T43n1834_唯識二十論述記
大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1834 唯識二十論述記
No. 1834 [cf. No. 1590]
唯識二十論述記捲上
翻經沙門基撰
唯識二十論者。筏蘇畔徒菩薩之所作也。題敘本宗有二十頌。為簡三十。因以名焉。昔覺愛法師。魏朝創譯。家依三藏。陳代再翻。今我和上三藏法師玄奘。校諸梵本。睹先再譯。知其莫閑奧理。義多缺謬。不悟聲明。詞甚繁鄙。非只一條。難具陳述。所以自古通學開而靡究。復以大唐龍朔元年。歲次辛酉。六月一日。于玉花慶福殿。肇翻此論。基受旨執筆。其月八日。詳譯畢功。刪整增訛。綴補紕闕。既睹新本。方類世親。聖旨創興于至那。神容重生於像季。哲鑒君子。當自詳之。然此論本。理豐文約。西域註釋。數十餘家。根本即有世親弟子。瞿波論師。末後乃有護法菩薩。護法所造。釋名唯識導論。印度重為詞義之寶。爰至異道嘗味研談。我師不以庸愚命旌厥趣。隨翻受旨。編為述記。每至盤根錯節之義。敘宗回覆之文。旨義拾釋。以備提訓。更俟他辰。方冀翻釋。工虧化畢未果便終。遂使玄源見擁而無披。幽靈守昏而永翳。可謂。連城易托。法寶難規。淺義疏文從茲絕矣 梵云毗若底(此云識)摩呾喇多(此云唯)憑始迦(此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《唯識二十論述記》是大正藏第43冊，編號為1834。[參見No. 1590]
《唯識二十論述記》捲上
翻經沙門窺基撰
《唯識二十論》的作者是筏蘇畔徒（Vasubandhu，世親）菩薩。題目的意思是本宗有二十頌，爲了區別於三十頌，因此得名。過去覺愛法師在魏朝首次翻譯此論，家依三藏在陳代再次翻譯。現在我的和上三藏法師玄奘，校對各種梵文版本，發現之前的翻譯存在很多不通順和深奧的道理，義理上有很多缺失和錯誤，不符合聲明（梵語語法），文字非常繁瑣鄙陋，不僅僅是一條，難以全部陳述。因此自古以來通學之人開啟研究卻無法深入。於是在大唐龍朔元年，歲次辛酉，六月一日，在玉花慶福殿開始翻譯此論。窺基奉旨執筆，於該月八日，詳細翻譯完畢。刪改整理錯誤，綴補遺漏。看到新的版本，才知道類似世親的著作。聖上的旨意開始興盛于至那（中國），神容在像法末期重生。有智慧的君子，應當自己詳細研究。然而此論的原本，義理豐富而文字簡略，在西域有數十餘家註釋。根本上就有世親的弟子瞿波（Gunaprabha）論師，最後有護法（Dharmapala）菩薩。護法所造的釋名《唯識導論》，在印度被認為是詞義的珍寶。甚至異教徒也曾經研究討論。我的師父不因為我庸碌愚鈍而埋沒它的趣味，於是我遵旨翻譯，編為述記。每到盤根錯節的義理，敘述宗義回覆的文字，拾取解釋旨義，以備提綱挈領的訓練。更等待其他時間，希望翻譯解釋。但工程未完成就化滅完畢，最終使得玄妙的源頭被擁塞而無法展現，幽深的靈性守著昏暗而永遠隱沒。可以說是，連城容易託付，法寶難以規劃。淺顯的義理和疏略的文字從此絕跡了。 梵語云毗若底（Vijnapti，此云識），摩呾喇多（Matrata，此云唯），憑始迦（Vimsatika，此）
【English Translation】 English version: This is Volume 43, No. 1834 of the Taisho Tripitaka, [cf. No. 1590]
Commentary on the Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, Volume 1
Composed by the Tripitaka Dharma Master Kuiji, a Sramana who translates scriptures
The 'Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only' was authored by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. The title indicates that the treatise contains twenty verses pertaining to the tenets of our school, distinguishing it from treatises with thirty verses. In the past, Dharma Master Jue』ai first translated this treatise during the Wei Dynasty, and Jia Yi, relying on the Tripitaka, re-translated it during the Chen Dynasty. Now, my teacher, the Tripitaka Dharma Master Xuanzang, after comparing various Sanskrit versions, found that the previous translations contained many obscure and incomprehensible points, with numerous omissions and errors in meaning. They did not conform to the rules of 'Shabda-vidya' (Sanskrit grammar), and the language was exceedingly verbose and crude. These issues were not limited to just one aspect, making it difficult to enumerate them all. Therefore, since ancient times, scholars have initiated studies but have been unable to delve deeply. Thus, in the first year of the Longshuo era of the Great Tang Dynasty, corresponding to the year Xin You, on the first day of the sixth month, the translation of this treatise was commenced at the Yu Hua Qingfu Palace. Kuiji received the imperial decree to take up the brush, and on the eighth day of that month, the detailed translation was completed. Errors were deleted and corrected, omissions were supplemented, and deficiencies were amended. Upon seeing the new version, it became clear that it resembled the works of Vasubandhu. The sage's decree began to flourish in China, and the divine countenance was reborn in the Dharma-Ending Age. Wise gentlemen should examine it carefully themselves. However, the original text of this treatise is rich in meaning but concise in language. In the Western Regions, there are more than ten commentaries. Fundamentally, there was the disciple of Vasubandhu, Gunaprabha, and later, Bodhisattva Dharmapala. The commentary composed by Dharmapala is named 'Introduction to Consciousness-Only,' and it is regarded as a treasure of meaning in India. Even adherents of other paths have tasted and discussed it. My teacher did not allow its profound meaning to be obscured due to my mediocrity and ignorance. Therefore, I followed the decree and compiled this commentary. Whenever encountering intricate and complex meanings, or passages describing the tenets of the school, I extracted and explained the essential points to provide a concise guide for training. I hoped to translate and explain it further at another time. However, the project was left unfinished, ultimately causing the profound source to be obstructed and unable to be revealed, and the hidden spirit to remain in darkness and forever obscured. It can be said that a city is easy to entrust, but the Dharma treasure is difficult to plan for. Shallow meanings and sparse texts have become extinct from then on. In Sanskrit, it is called Vijnapti (this means 'consciousness'), Matrata (this means 'only'), Vimsatika (this)
云二十)奢薩咀羅(此云論)順此方言。名唯識二十論。唯者獨但簡別之義。識者了別詮辨之義。唯有內心。無心外境。立唯識名。至下當釋。識即是唯。故言唯識。是持業釋。復言二十。是頌數名。合名唯識二十論者。帶數釋也。論如常釋。釋義及難。至文當敘。舊論但名唯識論者。譯家略也。
論。安立大乘三界唯識。
述曰。將釋本文以三門辨。一顯教時機教攝分齊。二明論宗體造論所由。三依論所明判文別釋。初顯教時機教攝分齊者。于中有三。一辨時。二辨機。三辨攝。先辨時者。如來說教總有三時。初于鹿苑。說阿笈摩。有四諦教。破我有執。次於鷲嶺。說大般若。空二取教。破法有執。雖空有教。能離斷常。然未盡理會於中道。後於七處八會。方說三界唯心。雙離有空。契中道教。即是花嚴解深密等。空心外二取。破初有執。有內識一心。遣后空見。故今此論。正處中道。是第三時。勝義教也。如解深密。瑜伽等說。先時所說一時五時。皆無經教。不可依也。如別章中已廣敘說。次辨機者。有情根性總有五種。謂三定性。一不定性。一總無性。於此五中。唯大乘定及不定性之所聽受。非餘聲聞獨覺等性之所依信。成唯識云。無性有情。不能窮底。趣寂種姓。不能通達。所辨教理。無上乘故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：云二十，即奢薩咀羅（意為『論』），順應此方（指中國）的語言習慣，命名為《唯識二十論》。『唯』，是獨特、唯一的簡別之義；『識』，是了別、詮辨之義。意為唯有內心，沒有心外的境界，故立『唯識』之名，下文將詳細解釋。『識』即是『唯』，所以稱為『唯識』，這是持業釋。又稱『二十』，是頌的數目。合稱《唯識二十論》，是帶數釋。『論』的解釋如常例，解釋意義及辯難，將在正文中敘述。舊譯本只稱《唯識論》，是譯者省略了。
論：安立大乘三界唯識。
述曰：將要解釋本文，分為三方面辨析：一、闡明教法的時機、所教化的對象及教法的範圍；二、說明本論的宗體及造論的緣由；三、依據本論所闡明的義理，判別文章的段落並分別解釋。首先闡明教法的時機、所教化的對象及教法的範圍。其中有三點：一、辨明時機；二、辨明對像；三、辨明範圍。先辨明時機：如來所說的教法總共有三個時期。最初在鹿野苑，宣說阿笈摩（Agama，意為聖傳、經）的四諦教法，破除對『我』的執著。其次在鷲嶺（Grdhrakuta，意為靈鷲山），宣說《大般若經》，闡述空掉能取、所取的教法，破除對『法』的執著。雖然空、有二教，能夠遠離斷見和常見，但尚未完全窮盡真理，會歸於中道。最後在七處八會，才宣說三界唯心，雙重遠離有和空，契合中道的教法，即是《華嚴經》、《解深密經》等。空掉心外的能取、所取，破除最初對『有』的執著；確立內識一心，遣除後來的空見。所以現在這部論，正處於中道，是第三時期的勝義教法，如《解深密經》、《瑜伽師地論》等所說。先前所說的一時教、五時教，都沒有經典依據，不可信從。如同在其他章節中已經詳細敘述。其次辨明對像：有情眾生的根性總共有五種，即三種定性（已決定者）、一種不定性（未決定者）、一種總無性（完全沒有可能性者）。在這五種之中，只有大乘定性及不定性的眾生才能聽受，其餘聲聞、獨覺等根性的眾生不能依從和信受。《成唯識論》說：『無性有情，不能窮盡其理；趣寂種姓，不能通達。』因為所辨明的教理，是無上乘的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: Yun twenty, which is Shesha Cula (meaning 'Treatise'), following the linguistic conventions of this land (referring to China), is named 'Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika' (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only). 'Vijnapti' (唯), means unique and singular distinction; 'Matra' (識), means discernment and explanation. It means that there is only the internal mind, and no external realm outside the mind, hence the name 'Vijnaptimatrata' (Representation-Only), which will be explained in detail below. 'Matra' (識) is 'Vijnapti' (唯), so it is called 'Vijnaptimatrata' (Representation-Only), which is a possessive compound. It is also called 'Twenty' (二十), which is the number of verses. The combined name 'Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika' (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only) is a numerical compound. The explanation of 'Treatise' (論) is as usual, and the explanation of meaning and debate will be described in the main text. The old translation was only called 'Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi' (Treatise on Representation-Only), which was abbreviated by the translator.
Treatise: Establishing the Representation-Only of the Three Realms in Mahayana.
Commentary: To explain this text, it is analyzed in three aspects: 1. Clarifying the timing of the teaching, the audience to be taught, and the scope of the teaching; 2. Explaining the doctrine and the reasons for writing the treatise; 3. According to the principles explained in this treatise, distinguishing the paragraphs of the article and explaining them separately. First, clarify the timing of the teaching, the audience to be taught, and the scope of the teaching. There are three points: 1. Clarifying the timing; 2. Clarifying the audience; 3. Clarifying the scope. First, clarify the timing: The teachings spoken by the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One) are divided into three periods. Initially, in Mrigadava (鹿野苑, Deer Park), the Four Noble Truths of the Agama (阿笈摩, Sacred Tradition, Scripture) were preached, eliminating the attachment to 'self'. Secondly, on Grdhrakuta (鷲嶺, Vulture Peak), the 'Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra' (大般若經, Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) was preached, explaining the emptiness of the grasper and the grasped, eliminating the attachment to 'dharma'. Although the teachings of emptiness and existence can avoid nihilism and eternalism, they have not fully exhausted the truth and converged to the Middle Way. Finally, in seven locations and eight assemblies, it was preached that the Three Realms are Mind-Only, doubly separated from existence and emptiness, in accordance with the Middle Way teaching, which is the 'Avatamsaka Sutra' (華嚴經, Flower Garland Sutra), 'Samdhinirmocana Sutra' (解深密經, Sutra Unraveling the Intent), etc. Emptying the grasper and the grasped outside the mind, eliminating the initial attachment to 'existence'; establishing the internal mind-only, eliminating the later view of emptiness. Therefore, this treatise is now in the Middle Way, and is the ultimate teaching of the third period, as stated in the 'Samdhinirmocana Sutra' (解深密經, Sutra Unraveling the Intent), 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), etc. The teachings of the first period and the five periods mentioned earlier have no scriptural basis and cannot be believed. As has been described in detail in other chapters. Secondly, clarify the audience: There are five types of sentient beings in total, namely three types of definite nature (those who have already decided), one type of indefinite nature (those who have not decided), and one type of completely without nature (those who have no possibility at all). Among these five types, only Mahayana (大乘, Great Vehicle) beings of definite and indefinite nature can listen, and other beings of Sravaka (聲聞, Hearer), Pratyekabuddha (獨覺, Solitary Realizer) etc. cannot follow and believe. The 'Cheng Weishi Lun' (成唯識論, Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only) says: 'Sentient beings without nature cannot exhaust its principles; those of the lineage of seeking tranquility cannot understand.' Because the teachings being explained are of the unsurpassed vehicle.
。說唯有一心。無心外境故。舍利弗等。如聾盲故。如成唯識義疏中說。后教攝者。於三藏中。對法藏攝。於二藏內。菩薩藏收。十二分教。論議經攝。於五乘中。大乘所攝。此等教理。如別章說。
第二明論宗體造論所由者。于中亦三。一辨論宗。二辨論體。三辨造論所由。初辨宗者。所明唯識唯識為宗。離自所明更無宗故。次辨體者。體有四種。如余處說。攝相歸性。真如為體。攝境歸識。以心為體。攝假歸實。以聲為體。性相別論。即有二種。一增上緣。許佛說法。以佛無漏聲名句等。為其教體。佛不說法。大定智悲。為其教體。二親因緣。隨佛說不說。皆于能聽者。耳意識上所變聲等。為其教體。今論之本。謂即佛經。故出體者。應如經說。然造論主。唯有說法。為增上緣。令聞者變。總合疏親所緣緣為論。皆以聲名句文為體。十地論說。說聽俱以二事究竟。一者聲。二善字。此下文云。展轉增上力。二識成決定。成唯識說。法詞二無礙解。境有差別等。廣引教理。明此體性。如余處說。后辨造論所由者。然此無文。準餘論說。令法久住。利益有情。故造論也。或為令知第三時教。契會中道。造斯論焉。或執外境如心是有。如薩婆多師等。或執內心如境是無。如空見外道等。或執諸識用別體同。如一類
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：說唯有一心（只有一心），因為沒有心外的境界。舍利弗（佛陀的十大弟子之一）等，就像聾盲之人一樣。正如《成唯識義疏》中所說。后教所攝的內容，在三藏（經藏、律藏、論藏）中，屬於對法藏所攝；在二藏（菩薩藏、聲聞藏）內，被菩薩藏所收錄。十二分教中，屬於論議經所攝。在五乘（人乘、天乘、聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）中，屬於大乘所攝。這些教理，如同在其他章節中所說。
第二部分說明論宗的本體以及造論的緣由。其中也分為三點：一、辨論宗；二、辨論體；三、辨造論的緣由。首先辨論宗，所闡明的是唯識，以唯識作為宗旨，除了自身所闡明的道理之外，沒有其他的宗旨。其次辨論體，體有四種，如同其他地方所說：攝相歸性，以真如（事物的本性）為體；攝境歸識，以心為體；攝假歸實，以聲為體；性相分別討論，則有兩種：一是增上緣，認為佛陀說法，以佛陀無漏的音聲、名句等，作為其教體。佛陀不說法時，以大定智悲作為其教體。二是親因緣，無論佛陀是否說法，都是在能聽者的耳意識上所變現的音聲等，作為其教體。現在這部論的根本，就是佛經，所以說明本體時，應該像佛經所說的那樣。然而造論者，只有說法，作為增上緣，使聽聞者產生變化。總合疏遠和親近的所緣緣作為論，都以音聲、名句、文句作為本體。《十地論》說，說法和聽法都以兩件事究竟：一是音聲，二是善字。下文說：『輾轉增上力，二識成決定。』《成唯識論》說，法和詞有二無礙解，境界有差別等，廣泛引用教理，闡明這個本體的性質，如同其他地方所說。最後辨明造論的緣由，然而這裡沒有明確的文字說明。參照其他論典的說法，是爲了使佛法長久住世，利益有情眾生，所以才造論。或者爲了使人瞭解第三時教（佛陀晚年所說的教法），契合中道（不偏不倚的真理），才造這部論。或者有人執著外境如同心一樣是實有的，如薩婆多師（一切有部）等；或者有人執著內心如同外境一樣是虛無的，如空見外道等；或者有人執著諸識的作用不同但本體相同，如一類人
【English Translation】 English version: It is said that there is only one mind, because there are no external realms outside the mind. Shariputra (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples) and others are like the deaf and blind. As stated in the 'Commentary on the Meaning of Establishing Consciousness Only'. What is included in the later teachings, within the Tripitaka (Sutra Pitaka, Vinaya Pitaka, Abhidhamma Pitaka), is included in the Abhidhamma Pitaka; within the two Pitakas (Bodhisattva Pitaka, Sravaka Pitaka), it is collected by the Bodhisattva Pitaka. Among the twelve divisions of teachings, it is included in the argumentative sutras. Among the five vehicles (human vehicle, heavenly vehicle, Sravaka vehicle, Pratyekabuddha vehicle, Bodhisattva vehicle), it is included in the Mahayana. These teachings, as mentioned in other chapters.
The second part explains the essence of the treatise and the reasons for writing it. It is also divided into three points: 1. Discriminating the doctrine of the treatise; 2. Discriminating the substance of the treatise; 3. Discriminating the reasons for writing the treatise. First, discriminating the doctrine, what is clarified is 'Consciousness Only', taking 'Consciousness Only' as its doctrine, and there is no other doctrine besides what it clarifies itself. Secondly, discriminating the substance, there are four kinds of substance, as mentioned elsewhere: Comprehending phenomena and returning to nature, taking 'Tathata' (suchness) as the substance; comprehending realms and returning to consciousness, taking the mind as the substance; comprehending the false and returning to the real, taking sound as the substance; discussing the nature and phenomena separately, there are two kinds: one is the 'Adhipati-pratyaya' (dominant condition), believing that the Buddha's teachings, with the Buddha's undefiled sounds, names, and sentences, are the substance of the teachings. When the Buddha does not teach, 'Mahasamadhi-jnana-karuna' (great samadhi, wisdom, and compassion) is the substance of the teachings. The second is the 'Upadana-pratyaya' (proximate cause), whether the Buddha teaches or not, the sounds transformed in the ear consciousness of the listener are the substance of the teachings. Now, the root of this treatise is the Buddhist scriptures, so when explaining the substance, it should be as the scriptures say. However, the author of the treatise only teaches, as the 'Adhipati-pratyaya', causing changes in the listener. Combining the distant and close 'Alambana-pratyaya' (object condition) as the treatise, all take sounds, names, and sentences as the substance. The 'Dasabhumika Sutra' says that both teaching and listening are accomplished by two things: one is sound, and the other is good words. The following text says: 'Through the power of mutual enhancement, the two consciousnesses become definite.' The 'Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi' says that the Dharma and words have two unimpeded understandings, and the realms have differences, etc., extensively citing teachings and reasoning to clarify the nature of this substance, as mentioned elsewhere. Finally, clarifying the reasons for writing the treatise, however, there is no clear textual explanation here. Referring to the statements of other treatises, it is to make the Dharma abide long in the world and benefit sentient beings, so the treatise is written. Or, in order to make people understand the teachings of the third period (the teachings spoken by the Buddha in his later years), which are in accordance with the Middle Way (the truth of non-attachment), this treatise is written. Or some are attached to external realms as real as the mind, such as the Sarvastivadins (Everything Exists School); or some are attached to the inner mind as unreal as the external realms, such as the nihilistic heretics; or some are attached to the functions of the consciousnesses being different but the substance being the same, such as a certain type of people.
菩薩等。或執離心無別心所。如經部等。或執獄卒等。是實有情。如大眾部等。或說獄卒等。非實有情。業生大種。大種相異。如薩婆多等。或說獄卒等。雖非有情。然熏習所起。非是識變。如經部等。或執外境體是一物。如吠世師等。或執境多念。心唯一剎那。如正量部等。或執極微。有相資相。為五識境。如眾賢師等。此等論師。皆由邪知無知二種。于義不了。遂於二果覆障不證。今為遮此種種異執。令于唯識深妙理中。得如實解。故作斯論。隨下破中。一一別顯。故不預釋。問此與三十意有何差別乃更造論以明唯識。答彼三十論廣顯自宗。此中二十廣破外難。雖俱明唯識。二論有別也。又彼三十廣顯正義。此中二十。廣釋外難。又彼三十。天親后造。有頌無釋。此中二十。天親先作。有頌有釋。又明唯識二論雖同。開設千門令隨一入。故須別造二部論也。又妙理幽玄丁寧始顯。宗趣雖一。二論重明。是謂二論緣起各別。
第三依論所明判文別釋者。菩提鶻露支。此云覺愛。先云覺熹。即魏時菩提流支法師。或云魏時有居士。名般若流支。此云慧愛。所譯。梁末陳初。有𤘽那羅他。此云家依。親依亦得。即真諦三藏也。並各翻此唯識二十。覺愛法師。文多頌少。家依三藏。文少頌多。今此所翻。文頌析中。
【現代漢語翻譯】 菩薩等，他們或者堅持離開心識就沒有其他心所，比如經量部（ Sautrantika ）等宗派的觀點。或者認為獄卒等是真實存在的有情眾生，比如大眾部（ Mahāsāṃghika ）等宗派的觀點。或者說獄卒等不是真實的有情眾生，而是由業力所生的大種（ mahābhūta ），這些大種彼此不同，比如薩婆多部（ Sarvāstivāda ）等宗派的觀點。或者說獄卒等雖然不是有情眾生，但是由熏習所產生，不是識的變現，比如經量部等宗派的觀點。或者堅持外境的本體是一個事物，比如吠世師迦（ Vaiśeṣika ）等宗派的觀點。或者認為境是多樣的，而心只有一個剎那，比如正量部（ Saṃmitīya ）等宗派的觀點。或者認為極微（ paramāṇu ）具有相互資助的性質，是前五識的對境，比如眾賢論師等人的觀點。這些論師都是由於邪知和無知這兩種原因，對於義理不能明瞭，因此對於二果（指須陀洹果和斯陀含果）被覆蓋而無法證得。現在爲了遮止這些種種不同的執見，使人們對於唯識的深奧微妙的道理，能夠得到如實的理解，所以才撰寫這部論。隨著下文的破斥，會一一分別地顯明這些觀點，所以這裡不預先解釋。 問：這部論與《三十唯識論》有什麼差別，而要另外造論來闡明唯識的道理呢？答：那部《三十唯識論》廣泛地闡明自己的宗義，這部《二十唯識論》廣泛地破斥外來的詰難。雖然都是闡明唯識的道理，但是這兩部論有所區別。又，《三十唯識論》廣泛地闡明正面的義理，這部《二十唯識論》廣泛地解釋外來的詰難。又，《三十唯識論》是世親（ Vasubandhu ）菩薩後來所造，只有頌文而沒有解釋。這部《二十唯識論》是世親菩薩先造的，有頌文也有解釋。又，雖然闡明唯識的道理這兩部論相同，但是開設了千門萬戶，使人們可以隨意選擇一門進入，所以需要分別造這兩部論。又，微妙的道理幽深玄妙，需要反覆叮嚀才能顯現。宗趣雖然相同，但是兩部論重複地闡明，這就是這兩部論的緣起各有不同。 第三，根據論中所闡明的來判別文章並分別解釋。菩提鶻露支（ Bodhiruci ），這裡翻譯為覺愛，先前翻譯為覺熹，就是魏朝時的菩提流支法師。或者說魏朝時有位居士，名叫般若流支（ Prajñāruci ），這裡翻譯為慧愛，所翻譯的。梁朝末年陳朝初期，有𤘽那羅他（ Paramārtha ），這裡翻譯為家依，親依也可以。就是真諦三藏。他們各自翻譯了這部《唯識二十論》。覺愛法師翻譯的文字多頌文少，家依三藏翻譯的文字少頌文多，現在我們所翻譯的文字，文章和頌文的分析居中。
【English Translation】 Bodhisattvas, etc., either hold that there are no separate mental factors apart from the mind, like the Sautrantikas (Sautrāntika) and other schools. Or they hold that the jailers of hell, etc., are real sentient beings, like the Mahāsāṃghikas (Mahāsāṃghika) and other schools. Or they say that the jailers of hell, etc., are not real sentient beings, but are great elements (mahābhūta) born from karma, and these great elements are different from each other, like the Sarvāstivādins (Sarvāstivāda) and other schools. Or they say that although the jailers of hell, etc., are not sentient beings, they arise from habitual tendencies and are not transformations of consciousness, like the Sautrantikas and other schools. Or they insist that the substance of external objects is a single entity, like the Vaiśeṣikas (Vaiśeṣika) and other schools. Or they believe that objects are multiple, but the mind is only one moment, like the Saṃmitīyas (Saṃmitīya) and other schools. Or they hold that atoms (paramāṇu) have the nature of mutual support and are the objects of the five consciousnesses, like the teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school. All these teachers, due to the two kinds of wrong knowledge and ignorance, are unable to understand the meaning, and therefore they are covered from and unable to attain the two fruits (referring to the Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmin fruits). Now, in order to prevent these various different attachments and enable people to gain a true understanding of the profound and subtle principles of Vijñānavāda, this treatise is written. As the refutations below proceed, each view will be separately clarified, so there is no need to explain them in advance. Question: What is the difference between this treatise and the 'Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only' (Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā) that necessitates the creation of another treatise to clarify the doctrine of Consciousness-Only? Answer: That 'Thirty Verses' extensively explains its own tenets, while this 'Twenty Verses' extensively refutes external difficulties. Although both clarify the doctrine of Consciousness-Only, the two treatises are different. Furthermore, the 'Thirty Verses' extensively explains the positive principles, while this 'Twenty Verses' extensively explains external difficulties. Moreover, the 'Thirty Verses' was composed later by Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), and it only has verses without commentary. This 'Twenty Verses' was composed earlier by Vasubandhu, and it has both verses and commentary. Also, although the two treatises are the same in clarifying the doctrine of Consciousness-Only, they open up thousands of doors, allowing people to choose any one door to enter. Therefore, it is necessary to create two separate treatises. Furthermore, the subtle principles are profound and mysterious, and they can only be revealed through repeated and careful instruction. Although the purpose is the same, the two treatises repeatedly clarify the doctrine. This is why the conditions for the arising of the two treatises are different. Third, according to the explanations in the treatise, the text is divided and explained separately. Bodhiruci (Bodhiruci), here translated as 'Awakened Love,' was previously translated as 'Awakened Joy,' and was the Dharma Master Bodhiruci of the Wei Dynasty. Or it is said that there was a layman in the Wei Dynasty named Prajñāruci (Prajñāruci), here translated as 'Wisdom Love,' who translated it. In the late Liang Dynasty and early Chen Dynasty, there was Paramārtha (Paramārtha), here translated as 'Family Reliance,' or 'Close Reliance.' He was the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha. They each translated this 'Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only.' The text translated by Dharma Master Bodhiruci has more prose and fewer verses, while the text translated by Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha has less prose and more verses. The text we are translating now has a balanced analysis of prose and verses.
且如覺愛法師。有二十三頌。一十八紙。家依法師。乃有二十四頌。總有九紙。今者新譯。有二十一頌。乃總八紙。覺愛所翻第二十一引經之頌。餘二本無。家依所翻。初首二頌歸敬之偈。餘二本無。故知皆是譯家。增取釋文。翻之於論本也。其次最初立宗之偈。舊二論有。唯新論無。校三梵本。及勘題目。都不合有。名唯識二十。何得有焉。覺愛增初一頌。及第二十一偈。家依乃增初之三頌。故知所餘二十一頌。三論皆有。是根本文。以二十頌顯暢唯識。是故名為唯識二十。末後一頌。結嘆歸能。非明宗義。由此于中文總有二。初正辨本宗破計釋難。后結已所造。嘆深推佛。
就初分中。大文有二。初立論宗大乘三界唯識無境。后即於此義有設難言下。釋外所徴。廣破異執 就立宗中。文有其四。初立論宗諸法唯識。二顯由經說。以經為證。今明唯識。但成大乘唯識之義。或顯論所明。為成經義。成立大乘。是佛所說唯識不虛。三釋外伏難。簡擇唯言。四明唯識義。舉喻以顯。或分為三。初立論宗。第二立因。以經成論。第三舉喻。前第三門。攝入立宗。為簡無失。今此所言。安立大乘三界唯識。即立宗也。凡有三意。一者安立大乘之中唯識之教。諸宗不信佛所說故。廣引教理如成唯識非此所明比量云。我說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 例如覺愛法師的譯本，有二十三頌，共十八紙。家依法師的譯本，有二十四頌，總共九紙。現在的新譯本，有二十一頌，總共八紙。覺愛所翻譯的第二十一頌引用了經文，其餘兩個版本沒有。家依所翻譯的，最初的兩頌是歸敬偈，其餘兩個版本也沒有。由此可知，這些都是譯者爲了解釋經文，而增加的內容，並非論原本的內容。其次，最初確立宗旨的偈頌，舊的兩個譯本有，只有新的譯本沒有。校對三個梵文版本，以及勘察題目，都不應該有。題目是『唯識二十』，怎麼會有呢？覺愛增加了最初的一頌，以及第二十一偈。家依增加了最初的三頌。由此可知，剩下的二十一頌，三個譯本都有，是根本的經文。用二十頌來闡明唯識的道理，所以叫做『唯識二十』。最後一頌，是總結讚歎歸功於佛，不是闡明宗旨的意義。 因此，在中文譯本中總共有兩部分。第一部分是辨析本宗，駁斥計較，解釋疑難。第二部分是總結已經完成的著作，讚歎佛法的精深。
在第一部分中，主要分為兩部分。首先是確立論宗，即大乘三界唯識無境。然後，針對這個觀點，提出疑問，並解釋外來的質疑，廣泛駁斥不同的觀點。在確立論宗的部分，分為四個部分。首先是確立論宗，即諸法唯識。第二是闡明經文的依據，以經文作為證明，來闡明唯識的道理。只是爲了成就大乘唯識的意義，或者闡明論所要闡明的，是爲了成就經文的意義，成立大乘，是佛所說的唯識真實不虛。第三是解釋外來的疑問，簡要選擇『唯』字的含義。第四是闡明唯識的意義，舉例說明。或者可以分為三個部分。首先是確立論宗。第二是確立原因，以經文來成就論。第三是舉例說明。之前的第三個部分，可以歸入確立論宗，爲了避免遺漏。現在所說的，安立大乘三界唯識，就是確立論宗。總共有三個意思。一是安立大乘中的唯識教義。因為其他宗派不相信佛所說的話，所以廣泛引用教理，如《成唯識論》所說，這裡不作詳細說明。比量云：我說
【English Translation】 English version: For example, the translation by Dharma Master Jue'ai (Awakening Love) has twenty-three verses, totaling eighteen folios. The translation by Dharma Master Jiayi (Home Reliance) has twenty-four verses, totaling nine folios. The current new translation has twenty-one verses, totaling eight folios. The twenty-first verse translated by Jue'ai quotes from the sutras, which the other two versions do not have. The initial two verses translated by Jiayi are verses of homage, which the other two versions also do not have. From this, it can be known that these are all additions made by the translators to explain the sutras, and are not part of the original treatise. Secondly, the verse initially establishing the doctrine is present in the old two translations, but absent in the new translation. Comparing the three Sanskrit versions and examining the titles, it should not be there. The title is 'Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika' ('Twenty Verses on Representation-Only'), so how could it be there? Jue'ai added the initial verse and the twenty-first verse. Jiayi added the initial three verses. From this, it can be known that the remaining twenty-one verses are present in all three translations and are the fundamental text. Using twenty verses to clearly explain Vijnaptimatrata (representation-only), hence it is called 'Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika'. The last verse is a conclusion praising and attributing merit to the Buddha, not clarifying the meaning of the doctrine.
Therefore, in the Chinese translation, there are two parts in total. The first part is to analyze the doctrine of this school, refute arguments, and explain difficulties. The second part is to summarize the completed work and praise the profundity of the Buddha's teachings.
In the first part, there are two main sections. First, establishing the doctrine, which is that the Three Realms of Mahayana are representation-only and without external objects. Then, regarding this view, questions are raised, and external criticisms are explained, extensively refuting different views. In the section establishing the doctrine, there are four parts. First, establishing the doctrine, which is that all dharmas are representation-only. Second, clarifying the basis of the sutras, using the sutras as proof to clarify the doctrine of representation-only. It is only to accomplish the meaning of Mahayana representation-only, or to clarify what the treatise intends to clarify, which is to accomplish the meaning of the sutras, establishing that the representation-only taught by the Buddha is true and not false. Third, explaining external doubts, briefly selecting the meaning of the word 'only'. Fourth, clarifying the meaning of representation-only, illustrating with examples. Or it can be divided into three parts. First, establishing the doctrine. Second, establishing the cause, using the sutras to accomplish the treatise. Third, illustrating with examples. The previous third part can be included in establishing the doctrine, to avoid omissions. What is now being said, establishing the Mahayana Three Realms representation-only, is establishing the doctrine. There are three meanings in total. One is to establish the doctrine of representation-only within Mahayana. Because other schools do not believe what the Buddha said, extensive use is made of teachings and reasoning, as explained in the 'Cheng Weishi Lun' ('Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only'), which will not be detailed here. Inference says: I say
大乘是佛所說。許具三法印契經攝故。如增一等。今此所言三界唯識。即顯能詮唯識之教。二者安立大乘中所說三界唯識理。諸宗說有心外境故。不信三界唯心之理。故今成也。今言大乘三界唯識。即顯所詮唯識之理。三者安立諸大乘教。及唯識理。于教理中俱不信故。隨文配屬 安立者。成立義。謂此論中。成立大乘三界唯識。即以因喻。成立宗義。名為安立。又安立者。施設義。以廣道理。施設唯識略理趣故。或安立者。開演義。未說之義。今說名立。已說之義。今廣名安。又安者可也。教理相稱。立者建也。法性離言。今言名立。順理所以稱安。陳那釋云。能立能破總名安立。謂能立自大乘唯識。能破於他余宗有境。故名安立 言大乘者。辨中邊論無上乘品。說由三義名無上乘。一正行無上。二所緣無上。三修證無上。正行無上有六種。謂最勝．作意．隨法．離二邊．差別．無差別。此等中一一皆有多門。所緣有十二。謂安立．法界．所能立．任持．印．內．持．通達．增．證．運．最勝。修證有十種。謂無闕．不毀．動．滿．起．堅固。及調柔．不住．無二障．無息。即由此教。辨斯三義。名為大乘。或雜集論第十一說。七大性相。應是名大乘義。一境．二行．三智．四精進．五方便善巧．六證得．七業大性
．境大者。以廣大教為所緣故。行大者。自利利他故。智大者。二無我智故。精進大者。三大劫中。修無量種難行行故。方便善巧大者。得不住道故。證得大者。證十力等諸功德故。業大者．窮生死際。建佛事故。亦由此教。辨斯七義。故名大乘。又攝論說。或乘大性。是有財釋。亦乘亦大。是持業釋。名為大乘 言三界者。謂欲．色界．及無色界。世親釋云。能持自相故名為界。或復界者。是種族義。欲謂段食．睡．淫所引貪慾．欲所屬界。故名欲界。變礙示現。說名為色。色所屬界。故名色界。于彼界中。色非有故。名為無色。彼體非色。立無色名。非彼但用色無為體。無色所屬界。名為無色界。略去中言。故作是說。如胡椒飲。如金剛環。又欲之界。名為欲界。由此界能任持欲故。色．無色界。應知亦然。體通五蘊。皆依士釋。無性釋云。謂與欲等愛結相應。墮在三界 言唯識者。瞿波師說。以有三德故今安立。一本有德本性凈故。意說識性。二中有德。即依唯識。修行萬行。三劫能斷皮肉膚等。所有粗重。三未有德。即至佛位。福智圓明。難遇獨出。唯獨但義。識了別義。體即五法心心所等。所以者何。總說諸法。略有三性。謂即遍計所執性。虛妄唯識。依他起性。非有似有。因緣所生因緣唯識。即是識相。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 境界廣大，是因為以廣大的教義作為所緣（所觀想的對象）。行持廣大，是因為既能自利又能利他。智慧廣大，是因為具有對人我和法我的兩種無我智慧。精進廣大，是因為在三大阿僧祇劫中，修習無量種難以實行的苦行。方便善巧廣大，是因為證得了不住于涅槃的境界。證得廣大，是因為證得了十力（如來十種力用）等諸多的功德。事業廣大，是因為窮盡生死輪迴，建立佛陀的事業。也正因為此教義，辨明這七種廣大之義，所以名為大乘（Mahāyāna）。另外，《攝大乘論》中說，或者說『乘』是『大性』，這是一種有財釋（形容詞性的解釋）；或者說『亦乘亦大』，這是一種持業釋（動詞性的解釋），名為大乘（Mahāyāna）。 所說的三界，指的是欲界（Kāmadhātu）、色界（Rūpadhātu）以及無色界（Arūpadhātu）。世親（Vasubandhu）解釋說：『能夠保持自身特性，所以名為界。』或者說，『界』是種族的意思。『欲』指的是由段食（粗糙食物）、睡眠、淫慾所引發的貪慾，屬於貪慾的界，所以名為欲界。變礙（有形質的阻礙）可以被示現，這被稱為『色』，屬於『色』的界，所以名為色界。在色界中，『色』並非完全存在，所以名為無色。它的本體並非『色』，所以立名為無色，並非僅僅以『色』的滅無作為本體。無色所屬的界，名為無色界。省略了中間的字，所以這樣說，例如『胡椒飲』，例如『金剛環』。另外，『欲』的界，名為欲界，因為這個界能夠任持『欲』。色界、無色界，應該知道也是這樣。本體貫通五蘊（pañca-skandha），都是依士釋（主格解釋）。無性（Asaṅga）解釋說：『指的是與欲等愛結（klesha）相應，墮落在三界之中。』 所說的『唯識』，瞿波（Guṇaprabha）大師說：『因為有三種功德，所以現在安立。一是本有德，本性清凈，意在說明識的自性。二是在修行過程中有功德，即依靠唯識的教義，修行萬行。三劫（kalpa）能夠斷除皮肉膚等所有的粗重煩惱。三是未來有功德，即到達佛的果位，福德和智慧圓滿光明，難以遇到，獨一無二。』『唯』是唯一、但的意思，『識』是了別的意思。本體即是五法（pañca dharmāḥ），心、心所等。為什麼這樣說呢？總的來說，諸法略有三種自性，即遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva），虛妄的唯識；依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva），非有似有，因緣所生，因緣的唯識，即是識相。
【English Translation】 English version The scope is vast because it takes the vast teachings as its object of contemplation. The practice is vast because it benefits both oneself and others. The wisdom is vast because it possesses the two kinds of non-self wisdom (absence of self of person and absence of self of phenomena). The diligence is vast because, throughout the three great asamkhya kalpas, it cultivates countless kinds of difficult practices. The skillful means are vast because one attains the state of non-abiding nirvana. The attainment is vast because one attains the various merits such as the ten powers (of a Tathagata). The activity is vast because, throughout the cycle of birth and death, one establishes the deeds of the Buddha. It is also because this teaching elucidates these seven meanings of vastness that it is called Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle). Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Or the 'vehicle' is 'great nature,' which is a possessive compound; or 'both vehicle and great,' which is a determinative compound,' and is called Mahāyāna. The so-called three realms refer to the Kāmadhātu (desire realm), the Rūpadhātu (form realm), and the Arūpadhātu (formless realm). Vasubandhu explains: 'That which can maintain its own characteristics is called a realm.' Or, 'realm' means a lineage. 'Desire' refers to the greed induced by coarse food, sleep, and sexual desire, belonging to the realm of desire, hence it is called the Kāmadhātu. Obstruction that can be manifested is called 'form,' belonging to the realm of 'form,' hence it is called the Rūpadhātu. In that realm, 'form' is not fully present, hence it is called the Arūpadhātu. Its substance is not 'form,' hence it is named formless, not merely taking the absence of 'form' as its substance. The realm belonging to the formless is called the Arūpadhātu. Omitting the middle words, it is said in this way, like 'pepper drink,' like 'vajra ring.' Furthermore, the realm of 'desire' is called the Kāmadhātu, because this realm can sustain 'desire.' The Rūpadhātu and Arūpadhātu should be understood similarly. The substance pervades the five skandhas (aggregates), all explained in the nominative case. Asaṅga explains: 'It refers to being in accordance with afflictions such as desire, falling into the three realms.' The so-called 'consciousness-only,' Master Guṇaprabha says: 'Because there are three merits, it is now established. First, there is inherent merit, the nature is pure, intending to explain the self-nature of consciousness. Second, there is merit in the process of cultivation, that is, relying on the teachings of consciousness-only, cultivating myriad practices. Three kalpas can sever all the coarse and heavy afflictions such as skin and flesh. Third, there is future merit, that is, reaching the fruit of Buddhahood, with merit and wisdom fully luminous, difficult to encounter, unique and unparalleled.' 'Only' means unique, but, 'consciousness' means discernment. The substance is the five dharmas (aspects of reality), mind, mental factors, etc. Why is this so? Generally speaking, phenomena briefly have three natures, namely the parikalpita-svabhāva (the completely imputed nature), the false consciousness-only; the paratantra-svabhāva (the dependently originated nature), non-existent yet seemingly existent, arising from conditions, the consciousness-only of conditions, which is the aspect of consciousness.
圓成實性。依他起上。遍計所執空無之理。真實唯識。即是識性。諸異生等。迷圓成實。執依他等是一是異。謂離心外定實有法。是心所取。無明所蔽。正智不生。今為顯彼所說。離心遍計所執實法非有。虛妄識現。但有有為依他識相。因緣唯識。及有無為圓成識性。真實唯識。故今總說諸法唯識。令知有無證轉依果。此則相性各別體說。若攝諸境。皆從於心。名唯識者。真如既是識之實性。亦名唯識。此約三性 若依二諦。說亦有差別。四重各別。一空有識。二事理識。三別總識。四詮旨識。如成唯識述記中說 于依他起唯有識中。此義有說。唯有識體一自證分。無見相分。以聖教說能取所取是所執故。皆性非有。說名唯識。此師意說。有漏八識。有學．菩薩．及二乘等。諸無漏心。皆有見相。有見相故。皆有法執。佛則不爾。至下當知 或說唯有自證．見分．及自相分。無此以外所執二取。說名唯識。此見相分。不離識故。此師意說。唯第六七。能起法執。非余識等。至下喻中當廣分別。此中意說。謂今此論。施設大乘中所立三界法皆唯有識。問離系法為唯識不。答此亦唯識。問何故此中但言三界。答且舉異生所成妄法唯有識理。但言三界。非無漏法無唯識義。此為理解。或由教故。
論。以契經說三界唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna，指圓滿成就的自性），建立在依他起性（Paratantra，指依他而起的現象）之上，而遍計所執性（Parikalpita，指虛妄分別的自性）是空無的道理。真實的唯識，就是識的本性。各種不同的凡夫俗子，迷惑于圓成實性，執著依他起性等為一或為異，認為在心之外，確實存在實在的法，是心所能取到的。這是被無明所遮蔽，正確的智慧無法生起。現在爲了顯示他們所說的，離開心之外的遍計所執的實在法是不存在的，只是虛妄的識的顯現。只有有為的依他起識的相狀，因緣所生的唯識，以及無為的圓成實識的本性，才是真實的唯識。所以現在總的說諸法唯識，使人知道有無，證得轉依的果。這是從相和性各自不同的體性上來說的。如果把所有的境都攝歸於心，就叫做唯識，真如既然是識的真實本性，也可以叫做唯識。這是從三性的角度來說的。如果依據二諦（Satya-dvaya，指世俗諦和勝義諦），來說也有差別，四重各不相同：一是空有識，二是事理識，三是別總識，四是詮旨識。如《成唯識述記》中所說。在依他起唯有識中，有一種說法是，只有識的自體一分，即自證分，沒有見分和相分。因為聖教說能取和所取都是所執著的，本質上是不存在的，所以說名叫唯識。這個師父的意思是說，有漏的八識，有學的、菩薩、以及二乘等，各種無漏的心，都有見分和相分。因為有見分和相分，所以都有法執。佛則不是這樣，到後面會知道。或者說只有自證分、見分、以及自相分，沒有這以外所執著的能取和所取，所以說名叫唯識。這個見分和相分，不離開識的緣故。這個師父的意思是說，只有第六識和第七識，能夠生起法執，不是其他的識等等。到後面的比喻中會廣泛地分別。這裡的意思是說，現在這個論，設施大乘中所立的三界法都唯有識。問：離系法（Vimoksha，指解脫之法）是唯識嗎？答：這也是唯識。問：為什麼這裡只說三界？答：暫且舉異生所成的虛妄法唯有識的道理，只說三界。不是說無漏法沒有唯識的意義。這是爲了理解，或者由於教的原因。
論：因為契經（Sutra，指佛經）說三界唯
【English Translation】 English version: The Pariniṣpanna (perfected nature) relies on the Paratantra (dependent nature), and the Parikalpita (imputed nature) is the principle of emptiness. The true Vijñaptimātratā (consciousness-only) is the nature of consciousness. Various ordinary beings are deluded about the Pariniṣpanna, clinging to the Paratantra etc. as being either the same or different, believing that outside the mind, there are indeed real dharmas that the mind can grasp. This is obscured by ignorance, and correct wisdom cannot arise. Now, to reveal what they say, the real dharmas of the Parikalpita that are separate from the mind do not exist; only illusory consciousness appears. There are only conditioned aspects of the Paratantra consciousness, Vijñaptimātratā arising from conditions, and the unconditioned nature of the Pariniṣpanna consciousness, which is the true Vijñaptimātratā. Therefore, now we generally say that all dharmas are Vijñaptimātratā, so that people may know existence and non-existence, and attain the result of transformation. This is speaking from the perspective of the distinct natures of characteristics and essence. If all objects are gathered into the mind, it is called Vijñaptimātratā. Since Suchness (Tathātā) is the true nature of consciousness, it can also be called Vijñaptimātratā. This is from the perspective of the three natures. If based on the Two Truths (Satya-dvaya), there are also differences, with four levels: first, emptiness and existence consciousness; second, phenomenal and noumenal consciousness; third, specific and general consciousness; fourth, explanatory consciousness. As stated in the Commentary on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only. Within the Paratantra, which is only consciousness, some say that there is only the self-cognition aspect (Sva-saṃvedana) of the consciousness entity, without the seeing aspect (Darśana) and the object aspect (Viṣaya). Because the holy teachings say that the grasper and the grasped are what is clung to, they are essentially non-existent, hence the name Vijñaptimātratā. This teacher means that the eight defiled consciousnesses, those in training, Bodhisattvas, and the two vehicles, all have seeing and object aspects in their undefiled minds. Because they have seeing and object aspects, they all have attachment to dharmas. The Buddha is not like this, as will be known later. Or it is said that there are only the self-cognition, seeing, and self-object aspects, without the grasper and grasped that are clung to outside of these, hence the name Vijñaptimātratā. This seeing and object aspect does not leave consciousness. This teacher means that only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses can give rise to attachment to dharmas, not the other consciousnesses, etc. This will be extensively differentiated in the analogy below. The meaning here is that this treatise establishes that all the dharmas of the three realms established in the Mahayana are only consciousness. Question: Is the Vimoksha (liberation) dharma Vijñaptimātratā? Answer: This is also Vijñaptimātratā. Question: Why does it only mention the three realms here? Answer: For now, it cites the principle that the illusory dharmas formed by ordinary beings are only consciousness, and only mentions the three realms. It is not that undefiled dharmas do not have the meaning of Vijñaptimātratā. This is for understanding, or due to the teachings.
Treatise: Because the Sutra (scripture) says the three realms are only
心。
述曰。此即第二顯由經說。今明唯識。以經成論。令信易生。以第五囀。與故字同。謂花嚴等契經中。說三界諸法唯有心故。是十地論第八卷內。第六地中說也。今方成立唯有識義。梵云素呾覽。此云契經。契者合也。經如常釋。經合正理。契應物機。故名契經。由佛經中說唯心故。此明唯識。以經成論。或此所明唯有識者。為契經說唯有心故。故今此論立理成經。或今所說唯有識言。以何為證。由契經說唯有必故 問經何但說三界唯心。答經部師等心緣無起亦但有心。然非一切。今遮于彼。故說三界唯有識。無性釋云。此唯識言。成立唯有諸心心所。無有三界橫計所緣。此言不遣真如所緣。依他所緣。謂道諦攝。根本后得二種所緣。由彼不為愛所執故。非所治故。非迷亂故。非三界攝。亦不離識故不待說。既由三界能緣之中。有能遍計。所緣之中。有所遍計。有漏聚中。有橫計故。為遮此執。但說唯心。非無漏法。非唯識也。下當廣說 問曰欲．色界有色。遮此說唯心。無色界色無。應不言唯識 此難不然。所執實皆無。遮此名唯識。非但遮色有故。說三界唯心。亦無所執唯識。及余虛空法等。一切境故。又經部師。說無色界諸心心所。是無色相。無體。無實所取境義。顯現所依。恐彼執為非心心所。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 心。
述曰：此即第二，顯示由佛經所說。現在闡明唯識，用佛經來印證論述，使人容易信服。這裡的『以』字，與古文中的『由』字意思相同，指的是《華嚴經》等契經中，說到三界諸法都只是心的顯現。這是《十地論》第八卷中，第六地的內容。現在要成立唯有識的道理。梵語『素呾覽』（Sūtra），這裡翻譯為『契經』。『契』是符合的意思。『經』的解釋如常。經符合正理，契合眾生的根機，所以稱為契經。因為佛經中說了唯心，所以這裡闡明唯識，用佛經來印證論述。或者說，這裡所闡明的唯有識，是因為契經說了唯有心。所以現在的論述立足於理來印證佛經。或者說，現在所說的唯有識，用什麼來證明？因為契經說了唯有心。
問：為什麼佛經只說三界唯心？ 答：經部師等認為心緣起時沒有外境，也只是有心。但並非一切都是唯心。現在爲了遮破他們的觀點，所以說三界唯有識。無性菩薩解釋說：『這唯識的說法，成立了唯有諸心和心所，沒有三界中橫加計度的所緣境。』這句話並不否定真如所緣，依他所緣，指的是道諦所攝的根本智和后得智的兩種所緣。因為它們不被愛所執著，不是所要對治的，不是迷亂的，不屬於三界，也不離識，所以不需要特別說明。既然在三界能緣之中，有能遍計，在所緣之中，有所遍計，在有漏的聚合中，有橫加計度，爲了遮破這種執著，所以只說唯心，而不是沒有無漏法，不是隻有唯識。下面會詳細說明。
問：欲界、色界有色法，遮蔽了這種說唯心的觀點。無色界沒有色法，應該不說唯識嗎？ 答：這種提問不對。所執著的實法都是沒有的，遮破這種執著才稱為唯識。不是僅僅遮蔽色法的存在，才說三界唯心。也沒有所執著的唯識，以及其他的虛空法等一切境。另外，經部師認為沒有色法的諸心心所，是無色相，沒有實體，沒有真實所取的境義，顯現的所依。恐怕他們執著這些為非心心所。
【English Translation】 English version: Mind.
Statement: This is the second point, revealing what is said in the scriptures. Now, we clarify the concept of 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, Consciousness-only), using the scriptures to validate the treatise, making it easier to believe. The word '以' (yǐ, 'by means of') here has the same meaning as the ancient word '由' (yóu, 'due to'), referring to the fact that the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (花嚴經, Huāyán Jīng) and other sutras state that all dharmas (諸法, zhūfǎ) in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè) are merely manifestations of the mind. This is found in the eighth volume of the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (十地論, Shí Dì Lùn), within the sixth bhūmi (地, dì, stage). Now, we are establishing the principle of 'only consciousness' (唯有識, wéi yǒu shí). The Sanskrit term 'Sūtra' (素呾覽, Sù dānlǎn) is translated here as '契經' (qì jīng, 'scriptures that accord'). '契' (qì) means 'to accord'. The explanation of '經' (jīng, 'scripture') remains as usual. The scripture accords with correct reasoning and aligns with the capacities of sentient beings, hence it is called '契經' (qì jīng). Because the Buddhist scriptures speak of 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn), we clarify 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, Consciousness-only), using the scriptures to validate the treatise. Or, what is clarified here as 'only consciousness' (唯有識, wéi yǒu shí) is because the scriptures say 'only mind' (唯有心, wéi yǒu xīn). Therefore, the current treatise establishes the principle to validate the scriptures. Or, what is said now as 'only consciousness' (唯有識, wéi yǒu shí), what is the proof? Because the scriptures say 'only mind' (唯有心, wéi yǒu xīn).
Question: Why do the scriptures only speak of 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn) in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè)? Answer: The Sautrāntikas (經部師, Jīngbù shī) and others believe that when the mind arises in relation to an object, there is only mind. However, not everything is 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn). Now, to refute their view, we say that in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè) there is only consciousness (唯有識, wéi yǒu shí). Vasubandhu (無性, Wúxìng) explains: 'This statement of 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, Consciousness-only) establishes that there are only minds and mental factors (心所, xīnsǔo), and there are no objects of perception that are superimposed in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè).' This statement does not negate the object of perception of Suchness (真如, Zhēnrú), or the object of perception of dependent origination (依他, Yī tā), referring to the two types of objects of perception of fundamental wisdom (根本智, Gēnběn zhì) and subsequent wisdom (后得智, Hòudé zhì) included in the Truth of the Path (道諦, Dàodì). Because they are not clung to by attachment, are not to be treated, are not confused, do not belong to the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè), and are not separate from consciousness (識, shí), there is no need to specifically explain them. Since in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè), among the cognizers, there is the ability to conceptualize (遍計, biàn jì), and among the objects of perception, there is what is conceptualized, and in the aggregates of defilements (有漏, yǒu lòu), there is superimposed conceptualization, to refute this clinging, we only say 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn), not that there are no unconditioned dharmas (無漏法, wú lòu fǎ), not that there is only 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, Consciousness-only). This will be explained in detail below.
