行者。有義兩釋。一同疏明。第二解云。欲界無明通發三界行。發業無明見所斷故。得上定者不伏下故。然證上定應言根本。近分未能伏下盡故何名行支。根本初生染未起故。故說上定下無明發。故疏非理 詳曰。且如起空處未至定時。第四禪癡發彼行不。若不發者何所以耶。若許發者何須欲界無明發為。二界無明不可俱起。若前後發便乃重發違論所說。故今不取。又未至定許能招報何非行支。行支豈要伏惑盡耶。余如燈辨 今助一釋。未至．根本皆容下地無明所發。二種皆是不動業收。俱得名行。如次而招別總報果。疏據初者但云近分。
論。彼愛亦緣當生地者。此文來意如疏已明。有義彈論云。然此問護法煩文。彼受既非受支。何事須此問 詳曰。按瑜伽論。十二有支分因果雜如前具明。受支名雜。以觸為因名為因受。與愛為緣名為果受。前際果故。由受二別故此文起。豈容無義徒致煩文。以凡凌聖竊為未可。
疏。十地論至但云三際者。按彼論牒經云。無明緣行者。是見過去世事。識．名色．六入．觸．受是見現在世事。愛．取．有．生．老死是見未來世事。於是見有三世轉 詳曰。今觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於色（rūpa，形態、顏色）、聲（śabda，聲音）、香（gandha，氣味）、味（rasa，味道）、觸（sparśa，觸感）、法（dharma，事物）而生起貪著。對於這些事物希求愛戀又是怎麼回事呢？就是對於其餘可愛的色等生起希望和愛。
論：如下地無明（avidyā，無明）發動上地行（karma，行為）的說法。有的人有兩種解釋。第一種解釋如同疏文所闡明。第二種解釋說，欲界（kāmadhātu，慾望界）的無明可以發動三界（tridhātu，三個界）的行為，因為發動業（karma）的無明是見所斷的。得到上地禪定的人不會被下地煩惱所控制。然而，如果證得上地禪定，應該說是根本定（mūla-samāpatti，根本禪定）。近分定（upacāra-samādhi，近分禪定）未能完全降伏下地煩惱，為什麼能稱為行支（karma-aṅga，行為的支分）呢？根本定初生時，染污尚未生起。所以說上地禪定能發動下地無明。所以疏文的解釋不合理。詳細地說，比如在生起空無邊處定（ākāśānantyāyatana-samāpatti，空無邊處禪定）或未至定（anāgamya-samādhi，未至定）時，第四禪（caturtha dhyāna，第四禪）的愚癡會不會發動彼行呢？如果不發動，原因是什麼？如果允許發動，又何必說欲界無明發動呢？二界的無明不可能同時生起。如果前後發動，那就是重複發動，違背了論中所說。所以現在不採納這種說法。又，未至定如果能招感果報，為什麼不能是行支呢？行支難道一定要降伏所有煩惱嗎？其餘的如同《燈辨》中所說。現在我來補充一種解釋。未至定和根本定都可能被下地無明所發動。這兩種都屬於不動業（āniñjya karma，不動業）所攝。都可以稱為行。依次招感不同的總報果。疏文依據最初的說法，只說了近分定。
論：彼愛也緣于當生之地。這段文字的來意如同疏文已經闡明。有的人反駁說，然而這段提問是護法（Dharmapāla，護法）的煩瑣文字。彼受（vedanā，感受）既然不是受支，為什麼需要這段提問呢？詳細地說，按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra，瑜伽師地論），十二有支（dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda，十二有支）的因果關係錯綜複雜，如同前面詳細說明的。受支的名稱是雜。以觸（sparśa，觸）為因為因受，與愛（tṛṣṇā，愛）為緣為果受。是前際的果。由於受有兩種區別，所以這段文字才產生。怎麼能說是沒有意義而徒增煩瑣呢？凡夫輕視聖人，我個人認為是不可以的。
疏：十地論（Daśabhūmika Sūtra，十地經）乃至只說三際。按照該論引用經文說：無明緣行，是觀察過去世的事情。識（vijñāna，識）、名色（nāmarūpa，名色）、六入（ṣaḍāyatana，六入）、觸、受是觀察現在世的事情。愛、取（upādāna，取）、有（bhava，有）、生（jāti，生）、老死（jarā-maraṇa，老死）是觀察未來世的事情。於是在觀察中存在三世的流轉。詳細地說，現在觀察
【English Translation】 English version: Greed and attachment arise towards rūpa (form, color), śabda (sound), gandha (smell), rasa (taste), sparśa (touch), and dharma (things). What is meant by desiring and loving these things? It means having hope and love for the remaining lovely forms and so on.
Treatise: Regarding the statement that lower avidyā (ignorance) activates the karma (action) of higher realms, some have two explanations. The first explanation is as clarified in the commentary. The second explanation says that the avidyā of the kāmadhātu (desire realm) can activate the actions of the tridhātu (three realms), because the avidyā that activates karma is severed by seeing. Those who attain higher samādhi (concentration) are not controlled by lower afflictions. However, if one attains higher samādhi, it should be said to be mūla-samāpatti (fundamental samādhi). Upacāra-samādhi (access concentration) has not completely subdued lower afflictions, so why can it be called a karma-aṅga (limb of action)? When fundamental samādhi first arises, defilement has not yet arisen. Therefore, it is said that higher samādhi can activate lower avidyā. Therefore, the commentary's explanation is unreasonable. In detail, for example, when arising ākāśānantyāyatana-samāpatti (sphere of infinite space) or anāgamya-samādhi (unreached concentration), will the delusion of the fourth dhyāna (fourth meditation) activate that action? If it does not activate, what is the reason? If it is allowed to activate, then why say that kāmadhātu avidyā activates it? The avidyā of the two realms cannot arise simultaneously. If they activate before and after, then it is repeated activation, which violates what is said in the treatise. Therefore, this explanation is not adopted now. Also, if anāgamya-samādhi can bring about retribution, why can't it be a karma-aṅga? Does a karma-aṅga necessarily have to subdue all afflictions? The rest is as explained in the 'Lamp Discrimination'. Now I will add an explanation. Both anāgamya-samādhi and fundamental samādhi can be activated by lower avidyā. Both of these are included in āniñjya karma (immovable karma). Both can be called action. They successively bring about different general retributive results. The commentary is based on the initial statement and only mentions upacāra-samādhi.
Treatise: That love is also conditioned by the place of future birth. The intention of this passage is as clarified in the commentary. Some refute the treatise, saying that this question is Dharmapāla's (defender of the Dharma) verbose text. Since vedanā (feeling) is not a limb of feeling, why is this question necessary? In detail, according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), the cause and effect relationships of the dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda (twelve limbs of dependent origination) are complex, as explained in detail earlier. The name of the feeling limb is mixed. Taking sparśa (contact) as the cause is the cause-feeling, and taking tṛṣṇā (craving) as the condition is the result-feeling. It is the result of the past boundary. Because there are two distinctions of feeling, this passage arises. How can it be said that it is meaningless and adds verbosity? It is not permissible for ordinary people to belittle sages, in my personal opinion.
Commentary: The Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra) even only speaks of the three times. According to that treatise, quoting the sutra, 'Avidyā conditions karma' is observing the events of the past life. 'Vijñāna (consciousness), nāmarūpa (name and form), ṣaḍāyatana (six sense bases), contact, and feeling' are observing the events of the present life. 'Craving, upādāna (grasping), bhava (becoming), jāti (birth), and jarā-maraṇa (old age and death)' are observing the events of the future life. Thus, in observation, there is the circulation of the three times. In detail, now observe
彼文。三世之名同於小宗。未來五支與小乘別。
疏。非轉愛為增上貪故者。以上品貪而為取支故云愛增。非轉愛支以成上品為取支故名為愛增。由斯取等名為獨相。
論。無明愛取唯通不善者。有義彈疏云。說欲無明唯不善者此不應理。助發亦通修所斷故 詳曰。疏自問答有助正別。正唯不善。助可無記。已作兩釋而不定判取正非助。何過見非。
疏。亦不可唯言聖不造業故者。此牒伏救。伏救意云。經中但云聖不造業。何得以此證內法人亦造業耶。故牒總非引對法證。
論。由此應知至不迷求故者。若準有宗有兩師說。故婆沙論五十三云。問聖為造欲界引同分業不。有說不造。欲界多過多災橫故但造滿業。有說亦造。前說為正 故順正理六十四云。非諸聖者更能新作牽引后業。以背生死向涅槃故。故經說聖唯受古業。
論。雜修靜慮等者。若準有宗。雜修靜慮新造引業。招凈居果名為雜修。不據熏故。故俱舍論二十四云。應知此中無漏勢力熏修有漏令感凈居 釋曰。初后無漏。中間有漏。名為成就。由前後心修中有漏令招彼果。既云令感明造引業。不爾如何感義得成。又婆沙論云。異熟因雜修靜慮引五凈居眾同分。既異熟因能引同分。明定造業。
疏。若言發別報業者。便
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 彼文：三世（過去、現在、未來）的名詞概念與小宗（Hinayana）相同。未來的五支（五蘊）與小乘（Hinayana）有所區別。
疏：『非轉愛為增上貪故者』，意思是說，因為以上品（高級）的貪愛作為取支（Upadana，執取）的原因，所以說這是愛增（愛增長）。並非是轉變愛支（Tanha，愛）以形成上品（高級）的貪愛，作為取支（Upadana，執取）的原因，所以才叫做愛增（愛增長）。由於這個原因，取（Upadana，執取）等才被稱為獨相（獨立的特徵）。
論：『無明（Avidya，無知）、愛（Tanha，愛）、取（Upadana，執取）唯通不善者』，有人根據義彈疏（對疏文的批評）說：『說欲無明（Avidya，無知）唯有不善的性質，這個說法不合理。因為助發（輔助生起）也通於修所斷（通過修行才能斷除的煩惱）』。詳細地說，疏文自己有問答，區分了助（輔助）和正（主要）。正（主要）的唯有不善的性質，助（輔助）的可以是無記（非善非惡）。已經作了兩種解釋，但是沒有確定地判斷取（Upadana，執取）是正（主要）的還是助（輔助）的，有什麼過失呢？見解的錯誤。
疏：『亦不可唯言聖不造業故者』，這是牒伏救（引用並反駁）。伏救（反駁）的意思是說：經中只是說聖人（Ariya）不造業（Karma），怎麼能用這個來證明內法人（修行者）也造業（Karma）呢？所以引用總的否定來引出對法（Abhidhamma）的證據。
論：『由此應知至不迷求故者』，如果按照有宗（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的說法，有兩種不同的觀點。所以《婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra）第五十三卷說：『問：聖人（Ariya）是否造欲界（Kama-dhatu，慾望界）引同分業（能引發同類果報的業）？』有人說不造，因為欲界（Kama-dhatu，慾望界）多過失、多災難、多橫禍，所以只造滿業（能使果報成熟的業）。有人說也造，前一種說法是正確的。所以《順正理論》（Nyayanusara-sastra）第六十四卷說：『不是所有的聖者（Ariya）都能重新造作牽引後世的業（Karma），因為他們背離生死，趨向涅槃（Nirvana）』。所以經中說聖人（Ariya）只承受過去的業（Karma）。
論：『雜修靜慮等者』，如果按照有宗（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的說法，雜修靜慮（混合修習禪定）會新造引業（能引發果報的業），招感凈居天（Suddhavasa）的果報，這叫做雜修（混合修習）。不依據熏習的原因。所以《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakosa-bhasya）第二十四卷說：『應當知道，這裡無漏（Anasrava，無煩惱）的力量熏修有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱），使得感得凈居天（Suddhavasa）的果報』。解釋說：開始和最後是無漏（Anasrava，無煩惱）的，中間是有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱）的，這叫做成就。由於前後心修習中間的有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱），使得招感那樣的果報。既然說是『使得感得』，就說明是造作了引業（能引發果報的業）。否則，如何能成就感果的意義呢？而且《婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra）說：『異熟因（Vipaka-hetu，異熟果的因）雜修靜慮（混合修習禪定）能引發五凈居天（Suddhavasa）的眾同分（同類的果報）』。既然異熟因（Vipaka-hetu，異熟果的因）能引發同分（同類的果報），就說明一定造業（Karma）。
疏：『若言發別報業者』，便
【English Translation】 English version: The text: The names of the three times (past, present, and future) are the same as in the Hinayana (small vehicle). The five aggregates of the future are different from the Hinayana (small vehicle).
Commentary: 'Not transforming love into increased greed' means that because the highest quality of craving is the cause of the grasping aggregate (Upadana), it is said to be increased craving. It is not that transforming the craving aggregate (Tanha) to form the highest quality of craving is the cause of the grasping aggregate (Upadana), so it is called increased craving. For this reason, grasping (Upadana) and others are called unique characteristics.
Treatise: 'Ignorance (Avidya), craving (Tanha), and grasping (Upadana) only pertain to the unwholesome' Some, based on a critique of the commentary, say: 'Saying that ignorance (Avidya) related to desire is only unwholesome is unreasonable because auxiliary factors also pertain to what is severed through cultivation.' In detail, the commentary itself has questions and answers, distinguishing between auxiliary and primary. The primary is only unwholesome, while the auxiliary can be neutral. Two explanations have already been given, but there is no definite judgment on whether grasping (Upadana) is primary or auxiliary. What fault is there? It is a fault of view.
Commentary: 'It is also not permissible to say only that the saints do not create karma' This is a refutation by citation. The meaning of the refutation is: The sutra only says that saints (Ariya) do not create karma (Karma). How can this be used to prove that internal practitioners also create karma (Karma)? Therefore, a general negation is cited to introduce evidence from the Abhidhamma.
Treatise: 'From this, it should be known that they do not mistakenly seek' According to the Sarvastivada school, there are two different views. Therefore, the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra, volume 53, says: 'Question: Do saints (Ariya) create karma (Karma) in the desire realm (Kama-dhatu) that leads to similar results?' Some say they do not, because the desire realm (Kama-dhatu) has many faults, disasters, and misfortunes, so they only create fulfilling karma (Karma). Others say they do. The former view is correct. Therefore, the Nyayanusara-sastra, volume 64, says: 'Not all saints (Ariya) can newly create karma (Karma) that leads to future lives, because they turn away from birth and death and towards Nirvana.' Therefore, the sutra says that saints (Ariya) only receive past karma (Karma).
Treatise: 'Mixed cultivation of dhyana, etc.' According to the Sarvastivada school, mixed cultivation of dhyana newly creates karma (Karma) that leads to rebirth, resulting in the Pure Abodes (Suddhavasa). This is called mixed cultivation. It is not based on the cause of perfuming. Therefore, the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, volume 24, says: 'It should be known that here, the power of the unconditioned (Anasrava) perfumes the conditioned (Sasrava), causing one to experience the Pure Abodes (Suddhavasa).' The explanation is: The beginning and the end are unconditioned (Anasrava), and the middle is conditioned (Sasrava). This is called accomplishment. Because the mind cultivates the conditioned (Sasrava) in the middle, it causes one to experience that result. Since it says 'causes one to experience,' it shows that karma (Karma) that leads to rebirth is created. Otherwise, how can the meaning of experiencing the result be accomplished? Moreover, the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra says: 'The cause of the resultant effect (Vipaka-hetu), mixed cultivation of dhyana, leads to the commonality of the five Pure Abodes (Suddhavasa).' Since the cause of the resultant effect (Vipaka-hetu) can lead to commonality, it shows that karma (Karma) is definitely created.
Commentary: 'If it is said that it generates separate retribution karma,' then
非行支者初句牒救。后句正破。彼救意云。大論云發三惡趣業是分別者。據發別報難意可悉。
疏。又此中二說者。解此三斷兩師是也。
疏。彼人至余見斷者。顯異熟愚修斷所以。所以者何。瑜伽既云迷俗真諦發非福等。對法復以俗．真二苦攝於八苦。七苦既事。異熟愚迷發非福行。故異熟愚唯修所斷。以迷事故。又對法第七云。由真實義愚發福．不動。真實義者即四聖諦。于彼愚癡名真實義愚。故知瑜伽世．勝二愚迷事理別。故修．見斷二有不同 問準對法等迷異熟愚既是迷事。斯愚修斷理契通途。疏何見責 答按對法論。釋異熟愚云。由彼一向是染污性。無明合時必不容受信解異熟行相正見。準此論文豈唯迷事俱生惑耶。由斯疏斥不違教理。
疏。第六七是壞者。按對法論第六說云。三苦．八苦展轉相攝。所謂生苦乃至怨憎會苦能顯苦苦。順苦受法苦自相義故。愛別離苦．求不得苦能顯壞苦。已得未得順樂受法壞自相義故。略攝一切五取蘊苦能顯行苦。不解脫二無常所隨不安穩義故 釋曰。二無常者。一生位苦。謂苦苦。二滅位苦。謂壞苦。生．滅二位皆無常攝。名二無常。
論。九種命終心等者。按對法第五云。相續力者。有九種命終心。與自體愛相應。於三界中各令欲．色．無色
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『非行支者初句牒救。后句正破。』這句話的意思是，首先引述對方的觀點進行辯護，然後直接進行駁斥。對方辯護的觀點是：根據《大智度論》所說，發起三惡趣業是由於分別心所致。根據發起不同果報的這個角度，對方的意圖可以理解。
『疏。又此中二說者。解此三斷兩師是也。』這句話是說，對於這三種斷惑（見斷、修斷、非所斷），有兩種不同的解釋，指的是兩位不同的論師的觀點。
『疏。彼人至余見斷者。顯異熟愚修斷所以。所以者何。瑜伽既云迷俗真諦發非福等。對法復以俗．真二苦攝於八苦。七苦既事。異熟愚迷發非福行。故異熟愚唯修所斷。以迷事故。又對法第七云。由真實義愚發福．不動。真實義者即四聖諦（catvāri-ārya-satyāni）。于彼愚癡名真實義愚。故知瑜伽世．勝二愚迷事理別。故修．見斷二有不同 問準對法等迷異熟愚既是迷事。斯愚修斷理契通途。疏何見責 答按對法論。釋異熟愚云。由彼一向是染污性。無明（avidyā）合時必不容受信解異熟行相正見。準此論文豈唯迷事俱生惑耶。由斯疏斥不違教理。』這段話解釋了異熟愚（vipāka-mūḍha）是修斷的原因。原因是什麼呢？《瑜伽師地論》說，迷惑於世俗諦和真諦會導致發起非福業等。《對法論》又將世俗諦和真諦所生的兩種苦包含在八苦之中。七苦既然是事，異熟愚迷惑於事而發起非福行，所以異熟愚只能通過修斷來斷除，因為它是迷惑所致。另外，《對法論》第七卷說，由於對真實義的愚癡，會發起福業和不動業。真實義就是四聖諦，對四聖諦的愚癡就叫做真實義愚。因此可知，《瑜伽師地論》中世俗愚和勝義愚在迷惑事和理上有所區別，所以修斷和見斷也有所不同。問：如果按照《對法論》等論典，迷惑于異熟愚既然是迷惑於事，那麼這種愚癡通過修斷來斷除，在道理上是普遍適用的，為什麼疏文要責難呢？答：按照《對法論》的解釋，異熟愚是因為它一直是染污的性質，與無明結合時，不可能接受和理解異熟行相的正見。根據這段經文，難道僅僅是迷惑於事而產生的俱生惑嗎？因此，疏文的駁斥並不違背教理。
『疏。第六七是壞者。按對法論第六說云。三苦．八苦展轉相攝。所謂生苦乃至怨憎會苦能顯苦苦。順苦受法苦自相義故。愛別離苦．求不得苦能顯壞苦。已得未得順樂受法壞自相義故。略攝一切五取蘊（pañca-upādāna-skandha）苦能顯行苦。不解脫二無常所隨不安穩義故 釋曰。二無常者。一生位苦。謂苦苦。二滅位苦。謂壞苦。生．滅二位皆無常攝。名二無常。』這段話解釋了第六和第七是壞苦。按照《對法論》第六卷所說，三苦和八苦相互包含。其中，生苦乃至怨憎會苦能夠顯示苦苦，因為它們順應苦受的法則，是苦的自相。愛別離苦和求不得苦能夠顯示壞苦，因為已得到或未得到的順應樂受的法則，是壞的自相。概括來說，一切五取蘊的苦能夠顯示行苦，因為它們不解脫於二種無常所帶來的不安穩的意義。解釋說，二種無常指的是：一是生位的苦，也就是苦苦；二是滅位的苦，也就是壞苦。生和滅這兩個階段都被無常所包含，所以叫做二種無常。
『論。九種命終心等者。按對法第五云。相續力者。有九種命終心。與自體愛相應。於三界中各令欲．色．無色』這段話是說，九種命終心等等。按照《對法論》第五卷所說，相續力指的是有九種命終心，與自體愛相應，在三界（trayo dhātavaḥ）中分別使欲界、色界、無色界...
【English Translation】 English version: 『非行支者初句牒救。后句正破.』 This sentence means that first, the opponent's view is cited for defense, and then it is directly refuted. The opponent's defense is: According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, the arising of the three evil destinies is due to discrimination. From the perspective of initiating different retributions, the opponent's intention can be understood.
『疏。又此中二說者。解此三斷兩師是也.』 This sentence means that there are two different explanations for these three severances (severance by seeing, severance by cultivation, and non-severance), referring to the views of two different teachers.
『疏。彼人至余見斷者。顯異熟愚修斷所以。所以者何。瑜伽既云迷俗真諦發非福等。對法復以俗．真二苦攝於八苦。七苦既事。異熟愚迷發非福行。故異熟愚唯修所斷。以迷事故。又對法第七云。由真實義愚發福．不動。真實義者即四聖諦（catvāri-ārya-satyāni）。于彼愚癡名真實義愚。故知瑜伽世．勝二愚迷事理別。故修．見斷二有不同 問準對法等迷異熟愚既是迷事。斯愚修斷理契通途。疏何見責 答按對法論。釋異熟愚云。由彼一向是染污性。無明（avidyā）合時必不容受信解異熟行相正見。準此論文豈唯迷事俱生惑耶。由斯疏斥不違教理.』 This passage explains why vipāka-mūḍha (ignorance due to fruition) is severed by cultivation. What is the reason? The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that being deluded about conventional truth and ultimate truth leads to the arising of non-meritorious actions, etc. The Abhidharmasamuccaya also includes the two kinds of suffering arising from conventional truth and ultimate truth within the eight sufferings. Since the seven sufferings are matters of fact, vipāka-mūḍha is deluded about facts and initiates non-meritorious actions. Therefore, vipāka-mūḍha can only be severed through cultivation because it is caused by delusion. Furthermore, the seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that due to ignorance of the true meaning, meritorious actions and unwavering actions arise. The true meaning is the Four Noble Truths. Ignorance of the Four Noble Truths is called ignorance of the true meaning. Therefore, it can be known that the conventional ignorance and ultimate ignorance in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra differ in their delusion about facts and principles, so severance by cultivation and severance by seeing are also different. Question: If, according to treatises such as the Abhidharmasamuccaya, delusion about vipāka-mūḍha is delusion about facts, then severing this ignorance through cultivation is universally applicable in principle. Why does the commentary criticize this? Answer: According to the explanation in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, vipāka-mūḍha is because it has always been of a defiled nature, and when combined with avidyā (ignorance), it is impossible to accept and understand the correct view of the characteristics of fruition. According to this passage, is it merely a co-arisen delusion arising from delusion about facts? Therefore, the commentary's refutation does not contradict the teachings.
『疏。第六七是壞者。按對法論第六說云。三苦．八苦展轉相攝。所謂生苦乃至怨憎會苦能顯苦苦。順苦受法苦自相義故。愛別離苦．求不得苦能顯壞苦。已得未得順樂受法壞自相義故。略攝一切五取蘊（pañca-upādāna-skandha）苦能顯行苦。不解脫二無常所隨不安穩義故 釋曰。二無常者。一生位苦。謂苦苦。二滅位苦。謂壞苦。生．滅二位皆無常攝。名二無常.』 This passage explains that the sixth and seventh are the suffering of decay. According to the sixth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the three sufferings and the eight sufferings are mutually inclusive. Among them, the suffering of birth to the suffering of encountering what is disliked can manifest the suffering of suffering because they accord with the law of suffering, which is the self-nature of suffering. The suffering of separation from loved ones and the suffering of not obtaining what is desired can manifest the suffering of decay because what has been obtained or not yet obtained accords with the law of pleasant feeling, which is the self-nature of decay. In summary, the suffering of all five aggregates of clinging can manifest the suffering of formation because they are not liberated from the unstable meaning brought about by the two kinds of impermanence. The explanation says that the two kinds of impermanence refer to: first, the suffering of the stage of arising, which is the suffering of suffering; second, the suffering of the stage of cessation, which is the suffering of decay. The stages of arising and cessation are both included in impermanence, so they are called the two kinds of impermanence.
『論。九種命終心等者。按對法第五云。相續力者。有九種命終心。與自體愛相應。於三界中各令欲．色．無色』 This passage refers to the nine kinds of consciousness at the time of death, etc. According to the fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the power of continuity refers to the nine kinds of consciousness at the time of death, which are associated with self-love, and in the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ), they respectively cause the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm...
界生相續。謂從欲界沒還生欲界者。即以欲界自體愛相應命終心結生相續。若生色．無色界者。即以色．無色界自體愛相應命終心結生相續。如是從色．無色界沒。若即生彼。若生余處。有六種心如其所應盡當知。又此自體愛唯是俱生。不了所緣境。有覆無記性攝。
疏。有說及無相沒者。即前第七無想天沒無心師義。
疏。此非因等起者。此六識等但由煩惱間生名雜。非以煩惱為因等起方得雜名。又諸無記法等者舉例證成。無記與惑相間名雜。非據因起。識等名雜類亦應然。
疏。既爾至亦自然無者。既由前理諸生上聖下地善等。雖未斷彼雜煩惱法。然彼善等亦名得斷。自然無者。顯不由雜煩惱無故而得斷也。
疏。如見道至亦名為斷者。舉見道惑自性強故。不由緣縛而稱為斷。例彼善等緣縛強無即名為斷。雖見緣縛與善等雜煩惱有別。以俱非強取以為喻亦無其失。有義其緣縛斷及雜縛斷。並依六識非第七識。故離欲者離此地者。諸不染法即名得斷。如不斷下得不還果不障果故。此亦應然。但約六識諸惑勝故。能發潤故。自地斷者即名為斷。若如疏說唯約緣者亦未善通。下地第七若緣若縛俱未離故 詳曰。唯約能緣何非善通。雖下第七能緣縛在能所緣狹。然欲善等從寬而說云斷何失。若以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 界生相續，指的是從欲界死亡后還生到欲界的情況。這是以欲界自身的愛（自體愛）相應的臨終心（命終心）和結生相續。如果生到色界或無色界，則是以色界或無色界自身的愛相應的臨終心和結生相續。同樣地，從色界或無色界死亡后，如果直接生到彼處，或者生到其他地方，有六種心，應當如其所應地完全瞭解。而且，這種自體愛僅僅是俱生的，不能明瞭所緣境，屬於有覆無記的性質。
疏：有說及無相沒者，指的是前面第七無想天死亡時沒有心識的情況。
疏：此非因等起者，指的是這六識等只是由於煩惱的間雜而產生，稱為雜，並非以煩惱為原因而生起，才得到雜的名稱。又諸無記法等者，這是舉例來證明，無記法與迷惑相互間雜，稱為雜，並非根據因緣生起。識等被稱為雜類也應該是這樣。
疏：既爾至亦自然無者，既然根據前面的道理，諸如生到上界、聖者生到下地、善法等，即使沒有斷除那些雜染的煩惱法，然而那些善法等也稱為得到了斷除。自然無者，顯示不是由於雜染煩惱的消失而得到斷除。
疏：如見道至亦名為斷者，這是舉見道所斷的迷惑自性強盛的緣故，不由緣縛而稱為斷。例如那些善法等，緣縛強盛，沒有了就稱為斷。雖然見道的緣縛與善法等雜染煩惱有所區別，但因為都不是強盛的，所以用作比喻也沒有什麼不妥。有一種觀點認為，緣縛的斷除和雜縛的斷除，都是依據六識，而不是第七識。所以，離欲者，離開此地者，諸不染污的法就稱為得到了斷除。如同不斷除下地的煩惱也能得到不還果，不障礙果位的獲得一樣，這裡也應該是這樣。只是就六識而言，諸惑強盛，能夠發起和滋潤，所以在自地斷除的就稱為斷除。如果像疏文所說，僅僅就緣縛而言，也未見得完全通達。下地的第七識，無論是緣還是縛，都沒有離開。 詳曰：僅僅就所能緣的來說，為什麼不是善於通達呢？雖然下地的第七識能緣的束縛還在，能緣和所緣的範圍狹窄。然而，欲界的善法等從寬泛的角度來說，稱為斷除又有什麼過失呢？如果以
【English Translation】 English version: 'The continuity of realms' refers to the situation where one dies in the Desire Realm and is reborn in the Desire Realm. This is the continuity of the dying mind (命終心) and the rebirth-linking (結生) associated with the self-love (自體愛) of the Desire Realm itself. If one is born in the Form Realm (色界) or Formless Realm (無色界), it is the continuity of the dying mind and rebirth-linking associated with the self-love of the Form Realm or Formless Realm itself. Similarly, when one dies in the Form Realm or Formless Realm, if one is born directly there, or born elsewhere, there are six types of minds, which should be fully understood as appropriate. Moreover, this self-love is only innate (俱生), unable to clearly perceive the object of perception (所緣境), and belongs to the nature of 'covered unwholesome' (有覆無記).
Commentary: 'Those who say and those who die without form' refers to the case where there is no consciousness at the death of the seventh Non-Perception Heaven (無想天).
Commentary: 'This is not caused by co-arising' means that these six consciousnesses (六識) are only produced due to the intermingling of afflictions (煩惱), and are called 'mixed' (雜). They are not called 'mixed' because they arise from afflictions as a cause. 'Also, all unwholesome dharmas, etc.' is an example to prove that unwholesome dharmas intermingling with delusion are called 'mixed', not based on causal arising. The same should be true for consciousnesses being called 'mixed categories'.
Commentary: 'Since it is so, even naturally without' means that, according to the previous reasoning, such as being born in higher realms, sages being born in lower realms, good dharmas, etc., even if they have not eradicated those defiled afflictive dharmas, those good dharmas are still said to have been eradicated. 'Naturally without' shows that it is not because the defiled afflictions have disappeared that eradication is attained.
Commentary: 'Like the Path of Seeing, it is also called eradication' is an example of the afflictions eradicated by the Path of Seeing (見道) being strong in nature, and are called eradicated without being bound by conditions. For example, those good dharmas, etc., are strongly bound by conditions, and are called eradicated when they are gone. Although there is a difference between the conditional binding of the Path of Seeing and the defiled afflictions of good dharmas, etc., there is nothing wrong with using them as a metaphor because neither is strong. One view is that the eradication of conditional binding and the eradication of mixed binding are both based on the six consciousnesses, not the seventh consciousness. Therefore, those who are free from desire, those who leave this realm, all undefiled dharmas are said to have been eradicated. Just as one can attain the non-returning fruit (不還果) without eradicating the afflictions of the lower realm, not hindering the attainment of the fruit, the same should be true here. It is only in terms of the six consciousnesses that the afflictions are strong, capable of initiating and nourishing, so those eradicated in one's own realm are called eradicated. If, as the commentary says, it is only in terms of conditional binding, it is not entirely clear. The seventh consciousness of the lower realm, whether it is the condition or the binding, has not been left behind. Detailed explanation: Why is it not skillful to understand only in terms of what can be conditioned? Although the binding of the seventh consciousness in the lower realm is still present, the scope of what can be conditioned is narrow. However, the good dharmas of the Desire Realm, etc., are broadly said to be eradicated, so what is the fault? If with
緣雜唯依六識。緣．雜二種攝法不盡。第七煩惱非二攝故。若言緣．雜攝彼七識善等。而言離緣．雜者。唯據六識。若爾何妨緣雜之言目七識惑。欲善等斷據彼能緣寬者無說。由斯疏旨理固無違。
疏。既爾如何由之名有漏等者。此難意云。斷既不由雜煩惱無。得成有漏應不由彼 詳曰。今為二釋。一既有斯妨。即約六識解雜煩惱。當地六識煩惱雜無。當地善等名得離縛。二成漏由漏俱。善等由七漏。斷縛據強緣。雜在善等斷 若爾何故云善等斷由斷緣彼雜彼煩惱 答善斷有二。一小分斷。二全分斷。言離欲等欲善名斷。據小分斷。言由斷雜名為斷者。依全分斷。無學滿位緣雜二惑皆悉無故。
疏。是見體者是縛非見者非者。惠與五見為體應斷。非五見體非自性斷。
疏。由此十等者。遍行．別境合而言也。
疏。無想定至因亡果喪者。問唯依外道方起此定。入見便舍外道依身定永不起 何故不名果喪因亡 答疏示方隅舉三惡起別報善業果喪因亡。顯定亦爾。然恐有執定唯果喪因亡一義故。更舉之因亡果喪顯通二義。不爾何故在此果喪因亡下辨。
疏。雖有七生至不定者。此問意云。得預流已欲極七生更不生上無慾第八。此即全離上界有支。云何得言無全斷者 其答意云。亦有預流而
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：緣和雜兩種作用僅僅依賴於六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。緣和雜兩種作用並不能完全涵蓋所有法，因為第七識（末那識）的煩惱不被這兩種作用所包含。如果說緣和雜涵蓋了第七識的善等法，那麼說『離開緣和雜』就僅僅是指六識。如果這樣，那麼用『緣雜』來指代第七識的迷惑又有什麼妨礙呢？想要善等法斷除，就根據它們能緣的寬泛程度來判斷，沒有什麼可說的。因此，疏文的旨意在理上並沒有衝突。
疏文：既然這樣，為什麼說『由之』這個名稱是有漏等呢？這個問題的意思是說，斷除煩惱既然不是通過雜煩惱來實現的，那麼就無法成就『有漏』，應該不是通過那些（雜煩惱）來實現的。詳細解釋說，現在有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是，既然有這樣的妨礙，就按照六識來解釋雜煩惱。在六識的層面，煩惱雜亂消失，在六識的層面，善等法就叫做『得到解脫』。第二種解釋是，成就『有漏』是因為與『漏』同時存在，善等法是因為第七識的『漏』。斷除束縛是根據強大的『緣』。雜煩惱在善等法斷除時也被斷除。如果這樣，為什麼說善等法的斷除是因為斷除了緣，從而斷除了那些雜煩惱呢？回答說，善的斷除有兩種：一種是小部分的斷除，一種是全部分的斷除。說『離開慾望』等，慾望和善被稱為『斷除』，是根據小部分的斷除。說『通過斷除雜煩惱』被稱為『斷除』，是依據全部分的斷除。在無學位的圓滿狀態，緣和雜兩種迷惑都完全消失了。
疏文：是見之體的是被束縛的，不是見之體的就不是被束縛的。慧與五見（身見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）為體，應該被斷除。不是五見之體的，就不是自性斷除。
疏文：由此十等，是指遍行（一切心中皆有的心理作用）和別境（只在特定情況下產生的心理作用）合在一起說的。
疏文：無想定乃至因亡果喪。問：只有依靠外道才能生起這種禪定。進入見道后就捨棄了外道的依身，禪定永遠不會再生起。為什麼不叫做果喪因亡呢？答：疏文只是指出了一個方面，舉出三惡道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）生起不同的報應，善業的果報喪失，原因是造惡業。顯示禪定也是這樣。然而，恐怕有人執著于禪定只有果喪因亡這一種含義，所以再次舉出因亡果喪，顯示通達兩種含義。不然的話，為什麼在這裡果喪因亡之後進行辨析呢？
疏文：雖有七生乃至不定。這個問題是說，得到預流果（須陀洹）后最多經歷七次生死，不會再生到更高的第八界（指色界和無色界）。這也就是完全離開了上界的有支（存在的因素）。怎麼能說沒有完全斷除呢？回答的意思是說，也有預流果的人...
【English Translation】 English version: 'Condition' and 'Mixture' rely solely on the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness). 'Condition' and 'Mixture' do not fully encompass all dharmas, because the afflictions of the seventh consciousness (Manas-consciousness) are not included in these two functions. If it is said that 'Condition' and 'Mixture' encompass the good dharmas of the seventh consciousness, then saying 'apart from Condition and Mixture' refers only to the six consciousnesses. If so, what is the harm in using 'Condition and Mixture' to refer to the delusion of the seventh consciousness? If one wants good dharmas to be eliminated, then judge according to the breadth of their ability to condition, there is nothing to say. Therefore, the meaning of the commentary does not conflict in principle.
Commentary: Since this is the case, why is the name 'by it' called 'with outflows' (having defilements)? The meaning of this question is that since the elimination of afflictions is not achieved through mixed afflictions, then 'having outflows' cannot be achieved, and it should not be achieved through those (mixed afflictions). Detailed explanation: Now there are two explanations. The first explanation is that since there is such an obstacle, explain mixed afflictions according to the six consciousnesses. At the level of the six consciousnesses, the mixed afflictions disappear, and at the level of the six consciousnesses, good dharmas are called 'liberated'. The second explanation is that the achievement of 'having outflows' is because it exists simultaneously with 'outflows', and good dharmas are because of the 'outflows' of the seventh consciousness. The elimination of bondage is based on the powerful 'condition'. Mixed afflictions are also eliminated when good dharmas are eliminated. If so, why is it said that the elimination of good dharmas is because the condition is eliminated, thereby eliminating those mixed afflictions? The answer is that there are two types of elimination of good: one is the elimination of a small part, and the other is the elimination of the whole part. Saying 'leaving desire' etc., desire and good are called 'elimination', which is based on the elimination of a small part. Saying 'through the elimination of mixed afflictions' is called 'elimination', which is based on the elimination of the whole part. In the complete state of the Arhat position, both the condition and the mixed delusions completely disappear.
Commentary: That which is the substance of view is bound, and that which is not the substance of view is not bound. Wisdom and the five views (self-view (Satkayadrishti), extreme view (Antagrahadrishti), wrong view (Mithyadrishti), view of holding to views (Drishtipararamarsha), and view of holding to precepts (Silavrataparamarsha)) are the substance, and should be eliminated. That which is not the substance of the five views is not eliminated by nature.
Commentary: 'Therefore, these ten etc.' refers to pervasive (present in all minds) and specific (arising only in specific situations) mental functions combined.
Commentary: 'Non-thinking Samadhi' to 'the cause is lost and the effect is lost'. Question: Only by relying on external paths can this samadhi arise. After entering the path of seeing, one abandons the external path's reliance on the body, and the samadhi will never arise again. Why is it not called the loss of effect and the loss of cause? Answer: The commentary only points out one aspect, citing the three evil realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals) arising from different retributions, the good karma's effect is lost because of creating evil karma. It shows that samadhi is also like this. However, fearing that some may cling to the idea that samadhi only has the meaning of the loss of effect and the loss of cause, it is cited again to show the understanding of both meanings. Otherwise, why is the analysis carried out here after the loss of effect and the loss of cause?
Commentary: 'Although there are seven births to uncertain'. The question is that after attaining the Stream-enterer fruit (Sotapanna), one experiences at most seven births and will not be reborn in the higher eighth realm (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm). This is completely leaving the factors of existence in the upper realms. How can it be said that there is no complete elimination? The meaning of the answer is that there are also Stream-enterers...
得不還得生上界。由此不得云全斷也。
論。十二全分行苦所攝等者。此同瑜伽六十六說。按彼論云。謂後有業煩惱所生諸行。于彼彼自體中能隨順。生一切煩惱及與眾苦。所有安立一切遍行粗重所攝。亦名粗重是行苦性。依此行苦略五取蘊皆名為苦。又此行苦遍三受中。然于舍受此粗重性分明顯現。是故但說不苦樂受由行苦故。譬如熱癰。以冷觸對即生樂想。熱灰墮上便生苦想。若二俱離爾時唯有癰自性苦分明顯現。又行苦性中樂如冷對。苦如灰墮。舍如離二癰自性苦。
疏。集是有報義者。大論五十五云。問苦諦義云何。答煩惱所生行義。問集諦義云何。答能生苦諦。
疏。大論第十至文同此者。疏所引文乍讀難解今具引之。問幾支苦諦攝及現法為苦。答二。謂生及老死。問幾支苦諦攝當來為苦。答識支乃至受種子性。問幾支集諦攝。答所餘支。
論。無明望行至有餘二緣者。有義問云。無明望行既非同類。如何得有等無間緣。答一云理實但與行俱無明為無間緣。然行俱者業眷屬故亦名為業。故說與行為無間緣。二云同聚異體展轉得作無間緣故。若如前解福．不動行非無明俱。如何成緣。故后說勝。問如非福行亦無明俱。如何望行為等無間。答總依諸行說有此緣。今此不言望三種行皆成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：是否還會再次投生到上界？由此看來，是否可以認為完全斷絕了輪迴？
論：『十二全分行苦所攝等者』，這與《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷所說相同。按照該論的說法：由後有業（bhava-karma，導致未來存在的業）和煩惱所生的諸行（samskara，心理活動），在它們各自的自體中，能夠隨順產生一切煩惱以及各種痛苦。所有安立的一切遍行粗重（sarvatraga-kayika-duhkha，普遍存在的身體上的痛苦）所攝，也稱為粗重，是行苦（samskara-duhkha，由心理活動產生的痛苦）的性質。依據這種行苦，略而言之，五取蘊（panca-upadanakkhandha，構成經驗的五個要素）都可稱為苦。而且這種行苦遍及三種感受（vedana，感覺）之中，但在舍受（upeksa-vedana，不苦不樂的感受）中，這種粗重的性質才分明地顯現出來。因此只說不苦不樂的感受是由行苦造成的。譬如熱癰（一種面板病），用冷的觸覺來應對，就會產生快樂的想法；熱灰掉在上面，便會產生痛苦的想法；如果兩者都離開，那麼此時只有癰的自性苦分明地顯現出來。又，行苦的性質中，快樂就像冷的應對，痛苦就像灰的掉落，舍受就像離開兩者，癰的自性苦。
疏：『集是有報義者』，《大毗婆沙論》第五十五卷說：問：苦諦（duhkha-satya，關於痛苦的真理）的含義是什麼？答：煩惱所生的行為的含義。問：集諦（samudaya-satya，關於痛苦根源的真理）的含義是什麼？答：能夠產生苦諦。
疏：『大論第十至文同此者』，疏中所引用的文字乍一看難以理解，現在完整地引用如下：問：幾支（anga，構成要素）屬於苦諦所攝，並且是現法為苦？答：兩支，即生（jati，出生）和老死（jaramarana，衰老和死亡）。問：幾支屬於苦諦所攝，並且是當來為苦？答：識支（vijnana-skandha，意識）乃至受種子性（vedana-bija，感受的種子）。問：幾支屬於集諦所攝？答：其餘的支。
論：『無明望行至有餘二緣者』，有人問：無明（avidya，無知）望行（samskara，心理活動）既然不是同類，如何能夠有等無間緣（samanantarapratyaya，緊隨其後的因緣）？答：一種說法是，實際上只是與行俱生的無明才作為無間緣。然而與行俱生的，因為是業的眷屬，所以也稱為業。因此說與行為無間緣。另一種說法是，同聚異體的法可以輾轉作為無間緣。如果像前面的解釋，福行（punya-samskara，善業）和不動行（aninjya-samskara，禪定業）不是與無明俱生的，如何能成為因緣？所以後面的說法更勝一籌。問：如果非福行（apunya-samskara，惡業）也不是與無明俱生的，如何望行為等無間？答：總的來說，是依據諸行來說有這種因緣。現在這裡沒有說望三種行都能成就。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Will one still be reborn in the upper realms? Does this mean that the cycle of rebirth is completely severed?
Treatise: 'The twelve full divisions are encompassed by the suffering of formations, etc.' This is the same as what is said in the sixty-sixth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. According to that treatise: The formations (samskara, mental activities) produced by karma (bhava-karma, actions leading to future existence) and afflictions, in their respective own-natures, can accordingly produce all afflictions and various sufferings. All that is established, all pervasive grossness (sarvatraga-kayika-duhkha, universally present bodily suffering) encompassed, is also called grossness, and is the nature of the suffering of formations (samskara-duhkha, suffering arising from mental activities). Based on this suffering of formations, briefly speaking, the five aggregates of clinging (panca-upadanakkhandha, the five elements constituting experience) can all be called suffering. Moreover, this suffering of formations pervades the three feelings (vedana, sensations), but in neutral feeling (upeksa-vedana, neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensation), this nature of grossness is clearly manifested. Therefore, it is only said that neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling is caused by the suffering of formations. For example, a hot boil (a skin disease), when treated with a cold touch, will produce a pleasant thought; hot ashes falling on it will produce a painful thought; if both are removed, then only the self-nature of the boil's suffering is clearly manifested. Furthermore, in the nature of the suffering of formations, pleasure is like the cold treatment, suffering is like the falling of ashes, and neutral feeling is like being separated from both, the self-nature of the boil's suffering.
Commentary: 'Accumulation has the meaning of retribution,' the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Mahavibhasa-sastra says: Question: What is the meaning of the truth of suffering (duhkha-satya, the truth about suffering)? Answer: The meaning of actions produced by afflictions. Question: What is the meaning of the truth of accumulation (samudaya-satya, the truth about the origin of suffering)? Answer: That which can produce the truth of suffering.
Commentary: 'The tenth fascicle of the Great Treatise to the text is the same as this,' the text cited in the commentary is difficult to understand at first glance, now it is fully cited as follows: Question: How many limbs (anga, elements) are encompassed by the truth of suffering, and are suffering in the present life? Answer: Two limbs, namely birth (jati, birth) and old age and death (jaramarana, aging and death). Question: How many limbs are encompassed by the truth of suffering, and are suffering in the future? Answer: The element of consciousness (vijnana-skandha, consciousness) up to the seed-nature of feeling (vedana-bija, the seed of sensation). Question: How many limbs are encompassed by the truth of accumulation? Answer: The remaining limbs.
Treatise: 'Ignorance looking towards formations up to the remaining two conditions,' someone asks: Since ignorance (avidya, ignorance) looking towards formations (samskara, mental activities) are not of the same kind, how can there be immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya, immediately preceding cause)? Answer: One explanation is that, in reality, only ignorance that arises together with formations serves as the immediately preceding condition. However, that which arises together with formations, because it is a member of the retinue of karma, is also called karma. Therefore, it is said to be the immediately preceding condition for formations. Another explanation is that phenomena of different entities within the same aggregate can reciprocally serve as the immediately preceding condition. If it were as the previous explanation, meritorious actions (punya-samskara, meritorious deeds) and imperturbable actions (aninjya-samskara, meditative deeds) do not arise together with ignorance, how can they become conditions? Therefore, the latter explanation is superior. Question: If non-meritorious actions (apunya-samskara, non-meritorious deeds) also do not arise together with ignorance, how can they be the immediately preceding condition looking towards formations? Answer: Generally speaking, it is based on all formations that this condition exists. Now, it is not said here that looking towards the three kinds of actions can all be accomplished.
無間。望福不動成無間故。非福應思 詳曰。觀后問意其非福行既無明俱。即是無明無明為緣。答意可悉。
今助一解。前聚心品望后聚品總為無間。無明望行為無間緣。不約別對后無明說。由斯但說無明望行為無間緣故無有失。
論。此中且依至如理應思者。若其不實假緣起者如對法說。按彼第四云。如無明望行前生習氣故得為因緣。由彼熏習相續所生諸業能造後有故。當於爾時現行無明能引發故為等無間緣。由彼引發差別諸行流轉相續生故。思惟彼故為所緣緣。以此計最勝等。不如理思惟。緣愚癡位為境界故。彼俱有故為增上緣。由彼增上力合相應思顛倒緣境而造作故。如是一切隨其所應盡當知。
論。由悲願力至故名變易者。問按攝大乘雲。菩薩留惑證一切智。今云悲願能招于生得至佛果豈不相違。又生但由悲願而致何用煩惱。不退菩薩而不斷耶 答七地以前用受分段。八地已去不障道故所以不斷 若爾應非是染污法。染污法者何不斷耶 答如末那惑雖最後除亦得名染此亦無失。又能助所知合變易續故不斷之 若爾二乘無學回心應無變易。煩惱無故 答有惑習氣能為助緣亦受變易。且依初釋。
疏。第八十至亦得受變易者。按彼論云。複次迴向菩提聲聞。或於學位即能棄捨求聲聞愿。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無間（Ānantarya）。因為希望福報不動搖而成就無間狀態。如果不是福報，就應該思考。詳細地說，觀察後面的提問，如果不是福報的行為，既然沒有光明，那就是無明（Avidyā）。因為無明為緣。答案的意思可以理解。
現在我來輔助解釋一下。前面的聚心品希望後面的聚品總合成為無間。無明希望行為無間緣。不特別針對後面的無明來說。因此只說無明希望行為無間緣，沒有缺失。
論：這裡且依據如理應思者。如果是不真實的假緣起，就像《對法》（Abhidharma）所說。按照《對法》第四卷所說：『如無明希望行為前生習氣，因此可以作為因緣。由於那種熏習相續所產生的諸業能夠造作後有。』所以在那個時候，現行無明能夠引發，所以是等無間緣。由於那種引發差別諸行流轉相續產生，所以思惟那個是所緣緣。用這個來計算最殊勝等等，不如理思惟。因為愚癡的地位為境界，所以是境界。因為它們俱有，所以是增上緣。由於那種增上力，合相應思顛倒緣境而造作。像這樣一切都應該根據它們各自的情況來了解。
論：由於悲願力乃至名為變易者。問：按照《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）所說，菩薩保留迷惑來證得一切智（Sarvajñā）。現在說悲願能夠招致于生，得到佛果（Buddha-phala），難道不是相互矛盾嗎？而且生只是由於悲願而導致，那要煩惱做什麼？不退轉菩薩（Avaivartika-bodhisattva）為什麼不斷除煩惱呢？答：七地以前用受分段生死，八地以後不障礙菩提道，所以不斷除。如果這樣，那應該不是染污法。染污法為什麼不斷除呢？答：就像末那識（Manas）的迷惑雖然最後才去除，也可以叫做染污，這也沒有缺失。而且能夠幫助所知障合變易生死相續，所以不斷除。如果這樣，二乘（Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha）的無學（Aśaikṣa）迴心應該沒有變易生死，因為沒有煩惱。答：有惑習氣能夠作為助緣，也接受變易生死。且依據最初的解釋。
疏：第八十乃至也得到變易生死者。按照那部論所說：『再次迴向菩提的聲聞，或者在有學位就能捨棄求聲聞的願望。』
【English Translation】 English version Ānantarya (無間). Because of hoping that blessings will not be shaken and thus achieving the state of Ānantarya. If it is not blessings, then one should contemplate. To elaborate, observing the subsequent question, if it is not the practice of blessings, since there is no light, then it is Avidyā (無明, ignorance). Because Avidyā is the condition. The meaning of the answer can be understood.
Now I will assist in explaining. The preceding chapter on the collection of mind hopes that the subsequent chapters will collectively become Ānantarya. Avidyā hopes that action is the condition for Ānantarya. It is not specifically directed at the subsequent Avidyā. Therefore, only saying that Avidyā hopes that action is the condition for Ānantarya, there is no deficiency.
Treatise: Here, it is based on 'one should contemplate according to reason'. If it is an unreal, false dependent origination, as stated in the Abhidharma (對法). According to the fourth volume of the Abhidharma: 'Like Avidyā hoping that action is the habit of previous lives, therefore it can be regarded as a causal condition. Because the karmas produced by that kind of habitual continuity can create subsequent existence.' So at that time, the current Avidyā can initiate, so it is the immediately preceding condition. Because that kind of initiation differentiates the continuous arising of actions, so contemplating that is the object-support condition. Using this to calculate the most supreme, etc., is not contemplating according to reason. Because the state of ignorance is the object, so it is the object. Because they are co-existent, so it is the dominant condition. Because of that dominant force, together with the corresponding thought, the inverted view conditions the object and creates. Like this, everything should be understood according to their respective situations.
Treatise: Because of the power of compassion and vows, even to be named transformation. Question: According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論), Bodhisattvas retain delusion to attain Sarvajñā (一切智, all-knowing wisdom). Now it is said that compassion and vows can lead to birth and attain Buddhaphala (佛果, Buddha fruit), isn't that contradictory? Moreover, birth is only caused by compassion and vows, then what is the use of afflictions? Why don't the Avaivartika-bodhisattvas (不退轉菩薩, non-regressing Bodhisattvas) eliminate afflictions? Answer: Before the seventh Bhumi (地), one uses the suffering of segmented life and death. After the eighth Bhumi, it does not obstruct the path to Bodhi, so it is not eliminated. If so, then it should not be a defiled dharma. Why is the defiled dharma not eliminated? Answer: Like the delusion of Manas (末那識), although it is removed last, it can also be called defiled, and there is no deficiency in this. Moreover, it can help the obstruction of the knowable and combine with the continuous transformation of life and death, so it is not eliminated. If so, the turning of mind of the Arhats (無學, no more to learn) of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha, 二乘) should not have the transformation of life and death, because there are no afflictions. Answer: There are habitual tendencies of delusion that can serve as auxiliary conditions, and they also accept the transformation of life and death. And it is based on the initial explanation.
Commentary: The eightieth, even to receive the transformation of life and death. According to that treatise: 'Again, the Śrāvakas (聲聞) who turn towards Bodhi, or in the state of learning, can abandon the desire to seek the Śrāvaka path.'
或無學位方能棄捨。由彼根性有差別故。所待眾緣有差別故。
疏。舍蟲身者。分段生身名為蟲身身有蟲故。大般若三百二十六．四百四十八云。善現不退菩薩身心清凈。非如常人身中恒為八萬戶蟲之所侵食。所以者何。是諸菩薩善根增上出過世間。所受身形內外清凈。故無蟲類侵食其身。如如善根漸漸增益。如是如是身心轉凈。由此因緣是諸菩薩身心堅固猶若金剛。不為違緣之所侵惱。
疏。十卷楞伽等者。疏雖粗釋初學猶迷。今依古德逐難略解。理惠之心證法相應有寂滅意。名三昧樂。顯生身因。由入三昧能現身故。復由三昧安住心海見自心境。忘心轉識波浪識相而不生起。或見自境顯由忘識不生方知。第二身文疏引下盡。而經次云。妙華莊嚴迅疾如意。猶如幻夢水中月鏡中像。非四大生似四大相具足身份。一切修行得如意自在。隨入諸佛國土大眾 釋曰。以無性惠悟此理故。得如幻定能覺諸法悉如幻等。菩薩所起意生之身。相好端妙如華莊嚴。有為緣生故如像等。言如實覺知諸法相。亦起身因 第三身云種類生等者 釋曰。應物現形形非一故名為種類。隨感齊發名曰俱生。起不加功稱無作行。無作行等為起身因。身名種類俱生等也。
疏。即非擇者復更生義者。身若及業已得非擇更無重起。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 或者沒有獲得學位的人才能捨棄（這些）。由於他們的根性（指眾生本具的佛性）有差別，所依賴的各種因緣也有差別。
疏解：捨棄蟲身的人，分段生死的身體被稱為蟲身，因為身體里有蟲。在《大般若經》第三百二十六卷和第四百四十八卷中說：『善現（須菩提，佛陀的弟子）！不退轉的菩薩身心清凈，不像普通人那樣身體里經常有八萬戶蟲侵蝕。這是什麼原因呢？因為這些菩薩的善根增長，超過了世間，所接受的身體內外清凈，所以沒有蟲類侵蝕他們的身體。像這樣，善根漸漸增長，身心也像這樣漸漸清凈。因為這個因緣，這些菩薩的身心堅固，就像金剛一樣，不會被違逆的因緣所侵擾。』
疏解：《十卷楞伽經》等，疏解雖然粗略解釋，初學者仍然迷惑。現在依照古代大德的解釋，逐個解答難題。理智和智慧的心與證悟的法相應，有寂滅的意境，稱為三昧樂（禪定帶來的快樂）。這顯示了生身（由意念產生的身體）的原因。因為進入三昧能顯現身體。又因為三昧能安住在心海中，見到自己的心境，忘記心，轉化識的波浪，使識相不再生起。或者見到自己的境界顯現，因為忘記識不再生起才能知道。第二身（意生身）的文義，疏解引用到這裡結束。而經文接著說：『妙華莊嚴，迅疾如意，猶如幻夢、水中月、鏡中像，不是四大（地、水、火、風）所生，但具有四大之相，具足身體各部分。一切修行者得到如意自在，隨意進入諸佛的國土大眾之中。』解釋說：因為用無性的智慧領悟了這個道理，所以得到如幻的禪定，能覺悟諸法都如幻等。菩薩所生起的意生身，相貌端正美妙，如用妙華裝飾。因為是有為的因緣所生，所以如映象等。說如實覺知諸法之相，也是起身（意生身）的原因。第三身（變化身）說種類生等，解釋說：應物而現形，形體不是唯一的，所以稱為種類。隨著感應同時發生，名叫俱生。生起時不用加功，稱為無作行。無作行等是起身的原因。身名叫種類俱生等。
疏解：『即非擇滅』又產生意義，身體和業如果已經得到非擇滅（通過智慧斷滅煩惱），就不會再次產生。
【English Translation】 English version Or those without degrees are able to abandon (these). It is because their root nature (referring to the inherent Buddha-nature of all beings) is different, and the various conditions they rely on are also different.
Commentary: Those who abandon the worm body, the body of segmented life and death is called the worm body because there are worms in the body. In the 'Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra', volumes 326 and 448, it says: 'Subhuti (a disciple of the Buddha)! Non-regressing Bodhisattvas have pure body and mind, unlike ordinary people whose bodies are constantly invaded by 80,000 households of worms. What is the reason for this? It is because these Bodhisattvas' roots of goodness have increased and surpassed the world, and the bodies they receive are pure inside and out, so no worms invade their bodies. Like this, as the roots of goodness gradually increase, the body and mind also gradually become pure. Because of this cause, these Bodhisattvas' bodies and minds are firm, like diamond, and will not be disturbed by adverse conditions.'
Commentary: 'The Ten-Volume Lankavatara Sutra', etc., although the commentary explains it roughly, beginners are still confused. Now, according to the explanations of ancient virtuous ones, I will answer the difficult questions one by one. The mind of reason and wisdom corresponds to the Dharma of enlightenment, and has the state of tranquility and extinction, which is called the bliss of Samadhi (the joy brought by meditation). This shows the cause of the manifested body (the body produced by intention). Because entering Samadhi can manifest the body. Also, because Samadhi can dwell in the sea of mind, see one's own state of mind, forget the mind, transform the waves of consciousness, so that the appearances of consciousness no longer arise. Or see one's own realm manifest, because forgetting consciousness no longer arises, one can know. The meaning of the second body (the mind-made body), the commentary quotes to here. And the sutra then says: 'Adorned with wonderful flowers, swift and as desired, like illusions, the moon in water, images in a mirror, not born of the four elements (earth, water, fire, wind), but possessing the appearance of the four elements, complete with all parts of the body. All practitioners obtain wish-fulfilling freedom, and freely enter the lands and assemblies of all Buddhas.' The explanation says: Because one understands this principle with the wisdom of no-self-nature, one obtains illusion-like Samadhi, and can realize that all dharmas are like illusions, etc. The mind-made body produced by Bodhisattvas is upright and beautiful in appearance, like adorned with wonderful flowers. Because it is born of conditioned causes, it is like images, etc. Saying that one truly knows the appearance of all dharmas is also the cause of the arising of the body (mind-made body). The third body (transformation body) says 'born of kinds', etc., the explanation says: Responding to things and manifesting forms, the forms are not unique, so it is called 'kinds'. Arising simultaneously with the feeling, it is called 'co-born'. Arising without effort, it is called 'uncreated action'. Uncreated action, etc., is the cause of the arising of the body. The body is called 'kinds', 'co-born', etc.
Commentary: 'That is, non-selective extinction' again produces meaning, if the body and karma have already obtained non-selective extinction (extinguishing afflictions through wisdom), they will not arise again.
由此但資感身之業令身不斷。準此疏文更字之下脫一無字 或不脫也。且未延前令得百年。百年外命得非擇滅。由后延故百年外命而得相續。故云非擇復更生也。非擇許生如后疏辨。且依后釋。
疏。不同小乘熏禪等法者。此唯無漏。彼漏無漏。故有別也。或小熏禪而更造業。今但資業故云不同。
疏。今雖無文至理不違者。望能得人得彼四定。自所得中最殊勝者即名邊際。若望他自下不知上。下人云何名得邊際。邊際不得何得變易。由斯不可望自他言。
論。既未圓證至猛利悲願者。問執彼菩提可是法執。執于有情何非我執 答若執有情一．常．主宰可我非法。但執有體不捨自性故但法收。
論。又所知障為有漏依者。問前言有漏由與漏俱。云何復云由所知障 答若成有漏必由漏俱。與漏為依必藉斯障。成漏成依二義既別。前後無違。
論。若所留身有漏定愿等者。正解如疏 有義二乘故意以無漏定資何不得。然無大悲大願力故無漏力弱。故所資身但名分段。不爾熏禪定唯有漏 詳曰。論既明言豈以人情抑而不從。又彼熏禪與留身事而義不同。謂熏禪者資異地因生異地果難故。可容無漏定熏。延壽但延此報前因。何得相例。復所延果而非永固。與變易生而不齊等。故可依論。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，僅僅憑藉資助身體的業力，就能使身體不斷延續。參照這段疏文，『更』字下面脫落了一個『無』字，或者沒有脫落。而且，如果未能延續之前的業力，就無法獲得百年的壽命。百年之後，壽命的終結並非是『擇滅』（Pratisankhya-nirodha，通過智慧抉擇而達到的滅盡）。由於後續業力的延續，百年之後的壽命得以相續，所以說『非擇』（Apratisankhya-nirodha，非通過智慧抉擇而達到的滅盡）之後又會再生。『非擇』允許再生，如後面的疏文所辨析。暫且依照後面的解釋。
疏文：『不同於小乘的熏禪等法』，是因為這裡僅僅是無漏（Anasrava，沒有煩惱的），而小乘既有有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱的）也有無漏，所以有區別。或者小乘的熏禪會再次造業，而現在僅僅是資助業力，所以說不同。
疏文：『現在雖然沒有經文依據，但道理上不違背』，是期望能夠有人獲得彼四禪定（Catur-dhyana，色界四種禪定）。在自己所獲得的禪定中，最殊勝的就叫做『邊際』。如果以下位的人不知上位的境界，下位的人怎麼能說獲得了『邊際』？沒有獲得『邊際』，又怎麼能變易？因此，不可以從自身和他人的角度來說。
論：『既然沒有圓滿證得猛利的悲願』，問：執著于菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）可以算是法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著），執著于有情（Sattva，眾生）為什麼不是我執（Atma-graha，對自我的執著）？答：如果執著于有情是『一』（Eka，單一的）、『常』（Nitya，永恒的）、『主宰』（Isvara，具有支配力的），那就可以算是我執而非『法』。但僅僅是執著于有情的自體，不捨棄其自性，所以只歸於『法』的範疇。
論：『又，所知障（Jnana-avarana，對所知事物的障礙）是有漏的所依』，問：前面說有漏是因為與『漏』（Asrava，煩惱）俱生，為什麼又說是由所知障？答：如果成就了有漏，必定是由與『漏』俱生；作為『漏』的所依，必定憑藉這個障礙。成就『漏』和作為『依』，這兩個含義既然不同，前後就沒有矛盾。
論：『如果所留下的身體是有漏的、定愿等』，正確的解釋如疏文。有人認為，二乘（Sravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）故意用無漏定來資助身體，為什麼不行？然而，因為沒有大悲心和大願力，無漏的力量很弱，所以所資助的身體只能稱為『分段』（Samghata，由業力所感召的生死）。否則，熏禪定就只有有漏了。詳細地說，論中既然已經明確說明，怎麼能用人的主觀臆斷來壓制而不遵從呢？而且，那個熏禪與留下身體的事情，意義不同。所謂熏禪，是資助異地的因，產生異地的果，很難做到，可以容許用無漏定來熏修。而延續壽命，僅僅是延續這個報身之前的原因，怎麼能相提並論？而且，所延續的果報並非永恒穩固，與變易生（Parinama，變化）並不完全相同，所以可以依據論典。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, merely by relying on the karma that supports the body, the body can be continuously maintained. According to this commentary, a 'no' character is missing below the character 'geng' (更), or it may not be missing. Moreover, if one fails to extend the previous karma, one cannot obtain a lifespan of a hundred years. After a hundred years, the end of life is not 'Pratisankhya-nirodha' (cessation through wisdom). Due to the continuation of subsequent karma, life after a hundred years can continue, so it is said that after 'Apratisankhya-nirodha' (cessation not through wisdom), there will be rebirth. 'Apratisankhya-nirodha' allows rebirth, as explained in the subsequent commentary. Let's temporarily follow the later explanation.
Commentary: 'Different from the practices of Sravakas's meditative absorptions, etc.' This is because this is only Anasrava (without defilements), while the Sravakas have both Sasrava (with defilements) and Anasrava, so there is a difference. Or the Sravakas's meditative absorptions may create karma again, but now it is only supporting karma, so it is said to be different.
Commentary: 'Although there is no textual basis now, it does not violate the principle.' It is hoped that someone can obtain those four Dhyanas (Catur-dhyana, the four meditative absorptions of the Form Realm). Among the meditative absorptions one has obtained, the most excellent is called 'the limit'. If a lower person does not know the state of a higher person, how can a lower person say that they have obtained 'the limit'? If one has not obtained 'the limit', how can there be transformation? Therefore, one cannot speak from the perspective of oneself and others.
Treatise: 'Since one has not fully realized the fierce compassion and vows.' Question: Holding onto Bodhi (enlightenment) can be considered Dharma-graha (attachment to the Dharma), why is holding onto Sattva (sentient beings) not Atma-graha (attachment to self)? Answer: If one holds onto sentient beings as 'Eka' (one), 'Nitya' (eternal), and 'Isvara' (sovereign), then it can be considered Atma-graha rather than 'Dharma'. But merely holding onto the substance of sentient beings, without abandoning its own nature, it is only categorized as 'Dharma'.
Treatise: 'Also, Jnana-avarana (the obscuration of knowledge) is the basis of Sasrava.' Question: Earlier it was said that Sasrava is due to being together with Asrava (defilements), why is it now said to be due to Jnana-avarana? Answer: If Sasrava is achieved, it must be due to being together with Asrava; as the basis of Asrava, it must rely on this obscuration. Since the two meanings of achieving 'defilements' and being the 'basis' are different, there is no contradiction between the previous and the subsequent.
Treatise: 'If the body left behind is Sasrava, vows of Samadhi, etc.' The correct explanation is as in the commentary. Some argue that the Sravakas deliberately use Anasrava Samadhi to support the body, why is it not possible? However, because there is no great compassion and great vows, the power of Anasrava is weak, so the body supported can only be called 'Samghata' (segmental, birth and death caused by karma). Otherwise, the meditative absorptions would only be Sasrava. In detail, since the treatise has clearly stated it, how can one suppress it with human speculation and not follow it? Moreover, that meditative absorptions and the matter of leaving the body are different in meaning. The so-called meditative absorptions are to support the cause of a different place, producing the fruit of a different place, which is difficult to achieve, and it is permissible to cultivate with Anasrava Samadhi. However, extending life is merely extending the previous cause of this retribution body, how can they be compared? Moreover, the fruit extended is not eternally stable, and it is not completely the same as Parinama (change), so one can rely on the treatise.
成唯識論演秘卷第八(終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1833 成唯識論演秘
成唯識論演秘卷第七(本)
沙門智周撰
論。此所妄執至自性差別者。問法中自性差別可知。我二云何 答但總為我名為自性。遍常等差名為差別。即離蘊等皆悉準知。亦即因明我為自性差別等也。
論。皆似所取能取現故者。問何以得知似能．所取皆名為執 答無性攝論第四云。依他起者。謂依業．煩惱．所取．能取．遍計隨念而得起故 又云如前所說身等諸識所取能取虛妄分別安立為性 又云譬如鹿愛自相續力安立似水。所取能取邪遍計性當知名為依他起性。以此故知。有二取者皆名為執 問所執二相為俱．不俱 答有義此文是總。理實隨心執能取時有能取相。所取亦爾。非一切時執二取故。
論。說阿賴耶至為所緣故者。問此欲證何 答有義二釋。一證能熏有漏七識皆有其執。二通證八。說能生因皆有執故 問此師第六許有二執。二執俱不 答有義二釋。一云同護法。二云不俱。如第七我無法執故。
論。計度分別能遍計故者。此同無著攝論所說。無性釋云。當知意識是能遍計有分別故者。由有顯示．隨念分別所雜糅故 釋曰。雜糅即是相應俱起義也。意識由與二分別俱故能分
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《成唯識論演秘》卷第八（終） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1833 《成唯識論演秘》
《成唯識論演秘》卷第七（本）
沙門智周 撰
論：此所妄執至自性差別者。問：法中自性差別可知，我二云何？答：但總為『我』名為自性，遍常等差名為差別。即離蘊等皆悉準知。亦即因明『我』為自性差別等也。
論：皆似所取能取現故者。問：何以得知似能、所取皆名為執？答：無性《攝論》第四云：『依他起者，謂依業、煩惱、所取、能取、遍計隨念而得起故。』又云：『如前所說身等諸識所取能取虛妄分別安立為性。』又云：『譬如鹿愛自相續力安立似水。所取能取邪遍計性當知名為依他起性。』以此故知，有二取者皆名為執。問：所執二相為俱、不俱？答：有義此文是總，理實隨心執能取時有能取相，所取亦爾。非一切時執二取故。
論：說阿賴耶至為所緣故者。問：此欲證何？答：有義二釋。一證能熏有漏七識皆有其執。二通證八，說能生因皆有執故。問：此師第六許有二執，二執俱不？答：有義二釋。一云同護法（Dharmapala）。二云不俱。如第七我無法執故。
論：計度分別能遍計故者。此同無著（Asanga）《攝論》所說。無性（Vasubandhu's commentator）釋云：『當知意識是能遍計有分別故者，由有顯示、隨念分別所雜糅故。』釋曰：雜糅即是相應俱起義也。意識由與二分別俱故能分
【English Translation】 English version: Cheng Weishi Lun Yan Bi Scroll 8 (End) Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43, No. 1833 Cheng Weishi Lun Yan Bi
Cheng Weishi Lun Yan Bi Scroll 7 (Original)
Composed by Shramana Zhizhou
Treatise: 'This falsely grasped to self-nature difference.' Question: 'Self-nature difference in Dharma is knowable, what about the two 'I's (self)?' Answer: 'Simply taking 'I' as a whole is called self-nature, pervasive, constant, and graded differences are called difference. That is, departing from the skandhas (aggregates) and so on, all should be understood accordingly. That is, in Hetuvidya (logic), 'I' is also self-nature difference and so on.'
Treatise: 'All appear as if they are the grasped and the grasper.' Question: 'How do we know that seeming grasper and grasped are both called grasping?' Answer: Vasubandhu's commentator's She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana) fourth says: 'Dependent arising means arising dependent on karma, afflictions, the grasped, the grasper, and conceptual imputation following thought.' It also says: 'As previously said, the grasped and grasper, which are the consciousnesses of the body and so on, are established as the nature of false discrimination.' It also says: 'For example, a deer loves its own continuous power and establishes the appearance of water. The grasped and grasper, which are the nature of perverse conceptual imputation, should be known as the nature of dependent arising.' Therefore, it is known that those who have two graspers are all called grasping. Question: 'Are the two aspects of what is grasped simultaneous or not simultaneous?' Answer: 'Some say this text is general. In reality, when the mind grasps the grasper, there is the aspect of the grasper, and the same is true for the grasped. It is not that the two graspers are grasped at all times.'
Treatise: 'Saying Alaya (store consciousness) to being the object.' Question: 'What is this trying to prove?' Answer: 'Some explain it in two ways. First, it proves that the seven consciousnesses with outflows that can be perfumed all have their grasping. Second, it generally proves all eight, saying that the causes that can produce all have grasping.' Question: 'Does this teacher allow two graspers in the sixth consciousness, are the two graspers simultaneous?' Answer: 'Some explain it in two ways. One says it is the same as Dharmapala (護法). The other says they are not simultaneous, such as the seventh consciousness having no grasping of Dharma.'
Treatise: 'Conceptual discrimination is able to conceptually impute.' This is the same as what Asanga (無著) said in the She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana). Vasubandhu's commentator (無性) explains: 'It should be known that the mind consciousness is able to conceptually impute because it has discrimination, because it is mixed with display and recollection discrimination.' Explanation: 'Mixing means the meaning of corresponding and arising together. The mind consciousness is able to discriminate because it is together with two discriminations.'