Question: The Desire Realm (欲界, Yùjiè) and the Form Realm (色界, Sèjiè) have form (色, sè), obscuring this view of 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn). The Formless Realm (無色界, Wúsèjiè) has no form (色, sè), should it not be said 'only consciousness' (唯識, wéi shí)? Answer: This question is incorrect. The real entities that are clung to are all non-existent. Refuting this clinging is called 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, Consciousness-only). It is not only by negating the existence of form (色, sè) that we say 'only mind' (唯心, wéi xīn) in the Three Realms (三界, Sānjiè). There is also no clung-to 'Vijñānamātra' (唯識, wéi shí), and all other objects such as space (虛空, xūkōng) and so on. Furthermore, the Sautrāntikas (經部師, Jīngbù shī) believe that the minds and mental factors (心所, xīnsǔo) without form (色, sè) are without form, without substance, without the meaning of a truly grasped object, and the basis of manifestation. They fear that they will cling to these as non-mind and non-mental factors.
故說三界皆唯有心 問唯有爾所經為證耶。答更有餘。解深密說唯識所現。又說諸法皆不離心。又說有情隨心垢凈。又說成就四智。菩薩能隨。悟入唯識無境。乃至廣說。如攝大乘第四卷中。及成唯識第七卷說。又花嚴經第九捲雲。心如工畫師。畫種種五陰。一切世界中。無法而不造。如心佛亦爾。如佛眾生然。心佛及眾生。是三無差別 問何故此論唯說一經 答且舉一經。以成教成理。何要多經其理方顯。
問何故論中。即言唯識。諸經所說。乃名唯心。舉心證識義如何成。
論。心意識了名之差別。
述曰。自下第三釋外伏難簡擇唯言。于中有二。初釋伏難解識字。后釋唯言。此即初也。難如前說。此即是答。謂諸經論所說。心．意．識．及了別。此之四名其體無異。但名差別。心積集義。意思量義。識了別義。了識達義應言了別。此中言略但說了言。舊論言等。等此了故。積集有二。一集行相。二集種子。初通諸識。后唯第八。思量有二。一無間覺。二現思量。初通諸識。后唯第七。了別有二。一細。二粗。初通諸識。后唯前六。此即八識皆有四名。若恐攝不盡義言等者。非八通名。何須等之。故如梵本應言了也。無性釋云。心．識是一。八識皆無離心之境。各名唯識。故經說心不違論說是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此說三界都只是唯心所現。問：只有這一部經可以作為證據嗎？答：還有其他的。《解深密經》說，一切都只是由識所顯現。又說，一切諸法都不離心。又說，有情眾生的清凈與染污都隨心而定。又說，成就四智的菩薩能夠隨之悟入唯識而無外境，乃至廣說。如《攝大乘論》第四卷中，以及《成唯識論》第七卷所說。又《華嚴經》第九卷說：『心如工畫師，畫種種五陰（色、受、想、行、識五種構成人身的要素）。一切世界中，沒有什麼是心不能創造的。如心這樣，佛也是這樣。如佛這樣，眾生也是這樣。心、佛及眾生，這三者沒有差別。』問：為什麼這部論只說一部經呢？答：暫且舉一部經，來成就教義和理則。哪裡需要多部經才能顯明這個道理呢？
問：為什麼論中說『唯識』，而諸經所說卻名為『唯心』呢？用『心』來證明『識』的意義如何成立？
論：心、意、識、了，這些名稱只是名稱上的差別。
述記：下面第三部分解釋外來的疑問，簡要選擇『唯』這個字。其中分為兩部分。首先解釋疑問，解釋『識』字。然後解釋『唯』字。這裡是第一部分。疑問如前面所說。這裡是回答。意思是說，諸經論所說的心、意、識以及了別，這四個名稱，它們的本體並沒有不同，只是名稱上的差別。『心』是積聚的意思，『意』是思量的意思，『識』是了別的意思，『了』是識達的意思，應該說是『了別』。這裡省略了，只說了『了』字。舊論說了『等』字，是等同於『了』的意思。積聚有兩種，一是積聚行相，二是積聚種子。前者通於各個識，後者只在第八識（阿賴耶識）中。思量有兩種，一是無間斷的覺察，二是現在的思量。前者通於各個識，後者只在第七識（末那識）中。了別有兩種，一是細微的，二是粗顯的。前者通於各個識，後者只在前六識中。這就是說八識都有這四個名稱。如果擔心不能完全包含其意義而說『等』字，如果不是八識共通的名稱，又何必用『等』字呢？所以應該像梵文版本一樣說『了』。無性解釋說：『心和識是一樣的。八識都沒有離開心的境界，各自名為唯識。』所以經書說『心』，不違背論典所說的『識』。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, it is said that the Three Realms are all only manifestations of mind. Question: Is there only this one sutra as evidence? Answer: There are others as well. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) says that everything is only manifested by consciousness (vijñāna 識). It also says that all dharmas do not depart from the mind. It also says that the purity and impurity of sentient beings depend on the mind. It also says that Bodhisattvas who have attained the Four Wisdoms can accordingly realize the absence of external objects in vijñapti-mātra (唯識, consciousness-only), and so on. As stated in the fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論), and the seventh volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (成唯識論). Furthermore, the ninth volume of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (花嚴經) says: 『The mind is like a skilled painter, painting various skandhas (五陰, aggregates). In all the worlds, there is nothing that the mind does not create. As is the mind, so is the Buddha. As is the Buddha, so are sentient beings. Mind, Buddha, and sentient beings, these three are without difference.』 Question: Why does this treatise only mention one sutra? Answer: Let us take one sutra to establish the teachings and principles. Why would we need many sutras to make the principle clear?
Question: Why does the treatise speak of 『vijñapti-mātra (唯識, consciousness-only)』, while the sutras speak of 『citta-mātra (唯心, mind-only)』? How can the meaning of proving 『consciousness』 with 『mind』 be established?
Treatise: Mind, manas (意), vijñāna (識), and vijñapti (了), these names are only differences in names.
Commentary: The third part below explains external objections, briefly selecting the word 『only』. It is divided into two parts. First, explain the objection, explaining the word 『consciousness』. Then explain the word 『only』. This is the first part. The objection is as mentioned before. This is the answer. It means that the mind, manas (意), vijñāna (識), and vijñapti (了別) mentioned in the sutras and treatises, these four names, their essence is not different, only the names are different. 『Mind』 means accumulation, 『manas (意)』 means thinking, 『vijñāna (識)』 means discernment, 『vijñapti (了)』 means understanding, it should be said 『vijñapti (了別)』. Here it is abbreviated, only the word 『vijñapti (了)』 is said. The old treatise said the word 『etc.』, which is equivalent to 『vijñapti (了)』. There are two types of accumulation, one is the accumulation of characteristics, and the other is the accumulation of seeds. The former applies to all consciousnesses, and the latter only exists in the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna 阿賴耶識). There are two types of thinking, one is uninterrupted awareness, and the other is present thinking. The former applies to all consciousnesses, and the latter only exists in the seventh consciousness (manas 末那識). There are two types of discernment, one is subtle, and the other is coarse. The former applies to all consciousnesses, and the latter only exists in the first six consciousnesses. This means that the eight consciousnesses all have these four names. If you are worried that it cannot fully contain its meaning and say the word 『etc.』, if it is not a common name for the eight consciousnesses, why use the word 『etc.』? Therefore, it should be said 『vijñapti (了)』 like the Sanskrit version. Asaṅga (無性) explains: 『Mind and consciousness are the same. The eight consciousnesses have no realm apart from the mind, and each is called vijñapti-mātra (唯識, consciousness-only).』 Therefore, the sutras say 『mind』, which does not contradict the 『consciousness』 stated in the treatises.
異名故。更有異釋。如唯識章 問此中八識。若皆得名心意識者。何故諸處。說第八識名心。第七名意。餘六名識。答成唯識論第五卷說。如是三義。雖通八識。而隨勝顯。第八名心。集諸法種。起諸法故。第七名意。恒審思量為我等故。餘六名識。粗動間斷了別轉故。各隨勝顯。別得一名。據實而言。皆得通說。此約通為論故。不相違 問若八識體各各名唯。何故乃說一心所作。答據梵本說亦無一字。但言唯心。今義釋言。唯獨但義。一無二義。名異義同。謂無外境唯有心故名為一心。非說心體但是一物 問據實而說識體是一識體是多。答如攝論言。一類菩薩。說八識體唯是一物。有一類師說有多體。今依后義。成唯識論第七卷說。八識自性。不可言定一。行相．所依．緣。相應異故。又一滅時。余不滅故。能所熏等。相各異故。亦非定異。經說八識。如水波等。無差別故。定異應非因果性故。如幻事等。無定性故。依理世俗。說有八別。非真勝義。真勝義中。心言絕故。此顯八識。體非即非離。入楞迦經伽陀中說。心意識八種。俗故相有別。真故相無別。相所相無故。若依一類說體唯一。於世俗諦。體亦非多。此言俗故相有別者。依用而說。此中八識。諸門分別。如成唯識第二．三卷等。第八識以十門分別。如第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 異名之故，還有其他的解釋。例如在《唯識章》中： 問：這其中的八識（eight consciousnesses），如果都可以被稱為心（citta，心）、意（manas，意）、識（vijñāna，識），那麼為什麼在不同的地方，說第八識名為心，第七識名為意，其餘六識名為識？ 答：《成唯識論》第五卷說，這三種含義，雖然貫通八識，但是隨其各自的殊勝之處而顯現。第八識名為心，因為它積聚諸法種子（seeds of all dharmas），並且生起諸法。第七識名為意，因為它恒常審察思量，執著于『我』。其餘六識名為識，因為它們粗糙動搖，間斷生滅，了別外境。各自隨其殊勝之處而得到一個名稱。但實際上來說，都可以通用。這是從普遍意義上來說，所以不矛盾。 問：如果八識的體性各自名為『唯』（only），為什麼又說一心所作（done by one mind）？ 答：根據梵文字來說，也沒有『一』字，只是說『唯心』。現在解釋說，『唯』是『獨』、『但』的意思，『一』是沒有二的意思。名稱不同，意義相同。意思是說，沒有外境，只有心，所以稱為一心。並不是說心的本體只是一個東西。 問：根據實際情況來說，識的本體是一個還是多個？ 答：如《攝大乘論》所說，有一類菩薩說八識的本體只有一個，也有一類老師說有多個本體。現在依照后一種說法，《成唯識論》第七卷說，八識的自性，不能說一定是一個，因為它們的行相（characteristics）、所依（basis）、緣（object）、相應（concomitant mental factors）都不同。而且一個識滅時，其餘的識不滅。能熏（capable of influencing）、所熏（influenced）等作用也各不相同。也不能說一定是不同的，因為經中說八識如水波等，沒有差別。如果一定是不同的，那麼就應該沒有因果性。如同幻事等，沒有固定的自性。依據理和世俗諦（conventional truth），說有八個不同的識，但這不是真勝義諦（ultimate truth）。在真勝義諦中，語言文字都無法表達。這表明八識的本體非即非離。《入楞伽經》的偈頌中說：『心意識八種，俗故相有別，真故相無別，相所相無故。』如果依照一類說法，認為本體只有一個，那麼在世俗諦中，本體也不是多個。這裡說『俗故相有別』，是依作用而說的。這其中八識的各種門類的分別，如《成唯識論》第二、三卷等。第八識以十個方面來分別，如第……
【English Translation】 English version Because of different names, there are further explanations. For example, in the chapter on Consciousness-Only: Question: If these eight consciousnesses (eight vijñānas) can all be called citta (mind), manas (intellect), and vijñāna (consciousness), then why is it that in various places, the eighth consciousness is called citta, the seventh is called manas, and the remaining six are called vijñāna? Answer: The fifth volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra says that these three meanings, although pervading all eight consciousnesses, are manifested according to their respective superiorities. The eighth consciousness is called citta because it accumulates the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas. The seventh consciousness is called manas because it constantly deliberates and clings to the notion of 'self'. The remaining six consciousnesses are called vijñāna because they are coarse, fluctuating, intermittent, and discern external objects. Each gains a name according to its respective superiority. But in reality, all can be referred to by any of the terms. This is speaking in a general sense, so there is no contradiction. Question: If the nature of each of the eight consciousnesses is called 'only', then why is it said to be 'done by one mind'? Answer: According to the Sanskrit text, there is not even the word 'one'; it simply says 'only mind'. Now, it is explained that 'only' means 'solely' or 'but', and 'one' means 'without a second'. The names are different, but the meaning is the same. It means that there are no external objects, only mind, so it is called one mind. It is not saying that the substance of the mind is just one thing. Question: According to reality, is the substance of consciousness one or many? Answer: As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, some Bodhisattvas say that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is only one, and some teachers say that there are multiple substances. Now, according to the latter view, the seventh volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra says that the nature of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be definitely one, because their characteristics (ākāra), bases (āśraya), objects (ālambana), and concomitant mental factors (saṃprayoga) are different. Moreover, when one consciousness ceases, the others do not cease. The functions of influencing (vāsanā) and being influenced are also different. Nor can it be said to be definitely different, because the sutras say that the eight consciousnesses are like waves of water, without difference. If they were definitely different, then there should be no causality. Like illusions, they have no fixed nature. According to reason and conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it is said that there are eight different consciousnesses, but this is not ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). In ultimate truth, language and words cannot express it. This shows that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is neither identical nor separate. In the verses of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, it says: 'Mind, intellect, and consciousness, eight kinds, are different in appearance because of convention, but are not different in appearance because of truth, because there is no subject or object.' If according to one view, it is thought that the substance is only one, then in conventional truth, the substance is also not many. Here, saying 'different in appearance because of convention' is speaking according to function. The various categories of distinctions of these eight consciousnesses are as in the second and third volumes of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, etc. The eighth consciousness is distinguished in ten aspects, such as the...
四．五卷等。第七識亦十門分別。如第五．六卷等。餘六識以九門分別。
經部等問。既言唯識。應無心所。不說唯故。
論。此中說心。意兼心所。
述曰。自下第二簡擇唯言。論所引經。說唯心者。言雖唯心。意亦兼說唯諸心所。以唯有心所。無實所取故 問何故不說。答無性釋云。唯聲為遣所取境義。由彼無故。能取亦無。不遮心所。由彼與心。不相離故。如說若無心所有法。心未曾轉經部轉計。及上座部言。若爾滅定。何故唯心。是彼宗過。我大乘中。若處有心。必有心所諸相應法。若無心所相應法者。心亦定無。成唯識說。以心勝故。但說唯心。心所依心勢力生故。略且不說。瞿波釋云。此中唯言。為顯勝義。不為顯能義。以三界中心最勝故。如經說言道唯護根戒名沙門等。由識故三界生故名勝。遂引頌言。諸法心為先。為勝及為顯。若人起凈心。說言及作事。樂從三善生。隨逐猶如影。諸法心為先。為勝及為顯。若人起染心。說言及作事。苦從三惡生。如輪隨牛腳。心相應故。說唯心言。亦攝心所 問何名心所。答心之所有。恒依心起。與心相應。系屬於心。故名心所。如王有臣。人有財等 問心所與心。為一為異。答如薩婆多等。與心定異。如經部等。與心無異。今大乘者。如成唯
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "四、五卷等。《成唯識論》第七識也以十個方面來分別，如第五、六卷等。其餘六識以九個方面來分別。", "", "經部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）等宗派問道：既然說是『唯識』，就應該沒有心所（Caitasika，心理作用）。為什麼又說『不說唯故』呢？", "", "論：這裡所說的『心』，意在兼指心所。", "", "述記說：下面第二點是簡要地選擇『唯』這個字。論中所引用的經文，說的是『唯心』，雖然說是『唯心』，但意思也兼說了唯有諸心所。因為只有心所，沒有實在的所取境（Grahya，被認知對像）。問：為什麼不說心所呢？答：無性（Asanga，印度佛教瑜伽行派創始人之一）解釋說，『唯』這個字是爲了遣除所取境的意義，因為所取境不存在，能取（Grahaka，能認知主體）也就不存在了，但並不遮止心所，因為心所與心不相分離。比如，如果說沒有心所法，心就不會運轉。經部轉而計較，以及上座部（Sthavira，佛教部派之一）說，如果這樣，滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態）中，為什麼只有心呢？這是他們的宗派的過失。在我們大乘佛教中，如果哪裡有心，必定有心所等相應的法。如果沒有心所等相應的法，心也必定不存在。《成唯識論》說，因為心是主要的，所以只說『唯心』，心所依賴於心，由心的勢力而生起，所以簡略地不說。瞿波（Gopa，人名）解釋說，這裡的『唯』字，是爲了顯示勝義（Paramārtha，最高真理），而不是爲了顯示能義（Samartha，能力）。因為在三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）中，心是最殊勝的。如經中所說，『道唯護根戒名沙門』等。因為由識（Vijñāna，意識）的緣故，三界才產生，所以稱為勝。於是引用頌文說：『諸法心為先，為勝及為顯。若人起凈心，說言及作事，樂從三善生，隨逐猶如影。諸法心為先，為勝及為顯。若人起染心，說言及作事，苦從三惡生，如輪隨牛腳。』因為與心相應，所以說『唯心』，也包含了心所。問：什麼叫做心所？答：心之所有，恒常依賴心而生起，與心相應，系屬於心，所以叫做心所。如同國王有臣子，人有財富等。問：心所與心，是一還是異？答：如同薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，佛教部派之一）等，認為心所與心一定是不同的。如同經部等，認為心所與心沒有差異。現在大乘佛教，如同《成唯識論》所說。", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "",
識第七卷中。廣有問答。辨其一異。然總意者。依世俗故。說有差別。不同經部。依勝義故。心所與心。非離非即。如日與光。不同薩婆多 問若依世俗。與心有異。其緣境時。與心何別。答成唯識論第五卷說。心於所緣。唯取總相。心所于彼。亦取別相。助成心事。得心所名。如畫師資作模填彩。辨中邊論第一頌云。三界心心所。是虛妄分別。總了境名心。亦別名心所。即是心所。取總別相。心王唯總。乃至廣說 問今幾心所。何心與何心所相應。緣何境界。乃至廣說一切義門。答如成唯識。及別章中。具廣分別。不能廣引。
問經中但說有心言。寧知有所。
論。唯遮外境不遣相應。
述曰。為諸愚夫。不知心外無實境相。便執實有。起諸惡業二重障等。經說唯心遮離心外。遍計所執實境是有。不為遣除。依他起性。不離於心。諸心所法。心為主故。說唯有心。理實亦唯有諸心所 問何名相應。答成唯識論第三卷說。謂心心所行相雖異。而時．依同．所緣．事等。故名相應。即具四義除同行相。乃名相應。彼違瑜伽。及理有別。皆如彼說 問若遮外境。豈復亦遮自身諸識各所變耶。答今亦遮此諸識相緣。不能親取。非遮體有。離自外境。亦非或一向。遮體都無。但說自心不能親取。心親所取。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《識》第七卷中，有很多問答，辨析心與心所的一同與差異。總的來說，依據世俗諦，認為心與心所存在差別，這與經部宗的觀點不同。依據勝義諦，心所與心之間，非分離也非完全相同，如同太陽與陽光的關係，這與薩婆多宗的觀點不同。 問：如果依據世俗諦，心所與心存在差異，那麼在緣取境界時，心所與心有什麼區別？ 答：《成唯識論》第五卷說，心對於所緣境，只取總相；心所對於所緣境，則取別相，輔助成就心的作用，因此得名為心所。如同畫師與助手，一個負責勾勒輪廓，一個負責填塗色彩。《辨中邊論》第一頌說：『三界的心和心所，都是虛妄分別。總的了知境界名為心，分別了知境界名為心所。』這就是說，心所取總相和別相，心王只取總相，乃至更廣的解釋。 問：現在有多少種心所？什麼心與什麼心所相應？緣取什麼境界？乃至請詳細解釋一切義理。 答：如同《成唯識論》以及其他相關章節中，都有詳細的分別解釋，這裡不能一一引用。 問：經典中只說有『心』這個概念，怎麼知道還有『心所』呢？ 論：只是遮遣外境，並沒有否定心所與心相應。 述曰：因為那些愚昧的人，不知道心外沒有真實的境相，便執著認為實有外境，從而產生各種惡業和二重障礙等等。經典中說『唯心』，是爲了遮遣離開心之外，遍計所執（Parikalpita）（虛妄分別）的真實外境是存在的這種觀點，並不是爲了遣除依他起性（Paratantra）（依他而生）不離於心的事實。各種心所法，因為心是主導，所以說『唯有心』，但實際上也唯有各種心所。問：什麼叫做『相應』？ 答：《成唯識論》第三卷說：『所謂心和心所，雖然行相不同，但在時間（時）、所依（依）、所緣（所緣）、事（事）等方面相同，所以叫做相應。』也就是說，具備四種意義，除了行相相同之外，才叫做相應。那些與《瑜伽師地論》相違背，以及在道理上有區別的地方，都如該論中所說。 問：如果遮遣外境，難道也遮遣自身諸識各自所變現的相分嗎？ 答：現在也遮遣這些識的相分作為所緣境，不能直接取用，但不是遮遣其體性的存在。離開自身之外的境界，也不是完全遮遣其體性完全不存在，只是說自心不能直接取用。心所能直接取用。
【English Translation】 English version: In the seventh volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), there are many questions and answers that distinguish the similarities and differences between the mind and mental functions (citta and caitta). In general, according to conventional truth (samvriti-satya), it is said that there are differences, which is different from the Sautrantika school. According to ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), mental functions and the mind are neither separate nor identical, like the sun and its light, which is different from the Sarvastivada school. Question: If, according to conventional truth, mental functions are different from the mind, then when they cognize objects, what is the difference between mental functions and the mind? Answer: The fifth volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says that the mind only grasps the general characteristics (samanya-lakshana) of what is cognized, while mental functions grasp the specific characteristics (vishesha-lakshana) of what is cognized, helping to accomplish the mind's function, hence the name 'mental functions.' It is like a painter and an assistant, one responsible for outlining the form, and the other for filling in the colors. The first verse of the Madhyantavibhaga-karika (Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes) says: 'The mind and mental functions in the three realms are all conceptual constructions. Comprehending the general aspect is called mind, and comprehending the specific aspect is called mental function.' That is, mental functions grasp both general and specific aspects, while the mind-king only grasps the general aspect, and so on in more detailed explanations. Question: How many mental functions are there now? Which mind is associated with which mental functions? What realms do they cognize? Please explain all the meanings in detail. Answer: As explained in detail in the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi and other related chapters, I cannot quote them all here. Question: The sutras only mention the concept of 'mind' (citta). How do we know there are also 'mental functions' (caitta)? Treatise: It only negates external objects, and does not negate the association of mental functions with the mind. Commentary: Because those ignorant people do not know that there are no real external objects outside the mind, they cling to the belief that external objects are real, thereby generating various evil deeds and the two kinds of obstructions, and so on. The sutras say 'only mind' to negate the view that real external objects of the Parikalpita (completely conceptualized) nature exist outside the mind, but not to negate the fact that the Paratantra (other-dependent) nature is inseparable from the mind. Because the mind is the leader of all mental functions, it is said 'only mind,' but in reality, there are also only various mental functions. Question: What is meant by 'association' (samprayoga)? Answer: The third volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says: 'What is called association is that although the characteristics (akara) of the mind and mental functions are different, they are the same in terms of time (kala), basis (ashraya), object (alambana), and thing (vastu), hence it is called association.' That is, it possesses four meanings; only when the characteristics are not the same is it called association. Those places that contradict the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Stages of Yoga Practice) and have differences in reasoning are as explained in that treatise. Question: If external objects are negated, does it also negate the image-component (nimitta-bhaga) transformed by each of the consciousnesses themselves? Answer: Now, we also negate these image-components of the consciousnesses as objects of cognition, which cannot be directly grasped, but we do not negate the existence of their essence (substance). Apart from the external realm of oneself, it is not a complete negation of the existence of its essence, but only says that the mind cannot directly grasp it. Mental functions can directly grasp it.
定不離心。若離自心。定不親取 問其心所法。唯既不遮。其真如性。經中不說。應非唯識。答成唯識說。識之實性。不離識故。名為唯識。非如心所。名唯心所。不名唯識。真如亦是。心所實性。亦得名為唯心所法。此理通故。舊論此中別說一頌。以立論宗。真諦頌云。實無有外塵。似塵識生故。猶如翳眼人。見毛．兩月等。菩提流支云。唯識無境界。以無虛妄見。如人目有翳。見毛月等事。理雖不違。勘三梵本。並無此頌。但譯家增。
論。內識生時。似外境現如有眩翳。見發蠅等此中都無少分實義。
述曰。自下第四。顯唯識義。舉喻以成。舊論此中。設為外難。方顯正理。此譯家增。非梵本有。內識生時。似外境現。此中都無少分實義。顯唯識義。如有眩翳。見發蠅等。此中都無少分實義。舉喻以成。或前雖引教。今以理成。若安慧等以前聖者。說此內識生。似外境現言。謂唯有識依他起性一自證分。似外遍計所執。見相二取境現。所執雖無。妄情謂有。似妄情故。名似所取。成唯識論第一卷言。或復內識。轉似外境。第七卷說。或轉變者。謂諸內識。轉似我法外境相現。此師意說。見．相二分。是所執無。唯自證分。依他性有。中邊等說。能取所取。皆所執故。由自證分。虛妄熏習。為因緣故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『定』（Samadhi）的體性不離『心』（Citta）。如果『定』離開了自身的『心』，那麼『定』就無法親自體證（親取）。 問：關於『心所法』（Caitasika dharmas），既然已經否定了它們不是『真如性』（Tathata），那麼經典中沒有說『心所法』是『唯識』（Vijnaptimatrata），那麼『心所法』應該不是『唯識』吧？ 答：『成唯識』的觀點是，『識』（Vijnana）的真實體性不離『識』本身，因此稱為『唯識』。不像『心所』（Caitasika），雖然可以稱為『唯心所』（Citta-samprayukta），但不能稱為『唯識』。『真如』也是『心所』的真實體性，也可以稱為『唯心所法』。這個道理是通用的。舊的論典中，在此處單獨增加了一頌，用來確立論點。真諦（Paramartha）的頌文說：『實際上沒有外在的塵境，只是因為『識』的生起才好像有塵境。就像眼睛有翳病的人，看到毛髮、兩個月亮等。』菩提流支（Bodhiruci）說：『唯識沒有境界，因為沒有虛妄的見解。就像人的眼睛有翳病，看到毛髮、月亮等事物。』 這個道理雖然沒有違背『唯識』的教義，但是考察三個梵文字，都沒有這個頌文，只是譯經的人增加的。
論：內在的『識』生起時，好像外在的境界顯現出來，就像有眩暈或眼翳的人，看到毛髮、蒼蠅等。這些現象中都沒有絲毫真實的意義。
述記：下面第四部分，闡明『唯識』的意義，用比喻來完成論證。舊的論典中，在此處設定了外來的詰難，然後才闡明正確的道理。這些是譯經的人增加的，不是梵文字原有的。『內在的『識』生起時，好像外在的境界顯現出來。』——這些現象中都沒有絲毫真實的意義，這是爲了闡明『唯識』的意義。『就像有眩暈或眼翳的人，看到毛髮、蒼蠅等。』——這些現象中都沒有絲毫真實的意義，這是用比喻來完成論證。或者前面雖然引用了經教，現在用道理來論證。如果安慧（Sthiramati）等以前的聖者，說這個『內在的識』生起，好像外在的境界顯現出來，是指只有『識』的『依他起性』（Paratantra-svabhava）的『一自證分』（Svasamvedana-bhaga），好像外在的『遍計所執』（Parikalpita-svabhava）的『見分』（Darsana-bhaga）和『相分』（Nimitta-bhaga）的取境顯現。所執雖然沒有，但虛妄的情識認為有，因為好像虛妄的情識，所以稱為『好像所取』。《成唯識論》第一卷說：『或者內在的『識』，轉變好像外在的境界。』第七卷說：『或者轉變者，是指各種內在的『識』，轉變好像我、法等外在境界的相狀顯現。』這位論師的意思是說，『見分』和『相分』是『所執』沒有的，只有『自證分』是『依他性』有的。《中邊分別論》（Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya）等經論說，能取和所取，都是『所執』。由於『自證分』的虛妄熏習，作為因緣的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version 『Samadhi』 (concentration) is inseparable from 『Citta』 (mind). If 『Samadhi』 departs from one's own 『mind』, then 『Samadhi』 cannot be personally attained (directly grasped). Question: Regarding 『Caitasika dharmas』 (mental factors), since it has already been negated that they are not 『Tathata』 (Suchness), and the scriptures do not say that 『Caitasika dharmas』 are 『Vijnaptimatrata』 (Representation-only), then shouldn't 『Caitasika dharmas』 not be 『Vijnaptimatrata』? Answer: The view of 『Cheng Weishi』 (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi) is that the true nature of 『Vijnana』 (consciousness) is inseparable from 『Vijnana』 itself, therefore it is called 『Vijnaptimatrata』. Unlike 『Caitasika』 (mental factors), although it can be called 『Citta-samprayukta』 (associated with mind), it cannot be called 『Vijnaptimatrata』. 『Tathata』 is also the true nature of 『Caitasika』, and can also be called 『Citta-samprayukta dharma』. This principle is universal. In the old treatises, a verse was added here to establish the argument. Paramartha's verse says: 『In reality, there are no external dust realms, it is only because of the arising of 『Vijnana』 that dust realms seem to exist. Just like a person with cataracts in their eyes, seeing hairs, two moons, etc.』 Bodhiruci said: 『Vijnaptimatrata has no realm, because there is no false view. Just like a person with cataracts in their eyes, seeing hairs, moons, etc.』 Although this principle does not contradict the teachings of 『Vijnaptimatrata』, examining the three Sanskrit versions, there is no such verse, it was only added by the translator.
Treatise: When the inner 『Vijnana』 arises, it seems that external realms appear, just like a person with dizziness or cataracts, seeing hairs, flies, etc. There is not the slightest real meaning in these phenomena.
Commentary: The fourth part below clarifies the meaning of 『Vijnaptimatrata』, using metaphors to complete the argument. In the old treatises, external challenges were set up here, and then the correct principles were clarified. These were added by the translator, and were not originally in the Sanskrit version. 『When the inner 『Vijnana』 arises, it seems that external realms appear.』 - There is not the slightest real meaning in these phenomena, this is to clarify the meaning of 『Vijnaptimatrata』. 『Just like a person with dizziness or cataracts, seeing hairs, flies, etc.』 - There is not the slightest real meaning in these phenomena, this is to complete the argument with metaphors. Or, although the scriptures were quoted earlier, now the argument is made with reason. If Sthiramati and other previous sages said that this 『inner Vijnana』 arises, and it seems that external realms appear, it refers to only the 『Svasamvedana-bhaga』 (self-awareness portion) of the 『Paratantra-svabhava』 (dependent nature) of 『Vijnana』, which seems like the 『Darsana-bhaga』 (seeing portion) and 『Nimitta-bhaga』 (appearance portion) of the 『Parikalpita-svabhava』 (completely imputed nature) of external realms. Although what is grasped does not exist, the false consciousness thinks it exists, because it seems like false consciousness, so it is called 『seeming to be grasped』. The first volume of 『Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi』 says: 『Or the inner 『Vijnana』 transforms to seem like external realms.』 The seventh volume says: 『Or the transformer refers to the various inner 『Vijnana』, transforming to seem like the appearance of external realms such as self and dharma.』 The meaning of this teacher is that the 『Darsana-bhaga』 and 『Nimitta-bhaga』 are 『grasped』 and do not exist, only the 『Svasamvedana-bhaga』 is 『dependent nature』 and exists. The 『Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya』 (Commentary on the Discrimination between Middle and Extremes) and other scriptures say that the grasper and the grasped are both 『grasped』. Due to the false perfuming of the 『Svasamvedana-bhaga』, it serves as a cause and condition.
。自體生時。似能所取外境相現。此中二取。都無少實。唯有自證。似彼而生。唯取自體。故無少法能取少法愚者不知謂離識體。有實二分。故說唯識。令其了知。若護法等以後聖說。言內識生似外境現。謂有依他自證．見．相三分而生。不離識故。名為唯識。愚者依此不離識法。執為離心。有實境相。此實所取。心外二取體性都無。中邊等說。二取非有。依他二取。其體非無攝論等說唯二等故。若無依他見．相二分。即違厚嚴及諸聖。說唯量唯二。能所取纏。見種種等。故今唯有非有似有。依他內識三分而生。都無少分離心之外。遍計所執實二取現。故無少法。能取少法。說唯識言。令其了達。不生愚昧。謂彼為有。成唯識論第一卷說。謂內識體。轉似二分。相．見俱依自證起故。依斯二分施設我法。彼二離此。無所依故。第七卷說三能變識。及諸心所。皆能變似見．相二分。此師說也。法體雖然。理猶未顯。故次舉喻。以成此宗。如世有人。眼有眩翳。意識遂于空中。見有發蠅等。等者等取空花黃色．第二月等。眩是亂病。翳是障疾。眼病為緣。意見發等。此中都無少分實義。由眼有病。以眼為門。意見蠅等。非即眼識。能見發蠅。如以手等按一目時。意識便見第二月現。非即眼識。見第二月。第六意識。以眼為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 當自體（自心）生起時，似乎能取（能認知的主體）和所取（被認知的客體）的外境顯現。但這其中的能取和所取，都沒有絲毫真實性，只有自證分（svasaṃvedana，能自我證明的意識）似乎像它們一樣生起，實際上只是取自體（自身）。因此，沒有任何法能夠取任何法。愚昧的人不明白這個道理，認為在識體之外，有真實的能取和所取二分。所以才說『唯識』，讓他們明白這個道理。 如果按照護法（Dharmapāla）等後來的聖者所說，『內識生起時，顯現得像外境』，意思是說有依他起（paratantra，依緣而起）的自證分、見分（darśana-bhāga，認識作用）和相分（ākāra-bhāga，被認識的表象）三分而生起。因為不離識，所以稱為『唯識』。愚昧的人依據這種不離識的法，執著地認為在心之外，有真實的境相，認為這是真實所取。實際上，心外的能取和所取二分的體性根本不存在。《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）等經論中說，能取和所取並非真實存在，但依他起的能取和所取，其體性並非完全沒有。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）等經論中說，只有能取和所取二分。 如果沒有依他起的見分和相分，就違背了《厚嚴經》（Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra）以及諸位聖者所說的『唯量』、『唯二』、『能所取纏』、『見種種』等。所以現在只有非有似有的依他起內識三分生起，根本沒有任何分離於心之外的遍計所執（parikalpita，虛妄分別）的真實能取和所取顯現。因此，沒有任何法能夠取任何法。說『唯識』，是爲了讓他們明白這個道理，不產生愚昧，認為它們是真實存在的。《成唯識論》第一卷說：『內識的體性，轉變而顯現為二分，相分和見分都依賴於自證分而生起，依據這二分來施設我法，這二分離開自證分，就沒有所依賴之處。』第七卷說：『三能變識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識；klīṣṭa-manas，末那識；manas，意識）以及諸心所，都能轉變而顯現得像見分和相分。』這是護法論師的說法。法的道理雖然如此，但理路還不明顯，所以接下來用比喻來成就這個宗義。 比如世間有人，眼睛有眩暈的毛病，意識就會在空中看到頭髮、蒼蠅等。『等』字包括空花、黃色、第二個月亮等。眩是擾亂的病，翳是遮障的疾病。以眼病為緣，意識見到頭髮等，這其中沒有任何真實的意義。由於眼睛有病，以眼睛為門戶，意識見到蒼蠅等，但並不是眼識能夠見到頭髮、蒼蠅。就像用手等按壓一隻眼睛時，意識就會看到第二個月亮顯現，但並不是眼識見到第二個月亮。第六意識以眼睛為...
【English Translation】 English version When the self-nature arises, it seems that the subject (the one who cognizes) and the object (the one being cognized) of the external world appear. However, neither the subject nor the object in this are real at all. Only self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) seems to arise like them, but in reality, it only grasps itself. Therefore, no dharma can grasp any dharma. Ignorant people do not understand this principle and think that outside the nature of consciousness, there are real subject and object divisions. That's why we say 'Vijñāptimātratā' (consciousness-only), to make them understand this principle. If, according to later sages like Dharmapāla, 'when inner consciousness arises, it appears like the external world,' it means that it arises with the three parts of dependent origination (paratantra): self-awareness, the seeing aspect (darśana-bhāga), and the appearance aspect (ākāra-bhāga). Because it does not leave consciousness, it is called 'Vijñāptimātratā'. Ignorant people, based on this dharma that does not leave consciousness, stubbornly believe that outside the mind, there are real objective appearances, thinking that this is the real object being grasped. In reality, the nature of the subject and object divisions outside the mind does not exist at all. The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya and other scriptures say that the subject and object are not real, but the subject and object of dependent origination are not completely non-existent. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other scriptures say that there are only the subject and object divisions. If there were no seeing aspect and appearance aspect of dependent origination, it would contradict the Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra and the sayings of the sages such as 'only measure', 'only two', 'entanglement of subject and object', 'seeing various things', etc. Therefore, now only the dependent origination of the three parts of inner consciousness, which are non-existent but seem to exist, arises. There is absolutely no real subject and object of imaginary construction (parikalpita) appearing outside the mind. Therefore, no dharma can grasp any dharma. Saying 'Vijñāptimātratā' is to make them understand this principle, not to be ignorant and think that they are real. The first volume of the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra says: 'The nature of inner consciousness transforms and appears as two parts. The appearance aspect and the seeing aspect both rely on self-awareness to arise. Based on these two parts, we establish self and dharma. These two parts have nothing to rely on if they are separated from self-awareness.' The seventh volume says: 'The three transforming consciousnesses (ālaya-vijñāna, the storehouse consciousness; klīṣṭa-manas, the afflicted mind; manas, the mind) and all mental factors can transform and appear like the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect.' This is the statement of Dharmapāla. Although the principle of dharma is like this, the reasoning is not yet clear, so next, we use a metaphor to accomplish this doctrine. For example, if someone in the world has a problem with dizziness in their eyes, their consciousness will see hairs, flies, etc., in the air. 'Etc.' includes things like empty flowers, yellow color, and a second moon. Dizziness is a disturbing illness, and blurred vision is an obstructing disease. Taking eye disease as a condition, consciousness sees hairs, etc., but there is no real meaning in this. Because the eyes are diseased, using the eyes as a gateway, consciousness sees flies, etc., but it is not the eye consciousness that can see hairs and flies. Just like when pressing one eye with a hand, consciousness will see a second moon appear, but it is not the eye consciousness that sees the second moon. The sixth consciousness uses the eyes as...
門。同時明瞭狀如眼見。實非眼見。以五識中。無慧執故。成唯識說。現量證時。不執為外。后意分別。妄生外想。故自相分。識所變故。亦說為有。意識所執。妄計度故。說之為無。此護法等。說唯六七有執者解。攝大乘說能計度者是意識故。又說。唯有二分。內識變相。不離於識。似外境現。此中都無離識實物。如有眩翳。見發蠅等。若安慧等。說八識中皆有執者。以此等論諸文為證。眼有眩翳。見第二月。眼即能見。故眼識等。諸見相分。皆是所執。此中都無少分實義。誰言意識。依眼見也。言唯意識。能計度者。彼論意說。遍一切境而計度者。唯意識能。誰言五識無有遍計。若不爾者。此中雲何說眼有眩。見發蠅等。廣此等諍如成唯識。瞿波論師。同護法釋。以眼為門。意識能執。無有道理五識緣無無分別故。一向緣實。如阿毗達磨經偈中說。無有眼等識。不緣實境起。意識有二種。緣實．不實境 安慧解此文云。五識起執。必詫似境實法。而起似色用故。不同意識緣龜毛等。本無亦生無似用故。不說五識不起法執 唯緣實境妄習內緣。所見外境皆非實有。亦如發蠅所見。蠅蛇喻亦如是。故成唯識云。如患夢者。患夢力故。心似種種外境相現。緣此執為實有外境。雖有此喻。理仍未顯。應更立量。量云。極成
眼識。定不親緣離自色境。五識之中隨一攝故。如餘四識。此余意識。亦不親緣離自諸法。是識性故。如眼識等。中間四識。比量準思。此成心外境。非內心所緣。次成心內境。定不離於識。量云。此親所緣。定不離此。二隨一故。如彼能緣。又親所緣。決定不離心及心所。所緣法故。如相應法。復第二云。余所執法。異心心所非實有性。是所取故。如心心所。能取彼覺。亦不緣彼。是能取故。如緣此覺 問如他身等識。雖不親緣既許有體。何得名唯識 答成唯識論第七卷說。非唯識言但說一識。若唯一識無他等者。何有十方凡聖尊卑因果等別誰為誰說。何法何求。故唯識言。有深意趣。識言總顯一切有情。各有八識。六位心所。所變相見分位差別。及彼空理所顯真如。識自相故。識相應故。二所變故。三分位故。四實性故。如是諸法。皆不離識。總立識名。唯言。但遮愚夫所執。定離諸識。實有色等。若如是知唯識教意。便能無倒。善備資糧。速入法空。證無上覺。救拔含識生死輪迴。非全撥無惡取空者。違背教理。能成是事。故定應信一切唯識。知清辨等。所執皆非。由撥依他圓成無故。中邊論中。慈氏尊說。虛妄分別有。於此二都無。此中唯有空。于彼亦有此。故說一切法。非空非不空。有無及有故。是則契中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眼識一定不直接以遠離自身的色境（rūpa-dhātu，物質領域）為所緣，因為它屬於五識（pañca-vijñāna，五種感官意識）中的一種，就像其餘四識一樣。這個其餘的意識（指意識本身），也一定不直接以遠離自身的諸法（dharma，事物、現象）為所緣，因為這是識的本性，就像眼識等一樣。中間的四識，可以通過比量（anumāna，推理）來推斷。這證明了心外的境是存在的，並非內心所緣。接下來證明心內的境，一定不離於識。量（pramāṇa，有效認知手段）說：『這個直接所緣，一定不離於此（指能緣的識），因為它們是二者之一，就像那個能緣一樣。』又，直接所緣，決定不離心（citta，心）及心所（caitta，心所法），因為是所緣法，就像相應法（samprayukta-dharma，相應的心所）一樣。再者，第二種說法是：『其餘所執著的法，異於心和心所，不是真實存在的，因為它們是被取（grahya，被認知）的，就像心和心所一樣。』能取彼覺（指能認知那個覺知的心），也不緣彼（指被覺知的事物），因為它是能取，就像緣此覺（指緣于這個覺知本身）一樣。 問：如果像他身識等，雖然不直接緣取，但承認有自體（svabhāva，自性），為何能稱為唯識（vijñapti-mātratā，唯識性）？ 答：《成唯識論》第七卷說：『非唯識言但說一識，若唯一識無他等者，何有十方凡聖尊卑因果等別，誰為誰說，何法何求？』所以，『唯識』一詞，有深刻的意趣。『識』字總括顯示一切有情（sattva，眾生）各有八識（aṣṭa vijñāna，八種意識），六位心所（caitasika，心所），所變現的相分（nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）、見分（darśana-bhāga，能見部分）的差別，以及彼空理所顯的真如（tathātā，真如）。識的自相（svalakṣaṇa，自性），識的相應（samprayoga，相應），二者所變現，三分位（avasthā，狀態），四種實性（vastuta，真實性）。像這樣的諸法，都不離識，總立為『識』名。『唯』字，只是遮止愚夫所執著的，一定遠離諸識，實有的色等。如果這樣理解唯識的教義，便能無倒（aviparita，不顛倒），善於準備資糧（sambhāra，修行資糧），迅速進入法空（dharma-śūnyatā，諸法空性），證得無上覺（anuttara-bodhi，無上菩提），救拔含識（saṃjñā，有情）脫離生死輪迴。並非完全否定，惡取空者（dṛṣṭi-śūnyatā，惡取空者），違背教理，能成就此事。所以，一定要相信一切唯識，知道清辨（Bhāvaviveka，印度論師）等所執著的都是錯誤的，因為否定了依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，依他起性）和圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，圓成實性）的緣故。《中邊分別論》中，彌勒菩薩（Maitreya，未來佛）說：『虛妄分別有，於此二都無，此中唯有空，于彼亦有此。』所以說一切法，非空非不空，有無及有故，這才是契合中道（madhyamā-pratipad，中道）。
【English Translation】 English version Eye-consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna) certainly does not directly cognize objects (rūpa-dhātu, realm of form) that are separate from its own color-object (rūpa-ālambana), because it is included among the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, five sense consciousnesses), just like the other four consciousnesses. This remaining consciousness (referring to consciousness itself) also certainly does not directly cognize phenomena (dharma, things, phenomena) that are separate from its own dharmas, because this is the nature of consciousness, just like eye-consciousness and the like. The four intermediate consciousnesses can be inferred through inference (anumāna, reasoning). This proves that external objects exist outside the mind and are not cognized by the inner mind. Next, it is proven that internal objects are definitely not separate from consciousness. The valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) states: 'This direct object of cognition is definitely not separate from this (referring to the cognizing consciousness), because they are one of the two, just like that cognizer.' Furthermore, the direct object of cognition is definitely not separate from the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta, mental events), because it is an object of cognition, just like associated mental factors (samprayukta-dharma, associated mental factors). Moreover, the second statement is: 'The remaining phenomena that are clung to, different from the mind and mental factors, are not truly existent, because they are apprehended (grahya, apprehended), just like the mind and mental factors.' The consciousness that apprehends that awareness (referring to the mind that cognizes that awareness) also does not cognize that (referring to the object being cognized), because it is the apprehender, just like cognizing this awareness (referring to cognizing this awareness itself). Question: If, like the consciousness of others' bodies, although it does not directly cognize, it is admitted to have its own nature (svabhāva, self-nature), why can it be called Mind-Only (vijñapti-mātratā, mere-consciousness)? Answer: The seventh volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: 'The term 'Mind-Only' does not merely refer to one consciousness. If there were only one consciousness and nothing else, how could there be distinctions such as the ordinary and the noble, the high and the low, cause and effect in the ten directions? Who would speak to whom, what dharma would be taught, and what would be sought?' Therefore, the term 'Mind-Only' has a profound meaning. The word 'consciousness' (vijñāna) comprehensively reveals that all sentient beings (sattva, beings) each have eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñāna, eight consciousnesses), six categories of mental factors (caitasika, mental factors), the differences in the appearance aspect (nimitta-bhāga, image aspect) and the perceiving aspect (darśana-bhāga, seeing aspect) that are transformed, and the Suchness (tathātā, suchness) revealed by that empty principle. The self-nature (svalakṣaṇa, self-characteristic) of consciousness, the association (samprayoga, association) of consciousness, what is transformed by the two, the three states (avasthā, states), and the four realities (vastuta, realities). Such phenomena as these are all inseparable from consciousness, and are collectively established as the name 'consciousness'. The word 'only' merely prevents the color, etc., which is definitely separated from all consciousnesses and is real, which is clung to by foolish people. If one understands the teachings of Mind-Only in this way, one can be without inversion (aviparita, non-inverted), be good at preparing the accumulations (sambhāra, accumulations of merit and wisdom), quickly enter the emptiness of phenomena (dharma-śūnyatā, emptiness of phenomena), realize unsurpassed enlightenment (anuttara-bodhi, unsurpassed enlightenment), and liberate sentient beings (saṃjñā, sentient beings) from the cycle of birth and death. It is not a complete denial, and those who wrongly grasp emptiness (dṛṣṭi-śūnyatā, those who wrongly grasp emptiness), who violate the teachings, can accomplish this. Therefore, one must believe in all Mind-Only, and know that what Bhāvaviveka (Bhāvaviveka, Indian philosopher) and others cling to is all wrong, because they deny the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva, dependent nature) and the perfectly established nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, perfectly established nature). In the Madhyāntavibhāga, Maitreya (Maitreya, future Buddha) said: 'Conceptual proliferation exists, but these two do not exist in it, only emptiness exists in it, and this also exists in that.' Therefore, it is said that all dharmas are neither empty nor non-empty, because of existence, non-existence, and existence, which is in accordance with the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipad, middle way).
道。由此故知。說唯識者。契中道義。今言唯識。但言三界。且略但依染依他說。妄執分別。唯染污故。理實亦有凈分依他。凈分依他。唯識異說。至下當敘。不繁煩顯。然心心所。依世俗諦。非真實有。依他起故。如幻事等。若依勝義。非實非不實。心言絕故。依清辨等。破有為空。真性有為空。緣生故。如幻。彼似比量。非真比量。若我真性。離心言故。有為非空。若汝真性。非極成有。唯是空故。故今所說。于理無違。為遣妄執心心所外。實有境故。說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者。如執外境。亦是法執 問雖知離心實境非有。心內之境。為如於心。亦是實有。為有異耶 答成唯識論第十卷中。略有三說。第一師說。然相分等。依識變現。非如識性依他中實。不爾唯識理應不成。許識內境俱實有故。第二師說。或識相見等從緣生。俱依他起。虛實如識。唯言遣外。不遮內境。不爾真如。亦應非實。境既同識。何名唯識。應名唯境虛實同故。識唯內有。境通外故。恐濫于彼。但言唯識。或諸愚夫。迷執于境。起煩惱業。生死沉淪。哀愍于彼。但說唯識。令自觀心解脫生死。非說內境如外都無。雖有內境。亦不如心。此中但說如心實者。第三師說。或相分等。皆識為性。由熏習力。似多分生。真如亦是識之實性。故除
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此可知，說『唯識』是符合中道之義的。現在所說的『唯識』，只是指三界，並且簡略地只依據染污的依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，事物由因緣和合而生起的性質），以及虛妄的執著和分別。這是因為只有染污才是需要破除的。實際上，也存在清凈的依他起性，關於清凈依他起性的『唯識』，有不同的說法，將在後面敘述，這裡不詳細展開。然而，心和心所（Citta-caitta，心理活動及其伴隨的精神現象）是依據世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）而存在的，並非真實存在，因為它們是依他而起的，就像幻術變出的事物一樣。如果依據勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理），它們既非真實存在，也非不真實存在，因為語言無法描述。清辨（Bhavaviveka，印度佛教中觀派論師）等人破斥有為法（Samskrita-dharma，由因緣和合而成的法）為空，認為真性是有為法，因為它是緣起（Pratitya-samutpada，事物依靠因緣條件而生起）的，就像幻象一樣。他們所用的似乎是比量（Anumana，通過推理獲得的知識），但並非真正的比量。如果我的真性是遠離語言的，那麼有為法就不是空。如果你的真性不是極成有（事物真實存在的極端），那麼它就只是空。所以，現在所說的『唯識』，在道理上沒有違背。爲了遣除人們虛妄執著於心和心所之外存在真實外境的觀念，所以才說『唯有識』。如果執著于『唯識』是真實存在的，那就如同執著外境一樣，也是一種法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著）。 問：雖然知道離開了心，真實的外境是不存在的，那麼心內的境，是和心一樣，也是真實存在的，還是有所不同呢？ 答：在《成唯識論》（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra）第十卷中，略有三種說法。第一位論師說：相分（Nimitta-bhaga，認識對像）等是依據識的變現而產生的，不像識的自性那樣在依他起性中是真實的。如果不是這樣，『唯識』的道理就不能成立，因為這樣就等於承認識內的境和識一樣都是真實存在的。第二位論師說：或者識的相分、見分（Darshana-bhaga，認識活動）等是從因緣而生的，都是依他起，它們的虛實和識一樣。說『唯』是爲了遣除外境，而不是遮止內境。如果遮止內境，那麼真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是的狀態）也應該不是真實的了。境既然和識一樣，為什麼叫做『唯識』呢？應該叫做『唯境』，因為虛實相同。識只是內有的，而境既有內也有外，恐怕和外境混淆，所以才說『唯識』。或者有些愚昧的人，迷惑于外境，產生煩惱和業，在生死中沉淪，爲了憐憫他們，才只說『唯識』，讓他們自己觀察內心，解脫生死，而不是說內境像外境一樣完全沒有。雖然有內境，也不如心那麼真實。這裡只是說像心一樣真實的情況。第三位論師說：或者相分等，都是以識為自性的，由於熏習（Vasana，長期影響）的力量，顯現出多種多樣的形態。真如也是識的真實自性，所以除了...
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is known that the statement of 'Vijñaptimātra' (consciousness-only) aligns with the Middle Way. The 'Vijñaptimātra' mentioned now refers only to the Three Realms and briefly relies only on the defiled Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of things arising from the combination of causes and conditions), as well as false attachments and discriminations. This is because only defilement needs to be eliminated. In reality, there is also pure Paratantra-svabhava. Regarding the 'Vijñaptimātra' of pure Paratantra-svabhava, there are different views, which will be discussed later, without elaborating here. However, Citta (mind) and Caitta (mental factors) exist based on Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), and are not truly existent, because they arise dependently, like things conjured by illusion. If based on Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth), they are neither truly existent nor non-truly existent, because language cannot describe them. Bhavaviveka (an Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher) and others refute Samskrita-dharma (conditioned phenomena) as empty, believing that true nature is Samskrita-dharma because it arises from Pratitya-samutpada (dependent origination), like illusions. Their seeming inference is not a true inference. If my true nature is beyond language, then conditioned phenomena are not empty. If your true nature is not extremely existent, then it is only empty. Therefore, what is said now does not contradict reason. To dispel people's false attachment to the existence of real external objects outside of Citta and Caitta, it is said that 'only consciousness exists'. If one clings to 'Vijñaptimātra' as truly existent, it is like clinging to external objects, which is also a Dharma-graha (attachment to the Dharma). Question: Although it is known that real external objects do not exist apart from the mind, are the internal objects within the mind the same as the mind, also truly existent, or are they different? Answer: In the tenth volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), there are briefly three views. The first teacher says: Nimitta-bhaga (the object of cognition) and others are produced based on the transformation of consciousness, and are not as real in Paratantra-svabhava as the nature of consciousness. If this were not the case, the principle of 'Vijñaptimātra' would not be established, because it would be equivalent to admitting that the internal objects of consciousness are as truly existent as consciousness itself. The second teacher says: Or the Nimitta-bhaga, Darshana-bhaga (the act of cognition), etc. of consciousness arise from causes and conditions, and are all Paratantra-utpanna (dependently arisen), their reality and unreality are the same as consciousness. Saying 'only' is to eliminate external objects, not to prevent internal objects. If internal objects were prevented, then Tathata (suchness) should also not be real. Since the object is the same as consciousness, why is it called 'Vijñaptimātra'? It should be called 'Vijnana-matra' because reality and unreality are the same. Consciousness is only internal, while objects are both internal and external. Fearing confusion with external objects, it is said 'Vijñaptimātra'. Or some foolish people are deluded by external objects, generating afflictions and karma, and sinking into Samsara (cycle of rebirth). Out of compassion for them, only 'Vijñaptimātra' is spoken, so that they can observe their own minds and be liberated from Samsara, not to say that internal objects are completely non-existent like external objects. Although there are internal objects, they are not as real as the mind. Here, only the situation of being as real as the mind is discussed. The third teacher says: Or Nimitta-bhaga and others are all of the nature of consciousness. Due to the power of Vasana (habitual tendencies), they appear in various forms. Tathata is also the real nature of consciousness, so except for...