別。顯示即是計度異名。亦名思擇 論用自名言熏習為種子者。無始生死所有意識戲論名言熏習種子為此生因 釋曰。顯自見分所熏種子。是自現行親生因體。論及用一切識名言熏習為種子者。謂無邊色等影識名言熏習種子為因似彼生故。是故一切無邊行相分別而轉 釋曰。緣十八界及他識等。相分之中熏成種者總名用他。由斯意識似一切生。故有無邊行相而轉。非五．八識得有斯事。
論。執我法者必是惠故者。問護法五識得與惠俱。今者難他豈不自噬。答有義兩釋。一云五識無勝惠故劣不能執。二云此因唯難第八 詳曰。夫有執者必有惠俱。不言有惠皆是其執。由彼有漏心皆許執。故以無惠而為難也。故二解者未為善釋。然不離難思之可悟。
疏。準二十釋至亦有法執者。二十唯識明他心智通漏．無漏。釋彼無漏他心智者而有三義。一師解彼菩薩無漏他心智體亦有法執。論云不知如佛智者明知有執。不知即是無知之義。由彼無知猶未斷故而蔽於心故不如佛。
疏。安陀偈師義者。按彼經云。若無明．諸見一相者。應無練解．凡佛非二。所以者何。煩惱同一體相故。何以故。而共一心生滅一時不別不異故。佛子若縛．解一相者。四大可為一。六味應不異。而大異故縛．解亦如是。佛子一切菩薩。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：『顯示即是計度異名。亦名思擇』——意思是說，『顯示』實際上是『計度』（kalpana，虛妄分別）的另一個名稱，也可以叫做『思擇』（vicara，推求、尋求）。 論：『用自名言熏習為種子者。無始生死所有意識戲論名言熏習種子為此生因』——意思是說，以自身名言熏習作為種子。從無始生死以來，所有意識的虛妄分別和名言熏習的種子，都是產生這種『顯示』的原因。 釋曰：『顯自見分所熏種子。是自現行親生因體。論及用一切識名言熏習為種子者。謂無邊色等影識名言熏習種子為因似彼生故。是故一切無邊行相分別而轉』——解釋說，『顯示』是自身見分所熏習的種子，是自身現行（現象的生起）最直接的原因。論中說，用一切識的名言熏習作為種子，指的是無邊的色等影像和意識的名言熏習的種子，因為『顯示』類似於它們而產生。因此，一切『顯示』都伴隨著無邊的行相分別而運轉。 釋曰：『緣十八界及他識等。相分之中熏成種者總名用他。由斯意識似一切生。故有無邊行相而轉。非五．八識得有斯事』——解釋說，緣於十八界（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根，色、聲、香、味、觸、法六境，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識六識）以及其他眾生的識等，在相分（現象的客體部分）中熏習而成的種子，總稱為『用他』。由於這種意識類似於一切事物的產生，所以具有無邊的行相而運轉。這不是前五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）和第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）所能做到的。 論：『執我法者必是惠故者』——意思是說，凡是執著于『我』（ātman，自我）和『法』（dharma，事物）的人，必定伴隨著『惠』（慧，prajñā，智慧）。 問：『護法五識得與惠俱。今者難他豈不自噬』——提問：護法（Dharmapāla）認為前五識可以與『惠』同時存在，現在用這個觀點來反駁別人，難道不是自相矛盾嗎？ 答：『有義兩釋。一云五識無勝惠故劣不能執。二云此因唯難第八』——回答：對此有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是，前五識沒有殊勝的『惠』，因為能力不足，所以不能產生執著。第二種解釋是，這個原因只是用來反駁第八識（阿賴耶識）。 詳曰：『夫有執者必有惠俱。不言有惠皆是其執。由彼有漏心皆許執。故以無惠而為難也。故二解者未為善釋。然不離難思之可悟』——詳細解釋說，凡是有執著的人，必定伴隨著『惠』。但不能說有『惠』就一定有執著。因為那些有漏心（受煩惱污染的心）都被認為是具有執著的。所以用沒有『惠』來作為反駁的理由。因此，以上兩種解釋都不是很好的解釋。然而，其中蘊含著難以思議的道理可以領悟。 疏：『準二十釋至亦有法執者。二十唯識明他心智通漏．無漏。釋彼無漏他心智者而有三義。一師解彼菩薩無漏他心智體亦有法執。論云不知如佛智者明知有執。不知即是無知之義。由彼無知猶未斷故而蔽於心故不如佛』——根據《成唯識論》二十頌的解釋，也存在『法執』的情況。《成唯識論》闡明了他心智（paracitta-jñāna，知曉他人內心的智慧）可以是有漏的，也可以是無漏的。解釋無漏的他心智有三種含義。其中一種解釋是，某些論師認為菩薩的無漏他心智的本體也存在『法執』。《論》中說，『不知道像佛陀那樣的智慧』，明確說明了存在執著。『不知道』就是無知的意思。由於這種無知還沒有斷除，所以遮蔽了菩薩的心，因此不如佛陀。 疏：『安陀偈師義者。按彼經云。若無明．諸見一相者。應無練解．凡佛非二。所以者何。煩惱同一體相故。何以故。而共一心生滅一時不別不異故。佛子若縛．解一相者。四大可為一。六味應不異。而大異故縛．解亦如是。佛子一切菩薩』——安陀偈師（Andhakavinda）的含義是，根據那部經的說法，如果無明（avidyā，對事物真相的無知）和各種見解（邪見）是同一相狀，那麼就不應該有修習和解脫，凡夫和佛陀也就沒有區別了。為什麼呢？因為煩惱是同一體相的緣故。為什麼呢？因為它們共同在一個心中生滅，同時存在，沒有區別也沒有差異的緣故。佛子，如果束縛和解脫是同一相狀，那麼四大（地、水、火、風）就可以成為一體，六味（酸、甜、苦、辣、咸、淡）也應該沒有差異。但是它們有很大的差異，所以束縛和解脫也是如此。佛子，一切菩薩……
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: 'Display is another name for conceptualization. It is also called deliberation' - This means that 'display' is actually another name for 'kalpana' (conceptualization, false discrimination), and can also be called 'vicara' (investigation, seeking). Treatise: 'Using self-verbal habituation as a seed means that the seeds of verbal habituation of all consciousness's delusive discriminations from beginningless samsara are the cause of this arising' - This means using self-verbal habituation as a seed. From beginningless samsara, the seeds of all consciousness's delusive discriminations and verbal habituation are the cause of the arising of this 'display'. Explanation: 'Display is the seed habituated by its own seeing-portion, which is the direct cause of its own manifestation. The treatise says that using the verbal habituation of all consciousnesses as a seed refers to the seeds of verbal habituation of boundless forms and other images and consciousnesses, because 'display' arises similar to them. Therefore, all 'display' operates with boundless aspects of discrimination.' - The explanation says that 'display' is the seed habituated by its own seeing-portion, which is the most direct cause of its own manifestation (the arising of phenomena). The treatise says that using the verbal habituation of all consciousnesses as a seed refers to the seeds of verbal habituation of boundless forms and other images and consciousnesses, because 'display' arises similar to them. Therefore, all 'display' operates with boundless aspects of discrimination. Explanation: 'Conditioning the seeds within the object-portion, which is related to the eighteen realms and other consciousnesses, is generally called 'using others'. Because this consciousness resembles the arising of all things, it operates with boundless aspects. This is not something that the first five consciousnesses or the eighth consciousness can do.' - The explanation says that conditioning the seeds within the object-portion (the objective part of phenomena), which is related to the eighteen realms (the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; the six sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma; and the six consciousnesses: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) and other beings' consciousnesses, is generally called 'using others'. Because this consciousness resembles the arising of all things, it operates with boundless aspects. This is not something that the first five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) and the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) can do. Treatise: 'Those who cling to self and dharma must have wisdom' - This means that whoever clings to 'ātman' (self) and 'dharma' (things) must be accompanied by 'prajñā' (wisdom). Question: 'Does Dharmapāla's five consciousnesses coexist with wisdom? Isn't it self-defeating to refute others now?' - Question: Dharmapāla believes that the first five consciousnesses can coexist with 'wisdom'. Isn't it self-contradictory to use this view to refute others now? Answer: 'There are two explanations. One says that the five consciousnesses do not have superior wisdom, so they are inferior and cannot cling. The other says that this cause only refutes the eighth consciousness.' - Answer: There are two explanations for this. The first explanation is that the first five consciousnesses do not have superior 'wisdom', so they are incapable of clinging due to their limited ability. The second explanation is that this reason is only used to refute the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). Detailed explanation: 'Those who cling must have wisdom. It is not said that all who have wisdom are clinging. Because those defiled minds are all considered to have clinging. Therefore, the lack of wisdom is used as a reason for refutation. Therefore, the two explanations above are not good explanations. However, there are inconceivable principles within them that can be understood.' - A detailed explanation says that whoever has clinging must be accompanied by 'wisdom'. But it cannot be said that having 'wisdom' necessarily means having clinging. Because those defiled minds (minds contaminated by afflictions) are all considered to have clinging. Therefore, the lack of 'wisdom' is used as a reason for refutation. Therefore, the two explanations above are not good explanations. However, there are inconceivable principles within them that can be understood. Commentary: 'According to the twentieth verse explanation, there is also dharma-clinging. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only clarifies that other-minds-wisdom can be defiled or undefiled. There are three meanings in explaining undefiled other-minds-wisdom. One teacher explains that the substance of a Bodhisattva's undefiled other-minds-wisdom also has dharma-clinging. The treatise says, 'Not knowing wisdom like the Buddha's clearly shows clinging.' Not knowing means ignorance. Because this ignorance has not yet been eliminated, it obscures the Bodhisattva's mind, so it is not like the Buddha's.' - According to the explanation of the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, there is also the case of 'dharma-clinging'. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only clarifies that paracitta-jñāna (other-minds-wisdom, the wisdom of knowing others' minds) can be defiled or undefiled. There are three meanings in explaining undefiled other-minds-wisdom. One explanation is that some teachers believe that the substance of a Bodhisattva's undefiled other-minds-wisdom also has 'dharma-clinging'. The treatise says, 'Not knowing wisdom like the Buddha's' clearly shows clinging. 'Not knowing' means ignorance. Because this ignorance has not yet been eliminated, it obscures the Bodhisattva's mind, so it is not like the Buddha's. Commentary: 'The meaning of Andhakavinda is that, according to that sutra, if ignorance and all views are of the same nature, then there should be no practice and liberation, and ordinary beings and Buddhas would be no different. Why? Because afflictions are of the same nature. Why? Because they arise and cease together in one mind, existing simultaneously, without distinction or difference. Disciple of the Buddha, if bondage and liberation are of the same nature, then the four elements could become one, and the six flavors should be no different. But they are very different, so bondage and liberation are also like that. Disciple of the Buddha, all Bodhisattvas...' - The meaning of Andhakavinda is that, according to that sutra, if avidyā (ignorance, unknowing of the true nature of things) and all views (wrong views) are of the same nature, then there should be no practice and liberation, and ordinary beings and Buddhas would be no different. Why? Because afflictions are of the same nature. Why? Because they arise and cease together in one mind, existing simultaneously, without distinction or difference. Disciple of the Buddha, if bondage and liberation are of the same nature, then the four elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) could become one, and the six flavors (sour, sweet, bitter, spicy, salty, and bland) should be no different. But they are very different, so bondage and liberation are also like that. Disciple of the Buddha, all Bodhisattvas...
為凡夫時具足一切結。而斷時粗分先去細分后除。若一心煩惱一者。不應明．闇有二。佛子復以近況遠。凡凡夫善心中尚無不善。何況無相心中有無明。佛子而言善惡一心者。是萍沙王國中外道安陀師偈。明闇一相善惡一心。
論。識品雖二至故言彼彼者。此等分別如疏所指論等廣明不可具錄。今隨所要而略列之。七十三中二遍計者。按彼論云。無差別者謂遍計一切法所有名。有差別者謂遍計此名為色等諸法各各所有別名。釋總計諸名為實有故名無差別 又加行執等者。一加行執者復有五種。貪嗔．合會．別離．及舍 釋曰。以此加行而起執也。貪．嗔如次為會．別離二加行也。二名施設執復有二種。謂非文字．文字所作。非文字所作者。謂執此為何物云何此物此物是何此物云何。文字所作者。謂執此為此物此物如是。謂五蘊．三性．為無為等。顯揚同也 又分別自體等者。八分別中當明相攝 又隨覺等者。釋曰。如次現．種。是能遍計心所計之境 又按七十三。計自相等四差別云。謂計三科諸法自性名計自性 謂計色等一切諸法有見無見無漏漏等一切差別種種道理名計差別 謂計色等一切諸法是彼各各三界三性漏無漏等心心所取名計所取 謂計色等能取色等。及計心．心所能取諸法名計能取 又依名計義等者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 當凡夫的時候，就具備了一切煩惱結縛。在斷除這些結縛時，粗顯的部分先去除，細微的部分後去除。如果說一心之中同時存在煩惱，那麼就不應該有光明和黑暗的對立。佛子又用近處的情況來推斷遠處的情況，說凡夫在善心生起的時候，尚且不能完全沒有不善的念頭，更何況在無相的心中會有無明呢？佛子所說的善惡一心，是萍沙王國中外道安陀師所說的偈頌，認為光明和黑暗是同一相，善和惡是同一心。
論：『識品雖然有二，但因為它們的作用是相同的，所以說「彼彼」。』這些分別，就像疏文所指出的論典中詳細說明的那樣，不能全部記錄下來。現在根據需要，簡略地列出一些。七十三種法相中的兩種遍計所執性，按照《瑜伽師地論》的說法：『無差別』是指遍計一切法所共有的名稱；『有差別』是指遍計此名稱為色等諸法各自所特有的名稱。解釋為：總計諸法名稱為實有，所以稱為『無差別』。
又，加行執等：一、加行執，又有五種，即貪、嗔、合會、別離以及舍。解釋為：憑藉這些加行而生起執著。貪和嗔依次是合會和別離這兩種加行。二、名施設執，又有兩種，即非文字所作和文字所作。非文字所作者，是指執著『這是什麼東西？』『這個東西是怎樣的？』『這個東西是什麼？』『這個東西是怎樣的？』文字所作者，是指執著『這是這個東西』『這個東西是這樣的』，例如五蘊、三性、有為和無為等。《顯揚聖教論》的說法相同。
又，分別自體等：八種分別將在後面說明相攝關係。又，隨覺等：解釋為：依次是現和種，是能遍計的心所計度的境界。又，按照七十三種法相，計自相等四種差別，是指：計度三科諸法的自性，名為計自性；計度色等一切諸法有見無見、有漏無漏等一切差別種種道理，名為計差別；計度色等一切諸法是彼各各三界三性、有漏無漏等心心所取，名為計所取；計度色等能取色等，以及計度心心所能取諸法，名為計能取。又，依名計義等：
【English Translation】 English version When an ordinary person (fanfu) is in the state of being an ordinary person, they are fully equipped with all the bonds (jie). When these bonds are severed, the grosser aspects are removed first, and the subtler aspects are removed later. If one mind (yi xin) can simultaneously contain afflictions (fannao), then there should not be the duality of light and darkness. The Buddha's disciple (Fozi) uses a near analogy to infer a distant one, saying that even when a good thought arises in an ordinary person's mind, it is still not completely free of unwholesome thoughts. How much more so would there be ignorance (wuming) in a mind that is without characteristics (wuxiang)? The Buddha's disciple's statement that good and evil are of one mind is a verse spoken by the heretic Anduo Shi in the kingdom of Pingsha, who believed that light and darkness are of the same nature, and good and evil are of the same mind.
Treatise: 'Although the consciousness category (shipin) has two aspects, because their functions are the same, they are referred to as "those".' These distinctions, as detailed in the commentaries pointed out in the subcommentaries, cannot all be recorded here. Now, according to what is needed, some are briefly listed. Among the seventy-three dharmas, the two kinds of completely conceptualized natures (bianji suo zhixing), according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yujia shidi lun), are: 'Non-differentiation' refers to the names common to all dharmas that are completely conceptualized; 'Differentiation' refers to the specific names that are completely conceptualized for each dharma, such as form (se) and so on. It is explained as: comprehensively considering the names of all dharmas as truly existing, hence the name 'Non-differentiation'.
Furthermore, the actions of attachment (jiaxing zhi), etc.: First, the actions of attachment have five types: greed (tan), aversion (chen), union (hehui), separation (bieli), and relinquishment (she). It is explained as: attachment arises through these actions. Greed and aversion are, in order, the two actions of union and separation. Second, the attachment to nominal designations (ming shishe zhi) has two types: non-verbal and verbal. Non-verbal refers to the attachment to 'What is this?' 'How is this thing?' 'What is this thing?' 'How is this thing?' Verbal refers to the attachment to 'This is this thing' 'This thing is like this,' such as the five aggregates (wuyun), the three natures (sanxing), conditioned (youwei) and unconditioned (wuwei), etc. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Xianyang shengjiao lun) says the same.
Furthermore, distinguishing self-nature (ziti), etc.: The eight distinctions will be explained later in terms of their interrelationship. Furthermore, subsequent awareness (suijue), etc.: It is explained as: sequentially, manifestation (xian) and seed (zhong), which are the objects measured by the mind that is capable of complete conceptualization. Furthermore, according to the seventy-three dharmas, the four distinctions of measuring self-nature, etc., refer to: measuring the self-nature of the three categories of dharmas, called measuring self-nature; measuring all the various principles of all dharmas such as form, visible and invisible, with outflows and without outflows, called measuring distinctions; measuring all dharmas such as form, each of the three realms and three natures, with outflows and without outflows, taken by the mind and mental factors, called measuring what is taken; measuring form, etc., which can take form, etc., and measuring the mind and mental factors that can take all dharmas, called measuring what can take. Furthermore, relying on names to measure meanings, etc.:
。按無性攝論第五本云。一依名遍計義自性。謂如是名有如是義。二依義遍計名自性。謂如是義有如是名。三依名遍計名自性。謂遍計度未了義名 釋曰。謂了其名未了彼事執名為實。故瑜伽云。謂不了色事分別色名。四依義遍計義自性。謂遍計度未了名義。五依二遍計二自性。謂遍計度此名此義如是體性 又按七十三計義自性等五種差別者。初義自性。有四差別。即前所引計能．所取等四種是也。二名自性。即前所引差．無差別二名是也。三染自性。謂計此色有貪．嗔．癡。不能遠離貪．瞋．癡系。又與一切善不相應。計余蘊等亦復如是。四凈自性反染應知。五非染凈。但計諸法是能所取 又顯揚十六第五加行。即是前二加行是也。六非文等亦同前二。故不重引 又按瑜伽論三十六等。八分別者分別色等種種自性名自性分別 分別色等有見無見三性三界三世對等一切道理名差別分別 總執一切情與非情假實諸法。因起分別名總執分別 依五蘊等而執為我及我所故。名我．我所二種分別 緣諸凈妙．可意之境。而生分別名愛分別 謂緣不凈．不可意境所起分別名非愛分別 緣凈不凈．可不可意俱離事境所生分別名俱相違分別 生三事者。初三分別生第一事。次二分別生第二事。后三分別生第三事 又攝論等十分別者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 根據《無性攝論》第五本所說，有五種遍計自性： 一、依名遍計義自性：指的是認為某個名稱就具有相應的意義，即『如是名有如是義』。 二、依義遍計名自性：指的是認為某個意義就具有相應的名稱，即『如是義有如是名』。 三、依名遍計名自性：指的是遍計度時，未能瞭解意義的名稱。解釋說，瞭解了名稱，卻未能瞭解其所指的事物，執著于名稱是真實的。所以《瑜伽師地論》說，『謂不了色事分別色名』，即不瞭解色法的事實，而只是分別色法的名稱。 四、依義遍計義自性：指的是遍計度時，未能瞭解名稱的意義。 五、依二遍計二自性：指的是遍計度時，認為此名稱和此意義具有這樣的體性，即『此名此義如是體性』。 另外，根據七十三種計義自性等，有五種差別： 一、義自性：有四種差別，即前面所引用的計能取（grasping faculty）、所取（grasped object）等四種。 二、名自性：即前面所引用的差別名和無差別名兩種。 三、染自性：指的是認為此色法具有貪（greed）、嗔（hatred）、癡（ignorance），不能遠離貪、嗔、癡的束縛，並且與一切善法不相應。認為其餘的蘊（skandha）等也是如此。 四、凈自性：與染自性相反，應當知道。 五、非染凈：只是認為諸法是能取和所取。 另外，《顯揚聖教論》第十六的第五加行，就是前面的兩種加行。 六、非文等也與前面的兩種相同，所以不再重複引用。 另外，根據《瑜伽師地論》第三十六等，有八種分別： 分別色等種種自性的，稱為名自性分別。 分別色等有見（visible）、無見（invisible）的三性（three natures）、三界（three realms）、三世（three times）等一切道理的，稱為差別分別。 總的執著一切有情（sentient beings）和非情（non-sentient things）、虛假和真實的諸法，因此而產生的分別，稱為總執分別。 依靠五蘊（five aggregates）等而執著為我（self）及我所（what belongs to self）的，稱為我、我所二種分別。 緣于諸種清凈美妙、令人喜愛的境界，而產生的分別，稱為愛分別。 緣于不清凈、不令人喜愛的境界，所產生的分別，稱為非愛分別。 緣于清凈與不清凈、可愛與不可愛都遠離的事物境界，所產生的分別，稱為俱相違分別。 產生三種事物：最初的三種分別產生第一種事物，其次的兩種分別產生第二種事物，最後的三種分別產生第三種事物。 另外，根據《攝大乘論》等，有十分別。
【English Translation】 English version: According to the fifth book of the Asamkhyeya Samgraha (Asamkhyeya Samgraha), there are five types of Parikalpita-svabhava (Parikalpita-svabhava: Imagined Nature): 1. Dependent on Name, the Parikalpita-svabhava of Meaning: This refers to the belief that a certain name inherently possesses a corresponding meaning, i.e., 'Such a name has such a meaning.' 2. Dependent on Meaning, the Parikalpita-svabhava of Name: This refers to the belief that a certain meaning inherently possesses a corresponding name, i.e., 'Such a meaning has such a name.' 3. Dependent on Name, the Parikalpita-svabhava of Name: This refers to the name that, during Parikalpita (Parikalpita: conceptualization), fails to understand the meaning. It is explained as understanding the name but failing to understand the thing it refers to, clinging to the name as real. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) says, 'Not understanding the matter of form, one distinguishes the name of form,' meaning not understanding the reality of form but merely distinguishing the name of form. 4. Dependent on Meaning, the Parikalpita-svabhava of Meaning: This refers to failing to understand the meaning of the name during Parikalpita. 5. Dependent on Both, the Parikalpita-svabhava of Both: This refers to believing that this name and this meaning possess such a nature during Parikalpita, i.e., 'This name and this meaning have such a nature.' Furthermore, according to the seventy-three types of conceptualized natures, there are five kinds of distinctions: 1. Nature of Meaning: There are four distinctions, namely the four types of grasping faculty (grahaka), grasped object (grahya), etc., mentioned earlier. 2. Nature of Name: This refers to the two types of names mentioned earlier, differentiated and undifferentiated. 3. Tainted Nature: This refers to believing that this form possesses greed (raga), hatred (dvesha), and ignorance (moha), being unable to escape the bonds of greed, hatred, and ignorance, and not being in accordance with all good dharmas. Believing that the other aggregates (skandha) etc., are also like this. 4. Pure Nature: The opposite of the tainted nature should be understood. 5. Neither Tainted nor Pure: Merely believing that all dharmas are the grasper and the grasped. Furthermore, the fifth practice of the sixteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) is the same as the previous two practices. 6. Non-textual and so on are also the same as the previous two, so they are not repeated. Furthermore, according to the thirty-sixth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra), there are eight kinds of discriminations: Discriminating the various natures of form, etc., is called name-nature discrimination. Discriminating all the principles of form, etc., such as visible (sanidarsana) and invisible (anidarsana), the three natures (trisvabhava), the three realms (tridhatu), the three times (trikala), etc., is called differentiated discrimination. The discrimination that arises from the general clinging to all sentient beings (sattva) and non-sentient things (asattva), false and real dharmas, is called general clinging discrimination. Clinging to the five aggregates (pancaskandha) etc., as self (atman) and what belongs to self (atmiya), is called the two kinds of discriminations of self and what belongs to self. The discrimination that arises from objects that are pure, wonderful, and pleasing is called love discrimination. The discrimination that arises from objects that are impure and unpleasing is called non-love discrimination. The discrimination that arises from objects that are both pure and impure, pleasing and unpleasing, is called mutually contradictory discrimination. Producing three things: the first three discriminations produce the first thing, the next two discriminations produce the second thing, and the last three discriminations produce the third thing. Furthermore, according to the Mahayana-samgraha (Mahayana-samgraha) etc., there are ten discriminations.
釋曰。十分別者是能分別 對法十中能所分別併名分別。如彼鈔會 按無性云。謂阿賴耶是余分別根本。自性亦是分別故名根本。緣相分別者。謂分別色等有如是相。顯相分別者。謂眼識等並所依識顯現似彼所緣相故 釋曰。眼等識者等取意識。所依識者謂即末那。即六轉識能現似彼所緣之相名顯相也 緣相變異分別者。謂似色等影識變異所起分別 釋曰。即所緣相而有變異。能緣分別從彼立名。謂老病．三受．貪嗔癡等為變易緣。令其身色而有變異。變異體者即色身等。如言樂故面端嚴等 顯相變異分別者。謂由眼等所依根故。令色等影像顯現。眼識等識種種變異。即於此中起諸分別。即如前說老等變異 釋曰。由所依根身等變異。令能依識亦有變異。舉彼顯現五塵境色。意取能緣分別之識。言老等者顯變異緣同於前也。余如疏引文相可知 又攝論中有十散動。一無相。二有相。三增益。四損滅。五一性。六異性。七自性。八差別。九如名取義。十如義取名散動。為對治此十種散動。一切般若波羅蜜多中說無分別智 釋曰。散動即是分別異名 又對法十二說見無見十者。此即二十八見中收。今故不引 又七十七有十種相。十八空除者。彼論甚廣。今略引云。有十種相。空能除遣 一了知法義有文字相。一切法空正能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：解釋說，『十分別』指的是能進行分別的能力。在《對法論》的『十』中，能分別和所分別都被稱為『分別』，就像那裡的鈔會所說的一樣。按照無性菩薩的說法，阿賴耶識是其餘分別的根本，因為它的自性也是一種分別，所以被稱為根本。『緣相分別』指的是，分別色等事物具有這樣的相狀。『顯相分別』指的是，眼識等以及它們所依賴的識，顯現出類似於它們所緣的相狀。 解釋說，『眼等識』中的『等』包括了意識。『所依識』指的是末那識。這六種轉識能夠顯現出類似於它們所緣之相，這被稱為『顯相』。『緣相變異分別』指的是，類似於色等影像的識，由於變異而產生的分別。 解釋說，所緣之相發生了變異，能緣的分別因此而得名。例如，衰老、疾病、三種感受（苦、樂、舍）、貪婪、嗔恨、愚癡等是變易之緣，使得身體和容貌發生變異。變異的本體就是色身等。例如，人們常說因為快樂而面容端莊等。『顯相變異分別』指的是，由於眼等所依賴的根，使得色等影像顯現，眼識等識產生種種變異，因此而產生各種分別。就像前面所說的衰老等變異。 解釋說，由於所依賴的根身等發生變異，使得能依賴的識也發生變異。這裡舉出顯現的五塵境色，實際上指的是能緣分別的識。說『衰老等』，是爲了說明變異之緣與前面相同。其餘內容可以參考疏文中的引文，相互對照理解。另外，《攝大乘論》中有十種散動：一、無相；二、有相；三、增益；四、損滅；五、一性；六、異性；七、自性；八、差別；九、如名取義；十、如義取名散動。爲了對治這十種散動，一切《般若波羅蜜多經》中宣說了無分別智。 解釋說，散動就是分別的另一種說法。另外，《對法論》十二中說到的『見』和『無見』十種，這包含在二十八見中，所以現在不引用。另外，七十七有十種相，十八空可以去除這些相。那部論非常廣博，現在簡略地引用說，有十種相，空能夠去除：一、了知法義有文字相，一切法空能夠真正地去除。
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: 'Shi Fen Bie' (十分別) refers to the ability to discriminate. In the 'Ten' of the Abhidharma, both the discriminator and the discriminated are called 'discrimination,' as stated in the commentaries there. According to Asanga, the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識) is the root of other discriminations because its nature is also a kind of discrimination, hence it is called the root. 'Object-aspect discrimination' refers to discriminating that phenomena such as form have such characteristics. Explanation: 'Manifestation-aspect discrimination' refers to the eye-consciousness (眼識) and other consciousnesses, along with the consciousnesses they depend on, manifesting aspects similar to those they perceive. Explanation: 'Eye-consciousness, etc.' includes mind-consciousness (意識). 'Dependent consciousness' refers to Manas (末那). These six transformed consciousnesses can manifest aspects similar to those they perceive, which is called 'manifestation-aspect'. 'Object-aspect variation discrimination' refers to the discrimination arising from variations in consciousness that resemble images of form, etc. Explanation: The perceived object-aspect undergoes variation, and the discriminating consciousness is named accordingly. For example, aging, sickness, the three feelings (suffering, pleasure, and indifference), greed, hatred, delusion, etc., are the causes of variation, causing changes in the body and appearance. The substance of variation is the physical body, etc. For example, people often say that the face is dignified because of happiness. 'Manifestation-aspect variation discrimination' refers to the fact that due to the roots on which the eyes and other senses depend, images of form, etc., are manifested, and the eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses undergo various variations, thus giving rise to various discriminations. This is like the aforementioned variations such as aging. Explanation: Because the dependent root-body, etc., undergoes variation, the dependent consciousness also undergoes variation. Here, the manifested five sense objects are mentioned, but in reality, it refers to the discriminating consciousness. Saying 'aging, etc.' is to indicate that the causes of variation are the same as before. The rest can be understood by referring to the quotations in the commentary and comparing them with each other. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) contains ten kinds of distraction: 1. absence of characteristics; 2. presence of characteristics; 3. augmentation; 4. diminution; 5. oneness; 6. otherness; 7. self-nature; 8. difference; 9. grasping meaning according to name; 10. grasping name according to meaning. To counteract these ten kinds of distraction, the non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) is taught in all the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (般若波羅蜜多經). Explanation: Distraction is another name for discrimination. Furthermore, the 'seeing' and 'non-seeing' ten mentioned in the twelve of the Abhidharma are included in the twenty-eight views, so they are not quoted now. Furthermore, the seventy-seven existences have ten characteristics, which the eighteen emptinesses can remove. That treatise is very extensive, so now it is briefly quoted, saying that there are ten characteristics that emptiness can remove: 1. Knowing that the meaning of the Dharma has verbal characteristics, the emptiness of all phenomena can truly remove it.
除遣 二了安立真如義故有生滅等相續轉相。此由相空及先後空正能除遣 三了能取有顧戀身及我慢相。此由內空及無所得空能除遣 四了所取有顧財相由外空遣 五了受用男女承事．資具相應有內安樂外凈妙相。由內外空本性空遣 六了建立有無量相。大空能遣 七了無色有內寂靜解脫相有為空遣 八了相真如故有人法二無我相．識勝義相。畢竟無性．無性自性．及勝義空能正除遣 九了清凈真如有無為相無變異相。無為．無變二空除遣 十即于彼對治空性。作意思惟有空性相。此由空空能正除遣 又十二者按楞伽第四云。謂樂著種種言語美妙音聲名言語分別 謂作是思惟應有前法實事之相。聖人修行知依彼法生於言語名可知分別 謂即彼可知境界中。熱濕動堅種種相執以為實名相分別 謂樂金銀等種種實境界名義分別 謂專念有法自體形相。此法如是如是不異非正見見分別名自體分別 謂何等何等因。何等何等緣。有無了別因相生了別想名因分別 謂有無一異俱不俱邪見外道執著分別名見分別 謂取我我所相說虛妄法名建立分別 謂依眾緣有無法中生執著心名生分別 謂一切法本來不生。以本無故依因緣有而無因果名無生分別 謂何等何等法和合如金縷共。何等何等法和合名和合分別 謂縛因執著如所縛。如人方
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一、爲了安立真如的意義，所以有生滅等相續轉變的現象。這可以通過對相空的理解以及對先後空的理解來正確地去除。 二、爲了去除對能取的執著，包括對身體的顧戀以及我慢的現象。這可以通過內空以及無所得空來去除。 三、爲了去除對所取的執著，包括對財富的顧戀。這可以通過外空來去除。 四、爲了去除對受用的執著，包括對男女承事、資具相應的內心安樂和外在清凈美妙的現象。這可以通過內外空和本性空來去除。 五、爲了去除對建立有和無量現象的執著。這可以通過大空來去除。 六、爲了去除對無色界中內心寂靜解脫的現象，以及對有為法的執著。這可以通過有為空來去除。 七、爲了去除對相即是真如的執著，從而去除人法二無我的現象，以及對識勝義的執著。這可以通過畢竟無性、無性自性以及勝義空來正確地去除。 八、爲了去除對清凈真如的執著，包括對無為現象和無變異現象的執著。這可以通過無為空和無變空來去除。 九、爲了去除對作為對治的空性的執著，以及對空性本身的思惟。這可以通過空空來正確地去除。 另外十二種分別，根據《楞伽經》第四卷所說： 一、是樂於執著種種言語美妙的聲音和名言語的分別。 二、是作這樣的思惟：應該有前法真實存在的現象。聖人修行知道，依賴於這些法會產生言語名，從而可以進行分別。 三、是在可以認知的境界中，對熱、濕、動、堅等種種現象執著認為是真實的，稱為相分別。 四、是樂於執著金銀等種種真實的境界，稱為名義分別。 五、是專心念誦有法本身的形相。認為此法如此如此，沒有差異，這不是正確的見解，稱為自體分別。 六、是什麼樣的因，什麼樣的緣，對有和無進行了解，因為因相產生了解的想法，稱為因分別。 七、是對有無、一異、俱不俱等邪見，外道執著分別，稱為見分別。 八、是取我和我所的現象，說虛妄的法，稱為建立分別。 九、是依賴於眾多的因緣，在有和無法中產生執著的心，稱為生分別。 十、是一切法本來不生。因為本來沒有，依賴於因緣而有，但沒有因果，稱為無生分別。 十一、是什麼樣的法和什麼樣的法和合，比如金線共同存在，什麼樣的法和什麼樣的法和合，稱為和合分別。 十二、是束縛的原因是執著，就像被束縛一樣，就像人一樣。
【English Translation】 English version 1. To establish the meaning of Suchness (真如), there are phenomena of arising, ceasing, and continuous transformation. This can be correctly removed by understanding emptiness of characteristics (相空) and emptiness of before and after (先後空). 2. To remove attachment to the grasper, including clinging to the body and the phenomenon of arrogance. This can be removed by inner emptiness (內空) and emptiness of non-attainment (無所得空). 3. To remove attachment to the grasped, including clinging to wealth. This can be removed by outer emptiness (外空). 4. To remove attachment to enjoyment, including the inner pleasure and outer pure and wonderful phenomena associated with serving men and women and material possessions. This can be removed by inner and outer emptiness (內外空) and emptiness of inherent nature (本性空). 5. To remove attachment to establishing existence and limitless phenomena. This can be removed by great emptiness (大空). 6. To remove the phenomenon of inner tranquility and liberation in the formless realm, and attachment to conditioned phenomena. This can be removed by conditioned emptiness (有為空). 7. To remove the attachment that characteristics are Suchness, thereby removing the phenomena of the two selflessnesses of persons and phenomena, and attachment to the ultimate meaning of consciousness. This can be correctly removed by ultimate non-nature (畢竟無性), non-nature of inherent nature (無性自性), and emptiness of ultimate meaning (勝義空). 8. To remove attachment to pure Suchness, including attachment to unconditioned phenomena and unchanging phenomena. This can be removed by unconditioned emptiness (無為空) and unchanging emptiness (無變空). 9. To remove attachment to emptiness as an antidote and thinking about emptiness itself. This can be correctly removed by emptiness of emptiness (空空). Furthermore, the twelve discriminations, according to the fourth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: 1. Is delighting in and clinging to various beautiful sounds of speech and nominal expressions, called speech discrimination (言語分別). 2. Is thinking that there should be a real phenomenon of the preceding dharma. Holy practitioners know that relying on these dharmas will produce speech names, which can then be discriminated. 3. Is clinging to various phenomena such as heat, moisture, movement, and solidity as real in the knowable realm, called characteristic discrimination (相分別). 4. Is delighting in and clinging to various real realms such as gold and silver, called name-meaning discrimination (名義分別). 5. Is focusing on the form of the dharma itself. Thinking that this dharma is like this and like that, without difference, which is not a correct view, called self-nature discrimination (自體分別). 6. What kind of cause, what kind of condition, understanding existence and non-existence, because the cause-characteristic produces the idea of understanding, called cause discrimination (因分別). 7. Is the discrimination of heretical views such as existence and non-existence, one and different, both and neither, clung to by non-Buddhists, called view discrimination (見分別). 8. Is taking the phenomena of 'I' and 'mine' and speaking false dharmas, called establishment discrimination (建立分別). 9. Is relying on numerous conditions, producing a clinging mind in existence and non-existence, called birth discrimination (生分別). 10. Is that all dharmas are originally unborn. Because they originally do not exist, they exist relying on conditions, but there is no cause and effect, called non-birth discrimination (無生分別). 11. What kind of dharma and what kind of dharma combine, like gold threads existing together, what kind of dharma and what kind of dharma combine, called combination discrimination (和合分別). 12. The cause of bondage is clinging, just like being bound, just like a person.
便結繩作結結已還解名縛不縛分別。大惠是名虛妄分別法體差別之相 又十六者。十六空所除者。空既能除。明所除法數亦如之。所除即是分別法也。下言所除皆準此知 又二十八見者。按對法論具明之也。今者略言。一相見謂聞大乘密意空教。執著如是無性等相是名相見 因茲便謗佛說三性。遂起第二損滅施設見。三損滅分別見。四損滅真實見 復欲成立此邪見故。攝少道理依了義經。方便轉變令順己見。所以復起五攝受見．六轉變見 因復起執若依此見行善不善皆無有罪。一切障垢皆得出離。由此復起七無罪見．八出離見 執自見已於聲聞藏及聲聞人輕毀憎嫉。復起第九輕毀見．十憤發見 又順自惡見顛倒建立空無相愿。又思自悟及令他悟所立法性一切皆生無量功德。復起十一顛倒見．十二出生見 因此他以理責所立。不立自宗。及以機弄妄理責他。復起十三不立宗見．十四憍亂見。又起慢心謂如是修是真供養恭敬諸佛。此即十五名敬事見 又達觀者令舍惡見以實道理方便開悟豎無舍心。謂唯此真余並邪妄。是名十六堅固愚癡見 上所說見習氣粗重是名十七根本見 十八于見無見見即前相見。此實堅執無性等相。而起不執一切相想故 十九舍方便見即前損減施設．分別．真實三見。慢諸法性於勤精進起無用想故
二十不出離見。即前攝受．轉變二見。非方便修不證果故 二十一障增益見。即前無罪．出離二見。所行邪僻無容盡障故 二十二生非福見。即前輕毀憤發二見。由於正法同梵行所起邪行門便發大損故 二十三無功果見。即前顛倒．出生二見。所立法非授者受者俱不能證勝進果故 二十四受辱見即不立宗．憍亂二見。非理興論無宜得勝故 二十五誹謗見。即前敬事見。所不應說強增益故 二十六不可與言見。即前堅固愚癡見。邪執空者不應與言。與言無益故 二十七廣大見。即前根本見。由此當來惡見增廣故 二十八增上慢見。前二十七見皆名增上。並能發起虛妄無實增上慢故。
論。攝大乘說是依他起等者。按彼論云。若遍計所執自性。依依他起實無所有。似義顯現 又云又依他起自性名所遍計。
疏。若非對心云何應知者。問言應知者何教為證 答瑜伽七十四云。問三種自性幾應遍知。答一切。故知遍計亦所知法。
論。諸聖教說至遍所執者。按新中邊論頌云。無二有無故。非有亦非無。非異亦非一。是說為空相 長行釋云。無二謂無所取．能取。有無謂有二取之無。此即顯空無性為性 釋曰。二取空性名為無性。此性不無故名有無 論云何非有無二有故者 釋曰妄執能所二取為有。無彼二有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二十、不出離見：即前述的攝受見（認為可以通過外力獲得解脫）和轉變見（認為可以通過改變行為獲得解脫）。因為不是正確的修行方法，所以不能證得果位。 二十一、障增益見：即前述的無罪見（認為沒有罪惡）和出離見（認為可以輕易解脫）。所行之路邪僻，無法消除障礙。 二十二、生非福見：即前述的輕毀見（輕視正法）和憤發見（對正法產生憤怒）。由於對與正法相同的梵行（清凈行為）產生邪行，會造成巨大的損害。 二十三、無功果見：即前述的顛倒見（對事物認知顛倒）和出生見（認為可以無因而生）。所建立的法，無論是傳授者還是接受者，都不能證得殊勝的果位。 二十四、受辱見：即不立宗見（不建立正確的宗義）和憍亂見（驕傲混亂）。不合道理的爭論，不可能獲得勝利。 二十五、誹謗見：即前述的敬事見（對不應尊敬的事物表示尊敬）。對不應該說的事情強行增益。 二十六、不可與言見：即前述的堅固見（固執己見）和愚癡見（愚昧無知）。邪執空性的人不應該與他辯論，因為辯論沒有益處。 二十七、廣大見：即前述的根本見（錯誤的根本知見）。由此，未來的惡見會不斷增長。 二十八、增上慢見：前述的二十七種見解都可稱為增上慢。它們都能引發虛妄不實的增上慢。
論：攝大乘論說的是依他起等。按照該論的說法：如果遍計所執自性（虛妄分別的自性），依賴依他起（因緣和合的自性）實際上什麼都沒有，只是顯現出相似的意義。 又說：依他起自性也被稱為所遍計（被虛妄分別的對象）。
疏：如果不是針對心識，又怎麼能知道呢？問：說應該知道，有什麼經典可以證明？ 答：《瑜伽師地論》第七十四卷說：問：三種自性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）中，有幾種應該普遍瞭解？答：全部。因此可知，遍計所執性也是所知之法。
論：諸聖教說乃至遍所執。按照新《中邊分別論》的頌文說：沒有二取，有無的緣故，所以說非有也非無，非異也非一，這是在說空相。 長行解釋說：沒有二取，是指沒有所取和能取。有無，是指有二取的空無。這就在顯示空無自性為自性。 解釋說：二取的空性名為無自性。此自性不是沒有，所以名為有無。 論：為什麼說非有無二有的緣故呢？ 解釋說：妄執能取和所取為有。沒有那二取。
【English Translation】 English version Twenty, the view of non-escape (non-uprising): This refers to the aforementioned views of 'seizing and receiving' (thinking liberation can be obtained through external forces) and 'transformation' (thinking liberation can be obtained through changing behavior). Because they are not proper methods of cultivation, they cannot lead to the attainment of fruition. Twenty-one, the view of increasing obstructions: This refers to the aforementioned views of 'no fault' (thinking there is no sin) and 'escape' (thinking one can easily be liberated). The path taken is perverse and cannot eliminate obstructions. Twenty-two, the view of generating non-merit: This refers to the aforementioned views of 'slighting and disparaging' (disparaging the correct Dharma) and 'anger and resentment' (feeling anger towards the correct Dharma). Because of generating wrong actions towards the pure conduct (Brahma-caryā) that is the same as the correct Dharma, it will cause great harm. Twenty-three, the view of no merit or fruition: This refers to the aforementioned views of 'inverted' (having inverted perceptions of things) and 'arising' (thinking things can arise without cause). The Dharma established, whether by the giver or the receiver, cannot lead to the attainment of superior fruition. Twenty-four, the view of receiving insult: This refers to the views of 'not establishing a tenet' (not establishing a correct doctrine) and 'arrogance and confusion' (being arrogant and confused). Unreasonable arguments cannot lead to victory. Twenty-five, the view of slander: This refers to the aforementioned view of 'respecting affairs' (showing respect to things that should not be respected). Forcibly adding to things that should not be said. Twenty-six, the view of being uncommunicative: This refers to the aforementioned views of 'firmly holding' (stubbornly holding one's own views) and 'ignorance' (being ignorant and unknowing). One who wrongly clings to emptiness should not be argued with, because arguing is of no benefit. Twenty-seven, the view of vastness: This refers to the aforementioned 'fundamental view' (wrong fundamental views). From this, future evil views will continue to grow. Twenty-eight, the view of increased arrogance: The aforementioned twenty-seven views can all be called increased arrogance. They can all give rise to false and unreal increased arrogance.
Treatise: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) speaks of dependent origination ( paratantra) and so on. According to that treatise: If the nature of what is completely conceptualized (parikalpita-svabhāva), relying on dependent origination, is actually non-existent, it only manifests a similar meaning. It also says: The nature of dependent origination is also called what is completely conceptualized.
Commentary: If it is not directed at consciousness, how can it be known? Question: What scripture proves that it should be known? Answer: Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume seventy-four, says: Question: Among the three natures ( trisvabhāva), how many should be universally understood? Answer: All of them. Therefore, it can be known that the completely conceptualized nature is also a knowable Dharma.
Treatise: All the holy teachings speak of even the completely conceptualized. According to the verses of the new Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Commentary Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes): Because there are no two graspers, and because of existence and non-existence, therefore it is said to be neither existent nor non-existent, neither different nor the same. This is speaking of the aspect of emptiness (śūnyatā). The long commentary explains: 'No two graspers' means there is no object grasped and no grasping subject. 'Existence and non-existence' means there is emptiness of the two graspers. This is revealing that emptiness without self-nature is the self-nature. The explanation says: The emptiness of the two graspers is called no self-nature. This self-nature is not non-existent, therefore it is called existence and non-existence. Treatise: Why is it said that it is neither existent nor non-existent because of the two graspers? The explanation says: Falsely clinging to the grasping subject and the object grasped as existent. There are no such two graspers.
名無二有 論云何非無。有二無故者 釋曰。二無我理體不無故名有二無 論此空與彼虛妄分別非異非一。若異應成法性異法。便違正理如若等性。若一則應非凈智境。亦非共相 釋曰。異不應言二空性者是諸法性。與法異故。若一不應言二空理是無分別凈智之境。與事一故。
疏。見分相分各有種種行相者。按攝論第四無性釋云。於一識中一分變異似所取相。一分變異似能取見。此之二分各有種種差別行相俱時而起。若有不許一識一時有種種相。應無一時覺種種境。
論。十一識等者。具如疏列。今遂難釋。身者識者即阿賴耶。是五識身所依之者名為身者。若爾第六亦依第八何但言五。既有此妨故更釋云。八執五根五識方起。五根名身。執身者識。名身者識。第六不例。依天親論以染末那為身者識。受者識者謂染末那。由是第六不共依故。五識不例。受者之識名受者識 問何不取六無間滅意為二三耶 答離六能受識無別故。故不取也。
疏。此中既言至亦依他起者。此十一中五是相分。彼言十一皆依他起。故知相分非計所執 問世．數二種何非相收。彼論說云。三時算數而影現故 答若論影像誠如所責。疏據其本。亦唯境相。故但言五。如五根等皆第八相。善惡趣體實唯報識。通能所取資具等論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『名無二有』，論中說『非無』是什麼意思？『有二無故者』，解釋說：『二無』是指二種無我（人無我，法無我）的道理和本體並非不存在，所以稱為『有二無』。 論中說，『此空』（指空性）與『彼虛妄分別』（指虛妄分別識）『非異非一』。如果說是『異』，就應該成為法性與法不同，這樣就違背了正理，如同若與等性不同一樣。如果說是『一』，那麼它就不應該是清凈智慧的境界，也不是共同的相。 解釋說：如果說是『異』，就不應該說二空之性是諸法的法性，因為它與法是不同的。如果說是『一』，就不應該說二空的道理是無分別清凈智慧的境界，因為它與事是一體的。
疏中說：『見分（能見）相分（所見）各有種種行相』。按照《攝論》（《瑜伽師地論·攝抉擇分》）第四，無性（菩薩名）解釋說：『在一個識中，一部分變異，類似於所取之相；一部分變異，類似於能取之見。』這兩部分各有種種差別行相，同時生起。如果有人不承認一個識在同一時間有種種相，那麼就不應該出現同一時間覺知種種境界的情況。
論中說：『十一識等』，具體內容如疏中所列。現在就來解釋這些難點。『身者識者』，就是指阿賴耶識（第八識，含藏識）。是五識身（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所依靠的，稱為『身者』。如果這樣，第六識（意識）也依靠第八識，為什麼只說五識？既然有這個疑問，所以進一步解釋說：第八識執持五根，五識才能生起。五根名為『身』，執持『身』的識，名為『身者識』。第六識不屬於這種情況。依據天親（菩薩名）的論，以染污的末那識（第七識，末那識）為『身者識』。『受者識者』，是指染污的末那識。因為第六識不是共同依靠的，所以五識不屬於這種情況。『受者之識』名為『受者識』。 問：為什麼不取第六識的無間滅意（前念意識）作為二三識？ 答：因為離開第六識，沒有能感受的識，所以不取。
疏中說：『此中既言至亦依他起者』，這十一識中，有五種是相分（所緣境）。前面說十一識都是依他起（依因緣而生），所以知道相分不是遍計所執（虛妄分別）。 問：世間和數論的兩種理論為什麼不被相分所包含？他們的理論說：『三時（過去、現在、未來）的算數而影現。』 答：如果說是影像，確實如你所說。疏是根據其根本理論，也只是境相。所以只說五種。如五根等都是第八識的相。善惡趣的本體實際上只是報識（果報之識）。通達能取和所取，以及資具等理論。
【English Translation】 English version 『Name is not two but exists,』 what does it mean in the treatise when it says 『not non-existent』? 『Having two because of non-existence,』 the explanation says: 『Two non-existences』 refers to the principle and substance of two kinds of non-self (non-self of person, non-self of phenomena) not being non-existent, therefore it is called 『having two non-existences.』 In the treatise, it says, 『This emptiness』 (referring to emptiness) and 『that false discrimination』 (referring to false discriminating consciousness) are 『neither different nor the same.』 If they are said to be 『different,』 then it should become that the nature of phenomena is different from phenomena, which would violate the correct principle, just like if it is different from equality. If they are said to be 『the same,』 then it should not be the realm of pure wisdom without discrimination, nor a common characteristic. The explanation says: If it is said to be 『different,』 then it should not be said that the nature of the two emptinesses is the nature of all phenomena, because it is different from phenomena. If it is said to be 『the same,』 then it should not be said that the principle of the two emptinesses is the realm of pure wisdom without discrimination, because it is one with things.
The commentary says: 『The seeing aspect (subjective perception) and the seen aspect (objective perception) each have various characteristics.』 According to the fourth of the Compendium of Treatises (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra-saṃgraha-vyākhyā), Asaṅga (Bodhisattva's name) explains: 『In one consciousness, one part changes, resembling the perceived aspect; one part changes, resembling the perceiving aspect.』 These two parts each have various different characteristics, arising simultaneously. If someone does not admit that one consciousness has various aspects at the same time, then there should not be the situation of perceiving various realms at the same time.
The treatise says: 『Eleven consciousnesses, etc.,』 the specific content is as listed in the commentary. Now, let's explain these difficult points. 『The body-possessor consciousness』 refers to the Ālaya consciousness (eighth consciousness, storehouse consciousness). It is what the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) rely on, and is called 『body-possessor.』 If so, the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) also relies on the eighth consciousness, why only mention the five consciousnesses? Since there is this question, it is further explained: The eighth consciousness grasps the five roots, and the five consciousnesses can then arise. The five roots are called 『body,』 and the consciousness that grasps the 『body』 is called 『body-possessor consciousness.』 The sixth consciousness does not belong to this situation. According to Vasubandhu's (Bodhisattva's name) treatise, the defiled Manas consciousness (seventh consciousness, Manas consciousness) is taken as the 『body-possessor consciousness.』 『The receiver consciousness』 refers to the defiled Manas consciousness. Because the sixth consciousness is not commonly relied upon, the five consciousnesses do not belong to this situation. 『The consciousness of the receiver』 is called 『receiver consciousness.』 Question: Why not take the immediately ceasing mind of the sixth consciousness (the previous thought of consciousness) as the second and third consciousnesses? Answer: Because apart from the sixth consciousness, there is no consciousness that can receive, so it is not taken.
The commentary says: 『Since it is said here that it also depends on other arising,』 among these eleven consciousnesses, five are the perceived aspect (object of perception). It was said earlier that all eleven consciousnesses depend on other arising (arising from conditions), so it is known that the perceived aspect is not the completely conceptualized (false discrimination). Question: Why are the two theories of the world and numbers not included in the perceived aspect? Their theory says: 『The calculations of the three times (past, present, future) are reflected.』 Answer: If it is said to be an image, it is indeed as you say. The commentary is based on its fundamental theory, and it is only the aspect of the realm. Therefore, only five are mentioned. Such as the five roots, etc., are all aspects of the eighth consciousness. The substance of good and evil destinies is actually only the reward consciousness (consciousness of karmic retribution). Comprehending the able-grasped and the grasped, as well as the theory of resources, etc.
。故趣亦相。世．數不例。思之。
疏。不爾此文是逐他義非謂極成者。若難於他二分無體應不熏種。此難不爾。安惠熏種不要有體。護法今以自義逼他。非是兩家極成之義。
疏。仍非相分者。雖自證緣種體。然非相分中攝。所以如燈。疏中上下言相分者。以護法義而從他也。
疏。如何緣自證等者。自緣現量。緣種非量。
疏。解二句為二者。遍計．依他名為二句。或頌依他但有兩句。前初科文而有二義。一以三性別明為三。二以三性總分為二。遍計．依他合為一也。以此二性須相對辨。
疏。若為初性至初師結者。依二分科。此即最初難陀師結 問明所遍計護法文中而有其四。第四結正即是此文。如何今說是初師結 答以難陀師二分依他結文順彼不言自證及證自證。少同護法隱已從他云初師結。前顯自義云四結正故不相違 或初字誤應為后字。顯此結文非安惠故。既通二義應從多本。
論。簡自共相虛空我等者。有義疏說共相如因明說。無別體性不可言常故常言簡。今解此依佛地經說苦無常等。有義共相雖可稱遍。由生滅故不名成就。又佛地經所說共相唯遮無表。苦．無常等具有遮表。前無性故後生滅故俱不可常。皆遮簡也 詳曰。疏無文判定依因明不依佛地。然言觀心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，『趣』（Abhisamaya，領悟）也具有相似的性質。世俗的道理和真理的數量並不相同。應該仔細思考。
疏解：如果不是這樣，那麼這段文字就是爲了駁斥他人的觀點，而不是爲了闡述已經完全成立的觀點。如果認為在他人（指經量部）的觀點中，『二分』（相分和見分）沒有實體，那麼它們就不應該能夠熏習種子。這種反駁是不成立的。安慧（Acarya Sthiramati）認為熏習種子不需要有實體。護法（Dharmapala）現在是用自己的觀點來逼迫他人，而不是兩家都認可的觀點。
疏解：仍然不是『相分』（Nimitta-bhaga，影像部分）。雖然『自證分』（Svasamvedana-bhaga，自證部分）能夠緣起種子的體性，但它並不屬於相分。這就像燈一樣。疏解中上下文中提到的『相分』，是按照護法的觀點，順從他人的說法。
疏解：如何緣起自證等？自證是現量（Pratyaksa，現量，直接認知）。緣起種子不是量（Pramana，量，有效認知）。
疏解：將兩句話解釋為兩種含義：『遍計所執性』（Parikalpita，遍計所執性）和『依他起性』（Paratantra，依他起性）被稱為兩句。或者頌文中關於依他起性只有兩句。前面最初的科判中有兩種含義：一是通過三種自性來闡明三種自性；二是通過三種自性總分為兩種，即遍計所執性和依他起性合為一種。因為這兩種自性需要相對辨別。
疏解：如果以『遍計所執性』作為最初的自性，直到最初的論師的結論：按照二分來科判。這就是最初的難陀（Nanda）論師的結論。問：在護法的文章中，明明闡明了『遍計所執性』有四種含義，第四種結論正是這段文字。為什麼現在說是最初的論師的結論？答：因為難陀論師關於二分依他起性的結論，順應了對方的觀點，沒有提到『自證』（Svasamvedana，自證）和『證自證』（Svasamvedanasamvedana，自證的自證）。稍微與護法的觀點相同，所以隱藏了自己的觀點，順從他人的觀點，說是最初的論師的結論。前面闡明自己的觀點說是四種結論，所以並不矛盾。或者『初』字是錯誤的，應該是『后』字。表明這段結論不是安慧的觀點。既然可以有兩種解釋，應該以多種版本為準。
論：簡別『自共相』（Svalaksana and Samanya-laksana，自相和共相）、虛空、我和其他事物：有一種觀點認為，疏解中說『共相』就像因明（Hetuvidya，因明學）中所說的那樣，沒有單獨的體性，不能說是常，所以用『常』字來簡別。現在解釋說，這是依據《佛地經》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）所說的苦、無常等。有一種觀點認為，『共相』雖然可以稱為普遍，但由於有生滅，所以不能稱為成就。而且，《佛地經》所說的『共相』只是遮無表（無表色的一種），苦、無常等既有遮表，也有顯表。前者沒有自性，後者有生滅，所以都不能是常。都是遮簡。詳細地說，疏解中沒有明確判定是依據因明還是依據《佛地經》。然而，說『觀心』
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, 'Abhisamaya' (趣, realization) also has similar characteristics. The number of worldly truths and ultimate truths are not the same. One should contemplate this carefully.
Commentary: If not, then this text is to refute others' views, not to explain what is already fully established. If it is thought that in others' (referring to Sautrantika) views, the 'two aspects' (Nimitta-bhaga and Darsana-bhaga) have no substance, then they should not be able to perfume seeds. This refutation is not valid. Acarya Sthiramati believes that perfuming seeds does not require having substance. Dharmapala is now using his own views to pressure others, not a view that is agreed upon by both schools.
Commentary: Still not 'Nimitta-bhaga' (相分, image-aspect). Although 'Svasamvedana-bhaga' (自證分, self-awareness aspect) can arise from the nature of the seed, it is not included in the Nimitta-bhaga. It is like a lamp. The 'Nimitta-bhaga' mentioned in the commentary above and below is according to Dharmapala's view, following others' statements.
Commentary: How does one cognize self-awareness, etc.? Self-awareness is direct perception (Pratyaksa, 現量). Cognizing the seed is not valid cognition (Pramana, 量).
Commentary: Explaining the two sentences as two meanings: 'Parikalpita' (遍計所執性, the completely conceptualized nature) and 'Paratantra' (依他起性, the dependently arisen nature) are called two sentences. Or the verse about Paratantra only has two sentences. The initial classification above has two meanings: one is to clarify the three natures through the three natures; the other is to divide the three natures into two in total, that is, Parikalpita and Paratantra are combined into one. Because these two natures need to be distinguished relatively.
Commentary: If taking 'Parikalpita' as the initial nature, up to the conclusion of the initial teacher: classifying according to the two aspects. This is the conclusion of the initial teacher Nanda. Question: In Dharmapala's text, it is clearly stated that 'Parikalpita' has four meanings, and the fourth conclusion is this text. Why is it now said to be the conclusion of the initial teacher? Answer: Because Nanda's conclusion about the two aspects of Paratantra follows the other party's view, without mentioning 'Svasamvedana' (自證, self-awareness) and 'Svasamvedanasamvedana' (證自證, self-awareness of self-awareness). It is slightly the same as Dharmapala's view, so he hid his own view, followed others' views, and said it was the conclusion of the initial teacher. The previous explanation of one's own view said it was four conclusions, so there is no contradiction. Or the word 'initial' (初) is wrong, it should be 'later' (後). It shows that this conclusion is not Sthiramati's view. Since there can be two explanations, it should be based on multiple versions.
Treatise: Distinguishing 'Svalaksana and Samanya-laksana' (自共相, own-character and common-character), space, self, and other things: One view is that the commentary says that 'Samanya-laksana' (共相, common-character) is like what is said in Hetuvidya (因明, logic), without a separate substance, and cannot be said to be permanent, so the word 'permanent' is used to distinguish it. Now it is explained that this is based on the Buddhabhumi Sutra (佛地經) which speaks of suffering, impermanence, etc. One view is that although 'Samanya-laksana' can be called universal, it cannot be called accomplished because it has arising and ceasing. Moreover, the 'Samanya-laksana' mentioned in the Buddhabhumi Sutra only obscures non-manifestation (a type of non-manifest form), while suffering, impermanence, etc., have both obscuring and manifesting aspects. The former has no own-nature, and the latter has arising and ceasing, so neither can be permanent. All are distinguishing and simplifying. In detail, the commentary does not clearly determine whether it is based on Hetuvidya or the Buddhabhumi Sutra. However, it says 'observing the mind'
共相無體。且釋論說空．無我二苦．無常二。論等等之故疏不釋隨論省略。非不許彼亦是所簡。通簡經論所說共相。若言唯簡經說共相。論說共相何意不簡。豈論共相非所簡耶。若非所簡常簡共相有不盡失。故疏無違。有義不足。
疏。如所遍計不如是有故者。此引略也。應云如所遍計畢竟不如是有故。釋曰。俗有之上妄情計有。此等永無名圓成實。
疏。此與前世親別者。前顯能生能遍計心名為遍計。此與遍計所執為依名為遍計。
疏。又依他起至名遍計所執者。此與世親后解同也。
疏。彼云至為計所執者。彼無性也 問準二菩薩以依依他假名遍計。而云不異以釋本論。若不假說二性相望解無著論有不離不 答理亦可成。而本論云。由是遍計所緣相故者 釋曰。由依他起能起第六能遍計心。方執離識實我法等。若不有此依他之境。能計不起。能計不起何有所執遍計性耶。由斯二性故不異也。亦猶于繩方起蛇覺。余準可知。
論。猶如幻事至非有似有等者。無著本論明此等喻。具如疏列。無性釋論今此當引 論云幻事喻者。如實無象而有幻象所緣境界。依他起性亦復如是。雖無色等所緣六處。遍計度時似有所緣六處顯現 釋曰。外以塵等八為實有。內以八喻反彼為虛應為八量。此初
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：共相（lakshana）沒有實體。而且《釋論》中說了空（shunyata）、無我（anatman）、二苦（duhkha）、無常（anitya）等。《論》等等的緣故，疏（shu）中沒有解釋，是隨《論》省略了。並非不允許那些也是所簡略的。總括地簡略了經（sutra）和論（shastra）中所說的共相。如果說只簡略經中所說的共相，那麼論中所說的共相為什麼不簡略呢？難道論中的共相不是所要簡略的嗎？如果不是所要簡略的，那麼常常簡略共相就有不完全的過失。所以疏中沒有違背。但從意義上說，還是有所不足。
疏：『如所遍計不如是有故』，這是引用的省略。應該說『如所遍計畢竟不如是有故』。解釋說：在俗有（samvriti-satya）之上，妄情計度為有。這些永遠沒有，名為圓成實（parinispanna-satya）。
疏：『此與前世親（Vasubandhu）別者』，前面顯示能生起能遍計的心，名為遍計。這裡是與遍計所執（parikalpita）為所依，名為遍計。
疏：『又依他起（paratantra）至名遍計所執者』，這與世親後來的解釋相同。
疏：『彼云至為計所執者』，彼指無性（Asanga）。問：依照兩位菩薩（Bodhisattva），以依他（paratantra）假名遍計（parikalpita），而說不異來解釋本論。如果不假借說二性（svabhava）相望，解釋無著（Asanga）論，有沒有不離不？答：道理上也可以成立。而本論說：『由是遍計所緣相故』。解釋說：由於依他起能生起第六能遍計的心，才執著離開識（vijnana）的實我（atman）、法（dharma）等。如果沒有這個依他的境界，能計的心就不會生起。能計的心不生起，哪裡有所執的遍計性呢？由於這二性，所以不異。也就像對於繩子才生起蛇的錯覺。其餘的可以類推得知。
論：『猶如幻事至非有似有等者』，無著本論（Asanga's original treatise）中說明這些比喻，詳細情況如疏中所列。無性釋論（Asanga's commentary）現在應當引用。論中說幻事（maya）的比喻：如實際上沒有象，而有幻象所緣的境界。依他起性（paratantra-svabhava）也是這樣。雖然沒有色（rupa）等所緣的六處（ayatana），在遍計度（parikalpita）時，好像有所緣的六處顯現。解釋說：外道以塵（rajas）等八事為實有，內以八個比喻來反駁他們是虛妄的，應該用八個量（pramana）。這是最初的。
【English Translation】 English version: The universal characteristic (lakshana) has no substance. Moreover, the commentary (Shastra) speaks of emptiness (shunyata), selflessness (anatman), the two sufferings (duhkha), impermanence (anitya), etc. Because of the 'Treatise' and so on, the commentary (Shu) does not explain, following the omissions in the 'Treatise'. It is not that those are not allowed to be simplified. It comprehensively simplifies the universal characteristics mentioned in the Sutras and Shastras. If it is said that only the universal characteristics mentioned in the Sutras are simplified, then why are the universal characteristics mentioned in the Shastras not simplified? Is it that the universal characteristics in the Shastras are not to be simplified? If they are not to be simplified, then constantly simplifying the universal characteristics would lead to the fault of incompleteness. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the commentary. However, in terms of meaning, it is still insufficient.
Commentary: 'As what is conceptually constructed is not as it is' - this is an abbreviated quotation. It should say, 'As what is conceptually constructed is ultimately not as it is.' Explanation: On top of conventional truth (samvriti-satya), deluded emotions conceive of existence. These never exist and are called perfect reality (parinispanna-satya).
Commentary: 'This differs from Vasubandhu in the previous life' - the former reveals the mind that can generate conceptual construction, called conceptual construction. This is with the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) as the basis, called conceptual construction.
Commentary: 'Also, dependent origination (paratantra) to what is called conceptually constructed' - this is the same as Vasubandhu's later explanation.
Commentary: 'He says to what is conceived as being grasped' - 'He' refers to Asanga. Question: According to the two Bodhisattvas, using dependent origination (paratantra) to nominally designate conceptual construction (parikalpita), and saying 'not different' to explain the original treatise. If the two natures (svabhava) are not borrowed to explain Asanga's treatise, is there a non-separation? Answer: It can also be established in principle. And the original treatise says, 'Because it is the object of conceptual construction.' Explanation: Because dependent origination can generate the sixth mind of conceptual construction, it clings to the real self (atman), dharma, etc., that are separate from consciousness (vijnana). If there is no such realm of dependent origination, the mind that can conceive will not arise. If the mind that can conceive does not arise, where is the conceptually constructed nature that is grasped? Because of these two natures, they are not different. It is like the illusion of a snake arising from a rope. The rest can be inferred.
Treatise: 'Like an illusion to what is not existent but appears to exist' - Asanga's original treatise explains these metaphors in detail as listed in the commentary. Asanga's commentary should now be quoted. The treatise says the metaphor of illusion (maya): Just as there is actually no elephant, but there is the realm of the object of the illusory elephant. Dependent origination (paratantra-svabhava) is also like this. Although there are no six sense bases (ayatana) such as form (rupa), when conceptually constructed (parikalpita), it seems that the six sense bases appear as objects. Explanation: Externalists consider the eight things such as dust (rajas) to be real, and internally use eight metaphors to refute them as illusory, and eight valid cognitions (pramana) should be used. This is the beginning.
量云。色等六塵。非真實有。分明顯現為計度境。猶如幻象。真如非彼計度顯現所行之境。故為異品。非能遍計所遍計故。故無不定 又如陽焰于飄動時。實無有水而有水覺。外器世間亦復如是。量云。外器世間。虛非實有。能生執實心．心所故。猶如陽焰。真如非親為執生依。故無不定 又如夢中睡眠所起心．心所聚極成昧略。雖無狀等種種境義。有愛非愛境界受用。覺時亦爾。量云。非夢愛非愛境。虛非實有。為愛憎心之所愛故。猶如所夢 又如影像于鏡等中還見本質。而謂我今別見影像。而此影像實無所有。非等引地善．惡思業本質為緣。影像果生亦復如是。量云。善惡業果。虛非實有。依緣現故。猶如影像 又如光影由弄影者映蔽其光起種種影。定等地中種種諸識于無實義差別而轉 釋曰。如光中舞動身多狀。其影亦然。定意分別起諸身業障無分別。如質蔽光身依識起。故目彼身名種種識。或上二界定心非一名種種識。此識既托非實境轉。明心是虛。依前量云。定起身業虛非實有。種種轉故。猶如光影。依后量云。定地諸識虛非實有依種種起故。如光影也 又如谷響實無有聲。而令聽者似聞多種言說境界種種言說。語業亦爾。量云。語業非實。聽所聞故。猶如谷響 又如水月由水潤滑澄清性故雖無有月而月可
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 量云：色、聲、香、味、觸、法（色等六塵）並非真實存在，只是由於分別唸的緣故，分明地顯現為被計度的境界，就像幻象一樣。而真如不是這些計度顯現所能到達的境界，所以是不同的範疇。因為它不是能遍計所遍計的，所以沒有不定過失。 又如陽焰在飄動時，實際上沒有水，卻讓人產生有水的錯覺。外在的器世間也是如此。量云：外在的器世間，虛假不實，因為它能生起執著為實的心和心所。就像陽焰一樣。真如不是直接產生執著的所依，所以沒有不定過失。 又如夢中，睡眠所引起的心和心所的聚合，極其昏昧模糊。雖然沒有形狀等種種境界的意義，卻有喜愛和不喜愛的境界的感受和享用。醒來時也是如此。量云：夢中的喜愛和不喜愛的境界，虛假不實，因為它是愛憎之心所喜愛的。就像所夢到的事物一樣。 又如影像在鏡子等物體中，還能看到本質，卻認為我現在分別看到了影像。而這個影像實際上什麼也沒有。非等引地（非禪定狀態）的善惡思業以本質為緣，影像果的產生也是如此。量云：善惡業的果報，虛假不實，因為它依賴於因緣而顯現。就像影像一樣。 又如光影，由玩弄影子的人遮蔽光線而產生種種影子。禪定等境界中的種種識，對於沒有真實意義的差別而運轉。解釋說：就像光中舞動身體呈現多種形狀，它的影子也是這樣。禪定中的分別念產生種種身業，而障蔽了無分別智。就像本質遮蔽了光線，身體依賴於識而生起。所以稱這些身體為種種識。或者說，上二界（色界和無色界）的定心不是一個，而是種種識。這些識既然依託于非真實的境界而運轉，說明心是虛假的。依據前面的量云：禪定中產生的身業，虛假不實，因為它種種轉變。就像光影一樣。依據後面的量云：禪定中的種種識，虛假不實，因為它依賴於種種而生起。就像光影一樣。 又如山谷的迴響，實際上沒有聲音，卻讓聽者好像聽到了多種言說的境界，種種言說。語業也是如此。量云：語業不是真實的，因為它被聽者所聽到。就像山谷的迴響一樣。 又如水中的月亮，由於水的潤滑澄清的性質，雖然沒有月亮，卻能顯現月亮。
【English Translation】 English version Argument: The six sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma) are not truly existent. Due to conceptual proliferation, they clearly appear as objects of conceptualization, like illusions. True Suchness (真如, Zhenru) is not an object that can be reached by these conceptual proliferations, so it is a different category. Because it is not what is conceptualized by the conceptualizer, there is no uncertain fault. Furthermore, like a mirage that appears as water when shimmering, even though there is no actual water. The external world is also like this. Argument: The external world is unreal and non-existent, because it can give rise to minds and mental factors that cling to reality. Like a mirage. True Suchness is not the direct basis for the arising of clinging, so there is no uncertain fault. Furthermore, like the aggregation of minds and mental factors arising from sleep in a dream, which is extremely obscure and vague. Although there are no meanings of various objects such as shapes, there is the experience and enjoyment of beloved and unloved objects. It is the same when awake. Argument: The beloved and unloved objects in a dream are unreal and non-existent, because they are what the mind of love and hatred clings to. Like what is dreamed. Furthermore, like an image in a mirror or other object, where one still sees the essence but thinks, 'I am now seeing a separate image.' But this image is actually nothing. The good and evil volitional actions (思業, siye) of non-equipoised states (非等引地, feidengyindi) take the essence as a condition, and the arising of the image-result is also like this. Argument: The results of good and evil karma are unreal and non-existent, because they appear dependent on conditions. Like an image. Furthermore, like light and shadow, where various shadows arise from someone playing with shadows by obscuring the light. The various consciousnesses in meditative states (定地, dingdi) operate on distinctions that have no real meaning. Explanation: Just as a body dancing in the light takes on many shapes, so does its shadow. The conceptual proliferations in meditation produce various bodily actions, obscuring non-conceptual wisdom. Just as the essence obscures the light, the body arises dependent on consciousness. Therefore, these bodies are called various consciousnesses. Or, the meditative mind of the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm) is not one, but various consciousnesses. Since these consciousnesses operate based on unreal objects, it shows that the mind is false. According to the previous argument: Bodily actions arising from meditation are unreal and non-existent, because they change in various ways. Like light and shadow. According to the later argument: The various consciousnesses in meditative states are unreal and non-existent, because they arise dependent on various things. Like light and shadow. Furthermore, like an echo in a valley, where there is actually no sound, but it makes the listener seem to hear various realms of speech, various kinds of speech. Verbal action (語業, yuye) is also like this. Argument: Verbal action is not real, because it is heard by the listener. Like an echo in a valley. Furthermore, like the moon in water, where, due to the smooth and clear nature of the water, the moon can appear even though there is no moon.
取。緣實義境之所熏脩潤清為性諸三摩地相應之意亦復如是。雖無所緣實義境界而似有轉。此與影像有何差別。定不定地而有差別 釋曰。定境能令善品相續名為實義。或簡遍計所執之境名之為實量云。定所現境。虛非實有。依清緣現。猶如水月 又如變化依此變化說名變化。雖無有實而能化者無有顛倒于所化事勤作功用。菩薩亦爾。雖無遍計所執有情。于依他起諸有情類由哀愍故。而往彼彼諸所生處攝受自體 釋曰。謂即依此能變化心起變化事。或依所化起能化心。無業生境名雖無實。量云。菩薩受生。虛非真實。無倒心起。猶如變化 問中邊頌云。于不動無倒。謂知義非有非無如幻等。有無不動故。以幻喻等喻計所執。二論既差各有何意 答中邊據彼幻事等體。及能執心．所執水等通喻二性。攝論據事但類依他。故不相違。
論。一流轉真如等者。瑜伽．此論二文不同。如疏中會。有義有為有二。一四相所遷因等所為。二煩惱所為。今言有為依后義說。故有為言但說緣起。此說為勝。下文攝中二性攝故。然顯揚云。于染凈法思惟諸行流轉實性。據世間凈故不相違 詳曰。非無此理。然下攝云隨相攝者流轉．苦集前二性攝。既云隨相。明不違理。據增而談。顯揚復云于染凈法。凈法不言依世間凈。由斯教理疏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『取。緣實義境』（以真實的意義境界為條件）的熏修，以清凈為自性的各種三摩地（Samadhi，禪定），與之相應的意念也是如此。雖然沒有所緣的真實意義境界，但看起來好像有轉變。這與影像有什麼差別呢？差別在於定與不定之地。解釋說：定境能夠使善的品性相續不斷，這被稱為『實義』。或者簡要地說，遍計所執（Parikalpita，虛妄分別）的境界被稱為『實』。量論說：定中所顯現的境界，虛幻而非真實存在，依賴於清凈的緣起而顯現，就像水中的月亮一樣。又如變化，依賴於此變化而說名為變化。雖然沒有真實的自體，但能夠變化者沒有顛倒，對於所變化的事物勤奮地進行功用。菩薩也是如此，雖然沒有遍計所執的有情，但對於依他起（Paratantra，依他起性）的各種有情，由於哀憫的緣故，前往各個所生之處攝受自體。解釋說：就是依賴於能夠變化的心而生起變化的事物，或者依賴於所變化的事物而生起能夠變化的心。沒有業力所生的境界，雖然名稱上沒有真實，量論說：菩薩受生，虛幻而非真實，沒有顛倒的心生起，就像變化一樣。問：中邊分別論的頌詞說：『于不動無倒，謂知義非有非無如幻等，有無不動故，以幻喻等喻計所執。』（對於不動的、沒有顛倒的真如，是指了知諸法的意義非有非無，如同幻象等，因為有和無都不動搖，所以用幻象等來比喻遍計所執。）攝大乘論和中邊分別論既然有差異，各自有什麼用意呢？答：中邊分別論是根據幻事等的本體，以及能執的心、所執的水等，來共同比喻二種自性。攝大乘論是根據事物，僅僅比類于依他起性，所以不相違背。 『論。一流轉真如等者』（關於流轉真如等），瑜伽師地論和攝大乘論的文句不同，如疏中會通。有義和有為有兩種：一種是四相（生、住、異、滅）所遷移，因等所為；另一種是煩惱所為。現在所說的有為是依據后一種意義來說的，所以說有為只是指緣起。這種說法更為殊勝。下文攝大乘論中說二性所攝就是這個意思。然而，顯揚聖教論說：『于染凈法思惟諸行流轉實性』（對於染污和清凈的法，思惟諸行的流轉實性），是根據世間清凈來說的，所以不相違背。詳細地說：並非沒有這個道理。然而，下文攝大乘論說，隨相攝者，流轉、苦集前二性所攝。既然說是隨相，就表明不違背道理，是根據增上來談的。顯揚聖教論又說，于染凈法，凈法不說是依據世間清凈，因此教理疏
【English Translation】 English version: 'Take. The cultivation and refinement of the 'real meaning realm' (conditioned by the realm of true meaning), with various Samadhis (Samadhi, meditative absorption) whose nature is purity, and the corresponding thoughts are also like this. Although there is no real meaning realm to be conditioned, it seems as if there is transformation. What is the difference between this and an image? The difference lies in the state of being in Samadhi or not. The explanation says: The state of Samadhi can cause good qualities to continue uninterruptedly, and this is called 'real meaning'. Or, in short, the realm of Parikalpita (Parikalpita, conceptual construction) is called 'real'. The treatise says: The realm manifested in Samadhi is illusory and not truly existent, arising dependent on pure conditions, just like the moon in water. Also, like transformation, it is called transformation dependent on this transformation. Although there is no real self-nature, the one who can transform is not inverted, and diligently performs functions on the things to be transformed. Bodhisattvas are also like this; although there are no sentient beings who are objects of conceptual construction, they go to various places of birth to embrace themselves out of compassion for the various sentient beings who are dependent on other conditions (Paratantra, dependent origination). The explanation says: It is precisely relying on the mind that can transform that the things to be transformed arise, or relying on the things to be transformed that the mind that can transform arises. There is no realm born of karma, and although there is no reality in name, the treatise says: The birth of a Bodhisattva is illusory and not real, and a non-inverted mind arises, just like transformation. Question: The verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya say: 'In the immovable and non-inverted, it means knowing that the meaning is neither existent nor non-existent, like illusions, etc., because existence and non-existence are immovable, so illusions, etc., are used to illustrate conceptual construction.' Since the Śūraṅgama Sūtra and the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya have differences, what are their respective intentions? Answer: The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya is based on the substance of illusions, etc., as well as the mind that can grasp and the water that is grasped, to jointly illustrate the two natures. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha is based on things, merely comparing them to dependent origination, so they are not contradictory. 'Treatise. 'The one who flows, Suchness, etc.' (regarding the flowing Suchness, etc.), the sentences of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha are different, as explained in the commentary. There are two kinds of meaning and conditioned phenomena: one is what is transferred by the four characteristics (birth, abiding, change, and extinction), and what is done by causes, etc.; the other is what is done by afflictions. The conditioned phenomena now spoken of are based on the latter meaning, so saying that conditioned phenomena only refers to dependent origination. This statement is more excellent. The following text in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which says that the two natures are embraced, means this. However, the Śūraṅgama Sūtra says: 'Contemplate the real nature of the flow of all actions in defiled and pure dharmas' (regarding defiled and pure dharmas, contemplate the real nature of the flow of all actions), which is based on worldly purity, so they are not contradictory. In detail: It is not that there is no such reason. However, the following text in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that those who are embraced according to characteristics are embraced by the first two natures of flow, suffering, and accumulation. Since it is said to be according to characteristics, it shows that it does not contradict the reason, and it is spoken of according to increase. The Śūraṅgama Sūtra also says, regarding defiled and pure dharmas, that pure dharmas are not said to be based on worldly purity, therefore the teachings and commentary
說無違。又疏下云流轉唯約有漏故者。談彼瑜伽明流轉也。
論。四安立真如者。問四皆安立何唯談苦 答雖標總稱即因別法。如色處等。又四諦初從總為目。餘三后故從別立名。
論。謂或有處至不攝五事者。按瑜伽論七十四云。問初自性五法中幾所攝。答都非所攝。問第二自性幾所攝。答四所攝。問第三自性幾所攝。答一所攝。
論。或復有處至圓成實者。按中邊頌云。名遍計所執。相．分別依他。真如．及正智。圓成實所攝。
疏。若體相攝成相違者。若以攝論名義二體。攝此五法名義體者。便成相違。何以故。五法中義即相．分別。體即依他。彼義初性。以無攝有豈不相違。
疏。中邊以三性與十真實相攝等者。彼論第二廣明相攝。今但舉名略辨名意。一根本真實。依此建立余真實故依三性立。二相真實。此于根本真實相中無顛倒故。三無顛倒真實。能治無常．苦．無我等四種倒故。四因果真實。謂四聖諦。染凈因果有差別故。五粗細真實。謂世俗．勝義二有別故。六極成真實。謂世間．道理二極成故。七凈智所行真實。謂煩惱．所知二障凈智所行有異。八攝受真實。謂即三性．五事相攝。九差別真實。謂七真如．三性相攝。十善巧真實。治十我見以修蘊等十種善巧。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 說『無違』。又疏文下面說『流轉唯約有漏故者』，是談論《瑜伽師地論》中關於流轉的內容。
論：四安立真如（四個方面安立的真如）者。問：四者都是安立，為何只談苦諦？答：雖然標的是總稱，實際是根據各個別的法。如色處等。又四諦（苦集滅道四聖諦）最初從總的方面作為綱目，其餘三諦在後，所以從個別方面立名。
論：謂或有處至不攝五事者。按《瑜伽師地論》第七十四卷說：問：最初自性五法（五種自性法）中，有幾法包含在內？答：都不包含。問：第二自性有幾法包含在內？答：包含四法。問：第三自性有幾法包含在內？答：包含一法。
論：或復有處至圓成實者。按《中邊分別論頌》說：名是遍計所執性（虛妄分別的自性），相和分別是依他起性（依他緣起的自性），真如和正智是圓成實性（圓滿成就的自性）所包含。
疏：若體相攝成相違者。如果以《攝大乘論》的名義二體，來包含這五法（五種法）的名義體，便會造成相違。為什麼呢？因為五法中的義就是相和分別，體就是依他。而《攝大乘論》的義是最初的自性，以無來包含有，豈不是相違？
疏：中邊以三性（三種自性）與十真實相攝等者。《中邊分別論》第二卷廣泛地闡明了相攝的關係，現在只是列舉名稱，簡略地辨別其含義。一、根本真實：依靠它來建立其餘的真實，所以依據三性而立。二、相真實：這是在根本真實的相中沒有顛倒的緣故。三、無顛倒真實：能夠對治無常、苦、無我等四種顛倒的緣故。四、因果真實：指四聖諦，染污和清凈的因果有差別的緣故。五、粗細真實：指世俗諦和勝義諦兩種有差別的緣故。六、極成真實：指世間極成和道理極成兩種。七、凈智所行真實：指煩惱障和所知障兩種障礙，被清凈智慧所行持而有所不同。八、攝受真實：指三性和五事相互包含。九、差別真實：指七真如和三性相互包含。十、善巧真實：通過修習蘊等十種善巧，來對治十種我見。
【English Translation】 English version To say 'no contradiction'. Furthermore, the commentary below says 'the cycle of rebirth is only about the afflicted', which discusses the cycle of rebirth in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.