識性。無別有法。此第三師安慧等。前二師義護法等宗。然有別說。合而論者。第二師說勝。無過失故。識者自知。然佛地論。但有一說。同第一師。
論。即於此義。有設難言。
述曰。上來總辨初立論宗。唯識無境。自下第二。釋外所徴。廣破外執。於二十頌中。大文有七。此下第一有十四頌。小乘外道。四事難識境無。卻徴實境執。二諸法由量刊定有無下。有一頌半。釋小乘等。以現量證境有。返破憶持執。三若如夢中雖無實境下。有半頌。釋小乘外道。以夢例覺時。應知境無失。四若諸有情由自相續下。有半頌。復釋外難二識成決定。外境非無失。五若如夢中境雖無實下。次有半頌。復解外難夢覺心無異。造行果差失。六若唯有識無身語等下。次有二頌。又釋外難無境殺等無。返誥他宗失。七若唯有識諸他心智下。次有一頌。又釋外難不照他心智。識不成失 就第一中文復有四。初有一頌。小乘外道四事難境無。證知非唯識。第二非皆不成下。次有五頌。釋四難非理。故知是唯識。第三此教非因下。次有三頌。釋有情法。二無我教。引教難不成。故知唯有識。第四復云何知佛依如是下。次有五頌。返破外人外境非實有。故知唯有識。或分為三。合初二段。總為一段。四事問答外境無故。于初難中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：識的自性。沒有其他的法。這位第三位論師安慧（Anhui，人名）等，與前兩位論師義護（Yihu，人名）等宗派的觀點不同。然而，也有其他的說法。綜合來看，第二位論師的說法更為優勝，沒有過失。有辨識能力的人自會明白。然而，《佛地論》（Fo Di Lun，佛教經論名）中，只有一種說法，與第一位論師相同。
論：就此義，有人提出疑問。
述：上面總的辨析了最初建立的論宗，即唯識無境。下面第二部分，解釋外人提出的質疑，廣泛地破斥外道的主張。在二十頌中，大體上有七個部分。這以下的第一部分有十四頌，小乘（Hinayana，佛教宗派名）外道（non-Buddhist，佛教術語，指非佛教的宗教或哲學）用四件事來質疑識境的空無，反過來質疑真實存在的境。第二部分『諸法由量刊定有無』以下，有一頌半，解釋小乘等用現量（pratyaksa，佛教術語，指直接的感官認知）來證明境的存在，反過來破斥憶持的執著。第三部分『若如夢中雖無實境』以下，有半頌，解釋小乘外道用夢境來比喻覺醒時，認為應該知道境是空無的，沒有過失。第四部分『若諸有情由自相續』以下，有半頌，再次解釋外人的質疑，即兩個識的成立是確定的，外境並非空無，沒有過失。第五部分『若如夢中境雖無實』以下，接下來有半頌，再次解釋外人的質疑，即夢境和覺醒時的心沒有差異，造作行為和結果有差別。第六部分『若唯有識無身語等』以下，接下來有兩頌，又解釋外人的質疑，即沒有外境，殺生等行為就不存在，反過來指責對方宗派的過失。第七部分『若唯有識諸他心智』以下，接下來有一頌，又解釋外人的質疑，即不能照見他人的心智，識的成立就有過失。就第一部分中，又分為四個部分。最初有一頌，小乘外道用四件事來質疑境的空無，證明並非唯識。第二部分『非皆不成』以下，接下來有五頌，解釋四種質疑並非合理，因此可知是唯識。第三部分『此教非因』以下，接下來有三頌，解釋有情法和二無我（anatta，佛教術語，指沒有永恒不變的自我）的教義，引用教義來質疑是不成立的，因此可知是唯識。第四部分『復云何知佛依如是』以下，接下來有五頌，反過來破斥外人認為外境並非真實存在，因此可知是唯識。或者分為三個部分，合併最初兩個部分，總共為一段，用四件事來問答外境的空無，所以在最初的質疑中。
【English Translation】 English version: The nature of consciousness. There is no other dharma (law, teaching). This third teacher, Anhui (name of a person), and others, hold different views from the former two teachers, Yihu (name of a person) and others. However, there are other opinions as well. Considering them together, the second teacher's view is superior, without fault. Those with discernment will understand this themselves. However, the Fo Di Lun (name of a Buddhist scripture) only has one view, which is the same as the first teacher's.
Treatise: Regarding this meaning, someone raises a question.
Commentary: Above, we generally analyzed the initially established thesis, which is that only consciousness exists, without external objects. Below, in the second part, we explain the questions raised by outsiders and extensively refute the views of non-Buddhists (those who are not Buddhists). In the twenty verses, there are seven main sections. The first section below has fourteen verses, where Hinayana (a school of Buddhism) non-Buddhists use four things to question the non-existence of the realm of objects, and in turn, question the existence of real objects. The second section, 'Whether all dharmas (phenomena) exist or not is determined by measurement,' has one and a half verses, explaining that Hinayana and others use direct perception (pratyaksa) to prove the existence of objects, and in turn, refute the attachment to memory and retention. The third section, 'If, as in a dream, there are no real objects,' has half a verse, explaining that Hinayana non-Buddhists use dreams to compare to the waking state, believing that it should be known that objects are non-existent, without fault. The fourth section, 'If all sentient beings are due to their own continuums,' has half a verse, again explaining the outsider's question, that the establishment of two consciousnesses is certain, and external objects are not non-existent, without fault. The fifth section, 'If, as in a dream, objects are not real,' then has half a verse, again explaining the outsider's question, that there is no difference between the mind in dreams and the mind in the waking state, but there are differences in actions and results. The sixth section, 'If only consciousness exists, without body, speech, etc.,' then has two verses, again explaining the outsider's question, that without external objects, actions like killing would not exist, and in turn, accuses the other school of faults. The seventh section, 'If only consciousness exists, and there are minds that know others' thoughts,' then has one verse, again explaining the outsider's question, that one cannot see others' minds, and the establishment of consciousness has faults. Within the first section, there are four parts. Initially, there is one verse, where Hinayana non-Buddhists use four things to question the non-existence of objects, proving that it is not only consciousness. The second section, 'Not all are unestablished,' then has five verses, explaining that the four questions are not reasonable, therefore it is known that it is only consciousness. The third section, 'This teaching is not a cause,' then has three verses, explaining the teachings of sentient beings and the two non-selves (anatta), quoting the teachings to question is not established, therefore it is known that it is only consciousness. The fourth section, 'How else do we know that the Buddha relies on this,' then has five verses, in turn refuting the outsiders' view that external objects are not real, therefore it is known that it is only consciousness. Or, it can be divided into three parts, combining the first two parts into one section, answering the non-existence of external objects with four things, so in the initial question.
。先標外難。后敘難。今即於此義有設難言者。標外難也。謂此所難。無實外徴。論主假作經部諸師。為此問意。故言設難。又設謂施設。即實經部。施設此難。
論。頌曰。若識無實境即處時決定相續不決定作用不應成。
述曰。下正敘難。初略頌。后廣問。頌中初句。牒大乘義。及第四句。不應成言。正為難理。總通四難。謂若說識無實境者。即處決定不應成等。至下當知。舊論頌云處時悉無定。無相續不定。作事不應成。若唯識無塵。意具文倒。尋者自知。
論曰。此說何義。
述曰。自下廣問。將演頌難。故先論主。起此問端。此頌所說。明何義理。
論。若離識實有色等外法色等識生不緣色等。
述曰。下廣四難。于中有二。初牒大乘義。別為四難。后總為四難。初中亦二。初牒大乘義。后正申難。此廣初句頌。通下四難。若者若其事謂若大乘。說唯有識無心外境。即是離於心外。實有色聲等境。有緣色等。能緣識生。此識生時。不以離心色等為境者。此即小乘外道。牒大乘義。
自下正難。
論。何因此識有處得生非一切處。
述曰。即第一難。頌第二句。處定不成。謂既無實境。許有此識生。何因如緣終南山識。於此山處起。余處則不生。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：首先標出外部的困難，然後敘述內在的困難。現在就針對這個義理，假設有人提出疑問，這就是標出外部的困難。意思是說，這個疑問並沒有實際的外在證據，論主只是假設經部宗的諸位法師，提出這樣的疑問。所以說是『設難』。又，『設』是施設的意思，也就是實際的經部宗，施設了這個困難。
論：頌曰：若識無實境，即處時決定，相續不決定，作用不應成。
述曰：下面正式敘述困難。先是簡略地用頌文概括，然後詳細地提出疑問。頌文中的第一句，是引用大乘的義理；第四句『不應成』，正是提出疑問的理據。總共包含四個方面的困難。意思是說，如果認為識沒有真實的外部境界，那麼處所的決定性等就不應該成立。具體內容在下文會詳細解釋。舊論的頌文是『處時悉無定，無相續不定，作事不應成』。如果認為只有識而沒有塵境，那麼意思就顛倒了，讀者自己可以體會。
論曰：這是什麼意思呢？
述曰：下面廣泛地提出疑問，將要闡述頌文中的困難，所以先由論主提出這個疑問的開端：這首頌所說的，闡明的是什麼義理呢？
論：如果離開識而有真實存在的色等外法，色等識生起時不緣色等。
述曰：下面廣泛地提出四個方面的困難。其中分為兩個部分，首先是引用大乘的義理，分別提出四個方面的困難；然後總括為四個方面的困難。在第一部分中又分為兩個部分，首先是引用大乘的義理，然後正式地提出困難。這裡是闡述頌文的第一句，貫通下面的四個困難。『若』，是如果的意思，也就是如果大乘認為只有識而沒有心外的境界，也就是離開了心外，有真實存在的色聲等境界，有緣於色等，能緣的識生起。這個識生起的時候，如果不以離開心的色等為境界，這就是小乘外道的觀點。這是引用大乘的義理。
下面正式提出困難。
論：為什麼這個識在某個處所能夠生起，而不是在所有處所都能生起呢？
述曰：這是第一個困難，對應頌文的第二句，處所的決定性不能成立。意思是說，既然沒有真實的境界，卻允許有這個識的生起，那麼為什麼像緣於終南山的識，只在這個山的地方生起，而在其他地方卻不能生起呢？這是疑問。
【English Translation】 English version: First, the external difficulties are pointed out, then the internal difficulties are narrated. Now, regarding this meaning, if someone raises a question, this is pointing out an external difficulty. It means that this question does not have actual external evidence; the author is merely assuming that the masters of the Sautrāntika school are raising this question. Therefore, it is called 'posing a difficulty'. Also, 'posing' means establishing, that is, the actual Sautrāntika school establishes this difficulty.
Treatise: Verse: 'If consciousness has no real object, then location and time are determined, continuity is not determined, and function should not be accomplished.'
Commentary: Below, the difficulties are formally narrated. First, the verse is summarized briefly, then the questions are asked in detail. The first line of the verse refers to the meaning of Mahayana; and the fourth line, 'should not be accomplished', is precisely the reason for raising the difficulty. It encompasses four aspects of difficulty. It means that if it is argued that consciousness has no real external object, then the determination of location, etc., should not be established. The details will be explained below. The old treatise's verse is 'Location and time are all undetermined, continuity is undetermined, and action should not be accomplished'. If it is argued that there is only consciousness and no dust, then the meaning is reversed; the reader can understand this for themselves.
Treatise: What does this mean?
Commentary: Below, the questions are asked extensively, and the difficulties in the verse are about to be elaborated, so the author first raises the beginning of this question: What meaning does this verse explain?
Treatise: If, apart from consciousness, there are real external dharmas such as form, then when consciousness of form arises, it does not cognize form, etc.
Commentary: Below, four aspects of difficulty are extensively presented. Among them, there are two parts: first, the meaning of Mahayana is cited, and four aspects of difficulty are presented separately; then, they are summarized into four aspects of difficulty. In the first part, there are also two parts: first, the meaning of Mahayana is cited, and then the difficulty is formally presented. This elaborates on the first line of the verse, connecting the four difficulties below. 'If' means if that is the case, that is, if Mahayana argues that there is only consciousness and no external realm of the mind, that is, apart from the mind, there are real external realms such as form and sound, which are conditioned by form, etc., and the consciousness that cognizes arises. If this consciousness, when it arises, does not take the form, etc., that is apart from the mind as its object, then this is the view of the Hinayana and non-Buddhist paths. This is citing the meaning of Mahayana.
Below, the difficulty is formally presented.
Treatise: Why can this consciousness arise in a certain location, but not in all locations?
Commentary: This is the first difficulty, corresponding to the second line of the verse, the determination of location cannot be established. It means that since there is no real object, but it is allowed for this consciousness to arise, then why, like the consciousness that is conditioned by Mount Zhongnan, does it only arise in the place of this mountain, but not in other places? This is the question.
及所餘境實無故。謂立量云。非緣終南處。緣此識應生。執境實無識得生故。如緣終南處。此言現識。非謂此識。若說此識者。非此處亦生。然今且為處定比量。此識不生例生比量。義準可知。然不繁作。下皆準悉。何因等言。即不應成。
論。何故此處有時識起非一切時。
述曰。此第二難。頌第二句。時定不成。謂既無實境。許有此識生。何故如緣終南山處。識於一時起。非一切時生。此時余時境俱無故。謂立量言。非緣終南時緣此識應起。執境實無此識生故。如緣終南時。此言現識。如前已說。處時有異。余意可同。
論曰。同一處時。有多相續何不決定隨一識生。
述曰。即第三難。頌第三句。相續不定。不應成難。言相續者。有情異名。前蘊始盡。后蘊即生。故言相續。或非常一。簡異外宗。亦言相續。謂既無外境許有此識生。如同一山處。及同一時間。有多相續。皆共緣見。何不決定。隨一相續。緣山識生。所餘有情。此識不起。
此雖正難。理猶未顯。次舉喻成。
論。如眩翳人見發蠅等非無眩翳有此識生。
述曰。此舉決定。例不決定。既言虛妄分別。以為緣故。似外境生實無外境。如有眩翳。見發蠅等。無小實義。唯有識者。如世目眩。及中有翳。以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及所餘的境界實際上是不存在的。這裡假設一個論證：如果不是以終南山為緣，這個意識也應該產生，因為執著于境界是真實存在的，所以意識才會產生，就像以終南山為緣一樣。這裡說的是現識，而不是指這個意識本身。如果說的是這個意識本身，那麼即使不是在終南山這個地方，意識也會產生。但現在我們暫且為處所設定一個比量，這個意識不產生，可以類推出生起的比量，其中的道理可以類推得知，所以不再繁瑣地說明。下面的情況都可以依此類推。『何因等言』，就是不應該成立。
論：為什麼在同一個地方，有時意識會生起，而不是在所有時間都生起？
述記：這是第二個難點，對應頌文的第二句，『時定不成』。意思是說，既然沒有真實的境界，卻允許這個意識產生，那麼為什麼像以終南山為緣一樣，意識只在某個時間生起，而不是在所有時間都生起呢？因為無論是在那個時間還是其他時間，境界都是不存在的。這裡假設一個論證：如果不是以終南山為緣，這個意識也應該生起，因為執著于境界是真實存在的，所以這個意識才會產生，就像以終南山為緣一樣。這裡說的是現識，就像前面已經說過的。處所和時間有所不同，其餘的道理可以類推。
論：在同一個處所和時間，有很多相續存在，為什麼不決定地只隨一個意識產生呢？
述記：這是第三個難點，對應頌文的第三句，『相續不定』，不應該成立這個難點。這裡說的『相續』，是有情的另一種說法。前一蘊剛剛消盡，后一蘊就立即產生，所以說是相續。或者說不是恒常唯一的，以此來區別于外道的觀點，也說是相續。意思是說，既然沒有外在的境界，卻允許這個意識產生，那麼像在同一座山和同一時間，有很多相續存在，大家都共同緣取而見到，為什麼不決定地只隨一個相續，緣取山的意識而產生呢？其餘的有情，這個意識就不應該生起。
雖然這正是難點所在，但道理還不明顯。接下來舉例說明。
論：就像有眩暈病的人看到頭髮和蒼蠅等，如果不是因為有眩暈病，就不會產生這種意識。
述記：這是舉出決定性的例子，來反駁不決定的情況。既然說是虛妄分別，作為產生的緣故，看起來像是外在的境界產生，但實際上沒有外在的境界。就像有眩暈病的人，看到頭髮和蒼蠅等，沒有絲毫真實的意義，只有意識存在。就像世間上眼睛有眩暈，或者眼睛裡有翳障。
【English Translation】 English version: And the remaining realms are in reality non-existent. Suppose we establish a proposition: If not conditioned by the Zhongnan Mountains (Zhongnan Chu, a famous mountain range), this consciousness should arise, because clinging to the realm as real causes this consciousness to arise, just like being conditioned by the Zhongnan Mountains. This refers to present consciousness (xian shi), not the consciousness itself. If we were talking about the consciousness itself, then even if it were not in the place of the Zhongnan Mountains, the consciousness would arise. But now we are temporarily setting up a syllogism for the place; this consciousness does not arise, and the syllogism for arising can be inferred by analogy. The principle can be inferred, so there is no need to explain it in detail. All the following situations can be inferred in the same way. 'What cause, etc.' means that it should not be established.
Treatise: Why does consciousness sometimes arise in the same place, but not at all times?
Commentary: This is the second difficulty, corresponding to the second line of the verse, 'Time is not fixed.' It means that since there is no real realm, but it is allowed that this consciousness arises, then why, like being conditioned by the Zhongnan Mountains, does consciousness only arise at a certain time, but not at all times? Because whether at that time or at other times, the realm is non-existent. Suppose we establish a proposition: If not conditioned by the time of Zhongnan, this consciousness should arise, because clinging to the realm as real causes this consciousness to arise, just like being conditioned by the time of Zhongnan. This refers to present consciousness, as has been said before. Place and time are different, and the remaining principles can be inferred.
Treatise: In the same place and time, there are many continuations (xiang xu, referring to the continuity of consciousness), why doesn't it decisively arise with only one consciousness?
Commentary: This is the third difficulty, corresponding to the third line of the verse, 'Continuations are not fixed,' and this difficulty should not be established. The 'continuations' here are another way of saying sentient beings. The previous skandha (yun, aggregates of existence) has just ended, and the next skandha immediately arises, so it is called continuation. Or it is not constant and unique, in order to distinguish it from the views of external paths, and it is also called continuation. It means that since there is no external realm, but it is allowed that this consciousness arises, then like on the same mountain and at the same time, there are many continuations, and everyone commonly perceives and sees, why doesn't it decisively arise with only one continuation, the consciousness that is conditioned by the mountain? The remaining sentient beings, this consciousness should not arise.
Although this is precisely the difficulty, the principle is not yet clear. Next, an example is given to illustrate.
Treatise: Just like people with dizziness see hairs and flies, etc., if it were not for the dizziness, this consciousness would not arise.
Commentary: This is giving a decisive example to refute the uncertain situation. Since it is said to be false discrimination (xu wang fen bie), as the cause of arising, it looks like an external realm arises, but in reality there is no external realm. Just like people with dizziness see hairs and flies, etc., there is no real meaning at all, only consciousness exists. Just like in the world, eyes have dizziness, or there is an obstruction in the eyes.
為緣故。同一時間。于虛空中。此決定見有發蠅花等。種種異物。非是眼中無眩翳者。於此時處。許有見發蠅等識生。何故於同一山之處。及同一時。有多相續皆共見山。非是決定。如見發等隨一能見。虛妄眩翳。唯識既齊。定隨一見。其義應等。既許多見。故是相續不決定也。謂立量云。有多相續同一時間於一處所。應定一見余不能見執唯識故。如多相續同一時間於一發等有見不見。
論。復有何因諸眩翳者所見發等。無發等用。
述曰。下第四難。頌第四句。作用不成於中有三難。此即第一。翳發等無實用。復有何因言。通三難問。及申三難竟。論云余發等物其用非無。通上三難。謂既無實境。許有此識生。有何所以。有眩翳者。所見發蠅等。無發蠅等用。無眩翳者。所見發蠅等。有發蠅等用。發有為髻等用。蠅有附食等用也。量云。眩翳所見應有實用。執無實境此識生故。如余發等。
論。夢中所得飲食刀杖毒藥衣等無飲等用。
述曰。難作用中。此即第二。夢飲等無實用。即供身四事。一飲食。二衣服。三醫藥。等取第四臥具。然此外。加刀杖及毒藥。藥通二種。有毒無毒故。謂既無實境。許識得生。何故夢飲酒等。無醉亂等用。余時飲等。有醉等用。量云。夢中飲等應有實用。執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為什麼緣故，在同一時間，于虛空中，這種確定的見解會有發蠅花等種種不同的事物出現。不是眼中沒有眩暈模糊的人，在此時此地，允許有見到發蠅等事物的意識產生。為什麼在同一座山的地方，以及同一時間，有多個相續都共同看到山，卻不是確定的，就像見到發蠅等事物一樣，只有其中一個能見到虛妄的眩暈景象。既然唯識的觀點一致，那麼確定只有一個人能見到的情況，其道理應該相同。既然有許多人都能見到，所以這種相續是不確定的。也就是說，可以這樣立論：有多個相續在同一時間、同一處所，應該確定只有一個人能見到，其餘的人不能見到，因為你們堅持唯識的觀點。就像多個相續在同一時間看到頭髮等事物，有的人能見到，有的人見不到一樣。
論：又有什麼原因導致那些有眩暈模糊的人所見到的發蠅等事物，沒有發蠅等的作用呢？
述曰：下面是第四個難點，頌文的第四句。作用不成，其中有三個難點，這是第一個。眩暈所見的發蠅等事物沒有實際用處。『又有什麼原因』這句話，貫通了三個難點的提問，以及對三個難點的闡述。論中說：『其餘的發蠅等事物，其作用並非沒有』，這是爲了駁斥上面的三個難點。意思是說，既然沒有真實的境界，卻允許有這種意識產生，那麼有什麼理由說，有眩暈模糊的人所見到的發蠅等發蠅，沒有發蠅等的作用，而沒有眩暈模糊的人所見到的發蠅等，卻有發蠅等的作用呢？頭髮有用來做髮髻等的作用，蒼蠅有用來依附食物等的作用。可以這樣立論：眩暈所見的事物應該有實際用處，因為你們堅持沒有真實境界，卻有這種意識產生，就像其餘的發蠅等事物一樣。
論：夢中所得到的飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣服等，沒有飲食等的作用。
述曰：在作用的難點中，這是第二個。夢中的飲食等沒有實際用處，也就是供養身體的四件事物：一、飲食，二、衣服，三、醫藥，等等，包括第四個臥具。然而，此外，還加上刀杖和毒藥。藥包括兩種，有毒的和無毒的。意思是說，既然沒有真實的境界，卻允許意識能夠產生，那麼為什麼夢中飲酒等，沒有醉亂等作用，而平時飲酒等，卻有醉亂等作用呢？可以這樣立論：夢中的飲酒等應該有實際用處，因為你們堅持...
【English Translation】 English version: For what reason, at the same time, in empty space, this definite view has various different things like hair-flies and flowers appearing. It is not that those without dizziness or blurred vision in their eyes, at this time and place, are allowed to have consciousnesses of seeing hair-flies and the like arise. Why is it that in the same mountain area, and at the same time, multiple continuums all commonly see the mountain, but it is not definite, like seeing hair-flies and the like, where only one can see the false, dizzying scene. Since the Yogācāra (唯識) view is consistent, then the principle should be the same that only one person can definitely see it. Since many people can see it, therefore this continuum is not definite. That is to say, one can establish the following argument: multiple continuums at the same time and in the same place, should definitely have only one person seeing it, and the rest not seeing it, because you adhere to the Yogācāra view. Just like multiple continuums at the same time seeing hair and the like, some can see it, and some cannot.
Treatise: Furthermore, what is the reason that the hair-flies and the like seen by those with dizziness and blurred vision, have no function of hair-flies and the like?
Commentary: Below is the fourth difficulty, the fourth line of the verse. The non-accomplishment of function has three difficulties, this is the first. The hair-flies and the like seen in dizziness have no practical use. The phrase 'Furthermore, what is the reason' connects the questions of the three difficulties, and the explanation of the three difficulties. The treatise says: 'The function of the remaining hair-flies and the like is not non-existent,' this is to refute the above three difficulties. It means, since there is no real realm, yet it is allowed that this consciousness arises, then what reason is there to say that the hair-flies and the like seen by those with dizziness and blurred vision, have no function of hair-flies and the like, while the hair-flies and the like seen by those without dizziness and blurred vision, have the function of hair-flies and the like? Hair has the function of being used for hairstyles and the like, flies have the function of attaching to food and the like. One can establish the following argument: the things seen in dizziness should have practical use, because you adhere to the view that there is no real realm, yet this consciousness arises, just like the remaining hair-flies and the like.
Treatise: The food, drink, knives, staves, poison, clothing, etc. obtained in dreams have no function of drinking, etc.
Commentary: In the difficulty of function, this is the second. The food and drink, etc. in dreams have no practical use, that is, the four things that nourish the body: one, food and drink; two, clothing; three, medicine; etc., including the fourth, bedding. However, in addition to these, knives, staves, and poison are also added. Medicine includes two types, poisonous and non-poisonous. It means, since there is no real realm, yet it is allowed that consciousness can arise, then why is it that drinking wine, etc. in dreams has no function of intoxication, etc., while drinking wine, etc. at other times has the function of intoxication, etc.? One can establish the following argument: drinking wine, etc. in dreams should have practical use, because you adhere to...
無實境此識生故。如余時飲等。
論。尋香城等無城等用。
述曰。此第三難。尋香城等作用不成。舊論云乾闥婆城訛也。梵云健達縛。此云尋香。謂中有能尋當生處香。即便往生。亦名健達縛。其西域呼俳優。亦云尋香。此等不事王侯。不作生業。唯尋諸家飲食等香。便往其門。作諸伎樂。而求飲食。能作幻術。此幻作城。于中游戲名尋香城。幻惑似有。無實城用。或呼陽焰化城。名健達縛城。諸商估等。入諸山海。多見陽焰化為城室。于中聞有作樂等聲。西域呼作樂者。既名尋香。故說此化城。名尋香城。謂既無實境。許此識生。何故此城。無實城用。非尋香城。有實城用。量云。此尋香城應有實用。許無實境此識生故。如余城等。
論。余發等物其用非無。
述曰。先敘三事。無實用已。此通三事。為相例難。謂既無實境。許此識生。何故眩翳所見。無發等用。余發蠅等。有發等用。乃至第三。如前已說。此中舉初余發蠅等。等取第二餘飲等用。及等第三餘城等用。然舊論一一難下。皆自出例。今恐煩廣。故總顯之。
論。若實同無色等外境唯有內識似外境生。
述曰。上來別約四事。難四不成。自下第二。於一事中。總為四難。亦結前文。此即牒大乘無境許識起。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無實境此識生故。如余時飲等。』
論：尋香城等無城等用。
述曰：此第三難。尋香城等作用不成。舊論云乾闥婆城（Gandharva-pura，尋香城）訛也。梵云健達縛（Gandharva），此云尋香。謂中有能尋當生處香，即便往生。亦名健達縛（Gandharva）。其西域呼俳優，亦云尋香。此等不事王侯，不作生業，唯尋諸家飲食等香，便往其門，作諸伎樂，而求飲食。能作幻術。此幻作城，于中游戲名尋香城。幻惑似有，無實城用。或呼陽焰化城，名健達縛城（Gandharva-pura）。諸商估等，入諸山海，多見陽焰化為城室，于中聞有作樂等聲。西域呼作樂者，既名尋香。故說此化城，名尋香城。謂既無實境，許此識生。何故此城，無實城用。非尋香城，有實城用。量云：此尋香城應有實用。許無實境此識生故。如余城等。
論：余發等物其用非無。
述曰：先敘三事。無實用已。此通三事。為相例難。謂既無實境，許此識生。何故眩翳所見。無發等用。余發蠅等。有發等用。乃至第三。如前已說。此中舉初余發蠅等。等取第二餘飲等用。及等第三餘城等用。然舊論一一難下。皆自出例。今恐煩廣。故總顯之。
論：若實同無色等外境唯有內識似外境生。
述曰：上來別約四事。難四不成。自下第二。於一事中。總為四難。亦結前文。此即牒大乘無境許識起。
【English Translation】 English version 'Because this consciousness arises without a real external object, like drinking at other times, etc.'
Treatise: 'The city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura) and others have no function like that of a city.'
Commentary: This is the third difficulty. The function of the city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura) and others cannot be established. The old treatise says that the city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura) is a mistake. In Sanskrit, it is called Gandharva, which means 'seeking fragrance' here. It refers to those who can seek the fragrance of the place where they will be born and then be reborn there. They are also called Gandharvas. In the Western Regions, actors are also called 'seeking fragrance.' These people do not serve kings and nobles, nor do they engage in productive labor. They only seek the fragrance of food and drink from various families and then go to their doors, perform various kinds of music, and seek food and drink. They can perform illusions. This illusory city, where they play, is called the city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura). The illusion is similar to reality, but it has no real city function. Or it is called a mirage city, named Gandharva-pura. Many merchants and others, when entering mountains and seas, often see mirages transformed into city buildings, in which they hear sounds of music and other things. In the Western Regions, those who make music are called 'seeking fragrance.' Therefore, this transformed city is called the city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura). Since there is no real external object, it is allowed that this consciousness arises. Why does this city have no real city function? The city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura) has no real city function. The argument is: This city of Gandharvas (Gandharva-pura) should have a real function because it is allowed that this consciousness arises without a real external object, like other cities, etc.'
Treatise: 'The function of remaining hairs and other things is not non-existent.'
Commentary: First, three things are described as having no real function. This applies to all three things as a comparative difficulty. Since there is no real external object, it is allowed that this consciousness arises. Why does what is seen in dizziness have no function like that of remaining hairs? Remaining hairs, flies, etc., have functions like that of remaining hairs, etc., even up to the third, as previously stated. Here, the first, remaining hairs, flies, etc., is mentioned. 'Etc.' takes the second, the function of remaining drinks, etc., and 'etc.' takes the third, the function of remaining cities, etc. However, in the old treatise, each difficulty is followed by its own example. Now, fearing prolixity, it is generally revealed.
Treatise: 'If, in reality, there are no external objects such as colors, etc., then only internal consciousness arises, appearing like external objects.'
Commentary: Above, each of the four things is separately discussed, and the four difficulties are not established. From here onwards, the second part presents four difficulties in one thing, which also concludes the previous text. This is to cite the Mahayana's allowance of the arising of consciousness without an external object.
論。定處定時不定相續有作用物皆不應成。
述曰。自下此文正申難意。四義如前。總立量云。定處時等皆不應成。說無外色等許此識生故。如余處時等。此中量意。應準上知。
論。非皆不成。
述曰。自下第二。釋四難非理。于中有二。初總答不成。后別顯不成。此即初也。彼言四事。皆不應成。今四皆成。故論說言非皆不成。然論言俱。或多少。若言皆。並定三以上。由三以上名多法故。新翻經論。皆準此知。今答四成。故言皆也。
論。頌曰處時定如夢身不定如鬼同見膿河等如夢損有用。
述曰。此下別顯非皆不成。總有五頌。于中有二。初有二頌。答非不成。后何緣不許下。復有三頌。破外救義。就初段中。文復有二。初之一頌。答別難不成。後有一頌。答總難不成。此即初也。然舊論文。以四難別逐破。頌文作數段釋。至下當知。初一句頌。答初二難。第二三句。答第三難。第四句頌。答第四難。至下當知。頌言身者。相續異名。
論曰。如夢意說如夢所見。
述曰。此長行中。文有其三。初以如夢喻。合解處時二難。次解第三徴。后解第四難。就初段中。文復有三。初解頌說如夢之言。次解處時俱定之理。后結二定非不得成。此即初也。然舊譯家。不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果地點固定、時間固定、狀態固定，並且相續存在作用，那麼事物都不應該能夠成立。
述記：從下面的文字開始，正式申述反駁的意圖。這四種情況如前所述。總的來說，可以立論如下：地點固定、時間固定等情況都不應該能夠成立，因為允許這種識的產生，而沒有外色等因素。就像其他地點、時間等情況一樣。這個論證的意圖，應該參照上面的理解。
論：並非所有情況都不能成立。
述記：從下面開始第二部分，解釋這四種反駁並非沒有道理。其中分為兩部分，首先總的回答說並非不能成立，然後分別顯示不能成立的情況。這裡是第一部分。他們說這四件事都不應該能夠成立，現在這四件事都能夠成立。所以論中說並非所有情況都不能成立。然而，論中說『俱』，或者多少。如果說『皆』，包括固定三種以上的情況，因為三種以上的情況被稱為多法。新翻譯的經論，都應該按照這個理解。現在回答說四種情況都成立，所以說『皆』。
論：頌曰：地點固定如夢境，身體（相續）不定如鬼，共同看見膿河等，如夢境般損失有用之物。
述記：下面分別顯示並非所有情況都不能成立。總共有五個頌。其中分為兩部分，首先有兩個頌，回答並非不能成立，然後在『為何不許』之後，又有三個頌，駁斥外道的救義。在第一段中，又分為兩部分，首先用一個頌，回答分別反駁不能成立的情況，然後用一個頌，回答總的反駁不能成立的情況。這裡是第一部分。然而，舊的論文，將四種反駁分別逐一駁破，頌文分為幾段解釋，到下面會知道。第一句頌，回答最初的兩種反駁，第二、三句，回答第三種反駁，第四句頌，回答第四種反駁，到下面會知道。頌中說的『身』，是相續的另一種說法。
論曰：如夢境，意思是說如夢境中所見。
述記：這段長行文中，分為三個部分。首先用如夢的比喻，來解釋地點和時間這兩種反駁，其次解釋第三種征問，最後解釋第四種反駁。在第一段中，又分為三個部分，首先解釋頌中說的『如夢』之言，其次解釋地點和時間都固定的道理，最後總結說這兩種固定並非不能成立。這裡是第一部分。然而，舊的翻譯家，不
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If location is fixed, time is fixed, state is fixed, and there is continuous function, then things should not be able to be established.
Commentary: From the following text onwards, the intention of refutation is formally stated. The four situations are as previously mentioned. In general, the following argument can be established: fixed location, fixed time, etc., should not be able to be established, because the production of this consciousness is permitted without external factors such as external form. Just like other locations, times, etc. The intention of this argument should be understood with reference to the above.
Treatise: Not all situations cannot be established.
Commentary: From below begins the second part, explaining that these four refutations are not unreasonable. It is divided into two parts, first a general answer that it is not impossible to establish, and then separately showing the situations that cannot be established. This is the first part. They say that these four things should not be able to be established, but now these four things can be established. Therefore, the treatise says that not all situations cannot be established. However, the treatise says 'both', or more or less. If it says 'all', including fixed three or more situations, because three or more situations are called multiple dharmas (多法). Newly translated sutras and treatises should be understood in accordance with this. Now the answer is that all four situations can be established, so it says 'all'.
Treatise: Verse: Fixed location is like a dream, the body (相續, xiāngxù - continuity) is unfixed like a ghost, commonly seeing a river of pus, etc., like a dream losing useful things.
Commentary: Below, it is separately shown that not all situations cannot be established. There are a total of five verses. Among them, it is divided into two parts, first there are two verses, answering that it is not impossible to establish, and then after 'Why not allow', there are three more verses, refuting the externalist's saving meaning. In the first section, it is again divided into two parts, first using one verse to answer the separate refutations of situations that cannot be established, and then using one verse to answer the general refutation of situations that cannot be established. This is the first part. However, the old treatises, refuted the four refutations one by one, and the verse text is divided into several sections for explanation, which will be known below. The first verse answers the initial two refutations, the second and third verses answer the third refutation, and the fourth verse answers the fourth refutation, which will be known below. The 'body' mentioned in the verse is another way of saying continuity (相續, xiāngxù).
Treatise says: 'Like a dream' means like what is seen in a dream.
Commentary: In this long passage, it is divided into three parts. First, the analogy of a dream is used to explain the two refutations of location and time, second, the third question is explained, and finally the fourth refutation is explained. In the first section, it is again divided into three parts, first explaining the words 'like a dream' in the verse, second, explaining the principle that both location and time are fixed, and finally concluding that these two fixations are not impossible to establish. This is the first part. However, the old translators, did not
閑此義遂略不翻。梵云伊(上聲呼之)縛(平聲呼之合名夢也)筏(此有二義一是有義二譬喻義)今言如夢。顯是譬喻故言意說如夢所見。非謂有夢名伊縛筏。或復有釋。夢者能緣其村園等。夢之所見。夢心所有。今頌略言喻如夢者。顯夢所見為二定喻。非能緣夢心。為處時同法。恐以能緣為同喻故。今簡略也。
論。謂如夢中雖無實境。
述曰。次解處時俱定之理。以一夢喻。喻二理成故。此最初說如夢中無實境也。然今論師。解四外難非正當難。以祛外疑。舉世現事。返質外人。傍解前難。此夢境無。經部大乘。彼此共許。故以為喻。
論。而或有處見有村園男女等物非一切處。
述曰。此解處定成。猶如夢中。一種境雖無實。或於是處。見有村等。余處不見。故雖一切處。皆唯有識。而於是處。見終南山。非於余處。應立量云。汝夢於是處見有村等應非處定。境無實故。如余不見處。然余不見處。例于見處。亦有比量。略不繁述。下準可知。然此雖有世間相違。置汝言故簡宗過也。彼此成已返解他難。量云。其非夢時境雖無實而處亦定。許境無實故。如夢中所見。此因言許。無隨一失。
論。即於是處或時見有彼村園等非一切時。
述曰。此解時定。夢境雖無實。即於此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為這個含義比較淺顯，所以這裡就省略不翻譯了。梵語叫做伊縛筏（I-fu-fa）（『伊』發上聲，『縛』發平聲，合起來的意思是『夢』），筏（fa）在這裡有兩個意思：一是有，二是譬喻。現在說『如夢』，明顯是譬喻，所以說是『意說如夢所見』，不是說有一個夢叫做伊縛筏。或者還有一種解釋，夢能夠緣取村莊、園林等，夢中所見，是夢心的所有。現在的頌文簡略地說『譬喻如夢』，是表明夢中所見是兩種確定的譬喻，而不是能緣的夢心，作為處所和時間相同的法。恐怕有人把能緣的心當作相同的譬喻，所以這裡進行了簡化。
論：就像夢中雖然沒有真實的境界。
述記：接下來解釋處所和時間都是確定的道理，用一個夢來比喻，比喻兩種道理成立。這裡最初說的是夢中沒有真實的境界。然而現在的論師，解釋四種外來的詰難，並非是直接針對這些詰難，而是爲了消除外界的疑惑，舉出世間現有的事情，反過來質問外人，從側面解釋之前的詰難。這種夢境不存在的觀點，經部和大眾部都是共同認可的，所以可以用作比喻。
論：或者在某個地方看見有村莊、園林、男女等事物，而不是在所有地方都能看見。
述記：這裡解釋處所是確定的。就像夢中，一種境界雖然不是真實的，或者在這個地方，看見有村莊等，在其他地方就看不見。所以雖然所有地方都只有識，而在這個地方，看見終南山，不在其他地方看見。應該建立論式說：『你在夢中在這個地方看見有村莊等，應該不是處所確定的，因為境界不是真實的，就像在其他看不見的地方一樣。』然而在其他看不見的地方，可以類比于看見的地方，也有比量，這裡省略不詳細敘述，下面可以類推得知。然而這裡雖然有世間常識的違背，因為有『你』這個詞，所以避免了宗的過失。彼此成立之後，反過來解釋他人的詰難。論式是：『不是夢的時候，境界雖然不是真實的，但是處所也是確定的，因為承認境界不是真實的，就像夢中所見一樣。』這個因的陳述中，沒有隨一的過失。
論：就在這個地方，或者有時看見那個村莊、園林等，而不是所有時間都能看見。
述記：這裡解釋時間是確定的。夢境雖然不是真實的，就在這個地方
【English Translation】 English version Since the meaning here is relatively straightforward, I will omit the translation. In Sanskrit, it's called I-fu-fa (伊縛筏) ('I' is pronounced with a rising tone, 'fu' with a level tone, together meaning 'dream'), where 'fa' has two meanings: one is 'existence,' and the other is 'metaphor.' Now, saying 'like a dream' clearly indicates a metaphor, so it's said 'intended to mean what is seen in a dream,' not that there's a dream called I-fu-fa. Alternatively, there's another explanation: a dream can grasp villages, gardens, etc.; what is seen in a dream belongs to the mind of the dream. The current verse briefly says 'metaphor like a dream,' indicating that what is seen in a dream is two kinds of definite metaphors, not the grasping mind of the dream, as a place and time with the same dharma. Fearing that someone might take the grasping mind as the same metaphor, it's simplified here.
Treatise: It's like in a dream, although there's no real environment.
Commentary: Next, explain the principle that place and time are both fixed, using a dream as a metaphor to establish two principles. Here, it initially says that there's no real environment in a dream. However, the current treatise master, in explaining the four external challenges, isn't directly addressing these challenges but rather dispelling external doubts, citing existing worldly matters to question outsiders in return, indirectly explaining the previous challenges. The view that this dream environment doesn't exist is commonly accepted by both the Sautrantika and Mahayana schools, so it can be used as a metaphor.
Treatise: Or in a certain place, one sees villages, gardens, men, women, and other things, but not in all places.
Commentary: Here, it explains that the place is fixed. Like in a dream, although an environment isn't real, in this place, one sees villages, etc., but not in other places. So although all places only have consciousness, in this place, one sees Zhongnan Mountain, not in other places. One should establish the argument: 'In your dream, you see villages, etc., in this place, so it shouldn't be a fixed place, because the environment isn't real, like in other places where you don't see it.' However, in other places where you don't see it, it can be analogous to the places where you see it, and there's also an inference, which I'll omit here for brevity; the following can be inferred accordingly. However, although there's a contradiction with worldly common sense here, because there's the word 'you,' it avoids the fault of the subject. After establishing each other, it explains the other's challenges in return. The argument is: 'When it's not a dream, although the environment isn't real, the place is also fixed, because it's admitted that the environment isn't real, like what is seen in a dream.' In this statement of the reason, there's no fault of 'one-sidedness'.
Treatise: In that very place, sometimes one sees that village, garden, etc., but not at all times.
Commentary: Here, it explains that the time is fixed. Although the dream environment isn't real, in that very place
處。或於一時。見村園等。非一切時。皆恒見有。故於覺位。雖無實境。有時見彼終南山等。此識得生。非一切時。定恒見有。此識得生。比量準前處中可解。
論。由此雖無離識實境而處時定非不得成。
述曰。此結二定非不得成以斯一喻成處時定也。
論。說如鬼言顯如餓鬼。
述曰。自下第二。解第三難。于中有三。初別解如鬼等言。次解相續不定。后結不定義成。今先解如鬼言。梵云筏。有二義。如前已說。今顯譬喻。非顯有義。故言如鬼。或復有釋。鬼有二種。一福德鬼。住此洲西。報與天同。二薄福德。所見水等。皆為猛火。今以薄福。喻身不定。故如餓鬼。若福德鬼。喻不成故(舊論無此如前已說)。
論。河中膿滿。故名膿河如說蘇瓶其中蘇滿。
述曰。解頌膿河。河中膿滿。得膿河名。非有小膿。名膿河也。如西域中賣蘇人。說賣蘇瓶言。滿瓶著蘇並瓶。亦賣言賣蘇瓶。非有少蘇。言賣蘇瓶。舊言蘇甕。膿河亦爾。
論。謂如餓鬼同業異熟多身共集皆見膿河非於此中定唯一見。
述曰。自下正解相續不定。如多餓鬼。同爲惡業。同得惡果。多共一處聚集之時。同見膿河。相續不定。非於膿河。定唯一見。一不能見。如眩翳者。見發蠅等故。雖無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 處。或者在某個時候，看見村莊園林等等。不是所有時間，都一直能看見。所以在覺悟的地位，雖然沒有真實的境界，有時也能看見終南山等等。這個識的產生，不是所有時間，都一定能恒常看見。這個識的產生，用比量的方法，可以參照前面的處中來理解。
論：由此，即使沒有離開識的真實境界，處所和時間的確定，也不是不能成立的。
述記：這是總結，用這個比喻來成立處所和時間的確定，即使沒有離開識的真實境界，處所和時間的確定，也不是不能成立的。
論：說『如鬼』，是爲了顯示像餓鬼一樣。
述記：下面第二點，解釋第三個難題。其中有三點：首先分別解釋『如鬼』等言語；其次解釋相續的不確定；最後總結不確定的意義成立。現在先解釋『如鬼』這個詞。梵語是筏（Vata），有兩個意思，像前面已經說過的。現在是顯示譬喻，不是顯示有意義。所以說『如鬼』。或者還有一種解釋，鬼有兩種：一種是有福德的鬼，住在西方的洲，福報和天人一樣；一種是薄福德的鬼，所看見的水等等，都變成猛火。現在用薄福德，比喻身體的不確定。所以像餓鬼一樣。如果是福德鬼，這個比喻就不成立了（舊論沒有這個，像前面已經說過的）。
論：河中充滿膿液，所以叫做膿河，就像說蘇瓶，其中充滿蘇油一樣。
述記：解釋頌文中的膿河。河中充滿膿液，才得到膿河的名字。不是隻有少量的膿液，就叫做膿河。就像西域賣蘇油的人，說賣蘇油瓶，說滿瓶裝著蘇油，連瓶子一起賣，也說賣蘇油瓶。不是隻有少量的蘇油，就說賣蘇油瓶。舊譯本說是蘇甕，膿河也是這樣。
論：就像餓鬼，因為共同的業力，共同的異熟果報，多個身體共同聚集，都看見膿河，不是在這個膿河中，一定只有一種看見。
述記：下面正式解釋相續的不確定。就像很多餓鬼，因為共同的惡業，共同得到惡果，很多餓鬼在一個地方聚集的時候，共同看見膿河，相續是不確定的。不是對於膿河，一定只有一種看見，或者不能看見，就像眼睛昏花的人，看見頭髮和蒼蠅等等一樣。所以，即使沒有
【English Translation】 English version: Location. Or at one time, seeing villages, gardens, and so on. It is not at all times that one can always see them. Therefore, in the position of enlightenment, although there is no real realm, sometimes one can see Mount Zhongnan and so on. The arising of this consciousness is not at all times that one can definitely and constantly see it. The arising of this consciousness can be understood by analogy with the previous 'location in the middle'.
Treatise: Therefore, even without a real realm apart from consciousness, the determination of location and time is not impossible to establish.
Commentary: This is a conclusion, using this metaphor to establish the determination of location and time, even without a real realm apart from consciousness, the determination of location and time is not impossible to establish.
Treatise: Saying 'like a ghost' is to show it is like a hungry ghost (preta).
Commentary: The second point below explains the third difficulty. There are three points: first, separately explain the words 'like a ghost' and so on; second, explain the uncertainty of continuity; and finally, conclude that the meaning of uncertainty is established. Now, first explain the word 'like a ghost'. The Sanskrit word is Vata, which has two meanings, as mentioned before. Now it is showing a metaphor, not showing a meaning. Therefore, it is said 'like a ghost'. Or there is another explanation, there are two kinds of ghosts: one is a ghost with merit, living in the western continent, whose blessings are the same as those of the devas (gods); the other is a ghost with little merit, who sees water and so on, all turning into fierce fire. Now, using little merit as a metaphor for the uncertainty of the body. Therefore, it is like a hungry ghost. If it were a ghost with merit, this metaphor would not be established (the old treatise does not have this, as mentioned before).
Treatise: The river is full of pus, so it is called the Pus River, just like saying a ghee (clarified butter) bottle, which is full of ghee.
Commentary: Explaining the Pus River in the verse. The river is full of pus, hence the name Pus River. It is not that there is only a small amount of pus, and it is called the Pus River. Just like the ghee sellers in the Western Regions, when selling ghee bottles, they say the bottle is full of ghee, and they sell the bottle together, also saying they are selling the ghee bottle. It is not that there is only a small amount of ghee, and they say they are selling the ghee bottle. The old translation says ghee urn, the Pus River is also like this.
Treatise: It is like hungry ghosts, because of shared karma, shared different ripening results, multiple bodies gathering together, all seeing the Pus River, it is not that in this Pus River, there is definitely only one kind of seeing.
Commentary: Below is the formal explanation of the uncertainty of continuity. Just like many hungry ghosts, because of shared evil karma, shared evil results, when many hungry ghosts gather in one place, they all see the Pus River, the continuity is uncertain. It is not that for the Pus River, there is definitely only one kind of seeing, or not being able to see, just like a person with blurred vision, seeing hairs and flies and so on. Therefore, even without
實境。相續不定。其義亦成。外道小乘。經部師等。皆信餓鬼。同見膿河。故以為喻。量云同於一時同於此處相續不定其理得成。許無實境故。如餓鬼所見膿河。然頌膿河。更有等字。等何等法。
論。等言顯示或見糞等。
述曰。由惡業故。所見水等。皆謂糞尿。及余血等。攝論等云。鬼傍生人天。各隨其所應。等事心異故。許義非真實。即此意也。
論。及見有情執持刀杖遮捍守護。不令得食。
述曰。前解于等。糞膿別事。今此解等。即于膿等。見有有情。執持刀杖。遮捍餓鬼。守護膿等。不令得食。鬼由惡業。深極飢渴。設雖見膿。亦趣望得。為諸有情。遮不令食。一切同見。非唯一見。故喻得成。
論。由此雖無離識實境而多相續不定義成。
述曰。此結相續不定理成。
論。又如夢中境雖無實而有損失精血等用。
述曰。此下第三。解第四難。于中有二。初正解。后結成。此即初也 如夢中言。如先已說。譬如夢中。夢兩交會。境雖無實。而男有損精。女有損血等用。等者。等取支分勞倦。出汗等用。夢得錢等。其用則無 境雖無實。其眩翳者。所見發等。無發等用。余見發等。有發等用。其理亦成。量云。眩翳非眩翳等所見發等有用無用成。許無實
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：實境是否存在，以及相續不定（事物持續存在但不斷變化）的道理是否成立？外道（非佛教的宗教或哲學派別）、小乘（早期佛教派別）和經部師（佛教經量部的學者）等，都相信有餓鬼（preta，一種受苦眾生），並且都共同看到膿河（充滿膿液的河流）。因此，可以用這個例子來比喻。可以這樣論證：在同一時間、同一地點，相續不定（事物持續存在但不斷變化）的道理是成立的，因為我們承認沒有真實的實境。就像餓鬼所看到的膿河一樣。然而，頌文中提到膿河，還用了一個『等』字，這個『等』字代表什麼法呢？ 論：『等』字表示或者（餓鬼）看到糞便等物。 述曰：由於惡業的緣故，（餓鬼）所看到的水等，都認為是糞尿以及其他的血液等。《攝大乘論》等經論中說：鬼、傍生（動物）、人、天，各自根據他們相應的業力，對同一事物產生不同的認知，因此可以認為他們所見並非真實。這就是這個意思。 論：以及（餓鬼）看到有情（sentient beings，有感覺的生命）拿著刀杖，遮擋和守護（食物），不讓（餓鬼）得到食物。 述曰：前面解釋『等』字，是指糞便、膿液等不同的事物。現在這裡解釋『等』字，是指在膿液等事物中，（餓鬼）看到有有情拿著刀杖，遮擋餓鬼，守護膿液等，不讓餓鬼得到食物。餓鬼由於惡業，感到非常飢渴，即使看到膿液，也想要去吃，但被那些有情遮擋，不讓它們吃。所有餓鬼都共同看到這種情況，不是隻有一隻餓鬼看到，所以這個比喻是成立的。 論：由此可見，即使沒有離開識（consciousness，意識）的真實實境，但多人的相續不定（事物持續存在但不斷變化）的道理也是成立的。 述曰：這裡總結了相續不定（事物持續存在但不斷變化）的道理是成立的。 論：又比如在夢中，境（object，對像）雖然不是真實的，但會有損失精血等作用。 述曰：下面第三個部分，解釋第四個難題。這部分分為兩個部分，首先是正面解釋，然後是總結。這裡是第一個部分。就像夢中說的那樣，就像之前已經說過的。譬如在夢中，夢到男女交合，境（object，對像）雖然不是真實的，但男人會有損失精液，女人會有損失血液等作用。『等』字，是指支體勞累、出汗等作用。夢中得到錢財等，就沒有這些作用。境（object，對像）雖然不是真實的，但對於有眩翳病的人來說，所看到的頭髮等，沒有頭髮等的作用。其他人看到的頭髮等，有頭髮等的作用，這個道理也是成立的。可以這樣論證：眩翳病患者和非眩翳病患者所看到的頭髮等，有用和無用的道理是成立的，因為我們承認沒有真實的實境。
【English Translation】 English version: Does the reality of objects exist, and is the principle of impermanence (the continuous existence but constant change of things) established? Heretics (non-Buddhist religious or philosophical schools), Hinayana (early Buddhist schools), and Sautrāntikas (scholars of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism) all believe in pretas (hungry ghosts, a type of suffering being) and commonly see a river of pus (a river filled with pus). Therefore, this example can be used as a metaphor. It can be argued that at the same time and in the same place, the principle of impermanence (the continuous existence but constant change of things) is established because we admit that there is no real reality. It's like the river of pus seen by the pretas. However, the verse mentions the river of pus and also uses the word 'etc.,' what dharma (phenomena) does this 'etc.' represent? Treatise: The word 'etc.' indicates that (pretas) may see feces and other things. Commentary: Due to bad karma, what (pretas) see as water, etc., is considered feces, urine, and other blood, etc. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other scriptures say: ghosts, animals, humans, and devas (gods), each according to their corresponding karma, have different perceptions of the same thing, so it can be considered that what they see is not real. This is the meaning. Treatise: And (pretas) see sentient beings (sentient beings, beings with senses) holding knives and sticks, blocking and guarding (food), preventing (pretas) from getting food. Commentary: The previous explanation of the word 'etc.' refers to different things such as feces and pus. Now, the explanation of the word 'etc.' here refers to, in things like pus, etc., (pretas) seeing sentient beings holding knives and sticks, blocking pretas, guarding pus, etc., preventing pretas from getting food. Pretas feel very hungry and thirsty due to bad karma, and even if they see pus, they want to eat it, but they are blocked by those sentient beings, preventing them from eating. All pretas commonly see this situation, not just one preta sees it, so this metaphor is established. Treatise: From this, it can be seen that even if there is no real reality apart from consciousness (consciousness, awareness), the principle of impermanence (the continuous existence but constant change of things) among many people is established. Commentary: This concludes that the principle of impermanence (the continuous existence but constant change of things) is established. Treatise: Also, like in a dream, although the object (object, target) is not real, there will be effects such as the loss of essence and blood. Commentary: The third part below explains the fourth difficulty. This part is divided into two parts, first a positive explanation, and then a summary. Here is the first part. Just like it says in a dream, just like it has been said before. For example, in a dream, dreaming of a man and woman having intercourse, although the object (object, target) is not real, the man will have the effect of losing semen, and the woman will have the effect of losing blood, etc. The word 'etc.' refers to effects such as physical fatigue and sweating. Getting money, etc., in a dream does not have these effects. Although the object (object, target) is not real, for people with dizziness, the hair, etc., they see does not have the effect of hair, etc. Others who see hair, etc., have the effect of hair, etc., this principle is also established. It can be argued that the hair, etc., seen by patients with dizziness and those without dizziness has the principle of being useful and useless, because we admit that there is no real reality.