Treatise: The four established suchness (four aspects of established suchness). Question: Since all four are established, why only discuss suffering? Answer: Although the general term is indicated, it is actually based on individual dharmas. Such as the sense fields, etc. Also, the Four Noble Truths (suffering, accumulation, cessation, path) initially take the general aspect as the outline, while the other three truths come later, so the names are established from the individual aspects.
Treatise: Saying that in some places, it does not encompass the five matters. According to the seventy-fourth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: Question: Among the initial five self-natures (five kinds of self-nature), how many are encompassed? Answer: None are encompassed. Question: How many are encompassed by the second self-nature? Answer: Four are encompassed. Question: How many are encompassed by the third self-nature? Answer: One is encompassed.
Treatise: Or in some places, it reaches the perfectly accomplished reality. According to the Madhyantavibhaga-karika: Name is the completely imputed nature (nature of false discrimination), characteristics and discrimination are the dependently arisen nature (nature of dependent origination), suchness and correct wisdom are encompassed by the perfectly accomplished nature (nature of perfect accomplishment).
Commentary: If the substance and characteristics encompass each other, it becomes contradictory. If the names and meanings, the two substances of the Mahayanasamgraha, are used to encompass the names, meanings, and substance of these five dharmas (five kinds of dharmas), it would become contradictory. Why? Because the meaning in the five dharmas is the characteristics and discrimination, and the substance is the dependently arisen. And the meaning of the Mahayanasamgraha is the initial self-nature. Using non-being to encompass being, wouldn't that be contradictory?
Commentary: The Madhyantavibhaga uses the three natures (three kinds of natures) to encompass the ten realities, etc. The second fascicle of that treatise extensively explains the relationship of encompassing. Now, it only lists the names and briefly distinguishes their meanings. 1. Fundamental reality: Relying on this to establish the remaining realities, so it is established based on the three natures. 2. Characteristic reality: This is because there is no inversion in the characteristics of the fundamental reality. 3. Non-inverted reality: It can counteract the four inversions of impermanence, suffering, non-self, etc. 4. Cause and effect reality: Refers to the Four Noble Truths, because the causes and effects of defilement and purity are different. 5. Coarse and subtle reality: Refers to the difference between conventional truth and ultimate truth. 6. Extremely established reality: Refers to the two extremely established realities of worldly establishment and logical establishment. 7. Reality practiced by pure wisdom: Refers to the difference between the two obscurations of afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations, which are practiced by pure wisdom. 8. Encompassing reality: Refers to the mutual encompassing of the three natures and the five matters. 9. Differentiated reality: Refers to the mutual encompassing of the seven suchnesses and the three natures. 10. Skillful reality: By practicing the ten kinds of skillful means such as the aggregates, one can counteract the ten kinds of self-views.
疏。取分別全至是所詮故者。問正智心等通能所詮。分別何乃唯所詮耶 答有漏別開相．名．分別。分別所以唯是所詮。無漏總合。故正智一能所詮具。有義相唯所詮。名但能詮。分別通二。隨二所變有差別故。雖有多釋將今說勝 詳曰。如名詮名所詮之名豈非名耶。若是名者何非所詮。名依識變何非名相。若許是相。相即能詮。若以識能變能詮故名能詮者。應相從故從於能變但名分別。從所變故唯相．名二。此既不爾彼云何然。故疏為勝。今助一釋。相．分別二唯是所詮。名通能所。雖名識變亦是相收。然據別義但稱為名。若不爾者即有如前相從例失。思之可知。
疏。亦名和合等者。按瑜伽云。亦名遍計所執。亦名和合所成。亦名所增益相。亦名虛妄所執。亦名言說所顯。亦名文字加行。亦名唯有音聲。亦名無有體相。
疏。故第四言遍計所執自性執等者。即五事中第四執著。
疏。四道理者。按對法論第十一云。一觀待道理。謂諸行生要待眾緣。二作用道理。如眼根等為眼識等所依作用。三證成道理。謂為證成所應成義。宣說諸量不相違語。四法爾道理。謂無始來法相法爾。如火能燒水能潤等。
疏。亦取無漏智至不爾便減者。不取無漏智為真實。四真實體不攝道諦。故為減也。第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏：『取分別全至是所詮故者』。問：正智心等既能通達能詮和所詮，為何分別僅僅是所詮呢？答：有漏的別開為相、名、分別。分別之所以僅僅是所詮，是因為無漏是總合的。所以正智同時具備能詮和所詮。有一種觀點認為，相僅僅是所詮，名僅僅是能詮，分別則貫通二者。隨著二者的變化而有差別。雖然有多種解釋，但現在所說的這種解釋更勝一籌。詳述：如果說『名詮名所詮之名』難道不是名嗎？如果是名，為何不是所詮？名依識而變，為何不是名相？如果允許它是相，那麼相就是能詮。如果因為識能夠變現能詮，所以稱之為能詮，那麼應該相隨，從而歸於能變，僅僅稱之為分別。因為是從所變而來的，所以只有相和名二者。如果不是這樣，那麼彼處又該如何呢？所以疏解更為優勝。現在我來輔助解釋一下：相和分別二者僅僅是所詮，名貫通能詮和所詮。雖然名是識所變現的，也屬於相的範疇，但根據其特殊的意義，僅僅稱之為名。如果不是這樣，就會出現像前面所說的相隨的過失。仔細思考就可以明白。 疏：『亦名和合等者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》所說：也叫做遍計所執（parikalpita-svabhāva，虛妄分別的自性），也叫做和合所成，也叫做所增益相，也叫做虛妄所執，也叫做言說所顯，也叫做文字加行，也叫做唯有音聲，也叫做無有體相。 疏：『故第四言遍計所執自性執等者』。就是五事中的第四種執著。 疏：『四道理者』。按照《對法論》第十一卷所說：一、觀待道理，是指諸行產生要依賴眾多因緣。二、作用道理，如眼根等作為眼識等的所依作用。三、證成道理，是指爲了證明所應成立的意義，宣說與諸量不相違背的語言。四、法爾道理，是指無始以來法相本來如此，如火能燃燒，水能潤濕等。 疏：『亦取無漏智至不爾便減者』。不取無漏智作為真實，因為四真實體不包含道諦，所以是減損。
【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: 'Taking distinctions entirely as what is expressed.' Question: Since Correct Wisdom (正智, zhengzhi) and mind (心, xin) etc. can all penetrate both the expressing (能詮, nengquan) and the expressed (所詮, suoquan), why is distinction only the expressed? Answer: The defiled (有漏, youlou) separately opens into characteristic (相, xiang), name (名, ming), and distinction (分別, fenbie). The reason why distinction is only the expressed is because the undefiled (無漏, wulou) is a complete integration. Therefore, Correct Wisdom simultaneously possesses both the expressing and the expressed. One view holds that characteristic is only the expressed, name is only the expressing, while distinction penetrates both. It varies according to the changes in the two. Although there are many explanations, the one now being presented is superior. Detailed explanation: If 'name expresses the name of what is expressed,' isn't that a name? If it is a name, why isn't it the expressed? Name changes according to consciousness (識, shi), why isn't it a name-characteristic? If it is allowed to be a characteristic, then the characteristic is the expressing. If because consciousness can manifest the expressing, it is called the expressing, then it should follow, thus belonging to the manifesting, and only be called distinction. Because it comes from what is manifested, there are only characteristic and name. If it is not like this, then how should it be there? Therefore, the commentary is superior. Now I will assist in explaining: Characteristic and distinction are only the expressed, name penetrates both the expressing and the expressed. Although name is manifested by consciousness, it also belongs to the category of characteristic, but according to its special meaning, it is only called name. If it is not like this, there will be the fault of following as mentioned earlier. Think carefully and you will understand. Commentary: 'Also called aggregation etc.' According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yuqie shidi lun): It is also called the completely imputed nature (遍計所執, parikalpita-svabhāva), also called accomplished by aggregation, also called the increased characteristic, also called falsely grasped, also called manifested by speech, also called verbal application, also called only sound, also called without substance or characteristic. Commentary: 'Therefore, the fourth says the completely imputed nature clinging etc.' This is the fourth clinging among the five matters. Commentary: 'The four reasons.' According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論, Duifa lun), eleventh fascicle: First, the reason of dependence, which means the arising of all phenomena depends on numerous conditions. Second, the reason of function, such as the eye-faculty etc. serving as the basis for the eye-consciousness etc. Third, the reason of proof, which means in order to prove the meaning that should be established, language that does not contradict the various valid cognitions is proclaimed. Fourth, the reason of suchness, which means the characteristics of phenomena have been such since beginningless time, such as fire being able to burn, water being able to moisten, etc. Commentary: 'Also taking undefiled wisdom to... otherwise it would be diminished.' Not taking undefiled wisdom as real, because the four realities do not include the path truth, therefore it is a diminution.
四真實準第三知。故疏不舉。
論。二障至二事攝故者。問準瑜伽論三十六說。后二真實以四諦理真如為體。七十三中兼取正智。何意不同 答有三釋。一解如疏。二傳三藏釋云。當證二障凈所行時亦證智慧。猶如見分緣真如時。即自證分亦緣見分。三有義二空觀智慧有所行亦名所行。不應說云二障凈智通緣真俗。故無漏智亦名所行。后得緣者此理不然。后得通緣染凈依他。應說染分亦是二智所行真實。若爾即應二智所行通攝五事。既二事攝。故能觀智慧有所行名為所行 詳曰。疏及傳釋其理稍通。有義所斷恐乖論旨。論旨者何。謂論本明所緣之境。顯境不同有四真實。故三十六云。此真實義品類差別復有四種。義即境也。今取其智慧有所行名有所行。不約為境。豈與本論。不成楚．越。論據一分凈境為言。非境義同以染依他便例責也 今助二釋。一雲根本智所行真如真如所攝。余無漏智緣安立等所變相等亦名二智所行真實正智所攝。不同有漏虛妄分別非相等攝。故七十三無漏有為總名正智 問何以證知 答三十六云。一切二乘若無漏智若無漏后得世間智所行境界。是名煩惱障凈智所行真實。又顯揚云。此中何者是真實。答謂四聖諦。既后智境亦名真實。故知后得所緣四諦真如等相皆名真實。然三十六第三真實
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "『四真實準第三知。故疏不舉。』——因為『四真實』已經包含在第三種智慧中，所以註釋中沒有特別提及。", "", "『論。二障至二事攝故者。』——論：兩種障礙（煩惱障和所知障）被兩種事物（所行真實和正智）所涵蓋。問：根據《瑜伽師地論》第三十六卷的說法，后兩種真實以四聖諦的真如為本體，而第七十三卷中又兼取正智，這是什麼意思？為什麼說法不同？答：有三種解釋。第一種解釋如註釋所說。第二種是三藏法師的解釋，認為當證得二障清凈所行時，也證得了智慧。就像見分緣真如時，自證分也緣見分一樣。第三種解釋認為，二空觀的智慧有所行，也可以稱為所行。不應該說二障清凈智普遍緣真俗二諦，因此無漏智也可以稱為所行。后得智所緣的境界並非如此，后得智普遍緣染凈依他，應該說染分也是二智所行真實。如果這樣，那麼二智所行就應該涵蓋五事。既然只涵蓋兩種事物，所以能觀的智慧有所行，稱為所行。詳曰：註釋和三藏法師的解釋比較合理。有義的解釋恐怕不符合論旨。論旨是什麼呢？就是論本身闡明所緣的境界，顯現的境界不同，有四種真實。所以第三十六卷說：『此真實義品類差別復有四種。』義就是境界。現在取其智慧有所行，稱為所行，不以境界為限，豈不是與本論相悖？不成楚國和越國。論據一部分清凈境界來說，不是境界的意義相同，就用染污的依他起性來責難。", "", "現在我來補充兩種解釋。一種是根本智所行的真如，屬於真如所攝。其餘無漏智緣安立等所變現的相，也可以稱為二智所行真實，屬於正智所攝。不同於有漏的虛妄分別，不屬於相等所攝。所以第七十三卷中，無漏有為法總稱為正智。問：憑什麼證明？答：第三十六卷說：『一切二乘若無漏智若無漏后得世間智所行境界。是名煩惱障凈智所行真實。』又《顯揚聖教論》說：『此中何者是真實？答：謂四聖諦。』既然後得智的境界也稱為真實，所以可知后得智所緣的四諦、真如等相，都稱為真實。然而第三十六卷的第三真實……", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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具言三智。第四不具但影顯也。不爾何意有具．不具。或取疏傳合今所明覆為一釋。故大論前後亦不相違。更思。
疏。中邊論至依一圓成實者。四句之中初顯初實依遍計一。二顯第二依計等三。第三．四顯第四三實共依成實。
疏。此約詮分位為垢凈者。以有染凈．隱顯二位。據斯詮顯似彼苦下能緣之心無常行也。假名無常體實常也。
疏。無常行實不緣之者。無常行相但緣三諦有為為義。不緣滅諦無為為境。
疏。又依一切無常為語等者。言無常行緣初后性。此能緣行非是十六行中無常。是十六外緣無常心。何所以者。十六行中無常但緣三諦為境。初性非諦。后性無為。非無常故。
疏。六無常者。四別離無常。五得無常。余如疏引。
疏。心唯在名者。非色四蘊總名為名。
疏。十五種無常者。按彼論云。六無常中后五無常併名變異。變異不同有十五種。一分位變異。謂嬰兒等。二顯變異。謂從妙色變為惡等。三形變異。謂饑疲等。四興盛變異。五支節變異。六寒熱變異。七他損變異。八疲倦變異。九威儀變異。十觸對變異。由苦等觸。十一染污變異。十二病等變異。十三死變異。十四青瘀等變異。十五一切種不現盡變異者。謂骨鎖等燒壞離散一切種都無所見。
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本\n\n完整地講述三種智慧（三智）。第四種智慧不完整，只是略微顯現。如果不是這樣，為什麼會有完整和不完整的說法呢？或許可以採用疏鈔的說法，結合現在所闡明的，重新作為一種解釋。所以《大智度論》前後也不互相矛盾。需要進一步思考。\n\n疏鈔：中邊論中說到『依一圓成實』，四句之中，第一句顯示最初的實性，依賴於遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhava）。第二句顯示第二種實性，依賴於計度所生性等三種實性。第三、四句顯示第四種實性，三種實性共同依賴於圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava）。\n\n疏鈔：這裡所說的以詮釋分位作為垢凈，是因為有染污和清凈、隱沒和顯現兩種狀態。根據這種詮釋顯現，類似於彼苦下能緣之心是無常的行相。假名的無常，其體性實際上是常的。\n\n疏鈔：無常的行相實際上不緣取滅諦，無常的行相只是緣取三諦（苦諦，集諦，滅諦）中的有為法作為意義，不緣取滅諦的無為法作為境界。\n\n疏鈔：又依據一切無常作為語言等，說無常的行相緣取最初的自性和最後的自性。這種能緣的行相不是十六行觀中的無常，而是十六行觀之外緣取無常的心。為什麼這樣說呢？因為十六行觀中的無常只是緣取三諦作為境界，最初的自性不是諦，最後的自性是無為法，不是無常。\n\n疏鈔：六種無常，四種是別離無常，五種是獲得無常，其餘的如同疏鈔所引用。\n\n疏鈔：心唯在名，不是色蘊等四蘊總稱為名。\n\n疏鈔：十五種無常，按照那部論的說法，六種無常中，後面的五種無常都稱為變異。變異的不同有十五種：一是分位變異，比如嬰兒等。二是顯變異，比如從美妙的顏色變為醜惡等。三是形變異，比如飢餓疲勞等。四是興盛變異。五是支節變異。六是寒熱變異。七是他損變異。八是疲倦變異。九是威儀變異。十是觸對變異，由苦等觸引起。十一是染污變異。十二是疾病等變異。十三是死亡變異。十四是青瘀等變異。十五是一切種類不現盡的變異，指骨鎖等燒壞離散，一切種類都無法看見。" , "english_translations": [ "English version\n\nFully explain the three wisdoms (Tri-jnana). The fourth wisdom is incomplete, only slightly manifested. If this were not the case, why would there be complete and incomplete distinctions? Perhaps we can adopt the commentary's explanation, combining it with what is currently being clarified, and reframe it as a single explanation. Therefore, the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra does not contradict itself from beginning to end. Further contemplation is needed.\n\nCommentary: In the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya, regarding 'depending on one Parinispanna-svabhava (圓成實性, the perfectly accomplished nature)', among the four statements, the first statement reveals the initial reality, which depends on Parikalpita-svabhava (遍計所執性, the completely conceptualized nature). The second statement reveals the second reality, which depends on the three realities such as Paratantra-svabhava (計度所生性, the dependently originated nature). The third and fourth statements reveal the fourth reality, where the three realities jointly depend on Parinispanna-svabhava.\n\nCommentary: The statement about using the division of explanation as defilement and purity is because there are two states: defiled and pure, hidden and manifest. According to this explanation, it is similar to the impermanent aspect of the mind that cognizes suffering. The impermanence of the nominal is actually permanent in its essence.\n\nCommentary: The aspect of impermanence does not actually cognize Nirodha-satya (滅諦, the truth of cessation). The aspect of impermanence only cognizes conditioned phenomena within the three truths (Dukkha-satya, Samudaya-satya, Nirodha-satya) as its meaning, and does not cognize the unconditioned Nirodha-satya as its object.\n\nCommentary: Furthermore, based on all impermanence as language, it is said that the aspect of impermanence cognizes the initial nature and the final nature. This cognizing aspect is not the impermanence within the sixteen aspects of mindfulness, but rather a mind outside the sixteen aspects that cognizes impermanence. Why is this so? Because the impermanence within the sixteen aspects only cognizes the three truths as its object. The initial nature is not a truth, and the final nature is unconditioned, not impermanent.\n\nCommentary: The six kinds of impermanence: four are separation impermanence, five are attainment impermanence, and the rest are as cited in the commentary.\n\nCommentary: The mind is only in name, not that the four aggregates such as the form aggregate are collectively called name.\n\nCommentary: The fifteen kinds of impermanence, according to that treatise, among the six kinds of impermanence, the latter five kinds of impermanence are all called change. The differences in change are fifteen kinds: one is positional change, such as infants. Two is manifest change, such as changing from beautiful colors to ugly ones. Three is form change, such as hunger and fatigue. Four is flourishing change. Five is limb change. Six is hot and cold change. Seven is damage by others change. Eight is fatigue change. Nine is demeanor change. Ten is contact change, caused by painful contacts. Eleven is defilement change. Twelve is disease change. Thirteen is death change. Fourteen is bluish discoloration change. Fifteen is the change of all kinds of non-appearance and exhaustion, referring to bone locks etc. being burned, broken apart, scattered, and all kinds being completely invisible." ] }
論。一習氣集等者。疏有兩釋。初釋意云。由能執心執於我法而熏成種。種雖有體。由因遍計所執我法能計心等熏成於種種名初性。非是別熏所執之種。或能遍計假名所執。所熏之種從能熏心假名初性。
第二意云。為能執心執彼習氣為所遍計。習熏是彼所執所依。從彼能依假名所執。
論。滅諦三者。此論．中邊安惠．護法諸說不同。如燈引釋。
疏。謂緣依他至即為空境者。此明三性俱為空境之所以也。遍計體空故疏不云。但顯依．圓為空所以。
疏。俱不於此起愿等者。此前三空皆約遍計故。於此空三皆叵愿名俱不願。
疏。非緣遍計至起愿求故者。遍計所執真如無體。故不于彼所執如上而起愿求。然七十二據實真如不名無愿。亦不相違。
疏。如空緣此三至為無相境者。此舉空境以成無相。三性為空皆約遍計。無相亦然。以彼體無何有其相。
疏。相通三種者。五事中相。然三解脫有能所知。相多所知。少通能知。所知．能知俱三解脫。
疏。相亦三種境者。相亦攝彼所知三解。即是境也 問何意說此 答欲明依．圓亦三解脫。故先引文後方成立。次下疏云既爾等者正成立也。
疏。既爾至名無相者。此立理也。五事中相通漏．無漏。復說相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
論：『一習氣集等者』。疏中有兩種解釋。第一種解釋的意思是：由於能執之心執著於我法，從而熏習成種子。種子雖然有自體，但由於遍計所執的我法，能計之心等熏習成種種名，這是最初的自性。並非是另外熏習所執的種子。或者說，是能遍計的假名所執著，所熏習的種子從能熏習的心假名為最初的自性。 第二種解釋的意思是：能執之心執著那些習氣作為所遍計的對象。習氣熏習是那些所執著的對象所依賴的基礎。從那些能依賴的基礎假名為所執著的對象。 論：『滅諦三者』。此論、《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga，佛教唯識宗的重要論著）、安慧（Sthiramati，古印度佛教瑜伽行學派論師）、護法（Dharmapāla，古印度佛教瑜伽行學派論師）等諸家的說法不同。如《燈論》（Ālokamālā，註釋書）的解釋。 疏：『謂緣依他至即為空境者』。這說明了三性（三自性，即遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）都為空境的原因。遍計所執性本體是空，所以疏中沒有提到。只是顯明依他起性和圓成實性為空的原因。 疏：『俱不於此起愿等者』。此前面的三種空都是就遍計所執性而言的，因此對於這三種空，都不可願求，所以名為『俱不願』。 疏：『非緣遍計至起愿求故者』。遍計所執的真如沒有本體，所以不對於它所執著的如上之境而生起愿求。然而，七十二種據實的真如不稱為無愿，也不相違背。 疏：『如空緣此三至為無相境者』。這是舉出空境來成就無相。三性為空都是就遍計所執性而言的，無相也是這樣。因為它的本體是空無，哪裡會有什麼相呢？ 疏：『相通三種者』。五事（名、相、分別、正智、如如）中的相，然而三種解脫（空解脫門、無相解脫門、無愿解脫門）有能知和所知。相多是所知，少部分是能知。所知和能知都屬於三種解脫。 疏：『相亦三種境者』。相也攝取了那些所知的三種解脫，也就是境。問：說這些是什麼意思？答：想要說明依他起性和圓成實性也是三種解脫。所以先引用經文，然後才成立。接下來的疏文說『既爾等者』，就是正式成立的意思。 疏：『既爾至名無相者』。這是立論。五事中的相，通於有漏和無漏。又說相
【English Translation】 English version
Commentary: 'One accumulation of habits, etc.' The commentary has two explanations. The first explanation means: Because the mind that grasps clings to 'I' and 'Dharma', it is thus perfumed into seeds. Although the seeds have substance, due to the 'I' and 'Dharma' that are grasped by conceptual construction (parikalpita), the mind that calculates and so on are perfumed into various names, which is the initial nature. It is not a separate perfuming of the grasped seeds. Or, it is what is grasped by the conceptual construction of imputed names, and the perfumed seeds come from the mind that perfumes, with imputed names as the initial nature. The second explanation means: The mind that grasps clings to those habits as the object of conceptual construction. The perfuming of habits is the basis upon which those grasped objects rely. From those relying bases, imputed names are the grasped objects. Treatise: 'The third of the cessation of suffering (Nirodha Satya)'. The statements in this treatise, the Madhyāntavibhāga (Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes, an important text of the Buddhist Yogācāra school), Sthiramati (an ancient Indian Buddhist Yogācāra school philosopher), Dharmapāla (an ancient Indian Buddhist Yogācāra school philosopher), and others are different. As explained in the Ālokamālā (Garland of Light, a commentary). Commentary: 'That which is conditioned by other, up to being the realm of emptiness'. This explains why the three natures (trisvabhāva, namely, the nature of conceptual construction (parikalpita-svabhāva), the nature of dependence on others (paratantra-svabhāva), and the nature of perfect accomplishment (parinispanna-svabhāva)) are all realms of emptiness. The nature of conceptual construction is empty in itself, so the commentary does not mention it. It only clarifies the reason why the nature of dependence on others and the nature of perfect accomplishment are empty. Commentary: 'Not jointly arising desires in this, etc.' The previous three emptinesses are all in terms of the nature of conceptual construction, so for these three emptinesses, it is not possible to desire, hence the name 'not jointly desiring'. Commentary: 'Not conditioned by conceptual construction, up to arising desires and seeking because'. The thusness (tathata) of conceptual construction has no substance, so one does not arise desires and seek for the above-mentioned realm that it grasps. However, the seventy-two kinds of thusness that are based on reality are not called without desire, and are not contradictory. Commentary: 'Like emptiness conditioned by these three, up to being the realm of no-sign'. This cites the realm of emptiness to accomplish no-sign. The three natures being empty are all in terms of the nature of conceptual construction, and so is no-sign. Because its substance is empty, how can there be any sign? Commentary: 'Signs pervade the three kinds'. Among the five aggregates (pañca-vastu, namely, name, sign, discrimination, right knowledge, suchness), there are signs. However, the three doors to liberation (trimokṣa, namely, emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness) have knower and known. Signs are mostly known, and a small part is knower. Both knower and known belong to the three doors to liberation. Commentary: 'Signs are also the three kinds of realms'. Signs also encompass those known three liberations, which are realms. Question: What is the meaning of saying this? Answer: To clarify that the nature of dependence on others and the nature of perfect accomplishment are also the three doors to liberation. Therefore, the sutra text is cited first, and then it is established. The following commentary says 'Since it is so, etc.', which is the formal establishment. Commentary: 'Since it is so, up to being called no-sign'. This is establishing the argument. Among the five aggregates, signs pervade defiled and undefiled. It is also said that signs
為三解脫境。無漏漏殊分依．圓二。故知依．圓併名三境 問無漏有為何名無相 答顯揚第二云。緣智無相道作道．如．行．出行。此亦是無相行 釋曰。智緣無相亦名無相。余教不同廣如義燈引會釋也。
疏。證圓成實時或苦不起者。有義彈云。證圓成時無異忍故。無生忍者意顯證彼無生境故名無生忍。證圓成時惑苦不生豈籍觀耶。故應說云。觀圓成實非惑苦故。無惑苦生名為惑苦無生忍也 詳曰。了知證彼圓成實時惑苦不起名無生忍。不言正證成實之時別起斯忍。或苦不生亦即境也。故疏無違。有義所明理亦通矣。任隨所好。
論。二得勝義等者。此謂涅槃。體是勝果立以勝名。復能順益。又是義利。故亦名義。亦勝亦義持業釋也。因顯所得名得勝義。異釋如燈。
疏。三性五業者。按顯揚論第六云。遍計五業者。一能生依他起自性。由計所執我法為境。能執之心熏成種子。復生似彼我法相等。有質無質．見相同別如理可知。二即於是中起諸言說 釋曰。由彼起此能詮我等種種言論 三能生眾生執。四能生法執。五能攝受二執習氣粗重 釋曰。因彼所執能執之心相分熏似我法等種。見覆熏成能執之種。種因彼起名攝習氣。非彼無體能持習氣名為攝也 依他五業者。一能生諸雜染體。二能為遍計
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為三解脫境（解脫的三個境界）。無漏（沒有煩惱）的智慧和煩惱的差別在於所依和所緣的圓滿程度不同。因此，所依和所緣的圓滿都可稱為三境。問：無漏的智慧為什麼又稱為無相（沒有具體形象）？答：《顯揚論》第二卷說：『以智慧緣于無相之道，作為修道的道路、真如、修行和出離。』這也就是無相行（以無相為對象的修行）。釋：以智慧緣于無相，也稱為無相。其他教派的解釋不同，詳細內容可參考《義燈》的引證和解釋。
疏：證得圓成實性（究竟真實的自性）時，有時苦惱不再生起。有一種觀點反駁說：證得圓成實性時，沒有異於無生忍（對無生之法安忍的智慧）的忍。無生忍的意思是，顯現證得那無生的境界，所以稱為無生忍。證得圓成實性時，煩惱和痛苦不生起，難道需要依靠觀想嗎？所以應該說：觀想圓成實性並非煩惱和痛苦，因此沒有煩惱和痛苦生起，稱為煩惱和痛苦的無生忍。詳：了知證得那圓成實性時，煩惱和痛苦不再生起，稱為無生忍。並不是說在真正證得圓成實性的時候，另外生起這種忍。或者說，苦惱不生起，也就是境界。所以疏文沒有矛盾。這種觀點所闡明的道理也是通順的。可以根據自己的理解選擇。
論：二、得勝義等，指的是涅槃（寂滅）。涅槃的本體是殊勝的果報，所以用『勝』來命名。又能順應和利益眾生，又是義利，所以也稱為『義』。既殊勝又有義利，這是持業釋（一種梵文語法結構）。因為顯示所得的果報，所以稱為『得勝義』。其他的解釋可以參考《燈》。
疏：三性五業，根據《顯揚論》第六卷所說，遍計所執性（虛妄分別的自性）有五種作用：一、能生依他起自性（因緣和合而生的自性）。由於以計度所執的我法為對象，能執之心熏習成種子，又產生類似我法等的現象。有質礙和無質礙、見解相同和見解不同，可以根據道理來了解。二、即於此中生起各種言說。釋：由此生起能詮釋我等的各種言論。三、能生眾生執。四、能生法執。五、能攝受二執的習氣粗重。釋：因為所執的，能執的心相分熏習類似我法等的種子，見解又熏習成能執的種子。種子因為彼而生起，稱為攝習氣。不是說彼沒有本體，能持有習氣，稱為攝。依他起性（因緣和合而生的自性）有五種作用：一、能生各種雜染的本體。二、能為遍計所執性提供...
【English Translation】 English version: These are the three realms of liberation. The difference between non-outflow (without afflictions) wisdom and afflictions lies in the difference in the perfection of what is relied upon and what is cognized. Therefore, both the perfection of what is relied upon and what is cognized can be called the three realms. Question: Why is non-outflow wisdom also called 'no-characteristic' (without concrete form)? Answer: The second volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations says: 'Using wisdom to cognize the path of no-characteristic, as the path of cultivation, suchness, practice, and liberation.' This is also the practice of no-characteristic (practice with no-characteristic as the object). Explanation: Cognizing no-characteristic with wisdom is also called no-characteristic. Other schools have different explanations, and detailed content can be found in the citations and explanations of the Meaning Lamp.
Commentary: When realizing the perfected reality (the ultimate true nature), sometimes suffering does not arise. One view refutes this, saying: When realizing the perfected reality, there is no forbearance different from the non-arising forbearance (the wisdom of being patient with the non-arising dharma). The meaning of non-arising forbearance is to manifest the realization of that non-arising realm, so it is called non-arising forbearance. When realizing the perfected reality, afflictions and suffering do not arise, is it necessary to rely on contemplation? Therefore, it should be said: Contemplating the perfected reality is not affliction and suffering, so no affliction and suffering arise, which is called the non-arising forbearance of affliction and suffering. Detailed: Knowing that when realizing that perfected reality, affliction and suffering no longer arise is called non-arising forbearance. It is not said that when truly realizing the perfected reality, this forbearance arises separately. Or, suffering does not arise, which is also the realm. Therefore, the commentary is not contradictory. The principle explained by this view is also consistent. You can choose according to your own understanding.
Treatise: Two, obtaining the supreme meaning, etc., refers to Nirvana (extinction). The essence of Nirvana is a supreme reward, so it is named 'supreme'. It can also accord with and benefit sentient beings, and it is also beneficial, so it is also called 'meaning'. Both supreme and beneficial, this is a karmadharaya compound (a type of Sanskrit grammatical structure). Because it shows the reward obtained, it is called 'obtaining the supreme meaning'. Other explanations can be found in the Lamp.
Commentary: The three natures and five activities, according to the sixth volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations, the imagined nature (the nature of false discrimination) has five functions: One, it can generate the dependent nature (the nature arising from conditions). Because it takes the imagined self and dharma as objects, the mind that can grasp is perfumed into seeds, and phenomena similar to self and dharma arise again. Whether there are obstacles or no obstacles, whether the views are the same or different, can be understood according to reason. Two, various speeches arise from this. Explanation: From this arise various speeches that can explain the self, etc. Three, it can generate sentient being attachment. Four, it can generate dharma attachment. Five, it can gather and receive the heavy habits of the two attachments. Explanation: Because of what is grasped, the mind aspect that can grasp perfumes seeds similar to self and dharma, and the views perfume into seeds that can grasp. The seeds arise because of that, which is called gathering habits. It is not that it has no essence, and can hold habits, which is called gathering. The dependent nature (the nature arising from conditions) has five functions: One, it can generate the essence of various defilements. Two, it can provide the imagined nature with...
所執自性及圓成自性所依。三能為眾生執所依 釋曰。為所緣緣能起二執名執所依 四能為法執所依。五能為二執習氣粗重所依 圓成五業者。謂能為二種五業對治生起所緣性故 又云。當隨三種自性義解釋一切不了義經。無量經中如來菩薩隱密語言。皆隨三種自性方可悟入彼義故 釋云了知如是三種自效能作一切聲聞．獨覺．無上正等菩提方便。
疏。攝大乘說等者。按無性攝論．本論說云。世尊依何密意。于梵問經中說如來不得生死不得涅槃 釋曰。牒經為問。佛離諸有可無生死。現證圓寂何無涅槃 論于依他起自性中。依遍計所執自性．及圓成實自性．生死涅槃無差別密意 釋曰。由依他起與計．圓成等為所依故。佛證彼依他起際生死．涅槃。不二偏得。由依體一通二分故。實理而言生死．涅槃有別無別。唯約無別故云密意 論何以故。
釋曰。徴也。升．沈既別何言無差 論即此依他起自性。由遍計所執分成生死。由圓成實分成涅槃故 釋曰。依他既由遍計．圓成成圓寂等。能成不離所成之體故無差別 問遍計體無。云何由之成於生死 答因計所執依他相續生死不絕。由悟圓成斷諸煩惱故證涅槃 又云。阿毗達磨大乘經中薄伽梵說法有三種。一雜染分。二清凈分。三彼二分。依何密意作如是說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所執自性（Parikalpita-lakshana，遍計所執性）以及圓成自性（Parinishpanna-lakshana，圓成實性）的所依。三種自效能夠成為眾生執著的所依。解釋說：作為所緣緣，能夠生起兩種執著，名為執著的所依。四種自效能夠成為法執的所依。五種自效能夠成為兩種執著習氣粗重的所依。圓成五業，是指能夠為兩種五業的對治生起所緣的自性。又說：應當根據三種自性的意義來解釋一切不了義經。無量經中如來菩薩隱秘的語言，都應當根據三種自性才能夠領悟其中的意義。解釋說：瞭解這三種自性，能夠作為一切聲聞（Śrāvaka，小乘修行者）、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，緣覺）、無上正等菩提（Anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi，無上正等正覺）的方便。 疏：攝大乘論說等等。按照無性《攝大乘論》和《本論》所說：世尊依據什麼密意，在《梵問經》中說如來不得生死，不得涅槃？解釋說：引用經文作為提問。佛陀已經遠離諸有，可以沒有生死。現在已經證得圓寂，為什麼沒有涅槃？論中說：依據依他起自性（Paratantra-lakshana，依他起性）中，遍計所執自性以及圓成實自性，生死涅槃沒有差別的密意。解釋說：由於依他起與遍計所執、圓成實等作為所依，所以佛陀證得依他起的邊際，生死和涅槃不二而偏得。由於依他起的體性貫通生死和涅槃兩方面，所以從真實的道理來說，生死和涅槃有差別和沒有差別。只是就無差別而言，所以說是密意。論：為什麼呢？ 解釋說：這是征問。上升和下沉既然有區別，為什麼說沒有差別？論：就是這依他起自性，由遍計所執分成生死，由圓成實分成涅槃。解釋說：依他起既然由遍計所執、圓成實成就圓寂等，能夠成就的不離開所成就的體性，所以沒有差別。問：遍計所執的體性是空無的，怎麼能由它成就生死呢？答：因為執著遍計所執，依他起相續不斷，所以生死不絕。由於領悟圓成實，斷除各種煩惱，所以證得涅槃。又說：在《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma，論藏）和大乘經中，薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）說法有三種：一、雜染分；二、清凈分；三、彼二分。依據什麼密意這樣說呢？
【English Translation】 English version: The basis of the imagined nature (Parikalpita-lakshana) and the perfected nature (Parinishpanna-lakshana). The three natures can be the basis of sentient beings' attachments. Explanation: As the object-support condition, it can give rise to two attachments, called the basis of attachment. The four natures can be the basis of attachment to phenomena. The five natures can be the basis of the heavy and coarse habits of the two attachments. Perfecting the five karmas means being able to generate the object-support condition for the counteraction of the two kinds of five karmas. It is also said: All provisional sutras should be explained according to the meaning of the three natures. The hidden language of the Tathagatas and Bodhisattvas in countless sutras can only be understood by following the three natures. Explanation: Understanding these three natures can serve as a means for all Śrāvakas (Hearers), Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), and Anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi (Unsurpassed Perfect Enlightenment). Commentary: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, etc. According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Treatise by Asaṅga: Based on what hidden intention did the World-Honored One say in the Brahma Question Sutra that the Tathagata neither attains birth and death nor attains Nirvana? Explanation: Quoting the sutra as a question. The Buddha has already departed from all existence, so there can be no birth and death. Now that he has attained perfect tranquility, why is there no Nirvana? The treatise says: Based on the dependent nature (Paratantra-lakshana), the imagined nature and the perfected nature, there is the hidden intention that there is no difference between birth and death and Nirvana. Explanation: Because the dependent nature relies on the imagined and perfected natures as its basis, the Buddha attains the boundary of the dependent nature, and birth and death and Nirvana are non-dual and partially attained. Because the nature of the dependent nature pervades both birth and death and Nirvana, from the perspective of true principle, birth and death and Nirvana are different and not different. It is only in terms of non-difference that it is called hidden intention. Treatise: Why? Explanation: This is a question. Since ascent and descent are different, why is it said that there is no difference? Treatise: This dependent nature is divided into birth and death by the imagined nature and into Nirvana by the perfected nature. Explanation: Since the dependent nature achieves perfect tranquility, etc., through the imagined and perfected natures, what can be achieved does not depart from the nature of what is achieved, so there is no difference. Question: The nature of the imagined is empty, so how can it achieve birth and death? Answer: Because of attachment to the imagined, the dependent nature continues uninterrupted, so birth and death do not cease. Because of understanding the perfected nature and cutting off various afflictions, Nirvana is attained. It is also said: In the Abhidharma and Mahayana sutras, the Blessed One (Bhagavan) speaks of three kinds of teachings: 1. the defiled division; 2. the pure division; 3. both divisions. Based on what hidden intention is this said?
釋曰。牒經為問 論于依他起自性中。遍計所執自性是雜染分。圓成實有性是清凈分。即依他起是彼二分。依此密意作如是說。喻如世間金土藏中三法可得。一地界。二土。三金。于地界中土非實有而現可得。金是實有而不可得。火燒練時土相不現金相顯現。識亦如是。無分別智火未燒時。於此識中所有虛妄遍計所執自性顯現。所有真實圓成自性不顯現。此識若為無分別智火所燒時。於此識中所有真實圓成自性顯現。所有虛妄遍計所執自性不顯現。是故此虛妄分別識依他起自性有彼二分。如金土藏中所有地界 釋論云。地喻依他。土喻遍計。金喻圓成。由唯識性是依他起。遍計．圓成是此性分 又云世尊有處說一切法常。有處說一切法無常。有處說一切法非常非無常。依何密意作如是說。謂依他起自性由圓成實性分是常。由遍計所執性分是無常。由彼二分非常非無常 釋論云。謂依他起法性真如體是常住。遍計所執自性分邊體是無常。此性常無故名無常。非有生滅說名無常。
疏。通達三性至無相耶者。按七十四云。答若以世間智而通達時。當言行於相。若以出世間智而通達時。當言行於無相。如遍計所執自性。依他．圓成自性亦爾。又若觀行者如實悟入遍計所執自性時。當言隨入何等自性。答圓成自性。問若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解釋說：這是根據經文提問，論述在依他起自性（緣起性，dependent origination）中，遍計所執自性（妄想執著性，the nature of what is mentally constructed）是雜染的部分，圓成實性（真實圓滿性，the nature of perfect accomplishment）是清凈的部分。即依他起是這兩部分的所依。依據這個密意這樣說。比如世間的金礦中可以得到三種東西：一是地界（土地的本質，earth element），二是土，三是金。在地界中，土不是真實存在但可以顯現，金是真實存在但不可顯現。用火燒煉時，土的相狀消失，金的相狀顯現。識（意識，consciousness）也是這樣。當無分別智（non-discriminating wisdom）的火沒有燒煉時，在這個識中，所有虛妄的遍計所執自性顯現，所有真實的圓成實性不顯現。這個識如果被無分別智的火燒煉時，在這個識中，所有真實的圓成實性顯現，所有虛妄的遍計所執自性不顯現。因此，這個虛妄分別識的依他起自性具有這兩部分，就像金礦中所有的地界一樣。釋論說：地比喻依他起，土比喻遍計所執，金比喻圓成實。由於唯識性（only-consciousness nature）是依他起，遍計所執和圓成實是這個自性的組成部分。 又說，世尊（佛陀，the World-Honored One）有時說一切法是常（恒常，eternal），有時說一切法是無常（無恒常，impermanent），有時說一切法既不是常也不是無常。是依據什麼密意這樣說的呢？是說依他起自性由於圓成實性部分是常，由於遍計所執性部分是無常，由於這兩部分，所以既不是常也不是無常。釋論說：依他起法性（the nature of dependent origination）的真如（the ultimate truth）本體是常住的，遍計所執自性部分的本體是無常的。這個自性常與無常，所以名為無常。不是有生有滅才叫做無常。
疏：通達三性（三種自性，three natures）達到無相（沒有表象，formlessness）的境界嗎？按照第七十四卷所說：回答說，如果用世間智（worldly wisdom）來通達時，應當說是行於相（有相，form）。如果用出世間智（transcendental wisdom）來通達時，應當說是行於無相。如同遍計所執自性，依他起和圓成實自性也是這樣。又如果觀行者（meditator）如實地領悟遍計所執自性時，應當說是隨入了什麼自性？回答是圓成實自性。問：如果
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: This is a question based on the scriptures, discussing that in the Paratantra-svabhava (依他起自性, dependent nature), the Parikalpita-svabhava (遍計所執自性, the imagined nature) is the impure part, and the Parinispanna-svabhava (圓成實性, the perfected nature) is the pure part. That is, the Paratantra is the basis of these two parts. It is said according to this hidden meaning. For example, three things can be obtained in a gold mine in the world: first, the earth element (地界, the essence of the land), second, soil, and third, gold. In the earth element, soil is not truly existent but can appear, and gold is truly existent but cannot appear. When burned with fire, the appearance of soil disappears, and the appearance of gold appears. Consciousness (識, vijnana) is also like this. When the fire of non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智, nirvikalpa-jnana) has not burned, in this consciousness, all the false Parikalpita-svabhava appears, and all the true Parinispanna-svabhava does not appear. If this consciousness is burned by the fire of non-discriminating wisdom, in this consciousness, all the true Parinispanna-svabhava appears, and all the false Parikalpita-svabhava does not appear. Therefore, this illusory discriminating consciousness, the Paratantra-svabhava, has these two parts, just like all the earth elements in a gold mine. The commentary says: Earth is a metaphor for Paratantra, soil is a metaphor for Parikalpita, and gold is a metaphor for Parinispanna. Because the nature of only-consciousness (唯識性, vijnapti-matrata) is Paratantra, Parikalpita and Parinispanna are parts of this nature. It is also said that the World-Honored One (世尊, Bhagavan) sometimes says that all dharmas (法, phenomena) are eternal (常, nitya), sometimes says that all dharmas are impermanent (無常, anitya), and sometimes says that all dharmas are neither eternal nor impermanent. According to what hidden meaning is this said? It is said that the Paratantra-svabhava is eternal due to the Parinispanna-svabhava part, and impermanent due to the Parikalpita-svabhava part. Because of these two parts, it is neither eternal nor impermanent. The commentary says: The Suchness (真如, tathata) of the Paratantra-svabhava's Dharma-nature (法性, dharma-dhatu) is permanent, and the substance of the Parikalpita-svabhava part is impermanent. This nature is both constant and inconstant, so it is called impermanent. It is not that having birth and death is called impermanent.
Commentary: Does understanding the three natures (三性, tri-svabhava) reach the state of no-form (無相, alakshana)? According to the seventy-fourth volume: The answer is, if one understands with worldly wisdom (世間智, laukika-jnana), it should be said that one is acting in form (相, lakshana). If one understands with transcendental wisdom (出世間智, lokottara-jnana), it should be said that one is acting in no-form. Just like the Parikalpita-svabhava, so are the Paratantra and Parinispanna-svabhava. Furthermore, if a meditator (觀行者, vipasyana) truly realizes the Parikalpita-svabhava, it should be said that one is entering into what nature? The answer is the Parinispanna-svabhava. Question: If
觀行者隨入圓成自性。當言除遣何等自性。答依他起自性 又云遍計所執依止三事。相．名．分別。依他起性即依遍計所執自性執及自等流。圓成實性無所安住無所依止 釋曰。自性執者能分別心。即此所引有漏心．心所法。及彼自類展轉相熏熏習而生 又云。無三性染凈不成。如疏具引 又云。遍計所執當言微細難見難了。依他起性當言是粗然難見了。圓成實性當言極微細．極難見．極難了 釋曰。初性世間智不覺悟名為細也。依他之中如心．心等常現前故故名為粗。圓成實性一切異生皆不達故名為極細。二乘聖者猶未了故名為極細。見者初見。了者后了 又云。一是無體能轉有體。一是有體轉有無體。一是有體而非能轉 釋曰。遍計體無。為境能起依他執心名轉有體。轉猶起也。由依他效能起依他名有轉有。是所執依名轉于無 問無法體無。何得稱轉 答對彼妄情故名為轉 又云。一是不生能生於生。一是生能生生不生。一是非生不能生生及不生 釋曰。遍計無體故是不生。為境能生能執心等名能生生。依他有體緣起名生。能生依他名為生生。能生執彼不生之心名生不生 又云。遍計所執自性執。無執相云何應知。答此有二種。一彼覺悟執或無執。若由言說假立名字。遍計諸法決定自性名覺悟執。若善了知唯有名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 觀行者隨之進入圓成實性（Parinispanna，究竟圓滿的自性）。應當說要去除的是哪種自性呢？回答：是依他起自性（Paratantra-svabhava，依他而起的自性）。 經中又說，遍計所執（Parikalpita，虛妄分別的自性）依賴於三種事物：相（Lakshana，表相）、名（Nama，名稱）、分別（Vikalpa，分別作用）。依他起性即是依賴於遍計所執自性而產生的執著以及與此執著同類的煩惱。圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，圓滿成就的自性）無所安住，也無所依賴。 解釋：『自性執』指的是能分別的心。即由此所引發的有漏心（Sasrava-citta，有煩惱的心）、心所法（Caitasika，心的作用），以及它們同類相續，輾轉互相熏習而生起的煩惱。 經中又說，沒有三種自性，染（Klesha，煩惱）和凈（Visuddhi，清凈）都不能成立。正如疏文詳細引述的那樣。 經中又說，遍計所執應當說是微細、難以見到、難以瞭解的。依他起性應當說是粗顯，然而難以瞭解的。圓成實性應當說是極其微細、極其難以見到、極其難以瞭解的。 解釋：最初的遍計所執自性，世間的智慧不能覺悟，所以稱為『細』。依他起性中的心、心所等常常顯現於眼前，所以稱為『粗』。圓成實性一切凡夫都不能通達，所以稱為『極細』。二乘聖者（聲聞乘和緣覺乘的聖者）尚未完全瞭解，所以稱為『極其微細』。『見』是指最初見到，『了』是指後來瞭解。 經中又說，一個是無體性，卻能轉變出有體性；一個是有體性，卻能轉變出無體性；一個是有體性，卻不能轉變。 解釋：遍計所執體性本無，作為所緣境，能生起依他起性的執著心，這稱為『轉變出有體性』。『轉』就是生起的意思。由於依他起效能生起依他起性，所以說『有轉變出有』。是所執著的依他起性，名為『轉變于無』。 問：沒有法體，怎麼能稱為『轉』呢？ 答：這是針對虛妄的情執而說的，所以稱為『轉』。 經中又說，一個是不生，卻能生出所生；一個是生，卻能生出不生；一個是非生，不能生出所生和不生。 解釋：遍計所執沒有體性，所以是『不生』。作為所緣境，能生起能執著的心等，這稱為『能生生』。依他起性有體性，是緣起法，名為『生』。能生起依他起性，稱為『生生』。能生起執著遍計所執不生之心，稱為『生不生』。 經中又說，遍計所執自性執，沒有執著之相，應當如何理解？回答：這有兩種情況。一是覺悟到執著或沒有執著。如果通過言說假立名字，對遍計諸法確定其自性，這稱為『覺悟執』。如果能夠清楚地知道一切都只是名稱而已。
【English Translation】 English version The practitioner, following the path, enters into the Parinispanna-svabhava (perfected nature). What nature should be said to be removed? The answer is the Paratantra-svabhava (other-dependent nature). It is also said that the Parikalpita (imagined nature) relies on three things: Lakshana (characteristics), Nama (name), and Vikalpa (discrimination). The Paratantra-svabhava is the attachment to the Parikalpita and its outflows. The Parinispanna-svabhava has no place to dwell and nothing to rely on. Explanation: 'Attachment to self-nature' refers to the discriminating mind. This refers to the afflicted mind (Sasrava-citta) and mental functions (Caitasika) that are produced by this, as well as the afflictions that arise from the mutual conditioning of similar types. It is also said that without the three natures, defilement (Klesha) and purification (Visuddhi) cannot be established, as detailed in the commentary. It is also said that the Parikalpita should be said to be subtle, difficult to see, and difficult to understand. The Paratantra-svabhava should be said to be coarse, but difficult to understand. The Parinispanna-svabhava should be said to be extremely subtle, extremely difficult to see, and extremely difficult to understand. Explanation: The initial nature, the Parikalpita, is not awakened to by worldly wisdom, so it is called 'subtle'. Among the Paratantra-svabhava, the mind and mental functions are constantly present, so they are called 'coarse'. The Parinispanna-svabhava is not understood by all ordinary beings, so it is called 'extremely subtle'. Even the Arhats of the Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) have not fully understood it, so it is called 'extremely subtle'. 'Seeing' refers to the initial seeing, and 'understanding' refers to the later understanding. It is also said that one is without substance but can transform into substance; one has substance but transforms into non-substance; and one has substance but cannot transform. Explanation: The Parikalpita has no substance. As an object, it can give rise to the mind of attachment to the Paratantra-svabhava, which is called 'transforming into substance'. 'Transforming' means arising. Because the Paratantra-svabhava can give rise to the Paratantra-svabhava, it is said that 'substance transforms into substance'. The object of attachment, the Paratantra-svabhava, is called 'transforming into non-substance'. Question: If there is no substance, how can it be called 'transforming'? Answer: It is called 'transforming' in relation to the false emotional attachments. It is also said that one is unborn but can give rise to what is born; one is born but can give rise to what is unborn; and one is non-born and cannot give rise to what is born or unborn. Explanation: The Parikalpita has no substance, so it is 'unborn'. As an object, it can give rise to the mind of attachment, which is called 'giving rise to what is born'. The Paratantra-svabhava has substance and is dependent origination, so it is called 'born'. Being able to give rise to the Paratantra-svabhava is called 'giving rise to what is born'. Being able to give rise to the mind that is attached to the unborn Parikalpita is called 'giving rise to what is unborn'. It is also said that the attachment to the Parikalpita, if there is no sign of attachment, how should it be understood? Answer: There are two situations. One is being aware of attachment or not being attached. If names are falsely established through speech, and the nature of all Parikalpita dharmas is determined, this is called 'awareness of attachment'. If one clearly knows that everything is just a name.
者知唯名故。非彼諸法有決定性名為無執 釋曰。我法二執現行之位名覺悟執。諸無漏心．及善．無覆無記心等名為無執。無執心中於諸名等有不了．了。思可知也。二彼隨眠執或無執。若未拔彼習氣隨眠有隨眠執。若永斷已當知無執 釋曰。種名隨眠。未斷．斷已名執．無執。論依他起自性執無執相云何應知。答若由遍計所執自性覺悟執故。復遍計彼所成自性是名初執。若善了知唯有眾相。不遍計彼所成自性是名無執 釋曰。此覺悟執無執二也。所成自性即依他起。由彼二執妄計依他以為我法。因染計生名所成也 論若於相縛未永拔者。于諸相中有所得時名第二執。若於相縛已永拔者于無相界正了知故。于相無得當知無執 釋曰。此是隨眠執．無執二。相縛種子名為相縛。
論。圓成實性此無有執。此界非安足處故。若於此界未得觸證。起得觸證增上慢者。即計所執及依他起自性上執 又云。遍計自性當云何知。答當正了知唯有其名唯遍計執。無相無性無生無滅。乃至如空。依他起性當正了知一切所詮有為事攝。圓成實性當正了知如先所說差別之相。所謂真如實際法界如是等類 又云。一自非染能令他染。一唯自染。一自清凈。令他清凈苦等亦爾 釋曰。遍計體無。不名為染。令二執起名染於他。約染依他名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：知曉這些只是名稱，因此，對於這些法沒有決定性的執著，這被稱為『無執』。解釋：『我執』和『法執』現行的狀態稱為『覺悟執』。各種無漏的心，以及善心、無覆無記心等，被稱為『無執』。在『無執』心中，對於各種名稱等，有不了知和了知的情況，可以思考得知。第二種情況是，隨眠的執著或者無執著。如果還沒有拔除這些習氣的隨眠，就存在隨眠的執著；如果已經永遠斷除，應當知道是無執著。解釋：種子被稱為『隨眠』，未斷除和已斷除分別稱為『執』和『無執』。 論中關於依他起自性的執著和無執著，應當如何理解？回答：如果因為對遍計所執自性的覺悟而產生執著，又遍計這種所成的自性，這稱為最初的執著。如果能夠清楚地瞭解只有眾多的相，而不遍計這種所成的自性，這稱為無執著。解釋：這裡說的是覺悟執和無執兩種情況。所成的自性就是依他起。因為這兩種執著而錯誤地認為依他起是我和法，因為染污的計度而產生，所以稱為『所成』。 論中說，如果對於相的束縛還沒有永遠拔除，在各種相中有所得的時候，稱為第二種執著。如果對於相的束縛已經永遠拔除，因為對無相的境界正確地瞭解，對於相沒有所得，應當知道是無執著。解釋：這是隨眠執和無執兩種情況。相縛的種子被稱為『相縛』。 論：圓成實性沒有執著，因為這個境界不是安身立命之處。如果對於這個境界還沒有得到觸證，卻生起得到觸證的增上慢，那就是在遍計所執和依他起自性上產生執著。又說：遍計自性應當如何理解？回答：應當正確地瞭解，它只有名稱，只是遍計執著，沒有相、沒有自性、沒有生、沒有滅，乃至如同虛空。依他起性應當正確地瞭解，它包含一切所詮釋的有為事物。圓成實性應當正確地瞭解，如同先前所說的各種差別之相，也就是真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是的狀態），實際（Bhūtakoti，真實的邊際），法界（Dharmadhatu，諸法的界限）等等。 又說：一個自性不能因為不是染污而使其他自性染污，一個自性只能自己染污。一個自性自己清凈，才能使其他自性清凈，苦等等也是這樣。解釋：遍計所執的體性是虛無的，不能稱為染污。使兩種執著生起，稱為染污其他自性。這裡是就染污依他起性來說的。
【English Translation】 English version: Knowing that these are merely names, therefore, not having a definitive attachment to these dharmas is called 'non-attachment'. Explanation: The state where 'self-attachment' (ātma-graha) and 'dharma-attachment' (dharma-graha) are active is called 'awakened attachment'. Various undefiled minds, as well as wholesome minds, neutral minds without obscuration, etc., are called 'non-attachment'. In 'non-attachment' minds, regarding various names, etc., there are instances of not understanding and understanding, which can be understood through contemplation. The second situation is the attachment of latent tendencies (anuśaya) or non-attachment. If these latent tendencies of habits have not been eradicated, then there exists the attachment of latent tendencies; if they have been permanently severed, it should be known as non-attachment. Explanation: Seeds are called 'latent tendencies', not severed and severed are respectively called 'attachment' and 'non-attachment'. In the treatise, how should the attachment and non-attachment of the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) be understood? Answer: If, due to the awakening of attachment to the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), one further imagines this accomplished nature, this is called the initial attachment. If one can clearly understand that there are only numerous appearances (nimitta), and does not imagine this accomplished nature, this is called non-attachment. Explanation: Here, it refers to the two situations of awakened attachment and non-attachment. The accomplished nature is the dependent arising. Because of these two attachments, one mistakenly believes that dependent arising is self and dharma, and it arises because of defiled conceptualization, hence it is called 'accomplished'. The treatise says, if the bondage of appearances (nimitta-bandha) has not been permanently eradicated, when one obtains something in various appearances, it is called the second attachment. If the bondage of appearances has been permanently eradicated, because of correctly understanding the realm of non-appearance, one does not obtain anything in appearances, it should be known as non-attachment. Explanation: These are the two situations of latent attachment and non-attachment. The seeds of appearance-bondage are called 'appearance-bondage'. Treatise: The perfectly established nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) has no attachment, because this realm is not a place to settle down. If one has not attained tangible proof of this realm, but arises with the arrogance of having attained tangible proof, then attachment arises on the imagined and dependent natures. It also says: How should the imagined nature be understood? Answer: It should be correctly understood that it only has names, it is merely imagined, without appearance, without nature, without birth, without death, even like space. The dependent nature should be correctly understood that it includes all conditioned phenomena that are explained. The perfectly established nature should be correctly understood, like the various differentiated aspects previously mentioned, which are suchness (Tathata, the true state of things as they are), the limit of reality (Bhūtakoti, the ultimate boundary of reality), the realm of dharma (Dharmadhatu, the boundary of all dharmas), and so on. It also says: One nature cannot defile another nature if it is not defiled itself; one nature can only defile itself. One nature is pure itself, then it can purify other natures, suffering and so on are also like this. Explanation: The essence of the imagined nature is empty, it cannot be called defilement. Causing the two attachments to arise is called defiling other natures. This is in terms of defiling the dependent nature.
為自染。由對初性不據自類而相染說名唯自染。或所染法性同不別名唯自染 又云。遍計所執譬如虛空。依他起性如害如怨。圓成實性譬如無盡大寶伏藏 釋曰。依染依他說如怨等。真如是彼眾功德依名大寶藏 又云。遍計所執由何故遍計。由依他自性。依他起性由何故依他。由因緣故。圓成實性由何故圓成。由一切煩惱眾苦所不雜染故。又由常故。
論第九
論。謂名法界等者。按對法論有七種名。一名真如。由彼自性無變異故。釋論云。謂一切時無我實性。無改轉故說無變異 釋曰。無我性者。顯彼自性即是真義 無改轉者。明無變異。即是如義 二無我性。離二我故。三者空性。一切雜染所不行故。釋論云。由緣此故能令一切諸雜染事悉皆空寂 釋曰。由無分別智證彼真如令彼煩惱悉皆空寂。而言染法所不行者。不為染法親所緣著名不行也。四名無相。如疏所引。五名實際。無例所緣故。釋論云。實者謂無顛倒。此處究竟故名為際。過無我性更無所求 釋曰。以所緣中以得究竟故名為際。際者極也。會悟此已更無過此可緣求法故名實際。余如疏引。
論。要具大乘至悟入唯識者。問本性無習。習性非本。如何具二方悟唯識 答有義依前後際說具二種。非同時俱。又習性位非無本性。即一種子
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：自染是指，由於對初性（最初的性質）不依據自身類別而相互沾染，所以稱為唯自染。或者說，被沾染的法性相同而沒有差別，也稱為唯自染。又說，遍計所執性（Parikalpita-lakshana，虛妄分別的性質）譬如虛空，依他起性（Paratantra-lakshana，依他而起的性質）如危害如怨恨，圓成實性（Parinishpanna-lakshana，圓滿成就的性質）譬如無盡的大寶伏藏。解釋說，依染和依他說就像怨恨等，真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是）是那些眾多功德所依賴的，所以稱為大寶藏。又說，遍計所執性由什麼原因而遍計？由於依他起自性。依他起性由什麼原因而依他？由於因緣。圓成實性由什麼原因而圓成？由於一切煩惱和眾多痛苦所不雜染，又由於常恒不變。 論第九 論中說，所謂名法界等，按照《對法論》有七種名稱。第一種名稱是真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是），由於它的自性沒有變異的緣故。《釋論》中說，所謂一切時都沒有我（Atman，獨立存在的實體）的真實性質，沒有改變和轉化，所以說沒有變異。解釋說，無我性（Anatmata，沒有獨立存在的實體）是指，顯示那個自性就是真實的意義。沒有改變和轉化是指，說明沒有變異，就是如（Tathata，如實）的意義。第二種是無我性（Anatmata，沒有獨立存在的實體），遠離了人我和法我（Pudgala-atman and Dharma-atman，個體和現象的實體）的緣故。第三種是空性（Sunyata，空虛的性質），一切雜染所不能行到的緣故。《釋論》中說，由於緣於此，能夠使一切雜染的事情全部都空寂。解釋說，由於沒有分別的智慧證悟了那個真如，使那些煩惱全部都空寂。說染法所不能行到，是指不被染法親近作為所緣，所以稱為不行。第四種名稱是無相（Animitta，沒有表象），如疏中所引用。第五種名稱是實際（Bhutakoti，真實的邊際），沒有可以比擬的所緣的緣故。《釋論》中說，真實是指沒有顛倒，此處是究竟的，所以稱為際（Anta，邊際）。超過了無我性（Anatmata，沒有獨立存在的實體）就沒有什麼可以再求的了。解釋說，在所緣之中，因為得到了究竟，所以稱為際（Anta，邊際）。際（Anta，邊際）就是極點。領會覺悟了這個之後，就沒有超過這個可以緣求的法了，所以稱為實際（Bhutakoti，真實的邊際）。其餘的如疏中所引用。 論中說，要具備大乘直到覺悟進入唯識，有人問，本性沒有熏習，熏習的性質不是本有的，如何具備這兩種才能覺悟唯識？回答說，有一種觀點是依據前後際來說具備兩種，不是同時具備。而且熏習的地位並非沒有本性，就是一種種子。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Self-staining' (Svaranjana) means that because the initial nature (prathamika-svabhava) does not rely on its own category but mutually stains, it is called 'only self-staining.' Or, if the nature of the stained dharma is the same and not different, it is also called 'only self-staining.' Furthermore, it is said that the Parikalpita-lakshana (the nature of conceptual construction) is like empty space, the Paratantra-lakshana (the nature of dependent origination) is like harm and resentment, and the Parinishpanna-lakshana (the nature of perfect accomplishment) is like an inexhaustible great treasure trove. The explanation is that dependence on staining and dependence on others' words are like resentment, etc. The Tathata (suchness, the true nature of things) is what those many merits rely on, so it is called a great treasure trove. Furthermore, it is said, 'By what cause is the Parikalpita-lakshana conceptually constructed?' 'Because of the Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of dependent origination).' 'By what cause does the Paratantra-lakshana depend on others?' 'Because of conditions.' 'By what cause is the Parinishpanna-lakshana perfectly accomplished?' 'Because it is not mixed with all afflictions and many sufferings, and also because it is constant.' Treatise Ninth The treatise says, 'What is meant by names like Dharmadhatu (the realm of dharma)?' According to the Abhidharma texts, there are seven names. The first name is Tathata (suchness, the true nature of things), because its nature does not change. The commentary says, 'What is meant by 'at all times there is no self (Atman, independent entity) in reality'? Because there is no alteration or transformation, it is said that there is no change.' The explanation is that 'no-self nature' (Anatmata, absence of independent entity) means that it shows that that nature is the true meaning. 'No alteration or transformation' means that it explains that there is no change, which is the meaning of 'suchness' (Tathata, reality as it is). The second is 'no-self nature' (Anatmata, absence of independent entity), because it is away from the self of person and the self of phenomena (Pudgala-atman and Dharma-atman, self of individual and self of phenomena). The third is 'emptiness' (Sunyata, the nature of emptiness), because all defilements cannot reach it. The commentary says, 'Because of relying on this, it can make all defiled things completely empty and still.' The explanation is that because of the non-discriminating wisdom realizing that Tathata, it makes those afflictions completely empty and still. Saying that defiled dharmas cannot reach it means that it is not closely related to defiled dharmas as an object, so it is called 'cannot reach.' The fourth name is 'no-sign' (Animitta, absence of characteristics), as quoted in the commentary. The fifth name is 'actual limit' (Bhutakoti, the real boundary), because there is no comparable object. The commentary says, 'Reality means there is no inversion, and this place is ultimate, so it is called 'limit' (Anta, boundary). Beyond the 'no-self nature' (Anatmata, absence of independent entity), there is nothing more to seek.' The explanation is that in the object of cognition, because the ultimate is obtained, it is called 'limit' (Anta, boundary). 'Limit' (Anta, boundary) is the extreme. After comprehending and realizing this, there is no dharma beyond this that can be sought, so it is called 'actual limit' (Bhutakoti, the real boundary). The rest is as quoted in the commentary. The treatise says, 'One must possess Mahayana until one awakens and enters Vijnanavada (Yogacara).' Someone asks, 'The original nature has no habituation, and the nature of habituation is not original. How can one possess both to awaken to Vijnanavada?' The answer is, 'One view is that according to the before and after, one possesses both, not simultaneously. Moreover, the state of habituation is not without the original nature, it is a seed.'
得二種名。本種．熏習有差別故。若依此解未發心前名本性住。發心已去乃至等覺得二種名。此解應勝 詳曰。前解稍通理猶未顯。后解教理俱不符契。一位雜亂。二仁王．瓔珞．瑜伽．攝論經論皆云二種種性在見道前。判通等得豈不遠教。又此論云。無始本因名本性住。聞熏已去方名習性。雖一種子未增增別。增位不可更得本名。后釋難依。今觀論意必有二性後方能悟。具猶有也。非俱名具。
疏。用及用具者。思．修二惠是能入具。此具能現似法．似義。及能有入所知法義之功能故故名為用。此具及用必待能執。彼具假者具方有用。由此前明思修具已。故今次問能執作者。
疏。此初二位以道為位即分出體者。以五道中初之二道標二位名。俱有漏道。有漏道中散定體別分為二也。分者別也。
疏。后三以分為位等者。不以五道而彰位名。但以修等少分多分全分不同分三位也。體俱無漏無為攝故故名通體。
疏。于彼現行等者。明前眾善容於菩薩身得現行。
疏。亦有顯現由性仁賢等者。顯前現行但由仁賢而所起也。或劣勝別而分現行．顯現二也。
疏。性不能起上煩惱等者。問楞伽經云。焚燒一切善根闡提許得成佛。涅槃經中其義亦爾。豈后成佛先無種姓。種姓既有云何斷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 獲得兩種名稱。根本的種性（本種）和熏習的種性，因為差別而得名。如果按照這種解釋，在發起菩提心之前稱為本性住種性，發起菩提心之後乃至獲得等覺（究竟圓滿的覺悟）得到兩種名稱。這種解釋應該更勝一籌。詳細地說，前面的解釋稍微通順，但道理還不明顯。後面的解釋在教義和理證上都不符合。第一，名位雜亂。第二，《仁王經》、《瓔珞經》、《瑜伽師地論》、《攝大乘論》等經論都說兩種種性在見道之前。判為通達等，豈不是遠離了教義？而且此論說，無始以來的根本因叫做本性住種性，聽聞熏習之後才叫做習性種性。雖然是一種種子，但沒有增加增勝的差別。在增勝的階段不能再得到根本的名稱。後面的解釋難以依據。現在觀察論的意義，必定要有兩種種性之後才能證悟。『具』是具有的意思，不是全部都叫做『具』。
思慧和修慧是能進入的工具。這種工具能夠顯現相似的法和相似的義，以及能夠進入所知法義的功能，所以叫做『用』。這種工具和作用必定要依賴能執持者，這種工具如果是虛假的，工具才有用。因此前面說明思修工具之後，現在接著問能執持的作者。
最初的兩個位次以道為位次，就是分出體性。以五道（資糧道、加行道、見道、修道、無學道）中最初的兩個道來標示兩個位次的名字，都是有漏道。有漏道中散亂和禪定的體性不同，所以分為兩種。『分』是不同的意思。
後面的三個位次以分位為位次等等。不以五道來彰顯位次的名字，只是以修習等少分、多分、全分的不同來分三種位次。體性都是無漏無為所攝，所以叫做通體。
對於他們現行等等。說明前面的眾善能夠在菩薩身上得到現行。
也有顯現由性仁賢等等。說明前面的現行只是由仁賢而生起。或者以劣勝的差別來區分現行和顯現兩種。
本性不能生起上品的煩惱等等。問：楞伽經說，焚燒一切善根的闡提（斷善根的人）允許成佛。涅槃經中也是這個意思。難道後來成佛的人先前沒有種姓嗎？種姓既然有，為什麼會斷滅呢？
【English Translation】 English version Two kinds of names are obtained: the fundamental nature (Bija) and the habituated nature, named because of their differences. According to this explanation, before the arising of Bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment), it is called the 'inherent nature dwelling' (本性住). From the arising of Bodhicitta until the attainment of complete enlightenment (等覺), two names are obtained. This explanation should be superior. In detail, the previous explanation is somewhat coherent, but the principle is not yet clear. The latter explanation does not conform to both doctrine and reason. First, the positions are confused. Second, the Sutra of Humane Kings (仁王經), the Garland Sutra (瓔珞經), the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) all say that the two kinds of natures are before the path of seeing (見道). Judging them as 'common' etc., wouldn't that be far from the teachings? Moreover, this treatise says that the fundamental cause from beginningless time is called the 'inherent nature dwelling', and only after hearing and habituation is it called the 'habitual nature'. Although it is one seed, there is no difference in increase or superiority. At the stage of increase, the fundamental name cannot be obtained again. The latter explanation is difficult to rely on. Now, observing the meaning of the treatise, there must be two natures before enlightenment can be attained. '具' (Ju) means 'having', not everything is called '具'.
Thinking-wisdom (思慧) and cultivation-wisdom (修慧) are the tools for entering. These tools can manifest similar Dharmas and similar meanings, and have the function of entering the knowable Dharmas and meanings, so they are called 'use'. These tools and uses must rely on the one who can grasp them. If these tools are false, then the tools are useful. Therefore, after explaining the tools of thinking and cultivation, now we ask about the author who can grasp them.
The first two positions take the path as the position, which is to distinguish the essence. The names of the two positions are marked by the first two paths in the Five Paths (資糧道, 加行道, 見道, 修道, 無學道), both of which are paths with outflows (有漏道). In the path with outflows, the nature of scattering and concentration is different, so it is divided into two. '分' (Fen) means 'different'.
The latter three positions take the divisions as the positions, etc. The names of the positions are not manifested by the Five Paths, but only by the differences in practicing a small part, a large part, and the whole part. The essence is all included in the unconditioned without outflows (無漏無為), so it is called the 'common essence'.
Regarding their manifestation, etc. It explains that the previous good deeds can be manifested in the body of the Bodhisattva.
There is also manifestation due to inherent goodness, etc. It explains that the previous manifestation is only caused by inherent goodness. Or, the difference between inferiority and superiority is used to distinguish between manifestation and appearance.
The inherent nature cannot give rise to superior afflictions, etc. Question: The Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經) says that even an icchantika (闡提), who has burned all good roots, is allowed to become a Buddha. The Nirvana Sutra (涅槃經) also has this meaning. Could it be that those who later become Buddhas did not have a lineage beforehand? Since the lineage exists, why would it be cut off?
善。經論何違 答論據多分。經依盡理。更思。
疏。未得未凈者。未發心求不迨彼位名未發起及未得也。復未為彼後後諸地修諸正行名未清凈。
疏。久作久說有所忘失等者。久謂久遠。所作．說法經時久遠故忘不憶。
疏。在家出家二分菩薩等者。此二種菩薩行中。不能齊修俱行彼行名不顯現。
疏。於此所說至漸輕微故者。于上所說過失相貌。至下忍時過失上品。中上忍時過中下品 問三忍何位 答有二釋。一云如次在三十心。二云論既云忍。四善根中忍有三品。三品忍位過成三品。然三十心同於下忍。世第一法時促不論。或同上忍。
疏。有五補特伽羅等者。無性釋云。應知唯一補特伽羅。位差別故建立五種。如預流等。余文如疏 而有釋云。從初方便至初地為第一。從二地至四地為第二。從五至六為第三。七為第四。八至十地為第五。初地乃屬初劫攝故 詳曰。論既明言謂勝解行補特伽羅經初大劫。初地豈是解行地耶。又第二劫分為三人復無所以。今別釋云。初后二劫是初後人。始從初地至第七滿是第二劫分為三人。初之三地相同世修。四．五．六地同彼二乘。第七依大。三類不同。分為三人故合成五。八地已上俱純無相故合為一。言預流等舉喻明之。按梁攝論云。如前三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：經典和論著有什麼不同？答：論著的依據有很多方面，而經典則完全依據究竟真理。需要進一步思考。
疏：『未得未凈者』，指未發起求道之心，未能達到相應果位，這叫做『未發起』和『未得』。此外，未能爲了證得更高層次的果位，在各個階段修習相應的正確行為，這叫做『未清凈』。
疏：『久作久說有所忘失等者』，『久』指時間長久。所做的事情、所說的法，因為時間長久，所以遺忘不記得了。
疏：『在家出家二分菩薩等者』，這兩種菩薩在修行中，不能同時修習，一起進行，這叫做『不顯現』。
疏：『於此所說至漸輕微故者』，對於上面所說的過失的各種表現，到下忍位時，是過失中的上品；中上忍位時，是過失中的中下品。問：三忍分別對應什麼位次？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是依次對應三十心。另一種說法是，論中既然說是『忍』，四善根中的忍有三品，三品忍位對應過成三品。然而三十心等同於下忍，世第一法時間短暫，不作討論，或者等同於上忍。
疏：『有五補特伽羅（pudgalas，人）等者』，無性（Asanga）解釋說：應當知道只有一個補特伽羅（pudgalas，人），因為果位的差別而建立五種，例如預流（srota-āpanna，入流者）等。其餘內容如疏文所說。而有解釋說：從最初的方便位到初地為第一種；從二地到四地為第二種；從五地到六地為第三種；七地為第四種；八地到十地為第五種。初地屬於初劫所攝。詳細地說，論中既然明確說勝解行補特伽羅（adhimukti-caryā-pudgala，勝解行補特伽羅）經歷最初的大劫，初地怎麼會是解行地呢？而且第二劫分為三人也沒有道理。現在另外解釋說：最初和最後兩個大劫是最初和最後的人。從初地到七地圓滿是第二個大劫，分為三人。初地、二地、三地相同於世間修行；四地、五地、六地等同於二乘；七地依于大乘。這三類不同，所以分為三人，因此合成為五種。八地以上都純粹是無相，所以合為一種。說『預流（srota-āpanna，入流者）等』是舉例子來說明。按照梁攝論所說，如同前面的三種。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What are the differences between sutras and treatises? Answer: Treatises have many bases, while sutras rely entirely on ultimate truth. Further contemplation is needed.
Commentary: 'Those who have not attained and are not pure' refers to those who have not initiated the mind of seeking the path and have not attained the corresponding position, which is called 'not initiated' and 'not attained'. Furthermore, failing to cultivate the corresponding correct practices in each stage in order to attain higher levels of attainment is called 'not pure'.
Commentary: 'Having done and spoken for a long time, there are things forgotten, etc.' 'Long' refers to a long time. Things done and teachings spoken are forgotten and not remembered because of the long time.
Commentary: 'Lay and monastic Bodhisattvas, etc.' These two types of Bodhisattvas, in their practice, cannot cultivate simultaneously and proceed together, which is called 'not manifest'.
Commentary: 'Regarding what is said here, until it gradually becomes subtle' refers to the various manifestations of faults mentioned above. At the lower endurance (kṣānti) level, it is the highest grade of faults; at the middle and upper endurance level, it is the middle and lower grade of faults. Question: What positions do the three endurance levels correspond to? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that they correspond to the thirty minds in sequence. Another explanation is that since the treatise speaks of 'endurance (kṣānti)', the endurance in the four roots of goodness has three grades, and the three grades of endurance correspond to the three grades of accomplishment. However, the thirty minds are equivalent to the lower endurance, and the worldly first dharma is too short in time to be discussed, or it is equivalent to the upper endurance.
Commentary: 'There are five pudgalas (persons), etc.' Asaṅga explains: It should be known that there is only one pudgala (person), and five types are established because of the differences in positions, such as srota-āpanna (stream-enterer), etc. The rest of the text is as the commentary says. And there is an explanation that from the initial expedient stage to the first bhūmi (ground) is the first type; from the second bhūmi to the fourth bhūmi is the second type; from the fifth to the sixth is the third type; the seventh is the fourth type; and the eighth to the tenth bhūmi is the fifth type. The first bhūmi belongs to the first kalpa (aeon). In detail, since the treatise clearly states that the adhimukti-caryā-pudgala (person of liberated conduct) experiences the initial great kalpa (aeon), how can the first bhūmi be the ground of liberated conduct? Moreover, there is no reason for dividing the second kalpa (aeon) into three people. Now, another explanation is that the initial and final two kalpas (aeons) are the initial and final people. From the first bhūmi to the seventh bhūmi completion is the second kalpa (aeon), divided into three people. The first, second, and third bhūmis are the same as worldly practice; the fourth, fifth, and sixth bhūmis are equivalent to the two vehicles; the seventh bhūmi relies on the Great Vehicle. These three categories are different, so they are divided into three people, thus combining into five types. The eighth bhūmi and above are purely without characteristics, so they are combined into one type. Saying 'srota-āpanna (stream-enterer), etc.' is giving an example to illustrate. According to the Liang Saṃgraha-bhāṣya, it is like the previous three.
果三位亦得成立五人。從初向至須陀洹以為第一。家家為第二。斯陀含為第三。一種子為第四。阿那含為第五 問喻中既以方便初果合為一。法中何不初地方便合為一耶 答喻依少分非一切同故不應責。即第二果前後並自以為三種。第二劫中三位不同少同彼也 問若第二劫開為三者。何故無性。云如是二種補特伽羅經第二劫修行圓滿 答第二劫中前六有相。第七無相。且有．無相相對名二。于有相中略而不言示方隅爾。
疏。處夢謂多年者。按無性攝論所引頌云。處夢謂經年。寤乃須臾頃。故時雖無量。攝在一剎那。又西域傳云有隱士。結廬屏跡博習伎術究極神理。能使瓦礫為寶人畜易形。但未能馭風雲陪仙駕。閱圖考古更求仙術。其方曰夫神仙者長生之術也。將欲求學先定其志。筑建壇場命一列土執長刀立壇隅。屏息絕言自昏達署。求仙者中壇而坐手按長劍口誦神咒收視反聽達明登仙。是人既得仙方而訪列士。營求曠歲未諧心願后得列士。先與人傭力難辛五歲遠失一日遂被笞辱。又無所得悲號巡路。隱士見命數加重賂。潛行隱德感激其心。列士屢求效命以報知已。隱士曰我求列士彌歷歲時。幸而會遇奇貌應圖非有他故。愿一夕不聲耳。列士曰死尚不辭豈徒屏息。於是設壇場受仙法依方行事坐待日曛。曛暮之後
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如果三位（指三種補特伽羅）也能成立五位（指五種補特伽羅）。從初向（初果向，Srota-apatti-pratipannaka）到須陀洹（初果，Srota-apanna）作為第一位。家家（一種二果，Sakrdagamin）為第二位。斯陀含（二果，Sakrdagamin）為第三位。一種子（一種子，Ekabijin）為第四位。阿那含（三果，Anagamin）為第五位。問：譬喻中既然以方便初果（指初果向）合為一體。正法中為何不將初地（初果）和方便（初果向）合為一體呢？答：譬喻依賴於少部分相似，並非完全相同，所以不應該責難。即第二果（二果）前後自身分為三種。第二劫（指二果的修行階段）中三位不同，與此有少許相似。問：如果第二劫開為三種，為何說沒有自性？經中說：『像這樣兩種補特伽羅（指有相和無相的補特伽羅）在第二劫修行圓滿。』答：第二劫中前六位是有相的，第七位是無相的。且有相和無相相對而言稱為二。在有相中，省略不說是爲了指示方向而已。 疏：『處夢謂多年者』，按照無性《攝論》所引用的偈頌說：『處夢謂經年，寤乃須臾頃。』所以時間雖然無量，可以攝在一剎那。又《西域傳》記載有隱士，結廬隱居，廣泛學習技藝，窮究神理。能使瓦礫變為寶物，人畜改變形貌。但未能駕馭風雲，陪伴仙人。查閱圖籍，考察古代，更求仙術。其方法說：『所謂神仙，是長生不老的法術。將要學習，先要堅定志向。筑建壇場，命令一列人手執長刀，立於壇的角落。屏息絕言，從黃昏到天亮。求仙的人坐在壇的中央，手按長劍，口誦神咒，收視反聽，達到天亮就能登仙。』這人得到仙方后，尋訪列士。經營多年，未能如願，後來得到列士。先是給人做傭工，勞苦辛勤五年，有一天稍微失誤，就被鞭打侮辱。又沒有得到什麼，悲號著在路上巡走。隱士看見他，認為他的命數加重，用重金賄賂，暗中施行恩德，感動了他的心。列士多次請求效命來報答知遇之恩。隱士說：『我尋求列士已經歷多年，幸而遇到你，奇特的相貌與圖籍相符，沒有其他原因。希望你一晚上不要出聲。』列士說：『死尚且不推辭，何況只是屏息。』於是設定壇場，接受仙法，按照方法行事，坐著等待天黑。黃昏之後
【English Translation】 English version If the three (referring to three kinds of individuals, Pudgalas) can also establish five (referring to five kinds of individuals, Pudgalas). From the initial stage towards (Srota-apatti-pratipannaka, the path to the first fruit) to Srota-apanna (the first fruit) as the first. Sakrdagamin (once-returner, a type of the second fruit) as the second. Sakrdagamin (the second fruit) as the third. Ekabijin (one-seed, a type of Anagamin) as the fourth. Anagamin (non-returner, the third fruit) as the fifth. Question: Since in the analogy, the initial fruit of convenience (referring to the path to the first fruit) is combined into one. Why in the Dharma, are the initial ground (the first fruit) and convenience (the path to the first fruit) not combined into one? Answer: The analogy relies on a small portion of similarity, not complete sameness, so it should not be criticized. That is, the second fruit (the second fruit) itself is divided into three before and after. The three positions in the second Kalpa (referring to the stage of practice of the second fruit) are different, with some similarity to this. Question: If the second Kalpa is opened into three, why is it said to have no self-nature? The sutra says: 'Like this, two kinds of individuals (referring to individuals with form and without form) complete their practice in the second Kalpa.' Answer: In the second Kalpa, the first six are with form, and the seventh is without form. And with form and without form are relatively called two. In the with-form, omitting to say is only to indicate direction. Commentary: 'The dream is said to be many years', according to the verse quoted in Asanga's Mahayana-samgraha: 'The dream is said to be many years, awakening is only a moment.' So although time is immeasurable, it can be contained in an instant. Also, the Western Regions Records says there was a hermit who lived in seclusion, widely studying skills, and deeply investigating spiritual principles. He could turn tiles into treasures, and change the forms of humans and animals. But he could not control the wind and clouds, and accompany the immortals. He consulted books, examined the ancients, and sought the art of immortality. The method said: 'The so-called immortals are the art of longevity. If you want to learn, first you must strengthen your will. Build an altar, and order a row of people to hold long knives, standing at the corners of the altar. Hold your breath and be silent, from dusk to dawn. The seeker of immortality sits in the center of the altar, holding a long sword, chanting mantras, withdrawing sight and hearing, and reaching dawn to ascend to immortality.' After this person obtained the immortal formula, he sought out the knight. After many years of operation, he failed to fulfill his wish, and later obtained the knight. First, he worked as a laborer, working hard for five years, and one day he made a slight mistake, and was whipped and humiliated. He got nothing, and walked around the road crying. The hermit saw him and thought that his fate had worsened, bribed him with heavy money, secretly performed kindness, and moved his heart. The knight repeatedly asked to serve to repay the kindness of knowing him. The hermit said: 'I have been looking for a knight for many years, and fortunately I met you. Your strange appearance matches the books, there is no other reason. I hope you will not make a sound for one night.' The knight said: 'I would not refuse to die, let alone just hold my breath.' So he set up an altar, received the immortal method, acted according to the method, and sat waiting for the dark. After dusk
各司其務。隱士誦神咒。列士按铦刀。殆將曉矣忽發聲叫。是時空中火下煙焰云蒸。隱士疾引此人入池避難已而問曰。試子無聲。何以驚叫。列士曰受命后至夜分惛然若夢變事更起。見昔事主躬來慰謝。感荷厚恩忍不報語。彼人震怒遂見殺害。更受中陰身自顧嘆惜。猶愿歷世不言。以報厚德遂見託生南印度大婆羅門家乃至受胎。出胎修經苦厄。荷恩荷德忍而不言。洎乎受業冠婚喪親生子。每念前恩忍而不語。宗親戚屬咸見怪異。年過六十而有一男。我妻謂曰汝可言矣。若不語者當殺汝子。我時惟念已隔生世。自顧衰老唯此稚子。因止其妻令無殺害遂發此聲耳。隱士曰我之過也。此魔嬈耳。列士感恩悲事不成憤恚而死。
疏。所作狹少等者。志樂不廣所為非大。又非一行能修一切名狹少也。縱修間斷名為有缺。所修諸行不能堅志有起不起。或隨六度修於此彼而無楷準總名不定。隨所修善或時退舍名所得退。
論。資糧位者。位中有此資糧之法名資糧位。即有財釋。
論。亦名順解脫分者。疏有兩釋。有義彈彼第二釋云。此理不然。豈為有情求勝解耶。故前解正 詳曰。疏雖不斷。今以理準前解是本。后亦無違。諸教皆說無漏勝解名為解脫。自未解脫莫解脫他。言為有情求之何失。
疏。第七觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 各司其職。隱士誦讀神咒。武士手按利刃。眼看就要天亮，忽然發出叫聲。這時空中降下火焰，煙霧瀰漫。隱士迅速拉此人進入池中避難，之後問道：『你嘗試保持沉默，為何驚叫？』武士說：『接受命令后，到了半夜，昏昏沉沉如同做夢，變故再次發生。我看見以前的主人親自前來慰問感謝。我感念他深厚的恩情，不忍心不說話。那人震怒，於是將我殺害。我再次承受中陰身，獨自顧影自憐，嘆息不已。我仍然希望生生世世都不說話，來報答他的深厚恩德，於是投生到南印度一個大婆羅門家中，乃至受胎。出生后，我修行經典，歷經苦難。感念他的恩情和恩德，我忍住不說話。等到我接受學業、舉行冠禮和婚禮、經歷喪親、生兒育女，每每想到以前的恩情，都忍住不說話。宗族親戚都覺得我怪異。年過六十，我生了一個兒子。我的妻子說：「你可以說話了。如果不說話，我就殺了你的兒子。」我當時只想到已經隔了生世，自己也已衰老，只有這個年幼的兒子。因此我阻止我的妻子，讓她不要殺害兒子，於是發出了這個聲音。』隱士說：『這是我的過錯啊。這是魔的干擾。』武士感恩戴德，但因為事情不成而憤恨死去。 疏：『所作狹少等者』，意思是志向和喜好不廣，所作所為不大。又不是隻修行一種法門就能修成一切，這叫做『狹少』。即使修行，如果斷斷續續，就叫做『有缺』。所修行的各種行為不能堅定志向，時起時落，或者隨著六度修行，一會兒修這個，一會兒修那個，而沒有準則，總的來說叫做『不定』。隨著所修的善行，有時退卻捨棄，叫做『所得退』。 論：『資糧位者』，意思是說，在這個位次中，有作為資糧的法，所以叫做資糧位。這就是從擁有的財物來解釋。 論：『亦名順解脫分者』，疏中有兩種解釋。有人反駁第二種解釋說：『這個道理不對。難道是爲了有情眾生求得殊勝的理解嗎？』所以認為前面的解釋才是正確的。詳細地說，疏雖然沒有斷定，但現在以道理來衡量，前面的解釋是根本的。後面的解釋也沒有違背。各種教義都說無漏的殊勝理解叫做解脫。自己還沒有解脫，就不要去解脫他人。說爲了有情眾生求得解脫，有什麼過失呢？ 疏：第七觀
【English Translation】 English version Each performed their duties. The hermit chanted sacred mantras. The warrior gripped his sharp blade. As dawn approached, a sudden cry erupted. At that moment, fire descended from the sky, and smoke billowed. The hermit swiftly pulled the warrior into the pond for refuge, and then asked: 'You were trying to remain silent, why did you cry out?' The warrior said: 'After receiving the order, I became drowsy as if dreaming at midnight, and an unexpected event occurred. I saw my former master come to comfort and thank me in person. I was so grateful for his profound kindness that I couldn't bear to remain silent. That person became enraged and killed me. I then endured the intermediate state (bardo), lamenting my fate alone. I still wished to remain silent throughout all lifetimes to repay his great kindness, and was thus reborn into a high-caste Brahmin family in South India, even to the point of conception. After birth, I practiced the scriptures and endured hardships. Remembering his kindness and virtue, I refrained from speaking. When I received my education, underwent the coming-of-age ceremony and marriage, experienced the loss of loved ones, and had children, I always refrained from speaking whenever I thought of his past kindness. My relatives and family members all found me strange. After the age of sixty, I had a son. My wife said, "You can speak now. If you don't speak, I will kill your son." At that moment, I only thought that lifetimes had passed, and I was already old, with only this young son. Therefore, I stopped my wife, preventing her from killing our son, and thus I uttered that cry.' The hermit said, 'It is my fault. This is a demonic disturbance.' The warrior was grateful, but died resentfully because the matter was not resolved. Commentary: 'What is done is narrow and little, etc.' means that the aspirations and joys are not broad, and what is done is not great. Also, it is not that one can cultivate everything by practicing only one Dharma, which is called 'narrow and little.' Even if one cultivates, if it is intermittent, it is called 'incomplete.' The various practices that are cultivated cannot be firmly aspired to, sometimes arising and sometimes not, or following the Six Perfections, sometimes cultivating this and sometimes cultivating that, without a standard, which is generally called 'unstable.' Depending on the good deeds that are cultivated, sometimes retreating and abandoning them is called 'loss of what is attained.' Treatise: 'The stage of accumulation of merit' means that in this stage, there are Dharmas that serve as the accumulation of merit, so it is called the stage of accumulation of merit. This is explained from the possessions one has. Treatise: 'Also called the part that accords with liberation' The commentary has two explanations. Someone refutes the second explanation, saying: 'This reasoning is not correct. Is it for sentient beings to seek excellent understanding?' Therefore, the previous explanation is considered correct. In detail, although the commentary does not make a definitive judgment, the previous explanation is the fundamental one based on reason. The later explanation is not contradictory either. Various teachings say that stainless excellent understanding is called liberation. If one has not yet liberated oneself, one should not liberate others. What is wrong with saying that it is for sentient beings to seek liberation? Commentary: The seventh contemplation
業第八觀果等者。按第八十住品云。此菩薩從一切聖法正教中生修十種法。所謂信佛不壞究竟於法寂然定意。分別眾生。分別佛剎。分別世界。分別諸業。分別果報。分別生死。分別涅槃。
論。故於二取至二取現行者。經論相違疏有四釋。一疏云彼依伏因至及俱生煩惱。二又說佛法功力等。三因自分別等下是。四又但總言等下是。斷如燈辨。
論。此所知障不與異熟識俱等者。此中三因。佛地論同。彼云一切異熟無記心品。分別力劣不能執故。若有倒執成法我見有無明等。不應唯與五法相應。有見等故。又法空觀初現前時此識應斷。障治相違不俱行故 釋曰。佛地初因通一切異熟之心。非唯第八。或此亦兼明余異熟。
疏。又下異熟心至不可為例者。此設遮也。設彼例云。若眼等識是異熟心。不有法執法空智俱。四無記中異熟無記。一切應與法空智俱。皆無法執如第八等。故今答意異熟名同。執．不執別不可為例。
疏。第七識至十三法者。但說障也。故唯十三。
論。煩惱障至為所依故者。按勝鬘經明所知障為煩惱依。文有法喻及合三段。如疏已引。理旨奧隱遂難略釋 經於此起煩惱等者 釋曰。於此無明地上所起現行煩惱于剎那頃必與無明剎那剎那相應而起 經世尊心不相應。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 業第八觀果等者。按照第八十住品所說，此菩薩從一切聖法正教中生起，修習十種法。這十種法分別是：對佛的信心不動搖，究竟於法的寂然，定意，分別眾生（Sattvas，有情），分別佛剎（Buddha-kshetra，佛的國土），分別世界（Lokas，世間），分別諸業（Karmas，行為），分別果報（Vipāka，業報），分別生死（Samsara，輪迴），分別涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。 論：故於二取至二取現行者。經論相違，疏有四種解釋。第一種解釋是，疏中說，它依賴於潛在的原因，以及俱生煩惱（Sahaja-kleshas，與生俱來的煩惱）。第二種解釋又說，佛法功力等。第三種解釋是，因自分別等以下的內容。第四種解釋是，又只是總而言之等以下的內容。斷如燈辨。 論：此所知障（Jnana-avarana，智慧障）不與異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana，異熟識）俱等者。這裡有三個原因。《佛地論》的觀點相同。它說，一切異熟無記心品，由於分別的力量弱，不能執取。如果存在顛倒的執取，形成法我見（Dharma-atma-drishti，對法存在的執著）和無明（Avidya，無知）等，不應只與五法相應，因為有見等。此外，當法空觀（Dharma-shunyata-jnana，對法空性的認知）初次顯現時，此識應該斷除。因為障礙和對治是相互違背的，不能同時存在。釋曰：《佛地論》的第一個原因適用於一切異熟之心，不僅僅是第八識。或者這裡也兼明其他的異熟。 疏：又下異熟心至不可為例者。這是假設的遮止。假設他們舉例說，如果眼等識是異熟心，就不會有法執和法空智同時存在。在四種無記中，異熟無記，一切都應該與法空智同時存在，因為都沒有法執，如第八識等。所以現在的回答是，異熟的名稱相同，但執取和不執取是不同的，不能作為例子。 疏：第七識至十三法者。只是說了障礙。所以只有十三種。 論：煩惱障（Klesha-avarana，煩惱障）至為所依故者。按照《勝鬘經》所說，所知障是煩惱的所依。文中有法喻和合三段。如疏中已經引用。理旨奧隱，難以簡略解釋。經於此起煩惱等者。釋曰：在此無明地上所生起的現行煩惱，在剎那頃必定與無明剎那剎那相應而生起。經世尊心不相應。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the eighth Karma observation of results, etc., according to the eightieth chapter on abiding, this Bodhisattva arises from all sacred Dharma and correct teachings, cultivating ten kinds of Dharma. These ten kinds of Dharma are: unwavering faith in the Buddha, ultimate stillness of Dharma, concentration, distinguishing sentient beings (Sattvas), distinguishing Buddha-lands (Buddha-kshetra), distinguishing worlds (Lokas), distinguishing all actions (Karmas), distinguishing karmic retributions (Vipāka), distinguishing birth and death (Samsara), and distinguishing Nirvana (Nirvana). Treatise: Therefore, regarding 'in dualistic grasping' to 'dualistic grasping manifests,' there are contradictions between the sutras and treatises, and the commentary has four explanations. The first explanation is that the commentary says it relies on latent causes and co-arising afflictions (Sahaja-kleshas). The second explanation also speaks of the power of the Buddha's Dharma, etc. The third explanation is from 'because of self-discrimination,' etc., below. The fourth explanation is 'but generally speaking,' etc., below. Discernment is like distinguishing with a lamp. Treatise: Regarding 'this cognitive obscuration (Jnana-avarana) is not simultaneous with the resultant consciousness (Vipaka-vijnana),' there are three reasons here. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (佛地論) has the same view. It says that all resultant unwholesome mental states, due to the weakness of their discriminating power, cannot grasp. If there is inverted grasping, forming the view of self in phenomena (Dharma-atma-drishti) and ignorance (Avidya), etc., it should not only be associated with five dharmas, because there are views, etc. Furthermore, when the wisdom of the emptiness of phenomena (Dharma-shunyata-jnana) first manifests, this consciousness should be severed. Because obstacles and antidotes are contradictory and cannot coexist. Explanation: The first reason in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra applies to all resultant minds, not just the eighth consciousness. Or this also clarifies other results. Commentary: Regarding 'furthermore, the resultant mind' to 'cannot be taken as an example,' this is a hypothetical refutation. Suppose they give an example, saying that if eye consciousness, etc., are resultant minds, there will be no simultaneous existence of attachment to phenomena and wisdom of the emptiness of phenomena. Among the four unwholesome states, the resultant unwholesome, everything should coexist with the wisdom of the emptiness of phenomena, because there is no attachment to phenomena, like the eighth consciousness, etc. So the current answer is that the name 'resultant' is the same, but grasping and non-grasping are different and cannot be taken as an example. Commentary: Regarding 'the seventh consciousness' to 'thirteen dharmas,' it only speaks of obstacles. So there are only thirteen. Treatise: Regarding 'afflictive obscuration (Klesha-avarana)' to 'because it is the basis,' according to the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra, cognitive obscuration is the basis of afflictions. The text has three sections of Dharma analogy and combination. As the commentary has already quoted. The principles are profound and difficult to briefly explain. 'Sutras arise afflictions here,' etc. Explanation: The manifest afflictions arising on this ground of ignorance, in an instant, must arise in correspondence with ignorance moment by moment. 'Sutra: Not corresponding to the mind of the World Honored One.'
無始無明住地者 釋曰。無明地種名不相應。意明無明同於煩惱通種現也 或相應者是共之義。四住煩惱三乘同斷名曰相應。無明住地獨唯佛除名不相應 經過於恒沙等者 釋曰。顯依無明煩惱無極名過恒沙。余文易悟。
論。體雖無異而用有別者。用別有二。一現行用別。二種子用別。有障菩提．涅槃用故。前解為本。后理亦通。
論。故二隨眠斷惑前後者。問斷既前後何名體一。二乘斷惑所知應斷。以體一故。又十地中斷所知障煩惱應斷。一即體同。二契經言如地壞時種隨壞故 答有義種體雖一。而有粗細共和合故。如金鐵等一物之中精粗異故。生空聖道力不及彼菩薩方便故留不斷。經依見道．究竟道說故不相違 詳曰。既以粗細和合成之。種體應假。如瓶衣等。假非因緣何得生現。故今解云。用既有差斷彼一分用所依體。聖道功力有分限故。故佛地論云。煩惱障中有所知障。是所依故。必執有法而計我故。體雖無異然用有別。如一識體取境多用。此熏種子體亦多用。起時雖俱而漸次斷。聖道勢力有分限故。余義同前。
論。若所知障至無明住地者。此以經難。經如疏引。遂難略解。言住及起二煩惱者。住謂種子。起是現行。或所依生處名為住地。起謂現惑。正生起故。三界見惑而由見勝。復
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『無始無明住地者』，釋文說：『無明地種名不相應』。意思是說無明和煩惱一樣，普遍存在於各種種子和現行之中。『或相應者是共之義』，指的是四住煩惱，三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共同斷除，所以叫做相應。而無明住地只有佛才能斷除，所以叫做不相應。『經過於恒沙等者』，釋文說：『顯示依附於無明的煩惱是無窮無盡的，所以說超過恒河沙數。』其餘文字容易理解。
論：『體雖無異而用有別者』，用處的差別有兩種：一是現行用處的差別，二是種子用處的差別。因為有障礙菩提（覺悟）和涅槃（寂滅）的作用。前面的解釋是根本，後面的道理也說得通。
論：『故二隨眠斷惑前後者』，問：斷除有先後，為什麼說體性是一樣的？二乘斷除迷惑，所知障也應該斷除，因為體性是一樣的緣故。又，十地中，斷除所知障，煩惱也應該斷除，因為體性相同。二，契經上說，就像大地壞滅的時候，種子也隨之壞滅。答：有一種說法是，種子體性雖然一樣，但是有粗細和合的緣故，就像金鐵等物，在一種物質中，有精粗的差別。生空聖道的力量達不到，因為菩薩有方便，所以留下不斷。經文是依據見道和究竟道說的，所以不矛盾。詳細地說，既然用粗細和合而成，種子的體性應該是假的，就像瓶子、衣服等。如果是假的，不是因緣，怎麼能產生現行？所以現在解釋說，用處既然有差別，就斷除它一部分用處所依附的體性。聖道的功力有分限的緣故。所以《佛地論》說：『煩惱障中有所知障，是所依的緣故。』必定執著於法而計較有我。體性雖然沒有差別，但是用處有差別，就像一個識體，取境有多種用處。這種熏習的種子，體性也有多種用處。生起的時候雖然一起生起，但是逐漸斷除，因為聖道的勢力有分限的緣故。其餘的意思和前面一樣。
論：『若所知障至無明住地者』，這是用經文來責難。經文就像疏鈔所引用的。於是簡略地解釋責難。『言住及起二煩惱者』，住指的是種子，起指的是現行。或者說，所依的生處叫做住地，起指的是現行的迷惑，因為是真正生起的緣故。三界見惑，因為見解的偏勝。
【English Translation】 English version: 'The Abode of Beginningless Ignorance': The commentary says, 'The name of the seed-ground of ignorance is non-corresponding.' This means that ignorance, like afflictions, is universally present in all seeds and manifestations. 'Or corresponding means common,' referring to the four abodes of afflictions, which the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna) jointly eliminate, hence called corresponding. The abode of ignorance, however, is only eliminated by the Buddha, hence called non-corresponding. 'Passing through as many as the Ganges sands,' the commentary says, 'It shows that the afflictions dependent on ignorance are infinite, hence the saying of exceeding the Ganges sands.' The remaining text is easy to understand.
Treatise: 'Although the essence is not different, the function is different.' There are two kinds of functional differences: first, the difference in manifest function; second, the difference in seed function. Because there is the function of obstructing Bodhi (enlightenment) and Nirvana (extinction). The previous explanation is fundamental, and the latter reasoning also makes sense.
Treatise: 'Therefore, the two latent tendencies are severed at different times.' Question: Since severance occurs at different times, why is it said that the essence is the same? When the two vehicles sever afflictions, the object of knowledge should also be severed, because the essence is the same. Also, in the ten grounds, when the object of knowledge is severed, afflictions should also be severed, because the essence is the same. Second, the sutras say that just as when the earth is destroyed, the seeds are also destroyed. Answer: One view is that although the essence of the seeds is the same, there are coarse and fine combinations, just like gold and iron, in one substance, there are differences in fineness and coarseness. The power of the holy path of emptiness cannot reach it, because Bodhisattvas have expedient means, so they leave it unsevered. The sutras are based on the path of seeing and the ultimate path, so there is no contradiction. In detail, since it is formed by the combination of coarse and fine, the essence of the seed should be false, like bottles and clothes. If it is false, not caused by conditions, how can it produce manifestation? Therefore, the current explanation is that since the function is different, sever the essence on which a part of its function depends. The power of the holy path is limited. Therefore, the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra says: 'Among the afflictions, there is the object of knowledge, which is the basis.' One must cling to the Dharma and calculate that there is a self. Although the essence is not different, the function is different, just like one consciousness body, taking objects has multiple functions. The seeds of this kind of熏習 also have multiple functions. Although they arise together, they are gradually severed, because the power of the holy path is limited. The remaining meaning is the same as before.
Treatise: 'If the object of knowledge reaches the abode of ignorance,' this is to question with the sutras. The sutras are like those quoted in the commentary. Therefore, briefly explain the questioning. 'The two afflictions of abiding and arising,' abiding refers to the seed, arising refers to the manifestation. Or, the place of dependence is called the abode, arising refers to the manifest delusion, because it is truly arising. The delusions of the three realms are due to the superiority of views.
見道斷故。合言之見一處也。三有俱生修道之惑。潤生愛勝別分三種。非唯三界俱生但愛。言無明住地者。諸所知障皆能障智無明偏增總名無明。言一切上煩惱者。前四住惑現種皆依無明地上名上煩惱。
疏。總名無明無品數故者。有義彈云。此義不然。體同煩惱。即如煩惱品數別故。但應說云行微細故。不染義同合為一住 詳曰。不同煩惱地地九品分為粗細斷之前後言無品數。非言無彼愛．恚等類名無品也。故疏無違。若言不染義同合一。豈彼經中唯對二乘辨五住地。若兼菩薩何唯不染。對彼菩薩是應染分。如煩惱障既不別開。故知不約不染合也。
論。永斷二障至通有漏道者。有義彈疏釋云。若爾二乘伏煩惱時同體。所知應皆不起。又斷煩惱所知應斷。既所知種不障彼智。道力劣故二乘不斷。現行亦爾。非彼所伏。今言伏二依菩薩說。以法空觀。伏煩惱時。同體所知亦即能伏。若生空觀伏煩惱時亦不能伏。非治道故。由此道理望所知障。生空無漏不及法空有漏道也 詳曰。疏中不言二乘伏惑。亦不說云生空智也。何得輒以二乘不斷所知障體而為難耶。那知疏主不依法空智伏惑說。而言今依菩薩說耶。疏理實通非可局情自度破他。
疏。永斷習氣等者。按彼論云。永斷習氣非根所攝。然是六根所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『見道』（Dṛṣṭimārga）斷除的緣故，合起來說，『見』（Dṛṣṭi）只在一處。三有（Tribhava）俱生的修道之惑，潤生的愛（Tṛṣṇā）最為殊勝，特別分為三種。並非只有三界（Tridhātu）俱生的愛，說到『無明住地』（avidyā-sthiti）時，一切所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa）都能障礙智慧，無明（avidyā）偏重，總名為無明。說到『一切上煩惱』（sarva upakleśa）時，前面四住地的惑（kleśa）的現行和種子，都依附在無明地上，名為上煩惱。
疏：總名為無明，因為沒有品數。有人反駁說：這個說法不對。無明的體性與煩惱相同，就像煩惱有品數差別一樣，應該說無明行相微細的緣故，不染污的意義相同，合為一個住地。詳細地說，無明不同於煩惱，煩惱在地地分為九品，分為粗細和斷除的前後，所以說沒有品數，不是說沒有愛、恚等種類，所以說沒有品數。所以疏文沒有錯誤。如果說不染污的意義相同，合為一個住地，難道經中只對二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna）辨別五住地嗎？如果兼顧菩薩（Bodhisattva），為什麼只有不染污？對於菩薩來說，應該是染污的部分。就像煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa）沒有特別分開一樣，所以知道不是因為不染污而合併。
論：永遠斷除二障（dvyāvaraṇa），乃至通往有漏道（sāsrava-mārga）。有人反駁疏文的解釋說：如果這樣，二乘伏煩惱的時候，同體的所知障應該都不會生起。又斷除煩惱的時候，所知障應該也斷除。既然所知障的種子不障礙他們的智慧，因為道力弱的緣故，二乘不能斷除。現行也是這樣，不是他們所能伏的。現在說伏二障，是依菩薩說的，用『法空觀』（dharma-śūnyatā-darśana）伏煩惱的時候，同體的所知障也能伏。如果用『生空觀』（pudgala-śūnyatā-darśana）伏煩惱的時候，也不能伏，因為不是對治道。由此道理來看所知障，生空無漏不及法空有漏道。詳細地說，疏文中沒有說二乘伏惑，也沒有說生空智。怎麼能隨便用二乘不斷所知障的體性來作為責難呢？怎麼知道疏主不是依法空智伏惑說的，而說是現在依菩薩說的呢？疏文的道理是普遍適用的，不可以侷限於自己的想法來否定他人。
疏：永遠斷除習氣等等。按照論中的說法，永遠斷除習氣不是根所攝，但是六根（ṣaḍindriya）所……
【English Translation】 English version Because of the severance of 『Dṛṣṭimārga』 (Path of Seeing), it is said that 『Dṛṣṭi』 (View) is only in one place. The afflictions arising simultaneously with the three existences (Tribhava) that are cultivated on the path, among which the love (Tṛṣṇā) that moistens rebirth is the most prominent, and is specially divided into three types. It is not only the love arising simultaneously with the three realms (Tridhātu). When speaking of 『avidyā-sthiti』 (Ground of Ignorance), all jñeyāvaraṇa (Obstructions to Knowledge) can obstruct wisdom, and avidyā (Ignorance) is particularly increased, and is generally called ignorance. When speaking of 『sarva upakleśa』 (all higher defilements), the manifestations and seeds of the afflictions (kleśa) of the previous four abodes all depend on the ground of ignorance, and are called higher defilements.
Commentary: It is generally called ignorance because it has no categories. Someone retorted: This statement is incorrect. The nature of ignorance is the same as that of afflictions, just as afflictions have different categories. It should be said that the behavior of ignorance is subtle, and the meaning of non-contamination is the same, so it is combined into one abode. In detail, ignorance is different from afflictions. Afflictions are divided into nine categories in each ground, divided into coarse and subtle, and before and after severance, so it is said that there are no categories, not that there are no types such as love and hatred, so it is said that there are no categories. Therefore, the commentary is not wrong. If it is said that the meaning of non-contamination is the same, and it is combined into one abode, does the sutra only distinguish the five abodes for the two vehicles (Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna)? If Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) are also considered, why is there only non-contamination? For Bodhisattvas, it should be the contaminated part. Just as kleśāvaraṇa (Affliction Obstruction) is not specially separated, it is known that it is not combined because of non-contamination.
Treatise: Permanently severing the two obstructions (dvyāvaraṇa), and even reaching the sāsrava-mārga (path with outflows). Someone retorted the commentary's explanation: If so, when the two vehicles subdue afflictions, the jñeyāvaraṇa of the same nature should not arise. Also, when afflictions are severed, jñeyāvaraṇa should also be severed. Since the seeds of jñeyāvaraṇa do not obstruct their wisdom, the two vehicles cannot sever them because of the weakness of the power of the path. The manifestations are also the same, not what they can subdue. Now, saying that the two obstructions are subdued is based on the Bodhisattva. When subduing afflictions with 『dharma-śūnyatā-darśana』 (view of emptiness of phenomena), the jñeyāvaraṇa of the same nature can also be subdued. If subduing afflictions with 『pudgala-śūnyatā-darśana』 (view of emptiness of self), it cannot be subdued, because it is not the antidote. From this principle, looking at jñeyāvaraṇa, the undefiled of emptiness of self is not as good as the defiled path of emptiness of phenomena. In detail, the commentary does not say that the two vehicles subdue afflictions, nor does it say the wisdom of emptiness of self. How can one arbitrarily use the fact that the two vehicles do not sever the nature of jñeyāvaraṇa as a criticism? How do you know that the author of the commentary did not say that he subdued afflictions according to the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena, but said that it is now based on the Bodhisattva? The principle of the commentary is universally applicable, and one cannot limit oneself to one's own ideas to deny others.
Commentary: Permanently severing habitual tendencies, etc. According to the treatise, permanently severing habitual tendencies is not included in the roots, but is included in the six roots (ṣaḍindriya)...
證煩惱永斷所攝 釋曰。永斷習氣擇滅無為。因斷習氣之所得故得習氣名。信等五根及具知根六所證也。
疏。六善巧者。三科．緣起．及處非處．四諦為六。
疏。謂智有六種者。此牒文略。具而應言。謂福．智有六。即前六度。福．智合言而為六也。故三十六總結前云。如是福．智略有六種。一一分別應知無量。
論。三事練磨等者。三種大意如疏已明。準攝大乘更除四障緣於法義。故無性論第六說云。除四障者。一由離聲聞．獨覺作意斷作意故者 釋曰。由謂因義。由離作意障能入所知相。餘三準此 顯離作意障之所由名斷作意 斷謂伏斷。余障亦同。顯初菩薩見生死苦涅槃為樂。欲捨生死忻趣涅槃名二乘作意。障大菩提故須先斷。由觀生死．涅槃同無相性及修大悲。斷執小乘生死作意。作意即障 或二無學執自乘極而不趣大 或二有學執趣二果不樂大乘 或見道前二乘凡夫忻求二果。此等併名二乘作意 詳曰。四皆理通前二釋本 二論云。由於大乘諸疑離疑。以能永斷異惠疑故者 釋曰。雖離於前二乘作意。于大乘教種種法門先起疑惑。后執一是便撥余非。能撥邪惠與正惠殊故名異也。體即法執邪見所攝。故世親云。此中異惠謂鄙惡惠。于理動搖作三性觀。異惠及疑永不復轉名斷疑惠。疑
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『證煩惱永斷所攝』，釋文說：『永遠斷除習氣，通過擇滅而達到無為的境界。因為斷除了習氣才獲得了習氣的名稱。』信等五根以及具知根六者所證得的境界。
疏文說：『六善巧』，指的是三科、緣起、以及處非處、四諦這六種。
疏文說：『所謂智慧有六種』，這是省略了原文。完整地說應該是：『所謂福德、智慧有六種』，即前面的六度。福德和智慧合在一起說，共有六種。』所以第三十六總結前面說：『像這樣福德、智慧略有六種，一一分別應該知道是無量的。』
論中說：『三事練磨等』，三種大意如疏文已經闡明。參照《攝大乘論》，更要去除四種障礙，才能理解法義。所以無性論第六說：『去除四種障礙，一是由於遠離聲聞、獨覺的作意，斷除這種作意。』釋文說：『由』是『因為』的意思。因為遠離了作意障，才能進入所知之相。其餘三種可以類推。』顯示了遠離作意障的原因，名為斷作意。斷是伏斷。其餘的障礙也是一樣。』顯示了最初的菩薩認為生死是苦，涅槃是樂，想要捨棄生死，欣然趨向涅槃，這叫做二乘作意。因為障礙了大菩提，所以必須先斷除。通過觀察生死、涅槃都無自性，以及修習大悲，斷除執著小乘生死作意。作意就是障礙。或者二乘的無學執著于自己的乘為究竟，而不趣向大乘；或者二乘的有學執著于趣向二果，而不樂於大乘；或者見道前的二乘凡夫欣求二果。這些都叫做二乘作意。』詳細地說，這四種情況都符合前面兩種解釋的根本。二論說：『由於對大乘的各種疑惑，遠離疑惑，因為能夠永遠斷除與智慧相異的疑惑。』釋文說：『雖然遠離了前面的二乘作意，但是對於大乘教的種種法門，先產生疑惑，然後執著於一種，就否定其他的。能夠否定邪慧，與正慧不同，所以叫做異。』體就是法執邪見所攝。所以世親說：『這裡所說的異慧，指的是鄙惡的智慧。對於道理動搖，作三性觀。異慧和疑惑永遠不再轉變，叫做斷疑慧。』疑惑
【English Translation】 English version: 'Proof that afflictions are permanently severed and contained.' The commentary states: 'Permanently severing habitual tendencies, achieving non-action through selective cessation. Because of severing habitual tendencies, the name 'habitual tendencies' is obtained.' This is the state attained by the five roots of faith, etc., and the six roots of complete knowledge.
The commentary states: 'The six skillful means' refer to the three aggregates (skandha), dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), and what is appropriate and inappropriate, and the four noble truths (catvāri-ārya-satyāni)—these six.
The commentary states: 'The so-called six kinds of wisdom'—this is an abbreviation of the original text. It should be stated completely as: 'The so-called six kinds of merit and wisdom,' which are the preceding six perfections (pāramitā). Merit and wisdom are combined and spoken of as six. Therefore, the thirty-sixth section concludes by saying: 'Thus, merit and wisdom are briefly six kinds; each should be known to be immeasurable when distinguished separately.'
The treatise states: 'The three matters of refinement, etc.' The three great meanings have already been clarified in the commentary. Referring to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, further remove the four obstacles to understanding the Dharma and its meaning. Therefore, the sixth section of the Asaṅga's Commentary says: 'Removing the four obstacles: first, by abandoning the intention of the Śrāvakas (hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (solitary Buddhas), one abandons that intention.' The commentary states: 'By' means 'because.' Because of abandoning the obstacle of intention, one can enter the aspect of what is knowable. The other three can be inferred similarly. This shows that the reason for abandoning the obstacle of intention is called 'abandoning intention.' 'Abandoning' means 'subduing abandonment.' The other obstacles are the same. This shows that the initial Bodhisattvas consider birth and death as suffering and Nirvana as joy, wanting to abandon birth and death and joyfully approach Nirvana, which is called the intention of the Two Vehicles. Because it obstructs great Bodhi (enlightenment), it must first be abandoned. By observing that birth and death and Nirvana have no self-nature and by cultivating great compassion, one abandons the attachment to the intention of the Two Vehicles regarding birth and death. Intention is the obstacle. Or the Arhats (non-learners) of the Two Vehicles cling to their own vehicle as ultimate and do not approach the Great Vehicle; or the learners of the Two Vehicles cling to approaching the two fruits and do not delight in the Great Vehicle; or the ordinary people of the Two Vehicles before the path joyfully seek the two fruits. These are all called the intention of the Two Vehicles.' In detail, these four situations all correspond to the root of the previous two explanations. The two treatises say: 'Because of doubts about the Great Vehicle, one abandons doubts, because one can permanently sever doubts that differ from wisdom.' The commentary states: 'Although one has abandoned the previous intention of the Two Vehicles, one first generates doubts about the various Dharma gates of the Great Vehicle teachings, and then clings to one, thereby negating the others. Being able to negate wrong wisdom, which differs from right wisdom, is called 'different.' The substance is contained within the Dharma attachment and wrong views. Therefore, Vasubandhu says: 'The so-called different wisdom here refers to base and evil wisdom. One wavers regarding the principle, viewing the three natures. Different wisdom and doubt never transform again, which is called 'severing doubt wisdom.' Doubt.'
惠即障 問離疑之言自於何法 答有四釋。一云能斷彼疑名為離疑。二云諸疑即二乘人。離疑即是漸頓菩薩。三云不定諸小菩薩雖先發心。然于大行起懸崖想。數數退屈遂起疑心。為得不得名為諸疑。欲就二乘心生決定名為離疑。四云諸小菩薩先於佛說顯．密三藏種種不同。而生疑惑名為諸疑。后執一是斥余為非。自為決定名為離疑。據實未悟依彼妄解名離疑也 詳曰。初釋為正。故本論云。云何能入所應知相。彼總答云。由斷四處障等能入。下別釋中四種皆說能所二治。若離疑言不目能治。第二將何為能治耶。若言不說何故余有此獨無耶。故離疑言顯能離也 若爾何故第一．第三先說離言。第二能離後方說耶 答阿毗達磨性相而求逐便即明何責先後。第四亦復言無分別。豈無分別亦是障耶。然第四釋理亦小通。既非論意故亦不取 三論云。由離所聞所思法中我我所執斷法執故者 釋曰。雖離諸疑然隨所聞若教義等皆執有性。便障唯識法空觀智。故斷法執方名真觀 四論云。由於現前住安立一切相中。無所作意無所分別斷分別故者 釋曰。於此安立現前相中而無作意及離分別。斷分別言而通一切分別之法。若隨別說是忍一位能觀之智。此即勝障。入初地時息滅名斷 問何以復須斷此忍位分別智觀 答此忍雖離能所分別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『惠即障』，問：『離疑』（消除疑惑）之說是基於何種法？答：有四種解釋。一說，能夠斷除那些疑惑，就叫做『離疑』。二說，各種疑惑指的是二乘之人（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），『離疑』指的是漸悟和頓悟的菩薩。三說，一些不確定的、小根器的菩薩，雖然先發了菩提心，但對於菩薩的大行卻產生了如同面對懸崖般的畏懼，常常退縮，於是產生了疑惑，是否能夠證得果位，這就叫做『諸疑』。想要歸向二乘，心中生起決定，這就叫做『離疑』。四說，一些小根器的菩薩，先前對於佛所說的顯教、密教三藏（經、律、論）種種不同之處，產生了疑惑，後來執著于其中一種，排斥其他的，認為自己所執著的是正確的，這就叫做『離疑』。實際上並沒有領悟，只是依據自己的妄想來解釋，也叫做『離疑』。 詳細地說，第一種解釋是正確的。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『如何能夠進入所應知的實相？』總的回答是：『通過斷除四種障礙等，就能夠進入。』在下面的分別解釋中，四種障礙都說了能治和所治兩種。如果『離疑』這個說法不指能治，那麼第二種障礙用什麼來作為能治呢？如果說沒有說，那麼為什麼其他的都有而唯獨這個沒有呢？所以『離疑』這個說法顯示了能離。 如果這樣，為什麼第一種和第三種解釋先說『離』，而第二種解釋能離在後面才說呢？答：阿毗達磨（論藏）的體性是尋求相的，如果順著方便，那麼明白了又何必責怪先後呢？第四種解釋也說了『無分別』，難道『無分別』也是一種障礙嗎？然而第四種解釋在道理上也稍微說得通，但既然不是《瑜伽師地論》的本意，所以也不採用。 《三論》說：『由於遠離所聞所思法中的我我所執，斷除法執的緣故。』解釋說：雖然遠離了各種疑惑，但對於所聽聞的，無論是教義等，都執著于實有自性，於是就障礙了唯識法空的觀智。所以斷除法執才叫做真正的觀。 《四論》說：『對於現前安住於一切相中，沒有造作之意，沒有分別，斷除分別的緣故。』解釋說：對於這安立的現前之相中，沒有造作之意，並且遠離分別，『斷除分別』這個說法可以通用於一切分別之法。如果隨著個別來說，這是忍位（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）的能觀之智。這就能勝過障礙，進入初地（菩薩果位）的時候，息滅，就叫做斷除。 問：為什麼還需要斷除這忍位的分別智觀？答：這忍位雖然遠離了能所分別。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Huiji Zhang' (Wisdom is an Obstacle), question: 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt) is based on what Dharma? Answer: There are four explanations. One says that being able to cut off those doubts is called 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt). Two says that various doubts refer to the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), and 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt) refers to gradual and sudden Bodhisattvas. Three says that some uncertain, small-rooted Bodhisattvas, although they first aroused Bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment), they have fear like facing a cliff for the great practice of Bodhisattvas, and often retreat, so they have doubts, whether they can attain the fruit, this is called 'Zhu Yi' (Various Doubts). Wanting to return to the two vehicles, and generating determination in the heart, this is called 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt). Four says that some small-rooted Bodhisattvas, previously had doubts about the various differences in the exoteric and esoteric Tripitaka (Sūtra, Vinaya, Abhidharma) spoken by the Buddha, and later clung to one of them, rejecting the others, thinking that what they clung to was correct, this is called 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt). In reality, they have not understood, but only explain according to their own delusions, which is also called 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt). In detail, the first explanation is correct. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'How can one enter the aspect of what should be known?' The general answer is: 'By cutting off the four kinds of obstacles, etc., one can enter.' In the following separate explanations, the four kinds of obstacles all say the two kinds of ability to cure and what is to be cured. If the saying 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt) does not refer to the ability to cure, then what is used as the ability to cure for the second obstacle? If it is said that it is not said, then why do the others have it and only this one does not? Therefore, the saying 'Li Yi' (Eliminating Doubt) shows the ability to eliminate. If so, why do the first and third explanations say 'Li' (Eliminating) first, while the second explanation says the ability to eliminate only later? Answer: The nature of Abhidharma (the collection of treatises) is to seek aspects, if it follows convenience, then if it is understood, why blame the order? The fourth explanation also says 'no discrimination', is 'no discrimination' also an obstacle? However, the fourth explanation is also slightly reasonable, but since it is not the original intention of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it is not adopted. The Madhyamaka-śāstra says: 'Because of being away from the self and what belongs to self in what is heard and thought, and cutting off the Dharma attachment.' The explanation says: Although one is away from various doubts, one clings to the real nature of what is heard, whether it is doctrine, etc., and then obstructs the wisdom of the consciousness-only and Dharma-emptiness. Therefore, cutting off the Dharma attachment is called true contemplation. The Caturtha-śāstra says: 'In the present abiding in all aspects, there is no intention to create, no discrimination, because of cutting off discrimination.' The explanation says: In this established present aspect, there is no intention to create, and is away from discrimination, the saying 'cutting off discrimination' can be applied to all kinds of discrimination. If it is said individually, this is the wisdom of contemplation in the forbearance position (a stage in the practice of Bodhisattvas). This can overcome the obstacle, and when entering the first ground (the fruit of Bodhisattvas), it ceases, which is called cutting off. Question: Why is it necessary to cut off this discriminating wisdom of contemplation in the forbearance position? Answer: This forbearance position is although away from the discrimination of the ability to and what is to be.
。然自有彼微細分別障彼初地無分別智故須滅也 問何者為處 答處謂處所。即四所障。由此四障障四觀行。從彼所障以得處名。四處之障依主釋也 或此四障是分別心所居之處。障即是處持業釋也 此總意云。初二障彼厭小欣大之行。后二障舍妄證真之行。故名為障。若能斷智即觀無相及於三性。由證法空證無能所。斷分別心如次四智斷彼四障 問在何地位斷四障耶 答在十信位斷于初障。由離小心初入大乘十信位故。在十解位斷第二障。由於大乘離疑惑故。而得正解修菩薩行 在十回向乃至忍位斷第三障。由觀遍計遣所執故 在世第一斷第四障。由此第一分別觀智加行息滅。得成初地最上覺故。若據相違正滅言之。斷分別障即在初地。成此第四離分別障 論引頌云。現前自然住。安立一切相智者不分別。得最上菩提 釋曰。言現前者。通說定．散二境當心名現前也。自然住者。別顯散境。言安立者。別明定境。一切相者。顯二境相。智者不分別者。離能取心。得上菩提者。離障得果即以初地名上菩提。形於地前故稱最上。言緣法義者。法謂能詮文．名．句也。義即所詮。故無性云。似文似義。釋曰。似外相轉實唯在內。以有似無內似外也。
論。暖等四法至初后位立者。尋思。實智此二體行。按無性攝論第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：然而，因為還有那些微細的分辨，障礙了初地的無分別智，所以必須滅除它們。問：什麼是『處』（sthāna，位置，場所）？答：『處』指的是處所，也就是四種障礙。這四種障礙阻礙了四種觀行。因為被它們所障礙，所以得到『處』這個名稱。『四處之障』是依主釋（tatpuruṣa，一種複合詞的構成方式）。或者，這四種障礙是分別心所居住的地方，『障』就是『處』，這是持業釋（karmadhāraya，一種複合詞的構成方式）。總的來說，前兩種障礙阻礙了厭離小乘、欣求大乘的修行，后兩種障礙阻礙了捨棄虛妄、證悟真實的修行，所以被稱為障礙。如果能夠斷除智，就能觀照無相以及三性（trisvabhāva，遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）。通過證悟法空，證悟無能所（沒有能取和所取）。斷除分別心，就能依次用四智斷除這四種障礙。問：在哪個地位斷除這四種障礙呢？答：在十信位斷除第一種障礙，因為遠離了小乘之心，初次進入大乘的十信位。在十解位斷除第二種障礙，因為在大乘中遠離了疑惑，從而得到正確的理解，修行菩薩行。在十回向乃至忍位斷除第三種障礙，因為觀照遍計所執性，遣除所執。在世第一位斷除第四種障礙，因為通過這第一分別觀智的加行，息滅了分別，從而成就初地最上的覺悟。如果根據相違和真正滅除來說，斷除分別障就在初地，成就這第四種遠離分別的障礙。論中引用偈頌說：『現前自然住，安立一切相，智者不分別，得最上菩提。』解釋說：『現前者，普遍指禪定和散亂兩種境界呈現在心中。自然住者，特別顯示散亂境界。言安立者，特別說明禪定境界。一切相者，顯示兩種境界的相狀。智者不分別者，遠離能取之心。得上菩提者，遠離障礙而得到結果，也就是以初地稱為最上菩提。因為它位於地前，所以稱為最上。』說到緣法義，法指的是能詮釋的文、名、句，義指的是所詮釋的內容。所以無性（Asaṅga）說：『似文似義。』解釋說：『好像外在的相狀在運轉，實際上只是在內在。因為有相似，所以好像沒有內在；因為內在相似，所以好像沒有外在。』 論：暖等四法到初后位立者，尋思。實智此二體行。按照無性《攝論》第...
【English Translation】 The treatise: The four dharmas of warmth, etc., are established at the initial and later positions, contemplating. Actual wisdom, these two are the body of practice. According to Asaṅga's Compendium of Abhidharma, section...
六云。于加行時推求行見假有實無方便因相說名尋思 釋曰。約位以明尋思行相。推求行見即能觀智。行相見解名為行見。推求名義見識上假心外實無。即此尋思是加行位初修因相 又云了知假有實無所得決定行智方便果相名如實智 釋曰。決定了知名義等假名如實智。即方便位終成名果。
疏。今此住中已極清凈者。按彼論云。于無相住中四種災患今悉除斷。一者于無相中有加行有功用事。二者于上清凈住精勤思慕。三者於一切種利有情事。有大堪能精勤思慕。四者有微細想現在前行。故是此住名極清凈 釋曰。第七地中尚有法執。意識執彼上清凈等勤思慕等。故無生忍名之為雜。
疏。非尋思與尋相應等者。非四尋思與不定中尋相應故而得尋名。若尋相應方名尋思尋思不應在第四禪。第四禪中無不定中尋法體故。
疏。八種耶者。如前引也。
疏。依名所表外事者。名所詮表識外之事。
論。依印順定至名順樂忍者。疏有兩釋。有義彈后釋云。若印能取無順隨觀察順通上忍。應印所取無亦順觀彼順通下忍。理俱齊故。下忍由印既不名順。上忍亦印寧有順名。故今解順唯在中忍。上忍如下但名印忍 詳曰。據文粗顯有義為優。下總攝義釋本頌文。而明三忍印能所取。初后二忍皆無順
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 六云：在加行位時，推求行見（對行相的見解）是假有實無的，這種方便的因相叫做尋思（Vitarka）。 解釋：從修行階段來說明尋思的行相。推求行見，就是能觀的智慧。行相見解，名為行見。推求名義，見識上是假立的，心外實際上沒有。這種尋思是加行位（Adhimukti-caryābhūmi）初修的因相。 又說：了知假有實無，獲得決定的行智，這種方便的果相叫做如實智（Yathābhūta-jñāna）。 解釋：決定了知名義等是假名，這種如實智是方便位（Upāya-kausalya-bhūmi）最終成就的果。
疏：現在此住（Vihāra）中已經極其清凈。按照那部論的說法：在無相住（Animitta-vihāra）中，四種災患現在全部斷除。第一，在無相中，有加行有功用事。第二，對上清凈住（Adhyāśaya-viśuddhi-sthāna）精勤思慕。第三，對於一切種類的利益有情之事，有很大的堪能精勤思慕。第四，有微細的想念現在前行。所以這個住叫做極其清凈。 解釋：第七地（Dūraṅgama）中尚有法執。意識執著那個上清凈等，勤思慕等。所以無生忍（Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti）名為雜染。
疏：非尋思與尋相應等。不是四尋思（Catvāri vitarkāḥ）與不定中的尋相應，所以得到尋的名字。如果尋相應才叫做尋思，那麼尋思不應該在第四禪（Caturtha-dhyāna）。因為第四禪中沒有不定中的尋法體。
疏：八種耶者，如前面引用的那樣。
疏：依名所表外事者，名所詮表的是識外之事。
論：依印順定至名順樂忍者。疏有兩重解釋。有人反駁後面的解釋說：如果印能取無，順隨觀察，順通上忍（Adhyadhi-kṣānti）。那麼印所取無，也應該順觀彼，順通下忍（Avakrānti-kṣānti）。道理應該是一樣的。下忍由印既然不叫做順，上忍由印怎麼會有順的名字呢？所以現在解釋順，只在中忍（Anuloma-kṣānti）。上忍和下忍都只叫做印忍。 詳曰：根據文義粗略地顯示，有義的解釋更為優越。下面總攝義解釋本頌文，而說明三忍印能所取。初忍和后忍都沒有順。
【English Translation】 English version Six states: During the stage of application (Adhimukti-caryābhūmi), the investigation of 'conduct-view' (行見, the understanding of conduct) is nominally existent but substantially non-existent. This expedient cause is called 'Vitarka' (尋思, investigation). Explanation: This explains the characteristic of Vitarka from the perspective of the stage of practice. Investigating 'conduct-view' is the wisdom of the observing mind. The understanding of the characteristics of conduct is called 'conduct-view'. Investigating names and meanings reveals that they are nominally established in consciousness, but do not exist substantially outside of the mind. This Vitarka is the initial cause of practice in the stage of application. It is also said: Knowing that nominal existence is substantially non-existent, and attaining decisive wisdom of conduct, this expedient result is called 'Yathābhūta-jñāna' (如實智, knowledge as it is). Explanation: Decisively knowing that names and meanings are nominal, this Yathābhūta-jñāna is the final result of the stage of expedient means (Upāya-kausalya-bhūmi).
Commentary: Now, this dwelling (Vihāra) is extremely pure. According to that treatise, in the dwelling of no-sign (Animitta-vihāra), the four calamities are now completely eliminated. First, in the no-sign, there is application and effort. Second, there is diligent aspiration for the superior pure dwelling (Adhyāśaya-viśuddhi-sthāna). Third, there is great capacity and diligent aspiration for all kinds of activities that benefit sentient beings. Fourth, there are subtle thoughts that arise and proceed. Therefore, this dwelling is called extremely pure. Explanation: In the seventh ground (Dūraṅgama), there is still attachment to dharma. Consciousness clings to that superior purity, diligent aspiration, and so on. Therefore, the 'Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti' (無生忍, forbearance of non-arising) is called defiled.
Commentary: 'Not Vitarka and the corresponding Vitarka, etc.' It is not that the four Vitarkas (Catvāri vitarkāḥ) correspond to the Vitarka in the undetermined state, and therefore obtain the name Vitarka. If correspondence with Vitarka is called Vitarka, then Vitarka should not be in the fourth Dhyāna (Caturtha-dhyāna), because there is no Vitarka-dharma-essence in the undetermined state in the fourth Dhyāna.
Commentary: 'The eight kinds of 'ya'' are as quoted earlier.
Commentary: 'Relying on external matters expressed by names' means that what names express are matters external to consciousness.
Treatise: 'Relying on the seal, conforming to the determination, it is called the forbearance that accords with joy.' The commentary has two explanations. Someone refutes the latter explanation, saying: If the seal can grasp non-existence, conforming to observation, it accords with the superior forbearance (Adhyadhi-kṣānti). Then, what the seal grasps as non-existent should also conform to observation, according with the inferior forbearance (Avakrānti-kṣānti). The reasoning should be the same. Since the inferior forbearance is not called conforming because of the seal, how can the superior forbearance have the name of conforming because of the seal? Therefore, the explanation of conforming now only applies to the middle forbearance (Anuloma-kṣānti). The superior and inferior forbearances are only called seal-forbearances. Detailed explanation: According to the rough meaning of the text, the explanation of 'having meaning' is superior. The following summarizes the meaning to explain the verse, clarifying that the three forbearances are sealed, capable, and grasped. The initial and final forbearances do not have conforming.
字。若窮理談疏亦無失。初忍未修順無能取不立順名。后順觀彼故有于順。下攝義中舉中顯后。文略影耳。今助一釋。順通初二。初忍雖未修無能取。印所取無即是順無能取義也。能．所二取相待立故。故論結云。印前順后立印順名。上忍已印不可言順下文影顯。但中言順亦不相違。
論。異生法中此最勝故者。唯凡趣聖可如所言。聖者回心而歸於大。對此云何異生第一 答回趣聖者即俱句收。大乘異生性障未斷。由此亦得名為第一。
疏。謂有隨眠至無堪任性者。此顯羅漢所斷之漏所在之處以明體也。凡夫．有學五蘊假者名有隨眠者。有識身即有隨眠身。漏如毒藥。令身不安無所堪任。從喻為稱。
疏。隨眠斷時至皆得微薄者。是煩惱漏毒之氣分。因毒而有名所發等。無始而有名本所得。不安隱等同前煩惱名彼相似。由本毒除故發氣稍得微薄。
疏。對法第十二十四粗重者。謂遍行戲論粗重。謂執眼等諸法習氣 領受者。謂有漏諸受習氣 煩惱者。謂煩惱隨眠 業者。謂有漏業習氣 異熟者。異熟無堪能性 煩惱障者。謂猛利長時煩惱性 業障者。無間業等性 異熟障者。謂那落迦等自體 蓋者。能障善品欲貪等性 尋思者。能障出家欲尋思等 飲食者。謂多少食于方便行無堪任性 交會
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 字。如果深入研究探討疏文也沒有錯。最初的忍位（Ksanti，忍）還沒有修習，因為沒有能力去執取，所以不建立『順』這個名稱。後來的『順』是觀察那個（真如）的，所以有『順』。下面的攝義中，舉出中間的（忍位）來顯示後面的（忍位）。文句簡略，只是略微提及。現在我來輔助解釋一下。『順』可以通於初忍和二忍。初忍雖然還沒有修習，沒有能力去執取，但印證所取之無，也就是順於無能取之義。能取和所取是相對而立的，所以《瑜伽師地論》總結說，在印證之前稱為『順』，印證之後才立『印』和『順』的名稱。上忍已經印證，不可再說『順』，下文略微顯示了這個意思。但中間說『順』也不相違背。
論：『在異生法（Bala-prthag-jana-dharma，凡夫的法）中，這是最殊勝的』。只有凡夫趣向聖位才可以這樣說。聖者回心轉而歸向大乘，對此，怎麼說是異生第一呢？答：迴心趣向聖位的人，已經包含在（前面的）句子中了。大乘的異生性障（prthag-jana-svabhava-avarana）還沒有斷除，因此也可以稱為第一。
疏：『所謂有隨眠（anusaya，煩惱的種子）乃至無堪任性』。這是爲了顯示阿羅漢所斷的煩惱之所在，以闡明其體性。凡夫和有學（Seksa，還在學習的聖者）的五蘊（panca-skandha）假合之身，名為『有隨眠者』。有識之身，就是有隨眠之身。煩惱就像毒藥，使身不安，沒有堪能性。這是從比喻而得名。
疏：『隨眠斷時乃至皆得微薄』。這是煩惱漏毒的氣分。因為毒而有名所發等。無始以來而有名本所得。不安隱等同於前面的煩惱，名為與彼相似。由於根本的毒已經去除，所以發出的氣稍微變得微薄。
疏：『對法第十二十四粗重』。指的是遍行戲論粗重，也就是執著眼等諸法的習氣。領受者，指的是有漏諸受的習氣。煩惱者，指的是煩惱隨眠。業者，指的是有漏業的習氣。異熟者，指的是異熟無堪能性。煩惱障者，指的是猛利長時的煩惱性。業障者，指的是無間業等性。異熟障者，指的是那落迦（naraka，地獄）等的自體。蓋者，指的是能障礙善品的欲貪等性。尋思者，指的是能障礙出家的欲尋思等。飲食者，指的是飲食多少對於方便行的無堪任性。交會
【English Translation】 English version: Word. There is no fault in thoroughly studying and discussing the commentary. The initial Ksanti (patience) has not yet been cultivated, because there is no ability to grasp, so the name 'compliance' is not established. The later 'compliance' is observing that (Tathata), so there is 'compliance'. In the following summary of meaning, the middle (Ksanti) is mentioned to reveal the later (Ksanti). The text is brief, only slightly mentioning it. Now I will assist in explaining it. 'Compliance' can apply to the initial and second Ksanti. Although the initial Ksanti has not yet been cultivated and there is no ability to grasp, verifying the non-existence of what is grasped is the meaning of complying with the inability to grasp. The grasper and the grasped are established in relation to each other. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra concludes by saying that before verification it is called 'compliance', and only after verification are the names 'verification' and 'compliance' established. The upper Ksanti has already verified, so it cannot be said to be 'compliance', and the following text slightly reveals this meaning. But saying 'compliance' in the middle is not contradictory.
Treatise: 'Among the laws of the Bala-prthag-jana-dharma (ordinary beings), this is the most excellent.' Only when ordinary beings turn towards the holy position can this be said. If a holy person turns their mind and returns to the Mahayana, how can this be said to be the first among ordinary beings? Answer: Those who turn their minds and turn towards the holy position are already included in the (previous) sentence. The prthag-jana-svabhava-avarana (obstruction of the ordinary being's nature) of the Mahayana has not yet been cut off, so it can also be called the first.
Commentary: 'So-called having anusaya (latent tendencies, seeds of affliction) up to the inability to act.' This is to show where the afflictions cut off by the Arhat are located, in order to clarify their nature. The five skandhas (aggregates) of ordinary beings and those still learning (Seksa, holy ones still learning) are named 'those with latent tendencies'. The body with consciousness is the body with latent tendencies. Afflictions are like poison, making the body uneasy and without the ability to act. This is named from the metaphor.
Commentary: 'When latent tendencies are cut off, up to when they all become subtle.' This is the aura of the poison of affliction. Because of the poison, there are names such as what is emitted. From beginningless time, there are names such as what is originally obtained. Uneasiness and so on are the same as the previous afflictions, and are named similar to them. Because the root poison has been removed, the emitted aura gradually becomes subtle.
Commentary: 'The tenth and twenty-fourth coarse burdens of the Abhidharma.' Refers to the coarse burden of pervasive frivolous talk, which is the habitual energy of attachment to phenomena such as the eye. Those who receive, refers to the habitual energy of contaminated feelings. Afflictions, refers to the latent tendencies of affliction. Karma, refers to the habitual energy of contaminated karma. Vipaka (result), refers to the inability of the result. The obstruction of affliction, refers to the nature of fierce and long-lasting affliction. The obstruction of karma, refers to the nature of uninterrupted karma and so on. The obstruction of result, refers to the self-nature of Naraka (hell) and so on. Coverings, refers to the nature of desire and greed that can obstruct good qualities. Thoughts, refers to the desire for thought that can obstruct leaving home. Food, refers to the inability of more or less food to practice the path. Association
者。兩兩形交身心疲損性 夢者。睡眠所發身惛劣性 病者。諸界互違不安隱性 老者。大種衰變所起不隨轉性 死者。臨命終時諸根亂性 勞倦者。謂遠行等體頓弊性 堅固者。謂無涅槃法者如其所應所有戲論等性 粗中細三者。謂三界所有粗重 煩惱障者。謂二乘菩提所治 定障者。謂九定所發功德所治 所知障者。謂一切智性所治 一一之下有粗重字今省之也。會釋諸文如燈具辨。
論。非如二乘唯觀安立者。疏有兩釋不斷優劣。今觀二釋理猶難悟。何所以者。三乘真見皆非安立。如何二乘方便安立引非安立。如前不許以執導空以異類故。若許作者復違此文 答異類親因理誠未可。增上相發粗引妙生於理何失。如漏無漏許相導故。故瑜伽論七十三云。問若先無有知無相智。由無有故亦無熏習。既無其因應不得生。答有相亦得為無相因。隨順彼故。如世間智為緣生出世智。有漏智為緣生無漏智。有心定為緣生無心定。此亦如是。今以安立引非安立亦何爽理。然安立觀本希斷惑證無為理。能少伏惑亦得名為順非安立。又余類非一。涅槃．勝鬘諸經皆言無作四諦非諸二乘之所知故。或二乘人愚．不愚法二類不同。初不能作。后容修之。經論依前故言不作亦應無失。
疏。一依非依等者。謂思現觀唯欲界故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 者（指以上所列舉的各種情況）。兩兩形交身心疲損性：指性行為導致身心疲憊的狀態。夢者（做夢的人）：指睡眠時所產生的身心昏沉遲鈍的狀態。病者（生病的人）：指身體各元素互相違背，處於不安穩的狀態。老者（年老的人）：指構成身體的各種元素衰敗變化，身體不隨心意運轉的狀態。死者（將死之人）：指臨終時各種感官錯亂的狀態。勞倦者（勞累的人）：指長途跋涉等導致身體極度疲憊的狀態。堅固者（執著的人）：指沒有涅槃之法的人，他們所執著的各種戲論等狀態。粗、中、細三者：指欲界、色界、無色界所有粗重之物。煩惱障者：指二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）菩提所要對治的障礙。定障者：指由九次第定所引發的功德所要對治的障礙。所知障者：指一切智性所要對治的障礙。每一項之下都有『粗重』二字，這裡省略了。會釋這些文句，可以參考《燈具》的辨析。 論：並非像二乘那樣只觀察安立（建立）的法。疏鈔對此有兩種解釋，但難以判斷哪種更好。現在看來，這兩種解釋都難以理解。為什麼呢？因為三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的真見都不是安立的，怎麼能用二乘的方便安立來引導非安立呢？就像之前不允許用執著來引導空性，因為它們是不同型別的。如果允許這樣做，又會違背本文的觀點。答：雖然不同型別的親因可能不太合理，但增上緣互相激發，粗淺的引導精妙的產生，在道理上有什麼問題呢？就像有漏和無漏可以互相引導一樣。所以《瑜伽師地論》第七十三卷說：『問：如果先前沒有知無相智，因為沒有，所以也沒有熏習。既然沒有原因，應該不會產生結果。答：有相也可以作為無相的原因，因為它隨順無相。就像世間的智慧作為緣分產生出世間的智慧，有漏的智慧作為緣分產生無漏的智慧，有心定作為緣分產生無心定。』這裡也是一樣，用安立來引導非安立，又有什麼不合理呢？然而，安立觀的根本目的是希望斷除迷惑，證得無為的真理。即使只能稍微降伏迷惑，也可以稱為順應非安立。而且，其他型別的例子也不止一個。《涅槃經》、《勝鬘經》等都說，無作四諦不是二乘所能理解的。或者，二乘人有愚笨和不愚笨兩種型別。前者不能修習，後者可以修習。經論依據前者，所以說不能修習，也應該沒有問題。 疏鈔：一依非依等：指思現觀只在欲界。
【English Translation】 English version These (referring to the conditions listed above). 'Two by two, physical and mental exhaustion': refers to the state of physical and mental fatigue caused by sexual activity. 'Dreamer': refers to the state of mental dullness and sluggishness that occurs during sleep. 'Sick person': refers to the unstable state where the elements of the body are in conflict with each other. 'Elderly person': refers to the state where the elements that make up the body are decaying and changing, and the body does not operate as desired. 'Dead person': refers to the state of confusion of the senses at the time of death. 'Weary person': refers to the state of extreme physical exhaustion caused by long journeys, etc. 'Steadfast person': refers to those who do not have the Dharma of Nirvana, and their various states of clinging to discursive thoughts. 'The three, coarse, medium, and fine': refers to all the coarse and heavy things in the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm. 'Affliction obstacle': refers to the obstacle that the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) Bodhi needs to overcome. 'Obstacle of concentration': refers to the obstacle that the merits arising from the Nine Sequential Dwellings need to overcome. 'Obstacle of knowledge': refers to the obstacle that the nature of all-knowing wisdom needs to overcome. The word 'coarse and heavy' is omitted under each item here. For explanations of these sentences, refer to the analysis in the 'Lamp' (a commentary). Treatise: It is not like the Two Vehicles, which only observe the established (安立, anli) dharmas. The commentary has two explanations for this, but it is difficult to judge which is better. Now it seems that both explanations are difficult to understand. Why? Because the true views of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) are not established, how can the expedient establishment of the Two Vehicles be used to guide the non-established? It's like it was not allowed to use attachment to guide emptiness before, because they are different types. If this is allowed, it would violate the view of this text. Answer: Although it may not be reasonable for different types of proximate causes, what is wrong with the principle that increasing conditions stimulate each other, and the superficial guides the subtle to arise? Just like defiled and undefiled can guide each other. Therefore, the seventy-third volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' says: 'Question: If there was no knowledge of the signless wisdom before, because there was none, there was no habituation either. Since there is no cause, there should be no result. Answer: The signed can also be the cause of the signless, because it accords with the signless. Just like worldly wisdom arises as a condition for transcendental wisdom, defiled wisdom arises as a condition for undefiled wisdom, and mind-based concentration arises as a condition for mind-free concentration.' The same is true here, what is unreasonable about using establishment to guide non-establishment? However, the fundamental purpose of the established view is to hope to eliminate delusion and realize the truth of non-action. Even if it can only slightly subdue delusion, it can be called conforming to non-establishment. Moreover, there is more than one other type of example. The 'Nirvana Sutra', 'Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra', etc., all say that the uncreated Four Noble Truths are not understood by the Two Vehicles. Or, there are two types of Two Vehicle practitioners, those who are foolish and those who are not. The former cannot practice, and the latter can practice. The scriptures and treatises are based on the former, so it should be no problem to say that they cannot practice. Commentary: 'One depends on non-dependence, etc.': refers to the fact that thought and direct perception are only in the Desire Realm.
不依八定名依非依。餘五通依八定地有。據修道說。又三依五。此三初生依于見道。四禪根本及一未至名為五依。見道眷屬信亦五依。余信現觀而即不爾故云一分。
疏。今至修皆遍緣等者。彼傍所修世俗智種。至修道位皆能生現遍緣諸法。不同有宗畢竟不起。故六十九云。升見道時即先所修善世俗智所有種子。由彼熏修皆得清凈亦名為修 釋曰。由入見道斷染污故。故世俗種離彼一分能染污法名為清凈。據此清凈故名為修 又云。諸世俗智出見道已。生起此智證見所斷諸法解脫。能正分別不隨惡趣。又能了知得預流果已斷如是所有煩惱為他記別等 釋曰。此皆傍修世俗智慧。非說無漏后得智也。
疏。又六十九等者。按彼論云。又于見道初智生時。諸餘智因由能生緣所攝受故皆得增長。一切見道即此剎那皆名為得。於此得已后時漸漸次第現前。當知見道是速進道 釋曰。見道十六初智生時。餘十五智本有種子。而增長故皆名為得。由初智力而為生緣所攝受故。既云一切明無色界無漏見種。此時亦增名修無色于理無失。
疏。若自在先得至如類智緣者。按彼論云。問一切類智現在前時。皆了別色．無色界耶。答若有曾於色．無色界所有諸法。善聞善思善取相者即能了別。若不爾者不能了別 釋曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不依賴於八種禪定而被稱為『依非依』。其餘五種（五依）依賴於八種禪定之地而存在，這是根據修道而言的。另外，三種（三依）依賴於五種（五依）。這三種（三依）在初生時依賴於見道。四禪根本定以及一未至定被稱為五依。見道的眷屬，即信，也屬於五依。其餘的信是現觀，但並非如此，所以說是一部分。
疏：現在到達修道時都能普遍緣取等等，是指那些傍修的世俗智的種子，到達修道位時都能生起並顯現普遍緣取諸法。這不同於有宗，畢竟不能生起。所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷說：『升入見道時，先前所修的善的世俗智的所有種子，由於那些熏習修持，都變得清凈，也稱為修。』
釋：由於進入見道斷除了染污，所以世俗智的種子脫離了能染污法的一部分，被稱為清凈。根據這種清凈，所以稱為修。又說：『諸世俗智在出見道之後，生起這種智慧，證得見道所斷的諸法解脫，能夠正確地分別，不隨惡趣。又能了知獲得預流果后，斷除了如此所有的煩惱，為他人記別等等。』
釋：這些都是傍修的世俗智的功能，不是說無漏后得智。
疏：又如《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷等所說，按照該論所說：『又在見道初智生起時，其餘諸智的因，由於能生緣的攝受，都得到增長。一切見道即在此剎那都稱為得到。在此得到之後，后時漸漸次第現前。應當知道見道是快速前進的道路。』
釋：見道十六心最初的智生起時，其餘十五智本有的種子，由於增長的緣故，都稱為得到。由於最初的智的力量，而被生緣所攝受。既然說一切，就表明沒有**無漏見種。此時也增長，稱為修無色定，在道理上沒有缺失。
疏：如果自在地先得到，到達如類智的緣，按照該論所說：『問：一切類智現在前時，都能了別色界、無色界嗎？答：如果曾經對於色界、無色界所有諸法，善於聽聞、善於思考、善於取相，就能了別。如果不這樣，就不能了別。』
釋：
【English Translation】 English version: It is not dependent on the eight Dhyanas (meditative absorptions) and is called 'dependent on the non-dependent'. The remaining five (Five Supports) exist depending on the lands of the eight Dhyanas, according to the path of cultivation. Furthermore, the three (Three Supports) depend on the five (Five Supports). These three (Three Supports) depend on the Path of Seeing (見道, Jian Dao) when they first arise. The fundamental four Dhyanas and one 'not-yet-arrived' (未至, Wei Zhi) are called the Five Supports. The retinue of the Path of Seeing, namely faith (信, Xin), also belongs to the Five Supports. The remaining faith is direct perception, but it is not so, so it is said to be a part.
Commentary: 'Now, reaching the path of cultivation, they can universally cognize, etc.' refers to those seeds of mundane wisdom cultivated alongside, which, upon reaching the stage of the path of cultivation, can arise and manifest universal cognition of all dharmas. This is different from the Sarvastivadins, who ultimately cannot arise. Therefore, the sixty-ninth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'When ascending to the Path of Seeing, all the seeds of good mundane wisdom previously cultivated, due to those practices, become purified and are also called cultivation.'
Explanation: Because entering the Path of Seeing severs defilements, the seeds of mundane wisdom, separated from a portion of the defiling dharmas, are called purified. Based on this purification, they are called cultivation. It also says: 'After the mundane wisdoms emerge from the Path of Seeing, they give rise to this wisdom, realizing the liberation from the dharmas severed by the Path of Seeing, able to correctly distinguish and not follow evil destinies. They can also know that after obtaining the Stream-enterer fruit, they have severed all such afflictions, and can make distinctions for others, etc.'
Explanation: These are all functions of mundane wisdom cultivated alongside, not referring to the non-outflow subsequent wisdom.
Commentary: Furthermore, as stated in the sixty-ninth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, according to that treatise: 'Moreover, when the initial wisdom arises on the Path of Seeing, the causes of the remaining wisdoms, due to being embraced by the productive conditions, all increase. All of the Path of Seeing is called attainment in this instant. After this attainment, they gradually and sequentially manifest later. It should be known that the Path of Seeing is a path of rapid progress.'
Explanation: When the initial wisdom of the sixteen moments of the Path of Seeing arises, the inherent seeds of the remaining fifteen wisdoms are all called attainment due to their increase. Due to the power of the initial wisdom, they are embraced by the productive conditions. Since it says 'all', it indicates that there are no **non-outflow seeds of seeing. At this time, they also increase and are called cultivating the Formless Realm (無色, Wu Se), which is logically sound.