境故。如夢失精等。
論。由此雖無離識實境而有虛妄作用義成。
述曰。此結作用虛妄亦成。上來別解別四難訖。
論。如是且依別別譬喻顯處定等四義得成。
述曰。將解總四難。先結前也。四難既殊。四答亦異。
論。複次頌曰。一切如地獄同見獄卒等能為逼害事故四義皆成。
述曰。下總答也。言一切者。標宗所明。總解四難。故言一切。故四義皆成。此總結也。餘十三字。正答難也。
論曰。應知此中一地獄喻顯處定等一切皆成。
述曰。此中有三。初別解頌一切字。次正解四難。后總結四義成。配頌三段。此解頌一切字。以一獄地喻。解四義得成。
論。如地獄言顯在地獄受逼害苦諸有情類。
述曰。下第二段。梵云筏。有二義。一云如。二云有。今取如。不取有。為簡于有。故作斯說。復有義者。梵云捺落迦。此云苦器。即是地獄。顯如那落迦。受地獄苦者。非如彼器。說如地獄。
論。謂地獄中雖無真實有情數攝獄卒等事。
述曰。下正解難。然大乘中。其獄卒等。在地獄中。作逼害者。非實有情。至下當悉。其擲罪人。置地獄者。是實有情。與俱舍同。此對薩婆多。及經部等。申其正理。不對大眾。正量部等。申其正
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 境的緣故。例如夢中遺精等。
論：由此即使沒有離開識的真實境，也有虛妄作用的意義成立。
述記：這總結了虛妄作用也成立。上面分別解釋了四個難題完畢。
論：像這樣，暫且依靠個別的比喻，顯示處所決定等四種意義得以成立。
述記：將要解釋總的四個難題，先總結前面所說的。四個難題既然不同，四個回答也不同。
論：再次，頌詞說：一切如地獄，共同見到獄卒等，能夠造成逼迫損害的緣故，四種意義都成立。
述記：下面是總的回答。說『一切』，是標明宗義所要闡明的，總的解釋四個難題，所以說『一切』，所以四種意義都成立。其餘十三個字，正是回答難題。
論：應當知道，這其中一個地獄的比喻，顯示處所決定等一切都成立。
述記：這其中有三段。第一段分別解釋頌詞中的『一切』字，第二段正式解釋四個難題，第三段總結四種意義成立。配合頌詞分為三段。這裡解釋頌詞中的『一切』字，用一個地獄的比喻，解釋四種意義得以成立。
論：如地獄所說，顯示在地獄中遭受逼迫損害痛苦的各種有情眾生。
述記：下面是第二段。梵語筏（Upama），有兩種意思。一是『如』，二是『有』。現在取『如』，不取『有』。爲了簡別于『有』，所以這樣說。又有意思的是，梵語捺落迦（Naraka），這裡翻譯為苦器，就是地獄。顯示如那落迦（Naraka），遭受地獄痛苦的人，不是如那個苦器。說是如地獄。
論：所謂地獄中，即使沒有真實的有情眾生所包括的獄卒等事物。
述記：下面正式解釋難題。然而在大乘中，那些獄卒等，在地獄中，作為逼迫損害者，不是真實的有情。到下面會詳細說明。那些投擲罪人，安置在地獄中的，是真實的有情，與《俱舍論》相同。這是針對薩婆多（Sarvastivada），以及經部（Sautrantika）等，闡述他們的正理。不是針對大眾部（Mahasanghika），正量部（Sammitiya）等，闡述他們的正理。
【English Translation】 English version: Due to the realm. Such as nocturnal emission in a dream, etc.
Treatise: From this, even though there is no real realm apart from consciousness, the meaning of illusory function is established.
Commentary: This concludes that the illusory function is also established. The separate explanations of the four difficulties above are completed.
Treatise: Thus, relying on separate analogies, the four meanings of fixed location, etc., can be established.
Commentary: About to explain the four general difficulties, first conclude the previous statements. Since the four difficulties are different, the four answers are also different.
Treatise: Furthermore, the verse says: Everything is like hell, commonly seeing hell wardens, etc., being able to cause oppression and harm, therefore all four meanings are established.
Commentary: The following is the general answer. Saying 'everything' indicates the principle to be clarified, generally explaining the four difficulties, therefore it is said 'everything', so all four meanings are established. The remaining thirteen words are precisely answering the difficulties.
Treatise: It should be known that within this, the analogy of one hell demonstrates that fixed location, etc., are all established.
Commentary: There are three sections here. The first section separately explains the word 'everything' in the verse, the second section formally explains the four difficulties, and the third section concludes that the four meanings are established. Matching the verse, it is divided into three sections. Here, the word 'everything' in the verse is explained, using the analogy of one hell to explain that the four meanings can be established.
Treatise: As the hells are spoken of, it shows that in hell, there are sentient beings who suffer from oppression, harm, and pain.
Commentary: The following is the second section. The Sanskrit word Upama (筏) has two meanings. One is 'like', and the other is 'having'. Now we take 'like' and not 'having'. To distinguish it from 'having', it is said this way. Another meaning is that the Sanskrit word Naraka (捺落迦) is translated here as 'vessel of suffering', which is hell. It shows that like Naraka (捺落迦), those who suffer the pain of hell are not like that vessel of suffering. It is said to be like hell.
Treatise: That in hell, even though there are no real sentient beings included as hell wardens, etc.
Commentary: The following formally explains the difficulties. However, in Mahayana, those hell wardens, etc., in hell, acting as oppressors and harmers, are not real sentient beings. This will be explained in detail below. Those who throw sinners and place them in hell are real sentient beings, which is the same as in the Abhidharmakośa. This is directed towards the Sarvastivada (薩婆多) and Sautrantika (經部), etc., to expound their correct reasoning. It is not directed towards the Mahasanghika (大眾部) and Sammitiya (正量部), etc., to expound their correct reasoning.
理。下正解難。
論。而彼有情同業異熟增上力故。
述曰。由彼地獄受罪有情。因果同故。此顯所由。
論。同處同時眾多相續皆共見有獄卒狗烏鐵山等物來至其所為逼害事。
述曰。同處者。顯處定義。同此處見。余處無故 同時者。顯時定義。同此時見。余時無故 眾多相續等者。顯相續不定。皆共見故 來至其所為逼害事者。顯作用成 狗者烏駁狗也 烏者鐵嶲。啄眼精等烏也 鐵山者。即眾合地獄等。作羊牛等形來逼罪人 等物者。等取剛鐵樹林刺等蠰狗吒蟲等。此中意者。謂地獄中。境雖無實。同處同時。多受罪者。同見獄卒等來。為逼害事。四義既成。故於余時。境雖無實。其處定等。非皆不成。量云。餘位處定等非不得成。許無實境此識生故。如地獄人等此四事成。然外難中。皆有過失。思求可知。故不繁述。
論。由此雖無離識實境。而處定等四義皆成。
述曰。自下第三。總結四義得成。釋第四句頌。若言異識實境依他色等。大乘亦許是實。離識之外實有色等。大乘不成。故言離識境無實等。而處定等四事皆成。由此之言。
論。何緣不許獄卒等類是實有情。
述曰。上來二頌。答非不成。自下三頌。破外救義。于中有三。初之一頌。破摩訶
【現代漢語翻譯】 理。以下正確解釋這個難題。
論。因為那些有情眾生有共同的業和不同的異熟果報所增強的力量。
述曰。由於那些在地獄中受罪的有情，他們的因和果是相同的。這裡顯示了原因。
論。在同一個地方，同一個時間，許多相續不斷的眾生都共同看到有獄卒、狗、烏鴉、鐵山等事物來到他們那裡，對他們進行逼迫和傷害。
述曰。『同處』，顯示了處所的定義，因為只有在這個地方才能看到，其他地方沒有。『同時』，顯示了時間的定義，因為只有在這個時間才能看到，其他時間沒有。『眾多相續等』，顯示了相續不定，因為大家都共同看到。『來至其所為逼害事』，顯示了作用的成立。『狗』，指的是烏駁狗。『烏』，指的是鐵嘴烏鴉，啄食眼睛等。『鐵山』，就是眾合地獄等，變成羊、牛等形狀來逼迫罪人。『等物』，包括剛鐵樹林、刺等，以及蠰狗、吒蟲等。這裡的意思是說，在地獄中，雖然境界沒有實體，但在同一個地方，同一個時間，許多受罪的人共同看到獄卒等前來，進行逼迫和傷害。這四個條件成立，所以在其他時間，即使境界沒有實體，但處所等是確定的，並非都不能成立。可以這樣論證：在其他位置，處所等確定並非不能成立，因為允許沒有實體的境界，這種識也能產生。就像地獄中的人等，這四件事都能成立。然而，外人的詰難中，都有過失，仔細思考就可以知道，所以不再繁瑣地敘述。
論。因此，即使沒有離開識的真實境界，處所確定等四個條件也都能成立。
述曰。下面第三部分，總結這四個條件能夠成立，解釋第四句偈頌。如果說異識的真實境界是依他起性等，大乘也承認這是真實的。離開識之外，真實存在色等，大乘是不承認的。所以說離開識的境界沒有實體等，而處所確定等四件事都能成立，這是『由此』這句話的意思。
論。為什麼不允許獄卒等是真實的有情眾生？
述曰。上面兩首偈頌，回答了並非不能成立。下面三首偈頌，駁斥外道的救護之義。其中有三個部分，首先的第一首偈頌，駁斥摩訶
【English Translation】 Principle. The following correctly explains this difficult point.
Treatise. Because those sentient beings have the power enhanced by the same karma and different ripened retributions (異熟果報, yìshú guǒbào).
Commentary. Because those sentient beings suffering in hell have the same cause and effect. This reveals the reason.
Treatise. In the same place, at the same time, many continuous streams of beings all commonly see jailers (獄卒, yùzú), dogs, crows, iron mountains, etc., coming to their location to inflict coercion and harm.
Commentary. 'Same place' indicates the definition of the place; it is seen only in this place, not in others. 'Same time' indicates the definition of the time; it is seen only at this time, not at other times. 'Many continuous streams, etc.' indicates that the continuity is not fixed, because everyone commonly sees it. 'Coming to their location to inflict coercion and harm' indicates the establishment of the function. 'Dogs' refers to black and white mottled dogs. 'Crows' refers to iron-beaked crows that peck at the eyes, etc. 'Iron mountains' are the Compounded Hell (眾合地獄, zhònghé dìyù), etc., which take the form of sheep, cows, etc., to coerce the sinners. 'Etc.' includes iron forests, thorns, etc., as well as 蠰狗 (ránggǒu) and 吒蟲 (zhàchóng) insects. The meaning here is that in hell, although the realm has no reality, in the same place and at the same time, many suffering beings commonly see jailers, etc., coming to inflict coercion and harm. With these four conditions established, even if the realm has no reality at other times, the place, etc., is fixed and not all cannot be established. It can be argued that in other positions, the place, etc., being fixed is not impossible to establish, because it is allowed that this consciousness arises from a realm without reality, like the people in hell, etc. These four things can be established. However, in the external challenges, there are all faults, which can be understood by careful consideration, so I will not elaborate.
Treatise. Therefore, even though there is no real realm apart from consciousness, the four conditions such as the fixed place can all be established.
Commentary. The third part below summarizes that these four conditions can be established, explaining the fourth line of the verse. If it is said that the real realm of different consciousness is dependent origination (依他起性, yī tā qǐ xìng), etc., the Mahayana also acknowledges that this is real. Apart from consciousness, the real existence of form, etc., is not acknowledged by the Mahayana. Therefore, it is said that the realm apart from consciousness has no reality, etc., and the four things such as the fixed place can all be established. This is the meaning of 'therefore'.
Treatise. Why is it not allowed that jailers (獄卒, yùzú), etc., are real sentient beings?
Commentary. The above two verses answer that it is not impossible to establish. The following three verses refute the externalist's saving arguments. There are three parts to this, the first of which refutes the Mahā
僧祇犢子部等救義。次有一頌。破薩婆多師等救義。次有一頌。破經部師等救義。或初一頌。破救如前。次有一頌。正破薩婆多。兼破經部救義。次有一頌。正破經部。兼抑薩婆多令有熏習。然二解中。前說為勝。就初段中。文復有四。初大眾正量二部救義。二大乘廣破。三彼復救義。四論主復破。此即第一。彼部救義。然觀文勢。諍獄卒等。似是傍義。于下結中。結歸唯識。還為正義。今彼部意。獄卒狗等。皆有情數。是在地獄有情用故。如那落迦報。然諸部中。大眾正量說。獄卒等是實有情。薩婆多師。雖非有情。然是心外惡業所感。增上大種轉變所生。造色形顯量力差別。經部師等。雖非有情。然是心外造業之時。唯熏內識。及其受果。乃在心外。大種轉變起形顯等。今大乘意。亦非有情。造業之時。既在內識。受果之世。在識非余。故今大乘。與諸部異。大眾部等。於此救之。其在地獄行案擲人置地獄者。是實有情。諸部無諍 緣者由也。外人問言。有何所由。不許獄卒實有情數。比量如前。
論。不應理故。
述曰。下論主答。初總次別。此即總也。外人復問。何不應理。
論。且此不應那落迦攝不受如彼所受苦故。
述曰。自下別破。于中有二。初破獄卒等。非地獄趣。后破獄
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 僧祇犢子部（Samghatika-vatsiputriya）等救義。接下來有一頌，用於反駁薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等救義。接下來有一頌，用於反駁經部師（Sautrantika）等救義。或者最初一頌，反駁救義如前。接下來有一頌，正式反駁薩婆多部，兼反駁經部救義。接下來有一頌，正式反駁經部，兼抑制薩婆多部使其認為有熏習。然而兩種解釋中，前一種說法更為優勝。就最初的段落中，文義又有四重含義。第一，大眾部（Mahasamghika）和正量部（Sammitiya）的救義。第二，大乘（Mahayana）廣泛破斥。第三，他們再次救義。第四，論主再次破斥。這即是第一重含義，彼部救義。然而觀察文勢，爭論獄卒等，似乎是旁義。在下面的結論中，結論歸於唯識（Vijnanavada），還是爲了正義。現在彼部的意思是，獄卒狗等，都是有情之數，因為是在地獄有情所用，如同那落迦（Naraka，地獄）的報應。然而諸部中，大眾部和正量部說，獄卒等是真實的有情。薩婆多部師認為，雖然不是有情，但是心外惡業所感，增上大種轉變所生，造色形顯量力差別。經部師等認為，雖然不是有情，但是心外造業之時，唯有熏習內識，及其受果，乃在心外，大種轉變起形顯等。現在大乘的意思是，也不是有情，造業之時，既在內識，受果之世，在識而非其他。所以現在大乘，與諸部不同。大眾部等，對此進行辯護，認為在地獄執行刑罰，將罪犯擲入地獄的人，是真實的有情，諸部沒有爭議。緣者，由也。外人問道，有什麼理由，不承認獄卒是真實的有情之數，比量如前。
論：不應理故。
述曰：下面是論主的回答，先總說，再分別說明。這即是總說。外人又問，為什麼不應理？
論：且此不應那落迦攝，不受如彼所受苦故。
述曰：自下分別破斥。其中有二，首先破斥獄卒等，不是地獄趣，然後破斥獄。
【English Translation】 English version The Samghatika-vatsiputriya and other schools' defense. Next, there is a verse refuting the Sarvastivada and other schools' defense. Next, there is a verse refuting the Sautrantika and other schools' defense. Or, the first verse refutes the defense as before. Next, there is a verse formally refuting the Sarvastivada, while also refuting the Sautrantika's defense. Next, there is a verse formally refuting the Sautrantika, while also suppressing the Sarvastivada to acknowledge the existence of '熏習' (xunxi, influence by habit). However, among the two interpretations, the former is considered superior. Within the initial paragraph, the meaning has four layers. First, the Mahasanghika and Sammitiya schools' defense. Second, the Mahayana's extensive refutation. Third, their renewed defense. Fourth, the author's renewed refutation. This is the first layer, that school's defense. However, observing the textual flow, the dispute over the prison guards seems to be a side issue. In the conclusion below, the conclusion returns to Vijnanavada, which is still the main point. Now, that school's intention is that the prison guards, dogs, etc., are all sentient beings, because they are used by sentient beings in hell, like the retribution of Naraka (hell). However, among the schools, the Mahasanghika and Sammitiya schools say that the prison guards, etc., are real sentient beings. The Sarvastivada teachers believe that, although they are not sentient beings, they are produced by external evil karma, transformed by the augmented great elements, creating differences in form, appearance, quantity, and power. The Sautrantika teachers believe that, although they are not sentient beings, when creating karma outside the mind, only the inner consciousness is influenced, and the fruition is outside the mind, with the great elements transforming to create form, appearance, etc. Now, the Mahayana's intention is that they are not sentient beings either. When creating karma, it is within the inner consciousness, and when receiving the fruition, it is in consciousness and not elsewhere. Therefore, the Mahayana is different from the other schools. The Mahasanghika and other schools defend this, believing that those who execute punishments in hell and throw criminals into hell are real sentient beings, which the schools do not dispute. '緣者' (yuanzhe), means '由也' (youye, reason). An outsider asks, what is the reason for not acknowledging that the prison guards are real sentient beings, the analogy is as before.
Treatise: It is not logical.
Commentary: The author's response below, first general, then specific. This is the general statement. The outsider asks again, why is it not logical?
Treatise: Moreover, this should not be included in Naraka, because they do not experience suffering like those who are there.
Commentary: From here on, there is specific refutation. There are two parts, first refuting that the prison guards, etc., are not in the hell realm, and then refuting the prison.
卒等。非是余趣。就破非彼地獄趣中。略有四義。此即第一。兼破余趣。先破當趣。簡略為言故云且此。且此不應那落迦攝。通下四義。此獄卒等。不應是彼惡者所攝。此等不受如彼惡者所受苦故。若獄卒等。惡者所攝。如余惡者。應受彼苦。量云。彼獄卒等非惡者攝。不受如彼所受苦故。如人天等。或獄卒等應受彼苦。許那落迦攝故。如彼受罪者。俱舍第十一。若是有情。此果何處。彼復救言。即地獄中。彼論即以此第四難。難破彼宗。而彼但有一義破之。謂火應燒。同此第四。
論。互相逼害應不可立彼那落迦此獄卒等。
述曰。此第二義。此獄卒等。與破罪者。互相逼迫。能害眾罪者。若俱是彼趣。應不可說彼是受罪者。此是獄卒等。又俱那落迦。即互相逼害。如何可立彼受罪者。此獄卒等。此中二意。后解為勝 量云。汝獄卒等應不可說為獄卒等。許那落迦攝故。如受罪者 汝受罪者應不可說為受罪者。那落迦攝故。如獄卒等 或受罪者應能逼害。那落迦攝故。如獄卒等 或獄卒等應不能逼害。那落迦攝故。如受罪者 此四比量。有所簡過。並無過失。應一一知。
論。形量力既等應不極相怖。
述曰。此第三義。其獄卒等。與受罪者。俱是彼攝。形量大小。及與氣力。一一既齊等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 獄卒等等，並非屬於其他道。就破斥非彼地獄道中，略有四種意義。這即是第一種，兼破其他道。先破斥當下的地獄道。簡略而言，所以說『且此』。『且此』不應被那落迦（naraka，地獄）所攝，貫通下面的四種意義。這些獄卒等等，不應是那些惡者所攝，因為他們不受像那些惡者所受的痛苦。如果獄卒等等，被惡者所攝，像其他惡者一樣，應該承受那些痛苦。量式如下：那些獄卒等等，不是惡者所攝，因為他們不受像那些惡者所受的痛苦，就像人和天人等等。或者獄卒等等應該承受那些痛苦，因為他們被允許為那落迦所攝，就像那些受罪者。《俱舍論》第十一中說，如果是有情，這果報在哪裡？他們又回答說，就在地獄中。該論就用這第四難，來破斥他們的宗義，而他們只有一種意義來破斥它，即火應該燃燒，與這第四難相同。 論：互相逼害，不應成立彼那落迦，此獄卒等。 述曰：這是第二種意義。這些獄卒等等，與破斥罪人，互相逼迫，能夠傷害眾多罪人。如果都是屬於那個道，就不應該說他們是受罪者，這些是獄卒等等。又都是那落迦，即互相逼害，如何能成立他們是受罪者，這些是獄卒等等。這其中有兩種意思，後面的解釋更為殊勝。量式如下：你們的獄卒等等，不應該被稱為獄卒等等，因為被允許為那落迦所攝，就像受罪者。你們的受罪者，不應該被稱為受罪者，因為被那落迦所攝，就像獄卒等等。或者受罪者應該能夠逼害，因為被那落迦所攝，就像獄卒等等。或者獄卒等等應該不能逼害，因為被那落迦所攝，就像受罪者。這四個比量，有所簡略的過失，並沒有過失，應該一一知曉。 論：形體大小和力量既然相等，就不應該極度互相怖畏。 述曰：這是第三種意義。那些獄卒等等，與受罪者，都是被那落迦所攝，形體大小，以及氣力，一一既然相等。
【English Translation】 English version The prison guards, etc., do not belong to other realms. In refuting that they do not belong to the Naraka (地獄, hell) realm, there are roughly four meanings. This is the first, also refuting other realms. First, refute the current Naraka realm. To put it simply, hence the saying 'moreover, this'. 'Moreover, this' should not be included in Naraka, encompassing the following four meanings. These prison guards, etc., should not be included among those evil ones, because they do not suffer like those evil ones. If the prison guards, etc., are included among the evil ones, like other evil ones, they should suffer those pains. The syllogism is as follows: Those prison guards, etc., are not included among the evil ones, because they do not suffer like those evil ones, like humans and devas (天人, gods), etc. Or the prison guards, etc., should suffer those pains, because they are allowed to be included in Naraka, like those who are punished. In the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (俱舍論), it says, if there are sentient beings, where is this result? They also replied, it is in hell. That treatise uses this fourth difficulty to refute their doctrine, but they only have one meaning to refute it, that is, fire should burn, which is the same as this fourth difficulty. Argument: Mutual oppression should not establish that Naraka includes both the prison guards and those being punished. Commentary: This is the second meaning. These prison guards, etc., and those who are being punished, oppress each other, and are able to harm many sinners. If both belong to that realm, it should not be said that they are the punished, and these are the prison guards, etc. Also, both are Naraka, that is, they oppress each other, how can it be established that they are the punished, and these are the prison guards, etc. There are two meanings in this, and the latter explanation is more excellent. The syllogism is as follows: Your prison guards, etc., should not be called prison guards, etc., because they are allowed to be included in Naraka, like those who are punished. Your punished ones should not be called punished ones, because they are included in Naraka, like the prison guards, etc. Or the punished ones should be able to oppress, because they are included in Naraka, like the prison guards, etc. Or the prison guards, etc., should not be able to oppress, because they are included in Naraka, like those who are punished. These four syllogisms have some faults of simplification, but there are no faults, and they should be known one by one. Argument: Since the size and strength are equal, they should not be extremely afraid of each other. Commentary: This is the third meaning. Those prison guards, etc., and those who are being punished, are both included in Naraka, and the size and strength are equal.
。其罪受者。應不極怖此獄卒等 量云。彼受罪者應不極怖此獄卒等。那落迦攝故如獄卒等 返破量云。其獄卒等亦應有恐怖非自類彼趣。許那落迦攝故。如受罪者。此中宗法。簡無同喻過。所立不成等。應如是知。
論。應自不能忍受鐵地炎熱猛焰恒燒燃苦云何于彼能逼害他。
述曰。此第四義若獄卒等。是那落迦攝。應自不能忍受鐵地恒燒燃苦。既不能忍受。云何于彼處。能害余惡者。惡者彼趣不能忍苦。不能害他。此亦彼趣。應自不能受忍彼苦。不能害他 量云。其獄卒等應自不能忍受鐵地炎熱猛焰恒燒燃苦。許那落迦攝故。如余造惡者。若獄卒等。不能忍苦。此量有相符者 應更立量云。其獄卒等應不能害他造惡者。由自不能忍熱鐵地等故。如余造惡者。云何于彼能逼害他。亦結上次三難。俱舍十一。彼復救言。此由業力所隔礙故。或感異大種故不被燒者。此獄卒等造業。既同餘受罪者。云何獨由業火不燒害。
應立量云。其獄卒等應火燒害。許地獄趣故。如受罪者。故今總說應自不能受鐵地等。由此四義。眾多比量。其獄卒等非彼趣攝。彼若救言若是彼趣。有如是失。是余趣者。竟何有過。
論。非那落迦不應生彼。
述曰。自下第二。破是余趣非那落迦。造惡之者。不應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：受罪之人不應該極其害怕獄卒等。（量式論證：）受罪之人不應該極其害怕獄卒等，因為他們屬於那落迦（Naraka，地獄）的範疇，就像獄卒等一樣。（反駁量式論證：）獄卒等也應該感到恐懼，因為他們不屬於自己的同類，並且被允許進入那落迦的範疇，就像受罪之人一樣。這裡面的宗法（pakṣadharmatā，宗依）可以簡化為沒有相同的比喻，所立不成等，應該這樣理解。 論：如果獄卒自己都無法忍受鐵地的炎熱和猛烈的火焰持續燃燒的痛苦，又怎麼能在那裡逼迫和傷害他人呢？ 述：這是第四個意義，如果獄卒等屬於那落迦的範疇，他們自己就應該無法忍受鐵地持續燃燒的痛苦。既然他們無法忍受，又怎麼能在那裡傷害其他的作惡者呢？作惡者在那落迦中無法忍受痛苦，也無法傷害他人。這些獄卒也屬於那落迦，他們自己應該無法忍受那些痛苦，也無法傷害他人。（量式論證：）獄卒等應該無法忍受鐵地的炎熱和猛烈的火焰持續燃燒的痛苦，因為他們被允許進入那落迦的範疇，就像其他的作惡者一樣。如果獄卒等無法忍受痛苦，這個量式論證就有了相符之處。（應該進一步建立量式論證：）獄卒等應該不能傷害其他的作惡者，因為他們自己無法忍受炎熱的鐵地等，就像其他的作惡者一樣。他們怎麼能在那裡逼迫和傷害他人呢？這也總結了上次的三個難題。《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）第十一卷中，有人辯解說，這是由於業力的阻礙，或者是因為感受到了不同的大種（mahābhūta，四大元素），所以才沒有被燒傷。這些獄卒等造的業，和其餘的受罪之人一樣，為什麼唯獨他們不會被業火燒害呢？ 應該建立量式論證：獄卒等應該被火燒害，因為他們被允許進入地獄，就像受罪之人一樣。所以現在總的來說，他們自己應該無法忍受鐵地等。通過這四個意義，以及眾多的比量，可以得出結論：獄卒等不屬於那落迦的範疇。如果他們辯解說，如果屬於那落迦的範疇，就會有這樣的過失；如果屬於其他的範疇，又有什麼過失呢？ 論：不是那落迦的眾生，不應該生在那落迦。
【English Translation】 English version: Those who are suffering should not be extremely afraid of the prison guards, etc. (Inferential argument:) Those who are suffering should not be extremely afraid of the prison guards, etc., because they belong to the category of Naraka (hell), just like the prison guards, etc. (Counter-argument:) The prison guards, etc., should also feel fear, because they do not belong to their own kind and are allowed to enter the category of Naraka, just like those who are suffering. The pakṣadharmatā (property of the subject) here can be simplified to having no similar analogy, the unestablished thesis, etc., and should be understood in this way. Treatise: If the prison guards themselves cannot endure the heat of the iron ground and the intense flames that constantly burn, how can they oppress and harm others there? Commentary: This is the fourth meaning. If the prison guards, etc., belong to the category of Naraka, they themselves should not be able to endure the constant burning pain of the iron ground. Since they cannot endure it, how can they harm other evildoers there? Evildoers in Naraka cannot endure suffering and cannot harm others. These prison guards also belong to Naraka, and they themselves should not be able to endure those sufferings and cannot harm others. (Inferential argument:) The prison guards, etc., should not be able to endure the heat of the iron ground and the intense flames that constantly burn, because they are allowed to enter the category of Naraka, just like other evildoers. If the prison guards, etc., cannot endure suffering, this inferential argument has a corresponding point. (A further inferential argument should be established:) The prison guards, etc., should not be able to harm other evildoers, because they themselves cannot endure the hot iron ground, etc., just like other evildoers. How can they oppress and harm others there? This also summarizes the three difficulties from the previous time. In the eleventh volume of the Abhidharmakośa, someone argues that this is due to the obstruction of karmic force, or because they feel different mahābhūta (great elements), so they are not burned. The karma created by these prison guards, etc., is the same as that of the other sufferers, so why are they the only ones not harmed by the karmic fire? An inferential argument should be established: The prison guards, etc., should be burned by fire, because they are allowed to enter hell, just like those who are suffering. So, in general, they themselves should not be able to endure the iron ground, etc. Through these four meanings, and numerous inferences, it can be concluded that the prison guards, etc., do not belong to the category of Naraka. If they argue that if they belong to the category of Naraka, there will be such faults; if they belong to other categories, what faults are there? Treatise: Beings that are not of Naraka should not be born in Naraka.
生彼捺落迦中。非彼趣故。如人天等。
論。如何天上現有傍生地獄亦然有傍生鬼。為獄卒等。
述曰。大眾正量。既見破非捺落迦攝。更不能救。見破非余趣。第三救言。如上天處處雖是勝。猶有惡趣傍生等生。其下地獄雖惡者處。何妨得有傍生鬼生。為獄卒等。其人處等。諸趣通生。理極成立。非上勝趣。且舉天中 量云。其地獄中。應有餘趣生。許善惡趣隨一攝故。如上天中有傍生等。鬼處有傍生。理無疑難。無不定失。彼師意說。獄卒是鬼。狗烏等是傍生。故論說言有傍生鬼。為獄卒等。舊論無等字。乃云畜生餓鬼別類等。生地獄中。名為獄卒者。不然。
論。此救非然。
述曰。此下第四論主復破。初總。次別。此總非也。
論。頌曰 如天上傍生地獄中不爾所執傍生鬼不受彼苦故。
述曰。此下別非。初二句頌。顯喻不成。下二句頌。顯不成理。與外比量立宗中。法差別相違。彼宗法言有餘趣生。名法自相。此上所有。受彼器果。不受器果等。是法差別。今但與彼宗差別為違。天中余趣。受彼器果。汝宗所執地獄中余趣。不受器果故。
論曰。諸有傍生生天上者。必有能感彼器樂業生彼定受器所生樂。
述曰。釋初句頌。若龍麟等。生天上者。唯在欲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：他們會生於捺落迦（Naraka）之中，因為他們不屬於那一趣。就像人和天等眾生一樣。
論：為什麼天上會有傍生，地獄中也會有傍生和鬼呢？比如獄卒等。
述曰：大眾部和正量部認為，既然已經證明他們不屬於捺落迦（Naraka）所攝，就不能再救度他們了。既然已經證明他們不屬於其他趣，第三種救度方式是說，就像上天雖然殊勝，仍然有惡趣的傍生等眾生。那麼，下方的地獄雖然是惡劣之處，又有什麼妨礙會有傍生和鬼的產生呢？比如作為獄卒等。人和其它趣的眾生，普遍存在於各個趣中，這個道理是完全成立的。不是說上方的殊勝之趣，就舉天為例。量云：地獄中，應該有其他趣的眾生。允許善惡趣隨一攝受，就像上天中有傍生等。鬼道中有傍生，這個道理沒有疑問，沒有不確定的過失。那位論師的意思是說，獄卒是鬼，狗和烏鴉等是傍生。所以論中說有傍生鬼，作為獄卒等。舊論沒有『等』字，而是說畜生餓鬼是不同的類別等，生在地獄中，被稱為獄卒。這樣說是不對的。
論：這種救度是不成立的。
述曰：下面第四個論主再次破斥。先總說，再分別說。這裡總的來說是不成立的。
論：頌曰：就像天上會有傍生，地獄中卻不是這樣。所執著的傍生鬼，不受地獄的痛苦。
述曰：下面分別破斥。前兩句頌，顯示比喻不成立。后兩句頌，顯示道理不成立。與外道的比量在立宗時，法差別相違背。他們的宗法說有其他趣的眾生，這是法自相。天上所有，接受器世間的果報。不受器世間的果報等，是法差別。現在只是與他們的宗差別相違背。天上的其他趣，接受器世間的果報。你們宗派所執著的地獄中的其他趣，不接受器世間的果報。
論曰：凡是有傍生生到天上，必定有能夠感得天上器世間快樂的業，生到那裡必定會接受器世間所生的快樂。
述曰：解釋第一句頌。如果龍、麒麟等，生到天上，只會在欲界天。
【English Translation】 English version: They are born in Naraka (hell), because they do not belong to that realm, just like humans and Devas (gods).
Treatise: How is it that there are animals in the heavens, and also animals and ghosts in hell, such as the prison guards?
Commentary: The Mahasanghika and Zhengliang (Sammitiya) schools believe that since it has been proven that they are not included in Naraka (hell), they cannot be saved. Since it has been proven that they do not belong to other realms, the third way of salvation is to say that, just as the heavens, although superior, still have animals and other beings of evil destinies, what prevents the lower hells, although evil places, from having the birth of animals and ghosts? For example, as prison guards, etc. Humans and other realms of beings universally exist in all realms, and this principle is completely established. It is not that the superior realms, let's take the heavens as an example. The measure says: In hell, there should be beings from other realms. Allowing good and evil realms to be included in one, just like there are animals in the heavens. There are animals in the ghost realm, this principle is without doubt, without uncertain faults. That teacher's meaning is that the prison guards are ghosts, and dogs and crows are animals. Therefore, the treatise says that there are animal ghosts, as prison guards, etc. The old treatise does not have the word 'etc.', but says that animals and hungry ghosts are different categories, etc., born in hell, called prison guards. This is not correct.
Treatise: This salvation is not established.
Commentary: The fourth treatise master refutes again below. First generally, then separately. Here, generally speaking, it is not established.
Treatise: Verse: Just as there are animals in the heavens, it is not so in hell. The animals and ghosts that are clung to do not suffer the pain of hell.
Commentary: Refuting separately below. The first two lines of the verse show that the metaphor is not established. The last two lines of the verse show that the principle is not established. When establishing the proposition in comparison with external paths, the characteristics of the Dharma difference are contradictory. Their proposition says that there are beings from other realms, which is the self-characteristic of the Dharma. All that is in the heavens receives the retribution of the vessel world. Not receiving the retribution of the vessel world, etc., is the difference of the Dharma. Now it is only contradictory to the difference of their sect. The other realms in the heavens receive the retribution of the vessel world. The other realms in hell that your sect clings to do not receive the retribution of the vessel world.
Treatise: Verse: All animals born in the heavens must have the karma that can sense the happiness of the vessel world of the heavens, and they will surely receive the happiness born from the vessel world when they are born there.
Commentary: Explaining the first line of the verse. If dragons, unicorns, etc., are born in the heavens, they will only be in the Desire Realm heavens.
界地居天中。其鶴鳳等。亦通欲界空居天有。此等必有共業。是善能感彼天外器樂業。既有果生故。能受彼器所生樂。此顯他宗同喻差別。下成彼宗法之差別。
論。非獄卒等受地獄中器所生苦。
述曰。其獄卒等。生地獄時。不受地獄器所生苦。云何與彼天傍生同。前他立因。既能成彼余趣生地獄。如是亦能成獄卒等受地獄中器所生苦。量云。其獄卒等應受所居外器生果。許善惡趣隨一攝故。如上天中有傍生等。此中簡略。應須審知。此釋頌中下之三句。
論。故不應許傍生鬼趣。生捺落迦。
述曰。此總結釋第二句頌。捺落迦者。此云苦器。即地獄是。言地獄者。順此方說。由此理故。不應許傍生。及與鬼趣。生地獄中。然大眾正量。本計獄卒等是實有情。然是地獄趣。今非之云非傍生鬼者。是設遮言。或破轉計。彼復難言。若非有情。法救善現所說。復云何解。心常懷忿毒。好集諸惡業。見他苦欣悅。死作琰魔卒。今解之言。琰魔王使。諸邏剎娑。擲諸有情。置地獄者。名琰魔卒。是實有情。非地獄中害有情者。故地獄卒。非實有情。
論。若爾應許彼那落迦業增上力生異大種。
述曰。自下第二。破薩婆多等諸師救義。于中有二。先救后破。此即救也。若依舊本。先顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：居住在界地的天眾中，像鶴、鳳等，也與欲界空居天的天眾一樣。這些天眾必定有共同的業力，這種善業能夠感得彼天之外的器樂之業。既然有果報產生，就能領受那些器樂所產生的快樂。這顯示了其他宗派在比喻上的差別。下面成立彼宗在法上的差別。
論：獄卒等不會領受地獄中器物所產生的痛苦。
述曰：那些獄卒等，在生地獄的時候，不會領受地獄器物所產生的痛苦。怎麼能和那些天上的傍生一樣呢？前面他宗所立的因，既然能夠成立其他趣的眾生生地獄，那麼也能夠成立獄卒等領受地獄中器物所產生的痛苦。可以這樣推論：那些獄卒等應該領受所居住的外界器物所產生的果報，因為他們被認為是善惡趣中的一種，就像上界天眾中有傍生等一樣。這裡比較簡略，應該仔細瞭解。這是解釋頌文中的后三句。
論：所以不應該允許傍生和鬼趣的眾生，生在那落迦（Naraka，苦器，即地獄）。
述曰：這是總結解釋第二句頌文。捺落迦（Naraka）的意思是苦器，也就是地獄。說地獄，是爲了順應此方的說法。因為這個道理，不應該允許傍生以及鬼趣的眾生，生地獄中。然而大眾部和正量部，本來認為獄卒等是真實的有情。但現在否定他們說不是傍生鬼趣，這是假設遮止的說法，或者破斥轉變的計較。他們又反駁說，如果不是有情，那麼法救和善現所說的，又該如何解釋呢？『內心常常懷著忿恨毒害，喜歡聚集各種惡業，看到他人受苦就感到高興，死後就成為琰魔（Yama，閻魔）的獄卒。』現在解釋說，琰魔王（Yama Raja，閻魔王）的使者，那些羅剎娑（Rakshasa），把各種有情拋擲到地獄中，這些人被稱為琰魔卒。他們是真實的有情，而不是地獄中傷害有情的眾生。所以地獄的獄卒，不是真實的有情。
論：如果這樣，就應該允許那些那落迦（Naraka，苦器，即地獄）的業力，以增上力產生不同的大種。
述曰：從下面第二部分開始，破斥薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等諸位論師的救護之義。其中有兩部分，先是救護，然後是破斥。這裡是救護。
【English Translation】 English version: Among the Devas residing in the realm of the 'boundary land' (界地), such as cranes and phoenixes, there are also those who share the same realm as the 'desire realm' (欲界) Devas dwelling in the sky. These beings must share a common karma, a virtuous karma capable of sensing the instrumental music of that realm. Since there is a resultant effect, they can experience the joy produced by those instruments. This highlights the difference in analogies held by other schools. The following establishes the difference in Dharma according to their school.
Treatise: Jailers and the like do not experience the suffering produced by the instruments in hell.
Commentary: Those jailers and the like, when born in hell, do not experience the suffering produced by the instruments of hell. How can they be the same as the animals in the heavens? The cause established by the other school earlier, since it can establish the birth of beings from other realms in hell, can also establish that jailers and the like experience the suffering produced by the instruments in hell. It can be inferred that those jailers and the like should experience the results produced by the external instruments of their dwelling, because they are considered to be included in either the good or evil realms, just like there are animals among the Devas in the upper realms. This is brief and should be carefully understood. This explains the last three lines of the verse.
Treatise: Therefore, it should not be allowed that animals and ghosts are born in Naraka (捺落迦, 'vessel of suffering,' i.e., hell).
Commentary: This is a summary explanation of the second line of the verse. Naraka (捺落迦) means 'vessel of suffering,' which is hell. Saying 'hell' is to accord with the usage of this region. Because of this principle, it should not be allowed that animals and ghosts are born in hell. However, the Mahasanghika (大眾部) and Sautrantika (正量部) schools originally believed that jailers and the like are real sentient beings. But now it is denied that they are animals or ghosts; this is a hypothetical refutation, or a refutation of a changed view. They further object, saying that if they are not sentient beings, then how should the words of Dharmatrāta (法救) and Subhūti (善現) be explained? 'The mind constantly harbors anger and poison, likes to accumulate various evil deeds, rejoices at the suffering of others, and after death becomes a jailer of Yama (琰魔).' Now it is explained that the messengers of Yama Raja (琰魔王), those Rakshasas (羅剎娑), who throw various sentient beings into hell, are called jailers of Yama. They are real sentient beings, not the beings who harm sentient beings in hell. Therefore, the jailers of hell are not real sentient beings.
Treatise: If so, it should be allowed that the karma of those Narakas (捺落迦, 'vessel of suffering,' i.e., hell) produces different great elements through the power of augmentation.
Commentary: From the second part below, the defense of the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多) and other teachers is refuted. There are two parts to it, first the defense, then the refutation. This is the defense.
頌文。正破外義。於後長行。方申外義。申外義已。略釋頌文。今則不然。先有外救。后舉頌破。將為穩便。薩婆多等云。若獄卒等。非有情爾。應許造惡者。先業增上力。於今此生中。生別異大種。非內身攝。非有情數。非如無情無有作用。此實無情攝。似有情數。名異大種。
論。起勝形顯量力差別。于彼施設獄卒等名。
述曰。其異大種。起勝形色。身有粗細。起勝顯色。身或赤黑。起異貌量。或長或短。其觸處力。或強或弱。種種差別。此形顯等。望受罪者。皆為強大。故俱名勝。此形顯等。皆業所感。於此等上。施設獄卒狗烏等名。于無情物。假立情名。說為施設。此顯法體非有情數。但是心外業生。大種所起形等。假名施設。為獄卒等。
自下顯此有勝作用所由。
論。為生彼怖變現種種動手足等差別作用。
述曰。為造惡者。起怖畏故。知其惡業。招此惡果。其無情物。大形力等。由業所感變現非一。動手足等。差別作用。或斬。或斫。或剝。此顯作用。
次略顯事。
論。如羝羊山乍離乍合。
述曰。眾合地獄有二山。勢猶若羝羊相去稍遠。名之為離。罪人居中。其山相逼迫令苦楚。碎骨爛肉。名之為合。既合復離。罪人復活。如是離合。經無量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 頌文是爲了直接駁斥外道的觀點，通常在頌文之後會用長篇文字來闡述外道的觀點。闡述完外道觀點后，再簡要解釋頌文。但現在的情況不同，先提出外道的辯解，然後再引用頌文進行駁斥，這樣會更穩妥方便。薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等認為，如果獄卒等不是有情眾生，那麼就應該承認造惡者的宿業增上力，導致他們在此生中產生特殊的『大種』（Mahabhuta，四大元素），這些『大種』不屬於內在的身體，也不屬於有情眾生的範疇，但又不像無情物那樣沒有作用。這實際上是屬於無情物的範疇，但看起來像是有情眾生，所以稱之為『異大種』。
論：因為這些『異大種』產生了殊勝的形體、顯著的量和力量的差別，所以才在它們身上安立了獄卒等的名稱。
述記：這些特殊的『大種』，產生了殊勝的形色，身體有粗細之分；產生了殊勝的顯色，身體有紅色或黑色；產生了不同的外貌和量，或長或短；其觸覺和力量，或強或弱，種種差別。這些形體、顯色等，相對於受罪者來說，都是強大的，所以都稱為『勝』。這些形體、顯色等，都是由業力所感召的。在這些『大種』上，安立獄卒、狗、烏鴉等的名稱。在無情物上，假立有情的名稱，這被稱為『施設』。這表明法體的本質不是有情眾生，而是心外由業力所生的大種所產生的形體等，假名施設為獄卒等。
以下說明這些『異大種』具有殊勝作用的原因。
論：爲了讓受罪者產生恐懼，這些『異大種』會變現出種種動作，例如手足等的差別作用。
述記：爲了讓造惡者產生恐懼，讓他們知道自己的惡業招致了這樣的惡果，這些無情物，憑藉其巨大的形體和力量等，由業力所感召，變現出各種各樣的動作，例如手足等的差別作用，或者斬殺，或者砍斫，或者剝皮。這顯示了它們的作用。
接下來簡要地說明事實。
論：例如眾合地獄中的羝羊山，時而分離，時而合攏。
述記：眾合地獄中有兩座山，形狀像公羊，彼此相距稍遠，這稱為『離』。罪人處在兩山之間，山會相互逼近，使罪人感到痛苦，骨頭粉碎，肉體腐爛，這稱為『合』。既合攏又分離，罪人又復活。就這樣分離和合攏，經歷無量的時間。
【English Translation】 English version: The verses are to directly refute the views of externalists. Usually, lengthy explanations follow the verses to elaborate on the externalist views. After elaborating on the externalist views, the verses are then briefly explained. However, the current situation is different; the externalist defenses are presented first, and then the verses are cited to refute them, which is more stable and convenient. The Sarvastivadins (those who maintain 'everything exists') and others believe that if the prison guards, etc., are not sentient beings, then it should be admitted that the force of the accumulated karma of the evildoers causes them to produce special 'Mahabhutas' (great elements) in this life. These 'Mahabhutas' do not belong to the internal body, nor do they belong to the category of sentient beings, but they are not like inanimate objects that have no function. In reality, they belong to the category of inanimate objects, but they appear to be sentient beings, so they are called 'different Mahabhutas'.
Treatise: Because these 'different Mahabhutas' produce superior forms, significant quantities, and differences in power, the names of prison guards, etc., are established on them.
Commentary: These special 'Mahabhutas' produce superior forms and colors, with bodies that are coarse or fine; they produce superior appearances, with bodies that are red or black; they produce different appearances and quantities, either long or short; their touch and strength are either strong or weak, with various differences. These forms, appearances, etc., are all powerful relative to those who are suffering, so they are all called 'superior'. These forms, appearances, etc., are all caused by karma. On these 'Mahabhutas', the names of prison guards, dogs, crows, etc., are established. On inanimate objects, the names of sentient beings are falsely established, which is called 'establishment'. This shows that the essence of the Dharma body is not sentient beings, but the forms, etc., produced by the Mahabhutas generated by karma outside the mind, which are falsely named as prison guards, etc.
The following explains the reason why these 'different Mahabhutas' have superior functions.
Treatise: In order to cause fear in those who are suffering, these 'different Mahabhutas' manifest various actions, such as the different functions of hands and feet, etc.
Commentary: In order to cause fear in the evildoers, to let them know that their evil deeds have brought about such evil consequences, these inanimate objects, with their huge forms and powers, etc., are caused by karma to manifest various actions, such as the different functions of hands and feet, etc., either killing, or chopping, or skinning. This shows their function.
Next, briefly explain the facts.
Treatise: For example, the butting-ram mountains in the Samghata Hell, sometimes separate and sometimes come together.
Commentary: In the Samghata Hell, there are two mountains, shaped like rams, that are slightly distant from each other, which is called 'separation'. The sinners are in between the two mountains, and the mountains will approach each other, causing the sinners to suffer, their bones crushed and their flesh rotten, which is called 'coming together'. After coming together, they separate again, and the sinners are resurrected. Thus, separating and coming together, they experience immeasurable time.
時。令其罪人。受諸楚苦。碎而複合。舊言羺羊。顯其黑色。今言羝羊。事如相鬥。余則不然。非羝羊等。亦名羺羊故。依其梵本。但言羝羊。
論。剛鐵林刺或低或昂。
述曰。此鋒刃增中。第三鐵刺林。謂此林上。有利鐵刺。長十六指。罪人被逼。若上樹時。其刺即低。向下而刺。若下樹時。其刺即昂。向上而刺。有鐵㭰烏。揬啄有情眼精心肝。諍共而食。皆是罪者業生。大種差別轉變。然此林刺。實是非情。非此所諍。但諍獄卒。及鐵㭰烏。羝羊山等。因舉苦具。顯其惡相。非鐵林刺。亦此所論。上來總是薩婆多救義。
論。非事全無然不應理。
述曰。此下破救。初總非。后理逼。然此所說業果等事。事皆有故。非是全無。然說識外實有體。總名不應理。體用少有。名非全無。非內識變說非應理。
論。頌曰若許由業力有異大種生起如是轉變于識何不許。
述曰。自下理逼。前三句頌。牒彼外宗。第四句頌。正申義理。汝宗既許業招大種。起如是形量。有作用轉變。何不許此在識非余 如是者。形顯量力等也 轉變者。動手足等作用也。合此二種。名能所造。
論曰。何緣不許識由業力如是轉變而執大種。
述曰。此中總釋頌之大綱。總逐外人。義如前說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時，讓那些罪人遭受各種痛苦，身體破碎后又複合。過去說的是『羺羊』（指黑色的公羊），是爲了顯示其黑色。現在說的是『羝羊』（指公羊），事情就像它們互相爭鬥一樣。但我們所說的地獄景象並非如此，不是像『羝羊』等一樣，也可以叫做『羺羊』。根據梵文原本，只說是『羝羊』。
論：剛鐵的樹林，樹刺或低垂或昂起。
述記：這是鋒刃增大地獄中的第三個鐵刺林。這個樹林上面有利的鐵刺，長十六指。罪人被迫爬樹時，那些鐵刺就低垂下來，向下刺；當罪人要下樹時，鐵刺就昂起，向上刺。還有鐵嘴烏鴉，啄食有情眾生的眼睛、精髓和肝臟，爭搶著吃。這些都是罪人自己的業力所生，由四大種的差別轉變而來。然而，這些樹林和鐵刺，實際上都是無情之物，不是我們所爭論的。我們所爭論的是獄卒和鐵嘴烏鴉，以及羝羊山等等。這是藉由這些痛苦的刑具，來顯示地獄的惡劣景象，而不是鐵刺林本身，這也不是我們所討論的。以上所說，總的來說是薩婆多部的救義。
論：並非完全沒有，但說識外實有體不合道理。
述記：下面破斥這種救義。先總的否定，然後用道理逼迫。他們所說的業果等事，事情本身是存在的，所以並非完全沒有。然而，說在識之外，實有自體存在，總的來說是不合道理的。如果說體和用稍微有一點，就不能說是完全沒有。但如果說不是內心意識的變現，就說不過去了。
論：頌說：如果承認由業力，有不同的大種生起，像這樣的轉變，對於意識，為什麼不能承認呢？
述記：下面用道理逼迫。前面的三句頌，是引用對方的觀點。第四句頌，是正式闡述義理。你們既然承認業力可以招感大種，生起這樣的形狀和力量，產生這樣的作用和轉變，為什麼就不承認這些都是在意識之中，而不是在意識之外呢？『如是』，指的是形狀、顯現、力量等等。『轉變』，指的是動手、動腳等等作用。把這兩種合起來，就叫做能造和所造。
論曰：為什麼不承認意識可以由業力這樣轉變，而一定要執著于大種呢？
述記：這裡總的解釋頌的大綱，總的追問對方，道理和前面說的一樣。
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, the offenders are made to suffer all kinds of torments, broken apart and then rejoined. In the past, it was called 'ram' (羺羊, referring to a black male sheep) to highlight its black color. Now it is called 'he-goat' (羝羊, referring to a male sheep), and things are like they are fighting each other. But what we are talking about is not like that, not like 'he-goats' etc., which can also be called 'rams'. According to the original Sanskrit text, it only says 'he-goat'.
Treatise: The forest of hard iron thorns, the thorns either drooping or rising.
Commentary: This is the third forest of iron thorns in the hell of increasing sharp blades. On this forest are sharp iron thorns, sixteen fingers long. When offenders are forced to climb the trees, the thorns droop down and pierce downwards; when offenders are about to descend, the thorns rise up and pierce upwards. There are also iron-beaked crows that peck at the eyes, marrow, and livers of sentient beings, fighting over them to eat. These are all born from the offenders' own karma, transformed from the differences of the four great elements (大種). However, these forests and thorns are actually inanimate objects, which are not what we are arguing about. What we are arguing about are the hell-wardens and iron-beaked crows, as well as the he-goat mountain (羝羊山) and so on. This is to reveal the evil aspects of hell through these instruments of suffering, not the iron thorn forest itself, which is not what we are discussing. The above is all about the Sarvastivada's (薩婆多) meaning of salvation.
Treatise: It is not entirely non-existent, but it is unreasonable to say that there is a real entity outside of consciousness.
Commentary: Below, this refutes this meaning of salvation. First, a general negation, then forced by reason. The things they talk about, such as karmic results, exist, so they are not entirely non-existent. However, to say that there is a real entity outside of consciousness is generally unreasonable. If there is a slight bit of substance and function, it cannot be said to be completely non-existent. But if it is said that it is not a manifestation of inner consciousness, it is not convincing.
Treatise: The verse says: If it is admitted that different great elements arise from the power of karma, and such transformations occur, why not admit it for consciousness?
Commentary: Below, this is forced by reason. The first three lines of the verse quote the other party's view. The fourth line of the verse formally expounds the meaning. Since you admit that karma can attract the great elements, giving rise to such shapes and powers, and producing such functions and transformations, why not admit that these are all within consciousness, and not outside of consciousness? 'Such' refers to shape, appearance, power, and so on. 'Transformation' refers to functions such as moving hands and feet. Combining these two is called the creator and the created.
Treatise says: Why not admit that consciousness can be transformed in this way by the power of karma, and insist on clinging to the great elements?
Commentary: Here, this generally explains the outline of the verse, generally questioning the other party, the reasoning is the same as before.
。然無比量。若為共因。比量亦得 量云。此獄卒等物皆不離識等。許所知故。如心心所。真如等法。不離識有。無不定失。
上來已破薩婆多訖。自下經部為伏救義。我宗說彼亦是非情。然造業時。熏習種子。在內識故。可不離識。令得果時。其獄卒等。識外大種。轉變差別。不在識中。與余宗異。或重抑薩婆多。令有熏習。然前解勝。以薩婆多無熏習故。
論。複次頌曰 業熏習余處執余處有果所熏識有果不許有何因。
述曰。自下廣破上二句頌牒。下二句頌難 業熏習余處者。謂造業時。熏在識中或色根等中。果起之時。不在識內。斯業熏識。望果異故。名為余處 執余處有果者。果者在識等外。與業熏習處所異故。故言汝執余處有果 所熏識有果者。業所熏識。有此業果 不許有何因。因言所以。不許此果。在業所熏內識之中。有何所以。有因之識。應有果故。然彼熏習。或在根中。或在識類。今取彼宗。熏習內識。與己相似。以為難故。但言熏識。
論曰。執那落迦由自業力。生差別大種。起形等轉變。
述曰。此牒彼義。其經部等。與薩婆多同。形等者。等顯等。轉變者。作用也。
論。彼業熏習理應許在識相續中不在余處。
述曰。亦經部計。識非常一故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：然而，如果使用『無』作為衡量標準，那麼如果它是一個共同的原因，也可以通過比量來衡量。量論認為：『這些獄卒等事物都不離識等，因為它們被認為是所知之物，就像心和心所一樣。』如果真如等法不離識而存在，那麼就不會有不確定的過失。
以上已經駁斥了薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）。下面經部（Sautrantika，經量部）爲了挽救其觀點，認為我宗也認為那些不是有情。然而，在造業時，熏習的種子存在於內在的識中，因此可以不離識。當果報產生時，那些獄卒等是識外的四大種（mahābhūta，構成物質世界的四種基本元素：地、水、火、風）轉變的差別，不在識中，這與其他宗派不同。或者可以再次壓制薩婆多，使其具有熏習。然而，之前的解釋更好，因為薩婆多沒有熏習。
論：此外，頌曰：『業熏習余處，執余處有果，所熏識有果，不許有何因？』
述曰：下面廣泛地駁斥，上面的兩句是頌的提要，下面的兩句是頌的質難。『業熏習余處』，指的是造業時，熏習在識中或者色根等中。當果報生起時，不在識內。這種業熏習相對於果報來說是不同的地方，所以稱為『余處』。『執余處有果』，指的是果報在識等之外，與業熏習的處所不同。所以說『你認為在其他地方有果報』。『所熏識有果』，指的是業所熏習的識，具有這種業的果報。『不許有何因』，『因』指的是原因，為什麼不允許這種果報存在於業所熏習的內在識之中？有什麼原因？有原因的識，應該有果報。然而，那種熏習，或者在根中，或者在識的種類中。現在選取他們的宗派，熏習內在的識，與自己相似，作為質難的依據，所以只說熏識。
論：認為那落迦（Naraka，地獄）由自己的業力，產生差別的大種，生起形等轉變。
述曰：這是引述他們的觀點。經部等與薩婆多相同。『形等』，『等』表示顯現等。『轉變』，指的是作用。
論：那種業熏習理應允許存在於識的相續中，而不是在其他地方。
述曰：這也是經部的觀點，因為識不是常一的。
【English Translation】 English version: However, if 'non-existence' is used as a measure, then if it is a common cause, it can also be measured by inference. The argument states: 'These hell wardens and other things are not separate from consciousness, etc., because they are considered knowable, just like mind and mental factors.' If suchness (tathātā) and other dharmas exist without being separate from consciousness, then there would be no uncertain faults.
The above has refuted the Sarvastivada (the doctrine that 'everything exists'). Below, the Sautrantika (the Sutra school) attempts to salvage its view, arguing that our school also considers those to be non-sentient. However, at the time of creating karma, the seeds of habituation (vāsanā) exist within the inner consciousness, so they can be inseparable from consciousness. When the result arises, those hell wardens, etc., are transformations of the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four basic elements constituting the material world: earth, water, fire, and wind) outside of consciousness, and are not within consciousness, which is different from other schools. Or, one could again suppress the Sarvastivada, making it have habituation. However, the previous explanation is better, because the Sarvastivada does not have habituation.
Treatise: Furthermore, the verse says: 'Karma habituates elsewhere, holding that the result exists elsewhere, the consciousness habituated has the result, what is the reason for not allowing it?'
Commentary: Below is a broad refutation; the above two lines are a summary of the verse, and the below two lines are a challenge to the verse. 'Karma habituates elsewhere' refers to when creating karma, the habituation is in consciousness or sense organs, etc. When the result arises, it is not within consciousness. This karma habituation is a different place relative to the result, so it is called 'elsewhere'. 'Holding that the result exists elsewhere' refers to the result being outside of consciousness, etc., which is different from the place of karma habituation. Therefore, it is said, 'You believe that the result exists elsewhere.' 'The consciousness habituated has the result' refers to the consciousness habituated by karma having the result of this karma. 'What is the reason for not allowing it?' 'Reason' refers to the cause; why is it not allowed for this result to exist within the inner consciousness habituated by karma? What is the reason? Consciousness with a cause should have a result. However, that habituation is either in the sense organs or in the types of consciousness. Now, selecting their school, habituating the inner consciousness, similar to oneself, as the basis for the challenge, so it only says habituating consciousness.
Treatise: Believing that Naraka (hell) arises from one's own karmic force, producing different great elements, giving rise to transformations such as form, etc.
Commentary: This is quoting their view. The Sautrantika, etc., are the same as the Sarvastivada. 'Form, etc.,' 'etc.' indicates manifestation, etc. 'Transformation' refers to function.
Treatise: That karma habituation should reasonably be allowed to exist in the continuum of consciousness, and not elsewhere.
Commentary: This is also the view of the Sautrantika, because consciousness is not permanent and singular.
言相續。或相續者。趣不斷義。然經部師。亦計熏色根及其識類。但許熏識。以遍三界。故言在識不在余處。或抑薩婆多。令業熏內識。過去未來體非實有。非現攝故。如龜毛等。現攝即是現在無為。現有體故。若言現在。不攝無為。既無過去。又無熏習。先業如何能招異熟。由此故知。業熏內識。不在余處能招當果。
牒彼計已下正申難。
論。有熏習識汝便不許有果轉變無熏習處翻執有果此有何因。
述曰。識有熏習。汝便不許即此識中。有異大種。形顯等果。作用轉變。在識之外。都無熏習。異於業處。翻執有果。此有何因。因言所以。業熏在識。果在識外。故名為翻 量云。汝惡業熏習應不在識。地獄業果隨一攝故。如地獄果 其地獄果在識非余。非是余趣。業果攝故。或地獄業果隨一攝故。如地獄業。此因有簡。應如理知。
論。有教為因。
述曰。經部等答。有教為因。證知識外。有實色等。此總答也。舊論云。阿含是因。正云阿笈摩。此翻為傳。義當爲教。
論。謂若唯識似色等現無別色等佛不應說有色等處。
述曰。此顯教因。若一切法。唯有內識。此識能變。似色等眼等十處相現。無離識外實色等處。世尊經中。亦應不說有色等十種處。眼等色等。自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『言相續』，或者說『相續』，指的是趣向不間斷的意義。然而，經部師也認為薰染的色根及其識的種類是存在的，但只承認薰染識，因為它遍及三界。因此，業力存在於識中，而不是其他地方。或者可以抑制薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部），使業力薰染內在的識，因為過去和未來的實體並非真實存在，因為它們不屬於現在所攝。就像龜毛等一樣，現在所攝的就是現在的無為法，因為它是現有之體。如果說只有現在，而不包括無為法，既然沒有過去，又沒有熏習，那麼先前的業力如何能夠招感不同的成熟果報呢？因此可知，業力薰染內在的識，而不是在其他地方，才能招感未來的果報。
駁斥他們的觀點后，下面正式提出詰難。
論：如果識有熏習，你就不應該不承認有果的轉變；在沒有熏習的地方，反而執著于有果，這是什麼原因呢？
述曰：識有熏習，你就不應該不承認在此識中，有異於識的大種（Mahabhuta，四大），如形色、顯色等果，以及作用的轉變。在識之外，完全沒有熏習，不同於業力所在之處，反而執著于有果，這是什麼原因呢？『因』指的是原因。業力薰染在識中，果報卻在識外，所以稱為『翻』。量式如下：你的惡業熏習應該不在識中，因為它屬於地獄業果的範疇，就像地獄果一樣。地獄果存在於識中，而不是其他地方，因為它屬於業果所攝，或者說屬於地獄業果的範疇，就像地獄業一樣。這個『因』是有簡別的，應該如理了解。
論：有教證作為原因。
述曰：經部等回答說，有教證作為原因，證明在識之外，有真實的色等。這是總體的回答。舊論說，阿含（Agama，阿含經）是原因。正確的說法是阿笈摩（Agama），翻譯為『傳』，意義相當於『教』。
論：如果只有唯識，顯現出類似色等，而沒有其他的色等，那麼佛陀就不應該說有色等處。
述曰：這是顯示教證的原因。如果一切法都只是內在的識，這個識能夠變現出類似色等眼等十處（Ayatana，處）的相狀，而沒有離開識之外的真實的色等處，那麼世尊在經中，就不應該說有色等十種處，即眼等色等自身。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Speech continuity,』 or 『continuity,』 refers to the meaning of proceeding without interruption. However, the Sautrantikas (Sautrantika, 經部師) also consider the perfumed sense faculties and their types of consciousness to exist, but only acknowledge the perfuming of consciousness, because it pervades the three realms. Therefore, karma resides in consciousness, not elsewhere. Alternatively, one could restrain the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, 一切有部), causing karma to perfume the inner consciousness, because the entities of the past and future are not truly existent, as they are not included in the present. Like tortoise hair, what is included in the present is the unconditioned dharma of the present, because it is an existing entity. If one says only the present exists, without including the unconditioned, since there is no past and no perfuming, how can prior karma bring about different ripened results? Therefore, it can be known that karma perfumes the inner consciousness, not elsewhere, in order to bring about future results.
After refuting their view, the following formally raises a challenge.
Treatise: If consciousness has perfuming, then you should not deny the transformation of results; in a place without perfuming, you instead cling to the existence of results. What is the reason for this?
Commentary: Consciousness has perfuming, so you should not deny that within this consciousness, there are great elements (Mahabhuta, 四大) different from consciousness, such as the results of form, appearance, and so on, and the transformation of functions. Outside of consciousness, there is completely no perfuming, different from where karma resides, yet you instead cling to the existence of results. What is the reason for this? 『Reason』 refers to the cause. Karma perfumes in consciousness, but the results are outside of consciousness, so it is called 『reversal.』 The syllogism is as follows: Your evil karma perfuming should not be in consciousness, because it belongs to the category of hell karma results, like hell results. Hell results exist in consciousness, not elsewhere, because they are included in the category of karma results, or because they belong to the category of hell karma results, like hell karma. This 『reason』 has distinctions, and should be understood according to reason.
Treatise: There is scriptural authority as the reason.
Commentary: The Sautrantikas (Sautrantika, 經部師) and others answer that there is scriptural authority as the reason, proving that outside of consciousness, there are real forms and so on. This is the general answer. The old treatise says that the Agamas (Agama, 阿含經) are the reason. The correct term is Agama (Agama), translated as 『transmission,』 with a meaning equivalent to 『teaching.』
Treatise: If there were only Vijnanavada (Vijnanavada, 唯識), manifesting things similar to forms and so on, without other forms and so on, then the Buddha should not have said that there are sense bases such as forms and so on.
Commentary: This is to show the reason of scriptural authority. If all dharmas were only inner consciousness, and this consciousness could transform and manifest appearances similar to the ten sense bases (Ayatana, 處) such as forms, eyes, and so on, without real sense bases such as forms and so on existing apart from consciousness, then the World-Honored One should not have said in the sutras that there are ten kinds of sense bases such as forms, eyes, and so on themselves.
體變礙。名有色等處。謂經中說。云何為眼。謂四大所造眼識所依凈色為性。乃至廣說。
論。此教非因有別意故。
述曰。就第一段。自下第三。次有三頌。釋外所引有色等教。引教證不成。故知唯有識。初之一頌。引教證色有別意。成唯識。次有一頌。引教證色有密意。成唯識。后之一頌。引教證色有勝利。成唯識。今總非云此教非因。何故非因。有別意故。
云何別意。
論。頌曰依彼所化生世尊密意趣說有色等處如化生有情。
述曰。上三句。顯別意。第四句。引喻成。第一句。顯機宜。第二句。能化意。第三句。說色等。由所化宜。其能化者。十二處中。說有色等十有色處。如佛亦說化生有情。即是中有。為化斷見。說有中有。非是實有化生有情。經部中有說如大乘。但假有情。無實我故。此中所言密意趣者。意趣有四。一平等意趣。如佛說我曾名勝觀。二別時意趣。如說愿生極樂界等。三別義意趣。如說諸法皆無性等。四眾生意樂意趣。如說一善根。或時稱讚。或時毀訾。乃至廣說。今約第四眾生意樂趣。說有色等十處。故名為密意。非許實有。說色等處。
論曰。如佛說有化生有情。
述曰。此釋第四能成喻句。有斷見外道。聞說無我。來問佛云。我體既
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『體變礙』（具有變壞和阻礙性質的），名為『有色等處』（指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、色、聲、香、味、觸這十種有色處）。這是根據經中所說：『什麼是眼？』指的是四大（地、水、火、風）所造，眼識所依的清凈色為體性，乃至廣說。
論：這個教說並非沒有原因，而是有特別的用意。
述記：就第一段而言，從下面第三點開始，接下來有三首頌，解釋外道所引用的『有色等』教義。因為引用的教義不能證明他們的觀點，所以可知只有識存在。第一首頌，引用教義證明色有特別的用意，從而成立唯識。第二首頌，引用教義證明色有秘密的用意，從而成立唯識。第三首頌，引用教義證明色有殊勝的利益，從而成立唯識。現在總的否定說這個教說並非沒有原因。為什麼不是沒有原因呢？因為它有特別的用意。
什麼是特別的用意呢？
論：頌說：『依據所要教化的眾生，世尊以秘密的意趣說有色等處，就像化生有情一樣。』
述記：上面三句，顯示特別的用意。第四句，引用比喻來成立。第一句，顯示根機和時機。第二句，顯示能教化者的意圖。第三句，說色等。由於所要教化的對象適合，所以能教化者在十二處中，說有色等十種有色處，就像佛也說有化生有情一樣，也就是指中陰身。爲了教化那些持斷見的人，才說有中陰身，並非真的有化生有情。經部師所說的中陰身就像大乘一樣，只是假立的有情，沒有真實的『我』。這裡所說的『秘密意趣』，意趣有四種：一、平等意趣，如佛說我曾經名為勝觀。二、別時意趣，如說愿生極樂世界等。三、別義意趣，如說諸法皆無自性等。四、眾生意樂意趣，如說一個善根，有時稱讚，有時譭謗，乃至廣說。現在是根據第四種眾生意樂意趣，說有色等十處，所以稱為秘密的用意，並非是許可真實存在，才說色等處。
論：如佛說有化生有情。
述記：這是解釋第四句能成立比喻的句子。有持斷見的外道，聽到說沒有『我』，來問佛說：『我的身體既然
【English Translation】 English version: 'That which changes and obstructs' is called 'the sense spheres of form, etc.' (referring to the ten sense spheres of form: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, form, sound, smell, taste, and touch). This is based on what is said in the sutras: 'What is the eye?' It refers to the pure form produced by the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind), which is the basis of eye consciousness, and so on, extensively explained.
Treatise: This teaching is not without a reason; it has a special intention.
Commentary: Regarding the first section, starting from the third point below, there are three verses to explain the 'sense spheres of form, etc.' teachings cited by externalists. Because the cited teachings cannot prove their views, it is known that only consciousness exists. The first verse cites teachings to prove that form has a special intention, thereby establishing the doctrine of Consciousness-Only. The second verse cites teachings to prove that form has a secret intention, thereby establishing the doctrine of Consciousness-Only. The third verse cites teachings to prove that form has supreme benefits, thereby establishing the doctrine of Consciousness-Only. Now, it is generally denied that this teaching is without a reason. Why is it not without a reason? Because it has a special intention.
What is the special intention?
Treatise: The verse says: 'Based on the beings to be taught, the World-Honored One spoke of the sense spheres of form, etc., with a secret intention, just like beings born by transformation.'
Commentary: The first three lines reveal the special intention. The fourth line uses a metaphor to establish it. The first line reveals the capacity and timing. The second line reveals the intention of the one who can teach. The third line speaks of form, etc. Because it is suitable for the beings to be taught, the one who can teach speaks of the ten sense spheres of form, etc., among the twelve sense spheres, just as the Buddha also speaks of beings born by transformation, which refers to the intermediate state (antarabhava). In order to teach those who hold nihilistic views, it is said that there is an intermediate state, but there are no truly beings born by transformation. The intermediate state spoken of by the Sautrantikas is like that of the Mahayana, merely a provisional being, without a real 'self.' The 'secret intention' spoken of here has four types of intentions: 1. The intention of equality, such as when the Buddha said that I was once named Vipasyin. 2. The intention of different times, such as saying 'May I be born in the Land of Ultimate Bliss,' etc. 3. The intention of different meanings, such as saying 'All dharmas are without inherent nature,' etc. 4. The intention of pleasing sentient beings, such as saying that a single root of goodness is sometimes praised and sometimes criticized, and so on, extensively explained. Now, it is based on the fourth type, the intention of pleasing sentient beings, that the ten sense spheres of form, etc., are spoken of, so it is called a secret intention, not an allowance of real existence, that the sense spheres of form, etc., are spoken of.
Treatise: As the Buddha said, there are beings born by transformation.
Commentary: This explains the fourth line, which establishes the metaphor. There are externalists who hold nihilistic views, who, upon hearing that there is no 'self,' come to ask the Buddha: 'Since my body...
無。誰往後世如佛世尊。為答斷見者。說有中有化生有情。能往後世。非為實有。說化生也。若非實有。佛如何說。
論。彼但依心相續不斷能往後世密意趣說不說實有化生有情。
述曰。以諸色等斷。或不續。諸轉識等。或斷。或隱。唯第八心相續不斷。能從前世。往於後世。結生不斷。佛觀此心密意。說有化生有情。非觀實有化生有情。乃復說也。此舉極成。以況二家不極成法 問何故化生。知非實有密意趣說。
論。說無有情我但有法因故。
述曰。由佛經中。說無有情我。及生者等八種事。但有其法。但有其因。從因所起。因即所由。所從生法。一切名因。都無實物。故知化生密意趣說。然舊論偈說。無眾生及我。但法有因果。今勘三梵本。並無果字。然有故字。由此經故知。說化生是密意教。若無故者。其理不成。無因成故。
論。說色等處契經亦爾。
述曰。此合法喻。若爾如何。
論。依所化生宜受彼教密意趣說非別實有。
述曰。解上三句頌。觀宜密說。非別實有色等十處。機宜如何。所化眾生。執有實我。為破彼我執。說有色等十。令除一實見。故舊論頌云。色等入有教。為化執我人。即此頌云依所化機宜。說色等也。
論。依何密意說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：誰能像佛世尊一樣，爲了回答斷見者（認為人死後一切皆無的觀點），說有中有（指死亡到投胎之間的過渡狀態）和化生有情（指不通過父母而直接出生的生命），能夠前往後世？這並不是因為真的有化生，才這樣說的吧？如果不是真的有，佛又怎麼會這麼說呢？
答：這是因為佛只是依據心識相續不斷，能夠前往後世的密意（隱藏的真實意圖）而說的，並不是說真的有化生有情。
解釋：因為諸如色等物質斷滅，或者不相續；諸如轉識等意識，或者斷滅，或者隱沒；只有第八識（阿賴耶識）相續不斷，能夠從前世前往後世，結生相續不斷。佛觀察到這個心識的密意，才說有化生有情，而不是觀察到真的有化生有情才這麼說的。這是舉一個大家都認可的例子，來比況二家（指經量部和唯識宗）不認可的法。
問：為什麼知道說化生不是真的有，而是密意趣說的呢？
答：因為佛說沒有有情（指具有固定不變自我的生命體）和『我』（指恒常不變的自我），只有法（指構成世界的各種要素）和因（指產生結果的原因）。
解釋：因為佛經中說沒有有情和『我』，以及生者等八種事，只有法，只有因，從因所生起。因就是所由，所從生法，一切都叫做因，都沒有真實存在的實體。所以知道說化生是密意趣說。然而舊論的偈頌說：『無眾生及我，但法有因果。』現在勘對了三個梵文字，都沒有『果』字，但是有『故』字。因為這個經的緣故，知道說化生是密意教。如果沒有『故』字，這個道理就不能成立，因為會變成沒有原因。
答：說色等處（指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根及其對應的色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵）的契經（佛經）也是這樣。
解釋：這是用一個相似的例子來類比。如果這樣，那又如何解釋呢？
答：這是依據所化（被教化）的眾生適合接受那樣的教法，而以密意趣說的，並不是真的有色等處。
解釋：解釋上面三句頌。觀察適合的密意而說，並不是真的有色等十處。眾生的根機適合什麼樣的教法呢？所要教化的眾生，執著于有真實的『我』，爲了破除他們對『我』的執著，才說有色等十處，讓他們去除對單一實體的執見。所以舊論的頌說：『色等入有教，為化執我人。』就是這個頌說的依據所化眾生的根機，而說色等。
問：依據什麼密意而說？
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Who, like the Buddha, the World Honored One, would, in order to answer those holding annihilationist views (the view that everything ceases to exist after death), speak of the existence of an intermediate state (bardo, the transitional state between death and rebirth) and beings born by transformation (those who are born without parents), who are able to go to the next life? This isn't because there are truly beings born by transformation, is it? If they don't truly exist, how could the Buddha say such a thing?
Answer: It is because the Buddha, relying on the continuous stream of consciousness that is able to go to the next life, speaks with a hidden intention (a concealed true meaning), not saying that there truly exist beings born by transformation.
Explanation: Because material forms and other things cease or do not continue; consciousnesses such as the transforming consciousnesses either cease or become obscured; only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) continues uninterrupted, able to go from the previous life to the next, with the connection of rebirth continuing. The Buddha, observing this hidden intention of the mind, speaks of the existence of beings born by transformation, not observing that there truly exist beings born by transformation before speaking in this way. This is raising a universally accepted example to compare with the doctrines not accepted by the two schools (Sautrāntika and Yogācāra).
Question: Why do we know that speaking of beings born by transformation is not truly existent, but is spoken with a hidden intention?
Answer: Because in the Buddhist scriptures, it is said that there are no sentient beings (beings with a fixed and unchanging self) and no 'self' (an eternal and unchanging self), but only dharmas (the elements that constitute the world) and causes (the reasons that produce results).
Explanation: Because in the Buddhist scriptures, it is said that there are no sentient beings and no 'self,' as well as eight kinds of things such as those who are born, but only dharmas, only causes, arising from causes. A cause is that by which something arises, and all things that arise from a cause are called causes; there are no truly existing entities. Therefore, we know that speaking of beings born by transformation is spoken with a hidden intention. However, the verses in the old treatise say: 'There are no beings or self, but only dharmas with causes and effects.' Now, after comparing three Sanskrit versions, there is no word 'effect,' but there is the word 'cause.' Because of this scripture, we know that speaking of beings born by transformation is a teaching with a hidden intention. If there were no word 'cause,' this reasoning would not be established, because it would become causeless.
Answer: The sutras (K契經) that speak of the sense bases (the six sense organs and their corresponding objects) are also like this.
Explanation: This is using a similar example for analogy. If so, how is it explained?
Answer: This is based on the fact that the beings to be taught are suitable to receive such teachings, and it is spoken with a hidden intention, not that there truly exist sense bases.
Explanation: Explaining the three verses above. Observing the suitable hidden intention and speaking, it is not that there truly exist the ten sense bases. What kind of teachings are suitable for the faculties of beings? The beings to be taught are attached to the existence of a real 'self.' In order to break their attachment to 'self,' it is said that there are the ten sense bases, so that they can remove their view of a single, real entity. Therefore, the verses in the old treatise say: 'The teachings on the sense bases are to transform those who are attached to self.' This verse speaks of relying on the faculties of the beings to be taught and speaking of the sense bases.
Question: Based on what hidden intention is it spoken?
色等十。
述曰。外人復問。言佛密意。說有色等。依何密意。
論。頌曰。識從自種生似境相而轉為成內外處佛說彼為十。
述曰。此即第二。說密意頌。舊論說言。故佛說此二。以內外處。名之為二。似有色處。故言為十。亦不相違。謂六內識。從自種子。生現行時。其現行識變似色等境相而轉。非外實有色等十處。為破實我。成內外處。世尊說有色等十處。是此中意。
論曰。此說何義。
述曰。此釋頌文。故假問起。
論。似色現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。
述曰。釋初二句頌 似色現識者。謂即眼識能現。似色而轉之識。無實色故。名為似色。識現似色。故說眼識名似色現識 從自種子緣合轉變差別生者。從能生己識體之種。此種由境界等諸緣合。已異本相續。名為轉變。此了色識。從自種子。緣青黃等。種種行相差別而生。
論。佛依彼種及所現色如次說為眼處色處。
述曰。依眼識種。說為眼處。依于眼識所現似色。說為色處。種名為根。相名為色。故言如次。
論。如是乃至似觸現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。
述曰。如是者。牒眼識。乃至者。略中也。謂略中間耳鼻舌三識也。舉五識中。初后二識。以作其法。準余可
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 色等十。
述曰：外人復問，言佛密意，說有色等，依何密意？
論：頌曰：識從自種生，似境相而轉，為成內外處，佛說彼為十。
述曰：此即第二，說密意頌。舊論說言：『故佛說此二，以內外處，名之為二，似有色處，故言為十，亦不相違。』謂六內識，從自種子生現行時，其現行識變似色等境相而轉，非外實有色等十處。為破實我，成內外處，世尊說有色等十處，是此中意。
論曰：此說何義？
述曰：此釋頌文，故假問起。
論：似色現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。
述曰：釋初二句頌。似色現識者，謂即眼識能現似色而轉之識，無實色故，名為似色。識現似色，故說眼識名似色現識。從自種子緣合轉變差別生者，從能生己識體之種，此種由境界等諸緣合，已異本相續，名為轉變。此了色識，從自種子，緣青黃等種種行相差別而生。
論：佛依彼種及所現色如次說為眼處色處。
述曰：依眼識種，說為眼處。依于眼識所現似色，說為色處。種名為根，相名為色，故言如次。
論：如是乃至似觸現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。
述曰：如是者，牒眼識。乃至者，略中也。謂略中間耳鼻舌三識也。舉五識中，初后二識，以作其法，準余可
【English Translation】 English version The Ten of Rupa (Form) and Others.
Commentary: An outsider further asks: 'Regarding the Buddha's secret intention, saying there are Rupa (form) and others, based on what secret intention is this?'
Treatise: Verse: 'Consciousness arises from its own seed, transforming to resemble the appearance of objects. To establish the internal and external ayatanas (sense bases), the Buddha spoke of them as ten.'
Commentary: This is the second verse, explaining the secret intention. The old treatise says: 'Therefore, the Buddha spoke of these two, using the internal and external ayatanas, calling them two, resembling the ayatanas of form; therefore, it is said to be ten, which is not contradictory.' That is, when the six internal consciousnesses arise from their own seeds and manifest, their manifesting consciousness transforms to resemble the appearances of objects such as Rupa (form), etc. These ten ayatanas, such as Rupa (form), etc., are not truly existent externally. To refute the real self and establish the internal and external ayatanas, the World Honored One spoke of the ten ayatanas such as Rupa (form), etc. This is the intention here.
Treatise: What meaning does this convey?
Commentary: This explains the verse, hence the question is posed.
Treatise: The consciousness that appears like Rupa (form) arises from its own seed, through the combination of conditions, transformation, and differentiation.
Commentary: Explaining the first two lines of the verse. 'The consciousness that appears like Rupa (form)' refers to the eye consciousness that can manifest and transform like Rupa (form). Because there is no real Rupa (form), it is called 'like Rupa (form)'. Because consciousness manifests like Rupa (form), the eye consciousness is called 'the consciousness that appears like Rupa (form)'. 'Arises from its own seed, through the combination of conditions, transformation, and differentiation' means it arises from the seed that can produce its own consciousness-entity. This seed, through the combination of conditions such as objects, has already differed from its original continuum, which is called transformation. This consciousness that understands Rupa (form) arises from its own seed, through the differentiation of various characteristics such as blue, yellow, etc.
Treatise: The Buddha, according to that seed and the Rupa (form) that appears, sequentially spoke of them as the eye-ayatana (sense base) and the Rupa-ayatana (sense base).
Commentary: Based on the seed of eye consciousness, it is spoken of as the eye-ayatana (sense base). Based on the Rupa (form) that appears in the eye consciousness, it is spoken of as the Rupa-ayatana (sense base). The seed is called the root, and the appearance is called Rupa (form); therefore, it is said 'sequentially'.
Treatise: Likewise, even the consciousness that appears like touch arises from its own seed, through the combination of conditions, transformation, and differentiation.
Commentary: 'Likewise' refers to the eye consciousness. 'Even' omits the middle, meaning it omits the nose, ear, and tongue consciousnesses in the middle. It cites the first and last two consciousnesses among the five consciousnesses to establish the principle, and the rest can be inferred accordingly.
知。
論。佛依彼種及所現觸如次說為身處觸處。
述曰。此亦如前。此意即是五有色處種。名為內根。境名為外處。觀所緣論。亦作是說。識上色功能名五根。應理功能與境色。無始互為因。功能即是種子異名。亦說五根體即識種。成唯識論第四卷中。略有二說。有說眼等五根。即五識種。無現眼等為俱有根。唯自因緣生已種子。名為眼等。即引此頌及觀所緣。以為誠證。觀所緣說。第八識上。五識種子。名五根故。又說常與境。互得為因故。其五外境。許有依他色處無諍。其陳那等。依此唯識。于觀所緣。作如是說。有說非理。若五色根。即五識種。十八界種。應成雜亂。如是便有十一過失。廣如彼說。然護法論師。假朋陳那執。復轉救言。能感五識增上業種。名五色根。非作因緣。生五識種。其安惠等。復破彼言。應五色根。非無記故。如是便有十二過失。亦廣如彼。然陳那等。即隨文解。更無異釋。其安惠等。釋此等文云。種子功能名五根者。為破離識實有色等。于識所變似眼根等。以有發生五識用故。假名種子。及色功能。非謂色根。即識業種。破經部等心外實色。由未建立有第八識。若不說種為眼等根。眼等便離六識而有。故說種子。為眼等根。故今於此有二師釋。于中一一更別開義。如彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 知。
論。佛依據彼種及所顯現的觸，依次稱為身處和觸處。
述曰。此處的說法與前面類似。此意即是五種有色處的種子，名為內根，境界名為外處。《觀所緣論》也是這樣說的：在識上的色法功能稱為五根，合理的功能與境界色，無始以來互相為因。功能就是種子的另一種說法。也有說五根的本體就是識的種子。《成唯識論》第四卷中，略有兩種說法。一種說法認為眼等五根，就是五識的種子，沒有顯現的眼等作為俱有根，唯有自身的因緣所生的種子，才稱為眼等。並引用此頌和《觀所緣論》作為證據。《觀所緣論》說，第八識上的五識種子，名為五根。又說常與境界，互相作為因。其五種外境，承認有依他起的色處，沒有爭議。陳那等人，依據唯識宗，對《觀所緣論》作這樣的解釋。另一種說法認為不合理。如果五色根，就是五識的種子，那麼十八界（dhatus）的種子，應該成為雜亂。這樣便有十一種過失，詳細內容如彼處所說。然而護法（Dharmapala）論師，假借陳那的觀點，又轉而辯解說，能夠感受五識的增上業種子，名為五色根，不是作為因緣來產生五識的種子。安慧（Sthiramati）等人，又反駁他的說法，認為五色根不應該是無記的，這樣便有十二種過失，也詳細如彼處所說。然而陳那等人，只是按照字面意思解釋，沒有其他的解釋。安慧等人，解釋這些經文說，種子功能名為五根，是爲了破除離開識而實有的色法等，對於識所變現的類似眼根等，因為有發生五識的作用，所以假名為種子，以及色法功能，不是說色根，就是識的業種子，破除經量部（Sautrantika）等認為心外有實色的觀點。由於尚未建立有第八識，如果不說種子為眼等根，眼等便會離開六識而存在，所以說種子為眼等根。所以現在這裡有兩種師的解釋，在其中一一分別開顯其意義，如彼處所說。
【English Translation】 English version Knowing.
Treatise: The Buddha, based on those seeds and the manifested contact, sequentially refers to them as the body-location and the contact-location.
Commentary: This is similar to what was said before. The meaning here is that the seeds of the five colored locations are called internal roots, and the realm is called external locations. The Alambanapariksa also says this: the function of color on consciousness is called the five roots; the rational function and the realm of color have been mutually causal since beginningless time. Function is another name for seed. It is also said that the substance of the five roots is the seed of consciousness. In the fourth volume of the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, there are briefly two views. One view is that the five roots, such as the eye, are the seeds of the five consciousnesses. There are no manifest eyes, etc., as co-existent roots; only the seeds produced by their own causes and conditions are called eyes, etc. This verse and the Alambanapariksa are cited as evidence. The Alambanapariksa says that the seeds of the five consciousnesses on the eighth consciousness are called the five roots. It also says that they are always mutually causal with the realm. The five external realms are acknowledged to have dependently arisen color-locations without dispute. Dignāga and others, based on this Yogacara, interpret the Alambanapariksa in this way. Another view considers this unreasonable. If the five sense-organs are the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then the seeds of the eighteen dhatus should become confused. Thus, there would be eleven faults, as detailed in that text. However, Dharmapala, feigning Dignāga's view, then argues in defense, saying that the seeds of karma that can induce the five consciousnesses are called the five sense-organs, not as the causal conditions that produce the seeds of the five consciousnesses. Sthiramati and others refute his statement, arguing that the five sense-organs should not be non-specified, thus there would be twelve faults, also detailed in that text. However, Dignāga and others simply interpret according to the literal meaning, without any other explanation. Sthiramati and others explain these texts, saying that the function of seeds being called the five roots is to refute the existence of real colors, etc., apart from consciousness. For the eye-organs, etc., that appear to be transformed by consciousness, because they have the function of producing the five consciousnesses, they are falsely called seeds and the function of color, not that the sense-organs are the seeds of the karma of consciousness, refuting the view of the Sautrantikas and others that there are real colors outside the mind. Because the eighth consciousness has not yet been established, if the seeds are not said to be the eye-organs, etc., then the eye-organs, etc., would exist apart from the six consciousnesses. Therefore, it is said that the seeds are the eye-organs, etc. So now there are two teachers' interpretations here, each separately revealing their meanings, as detailed in that text.
疏解。
論。依斯密意說色等十。
述曰。此總結也。依破於我。于識種子說為眼等。于識所現現行似色。名為色等。非離於識。別有眼等。眼等不離第八識故。
論。此密意說有何勝利。
述曰。此下第三。辨教勝利。外人復問。如是說教。有何勝利。勝利者。果利也。
論。頌曰依此教能入數取趣無我所執法無我復依余教入。
述曰。上二句。說人無我勝利。下二句。說法無我勝利。補特伽羅。名數取趣。以能數數取諸趣故。有其果位。亦立因名。由無實我故數取趣。
論曰。依此所說十二處教受化者能入數取趣無我。
述曰。此釋上二句頌。總立宗也。次當廣釋。知十二處。無實我故 受化者。入有情無我。若言人者。趣唯一故。
論。謂若了知從六二法有六識轉都無見者乃至知者。
述曰。六二法者。即十二處。內六處外六處。謂根及境。由說十二處教。若知六識。從根及境六二法生。了知自身唯眼能見。都無見者。乃至。了知唯意知法。都無知者。此中見者等。外道等執實我能故。了知根境。除我執也。
論。應受有情無我教者便能悟入有情無我。
述曰。二乘根機者。名為應受有情無我教。由知唯有根境識等。無實我故。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏解：
論：依據此密意，說色等十。
述曰：這是總結。依據破除我執的密意，對於識的種子，說為眼等（眼根等六根）。對於識所顯現的現行，類似色的，名為色等（色聲香味觸法六塵）。並非脫離於識，另外存在眼等。眼等不離於第八識（阿賴耶識）的緣故。
論：此密意說，有什麼勝利？
述曰：這是第三部分，辨明教法的勝利。外人再次提問，像這樣說教，有什麼勝利？勝利，指的是果報利益。
論：頌曰：依據此教，能入數取趣（補特伽羅，指不斷輪迴的眾生）無我，所執法無我，又依據其他教法而入。
述曰：上面兩句，說明人無我的勝利。下面兩句，說明法無我的勝利。補特伽羅（Pudgala），名為數取趣，因為能夠不斷地在各道中輪迴。有其果位，也建立因的名稱。由於沒有真實的我，所以稱為數取趣。
論曰：依據此所說的十二處教法，受教化者能入數取趣無我。
述曰：這是解釋上面兩句頌，總的立宗。接下來應當廣泛解釋。知道十二處（六根和六塵）沒有真實的我，所以受教化者，進入有情無我。如果說是人，趣向是唯一的緣故。
論：所謂如果了知從六二法（十二處）有六識轉，都沒有見者乃至知者。
述曰：六二法，就是十二處，內六處（眼耳鼻舌身意）外六處（色聲香味觸法）。指的是根和境。由於宣說十二處教法，如果知道六識，從根和境這六二法產生，了知自身只有眼能見，都沒有見者。乃至，了知只有意能知法，都沒有知者。這其中的見者等，是外道等執著有真實的我能見能知。了知根境，是爲了去除我執。
論：應受有情無我教者，便能悟入有情無我。
述曰：二乘根機的人，名為應受有情無我教。由於知道只有根、境、識等，沒有真實的我，所以能夠悟入有情無我。二乘的...
【English Translation】 English version Explanation:
Treatise: According to this hidden meaning, it speaks of the ten, such as form.
Commentary: This is a summary. Based on the hidden meaning of breaking through the attachment to self, the seeds of consciousness are referred to as the eye, etc. (the six roots: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind). The manifestations of consciousness, resembling form, are called form, etc. (the six objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma). They do not exist separately from consciousness. The eye, etc., are not separate from the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).
Treatise: What is the benefit of this hidden meaning?
Commentary: This is the third part, clarifying the benefits of the teachings. An outsider asks again, 'What is the benefit of teaching in this way?' Benefit refers to the reward and advantage.
Treatise: Verse: Relying on this teaching, one can enter the non-self of Pudgala (the sentient being who continuously transmigrates), and the non-self of the dharmas, and also enter by relying on other teachings.
Commentary: The first two lines explain the benefit of the non-self of persons. The last two lines explain the benefit of the non-self of dharmas. Pudgala (補特伽羅), is called 'number taker of destinies' (數取趣), because it can continuously transmigrate in various realms. It has its resultant position, and also establishes the name of the cause. Because there is no real self, it is called 'number taker of destinies'.
Treatise: Based on the teaching of the twelve āyatanas (處) mentioned here, those who are taught can enter the non-self of Pudgala.
Commentary: This explains the above two lines of the verse, establishing the general principle. Next, it should be explained extensively. Knowing that there is no real self in the twelve āyatanas (the six roots and six objects), therefore, those who are taught enter the non-self of sentient beings. If it is said to be a person, the direction is unique.
Treatise: So-called, if one understands that from the six twos (twelve āyatanas), the six consciousnesses arise, there is no seer, and even no knower.
Commentary: The six twos are the twelve āyatanas, the inner six (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) and the outer six (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma). It refers to the roots and objects. Because the teaching of the twelve āyatanas is proclaimed, if one knows that the six consciousnesses arise from the six twos of the roots and objects, understanding that only the eye can see, there is no seer. And even, understanding that only the mind can know the dharma, there is no knower. The seer, etc., in this, is because the outsiders, etc., are attached to the real self being able to see and know. Understanding the roots and objects is to remove the attachment to self.
Treatise: Those who should receive the teaching of the non-self of sentient beings can awaken to the non-self of sentient beings.
Commentary: People of the Two Vehicles (二乘), are called those who should receive the teaching of the non-self of sentient beings. Because they know that there are only roots, objects, consciousnesses, etc., and there is no real self, they can awaken to the non-self of sentient beings. The Two Vehicles...
乘根者。便入有情無我正理。除計我執。得二乘果。是密意說十二處教之勝利也。
論。復依此余說唯識教受化者能入所執法無我。
述曰。此釋下二句頌。總立宗也。次當廣釋。文有其三。一釋頌。二申難。三正答。此初也。說一切法唯有識者。是有情無我。密意教余故。受化者。能入一切法無我。我主宰義。知法無主宰。名法無我也。
論。謂若了知唯識現似色等法起此中都無色等相法。
述曰。由說唯識教。若能了知一切法唯識現。似色等諸法生起。無實色等。了知此中。都無色等體用相法。除法執也。
論。應受諸法無我教者便能悟入諸法無我。
述曰。菩薩根機。名為應受法無我教。由知諸法唯有識故。菩薩根者。便能悟入諸法無我。除計法執。得成佛果。是諸法空。唯有識教之勝利也。然佛世尊。有三時教。此唯識教。第三時說。令得佛果。故非密意。有情無我教。是第一時教。令得二乘果。故名密意說。
論。若知諸法一切種無入法無我。
述曰。外人既聞諸法皆空說唯識教。自下設難。此牒大乘義。下方申正難。若能了知一切諸法。一切皆無。得入於法無我理者。
論。是則唯識亦畢竟無何所安立。
述曰。此正難也。既言一切諸法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：對於具有敏銳根器的人來說，他們能夠立即領悟到有情無我的正確道理，從而去除對『我』的執著，證得聲聞和緣覺二乘的果位。這是一種隱秘的說法，是宣講十二處教法的殊勝之處。
論：進一步說，依據這種唯識教義，那些能夠接受教化的人能夠領悟到所執之法無我的道理。
述曰：這是對下面兩句頌文的解釋，總的來說確立了宗義。接下來將詳細解釋，內容分為三個部分：一是解釋頌文，二是提出疑問，三是正面回答。這裡是第一部分。宣說一切法都只是識的顯現，這是有情無我的隱秘教義的另一種說法，因此，能夠接受教化的人能夠領悟到一切法無我的道理。『我』是主宰的意思，知道法沒有主宰，就叫做法無我。
論：也就是說，如果能夠了知一切法都只是識的顯現，看起來好像有色等法生起，但實際上其中並沒有真實的色等相狀之法。
述曰：通過宣說唯識教義，如果能夠了知一切法都只是識的顯現，看起來好像有色等諸法生起，但實際上並沒有真實的色等。了知其中並沒有真實的色等體用相法，就能去除對法的執著。
論：那些應該接受諸法無我教義的人，便能夠領悟到諸法無我的道理。
述曰：具有菩薩根器的人，被稱為應該接受法無我教義的人。因為知道諸法都只是識的顯現，所以具有菩薩根器的人，便能夠領悟到諸法無我的道理，去除對法的執著，最終成就佛果。這就是諸法空性，唯有識的教義的殊勝之處。然而，佛世尊有三個時期的教法，這唯識教義是第三個時期宣說的，目的是讓人證得佛果，因此不是隱秘的說法。有情無我的教義是第一個時期宣說的，目的是讓人證得二乘果位，所以被稱為隱秘的說法。
論：如果知道一切諸法在任何方面都不存在，就能證入法無我。
述曰：外道既然聽聞了諸法皆空的說法，又聽聞了唯識教義，所以下面提出疑問。這裡是引用大乘的義理，下面將提出正式的疑問。如果能夠了知一切諸法，在任何方面都不存在，就能證入法無我的道理，那麼……
論：那麼唯識也畢竟不存在，又有什麼可以安立的呢？
述曰：這是正式的疑問。既然說一切諸法都是空
【English Translation】 English version: Those with sharp faculties can immediately enter the correct principle of sentient being non-self (有情無我, youqing wuwo, the non-self of sentient beings), eliminating the attachment to 'self' and attaining the fruits of the Two Vehicles (二乘, ercheng, Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). This is a secret teaching, the victory of teaching the Twelve Āyatanas (十二處, shierchu, the twelve sense bases).
Treatise: Furthermore, based on this, it is said that those who are transformed by the Consciousness-Only (唯識, weishi, Vijñānavāda) teaching can enter the non-self of the dharmas they grasp.
Commentary: This explains the following two lines of verse, establishing the tenet in general. Next, it will be explained in detail, with three parts: first, explaining the verse; second, raising a difficulty; and third, answering directly. This is the first part. Saying that all dharmas are only consciousness is another way of secretly teaching sentient being non-self, therefore, those who are transformed can enter the non-self of all dharmas. 'Self' means mastery, knowing that dharmas have no master is called dharma non-self (法無我, fawuwo, dharma-nairātmya).
Treatise: That is, if one understands that only consciousness appears as seeming forms and other dharmas arise, but there are no actual form and other phenomenal dharmas in them.
Commentary: Through teaching the Consciousness-Only doctrine, if one can understand that all dharmas are only consciousness appearing, seeming forms and other dharmas arise, but there are no actual forms and so on. Knowing that there are no actual form and other substantial phenomenal dharmas in them eliminates the attachment to dharmas.
Treatise: Those who should receive the teaching of dharma non-self will be able to realize dharma non-self.
Commentary: Those with Bodhisattva faculties are called those who should receive the teaching of dharma non-self. Because they know that all dharmas are only consciousness, those with Bodhisattva faculties will be able to realize dharma non-self, eliminating the attachment to dharmas and ultimately attaining Buddhahood. This is the victory of the teaching that dharmas are empty and only consciousness exists. However, the World-Honored One Buddha had teachings in three periods. This Consciousness-Only teaching was taught in the third period, with the aim of enabling people to attain Buddhahood, therefore it is not a secret teaching. The teaching of sentient being non-self was taught in the first period, with the aim of enabling people to attain the fruits of the Two Vehicles, so it is called a secret teaching.
Treatise: If one knows that all dharmas are non-existent in every way, one can enter dharma non-self.
Commentary: Since outsiders have heard the teaching that all dharmas are empty and also heard the Consciousness-Only teaching, they raise a difficulty below. This quotes the meaning of Mahayana, and below will raise a formal difficulty. If one can understand that all dharmas are non-existent in every way, one can enter the principle of dharma non-self, then...
Treatise: Then Consciousness-Only is also ultimately non-existent, what can be established?
Commentary: This is the formal difficulty. Since it is said that all dharmas are empty...
皆無。即無有識。唯識既無。今此論中。何所安立得入佛果。其安立者。即牒論初立宗言。問義同前釋。
論。非知諸法一切種無乃得名為入法無我。
述曰。下論師答。非是令知一切種類唯識亦無。乃得名為入法無我。意存二性。故若非知一切種無。令知何等。
論。然達愚夫遍計所執自性差別諸法無我如是乃名入法無我。
述曰。二乘異生諸愚夫等。起計所執。自性諸法。差別諸法。以為實有。即是諸法。體及用也。令知此所執性。體用都無。名入法無我。非知真俗凡聖等境。亦都無故。名入法無我。
論。非諸佛境離言法性亦都無故名法無我。
述曰。諸佛正體后得二智。所知諸法。謂依他性。圓成實性。二性非無。此之二性。性離言說戲論所執。非謂知此二性亦無。入法無我。即於三性。但知初無餘二性有。名為唯識。入諸法空。亦菩薩境。但言佛者。從勝人說。既爾。若執唯識是有。應得入于諸法無我。
論。余識所執此唯識性其體亦無名法無我。
述曰。若執唯識。亦計所執。除入法空。名法無我。若不執時。此唯識體。性離言故。非除入空。
論。不爾余識所執境有則唯識理應不得成。
述曰。若所執唯識非法執。爾者。此所執境體既
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 皆無。就是沒有了識。如果唯識也沒有了，那麼這部論中，要安立什麼才能證入佛果呢？所要安立的，就是依照論最初立宗的言語。問的意義和前面的解釋相同。
論：不是知道諸法一切種類都沒有，才叫做證入法無我。
述記：下面論師回答。不是讓人知道一切種類，連唯識也沒有，才叫做證入法無我。意思是存在兩種自性。如果不是知道一切種類都沒有，那麼要讓人知道什麼呢？
論：而是通達愚夫遍計所執（Parikalpita，虛妄分別）的自性差別諸法無我，這樣才叫做證入法無我。
述記：二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）異生（Pṛthagjana，凡夫）等愚夫，生起遍計所執，自性諸法，差別諸法，認為真實存在。這就是諸法的體和用。讓人知道這種所執的自性，體和用都沒有，叫做證入法無我。不是知道真俗凡聖等境界，也都空無，才叫做證入法無我。
論：不是諸佛境界，離言法性（Dharmatā，法性）也都空無，才叫做法無我。
述記：諸佛的正體和后得二智（智和后得智）所知的諸法，即依他性（Paratantra，依他起性），圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna，圓成實性），這兩種自性不是沒有。這兩種自性，其性質是遠離言說戲論所執的，不是說知道這兩種自性也沒有，才叫做證入法無我。也就是說，對於三性（trisvabhāva，三自性），只是知道遍計所執性沒有，其餘兩種自性是有的，這叫做唯識。證入諸法空性，也是菩薩的境界，這裡只說佛，是從殊勝的人來說。既然這樣，如果執著唯識是有的，就應該能夠證入諸法無我。
論：其餘識所執著的這個唯識性，它的體也是沒有的，叫做法無我。
述記：如果執著唯識，也是遍計所執，除去證入法空，叫做法無我。如果不執著時，這個唯識的體，性質是遠離言說的，不是除去證入空性。
論：如果不是這樣，其餘識所執著的境界是有，那麼唯識的道理應該不能成立。
述記：如果所執著的唯識不是法執，那麼，這個所執著的境界的體既然
【English Translation】 English version: All are non-existent. That is, there is no consciousness. If even Vijñaptimātratā (唯識, Consciousness-only) is non-existent, then what can be established in this treatise to attain Buddhahood? What is to be established is in accordance with the initial statement of the thesis in the treatise. The meaning of the question is the same as the previous explanation.
Treatise: It is not by knowing that all kinds of dharmas (法, phenomena) are non-existent that one is called to enter into dharma-nairātmya (法無我, selflessness of phenomena).
Commentary: The following is the answer from the treatise master. It is not by making one know that all kinds, even Vijñaptimātratā, are non-existent that one is called to enter into dharma-nairātmya. The intention is to preserve two natures. If it is not by knowing that all kinds are non-existent, then what is to be made known?
Treatise: Rather, by realizing that the self-nature and differences of dharmas, which are Parikalpita (遍計所執, conceptually imputed) by foolish beings, are without self, one is thus called to enter into dharma-nairātmya.
Commentary: Foolish beings such as those of the Two Vehicles (二乘, Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) and ordinary beings (Pṛthagjana, 異生), give rise to Parikalpita, the self-nature of dharmas, the differences of dharmas, and consider them to be truly existent. This is the substance and function of dharmas. Making one know that this grasped nature, substance, and function are all non-existent is called entering into dharma-nairātmya. It is not by knowing that the realms of truth and falsehood, mundane and supramundane, etc., are all non-existent that one is called to enter into dharma-nairātmya.
Treatise: It is not that the realm of all Buddhas, the Dharmatā (法性, suchness) that is beyond words, is also completely non-existent that one is called dharma-nairātmya.
Commentary: The dharmas known by the true essence of all Buddhas and the two wisdoms (智和后得智, wisdom and post-attainment wisdom), namely Paratantra (依他性, other-dependent nature) and Pariniṣpanna (圓成實性, perfectly established nature), these two natures are not non-existent. These two natures, their nature is far from the attachment to verbal play and conceptual constructs, it is not that knowing these two natures are also non-existent is called entering into dharma-nairātmya. That is to say, regarding the three natures (trisvabhāva, 三自性), one only knows that the Parikalpita nature is non-existent, and the other two natures are existent, this is called Vijñaptimātratā. Entering into the emptiness of all dharmas is also the realm of Bodhisattvas, here only Buddha is mentioned, it is from the perspective of the superior person. Since this is the case, if one clings to Vijñaptimātratā as existent, one should be able to enter into the dharma-nairātmya of all dharmas.