Commentary: 'If one freely obtains it first, reaching the condition of the wisdom of kind', according to that treatise: 'Question: When all the wisdom of kind is present, does it distinguish the Form Realm (色, Se) and the Formless Realm (無色, Wu Se)? Answer: If one has previously heard, thought, and taken the characteristics of all dharmas in the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, then one can distinguish them. If not, one cannot distinguish them.'
Explanation:
類智有二。一真二俗。今此所明約俗類說。若真類智必緣于上。如上下諦八類智也。既善習者能了于上。明善自在亦能修上。俱曾得故。
論。若無彼相至名聲等智者。疏有量破。有義彈云。作此立因亦無因喻。但應直責不須立量 詳曰。作量直責理俱難詳。所以然者。前師但云無分別智無有相分不言余無。何得而以色．非色智為量直責。今以理準文闕一重難之與答。難云除無分別智餘一切心。正緣境時應無相分。名緣境故。如汝無分別智緣境之時。前師答云。設爾何失。故論牒云。若無彼相名緣彼等。難色等智展轉成立真見有相。論不言者。以巧略文令生后智。難色等智今為量云。汝緣色之智。能緣聲等。許無聲等相故。如緣聲等智。餘量準知。有義斷云無因喻者真似可知。
論。說無相取不取相故者。按七十三云。問于無相界若取其相非無相取。若無所取亦不得成無相之取。若爾云何名無相取。答言說隨眠已遠離故。此取雖復取無相界。不取相故成無相取。問若無構獲云何成取。答雖不構獲諸相差別有所增益。然取無相故得成取。問若無構獲無所增益。此取相狀云何可知。答取勝義故取無相故。五種事相皆不顯現以為其相。問若不分明可立為取。何故不計諸取滅無。答滅無無有修作義故。非修觀者依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 類智有兩種，一是真類智，二是俗類智。現在這裡所說明的是基於俗類智來說的。如果是真類智，必定是緣于更高的層次，例如上下諦的八類智。如果善於學習的人能夠了解更高的層次，那麼明白善的自在也能修習更高的層次，因為他們都曾經獲得過。
論：如果缺少了那些相，例如名聲等智者。疏有量破。有義彈云：『作此立因也沒有因和比喻，應該直接責備，不需要立量。』 詳細地說，作量和直接責備在理上都難以詳盡。為什麼這樣說呢？因為前師只是說沒有分別智，沒有相分，沒有說其他的沒有。怎麼能用色、非色智作為量來直接責備呢？現在用道理來推斷，補充文章中缺失的一重提問和回答。提問說：除了無分別智，其餘一切心在正確地緣取境的時候，應該沒有相分，因為是名緣境的緣故。就像你的無分別智緣取境的時候一樣。前師回答說：即使這樣，又有什麼損失呢？所以論中記載說：『如果缺少了那些相，名緣取那些等。』 難色等智輾轉成立真見有相。論中沒有說，是因為巧妙地省略了文字，爲了產生後面的智慧。難色等智現在作為量說：你的緣取色的智慧，能夠緣取聲等，允許沒有聲等相的緣故。就像緣取聲等智一樣。其餘的量可以類推得知。有義斷言說沒有因喻，真似可以知道。
論：說無相取是不取相的緣故。按照七十三說：提問：在無相界，如果取其相，就不是無相取；如果沒有所取，也不能成就無相的取。如果這樣，怎麼稱為無相取呢？回答說：因為說隨眠已經遠離的緣故。這個取雖然是取無相界，但不取相，所以成就無相取。提問：如果沒有構獲，怎麼能成就取呢？回答說：雖然沒有構獲諸相的差別，但有所增益。然而取無相，所以能夠成就取。提問：如果沒有構獲，沒有所增益，這個取的相狀怎麼可以知道呢？回答說：取勝義的緣故，取無相的緣故，五種事相都不顯現，以此作為它的相。提問：如果不分明，可以立為取，為什麼不認為諸取滅無呢？回答說：滅無沒有修作的意義的緣故。不是修觀者所依賴的。
【English Translation】 English version: There are two types of wisdom: true wisdom and conventional wisdom. What is being explained here is based on conventional wisdom. If it is true wisdom, it must be related to a higher level, such as the eight types of wisdom of the upper and lower truths (Satya). If someone is good at learning and can understand the higher levels, then understanding the freedom of goodness can also cultivate the higher levels, because they have all attained it before.
Treatise: If those characteristics are missing, such as the wise who have names and so on. The commentary refutes with measurement. Some argue, 'Establishing a cause in this way has neither cause nor analogy; one should directly rebuke, without needing to establish measurement.' In detail, both making measurements and directly rebuking are difficult to detail in principle. Why is this so? Because the former teacher only said that there is no non-discriminating wisdom, no aspect-division, and did not say that there is nothing else. How can one use the wisdom of color and non-color as a measurement to directly rebuke? Now, using reason to infer, supplementing a question and answer missing in the text. The question says: Except for non-discriminating wisdom, all other minds should have no aspect-division when correctly grasping an object, because it is name-grasping. Just like your non-discriminating wisdom when grasping an object. The former teacher replied: Even if that is the case, what is the loss? Therefore, the treatise records: 'If those characteristics are missing, names grasp those and so on.' It is difficult for the wisdom of color and so on to gradually establish the true view of having aspects. The treatise does not say this because it cleverly omits the text in order to generate later wisdom. The wisdom of color and so on is now used as a measurement, saying: Your wisdom of grasping color can grasp sound and so on, allowing for the absence of sound and other aspects. Just like the wisdom of grasping sound and so on. The remaining measurements can be known by analogy. Some assert that there is no cause or analogy, and the true and false can be known.
Treatise: Saying that non-aspect grasping is because it does not grasp aspects. According to seventy-three, it says: Question: In the realm of non-aspects, if one grasps its aspect, it is not non-aspect grasping; if there is nothing to grasp, one cannot achieve non-aspect grasping. If so, how is it called non-aspect grasping? The answer says: Because it is said that the latent tendencies (Klesha) have already been removed. Although this grasping grasps the realm of non-aspects, it does not grasp aspects, so it achieves non-aspect grasping. Question: If there is no construction, how can grasping be achieved? The answer says: Although there is no construction of the differences of aspects, there is some increase. However, grasping non-aspects, so it can achieve grasping. Question: If there is no construction and no increase, how can the appearance of this grasping be known? The answer says: Because it grasps the ultimate meaning (Paramartha), because it grasps non-aspects, the five types of phenomena do not appear, and this is taken as its appearance. Question: If it is not clear, can it be established as grasping? Why is it not considered that all grasping is extinguished and non-existent? The answer says: Extinction and non-existence have no meaning of cultivation. It is not what those who cultivate contemplation rely on.
于滅無有所修作。問若爾云何證知其相。答自內證智之所證智。問若爾何不如其所證如是記別。答此內所證非證名言安足處故。
論。一觀非安立有三品心者。有義今說三心為非安立者對十六心。若對一心無相見道亦名安立。二空真如四勝義中屬第三故 詳曰。雖有理然諸教中並無說是安立處故。故知安立唯依四諦差別觀說。與四勝義立有不同。不可為例。故對法論第九云。安立者謂聲聞等隨自所證已得究竟。為欲令他亦了知故。由后得智以無量種名．句．文身安立道諦。謂諸諦中有如是如是忍如是如是智。但約四諦辨安立也。
論。內遣有情假緣智等者。而言內等傳有兩釋。一解如疏自身名內。故對法論云。云何遣各別有情假所緣法智為相。由此智相於自相續中有不分別我相。不分別者是除遣義。云何為遣各別法假所緣法智為相。由此智于自相續中不分別色等法相。余同於前。故知內者約自身說。二云約界以辨內外。初遣欲界自他有情假。第二遣欲界自他法假。同在欲界故說內言。猶言內人通自及他皆名內也。第三遍遣上界我法二假皆盡故說遍言 詳曰。后理雖通然無所憑。今依初說。
論。法真見道至名相見道者。問真解脫道既不斷惑。如何第三名法于彼遍遣隨眠 答有二釋。一云今既假說非
【現代漢語翻譯】 于滅盡時，沒有什麼需要去修習或造作的。（滅：指涅槃寂滅的狀態） 問：如果是這樣，那麼如何才能認知到涅槃的實相呢？ 答：是通過自己內在的證智所證知的智慧。（證智：通過修行和證悟獲得的智慧） 問：如果是這樣，為什麼不按照所證知的實相來描述和分別呢？ 答：因為這種內在所證知的境界，不是可以通過名言概念來安立的。（名言：語言文字等概念）
論：觀察非安立有三種心，是指什麼呢？ 有的人認為，現在所說的三種心為非安立，是相對於十六種心而言的。（十六心：指見道位中的十六種心）如果相對於一心而言，無相見道也可以稱為安立。 二，空性和真如在四種勝義中屬於第三種，所以……（四勝義：指四種究竟真實的意義） 詳曰：雖然有道理，但是各種教義中都沒有說這是安立之處。所以要知道安立只是依據四諦的差別觀來說的。（四諦：苦、集、滅、道）與四勝義的建立有所不同，不可作為例子。所以《對法論》第九卷說：『安立，是指聲聞等隨各自所證悟已經達到究竟，爲了讓其他人也瞭解，通過後得智以無量種名、句、文身來安立道諦。』（后得智：證悟后獲得的智慧）就是說在諸諦中有如此這般的忍，如此這般的智。只是圍繞四諦來辨別安立。
論：內在遣除有情假緣智等，這裡的『內』等字，傳承有兩種解釋。 一種解釋是，如疏文所說，自身名為『內』。所以《對法論》說：『什麼是遣除各別有情假所緣法智的相？』因為這種智慧的相在自己的相續中不分別我相。（相續：心識的連續）『不分別』就是除遣的意思。『什麼是遣除各別法假所緣法智的相？』因為這種智慧在自己的相續中不分別色等法相。其餘與前面相同。所以要知道『內』是就自身來說的。 另一種說法是，根據界來辨別內外。首先遣除欲界自他有情假，第二遣除欲界自他法假。都在欲界所以說『內』。就像說『內人』，包括自己和他人都可以稱為『內』。第三遍遣上界我法二假都盡了，所以說『遍』。 詳曰：後面的道理雖然說得通，但是沒有依據。現在依照第一種說法。
論：法真見道，直到名相見道。 問：真解脫道既然不斷惑，為什麼第三個（解脫道）稱為『法』，並且能普遍遣除隨眠呢？（隨眠：煩惱的種子） 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，現在是假說，並非……
【English Translation】 At the cessation, there is nothing to cultivate or create. (Cessation: refers to the state of Nirvana) Question: If that is the case, how can one know its true nature? Answer: It is the wisdom known by the self-internalized wisdom. (Internalized wisdom: wisdom gained through practice and enlightenment) Question: If that is the case, why not describe and differentiate it according to what is known? Answer: Because this self-internalized state cannot be established through conceptual language. (Conceptual language: language, words, and other concepts)
Treatise: What does it mean to observe that non-establishment has three types of minds? Some believe that the three minds now referred to as non-establishment are relative to the sixteen minds. (Sixteen minds: refers to the sixteen minds in the stage of seeing the path) If relative to one mind, the path of seeing without characteristics can also be called establishment. Second, emptiness and suchness belong to the third of the four ultimate meanings, so... (Four ultimate meanings: refers to the four ultimate true meanings) Detailed explanation: Although there is reason, there is no saying in various teachings that this is a place of establishment. Therefore, it should be known that establishment is only based on the difference in observation of the Four Noble Truths. (Four Noble Truths: suffering, accumulation, cessation, path) The establishment of the Four Noble Truths is different from the establishment of the four ultimate meanings and cannot be taken as an example. Therefore, the ninth volume of the Abhidharma says: 'Establishment refers to śrāvakas (hearers) who have reached the ultimate according to their own realization. In order to let others also understand, they establish the path of truth with countless names, sentences, and body of words through subsequent wisdom.' (Subsequent wisdom: wisdom gained after enlightenment) That is to say, in the truths, there is such and such forbearance, such and such wisdom. It only distinguishes establishment around the Four Noble Truths.
Treatise: Internal removal of sentient beings, false condition wisdom, etc. There are two interpretations of the word 'internal' etc. One interpretation is that, as the commentary says, the self is called 'internal'. Therefore, the Abhidharma says: 'What is the characteristic of the wisdom that removes the false condition of individual sentient beings?' Because the characteristic of this wisdom does not distinguish the self-image in one's own continuum. (Continuum: the continuity of consciousness) 'Not distinguishing' means removing. 'What is the characteristic of the wisdom that removes the false condition of individual dharmas?' Because this wisdom does not distinguish the characteristics of rūpa (form) etc. in one's own continuum. The rest is the same as before. Therefore, it should be known that 'internal' refers to the self. Another saying is that the inside and outside are distinguished according to the realm. First, remove the false condition of sentient beings in the desire realm, both self and others, and second, remove the false condition of dharmas in the desire realm, both self and others. Both are in the desire realm, so it is said 'internal'. It's like saying 'internal person', including oneself and others can be called 'internal'. Third, the two false conditions of self and dharma in the upper realm are completely removed, so it is said 'universal'. Detailed explanation: Although the latter reason is understandable, it has no basis. Now according to the first saying.
Treatise: The path of seeing the true dharma, until the path of seeing the name and form. Question: Since the true path of liberation does not cut off delusions, why is the third (path of liberation) called 'dharma,' and can universally remove anuśaya (latent tendencies)? (Anuśaya: seeds of affliction) Answer: There are two explanations. One saying is that it is now a false saying, not...
實斷證故不應責。二云雖不斷種然除粗重。言遣隨眠亦何爽理 詳曰。后說應勝。夫言法者放似之義。所法既無能法何有。雖知假說亦假似真。以除粗重似彼斷。種假言遣惑故后說善。
疏。以自證分至體義無別者。問為．無為異何言無別 答無彼能緣．所緣之別。以自證分雖是能緣非無為法之能緣故。故言無別。
疏。忍前苦法智者。忍者即忍。忍前加行位中之智。由此此智通緣二境。一緣加行智。二緣真見所觀真如。真如極成。故疏不云但言忍智 有義彈云。然此智忍既不緣智。如何乃言忍前法智。故但應言現證真如故名忍也 詳曰。無違所以如燈具引理教。然云智忍或從因為名。因即方便緣教之智。忍從目智而得智名。或從果稱。皆如燈具。
論。苦類智忍等者此即雙證前忍．智二。故對法雲。苦類智忍者。謂苦法智無間無漏惠生。于苦法智忍及苦法智各別內證。言后諸聖法皆是此種類。所以者何。由初二種是后一切聖法種類。從此彼得生故。是故無漏惠生各別內證緣此為境。言后諸聖法皆是此種類。是故名為苦類智忍 釋曰。初二忍智是后所生聖道種類名為苦類。智緣此忍名之為忍。或后所生諸聖道等。是前類故名之為緣。
論。四苦類智等者。即緣第三類忍為境。或亦緣前法忍法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為已經通過實際的證悟斷除了，所以不應該再責難。第二種觀點認為，雖然沒有斷除種子，但是除去了粗重的煩惱。說遣除了隨眠煩惱，又有什麼不合道理的呢？ 詳細地說，後面的說法應該更勝一籌。所謂『法』，有『放似』的含義。所依之法既然不存在，能依之法又怎麼會有呢？即使知道是假說，也像是真實的。因為除去了粗重的煩惱，類似於斷除了種子，所以假借言說遣除了迷惑，因此後面的說法更好。 疏：因為自證分與本體在意義上沒有差別。問：有為法和無為法不同，為什麼說沒有差別？答：沒有能緣和所緣的差別。因為自證分雖然是能緣，但不是無為法的能緣。所以說沒有差別。 疏：忍前苦法智者。『忍者』就是『忍』。『忍前』指的是加行位中的智慧。因此，這種智慧可以同時緣兩種境界：一是緣加行智，二是緣真見所觀的真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）。真如已經達到極高的成就，所以疏中沒有說『但言忍智』。 有人反駁說：既然這種智忍不緣智，怎麼能說是『忍前法智』呢？所以應該只說是『現證真如』，因此名為『忍』。詳細地說，這沒有衝突，就像燈具一樣可以引用理教。說『智忍』，或許是從因上立名，因就是方便緣教之智。『忍』從目智而得智名，或者從果上稱呼，都像燈具一樣。 論：苦類智忍等者，這指的是同時證悟前忍（Kshanti，忍）和智（Jnana，智慧）二者。所以《對法》（Abhidharma，論藏）中說：『苦類智忍者，謂苦法智無間無漏惠生，于苦法智忍及苦法智各別內證。』意思是說，在苦法智（Dukkha-dharma-jnana，對苦諦的智慧）之後，無間生起的無漏智慧，分別對苦法智忍和苦法智進行內在的證悟。說後面的所有聖法都是這種種類，原因是什麼呢？因為最初的兩種（忍和智）是後面一切聖法的種類，從它們那裡才能產生後面的聖法。因此，無漏智慧分別對緣此為境的忍和智進行內在的證悟。說後面的所有聖法都是這種種類，所以名為苦類智忍。 論：四苦類智等者，指的是緣第三類忍為境界。或者也緣前面的法忍（Dharma-ksanti，對法的忍）法。
【English Translation】 English version: It should not be blamed because it has been cut off by actual realization. The second view is that although the seed has not been cut off, the gross and heavy afflictions have been removed. What is unreasonable about saying that the latent afflictions have been eliminated? In detail, the latter statement should be superior. The so-called 'dharma' has the meaning of 'resembling'. Since the dharma that is relied upon does not exist, how can the dharma that relies on it exist? Even if it is known to be a hypothetical statement, it is like the real. Because the gross and heavy afflictions have been removed, it is similar to cutting off the seed, so it is said that the delusion has been eliminated, so the latter statement is better. Commentary: Because the self-cognition division and the essence are not different in meaning. Question: How can it be said that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are not different? Answer: There is no difference between the subject and object of cognition. Because the self-cognition division, although it is the subject of cognition, is not the subject of cognition of unconditioned dharmas. So it is said that there is no difference. Commentary: 'The wisdom of suffering before forbearance'. 'Forbearance' is 'forbearance'. 'Before forbearance' refers to the wisdom in the stage of application. Therefore, this wisdom can simultaneously cognize two realms: one is the wisdom of application, and the other is the Suchness (Tathata, the true nature of things) contemplated by true vision. Suchness has reached the highest achievement, so the commentary does not say 'only forbearance and wisdom'. Some people retorted: Since this wisdom of forbearance does not cognize wisdom, how can it be said to be 'the wisdom of dharma before forbearance'? Therefore, it should only be said that 'directly realizing Suchness' is called 'forbearance'. In detail, there is no conflict, just like a lamp can cite reason and teaching. Saying 'wisdom of forbearance' may be named from the cause, the cause is the wisdom of expediently relying on teaching. 'Forbearance' gets the name of wisdom from the wisdom of the eye, or it is called from the result, just like a lamp. Treatise: 'The wisdom of the category of suffering, etc.' refers to the simultaneous realization of the former forbearance (Kshanti, patience) and wisdom (Jnana, knowledge). Therefore, the Abhidharma says: 'The wisdom of the category of suffering refers to the unhindered, undefiled wisdom arising after the wisdom of the dharma of suffering, which internally realizes the forbearance of the wisdom of the dharma of suffering and the wisdom of the dharma of suffering separately.' It means that after the wisdom of the dharma of suffering (Dukkha-dharma-jnana, wisdom of the truth of suffering), the undefiled wisdom that arises without hindrance internally realizes the forbearance of the wisdom of the dharma of suffering and the wisdom of the dharma of suffering separately. It is said that all the subsequent noble dharmas are of this kind, what is the reason? Because the first two (forbearance and wisdom) are the kinds of all subsequent noble dharmas, and the subsequent noble dharmas can only be produced from them. Therefore, undefiled wisdom internally realizes the forbearance and wisdom that take this as the object. It is said that all the subsequent noble dharmas are of this kind, so it is called the forbearance of the wisdom of the category of suffering. Treatise: 'The four wisdoms of the category of suffering, etc.' refers to taking the third category of forbearance as the object. Or it also cognizes the previous dharma-ksanti (Dharma-ksanti, patience with the dharma) dharma.
智。即印類所緣之事。不緣類忍名印類忍。
論。法真具道等者。疏有兩釋。有義彈初釋云。此論．對法皆云類忍於法忍智各別內證。即已總法無間．解脫二自證分。又云類智印可類忍。不說類智別證法智。如何乃言法真見道解脫自證。今作二釋。一云法忍法智別法真見無間．解脫見分緣如。類忍總法無間．解脫自證緣智。然未決定類智重法審決印持。亦同類忍法二自證。
二云前三如前。第四既云印可類忍。由是總法無間．解脫證自證分緣自證分。二道之中自證緣見四緣第三。今類智忍既法自證。第四緣忍明法二道證自證分。但說法見及自證者。略不論之。義必應爾 詳曰。而言法者但法真見緣如智。別不據法彼別別行相。以真見中無別行故。第三雖但證前二智第四亦然。或緣第三。然祇是智而緣于智。據此一邊別配二道。不約三四解行以分故亦何爽。故論結云差別建立名相見道。若第三．四俱雙法前二道自證。差別之義而不顯也。若法二道證自證分有理無文 或亦無失文省略爾 疏。又解此總法者。但法緣如。不分二道見與自證名總法也。
疏。雖緣智緣如不同見分是一等者。謂真無間．解脫二智皆緣于如。類忍緣智據能緣見同故合法。
論。二者依觀下上諦等者。按五十五云。現觀邊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 智（jnana）：即印類（indriya）所緣之事。不緣類忍（ksanti）名印類忍。
論：『法真具道等者』。疏有兩釋。有義彈初釋云：『此論、對法皆云類忍於法忍智各別內證，即已總法無間（anantara）．解脫（vimukti）二自證分。又云類智印可類忍，不說類智別證法智。如何乃言法真見道解脫自證。』今作二釋。一云法忍法智別法真見無間．解脫見分緣如。類忍總法無間．解脫自證緣智。然未決定類智重法審決印持。亦同類忍法二自證。
二云前三如前。第四既云印可類忍。由是總法無間．解脫證自證分緣自證分。二道之中自證緣見四緣第三。今類智忍既法自證。第四緣忍明法二道證自證分。但說法見及自證者。略不論之。義必應爾 詳曰。而言法者但法真見緣如智。別不據法彼別別行相。以真見中無別行故。第三雖但證前二智第四亦然。或緣第三。然祇是智而緣于智。據此一邊別配二道。不約三四解行以分故亦何爽。故論結云差別建立名相見道。若第三．四俱雙法前二道自證。差別之義而不顯也。若法二道證自證分有理無文 或亦無失文省略爾 疏。又解此總法者。但法緣如。不分二道見與自證名總法也。
疏：『雖緣智緣如不同見分是一等者』。謂真無間．解脫二智皆緣于如（tathata）。類忍緣智據能緣見同故合法。
論：『二者依觀下上諦等者』。按五十五云：現觀邊
【English Translation】 English version Jnana (智): That which is cognized by the indriya (印類). The ksanti (忍) that does not cognize the indriya is called indriya-ksanti.
Treatise: 'Those who possess the true Dharma possess the path, etc.' The commentary has two explanations. One interpretation criticizes the initial explanation, saying: 'This treatise and the Abhidharma both state that the indriya-ksanti individually and internally verifies the Dharma-ksanti and jnana, which already encompass the self-cognition divisions of the total Dharma's anantara (無間) and vimukti (解脫). Furthermore, it says that the indriya-jnana approves the indriya-ksanti, but does not say that the indriya-jnana separately verifies the Dharma-jnana. How can it be said that the true Dharma sees the path and liberation self-verifies?' Now, there are two explanations. One explanation says that the Dharma-ksanti and Dharma-jnana separately, the true Dharma sees the anantara and vimukti seeing divisions cognize suchness (tathata). The indriya-ksanti's total Dharma's anantara and vimukti self-cognition cognizes jnana. However, it is not yet determined whether the indriya-jnana emphasizes the Dharma's thorough examination and approval. It is also the same as the indriya-ksanti's Dharma's two self-cognitions.
The second explanation says that the first three are as before. The fourth already says that it approves the indriya-ksanti. Therefore, the total Dharma's anantara and vimukti verify the self-cognition division cognizing the self-cognition division. Among the two paths, self-cognition cognizes seeing, the fourth condition is the third. Now, the indriya-jnana and ksanti already self-cognize the Dharma. The fourth condition cognizes the ksanti, clarifying that the Dharma's two paths verify the self-cognition division. However, only the Dharma's seeing and self-cognition are discussed briefly. The meaning must be so. In detail, when speaking of Dharma, only the true Dharma sees suchness and cognizes jnana. It does not separately rely on the Dharma's separate characteristics. Because there are no separate characteristics in true seeing. Although the third only verifies the first two jnanas, the fourth is also the same. Or it cognizes the third. However, it is only jnana that cognizes jnana. According to this one side, the two paths are separately matched. It does not divide according to the three or four understandings and practices, so what is the harm? Therefore, the treatise concludes that the path of seeing establishes different names and characteristics. If the third and fourth both double the Dharma's first two paths' self-cognition, the meaning of difference is not revealed. If the Dharma's two paths verify the self-cognition division, there is reason but no text. Or there is no loss, the text is abbreviated. The commentary further explains that this total Dharma only cognizes suchness. It does not divide the two paths' seeing and self-cognition, which is called total Dharma.
Commentary: 'Although cognizing jnana and cognizing suchness are different, the seeing division is the same.' It means that the true anantara and vimukti two jnanas both cognize suchness. The indriya-ksanti cognizes jnana, according to the ability to cognize seeing, they are the same, so it is legitimate.
Treatise: 'The second is based on observing the lower and upper truths, etc.' According to fifty-five, the edge of direct perception
智諦現觀。當知此智第三心無間從見道起方現在前。緣先世智曾所觀察。下上二地及二增上安立諦境。似法類智世俗智攝。通世．出世。是出世間智后所得。如其次第於一一諦二種智生。謂忍可欲樂智。及現觀決定智如是從前現觀起已於下上諸諦中二二智生 釋曰緣先世者略有二解。一云緣見道前曾所觀察下欲界地上色．無色二地煩惱即苦．集諦。及二增上即滅．道二安立諦境。二云緣前真見名曾觀察。以放真見緣下上地及二地中所有增上安立四諦以之為境。言第三無間者。三心見道第三心后而起十六名第三無間。余文可悉。又按顯揚第十七云。從此諦現觀已上。于修道中有十六行世出世清凈智生。謂于欲系苦諦生二智。一現觀審察智。二現觀決定智。於色．無色系苦諦亦有如是二智。如於苦諦有四智。如是于集．滅．道亦各有四智 釋曰。四諦二智同五十五。見．修位別如燈已會。
論。諸相見道至真已斷故者。此會違文。五十五云。世第一無間有三心生斷見所斷 顯揚十七云。從第一法無間有三心生。斷見所斷百一十二煩惱 對法論云。謂世第一法無間苦法智忍等生。由此惠故永舍見苦所斷一切煩惱。如是文等並皆依真而假說也。對法會云。又如上說見道差別皆假建立非真實爾。何以故。出世住中各別內證
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 智諦現觀。應當知道這種智慧在見道之後，作為第三個無間心才開始顯現。它所緣的是過去世的智慧曾經觀察過的，地獄和上界兩地以及兩種增上安立的諦境。它類似於法類智，屬於世俗智的範疇，貫通世間和出世間。它是出世間智慧之後所獲得的。像這樣，依次在每一個諦中產生兩種智慧，即忍可欲樂智和現觀決定智。像這樣，從先前的現觀生起之後，在地獄和上界的各種諦中，兩種智慧相繼產生。 解釋說：『緣先世者』略有二種解釋。一種說法是，它所緣的是見道之前曾經觀察過的，地獄欲界地上色界和無色界兩種煩惱，也就是苦諦和集諦，以及兩種增上，也就是滅諦和道諦的安立諦境。另一種說法是，它所緣的是之前的真見，稱為『曾經觀察』。憑藉真見，以地獄和上界以及兩地中所有增上安立的四諦作為它的境界。『第三無間者』，是指三心見道第三心之後生起的十六個心念，稱為第三無間。其餘的文字都可以理解。另外，按照《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷所說，從這種諦現觀開始，在修道中會產生十六種行世出世清凈智，即在欲界苦諦中產生兩種智慧：一是現觀審察智，二是現觀決定智。在色界和無色界苦諦中也有這樣的兩種智慧。像在苦諦中有四種智慧一樣，在集諦、滅諦、道諦中也各有四種智慧。 解釋說：四諦的兩種智慧與五十五種智慧相同，只是見道位和修道位的區別，就像燈已經照亮一樣。 論：『諸相見道至真已斷故者』。這與經文相違背。《五十五》中說：『世第一無間有三心生斷見所斷』。《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷說：『從第一法無間有三心生，斷見所斷百一十二煩惱』。《對法論》中說：『謂世第一法無間苦法智忍等生。由此惠故永舍見苦所斷一切煩惱。』像這樣的經文等等，都是依據真諦而假說的。《對法會》中說：『又如上說見道差別皆假建立非真實爾。何以故。出世住中各別內證』。
【English Translation】 English version: The direct perception of wisdom regarding the Truth. It should be known that this wisdom arises as the third uninterrupted mind immediately after the path of seeing (見道, Jian Dao). It takes as its object what the wisdom of past lives has observed, namely, the realms of the lower and upper realms (下上二地, Xia Shang Er Di) and the truths established by the two augmentations (二增上, Er Zeng Shang). It resembles the wisdom of categories of phenomena (法類智, Fa Lei Zhi) and is included within conventional wisdom (世俗智, Shi Su Zhi), encompassing both mundane and supramundane realms. It is obtained after supramundane wisdom. In this way, two types of wisdom arise in each Truth in sequence, namely, the wisdom of acceptance and desire (忍可欲樂智, Ren Ke Yu Le Zhi) and the wisdom of decisive direct perception (現觀決定智, Xian Guan Jue Ding Zhi). Thus, after arising from the previous direct perception, two wisdoms arise successively in the various Truths of the lower and upper realms. The explanation says: 'Taking as its object what the past lives have observed' has two interpretations. One interpretation is that it takes as its object what was observed before the path of seeing, namely, the afflictions of the realm of desire (欲界, Yu Jie) in the lower realm and the realms of form (色界, Se Jie) and formlessness (無色界, Wu Se Jie) in the upper realms, which are the Truth of Suffering (苦諦, Ku Di) and the Truth of Origin (集諦, Ji Di), as well as the two augmentations, which are the established Truths of Cessation (滅諦, Mie Di) and the Truth of the Path (道諦, Dao Di). Another interpretation is that it takes the previous true seeing as 'what was observed'. Relying on true seeing, it takes the four Truths established in the lower and upper realms and the two realms as its object. 'The third uninterrupted' refers to the sixteen thoughts that arise after the third mind of the path of seeing, called the third uninterrupted. The rest of the text can be understood. Furthermore, according to the seventeenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論, Xian Yang Sheng Jiao Lun), from this direct perception of the Truth onwards, sixteen types of pure wisdom, both mundane and supramundane, arise in the path of cultivation, namely, two wisdoms arise in the Truth of Suffering in the realm of desire: one is the wisdom of direct perception and examination (現觀審察智, Xian Guan Shen Cha Zhi), and the other is the wisdom of decisive direct perception. There are also these two wisdoms in the Truth of Suffering in the realms of form and formlessness. Just as there are four wisdoms in the Truth of Suffering, there are also four wisdoms in each of the Truths of Origin, Cessation, and the Path. The explanation says: The two wisdoms of the four Truths are the same as the fifty-five wisdoms, only differing in the stages of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, just as a lamp has already illuminated. The treatise says: 'The path of seeing of all characteristics has already cut off the truth.' This contradicts the scripture. The Fifty-Five says: 'In the uninterrupted state of the highest mundane, three minds arise to cut off what is severed by views.' The seventeenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'From the uninterrupted state of the first dharma, three minds arise to cut off the one hundred and twelve afflictions severed by views.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya (對法論, Dui Fa Lun) says: 'Namely, in the uninterrupted state of the first mundane dharma, the forbearance of the wisdom of the dharma of suffering arises. Because of this wisdom, all afflictions severed by seeing suffering are permanently abandoned.' Texts like these are all provisional explanations based on the true meaning. The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā (對法會, Dui Fa Hui) says: 'Furthermore, as mentioned above, the differences in the path of seeing are all provisionally established and not truly real. Why? Because in the supramundane state, there is individual internal realization.'
離戲論故。
疏。非安立因不遍三心者。三心相見非安立故。故不得以非安立因以證三心非真見道。
疏。佛地論至二師之義者。彼第一師同此第二彼后二師同此第三。彼第二師總言無漏智有見．相。第三師者根本智無後得許有。故成二別。
論。又說此智分別諸法等者。按佛地論第三師云。無漏無分別智相應心品無分別故。所緣真如不離體故。如照自體無別相分。若后得智相應心品有分別故。所緣境界或離體故。如有漏心似境相現分明緣照。若無漏心緣離體境無似彼相而得緣者。觀所緣論不應說言五識上無似極微相故非所緣。如是境相同無漏心無漏種起。雖有相似有漏法相然非有漏。如有漏心似無漏相非無漏故。
論。六現觀等者。現觀差別諸論廣明如章所敘。對法．顯揚說十．十八。今略引之。對法第十三云。建立現觀略有十種 法現觀者。由於諸諦增上契經等法中。從聞他音增上緣力。已得最後順解脫分善根所攝上品清信勝解。由法而得名法現觀 義現觀者。由於如上諦增上法。如理作意增上緣力。于苦諦等境已得最後順抉擇分善根所攝上品諦察法忍 真現觀者。已得見道十六剎那所有聖道。又見道中得現觀邊安立諦世俗智 后現觀者。謂一切修道。由見后一切世間出世間道皆名后現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 離戲論的緣故。
疏：如果安立因不普遍適用於三心，那是因為三心相見不是安立的緣故。因此，不能用非安立的因來證明三心不是真正的見道。
疏：《佛地論》中關於二師的意義是：第一師的觀點與此處的第二師相同，彼論中的后二師與此處的第三師相同。彼論第二師總的來說，認為無漏智有見分和相分。第三師認為根本智沒有後得智，但允許有相分。因此形成了兩種區別。
論：又說此智分別諸法等等。按照《佛地論》第三師的觀點，無漏無分別智相應的心品沒有分別，因為所緣的真如不離本體。就像照見自體，沒有別的相分。如果后得智相應的心品有分別，因為所緣的境界或者離開本體。就像有漏心，相似於境界的相顯現，分明地緣照。如果無漏心緣離本體的境界，沒有相似於彼境界的相而能夠緣取，那麼《觀所緣論》不應該說五識上沒有相似於極微的相，所以不是所緣。像這樣的境界相，與無漏心、無漏種子生起。雖然有相似的有漏法相，但不是有漏的，就像有漏心相似於無漏相，但不是無漏的。
論：六現觀等等。現觀的差別，各種論典廣泛闡明，如章節所敘述的。《對法》、《顯揚》中說十種、十八種。現在簡略地引用。《對法》第十三中說：建立現觀，略有十種：法現觀者，由於諸諦增上契經等法中，從聽聞他人音聲的增上緣力，已經得到最後順解脫分善根所攝的上品清信勝解，由法而得名法現觀。義現觀者，由於如上諦增上法，如理作意的增上緣力，于苦諦等境已經得到最後順抉擇分善根所攝的上品諦察法忍。真現觀者，已經得到見道十六剎那所有聖道。又見道中得到現觀邊安立諦世俗智。后現觀者，指一切修道。由見道后一切世間出世間道都名為后現觀。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of being free from conceptual proliferation (li xi lun).
Commentary: If the establishing cause (an li yin) does not universally apply to the three minds (san xin), it is because the mutual perception of the three minds is not an establishment. Therefore, one cannot use a non-establishing cause to prove that the three minds are not the true path of seeing (jian dao).
Commentary: Regarding the meaning of the two teachers (er shi) in the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra (Fo Di Lun): The first teacher there is the same as the second teacher here, and the latter two teachers there are the same as the third teacher here. The second teacher there generally says that uncontaminated wisdom (wu lou zhi) has both the seeing aspect (jian fen) and the image aspect (xiang fen). The third teacher believes that fundamental wisdom (gen ben zhi) does not have subsequent wisdom (hou de zhi), but allows for the existence of the image aspect. Therefore, two distinctions are formed.
Treatise: Furthermore, it is said that this wisdom distinguishes all dharmas, etc. According to the third teacher's view in the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, the mind-class associated with uncontaminated non-discriminating wisdom (wu lou wu fen bie zhi) has no discrimination because the suchness (zhen ru) that is the object is not separate from the essence. It is like reflecting on one's own essence, without a separate image aspect (xiang fen). If the mind-class associated with subsequent wisdom has discrimination because the object of perception is either separate from the essence, it is like a contaminated mind (you lou xin), where the image of the object appears similar, and clearly illuminates. If an uncontaminated mind perceives an object separate from the essence, without a similar image of that object being able to be perceived, then the Treatise on the Observed Object (Guan Suo Yuan Lun) should not say that the five consciousnesses (wu shi) do not have an image similar to the ultimate particle (ji wei), therefore it is not the object of perception. Such an image of the object arises with the uncontaminated mind and uncontaminated seeds (wu lou zhong zi). Although there is a similar contaminated dharma-image (you lou fa xiang), it is not contaminated, just as a contaminated mind is similar to an uncontaminated image, but is not uncontaminated.
Treatise: The six kinds of direct perception (xian guan), etc. The differences in direct perception are extensively explained in various treatises, as described in the chapters. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Dui Fa) and Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Xian Yang) speak of ten and eighteen kinds, respectively. Now, I will briefly quote from them. The thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: Establishing direct perception, there are briefly ten kinds: Dharma direct perception (fa xian guan): Due to the Dharma in the sutras (qi jing) that increase the truths (di), etc., from the increasing causal power of hearing the voices of others, one has already obtained the superior pure faith and understanding (qing xin sheng jie) contained in the final part of the roots of good that accord with liberation (shun jie tuo fen shan gen), and is named Dharma direct perception because it is obtained through the Dharma. Meaning direct perception (yi xian guan): Due to the Dharma that increases the truths as above, from the increasing causal power of appropriate attention (ru li zuo yi), one has already obtained the superior Dharma-acceptance-patience (di cha fa ren) contained in the final part of the roots of good that accord with ascertainment (shun jue ze fen shan gen) regarding the objects of the truth of suffering (ku di), etc. True direct perception (zhen xian guan): One has already obtained all the holy paths (sheng dao) of the sixteen moments (shi liu cha na) of the path of seeing (jian dao). Furthermore, in the path of seeing, one obtains the conventional wisdom (shi su zhi) that establishes the truths on the side of direct perception. Subsequent direct perception (hou xian guan): Refers to all paths of cultivation (xiu dao). All worldly and supramundane paths after the path of seeing are called subsequent direct perception.
觀 寶現觀者。由佛聖弟子於三寶所已得決定證清凈信。謂薄伽梵是真正等覺。法毗奈耶是真善妙說。聖弟子眾是真凈行者 不行現觀者。謂已證得聖所愛戒所攝律儀。由得此故此所對治那落迦異熟等必不復行。永盡不行故名不行現觀 究竟現觀者。如道諦中究竟道說。謂已息一切粗重已。得一切離系得如是等 聲聞現觀者。謂前所說七種現觀。從他聞音而證得故名聲聞現觀 獨覺現觀者。謂前所說七種現觀。不由他音而證得故名獨覺現觀 菩薩現觀者。謂諸菩薩於前所說七種現觀。哀變眾生不于下乘而出離故。然于菩薩極喜地中入諸菩薩正性決定是名菩薩現觀 又按顯揚十七云。又此現觀差別有十八種。謂聞所生智．思所生智．修所生智．順抉擇分智．見道．修道．究竟道．不善清凈世俗智．善清凈世俗智．勝義智．不善清凈行有分別智．善清凈行有分別智．善清凈行無分別智．成所作前行智．成所作智．成所作后智．聲聞等智．菩薩等智 相傳釋云。初之三智資糧位中所有三惠如次。四如名。第八即是順解脫分。未能善解四諦理故。第九即是順抉擇分善解四諦。第十即是見．修．無覺。十一即是欲界之智。十二是上二界修惠。十三即是見．修．究竟三道之中緣非安立智。十四五六如次加行．正體．后得智。十七是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 觀寶現觀者：由佛的聖弟子對於佛、法、僧三寶已經獲得決定性的、清凈的信心。即薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）是真正的等正覺者，法（Dharma，佛法）和毗奈耶（Vinaya，戒律）是真正善妙的教說，聖弟子眾是真正清凈的修行者。 不行現觀者：指已經證得聖者所喜愛的、為戒所攝持的律儀。由於獲得這種律儀，因此這種律儀所對治的那落迦（Naraka，地獄）的異熟果報等，必定不再經歷。因為永遠斷盡，不再經歷，所以稱為不行現觀。 究竟現觀者：如同在道諦中對究竟道的描述，指已經止息一切粗重的煩惱，獲得一切解脫的繫縛，像這樣等等。 聲聞現觀者：指前面所說的七種現觀，由於從他人聽聞音聲而證得，所以稱為聲聞現觀。 獨覺現觀者：指前面所說的七種現觀，由於不依靠他人的音聲而證得，所以稱為獨覺現觀。 菩薩現觀者：指諸位菩薩對於前面所說的七種現觀，因為哀憫眾生，不願在下乘（小乘）中獲得出離，而是在菩薩的極喜地（初地）中進入諸菩薩的正性決定（不退轉位），這稱為菩薩現觀。 又，按照《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷所說，這種現觀的差別有十八種，即聞所生智、思所生智、修所生智、順抉擇分智、見道、修道、究竟道、不善清凈世俗智、善清凈世俗智、勝義智、不善清凈行有分別智、善清凈行有分別智、善清凈行無分別智、成所作前行智、成所作智、成所作后智、聲聞等智、菩薩等智。 相傳的解釋說，最初的三種智慧（聞所生智、思所生智、修所生智）是資糧位中所具有的三種智慧，依次對應。第四種（順抉擇分智）如其名。第八種（不善清凈世俗智）即是順解脫分，因為未能善於理解四諦的道理。第九種（善清凈世俗智）即是順抉擇分，善於理解四諦。第十種（勝義智）即是見道、修道、無學道。第十一種（不善清凈行有分別智）即是欲界的智慧。第十二種（善清凈行有分別智）是上二界修所生的智慧。第十三種（善清凈行無分別智）即是見道、修道、究竟道三種道中緣非安立的智慧。第十四、十五、十六種（成所作前行智、成所作智、成所作后智）依次是加行、正體、后得智。第十七種是聲聞等智。
【English Translation】 English version: Contemplating the Manifestation of Jewels: This refers to the definitive and pure faith that a holy disciple of the Buddha has attained in the Three Jewels (Triratna): that the Bhagavan (the Blessed One) is a truly and perfectly enlightened being; that the Dharma (the teachings) and Vinaya (the monastic discipline) are truly excellent teachings; and that the community of holy disciples are truly pure practitioners. Non-Practicing Contemplation: This refers to having attained the precepts cherished by the noble ones, which are encompassed by the discipline of morality. Because of attaining this, the maturation of Naraka (hell) and other such results, which are counteracted by this discipline, will certainly not be experienced again. Because they are forever exhausted and not experienced again, it is called non-practicing contemplation. Ultimate Contemplation: As described for the ultimate path in the Truth of the Path, this refers to having ceased all coarse afflictions, having attained all liberation from bonds, and so forth. Śrāvaka (Hearer) Contemplation: This refers to the seven types of contemplation mentioned earlier, which are attained by hearing sounds from others, hence it is called Śrāvaka contemplation. Pratyekabuddha (Solitary Realizer) Contemplation: This refers to the seven types of contemplation mentioned earlier, which are attained without relying on the sounds of others, hence it is called Pratyekabuddha contemplation. Bodhisattva Contemplation: This refers to the Bodhisattvas who, with regard to the seven types of contemplation mentioned earlier, out of compassion for sentient beings, do not seek liberation in the lower vehicle (Hīnayāna), but rather enter the stage of the certainty of the Bodhisattvas (non-retrogression) in the Joyful Ground (first bhūmi) of the Bodhisattvas. This is called Bodhisattva contemplation. Furthermore, according to the seventeenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, there are eighteen kinds of differences in this contemplation, namely: wisdom born from hearing, wisdom born from thinking, wisdom born from meditation, wisdom of the part conforming to ascertainment, the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, the ultimate path, impure and pure conventional wisdom, pure conventional wisdom, ultimate wisdom, impure and pure wisdom with conceptualization, pure wisdom with conceptualization, pure wisdom without conceptualization, the preliminary wisdom for accomplishing activities, the wisdom of accomplishing activities, the subsequent wisdom of accomplishing activities, the wisdom of Śrāvakas, and the wisdom of Bodhisattvas. The traditional explanation says that the first three wisdoms (wisdom born from hearing, wisdom born from thinking, wisdom born from meditation) are the three wisdoms possessed in the stage of accumulation, corresponding in order. The fourth (wisdom of the part conforming to ascertainment) is as its name suggests. The eighth (impure and pure conventional wisdom) is the part conforming to liberation, because it has not been able to understand the principles of the Four Noble Truths well. The ninth (pure conventional wisdom) is the part conforming to ascertainment, which understands the Four Noble Truths well. The tenth (ultimate wisdom) is the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, and the path of no more learning. The eleventh (impure and pure wisdom with conceptualization) is the wisdom of the desire realm. The twelfth (pure wisdom with conceptualization) is the wisdom born from cultivation in the upper two realms. The thirteenth (pure wisdom without conceptualization) is the wisdom that cognizes the non-established in the three paths of the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, and the ultimate path. The fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth (the preliminary wisdom for accomplishing activities, the wisdom of accomplishing activities, the subsequent wisdom of accomplishing activities) are, in order, the wisdom of application, the wisdom of the main body, and the wisdom of subsequent attainment. The seventeenth is the wisdom of Śrāvakas, etc.
彼聲聞所有現觀。十八菩薩諸現觀智 又依彼論第十四中釋此中九云。此中不善清凈世俗智者即是順抉擇分智。善清凈世俗智者是出世后得世間智。勝義智者是見道智。又不善清凈相有分別智．善清凈有相分別智．善清凈相無分別智。又成所作前行智．成所作智．成所作后智 前三差別者。未斷煩惱生非煩惱對治。已斷煩惱生非煩惱對治。已斷煩惱生是煩惱對治 中三差別者。即此三種由有分別無分別故。世俗．勝義智性差別 后三差別者。謂此三種顯示斷前．正斷．及后智性差別 今依論文配位為正 又按攝論第六六現觀。大小二乘有十一種差別不同。故本論云。菩薩現觀與聲聞異。由十一種差別應知。一由所緣差別。以大乘法為所緣故。二由資持差別。以大福智二種資糧為資持故。三由通達差別。以能通達補特伽羅．法無我故。四由涅槃差別。攝受無住大涅槃故。五由地差別。依於十地而出離故。六．七由清凈差別。斷煩惱．習凈佛土故。八由於自他得平等心差別。成熟有情加行無休息故。九由生差別。生如來家故。十由受生差別。常于諸佛大集會中攝受生故。十一由果差別。十力無畏不共佛法無量功德果成滿故。
論。得諸平等者。無性攝論第六云。得有情平等心性者。遍見一切等無我故。如有說言。一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 彼聲聞（Śrāvaka，小乘佛教的修行者）所有現觀（Abhisamaya，證悟）。十八菩薩（Bodhisattva，追求覺悟的修行者）諸現觀智，又依據《瑜伽師地論》第十四卷中的解釋，此中九種智慧是：不善清凈世俗智者，即是順抉擇分智（Anulomikī kṣānti，隨順抉擇分）；善清凈世俗智者，是出世后得世間智（Lokikajñāna，世間智）；勝義智者，是見道智（Darśanamārga-jñāna，見道之智）。 又不善清凈相有分別智、善清凈有相分別智、善清凈相無分別智；又成所作前行智、成所作智、成所作后智。前三者的差別在於：未斷煩惱而生起非煩惱的對治；已斷煩惱而生起非煩惱的對治；已斷煩惱而生起是煩惱的對治。 中間三者的差別在於：這三種智慧由於有分別和無分別而不同，即世俗智和勝義智的性質差別。后三者的差別在於：這三種智慧顯示了斷除煩惱之前、正在斷除煩惱、以及斷除煩惱之後的智慧性質的差別。現在依據論文來正確地進行配位。 又按照《攝大乘論》第六卷，現觀在大乘和小乘之間有十一種差別不同。所以本論說：菩薩的現觀與聲聞不同，應該通過十一種差別來了解。一是所緣差別，因為以大乘佛法作為所緣。二是資持差別，因為以大福德和大智慧兩種資糧作為資持。三是通達差別，因為能夠通達補特伽羅（Pudgala，人）無我和法無我（Dharma-nairātmya，法無我）。四是涅槃差別，因為攝受無住大涅槃（Apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa，無住涅槃）。五是地差別，因為依於十地（Daśa-bhūmi，十地）而出離。六、七是清凈差別，因為斷除煩惱和清凈佛土。八是對於自他獲得平等心的差別，因為成熟有情眾生的加行沒有休息。九是生差別，因為生於如來之家。十是受生差別，因為常在諸佛的大**中攝受生。十一是果差別，因為十力（Daśabala，如來十力）、無畏（Vaiśāradya，四無畏）、不共佛法（Āveṇikadharma，十八不共法）和無量功德果的成就圓滿。 論：獲得諸平等者。《無性攝大乘論》第六卷說：獲得對有情眾生的平等心性，是因為普遍見到一切眾生平等而無我。如有說言：一……
【English Translation】 English version The Abhisamaya (direct realization) possessed by those Śrāvakas (hearers, practitioners of early Buddhism). The wisdom of Abhisamaya of the eighteen Bodhisattvas (beings striving for enlightenment). Furthermore, according to the explanation in the fourteenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the nine types of wisdom here are: the impure and pure mundane wisdom is the Anulomikī kṣānti (compliant acceptance); the pure mundane wisdom is the Lokikajñāna (worldly knowledge) attained after emerging from the world; the ultimate wisdom is the Darśanamārga-jñāna (wisdom of the path of seeing). Furthermore, there are impure and pure wisdom with characteristics and discrimination, pure wisdom with characteristics and discrimination, and pure wisdom without characteristics and discrimination; also, wisdom preceding accomplishment, wisdom of accomplishment, and wisdom following accomplishment. The difference between the first three lies in: generating non-afflictive antidotes before severing afflictions; generating non-afflictive antidotes after severing afflictions; and generating afflictive antidotes after severing afflictions. The difference between the middle three lies in: these three types of wisdom differ due to the presence or absence of discrimination, that is, the difference in the nature of mundane and ultimate wisdom. The difference between the last three lies in: these three types of wisdom reveal the difference in the nature of wisdom before, during, and after severing afflictions. Now, we will correctly allocate them according to the text. Moreover, according to the sixth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, there are eleven differences between Abhisamaya in Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Therefore, this treatise says: the Abhisamaya of Bodhisattvas differs from that of Śrāvakas, and should be understood through eleven differences. First, the difference in object, because it takes Mahāyāna Dharma as its object. Second, the difference in support, because it takes the two accumulations of great merit and great wisdom as its support. Third, the difference in understanding, because it can understand Pudgala-nairātmya (the selflessness of persons) and Dharma-nairātmya (the selflessness of phenomena). Fourth, the difference in Nirvāṇa, because it embraces Apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa (non-abiding Nirvāṇa). Fifth, the difference in ground, because it emerges from the Daśa-bhūmi (ten grounds). Sixth and seventh, the difference in purification, because it severs afflictions and purifies Buddha-fields. Eighth, the difference in attaining equanimity towards oneself and others, because the practice of maturing sentient beings is without rest. Ninth, the difference in birth, because it is born into the family of the Tathāgata. Tenth, the difference in rebirth, because it constantly embraces rebirth in the great assemblies of all Buddhas. Eleventh, the difference in result, because the accomplishment and fulfillment of the fruits of Daśabala (ten powers), Vaiśāradya (four fearlessnesses), Āveṇikadharma (eighteen unique qualities of a Buddha), and immeasurable merits. Treatise: 'Obtaining all equalities.' The sixth chapter of the Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Obtaining the equanimous nature towards sentient beings is because one universally sees that all beings are equal and without self.' As it is said: 'One...'
切諸法皆如來藏。得一切菩薩平等心性者。得彼意樂平等性故。得一切佛平等心性者。得彼法身平等性故 佛地經中有十平等。如前已引。
疏。十種發心等者。所指經論文既廣多。故不引也。
疏。又作阿賴耶識依他性觀等者。按五十一云。此雜染根本阿賴耶識。修善法故方得轉滅。此修善法若諸異生以緣轉識為境作意。方便住心能入最初聖諦現觀。非未見諦者于諸諦中未得法眼。便能通達一切種子阿賴耶識。此未見諦者修如是行已。或入聲聞正性離生。或入菩薩正性離生。達一切法真法界已。亦能通達阿賴耶識。當於爾時能總觀察自內所有一切雜染。亦能了知。自身外為相縛所縛。內為粗重縛所縛 釋曰。資糧．加行異生緣彼眼等轉識此有二義。一三乘通說。理實大乘亦緣第八作唯識觀 二質．影不同。賴耶為質轉識為影。隱質談影云緣轉識 問二乘雲何能觀賴耶云入聲聞正性離生通達賴耶 答有二義。一據不定聲聞性人根熟者說。彼入自見后回入大能達賴耶。定性不然 二約種子賴耶識言。三乘皆能知苦斷集。廣如瑜伽論鈔。◎
成唯識論演秘卷第七(本終)
成唯識論演秘卷第七(末)
◎論。依謂所依等者。具如疏辨。有義轉者屬能轉道。亦轉之依。由能轉道轉所轉依名轉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：一切諸法都是如來藏（Tathagatagarbha，如來藏）。證得一切菩薩平等心性的人，是因為證得了菩薩意樂的平等性。證得一切佛平等心性的人，是因為證得了佛法身（Dharmakaya，法身）的平等性。《佛地經》中有十種平等，如前文已經引用。
疏：十種發心平等，所指的經文和論著既廣泛又多，所以這裡不引用。
疏：又作阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）依他性觀等。按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說，這個雜染的根本阿賴耶識，因為修習善法才能得以轉變滅除。這種修習善法，如果是異生（指凡夫）以緣轉識為境界進行作意，方便安住其心，就能進入最初的聖諦現觀。如果未見諦的人，在諸諦中未得法眼，就不能通達一切種子阿賴耶識。這些未見諦的人修習這樣的行持后，或者進入聲聞乘的正性離生，或者進入菩薩乘的正性離生。通達一切法的真法界后，也能通達阿賴耶識。當那時，就能總的觀察自己內心所有的一切雜染，也能了知自身外被相縛所束縛，內被粗重縛所束縛。解釋說：資糧位和加行位的異生緣彼眼等轉識，這裡有兩種含義：一是三乘共通的說法，實際上大乘也緣第八識作唯識觀；二是質和影不同，阿賴耶識是質，轉識是影，隱去質而談影，就說是緣轉識。問：二乘如何能觀阿賴耶識，說進入聲聞正性離生，是通達阿賴耶識嗎？答：有兩種含義。一是根據不定聲聞性的人，根器成熟的人來說，他們進入自見后回入大乘，能夠通達阿賴耶識。定性聲聞則不然。二是約種子阿賴耶識來說，三乘都能知苦斷集。詳細內容見《瑜伽師地論鈔》。
《成唯識論演秘》卷第七（本終）
《成唯識論演秘》卷第七（末）
論：依謂所依等，具體內容如疏文所辨析。有義轉，屬於能轉之道，也是所轉之依。由於能轉之道轉變了所轉之依，所以名為轉。
【English Translation】 English version: All dharmas are the Tathagatagarbha (Tathagatagarbha, the womb of the Thus-Come One). Those who attain the equality of mind-nature of all Bodhisattvas do so because they attain the equality of their intentions. Those who attain the equality of mind-nature of all Buddhas do so because they attain the equality of their Dharmakaya (Dharmakaya, the body of the Dharma). In the Buddhabhumi Sutra, there are ten equalities, as previously cited.
Commentary: The ten kinds of arising of the mind of equality refer to a wide range of sutras and treatises, so they are not cited here.
Commentary: Furthermore, contemplate the dependent nature of the Alaya-vijñana (Alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness), etc. According to the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, this fundamentally defiled Alaya-vijñana can only be transformed and extinguished through the cultivation of wholesome dharmas. This cultivation of wholesome dharmas, if ordinary beings intentionally focus on the transformed consciousness as their object, and skillfully abide in their minds, they can enter the initial direct realization of the noble truths. If those who have not seen the truth, and have not attained the Dharma-eye in the truths, they cannot penetrate the Alaya-vijñana of all seeds. After these who have not seen the truth cultivate in this way, they either enter the Stream-Enterer stage of the Sravaka vehicle, or enter the Stream-Enterer stage of the Bodhisattva vehicle. After penetrating the true Dharmadhatu of all dharmas, they can also penetrate the Alaya-vijñana. At that time, they can generally observe all the defilements within themselves, and also understand that externally they are bound by the bonds of characteristics, and internally they are bound by the bonds of coarseness. Explanation: Ordinary beings in the stages of accumulation and application focus on the transformed consciousness of their eyes, etc. There are two meanings here: first, it is a common teaching of the three vehicles; in reality, the Mahayana also focuses on the eighth consciousness to contemplate the Mind-Only. Second, the substance and the shadow are different; the Alaya-vijñana is the substance, and the transformed consciousness is the shadow. Hiding the substance and talking about the shadow is said to be focusing on the transformed consciousness. Question: How can those of the two vehicles contemplate the Alaya-vijñana, and is entering the Stream-Enterer stage of the Sravaka vehicle penetrating the Alaya-vijñana? Answer: There are two meanings. First, it refers to those of uncertain Sravaka nature, whose roots are mature. After they enter self-seeing, they return to the Mahayana and can penetrate the Alaya-vijñana. This is not the case for those of fixed nature. Second, it refers to the seed Alaya-vijñana; all three vehicles can know suffering and cut off accumulation. See the Yogacarabhumi-sastra Commentary for details.
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 7 (End of the Volume)
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 7 (End)
Treatise: 'Relying' means that which is relied upon, etc., as explained in detail in the commentary. 'Having meaning of transformation' belongs to the path that can transform, and is also that which is transformed. Because the path that can transform transforms that which is transformed, it is called transformation.
依故。今此解者相最顯了 詳曰。與轉為依名為轉依。轉即能依。能依論說是染凈法。云何轉言屬能轉道。能轉道者非是染故。今釋。轉者而有二義。一云轉者屬能轉道。舍．得二種。轉之舍．得。依主為稱。二屬所轉舍．得二種。轉即舍．得。持業立名。今依初義合言轉依。亦依主釋。
疏。無性云二所依止等者。按彼第九本論中雲。二所依止轉依為相。此中生死謂依他起性雜染分。涅槃謂依他起性清凈分。二所依止謂通二分。依他起性轉依謂即依他起性。對治起時轉舍雜染分轉得清凈分 無性釋云。二所依止轉依為相。或依士釋。或持業釋。
論。初極喜地等者。按瑜伽四十七。極喜住菩薩有四相發心。一者何相發心。謂勝解行住已善積集一切善根。于菩薩行已正超出略說是相。二者何所緣。慮緣當來世菩提資糧．利有情事一切佛法．諸佛所作此等圓滿。三者發心何狀何相何自性起。謂諸菩薩發起一切菩提資糧隨順有情一切菩薩成佛等事。四者發心有何勝利。謂諸菩薩發是心已。超過菩薩凡異生地。證入菩薩正性離生。生如來家紹如來種 又云。又現法中能起菩薩一切精進信增上力為前導故 又云。引發十大愿為欲供養最勝有情說無上法引第一愿。為欲受持彼所說法引第二愿。為欲勸請轉法輪故引第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此。現在這個解釋是最為明顯的。詳細解釋：以『與轉為依』稱為『轉依』。『轉』即是能依。能依的論述說的是染污法和清凈法。為什麼『轉』這個詞屬於能轉之道呢？因為能轉之道不是染污的緣故。現在解釋：『轉』有兩種含義。一是『轉』屬於能轉之道，包含捨棄和獲得兩種。『轉』的捨棄和獲得，以依主釋來稱呼。二是屬於所轉的捨棄和獲得兩種。『轉』即是捨棄和獲得，以持業釋來立名。現在依據第一種含義，合起來說『轉依』，也是依主釋。
疏文說：『無性云二所依止等者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》第九本中的說法：『二所依止轉依為相』。這裡所說的生死，指的是依他起性的雜染部分。涅槃，指的是依他起性的清凈部分。『二所依止』指的是通於雜染和清凈二分。『依他起性轉依』指的是即依他起性。在對治生起時，轉舍雜染分，轉得清凈分。無性解釋說：『二所依止轉依為相』，或者用依士釋，或者用持業釋。
論中說：『初極喜地等者』。按照《瑜伽師地論》第四十七卷的說法，極喜地菩薩有四種發心之相。一是何種相的發心？指的是勝解行地的菩薩已經很好地積累了一切善根，對於菩薩的修行已經正確地超出，簡略地說就是這種相。二是所緣是什麼？思慮緣于未來世菩提的資糧、利益有情的事情、一切佛法、諸佛所做的事情等等的圓滿。三是發心以何種狀態、何種相、何種自性生起？指的是諸位菩薩發起一切菩提資糧，隨順有情的一切菩薩成佛等等的事情。四是發心有什麼勝利？指的是諸位菩薩發起這個心之後，超過菩薩凡夫的異生之地，證入菩薩的正性離生，生於如來之家，繼承如來的種子。又說：又在現法中能夠生起菩薩一切精進的信心增上力作為前導。又說：引發十大愿，爲了供養最殊勝的有情而說無上法，引出第一愿。爲了受持他們所說的法，引出第二愿。爲了勸請轉法輪的緣故，引出第
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, this explanation is the most obvious now. In detail: 'Taking transformation as the basis' is called 'transformation basis' (Paravrtti-asraya). 'Transformation' is the dependent. The discourse on the dependent states that it is defiled and pure dharma. Why does the word 'transformation' belong to the path of transformation? Because the path of transformation is not defiled. Now explaining: 'Transformation' has two meanings. First, 'transformation' belongs to the path of transformation, including two kinds: abandonment and attainment. The abandonment and attainment of 'transformation' are referred to using the possessive compound (依主釋, yizhu shi). Second, it belongs to the abandonment and attainment of what is transformed. 'Transformation' is abandonment and attainment, named using the determinative compound (持業釋, chiye shi). Now, according to the first meaning, we combine to say 'transformation basis', which is also a possessive compound.
The commentary says: 'Vasubandhu (無性, Wuxing) says, two bases, etc.' According to the ninth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'Two bases take transformation as their characteristic.' Here, samsara refers to the defiled part of dependent origination (依他起性, yitaqixing). Nirvana refers to the pure part of dependent origination. 'Two bases' refers to both the defiled and pure parts. 'Dependent origination transformation' refers to dependent origination itself. When the antidote arises, it transforms and abandons the defiled part, and transforms and attains the pure part. Vasubandhu explains: 'Two bases take transformation as their characteristic,' either using the possessive compound or the determinative compound.
The treatise says: 'The first Joyful Ground (極喜地, Jixi Di), etc.' According to the forty-seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the Bodhisattva in the Joyful Ground has four aspects of generating the aspiration. First, what aspect of generating the aspiration? It refers to the Bodhisattva in the stage of understanding and practice (勝解行地, Shengjie Xing Di) who has well accumulated all good roots and has correctly transcended the practice of the Bodhisattva, which is briefly this aspect. Second, what is the object? Contemplating and considering the future resources for Bodhi, the matters of benefiting sentient beings, all the Buddha-dharma, the deeds of all Buddhas, and the perfection of these things. Third, in what state, what aspect, and what nature does the aspiration arise? It refers to all Bodhisattvas generating all the resources for Bodhi, according to the sentient beings, all Bodhisattvas accomplishing Buddhahood, and so on. Fourth, what are the benefits of generating the aspiration? It refers to all Bodhisattvas, after generating this aspiration, transcending the ordinary state of Bodhisattvas, realizing the correct determination of Bodhisattvas, being born into the family of the Tathagata, and inheriting the seed of the Tathagata. It also says: 'Also, in the present dharma, it can generate all the diligent faith and increased strength of the Bodhisattva as a guide.' It also says: 'It elicits the ten great vows, for the sake of offering the most excellent sentient beings and speaking the unsurpassed dharma, eliciting the first vow. For the sake of receiving and upholding the dharma they speak, eliciting the second vow. For the sake of encouraging the turning of the Dharma wheel, eliciting the third.'
三愿。為欲順彼行菩薩行引第四愿。為欲成就彼器有情引第五愿。為往佛國見佛供養聽聞正法引第六愿。為凈佛國引第七愿。為不離佛與諸菩薩。常同一味意樂加行引第八愿。為利有情曾無空過引第九愿。為證菩提作諸佛事引第十愿 十愿者按四十五云。若諸菩薩愿于當來以一切供具供無量佛名一大愿。愿于當來護佛正法傳令不斷名二大愿。愿于當來從都史下至般涅槃名三大愿。愿于當來行菩薩行名四大愿。愿于當來普成有情名五大愿。愿于當來普示世界名六大愿。愿于當來普凈佛立名七大愿。愿于當來一切菩薩皆同一種意樂加行趣入大乘名八大愿。愿于當來無倒加行皆不唐捐名九大愿。愿于當來速證菩提名十大愿 又四十七明初地中有十凈修住法。由是能令極歡喜住速得清凈。一于佛法深生凈信。二觀有情唯苦起悲。三誓令脫苦得樂起慈。四為救憂苦而行惠施。五為利有情求世．出世法無厭倦。六無厭倦故善知諸論。七善知論故善解世間。八即于如是正加行中而修慚愧。九即于如是正加行中得無退轉。十以妙利養及與正行供養如來 又云。又諸菩薩於此十法受學隨轉多修習已。復于餘九增上戒等諸菩薩住。從佛菩薩專精訪求一切種道功德過失及神通樂無失壞道等。此即開曉餘九地也 又云。愿見諸佛愿生佛國如實稱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三愿：爲了順應菩薩的修行而引導出第四愿。爲了成就堪能的眾生而引導出第五愿。爲了往生佛國，見佛、供養、聽聞正法而引導出第六愿。爲了清凈佛國而引導出第七愿。爲了不離佛與諸菩薩，常同一味地意樂加行而引導出第八愿。爲了利益眾生，不曾空過而引導出第九愿。爲了證得菩提，作諸佛事而引導出第十愿。 十愿的內容，按照四十五卷所說：如果諸菩薩發願在未來以一切供具供養無量佛，這稱為一大愿。發願在未來護持佛的正法，使其傳承不斷，這稱為二大愿。發願在未來從兜率天降生，直至般涅槃，這稱為三大愿。發願在未來行菩薩行，這稱為四大愿。發願在未來普遍成就一切眾生，這稱為五大愿。發願在未來普遍示現世界，這稱為六大愿。發願在未來普遍清凈佛的國土，這稱為七大愿。發願在未來一切菩薩都具有同一種意樂加行，趣入大乘，這稱為八大愿。發願在未來無有顛倒的加行，都不徒勞無功，這稱為九大愿。發願在未來迅速證得菩提，這稱為十大愿。 此外，第四十七卷說明初地中有十種凈修住法。由此能夠使極歡喜住迅速得到清凈：一是對佛法深深生起凈信。二是觀察有情唯有痛苦而生起悲心。三是發誓令眾生脫離痛苦得到快樂而生起慈心。四是爲了救濟憂愁痛苦而行惠施。五是爲了利益有情而尋求世間和出世間的法，沒有厭倦。六是沒有厭倦的緣故，善於瞭解各種論典。七是善於瞭解論典的緣故，善於瞭解世間。八是在這樣的正確加行中修習慚愧。九是在這樣的正確加行中得到不退轉。十是以美妙的利養以及正確的行為供養如來（Tathagata）。 經文又說：此外，諸菩薩對於這十種法受持學習，隨順轉變，多次修習之後，又在其餘九種增上戒等諸菩薩住處，從佛菩薩那裡專心精進地訪求一切種道功德過失以及神通快樂無失壞道等。這就是開曉其餘九地。 經文又說：『愿見諸佛，愿生佛國，如實稱』。
【English Translation】 English version The three vows: The fourth vow is introduced to accord with the practice of Bodhisattvas. The fifth vow is introduced to accomplish sentient beings who are vessels. The sixth vow is introduced to be reborn in the Buddha-land, see the Buddha, make offerings, and listen to the Dharma. The seventh vow is introduced to purify the Buddha-land. The eighth vow is introduced to not be separated from the Buddha and all Bodhisattvas, and to always have the same taste of intention and conduct. The ninth vow is introduced to benefit sentient beings without ever wasting time. The tenth vow is introduced to attain Bodhi and perform the deeds of all Buddhas. Regarding the content of the ten vows, according to volume forty-five: If the Bodhisattvas vow to offer immeasurable Buddhas with all offerings in the future, this is called the first great vow. Vowing to protect the Buddha's true Dharma in the future and ensure its continuous transmission is called the second great vow. Vowing to descend from Tushita Heaven in the future until Parinirvana is called the third great vow. Vowing to practice the Bodhisattva path in the future is called the fourth great vow. Vowing to universally accomplish all sentient beings in the future is called the fifth great vow. Vowing to universally reveal the world in the future is called the sixth great vow. Vowing to universally purify the Buddha's lands in the future is called the seventh great vow. Vowing that all Bodhisattvas will have the same intention and conduct, entering the Mahayana in the future is called the eighth great vow. Vowing that in the future, all non-inverted practices will not be in vain is called the ninth great vow. Vowing to quickly attain Bodhi in the future is called the tenth great vow. Furthermore, volume forty-seven explains that there are ten pure dwelling dharmas in the first ground (Bhumis). Because of this, the extremely joyful dwelling can quickly be purified: First, to deeply generate pure faith in the Buddha's Dharma. Second, to observe sentient beings only with suffering and generate compassion. Third, to vow to liberate sentient beings from suffering and attain happiness, generating loving-kindness. Fourth, to practice generosity to relieve sorrow and suffering. Fifth, to seek worldly and supramundane dharmas for the benefit of sentient beings without weariness. Sixth, because of not being weary, to be good at understanding various treatises. Seventh, because of being good at understanding treatises, to be good at understanding the world. Eighth, to cultivate shame and remorse in such correct conduct. Ninth, to attain non-retrogression in such correct conduct. Tenth, to make offerings to the Tathagata with wonderful benefits and correct conduct. The text also says: Furthermore, after the Bodhisattvas have received, learned, followed, and repeatedly practiced these ten dharmas, they then diligently seek from the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the remaining nine increasing precepts and other Bodhisattva abodes, all kinds of path merits, faults, as well as supernatural powers, happiness, and non-destructive paths, etc. This is to enlighten the remaining nine grounds. The text also says: 'May I see all the Buddhas, may I be born in the Buddha-lands, truthfully according to.'
遂。又以見佛成就有情善根迴向無上菩提。由是三種清凈因緣。彼諸善根倍復明凈名修善根 又云。在在生處多作輪王王贍部洲。得大自在得百法明門等是生處戒等。如彼廣明。
疏。十地云不忘煩惱薪者。忘謂廢忘忘失。煩惱無始相續不絕名為不忘。
論。五極難勝地者。問仁王經頌云。初地菩薩四天王雙照二諦平等理。何此論等唯說五地方合相應 答如燈具明 有義釋云。世智有二。一緣色等諸法自性。二廣分別五明差別。緣色等法無多差別初地真合。緣五明智有多別行。至第五地真俗方合。
疏。前第二識中已有妨難等者。即自第七名為第二。從於本末以為次第。彼我．我所不許俱起。
疏。十地云至有間大智現前住者。由觀緣起智為加行。有時引彼般若無分別智而得現前 間平聲讀。或可去聲。緣起智後方現前故。
疏。十地云報行純熟者。因循任運不待加行而能成之名為報行。如言報性自能是等。
論。十法雲地等者。按十地第十二云。法雲菩薩坐有十相。前五疏具。六成相。行諸法如幻性境界所成故。七第一義相。光明善照一切法界故善照者名為正觀。八功德相。過一切諸天所有境界故。九體相。大琉璃摩尼寶為莖等故。十莊嚴具足相。花身有無量光明。一切眾寶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 遂。又以見到佛的成就，將有情眾生的善根迴向于無上菩提（最高覺悟）。由於這三種清凈的因緣，這些善根更加明凈，名為修善根。又說，在生生世世的地方，多次成為輪王（統治世界的理想君主），統治贍部洲（我們所居住的大陸），獲得大自在，獲得百法明門（通達一切佛法的門徑）等，這些都是生處戒等的內容，如經中所廣為闡明。 疏：十地經中說『不忘煩惱薪』，『忘』是指廢棄、忘記、忘失。煩惱無始以來相續不斷，稱為『不忘』。 論：五極難勝地。問：仁王經的偈頌說，初地菩薩四天王雙照二諦（真諦和俗諦）平等之理，為什麼此論等只說五地才符合相應？答：如同燈具的明亮。有義解釋說，世俗的智慧有兩種：一種是緣於色等諸法的自性，一種是廣泛分別五明（聲明、工巧明、醫方明、因明、內明）的差別。緣於色等法沒有太多差別，初地真正符合。緣於五明智有多種差別行，到第五地真諦和俗諦才真正符合。 疏：前面第二識中已經有妨難等，這裡的『第二』是指第七識，從本末的角度來排列次第。彼我（主體與客體）、我所（屬於我的事物）不被允許同時生起。 疏：十地經中說『至有間大智現前住』，由於觀察緣起智作為加行，有時會引出般若（智慧）的無分別智而得以現前。『間』字讀平聲。或者可以讀去聲。因為緣起智之後才顯現無分別智。 疏：十地經中說『報行純熟』，因循任運，不待額外努力就能成就的，稱為報行。如說報性自然能夠等等。 論：十法雲地等。按十地經第十二說，法雲菩薩坐有十種相。前五種疏中已經具備。第六是成相，行諸法如幻性境界所成。第七是第一義相，光明善照一切法界，善於照見稱為正觀。第八是功德相，超過一切諸天所有的境界。第九是體相，以大琉璃摩尼寶為莖等等。第十是莊嚴具足相，花身有無量光明，一切眾寶。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, by seeing the Buddha's accomplishments, they dedicate the wholesome roots of sentient beings to Anuttara-Bodhi (supreme enlightenment). Due to these three pure causes and conditions, these wholesome roots become even brighter and purer, and are called 'cultivating wholesome roots'. It is also said that in every place of birth, they repeatedly become Chakravartin kings (ideal monarchs ruling the world), ruling Jambudvipa (the continent we inhabit), attaining great freedom, attaining the 'Hundred Dharma Illumination Gates' (pathways to understanding all Buddhist teachings), etc. These are all contents related to the precepts of the place of birth, as extensively explained in the scriptures. Commentary: The Ten Stages Sutra says, 'Not forgetting the fuel of afflictions.' 'Forgetting' refers to abandoning, neglecting, or losing. Afflictions, continuing uninterrupted since beginningless time, are called 'not forgetting'. Treatise: The Fifth, Most Difficult to Conquer Stage. Question: The verse in the Benevolent Kings Sutra says, 'The bodhisattva of the first stage illuminates the two truths (conventional and ultimate) equally with the Four Heavenly Kings.' Why do this treatise and others only say that the five stages are in accordance? Answer: Like the brightness of a lamp. One interpretation says that worldly wisdom is of two kinds: one is based on the self-nature of phenomena such as form, and the other is the broad differentiation of the five sciences (grammar, crafts, medicine, logic, and inner knowledge). There is not much difference in phenomena such as form, so the first stage truly corresponds. There are many different practices based on the wisdom of the five sciences, so the conventional and ultimate truths truly correspond only at the fifth stage. Commentary: In the preceding second consciousness, there are already obstacles and difficulties, etc. Here, 'second' refers to the seventh consciousness, arranged in order from root to branch. The subject and object, and what belongs to me, are not allowed to arise simultaneously. Commentary: The Ten Stages Sutra says, 'Until the great wisdom appears and abides with intervals.' Because of observing the wisdom of dependent origination as an additional practice, sometimes the non-discriminating wisdom of Prajna (wisdom) is drawn out and can appear. The word 'interval' is read with a level tone. Or it can be read with a departing tone. Because non-discriminating wisdom appears only after the wisdom of dependent origination. Commentary: The Ten Stages Sutra says, 'The karmic actions are fully matured.' Following the course of events naturally, without needing extra effort to accomplish, is called karmic action. As it is said, the nature of karmic retribution is naturally capable, etc. Treatise: The Tenth, Dharma Cloud Stage, etc. According to the twelfth chapter of the Ten Stages Sutra, the bodhisattva of the Dharma Cloud Stage has ten characteristics when seated. The first five are already included in the commentary. The sixth is the characteristic of accomplishment, practicing all dharmas as accomplished by the illusory nature of reality. The seventh is the characteristic of ultimate meaning, the light shines brightly on all realms of reality, being good at seeing is called right view. The eighth is the characteristic of merit, surpassing all the realms of all the gods. The ninth is the characteristic of essence, with great lapis lazuli mani jewels as stems, etc. The tenth is the characteristic of complete adornment, the flower body has immeasurable light, all kinds of precious jewels.
間飾其內。無量寶網彌覆其上故。
論。如是十地等者。明此地體諸論不同。按十住毗婆沙云。善根階級住處是地義。此同攝論以智為體。以無為法無階級故。又梁攝論唯說出離真如為地。如為法本故偏說之。又佛地論第一說云。地謂所依．所行。所攝。以凈法界鏡智等法合為地也。如次名為所依．行．攝。鏡智慧有所行名有所行。智相應法是佛所攝名為所攝。瑜伽等說如疏所引。望義不同諸教不違 有義彈疏釋地義云說別實法與總假者名之為地。今解不然。論自說云與所修行為勝依持。令得生長其所修行定非假者。不可假者別從實生故。但應說有為．無為總聚之法。與所修行別法為依為生長因名為地也 詳曰。若但云地不對於人可如所斷。若對於人云菩薩地。菩薩之號豈非目彼假者體耶。若許爾者與假為地何理不得。又本立地祇約行人階位差別。若不對人何須立地。又人無別攬法成人。所修之行亦即總分。廢總談別云與修行為依生因。又與修行為勝依等。正釋與假為地所以。又諸菩薩殊勝五蘊。遠因實法而得生起何過不許。故四十七云。由能攝持菩薩義故名地正同此論。于菩薩行能攝故。故與菩薩而為地也。
疏。能為受用居處義故名住者。菩薩受用二利行時。所居處義說之為住。
疏。此約果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：內部裝飾著各種珍寶。上方覆蓋著無量的寶網。
論：像這樣'十地'等等，說明了對於'地'的本體，各種論典有不同的說法。按照《十住毗婆沙論》所說，善根的階級和住處就是'地'的含義。這與《攝大乘論》相同，都以智慧為本體。因為無為法沒有階級。另外，《梁攝大乘論》只說出離真如為'地'，因為真如是法的根本，所以偏重說明它。還有，《佛地論》第一卷說，'地'是指所依、所行、所攝。以清凈法界、鏡智等法合起來作為'地'。依次名為所依、所行、所攝。鏡智慧夠有所行，名為有所行。與智慧相應的法是佛所攝，名為所攝。《瑜伽師地論》等所說如同疏文所引用。因為期望的意義不同，所以各種教義並不相違背。有人反駁疏文解釋'地'的含義，說把個別的實法和總體的假法稱為'地'。現在解釋並非如此。《攝大乘論》自己說，'地'是對於所修行的行為殊勝的依持，使之能夠生長，那麼所修行的行為一定不是假法。不可能假法能夠從實法中產生。所以應該說有為法和無為法總聚之法，對於所修行的別法作為依止和生長的原因，稱為'地'。詳細地說，如果只是說'地'，不對應於人，可以如所說的那樣理解。如果對應於人，說'菩薩地'，那麼'菩薩'這個稱號難道不是指代那個假法之體嗎？如果允許這樣說，那麼以假法作為'地'，有什麼道理不可以呢？而且本來建立'地'，只是爲了區分行人的階位差別。如果不對應於人，何必建立'地'呢？而且人沒有另外攝取法來成就人。所修行的行為也就是總體和部分。廢棄總體而談論個別，說對於修行行為是依止和生長的原因。而且對於修行行為是殊勝的依止等等，正是解釋以假法作為'地'的原因。而且諸菩薩殊勝的五蘊，從遙遠的實法作為原因而得以生起，有什麼不可以允許的呢？所以《四十七論》說，由於能夠攝持菩薩的意義，所以稱為'地'，這與此論相同。對於菩薩的修行能夠攝持，所以對於菩薩來說就是'地'。
疏：能夠作為受用和居處的意義，所以稱為'住'。菩薩受用二利（自利利他）行的時候，所居處的意義就說為'住'。
疏：這是就果位而言。
【English Translation】 English version: Its interior is adorned with various treasures. Above it is covered with immeasurable jeweled nets.
Commentary: 'Such as the Ten Grounds (Dasa-bhumi)' and so on, explains that various treatises have different views on the substance of 'ground' (bhumi). According to the Dasabhumika-vibhāṣā, the stages and abodes of wholesome roots are the meaning of 'ground'. This is the same as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which takes wisdom as its substance, because conditioned dharmas do not have stages. Furthermore, the Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha only speaks of liberation from Suchness (Tathata) as 'ground', because Suchness is the root of dharma, so it is emphasized. Also, the first chapter of the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that 'ground' refers to that which is relied upon, that which is practiced, and that which is gathered. The pure dharma realm, mirror wisdom (adarsha-jnana), and other dharmas are combined to form the 'ground'. They are respectively called that which is relied upon, that which is practiced, and that which is gathered. Mirror wisdom can have something to be practiced, so it is called having something to be practiced. Dharmas corresponding to wisdom are gathered by the Buddha, so they are called that which is gathered. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others say as quoted in the commentary. Because the meanings expected are different, the various teachings do not contradict each other. Someone refutes the commentary's explanation of the meaning of 'ground', saying that calling individual real dharmas and collective provisional dharmas 'ground'. Now the explanation is not like this. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha itself says that 'ground' is a superior support for the practices that are cultivated, enabling them to grow. Then the practices that are cultivated must not be provisional dharmas. It is impossible for provisional dharmas to arise from real dharmas. Therefore, it should be said that the collective dharmas of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, for the individual dharmas that are cultivated, serve as the cause of reliance and growth, and are called 'ground'. In detail, if it is only said 'ground', not corresponding to a person, it can be understood as said. If corresponding to a person, saying 'Bodhisattva Ground', then doesn't the title 'Bodhisattva' refer to that provisional dharma body? If it is allowed to say so, then what reason is there to say that taking provisional dharmas as 'ground' is not allowed? Moreover, the establishment of 'ground' is only to distinguish the differences in the stages of practitioners. If it does not correspond to a person, why establish 'ground'? Moreover, a person does not separately grasp dharmas to become a person. The practices that are cultivated are also the whole and the parts. Abandoning the whole and discussing the individual, saying that for the practice, it is the cause of reliance and growth. Moreover, for the practice, it is a superior reliance, etc., which is precisely the explanation of taking provisional dharmas as 'ground'. Moreover, the superior five aggregates of the Bodhisattvas arise from distant real dharmas as the cause, what is wrong with not allowing it? Therefore, the Forty-Seven Treatises says that because it can gather and hold the meaning of Bodhisattva, it is called 'ground', which is the same as this treatise. For the practice of Bodhisattvas, it can gather and hold, so for Bodhisattvas, it is 'ground'.
Commentary: Being able to serve as the meaning of enjoyment and dwelling, therefore it is called 'abode' (vasa). When Bodhisattvas enjoy the practice of the two benefits (self-benefit and benefiting others), the meaning of the place where they dwell is called 'abode'.
Commentary: This is in terms of the fruition.
與因者。以果與因而為地也。由所求果方起行故。即隨自地理智二極皆名為果。非唯佛果。
論。施有三等者。按瑜伽論三十九云。財施者。謂以上妙清凈如法財物而行惠施。調伏慳吝垢而行惠施。調伏積藏垢而行惠施。無畏施者。謂濟拔師子虎狼鬼魅等畏。拔濟王賊等畏。拔濟水火等畏。法施者。謂無倒說法稱理說法勸修學處。如是一切總說九相。
論戒有三種等者。按瑜伽論四十云。謂諸菩薩所受七眾別解脫律儀。依止在家．出家二分名菩薩律戒。謂諸菩薩受律儀戒后。所有一切為大菩提。由身．語．意積集諸善。總說名為攝善法戒。謂諸菩薩于諸有情能引義利。彼彼事業與作助伴等名饒益有情戒 問瑜伽自云。三戒同受。復云何言受律儀后所有諸善方名攝善 答理實同受。顯后所起亦攝善攝。若不言者恐疑後起非戒攝。故顯律儀是余戒本致先後言。實同受也 問云何善住善護律儀 答按瑜伽云。成就十支名善住護。謂不顧戀過去諸欲。又不希求未來諸欲。又不耽著現在諸欲。又樂遠離不生喜足。又能掃滌不正言論諸惡尋．伺。又能於己不自輕蔑。又性柔和。又能堪忍。又不放逸。又能具足軌則凈命 問云何善住善護攝善 答即彼論云。由十種相名住攝善速能攝善一切種相。謂即施等十波羅密多 問
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『與因』是指，以『果』作為『因』的基礎。因為只有期望獲得『果』，才會開始修行。也就是說，根據自身所處的修行階段和智慧程度，都可以稱為『果』，而不僅僅是指佛果（Buddha-phala）。
論：佈施有三種等級。根據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第三十九卷所說：『財施』是指以殊勝、清凈、如法的財物進行佈施，調伏慳吝的垢染而進行佈施，調伏積藏的垢染而進行佈施。『無畏施』是指救濟眾生脫離獅子、老虎、豺狼、鬼魅等的恐懼，救濟眾生脫離國王、盜賊等的恐懼，救濟眾生脫離水災、火災等的恐懼。『法施』是指如實無誤地宣說佛法，契合真理地宣說佛法，勸導眾生修習學處。以上總共可以歸納為九種形態。
論：戒律有三種等等。根據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第四十卷所說：菩薩所受持的比丘、比丘尼等七眾的別解脫律儀（Pratimoksha），依據在家和出家兩種身份，稱為菩薩律戒。菩薩受持律儀戒后，所有一切爲了大菩提（Mahabodhi），通過身、語、意積累的各種善行，總稱為攝善法戒。菩薩對於一切有情（Sattva）能夠引導利益，對於他們的事業給予幫助等，稱為饒益有情戒。問：瑜伽師地論自己說，三種戒是同時受持的，又為什麼說受持律儀戒后所有諸善才稱為攝善呢？答：道理上確實是同時受持的，這裡是爲了顯示後來所產生的善行也屬於攝善。如果不這樣說，恐怕會有人懷疑後來產生的善行不屬於戒律所攝，所以才要說明律儀戒是其餘戒律的根本，因此才有了先後的說法，實際上是同時受持的。問：如何才能善於安住和守護律儀呢？答：根據瑜伽師地論所說，成就十種條件才能稱為善於安住和守護。這十種條件是：不顧戀過去諸欲，不希求未來諸欲，不耽著現在諸欲，樂於遠離而不生喜足，能夠掃除不正言論的各種惡尋和惡伺，不輕視自己，性格柔和，能夠堪忍，不放逸，能夠具足軌則和清凈的活命方式。問：如何才能善於安住和守護攝善法戒呢？答：瑜伽師地論說，通過十種相，可以稱為安住攝善，迅速能夠攝善一切種相，這十種相就是佈施等十波羅蜜多（Paramita）。問：
【English Translation】 English version 'With cause' means using 'fruit' as the foundation for 'cause'. Because only by desiring to obtain 'fruit' will one begin to practice. That is to say, according to one's own stage of practice and level of wisdom, one can be called 'fruit', not just the Buddha-phala (Buddha-phala).
Treatise: There are three levels of giving. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra), Volume 39: 'Material giving' refers to giving with excellent, pure, and lawful wealth, giving by subduing the defilement of stinginess, and giving by subduing the defilement of accumulation. 'Fearless giving' refers to rescuing beings from the fear of lions, tigers, wolves, ghosts, etc., rescuing beings from the fear of kings, thieves, etc., and rescuing beings from the fear of floods, fires, etc. 'Dharma giving' refers to accurately and correctly expounding the Dharma, expounding the Dharma in accordance with the truth, and encouraging beings to practice the precepts. The above can be summarized into nine forms.
Treatise: There are three types of precepts, etc. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra), Volume 40: The Pratimoksha (Pratimoksha) of the seven assemblies of Bhikshus, Bhikshunis, etc., upheld by Bodhisattvas, based on the two statuses of householders and renunciants, is called the Bodhisattva precepts. After a Bodhisattva upholds the precepts, all actions done for the sake of Mahabodhi (Mahabodhi), through the accumulation of various good deeds by body, speech, and mind, are collectively called the precepts of gathering good dharmas. When a Bodhisattva is able to guide sentient beings (Sattva) to benefit them, and provides assistance to their endeavors, etc., this is called the precepts of benefiting sentient beings. Question: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra itself says that the three precepts are upheld simultaneously, so why does it say that all good deeds after upholding the precepts are called the precepts of gathering good dharmas? Answer: In principle, they are indeed upheld simultaneously, but this is to show that the good deeds that arise later also belong to the precepts of gathering good dharmas. If this were not said, it might be suspected that the good deeds that arise later do not belong to the precepts, so it is necessary to explain that the Pratimoksha is the root of the other precepts, hence the sequential statement, but in reality, they are upheld simultaneously. Question: How can one dwell well and protect the precepts well? Answer: According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, achieving ten conditions is called dwelling well and protecting well. These ten conditions are: not being attached to past desires, not desiring future desires, not being attached to present desires, being happy to be apart from desires and not being content with joy, being able to sweep away various evil thoughts and evil intentions of improper speech, not looking down on oneself, being gentle in nature, being able to endure, not being lax, and being able to have proper conduct and a pure way of life. Question: How can one dwell well and protect the precepts of gathering good dharmas? Answer: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that through ten aspects, one can be called dwelling in the gathering of good dharmas, and quickly being able to gather all aspects of good dharmas, and these ten aspects are the ten Paramitas (Paramita) such as giving. Question:
云何善住善護饒益有情戒耶 答即彼論云。由十一相名住饒益有情戒 謂諸菩薩于諸有情。彼彼事業皆為助伴 又諸菩薩為國有情。如理宣說令斷諸惡 又諸菩薩于其有恩諸有情所。深知恩惠常思酬報 又諸菩薩于遭怖畏諸有情類能為救護 又諸菩薩于處衰惱諸有情類。能善開解令離愁憂 又諸菩薩備資生具。隨有來求即皆施與 又諸菩薩性好攝受諸有情類。如法御眾方便饒益。以無深心先與依止。以憐愍心現作饒益 又諸菩薩于有情心性好隨轉。先知體性方隨彼轉。為隨彼心而令惡止善法得生 又諸菩薩性好讚揚真實功德令他歡喜 又諸菩薩性好悲愍。以調伏法調伏有情 又諸菩薩為欲饒益諸有情故。現神通力說是名菩薩三種戒藏。亦名無量大功德藏。如彼廣說。
論。忍有三種等者。按瑜伽論第四十二說三相云。云何菩薩耐他怨害忍。謂諸菩薩猛利無間種種長時。從他怨害所生。眾苦現在前時。應如是學。如此是我自業過耳。由我先世自造種種不凈業故。今受如是種種苦果。我今於此無義利苦若不忍者。復為當來大苦因處。又自他身皆苦為體。彼無知故於我苦體更增其苦。我既有知何宜加苦。又聲聞人修自利行不生他苦。況我為他而生不忍。云何安受苦忍。謂諸菩薩應如是學。我從昔來依欲行轉常求諸欲。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 什麼是善於安住、善於守護、饒益有情之戒呢？回答是，就像那部論典所說：通過十一種相，可以稱為安住饒益有情戒。這十一種相是：菩薩對於各種有情，在他們各自的事業中都成為助伴；菩薩爲了國家中的有情，如理宣說佛法，使他們斷除各種惡行；菩薩對於那些對自己有恩的有情，深深地知道他們的恩惠，常常想著報答；菩薩對於遭遇怖畏的各種有情，能夠為他們提供救護；菩薩對於處於衰敗困惱的各種有情，能夠善巧地開導他們，使他們遠離憂愁；菩薩準備好生活所需的物資，無論誰來請求，都全部施與；菩薩天性喜歡攝受各種有情，如法地管理大眾，方便地饒益他們，不懷有任何自私的想法，先給予依靠，以憐憫之心實際地進行饒益；菩薩對於有情的心性，善於隨順轉變，先了解他們的體性，然後隨順他們的心意轉變，爲了隨順他們的心意，從而使他們停止作惡，生起善法；菩薩天性喜歡讚揚真實的功德，使他人感到歡喜；菩薩天性喜歡悲憫，用調伏的方法來調伏有情；菩薩爲了饒益各種有情，示現神通力。這被稱為菩薩的三種戒藏，也稱為無量大功德藏，就像那部論典中廣泛敘述的那樣。
論典中說，忍有三種等等。按照《瑜伽師地論》第四十二卷所說，忍有三種相：什麼是菩薩忍耐他人怨恨損害的忍？是指菩薩在猛烈、持續不斷、長時間地受到他人怨恨損害所產生的各種痛苦時，應當這樣學習：『這些都是我自己的業報啊！由於我前世自己造作了各種不凈的業，所以今生才承受這樣各種痛苦的果報。我現在對於這種沒有意義的痛苦如果不忍耐，就會成為將來更大痛苦的原因。』而且，自己和他人的身體都是以痛苦為本體的。那些人因為無知，所以在我的痛苦之體上又增加了痛苦。我既然有知，怎麼可以再增加痛苦呢？而且，聲聞人修習自利的行為，尚且不讓他人產生痛苦，更何況我是爲了利益他人，怎麼能生起不忍之心呢？什麼叫做安受苦忍？是指菩薩應當這樣學習：『我從過去以來，依隨著慾望而行動，常常追求各種慾望。
【English Translation】 English version: What is the precept of dwelling well, protecting well, and benefiting sentient beings? The answer is, as that treatise says: It is called the precept of dwelling in benefiting sentient beings through eleven aspects. These eleven aspects are: Bodhisattvas become companions to various sentient beings in their respective endeavors; Bodhisattvas, for the sentient beings in their country, righteously proclaim the Dharma, causing them to cease all evil deeds; Bodhisattvas, towards those sentient beings who have been kind to them, deeply know their kindness and constantly think of repaying them; Bodhisattvas, for various sentient beings who encounter fear, are able to provide protection; Bodhisattvas, for various sentient beings who are in decline and distress, are able to skillfully guide them, causing them to be free from sorrow; Bodhisattvas prepare the necessities of life, and give them all to whoever comes to ask; Bodhisattvas are by nature fond of gathering various sentient beings, managing the masses according to the Dharma, conveniently benefiting them, without any selfish thoughts, first giving them reliance, and actually benefiting them with a compassionate heart; Bodhisattvas are good at adapting to the minds of sentient beings, first understanding their nature, and then adapting to their minds, in order to comply with their minds, thereby causing them to stop doing evil and generate good deeds; Bodhisattvas are by nature fond of praising true merits, making others happy; Bodhisattvas are by nature fond of compassion, using methods of taming to tame sentient beings; Bodhisattvas, in order to benefit various sentient beings, manifest supernatural powers. This is called the three precept treasuries of Bodhisattvas, also called the immeasurable treasury of great merit, as widely described in that treatise.
The treatise says that there are three types of forbearance, etc. According to the forty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), there are three aspects of forbearance: What is the Bodhisattva's forbearance of enduring the hatred and harm of others? It refers to when a Bodhisattva experiences various sufferings arising from the fierce, continuous, and prolonged hatred and harm of others, they should learn in this way: 'These are all my own karmic retributions! Because I myself created various impure deeds in my past lives, I am now enduring such various painful consequences. If I do not endure this meaningless suffering now, it will become the cause of even greater suffering in the future.' Moreover, both one's own body and the bodies of others are fundamentally based on suffering. Those people, because of their ignorance, are adding to the suffering of my suffering body. Since I have knowledge, how can I add to the suffering? Furthermore, Sravakas (Hearers) cultivate self-benefit without causing suffering to others, how much more so should I, who am acting for the benefit of others, not give rise to intolerance? What is called the forbearance of accepting suffering? It refers to when a Bodhisattva should learn in this way: 'Since the past, I have acted according to desires, constantly seeking various desires.'
如是追求無義苦時。令我具受種種大苦。皆由無智思擇過失。我今為求能引安樂最勝善品尚應思擇。忍受百千俱胝大苦。況少少苦而不忍受。如是如是正思惟故。為求菩提悉能忍受一切事苦。云何菩薩法思勝解忍。謂諸菩薩於一切法能正思擇。由善觀察勝覺惠故。能於八種生勝解處善安勝解。一三寶功德處。二真實義處。三諸佛菩薩大神力處。四因處。五果處。六應得義處。七自於彼義得方便處。八一切所知所應行處。
論。精進三種等者。按瑜伽第四十二顯彼相云。云何菩薩擐甲精進。謂諸菩薩于發加行精進之前。其心勇悍先擐誓甲。若我為脫一有情苦。以千大劫等一日夜。處那落迦不在余趣。乃至菩薩經爾所時證得菩提。假使過此百千俱胝倍數時劫方證菩提。我之勇悍亦無退屈。云何菩薩攝善精進。謂諸菩薩所有精進。能為施等諸度加行成辨施等。又由此精進是能修證。能成菩提一切善法最勝因緣。余則不爾。是故如來以種種門。稱讚精進能證菩提。云何菩薩饒益有情精進。謂此精進有十一種。如戒品說。彼說尸羅此說精進。如前已引。
論。靜慮三等者。按瑜伽四十三。謂此靜慮略有二種。一者世間。二出世間。當知此二隨其所應 復有三種。一者若諸菩薩所有靜慮遠離一切分別。能生身心輕安。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果這樣追求毫無意義的痛苦，讓我完全承受各種巨大的痛苦，都是由於沒有智慧去思考辨別過失。我現在爲了尋求能夠帶來安樂的最殊勝的善行，尚且應該思考辨別，忍受成百上千俱胝的大苦，更何況是少許的痛苦而不能忍受呢？像這樣反覆地正確思維，爲了尋求菩提，完全能夠忍受一切事情的痛苦。什麼是菩薩對法的思維所產生的殊勝理解和忍耐呢？就是說，諸位菩薩對於一切法能夠正確地思考辨別，由於善於觀察的殊勝智慧，能夠在八種產生殊勝理解的地方，很好地安住殊勝的理解。一是三寶（佛、法、僧）的功德之處，二是真實義之處，三是諸佛菩薩的大神力之處，四是因之處，五是果之處，六是應得的意義之處，七是自己對於那個意義獲得方便之處，八是一切所知所應該行之處。
論：精進三種等者。按照《瑜伽師地論》第四十二卷所顯示的那樣，菩薩的精進有三種相。什麼是菩薩的擐甲精進（huan jia jing jin）呢？就是說，諸位菩薩在發起加行精進之前，內心勇猛剛強，先穿上誓言的盔甲，『如果我爲了解脫一個有情眾生的痛苦，用一千大劫的時間，像一日一夜一樣，處在那落迦（naraka，地獄）之中，不在其他的趣道，乃至菩薩經過那麼長的時間才證得菩提。假使超過這個時間成百上千俱胝倍數的時間才證得菩提，我的勇猛剛強也不會退縮。』什麼是菩薩的攝善精進（she shan jing jin）呢？就是說，諸位菩薩所有的精進，能夠爲了佈施等等的諸度加行，成就辨別佈施等等。又由此精進是能夠修證，能夠成就菩提的一切善法最殊勝的因緣，其他的則不是這樣。所以如來用種種方法，稱讚精進能夠證得菩提。什麼是菩薩的饒益有情精進（rao yi you qing jing jin）呢？就是說，這種精進有十一種，如戒品所說。那裡說的是尸羅（shila，戒律），這裡說的是精進，如前面已經引用。
論：靜慮三等者。按照《瑜伽師地論》第四十三卷所說，這種靜慮（dhyana，禪定）大致有兩種，一是世間的，二是出世間的。應當知道這兩種靜慮根據它們各自的情況，又有三種。一是如果諸位菩薩所有的靜慮遠離一切分別，能夠產生身心的輕安。
【English Translation】 English version: If thus pursuing meaningless suffering, causing me to fully endure all kinds of great suffering, all are due to the lack of wisdom to contemplate and discern faults. Now, for the sake of seeking the most supreme good that can bring happiness, I should still contemplate and discern, enduring hundreds of thousands of kotis of great suffering, let alone a little suffering that I cannot endure? Like this, repeatedly and correctly contemplating, for the sake of seeking Bodhi (enlightenment), I am fully able to endure all the suffering of all things. What is the superior understanding and forbearance that a Bodhisattva (enlightened being) has towards the Dharma (teachings)? It means that all Bodhisattvas are able to correctly contemplate and discern all Dharmas, and due to the superior wisdom of good observation, they are able to well abide in superior understanding in eight places where superior understanding arises: first, the place of the merits of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha); second, the place of the true meaning; third, the place of the great spiritual power of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; fourth, the place of cause; fifth, the place of effect; sixth, the place of the meaning to be attained; seventh, the place of the means to attain that meaning oneself; eighth, the place of all that should be known and all that should be practiced.
Treatise: 'The three kinds of diligence, etc.' According to the forty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the aspects of a Bodhisattva's diligence are shown as follows: What is a Bodhisattva's 'armored diligence' (huan jia jing jin)? It means that before initiating the diligence of exertion, the minds of all Bodhisattvas are courageous and fierce, first donning the armor of vows: 'If I were to liberate the suffering of one sentient being, spending a thousand great kalpas (aeons), like a day and night, dwelling in Naraka (hell), not in other realms, until the Bodhisattva attains Bodhi after such a long time. Even if it takes hundreds of thousands of kotis of times longer to attain Bodhi, my courage and fierceness will not diminish.' What is a Bodhisattva's 'gathering good diligence' (she shan jing jin)? It means that all the diligence of all Bodhisattvas is able to accomplish and discern giving, etc., for the sake of the exertion of the perfections of giving, etc. Moreover, this diligence is able to cultivate and realize, and is the most supreme cause and condition for all good Dharmas that can accomplish Bodhi; others are not like this. Therefore, the Tathagata (Buddha) praises in various ways that diligence can attain Bodhi. What is a Bodhisattva's 'benefiting sentient beings diligence' (rao yi you qing jing jin)? It means that this diligence has eleven kinds, as stated in the chapter on precepts. There, it speaks of shila (precepts), here, it speaks of diligence, as previously cited.
Treatise: 'The three kinds of dhyana, etc.' According to the forty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, this dhyana (meditation) roughly has two kinds: one is worldly, and the other is supramundane. It should be known that these two kinds of dhyana, according to their respective situations, also have three kinds. One is that if all Bodhisattvas' dhyana is free from all discriminations, it can generate ease of body and mind.
最極寂靜遠離憍舉。離諸愛味泯一切相。當知是名菩薩現法樂住靜慮 二者若諸菩薩所有靜慮。能引能住種種殊勝不可思議所有功德。當知是名能引菩薩等持功德靜慮 三者饒益有情靜慮有十一種。如戒度引 又對法論第十二云。御眾業任持者。謂依止內證。故教授教戒所化有情。心未定者令其心定心。已定者令其解脫。由饒益有情靜慮所任持故。
論。般若有三種者。按瑜伽論四十三云。惠有二種。一者世間。二出世間 此二略說復有三種。一者若諸菩薩于離言說法無我性。或於真諦。將欲覺寤。或於真諦正覺寤時。或於真諦覺寤已后。所有妙惠最勝寂靜明瞭現前無有分別離諸戲論。於一切法修平等性。入大總相究達一切所知邊際。遠離二邊順入中道。是名菩薩能于所知真實隨覺通達惠 二者若諸菩薩於五明處。及於三聚決定善巧。謂于能引義利法聚。能引非義利法聚。能引非義利非非義利法聚。皆如實知。於是八處所有妙惠善巧攝受。能速圓滿廣大資糧速證菩提。是名菩薩能於五明處。及三聚中決定善巧惠 三者能作一切有情義利惠有十一種。如前已具。
論。方便善巧等者。按無性釋云。若以前六波羅密多所集善根。共諸有情為欲饒益諸有情故不捨有情。當知即是不捨生死苦。以此善回求無上正等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：最極寂靜遠離憍舉（遠離驕慢和炫耀）。離諸愛味（脫離各種貪愛和執著），泯一切相（超越一切表象）。應當知道，這被稱為菩薩現法樂住靜慮（菩薩體驗當下快樂的禪定狀態）。 二者，如果諸位菩薩所擁有的靜慮（禪定），能夠引導和保持種種殊勝不可思議的功德，應當知道，這被稱為能引導菩薩等持功德靜慮（能引導菩薩獲得三摩地功德的禪定）。 三者，饒益有情靜慮（利益眾生的禪定）有十一種，如同戒度（持戒）所引導的那樣。 又，《對法論》第十二卷說：『御眾業任持者（管理大眾事務的承擔者），指的是依止內在的證悟，因此教授和教誡那些可以被教化的眾生，使那些心未定的眾生安定下來，使那些心已定的眾生得到解脫，這是由於饒益有情靜慮（利益眾生的禪定）所承擔的緣故。』
論：般若（智慧）有三種。按照《瑜伽師地論》第四十三卷所說，智慧有兩種：一是世間智慧，二是出世間智慧。 這兩種智慧簡略來說又有三種：一是如果諸位菩薩對於離言說法（超越語言的真理）、無我性（沒有自我的本性），或者對於真諦（真實的道理），將要覺悟，或者對於真諦正在覺悟，或者對於真諦覺悟之後，所擁有的妙慧（卓越的智慧）是最殊勝、寂靜、明瞭、現前、沒有分別、遠離各種戲論（虛妄的言論），對於一切法修習平等性（平等對待一切事物），進入大總相（整體的認知），徹底瞭解一切所知的邊際，遠離兩種極端，順應進入中道（不偏不倚的道路），這被稱為菩薩能夠對於所知的真實隨覺通達惠（菩薩能夠隨著覺悟而通達真實的智慧）。 二是如果諸位菩薩對於五明處（五種學問，即聲明、工巧明、醫方明、因明、內明），以及對於三聚（三種集合，即能引義利法聚、能引非義利法聚、能引非義利非非義利法聚）決定善巧（確定而熟練），也就是對於能夠引導利益的法、能夠引導非利益的法、能夠引導非利益也非非利益的法，都如實地瞭解。對於這八個方面所擁有的妙慧（卓越的智慧）善巧攝受（巧妙地掌握），能夠迅速圓滿廣大的資糧（修行的準備），迅速證得菩提（覺悟）。這被稱為菩薩能夠對於五明處（五種學問）以及三聚（三種集合）中決定善巧惠（確定而熟練的智慧）。 三是能夠為一切有情（眾生）帶來利益的智慧有十一種，如同前面已經詳細說明的那樣。
論：方便善巧等。按照無性釋的解釋，如果以前面的六波羅蜜多（佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧）所積累的善根，與諸位有情（眾生）共同分享，爲了利益諸位有情（眾生）而不捨棄有情（眾生），應當知道這就是不捨棄生死之苦。用這種善行迴向求取無上正等（無上正等正覺）。
【English Translation】 English version: Utmost perfect tranquility, far removed from pride and boasting. Separated from all cravings and attachments, transcending all appearances. Know that this is called the Bodhisattva's present-moment blissful abiding in meditative concentration (dhyana). Secondly, if the meditative concentration (dhyana) possessed by Bodhisattvas can lead to and maintain various supreme and inconceivable merits, know that this is called the meditative concentration (dhyana) that leads to the Bodhisattva's samadhi merits. Thirdly, the meditative concentration (dhyana) that benefits sentient beings has eleven aspects, just as guided by the discipline (sila). Furthermore, the twelfth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya states: 'The one who manages the affairs of the assembly and upholds them refers to relying on inner realization. Therefore, they teach and instruct those sentient beings who can be taught, stabilizing the minds of those whose minds are not yet stable, and liberating those whose minds are already stable, because it is upheld by the meditative concentration (dhyana) that benefits sentient beings.'
Treatise: Prajna (wisdom) has three types. According to the forty-third chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, wisdom has two types: one is worldly wisdom, and the other is supramundane wisdom. These two types can be briefly summarized into three: Firstly, if Bodhisattvas are about to awaken to the truth beyond words, the nature of no-self (anatman), or the ultimate truth (paramartha), or are awakening to the ultimate truth, or after awakening to the ultimate truth, the wonderful wisdom (prajna) they possess is the most supreme, tranquil, clear, present, without discrimination, free from all fabrications (prapancha), cultivating equanimity towards all dharmas, entering the great totality, thoroughly understanding the limits of all that is knowable, and avoiding the two extremes, entering the Middle Way, this is called the Bodhisattva's ability to perceive and understand the truth of what is knowable through wisdom (prajna). Secondly, if Bodhisattvas are decisive and skillful in the five sciences (Panca-vidya: Sabdavidya (grammar), Silpasthanavidya (arts and crafts), Cikitsavidya (medicine), Hetuvidya (logic), Adhyatmavidya (spirituality)) and the three aggregates (Trini Samgrahavastuni: those that lead to benefit, those that lead to non-benefit, and those that lead to neither benefit nor non-benefit), that is, they truly understand the dharmas that can lead to benefit, the dharmas that can lead to non-benefit, and the dharmas that can lead to neither benefit nor non-benefit. The wonderful wisdom (prajna) possessed in these eight aspects is skillfully grasped, enabling the swift completion of vast accumulations (of merit) and the swift attainment of Bodhi (enlightenment). This is called the Bodhisattva's ability to be decisive and skillful in the five sciences and the three aggregates through wisdom (prajna). Thirdly, the wisdom that can bring benefit to all sentient beings has eleven aspects, as previously explained in detail.
Treatise: Skillful means and so on. According to the commentary by Asanga, if the roots of goodness accumulated through the previous six paramitas (perfections: generosity, discipline, patience, diligence, concentration, and wisdom) are shared with all sentient beings, and one does not abandon sentient beings for the sake of benefiting them, know that this is not abandoning the suffering of samsara (cycle of rebirth). With this good deed, one dedicates it to seeking the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment (anuttara-samyak-sambodhi).
菩提。為證佛菩提故。當知即是希求涅槃。疏引略也。當依此知 又對法十四有四善巧。一成就有情善巧。謂四攝法。由攝受彼令處善巧。二圓滿佛法善巧。謂惠波羅密。三速證通惠善巧。謂日夜六時發露諸惡隨喜功德勸請諸佛迴向善根。四道無斷善巧。謂無住涅槃。由此數數究竟無斷。周遍十方一切世界。隨所應化示現一切佛菩薩行。
論。力有二種者。有云思擇思惠。修習修惠。若爾後得何有思惠。唯無漏故 答有正思惟名思何失。
論。戒以受學等為體等者。又按文殊問經具明其相。今略引之。若以心分別人非人等男女非男女等。若受出世間菩薩戒而不起慈悲心。若他物起盜想。若起妄語心。並犯波羅夷。若以身．口行不堪得三乘。又若樹葉皮汁以心欲取。若起歌舞作樂花香瓔珞想。若起高廣大床想。若起捉金銀珍寶想。並是菩薩僧伽婆尸沙。若以身．口行不堪得三乘。又若剃身毛。若翦爪如初月形。若起此想。若起斬斫草木想。若起毀他名譽等想並犯偷蘭遮。若以身．口行不堪得三乘。又若佛法僧物花香衣寶以腳踐踏。若佛塔若佛所行處。及菩提樹轉法輪處以腳踐踏。並犯波逸提。若不信者不堪得三乘。又若吐舌動眼毀諸威儀。起犯此想者犯突吉羅。若以身．口行不堪得三乘。又若見他物他樂種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 菩提（bodhi，覺悟）。爲了證得佛菩提（Buddha-bodhi，佛的覺悟），應當知道這就是希求涅槃（nirvana，寂滅）。（這是）疏文的簡略引述。應當依據這個來理解。此外，《對法》（Abhidharma）第十四卷有四種善巧：一是成就有情善巧，即四攝法（catuh-samgraha-vastu，佈施、愛語、利行、同事）。通過攝受他們，使他們處於善巧之中。二是圓滿佛法善巧，即慧波羅蜜（prajna-paramita，智慧到彼岸）。三是迅速證得通慧善巧，即日夜六時發露各種惡行，隨喜功德，勸請諸佛，迴向善根。四是道無斷善巧，即無住涅槃（apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa，不住于生死和涅槃的境界）。因此，（菩薩）數數究竟無斷，周遍十方一切世界，隨所應化，示現一切佛菩薩的行跡。
論：『力有二種』，有人說是思擇思慧，修習修慧。如果這樣，后得智（prsthalabdha-jnana，證悟后獲得的智慧）怎麼會有思慧呢？因為唯有無漏（anasrava，沒有煩惱）的緣故。回答：有正思惟，名為思慧，有什麼過失呢？
論：『戒以受學等為體』等等。又按照《文殊問經》詳細說明了它的相狀，現在簡略地引用它。如果用心分別人與非人等，男人與非男人等；如果受了出世間的菩薩戒（bodhisattva-sila，菩薩的戒律）而不生起慈悲心；如果對他人財物生起盜竊的想法；如果生起妄語的心，都犯波羅夷（parajika，斷頭罪）。如果以身、口的行為不堪獲得三乘（triyana，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的果位。又如果對樹葉、樹皮、樹汁，以心想要拿取；如果生起歌舞作樂、花香瓔珞的想法；如果生起高廣大床的想法；如果生起拿取金銀珍寶的想法，都是菩薩僧伽婆尸沙（samghavasesa，僧殘罪）。如果以身、口的行為不堪獲得三乘的果位。又如果剃除身毛；如果修剪指甲成新月形；如果生起這樣的想法；如果生起斬斷砍伐草木的想法；如果生起毀壞他人名譽等的想法，都犯偷蘭遮（stulatyaya，粗罪）。如果以身、口的行為不堪獲得三乘的果位。又如果佛法僧的物品、花香衣寶，用腳踐踏；如果佛塔，如果佛所行之處，以及菩提樹（bodhi-vrksa，覺悟之樹）和轉法輪之處，用腳踐踏，都犯波逸提（pacittiya，單墮罪）。如果不信者，不堪獲得三乘的果位。又如果吐舌頭、動眼睛，毀壞各種威儀，生起犯此罪的想法，就犯突吉羅（duskrita，惡作罪）。如果以身、口的行為不堪獲得三乘的果位。又如果見到他人財物，他人快樂的種子
【English Translation】 English version: Bodhi (awakening). For the sake of attaining Buddha-bodhi (Buddha's awakening), it should be known that this is precisely seeking nirvana (cessation). This is a brief quote from the commentary. One should understand based on this. Furthermore, the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharma has four skillful means: first, the skillful means of accomplishing sentient beings, namely the four means of attraction (catuh-samgraha-vastu, generosity, kind speech, beneficial action, and cooperation). By attracting them, one places them in skillful means. Second, the skillful means of perfecting the Buddha-dharma, namely prajna-paramita (perfection of wisdom). Third, the skillful means of quickly attaining penetrating wisdom, namely revealing all evil deeds, rejoicing in merits, urging the Buddhas, and dedicating roots of goodness during the six periods of day and night. Fourth, the skillful means of uninterrupted path, namely apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa (non-abiding nirvana). Therefore, (the Bodhisattva) repeatedly and ultimately without interruption, pervades all worlds in the ten directions, manifesting all the conduct of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas according to what is appropriate to transform.
Treatise: 'There are two kinds of power.' Some say they are deliberative wisdom and cultivated wisdom. If so, how can post-attainment wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana) have deliberative wisdom? Because it is only unconditioned (anasrava). Answer: Having right thought is called deliberative wisdom. What fault is there?
Treatise: 'The precepts take receiving and learning as their substance,' and so on. Furthermore, according to the Manjushri Question Sutra, its characteristics are explained in detail. Now, it is briefly quoted. If one discriminates in the mind between humans and non-humans, men and non-men, etc.; if one receives the transcendent Bodhisattva precepts (bodhisattva-sila) without generating a compassionate mind; if one generates the thought of stealing others' property; if one generates the mind of false speech, one commits parajika (defeat). If one's actions of body and speech are incapable of attaining the three vehicles (triyana, Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana). Furthermore, if one mentally desires to take leaves, bark, or sap from trees; if one generates thoughts of singing, dancing, making music, flowers, fragrant garlands; if one generates thoughts of high and wide beds; if one generates thoughts of taking gold, silver, and jewels, these are all Bodhisattva samghavasesa (formal suspension). If one's actions of body and speech are incapable of attaining the three vehicles. Furthermore, if one shaves body hair; if one trims nails into the shape of a new moon; if one generates such thoughts; if one generates thoughts of cutting down trees and plants; if one generates thoughts of destroying others' reputations, one commits stulatyaya (gross offense). If one's actions of body and speech are incapable of attaining the three vehicles. Furthermore, if one treads on the objects of the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, flowers, fragrant clothes, and jewels; if one treads on stupas, places where the Buddha walked, and places where the Bodhi tree (bodhi-vrksa) and the turning of the wheel of Dharma occurred, one commits pacittiya (expiation). If one is not a believer, one is incapable of attaining the three vehicles. Furthermore, if one sticks out one's tongue, moves one's eyes, destroys all dignified behavior, and generates the thought of committing this offense, one commits duskrita (wrongdoing). If one's actions of body and speech are incapable of attaining the three vehicles. Furthermore, if one sees others' property, others' seeds of happiness
種服玩。詐現求利及說人罪過若起此想犯波羅提舍。若以身．口行不堪得三乘。
疏。亦不隨眠流注相續者。雖不現起壞惡不捨結怨里心名隨眠也。
疏。世法處有九種等者。問世法有八謂譽利稱樂及苦等四。何故不言譽等四耶 答譽等可欣非是苦相故不言也。謂資具等性是壞法。復遇緣壞名壞法壞。此猶質在遇緣質盡名盡法盡 問壞．盡二與老．病．死三而有何別 答外內有異故分五種。
論。此說自性等者。問忍．精進等體非三業。如何今言說自性耶 答有義實非自性。而作用中三業殊勝。于眷屬中對余劣者假名自性 詳曰。忍及精進必有三業二行方成。故取三業亦何爽理。諸論多分說彼自性通三業故。
論。安住最勝等者。按對法十一但有五種。釋論云。種性者謂菩薩法性。愿者謂菩提心。意樂者謂悲導心。事者謂舍諸所有。自體者謂身．語．意業。
論。巧便最勝者。即當攝論無分別智所攝受也。無性釋云。謂三輪清凈施者．受者．施物分別皆遠離故。
論。由斯施等四句分別者。有三四句如疏所明。又按優婆塞戒經廣作四句。施四句云。是施非度。謂聲聞．緣覺．凡夫．外道．初二僧祇菩薩等施。度而非施。謂餘五度。示度亦施。第三僧祇菩薩所施。非度非施。謂二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『種服玩』（種植、穿著、玩樂）。『詐現求利及說人罪過若起此想犯波羅提舍』（虛假顯現以求取利益，以及說別人的罪過，如果生起這樣的想法，就觸犯了波羅提舍）。『若以身．口行不堪得三乘』（如果以身、口做出不適合的行為，就無法獲得聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘這三乘的果位）。
疏：『亦不隨眠流注相續者』（即使沒有現行表現出來，但壞的、惡的念頭沒有捨棄，結下的怨恨留在心裡，這叫做隨眠）。『雖不現起壞惡不捨結怨里心名隨眠也』。
疏：『世法處有九種等者』（世間法有九種等等）。『問世法有八謂譽利稱樂及苦等四。何故不言譽等四耶』（問：世間法有八種，即名譽、利益、稱讚、快樂以及苦等等四種。為什麼不說名譽等等四種呢？）。『答譽等可欣非是苦相故不言也』（答：名譽等等是令人欣喜的，不是苦的相狀，所以不說）。『謂資具等性是壞法。復遇緣壞名壞法壞。此猶質在遇緣質盡名盡法盡』（所說的資生之具等等的性質是壞法，再次遇到因緣而壞滅，叫做壞法壞滅。這就像抵押品存在，遇到因緣抵押品耗盡，叫做盡法耗盡）。『問壞．盡二與老．病．死三而有何別』（問：壞滅、耗盡這兩種和衰老、疾病、死亡這三種有什麼區別？）。『答外內有異故分五種』（答：因為有外在和內在的不同，所以分為五種）。
論：『此說自性等者』（這裡說的是自性等等）。『問忍．精進等體非三業。如何今言說自性耶』（問：忍辱、精進等的本體不是身、口、意三業。為什麼現在說是自性呢？）。『答有義實非自性。而作用中三業殊勝。于眷屬中對余劣者假名自性』（答：有的意義上確實不是自性。但在作用中，身、口、意三業殊勝。在眷屬中，相對於其餘較差的，假名為自性）。『詳曰。忍及精進必有三業二行方成。故取三業亦何爽理。諸論多分說彼自性通三業故』（詳細地說，忍辱以及精進必定有身、口、意三業兩種行為才能成就。所以取三業也沒有什麼不合道理。各種論典大多說它們的自性通於三業）。
論：『安住最勝等者』（安住最殊勝等等）。『按對法十一但有五種。釋論云。種性者謂菩薩法性。愿者謂菩提心。意樂者謂悲導心。事者謂舍諸所有。自體者謂身．語．意業』（按照《對法》第十一，只有五種。解釋說，種性指的是菩薩的法性。愿指的是菩提心。意樂指的是以慈悲引導的心。事指的是捨棄所有。自體指的是身、語、意業）。
論：『巧便最勝者』（方便最殊勝）。『即當攝論無分別智所攝受也。無性釋云。謂三輪清凈施者．受者．施物分別皆遠離故』（就是《攝大乘論》中無分別智所攝受的。無性解釋說，指的是三輪清凈，施者、受者、施物這三種分別都遠離的緣故）。
論：『由斯施等四句分別者』（由此，佈施等等用四句分別）。『有三四句如疏所明。又按優婆塞戒經廣作四句。施四句云。是施非度。謂聲聞．緣覺．凡夫．外道．初二僧祇菩薩等施。度而非施。謂餘五度。示度亦施。第三僧祇菩薩所施。非度非施。謂二』（有三種四句，如疏中所說明的。又按照《優婆塞戒經》廣泛地做了四句。佈施四句說：是佈施但不是度，指的是對聲聞、緣覺、凡夫、外道、初二僧祇菩薩等的佈施。是度但不是佈施，指的是其餘五度。既是度又是佈施，指的是第三僧祇菩薩所佈施。既不是度也不是佈施，指的是二）。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Planting, clothing, and playing.' 'Falsely appearing to seek profit and speaking of others' faults, if such thoughts arise, one violates a Parajika.' 'If one's actions of body and speech are unsuitable, one cannot attain the Three Vehicles (Triyana)'.
Commentary: 'Also, not following the dormant flow of continuity' (Even if not currently manifest, bad and evil thoughts are not abandoned, and resentment remains in the heart; this is called dormancy). 'Although not currently manifest, bad and evil thoughts are not abandoned, and resentment remains in the heart; this is called dormancy'.
Commentary: 'The worldly dharmas have nine kinds, etc.' 'Question: Worldly dharmas have eight, namely fame, gain, praise, pleasure, and suffering, etc., four. Why not say fame, etc., four?' 'Answer: Fame, etc., are pleasing and not aspects of suffering, so they are not mentioned.' 'The nature of resources, etc., is destructible. Again, encountering conditions and being destroyed is called destruction of destructible dharmas. This is like a pledge existing, and encountering conditions and the pledge being exhausted is called exhaustion of exhaustible dharmas.' 'Question: What is the difference between destruction and exhaustion and aging, sickness, and death?' 'Answer: Because there are differences between external and internal, they are divided into five kinds'.
Treatise: 'This speaks of self-nature, etc.' 'Question: Patience, diligence, etc., are not the three karmas (Tri-karma). How can it now be said to be self-nature?' 'Answer: In some senses, it is not self-nature. But in function, the three karmas are superior. Among the retinue, relative to the inferior, it is nominally called self-nature.' 'Detailed explanation: Patience and diligence must have the two practices of the three karmas to be accomplished. Therefore, taking the three karmas is not unreasonable. Many treatises mostly say that their self-nature pervades the three karmas'.
Treatise: 'Abiding in the most excellent, etc.' 'According to Abhidharma, there are only five kinds. Commentary says: 'Nature refers to the nature of a Bodhisattva. Vow refers to the Bodhi mind. Intention refers to the mind guided by compassion. Matter refers to relinquishing all possessions. Self refers to the karma of body, speech, and mind'.
Treatise: 'Skillful means are the most excellent.' 'This is what is encompassed by the non-discriminating wisdom in the Mahayana-samgraha. Asanga explains: 'It refers to the purity of the three wheels, where the distinctions between the giver, the receiver, and the gift are all abandoned'.
Treatise: 'Therefore, giving, etc., are distinguished by four sentences.' 'There are three sets of four sentences, as explained in the commentary. Also, according to the Upasaka Precept Sutra, four sentences are extensively made. The four sentences of giving say: 'It is giving but not a paramita, referring to giving to Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, ordinary people, non-Buddhists, and Bodhisattvas in the first two asamkhya kalpas. It is a paramita but not giving, referring to the other five paramitas. It is both a paramita and giving, referring to the giving of Bodhisattvas in the third asamkhya kalpa. It is neither a paramita nor giving, referring to two'.
乘等所修五度。余度四句準此可量 問經論何違 答經據任運進修不退增勝名度。論依具相通退．不退．加．無加行以立度名。望義不同故無違也。
論。複次至相違障故者。按攝論第七云。成立對治所治障故。為欲對治不發趣因故立施戒。不發趣因。謂著財位及著室家。為欲對治雖已發趣復退還因故立忍進。退還因者。謂處生死有情違犯所生眾苦。及於長時善品加行所生疲怠。為欲對治雖已發趣不復退還而失壞因故立定惠。失壞因者。謂諸散動及邪惡惠。如是成立對治所治障故唯立六數。
論。又施等三增上生道等者。增上生者。所招果體。道者是因。大財等果從因等起名增上生。決定勝者。亦是果也。望前三果增上果體。后三果體而勝於彼名決定勝。道者因也。
論。智助般若等者。又按辨中邊論障十度果頌如疏引。長行釋云。此說十種波羅密多所得果障。以顯十種波羅密多自性之障。謂于佈施說富貴障。于凈戒說善趣障。于安忍說不捨有情障。于精進說減過失增功德障。于靜慮說令所化趣八法障。于般若說解脫障。于方便說施等善無窮盡障。由此迴向無上菩提。令施等善無窮盡故。于愿說一切生中善無間轉障。由大願力攝受能順善法生故。于力說所作善得決定障。由思擇力及修習力能伏彼障
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於乘等所修的五度（Pañca-pāramitā，五種達到彼岸的方法），其餘四度也可以按照這個模式來理解。問：這與經論有什麼衝突嗎？答：經是根據任運（自然而然）地進步修習，不退轉並不斷增勝的狀態來定義『度』。而論則是依據具備各種相，包括退轉、不退轉、有加行、無加行等情況來建立『度』的名稱。因為觀察的角度不同，所以沒有衝突。 論：更進一步說，是爲了對治相應的障礙。根據《攝大乘論》第七卷所說：爲了成立對治所要治理的障礙，所以爲了對治不願開始行動的原因，設立佈施（Dāna-pāramitā，慷慨施予）和持戒（Śīla-pāramitā，遵守道德規範）。不願開始行動的原因，是指執著于財富和地位，以及執著於家庭。爲了對治即使已經開始行動又退轉的原因，設立忍辱（Kṣānti-pāramitā，忍耐）和精進（Vīrya-pāramitā，努力）。退轉的原因，是指處於生死輪迴中有情眾生所遭受的各種痛苦，以及長時間進行善行所產生的疲憊。爲了對治即使已經開始行動也不退轉，但卻會失去的原因，設立禪定（Dhyāna-pāramitā，冥想）和智慧（Prajñā-pāramitā，洞察力）。失去的原因，是指各種散亂和邪惡的智慧。像這樣，爲了成立對治所要治理的障礙，所以只設立六種度。 論：此外，佈施等前三種是增上生道等。增上生，是指所招感的果報的本體。道，是指原因。巨大的財富等果報從原因等產生，稱為增上生。決定勝，也是果報。相對於前三種果報的增上果體，后三種果報的本體勝過它們，稱為決定勝。道，是指原因。 論：智慧輔助般若等。又根據《辨中邊論》中關於障礙十度果的偈頌，如疏中所引用。長行解釋說：這裡說的是十種波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，達到彼岸的方法）所得到的果報的障礙，以此來顯示十種波羅蜜多自性的障礙。例如，對於佈施，說是富貴的障礙；對於凈戒，說是善趣（Sugati，好的去處）的障礙；對於安忍，說是不捨棄有情的障礙；對於精進，說是減少過失、增長功德的障礙；對於靜慮，說是使所化眾生趨向八法的障礙；對於般若，說是解脫的障礙；對於方便（Upāya-kauśalya，善巧方便），說是佈施等善行無窮無盡的障礙，由此迴向無上菩提，使佈施等善行無窮無盡；對於愿（Praṇidhāna-pāramitā，誓願），說是一切生中善行無間斷運轉的障礙，由於大願力的攝受，能夠順應善法的產生；對於力（Bala-pāramitā，力量），說是所作的善行得到決定的障礙，由於思擇力和修習力能夠降伏這些障礙。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the five Pāramitās (perfections) cultivated by the vehicle and others, the remaining four can be understood in a similar manner. Question: What conflict is there with the Sutras and Shastras? Answer: The Sutras define 'Pāramitā' based on the state of naturally progressing in cultivation, without regression, and with continuous increase and excellence. The Shastras establish the name 'Pāramitā' based on possessing various characteristics, including regression, non-regression, with effort, and without effort. Because the perspectives are different, there is no conflict. Treatise: Furthermore, it is to counteract the corresponding obstacles. According to the seventh volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana): In order to establish the counteraction of the obstacles to be governed, Dāna-pāramitā (perfection of generosity) and Śīla-pāramitā (perfection of ethical discipline) are established to counteract the causes of not initiating action. The causes of not initiating action refer to attachment to wealth and status, and attachment to family. To counteract the causes of regressing even after initiating action, Kṣānti-pāramitā (perfection of patience) and Vīrya-pāramitā (perfection of effort) are established. The causes of regression refer to the various sufferings experienced by sentient beings in the cycle of birth and death, and the fatigue caused by prolonged engagement in virtuous practices. To counteract the causes of losing what has been attained even after initiating action and not regressing, Dhyāna-pāramitā (perfection of meditation) and Prajñā-pāramitā (perfection of wisdom) are established. The causes of loss refer to various distractions and evil wisdom. In this way, in order to establish the counteraction of the obstacles to be governed, only six Pāramitās are established. Treatise: Moreover, the first three, such as Dāna, are paths of higher rebirth, etc. Higher rebirth refers to the essence of the karmic result. Path refers to the cause. The result of great wealth, etc., arising from the cause, etc., is called higher rebirth. Definite victory is also a result. Compared to the higher rebirth of the first three results, the essence of the latter three results surpasses them and is called definite victory. Path refers to the cause. Treatise: Wisdom assists Prajñā, etc. Furthermore, according to the verses in the Madhyāntavibhāga (Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes) on the obstacles to the results of the ten Pāramitās, as quoted in the commentary. The extended explanation says: This speaks of the obstacles to the results obtained from the ten Pāramitās, in order to reveal the obstacles to the nature of the ten Pāramitās. For example, regarding Dāna, it speaks of the obstacle of wealth and nobility; regarding Śīla, it speaks of the obstacle of good rebirth (Sugati); regarding Kṣānti, it speaks of the obstacle of not abandoning sentient beings; regarding Vīrya, it speaks of the obstacle of reducing faults and increasing merits; regarding Dhyāna, it speaks of the obstacle of causing those to be transformed to be drawn to the eight worldly concerns; regarding Prajñā, it speaks of the obstacle of liberation; regarding Upāya-kauśalya (skillful means), it speaks of the obstacle of the endlessness of virtuous deeds such as Dāna, thereby dedicating it to unsurpassed Bodhi, making virtuous deeds such as Dāna endless; regarding Praṇidhāna-pāramitā (perfection of vow), it speaks of the obstacle of the uninterrupted continuation of virtuous deeds in all lives, due to the power of great vows, being able to accord with the arising of virtuous Dharma; regarding Bala-pāramitā (perfection of strength), it speaks of the obstacle of the certainty of the virtuous deeds performed, due to the power of discernment and the power of cultivation being able to subdue these obstacles.
非彼伏故。于智說自他受用法成就障。不如聞言而覺義故。
論。謂由前前引發後後等者。按對法雲。由施串習舍施內外。不顧身命棄大寶藏受持禁戒。由護戒故他所毀罵。終不反報遂能堪忍。以能堪忍寒熱等苦。加行不息發勤精進。精進方便證究竟果成滿靜慮。靜慮滿已證得出世究竟大惠。複次前前後後所持。由具尸羅施得清凈。由行佈施攝益有情。由具尸羅不為惱害。由忍力故戒得清凈。由能忍受他不饒益。終不毀犯所學處故。由精進故忍得清凈。由勇猛力久處生死不以為難。能受眾生違逆等苦。由靜慮故精進清凈。由喜樂俱能勤修習一切善法無休息故。由具惠故靜慮清凈。若由無量門數數觀諸法。能證內寂靜增長三摩地。瑜伽．攝論．與對法論。初複次同。故不引也。
疏。最勝所作等者。按彼論解云。一切佛菩薩所為所到故。有釋最勝所作是佛所作。最勝所至十地菩薩之所至也 詳曰。佛及菩薩俱作俱至。或佛所至菩薩所作。亦應無失。
疏。安住佛性者。佛性正是彼岸之體。由能安住名之為到。又彼岸者總攝大乘出世教．理．行．果四也。佛性即是理所攝也。或通於果。
疏。又波羅是所知等者。此非對法文乃是疏主釋彼論也。
疏。合有六解者。六字應錯。合為五字。一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：並非因為其他原因而伏藏，而是因為對於智慧，宣說自己和他人接受使用方法而成就障礙。不如聽聞言語而覺悟其意義。
論：所說的由前前引發後後等等，按照《對法論》所說：由於佈施的串習，捨棄內外之物，不顧身命，捨棄大寶藏，受持禁戒。由於守護戒律，他人譭謗謾罵，終究不反報，於是能夠堪忍。以能堪忍寒熱等苦，加行不息，發勤精進。以精進為方便，證得究竟果，成就圓滿靜慮（Dhyana，禪定）。靜慮圓滿后，證得出世間的究竟大智慧。再次，前前後後所持守的，由於具備尸羅（Śīla，戒律）而佈施得清凈，由於行佈施而攝益有情（Sattva，眾生），由於具備尸羅而不為惱害，由於忍辱的力量，戒律得以清凈，由於能夠忍受他人不饒益，終究不毀犯所學之處。由於精進的緣故，忍辱得以清凈，由於勇猛的力量，長久處於生死輪迴中不以為難，能夠承受眾生的違逆等苦。由於靜慮的緣故，精進得以清凈，由於喜樂相伴，能夠勤奮修習一切善法而無有休息。由於具備智慧的緣故，靜慮得以清凈。如果通過無量門數數觀察諸法，能夠證得內在的寂靜，增長三摩地（Samādhi，禪定）。《瑜伽師地論》、《攝大乘論》與《對法論》，最初的『複次』相同，所以不引用了。
疏：最勝所作等等，按照彼論的解釋說：一切佛菩薩所為所到之處。有解釋說最勝所作是佛所作，最勝所至是十地菩薩之所至也。詳細地說，佛和菩薩都作都至，或者佛所至菩薩所作，也應該沒有缺失。
疏：安住佛性者，佛性正是彼岸的本體。由於能夠安住，名之為到達。又彼岸總攝大乘出世間的教、理、行、果四者。佛性即是理所攝也，或者通於果。
疏：又波羅（Pāramitā，彼岸）是所知等等，這並非《對法論》的原文，而是疏主解釋彼論。
疏：合有六解者，六字應錯，合為五字，一
【English Translation】 English version: It is not because of other hidden reasons, but because, with regard to wisdom, explaining the accomplishment of obstacles through the methods of self and others receiving and using. It is not as good as hearing words and awakening to their meaning.
Treatise: What is said about the former leading to the latter, etc., according to the Abhidharma (對法論): 'Due to the habituation of giving, one abandons internal and external things, disregarding life and limb, relinquishing great treasures, and upholding precepts. Because of protecting the precepts, even if others slander and revile, one ultimately does not retaliate, and thus is able to endure. By being able to endure cold, heat, and other sufferings, one's effort does not cease, and one diligently progresses. Using diligence as a means, one attains the ultimate fruit, accomplishing perfect Dhyana (靜慮, meditation). After Dhyana is perfected, one attains the ultimate great wisdom that transcends the world. Furthermore, what is upheld from moment to moment, due to possessing Śīla (尸羅, moral discipline), giving becomes pure; due to practicing giving, one benefits sentient beings (Sattva, 有情); due to possessing Śīla, one does not cause harm; due to the power of patience, the precepts become pure; due to being able to endure others' unkindness, one ultimately does not violate what has been learned. Due to diligence, patience becomes pure; due to the power of courage, one does not consider it difficult to remain in Saṃsāra (生死, cycle of rebirth) for a long time, and is able to endure the adversities and sufferings of sentient beings. Due to Dhyana, diligence becomes pure; due to the accompaniment of joy and happiness, one is able to diligently cultivate all virtuous dharmas without rest. Due to possessing wisdom, Dhyana becomes pure. If one observes all dharmas through countless doors, one is able to attain inner tranquility and increase Samādhi (三摩地, concentration).' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論), and Abhidharma treatises have the same initial 'furthermore,' so they are not quoted.
Commentary: 'The most excellent actions,' etc., according to the explanation in that treatise: 'It is what all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas do and reach.' Some explain that the most excellent actions are what Buddhas do, and the most excellent attainment is what Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhūmis (地, stages) attain. In detail, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas both do and reach, or what Buddhas reach and Bodhisattvas do, should also be without fault.
Commentary: 'Abiding in Buddha-nature,' Buddha-nature is precisely the essence of the other shore (Pāramitā, 波羅). Because one is able to abide, it is called reaching. Moreover, the other shore encompasses the four aspects of Mahāyāna (大乘, Great Vehicle) transcendence: doctrine, principle, practice, and result. Buddha-nature is included in the principle, or it extends to the result.
Commentary: 'Moreover, Pāramitā (波羅, other shore) is what is known,' etc., this is not the original text of the Abhidharma, but rather the commentator's explanation of that treatise.
Commentary: 'There are six explanations in total,' the word 'six' should be a mistake, it should be 'five,' one:
瑜伽五緣。二十二最勝。三最勝所作等 疏云波羅所至義等者。此是疏主釋彼論中所作所至。非是論文。四所知彼岸等。五濟度自他等。或波羅是所知義等。此為一解。六字不錯 又按智度論復有三釋。一云度慳貪等諸煩惱海至究竟故名到彼岸。即以六障而為此岸。六度為彼岸。二云此岸是世間。彼岸是涅槃。即以生死．涅槃二種為此彼岸。三云有無等境名為此岸。知有無智名到彼岸。即以分別有相．無相名此．彼岸。
疏。釋別名者。按攝論第七云。又能息滅惡戒惡趣。及能取得善趣等持故名為戒。又能滅盡忿怒怨仇。及能善住自他安隱故名為忍。又能遠離所有懈怠惡不善法。及能出生無量善法令其增長故名精進。又能消除所有散動。及能引得內心安住故名靜慮。施惠如疏引。
疏。由大施等者。按彼論云。大施者盡舍一切內外事故。長時施故。離過者遠離不平等追求等過故。離垢者永斷一切所治慳故 釋曰。離非法貪亦離過也。余之五度各亦有三義。意易知論指不作 又云。能令諸根永寂靜故。能起清凈諸善趣故。能為清凈所依處故。說名為戒。隨其次第護諸根門。往善趣因涅槃所依。遠離一切忿勢灰故。遠離不捨怨害心故。顯發損者常安隱故。說名為忍。怨害心者。謂起報怨心。不捨者。謂不棄此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 瑜伽的五種因緣（瑜伽五緣）：二十二種殊勝（二十二最勝），三種殊勝所作等。《疏》中說『波羅所至義等』，這是《疏》的作者解釋《瑜伽師地論》中所說的『所作所至』，並非是經文原文。四種所知彼岸等，五種濟度自他等。或者『波羅』是所知的意思等，這是一種解釋。六字不錯。 又根據《大智度論》，還有三種解釋。第一種說法是，度過慳貪等各種煩惱之海，到達究竟的境界，所以叫做『到彼岸』。就是以六種障礙作為此岸，六度作為彼岸。第二種說法是，此岸是世間，彼岸是涅槃。就是以生死和涅槃兩種作為此岸和彼岸。第三種說法是，有和無等境界叫做此岸，知道有和無的智慧叫做『到彼岸』。就是以分別有相和無相作為此岸和彼岸。 《疏》中解釋別名，根據《攝大乘論》第七卷說：『又能息滅惡戒和惡趣，以及能夠取得善趣和等持，所以叫做戒。又能滅盡忿怒和怨仇，以及能夠安住自己和他人的安穩，所以叫做忍。又能遠離所有懈怠和惡不善法，以及能夠出生無量善法，令其增長，所以叫做精進。又能消除所有散動，以及能夠引得內心安住，所以叫做靜慮。』施惠就像《疏》中引用的那樣。 《疏》中說，『由大施等』，根據《攝大乘論》說：『大施就是盡舍一切內外事物，長久地佈施，所以稱為大施。遠離過失，就是遠離不平等的追求等過失。遠離垢染，就是永遠斷除一切所要對治的慳吝。』解釋說，遠離非法貪也是遠離過失。其餘的五度也各有三種含義，意思容易理解，論中沒有詳細說明。又說，『能夠令諸根永遠寂靜，所以稱為戒。能夠發起清凈的各種善趣，所以稱為戒。能夠作為清凈的所依之處，所以稱為戒。』隨其次第守護諸根之門，是往生善趣的原因，是涅槃的所依。遠離一切忿怒的威勢和灰燼，所以稱為忍。遠離不捨棄怨恨和損害他人的心，所以稱為忍。顯發損害者常常安穩，所以稱為忍。怨害心，就是指生起報復怨恨的心。不捨棄，就是指不拋棄這種心。
【English Translation】 English version The five causes of Yoga (Yoga five causes): twenty-two supreme (twenty-two most victorious), three supreme actions, etc. The commentary says 'Parasu-ata-artha etc.', this is the commentator's explanation of 'actions and attainments' in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, not the original text of the sutra. Four kinds of knowledge of the other shore, etc., five kinds of deliverance of oneself and others, etc. Or 'Parasu' means the meaning of knowledge, etc., this is one explanation. Six words are not wrong. According to the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra, there are three explanations. The first is that crossing the sea of greed and other afflictions to reach the ultimate state is called 'reaching the other shore'. That is, the six obstacles are taken as this shore, and the six perfections (Paramitas) are taken as the other shore. The second is that this shore is the world, and the other shore is Nirvana. That is, birth and death and Nirvana are taken as this shore and the other shore. The third is that the realm of existence and non-existence is called this shore, and the wisdom of knowing existence and non-existence is called 'reaching the other shore'. That is, distinguishing between existence and non-existence is called this shore and the other shore. The commentary explains the different names, according to the seventh volume of the Mahayana-samgraha: 'It can also extinguish evil precepts and evil destinies, and can obtain good destinies and equanimity, so it is called Sila (precept). It can also extinguish anger and hatred, and can abide in the peace of oneself and others, so it is called Ksanti (patience). It can also stay away from all laziness and evil unwholesome dharmas, and can generate immeasurable good dharmas and make them grow, so it is called Virya (diligence). It can also eliminate all distractions and can lead to inner peace, so it is called Dhyana (meditation).' Giving is like what is quoted in the commentary. The commentary says, 'Because of great giving, etc.', according to the Mahayana-samgraha: 'Great giving is to give up all internal and external things completely, and to give for a long time, so it is called great giving. Avoiding faults is to avoid faults such as unequal pursuit. Avoiding defilement is to permanently cut off all stinginess to be treated.' The explanation says that avoiding illegal greed is also avoiding faults. The other five perfections also have three meanings each, and the meaning is easy to understand. The treatise does not elaborate. It also says, 'It can make the senses forever quiet, so it is called Sila. It can initiate pure good destinies, so it is called Sila. It can be a pure place of reliance, so it is called Sila.' Following the order, guarding the gates of the senses is the cause of rebirth in good destinies and the basis of Nirvana. Avoiding all the power and ashes of anger is called Ksanti. Avoiding not abandoning resentment and harming others is called Ksanti. Manifesting that those who harm are always at peace is called Ksanti. Resentment and harm refer to the mind of retaliation and resentment. Not abandoning means not abandoning this mind.
心。能壞怨心名為損者。顯此無畏故名顯發損者常安隱。故損害生長作用相應故名精進。損害作用相應者。謂前二正斷。以能損害不善法故。生長作用相應者。謂后二正斷。以能生長諸善法故。能持能息能靜能調。又能引發故名靜慮。能持者。謂于境繫心。能息者。謂息諸散亂。能靜者。謂令心寂靜。能調者。謂制伏諸纏。能引發者。謂能引發自在作用 施惠兩文如疏已引。其施中雲。能捨施等者。舍謂棄捨。除斷之義。為由施故能斷施人當來貧苦。復由施故能除受人現生遺乏逼迫熱惱 又惠度者。彼論釋云。他所發者。謂從他言音所生。及如理作意相應。惠內證者。謂出世間惠。種別者謂出世間后所得惠。得寂靜者。謂修道中治煩惱惠。勝德者。謂能引發勝功德惠。
論。依止意樂修者。按對法論有六意樂。謂諸菩薩以殑伽沙界滿中七寶。又殑伽沙等身命剎那頃。或經殑伽沙等大劫。施一有情乃至一切皆令彼于菩提速成修行。如是差別施時。菩薩意樂猶不厭足名無厭意樂。又諸菩薩修行施時。展轉相續無一剎那有退有斷。乃至菩提名廣大意樂。又諸菩薩修行施時。于施所攝諸有情所。生大歡喜名歡喜意樂。又諸菩薩修行施時。觀施所攝一切有情。於我己身有大恩德。不見已身於彼有恩。由資助我三菩提故名恩
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 心。能夠摧毀怨恨之心，這被稱為『損』（Dhana，佈施）。顯示這種無畏，所以稱為『顯發』，行『損』之人常常安穩。因此，損害和生長作用相互配合，這被稱為『精進』（Viriya，精進）。損害作用相互配合，指的是前面的兩種正斷（Samvara-padhana，律儀斷和斷斷）。因為能夠損害不善之法。生長作用相互配合，指的是後面的兩種正斷（Pariharana-padhana，防護斷和隨護斷）。因為能夠生長各種善法。能夠保持、能夠止息、能夠安靜、能夠調伏，又能夠引發，所以稱為『靜慮』（Dhyana，禪定）。能夠保持，指的是將心專注于境界。能夠止息，指的是止息各種散亂。能夠安靜，指的是使心寂靜。能夠調伏，指的是制伏各種煩惱。能夠引發，指的是能夠引發自在的作用。
施惠兩種說法如疏中已經引用。其中關於『施』（Dana，佈施）的部分說：『能夠捨棄佈施等』，捨棄指的是拋棄、斷除的含義。因為通過佈施，能夠斷除佈施之人未來貧困的果報。又因為通過佈施，能夠消除受施之人現生匱乏的逼迫和熱惱。
又，關於『惠』（Pragya，智慧）度，那部論典解釋說：『他人所發』，指的是從他人的言語聲音所生，以及與如理作意相應的智慧。『惠內證』，指的是出世間的智慧。『種別』，指的是出世間智慧之後所獲得的智慧。『得寂靜』，指的是修道中對治煩惱的智慧。『勝德』，指的是能夠引發殊勝功德的智慧。
論：依止意樂修。按照《對法論》（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）的說法，有六種意樂。即諸位菩薩用恒河沙數世界裝滿七寶，又用恒河沙數的身命在剎那間，或者經歷恒河沙數的大劫，佈施給一個有情乃至一切有情，都讓他們迅速成就菩提的修行。像這樣差別佈施的時候，菩薩的意樂仍然不厭倦滿足，這稱為『無厭意樂』。又諸位菩薩修行佈施的時候，輾轉相續，沒有一剎那有退轉有間斷，乃至菩提，這稱為『廣大意樂』。又諸位菩薩修行佈施的時候，對於佈施所攝的一切有情，生起大歡喜，這稱為『歡喜意樂』。又諸位菩薩修行佈施的時候，觀察佈施所攝的一切有情，對於我自身有大恩德，不見我自身對於他們有恩德，因為他們資助我成就三菩提，這稱為『恩』
【English Translation】 English version: Mind. The ability to destroy resentment is called 'Dhana' (佈施, Giving). Manifesting this fearlessness is called 'manifestation', and those who practice 'Dhana' are always peaceful. Therefore, the coordination of damaging and growing actions is called 'Viriya' (精進, Diligence). The coordination of damaging actions refers to the first two Right Exertions (Samvara-padhana, 律儀斷 and 斷斷). Because it can damage unwholesome dharmas. The coordination of growing actions refers to the latter two Right Exertions (Pariharana-padhana, 防護斷 and 隨護斷). Because it can grow various wholesome dharmas. The ability to hold, to cease, to quiet, to tame, and to initiate is called 'Dhyana' (靜慮, Meditation). The ability to hold refers to focusing the mind on the object. The ability to cease refers to ceasing various distractions. The ability to quiet refers to making the mind tranquil. The ability to tame refers to subduing various afflictions. The ability to initiate refers to initiating free actions.
The two statements of giving and wisdom have already been cited in the commentary. Among them, the part about 'Dana' (施, Giving) says: 'The ability to abandon giving, etc.', abandoning refers to the meaning of discarding and cutting off. Because through giving, one can cut off the future suffering of poverty for the giver. And because through giving, one can eliminate the present suffering of deprivation and distress for the receiver.
Also, regarding the 'Pragya' (惠, Wisdom) perfection, that treatise explains: 'Initiated by others' refers to the wisdom born from the words and sounds of others, and corresponding to proper reflection. 'Inner realization of wisdom' refers to supramundane wisdom. 'Different kinds' refers to the wisdom obtained after supramundane wisdom. 'Obtaining tranquility' refers to the wisdom that cures afflictions in the path of cultivation. 'Superior virtue' refers to the wisdom that can initiate superior merits.
Treatise: Relying on the intention to cultivate. According to the 'Abhidharma' (對法論, Abhidharma) , there are six kinds of intention. That is, all Bodhisattvas fill countless worlds of the Ganges River with seven treasures, and use countless lives of the Ganges River in an instant, or spend countless great kalpas, giving to one sentient being or even all sentient beings, so that they can quickly achieve the practice of Bodhi. When giving in such different ways, the Bodhisattva's intention is still not tired and satisfied, which is called 'inexhaustible intention'. Also, when all Bodhisattvas practice giving, they continue one after another without a moment of retreat or interruption, until Bodhi, which is called 'vast intention'. Also, when all Bodhisattvas practice giving, they generate great joy for all sentient beings included in giving, which is called 'joyful intention'. Also, when all Bodhisattvas practice giving, they observe that all sentient beings included in giving have great kindness to themselves, and do not see that they have kindness to them, because they help them achieve the three Bodhis, which is called 'gratitude'.
德意樂。又諸菩薩修行施時。雖于無量諸有情所興大施福。而不希報恩當來異熟名無染意樂。又諸菩薩修行施時。所得異熟施諸有情不自為己。又以此福共諸有情迴向菩提名善好意樂余度準知。
疏。四依止方便修亦有三種者。即觀三輪以為三也。
論。此十攝者等者。按攝論本云。世尊於此一切六種波羅密多或有處所以施聲等說者 釋曰。經中有處以一施言攝干六度。戒等之聲亦復如是 無性釋曰。謂於一切修加行中。即有一切更互相助。謂修施時禁防忍受策勵專心。能善巧知業果相屬。如是施中即有餘轉。若修戒時遠離慳吝．忿恚．懈怠．散動．邪見。如是戒中即有餘轉。修習所餘亦如是說。
論。依修前行至應作四句者。泛爾抉擇問答諸法。而有寬狹差別不同。由斯對法第十五中。明其一行順前．順后．二．三．四等諸句數也。故彼論云。一行者。即問論法。謂以一法與余法一一互相問已。除此法更以第二法與余法互相問。如是一一問一切法 今有問言。若成就眼處亦色處耶。設成就色處亦眼處耶 應順前句答。余句相望問答順前後及以四句。如理應思。如是次第一一漸咸如理應說 順前句者。謂于諸法中隨取二法更互相問。依止前法以答所問 如有問言。若智亦所知耶。設所知亦智耶 此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：德意樂（殊勝的意樂）。此外，諸位菩薩在修行佈施時，即使對無量無邊的眾生行廣大布施，也不希望得到報答，不期待未來有不同的果報，這叫做無染意樂（沒有染污的意樂）。此外，諸位菩薩在修行佈施時，所得到的殊勝果報都佈施給眾生，不為自己享用。又將以此福德與眾生共同迴向于菩提（覺悟），這叫做善好意樂（善良美好的意樂），其餘的度（波羅蜜多）可以參照理解。
疏（註釋）：四依止方便修也有三種，就是觀察三輪（施者、受者、所施物）作為三種依止。
論（本論）：此十攝者等，按照《攝大乘論》的原本所說：『世尊對於這全部六種波羅蜜多（六度），或者在某些地方用佈施等名稱來說明。』釋（解釋）說：經文中有時用一個『施』字就涵蓋了全部六度，戒等的說法也是如此。無性釋（無性菩薩的解釋）說：在一切修行加行中，都有一切互相幫助的作用。比如修佈施時，要禁止惡行，忍受困難，努力精進，專心致志，能夠善巧地瞭解業果之間的關係。這樣，在佈施中就包含了其他的修行。如果修持戒律，就要遠離慳吝、忿怒、懈怠、散亂、邪見。這樣，在持戒中就包含了其他的修行。修習其餘的波羅蜜多也可以這樣理解。
論（本論）：依據修前行到應該作四句，普遍地對所抉擇、問答的諸法，有寬泛和狹窄的差別。因此，在《對法論》第十五中，說明其中一行順前、順后、二、三、四等各種句式。所以那部論中說：『一行』，就是指問論法。用一個法與其餘的法一一互相詢問之後，除去這個法，再用第二個法與其餘的法互相詢問。像這樣，一個一個地詢問一切法。現在有一個問題：如果成就了眼處（眼根），也就成就了色處（色塵）嗎？如果成就了色處，也就成就了眼處嗎？應該用順前句來回答。其餘的句式相互對應，問答有順前、順后以及四句。應該如理地思考。像這樣，依次逐漸地都應該如理地說。順前句，是指在諸法中隨便選取兩個法，互相詢問，依據前面的法來回答所問的問題。比如有人問：如果是智慧，也就是所知嗎？如果所知，也就是智慧嗎？這就是順前句。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Virtuous Intention. Furthermore, when Bodhisattvas practice giving, even if they perform great acts of generosity towards countless sentient beings, they do not hope for repayment or expect different future retributions. This is called 'untainted intention'. Moreover, when Bodhisattvas practice giving, they give the excellent retributions they receive to sentient beings and do not keep them for themselves. Furthermore, they dedicate this merit together with all sentient beings towards Bodhi (enlightenment). This is called 'wholesome intention'. The other perfections (Pāramitās) can be understood similarly.'