Treatise: The nature of this Vijñaptimātratā, which is grasped by other consciousnesses, its substance is also non-existent, is called dharma-nairātmya.
Commentary: If one clings to Vijñaptimātratā, it is also Parikalpita, except for entering into dharma-śūnyatā (法空, emptiness of phenomena), it is called dharma-nairātmya. If one does not cling to it, the substance of this Vijñaptimātratā, its nature is far from words, it is not except for entering into śūnyatā.
Treatise: If not, if the realm grasped by other consciousnesses is existent, then the principle of Vijñaptimātratā should not be established.
Commentary: If the Vijñaptimātratā grasped is not a dharma-attachment, then, the substance of this grasped realm is
非無應非唯識。以實執有猶不遣故。理猶未曉。其義如何。
論。許諸餘識有實境故。
述曰。以執唯識識。是執法識余此既有實境。如何名唯識。然我宗中。識無心外實有之境。名為唯識。故執唯識亦法執收。成唯識說。若執唯識亦是法執。
論。由此道理說立唯識教普令悟入一切法無我。
述曰。即此總結經論二教。由於此中所有道理。佛說唯識之教。我立唯識之教。普令有情入法無我。或我說我立。二俱雙結。名為說立。非說是經。
論。非一切種撥有性故。
述曰。由有唯識。無計所執。入法無我。非是一切種。唯識等亦無。能入法無我。所以者何。撥有性故。依他圓成二性是有。若說為無。便是邪見。撥于有性。故此不能入法無我。許有唯識。無計所執。名為正見。入法無我。不撥于有。名處中道。契真正理。此意即違清辨等也。
唯識二十論述記捲上
承久二年庚辛七月二十九日移點了永恩生年五十四
偏為上生內院值遇彌勒也。 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1834 唯識二十論述記
唯識二十論述記卷下
翻經沙門基撰
論。復云何知佛依如是密意趣說有色等處。
述曰。第一段中。自下第四。返破他宗外
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果不是沒有所應，那就不是唯識。因為對實有的執著仍然沒有去除。這個道理還是不明白，它的含義是什麼？
答：論中說，因為允許其他的識有真實的境界。
解釋：因為執著唯識的識，就是執著法的識，除了這個之外，既然有真實的境界，怎麼能稱為唯識呢？然而在我宗（唯識宗）中，識沒有心外真實的境界，這才能稱為唯識。所以執著唯識也被法執所包含。《成唯識論》中說，如果執著唯識也是法執。
論：因此道理，才說建立唯識的教義，普遍地使人領悟進入一切法無我的境界。
解釋：這是總結經和論兩種教義。由於這裡面所有的道理，佛說唯識的教義，我（指作者）立唯識的教義，普遍地使有情眾生進入法無我的境界。或者說我說，我立，兩者都總結，稱為『說立』，不是說這是經。
論：不是一切種類都否定有自性。
解釋：因為有唯識，沒有遍計所執性，才能進入法無我。不是一切種類，唯識等等也沒有，就能進入法無我。為什麼呢？因為否定有自性。依他起性和圓成實性這兩種是有自性的，如果說它們沒有，那就是邪見，否定了有自性。所以這不能進入法無我。允許有唯識，沒有遍計所執性，稱為正見，進入法無我，不否定有自性，名為處於中道，契合真正的道理。這個意思就是違背清辨等人的觀點。
《唯識二十論述記》捲上
承久二年庚辛七月二十九日移點了永恩生年五十四
偏為上生兜率內院值遇彌勒（Maitreya）菩薩。 《大正藏》第43冊 No. 1834 《唯識二十論述記》
《唯識二十論述記》卷下
翻經沙門基撰
論：又怎麼知道佛是依據這樣的秘密意趣來說有色等處（ayatana）的？
解釋：第一段中，從下面第四點開始，反駁其他宗派的觀點。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If it is not that there is no object, then it is not Vijnaptimatrata (唯識, Consciousness-only). Because the attachment to reality has still not been eliminated. The principle is still not understood. What is its meaning?
Answer: The treatise says, because it allows other consciousnesses to have real realms.
Explanation: Because clinging to the consciousness of Vijnaptimatrata is clinging to the consciousness of dharma. Since there are real realms besides this, how can it be called Vijnaptimatrata? However, in my school (the Yogacara school), consciousness has no real realm outside the mind, and this is what is called Vijnaptimatrata. Therefore, clinging to Vijnaptimatrata is also included in the dharma attachment. The Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論, Discourse on Establishing Consciousness-only) says that if clinging to Vijnaptimatrata is also a dharma attachment.
Treatise: For this reason, it is said that establishing the teaching of Vijnaptimatrata universally enables people to awaken and enter the realm of non-self of all dharmas.
Explanation: This is a summary of the two teachings of sutras and treatises. Because of all the principles in this, the Buddha spoke of the teaching of Vijnaptimatrata, and I (the author) established the teaching of Vijnaptimatrata, universally enabling sentient beings to enter the realm of non-self of dharmas. Or it can be said that I spoke and I established, and both are summarized, called 'speaking and establishing,' not saying that this is a sutra.
Treatise: It is not that all kinds deny the existence of self-nature.
Explanation: Because there is Vijnaptimatrata and no Parikalpita (遍計所執, completely conceptualized nature), one can enter the non-self of dharmas. It is not that all kinds, Vijnaptimatrata, etc., also do not have the ability to enter the non-self of dharmas. Why? Because it denies the existence of self-nature. The Paratantra (依他起, dependent nature) and Parinispanna (圓成實, perfected nature) natures have self-nature. If it is said that they do not exist, then that is a false view, denying the existence of self-nature. Therefore, this cannot enter the non-self of dharmas. Allowing the existence of Vijnaptimatrata and the absence of Parikalpita is called right view, entering the non-self of dharmas, and not denying the existence of self-nature is called being in the middle way, in accordance with the true principle. This meaning is contrary to the views of Bhavaviveka (清辨) and others.
Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, Volume 1
Moved and punctuated on the 29th day of the 7th month of Keng-Shin in the 2nd year of Shoji (承久二年). Yongen (永恩) was born in the year of 54.
Especially for being reborn in the inner court of Tushita (兜率) Heaven to meet Maitreya (彌勒). Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1834, Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only
Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, Volume 2
Composed by the Tripitaka Master, Ji (基)
Treatise: Furthermore, how do we know that the Buddha spoke of the ayatanas (處, sense bases) such as form, etc., based on such a secret intention?
Explanation: In the first section, from the fourth point below, refuting the views of other schools.
境非實有。證知唯有識。于中有三。初小乘等。因前起問。次舉頌下。論主正破。后已辨極微非一實下。結歸唯識。此即初也。先牒大乘前所說意。後方申難。論主前說。依生無我者。佛說色等十。今牒之。云何知如是密說有色等處。
論。非別實有色等外法為色等識各別境耶。
述曰。自下外人正為徴問。非離於識。別有實體。色等外法。為色等識。各別境耶。其眼等識。緣色等故。變似色等。名色等識。非說色等。名色等識。
論。頌曰。以彼境非一亦非多極微又非和合等極微不成故。
述曰。自下第二。論主正破。合有五頌。于中有三。初之一頌。合破小乘外道二種。次有三頌。正破小乘。後有一頌。正破外道。設破小乘。此即初也。就初頌中。第一句破外道。下三句破小乘。破小乘中。第一句。破古薩婆多毗婆沙師。下二句。破經部。及新薩婆多順正理師 又非和合等。立宗 極微不成故。立因。驗此兼破極微和集。此唯識論。世親年邁。正理論後方始作也。至下當知。
論曰。此何所說。
述曰。自下破執。于中有三。初假問起。次敘外執。后正破之。此假問也。體例如前。
論。謂若實有外色等處與色等識各別為境。
述曰。此下敘執。外道小乘。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 境非實有，由此可以證實只有識的存在。關於這一點，有三個部分：首先是小乘等宗派，他們根據前面的內容提出疑問；其次是偈頌部分，論主（指唯識論的作者）正式進行駁斥；最後是『已經辨明極微並非單一實體』之後，結論歸於唯識。這便是第一部分。先複述大乘先前所說的意思，然後才提出詰難。論主先前說，依據于『生無我』的觀點，佛陀說了色等十種法。現在複述它，問道：『如何得知像這樣隱秘的說法中有色等處？』 論：難道離開識，另外真實存在色等外在的法，作為色等識各自不同的境嗎？ 述：從這裡開始，外人正式提出疑問：難道是離開識，另外有真實存在的色等外在的法，作為眼識等各自不同的境嗎？那些眼等識，因為緣於色等，變現出類似色等的形象，所以稱為色等識，而不是說色等本身就叫做色等識。 論：偈頌說：因為那些境不是單一的，也不是眾多的極微；又不是和合等等，因為極微不能成立。 述：從這裡開始是第二部分，論主正式進行駁斥。總共有五個偈頌，分為三個部分：第一個偈頌，合併駁斥小乘和外道兩種觀點；接下來三個偈頌，正式駁斥小乘；最後一個偈頌，正式駁斥外道。假設駁斥小乘，這就是第一個偈頌。在第一個偈頌中，第一句駁斥外道，下面三句駁斥小乘。在駁斥小乘中，第一句駁斥古薩婆多毗婆沙師（Sarvastivada Vaibhasika）；下面兩句駁斥經部（Sautrantika）以及新薩婆多順正理師（Sarvastivada）。『又不是和合等等』，這是立宗；『極微不能成立故』，這是立因。可以驗證，這裡也兼帶駁斥了極微和集。這部《唯識論》，是世親（Vasubandhu）晚年，在《正理論》之後才開始創作的。到後面自然會知道。 論：這是在說什麼？ 述：從這裡開始是駁斥執著，分為三個部分：首先是假設提問，然後敘述外人的執著，最後正式駁斥它。這是假設提問，體例和前面一樣。 論：說的是，如果真實存在外在的色等處，與色等識各自作為不同的境。
【English Translation】 English version The realm is not truly existent; this proves that only consciousness exists. Regarding this, there are three parts: first, the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) and other schools raise questions based on the preceding content; second, the verses where the author of the treatise (Vasubandhu) formally refutes; and finally, after 'it has been clarified that ultimate particles are not single entities,' the conclusion returns to the doctrine of consciousness-only (Vijnanavada). This is the first part. First, restate the meaning of what the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) previously said, and then raise challenges. The author of the treatise previously said that, based on the view of 'no-self of phenomena,' the Buddha spoke of the ten dharmas such as form. Now restate it, asking: 'How is it known that there are such things as form, etc., in such a secret teaching?' Treatise: Is it that apart from consciousness, there are truly existent external dharmas such as form, etc., as the separate objects of the respective consciousnesses of form, etc.? Commentary: From here on, the outsider formally raises the question: Is it that apart from consciousness, there are truly existent external dharmas such as form, etc., as the separate objects of the respective consciousnesses of the eye, etc.? Those consciousnesses of the eye, etc., because they are conditioned by form, etc., manifest images similar to form, etc., so they are called consciousnesses of form, etc., rather than saying that form, etc., themselves are called consciousnesses of form, etc. Treatise: The verse says: Because those objects are not one, nor are they many ultimate particles; nor are they aggregates, etc., because ultimate particles cannot be established. Commentary: From here on is the second part, where the author of the treatise formally refutes. There are a total of five verses, divided into three parts: the first verse combines and refutes the views of both Hinayana and non-Buddhist schools; the next three verses formally refute Hinayana; and the last verse formally refutes non-Buddhist schools. Assuming the refutation of Hinayana, this is the first verse. In the first verse, the first line refutes non-Buddhists, and the following three lines refute Hinayana. In the refutation of Hinayana, the first line refutes the ancient Sarvastivada Vaibhasika; the following two lines refute the Sautrantika and the new Sarvastivada. 'Nor are they aggregates, etc.,' this is establishing the proposition; 'because ultimate particles cannot be established,' this is establishing the reason. It can be verified that this also refutes the aggregation of ultimate particles. This 'Treatise on Consciousness-Only' was composed by Vasubandhu in his later years, after the 'Treatise on the Establishment of Principles'. This will be known later. Treatise: What is being said here? Commentary: From here on is the refutation of attachment, divided into three parts: first, a hypothetical question is raised, then the outsider's attachment is described, and finally it is formally refuted. This is a hypothetical question, the format is the same as before. Treatise: It is said that if there truly exist external places such as form, etc., as separate objects of the respective consciousnesses of form, etc.
執實有離識之外。有色等處。與緣色等能緣之識。各別為境。
此即總敘小乘外道遍計之義。自下別敘。
論。如是外境或應是一。
述曰。此外道計。執色等法體唯是一。
論。如勝論者執有分色。
述曰。此顯執師。是吠世師迦。此云勝論。造此論師名勝論者。釋此立名。說斯緣起。如余處辨。此師本計。有六句義。後有末執。立十句義。如成唯識。然六句者。一實。二德。三業。四有。五同異。六和合。實中有九。謂地水火風空時方我意。其地水火風。是極微性。若劫壞時。此等不滅。散在處處。體無生滅。說為常住。有眾多法。體非是一。后成劫時。兩兩極微。合生一子微。子微之量。等於父母。體唯是一。從他生故。性是無常。如是散極微。皆兩兩合生一子微。子微並本。合有三微。如是復與餘三微。合生一子微。第七其子。等於六本微量。如是七微。復與余合。生一子微。第十五子。其量等於本生父母十四微量。如是展轉成三千界。其三千界。既從父母二法所生。其量合等於父母量。故三千界為識等境。體唯是一。然色是火德。乃至觸是風德。眼見色時。不得風大。得地水火。以於色中無風相故。耳鼻舌三。得聲香味時。得三亦爾。唯身得觸時得四大。以于觸中有風大故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他們堅持認為，在能識別的意識之外，存在著色等處（rupa-ayatana，色所入），這些色等處與能緣的意識（vijnana，識），例如緣色之識，各自作為獨立的對境（visaya，境界）。
這總括地敘述了小乘（Hinayana）和外道（Tirthika）普遍計度的意義。下面分別敘述。
論：如此外境，或者應當是唯一的。
述記：此外道計度，執著色等法的本體是唯一的。
論：例如勝論者（Vaisesika）執著有分色（savayava-rupa）。
述記：這表明執持此說的導師是吠世師迦（Vaisesika）。此派被稱為勝論，創立此論的論師名為勝論者。解釋這個名稱的由來，說明了此論緣起的因由，如其他地方所辨析的。此派最初計度有六句義（padartha，範疇）：一、實（dravya，實體）；二、德（guna，屬性）；三、業（karma，活動）；四、有（samanya，共性）；五、同異（visesa，殊性）；六、和合（samavaya，和合關係）。實中有九種，即地、水、火、風、空、時、方、我、意。其中的地、水、火、風是極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）的性質。當劫壞（kalpa-vinasa，宇宙毀滅）時，這些極微不會消滅，而是散佈在各處，本體沒有生滅，因此說是常住的。有眾多法，本體並非唯一。后成劫時，兩個極微結合產生一個子微（dvyanuka）。子微的量等於父母微，本體是唯一的，因為它由其他事物所生，性質是無常的。像這樣，散佈的極微都兩兩結合產生一個子微。子微與原本的極微合起來共有三個微。這樣，又與另外三個微結合產生一個子微。第七個子微的量等於六個原本微的量。這樣，七個微又與其他的微結合，產生一個子微。第十五個子微的量等於原本產生它的父母十四個微的量。這樣輾轉相生，形成三千大千世界。這三千大千世界既然是從父母二法所生，其量合起來等於父母的量，因此三千大千世界作為識等的對境，本體是唯一的。然而，色是火的德，乃至觸是風的德。眼見色時，不能得到風大（vayu-mahabhuta，風元素），只能得到地、水、火，因為在色中沒有風的相狀。耳、鼻、舌三根得到聲、香、味時，得到三種元素也是如此。只有身體得到觸時才能得到四大（catvari mahabhutani，四大元素），因為在觸中有風大的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: They insist that outside of the cognizing consciousness, there exist rupa-ayatana (sense-fields of form), which, along with the cognizing consciousness (vijnana), such as the consciousness that cognizes form, each serve as separate objects (visaya).
This is a general description of the meaning of the common conceptualizations of the Hinayana and Tirthikas. The following is a separate description.
Treatise: As such, the external object should either be singular.
Commentary: This is the calculation of the heretics, who insist that the substance of dharmas such as rupa is only one.
Treatise: For example, the Vaisesikas insist on savayava-rupa (divisible form).
Commentary: This shows that the teacher who holds this view is a Vaisesika. This school is called Vaisesika, and the teacher who founded this treatise is called Vaisesika. Explaining the origin of this name, it explains the reason for the arising of this treatise, as analyzed elsewhere. This school initially calculated that there were six padartha (categories): 1. dravya (substance); 2. guna (quality); 3. karma (activity); 4. samanya (generality); 5. visesa (particularity); 6. samavaya (inherence). There are nine types of dravya, namely earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, direction, self, and mind. Among them, earth, water, fire, and wind are the nature of paramanu (ultimate particles). When kalpa-vinasa (the destruction of the eon) occurs, these paramanu will not be destroyed, but will be scattered everywhere, and their substance will not be produced or destroyed, so they are said to be permanent. There are many dharmas, and their substance is not unique. When the eon is formed later, two paramanu combine to produce a dvyanuka (binary atom). The quantity of the dvyanuka is equal to the parent paramanu, and its substance is unique because it is produced by other things, and its nature is impermanent. In this way, the scattered paramanu all combine in pairs to produce a dvyanuka. The dvyanuka and the original paramanu together have three atoms. In this way, it combines with another three atoms to produce a dvyanuka. The quantity of the seventh dvyanuka is equal to the quantity of the six original atoms. In this way, the seven atoms combine with other atoms to produce a dvyanuka. The quantity of the fifteenth dvyanuka is equal to the quantity of the fourteen atoms of the parents that originally produced it. In this way, they are transformed into three thousand great thousand worlds. Since these three thousand great thousand worlds are produced from the two dharmas of the parents, their quantity is equal to the quantity of the parents, so the three thousand great thousand worlds are the object of consciousness, etc., and their substance is unique. However, rupa is the guna of fire, and even touch is the guna of wind. When the eye sees rupa, it cannot obtain vayu-mahabhuta (the element of wind), but can only obtain earth, water, and fire, because there is no appearance of wind in rupa. The same is true when the ears, nose, and tongue obtain sound, smell, and taste, and obtain three elements. Only when the body obtains touch can it obtain catvari mahabhutani (the four great elements), because there is wind in touch.
。意緣一切。故有分色為眼識等境。體唯一物。其子粗微名為有分。有細分故。其本細微。但名為分。不有他故。廣敘此執。如成唯識。
論。或應是多如執實有眾多極微各別為境。
述曰。下破小乘。今此先敘古薩婆多毗婆沙義。此師意說。如色處等。體是多法。為眼識境。所以者何。其一一極微。體是實有。合成阿耨。阿耨是假。故此以上皆非實有。五識既緣實法為境故。不緣于阿耨以上和合假色。故色處等。為眼識等境時。其實極微。一一各別。為眼識等境。不緣假故。以有實體能生識故。
論。或應多極微和合或和集。
述曰。此敘經部。新薩婆多正理師義。經部師說。多極微和合。正理師說。多極微和集。
論。如執實有眾多極微皆共和合和集為境。
述曰。此即廣敘。謂經部師。實有極微。非五識境。五識上無極微相故。此七和合。成阿耨色。以上粗顯。體雖是假。五識之上有此相故。為五識境。一一實微。既不緣著。故須和合成一粗假。五識方緣。故論說言實有眾微皆共和合。其正理師。恐違自宗。眼等五識。不緣假法。異於經部。若順於古。即有陳那。五識之上。無微相故。非所緣失。遂復說言。色等諸法。各有多相。于中一分是現量境。故諸極微相資各有一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意根緣於一切法。因此，有『分色』作為眼識等所緣的境界。其本體是一個東西，其中細微的部分稱為『有分』。因為有細微的部分，所以其根本也是細微的，僅僅稱為『分』，而不是其他的什麼。關於這種觀點的詳細敘述，可以參考《成唯識論》。
論：或者應該是多個極微，就像認為實有眾多極微，各自作為境界一樣。
述記：下面是破斥小乘的觀點。這裡先敘述古薩婆多毗婆沙（Sarvāstivāda-Vibhāṣā，一切有部）的觀點。這個學派認為，色處（rūpa-āyatana，色處）等，其本體是多種法，作為眼識的境界。為什麼呢？因為每一個極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位），其本體是實有的，合成阿耨（aṇu，微粒），阿耨是假有的。因此，阿耨以上都不是實有的。五識既然緣于實法作為境界，所以不緣于阿耨以上和合的假色。因此，色處等作為眼識等的境界時，其實是極微，每一個各自作為眼識等的境界，不緣于假有。因為有實體能夠產生識。
論：或者應該是多個極微和合，或者和集。
述記：這裡敘述經部（Sautrāntika，經量部）和新薩婆多正理師的觀點。經部師認為，是多個極微和合；正理師認為，是多個極微和集。
論：就像認為實有眾多極微，都共和合或和集，作為境界一樣。
述記：這裡是詳細敘述。經部師認為，實有極微，但不是五識的境界，因為五識上沒有極微的相狀。七個極微和合，成為阿耨色。阿耨色以上比較粗顯，本體雖然是假有，但五識之上具有這種相狀，所以作為五識的境界。每一個實有的極微，既然不被緣取，所以需要和合成一個粗大的假有，五識才能緣取。所以論中說，實有眾多極微，都共和合。正理師恐怕違背自己的宗義，認為眼等五識不緣于假法，這與經部不同。如果順從古義，就會有陳那（Dignāga，陳那）所說的，五識之上沒有微細的相狀，因此不是所緣的過失。於是又說，色等諸法，各有多種相狀，其中一部分是現量的境界，因此各個極微互相資助，各有一種...
【English Translation】 English version: The mind-consciousness (manas) cognizes all dharmas. Therefore, there is 'divided matter' (bhāga-rūpa) as the object of eye-consciousness (cakṣu-vijñāna) and so on. Its substance is a single entity, and its subtle parts are called 'possessed of parts' (savayava). Because it has subtle parts, its origin is also subtle, and it is merely called 'part' (bhāga), and nothing else. A detailed account of this view can be found in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only).
Treatise: Or it should be many, like holding that there are truly many individual atoms (paramāṇu) each as an object.
Commentary: The following refutes the views of the Hīnayāna. Here, we first describe the meaning of the ancient Sarvāstivāda-Vibhāṣā (everything exists school). This school says that the sense-sphere of color (rūpa-āyatana), etc., is in essence many dharmas, as the object of eye-consciousness. Why? Because each atom (paramāṇu) is truly existent, and they combine to form an aṇu (molecule), which is a conceptual fiction. Therefore, anything above the aṇu is not truly existent. Since the five consciousnesses cognize real dharmas as their objects, they do not cognize the composite, conceptual color above the aṇu. Therefore, when the sense-sphere of color, etc., serves as the object of eye-consciousness, etc., it is actually the individual atoms, each as the object of eye-consciousness, etc., not cognizing the conceptual. Because there is a real entity that can produce consciousness.
Treatise: Or it should be many atoms combined or aggregated.
Commentary: This describes the views of the Sautrāntika (sūtra school) and the new Sarvāstivāda logicians. The Sautrāntika says that it is many atoms combined; the logicians say that it is many atoms aggregated.
Treatise: Like holding that there are truly many atoms, all combined or aggregated together, as an object.
Commentary: This is a detailed description. The Sautrāntika believes that atoms are truly existent, but not the object of the five consciousnesses, because the five consciousnesses do not have the appearance of atoms. Seven atoms combine to form an aṇu-color. Anything above the aṇu-color is relatively coarse and manifest, and although its substance is conceptual, the five consciousnesses have this appearance, so it serves as the object of the five consciousnesses. Since each real atom is not cognized, it needs to be combined into a coarse conceptual entity for the five consciousnesses to cognize. Therefore, the treatise says that there are truly many atoms, all combined together. The logicians, fearing to contradict their own doctrine that the eye and other five consciousnesses do not cognize conceptual dharmas, which is different from the Sautrāntika, and if they follow the ancient meaning, there would be the fault that Dignāga (陳那) said that the five consciousnesses do not have subtle appearances, therefore it is not an object. Therefore, they further say that color and other dharmas each have many appearances, and a portion of them is the object of direct perception, therefore each atom mutually supports each other, each having a...
和集相。此相實有。各能發生似己相識。故與五識作所緣緣。如多極微整合山等。相資各有山等量相。眼等五識。緣山等時。實有多極微相資山相。五識並得。故成所緣。不爾即有非所緣失。許有實體。但為緣故。故論說言實有眾多極微。皆共和集。廣如陳那觀所緣論。及成唯識第一卷說。然舊唯識。但有鞞世師。及古薩婆多義。其和合和集文但說一。謂鄰虛集色。仍意難知。文亦難曉。于下破中。言非鄰虛聚整合塵。披者自知。豈如今論。
論。且彼外境理應非一。
述曰。自下第三。一一破執。先破外道。未破小乘。故言且彼所執外境。理應非一。釋頌初句。
此即總非。次顯非理。
論。有分色體異諸分色不可取故。
述曰。所執是一粗有分色。異本極微實有體者。諸有分色體。不可取故。如山地等。一一段別。即是分色。豈離於此。別有一實粗有分色。應立量言。汝有分色非異分色。異諸分色不可取故。猶如分色。汝若又言誰謂有分。異於分色。是不可取。因隨一者。應更破云。汝有分色定非異於諸細分色。汝宗自許實句色故。如細分色。或於前因。應置許字。我意自許異於分色。不可取故。無隨一失。此論言略。遂無許字。或應此論。但述其宗。略無因喻。謂立宗言。汝有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 和合之相（Samucchaya-laksana）。此相是真實存在的，各自能夠產生相似於自身形象的認知，因此作為五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）的所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，認識對像）。就像許多極微（Paramanu，物質的最小單位）聚集形成山等物體一樣，互相資助，各自具有山等物體的量和形象。當眼等五識緣取山等物體時，實際上存在許多極微互相資助形成的山的形象，五識能夠同時獲得這些形象，因此成為所緣。否則，就會出現無法緣取的情況。雖然承認實體的存在，但僅僅是爲了作為緣起的原因。因此，《論》中說，確實存在眾多極微，它們共同和合聚集。詳細內容可以參考陳那（Dignaga）的《觀所緣論》以及《成唯識論》第一卷的說法。然而，舊的唯識學說，只有鞞世師（Vaisesika，勝論派）以及古代薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，說一切有部）的觀點，其關於和合和聚集的描述只說了一個方面，即鄰近虛空的色法聚集，仍然難以理解，文字也很難理解。在下面的破斥中，說並非鄰近虛空的聚集形成微塵，讀者自己可以瞭解。難道能像現在的論述這樣嗎？
論：而且，他們所認為的外境，在道理上不應該是一個。
述記：下面第三部分，逐一破斥各種執著。先破斥外道，再破斥小乘。所以說，他們所執著的外境，在道理上不應該是一個。這是解釋頌文的第一句。
這只是總體的否定。接下來顯示其不合理之處。
論：有分之色體（Savayava-rupa，有組成部分的色法）與諸多分之色（avayava-rupa，組成部分）不同，因為有分之色體是不可取的。
述記：他們所執著的是一個粗大的、有組成部分的色法，與作為根本的極微的真實存在不同。那些有組成部分的色法，其體是不可取的。比如山、地等，一段一段的區別，就是有分之色。難道離開這些，另外存在一個真實的、粗大的、有組成部分的色法嗎？應該建立量式：你們的有分之色不是異於多分之色，因為異於諸多分之色是不可取的，就像多分之色一樣。你們如果又說，誰說有分之色異於多分之色是不可取的？如果有人這樣反駁，應該進一步破斥說：你們的有分之色一定不是異於諸細分之色，因為你們宗派自己承認是實句色（Satya-rupa，真實的色法），就像細分之色一樣。或者在前一個因中，應該加上『許』字。我的意思是，我自己承認異於多分之色是不可取的，這樣就沒有隨一過失。這篇論述比較簡略，所以沒有『許』字。或者這篇論述只是陳述他們的宗派，省略了因和比喻。即建立宗言：你們的有分之色。
【English Translation】 English version The characteristic of aggregation (Samucchaya-laksana). This characteristic is truly existent, and each can generate cognitions similar to its own image, thus serving as the object-condition (Alambana-pratyaya) for the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness). Just as many atoms (Paramanu, the smallest unit of matter) gather to form mountains and other objects, supporting each other and each possessing the measure and image of mountains and other objects. When the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, perceive mountains and other objects, there are actually many atoms supporting each other to form the image of the mountain, which the five consciousnesses can simultaneously obtain, thus becoming the object of cognition. Otherwise, there would be a loss of what is not cognized. Although the existence of entities is acknowledged, it is merely for the sake of being a cause of origination. Therefore, the Treatise states that there are indeed many atoms that collectively gather together. Detailed information can be found in Dignaga's 'Examination of the Object of Cognition' and the first volume of the 'Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only'. However, the old Consciousness-Only doctrines, only have the views of the Vaisesika (School of Particularity) and the ancient Sarvastivada (the "All Exists" school), whose descriptions of aggregation and gathering only mention one aspect, that is, the aggregation of form elements adjacent to space, which is still difficult to understand, and the text is also difficult to comprehend. In the refutation below, it is said that the aggregation of what is adjacent to space does not form dust, which the reader can understand for themselves. How can it be like the current discussion?
Treatise: Moreover, their assumed external objects should not be one in principle.
Commentary: The third part below refutes each attachment one by one. First refuting the externalists, then refuting the Hinayana. Therefore, it is said that their assumed external objects should not be one in principle. This explains the first line of the verse.
This is just a general negation. Next, it shows the unreasonableness.
Treatise: The composite color-entity (Savayava-rupa, color-form with components) is different from the component colors (avayava-rupa, components), because the composite color-entity is not apprehensible.
Commentary: What they adhere to is a coarse, composite color-form, which is different from the real existence of the fundamental atoms. Those composite color-forms, their substance is not apprehensible. For example, mountains, land, etc., the distinctions between sections are composite colors. Could it be that apart from these, there exists another real, coarse, composite color-form? A logical statement should be established: Your composite color is not different from the component colors, because being different from the component colors is not apprehensible, just like the component colors. If you say again, who says that the composite color being different from the component colors is not apprehensible? If someone refutes in this way, it should be further refuted: Your composite color is definitely not different from the subtle component colors, because your school itself admits that it is a real color-form (Satya-rupa, a real color-form), just like the subtle component colors. Or in the previous reason, the word 'admitted' should be added. My meaning is that I myself admit that being different from the component colors is not apprehensible, so there is no fault of 'one-sidedness'. This treatise is relatively brief, so there is no word 'admitted'. Or this treatise is only stating their school, omitting the cause and analogy. That is, establishing the statement: Your composite color.
分色體異汝諸分色定不可取。許實句色故。如細分色。論故字者。乘文便說。由此比量亦無過失。
論。理亦非多。
述曰。下破小乘。釋頌第二句。此即總非古薩婆多。
自下別破。
論。極微各別不可取故。
述曰。此下別破。汝言極微一一各別。為五識境。此定不然。極微各別。眼等五識。不可取故。然汝自宗。異生等眼。不見極微。五識之上。不現其相。如何說極微各別為境。應立量言。各別極微非五識所緣。眼等五識不可取故。如眼根等。故此論中。極微各別。但是有法不可取故。但是其因。略無同喻及所立宗。或應量云。聚色多極微非五識所緣。極微各別五識不取故。如眼根等。論有宗言及因。觀所緣論。約所緣緣。以立量破。所緣緣者。謂能緣識。帶彼相起。及有實體。令能緣識。托彼而生。具二支義。色等極微。我非許有。設有實體。能生五識。容有緣義。然非所緣。如眼根等。于眼等識無彼相故。遂立量云。極微於五識設緣非所緣。彼相識無故。猶如眼根等。彼言雖別。意與此同。成唯識論第一卷說。小與此同。彼論說言。非諸極微。共和集位。可與五識各作所緣。此識上無極微相故。設彼救言極微各別有和合相。為五識境。和合相者。即似一相。此相是用。大於
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『分色體異汝諸分色定不可取』（你所說的最小的、有差別的色法，一定不能被五識所取）。因為你承認實句色（真實存在的聚合色法）。就像細分色（更細微的色法）一樣。論中的『故』字，是爲了順著文意方便說明。因此，用這個比量（推理）也沒有過失。
論：理亦非多。（道理上，也不可能是多個極微同時被五識所取。）
述曰：下面破斥小乘的觀點。解釋頌文的第二句。這裡是總的否定古薩婆多部（說一切有部）。
自下別破。（下面分別破斥。）
論：極微各別不可取故。（極微各自獨立，不能被五識所取。）
述曰：這裡開始分別破斥。你說極微一一各自獨立，是五識的境界。這一定不對。極微各自獨立，眼等五識不能取到。然而，按照你自己的宗義，異生（凡夫）的眼睛，看不見極微。在五識之上，不顯現極微的相狀。怎麼能說極微各自獨立是五識的境界呢？應該立量（建立論證）說：各自獨立的極微，不是五識所緣。因為眼等五識不能取到它。就像眼根等。所以，這個論中，極微各自獨立，只是有法（論證的主體），『不可取故』只是因（理由），缺少同喻（相同的例子）和所立宗（所要證明的結論）。或者應該立量說：聚合的色法，由多個極微組成，不是五識所緣。因為極微各自獨立，五識不能取到。就像眼根等。論中提到宗（結論）和因（理由）。《觀所緣論》從所緣緣（作為認識對象的原因）的角度，來建立論證進行破斥。所緣緣，是指能緣識（能認識的心識），帶著所緣對象的相狀生起，並且有實體，使能緣識依託它而生。具備兩個方面的意義。色等極微，我不承認它有。即使有實體，能生起五識，或許有作為『緣』的意義，但不是『所緣』。就像眼根等，對於眼等識，沒有眼根的相狀。於是立量說：極微對於五識，即使是『緣』，也不是『所緣』。因為在五識中沒有極微的相狀。就像眼根等。他的說法雖然不同，意思與此相同。《成唯識論》第一卷說，小乘的觀點與此相同。那個論中說：不是所有的極微，在共同聚集的狀態下，可以各自作為五識的所緣。因為在這個識上沒有極微的相狀。假設他們辯解說，極微各自獨立，有和合相（聚合的相狀），作為五識的境界。和合相，就是相似於一個整體的相狀。這個相狀的作用，大於極微。 English version 'The differentiated atoms of color that you speak of are definitely not apprehensible.' Because you admit the existence of real composite colors, just like subtle colors. The word '故' (therefore) in the treatise is used to conveniently explain according to the text. Therefore, there is no fault in using this inference.
Treatise: 'In principle, it is also not many.'
Commentary: Below, refuting the Hinayana view. Explaining the second line of the verse. This is a general negation of the Sarvastivadins (the 'All Exists' school).
Separately refuting below.
Treatise: 'Because individual atoms are not apprehensible.'
Commentary: Here begins the separate refutation. You say that each individual atom is a realm of the five consciousnesses. This is definitely not so. Individual atoms are not apprehensible by the five consciousnesses such as the eye. However, according to your own doctrine, the eyes of ordinary beings do not see atoms. The appearance of atoms does not manifest on the five consciousnesses. How can you say that individual atoms are a realm? One should establish a proof saying: Individual atoms are not the object of the five consciousnesses, because the five consciousnesses such as the eye cannot apprehend them, just like the eye-organ, etc. Therefore, in this treatise, individual atoms are merely the subject (of the argument), and 'not apprehensible' is merely the reason (the cause), lacking a similar example and the proposition to be established. Or one should establish a proof saying: Aggregate color, composed of many atoms, is not the object of the five consciousnesses, because the five consciousnesses do not apprehend individual atoms, just like the eye-organ, etc. The treatise mentions the proposition and the reason. The Treatise on the Object of Cognition refutes from the perspective of the objective condition (所緣緣). The objective condition refers to the cognizing consciousness, arising with the appearance of the object, and having substance, causing the cognizing consciousness to rely on it to arise, possessing two aspects of meaning. Atoms of color, etc., I do not admit that they exist. Even if they have substance and can give rise to the five consciousnesses, they may have the meaning of being a 'condition,' but they are not the 'object.' Just like the eye-organ, etc., there is no appearance of the eye-organ in the eye consciousness, etc. Therefore, one establishes a proof saying: Atoms, even if they are a condition for the five consciousnesses, are not the object, because there is no appearance of atoms in the consciousnesses, just like the eye-organ, etc. Although his statement is different, the meaning is the same. The first volume of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only says that the Hinayana view is the same as this. That treatise says: Not all atoms, in a state of common aggregation, can each be the object of the five consciousnesses, because there is no appearance of atoms on this consciousness. Suppose they argue that individual atoms have a combined appearance, as the realm of the five consciousnesses. The combined appearance is an appearance similar to a whole. The function of this appearance is greater than that of an atom.
【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2
本極微。用不離體。體既實有。成所緣緣。彼論破言。非和合位。與不合時。此諸極微體相。有異故。和合位。如不合時色等極微。非五識境。然更有救。復有別徴。如成唯識第一疏說。
論。又理非和合或和集為境。
述曰。下破經部正理論師。此即總非。下自別破。
論。一實極微理不成故。
述曰。經部等極微有一實體唯意識境。薩婆多師等亦有一實體十處所攝。六識之境。然汝所執。一實極微。我不許有。理既不成。故說極微和合和集。義皆乖返。然觀所緣論。破經部師言。色等和合。于眼識等上。有彼相故。設作所緣。以粗顯故。識現相故。然無緣義。無實體故。如眼錯亂。見第二月。彼無實體。不能生故。遂立量云。和合於五識設所緣非緣。彼體實無故。猶如第二月。成唯識論。復破彼言。非和合相。異諸極微。有實自體。分折彼時。似彼相識。定不生故。彼和合相。既非實有。故不可說是五識緣。勿第二月等。能生五識故。此中難意。若有實極微。容有和合假。能合實非有。所合假成無。觀所緣緣論。破正理師言。如堅等相。雖是實有。于眼等識。容有緣義。而非所緣。眼等識上。無彼相故。色等極微。諸和集相。理亦應爾。彼俱執為極微相故。遂立量云。極微和集相設於眼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此為最小的微粒（本極微），其作用不離其本體（用不離體）。本體如果是真實存在的（體既實有），就能成為所緣緣（成所緣緣）。《彼論》反駁說，在和合的狀態（非和合位）與不和合的時候（與不合時），這些極微的本體和狀態（此諸極微體相）是有區別的。在和合狀態下，就像不和合時的顏色等極微（如不合時色等極微），不是五識的境界（非五識境）。然而還有辯解（然更有救），並且有其他的論證（復有別徴），就像《成唯識第一疏》所說。
論：而且從道理上來說，和合或者和集不能作為（五識的）境界（又理非和合或和集為境）。
述記：下面駁斥經部和正理論師（下破經部正理論師）。這是一種總體的否定（此即總非），下面會分別駁斥（下自別破）。
論：因為一個真實的極微在道理上是不成立的（一實極微理不成故）。
述記：經部等認為極微只有一個實體，只是意識的境界（經部等極微有一實體唯意識境）。薩婆多師等也認為極微只有一個實體，被十個處所包含，是六識的境界（薩婆多師等亦有一實體十處所攝。六識之境）。但是你們所執著的，一個真實的極微（一實極微），我是不承認它存在的（我不許有）。道理既然不成立（理既不成），所以說極微的和合和和集，在意義上都是錯誤的（故說極微和合和集。義皆乖返）。然而《觀所緣論》駁斥經部師說，顏色等的和合，在眼識等上面，有那些現象的緣故（色等和合。于眼識等上。有彼相故），姑且作為所緣（設作所緣），因為它粗大而明顯（以粗顯故），識能夠顯現它的相（識現相故），但是沒有緣的作用（然無緣義），因為它沒有實體（無實體故），就像眼睛錯亂時，看到第二個月亮（如眼錯亂。見第二月）。它沒有實體（彼無實體），不能產生作用（不能生故）。於是立論說，和合對於五識來說，假設是所緣，也不是緣（和合於五識設所緣非緣），因為它本體是虛無的（彼體實無故），就像第二個月亮（猶如第二月）。《成唯識論》又駁斥他們說，和合的相，與各個極微不同（非和合相。異諸極微），沒有真實的自體（有實自體），在分析它的時候（分折彼時），相似的相識，一定不會產生（似彼相識。定不生故）。那個和合的相，既然不是真實存在的（彼和合相。既非實有），所以不能說是五識的緣（故不可說是五識緣），不要像第二個月亮等，能夠產生五識（勿第二月等。能生五識故）。這裡面的難點在於，如果有真實的極微（若有實極微），或許有和合的假象（容有和合假），能和合的真實不存在（能合實非有），所和合的假象就不能成立（所合假成無）。《觀所緣緣論》駁斥正理師說，像堅硬等的相，雖然是真實存在的（如堅等相。雖是實有），對於眼等識來說，或許有緣的作用（于眼等識。容有緣義），但不是所緣（而非所緣），因為眼等識上面，沒有那些相（眼等識上。無彼相故）。顏色等極微，各種和集的相（色等極微。諸和集相），道理也應該這樣（理亦應爾）。他們都執著認為是極微的相（彼俱執為極微相故）。於是立論說，極微的和集相，假設在眼
【English Translation】 English version This is the smallest particle (paramāṇu). Its function is inseparable from its substance (用不離體). If the substance is truly existent (體既實有), it can become an object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) (成所緣緣). The 'other' treatise refutes, saying that in the state of combination (非和合位) and when not combined (與不合時), the substance and state of these atoms (此諸極微體相) are different. In the state of combination, like the atoms of color, etc., when not combined (如不合時色等極微), they are not the realm of the five consciousnesses (非五識境). However, there is further defense (然更有救), and there are other arguments (復有別徴), as stated in the 'First Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'.
Treatise: Moreover, logically, combination or aggregation cannot be the object (of the five consciousnesses) (又理非和合或和集為境).
Commentary: The following refutes the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika masters (下破經部正理論師). This is a general negation (此即總非), and the following will refute them separately (下自別破).
Treatise: Because a single real atom is logically untenable (一實極微理不成故).
Commentary: The Sautrāntikas, etc., believe that the atom has only one substance and is only the realm of consciousness (經部等極微有一實體唯意識境). The Sarvāstivādins, etc., also believe that the atom has only one substance, is contained in the ten places, and is the realm of the six consciousnesses (薩婆多師等亦有一實體十處所攝. 六識之境). However, I do not admit the existence of what you cling to, a single real atom (一實極微) (我不許有). Since the logic is untenable (理既不成), therefore, the combination and aggregation of atoms are all erroneous in meaning (故說極微和合和集. 義皆乖返). However, the 'Treatise on the Object-Condition' refutes the Sautrāntika master, saying that the combination of colors, etc., has those phenomena on the eye-consciousness, etc. (色等和合. 于眼識等上. 有彼相故), so let it be taken as an object (設作所緣), because it is coarse and obvious (以粗顯故), and consciousness can manifest its appearance (識現相故), but it has no function as a condition (然無緣義), because it has no substance (無實體故), like seeing a second moon when the eyes are confused (如眼錯亂. 見第二月). It has no substance (彼無實體) and cannot produce an effect (不能生故). Therefore, it is argued that combination, for the five consciousnesses, is assumed to be an object but is not a condition (和合於五識設所緣非緣), because its substance is unreal (彼體實無故), like the second moon (猶如第二月). The 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi' further refutes them, saying that the appearance of combination is different from the individual atoms (非和合相. 異諸極微), and it has no real self-nature (有實自體). When analyzing it (分折彼時), a similar appearance-consciousness will definitely not arise (似彼相識. 定不生故). Since that appearance of combination is not truly existent (彼和合相. 既非實有), therefore, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses (故不可說是五識緣), lest the second moon, etc., be able to produce the five consciousnesses (勿第二月等. 能生五識故). The difficulty here is that if there are real atoms (若有實極微), there may be a false appearance of combination (容有和合假), but the real that can combine does not exist (能合實非有), and the false appearance of what is combined cannot be established (所合假成無). The 'Treatise on the Object-Condition' refutes the Vaibhāṣika master, saying that although appearances such as hardness are truly existent (如堅等相. 雖是實有), for the eye-consciousness, etc., there may be a function as a condition (于眼等識. 容有緣義), but it is not an object (而非所緣), because those appearances are not on the eye-consciousness, etc. (眼等識上. 無彼相故). The various aggregated appearances of atoms of color, etc. (色等極微. 諸和集相), should also be the same in principle (理亦應爾). They both cling to the belief that they are the appearances of atoms (彼俱執為極微相故). Therefore, it is argued that the aggregated appearance of atoms, assuming it is on the eye
等識是緣非所緣。許極微相故。猶如堅濕等。執眼等識。能緣極微諸和集相。復有別生。瓶甌等覺相。彼執應無別。非形別故別。形別非實故。又不應執極微。亦有差別形相。所以者何。極微量等故。形別唯在假。拆彼至極微。彼覺定舍故。成唯識論。復作是說。彼執不然。共和集位。與未集時。體相一故。瓶甌等物極微等者。緣彼相識。應無別故。共和集位。一一極微。各各應舍微圓相故。非粗相識。緣細相境。勿余境識。緣余境故。一識應緣一切境故。此論但有破本極微。既非實有。所成和集理實不成。種種推徴。如餘論說。
論。云何不成。
述曰。自下廣釋極微不成。于中有三。初問不成。次答不成。后申正義。總結不成。此即初問。外人既見非其極微一實不成。有隨一過。遂問論主。云何不成。
論。頌曰。極微與六合一應成六分若與六同處聚應如極微。
述曰。次答不成。總有二頌。別破小乘。于中有二。初之二頌。破極微有合無合不成。后之一頌。破極微有分無分不成。就初段中。復分為二。初答合等不成。后結不成。答合等不成中。既有二頌。復分為二。初設答不成。后破救不成。初中二難。上之二句。難極微合應成六分。下之二句難極微合應成六分極微同處聚。應如極微
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『等識』（Sameness Consciousness）是因緣和合而生，並非獨立存在的實體。因為你們假設存在最小的微粒（極微，Paramāṇu），就像堅硬、潮濕等性質一樣。如果你們認為眼識等能夠感知這些最小微粒及其組合，並且由此產生對瓶子、碗等事物的不同認知，那麼這些認知應該沒有差別。如果說是因為形狀不同而產生差別，但形狀的差別並非真實存在。而且，你們不應該認為最小微粒也具有不同的形狀。為什麼呢？因為最小微粒的量是相等的，形狀的差別只存在於假想之中。如果將物體拆解到最小微粒的程度，那麼原先的認知必然會消失。《成唯識論》（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra）也說：『你們的觀點是不成立的，因為在組合狀態和未組合狀態下，它們的體性和性質是一樣的。如果瓶子、碗等物體是由最小微粒組成的，那麼感知它們的意識應該沒有差別。在組合狀態下，每一個最小微粒都應該失去其微小和圓形的特徵。粗略的認知不應該感知到微細的境界，否則，一個意識就會感知到所有的境界。』這部論只是否定了根本的最小微粒，既然它不是真實存在的，那麼由它組成的組合體在道理上也是不成立的。種種推論和證明，如同其他論述所說。
論：如何不成立呢？
述曰：下面詳細解釋最小微粒的不成立。其中有三個部分：首先提出問題，說明不成立；其次回答，說明不成立；最後闡述正確的觀點，總結不成立。這便是最初的提問。外人既然看到他們的最小微粒並非真實存在，存在任何一個過失，於是詢問論主：如何不成立呢？
論：頌曰：極微與六合，一應成六分，若與六同處，聚應如極微。
述曰：接下來回答不成立。總共有兩個頌，分別破斥小乘佛教的觀點。其中有兩個部分：最初的兩個頌，破斥最小微粒的結合或不結合都不成立；後面的一個頌，破斥最小微粒有分割或無分割都不成立。在最初的部分中，又分為兩個部分：首先回答結合等不成立；然後破斥辯解，說明不成立。在回答結合等不成立中，既然有兩個頌，又分為兩個部分：首先假設回答，說明不成立；然後破斥辯解，說明不成立。最初的兩個難點，上面的兩句是：如果最小微粒與六個方向結合，那麼一個最小微粒應該成為六個部分。下面的兩句是：如果最小微粒與六個方向同處一地聚集，那麼聚集體應該像最小微粒一樣。
【English Translation】 English version 『Sameness Consciousness』 (等識, Děng Shì) arises from conditions and is not an independent entity. This is because you posit the existence of ultimate particles (極微, Jí Wēi, Paramāṇu), just like properties such as hardness and moisture. If you believe that eye-consciousness and other forms of consciousness can perceive these ultimate particles and their combinations, and thereby generate different cognitions of things like bottles and bowls, then these cognitions should be no different. If it is said that the difference arises from different shapes, but the difference in shapes is not real. Moreover, you should not assume that ultimate particles also have different shapes. Why? Because the quantity of ultimate particles is equal, and the difference in shapes exists only in imagination. If an object is broken down to the level of ultimate particles, then the original cognition will necessarily disappear. The 『Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only』 (成唯識論, Chéng Wéi Shì Lùn, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra) also says: 『Your view is untenable because in the combined state and the uncombined state, their substance and nature are the same. If bottles, bowls, and other objects are composed of ultimate particles, then the consciousness perceiving them should be no different. In the combined state, each ultimate particle should lose its minute and round characteristics. Coarse cognition should not perceive subtle realms, otherwise, one consciousness would perceive all realms.』 This treatise only negates the fundamental ultimate particle; since it is not real, then the composite formed by it is also untenable in principle. Various inferences and proofs, as stated in other treatises.
Treatise: How is it untenable?
Commentary: Below is a detailed explanation of the untenability of ultimate particles. There are three parts: first, posing the question, explaining the untenability; second, answering, explaining the untenability; and third, elaborating the correct view, summarizing the untenability. This is the initial question. Since outsiders see that their ultimate particles are not real and that any single fault exists, they ask the treatise master: How is it untenable?
Treatise: Verse: If an ultimate particle combines with six, one should become six parts; if it gathers in the same place with six, the aggregate should be like an ultimate particle.
Commentary: Next, answering the untenability. There are two verses in total, refuting the views of the Theravada Buddhism separately. There are two parts: the first two verses refute that the combination or non-combination of ultimate particles is untenable; the following verse refutes that the division or non-division of ultimate particles is untenable. In the first part, it is further divided into two parts: first, assuming an answer, explaining the untenability; then refuting the defense, explaining the untenability. In answering the untenability of combination, since there are two verses, it is further divided into two parts: first, assuming an answer, explaining the untenability; then refuting the defense, explaining the untenability. The first two difficulties, the upper two lines are: If an ultimate particle combines with six directions, then one ultimate particle should become six parts. The lower two lines are: If ultimate particles gather in the same place with six directions, then the aggregate should be like an ultimate particle.
。如阿拏色。合七極微成。中有一極微。外邊有六。中極微若與外六極微合。所合既六。能合極微。應成六分。若以極微。更無分故。不相合者。六對之時。便相糅住。同一處所。既同一處。阿耨色等。各各應如一極微量。
論曰。若一極微六方各與一極微合應成六分。
述曰。釋上二句頌。此設破他。非本宗義。中間極微。四方上下。有六極微。閤中間極微。應成六分。
所以者何。
論。一處無容有餘處故。
述曰。顯成六因。謂中間極微。東極微處。無理容有餘五方處五極微故。如是乃至。中間極微。下方極微處。非餘五處。中間極微。所合六異故。中間極微。應成六分。應立量云。中間極微應成多分。一處無容有餘處故。如粗聚色。或於頌中。亦成比量。中一極微應成六分。與六合故。如粗聚色與六色合。然頌唯宗因。略無同喻。
論。一極微處若有六微應諸聚色如極微量。
述曰。此釋下二句頌。若言極微。無方分故。不相合者。中間極微既與六合時。既應互相糅同一處所。中一微處。既與六微。同處而住。應阿耨等諸粗聚色。如極微量更不增長。即微處故。
所以者何。
論展轉相望不過量故。
述曰。顯諸聚色。如微量因。以一與六。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：比如阿拏色（Anu，極微），由七個極微組成。中間有一個極微，外邊有六個。如果中間的極微與外面的六個極微結合，所結合的部分既然有六個，那麼能結合的極微，應該分成六份。如果極微不能再分割，那麼不結合的話，六個極微相對的時候，就會混合在一起，處於同一個地方。既然處於同一個地方，阿耨色（Anu）等粗大的色聚，各自應該像一個極微那麼小。
論曰：如果一個極微的六個方向各自與一個極微結合，應該分成六份。
述曰：解釋上面兩句頌文。這是爲了駁斥他人，不是本宗的觀點。中間的極微，四方上下，有六個極微。結合中間的極微，應該分成六份。
為什麼呢？
論：一個地方不能容納其他地方。
述曰：顯示分成六份的原因。就是說，中間的極微佔據了東邊極微的位置，就沒有道理容納其他五個方向的極微。像這樣，乃至中間的極微佔據了下方極微的位置，就不是其他五個位置。中間的極微，結合了六個不同的極微，中間的極微，應該分成六份。應該立論說：中間的極微應該分成很多份，因為一個地方不能容納其他地方，就像粗大的色聚一樣。或者在頌文中，也可以成立比量：中間的一個極微應該分成六份，因為它與六個極微結合，就像粗大的色聚與六個色結合一樣。然而頌文只有宗和因，省略了同喻。
論：如果一個極微的位置有六個極微，那麼所有的色聚應該像極微那麼小。
述曰：這是解釋下面兩句頌文。如果說極微沒有方分，所以不結合，那麼中間的極微與六個極微結合的時候，就應該互相混合，處於同一個地方。中間一個極微的位置，既然與六個極微同處而住，那麼阿耨（Anu）等各種粗大的色聚，應該像極微那麼小，不再增長，因為它們處於極微的位置。
為什麼呢？
論：輾轉相望，不會超過極微的量。
述曰：顯示各種色聚像極微那麼小的原因，因為一個極微與六個極微...
【English Translation】 English version: For example, Anu (阿拏色, atom), is composed of seven ultimate particles (極微). There is one ultimate particle in the middle, and six on the outside. If the middle ultimate particle combines with the six outer ultimate particles, since there are six parts being combined, the combining ultimate particle should be divided into six parts. If the ultimate particle cannot be further divided, then if they do not combine, the six ultimate particles will mix together when facing each other, residing in the same place. Since they are in the same place, coarse aggregates of matter such as Anu (阿耨色) should each be as small as one ultimate particle.