'Commentary: The four reliances and skillful means of practice also have three aspects, which are observing the three wheels (the giver, the receiver, and the gift) as the three reliances.'
'Treatise: 'These ten include, etc.' According to the original text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana): 'The World-Honored One, regarding all six Pāramitās (perfections), sometimes explains them using terms like 'giving'.' Explanation: In the scriptures, there are instances where a single word like 'giving' encompasses all six perfections. The same applies to terms like 'discipline'. Vasubandhu's commentary: In all practices of preliminary application, there is mutual assistance. For example, when practicing giving, one must restrain from evil deeds, endure difficulties, strive diligently, concentrate the mind, and skillfully understand the relationship between actions and their consequences. Thus, giving includes other practices. If one practices discipline, one must stay away from stinginess, anger, laziness, distraction, and wrong views. Thus, discipline includes other practices. The same can be said for the practice of the remaining perfections.'
'Treatise: 'Based on practicing the preliminary practices, one should make four statements.' Generally, regarding the chosen and questioned dharmas, there are broad and narrow differences. Therefore, in the fifteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), it explains the various sentence structures such as one line following the previous, following the subsequent, two, three, and four, etc. Therefore, that treatise says: 'One line' refers to questioning the dharma. After questioning one dharma with each of the other dharmas, remove that dharma and then question the second dharma with the other dharmas. In this way, one by one, question all the dharmas. Now there is a question: If one has attained the eye-sphere (eye sense base), has one also attained the form-sphere (form sense base)? If one has attained the form-sphere, has one also attained the eye-sphere? One should answer with a statement that follows the previous. The remaining statements correspond to each other, and the questions and answers have structures that follow the previous, follow the subsequent, and have four parts. One should contemplate this reasonably. In this way, gradually and sequentially, one should speak reasonably. A statement that follows the previous refers to randomly selecting two dharmas from among all dharmas and questioning each other, relying on the previous dharma to answer the question. For example, someone asks: If it is wisdom, is it also the knowable? If it is the knowable, is it also wisdom? This is a statement that follows the previous.'
應作順前句答。諸智亦所知。有所知非智。謂余法 順后句者。謂即二法展轉相問。依止后法以答所問 如有問言。若所取亦能取耶。設能取亦所取耶 此應作順后句答。諸能取亦所取。有所取非能取。謂色等五境及法處除相應 二句者。謂于所問應二句答。不得有餘 如有依蘊建立依界建立。而發問言若蘊數亦界數耶。設界數亦蘊數耶。此應作二句答。或蘊數非界數。謂色蘊．識蘊。何以故。無有一界全攝色蘊相。或全攝識蘊相故。或界數非蘊數。謂法界 三句者。謂于所問唯三句答 如有問言。若蘊數亦處數耶。設處數亦蘊數耶 此應三句答。或蘊數非處數。謂色蘊。或處數非蘊數。謂法處。或蘊數亦處數。謂識蘊意處 俱非者于蘊．處中決定不有 四句者。謂于所問作四句答 如有問言。若成就眼根亦耳根耶。設成就耳根亦眼根耶 應四句答。初句謂聾者。眼根已生不捨。第二句謂盲者。耳根已生不捨。第三句謂眼．耳根已生不捨。第四句除上爾所相 述可句者。謂于所問順爾而答。以如是言述可所問 如有問言。諸無常者皆是行耶。設當是行皆無常耶。應述可答所問如是 遮止句者。謂于所問不爾而答。以不爾言遮止所問 如有問言。蘊外諸行幾諦攝耶 應遮止答蘊外無行。
疏。此依始業地等者。由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 應作順前句答：對於提問，應該用肯定前一句的方式來回答。例如：『諸智亦所知（所有的智慧也是所知嗎？）』，『有所知非智（有些所知不是智慧）』，這裡『謂余法（指其他的法）』。這是順前句的回答。 順后句者：指對於兩個法，互相轉換提問，依據后一個法來回答所問。例如：『若所取亦能取耶（如果被取也是能取嗎？）』，『設能取亦所取耶（如果能取也是被取嗎？）』。此應作順后句答：『諸能取亦所取（所有能取也是被取）』，『有所取非能取（有些被取不是能取）』，這裡『謂色等五境及法處除相應（指色等五種境以及法處，除了相應的）』。 二句者：指對於所提出的問題，應該用兩句話來回答，不能有多餘的。例如：依據蘊（skandha）建立，依據界（dhatu）建立，而提出問題：『若蘊數亦界數耶（如果蘊的數量也是界的數量嗎？）』，『設界數亦蘊數耶（如果界的數量也是蘊的數量嗎？）』。此應作二句答：『或蘊數非界數（或者蘊的數量不是界的數量）』，『謂色蘊．識蘊（指色蘊和識蘊）』。『何以故（為什麼呢？）』，『無有一界全攝色蘊相（沒有一個界能夠完全包含色蘊的相）』，『或全攝識蘊相故（或者完全包含識蘊的相的緣故）』。『或界數非蘊數（或者界的數量不是蘊的數量）』，『謂法界（指法界）』。 三句者：指對於所提出的問題，只能用三句話來回答。例如：『若蘊數亦處數耶（如果蘊的數量也是處的數量嗎？）』，『設處數亦蘊數耶（如果處的數量也是蘊的數量嗎？）』。此應三句答：『或蘊數非處數（或者蘊的數量不是處的數量）』，『謂色蘊（指色蘊）』。『或處數非蘊數（或者處的數量不是蘊的數量）』，『謂法處（指法處）』。『或蘊數亦處數（或者蘊的數量也是處的數量）』，『謂識蘊意處（指識蘊和意處）』。『俱非者于蘊．處中決定不有（兩者都不是的情況，在蘊和處中絕對沒有）』。 四句者：指對於所提出的問題，用四句話來回答。例如：『若成就眼根亦耳根耶（如果成就了眼根，也成就了耳根嗎？）』，『設成就耳根亦眼根耶（如果成就了耳根，也成就了眼根嗎？）』。應四句答：第一句『謂聾者（指聾子）』，『眼根已生不捨（眼根已經產生，沒有捨棄）』。第二句『謂盲者（指盲人）』，『耳根已生不捨（耳根已經產生，沒有捨棄）』。第三句『謂眼．耳根已生不捨（指眼根和耳根都已經產生，沒有捨棄）』。第四句『除上爾所相（排除以上所說的那些情況）』。 述可句者：指對於所提出的問題，順著問題來回答，用『如是』這樣的詞語來肯定所問。例如：『諸無常者皆是行耶（所有無常的事物都是行嗎？）』，『設當是行皆無常耶（如果是行，都是無常的嗎？）』。應述可答所問如是（應該用肯定性的回答，所問的是正確的）。 遮止句者：指對於所提出的問題，不順著問題來回答，用『不爾』這樣的詞語來否定所問。例如：『蘊外諸行幾諦攝耶（在蘊之外的諸行，被幾諦所包含呢？）』。應遮止答蘊外無行（應該用否定的方式回答，蘊之外沒有行）。 疏：此依始業地等者：這段解釋是依據《始業地》等論著。
【English Translation】 English version One should answer with a direct affirmation of the preceding statement. For example: 'Are all wisdoms also knowable?' 'Some knowable things are not wisdoms,' referring to other dharmas. This is answering by directly affirming the preceding statement. Affirming the subsequent statement refers to asking about two dharmas in a reciprocal manner, answering the question based on the latter dharma. For example: 'If what is grasped is also able to grasp?' 'If what is able to grasp is also grasped?' One should answer by affirming the subsequent statement: 'All that is able to grasp is also grasped,' 'Some that is grasped is not able to grasp,' referring to the five sense objects such as form, and the dharma realm, excluding the corresponding ones. Two statements refer to answering the question with two statements, with nothing superfluous. For example, based on the establishment of skandhas (aggregates) and the establishment of dhatus (elements), the question is asked: 'Is the number of skandhas also the number of dhatus?' 'Is the number of dhatus also the number of skandhas?' One should answer with two statements: 'Either the number of skandhas is not the number of dhatus,' referring to the rupa skandha (aggregate of form) and the vijnana skandha (aggregate of consciousness). 'Why?' 'Because there is no dhatu that fully encompasses the aspect of the rupa skandha,' 'Or fully encompasses the aspect of the vijnana skandha.' 'Or the number of dhatus is not the number of skandhas,' referring to the dharma dhatu (element of dharma). Three statements refer to answering the question with only three statements. For example: 'Is the number of skandhas also the number of ayatanas (sense bases)?' 'Is the number of ayatanas also the number of skandhas?' One should answer with three statements: 'Either the number of skandhas is not the number of ayatanas,' referring to the rupa skandha. 'Or the number of ayatanas is not the number of skandhas,' referring to the dharma ayatana. 'Or the number of skandhas is also the number of ayatanas,' referring to the vijnana skandha and the mano ayatana (sense base of mind). 'Neither' refers to something that is definitely not present in either skandhas or ayatanas. Four statements refer to answering the question with four statements. For example: 'If one has attained the eye faculty, has one also attained the ear faculty?' 'If one has attained the ear faculty, has one also attained the eye faculty?' One should answer with four statements: The first statement refers to the deaf, whose eye faculty has already arisen and has not been abandoned. The second statement refers to the blind, whose ear faculty has already arisen and has not been abandoned. The third statement refers to those whose eye and ear faculties have already arisen and have not been abandoned. The fourth statement excludes the aforementioned situations. Affirming the statement refers to answering the question in accordance with it, using words like 'it is so' to affirm the question. For example: 'Are all impermanent things conditioned?' 'If something is conditioned, is it all impermanent?' One should answer by affirming that the question is correct. Negating the statement refers to answering the question not in accordance with it, using words like 'it is not so' to negate the question. For example: 'How many truths encompass the conditioned things outside the skandhas?' One should answer by negating that there are conditioned things outside the skandhas. Commentary: 'This is based on the Shiyedi (Beginner's Ground)' and other treatises.
依始業地人故順后句。
答。若依串習六皆頓修。皆互相攝。
論。若依純雜等者。對法十二兩種四句。初四如疏。第二四云。複次一切行施皆能生施波羅密多種類福耶。此應作四句。初句謂所行施不迴向大菩提。第二句謂于施波羅密多勸勵讚美隨喜慶悅。第三句謂所行施迴向大菩提。第四句謂除上爾所相。惠等亦爾。四句應思 釋曰初句行施非生波羅密多類福。第二句生波羅密多種類之福而非行施。三．四可知 又按攝論第七。無性釋彼相攝義云。是其相故者。是攝體相。謂此施等與彼施等更互相攝。是隨順故者。是攝隨順信等善法。施等善心彼所修故於施等中彼隨轉故。信等即是諸善。大地及念住等菩提分法。是等流故者是攝等流。謂無諍等及十力等。是到彼岸等流果故。
論。此十果等者。按瑜伽七十八云。一切波羅密多何果異熟。當知此亦略有六種。一者得大財富。二者往生善趣。三者無怨無壞多諸喜樂。四者為眾生主。五者身無惱害。六者有大宗業。且就異熟一果以明。不障得余 又按攝論無性釋云 富貴攝者。是施所得勝利。大生攝者。是戒所得勝利。勝善趣攝故名大生 大朋大屬攝者。是忍所得勝利。朋謂親族。屬謂奴婢 廣大事業加行成就攝者。謂勤所得勝利。廣大事業謂輪王等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：依始業地人故順后句。 答：若依串習，六皆頓修，皆互相攝。 論：若依純雜等者，對法十二兩種四句。初四如疏。第二四云：『複次，一切行施皆能生施波羅密多（Dāna-pāramitā，佈施波羅蜜）多種類福耶？』此應作四句。初句謂所行施不迴向大菩提。第二句謂于施波羅密多勸勵讚美隨喜慶悅。第三句謂所行施迴向大菩提。第四句謂除上爾所相。惠等亦爾。四句應思。釋曰：初句行施非生波羅密多類福。第二句生波羅密多種類之福而非行施。三、四可知。又按攝論第七，無性釋彼相攝義云：『是其相故者，是攝體相，謂此施等與彼施等更互相攝。是隨順故者，是攝隨順信等善法。施等善心彼所修故，于施等中彼隨轉故。信等即是諸善，大地及念住等菩提分法。是等流故者，是攝等流，謂無諍等及十力等。是到彼岸等流果故。』 論：此十果等者，按瑜伽七十八云：『一切波羅密多何果異熟？當知此亦略有六種。一者得大財富，二者往生善趣，三者無怨無壞多諸喜樂，四者為眾生主，五者身無惱害，六者有大宗業。』且就異熟一果以明，不障得余。又按攝論無性釋云：『富貴攝者，是施所得勝利。大生攝者，是戒所得勝利，勝善趣攝故名大生。大朋大屬攝者，是忍所得勝利，朋謂親族，屬謂奴婢。廣大事業加行成就攝者，謂勤所得勝利。廣大事業謂輪王等。』
【English Translation】 English version: Question: According to the person who initially engages in the practice, the latter statement follows. Answer: If relying on habitual practice, all six are cultivated simultaneously, and all mutually encompass each other. Treatise: If relying on purity, mixture, etc., according to the Abhidharma (對法), there are twelve types and two sets of fourfold statements. The first four are as explained in the commentary. The second four state: 'Furthermore, can all acts of giving generate various kinds of merit related to Dāna-pāramitā (佈施波羅蜜, Perfection of Giving)?' This should be formulated as four statements. The first statement refers to acts of giving that are not dedicated to great Bodhi (大菩提, Enlightenment). The second statement refers to encouraging, praising, rejoicing, and delighting in Dāna-pāramitā. The third statement refers to acts of giving that are dedicated to great Bodhi. The fourth statement refers to excluding the aforementioned aspects. The same applies to generosity, etc. These four statements should be contemplated. Explanation: The first statement refers to acts of giving that do not generate merit related to Pāramitā. The second statement refers to generating various kinds of merit related to Pāramitā but not through acts of giving. The third and fourth are self-explanatory. Furthermore, according to the seventh chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝論), Asaṅga (無性) explains the meaning of mutual inclusion, stating: 'Because it is its characteristic, it is the characteristic of the included entity, meaning that these acts of giving, etc., mutually encompass those acts of giving, etc. Because it is in accordance, it includes virtuous qualities such as faith, etc. Because these virtuous minds of giving, etc., are cultivated by it, and because it follows along with giving, etc. Faith, etc., are all virtues, the great earth, and the factors of Bodhi (菩提, Enlightenment) such as the smṛtyupasthānas (念住, mindfulness). Because it is a co-emergent stream, it includes co-emergent streams, such as non-contention, etc., and the ten powers, etc. Because it is the fruit of reaching the other shore.' Treatise: Regarding these ten fruits, etc., according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) seventy-eighth, 'What are the resultant effects of all Pāramitās? It should be known that there are roughly six types: first, obtaining great wealth; second, being reborn in a good realm; third, having much joy and happiness without enemies or destruction; fourth, being a leader of beings; fifth, having a body without afflictions; sixth, having a great lineage.' Let us explain based on one resultant effect, without obstructing the attainment of others. Furthermore, according to Asaṅga's (無性) explanation in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝論): 'Including wealth and nobility is the victory obtained from giving. Including great birth is the victory obtained from morality; it is called great birth because it includes superior good realms. Including great friends and great retinue is the victory obtained from patience; friends refer to relatives, and retinue refers to servants. Including the accomplishment of vast undertakings and diligent effort is the victory obtained from diligence. Vast undertakings refer to wheel-turning kings, etc.'
于中策勵名為加行。所作皆辨故名成就 無諸惱害性薄塵垢攝者。是靜慮所得勝利。由靜慮故感此威力善知一切 五明處攝者。是惠所得勝利。
論。此與二乘有共不共等者。攝論第七有四殊勝。明與二乘而有差別。無性釋云。差別殊勝。謂諸菩薩具三種戒。聲聞乘等唯有一種律儀尸羅。是故菩薩望彼殊勝。餘三殊勝準此應知。如疏略引。
論。定學有四等者。疏判此定非地前得。有義彈云。亦未可依。雖復勝定多依第四。亦有通依餘地生故。又不可以二乘不得證是無漏。地前菩薩所有修行。亦非二乘所知境故。戒及惠學並通地前。何故定學唯說地上。故通地前以之勝也 詳曰。疏意不說所言定學唯取無漏。但顯論中所舉四定非地前相。又二乘不知通漏．無漏。今但以彼不知之義證定無漏。非言有漏即彼皆知 又按攝論明定差別。后四差別謂對治．堪能．引發．作業．若非無漏何有此能。故知彼論據無漏定。此所舉定同彼何建。又復三學隨據一說。何要責之一等。
疏。又能引發十難行者。按彼論云 一自誓難行。誓受無上菩提愿故 二不退難行。生死眾苦不能退故 三不背難行。一切有情雖行邪行而不棄故 四現前難行。怨有情所現作一切饒益事故 五不染難行。生在世間不為世法所染污故 六
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 於此之中，策勵精進稱為加行（Prayoga，努力）。所作所為皆能辨明，故名成就（Siddhi，圓滿）。沒有諸般惱害，自性清凈，少有塵垢所染者，這是由靜慮（Dhyana，禪定）所得的殊勝利益。由於靜慮的緣故，能感得這種威力，善於通曉一切五明（Panca-vidya，五種明處）所攝的內容，這是由智慧（Prajna，般若）所得的殊勝利益。
論：此（靜慮和智慧）與二乘（Sravaka-yana，聲聞乘和Pratyekabuddha-yana，緣覺乘）有共同和不共同之處嗎？《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）第七卷中有四種殊勝之處，說明了與二乘的差別。無性（Asanga，無著）的解釋說：『差別殊勝，是指諸菩薩（Bodhisattva，菩薩）具足三種戒律（Trisila，三戒），而聲聞乘等只有一種律儀尸羅（Pratimoksa-sila，別解脫戒）。因此，菩薩相對於他們來說是殊勝的。』其餘三種殊勝之處，可以依此類推。如疏文中略有引述。
論：定學有四等，疏文判斷此定並非地前（Bhumipravesa，入地之前）所得。有人反駁說：『這也不可完全依賴。雖然殊勝的禪定多依于第四禪（Caturtha-dhyana，第四禪），但也有通於其他地而生的緣故。』又不能因為二乘無法證得，就認為這是無漏（Anasrava，無漏）。地前菩薩所有的修行，也不是二乘所能知曉的境界。戒學和慧學都通於地前，為何定學只說地上？所以通於地前，以此為殊勝。詳細地說，疏文的意思並不是說所說的定學只取無漏，只是顯示論中所舉的四種禪定並非地前的狀態。而且二乘不知通於有漏（Sasrava，有漏）和無漏。現在只是用他們不知的意義來證明定是無漏，並非說有漏他們都知道。又按《攝大乘論》說明定的差別，后四種差別是對治（Pratipaksa，對治）、堪能（Samarthya，堪能）、引發（Abhinirharana，引發）、作業（Karman，作業）。如果不是無漏，怎麼會有這種能力？所以知道彼論是根據無漏定。這裡所舉的定與彼論有何不同？而且三學（Trisiksa，三學）隨所依據而說，為何要責求一律？
疏：又能夠引發十種難行之事。按彼論所說：一、自誓難行。因為發誓要接受無上菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺）的願望。二、不退難行。因為生死（Samsara，輪迴）的種種痛苦不能使之退轉。三、不背難行。對於一切有情（Sattva，眾生）即使行邪行也不捨棄。四、現前難行。對於怨恨的有情，也現前做一切饒益的事情。五、不染難行。生在世間不為世間的法則所染污。六、...
【English Translation】 English version: Herein, diligent effort is called Prayoga (exertion). All actions are clearly discerned, hence it is called Siddhi (accomplishment). Free from all afflictions, with a pure nature and little defilement, this is the excellent benefit obtained from Dhyana (meditation). Due to Dhyana, one can sense this power and be skilled in understanding all that is encompassed by the Panca-vidya (five sciences), which is the excellent benefit obtained from Prajna (wisdom).
Treatise: Are these (Dhyana and Prajna) common or uncommon to the Two Vehicles (Sravaka-yana, Hearer Vehicle and Pratyekabuddha-yana, Solitary Realizer Vehicle)? The seventh chapter of the Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) explains four superiorities that differentiate it from the Two Vehicles. Asanga's (Wuxing) commentary states: 'The superiority of difference refers to the fact that Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) possess the Trisila (threefold precepts), while the Hearer Vehicle and others only have one Pratimoksa-sila (precept of individual liberation). Therefore, Bodhisattvas are superior to them.' The remaining three superiorities can be understood analogously, as briefly cited in the commentary.
Treatise: The study of Samadhi (meditative concentration) has four aspects, etc. The commentary judges that this Samadhi is not attained before entering the Bhumipravesa (stage of entering the grounds). Some argue: 'This is not entirely reliable. Although superior Samadhi often relies on the Caturtha-dhyana (fourth Dhyana), it can also arise in other grounds.' Furthermore, one cannot conclude that it is Anasrava (free from outflows) simply because the Two Vehicles cannot attain it. The practices of Bodhisattvas before entering the grounds are also beyond the comprehension of the Two Vehicles. The studies of Sila (ethics) and Prajna (wisdom) are common before entering the grounds, so why is the study of Samadhi only mentioned in relation to the grounds? Therefore, it is common before entering the grounds, making it superior. To elaborate, the commentary does not mean that the mentioned study of Samadhi only refers to the Anasrava, but rather it shows that the four Dhyanas mentioned in the treatise are not the state before entering the grounds. Moreover, the Two Vehicles do not know what is common to Sasrava (with outflows) and Anasrava. Now, we only use their lack of knowledge to prove that Samadhi is Anasrava, not that they know everything that is Sasrava. Furthermore, according to the Mahayana-samgraha, the differences in Samadhi are explained, with the latter four differences being Pratipaksa (antidote), Samarthya (capability), Abhinirharana (manifestation), and Karman (action). If it were not Anasrava, how could it have these abilities? Therefore, it is known that the treatise is based on Anasrava Samadhi. How does the Samadhi mentioned here differ from that treatise? Moreover, the Trisiksa (three trainings) are discussed based on what they rely on, so why demand uniformity?
Commentary: Furthermore, it can give rise to ten difficult practices. According to that treatise: 1. Difficult to vow. Because of vowing to receive Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (unexcelled complete enlightenment). 2. Difficult to not regress. Because the various sufferings of Samsara (cyclic existence) cannot cause one to regress. 3. Difficult to not turn away. One does not abandon all Sattva (sentient beings) even if they engage in wrong actions. 4. Difficult to manifest. One manifests all beneficial actions even to hateful beings. 5. Difficult to not be tainted. One is not tainted by worldly laws even when born in the world. 6. ...
勝解難行。于大乘中深生信解故 七通達難行。具能通達補特伽羅．法無我故 八隨覺難行。于諸如來所說甚深秘密言詞能隨覺故 九不離不染難行。不捨生死而不染故 十加行難行。能修諸佛安住解脫。一切障礙窮生死際不作功用。常起一切有情一切義利行故。
論。此三自性等者。攝論第八有十六門今略引云。此中無分別智離五種相以為自性。本論如疏。無性釋云。若無作意是無分別智。熟眠醉等應成無分別智。若過尋伺地是無分別智。第二靜慮已上諸地一切異生及聲聞等。應成無分別智。若想受滅是無分別智。此智體相難可成立。無想等中離心無有諸心法故。若如其色是無分別智。應不得成無分別智。譬如大種所造色故。若於真義異相計度是無分別智。此智不成無分別性。以于真義異相計度。言此是真是無分別有分別故 二智所依者。謂無分別智所依非心非思義故。亦非非心為所依止。心種類故。以心為因數習勢力引得此位名心種類。此即顯示智所依心。出過一切思量分別 釋曰。心言通目思非思量。外又偏以思量心難。答中據彼二種心故言不依依。智所依心雖無分別。是前無間心之種類亦得名心。余如疏引 三智因緣。四智所緣。五智行相。皆如疏引 六智所住持者。謂無分別后得智中所得種種菩薩諸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勝解難行：因為對於大乘佛法能夠深深地生起信心和理解。 通達難行：因為能夠完全通達補特伽羅（pudgalā，人）和法無我（dharma-nairātmya，諸法無自性）。 隨覺難行：因為對於諸佛如來說的甚深秘密的言語能夠隨之覺悟。 不離不染難行：因為不捨棄生死輪迴，卻不被其污染。 加行難行：因為能夠修習諸佛所安住的解脫境界，一切障礙直到生死窮盡都不起作用，並且常常發起一切有情眾生的一切利益行為。
論：『此三自性等者』，《攝大乘論》第八品有十六種門，現在簡略地引用說：『這其中無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，沒有分別的智慧）以離開五種相為自性。』 本論就像疏文所說。 無性釋說：『如果無作意（manasikara，不主動思考）就是無分別智，那麼熟睡、醉酒等狀態也應該成為無分別智。如果超過尋伺地（vitarka-vicāra bhūmi，有尋有伺的禪定境界）就是無分別智，那麼第二禪以上的所有境界，一切凡夫和聲聞等，都應該成為無分別智。如果想受滅（saṃjñā-vedanā-nirodha，滅盡定）就是無分別智，那麼這種智慧的體相難以成立，因為在無想等狀態中，離開心就沒有諸心法。如果像色法一樣是無分別智，那麼應該不能成就無分別智，譬如由四大種所造的色法。如果對於真義（tattva-artha，真實意義）的異相進行計度（parikalpa，推測），就是無分別智，那麼這種智慧不能成立無分別性，因為對於真義的異相進行計度，說『這是真』，是有分別的。』 二、智所依者：是指無分別智所依賴的不是心也不是思義，也不是非心作為所依賴的。因為是心種類，以心為因，通過數數修習的力量引導而得到這個位置，名為心種類。這即是顯示智慧所依賴的心，超出一切思量分別。 釋曰：『心』這個詞普遍指稱思和非思量。外面又偏偏以思量心來提問。回答中根據這兩種心，所以說不依止。智慧所依賴的心雖然沒有分別，是前一無間心的種類，也可以稱為心。其餘的就像疏文所引用。 三、智因緣，四、智所緣，五、智行相，都像疏文所引用。 六、智所住持者：是指無分別后得智（prsthalabdha-jñana，證得真如后所獲得的智慧）中所得到的種種菩薩的...
【English Translation】 English version Difficult to achieve profound understanding: Because one can deeply generate faith and understanding in Mahayana Buddhism. Difficult to achieve thorough comprehension: Because one can fully comprehend the Pudgala (pudgalā, person) and Dharma-nairatmya (dharma-nairātmya, the selflessness of all dharmas). Difficult to achieve subsequent awareness: Because one can subsequently awaken to the profound and secret words spoken by all Buddhas. Difficult to achieve non-separation and non-attachment: Because one does not abandon samsara (saṃsāra, cycle of birth and death) but is not defiled by it. Difficult to achieve exertion: Because one can cultivate the liberation in which all Buddhas abide, all obstacles cease to function until the end of samsara, and one constantly initiates all beneficial actions for all sentient beings.
Treatise: 'These three self-natures, etc.' The eighth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha has sixteen aspects, which are now briefly quoted: 'Among these, non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna, wisdom without discrimination) takes as its nature the separation from five aspects.' The main treatise is as the commentary says. Vasubandhu explains: 'If non-attention (manasikara, non-active thinking) is non-discriminating wisdom, then deep sleep, drunkenness, etc., should also become non-discriminating wisdom. If surpassing the stage of investigation and analysis (vitarka-vicāra bhūmi, the meditative state with investigation and analysis) is non-discriminating wisdom, then all states above the second dhyana (jhāna, meditation), all ordinary beings, and śrāvakas (śrāvaka, disciple) etc., should become non-discriminating wisdom. If the cessation of perception and feeling (saṃjñā-vedanā-nirodha, cessation of perception and feeling) is non-discriminating wisdom, then the substance and characteristics of this wisdom are difficult to establish, because in states of non-perception, etc., there are no mental dharmas apart from the mind. If it is like form that is non-discriminating wisdom, then non-discriminating wisdom should not be able to be achieved, like form created by the four great elements. If measuring the different aspects of true meaning (tattva-artha, true meaning) is non-discriminating wisdom, then this wisdom cannot establish non-discriminating nature, because measuring the different aspects of true meaning, saying 'this is true,' is discriminating.' Second, that on which wisdom relies: It refers to that on which non-discriminating wisdom relies, which is neither mind nor the meaning of thought, nor is it non-mind as that on which it relies. Because it is a type of mind, taking mind as the cause, through the power of repeated practice, it is guided to obtain this position, called a type of mind. This shows that the mind on which wisdom relies surpasses all thought and discrimination. Explanation: The word 'mind' generally refers to both thought and non-thought. Furthermore, it specifically uses the thinking mind to question. The answer is based on these two types of mind, so it says it does not rely. Although the mind on which wisdom relies has no discrimination, it is a type of the immediately preceding mind and can also be called mind. The rest is as quoted in the commentary. Third, the causes and conditions of wisdom, fourth, that which wisdom cognizes, fifth, the characteristics of wisdom, are all as quoted in the commentary. Sixth, that which wisdom sustains: It refers to the various bodhisattvas obtained in the wisdom attained after non-discrimination (prsthalabdha-jñana, wisdom attained after realization of suchness)...
行。此行皆以智為所依 七無分別智誰為助伴。若唯有一應無所能者。謂前五度分為二道。初四資糧道。后一依止道。為能助伴 八無分別智當於何處感異熟果者。謂于諸佛變化受用二身會中。此非異熟因。能治彼故。即增上果假名異熟。由此資熏余有漏業令感異熟故立此名 九無分別智誰為等流者。謂前前生中無分別智。後後生處展轉增勝是等流果 十無分別智出離云何者。謂初極喜地入見道時。見一切地無分別理初得出離。后修道位諸地方成 十一無分別智誰為究竟者。謂初地中雖得三身而未清凈。至第十地乃得清凈方名究竟 十二無分別智如何從何由何無染者。謂如虛空從種種極惡。由信惠解以為因故而得無染 十三加行．根本．后得三種無分別智有差別者。頌曰如啞求受義。如啞正受義。如非啞受義。如愚求受義。如愚正受義。如非愚受義。如五求受義。如五正受義。如末那受義。如未解于論求論受法義。次第譬三智。應知加行等 義謂境義。初未受未說。次受未說。后受亦說。五識等者。約無分別有分別明。求論等者。據求溫習通達以辨。意識依意名為末那 十四根本．后得二智差別者。頌曰如人正閉目。是無分別智。即彼復開目。后得智亦爾 十五無分別智云何能作利有情事者。頌曰如末尼天樂。無思成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 行。此行皆以智為所依，七無分別智（sattama-nirvikalpa-jñāna）誰為助伴？若唯有一應無所能者，謂前五度分為二道：初四資糧道，后一依止道，為能助伴。八無分別智當於何處感異熟果者？謂于諸佛變化受用二身會中。此非異熟因，能治彼故，即增上果假名異熟。由此資熏余有漏業令感異熟故立此名。九無分別智誰為等流者？謂前前生中無分別智，後後生處展轉增勝是等流果。十無分別智出離云何者？謂初極喜地入見道時，見一切地無分別理初得出離，后修道位諸地方成。十一無分別智誰為究竟者？謂初地中雖得三身而未清凈，至第十地乃得清凈方名究竟。十二無分別智如何從何由何無染者？謂如虛空從種種極惡，由信惠解以為因故而得無染。十三加行、根本、后得三種無分別智有差別者？頌曰：『如啞求受義，如啞正受義，如非啞受義；如愚求受義，如愚正受義，如非愚受義；如五求受義，如五正受義，如末那受義；如未解于論求論受法義，次第譬三智，應知加行等。』義謂境義，初未受未說，次受未說，后受亦說。五識等者，約無分別有分別明。求論等者，據求溫習通達以辨。意識依意名為末那（manas）。十四根本、后得二智差別者？頌曰：『如人正閉目，是無分別智，即彼復開目，后得智亦爾。』十五無分別智云何能作利有情事者？頌曰：『如末尼（mani）天樂，無思成。』
【English Translation】 English version: Line. This line all relies on wisdom. What assists the seventh non-discriminating wisdom (sattama-nirvikalpa-jñāna)? If there were only one, it would be incapable. It means the previous five perfections are divided into two paths: the first four are the path of accumulation, and the last one, the path of reliance, serves as an assistant. Where does the eighth non-discriminating wisdom experience the result of maturation? It is in the assemblies of the transformation and enjoyment bodies of all Buddhas. This is not a cause for the result of maturation because it cures that. It is the nominally matured result of the increased cause. Because it nourishes other contaminated karmas, causing them to experience maturation, this name is established. Who is the co-flowing result of the ninth non-discriminating wisdom? It is the non-discriminating wisdom in previous lives, which gradually increases and excels in subsequent lives, being the co-flowing result. What is the liberation of the tenth non-discriminating wisdom? It is when entering the path of seeing in the first Joyful Ground, initially liberating upon seeing the non-discriminating principle of all grounds, and later, in the path of cultivation, all grounds are perfected. Who is the ultimate of the eleventh non-discriminating wisdom? Although the three bodies are attained in the first ground, they are not yet purified. Only upon reaching the tenth ground and achieving purification is it called ultimate. How, from what, and by what is the twelfth non-discriminating wisdom unpolluted? It is like space, unpolluted from all kinds of extreme evils, due to faith, wisdom, and understanding as causes. What are the differences between the three non-discriminating wisdoms of application, fundamental, and subsequent attainment? The verse says: 'Like a mute seeking to receive meaning, like a mute rightly receiving meaning, like a non-mute receiving meaning; like a fool seeking to receive meaning, like a fool rightly receiving meaning, like a non-fool receiving meaning; like the five seeking to receive meaning, like the five rightly receiving meaning, like manas seeking meaning; like seeking to study the Dharma meaning from a treatise without understanding, successively compare the three wisdoms, one should know application and so on.' Meaning refers to the meaning of the object. Initially, not received and not spoken; next, received but not spoken; finally, received and also spoken. 'The five consciousnesses and so on' clarifies the distinction between non-discrimination and discrimination. 'Seeking treatises and so on' refers to seeking, reviewing, and thoroughly understanding to discern. Consciousness relying on mind is called manas. What is the difference between the fundamental and subsequent attainment wisdoms? The verse says: 'Like a person closing their eyes, this is non-discriminating wisdom; immediately after, opening their eyes again, so too is subsequent attainment wisdom.' How does non-discriminating wisdom accomplish the benefit of sentient beings? The verse says: 'Like a mani jewel and heavenly music, accomplished without thought.'
自事。種種佛事成。常離思亦爾 十六無分別智為緣分別依他起性。為緣余境自體亦爾。為智非智。若緣依他云何得成無分別智。若緣余境余境定無。當何所緣。是智應有所知。非智云何名無分別智者。謂無分別智不緣依他。無分別故亦不緣余。緣此分別法性為境。法與法性非一異等。是故此智不可定說緣分別境．非分別境。自體亦爾不可說言決定是智。如加行．后得無分別故。亦非非智以加行智為先因故。此智與境無差別相。如空與空所有光明。是故此智成無分別。
論。如是三惠至俱已舍故者。問下明菩薩一一剎那四道具有。如何今言見道等中無加行耶 答若加行道通漏無漏。加行智者唯是漏攝。故不為例。或加行智亦通無漏。今依漏說亦不相違。
論。八地已去至現唯無漏者 問八地已上五識中善亦非無漏。如何施等唯無漏耶 答五識中善既非增勝。非立為度故不相違。
論。此十義類差別無邊等者。按瑜伽論七十八中。廣有諸門故指彼也。今略引云。總說一切波羅密多清凈相者。當知七種。一者菩薩於此諸法不求他知。二者於此諸法見已不生執著。三者即于如是諸法不生疑惑。謂為能得大菩提不。四者終不自讚毀他有所輕蔑。五者終不憍傲放逸。六者終不少有所得便生喜足。七者終不由此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 自事，種種佛事成就。常離思也是這樣。十六無分別智以分別依他起性為緣。以其他境界自體為緣也是這樣。是智還是非智呢？如果以依他為緣，如何能成就無分別智？如果以其他境界為緣，其他境界必定不存在，應當以什麼為緣呢？這個智慧應該有所知，如果不是智慧，又怎麼能稱為無分別智呢？
所謂無分別智不以依他為緣，因為沒有分別，也不以其他為緣。以這個分別法性為境界。法與法性不是一也不是異。因此，這個智慧不能確定說是以分別境界為緣，還是以非分別境界為緣。自體也是這樣，不能說一定是智慧。如同加行、后得沒有分別的緣故。也不是非智，因為以加行智為先因的緣故。這個智慧與境界沒有差別相，如同空與空的所有光明。因此，這個智慧成就了無分別。
論：像這樣，三種智慧到了俱已捨棄的緣故。問：下面說明菩薩每一個剎那都具有四道，為什麼現在說見道等中沒有加行呢？答：如果加行道通於有漏和無漏，加行智只是有漏所攝，所以不能作為例子。或者加行智也通於無漏，現在依據有漏來說，也不相違背。
論：八地以上直到顯現唯有無漏。問：八地以上五識中的善也不是無漏，為什麼佈施等唯有無漏呢？答：五識中的善既然不是增勝，沒有被立為度，所以不相違背。
論：這十種義類差別無邊等。按《瑜伽師地論》第七十八卷中，廣有各種門類，所以指向那裡。現在簡略地引用說：總說一切波羅蜜多清凈相，應當知道有七種。一是菩薩對於這些法不求他人知曉。二是對這些法見后不生執著。三是對於這些法不生疑惑，是否能夠得到大菩提。四是終不自我讚揚譭謗他人，有所輕蔑。五是終不驕傲放逸。六是終不因為少有所得就生喜足。七是終不因此...
【English Translation】 English version: Self-matters, all kinds of Buddha-matters are accomplished. Constant detachment from thought is also like that. The sixteenth non-discriminating wisdom takes the dependent nature of discrimination as its condition. Taking the self-nature of other realms as its condition is also like that. Is it wisdom or non-wisdom? If it takes dependence as its condition, how can non-discriminating wisdom be accomplished? If it takes other realms as its condition, other realms are certainly non-existent, what should it take as its condition? This wisdom should have something to know, if it is not wisdom, how can it be called non-discriminating wisdom?
So-called non-discriminating wisdom does not take dependence as its condition, because there is no discrimination, nor does it take others as its condition. It takes the nature of this discriminating dharma as its realm. Dharma and the nature of dharma are neither one nor different. Therefore, this wisdom cannot be definitively said to take discriminating realms as its condition, or non-discriminating realms as its condition. The self-nature is also like that, it cannot be said to be definitely wisdom. Like application and subsequent attainment, there is no discrimination. Nor is it non-wisdom, because it takes application wisdom as its prior cause. This wisdom and the realm have no different characteristics, like emptiness and all the light of emptiness. Therefore, this wisdom accomplishes non-discrimination.
Treatise: Like this, the three kinds of wisdom reach the point of having already abandoned them. Question: The following explains that a Bodhisattva possesses the four paths in every moment, why does it now say that there is no application in the path of seeing, etc.? Answer: If the path of application is common to both defiled and undefiled, application wisdom is only included in the defiled, so it cannot be taken as an example. Or application wisdom is also common to the undefiled, now based on the defiled to say, it is not contradictory.
Treatise: From the eighth ground onwards until manifestation, there is only undefiled. Question: From the eighth ground onwards, the good in the five consciousnesses is also not undefiled, why are giving, etc., only undefiled? Answer: Since the good in the five consciousnesses is not increasing and superior, it is not established as a perfection, so it is not contradictory.
Treatise: These ten kinds of meanings and categories have endless differences, etc. According to the seventy-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), there are various categories, so it points there. Now briefly quoting, saying: Generally speaking, the pure characteristics of all paramitas (波羅蜜多), it should be known that there are seven kinds. First, a Bodhisattva does not seek others to know these dharmas. Second, after seeing these dharmas, he does not give rise to attachment. Third, he does not give rise to doubt about these dharmas, whether he can attain great bodhi (菩提). Fourth, he never praises himself and slanders others, having contempt. Fifth, he never becomes arrogant and lax. Sixth, he never becomes satisfied with little attainment. Seventh, he never because of this...
諸法於他發起嫉妒慳吝 又云。無染著性無顧戀性正迴向性最為廣大。無罪過性無分別性無有染污。思擇所作最為明盛。已入無退轉法地名不可動。若十地攝佛地攝者名最清凈 又云。何因緣故菩薩所得波羅密多諸可愛果。及諸異熟常無有盡。波羅密多亦無有盡。善男子展轉相依生起修習無間斷故 又云。當知一切波羅密多各有四種最勝威德。一者於此波羅密多正修行時。能捨慳吝犯戒心憤懈怠散亂見趣所治。二者於此正修行時。能為無上正等菩提真實資糧。三者於此正修行時。于現法中能自攝受饒益有情。四者於此正修行時。于未來世能得廣大無盡可愛諸果異熟 又云。當知一切波羅密多大悲為因。微妙可愛諸果異熟饒益一切有情為果圓滿。無上廣大菩提為大義利 又云。以般若波羅蜜多能取諸法無自性性。
論。依彼種立異生性故者 問若爾如何下愚相。即云執著我法愚是畢生性障。豈此愚者唯約種談 答性狹障寬。異生性障即通種．現。謂異生性及異生性種類現行。總合名為異生性障。故無違也。
疏。六十六立五無記者。謂異熟等四加自性一。自性體者。謂諸色根是長養者。及外諸有色處等非異熟等所攝者。除善．染污色處．聲處。
疏。如實義至名為自相者。總明因明自．共二相。唯分
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：諸法對於其他事物會產生嫉妒和慳吝。經典中還說：『沒有染著的本性，沒有顧戀的本性，以正直的心迴向是最為廣大的。沒有罪過的本性，沒有分別的本性，沒有染污。審慎選擇所做的事情是最為明智的。已經進入無退轉法地的菩薩，被稱為不可動地的菩薩。如果被十地菩薩或佛的境界所攝，就稱為最清凈的。』經典中還說：『因為什麼因緣，菩薩所獲得的波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，到彼岸）的各種可愛果報，以及各種異熟果報常常沒有窮盡？波羅蜜多也沒有窮盡？』『善男子，因為輾轉相互依靠而生起修習，沒有間斷的緣故。』經典中還說：『應當知道一切波羅蜜多各有四種最殊勝的威德。第一，當正確修行此波羅蜜多時，能夠捨棄慳吝、犯戒、嗔恨、懈怠、散亂和邪見所帶來的困擾。第二，當正確修行此波羅蜜多時，能夠成為無上正等菩提（Anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi，無上正等正覺）的真實資糧。第三，當正確修行此波羅蜜多時，在現世中能夠自己攝受利益眾生。第四，當正確修行此波羅蜜多時，在未來世能夠獲得廣大無盡的可愛果報和異熟果報。』經典中還說：『應當知道一切波羅蜜多以大悲為根本原因，以微妙可愛的各種果報和異熟果報饒益一切有情為結果圓滿，以無上廣大的菩提為最大的利益。』經典中還說：『以般若波羅蜜多（Prajñā-pāramitā，智慧到彼岸）能夠認識到諸法沒有自性的本性。 論：『依據那個種子而建立異生性』。問：『如果這樣，那麼如何解釋下愚相呢？』經典中說：『執著於我法是愚癡，是畢生的障礙。難道這種愚癡只是就種子而言嗎？』答：『本性狹窄，障礙寬泛。異生性障礙既包括種子，也包括現行。』也就是說，異生性以及異生性的種類現行，總合起來稱為異生性障礙，所以沒有矛盾。 疏：『六十六立五無記』，指的是異熟等四種加上自性一種。自性體指的是各種色根是長養者，以及外在的各種有色處等不被異熟等所攝的，除去善和染污的色處和聲處。 疏：『如實義到名為自相』，總的說明因明的自相和共相，只是進行區分。
【English Translation】 English version: All dharmas (phenomena) give rise to jealousy and stinginess towards others. It is also said: 'The nature of non-attachment, the nature of non-covetousness, and the nature of right dedication are the most vast. The nature of being without fault, the nature of non-discrimination, and being without defilement. Deliberating on what is done is the most enlightened. One who has entered the ground of non-retrogression is called immovable.' If one is included in the ten grounds (of a Bodhisattva) or the Buddha ground, one is called the most pure. It is also said: 'For what reason do Bodhisattvas obtain the various lovely fruits of the Pāramitās (perfections, going to the other shore) and the various Vipāka (results of actions) that are never exhausted? The Pāramitās are also inexhaustible?' 'Good men, because they arise and cultivate in reliance on each other, without interruption.' It is also said: 'You should know that each of the Pāramitās has four kinds of supreme power and virtue. First, when correctly practicing this Pāramitā, one can abandon the afflictions caused by stinginess, breaking precepts, anger, laziness, distraction, and wrong views. Second, when correctly practicing this Pāramitā, one can become the true resource for Anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi (unsurpassed complete and perfect enlightenment). Third, when correctly practicing this Pāramitā, one can, in the present life, personally gather and benefit sentient beings. Fourth, when correctly practicing this Pāramitā, one can, in future lives, obtain vast and endless lovely fruits and Vipāka.' It is also said: 'You should know that all Pāramitās have great compassion as their cause, and the subtle and lovely various fruits and Vipāka benefiting all sentient beings as their complete result, and unsurpassed and vast Bodhi as their great benefit.' It is also said: 'With Prajñā-pāramitā (perfection of wisdom), one can grasp the nature of all dharmas as being without self-nature.' Treatise: 'Based on that seed, the nature of an ordinary being is established.' Question: 'If that is the case, then how do you explain the characteristic of inferior foolishness?' The scripture says: 'Attachment to self and dharma is foolishness, and it is a lifelong obstacle.' Is this foolishness only discussed in terms of the seed? Answer: 'Nature is narrow, and obstacles are broad.' The obstacle of the nature of an ordinary being includes both the seed and the present manifestation. That is to say, the nature of an ordinary being and the present manifestation of the types of the nature of an ordinary being are collectively called the obstacle of the nature of an ordinary being, so there is no contradiction. Commentary: 'Sixty-six establishes five non-records,' referring to the four kinds of Vipāka, etc., plus one kind of self-nature. The substance of self-nature refers to the various sense organs that are nurtured, and the various external forms, etc., that are not included in Vipāka, etc., except for the good and defiled forms and sounds. Commentary: 'The true meaning is called self-nature,' generally explaining the self-nature and common nature of Hetu-vidya (logic), only making distinctions.
別心安立等者。方名共相。若非安立縱五蘊上空．無常等皆名自相。一一各附自所依蘊不通余故。即無常等亦名實義。異彼分別心所立故 問經中二相其義云何 答五蘊等體名為自相。蘊上無常．苦．無我等名為共相。雖一一蘊無常等別。彼此相似以立共名。不說散心分別安立名共相也。故與因明所說不同 問初后二師義何別耶 答大意是同。廣略異耳。明經中意與前師同。唯敘因明有別前也。然疏中雲彼因明論至與此不同者。並依佛地敘因明論二相之義。結與經別。經別之義同於初師更不言也。故佛地論敘因明已。而總結云此經不爾故不相違。
論。斷惑證滅期心別故者。問若無間道不證滅者。何故說彼無分別智是緣理智 答所緣之理但名真如不名擇滅。猶有粗重而未斷故 若爾斷惑證滅別者。如何下說菩薩利根剎那剎那斷惑證滅 答彼依異品相望而談。此約一品故不相例。
疏。無間道粗至解脫得自在故者。有義釋云。無間道時伏受等種。解脫道位除彼粗重。
疏。亦顯所知障斷不得無為等者。詳曰。今助一釋。斷所知障亦得無為。如顯揚云。想受．不動二無為者。若斷障得擇滅所攝。彼障即是所知障攝 又此論下云。許無住處亦擇滅攝。經言三乘無差別等。而依離縛斷煩惱說。亦不相違。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不要安心於安立等等。這才能叫做共相（Gongxiang，共同的性質）。如果不是安立，即使五蘊上的空、無常等等，都叫做自相（Zixiang，自身的性質）。每一個都附著於它所依賴的蘊，不與其他相通。因此，無常等等也叫做實義（Shiyi，真實的意義），因為它不同於分別心所安立的。問：經中所說的二相（Erxiang，兩種性質），它的意義是什麼？答：五蘊等的本體叫做自相。蘊上的無常、苦、無我等等叫做共相。雖然每一個蘊的無常等等有所不同，但彼此相似，因此建立共同的名稱。這裡所說的共相，不是指散亂心分別安立的。所以與因明（Yinming，邏輯學）所說的不同。問：初師（Chushi，最初的老師）和后師（Houshi，後來的老師）的意義有什麼區別？答：大意是相同的，只是廣略不同而已。說明經中的意思與前一位老師相同，只是敘述因明有所不同。然而，疏中說，『彼因明論至與此不同者』，是依據《佛地論》（Fodilun）敘述因明二相的意義，結論與經文有所區別。經文區別的意義與初師相同，不再贅述。所以《佛地論》敘述因明之後，總結說『此經不爾，故不相違』（Cijing bu er, gu bu xiangwei，這部經不是這樣說的，所以不矛盾）。 論：斷惑證滅期心別故者。問：如果無間道（Wujiandao，無間道）不證滅，為什麼說它的無分別智（Wufenbiezhi，無分別智）是緣理智（Yuanlizhi，緣理智）？答：所緣的理只是叫做真如（Zhenru，真如），不叫做擇滅（Zemi，擇滅），因為還有粗重的煩惱沒有斷除。如果這樣，斷惑證滅是不同的，為什麼下面說菩薩（Pusa，菩薩）利根剎那剎那斷惑證滅？答：那是依據不同品類相互比較而說的，這裡是就同一品類而言，所以不能相比。 疏：無間道粗至解脫得自在故者。有一種解釋說，無間道時伏藏受等等的種子，解脫道（Jiedao，解脫道）位除掉那些粗重的煩惱。 疏：亦顯所知障斷不得無為等者。詳細地說，現在我來補充一種解釋。斷除所知障（Suozhizhang，所知障）也能得到無為（Wuwei，無為）。如《顯揚論》（Xianyanglun）所說，想受、不動二無為，如果斷除障礙而得到，就屬於擇滅所攝。那些障礙就是所知障所攝。又此論下面說，允許無住處也屬於擇滅所攝。經中說三乘（Sancheng，三乘）沒有差別等等，是依據離開束縛、斷除煩惱而說的，也不相違背。
【English Translation】 English version: Do not be content with establishing and so on. Only then can it be called 'Gongxiang' (共相, common characteristic). If it is not established, even emptiness, impermanence, etc., on the five skandhas are called 'Zixiang' (自相, self-characteristic). Each one is attached to the skandha it relies on and does not communicate with others. Therefore, impermanence, etc., are also called 'Shiyi' (實義, real meaning), because it is different from what is established by the discriminating mind. Question: What is the meaning of the two characteristics ('Erxiang' 二相) mentioned in the sutra? Answer: The substance of the five skandhas, etc., is called 'Zixiang'. Impermanence, suffering, non-self, etc., on the skandhas are called 'Gongxiang'. Although the impermanence, etc., of each skandha is different, they are similar to each other, so a common name is established. The 'Gongxiang' mentioned here does not refer to what is established by the scattered mind's discrimination. Therefore, it is different from what is said in 'Yinming' (因明, Hetu-vidya or logic). Question: What is the difference between the meaning of the first teacher ('Chushi' 初師) and the later teacher ('Houshi' 后師)? Answer: The general meaning is the same, only the scope is different. It explains that the meaning in the sutra is the same as the previous teacher, only the description of 'Yinming' is different. However, the commentary says, 'The 'Yinming' treatise is different from this,' which is based on the 'Fodilun' (佛地論, Buddhabhumi Sutra) to describe the meaning of the two characteristics of 'Yinming', and the conclusion is different from the sutra. The meaning of the sutra's distinction is the same as the first teacher, and will not be repeated. Therefore, after describing 'Yinming', the 'Fodilun' concludes by saying, 'This sutra is not like that, so there is no contradiction' ('Cijing bu er, gu bu xiangwei' 此經不爾，故不相違). Treatise: 'Severing delusion and realizing cessation are different in the timing of the mind.' Question: If the 'Wujiandao' (無間道, Path of Immediate Consecution) does not realize cessation, why is its non-discriminating wisdom ('Wufenbiezhi' 無分別智) said to be wisdom that cognizes the principle ('Yuanlizhi' 緣理智)? Answer: The principle that is cognized is only called 'Zhenru' (真如, Suchness), not 'Zemi' (擇滅, Cessation through discrimination), because there are still coarse afflictions that have not been severed. If so, severing delusion and realizing cessation are different, why does it say below that a Bodhisattva ('Pusa' 菩薩) with sharp faculties severs delusion and realizes cessation in every moment? Answer: That is said based on comparing different categories with each other. This is in terms of the same category, so they cannot be compared. Commentary: 'The coarseness of the 'Wujiandao' leads to liberation and attainment of freedom.' One interpretation says that during the 'Wujiandao', the seeds of reception, etc., are suppressed, and in the stage of the 'Jiedao' (解脫道, Path of Liberation), those coarse afflictions are removed. Commentary: 'It also shows that severing the 'Suozhizhang' (所知障, cognitive obscurations) does not attain the unconditioned, etc.' In detail, I will now add an explanation. Severing the 'Suozhizhang' can also attain the unconditioned ('Wuwei' 無為). As the 'Xianyanglun' (顯揚論, Asanga's Explanation of the Abhidharma) says, the unconditioned of perception and non-motion, if attained by severing obstacles, belongs to the category of 'Zemi'. Those obstacles are included in the 'Suozhizhang'. Also, this treatise says below that allowing the non-abiding place also belongs to the category of 'Zemi'. The sutra says that the three vehicles ('Sancheng' 三乘) have no difference, etc., which is based on leaving bondage and severing afflictions, and there is no contradiction.
論。如入二定說斷苦根者。即欲界中苦受所引不安隱性名苦粗重。初定力微未能發生殊勝喜樂及勝輕安。未遍適悅故未能斷彼苦粗重。二定相違故彼方斷。又婆沙論八十一云。問離欲染時斷憂及苦。契經何故說第二定而滅苦耶。答依過對治故作是說。謂離欲染雖斷苦根。而未名為過苦對治。于初靜慮得離欲時過苦對治故說苦滅。苦對治者謂初靜慮。廣如彼說。
論。又十無明等者。按攝論本云。以於十相所知法界。有十無明所治障住 釋曰。由彼十相所顯真如名十相法界 又云應知如是無明。于聲聞等非染污。于諸菩薩是染污 十無明名一一如下疏中牒也。準此故知。異生性障非十無明。以異生性非無記故非唯智障。
疏。有或九故者。若初地中唯斷見惑。而更不斷修道惑等。修道但應有於九地。何故論說修道十地。
論。四微細障最下品者。具如疏辨。有義彈云。應說地地第九品攝。不應說為三品中下 詳曰。見等余惑第九品者。一切應是此微細障。是下品故。既有此濫故疏三品遮簡尤善。
論。二身見者。二釋如疏。有義法執之中有我．我所二身見故 詳曰。雖薩迦耶兼攝我所。觀今文勢不取我所品 所以者何 答明二見已既問寧知唯第六俱。既與第七相對問答。第七豈許有我所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果有人說進入二禪定就能斷除苦的根源，那麼欲界中的苦受所引發的不安穩性，就叫做苦粗重（duhkha-粗重的苦）。初禪定的力量微弱，不能產生殊勝的喜樂和殊勝的輕安，沒有普遍的適悅，所以不能斷除那種苦粗重。二禪定與苦粗重相違背，所以在二禪定中才能斷除。另外，《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）第八十一卷說：『問：離開欲染的時候斷除憂和苦，為什麼契經（sutra）卻說在第二禪定中滅除苦呢？』答：『依據過患的對治來說的。』意思是說，雖然離開欲染的時候斷除了苦的根源，但還不能稱作是過患的苦的對治。在初禪定中得到離開欲染的時候，是過患的苦的對治，所以說苦滅。苦的對治指的是初禪定。詳細的解釋就像《婆沙論》所說的那樣。
論：又，十無明等，按照《攝論》（Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma）的原本說：『因為對於十相所知的法界（dharmadhatu），有十種無明所對治的障礙存在。』解釋說：由那十相所顯現的真如（tathata），叫做十相法界。又說：『應當知道這樣的無明，對於聲聞（sravaka）等來說不是染污的，對於諸菩薩（bodhisattva）來說是染污的。』十無明的名稱，每一個都在下面的疏文中列舉了。根據這些可以知道，異生性（prthag-jana-tva）的障礙不是十無明，因為異生性不是無記（avyakrta）的，所以不是僅僅是智障（jnana-avarana）。
疏：有或者有九地的緣故。如果初地（prthivi）中只斷除見惑（drsti-heya），而不再斷除修道惑（bhavana-heya）等，修道惑就只應該存在於九地中，為什麼論中說修道有十地呢？
論：四微細障（suksma-avarana）的最下品，詳細的解釋就像疏文所辨析的那樣。有一種觀點反駁說：『應該說每一地都是第九品所攝，不應該說是三品中的下品。』詳細地說，見惑等其餘的煩惱的第九品，一切都應該是這種微細障，因為是下品。既然有這種混淆，所以疏文用三品來遮止和簡別就特別好。
論：二身見（satkaya-drsti），有兩種解釋，就像疏文所說的那樣。有一種觀點認為，在法執（dharma-graha）之中有我見（atma-drsti）和我所見（atmiya-drsti）兩種身見。詳細地說，雖然薩迦耶見（satkaya-drsti）兼攝我所見，但看現在的文勢，不取我所見這一品。為什麼呢？回答說，既然已經闡明了二見，又問憑什麼知道只有第六意識（mano-vijnana）與之俱生？既然是與第七意識（manas）相對地提問和回答，第七意識怎麼能允許有我所見呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If one says that entering the second dhyana (second concentration) severs the root of suffering, then the instability induced by painful feelings in the desire realm is called 'gross heaviness of suffering' (duhkha-粗重的苦). The power of the first dhyana is weak, unable to generate superior joy and superior tranquility, and lacking pervasive pleasantness, so it cannot sever that gross heaviness of suffering. The second dhyana is contrary to the gross heaviness of suffering, so it is severed in the second dhyana. Furthermore, the Vibhasa (Vibhasa) treatise, volume 81, states: 'Question: When one departs from desire-attachment, one severs sorrow and suffering. Why does the sutra (sutra) say that suffering is extinguished in the second dhyana?' Answer: 'It is spoken in accordance with the antidote to faults.' That is to say, although the root of suffering is severed when one departs from desire-attachment, it is not yet called the antidote to the fault of suffering. When one attains departure from desire in the first dhyana, it is the antidote to the fault of suffering, so it is said that suffering is extinguished. The antidote to suffering refers to the first dhyana. The detailed explanation is as described in the Vibhasa.
Treatise: Furthermore, regarding the 'ten ignorances' (十無明) etc., according to the original text of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma (攝論), 'Because with respect to the dharmadhatu (法界) known by the ten aspects, there exist obstacles governed by the ten ignorances.' The explanation says: The suchness (tathata) revealed by those ten aspects is called the dharmadhatu of ten aspects. It also says: 'It should be known that such ignorance is not defiled for sravakas (聲聞) etc., but is defiled for bodhisattvas (菩薩).' The names of the ten ignorances are listed individually in the commentary below. Based on this, it can be known that the obstacle of being an ordinary being (prthag-jana-tva) is not one of the ten ignorances, because the state of being an ordinary being is not indeterminate (avyakrta), so it is not solely a cognitive obscuration (jnana-avarana).
Commentary: 'There are perhaps nine grounds because...' If in the first ground (prthivi), only the afflictions to be abandoned by seeing (drsti-heya) are severed, and the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation (bhavana-heya) etc. are no longer severed, then the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation should only exist in nine grounds. Why does the treatise say that there are ten grounds for cultivation?
Treatise: The lowest grade of the four subtle obscurations (suksma-avarana), the detailed explanation is as analyzed in the commentary. One view refutes, saying: 'It should be said that each ground is encompassed by the ninth grade, and it should not be said to be the lowest of the three grades.' In detail, the ninth grade of the afflictions such as views etc., should all be this subtle obscuration, because it is the lowest grade. Since there is this confusion, the commentary's use of the three grades to prevent and distinguish is particularly good.
Treatise: The two 'views of the body' (satkaya-drsti), there are two explanations, as the commentary says. One view holds that within the 'attachment to phenomena' (dharma-graha), there are two 'views of the body': the 'view of self' (atma-drsti) and the 'view of what belongs to self' (atmiya-drsti). In detail, although satkaya-drsti encompasses the view of what belongs to self, looking at the current textual context, it does not take the category of the view of what belongs to self. Why is that? The answer is, since the two views have already been clarified, and it is asked, 'How do we know that only the sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana) arises together with it?' Since the question and answer are in relation to the seventh consciousness (manas), how could the seventh consciousness allow for the view of what belongs to self?
見。由此故疏第二解勝。
疏。以十種方便智至入者。入第七地十方便智。彼廣。不錄。
論。入十地至及所含藏者。問後後地中所有功德。前前地中頗亦得不 答亦許得。故瑜伽論四十八云。如是所說後後住中支分功德。非前前住一切都無。然下品故不隨其數。當知即彼展轉修習成中上品。于余后地證得成滿方乃建立。
論第十卷
疏。此中意說已斷處故者。問若約已斷煩惱亦應言如來位。若依正斷所知亦合在金剛心。何故不同 答大論二障據影略說。說彼二障一在金剛一如來地。亦不相違。
論。真見道中一切頓斷者。縱三心見道亦頓斷也。故瑜伽論五十九云。見斷煩惱頓斷非漸。所以者何。由現觀智諦現觀故。能斷見道所斷煩惱。然此現觀與壞緣諦作意相應。是故三心頓斷一切迷苦諦等見斷煩惱。
疏。尚不許九無間道入根本定等者。次第那含斷欲九品無間。皆依未至定起。
論。通緣內外至有眾多故者。有義彈疏而自釋云。今說通釋煩惱．所知六識俱者漸斷所以。如前第七雙釋二障頓斷所由。故知此文合解二障漸斷所以。不爾煩惱如何不釋 詳曰。第七二障頓斷無差。鄰次雙明頓斷所以。六識二障前後別明。就煩惱中小大有異小漸大頓。次明所知唯大唯漸。後方
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：見。因此，從這個角度來看，疏文的第二種解釋更為優勝。
疏文：以十種方便智至入者。指的是進入第七地時所具備的十種方便智。這些內容在其他地方有詳細闡述，這裡就不再贅述。
論：入十地至及所含藏者。問：在後后的地中所有的功德，在前前的地中是否也能獲得？答：也是允許獲得的。所以《瑜伽師地論》第四十八卷說：『像這樣所說的後後住（指後面的地）中的支分功德，並非前前住（指前面的地）中完全沒有。』然而因為是下品，所以不計入其數。應當知道，這些功德經過逐漸修習，成為中品和上品，在其餘後面的地中證得圓滿，才得以建立。
論第十卷
疏文：此中意說已斷處故者。問：如果按照已經斷除的煩惱來說，也應該說是如來位。如果依據正在斷除的所知障來說，也應該在金剛心位。為什麼不一樣呢？答：《大論》中關於二障的說法是簡略的。說這二障一個在金剛心位，一個在如來地，這並不矛盾。
論：真見道中一切頓斷者。即使是三心見道，也是頓斷的。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說：『見斷煩惱是頓斷，不是漸斷。』為什麼呢？因為現觀智是如實地觀照真諦的，能夠斷除見道所斷的煩惱。然而這種現觀與壞緣諦作意相應，因此三心頓斷一切迷苦諦等見斷煩惱。
疏文：尚不許九無間道入根本定等者。次第那含（Anagamin，不還果）斷除欲界九品煩惱的無間道，都是依據未至定而生起的。
論：通緣內外至有眾多故者。有一種觀點批評疏文並自行解釋說：現在所說的是通用於煩惱障和所知障，六識俱生的漸斷的原因。就像前面第七品中同時解釋二障頓斷的原因一樣。所以知道這段文字是合起來解釋二障漸斷的原因。否則，煩惱障為什麼不解釋呢？詳細地說，第七品中二障的頓斷沒有差別，緊接著同時說明頓斷的原因。六識的二障前後分別說明，就煩惱障來說，有小有大，小的漸斷，大的頓斷。接下來說明所知障只有大，只有漸斷。最後才...
【English Translation】 English version: See. Therefore, from this perspective, the second explanation in the commentary is superior.
Commentary: 'With ten kinds of expedient wisdom to enter' refers to the ten kinds of expedient wisdom possessed when entering the seventh Bhumi (ground). These contents are elaborated elsewhere and will not be repeated here.
Treatise: 'Entering the tenth Bhumi to and including what is contained' Question: Are the merits present in the later Bhumis also obtainable in the earlier Bhumis? Answer: It is permissible. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume 48, states: 'The qualities of the later abodes are not entirely absent from the earlier abodes.' However, because they are of inferior quality, they are not counted. It should be understood that these qualities, through gradual cultivation, become of medium and superior quality, and are established only when they are fully realized in the subsequent Bhumis.
Treatise, Volume 10
Commentary: 'The meaning here is that it is because the place has already been severed.' Question: If we speak in terms of already severed afflictions, shouldn't we also say the Tathagata (如來) position? If we rely on the actual severing of the jñeyavarana (所知障, obscuration of knowledge), shouldn't it also be at the Vajra-like Samadhi (金剛心, diamond mind)? Why is it different? Answer: The Mahayana-samgraha (大論, Compendium of Mahayana) speaks concisely about the two obscurations, saying that one is at the Vajra-like Samadhi and the other is at the Tathagata Bhumi. This is not contradictory.
Treatise: 'In the true path of seeing, everything is severed suddenly.' Even the three-moment path of seeing is a sudden severing. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 59, states: 'The afflictions to be severed by the path of seeing are severed suddenly, not gradually.' Why? Because the wisdom of direct perception directly perceives the truth, it can sever the afflictions to be severed by the path of seeing. However, this direct perception is associated with the mind's engagement with the destruction of the cause of suffering. Therefore, the three moments suddenly sever all afflictions to be severed by the path of seeing, such as delusion about the truth of suffering.
Commentary: 'It is not even permitted for the nine uninterrupted paths to enter fundamental samadhi, etc.' The nine uninterrupted paths by which an Anagamin (不還果, Non-Returner) gradually severs the nine grades of desire realm afflictions all arise based on the preliminary concentration (未至定, meditation before reaching the first dhyana).
Treatise: 'Universally connected with internal and external, there are many reasons.' One view criticizes the commentary and explains it themselves, saying: 'What is now being said is universally applicable to both the kleshavarana (煩惱障, affliction obscuration) and the jñeyavarana, and the gradual severing of the six consciousnesses together.' Just as in the seventh section, the reasons for the sudden severing of the two obscurations were explained simultaneously. Therefore, it is known that this passage is a combined explanation of the reasons for the gradual severing of the two obscurations. Otherwise, why is the kleshavarana not explained? In detail, in the seventh section, there is no difference in the sudden severing of the two obscurations, and the reasons for the sudden severing are explained simultaneously. The two obscurations of the six consciousnesses are explained separately in sequence. In terms of the kleshavarana, there are small and large, the small are gradually severed, and the large are suddenly severed. Next, it is explained that the jñeyavarana is only large and only gradually severed. Only then...
釋彼漸斷所以。文勢既隔何得通釋煩惱漸因。又煩惱障菩薩頓斷文已自彰。緣內外言如何顯頓反明漸耶。由斯但辨所知漸由示方隅爾。
論。必各別起無間等者。問四義云何 答按對法論第九說云。加行道者。謂由此道能捨煩惱。所以者何。由正修如是道時。能漸舍離各別上品等煩惱所生品類粗重一分漸得轉依。無間道者。謂由此道無間永斷煩惱令無所餘。所以者何。由此道無間能永除遣此品煩惱所生品類粗重令無有餘。又轉粗重依得無粗重。解脫道者。謂由此道證斷煩惱所得解脫。所以者何。由此道能證煩惱永斷所得轉依故。勝進道者。謂為斷余品煩惱所有加行．無間．解脫道是名勝進。所以者何。為斷此品后余煩惱所有加行．無間．解脫。望此品勝名勝進道 釋曰。所斷粗重即惑種子。或無堪任。所言轉依即第八識。能離識上一分粗重名之為得 或成實性亦為轉依。得義同前 又按俱舍說云。無間道者約斷惑得無能隔礙故 釋曰。由斷惑得令不至生。無有力能隔礙聖道令不證滅名無間道 由解脫道已至生相決定現起能證滅故。已解脫惑得與離系得俱時起故 釋曰。已解脫得與離系得俱時而生。正證離系果故名解脫。猶如世間驅賊閉戶。故隨何品要俱二道。與大乘別。如前斷惑證滅別辨。
疏。此依容
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：請解釋『漸斷』（逐步斷除）的含義。既然文義已經分隔，如何能貫通解釋煩惱的漸進成因？而且，關於煩惱障，菩薩頓悟斷除的說法已經很明確了，緣起于內外之說，又如何能顯示頓悟，反而闡明漸悟呢？因此，只能辨析所知障是逐步斷除的，這只是指明了一個方面而已。 論：必須各自生起無間道等。問：四道的含義是什麼？答：按照《對法論》第九卷所說：『加行道』（preparation path）是指通過此道能夠捨棄煩惱。為什麼呢？因為在正確修習此道時，能夠逐漸舍離各個上品等煩惱所生的品類粗重（kilesa parikilesa，煩惱的粗重部分）的一部分，逐漸獲得轉依（āśraya-parivṛtti，轉變所依）。『無間道』（path of immediate release）是指通過此道無間斷除煩惱，使其沒有剩餘。為什麼呢？因為此道能夠無間地永遠去除此品煩惱所生的品類粗重，使其沒有剩餘。並且，轉變粗重，所依獲得無粗重。『解脫道』（path of deliverance）是指通過此道證得斷除煩惱所獲得的解脫。為什麼呢？因為此道能夠證得煩惱永斷所獲得的轉依。『勝進道』（path of surpassing progress）是指爲了斷除其餘品類煩惱的所有加行道、無間道、解脫道，這被稱為勝進道。為什麼呢？爲了斷除此品之後的其餘煩惱，所有的加行道、無間道、解脫道，相對於此品來說，被稱為勝進道。』釋曰：所斷的粗重就是迷惑的種子，或者說是無堪能性。所說的轉依就是第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識），能夠脫離識上的一部分粗重，這被稱為獲得。或者成就實性也作為轉依，獲得的含義與前面相同。又按照《俱舍論》所說：『無間道』是指就斷除迷惑而言，獲得沒有能夠隔礙的緣故。釋曰：由於斷除迷惑而獲得，使之不至於產生。沒有力量能夠隔礙聖道，使之不能證得寂滅，這被稱為無間道。由於解脫道已經到達生相決定現起，能夠證得寂滅的緣故。已經解脫惑得與離系得同時生起。釋曰：已經解脫的獲得與離系的獲得同時產生，正在證得離系果的緣故，這被稱為解脫。猶如世間驅趕盜賊，關閉門戶。所以無論哪一品，都要具備兩種道。這與大乘有所區別。如前所述，斷除迷惑，證得寂滅，要分別辨析。 疏：這是依據容易理解的說法。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Please explain the meaning of 'gradual cessation' (gradual elimination). Since the meaning of the text is already separated, how can it be connected to explain the gradual cause of afflictions? Moreover, regarding the affliction obstacle, the statement that Bodhisattvas achieve sudden enlightenment and eliminate it is already clear. How can the theory of arising from internal and external causes show sudden enlightenment and instead clarify gradual enlightenment? Therefore, it can only be analyzed that the knowledge obstacle is gradually eliminated, which only indicates one aspect. Treatise: It is necessary for each to arise separately with the path of immediate release, etc. Question: What are the meanings of the four paths? Answer: According to the ninth volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), the 'preparation path' (加行道, prayogamārga) refers to the path through which one can abandon afflictions. Why? Because when correctly practicing this path, one can gradually abandon a portion of the coarse burdens (粗重, audārika) of the categories produced by the various superior afflictions, and gradually attain the transformation of the basis (轉依, āśraya-parivṛtti). The 'path of immediate release' (無間道, ānantaryamārga) refers to the path through which afflictions are immediately eliminated without any remainder. Why? Because this path can immediately and permanently remove the coarse burdens of the categories produced by this type of affliction, leaving nothing remaining. Furthermore, the coarse burdens are transformed, and the basis attains freedom from coarse burdens. The 'path of deliverance' (解脫道, vimuktimārga) refers to the liberation attained through this path by realizing the cessation of afflictions. Why? Because this path can realize the transformation of the basis attained through the permanent cessation of afflictions. The 'path of surpassing progress' (勝進道, viśeṣamārga) refers to all the preparation paths, paths of immediate release, and paths of deliverance for eliminating the remaining categories of afflictions, which are called the path of surpassing progress. Why? Because all the preparation paths, paths of immediate release, and paths of deliverance for eliminating the remaining afflictions after this type are called the path of surpassing progress relative to this type.' Explanation: The coarse burdens to be eliminated are the seeds of delusion, or the lack of capacity. The transformation of the basis refers to the eighth consciousness (第八識, ālayavijñāna), which can detach from a portion of the coarse burdens on the consciousness, which is called attainment. Or the accomplishment of true nature is also regarded as the transformation of the basis, and the meaning of attainment is the same as before. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Abhidharma), the 'path of immediate release' refers to the fact that, in terms of eliminating delusion, attainment has no obstruction. Explanation: Because of the attainment through eliminating delusion, it does not lead to arising. There is no power that can obstruct the noble path, preventing it from realizing cessation, which is called the path of immediate release. Because the path of deliverance has already reached the stage where the appearance of arising is definitely manifested, it can realize cessation. The attainment of liberation from affliction arises simultaneously with the attainment of separation. Explanation: The attainment of liberation already arises simultaneously with the attainment of separation, and it is precisely because one is realizing the fruit of separation that it is called liberation. It is like driving away thieves and closing the door in the world. Therefore, no matter which type, both paths must be present. This is different from Mahayana. As mentioned earlier, the elimination of delusion and the realization of cessation must be analyzed separately. Commentary: This is based on an easily understandable explanation.
預不爾便違對法者。容預勝進而即別起。非容預者以彼后品加行．無間．解脫三道為勝進道。對法說故違意可知。
疏。若別別斷至故具四道者。談體一智。據義不同分為四道。容預．欣求即是勝進．加行義也。
疏。即是別別望前有也者。此顯彼論據于菩薩別起道說。故言后三是前勝進。與此論別。
疏。又云至即二乘者。復會對法。后明勝進依二乘說。按彼論云。又復棄捨斷煩惱加行。或勤方便思惟諸法。或勤加行安住諸法。或進修餘三摩缽底諸所有道名勝進道。釋論云。又復者為顯余義。舍斷煩惱諸加行道。但正思惟契經等法。或復于先所思所證法中安住觀察。或復進入余勝品定。諸如是等名勝進道 釋曰。明非斷惑諸勝進道。簡彼斷惑勝進道。故云棄捨斷煩惱行。余文可量。
疏。或總通三乘者。重明對法兩文皆通三乘說也。
疏。今此既論至是前勝進者。顯此論說二乘勝進。言或總者同彼對法后品三道皆前勝進。
疏。若不爾至勝進者故者。又顯此論或總別言不同對法望后品說。若不爾者初品以後所有品道皆勝於前。此即無有不起若別若總二勝進道。既不如是明不同彼。或總言顯是不定也。義如疏辨。對法不言或總別故。容有不起勝進道時。
疏。得十意樂平
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果不是這樣，那就違背了《對法論》的觀點。《對法論》認為，容預（Rongyu，準備道）勝進之後，會另外生起（新的道）。而非容預的情況，是因為《對法論》認為，后品的加行道（Jiaxingdao，方便道）、無間道（Wujiandao，無間解脫道）和解脫道（Jietuo Dao，解脫道）這三種道是勝進道。《對法論》是這樣說的，否則就違背了它的意思，這是可以理解的。
疏：如果別別斷除，以至於具足四道，那麼談論的是體性唯一的智慧。根據意義的不同，可以分為四道。容預和欣求（Xinqiu，欣求道）就是勝進和加行的意義。
疏：就是別別地相對於前一階段而言。這表明《對法論》是根據菩薩另外生起道來說的。所以說后三道是前一階段的勝進，這與本論不同。
疏：又說，乃至是二乘。這是再次對照《對法論》。後面說明勝進是依據二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）來說的。按照《對法論》的說法，『又捨棄斷除煩惱的加行，或者勤奮方便地思維諸法，或者勤奮加行地安住諸法，或者進修其餘三摩缽底（Sanmabodi，等持，禪定）的所有道，名為勝進道。』釋論說，『又』是爲了顯示其餘的意義。捨棄斷除煩惱的各種加行道，只是如實地思維契經等法。或者對於先前所思維所證悟的法安住觀察。或者進入其餘殊勝的禪定。諸如此類的都叫做勝進道。解釋說：說明不是斷除迷惑的各種勝進道，簡別于斷除迷惑的勝進道。所以說捨棄斷除煩惱的修行，其餘的文字可以類推。
疏：或者總的來說，通於三乘。這是再次說明《對法論》的兩段文字都通於三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）來說的。
疏：現在這裡既然討論乃至是前一階段的勝進。顯示本論說的是二乘的勝進。說『或者總的來說』，是說和《對法論》一樣，后品的三道都是前一階段的勝進。
疏：如果不這樣，乃至是勝進的緣故。又顯示本論或者總說或者別說，不同於《對法論》相對於后品來說。如果不這樣，初品以後的所有品道都勝於前一階段。這樣就沒有不生起（勝進道）的情況了，無論是別說還是總說兩種勝進道。既然不是這樣，就說明不同於《對法論》。或者總說，顯示是不一定的。意義如疏文所辨。因為《對法論》沒有說或者總說或者別說，所以容許有不生起勝進道的時候。
疏：得到十種意樂平等。
【English Translation】 English version: If it were not so, it would contradict the Abhidharma (Duifa Lun, Treatise on Abhidharma). The Abhidharma believes that after Rongyu (preparation path) advances, another (new path) will arise. In the case of non-Rongyu, it is because the Abhidharma believes that the three paths of Jiaxingdao (path of application), Wujiandao (path of immediate release), and Jietuo Dao (path of liberation) in the later chapter are the paths of advancement. The Abhidharma says so, otherwise it would contradict its meaning, which is understandable.