Treatise says: If one ultimate particle combines with one ultimate particle in each of its six directions, it should be divided into six parts.
Commentary says: Explaining the above two lines of verse. This is to refute others, not the view of our school. The middle ultimate particle, in the four directions and above and below, has six ultimate particles. Combining with the middle ultimate particle, it should be divided into six parts.
Why is that?
Treatise: One place cannot accommodate other places.
Commentary says: Showing the reason for being divided into six parts. That is, the middle ultimate particle occupies the position of the eastern ultimate particle, so there is no reason to accommodate the ultimate particles in the other five directions. Like this, even the middle ultimate particle occupies the position of the lower ultimate particle, it is not the other five positions. The middle ultimate particle, combining with six different ultimate particles, the middle ultimate particle should be divided into six parts. It should be argued that the middle ultimate particle should be divided into many parts, because one place cannot accommodate other places, just like coarse aggregates of matter. Or in the verse, a comparison can also be established: the middle ultimate particle should be divided into six parts, because it combines with six ultimate particles, just like coarse aggregates of matter combine with six colors. However, the verse only has the proposition and the reason, omitting the example.
Treatise: If there are six ultimate particles in the position of one ultimate particle, then all aggregates of matter should be as small as ultimate particles.
Commentary says: This is explaining the following two lines of verse. If it is said that ultimate particles have no directional parts, so they do not combine, then when the middle ultimate particle combines with six ultimate particles, they should mix together and be in the same place. Since the position of one middle ultimate particle resides in the same place with six ultimate particles, then various coarse aggregates of matter such as Anu (阿耨) should be as small as ultimate particles, no longer increasing, because they are in the position of ultimate particles.
Why is that?
Treatise: Looking at each other in turn, it will not exceed the amount of ultimate particles.
Commentary says: Showing the reason why various aggregates of matter are as small as ultimate particles, because one ultimate particle and six ultimate particles...
展轉相望。量不相過。故諸聚色。如極微量。應立量言。汝諸聚色應如微量。量不過微故。如一極微。或於頌中。亦成比量。汝聚色量應如極微。即微處故。猶如極微。即同無異。然頌下說如極微言。通宗中法。及同法喻。義不違故。或唯是法。而非同喻。文勢異故。其宗因等。義準應配。
論。則應聚色亦不可見。
述曰。若許聚色量同極微。其諸聚色。應不可見。量如微故。又立量言。汝粗聚色應不可見。量如微故。或即微處故。猶如極微。此中說宗。因如前說。然合與同處。此之二難。皆是設遮。非為本計。
論。迦濕彌羅國毗婆沙師言非諸極微有相合義。
述曰。薩婆多師。既見前破設遮彼義。遂作是言。非諸極微。有相合義。此立宗也。然此本師。亦不相糅。同一處所。定無是事。今於此中。且但遮合。世友說。極微相觸。即應住至后念。大德說。極微實不相觸。但由無間。假立觸名。若異此者。微有間隙。中間既空。誰障其行。許為有對。合之與觸。名異義同。迦濕彌羅北印度境毗婆沙論。在此國造。因以為名。顯此論因。如余處說。毗婆沙者。婆沙說也。毗有三義。一勝義。此論決定勝餘論故。二異義。於一部中諸師異說故。三廣義。於一一義中。諸師廣說故。
論。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：輾轉相望，數量上不會互相超過。所以，各種聚集的色法（rupa，物質現象），就像極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）一樣微小。應該建立論證說：你們這些聚集的色法應該像極微一樣微小，因為數量上不超過極微的緣故，就像一個極微一樣。或者在頌文中，也可以構成比量（anumana，推理）。你們聚集的色法的量應該像極微一樣，因為就在極微之處的緣故，就像極微一樣。這和極微沒有區別。然而頌文下面說『如極微』，貫通宗（paksa，論題）中的法（dharma，性質）以及同法喻（sapaksa-drstanta，同類比喻），因為意義上不相違背。或者僅僅是法，而不是同喻，因為文句的語氣不同。其中的宗、因（hetu，理由）等，意義上應該配合。
論：那麼，聚集的色法也應該不可見。
述曰：如果允許聚集的色法的量和極微相同，那麼這些聚集的色法應該不可見，因為量像極微一樣。又建立論證說：你們粗大的聚集的色法應該不可見，因為量像極微一樣。或者因為就在極微之處的緣故，就像極微一樣。這裡所說的宗，因就像前面所說的那樣。然而，合和同處，這兩種責難，都是假設的遮難，不是原本的主張。
論：迦濕彌羅國（Kashmir）的毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika，論師）說，不是所有的極微都有相合的意義。
述曰：薩婆多師（Sarvastivadin，一切有部論師）既然看到前面破斥假設的遮難，於是這樣說：不是所有的極微都有相合的意義。這是立宗。然而這位本師，也不互相混合，在同一個處所，一定沒有這樣的事。現在在這裡，僅僅是遮止相合。世友（Vasumitra，論師）說：極微互相接觸，就應該持續到后一念。大德（長老）說：極微實際上不互相接觸，只是因為沒有間隔，假立接觸的名稱。如果不是這樣，極微之間有間隙，中間既然是空的，誰來阻礙它的執行？允許為有對（具有阻礙性）。合和觸，名稱不同，意義相同。迦濕彌羅是北印度境，毗婆沙論（Vibhasa，廣解）在這個國家制造，因此用它來命名。顯示這部論的原因，就像其他地方所說的那樣。毗婆沙，就是婆沙（bhasa，語言）的解說。毗有三種意義：一是勝義，這部論決定勝過其他論的緣故；二是異義，在一部之中，諸位論師有不同的說法；三是廣義，在每一個意義之中，諸位論師廣泛解說。
【English Translation】 English version: They observe each other in succession, and their quantity does not exceed each other. Therefore, all aggregated rupas (material phenomena) are as minute as paramanus (ultimate particles). A valid argument should be established: 'Your aggregated rupas should be as minute as paramanus, because their quantity does not exceed paramanus, just like a single paramanu.' Or, within a verse, it can also form an anumana (inference): 'The quantity of your aggregated rupas should be like paramanus, because they are located at the same place as paramanus, just like paramanus.' This is no different from paramanus. However, the verse below says 'like paramanus,' which encompasses the dharma (quality) in the paksa (thesis) and the sapaksa-drstanta (example of similar instances), because there is no contradiction in meaning. Or it is only a dharma, and not a similar example, because the tone of the sentence is different. The paksa, hetu (reason), etc., should be matched in meaning accordingly.
Objection: Then, aggregated rupas should also be invisible.
Reply: If it is accepted that the quantity of aggregated rupas is the same as paramanus, then these aggregated rupas should be invisible, because their quantity is like paramanus. Another argument is established: 'Your coarse aggregated rupas should be invisible, because their quantity is like paramanus.' Or, because they are located at the same place as paramanus, just like paramanus. The paksa mentioned here, the hetu is as previously stated. However, the combination and the same location, these two criticisms, are both hypothetical objections, not the original assertion.
Objection: The Vaibhashikas (exponents of the Vibhasa) of Kashmir (Kashmira) say that not all paramanus have the meaning of combining.
Reply: Since the Sarvastivadins (those who assert everything exists) saw the previous refutation of the hypothetical objection, they said: 'Not all paramanus have the meaning of combining.' This is establishing the thesis. However, this original teacher does not mix them together either; in the same location, there is definitely no such thing. Now, here, it is only preventing combination. Vasumitra (a teacher) said: 'If paramanus touch each other, they should continue to exist until the next moment.' An elder (a senior monk) said: 'Paramanus do not actually touch each other, but because there is no gap, the name of contact is falsely established. If it were not so, there would be gaps between paramanus, and since the middle is empty, who would prevent their movement? It is allowed to be obstructive (having resistance).' Combination and touch, the names are different, but the meanings are the same. Kashmir is a region in northern India, and the Vibhasa (extensive commentary) was created in this country, hence it is named after it. The reason for this treatise is shown, as stated elsewhere. Vibhasa is the explanation of bhasa (language). Vi has three meanings: first, superior meaning, because this treatise decisively surpasses other treatises; second, different meaning, because within one treatise, various teachers have different opinions; third, extensive meaning, because in each meaning, various teachers explain extensively.
無方分故離如前失。
述曰。顯不合因。若有方分。可說有合得成六分。既無方分。不得相合。故離前來遮破我失。
論。但諸聚色有相合理有方分故。
述曰。阿耨色以上諸大聚色。可有相合。有方分故。可成六分。聚色亦成。即顯聚合許有方分。極微無合無分義成。俱舍論云。又和合色。許有分故。相觸無失。觸之與合。義一名異。此名為聚色。彼名和合色。
論。此亦不然。
述曰。此總非。
下理顯。
論。頌曰極微既無合聚有合者誰或相合不成不由無方分。
述曰。自下正破極微不成。于中有二。上二句但。正徴詰。下二句。設破轉救。汝說極微既無合義。極微即聚。聚有合者。非微是誰。或若聚色。亦無相合。故知不由無方分故。極微不合。聚有方分。亦不合故。
論。今應詰彼所說理趣。
述曰。將釋上二句頌。先發端標起。此中無難。但有徴詰外人所說無合理趣。理謂義理。趣謂意趣。雙徴義意。故詰理趣。或趣即理。理是能緣。意所趣故。
論。既異極微。無別聚色極微無合聚合者誰。
述曰。初二句牒。下二句詰。若異極微。有諸聚色。可言聚合極微合無。既異極微。諸聚非有。言聚有合。其合者誰。誰者問也。問
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『無方分故離如前失』。
述曰：這表明不符合因明（hetu）。如果存在方分，就可以說存在結合，從而形成六分。既然沒有方分，就不能相互結合。因此，用分離來遮止先前破斥我的過失。
論：但是，各種聚集的色法（rupa）之所以能夠相互結合，是因為它們具有方分。
述曰：阿耨色（anurupa，極微色）以上的各種大的聚集色法，可以相互結合，因為它們具有方分，可以形成六分。聚集的色法也能形成。這表明聚合允許存在方分。極微沒有結合也沒有分割的意義成立。《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）說：『又，和合的色法，允許有分割，因此相互接觸沒有過失。』接觸與結合，意義相同，名稱不同。這裡稱為聚色，那裡稱為和合色。
論：這種說法也不對。
述曰：這是總體的否定。
下面用道理來顯示。
論：頌曰：『極微既無合，聚有合者誰？或相合不成，不由無方分。』
述曰：下面正式破斥極微不能成立。其中有兩部分。前面兩句只是正式的征問，後面兩句是假設破斥並進行辯護。你說極微既然沒有結合的意義，極微就是聚集。聚集有結合，不是極微是誰？或者如果聚集的色法，也沒有相互結合，所以知道不是因為沒有方分的原因。極微不結合。聚集有方分，也不結合。
論：現在應該詰難他們所說的道理和意趣。
述曰：將要解釋上面兩句頌文，首先發起端緒。這裡沒有困難，只是征問外人所說的沒有結合的道理和意趣。理指義理，趣指意趣。同時征問義理和意趣，所以詰難理趣。或者趣就是理，理是能緣，是意所趨向的。
論：既然不同於極微，沒有其他的聚色，極微沒有結合，聚合的是誰？
述曰：前兩句是陳述，后兩句是詰問。如果不同於極微，有各種聚色，可以說聚合。極微結合了嗎？既然不同於極微，各種聚集不存在，說聚集有結合，那麼結合的是誰？誰是疑問詞，是提問。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Because there are no directional parts, the fault of separation remains as before.』
Commentary: This shows a non-conforming cause. If there were directional parts, it could be said that there is combination, thus forming six parts. Since there are no directional parts, they cannot combine with each other. Therefore, separation is used to prevent the previous refutation of my fault.
Treatise: But the reason why various aggregates of matter (rupa) can combine with each other is that they have directional parts.
Commentary: Various large aggregates of matter above Anurupa (anurupa, ultimate particle of matter) can combine with each other because they have directional parts and can form six parts. Aggregates of matter can also be formed. This shows that aggregation allows for the existence of directional parts. The meaning that ultimate particles have neither combination nor division is established. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says: 『Moreover, combined matter is allowed to have division, so there is no fault in mutual contact.』 Contact and combination have the same meaning but different names. Here it is called an aggregate of matter, and there it is called combined matter.
Treatise: This statement is also incorrect.
Commentary: This is a general negation.
The reason is shown below.
Treatise: Verse: 『Since ultimate particles have no combination, who has combination in aggregates? Or combination does not occur, not because of the absence of directional parts.』
Commentary: Below, the impossibility of ultimate particles is formally refuted. There are two parts to this. The first two lines are merely a formal inquiry, and the last two lines are a hypothetical refutation and defense. You say that since ultimate particles have no meaning of combination, ultimate particles are aggregates. Aggregates have combination, who is it if not ultimate particles? Or if aggregates of matter also do not combine with each other, then it is known that it is not because of the absence of directional parts. Ultimate particles do not combine. Aggregates have directional parts, but they also do not combine.
Treatise: Now, the reasoning and intention of what they say should be questioned.
Commentary: About to explain the above two lines of the verse, first initiate the beginning. There is no difficulty here, just questioning the reasoning and intention of what outsiders say about the absence of combination. Reasoning refers to the meaning of the doctrine, and intention refers to the purpose. Simultaneously questioning the meaning and intention, therefore questioning the reasoning and intention. Or intention is reasoning, reasoning is the able condition, which is what the intention tends towards.
Treatise: Since it is different from ultimate particles, there are no other aggregates of matter, ultimate particles have no combination, who is it that aggregates?
Commentary: The first two lines are statements, and the last two lines are questions. If it is different from ultimate particles, there are various aggregates of matter, it can be said that there is aggregation. Have ultimate particles combined? Since it is different from ultimate particles, various aggregates do not exist, saying that aggregates have combination, then who is it that combines? Who is a question word, it is a question.
聚合者體是誰也。助立量云。聚應無合。即極微故。猶如極微 極微應合。即諸聚故。猶如聚色。
論。若轉救言聚色展轉亦無合義。
述曰。此非正救。以彼師宗。許聚合故。言聚無合。是設為救。若諸聚色展轉。但有無間生至。假名為合。不相逼近。名無合者。彼師亦說。
論。則不應言極微無合無方分故。
述曰。此中總破正設二救汝之聚色。既不相合。則不應說以諸極微無方分故。極微無合。
所以者何。
論。聚有方分亦不許合故極微無合不由無方分。
述曰。此重顯成。破聚無合。汝之聚色。許有方分。亦不許相合。返顯成立極微無合。不由無方分。若由無方分。執極微無合。聚既有方分。聚色應有合。此中乃有法之差別。及有法差別隨一不成。非遍是宗法。同喻能立不成。異喻所立不遣。合有六過。所以者何。彼立量云。如我所說極微無合。無方分故。如心心所。實微無合。非實微無合。是法差別。作實微緣性不作實微緣性。有礙無礙。名有法差別。此因非但能成無合。如是亦能。成無合宗法非實微無合。及成有法作非實微緣性。及無質礙。若說汝實微無方分故。他隨一不成。若說我假微無合。無方分故。因不遍宗法。我說假微有方分故。若以聚色亦無合
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：什麼是聚合者體（Samghata-dravya，複合物質）？ 答：助成『立量』（Sthapana-hetu，建立論證）的量（pramana，認識的工具）說，聚合者體應是無合（asamhata，非結合）的，因為它是由極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）組成的。就像極微一樣。 問：極微應是結合的，因為它是由諸聚（samghata，複合體）組成的。就像聚色（samghata-rupa，複合的顏色）一樣。
論：如果轉而辯解說，聚色在擴充套件和轉變中也沒有結合的意義。
述曰：這並非正確的辯解，因為對方的宗派（自宗）是允許聚合的。說聚無合，是假設的辯解。如果諸聚色在擴充套件和轉變中，只有無間生滅，假名為合，不互相逼近，名為無合，對方的宗派也這樣說。
論：那麼，就不應該說極微無合，因為極微沒有方分（dik-bhaga，空間分割）。
述曰：這裡總的破斥了正救和設救兩種觀點。你的聚色既然不相合，那麼就不應該說因為諸極微沒有方分，所以極微無合。
為什麼這樣說呢？
論：聚有方分，也不允許相合，所以極微無合不是因為沒有方分。
述曰：這是再次顯明成立，破斥聚無合。你的聚色，允許有方分，也不允許相合，反過來顯明成立極微無合，不是因為沒有方分。如果因為沒有方分，就認為極微無合，那麼聚既然有方分，聚色就應該有合。這裡有『法之差別』（dharma-visesa，性質的差別）以及『有法差別』（dharmin-visesa，具有性質者的差別），隨一不成，不是普遍的宗法（paksa-dharma，主題的性質）。同喻（sadharmya-drstanta，相似的例子）的能立（sadhana，論證）不成，異喻（vaidharmya-drstanta，相異的例子）的所立（sadhya，所要證明的）不排除，結合有六種過失。為什麼這樣說呢？對方建立論證說：就像我所說的極微無合，因為沒有方分，就像心心所（citta-caitta，心和心所）。實微（sat-paramanu，真實的極微）無合，非實微無合，是法差別。作為實微的緣性，不作為實微的緣性，有礙無礙，名為有法差別。這個因（hetu，理由）不僅能成立無合，也能成立無合的宗法（paksa-dharma，主題的性質）——非實微無合，以及成立有法（dharmin，具有性質者）——作為非實微的緣性，以及沒有質礙。如果說你的實微沒有方分，對方隨一不成。如果說我的假微（kalpita-paramanu，假想的極微）無合，因為沒有方分，因不普遍於宗法。我說假微有方分，如果以聚色也無合。
【English Translation】 English version Question: What is the nature of the aggregate (Samghata-dravya, composite substance)? Answer: According to the means of valid cognition (pramana) that establishes the 'establishment-reason' (Sthapana-hetu), the aggregate should be non-combined (asamhata, non-integrated), because it is composed of ultimate particles (paramanu, the smallest unit of matter). Just like an ultimate particle. Question: An ultimate particle should be combined, because it is composed of aggregates (samghata, composites). Just like a composite color (samghata-rupa, composite of colors).
Objection: If one were to argue that composite color, in its expansion and transformation, also lacks the meaning of combination.
Reply: This is not a correct objection, because their school (self-school) admits aggregation. Saying that aggregates are non-combined is a hypothetical objection. If the composite colors, in their expansion and transformation, only have uninterrupted arising and ceasing, falsely called combination, and do not closely approach each other, called non-combined, their school also says this.
Argument: Then, it should not be said that an ultimate particle is non-combined, because an ultimate particle has no spatial divisions (dik-bhaga, spatial parts).
Reply: Here, both the correct objection and the hypothetical objection are generally refuted. Since your composite color is not combined, then it should not be said that because the ultimate particles have no spatial divisions, the ultimate particles are non-combined.
Why is this so?
Argument: An aggregate has spatial divisions, but combination is not allowed, so the non-combination of ultimate particles is not because of the absence of spatial divisions.
Reply: This is to re-clarify and establish, refuting the non-combination of aggregates. Your composite color, which is admitted to have spatial divisions, is also not allowed to be combined, which in turn clarifies and establishes that the non-combination of ultimate particles is not because of the absence of spatial divisions. If, because of the absence of spatial divisions, one considers ultimate particles to be non-combined, then since an aggregate has spatial divisions, the composite color should have combination. Here, there is a 'difference in properties' (dharma-visesa, difference in qualities) and a 'difference in the possessor of properties' (dharmin-visesa, difference in the subject possessing qualities), and one of them is not established, and it is not a universal property of the subject (paksa-dharma, property of the subject). The establishment (sadhana, proof) of the similar example (sadharmya-drstanta, example of similarity) is not established, and the exclusion of the opposite example (vaidharmya-drstanta, example of dissimilarity) is not excluded, and combination has six faults. Why is this so? The opponent establishes the argument by saying: Just as I said, ultimate particles are non-combined, because they have no spatial divisions, just like mind and mental factors (citta-caitta, mind and mental events). Real ultimate particles (sat-paramanu, real ultimate particles) are non-combined, and non-real ultimate particles are non-combined, which is a difference in properties. Being the causal nature of real ultimate particles, and not being the causal nature of real ultimate particles, being obstructive and non-obstructive, is called a difference in the possessor of properties. This reason (hetu, cause) can not only establish non-combination, but can also establish the property of the subject (paksa-dharma, property of the subject) of non-combination—that non-real ultimate particles are non-combined, and establish the possessor of properties (dharmin, subject possessing qualities)—that they are the causal nature of non-real ultimate particles, and that they have no material obstruction. If you say that your real ultimate particles have no spatial divisions, the opponent will not establish one of them. If I say that my imagined ultimate particles (kalpita-paramanu, imagined ultimate particles) are non-combined, because they have no spatial divisions, the reason is not universal to the property of the subject. I say that imagined ultimate particles have spatial divisions, and if composite color is also non-combined.
故。為微同品。能立不成。說諸聚色。有方分故。若以聚色。有方分故。為因異品。所立不遣。以諸聚色。雖有方分。亦無合故。此中亦有如電日等無常同品。勤勇之因。於此無故。同喻之中。能立不成。以電日等。為因異法。有無常故。所立不遣。為例難者。此亦不然。今他但以聚。為極微異法之喻。無合故。便有所立不遣之失。非聲無常宗。電等為異法。故無所立不遣之過。故今此論。但顯他量有此所立不遣之失。自餘五過。今助顯之。非本論意。善因明者。當自詳之。
論。是故一實極微不成。
述曰。此破小乘微不成中。結不成也。是者指前。故者所以。由前我說量過等。所以汝之所執一實微不成。
論。又許極微合與不合其過且爾。
述曰。上來二頌。破諸極微有合無合二俱不成。自下一頌。破外極微有分無分二俱不成。于中有三。初發論端。生不成理。次外返徴。后舉頌下正顯不成。發論端中。初結於前有合無合。后正生下有無分失。此結於前合無合也。汝宗所許一實極微。汝許相合及不相合。其過且如我所說爾。結上所明。舍不論也。
論。若許極微有分無分俱為大失。
述曰。此正生下有無分失。謂說極微更有方分。及無方分。俱有大失。
論。所以者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，如果（將）微小同類（的物質）作為能立，這是不成立的。因為（你）說諸聚色（由眾多顏色聚集而成的事物），有方位和部分。如果以聚色有方位和部分作為原因，那麼異品所立（的觀點）無法排除，因為諸聚色雖然有方位和部分，但也沒有結合成一體。這裡也有像閃電、太陽等無常的同類事物，但勤奮努力的原因在這裡並不存在。在同喻中，能立是不成立的，因為閃電、太陽等作為原因的異法，具有無常的性質，所以所立（的觀點）無法排除。如果有人以這些為例來提出詰難，那也是不對的。現在他只是以聚集（的事物）作為與極微不同的比喻，因為沒有結合成一體，所以就有了所立無法排除的過失，而不是以聲音無常為宗，以閃電等作為異法，所以沒有所立無法排除的過失。所以現在這個論證，只是顯示出他量有這種所立無法排除的過失，至於其餘五種過失，現在只是幫助顯示出來，並非本論的本意。善於因明的人，應當自己詳細考察。 論：因此，一實極微（最小的物質單位）是不成立的。 述曰：這是在破斥小乘宗派的極微不成立的觀點中，作出的不成立的結論。『是』指的是前面所說的，『故』指的是原因。由於前面我說了量（衡量）的過失等，所以你所執著的一實極微是不成立的。 論：又，允許極微相合與不相合，其過失且是如此。 述曰：上面兩頌，破斥了諸極微有相合和無相合兩種情況都不成立。下面一頌，破斥外道所說的極微有分和無分兩種情況都不成立。其中有三個部分：首先提出論點，產生不成立的道理；其次是外道的反駁；最後舉出頌文來正式顯示不成立。在提出論點中，首先總結前面所說的有相合和無相合，然後正式提出有分和無分的過失。這裡總結了前面所說的相合和不相合。你們宗派所允許的一實極微，你們允許它們相合或者不相合，其過失且如我所說的那樣。總結上面所說明的，捨棄不討論。 論：如果允許極微有分和無分，都會造成很大的過失。 述曰：這裡正式提出有分和無分的過失。意思是說，如果說極微還有方位和部分，或者沒有方位和部分，都會有很大的過失。 論：為什麼呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, if (taking) minute homogeneous substances as the probandum, it is not established. Because (you) say that aggregates of colors (things formed by the aggregation of numerous colors) have directions and parts. If the aggregates of colors having directions and parts are taken as the reason, then the thesis of dissimilar instances cannot be refuted, because although the aggregates of colors have directions and parts, they are not combined into one entity. Here, there are also impermanent homogeneous instances such as lightning and the sun, but the cause of diligent effort does not exist here. In the homological example, the probandum is not established, because dissimilar instances such as lightning and the sun, as the reason, have the nature of impermanence, so the thesis cannot be refuted. If someone uses these as examples to raise objections, that is also incorrect. Now, he is only using aggregation (of things) as a metaphor different from the ultimate particle, because there is no combination into one entity, so there is the fault of the thesis not being refuted, rather than taking sound as impermanent as the thesis, and lightning, etc., as dissimilar instances, so there is no fault of the thesis not being refuted. Therefore, this argument now only shows that other measures have this fault of the thesis not being refuted, as for the remaining five faults, now it is only helping to show them, not the original intention of this treatise. Those who are good at Hetu-vidya (logic), should examine it in detail themselves. Treatise: Therefore, the single real ultimate particle (the smallest unit of matter) is not established. Commentary: This is making the conclusion of non-establishment in refuting the view of the Sarvastivadins that the ultimate particle is not established. 'This' refers to what was said earlier, 'therefore' refers to the reason. Because I said earlier about the faults of measurement, etc., therefore your adherence to the single real ultimate particle is not established. Treatise: Furthermore, allowing ultimate particles to combine or not combine, the fault is just like that. Commentary: The above two verses refute that both the cases of ultimate particles having combination and not having combination are not established. The following verse refutes the view of externalists that ultimate particles having parts and not having parts are not established. There are three parts in it: first, put forward the argument, producing the reason for non-establishment; second, the externalist's rebuttal; and finally, cite the verse to formally show non-establishment. In putting forward the argument, first summarize what was said earlier about having combination and not having combination, and then formally put forward the faults of having parts and not having parts. Here summarizes what was said earlier about combination and non-combination. Your school's allowed single real ultimate particle, you allow them to combine or not combine, the fault is just as I said. Summarize what was explained above, abandoning the discussion. Treatise: If allowing ultimate particles to have parts and not have parts, it will cause great faults. Commentary: Here formally puts forward the faults of having parts and not having parts. It means that if you say that ultimate particles still have directions and parts, or do not have directions and parts, there will be great faults. Treatise: Why is that?
何。
述曰。此外人問。有何所以。俱有大失。
論。頌曰極微有方分理不應成一無應影障無聚不異無二。
述曰。上二句。顯有分失。下二句。明無分過。初之二句。文意可知。下二句中。總有三破。若無方分應無發影。應無為障頌第三句。有此二難。破無方分。頌第四句。破外救義。若諸聚色。不異極微。極微無二。其諸聚色。應無影障。重成前義。至下當知。然舊論頌。乃分為三。初二句為一。下二句各一。
論曰。以一極微六方分異多分為體云何成一。
述曰。釋上半頌。難有方分。正破經部。此亦設遮薩婆多師。今以理逼合有方分。非彼本計。如阿拏色中間一微。所對六方諸分。各異此一能對。體既成多。云何成一。以可分故。如前已難。與六微合。令成六分。故此破一有分為因應立量云。所執極微不應成一。必更可折有方分故。如諸聚色。若微不合。但可無間。無多分者。中間之微。隨不相合。所擬東處。非西等處。六面既殊。還應成六不成一也 所執極微應不成一。所擬東處非西等故。如諸聚色 無方分故。若所擬東非是東者。應擬西等亦非西等。若爾。此微應不成色。不可示其東西等故。如心心所。成唯識說。又諸極微。隨所住處。必有上下四方差別。不爾便無共和
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：這是什麼意思？ 答：陳述說：此外人提問，有什麼理由認為極微是有方分的？這完全是大錯。 論：頌文說：『極微有方分，道理上不應成為一體；沒有方分，就不應有發影和遮障，聚集起來的色法如果不異於極微，極微沒有二，那麼聚集起來的色法就不應有影和障。』 答：陳述說：上面兩句，顯示了有方分的過失；下面兩句，說明了沒有方分的過失。開始的兩句，文意可以理解。下面的兩句中，總共有三重破斥。如果沒有方分，就不應有發影；不應有遮障，頌文的第三句，有這兩種責難，破斥沒有方分。頌文的第四句，破斥外道的救義。如果各種聚集起來的色法，不異於極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位），極微沒有二，那麼各種聚集起來的色法，就不應有影和障，重新構成前面的意思，到下面應當知道。然而舊論的頌文，乃是分為三段，開始的兩句為一段，下面的兩句各為一段。 論：以一個極微六個方向的方分不同，多個方分為體，怎麼能成為一體？ 答：陳述說：解釋上半頌，責難有方分，正是破斥經部（Sautrāntika）。這也是假設遮止薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的老師。現在用道理逼迫使其承認有方分，不是他們本來的主張。比如阿拏色（aṇu-rūpa，微細色）中間的一個極微，所對的六個方向的各個部分，各自不同於這一個能對的部分，體既然成為多個，怎麼能成為一體？因為可以分割的緣故，如前面已經責難的。與六個極微結合，使其成為六個部分。所以這裡破斥一體，以有方分為原因，應當立量說：所執著的極微不應成為一體，必定可以再分割，因為有方分的緣故，如各種聚集起來的色法。如果極微不結合，但可以是無間，沒有多個部分，中間的極微，隨不相合，所擬定的東邊，不是西邊等處，六個面既然不同，還應當成為六個，不能成為一體。所執著的極微應不能成為一體，所擬定的東邊不是西邊等處，如各種聚集起來的色法。沒有方分的緣故，如果所擬定的東邊不是東邊，那麼應擬定的西邊等也不是西邊等。如果這樣，這個極微應不能成為色法，不可指示其東西等，如心心所。成唯識說，又各種極微，隨所住之處，必有上下四方差別，不然便沒有共同之處。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What does this mean? Answer: The commentary states: Outsiders ask, what reason is there to believe that atoms have spatial parts? This is completely wrong. Treatise: The verse says: 'Atoms with spatial parts, in principle, should not become one; without spatial parts, there should be no emission of shadows and obstructions; if the aggregated forms are not different from atoms, and atoms are not dual, then the aggregated forms should not have shadows and obstructions.' Answer: The commentary states: The first two lines show the fault of having spatial parts; the last two lines explain the fault of not having spatial parts. The meaning of the first two lines is understandable. In the last two lines, there are a total of three refutations. If there are no spatial parts, there should be no emission of shadows; there should be no obstructions. The third line of the verse contains these two challenges, refuting the absence of spatial parts. The fourth line of the verse refutes the externalist's attempt to salvage the meaning. If the various aggregated forms are not different from atoms (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter), and atoms are not dual, then the various aggregated forms should not have shadows and obstructions, re-establishing the previous meaning, which should be understood later. However, the verses of the old treatise are divided into three sections, with the first two lines as one section and the last two lines each as a section. Treatise: With one atom having different spatial parts in six directions, and multiple parts forming the body, how can it become one? Answer: The commentary states: Explaining the first half of the verse, challenging the existence of spatial parts, is precisely refuting the Sautrāntika (the Sutra School). This is also assuming to prevent the teacher of the Sarvāstivāda (the All Exists School). Now, using reason to force them to admit the existence of spatial parts is not their original assertion. For example, a subtle form (aṇu-rūpa, subtle form) in the middle of an atom, the various parts facing the six directions are each different from this one facing part. Since the body becomes multiple, how can it become one? Because it can be divided, as previously challenged. Combining with six atoms makes it become six parts. Therefore, here, refuting oneness, using the existence of spatial parts as the reason, one should establish the measure saying: The atom that is adhered to should not become one, it must be further divisible, because it has spatial parts, like the various aggregated forms. If atoms do not combine, but can be without interval, without multiple parts, the middle atom, following non-combination, the designated east side is not the west side, etc. Since the six faces are different, it should still become six, not become one. The atom that is adhered to should not become one, the designated east side is not the west side, etc., like the various aggregated forms. Because there are no spatial parts, if the designated east side is not the east side, then the designated west side, etc., should also not be the west side, etc. If so, this atom should not become a form, it cannot indicate its east, west, etc., like the mind and mental factors. The Consciousness-Only Treatise says, also, the various atoms, wherever they reside, must have differences in up, down, and four directions, otherwise there would be no commonality.
集義。和破古薩婆多師。集破新薩婆多正理論師。又有方分。必可分折。便非實有。
論。若一極微無異方分。
述曰。下破薩婆多無方分義。釋頌第三句中初無字。此敘彼計。彼由極微。極微圓故。能對之東。亦非是東。余方亦爾。無異方分。以極微細其相圓故。
論。日輪才舉光照觸時云何余邊得有影現。
述曰。此下正破。釋頌第三句應影無字。且如日輪才舉。自體放其光已。照觸柱等東邊一面。云何西邊得有影現。此雖理難。義猶未顯。有何所以。不許有影。
論。以無餘分光所不及。
述曰。以微所對。東非東等。日照東時。即是照于西等之處。既無極微。隨有一邊光所不及。故照東時。西應無影。應立量云。日照柱等時應無有影。無東西等諸方分故。如虛空等。成唯識說。若無方分。則如非色。云何和合。承光發影。承光發影。處既不同。所執極微定有方分。以現量破。
論。又執極微無方分者。
述曰。重牒彼計。釋第三句頌。初一無字義。意即顯此一無字。通影及障二難牒計。
論。云何此彼展轉相障。
述曰。此正申難。釋第三句頌應障無字。如以二手相擊觸時。東既非東等。云何左右手。展轉得相障。此由未曉不障所由。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 集義。和破古薩婆多師（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部，一個古老的佛教部派）。集合起來駁斥新的薩婆多正理論師。又有觀點認為，如果事物可以被分割，那就不是真實存在的。
論：如果一個極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）沒有不同的方位。
述曰：下面駁斥薩婆多部認為極微沒有方位的觀點。解釋頌文第三句中的『無』字。這是敘述他們的觀點。他們認為由於極微是圓的，所以它所面對的東邊，也就不是東邊了。其他方位也是一樣，沒有不同的方位。因為極微非常微小，它的形狀是圓的。
論：如果太陽剛剛升起，光芒照耀到物體，為什麼物體的另一邊會有陰影出現？
述曰：下面正式駁斥。解釋頌文第三句中的『應影無』字。比如太陽剛剛升起，太陽本身發出光芒，照耀到柱子等物體的東邊一面，為什麼西邊會有陰影出現？雖然這在道理上難以理解，但意義還不明顯。有什麼理由不允許有陰影的存在呢？
論：因為沒有光芒無法到達的其餘部分。
述曰：因為極微所面對的東邊不是東邊等等。太陽照耀東邊的時候，也就是照耀西邊等地方。既然沒有極微，那麼總有一邊是光芒無法到達的。所以照耀東邊的時候，西邊應該沒有陰影。應該建立一個量式：太陽照耀柱子等物體的時候，應該沒有陰影。因為沒有東西等方位，就像虛空一樣。《成唯識論》說，如果沒有方位，那就如同非色法一樣，如何能夠聚合，承受光芒併產生陰影？承受光芒併產生陰影的地方既然不同，那麼所執著的極微一定有方位。這是用現量來駁斥。
論：又如果認為極微沒有方位。
述曰：再次陳述他們的觀點。解釋第三句頌文，最初的『一無』二字的意思。意思是說這個『一無』二字，可以概括陰影和阻礙這兩種困難，並陳述他們的觀點。
論：為什麼物體之間能夠互相阻礙？
述曰：這是正式提出疑問。解釋第三句頌文中的『應障無』字。比如用兩隻手互相拍擊的時候，東邊既然不是東邊等等，為什麼左右手能夠互相阻礙？這是因為不明白不阻礙的原因。
【English Translation】 English version: Collection of meanings. [They] jointly refute the old Sarvāstivāda (everything exists) teachers. [They] gather to refute the new Sarvāstivāda orthodox theory teachers. Furthermore, there is the view that if something can be divided, then it is not truly existent.
Treatise: If a single paramāṇu (ultimate particle) has no different directions.
Commentary: Below, [we] refute the Sarvāstivāda's view that paramāṇus have no directions. Explaining the 'no' character in the third line of the verse. This narrates their view. They believe that because the paramāṇu is round, the east that it faces is not east. The other directions are the same, without different directions. Because the paramāṇu is extremely small, its shape is round.
Treatise: If the sun just rises and its light shines on something, why does the other side of the object have a shadow?
Commentary: Below, [we] formally refute. Explaining the 'should shadow no' characters in the third line of the verse. For example, if the sun just rises and the sun itself emits light, shining on the east side of a pillar or other object, why does the west side have a shadow? Although this is difficult to understand in principle, the meaning is not yet clear. What reason is there to not allow the existence of shadows?
Treatise: Because there are no remaining parts that the light cannot reach.
Commentary: Because the east that the paramāṇu faces is not east, etc. When the sun shines on the east, it is also shining on places like the west. Since there are no paramāṇus, there is always one side that the light cannot reach. Therefore, when shining on the east, there should be no shadow on the west. A syllogism should be established: when the sun shines on a pillar or other object, there should be no shadow. Because there are no directions such as east and west, like empty space. The Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) says that if there are no directions, then it is like non-form. How can it aggregate, receive light, and produce a shadow? Since the places that receive light and produce shadows are different, the paramāṇu that is adhered to must have directions. This is refuted using direct perception.
Treatise: Furthermore, if one believes that paramāṇus have no directions.
Commentary: Again stating their view. Explaining the meaning of the initial 'one no' characters in the third line of the verse. The meaning is that these 'one no' characters can summarize the two difficulties of shadow and obstruction, and state their view.
Treatise: Why can objects obstruct each other?
Commentary: This is formally raising the question. Explaining the 'should obstruct no' characters in the third line of the verse. For example, when two hands clap together, since the east is not east, etc., why can the left and right hands obstruct each other? This is because the reason for not obstructing is not understood.
論。以無餘分他所不行可說此彼展轉相礙。
述曰。以微所擬東非東等。左手之東。即是西等。無此一分非是左手他不行處。以西即東。故樹東應至西。故二相擊定無相障。行者往也。應立量云。手相擊等應不相障。無方分故。如虛空等。此無方分。亦不相障。故以為喻。成唯識說。又若見觸壁等物時。唯得此邊。不得彼分。既和合物。即諸極微。故此極微必有方分。
論。既不相礙應諸極微展轉處同。
述曰。前破無分不得相礙。今破不礙。令處應同。此極微處。應即是諸極微處所。不相礙故。既爾。此色應不成粗。皆相入故。
論。則諸色聚同一微量。過如前說。
述曰。若許同處。則汝所言諸聚色法。同一微量。應不成粗不成粗故。過如前說。前說者何。謂若六同處聚。量應如微。則應聚色。亦不可見。比量如前。故不重述。
論。云何不許影障屬聚不屬極微。
述曰。此外人救。我說極微無有方分。汝便難言應無影障。汝宗云何不許我說聚有方分。影障屬聚。極微無分不屬極微。
論。豈異極微許有聚色發影為障。
述曰。論主返詰。汝雖作難。然汝本宗。豈異於極微。許別有聚色。極微無影障。聚發影為障。
論。不爾。
述曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果極微沒有剩餘部分，那麼它所不能通過的地方，就可以說是彼此互相阻礙的。
述記：用極微來比擬，東非東等。左手的東邊，就是西邊等。沒有這一部分就不是左手不能通過的地方。因為西就是東，所以樹的東邊應該到達西邊。因此，兩個物體相撞必定互相阻礙。行者前往也是如此。應該立一個論式：手相擊等，應該不互相阻礙，因為沒有方位分界，就像虛空一樣。虛空沒有方位分界，也不互相阻礙，所以用它來作比喻。《成唯識論》說：又如果看見觸控墻壁等物體時，只能得到這一邊，得不到那一部分。既然是和合物，就是由諸極微組成。因此，這個極微必定有方位分界。
論：既然不互相阻礙，那麼所有的極微應該在同一個地方。
述記：前面破斥了無分，說它們不應該互相阻礙。現在破斥不阻礙，使得它們所處的地方應該相同。這個極微所處的地方，應該就是所有極微所處的地方。因為不互相阻礙。既然這樣，那麼這個顏色就不應該形成粗大的物體，因為它們都互相進入了。
論：那麼所有的色聚都只有極微的大小，過失和前面說的一樣。
述記：如果允許在同一個地方，那麼你所說的所有聚集的色法，就只有極微的大小。應該不能形成粗大的物體，因為不能形成粗大的物體，所以過失和前面說的一樣。前面說的是什麼呢？就是如果六個極微在同一個地方聚集，那麼它們的大小應該和極微一樣，那麼聚集的顏色也應該看不見。比量和前面一樣，所以不再重複敘述。
論：為什麼不允許影子和障礙屬於色聚，而不屬於極微呢？
述記：這是外人的辯解。我說極微沒有方位分界，你就反駁說應該沒有影子和障礙。你們宗派為什麼不允許我說色聚有方位分界，影子和障礙屬於色聚，極微沒有分界，所以不屬於極微呢？
論：難道不同於極微，允許有色聚發出影子作為障礙嗎？
述記：論主反駁說：你雖然提出疑問，但是你們本來的宗派，難道不同於極微，允許另外有色聚。極微沒有影子和障礙，色聚發出影子作為障礙嗎？
論：不是這樣的。
述記：
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If the ultimate particle has no remaining parts, then what it cannot pass through can be said to be mutually obstructive.
Commentary: Using the ultimate particle as an analogy, east is not east, etc. The east of the left hand is the west, etc. Without this part, it is not a place that the left hand cannot pass through. Because west is east, the east of the tree should reach the west. Therefore, two objects colliding must obstruct each other. A practitioner going is also like this. One should establish a proposition: hands colliding, etc., should not obstruct each other, because there are no directional boundaries, like empty space. Empty space has no directional boundaries and does not obstruct each other, so it is used as a metaphor. The Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says: 'Also, if one sees or touches a wall or other object, one can only obtain this side and not that part.' Since it is a composite, it is composed of ultimate particles. Therefore, this ultimate particle must have directional boundaries.
Treatise: Since they do not obstruct each other, then all ultimate particles should be in the same place.
Commentary: The previous section refuted the idea of indivisibility, saying that they should not obstruct each other. Now, this refutes non-obstruction, making their locations the same. The place where this ultimate particle is located should be the place where all ultimate particles are located, because they do not obstruct each other. If so, then this color should not form a coarse object, because they all enter each other.
Treatise: Then all aggregates of color would have the same size as an ultimate particle, and the fault would be as previously stated.
Commentary: If it is allowed to be in the same place, then all the aggregated color dharmas you speak of would have the same size as an ultimate particle. They should not be able to form coarse objects, and because they cannot form coarse objects, the fault is as previously stated. What was said before? It means that if six ultimate particles gather in the same place, then their size should be the same as an ultimate particle, and then the aggregated color should also be invisible. The inference is the same as before, so it is not repeated.
Treatise: Why not allow shadows and obstacles to belong to aggregates of color and not to ultimate particles?
Commentary: This is an outsider's defense. I said that the ultimate particle has no directional boundaries, and you retorted that there should be no shadows and obstacles. Why does your school not allow me to say that aggregates of color have directional boundaries, shadows and obstacles belong to aggregates of color, and ultimate particles have no boundaries, so they do not belong to ultimate particles?
Treatise: Is it not different from ultimate particles, allowing aggregates of color to emit shadows as obstacles?
Commentary: The treatise master retorted: Although you raise a question, does your original school, different from ultimate particles, allow there to be separate aggregates of color? Ultimate particles have no shadows and obstacles, and aggregates of color emit shadows as obstacles?
Treatise: It is not so.
Commentary:
此外人答。非異極微別有聚色。故言不爾。
論。若爾聚應無二。
述曰。此論主難 若爾者。釋頌第四句。聚不異言 聚應無二。釋無二言爾者。此牒彼計。若聚不異極微 則應聚色無影障二。即極微故。猶如極微。
此即總答。次下別顯。
論。謂若聚色不異極微影障應成不屬聚色。
述曰。此廣前難。此中四句。上半顯聚不異。下半明無二。謂若汝宗所說聚色。不異汝執一實極微。其影及障。應屬極微。不屬聚色。聚色體即是極微故 比量如前。成唯識中。亦作是說。既和合物。即其極微。發影障等。故知極微。定有方分。
論。安布差別立為極微或立為聚俱非一實。
述曰。明一實微不成之中。上來第二。有合無合有分無分。正答不成此。即第三申我正義。總結不成。此四句中。上三句申正義。第四句結不成答。若吠世史迦。極微實句攝。通常無常。空劫極微體是常住。成劫之微。此所生者。名為無常。其量方大。后大地等。合成一物。唯地水火風。是極微性。色聲香味觸。五大之德。體非是微。若順世外道。與勝論同。然所生子微。同本因量。子微別與量德合故。可名為粗。非本極微亦量德合。薩婆多極微。十色處攝。七極微成阿耨。乃至展轉。積小成大。極
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此外人回答說：並非不同的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）之外，另外有聚集的色（rūpa，顏色、形態）。所以說不是這樣的。
論：如果這樣，聚集的色應該沒有二相。
述記：這是論主的責難。『如果這樣』，解釋頌文的第四句，『聚集不異』的意思。『聚集應該沒有二相』，解釋『沒有二相』的意思。『如果這樣』，這是重複對方的觀點。如果聚集的色不異於極微，那麼聚集的色應該沒有影和障這二相，因為它就是極微。就像極微一樣。
這即是總的回答。接下來分別顯示。
論：如果聚集的色不異於極微，那麼影和障應該成為不屬於聚集的色。
述記：這是廣泛地責難前面所說的。這其中有四句。上半部分顯示聚集不異。下半部分說明沒有二相。如果你們宗派所說的聚集的色，不異於你們所執著的一實極微，那麼它的影和障，應該屬於極微，不屬於聚集的色。因為聚集的色體就是極微。比量就像前面所說。《成唯識論》中，也是這樣說的。既然是和合物，就是它的極微，產生影和障等，所以知道極微一定有方分。
論：安布的差別被立為極微，或者被立為聚集，都不是一實。
述記：說明一實極微不能成立之中，上面是第二點，有合無合，有分無分。正面回答不能成立。這即是第三點，陳述我的正義。總結不能成立。這四句中，前三句陳述正義。第四句總結不能成立的回答。如果吠世史迦（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派），極微實句所攝，通常無常。空劫的極微體是常住的。成劫的極微，是所生的，名為無常。它的量方大。後來的大地等，合成一物。只有地水火風，是極微的性質。色聲香味觸，五大之德，體不是極微。如果順世外道，與勝論相同。然而所生的子微，與本因的量相同。子微另外與量德結合，可以名為粗，並非本來的極微也與量德結合。薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部）的極微，十色處所攝。七個極微成為阿耨（aṇu，微塵），乃至輾轉，積小成大。極
【English Translation】 English version Another person answers: It is not that besides different paramāṇus (smallest units of matter), there is a separate aggregate of rūpa (form, color). Therefore, it is not so.
Treatise: If that is so, the aggregate should not have two characteristics.
Commentary: This is the treatise master's refutation. 'If that is so' explains the fourth line of the verse, meaning 'the aggregate is not different.' 'The aggregate should not have two characteristics' explains the meaning of 'no two characteristics.' 'If that is so' is a repetition of the opponent's view. If the aggregate of rūpa is not different from the paramāṇu, then the aggregate of rūpa should not have the two characteristics of shadow and obstruction, because it is the paramāṇu. It is like the paramāṇu.
This is the general answer. Next, it is shown separately.
Treatise: If the aggregate of rūpa is not different from the paramāṇu, then shadow and obstruction should not belong to the aggregate of rūpa.
Commentary: This is a broad refutation of what was said earlier. There are four lines here. The first half shows that the aggregate is not different. The second half explains that there are no two characteristics. If the aggregate of rūpa spoken of by your school is not different from the one real paramāṇu that you adhere to, then its shadow and obstruction should belong to the paramāṇu and not to the aggregate of rūpa. Because the substance of the aggregate of rūpa is the paramāṇu. The analogy is as before. In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Mere Consciousness), it is also said in this way. Since it is a composite, it is its paramāṇu, producing shadow and obstruction, etc. Therefore, it is known that the paramāṇu definitely has spatial dimensions.
Treatise: The difference in arrangement being established as a paramāṇu, or being established as an aggregate, neither is truly real.
Commentary: Explaining that the one real paramāṇu cannot be established, the above is the second point, having combination or not having combination, having parts or not having parts. Directly answering that it cannot be established. This is the third point, stating my correct meaning. Concluding that it cannot be established. In these four lines, the first three lines state the correct meaning. The fourth line concludes the answer that it cannot be established. If the Vaiśeṣika (atomist school), the paramāṇu is included in the real statement, usually impermanent. The paramāṇu of the empty kalpa (aeon) is permanent. The paramāṇu of the forming kalpa, which is produced, is called impermanent. Its size is large. The later great earth, etc., combine into one thing. Only earth, water, fire, and wind are the nature of the paramāṇu. Form, sound, smell, taste, and touch, the virtues of the five great elements, are not the substance of the paramāṇu. If the Lokāyata (materialist school) is the same as the Vaiśeṣika. However, the produced child-paramāṇu is the same as the quantity of the original cause. The child-paramāṇu is additionally combined with the quantity-virtue, so it can be called coarse, not the original paramāṇu also combined with the quantity-virtue. The Sarvāstivāda (the 'all exists' school) paramāṇu is included in the ten sense-fields of form. Seven paramāṇus become an aṇu (dust mote), and so on, gradually accumulating from small to large. Extremely
微實有故五識緣。阿耨以上皆是假有。五識不緣。經部極微隨何處攝。亦是實有積成大物。大物是假。五識所緣。其實極微。唯意識得。然大乘中。極微亦假。法處所收。但從大物拆成於小。名為極微。非從於小積以成大。成唯識說。然識變時。隨量大小頓現一相。非別變作眾多極微。合成一物。為執粗色有實體者。佛說極微令其除拆。非謂諸色實有極微諸瑜伽師。以假想慧。于粗色相。漸次除拆。至不可拆。假說極微。雖此極微猶有方分。而不可拆。若更拆之。便似空現。不名為色。故說極微是色邊際。廣如瑜伽第三。及五十四。顯揚第五。及十六十八等解。故今論言覺慧分拆安布差別立為極微。若不折時。頓現一相。即立為聚。聚色可更拆。微假慧安布故。微與聚俱非一實。遮彼聚微體是實有。非我大乘聚亦稱假。有實色用。別從種生。非諸極微。有此義故。
論。何用思擇極微聚為。猶未能遮外色等相。
述曰。初段之中。第四反破外境實執。合有五頌。上來四頌。初之一頌。合破小乘外道二執。其次三頌。正破小乘。下第五頌。正破外道。設破小乘。于中有八。初勝論師等咸作是言。且置極微。猶未遮我外色等相。二論主問。三外人答。四論主徴。五外人問。六論主難。七正量部等救。八論主破
。此即初也。勝論等言。前來極微何用思擇。然汝大乘。猶未能遮我宗等。立外色等相。
論。此復何相。
述曰。此論主問。汝色等相體即極微。極微已破。即破色等。復言未遮我色等相。此諸色等。離極微外。復有何相。
論。謂眼等境亦是青等實色等性。
述曰。此外人答。外色等相。即是眼等諸現量境。此通五塵。亦是顯色。青黃赤等實色等性。即顯二義。外色等相。一顯現量境。二顯實體。故是實有。其內五根。就他宗說。非現量境。但能發識。比知是有。且約外處辨現量境。于青等中。等取黃等。亦兼聲等。實色等中。亦等聲等。此所說者。識外實有。
論。廣應共審思此眼等境青等實性為一為多。
述曰。此論主徴。隨其經部。或薩婆多。或吠世師。若假若實。汝今與我。應共審思。汝此所說。諸外色等。眼等五境。青等實性。為體是一。為體是多。此為二問。
論。設爾何失。
述曰。此外人答。設一或多。竟有何失。
論。二俱有過多過如前一亦非理。
述曰。下論主難。若一若多。二俱有過。其多過者。如前已說。非多極微等。以下三頌。是一亦非理。非直多成失。設一復為過。故言亦非理。
外人伏問。非理者何。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這就是最初的觀點。勝論派等認為，之前的極微（Paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）有什麼值得思考的呢？然而你們大乘佛教，仍然不能駁倒我宗派等所建立的外色等相。
論：這又是什麼樣的相呢？
述曰：這是論主的提問。你們所說的色等相，其本體就是極微。極微已經被破斥，那麼色等也就被破斥了。現在又說沒有駁倒我所說的色等相，那麼這些色等，離開極微之外，又是什麼樣的相呢？
論：所謂眼等（cakṣu-ādi，視覺等）的境界，也就是青等（nīla-ādi，藍色等）真實色等（satya-varṇa-ādi，真實顏色等）的自性。
述曰：這是外道之人的回答。外色等相，就是眼等諸現量境（pratyakṣa-viṣaya，直接感知的對象）。這裡涵蓋了五塵（pañca-viṣaya，五種感官對像），也是顯色（varṇa，顏色），青黃赤等真實色等之自性，這裡既顯示了『顯』，又顯示了『實體』這兩個含義。外色等相，一是顯現量境，二是顯實體，所以是真實存在的。至於內在的五根（pañcendriya，五種感官），按照他們的宗派來說，不是現量境，只能引發意識，通過比量（anumāna，推論）才能知道它們的存在。這裡暫且以外處來辨別現量境。在青等之中，『等』包含了黃等，也包括了聲等。在實色等中，也『等』包含了聲等。這裡所說的是，識之外是真實存在的。
論：應該廣泛共同地審視思考，這眼等境界的青等實性，是一還是多。
述曰：這是論主的質問。無論是經部（Sautrāntika，佛教的一個學派），還是薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部，佛教的一個學派），或者是吠世師（Vaiśeṣika，印度教的一個學派），無論是假是真，你們現在應該和我共同審視思考。你們所說的這些外色等，眼等五境，青等實性，其本體是一，還是其本體是多。這是兩個問題。
論：假設這樣，會有什麼過失呢？
述曰：這是外道之人的回答。假設是一或者多，究竟有什麼過失呢？
論：兩種情況都有過失，多的過失如前面所說，一也不是道理。
述曰：下面是論主的駁難。如果是一或者是多，兩種情況都有過失。多的過失，如前面已經說過，不是多個極微等。下面的三頌，說的是一也不是道理。不僅僅是多會造成過失，假設是一，也會有過失，所以說『亦非理』。
外人反問：什麼不是道理呢？
【English Translation】 English version: This is the initial view. The Vaiśeṣika school and others say, 'What is there to contemplate about the previous Paramāṇu (atom, the smallest unit of matter)?' However, you, Mahāyāna Buddhism, still cannot refute the external color and other characteristics established by our school.