Commentary: If one separately cuts off, to the point of possessing the four paths, then it is discussing the wisdom of a single essence. According to the difference in meaning, it can be divided into four paths. Rongyu and Xinqiu (path of aspiration) are the meaning of advancement and application.
Commentary: It is separately in relation to the previous stage. This shows that the Abhidharma is based on the Bodhisattva separately arising paths. Therefore, it is said that the latter three paths are the advancement of the previous stage, which is different from this treatise.
Commentary: It also says, even to the point of being the Two Vehicles (Shravaka Vehicle and Pratyekabuddha Vehicle). This is again comparing with the Abhidharma. The following explains that advancement is based on the Two Vehicles. According to the Abhidharma, 'Also abandoning the application of cutting off afflictions, or diligently and skillfully contemplating all dharmas, or diligently applying and abiding in all dharmas, or advancing and cultivating the remaining Samadhis (concentration, meditation) of all paths, is called the path of advancement.' The commentary says, 'Also' is to show the remaining meaning. Abandoning the various application paths of cutting off afflictions, only truly contemplating the Sutras and other dharmas. Or abiding and observing in the dharmas previously contemplated and realized. Or entering the remaining superior Samadhis. All such are called the path of advancement. Explanation: Explaining that it is not the various paths of advancement of cutting off delusions, distinguishing from the paths of advancement of cutting off delusions. Therefore, it is said to abandon the practice of cutting off afflictions, and the remaining text can be inferred.
Commentary: Or generally speaking, it applies to the Three Vehicles. This is again explaining that both passages of the Abhidharma apply to the Three Vehicles (Shravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle).
Commentary: Now that we are discussing even to the point of being the advancement of the previous stage. It shows that this treatise speaks of the advancement of the Two Vehicles. Saying 'or generally speaking' means that, like the Abhidharma, the three paths of the later chapter are all the advancement of the previous stage.
Commentary: If it were not so, even to the point of being the reason for advancement. It also shows that this treatise either speaks generally or separately, which is different from the Abhidharma in relation to the later chapter. If it were not so, all paths after the initial chapter would be superior to the previous stage. In this way, there would be no case of not arising (the path of advancement), whether it is the separate or general two paths of advancement. Since it is not so, it shows that it is different from the Abhidharma. Or generally speaking, it shows that it is uncertain. The meaning is as explained in the commentary. Because the Abhidharma does not say either generally or separately, it allows for the time when the path of advancement does not arise.
Commentary: Obtaining the equality of the ten kinds of joy.
等凈心者。按十地論第七經云。一過去佛平等染凈心。二未來佛。三現在佛。四戒凈。五心凈。六除見疑悔凈。七道非道智凈。八行斷智凈。九思量一切菩提分法上上凈。十化度一切眾生凈。彼論解云。于平等中心得清凈。是諸佛法及隨順諸佛法。謂初三世佛十力等是即諸佛法。餘七隨順諸佛法也。佛法因此戒．定．智惠化眾產生。戒即第四。定是第五。六．七．八．九總智凈攝 釋曰。於三寶所離疑惑心。知佛所說道能出離。外道非道不能出離。又謂我應斷下．中行而為發起上妙聖行。如次。是彼六．七．八相。
疏。不行契經等種種法相中者。由知法無相故。不以有相行。于契經等種種法相中。觀契經等為有相也。
論。八不增減真如等者。如疏具辨。攝論中邊與此同異。有義自釋。復彈疏云。初應正同世親所說。義無別故。無性后釋亦與此同。不可如疏說此彼別 詳曰。乍觀似同。窮理少異。攝論直據斷染得凈明無增減。此約離執明無增減。即同中邊。由證此如而離於執。不見一法而有增減。舉彼所見不增減法以顯真如。不增減之真如。依主釋也。以此而言疏意遠矣。
論。即此亦名相土自在等者。問此相自在即中邊論四自在中無分別攝。何故此相名無分別 答無分別智之所起故從因為名。
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "『等凈心』是指平等清凈的心。根據《十地論》第七經所說，有十種清凈心：一、過去佛平等染凈心；二、未來佛平等染凈心；三、現在佛平等染凈心；四、戒凈（持戒清凈）；五、心凈（心性清凈）；六、除見疑悔凈（去除錯誤的見解、疑惑和後悔）；七、道非道智凈（辨別正道與非道的智慧清凈）；八、行斷智凈（通過修行斷除煩惱的智慧清凈）；九、思量一切菩提分法上上凈（對所有菩提分法進行思量並不斷提升的清凈）；十、化度一切眾生凈（教化和度化一切眾生的清凈）。", "《十地論》解釋說：『在平等心中獲得清凈，是諸佛的法以及隨順諸佛的法。』所謂初三世佛（過去佛、未來佛、現在佛）的十力等，就是諸佛的法。其餘七種清凈心是隨順諸佛的法。佛法因此通過戒、定、智慧來教化眾生而成。戒就是第四種清凈心（戒凈），定是第五種清凈心（心凈）。第六、第七、第八、第九種清凈心總歸屬於智慧清凈。", "解釋：對於三寶（佛、法、僧）所產生的遠離疑惑的心，知道佛所說的道理能夠使人解脫，而外道所說的非正道不能使人解脫。又認為我應該斷除下等和中等的行為，從而發起上等和微妙的聖行。這些依次是第六、第七、第八種清凈心的表現。", "", "疏：『不行契經等種種法相中』，是因為知道法的無相本質，所以不以有相的方式修行。在契經等種種法相中，觀察契經等是有相的。", "", "論：『八不增減真如等』，如疏中詳細辨析。《攝大乘論》、《中邊分別論》與此處的同異之處，有義自作解釋。又反駁疏文說：『最初應該完全與世親（Vasubandhu）所說的相同，因為意義沒有差別。』無性（Asanga）後來的解釋也與此相同，不能像疏文所說的那樣認為此處與彼處不同。", "詳細解釋：乍一看似乎相同，但深入探究則略有不同。《攝大乘論》直接根據斷除染污而獲得清凈來說明沒有增減。此處是根據遠離執著來說明沒有增減，即與《中邊分別論》相同。由於證悟了這個真如（Tathata）而遠離執著，所以不見一法有增減。舉出他們所見的不增減法來顯示真如。『不增減之真如』，是依主釋。因此而言，疏文的意義就顯得比較遠了。", "", "論：『即此亦名相土自在等』，問：此相自在（Laksana-vasita）即《中邊分別論》四自在中無分別攝，為什麼此相名為無分別？答：因為無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana）所生起，所以從因立名。", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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此論言相依果受稱。故不相違。
論。有漏曾習等者。問何以曾習不能斷惑 答言曾習者是曾得也。此曾習道若能斷者。既應二障無始不成。以能治道先已起故。雖道曾得而障不亡。故知曾習非能斷也。
疏。然約緣縛至可說地斷者。顯所知障而不可說上下自他斷差別也。以非相應．所緣等縛不同惑障。
疏。此即在下斷上至非縛法故者。此言即此所知障也。言非潤生非縛法者。顯異煩惱。故在上下隨斷下上。理無有違。
疏。又解至類亦應然者。類同煩惱斷有次第。
疏。即二障至各有四句者。以所知障類同煩惱斷有次第。故所知障六七相望亦成四句。四句作法同煩惱說。但易其名思可知也。
論。一切有情至可言具四者。問無住涅槃菩薩證不 答傳有兩釋。一曰不得。此論說云出所知障而證得故。若爾攝論云何會耶。彼謂菩薩有無住故 解云。無住涅槃由菩薩證非彼已得。如修習位說得轉依非已得故。二云許得。分斷所知所顯真如悲智依故 有義斷云。今依前解說出煩惱得有餘依要全出離。說出所知得無住處明非因得 詳曰。后釋為勝。言出所知而有二義。一者全出名之為出。此舉勝者影顯菩薩。如有餘依舉二乘者以顯于佛。二者分．全俱名為出。亦如三乘見．修．無學三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此論點說明，現象的產生依賴於相應的因果關係，因此，這種說法並不矛盾。
論：『有漏曾習等者』。問：為什麼曾經修習過的（道）不能斷除迷惑？答：『曾習者』指的是曾經獲得（道）。如果這種曾經修習的道能夠斷除迷惑，那麼二障（煩惱障和所知障）就不應該從無始以來就存在，因為能夠對治二障的道早就已經生起了。雖然道曾經被獲得，但障礙並沒有消失，因此可知曾經的修習並不能斷除迷惑。
疏：『然約緣縛至可說地斷者』，這表明所知障的斷除，其上下自他的差別是不可言說的。因為（所知障的）非相應、所緣等束縛，與煩惱障不同。
疏：『此即在下斷上至非縛法故者』，這裡所說的『此』，指的就是所知障。『言非潤生非縛法者』，表明所知障不同於煩惱。因此，在（不同層次）上下斷除（所知障），並不會有衝突。
疏：『又解至類亦應然者』，（所知障的）類別如同煩惱，斷除也有次第。
疏：『即二障至各有四句者』，因為所知障的類別如同煩惱，斷除也有次第，所以所知障的六七（地）相互比較，也能形成四句。四句的運作方式與煩惱的說法相同，只是改變了名稱，可以思考理解。
論：『一切有情至可言具四者』。問：無住涅槃（nirvana without remainder）菩薩（Bodhisattva）是否證得？答：傳承有兩種解釋。一種說法是不得證。此論說，（佛）出離所知障才能證得。如果這樣，攝論（《攝大乘論》）又該如何解釋呢？攝論認為菩薩有無住涅槃。解釋說，無住涅槃是由菩薩證得，並非菩薩已經獲得。如同修習位說獲得轉依（轉變所依），並非已經獲得。另一種說法是允許證得。因為（菩薩）分斷所知障所顯現的真如（tathata）、悲智（karuna-jnana）作為所依。有人認為，現在依照前一種解釋，說出離煩惱才能獲得有餘依（nirvana with remainder），要完全出離（煩惱）才能獲得。說出離所知障才能獲得無住處，表明（無住涅槃）並非由因獲得。詳細分析說，后一種解釋更為殊勝。『言出所知』有兩種含義。一是完全出離，稱之為出。這是舉出殊勝者，影射菩薩。如有餘依舉二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）者，是爲了彰顯佛。二是分斷和全斷都稱為出。也如同三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）的見道位、修道位、無學位三種。
【English Translation】 English version: This argument states that phenomena arise dependent on corresponding cause and effect, therefore, this statement is not contradictory.
Treatise: 'Those with outflows who have previously practiced, etc.' Question: Why can't what has been previously practiced sever afflictions? Answer: 'Previously practiced' refers to having previously attained (the path). If this previously practiced path could sever afflictions, then the two obscurations (afflictive obscuration and cognitive obscuration) should not have existed since beginningless time, because the path that can counteract the two obscurations would have already arisen. Although the path has been previously attained, the obstructions have not disappeared, therefore it is known that previous practice cannot sever afflictions.
Commentary: 'However, regarding the bondage of conditions up to the severing at the level that can be spoken of,' this shows that the differences in severing the cognitive obscuration, in terms of above and below, self and other, are inexpressible. Because the non-associated, object-related, and other bondages (of the cognitive obscuration) are different from the afflictive obscurations.
Commentary: 'This, namely severing the above while being below, up to the reason that it is not a binding dharma,' this statement refers to the cognitive obscuration. 'Saying it does not moisten rebirth and is not a binding dharma' shows that it is different from afflictions. Therefore, severing the above while being below, there is no contradiction in principle.
Commentary: 'Also, explaining up to the category should also be so,' the category is similar to afflictions, and severing has a sequence.
Commentary: 'Namely, the two obscurations up to each having four phrases,' because the category of cognitive obscuration is similar to afflictions, and severing has a sequence, therefore the sixth and seventh (grounds) of the cognitive obscuration, when compared to each other, can also form four phrases. The way the four phrases operate is the same as the explanation of afflictions, only the names are changed, which can be understood through contemplation.
Treatise: 'All sentient beings up to it can be said to possess four,' Question: Do Bodhisattvas attain nirvana without remainder? Answer: There are two interpretations in the transmission. One says they do not attain it. This treatise says that (Buddhas) attain it by emerging from the cognitive obscuration. If so, how should the Mahāyānasaṃgraha be explained? It considers that Bodhisattvas have nirvana without remainder. The explanation is that nirvana without remainder is attained by Bodhisattvas, but not already obtained by them. Just as the stage of cultivation says that obtaining the transformation of the basis is not already obtained. The second says it is permissible to attain it. Because (Bodhisattvas) partially sever the cognitive obscuration, the thusness (tathata) manifested, compassion and wisdom (karuna-jnana) serve as the basis. Some argue that, according to the former explanation, emerging from afflictions is said to obtain nirvana with remainder, and complete emergence (from afflictions) is required to obtain it. Saying that emerging from the cognitive obscuration obtains the place without remainder indicates that (nirvana without remainder) is not obtained through causes. Detailed analysis says that the latter explanation is superior. 'Saying emerging from the cognitive obscuration' has two meanings. One is complete emergence, which is called emergence. This highlights the superior ones, alluding to Bodhisattvas. Just as nirvana with remainder is mentioned for the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) to highlight the Buddha. The second is that both partial and complete severing are called emergence. It is also like the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna)'s paths of seeing, cultivation, and no more learning.
無漏道俱名出世。由此有餘言障永寂。無住不爾。若要障盡亦應同彼言障永寂。既不如之。故與前別不可為例。又由悲智不住於二。所證之理名無住處。五地既斷背于生死樂涅槃愚。而由證彼無差別理。此豈不名無住之義。況乃攝論明言有也。豈隨己情強通聖教。
論。若聲聞等至說彼非有者。按勝鬘經云。阿羅漢．辟支佛有餘生法不盡故有生者 釋曰。明我生已盡智不究竟。即知苦智。知苦智二。一知分段。二知變易。二乘斷初未斷變易故言有生 有餘梵行成故不純者 釋曰。梵行已立不究竟也。即證滅智。涅槃名梵。證梵之因名為梵行。梵行有二。一分段因盡顯有餘依。分段果盡顯無餘依。二變易果盡顯無餘依。無漏依在顯有餘依。二乘定姓及不定姓。於前一中得有全分不得第二。雖有所成而為變易因果所雜故名不純。事不究竟故當有所作者 釋曰。所作已辦不究竟也。是修道智。修道有二。一治分段。二治變易。二乘但修分段對治。余治未修故事不究竟。事不究竟故當有所作 不度彼故當有所斷者 釋曰。不受後有不究竟也。是斷集智。所斷有二。一分段因。二變易因。二乘斷初第二因名不度彼。不度彼故當必須斷 不斷彼故去涅槃界遠者 釋曰。由前四智皆不究竟故。去如來大涅槃遠。舉第四智顯前三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無漏道（無煩惱的修行道路）都稱為出世間法。因此，有餘涅槃可以說煩惱永遠寂滅。但無住涅槃不是這樣。如果想要煩惱斷盡，也應該像有餘涅槃一樣煩惱永遠寂滅。既然不是這樣，所以和前者不同，不能作為例子。而且，由於佛陀的悲心和智慧，不住于生死和涅槃兩邊，所證悟的道理稱為無住處涅槃。五地菩薩已經斷除了背離生死、貪戀涅槃的愚癡，並且證悟了生死和涅槃無差別的道理，這難道不稱為無住的意義嗎？更何況《攝大乘論》明確說明有無住涅槃。怎麼能隨自己的想法強行解釋聖教呢？
論：如果聲聞乘等認為沒有無住涅槃，那麼根據《勝鬘經》說：『阿羅漢（斷盡煩惱的聖者）、辟支佛（獨自悟道的聖者）還有剩餘的生命現象沒有斷盡，所以還有生死。』 釋：說明『我生已盡』的智慧不究竟。也就是知苦智（瞭解痛苦的智慧）不究竟。知苦智有兩種：一是瞭解分段生死（由善惡業力導致的輪迴），二是瞭解變易生死（菩薩因願力而示現的生死）。二乘聖者斷除了分段生死，但沒有斷除變易生死，所以說還有生死。
『有餘梵行成故不純者』 釋：梵行（清凈的行為）已經建立，但不究竟。也就是證滅智（證悟寂滅的智慧）不究竟。涅槃稱為梵，證悟涅槃的原因稱為梵行。梵行有兩種：一是分段生死的因斷盡，顯現有餘依涅槃（仍有身體和感覺的涅槃）；分段生死的果報斷盡，顯現無餘依涅槃（沒有身體和感覺的涅槃）。二是變易生死的果報斷盡，顯現無餘依涅槃。無漏的依存在，顯現有餘依涅槃。二乘的定性聲聞和不定性聲聞，在前一種情況中可以得到全分，但在第二種情況中不能得到。雖然有所成就，但被變易生死的因果所混雜，所以稱為不純。
『事不究竟故當有所作者』 釋：所作已辦（該做的已經做完）不究竟。這是修道智（修行的智慧）不究竟。修道有兩種：一是治理分段生死，二是治理變易生死。二乘聖者只修了分段生死的對治，其餘的對治沒有修，所以事情不究竟。事情不究竟，所以應當有所作為。
『不度彼故當有所斷者』 釋：不受後有（不再接受未來的生命）不究竟。這是斷集智（斷除煩惱的智慧）不究竟。所斷的有兩種：一是分段生死的因，二是變易生死的因。二乘聖者斷除了第一種因，第二種因稱為不度彼。不度彼，所以應當必須斷除。
『不斷彼故去涅槃界遠者』 釋：由於前面的四種智慧都不究竟，所以距離如來的大涅槃很遠。這裡舉出第四種智慧，是爲了顯示前面的三種智慧也不究竟。
【English Translation】 English version: The unconditioned path (the path of practice without afflictions) is entirely called supramundane. Therefore, it can be said that in Nirvana with remainder, afflictions are eternally extinguished. But Nirvana without remainder is not like this. If one wants to completely extinguish afflictions, it should also be like Nirvana with remainder, where afflictions are eternally extinguished. Since it is not like that, it is different from the former and cannot be taken as an example. Moreover, due to the Buddha's compassion and wisdom, not dwelling in either Samsara or Nirvana, the principle realized is called Nirvana without fixed abode. The Bodhisattvas of the Fifth Ground have already severed the ignorance of turning away from Samsara and clinging to Nirvana, and have realized the principle of non-difference between Samsara and Nirvana. Isn't this called the meaning of non-abiding? Moreover, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha clearly states that there is Nirvana without fixed abode. How can one forcibly interpret the holy teachings according to one's own ideas?
Treatise: If the Śrāvakayāna (the Vehicle of Hearers) and others say that there is no Nirvana without fixed abode, then according to the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra: 'Arhats (saints who have extinguished all afflictions) and Pratyekabuddhas (saints who attain enlightenment independently) still have remaining life phenomena that have not been completely extinguished, so they still have birth and death.' Explanation: It explains that the wisdom of 'birth is exhausted' is not complete. That is, the duḥkha-jñāna (wisdom of suffering) is not complete. There are two types of duḥkha-jñāna: one is understanding saṃsāra (cyclic existence) of segments (caused by good and bad karma), and the other is understanding saṃsāra of transformation (manifested by Bodhisattvas due to vows). The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have cut off saṃsāra of segments, but have not cut off saṃsāra of transformation, so it is said that there is still birth and death.
'Because the remaining brahmacarya (pure conduct) is accomplished, it is impure.' Explanation: Brahmacarya (pure conduct) has been established, but it is not complete. That is, the nirodha-jñāna (wisdom of cessation) is not complete. Nirvana is called brahman, and the cause of realizing Nirvana is called brahmacarya. There are two types of brahmacarya: one is that the cause of saṃsāra of segments is exhausted, revealing Nirvana with remainder (Nirvana with a body and feelings); the result of saṃsāra of segments is exhausted, revealing Nirvana without remainder (Nirvana without a body and feelings). The second is that the result of saṃsāra of transformation is exhausted, revealing Nirvana without remainder. The unconditioned basis exists, revealing Nirvana with remainder. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas of fixed nature and unfixed nature can obtain the full share in the former case, but cannot obtain it in the second case. Although there is some accomplishment, it is mixed with the cause and effect of saṃsāra of transformation, so it is called impure.
'Because the matter is not complete, there is something to be done.' Explanation: 'What has to be done is done' is not complete. This is the mārga-jñāna (wisdom of the path) is not complete. There are two types of practice: one is to treat saṃsāra of segments, and the other is to treat saṃsāra of transformation. The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas only practice the treatment of saṃsāra of segments, and the remaining treatments have not been practiced, so the matter is not complete. Because the matter is not complete, there should be something to be done.
'Because they do not cross over that, there is something to be cut off.' Explanation: Not accepting future existence is not complete. This is the samudaya-jñāna (wisdom of origination) is not complete. There are two types of what is to be cut off: one is the cause of saṃsāra of segments, and the other is the cause of saṃsāra of transformation. The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have cut off the first cause, and the second cause is called not crossing over that. Because they do not cross over that, they should necessarily cut it off.
'Because they do not cut off that, they are far from the realm of Nirvana.' Explanation: Because the previous four wisdoms are not complete, they are far from the great Nirvana of the Tathāgata (Thus-Gone One). Here, the fourth wisdom is mentioned to show that the previous three wisdoms are also not complete.
智。
論。非擇滅攝說暫離故者。即顯揚論十八中雲。謂非擇滅等四種離系者。謂緣差脫畢竟離系。簡擇煩惱究竟離系。苦樂系時離系。心心法暫時離系。釋非擇．擇滅．不動．想受如次為四。后二既雲系時離系。明是四中非擇滅攝。
疏。對法至不可為難者。此遮伏難。伏難意云。按對法雲。有二種應斷法。謂諸煩惱及此所依受。受有二種。謂變異及不變異。如其次第苦樂非苦樂。當知煩惱斷故建立擇滅。二受斷故如其次第建立不動及想受滅。既云斷受得二無為。二無為者如何。不是擇滅攝耶。疏意釋者種斷現息俱名為斷。受等據現暫爾不行。若不爾者于擇滅中。何不攝彼不動．想受。既開不攝。明非擇也。
疏。不同有漏等者。遮小宗救。小宗救云。汝大乘宗有漏斷惑亦但非擇。何責我斷不染無知得非擇滅。答意易詳。
論。攝觀無量等者。一釋如疏。有義觀者觀名。即念住等。此能任持念住觀故。佛地論說。若就粗相妙觀察智攝。四念住觀察一切身土等法 詳曰。理既多途。二義俱得。
疏。今說因果位通者。今者說通因果二位。俱二十二。尋．伺唯因不通果有。故不言之。
論。此轉有漏八七六五等者。問莊嚴論頌云。八．七．五．六識。如次而得故。即轉五識得妙觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 智。
論：『非擇滅攝說暫離故』，出自《顯揚論》第十八卷，其中提到：『所謂的非擇滅等四種離系，是指緣差脫的畢竟離系，簡擇煩惱的究竟離系，苦樂系時的離系，以及心心法暫時離系。』這裡將非擇滅、擇滅、不動滅、想受滅依次分為四種。後兩者既然說是『系時離系』，就表明這四種情況屬於非擇滅所攝。
疏：『對法至不可為難者』，這是爲了駁斥一種詰難。詰難的意思是：按照《對法論》的說法，有兩種應該斷除的法，即各種煩惱以及煩惱所依之受。受有兩種，即變異受和不變異受，分別對應苦樂受和非苦樂受。應當知道，斷除煩惱就建立了擇滅，斷除二受就分別建立了不動滅和想受滅。既然說斷除受可以得到兩種無為法，那麼這兩種無為法怎麼不是擇滅所攝呢？疏文的解釋是，徹底斷除（煩惱）和暫時止息（受）都可以稱為斷。受等是根據其暫時的不行用而說的。如果不是這樣，為什麼在擇滅中不包括不動滅和想受滅呢？既然分開不包括，就表明它們屬於非擇滅。
疏：『不同有漏等者』，這是爲了駁斥小乘宗的辯解。小乘宗辯解說：你們大乘宗斷除有漏惑也只是非擇滅，為什麼責備我們斷除不染無知而得到非擇滅呢？回答的含義很容易理解。
論：『攝觀無量等者』，一種解釋如疏文所說。另一種解釋是，觀就是觀想之名，即念住等。這能任持念住觀想，所以《佛地論》說，如果就粗相妙觀察智所攝而言，四念住可以觀察一切身土等法。詳細地說，道理有很多方面，兩種解釋都可以成立。
疏：『今說因果位通者』，這裡說的是因位和果位都通達，都是二十二種。尋和伺只在因位有，不在果位有，所以沒有提到。
論：『此轉有漏八七六五等者』，有人問，《莊嚴論》的偈頌說：『八、七、五、六識，如次而得故』，意思是說轉五識可以得到妙觀察智。
【English Translation】 English version: Wisdom.
Treatise: 'The statement that non-selective cessation is included because of temporary separation' is from the eighteenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, which states: 'The so-called four kinds of separation from bondage, such as non-selective cessation, refer to the ultimate separation from bondage due to differences in conditions, the ultimate separation from bondage through the selection of afflictions, the separation from bondage during the time of suffering and pleasure, and the temporary separation from bondage of mental and mental factors.' Here, non-selective cessation, selective cessation, immovable cessation, and cessation of perception and feeling are sequentially divided into four types. Since the latter two are said to be 'separation from bondage during the time of bondage,' it indicates that these four situations are included in non-selective cessation.
Commentary: 'The Abhidharma to the point where it is not difficult to challenge' is to refute a certain challenge. The meaning of the challenge is: According to the Abhidharma, there are two types of dharmas that should be eliminated, namely, all kinds of afflictions and the feelings on which these afflictions depend. There are two types of feelings, namely, changing feelings and unchanging feelings, corresponding to feelings of suffering and pleasure and feelings of neither suffering nor pleasure, respectively. It should be known that eliminating afflictions establishes selective cessation, and eliminating the two types of feelings establishes immovable cessation and cessation of perception and feeling, respectively. Since it is said that eliminating feelings can attain two unconditioned dharmas, how can these two unconditioned dharmas not be included in selective cessation? The commentary explains that completely eliminating (afflictions) and temporarily ceasing (feelings) can both be called elimination. Feelings, etc., are spoken of based on their temporary non-functioning. If this were not the case, why are immovable cessation and cessation of perception and feeling not included in selective cessation? Since they are separated and not included, it indicates that they belong to non-selective cessation.
Commentary: 'Different from the defiled, etc.' is to refute the explanation of the Hīnayāna school. The Hīnayāna school argues: Your Mahāyāna school's elimination of defiled delusions is also just non-selective cessation, so why do you blame us for attaining non-selective cessation by eliminating undefiled ignorance? The meaning of the answer is easy to understand.
Treatise: 'Including immeasurable contemplation, etc.' One explanation is as stated in the commentary. Another explanation is that contemplation is the name of contemplation, i.e., the smṛtyupasthānas (foundations of mindfulness), etc. This can uphold the contemplation of the smṛtyupasthānas, so the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says that if it is included in the subtle wisdom of observing coarse characteristics, the four smṛtyupasthānas can observe all dharmas such as body and land. In detail, there are many aspects to the principle, and both explanations can be established.
Commentary: 'Now it is said that the cause and effect positions are both accessible' refers to both the cause position and the effect position being accessible, both being twenty-two types. Vitarka (initial application of thought) and vicāra (sustained application of thought) only exist in the cause position and not in the effect position, so they are not mentioned.
Treatise: 'This transforms the defiled eight, seven, six, five, etc.' Someone asks, the verse in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The eight, seven, five, six consciousnesses are attained in sequence,' meaning that transforming the five consciousnesses can attain adbhutadarśana-jñāna (wisdom of wonderful observation).
察。如何相違 答佛地第三有二師釋。正義同此。第二師云。轉第六識得成事作智。轉五現識得妙觀察。正義破云。此不應爾。非次第故。說法除疑周遍觀察非五用故 釋曰。彼第二師意同莊嚴。正義顯彼莊嚴論說非次第也。故不相違。
論。智雖非識等者。佛地第三大意同之。稍廣此也。並顯相應總名為智。彼云如是四智轉何法得。攝大乘說轉識蘊得。何故轉心而得心法。非得心法。四無漏心智相應故假說名智。故論說言。問正智當言實有。當言假有。答當言俱有。此中智是實有。若智眷屬諸心．心法亦名為智說之為假。故有二種。此中無漏心．心法等智為主故皆說名智。轉識蘊依得四無漏智相應心。謂大圓鏡心乃至成事作心。
疏。何故第八至五識不爾者。此難初釋。何故因八緣于定色。定色引故所變即屬法處定色。五識亦緣定色為質所變即非法處色收。
疏。五稱散五常緣故者。此答辭也。一性散動。二者常緣五塵為境不同第八。故所變色五塵中收。
論。又此是常等者。有義論云。所依常者謂所緣境。以境常故假說智常。故涅槃云。諸佛所師所謂法也。以法常故諸佛亦常。無斷盡言總釋四智為常之義。相續無間故名無斷。后際無故故名無盡。不須別配三身說也 詳曰。雖此論中正約
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：察。如何相違？答：佛地第三有兩位論師的解釋，正義派的觀點與此相同。第二位論師說：『轉變第六識可以得到成事作智（kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，成就事業之智慧），轉變五種現識可以得到妙觀察智（pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna，精妙觀察之智慧）。』正義派反駁說：『這不應該這樣，因為這不符合次第。說法、消除疑惑、周遍觀察不是五識的作用。』解釋說：那位第二位論師的觀點與《莊嚴論》相同，正義派表明《莊嚴論》的說法不是次第性的，所以並不矛盾。 論：『智雖然不是識等』，佛地第三的觀點大體相同，只是稍加擴充套件。並且表明相應的總稱名為智。那裡說：『像這樣四智轉變什麼法而得到？』《攝大乘論》說轉變識蘊而得到。為什麼轉變心而得到心法？不是得到心法，因為四種無漏心智相應，所以假說名為智。所以論中說：『問：正智應當說是實有，還是假有？』答：『應當說是俱有。』這裡智是實有，如果智的眷屬，各種心、心法也名為智，說是假有。所以有兩種。這裡無漏心、心法等以智為主，所以都說名為智。轉變識蘊，依靠得到四種無漏智相應的心，即大圓鏡智心（ādarśa-jñāna-citta，如鏡般反映一切的心）、乃至成事作智心。 疏：『為什麼第八識乃至第五識不是這樣呢？』這是解釋最初的疑問。為什麼第八識以定色為因緣？因為定色引導，所以所變現的就屬於法處定色。五識也以定色為本質，所變現的就屬於非法處色所攝。 疏：『五識稱散，五識常緣故』。這是回答。五識的自性是散動，而且常常緣於五塵為境，與第八識不同，所以所變現的色屬於五塵所攝。 論：『又，這（智）是常等』。有義論說：『所依是常，指的是所緣的境。因為境是常的，所以假說智是常的。』所以《涅槃經》說：『諸佛的老師，就是法。因為法是常的，所以諸佛也是常的。』『無斷盡』是總的解釋四智為常的含義。相續沒有間斷，所以名為『無斷』。后際沒有窮盡，所以名為『無盡』。不需要分別配合三身來說。詳細地說，雖然此論中正是約
【English Translation】 English version: Question: How can they not contradict each other? Answer: The third chapter of Buddhabhūmi (Buddha-land) has two masters' interpretations. The orthodox view is the same as this. The second master says: 'Transforming the sixth consciousness results in kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (wisdom of accomplishing activities), and transforming the five present consciousnesses results in pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna (wisdom of wonderful observation).' The orthodox view refutes this, saying: 'This should not be the case, because it is not in sequence. Explaining the Dharma, removing doubts, and observing comprehensively are not functions of the five consciousnesses.' Explanation: That second master's view is the same as that in the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. The orthodox view shows that the Śūraṅgama Sūtra's statement is not sequential, so there is no contradiction. Treatise: 'Although wisdom is not the same as consciousness, etc.,' the third chapter of Buddhabhūmi has the same general idea, but it is slightly more extensive. It also shows that the corresponding general term is called wisdom. It says there: 'What Dharma is transformed to obtain these four wisdoms?' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that transforming the consciousness aggregate is how they are obtained. Why is it that transforming the mind obtains mental dharmas? It is not obtaining mental dharmas, because the four undefiled mind-wisdoms correspond, so it is nominally called wisdom. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Question: Should correct wisdom be said to be truly existent or nominally existent?' Answer: 'It should be said to be both existent.' Here, wisdom is truly existent. If the retinue of wisdom, various minds and mental dharmas, are also called wisdom, it is said to be nominally existent. Therefore, there are two types. Here, the undefiled mind, mental dharmas, etc., take wisdom as the main thing, so they are all called wisdom. Transforming the consciousness aggregate relies on obtaining the four undefiled wisdom-corresponding minds, namely ādarśa-jñāna-citta (mirror-like wisdom mind), up to kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna-citta (wisdom of accomplishing activities mind). Commentary: 'Why are the eighth to fifth consciousnesses not like this?' This is the explanation of the initial question. Why does the eighth consciousness take meditative form as its cause and condition? Because meditative form guides it, so what is transformed belongs to the Dharma-realm meditative form. The five consciousnesses also take meditative form as their essence, so what is transformed is included in the form not belonging to the Dharma-realm. Commentary: 'The five are called scattered, because the five constantly perceive.' This is the answer. The nature of the five consciousnesses is scattered and moving, and they constantly perceive the five sense objects as their realm, which is different from the eighth consciousness, so the form that is transformed belongs to the five sense objects. Treatise: 'Also, this (wisdom) is constant, etc.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'What is relied upon is constant, referring to the object that is perceived. Because the object is constant, it is nominally said that wisdom is constant.' Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says: 'The teacher of all Buddhas is the Dharma. Because the Dharma is constant, all Buddhas are also constant.' 'Without cessation and exhaustion' is a general explanation of the meaning of the four wisdoms being constant. Continuously without interruption is called 'without cessation.' The final limit is without exhaustion, so it is called 'without exhaustion.' There is no need to separately match it with the three bodies. In detail, although this treatise is precisely about
四智說無斷盡。然身體離四智無。故無斷盡兼配于身。理亦應善。莊嚴論有此識說故。
論。如是法身有三相別者。問如是三身佛佛同體。常．無常耶 答自性身同。余身義等。亦得名同。雖俱云常。常有差別也。故莊嚴論云。彼三種身一切諸佛皆悉平等 由依故 一切諸佛自性身平等。法界無別故 由心故 一切諸佛色身平等佛心無別故 由業故 一切諸佛化身平等 同一所化故 一切諸佛悉同常住 由自性常故 一切諸佛自性身常 畢竟無漏故 由無間常故 一切諸佛色身常住 說法無斷絕故 由相續常故 一切諸佛化身常住。雖於此滅復彼現故。
論。二他受用由平等示現等者。傳有三釋。一云觀察擊發平等故示現之。二云平等擊圓鏡智而令示現。從彼能擊說平等現。三云平等自能示現。不假他擊。亦不擊他 詳曰。后釋為正。既自在智非唯根本。現身土相何理不能。第二理通。鏡智本故。初釋非也。
論。三變化身至諸利樂事等者。問瑜伽論七十九云。地前菩薩不生凈土。攝論亦云生凈土者是別時意。如何今云化居凈土。為未登地菩薩等耶 答傳有兩釋。一云二乘．異生亦生故。觀經等皆誠說故。瑜伽．攝論云不生者。據受用土不遮化土。二云不生。瑜伽．攝論以自會故。又大乘同性經云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於四智（catuḥ-jñāna）的說法是無有斷絕窮盡的。然而身體與四智不可分離。因此，無有斷絕窮盡的說法也適用於身體。這個道理應該是正確的。《莊嚴論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中有關於這種識的論述。
論：《莊嚴論》中說，如此法身（Dharmakāya）有三種不同的相。問：如此三身（trikāya），諸佛（Buddha）之間是同體的，是常（nitya）還是無常（anitya）呢？答：自性身（Svābhāvikakāya）是相同的，其餘身在意義上是相等的，也可以說是相同的。雖然都稱為常，但常也有差別。所以《莊嚴論》中說：『這三種身，一切諸佛都是平等的。』由於所依（hetu）的緣故，一切諸佛的自性身是平等的，因為法界（dharmadhātu）沒有差別。由於心（citta）的緣故，一切諸佛的色身（Rūpakāya）是平等的，因為佛心沒有差別。由於業（karma）的緣故，一切諸佛的化身（Nirmāṇakāya）是平等的，因為所教化的對象是相同的。一切諸佛都是常住的，由於自性是常的緣故，一切諸佛的自性身是常的，畢竟沒有煩惱（kleśa）的緣故。由於無間常的緣故，一切諸佛的色身是常住的，說法沒有斷絕的緣故。由於相續常的緣故，一切諸佛的化身是常住的，雖然在此處滅度，又在彼處顯現的緣故。
論：『二、他受用身（Para-saṃbhogakāya）由平等示現等』。相傳有三種解釋。第一種說法是，觀察擊發是平等的，所以示現。第二種說法是，平等地擊打圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna），從而令其示現。從能擊打圓鏡智的角度來說，是平等示現。第三種說法是，平等地自身能夠示現，不假借其他的擊打，也不擊打其他的。詳細地說，后一種解釋是正確的。既然自在智（Pratisamvidā）不僅僅是根本智（Mūla-jñāna），那麼顯現身土的相狀，又有什麼道理不能做到呢？第二種解釋在理上是通順的，因為圓鏡智是根本。第一種解釋是不正確的。
論：『三、變化身乃至諸利樂事等』。問：《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第七十九卷說，地前菩薩（Bodhisattva）不生凈土（Śuddhāvāsa）。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）也說，生凈土是別時意。為什麼現在說化身居住在凈土，是爲了未登地的菩薩等呢？答：相傳有兩種解釋。第一種說法是，二乘（Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha）、異生（Pṛthagjana）也會往生凈土，因為《觀經》（Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra）等經典都誠實地這樣說。《瑜伽師地論》、《攝大乘論》說不往生凈土，是根據受用土（saṃbhogakāya-kṣetra）而言，不遮止化土（nirmāṇakāya-kṣetra）。第二種說法是不往生凈土，《瑜伽師地論》、《攝大乘論》用來自圓其說。而且《大乘同性經》（Mahāyānasamatā-sūtra）說
【English Translation】 English version: The teaching about the Four Wisdoms (catuḥ-jñāna) is that they are without cessation or exhaustion. However, the body is inseparable from the Four Wisdoms. Therefore, the statement of being without cessation or exhaustion also applies to the body. This reasoning should be correct. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) contains discussions about this kind of consciousness.
Treatise: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that the Dharmakāya (法身, Body of Dharma) has three distinct aspects. Question: Are these three bodies (trikāya), being of the same essence among all Buddhas (Buddha), permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya)? Answer: The Svābhāvikakāya (自性身, Essence Body) is the same, and the remaining bodies are equal in meaning and can also be said to be the same. Although all are called permanent, there are differences in permanence. Therefore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'These three bodies are all equal among all Buddhas.' Because of the basis (hetu), the Svābhāvikakāya of all Buddhas is equal, because the Dharmadhātu (法界, Realm of Dharma) has no difference. Because of the mind (citta), the Rūpakāya (色身, Form Body) of all Buddhas is equal, because the Buddha-mind has no difference. Because of karma (karma), the Nirmāṇakāya (化身, Emanation Body) of all Buddhas is equal, because the objects of transformation are the same. All Buddhas are eternally abiding, because the essence is permanent, the Svābhāvikakāya of all Buddhas is permanent, ultimately without defilements (kleśa). Because of uninterrupted permanence, the Rūpakāya of all Buddhas is eternally abiding, because the teaching of the Dharma is without cessation. Because of continuous permanence, the Nirmāṇakāya of all Buddhas is eternally abiding, although it vanishes here and appears there.
Treatise: 'Secondly, the Para-saṃbhogakāya (他受用身, Body of Enjoyment for Others) is manifested through equality, etc.' It is traditionally said that there are three explanations. The first explanation is that manifestation occurs because observation and striking are equal. The second explanation is that it manifests by equally striking the Ādarśa-jñāna (圓鏡智, Mirror-like Wisdom). From the perspective of being able to strike the Ādarśa-jñāna, it is an equal manifestation. The third explanation is that it is able to manifest equally by itself, without relying on other strikes, nor striking others. In detail, the latter explanation is correct. Since Pratisamvidā (自在智, Analytical Wisdom) is not only Mūla-jñāna (根本智, Fundamental Wisdom), what reason is there that it cannot manifest the appearances of the body and land? The second explanation is logically consistent, because Ādarśa-jñāna is fundamental. The first explanation is incorrect.
Treatise: 'Thirdly, the Nirmāṇakāya, up to all beneficial and joyful matters, etc.' Question: The seventy-ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) states that Bodhisattvas (菩薩) before the bhūmi (地, stages) are not born in the Śuddhāvāsa (凈土, Pure Land). The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also states that being born in the Pure Land is a separate intention. Why does it now say that the Nirmāṇakāya resides in the Pure Land, for Bodhisattvas who have not yet attained the bhūmi, etc.? Answer: It is traditionally said that there are two explanations. The first explanation is that Śrāvakas (聲聞, Hearers), Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺, Solitary Buddhas), and Pṛthagjanas (異生, ordinary beings) are also born in the Pure Land, because the Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra (觀經, Contemplation Sutra) and other scriptures truthfully say so. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that they are not born in the Pure Land, according to the saṃbhogakāya-kṣetra (受用土, Enjoyment Body Land), not precluding the nirmāṇakāya-kṣetra (化土, Emanation Body Land). The second explanation is that they are not born in the Pure Land, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and Mahāyānasaṃgraha use it to reconcile themselves. Moreover, the Mahāyānasamatā-sūtra (大乘同性經, Great Vehicle Treatise on Sameness) says
。凈土成佛皆是受用身。穢土中者皆是化身。故知化身所居土者不得名凈。此言凈土據暫變說。即如法華三變凈方。維摩等同 詳曰。今同前說。多經論中說生凈故。同性經中為對受用化稱為穢。亦不相違。
論。論說轉去阿賴耶識得自性者。攝論本云。應知法身由幾佛法之所攝持。一由清凈。謂轉阿賴耶識得法身故。故知鏡智自性身攝。
論。圓鏡智品至而證得故者。攝論第九無性釋云。當知此中轉阿賴耶識故得大圓鏡智。
論。說平等智等者。無性攝論第九云。轉染污末那故得平等性智。由此安住無住涅槃。大慈大悲恒與相應。能隨所樂現佛影像 又云。妙觀察智具足一切陀羅尼門．三摩地門。猶如寶藏。于大會中能現一切自在作用。能斷諸疑能雨法雨 又云。成所作智普於十方一切世界能現變化。八相成道能現住持一切有情利樂事故。
論。然說轉去藏識至彼實性故者。按無性論第九說云。以其法身體清凈故。凈誰轉誰而得清凈。為答此問說如是言。轉阿賴耶識得法身故。由阿賴耶識執持一切雜染種子。對治起時轉滅如是一切染種。轉得隨順一切無罪圓滿功德。譬如世間阿揭陀藥。能變有毒令成無毒。故說名轉。
論。平等智品至攝變化身者。問按佛地經說。觀察智于大眾中雨
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在凈土中成佛的都是受用身（Sambhogakāya，報身），在穢土中的都是化身（Nirmāṇakāya，應化身）。因此可知，化身所居住的國土不能稱為凈土。這裡所說的凈土是就暫時的變化而言，就像《法華經》中三次變易國土為清凈一樣，《維摩經》等也是如此。詳細地說，現在與前面的說法相同，因為許多經論中都說往生凈土。在《同性經》中，爲了與受用身和化身相對，才稱之為穢土，這並不矛盾。
論：論中說轉去阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識）而得到自性身（Svabhāvakāya，自性身），《攝大乘論》的根本頌說：『應當知道法身（Dharmakāya，法身）由多少佛法所攝持？一是由清凈，即轉阿賴耶識而得到法身。』因此可知，圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，大圓鏡智）屬於自性身所攝。
論：在圓鏡智品中說『而證得故』，《攝大乘論》第九卷無性釋中說：『應當知道，這裡因為轉阿賴耶識的緣故，而得到大圓鏡智。』
論：說到平等智等，無性《攝大乘論》第九卷說：『轉變染污的末那識（Manas-vijñāna，末那識）的緣故，而得到平等性智（Samatā-jñāna，平等性智）。由此安住于無住涅槃（apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa，無住涅槃），大慈大悲恒常與之相應，能夠隨其所樂而顯現佛的影像。』又說：『妙觀察智（Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna，妙觀察智）具足一切陀羅尼門（dhāraṇī-mukha，總持門）、三摩地門（samādhi-mukha，三昧門），猶如寶藏，在大會中能夠顯現一切自在作用，能夠斷除各種疑惑，能夠降下法雨。』又說：『成所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，成所作智）普遍在十方一切世界能夠顯現變化，八相成道（aṣṭāṅga-mārga，八相成道），能夠顯現住持一切有情利樂的事故。
論：然而說到『轉去藏識，達到彼實性故』，按照無性論第九卷所說：『因為法身體清凈的緣故，清凈是誰轉變誰而得到的呢？爲了回答這個問題，所以這樣說：轉變阿賴耶識而得到法身。由於阿賴耶識執持一切雜染的種子，對治生起時，轉變滅除這些染污的種子，轉變而得到隨順一切無罪圓滿的功德。譬如世間的阿揭陀藥（agada，藥名），能夠將有毒的變為無毒，所以稱為轉變。』
論：平等智品中說『攝變化身者』，問：按照《佛地經》所說，觀察智于大眾中降下法雨
【English Translation】 English version: The Buddhahood attained in Pure Lands is always the Sambhogakāya (enjoyment body), while those in impure lands are Nirmāṇakāya (transformation body). Therefore, it is known that the lands where Nirmāṇakāyas reside cannot be called Pure Lands. This statement about Pure Lands refers to temporary transformations, just like the three transformations of the land into purity in the Lotus Sutra, and similarly in the Vimalakīrti Sutra. To elaborate, the current view aligns with the previous one, as many sutras and treatises mention rebirth in Pure Lands. In the Sameness of Nature Sutra, it is called impure in contrast to the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, which is not contradictory.
Treatise: The treatise states that by transforming the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), one attains the Svabhāvakāya (self-nature body). The root verses of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state: 'One should know by how many Buddha-dharmas the Dharmakāya (dharma body) is upheld? One is by purity, that is, by transforming the Ālaya-vijñāna, one attains the Dharmakāya.' Therefore, it is known that the Ādarśa-jñāna (great mirror wisdom) is included within the Svabhāvakāya.
Treatise: In the section on Ādarśa-jñāna, it says 'and thus attained.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, ninth fascicle, in the commentary by Asaṅga states: 'One should know that here, due to transforming the Ālaya-vijñāna, one attains the great mirror wisdom.'
Treatise: Speaking of Samatā-jñāna (equality wisdom) and others, Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, ninth fascicle, states: 'Due to transforming the defiled Manas-vijñāna (mind consciousness), one attains Samatā-jñāna. By this, one dwells in apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa (non-abiding nirvana), constantly associated with great compassion and great mercy, able to manifest Buddha images according to one's wishes.' It also states: 'Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna (discriminating wisdom) is complete with all dhāraṇī-mukhas (dharani gates), samādhi-mukhas (samadhi gates), like a treasure trove, able to manifest all unhindered functions in great assemblies, able to cut off all doubts, able to rain the Dharma rain.' It also states: 'Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (accomplishment wisdom) universally in all worlds of the ten directions is able to manifest transformations, the aṣṭāṅga-mārga (eight aspects of enlightenment), able to manifest and maintain all sentient beings' benefit and happiness.'
Treatise: However, regarding 'transforming the store consciousness, reaching its true nature,' according to Asaṅga's ninth fascicle: 'Because the Dharmakāya is pure, who transforms whom to attain purity? To answer this question, it is said: transforming the Ālaya-vijñāna, one attains the Dharmakāya. Because the Ālaya-vijñāna holds all defiled seeds, when the antidote arises, these defiled seeds are transformed and extinguished, transforming and attaining the merits that accord with all faultless perfections. For example, the worldly agada (medicine) is able to transform poison into non-poison, therefore it is called transformation.'
Treatise: In the section on Samatā-jñāna, it says 'includes the transformation body.' Question: According to the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra, Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna rains the Dharma rain in great assemblies
大法雨說法斷疑。故起化相屬何身耶 答依受用身為聖菩薩說法等者他受用攝。依于化身攝亦如之 問大圓鏡智緣餘二身所變之相。余之三智緣自受用所變之相。各屬何身 答圓鏡智變餘二身土所有相者而有兩釋。一云亦是自受用攝。以極微細非彼境故。由斯二智自變二身。非擊第八而令現也。二云所變隨質二身土攝。若餘三智緣自身土所變之相。自身土攝非為他故。
論。說圓鏡智是受用佛者。問此既莊嚴論中所說。前師如何而會釋耶 答今為通云。由因圓鏡智方得受用。據所因說。亦不相違。
論。三業化身等者。按佛地經云。身．語．及心化善巧方便業。論第七云。此顯成所作智起三業化。由此智慧善巧方便。能起身．語．心三業化。身化三種。一自身相應。謂化自身為輪王等種種形類。及現種種諸本生事。二他身相應。謂化魔王為佛身等。變舍利子為天女等。寄他身上示現種種變化形類。三非身相應。謂現大地為七寶等。或現無量佛化身等。或放光明照無邊界。如是等類離自他身。別變化作情非情色種種形類。動地．放光．風香等事。皆為利樂諸有情故。一切皆名佛身化業。語業亦三。一自身相應。謂佛自身化現梵音遍告無邊諸世界等種種語業。二他身相應。謂令聲聞大弟子等以佛梵音宣說大乘
甚深法等。是故聲聞諸菩薩等。說非己分甚深妙法。皆是如來變化所作非彼自力。三非身相應。謂化大海草木等類乃至虛空。亦出音聲說大法等。如是皆名變化語業。心化唯二。一自身相應。謂自心上化種種心及心法影像差別。二他身相應。謂令他心亦現種種心及心法影像差別。此並相分似見分現 問云何不化非情令心相現 答非情已是心等相分。云何復令有心相現。若心相現則名有情。非非情攝。是故化心但有二種 問既許化作非情色相。如化佛等。於此現心說非身化。斯有何失 答色有離質化通非身。心法不然無非身化。彼論復有異師說云。心不可化。但由定力能令自心解非分法名化自心。若加被他令愚昧者解甚深法。令失念者得正憶念名化他心。前為正義。
論。謂自性身至離雜染等者。離雜染者顯不能起貪恚等也。故疏依此不起貪等。云應木石以之為難。不難木石中之實性。實性亦是真如體故。有義云。然疏說法身轉依真如順生無漏四智功德。有情身中當能順生故。亦得說具恒沙德。木石之性非現不順。當亦無有順生義故。又應正說木石之性即佛法身。法身真如體圓遍故 詳曰。雖作此釋。非疏本意。本意如前。
論。自受用身唯自利者。問因自受用方有他化。復與有情不為障礙為依．增上。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
甚深之法等等。因此，聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛陀教誨而證悟的修行者）和諸菩薩等，所說的並非自己證悟的甚深微妙之法，都是如來（Tathāgata，佛陀的稱號之一）變化所作，並非他們自身的力量。三、非身相應的變化語業，指的是變化出大海、草木等事物，乃至虛空，也發出聲音宣說大法等等。這些都稱為變化語業。心識的變化只有兩種：一、自身相應的變化，指的是在自己的心識上變化出種種心識以及心法（Dharma，佛法的組成部分）的影像差別。二、他身相應的變化，指的是令他人的心識也顯現種種心識以及心法的影像差別。這些都是相分（Nimitta-bhāga，心識所認識的對象）相似於見分（Darśana-bhāga，心識的能認識部分）的顯現。問：如何不變化無情之物，而令心識顯現？答：無情之物已經是心識等等的相分，為何還要令有心識顯現？如果心識顯現，那就稱為有情（Sattva，有情識的生命），不屬於無情之物。因此，心識的變化只有兩種。問：既然允許變化出非情之相，如變化出佛等等，在這種情況下，於此顯現的心識說成非身變化，有什麼過失？答：色法（Rūpa，物質現象）有離質（離開物質基礎）的變化，可以通於非身。心法不是這樣，沒有非身的變化。彼論（指《成唯識論》）又有其他師父說，心識不可變化，只是憑藉禪定之力，能夠讓自己的心識理解超出自己能力範圍的佛法，這稱為變化自心。如果加持他人，讓愚昧的人理解甚深佛法，讓失去正念的人得到正確的憶念，這稱為變化他心。前面的說法是正確的觀點。
論：所謂自性身（Svabhāva-kāya，法身）乃至遠離雜染等等，其中的『遠離雜染』，顯示了法身不能生起貪婪、嗔恨等等煩惱。所以疏鈔依據這一點，認為不應以木頭、石頭來作為詰難。這並非詰難，因為木頭、石頭中存在實性（真實不變的體性），實性也是真如（Tathātā，事物的真實如是的狀態）的本體。有一種觀點認為，疏鈔說法身轉依（Parāvṛtti，轉變所依）真如，順應產生無漏（Anāsrava，沒有煩惱）的四智功德。有情身中應當能夠順應產生，所以也可以說具備恒河沙數般的功德。木頭、石頭的體性不是現在順應，將來也沒有順應產生的意義。又應當正確地說，木頭、石頭的體性就是佛的法身，因為法身的真如本體是圓滿周遍的。詳細地說，雖然這樣解釋，但並非疏鈔的本意，本意如前面所說。
論：自受用身（Sva-saṃbhoga-kāya，報身）只是爲了自己受益。問：因為自受用身才會有他化身（Nirmāṇa-kāya，應化身），又與有情之間不是障礙，而是作為所依、增上（Adhipati，增上緣）。
【English Translation】 English version
Profound Dharmas and so on. Therefore, Śrāvakas (those who attain enlightenment by hearing the Buddha's teachings) and Bodhisattvas, when speaking of profound and subtle Dharmas that are not of their own realization, are all transformations made by the Tathāgata (one of the titles of the Buddha), not by their own power. Three, non-body-related verbal karma of transformation refers to transforming the great ocean, grasses, trees, and even empty space, also emitting sounds to proclaim the Great Dharma and so on. These are all called verbal karma of transformation. Transformations of the mind are only of two kinds: one, self-related transformation, which refers to transforming various minds and images of mental Dharmas on one's own mind. Two, other-related transformation, which refers to causing the minds of others to also manifest various minds and images of mental Dharmas. These are all appearances of the object-aspect (Nimitta-bhāga, the object perceived by the mind) similar to the seeing-aspect (Darśana-bhāga, the perceiving aspect of the mind). Question: How can one cause the mind to manifest without transforming non-sentient things? Answer: Non-sentient things are already the object-aspect of the mind and so on. Why would one need to cause the mind to manifest? If the mind manifests, then it is called a sentient being (Sattva, a being with consciousness), and it is not included in non-sentient things. Therefore, there are only two kinds of mind transformation. Question: Since it is allowed to transform non-sentient appearances, such as transforming a Buddha, in this case, what is the fault in saying that the mind that manifests here is a non-body transformation? Answer: Form (Rūpa, material phenomena) has transformations that are separate from matter, which can extend to non-body. Mental Dharmas are not like this; there is no non-body transformation. Another teacher in that treatise (referring to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi) says that the mind cannot be transformed, but by the power of Samādhi (meditative concentration), one can enable one's own mind to understand Dharmas beyond one's capacity, which is called transforming one's own mind. If one blesses others, enabling ignorant people to understand profound Dharmas, and enabling those who have lost mindfulness to regain correct mindfulness, this is called transforming the minds of others. The former statement is the correct view.
Treatise: The so-called Svabhāva-kāya (Dharmakāya, the Body of Essence) up to being free from defilements, etc., where 'being free from defilements' shows that the Dharmakāya cannot give rise to greed, hatred, etc. Therefore, the commentary relies on this point and believes that one should not use wood and stone as a challenge. This is not a challenge because there is reality (true and unchanging nature) in wood and stone, and reality is also the essence of Tathātā (the suchness of things). One view holds that the commentary says that the Dharmakāya transforms and relies on Tathātā, which accords with the generation of the four wisdoms of Anāsrava (without outflows). Sentient beings should be able to accord with generation, so it can also be said to possess merits like the sands of the Ganges. The nature of wood and stone is not in accordance now, and there will be no meaning of according with generation in the future. Furthermore, it should be correctly said that the nature of wood and stone is the Dharmakāya of the Buddha because the essence of the Dharmakāya is complete and pervasive. In detail, although this explanation is made, it is not the original intention of the commentary; the original intention is as stated earlier.
Treatise: The Sva-saṃbhoga-kāya (Sambhogakāya, the Body of Enjoyment) is only for one's own benefit. Question: Because of the Sambhogakāya, there is the Nirmāṇa-kāya (the Body of Transformation), and it is not an obstacle to sentient beings, but serves as a basis and Adhipati (a dominant condition).
義既具。何唯自利 答其自性身非唯二義。復是眾聖所證之境。自受用身非余所知。故不為例。然實非無利他之義。望增勝義故無有失。
論。自性身土等者。此明身土諸佛同異。諸聖教中約義不同互有同異。皆不相違 且莊嚴論云。由依．心．業故。三身俱平等 釋曰。彼三種身如其次第。一切諸佛悉皆平等。由依故一切諸佛自性身平等。法界無別故。由心故一切諸佛生身平等。佛心無別故。由業故一切諸佛化身平等。同一所作故 若依佛地第七所明。三身諸佛各有同異。故彼論云。法身一切如來共有故無差別。就能證因有差別故假說差別。其餘二身各別因感。各別自性實有差別。但無別執。同處相似利樂意樂事業平等說無差別 又按攝論亦有同異。彼第九云。諸佛法身當言有異。當言無異。依止．意樂．業無別故。當言無異 釋曰。同莊嚴論。又無量佛身現等覺故當言有異。此顯法身約能證說同佛地論 又云。無量依身差別轉故當言有異。化身亦爾 即此論中約色身明。據有異說。
論。餘二身土有共不共等者。佛地第七有三師說。此同第三正義所論。彼論甚廣今者略云。一切如來所化有情為共不共 有義皆共。以一一佛皆度一切。福德智惠一切平等。同爲拔濟一切有情求菩提故。如說一佛所化有情
【現代漢語翻譯】 義理已經完備，為什麼只說自利呢？答：自性身（Svabhavikakaya，法身）並非只有自利這一個含義，它還是眾多聖者所證悟的境界。自受用身（Sambhogakaya，報身）不是其他人所能瞭解的，所以不能作為例子。然而，實際上並非沒有利他的含義，只是相對於增勝的意義而言，所以沒有過失。
論：自性身土等，這是說明諸佛的身和國土的同異之處。在各種聖教中，根據義理的不同，同異之處也不同，但都不互相違背。且《莊嚴論》說：『由於所依、心、業的緣故，三身都是平等的。』解釋說：這三種身，如次第而言，一切諸佛都是平等的。由於所依的緣故，一切諸佛的自性身是平等的，因為法界沒有差別。由於心的緣故，一切諸佛的生身（Nirmanakaya，化身）是平等的，因為佛心沒有差別。由於業的緣故，一切諸佛的化身是平等的，因為所作的事情相同。如果依據《佛地經論》第七所闡明的，三身諸佛各有同異。所以該論說：『法身是一切如來共有的，所以沒有差別。就所能證悟的因有差別而言，假說有差別。其餘二身各自因感，各自的自性實際上有差別。但沒有分別執著，在同一處所，相似的利樂意樂事業平等，所以說沒有差別。』又按照《攝大乘論》，也有同異。該論第九說：『諸佛的法身，應當說是有異，還是說無異？由於所依、意樂、業沒有差別，應當說無異。』解釋說：與《莊嚴論》相同。又因為無量佛身顯現等覺的緣故，應當說有異。這顯示法身就所能證悟而言，與《佛地經論》相同。又說：『無量依身差別運轉的緣故，應當說有異。』化身也是如此。即此論中就色身闡明，根據有異而說。
論：其餘二身土有共不共等，在《佛地經論》第七中有三位論師的說法。這裡同於第三位論師的正義所論。該論非常廣博，現在簡略地說：一切如來所化度的有情，是共同的還是不共同的？有義認為都是共同的。因為每一位佛都度化一切眾生，福德智慧一切平等，共同爲了拔濟一切有情而求菩提的緣故。如說一位佛所化度的有情。
【English Translation】 Since the meaning is already complete, why only speak of self-benefit? Answer: The Svabhavikakaya (法身, Dharma body) is not only about self-benefit; it is also the realm realized by many saints. The Sambhogakaya (報身, Reward body) is not known by others, so it cannot be taken as an example. However, in reality, it is not without the meaning of benefiting others, but in relation to the meaning of increasing excellence, there is no fault.
Treatise: 'Svabhavikakaya and lands, etc.' This clarifies the similarities and differences between the bodies and lands of all Buddhas. In various sacred teachings, the similarities and differences vary according to the differences in meaning, but they do not contradict each other. Moreover, the Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras says: 'Due to the support, mind, and karma, the three bodies are all equal.' The explanation says: These three bodies, in order, are all equal for all Buddhas. Due to the support, the Svabhavikakaya of all Buddhas is equal, because the Dharmadhatu (法界, Dharma realm) is not different. Due to the mind, the Nirmanakaya (化身, Transformation body) of all Buddhas is equal, because the Buddha's mind is not different. Due to karma, the Nirmanakaya of all Buddhas is equal, because the actions are the same. If based on what is explained in the seventh chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the three bodies of all Buddhas have similarities and differences. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The Dharmakaya is shared by all Tathagatas, so there is no difference. In terms of the cause that can be realized, there are differences, so differences are nominally stated. The other two bodies are each caused by different conditions, and their respective natures are actually different. But there is no separate attachment, and in the same place, similar benefit, joy, intention, and activity are equally spoken of as without difference.' Furthermore, according to the Mahayana-samgraha, there are also similarities and differences. The ninth chapter of that treatise says: 'Should the Dharmakaya of all Buddhas be said to be different, or should it be said to be not different? Because the support, intention, and karma are not different, it should be said to be not different.' The explanation says: It is the same as the Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras. Also, because the bodies of countless Buddhas manifest enlightenment, it should be said to be different. This shows that the Dharmakaya, in terms of what can be realized, is the same as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. It also says: 'Because the transformations of countless support bodies are different, it should be said to be different.' The Nirmanakaya is also the same. That is, in this treatise, it is clarified in terms of the Rupakaya (色身, Form body), based on the statement that there are differences.
Treatise: 'The other two bodies and lands have common and uncommon aspects, etc.' In the seventh chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there are three teachers' statements. This is the same as the statement of the third teacher's correct meaning. That treatise is very extensive, but now it is briefly said: Are the sentient beings transformed by all Tathagatas common or uncommon? Some argue that they are all common. Because each Buddha transforms all beings, and merit and wisdom are all equal, and they are all seeking Bodhi (菩提, Enlightenment) for the sake of saving all sentient beings. As it is said, the sentient beings transformed by one Buddha.
即一切佛 有義不共。以佛所化諸有情類本相屬故。是故如來底沙佛時。曾與慈氏同爲弟子。佛觀釋迦所化有情善根先熟。慈氏所化有情后熟。慈因先滿。釋迦后滿。入火光定令釋迦嘆。起先成佛。佛欲入滅言所應度皆已度訖 又契經說。觀一所化在有頂處化留一身。彼從彼沒來生此間。所留化身為說妙法令成羅漢 如實義者有共不共。若所化生一向共者何須多佛。一佛能化一切生故。若所化生一向不共。菩薩不應發弘誓願歷事多佛修學大乘。諸佛不應以已所化付屬后佛。
疏。能變之者無煩惱穢故者 問七地以前煩惱猶起。云何乃言無煩惱穢 答雖有煩惱皆為利益。具無量德故不為過為能穢也。
疏。本質通凈穢等者。佛所變質似染名穢。
疏。相名非順理故等者。此顯識相不必皆同之所以也。性相順故見．相同性。非相順者即色心等種種別故。
疏。不可有漏同無漏難者。難云無漏見．相善等種同生。有漏二分殊性種何不等 答系．不繫殊。不可為難。
疏。問至有漏無漏必同者。見．相二分有漏．無漏。何意必同 答云相順者固漏．無漏可名相順。一漏．無漏相順義失。
疏。三身相對四句等者。按彼論云。如是三身有四分故得為四句。一受用非變化。謂自利分實受用身
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『即一切佛，有義不共。』意思是說，諸佛在教化眾生方面，各有其不共同之處。因為諸佛所教化的各類有情眾生，本來就各有歸屬。所以，如來Dipamkara佛（錠光佛）時，曾與Maitreya（彌勒）一同為弟子。Dipamkara佛觀察到釋迦牟尼佛所教化的有情眾生善根先成熟，而彌勒佛所教化的有情眾生善根后成熟。彌勒佛的慈悲因緣先圓滿，釋迦牟尼佛的慈悲因緣后圓滿。Dipamkara佛入火光三昧，令釋迦牟尼佛讚歎，然後先成佛。佛將要入滅時說，所應該度化的眾生都已經度化完畢。又有契經上說，Dipamkara佛觀察到一個所教化的眾生在有頂天處，化現留下一身。那個眾生從有頂天死後，來生到這個世間。Dipamkara佛所留下的化身，為他說微妙的佛法，令他成就阿羅漢果。
『如實義者有共不共。』意思是說，在真實意義上，諸佛的教化既有共同之處，也有不共同之處。如果所教化的眾生完全相同，那又何須多佛呢？一佛就能教化一切眾生了。如果所教化的眾生完全不同，菩薩就不應該發廣大誓願，經歷多佛，修學大乘佛法。諸佛也不應該把自己所教化的眾生，囑託給後來的佛。
疏：『能變之者無煩惱穢故者。』 問：七地菩薩以前，煩惱還會生起，為什麼說沒有煩惱垢染呢？ 答：雖然有煩惱，但都是爲了利益眾生。因為具備無量的功德，所以這些煩惱不會成為過失，不會成為垢染。
疏：『本質通凈穢等者。』意思是說，佛所變化的本質，有時看起來像是染污的，這就被稱為『穢』。
疏：『相名非順理故等者。』這顯示了識的相分和名稱不必完全相同的原因。如果自性與相分相順，那麼見分和相分就相同。如果自性與相分不相順，那麼就會有色法和心法等種種差別。
疏：『不可有漏同無漏難者。』 難：無漏的見分和相分，以及善等種子，可以同時產生。那麼有漏的見分和相分，以及殊異的自性種子，為什麼不能同時產生呢？ 答：因為有繫縛和不繫縛的差別，所以不能這樣來責難。
疏：『問至有漏無漏必同者。』 問：見分和相分，有有漏和無漏的差別，為什麼一定要相同呢？ 答：如果說是相順，那麼有漏和無漏可以稱為相順。如果一個是有漏，一個是無漏，那麼相順的意義就失去了。
疏：『三身相對四句等者。』按照那部論典的說法，因為有法身、報身、化身這三身，所以可以分為四句。第一句是隻有受用身，沒有變化身。這是指自利部分的真實受用身。
【English Translation】 English version: 'That all Buddhas have meanings that are not shared.' This means that Buddhas each have unique aspects in their teaching of sentient beings. This is because the various types of sentient beings that Buddhas teach originally have their own affiliations. Therefore, when the Tathagata Dipamkara Buddha (the Buddha of Fixed Light) was present, he and Maitreya (the Buddha of Loving-Kindness) were once disciples together. Dipamkara Buddha observed that the good roots of the sentient beings to be taught by Shakyamuni Buddha would mature first, while the good roots of the sentient beings to be taught by Maitreya Buddha would mature later. Maitreya Buddha's causes and conditions of loving-kindness would be fulfilled first, while Shakyamuni Buddha's would be fulfilled later. Dipamkara Buddha entered the Fire Light Samadhi, causing Shakyamuni Buddha to praise him, and then he became a Buddha first. When the Buddha was about to enter Nirvana, he said that all the sentient beings who should be liberated had already been liberated. Furthermore, a sutra states that Dipamkara Buddha observed a sentient being to be taught in the Akanistha Heaven (the highest heaven in the Realm of Form), and manifested a body to remain there. That sentient being died in the Akanistha Heaven and was reborn in this world. The manifested body left by Dipamkara Buddha spoke the wonderful Dharma for him, causing him to attain the state of Arhat.
'Those with real meaning have both shared and unshared aspects.' This means that in reality, the teachings of the Buddhas have both common and uncommon aspects. If the sentient beings to be taught were completely the same, then why would there be a need for multiple Buddhas? One Buddha could teach all sentient beings. If the sentient beings to be taught were completely different, then Bodhisattvas should not make great vows to experience many Buddhas and study the Mahayana Dharma. The Buddhas should also not entrust the sentient beings they have taught to later Buddhas.
Commentary: 'Those who can transform are without the defilement of afflictions.' Question: Before the seventh Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva), afflictions still arise. Why is it said that there is no defilement of afflictions? Answer: Although there are afflictions, they are all for the benefit of sentient beings. Because they possess immeasurable merits, these afflictions do not become faults or defilements.
Commentary: 'The essence is common to purity and impurity.' This means that the essence transformed by the Buddha sometimes appears to be defiled, and this is called 'impurity'.
Commentary: 'The appearance and name are not in accordance with reason.' This shows the reason why the appearance and name of consciousness do not necessarily have to be the same. If the nature and appearance are in accordance, then the seeing-aspect and appearance-aspect are the same. If the nature and appearance are not in accordance, then there will be various differences such as form and mind.
Commentary: 'It is difficult to have the same defilement and non-defilement.' Objection: The undefiled seeing-aspect and appearance-aspect, as well as the seeds of goodness, can arise simultaneously. Then why can't the defiled seeing-aspect and appearance-aspect, as well as the seeds of distinct natures, arise simultaneously? Answer: Because there is a difference between being bound and unbound, this cannot be used as an objection.
Commentary: 'Question to defilement and non-defilement must be the same.' Question: The seeing-aspect and appearance-aspect have the difference between defilement and non-defilement. Why must they be the same? Answer: If it is said that they are in accordance, then defilement and non-defilement can be called in accordance. If one is defiled and the other is undefiled, then the meaning of being in accordance is lost.
Commentary: 'The four sentences relative to the three bodies.' According to that treatise, because there are the three bodies of Dharmakaya (Dharma Body), Sambhogakaya (Enjoyment Body), and Nirmanakaya (Emanation Body), they can be divided into four sentences. The first sentence is that there is only the Enjoyment Body, and not the Emanation Body. This refers to the true Enjoyment Body of the self-benefiting aspect.
。二變化非受用。謂變化身。為化地前雜類生故。或粗或妙。或令歡喜。或令怖畏。改轉不定但名變化。不是受用不必令受現法樂故。三亦受用亦變化。謂為地上菩薩所現種種化身。令諸菩薩受法樂故。隨時改轉不決定故 又云。或處說佛有二種身。一者生身。二者法身。若自性身若實受用俱名法身。諸功德法所依止故。諸功德法所整合故。若變化身若他受用俱名生身。隨眾所宜數現生故 又云。又余經說有十種佛。一現等覺佛。二弘誓願佛。三業異熟佛。四住持佛。五變化佛。六法界佛。七心佛。八定佛。九本性佛。十隨樂佛。前五世俗佛。后五勝義佛。隨其所應三身所攝 釋曰。化身現於樹下成道名現等覺。以愿乘通化一切生名弘誓願。百劫修相業感王宮相好之身名業異熟。績素等像名為住持。法身自體名法界佛。第八無漏名為心佛。大定之身名定佛也。自受用身從本種性三劫修成名本性佛。隨彼地上所樂不同現身有異名隨樂佛。前五是化及以住持故名世俗。后五實身而殊勝故名為勝義。初四化身。第五化像。第六法身。后四受用。
成唯識論演秘卷第七
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二、變化非受用：指的是變化身（Nirmanakaya）。爲了教化地上菩薩之前的各類眾生，所現之身或粗糙或精妙，或使人歡喜，或使人怖畏，形態變化不定，只能稱為變化身。它不是爲了受用，不必使眾生感受現世的快樂。 三、亦受用亦變化：指的是為地上菩薩所現的種種化身。爲了讓菩薩們感受佛法的快樂，隨時間變化而改變，形態並不固定。 又說，有的地方說佛有二種身：一是生身（Nirmanakaya），二是法身（Dharmakaya）。自性身（Svabhavikakaya）和實受用身（Sambhogakaya）都稱為法身，因為它們是諸功德法所依止之處，是諸功德法所整合之身。變化身（Nirmanakaya）和他受用身（Parinirmanakaya）都稱為生身，因為它們是隨眾生根器而多次顯現的。 又說，還有經中說有十種佛：一、現等覺佛（Abhisambuddha），二、弘誓願佛（Pranidhana-buddha），三、業異熟佛（Karma-vipaka-buddha），四、住持佛（Sthiti-buddha），五、變化佛（Nirmana-buddha），六、法界佛（Dharmadhatu-buddha），七、心佛（Citta-buddha），八、定佛（Samadhi-buddha），九、本性佛（Prakriti-buddha），十、隨樂佛（Yatharuchi-buddha）。前五種是世俗佛，后五種是勝義佛，分別屬於三身所攝。 解釋：化身在菩提樹下成道，名為現等覺佛。以誓願之力教化一切眾生，名為弘誓願佛。經歷百劫修習相好，以業力感得王宮相好之身，名為業異熟佛。用絲綢等材料製作的佛像，名為住持佛。法身自體名為法界佛。第八識無漏心識名為心佛。大定之身名為定佛。自受用身從本有種性經歷三大阿僧祇劫修成，名為本性佛。隨地上菩薩所喜好的不同而顯現不同的身，名為隨樂佛。前五種是化身以及住持佛像，所以稱為世俗。后五種是真實之身，而且殊勝，所以稱為勝義。前四種是化身，第五種是化像，第六種是法身，后四種是受用身。 《成唯識論演秘》卷第七
【English Translation】 English version 2. Transformation is not for enjoyment: This refers to the Nirmanakaya (Transformation Body). It appears in various forms, either coarse or subtle, to transform sentient beings before the Bhumi (Stages) of Bodhisattvas. It may bring joy or fear. Its form changes constantly, so it is only called a Transformation Body. It is not for enjoyment and does not necessarily bring immediate happiness to sentient beings. 3. Both enjoyment and transformation: This refers to the various transformation bodies manifested for Bodhisattvas on the Bhumis (Stages). It is to allow the Bodhisattvas to experience the joy of the Dharma. It changes with time and is not fixed in form. Furthermore, it is said that in some places, the Buddha has two types of bodies: one is the Nirmanakaya (Transformation Body), and the other is the Dharmakaya (Dharma Body). The Svabhavikakaya (Essence Body) and the Sambhogakaya (Enjoyment Body) are both called Dharmakaya because they are the basis upon which all meritorious Dharmas rely and are the bodies formed by the accumulation of all meritorious Dharmas. The Nirmanakaya (Transformation Body) and the Parinirmanakaya (Other-Transformation Body) are both called Nirmanakaya because they appear many times according to the needs of sentient beings. Furthermore, other sutras say that there are ten types of Buddhas: 1. Abhisambuddha (Perfect Enlightenment Buddha), 2. Pranidhana-buddha (Vow Buddha), 3. Karma-vipaka-buddha (Karma Result Buddha), 4. Sthiti-buddha (Abiding Buddha), 5. Nirmana-buddha (Transformation Buddha), 6. Dharmadhatu-buddha (Dharma Realm Buddha), 7. Citta-buddha (Mind Buddha), 8. Samadhi-buddha (Concentration Buddha), 9. Prakriti-buddha (Nature Buddha), 10. Yatharuchi-buddha (According-to-Pleasure Buddha). The first five are mundane Buddhas, and the last five are ultimate Buddhas, each belonging to the Three Bodies. Explanation: The Transformation Body attaining enlightenment under the Bodhi tree is called Abhisambuddha. Using the power of vows to transform all sentient beings is called Pranidhana-buddha. After cultivating good qualities for hundreds of kalpas (aeons), the body with excellent marks and characteristics in the royal palace is the Karma-vipaka-buddha. Images made of silk and other materials are called Sthiti-buddha. The Dharmakaya itself is called Dharmadhatu-buddha. The eighth consciousness, the undefiled consciousness, is called Citta-buddha. The body of great Samadhi (Concentration) is called Samadhi-buddha. The Sambhogakaya (Enjoyment Body) is cultivated from the original nature for three great Asamkhyeya kalpas (incalculable eons) and is called Prakriti-buddha. The body that appears differently according to the different preferences of the Bodhisattvas on the Bhumis (Stages) is called Yatharuchi-buddha. The first five are Transformation Bodies and Abiding Images, so they are called mundane. The last five are real bodies and are superior, so they are called ultimate. The first four are Transformation Bodies, the fifth is a Transformation Image, the sixth is the Dharmakaya, and the last four are Enjoyment Bodies. Commentary on the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra, Volume 7