Treatise: What are these characteristics?
Commentary: This is the treatise master's question. You say that the nature of color and other characteristics is Paramāṇu. Since Paramāṇu has been refuted, color and other characteristics have also been refuted. Now you say that you have not refuted my color and other characteristics. Then, what are these colors and other characteristics apart from Paramāṇu?
Treatise: The objects of the eye and other senses (cakṣu-ādi, visual sense etc.) are also the nature of real colors such as blue (nīla-ādi, blue etc.).
Commentary: This is the answer of the outsider. External color and other characteristics are the objects of direct perception (pratyakṣa-viṣaya, directly perceived objects) of the eye and other senses. This encompasses the five sense objects (pañca-viṣaya, five sensory objects), and is also the nature of manifest colors (varṇa, color), such as blue, yellow, red, and other real colors. This shows both 'manifestation' and 'substance'. External color and other characteristics are, firstly, objects of direct perception, and secondly, manifest substances, so they are real. As for the internal five senses (pañcendriya, five sensory organs), according to their school, they are not objects of direct perception, but can only give rise to consciousness, and their existence can only be known through inference (anumāna, inference). Here, we will temporarily distinguish the objects of direct perception by external objects. Among blue and other colors, 'etc.' includes yellow and other colors, as well as sounds and other things. Among real colors, 'etc.' also includes sounds and other things. What is being said here is that there is reality outside of consciousness.
Treatise: It should be extensively and jointly examined and considered whether the real nature of blue and other colors in the realm of the eye and other senses is one or many.
Commentary: This is the treatise master's question. Whether it is the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school), the Sarvāstivāda (a Buddhist school), or the Vaiśeṣika (a Hindu school), whether it is false or true, you should now examine and consider this with me. These external colors and other things that you speak of, the five objects of the eye and other senses, the real nature of blue and other colors, is their essence one, or is their essence many? These are two questions.
Treatise: If so, what fault would there be?
Commentary: This is the answer of the outsider. If it is one or many, what fault would there be?
Treatise: Both cases have faults, the fault of many is as previously stated, and one is also not reasonable.
Commentary: Below is the treatise master's refutation. Whether it is one or many, both cases have faults. The fault of many is as previously stated, not multiple Paramāṇu and so on. The following three verses say that one is also not reasonable. Not only does many cause faults, but if it is one, there will also be faults, so it is said 'also not reasonable'.
The outsider asks in return: What is not reasonable?
論。頌曰一應無次行俱時至未至及多有間事並難見細物。
述曰。下正破一。前敘宗中。衛世執一。小乘執多。今此設遮小乘執一。意兼外道。以小乘救有色等故 其頌一字。牒外人執 應無二字。通下五難 五難者何。若執境一。一應無次第行義。二應無俱時至未至。三應無多有間事。四應無有間。五應無難見細物。今合第三多有間事。第四有間為第三句。言多有間事。如業道等。西域言遮。此翻為及。或翻為等。若作及義。於六釋中。顯相違釋。第三句及第四句。並是顯此四難義各不同。非無次行。即是俱時。至與未至。故置及言。若言等者。顯非唯爾。更有此余。今者四義。皆已列名。等不是等。但言及並。顯相違釋。
論曰。若無隔別所有青等眼所行境執為一物。
述曰。釋頌一字。即敘彼宗。彼宗意說。若有隔別。眼所行境。體即是多。無隔別時。所有青等。眼所行者。說為一物。其聲香等。類色亦然。
前來總議外五處故。不是唯言於色處法。今此文略且言眼境。非耳等境。此中不破彼執為多。然此牒計。于下四難。一一應敘。凡難義法。牒方難故。今恐文繁。最初總敘。下別為難。
論。應無漸次行大地理若下一足至一切故。
述曰。此第一破。配頌可知。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：頌詞說：如果一切事物都是單一的，那麼就不會有次第的行動，也不會有同時到達和未到達的情況，也不會有多種有間隔的事物，也不會有間隔，也不會有難以看見的細微之物。
述記說：下面正式破斥『一』的觀點。前面敘述宗義時，衛世（Saudṛṣṭāntika，經量部）執著于『一』，小乘（Hinayana）執著于『多』。現在這裡設立遮難，針對小乘執著于『一』的觀點，意在兼顧外道（Tīrthika）。因為小乘爲了救護有色等事物，所以頌詞中的『一』字，是針對外人的執著。『應無』二字，統攝下面的五難。五難是什麼呢？如果執著于境是單一的，一應沒有次第行動的道理；二應沒有同時到達和未到達的情況；三應沒有多種有間隔的事物；四應沒有間隔；五應沒有難以看見的細微之物。現在合併第三種『多種有間隔的事物』和第四種『有間隔』為第三句。說『多種有間隔的事物』，如業道等。西域（Western Regions）的語言中，『遮』翻譯成這裡就是『及』，或者翻譯成『等』。如果作為『及』的含義，在六釋（ṣaṭ-sthāna）中，是顯相違釋（bhāva-virodha-vyākhyā）。第三句和第四句，都是顯示這四難的意義各不相同。『非無次行』，就是『俱時』，『至與未至』，所以設定『及』字。如果說『等』，顯示並非僅僅如此，還有其他的。現在這四種意義，都已經列出名稱，『等』不是『等』，只是說『及』和『並』，顯示相違釋。
論：如果沒有隔絕，所有青色等眼所行之境，執著為單一之物。
述記說：解釋頌詞中的『一』字，就是敘述他們的宗義。他們的宗義認為，如果有隔絕，眼所行之境，體性就是多的。沒有隔絕時，所有青色等眼所行之境，就說是單一之物。其聲、香等，與色類似。
前面總的議論外五處（外五處指色、聲、香、味、觸五種外境），所以不是隻說色處法（rūpa-āyatana-dharma）。現在這裡文略，且說眼境（cakṣur-viṣaya）。不是耳等境（śrotra-viṣaya）。這裡不破斥他們執著為多。然而這裡敘述他們的計度，在下面的四難中，一一應該敘述。凡是作難的義法，要敘述對方的觀點才能作難，現在恐怕文字繁瑣，最初總的敘述，下面分別作難。
論：應沒有漸次行走廣大地理的道理，如果下一步足就到達一切地方。
述記說：這是第一種破斥，配合頌詞就可以知道。
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The verse says: 'If all things are one, then there would be no sequential action, nor simultaneous arrival and non-arrival, nor multiple things with intervals, nor intervals, nor difficult-to-see subtle things.'
Commentary: Below, we formally refute the view of 'one'. Previously, when narrating the tenets, the Saudṛṣṭāntikas (the Sautrāntika school) adhered to 'one', while the Hinayana adhered to 'many'. Now, we establish a refutation targeting the Hinayana's adherence to 'one', intending to encompass the Tīrthikas (non-Buddhist schools). Because the Hinayana aims to safeguard colored objects, etc., the word 'one' in the verse is directed at the adherence of outsiders. The words 'should not' encompass the following five difficulties. What are the five difficulties? If one adheres to the view that objects are singular, one, there should be no reason for sequential action; two, there should be no simultaneous arrival and non-arrival; three, there should be no multiple things with intervals; four, there should be no intervals; five, there should be no difficult-to-see subtle things. Now, we combine the third 'multiple things with intervals' and the fourth 'with intervals' into the third sentence. Saying 'multiple things with intervals', such as the paths of karma, etc. In the language of the Western Regions, '遮 (zhē)' is translated here as '及 (jí)', or translated as '等 (děng)'. If it is used as the meaning of '及 (jí)', in the six explanations (ṣaṭ-sthāna), it is a manifest contradictory explanation (bhāva-virodha-vyākhyā). The third and fourth sentences both show that the meanings of these four difficulties are different. 'Not without sequential action' is 'simultaneous', 'arrival and non-arrival', so the word '及 (jí)' is set. If one says '等 (děng)', it shows that it is not only this, but there are others. Now these four meanings have all been listed by name, '等 (děng)' is not '等 (děng)', but only says '及 (jí)' and '並 (bìng)', showing a contradictory explanation.
Treatise: If there is no separation, all blue colors, etc., that are objects of the eye, are adhered to as a single thing.
Commentary: Explaining the word 'one' in the verse is to narrate their tenets. Their tenets believe that if there is separation, the objects of the eye are multiple in nature. When there is no separation, all blue colors, etc., that are objects of the eye are said to be a single thing. Their sounds, smells, etc., are similar to colors.
Previously, we generally discussed the outer five sense bases (outer five sense bases refer to the five external objects of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch), so it is not only about the rūpa-āyatana-dharma (sphere of form and dharma). Now, this text is abbreviated, and we only speak of cakṣur-viṣaya (the object of the eye). Not śrotra-viṣaya (the object of the ear), etc. Here, we do not refute their adherence to multiplicity. However, here we narrate their estimation, and in the following four difficulties, each should be narrated. Whenever there is a method of making difficulties, one must narrate the other party's point of view in order to make difficulties. Now, fearing that the text is cumbersome, we first give a general narration, and then make difficulties separately below.
Treatise: There should be no reason for gradually walking across a vast geography, if one step reaches everywhere.
Commentary: This is the first refutation, which can be understood by matching the verse.
若執為一。眼所行境。無隔障處。世間應無漸次行大地義。以地一故。若下一足已至一切。如何可說有漸次行。應立量言 無隔障處下此一足時所未至處時亦應至。汝執一故。彼即此故。猶如於此 或云。無隔大地應無漸次行義。若下一足至一切故。如此足處。然今論文。有大宗意。其為比量。應如是知。然今眼境。名大地者。假名大地。非實地大。
論。又應俱時於此于彼。無至未至。
述曰。此第二難。若執是一。且如手執無隔障物。無有一法一時之中。此邊彼邊。有手至未至。
此猶未曉。次顯其因。
論。一物一時理不應有得未得故。
述曰。至者到也。得也。及也。體是一物。於一時中。若手執時。理不應有。此處可得。彼處未得。今依此難。一切世間。無一物者。所以者何。且如一筆。以手執時。有至未至。如何成一。故知。大乘諸眼等境。或可說一。總可至故。如手握珠。或可說多。至未至故。如指捻珠。應立量云 汝宗世間無隔斷物無有一法有至未至。執是一故。如手握珠。
論。又一方處應不得有多象馬等有間隙事。
述曰。此第三難。若執境一。于無隔障一方處所。多象馬等。皆集其中。應不得有。像馬等物。多間隙事。二物中間所見空處。是次下
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果執著于『一』（Eka，唯一性）的觀點，認為眼睛所能看到的境界，沒有阻隔障礙之處，那麼世間就不應該存在逐漸行走于大地上的道理。因為大地是『一』的緣故。如果下一步足就到達了所有地方，怎麼能說有逐漸行走的過程呢？應該這樣建立論證：在沒有阻隔障礙的地方，當下一足時，所未到達之處，在同一時間也應該到達。因為你執著于『一』的觀點，彼處即是此處。就像在這裡一樣。或者說，如果沒有阻隔的大地，就不應該有逐漸行走的道理，因為下一步足就到達了所有地方，就像這隻腳所處的地方一樣。然而，現在的論文中，有更重要的意義，這個比量（anumana，推論）應該這樣理解。現在眼睛所見的境界，名為大地，只是假名的大地，並非真實的大地。
論：又應該同時在此處和彼處，沒有到達和未到達的區別。
述曰：這是第二個難題。如果執著于『一』的觀點，比如手拿著沒有阻隔障礙的物體，沒有一種法（dharma，事物、現象）在同一時間，此邊和彼邊，有手到達和未到達的區別。
這仍然沒有理解透徹，下面闡明其中的原因。
論：一個事物在同一時間，道理上不應該有得到和未得到的情況。
述曰：到達，就是到達、得到、及於。本體是一個事物，在同一時間，如果手拿著它，道理上不應該有，此處可以得到，彼處尚未得到。現在依據這個難題，一切世間，沒有『一』的事物。為什麼呢？比如一支筆，用手拿著的時候，有到達和未到達的區別，如何能成為『一』呢？所以要知道，大乘（Mahayana）諸眼等所見的境界，或許可以說『一』，總體上可以到達的緣故，比如手握著珠子；或許可以說『多』，有到達和未到達的區別的緣故，比如手指捻著珠子。應該這樣建立論證：你所宗的世間，沒有隔斷的物體，沒有一種法有到達和未到達的區別，因為執著于『一』的觀點，就像手握著珠子一樣。
論：又在一個地方，不應該有多頭大象、馬等有間隙的事物。
述曰：這是第三個難題。如果執著于境界是『一』，在沒有阻隔障礙的一個地方，多頭大象、馬等都聚集在那裡，就不應該有大象、馬等物體之間存在很多間隙的情況，兩個物體中間所看到的空處。
【English Translation】 English version: If one adheres to the view of 'Eka' (oneness), believing that the realm perceived by the eye has no obstructions, then there should be no gradual progression across the earth in this world. Because the earth is 'one'. If taking one step means reaching everywhere, how can one speak of gradual progression? One should establish the argument thus: In a place without obstructions, when one foot is placed down, the places not yet reached should also be reached at the same time. Because you adhere to the view of 'one', that place is this place. Just like here. Or, if there is no obstructed earth, there should be no gradual progression, because taking one step reaches everywhere, just like where this foot is. However, the current treatise has a greater meaning; this anumana (inference) should be understood in this way. The realm seen by the eye, called earth, is merely a nominal earth, not a real, great earth.
Treatise: Furthermore, it should be simultaneously here and there, with no distinction between reached and unreached.
Commentary: This is the second difficulty. If one adheres to the view of 'one', like holding an object without obstructions, there is no dharma (phenomenon, thing) at the same time where the hand has both reached and not reached, on this side and that side.
This is still not fully understood; the reason is clarified below.
Treatise: It is not reasonable for one thing to have both attainment and non-attainment at the same time.
Commentary: Reaching means arriving, attaining, and extending to. The substance is one thing; at the same time, if the hand is holding it, it is not reasonable to have a situation where it can be attained here but not attained there. Now, based on this difficulty, there is no 'one' thing in all the world. Why? For example, a pen, when held by the hand, has both reached and unreached parts; how can it be 'one'? Therefore, one should know that the realms seen by the eyes, etc., in Mahayana (Great Vehicle), may be said to be 'one' because they can be reached in their entirety, like a hand holding beads; or they may be said to be 'many' because there are reached and unreached parts, like fingers twirling beads. One should establish the argument thus: In your school, there are no obstructed objects in the world, and no dharma has both reached and unreached parts, because you adhere to the view of 'one', like a hand holding beads.
Treatise: Furthermore, in one place, there should not be multiple elephants, horses, etc., with gaps between them.
Commentary: This is the third difficulty. If one adheres to the view that the realm is 'one', in one place without obstructions, where multiple elephants, horses, etc., are gathered, there should not be many gaps between the elephants, horses, etc.; the empty space seen between two objects.
難。像馬二物。自不相到。名間隙事。是此中難。
所以者何。
論。若處有一亦即有餘云何此彼可辨差別。
述曰。此顯所由。所依之處體既是一。若有一象。亦有餘馬。云何此象。及彼馬等。可辨差別。應立量云 于無障隔一方處所多象馬集一象住地應余馬等亦住此地。執是一故。如此一象住地 或言汝宗無隔一方多象等集應不得有多間隙事。或應此彼亦無差別。執是一故。如一象處。
論。或二如何可於一處有至不至中間見空。
述曰。此第四難。若執境一。如何可有象馬二物。此是所至中間不至。見有空處。應立量言 無隔一處象馬二居應不得有中間空處。執是一故。如手握珠。前第三難。約所依一。能依象等。多有間事。難應非有。此第四難約能依二。所依地一。中間應無空缺之處。是二別故。前多有間事。及此有間。合釋於前第三句頌。多有間事。舊論頌但言及別類多事。此第四難。彼頌不攝。故今勘此。善惡易明。
論。又亦應無小水蟲等難見細物。
述曰。此第五難。若執境一。無隔水中。亦應無有。小水蟲等。難見細物。
此立宗非。下明所以。
論。彼與粗物。同一處所量應等故。
述曰。所依之境。既是一物。能依水蟲。應無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 難點在於，如果大象和馬這兩個物體，它們自身無法互相到達，這就叫做間隙之事（名間隙事）。這是其中的一個難點。
為什麼這麼說呢？
論：如果一個地方存在一個物體，那麼其餘的物體也應該存在於此地，那麼如何區分這些物體之間的差別呢？
述曰：這顯示了原因。如果所依賴的地方的本體是一樣的，如果有一個大象，那麼也應該有其餘的馬。那麼如何區分這隻大象和那匹馬呢？應該這樣立論：在沒有障礙隔閡的一個地方，如果有很多大象和馬聚集在一起，那麼一隻大象所住的地方，其餘的馬等也應該住在這裡。因為你認為它們是一體的。就像一隻大象所住的地方一樣。或者說，如果你的宗派認為沒有隔閡，一個地方有很多大象等聚集，那麼就不應該有很多間隙之事。或者說，這些物體之間也不應該有差別。因為你認為它們是一體的。就像一個大象所處的地方一樣。
論：或者，如果兩個物體在同一個地方，如何能看到它們之間有到達和未到達的空隙呢？
述曰：這是第四個難點。如果認為境是一體的，那麼如何能有大象和馬這兩個物體，一個是到達的，一個是沒有到達的，並且能看到它們之間有空隙呢？應該這樣立論：在沒有隔閡的一個地方，如果大象和馬同時存在，那麼就不應該有中間的空隙。因為你認為它們是一體的。就像手握著珠子一樣。前面的第三個難點，是關於所依賴的地方是一體的，能依賴的大象等，有很多間隙之事，這應該是不存在的。這第四個難點是關於能依賴的兩個物體，所依賴的地方是一體的，中間應該沒有空缺的地方。這是兩個不同的物體。前面說的有很多間隙之事，和這裡說的有間隙，合起來解釋了前面第三句頌詞。多有間事。舊論頌只說了及別類多事。這第四個難點，那個頌詞沒有包含。所以現在勘正這一點，善惡很容易明白。
論：而且，也應該沒有小水蟲等難以看見的細小物體。
述曰：這是第五個難點。如果認為境是一體的，在沒有隔閡的水中，也應該沒有小水蟲等難以看見的細小物體。
這是立宗錯誤。下面說明原因。
論：它們和粗大的物體，在同一個地方，大小應該相等。
述曰：所依賴的境，既然是一個物體，能依賴的水蟲，應該不存在。
【English Translation】 English version: The difficulty lies in the fact that if two objects, such as an elephant and a horse, cannot reach each other, it is called an 'interstitial matter' (名間隙事). This is one of the difficulties.
Why is that so?
Treatise: If there is one object in a place, then the rest of the objects should also exist in this place, then how to distinguish the differences between these objects?
Explanation: This shows the reason. If the substance of the place on which they depend is the same, if there is one elephant, then there should also be the rest of the horses. Then how to distinguish this elephant from that horse? It should be argued that: in a place without obstacles or separations, if many elephants and horses gather together, then the place where one elephant lives, the rest of the horses, etc., should also live here. Because you think they are one. Just like the place where one elephant lives. Or, if your sect believes that there is no separation, and many elephants, etc., gather in one place, then there should not be many interstitial matters. Or, there should be no difference between these objects. Because you think they are one. Just like the place where one elephant is.
Treatise: Or, if two objects are in the same place, how can you see the gap between them that is reached and not reached?
Explanation: This is the fourth difficulty. If you think that the realm is one, then how can there be two objects, an elephant and a horse, one that is reached and one that is not reached, and see that there is a gap between them? It should be argued that: in a place without separation, if an elephant and a horse exist at the same time, then there should be no gap in the middle. Because you think they are one. Just like holding a bead in your hand. The previous third difficulty is about the place on which they depend being one, and the elephants, etc., on which they can depend, having many interstitial matters, which should not exist. This fourth difficulty is about the two objects on which they can depend, and the place on which they depend being one, and there should be no empty space in the middle. These are two different objects. The previously mentioned many interstitial matters, and the gap mentioned here, together explain the third verse mentioned earlier. 多有間事. The old treatise only said 及別類多事. This fourth difficulty is not included in that verse. So now correct this point, and good and evil are easy to understand.
Treatise: Moreover, there should also be no small aquatic insects and other small objects that are difficult to see.
Explanation: This is the fifth difficulty. If you think that the realm is one, then in the water without separation, there should also be no small aquatic insects and other small objects that are difficult to see.
This is a wrong proposition. The reason is explained below.
Treatise: They and the coarse objects are in the same place, and the size should be equal.
Explanation: Since the realm on which they depend is one object, the aquatic insects on which they can depend should not exist.
小者。彼小蟲與粗大物。依一所依。遍所依故。能依所依量皆等故。舊論說言最細水蟲。與大色同應不可見。彼言色者。即形量色。若小水蟲。不遍所依。量不等故。可見細者。所依不遍。故非是一。如說極微。六方分異。云何成一。應立量言 小水蟲等依無隔水能依應等所依之量。執所依一故。猶如無隔一頗胝迦一所依色 又應量言。小水蟲等依無隔水應不難見。執水一故。如無隔水。此中如前所說比量。論文既隱。唯強思惟施設安立。于宗因喻。皆遮過失。恐文繁廣不能具明。善因明者。自當詳悉。然或不須作其比量。準論但以道理徴之。亦不違理。
論。若謂由相此彼差別成別物不由余義。
述曰。此正量部轉計救義。謂見如前五義破一。遂作是義。亦非無隔眼所行境體。皆是一物。所以者何。由彼地相。此象彼馬。處有差別。即成此彼二處地別。如是四足處各差別。地即成四。一蹄之下。東西有殊。其地即異。不由異義。所餘無隔眼所及境。名為一物。有隔不及。遂即成多。故我宗中。無前五失。今牒言若謂由等。
論。則定應許此差別物展轉分拆成多極微。
述曰。此則第八論主正破。若由相故。此彼差別。其體各一。則汝定應許汝所執。此差別物體是一者。又以覺慧。展轉分拆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 小者：小蟲與粗大的物體，如果它們依賴於同一個所依（所依：支撐、依靠之物），並且遍佈于這個所依，那麼能依（能依：依靠者）和所依的量應該相等。舊的理論說，最細小的水蟲與大的顏色（色：此處指形量色，即形狀和大小）一樣，應該是不可見的。他們所說的『顏色』，指的是形量之色。如果小水蟲沒有遍佈於它所依賴的所依，並且量不相等，那麼可見的細小之物，由於它所依賴的所依沒有遍佈，所以不是一體的。正如所說的極微（極微：物質的最小單位），在六個方向上都有區分，怎麼能成為一體呢？應該建立量式來說明：小水蟲等，依賴於沒有間隔的水，能依應該等於所依的量，因為他們認為所依是一體的，就像沒有間隔的一塊頗胝迦（頗胝迦：一種透明的寶石）上的一種顏色。又應該建立量式來說明：小水蟲等，依賴於沒有間隔的水，應該不難被看見，因為他們認為水是一體的，就像沒有間隔的水一樣。這裡，像前面所說的比量（比量：佛教因明學中的一種推理形式），論文已經隱藏了，只是通過強烈的思考來施設和安立，對於宗（宗：論題）、因（因：理由）、喻（喻：例子）都遮止了過失。恐怕文字繁瑣，不能完全說明。善於因明的人，自然會詳細瞭解。然而，或許不需要作這樣的比量，按照論典，只是用道理來徵詢，也不違反道理。
論：如果認為由於相（相：特徵）的差別，此物與彼物成為不同的物體，而不是由於其他的意義。
述曰：這是正量部（正量部：佛教部派之一）轉變計較來救護自己的觀點。他們看到前面用五種意義破斥『一』，於是提出這樣的觀點：並非沒有間隔、眼睛所能觸及的境體，都是一個物體。為什麼呢？因為地相（地相：地的特徵），比如這塊地上的象，那塊地上的馬，處所上有差別，就成了此處和彼處兩塊不同的地。像這樣，四隻腳所處的地方各有差別，地就成了四塊。一個蹄子的下面，東西方向有差異，那塊地就是不同的。不是由於其他的意義。其餘沒有間隔、眼睛所能觸及的境，就叫做一個物體。有間隔、眼睛不能觸及的，就成了多個物體。所以我的宗派中，沒有前面五種過失。現在引用『如果認為由於相』等。
論：那麼必定應該承認，這些差別之物，經過輾轉分拆，成為多個極微。
述曰：這是第八個論主（論主：辯論的提出者）正式破斥。如果由於相的緣故，此物與彼物有差別，它們的本體各自是一，那麼你們必定應該承認，你們所執著的這些差別物體，是一個物體，又用覺慧（覺慧：覺悟的智慧）輾轉分拆
【English Translation】 English version Small ones: If small insects and large objects rely on the same basis (所依, suo yi: that which is relied upon, the support), and pervade that basis, then the measure of the relier (能依, neng yi: that which relies) and the basis should be equal. The old theory says that the smallest water insects, like large colors (色, se: here referring to shape and size), should be invisible. What they call 'color' refers to the color of shape and size. If small water insects do not pervade the basis they rely on, and the measures are not equal, then the visible small things, because the basis they rely on is not pervaded, are not one entity. Just as it is said that the ultimate particles (極微, ji wei: the smallest unit of matter) are differentiated in six directions, how can they become one? A syllogism should be established to explain: small water insects, etc., rely on water without gaps, the relier should be equal to the measure of the basis, because they believe the basis is one entity, just like a color on a piece of crystal (頗胝迦, po zhi jia: a type of transparent gemstone) without gaps. Another syllogism should be established: small water insects, etc., rely on water without gaps, they should not be difficult to see, because they believe the water is one entity, just like water without gaps. Here, like the syllogisms mentioned earlier, the thesis has been hidden, and it is only through strong thinking that it is established and posited, and the faults are prevented for the subject (宗, zong: the thesis), the reason (因, yin: the reason), and the example (喻, yu: the example). I am afraid that the text is cumbersome and cannot be fully explained. Those who are good at Hetu-vidya (因明, yin ming: Buddhist logic) will naturally understand in detail. However, perhaps it is not necessary to make such syllogisms, according to the treatise, it is not against reason to just inquire with reason.
Treatise: If it is thought that due to the difference in characteristics (相, xiang: characteristics), this object and that object become different objects, and not due to other meanings.
Commentary: This is the Sautrantika (正量部, zheng liang bu: one of the Buddhist schools) changing their calculations to protect their views. They saw that the 'one' was refuted with five meanings earlier, so they put forward this view: it is not that all the realms that are not separated and can be touched by the eyes are one object. Why? Because of the characteristics of the earth (地相, di xiang: the characteristics of the earth), such as the elephant on this piece of land and the horse on that piece of land, there are differences in location, which makes this place and that place two different pieces of land. Like this, the places where the four feet are located are different, and the land becomes four pieces. Under one hoof, there are differences in the east and west directions, and that piece of land is different. It is not due to other meanings. The realms that are not separated and can be touched by the eyes are called one object. Those that are separated and cannot be touched by the eyes become multiple objects. Therefore, in my school, there are no five faults mentioned earlier. Now quoting 'If it is thought that due to the characteristics' etc.
Treatise: Then it must be admitted that these different objects, after being repeatedly divided, become multiple ultimate particles.
Commentary: This is the eighth debater (論主, lun zhu: the proposer of the debate) formally refuting. If due to the characteristics, this object and that object are different, and their entities are each one, then you must admit that these different objects that you hold on to are one object, and also use awakened wisdom (覺慧, jue hui: wisdom of enlightenment) to repeatedly divide
。或多極微。都無一物。如馬住處。名為一物。四足各異。地即成四。如是于足東西方異。于東西方。多百千分。如是至細。成多極微。是故世間。無定實有唯一物者。故汝等計。皆述妄情。虛所施設。
論。已辨極微非一實物是則離識眼等色等若根若境皆不得成。
述曰。就第四段。破他宗中。此下第三。總結不成。顯歸唯識 已辨極微非一實物者。結前所破。能成極微。一實非有 是則離識眼色等者。總結以上極微所成根境非有。即是離識。眼等五根。色等五境。皆不得成。能成極微。非實有故。所成根境。何義得成。
既爾此無言何所顯。
論。由此善成唯有識義。
述曰。顯歸唯識。離識根境。今既破無。故知根境。皆不離識。不離識色。可許有故。然諸根境。四大所造諸宗計別。如唯識第一疏述。
上來總有一十四頌。合為四段。初之一頌。小乘外道四事難境無。次有五頌。釋四難非理。次有三頌。釋有情法二無我教。次有五頌。返破境實執。或分為三。合初二段。總有六頌。四事問答外境無故。此等總是第一大段。四事難議境無。卻徴實境執。自下大文第二。釋外人難。現量證境有。返破憶持執。
論。諸法由量刊定有無一切量中現量為勝。
述曰。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：或者有更多的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位），但即使如此，也沒有任何單一的實在之物。比如，馬居住的地方，我們稱之為一個『物』，但它的四條腿各不相同，如果以地面來區分，就成了四個部分。同樣，對於馬的腿，如果區分東西方向，就會產產生百上千的不同部分。像這樣不斷細分，最終會形成更多的極微。因此，世間並沒有固定不變、真實存在的單一之物。所以你們的推論，都是基於虛妄的情感，是虛假的設定。
論：已經辨明極微並非單一的實在之物，那麼離開識，眼等（cakṣu，視覺器官）色等（rūpa，顏色等）無論是根（indriya，感覺器官）還是境（viṣaya，感覺對像），都無法成立。
述曰：就第四段，破斥其他宗派的觀點中，接下來是第三部分，總結其不能成立，從而顯明歸於唯識（Vijñānavāda，唯識宗）。『已經辨明極微並非單一的實在之物』，總結前面所破斥的，能夠構成極微的單一實體並不存在。『那麼離開識，眼色等』，總結以上極微所構成的根境並不存在，也就是離開識，眼等五根（pañcendriya，五種感覺器官），色等五境（pañcaviṣaya，五種感覺對像）都無法成立。因為能夠構成極微的實體並不真實存在，那麼由它構成的根境，又怎麼可能成立呢？
既然如此，那麼這些話要顯示什麼呢？
論：由此很好地成立了唯有識的道理。
述曰：顯明歸於唯識。離開識的根境，現在既然已經破斥其不存在，那麼可知根境，都不離識。不離識的色，是可以允許存在的。然而各種根境，是由四大（catvāri mahābhūtāni，地、水、火、風）所造，各宗派的觀點不同，如《唯識第一疏述》中所述。
上面總共有十四頌，合為四個部分。最初的一頌，小乘（Hīnayāna，小乘佛教）、外道（tīrthika，非佛教的宗教或哲學派別）以四事（catuḥprakāra，四種方式）來質疑境（viṣaya，感覺對像）的空無。接著有五頌，解釋四種質疑並非合理。接著有三頌，解釋有情法（sattvadhātu，有情界；dharmadhātu，法界）二無我（dvayanairātmya，人無我和法無我）的教義。接著有五頌，反過來破斥執著境為實有的觀點。或者可以分為三個部分，合併最初兩個部分，總共有六頌，以四事問答來論證外境的空無。這些總的來說是第一大段，以四事來質疑外境的空無，從而反過來徵詢真實存在的境的執著。從下面開始是第二大段，解釋外人提出的質疑，認為現量（pratyakṣa，現量，直接感知）可以證明境的存在，從而反過來破斥憶持（smṛti，記憶）的執著。
論：諸法的有無，由量（pramāṇa，量，認識的工具）來判定，一切量中，現量最為殊勝。
述曰：
【English Translation】 English version: Or there are more paramāṇus (smallest units of matter), but even so, there is no single real thing. For example, the place where a horse lives, we call it a 'thing,' but its four legs are different, and if we distinguish it by the ground, it becomes four parts. Similarly, for the horse's legs, if we distinguish the east and west directions, hundreds and thousands of different parts will be produced. Subdividing like this, more paramāṇus will eventually be formed. Therefore, there is no fixed, real, single thing in the world. So your inferences are all based on false emotions and are false settings.
Treatise: It has already been clarified that paramāṇus are not single real things, then apart from consciousness, the eye (cakṣu, visual organ) and so on, color (rūpa, color, etc.) and so on, whether it is the root (indriya, sense organ) or the object (viṣaya, sense object), cannot be established.
Commentary: In the fourth section, refuting the views of other schools, the following is the third part, summarizing its failure to establish, thus revealing the return to Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only school). 'It has already been clarified that paramāṇus are not single real things,' summarizing what was refuted earlier, the single entity that can constitute paramāṇus does not exist. 'Then apart from consciousness, the eye, color, etc.,' summarizing that the roots and objects composed of the above paramāṇus do not exist, that is, apart from consciousness, the five sense organs (pañcendriya, five sense organs) such as the eye, and the five sense objects (pañcaviṣaya, five sense objects) such as color, cannot be established. Because the entity that can constitute paramāṇus does not really exist, how can the roots and objects composed of it be established?
Since this is the case, what do these words want to show?
Treatise: From this, the principle of consciousness-only is well established.
Commentary: Revealing the return to Vijñānavāda. Since the roots and objects apart from consciousness have now been refuted as non-existent, it can be known that the roots and objects are inseparable from consciousness. Colors that are inseparable from consciousness can be allowed to exist. However, the various roots and objects are made by the four great elements (catvāri mahābhūtāni, earth, water, fire, and wind), and the views of the various schools are different, as described in the Commentary on the First Treatise of Consciousness-only.
There are a total of fourteen verses above, combined into four parts. The first verse, Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle Buddhism), tīrthikas (non-Buddhist religions or philosophical schools) question the emptiness of objects (viṣaya, sense objects) with four things (catuḥprakāra, four ways). Then there are five verses, explaining that the four questions are not reasonable. Then there are three verses, explaining the teachings of the two non-selves (dvayanairātmya, the non-self of persons and the non-self of phenomena) of sentient beings and dharmas (sattvadhātu, the realm of sentient beings; dharmadhātu, the realm of dharmas). Then there are five verses, refuting the view of clinging to objects as real. Or it can be divided into three parts, combining the first two parts, there are a total of six verses, using the four questions and answers to argue for the emptiness of external objects. These are generally the first major section, questioning the emptiness of external objects with four things, thereby inquiring about the clinging to real objects. From below is the second major section, explaining the questions raised by outsiders, believing that pratyakṣa (direct perception) can prove the existence of objects, thereby refuting the clinging to smṛti (memory).
Treatise: The existence or non-existence of all dharmas is determined by pramāṇa (means of cognition), and among all pramāṇas, pratyakṣa is the most superior.
Commentary:
此第二段。有一頌半。合分為二。初之一頌。釋現量證。后之半頌。釋憶持執。于中皆有先難后破。此則正量。薩婆多等。為此問起。先議諸法。刊定勝量。後方申難。此即議也。刊定者。貶量也。言諸法者。即是所量。一切有漏無漏諸法。由三二量。揩準有無。量者量度。如以尺丈。量綾錦等尺為能量。綾等所量。知其量數。是其量果。諸心心所。緣諸法時。說有四分。見分能量。相分所量。自證量果。如是自證。緣見分時。見分所量。自證能量。證自證為量果。如證自證。緣自證時。自證所量。證自證分。為其能量。即此自證。亦為量果。能返緣故。若以第三。緣第四時。第四所量。第三能量。其第四分。即為量果。能返緣故。陳那以前。古內外道。大小乘師。皆說三量。一現量二比量。三聖言量。今依梵音。云阿弗多阿笈摩。此云至教。至教量者。非得但聖者說。名為至教。但是世間言無差二可信者語。皆至教量。契至理故。合實事故。如八語品。四聖言等。言比量者。比附量度。名為比量。即以眾相。而觀于義。緣此義智。名為比量。言現量者。諸部說異。且薩婆多。用世友說。以根名見。根體是現量。以顯現義是根義故。此能量境。故名現量。是持業釋。法救說。識名見。能量境故。識名現量。持業如前。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此第二段，有一頌半，合分為二。初之一頌，解釋現量證（Pratyaksha Pramana，直接認知）。后之半頌，解釋憶持執（Smriti，記憶；Dharana，專注；Abhinivesha，執著）。于中皆有先難后破。此則正量（Pramana，正確的認知方式）。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等，為此問起，先議諸法，刊定勝量（Pramana，正確的認知方式），後方申難。此即議也。刊定者，貶量也。言諸法者，即是所量，一切有漏無漏諸法，由三二量，揩準有無。量者量度，如以尺丈，量綾錦等，尺為能量，綾等所量，知其量數，是其量果。諸心心所，緣諸法時，說有四分：見分能量，相分所量，自證量果。如是自證，緣見分時，見分所量，自證能量，證自證為量果。如證自證，緣自證時，自證所量，證自證分，為其能量，即此自證，亦為量果，能返緣故。若以第三，緣第四時，第四所量，第三能量，其第四分，即為量果，能返緣故。陳那（Dignaga）以前，古內外道，大小乘師，皆說三量：一現量，二比量（Anumana Pramana，推論認知），三聖言量（Agama Pramana，聖教量）。今依梵音，云阿弗多阿笈摩（Aptagama），此云至教。至教量者，非得但聖者說，名為至教，但是世間言無差二可信者語，皆至教量，契至理故，合實事故。如八語品，四聖言等。言比量者，比附量度，名為比量，即以眾相，而觀于義，緣此義智，名為比量。言現量者，諸部說異。且薩婆多，用世友（Vasumitra）說，以根名見，根體是現量，以顯現義是根義故。此能量境，故名現量，是持業釋。法救（Dharmatrāta）說，識名見，能量境故，識名現量，持業如前。
【English Translation】 English version This second section consists of one and a half verses, divided into two parts. The first verse explains Pratyaksha Pramana (direct perception). The latter half verse explains Smriti (memory), Dharana (concentration), and Abhinivesha (clinging). In both, there is first a challenge and then a refutation. This is Pramana (valid cognition). The Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivada, the 'all exists' school), among others, raise this question, first discussing all dharmas (phenomena), then establishing Pramana (valid cognition), and finally presenting the challenge. This is the discussion. 'Establishing' means diminishing the measure. 'All dharmas' refers to what is measured, all conditioned (with outflows) and unconditioned (without outflows) dharmas, which are assessed for existence or non-existence by the three or two pramanas. 'Measure' means to measure, like using a ruler to measure silk. The ruler is the measuring instrument, the silk is what is measured, and knowing its length is the result of the measurement. When all mental factors cognize all dharmas, it is said to have four aspects: the seeing aspect is the measuring instrument, the appearance aspect is what is measured, and self-awareness is the result of the measurement. Thus, when self-awareness cognizes the seeing aspect, the seeing aspect is what is measured, self-awareness is the measuring instrument, and the awareness of self-awareness is the result of the measurement. As with the awareness of self-awareness, when self-awareness cognizes self-awareness, self-awareness is what is measured, and the aspect of self-awareness is the measuring instrument. This self-awareness is also the result of the measurement because it can reflect back. If the third cognizes the fourth, the fourth is what is measured, the third is the measuring instrument, and the fourth aspect is the result of the measurement because it can reflect back. Before Dignaga (Dignaga), ancient internal and external schools, teachers of both the Great and Small Vehicles, all spoke of three pramanas: 1. Pratyaksha Pramana (direct perception), 2. Anumana Pramana (inference), and 3. Agama Pramana (scriptural authority). Now, according to the Sanskrit, it is called Aptagama, which means 'reliable teaching'. Agama Pramana is not just what the sages say, but any reliable speech in the world that is without error and trustworthy is Agama Pramana because it accords with the ultimate truth and corresponds to reality. Like the eight speech qualities, the four holy sayings, etc. 'Anumana' means to measure by comparison, hence it is called Anumana. It is to observe the meaning through various signs, and the wisdom that arises from this meaning is called Anumana. As for Pratyaksha, different schools have different explanations. The Sarvastivadins, following Vasumitra's view, say that the root (sensory faculty) is called 'seeing', and the essence of the root is Pratyaksha because the meaning of 'root' is 'manifestation'. This is the measuring instrument of the object, hence it is called Pratyaksha, which is a possessive compound. Dharmatrāta (Dharmatrāta) says that consciousness is called 'seeing', and because it is the measuring instrument of the object, consciousness is called Pratyaksha, a possessive compound as before.
妙音慧名見。能量法勝慧。名現量。正量部說。心心所法。和合名見。心心所法。合名現量。經部師說。根識和合。假名為見。假能量境。假名現量。吠世史迦。德句義中。覺為現量。數論師說。十一根中。五根是現量。若歸於本。自性是現量。大乘師說。根名為現。依發屬助如根五義。勝餘故。然是色法。不能量境。唯心心所。能量度故。心心所法。正是量體。依現之量。名為現量。此依士釋。若無著以前。但說二分。唯一見分。為現量體。無著以後陳那菩薩。立三分者。見自證。分為現量體。護法以後。見分自證。證自證分。為現量體。安慧。諸識雖皆有執。然無隨念計度分別。明現取境。名為現量。無漏皆現量。如說善等性。小乘有五。外道有二。大乘有四。合有十一種。出現量體。廣如余處。此略顯示。陳那以後。其聖言量攝。入此中。此體除此。外更無故。如因明疏。今者世親。說有三量。故論說言一切量中。現量為勝。取現境故。證自相故。大小二乘。外道內道。皆共許爾。故今總敘貶議諸量。現量勝餘。
論。若無外境寧有此覺我今現證如是境耶。
述曰。此正申難。如世人言。我今見色。乃至觸觸。若無識外實色等境。寧有此覺。我今現證如是色等。此覺既非無。外色等定有。總言覺者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 妙音（妙音天女，佛教護法神）慧名見。能量法勝慧。名現量（pratyakṣa，直接認知）。正量部（佛教部派之一）說：『心心所法（citta-caitta，心和心所的合稱），和合名為見。心心所法，合名現量。』經部師（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）說：『根識（感官和意識）和合，假名為見。假能量境，假名現量。』吠世史迦（Vaiśeṣika，印度教正理學派之一）在德句義中，覺為現量。數論師（Sāṃkhya，印度教數論學派）說：『十一根中，五根是現量。若歸於本，自性（prakṛti，本原）是現量。』大乘師說：『根名為現，依發屬助如根五義，勝餘故。然是色法，不能量境。唯心心所，能量度故。心心所法，正是量體。依現之量，名為現量。』此依士釋。若無著（Asaṅga，瑜伽行唯識學派創始人之一）以前，但說二分，唯一見分，為現量體。無著以後陳那菩薩（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家），立三分者，見自證（sva-saṃvedana，自證分）。分為現量體。護法（Dharmapāla，古印度佛教論師）以後，見分自證，證自證分，為現量體。安慧（Sthiramati，古印度佛教論師），諸識雖皆有執，然無隨念計度分別，明現取境，名為現量。無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱）皆現量，如說善等性。小乘（Hīnayāna，小乘佛教）有五，外道（tīrthika，非佛教的宗教）有二，大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘佛教）有四，合有十一種，出現量體。廣如余處。此略顯示。陳那以後，其聖言量（āgama-pramāṇa，聖教量）攝入此中。此體除此，外更無故。如因明疏。今者世親（Vasubandhu，古印度佛教論師），說有三量。故論說言：『一切量中，現量為勝，取現境故，證自相故。』大小二乘，外道內道，皆共許爾。故今總敘貶議諸量，現量勝餘。
論：若無外境寧有此覺我今現證如是境耶？
述曰：此正申難。如世人言：『我今見色，乃至觸觸。』若無識外實色等境，寧有此覺：『我今現證如是色等。』此覺既非無，外色等定有。總言覺者
【English Translation】 English version: The wisdom of Sound Melody (Myo-on, a Buddhist protective deity) is called 'seeing'. The power of Dharma surpasses wisdom. This is called direct perception (pratyakṣa). The Sautrāntikas (a Buddhist school) say: 'The combined mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) are called 'seeing'. The combination of mind and mental factors is called direct perception.' The Sautrāntika masters say: 'The combination of sense faculties and consciousness is nominally called 'seeing'. The nominal object of measurement is nominally called direct perception.' The Vaiśeṣikas (a school of Hindu philosophy) consider awareness as direct perception in the meaning of virtue and sentence. The Sāṃkhyas (a school of Hindu philosophy) say: 'Among the eleven faculties, the five sense faculties are direct perception. If returning to the origin, the fundamental nature (prakṛti) is direct perception.' The Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna Buddhism) masters say: 'The sense faculties are called 'direct', relying on the five meanings of origination, belonging, assistance, such as the sense faculties, surpassing others. However, being material forms, they cannot measure objects. Only the mind and mental factors can measure. Therefore, the mind and mental factors are precisely the measuring entity. The measurement based on the direct is called direct perception.' This is interpreted based on the agent. Before Asaṅga (a founder of the Yogācāra school), only two aspects were discussed, with only the seeing aspect being the entity of direct perception. After Asaṅga, Dignāga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) established three aspects, with the seeing and self-awareness (sva-saṃvedana) aspects being the entity of direct perception. After Dharmapāla (an ancient Indian Buddhist commentator), the seeing aspect, self-awareness, and the self-awareness of self-awareness are the entity of direct perception. Sthiramati (an ancient Indian Buddhist commentator) says that although all consciousnesses have grasping, they lack subsequent recollection, conceptualization, and discrimination, clearly and directly grasping objects, which is called direct perception. All that is without outflows (anāsrava) is direct perception, such as the nature of goodness and so on. The Hīnayāna (Hīnayāna Buddhism) has five, the non-Buddhists (tīrthika) have two, the Mahāyāna has four, totaling eleven, manifesting the entity of direct perception. This is extensively discussed elsewhere. This is a brief explanation. After Dignāga, the scriptural authority (āgama-pramāṇa) is included in this. Apart from this entity, there is nothing else. As in the commentary on logic. Now, Vasubandhu (an ancient Indian Buddhist commentator) speaks of three types of valid cognition. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Among all valid cognitions, direct perception is the best, because it grasps present objects and verifies its own nature.' Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, non-Buddhists and Buddhists, all commonly acknowledge this. Therefore, now we generally discuss and evaluate all valid cognitions, with direct perception surpassing the others.
Treatise: If there were no external objects, how could there be this awareness, 'I am now directly perceiving such an object'?
Commentary: This is a direct challenge. As people say: 'I now see colors, and even touch.' If there were no real objects such as colors outside of consciousness, how could there be this awareness: 'I am now directly perceiving such colors'? Since this awareness is not non-existent, external colors and so on must exist. Generally speaking of awareness
。心心所法之異名也。今此言覺。謂現量智。非唯是慧。因明者說言證智者。心心所法之總名矣。故舊論云。如此證智。云何得起。成唯識中。亦有此難。色等外境。分明現證。現量所得。寧撥為無。
此中難已下論主破。
論。此證不成。
述曰。破中有二。初總非。后別破。此總非也。
外人設問。云何不成。
論曰。頌曰現覺如夢等已起現覺時見及境已無寧許有現量。
述曰。第一句述正理。顯難外境實有不成。下三句破外宗。明無現覺。成無外境。然舊論本。遂分二段。前後別明。其此頌中。初句易解。至下當知。上一句引喻破經部。下三句中。略破二類。初破正量部等。非剎那論。后破一切有等。剎那論者。謂已起現覺時。其見已無。寧許有現量。破正量部等。謂已起現覺時。其見及境已無。寧許有現量。破薩婆多等。大眾部等宗計不同。亦應敘破。如薩婆多。第三句中。言及字者。即相違釋。意顯有二難。至下當知。
論曰。如夢等時雖無外境而亦得有如是現覺。
述曰。先釋初句。今解初中。如夢等字。能成喻法。等者。等取眩翳目等。緣見發蠅等。此等諸位。經部及大乘。彼此共許外境非有。故以為喻。如夢等中。雖無離心外實境界。而彼言謂。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心和心所法的不同名稱。現在這裡說的『覺』，指的是現量智（Pratyaksha-jnana，直接感知智慧）。不僅僅是慧（Prajna，智慧），因明學家說『證智』是心和心所法的總稱。所以舊論中說，這樣的證智，如何才能生起？《成唯識論》中，也有這樣的疑問：色等外境，分明地現前被證實，是現量所得，怎麼能否定它呢？
下面論主開始駁斥。
論：這種證實是不成立的。
述記：駁斥分為兩部分，先總的否定，後分別駁斥。這裡是總的否定。
外人提問：為什麼不成立？
論曰：頌曰：現覺如夢等，已起現覺時，見及境已無，寧許有現量？
述記：第一句闡述正理，表明外境真實存在是不成立的。下面三句駁斥外宗，說明沒有現覺，從而成立沒有外境。然而舊論的版本，將此分為兩段，前後分別說明。這首頌中，第一句容易理解，到下面自然明白。上面一句用比喻來駁斥經量部（Sautrantika）。下面三句中，略微駁斥了兩類。首先駁斥正量部（Sammitiya）等，非剎那論者。然後駁斥一切有部（Sarvastivada）等，剎那論者。所謂『已起現覺時，其見已無，寧許有現量』，是駁斥正量部等。所謂『已起現覺時，其見及境已無，寧許有現量』，是駁斥薩婆多（Sarvastivada）等。大眾部（Mahasanghika）等宗派的觀點不同，也應該敘述駁斥。比如薩婆多，第三句中的『及』字，就是互相矛盾的解釋，意思是顯示有兩種困難，到下面自然明白。
論曰：如同夢等時候，即使沒有外境，也仍然可以有這樣的現覺。
述記：先解釋第一句。現在解釋第一句中的『如夢等』，能夠構成比喻。『等』字，包括眩暈、眼睛有毛病等情況，緣見蒼蠅等。這些情況，經量部和大乘（Mahayana）都共同承認外境是不存在的，所以用作比喻。如同夢等情況中，即使沒有離開心識之外的真實境界，但他們說...
【English Translation】 English version: These are different names for the mind and mental functions (citta and caitta dharmas). Here, 'awareness' (覺, jue) refers to direct perception wisdom (Pratyaksha-jnana). It is not just wisdom (Prajna); those skilled in logic (Hetu-vidya) say that 'verifying wisdom' (證智, zheng zhi) is a general term for the mind and mental functions. Therefore, the old treatises say, how can such verifying wisdom arise? In the 'Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only' (成唯識論, Cheng Weishi Lun), there is also this question: external objects such as form, are clearly and evidently verified, obtained through direct perception; how can you deny their existence?
The following is the treatise master refuting the above.
Treatise: This verification is not established.
Commentary: The refutation has two parts: first, a general negation; second, a specific refutation. This is the general negation.
An outsider asks: Why is it not established?
Treatise: Verse: Awareness is like dreams, etc.; when awareness has already arisen, the seeing and the object are already gone; how can you allow for direct perception?
Commentary: The first line states the correct principle, showing that the real existence of external objects is not established. The following three lines refute external schools, explaining that there is no direct perception, thereby establishing that there are no external objects. However, the old treatise versions divide this into two sections, explaining them separately before and after. In this verse, the first line is easy to understand; you will understand it later. The line above uses a metaphor to refute the Sautrantika school. In the following three lines, it briefly refutes two categories. First, it refutes the Sammitiya school, etc., those who do not believe in momentariness. Then, it refutes the Sarvastivada school, etc., those who believe in momentariness. The so-called 'when awareness has already arisen, the seeing is already gone; how can you allow for direct perception?' refutes the Sammitiya school, etc. The so-called 'when awareness has already arisen, the seeing and the object are already gone; how can you allow for direct perception?' refutes the Sarvastivada school, etc. The views of the Mahasanghika school, etc., are different and should also be described and refuted. For example, in Sarvastivada, the word 'and' (及, ji) in the third line is a contradictory explanation, meaning that there are two difficulties, which will be understood later.
Treatise: Just like in dreams, even if there are no external objects, there can still be such awareness.
Commentary: First, explain the first line. Now explain 'like dreams, etc.' in the first line, which can form a metaphor. 'Etc.' includes dizziness, eye problems, etc., seeing flies, etc. In these situations, both the Sautrantika and Mahayana schools commonly acknowledge that external objects do not exist, so they are used as metaphors. Just like in dreams, even if there are no real objects apart from consciousness, they say...
我見是事。聞是事等。起此現覺。
下合法顯。
論。余時現覺應知亦爾。
述曰。釋頌初句。現覺二字。除夢等外余時。所起見是事等。如是現量。應知亦爾。亦無外境。此現覺生。應立量言 除夢等外所有現覺緣非現境起。許現覺故。如夢等現覺。此中意說。若實現覺。如五識等。不作此解。我今現證如是事境。作此解者。是意識中分別妄覺。非謂現量心心所法。成唯識說。現量證時。不執為外。后意分別。妄生外想。故現量境。是自相分。識所變故。亦說為有。意識所執外實色等。妄計度故。說彼為無。又彼論說。謂假智詮。不得自相。唯于諸法共相而轉。故現覺者。必無此智及與此論。我今現證如是事等。
論。故彼引此為證不成。
述曰。此結非也。現覺所緣。由如夢境性非實有。故彼汝宗。引此現覺為證。離心外境實有。理證不成。
論。又若爾時有此現覺我今現證如是色等。
述曰。次釋下三句頌。先破正量部等。此解第二句頌若。于爾時。起此現覺。我今現證如是心外色等實境者。此牒彼計。
下正申難。
論。爾時于境能見已無。
述曰。釋第三句見已無字。申其難意。正量等計。六識不併。起此覺時。能見五識實現量者。已入過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『我見是事。聞是事等。起此現覺。』
下文是合法顯的解釋。
論：其餘時候的現覺，應當知道也是這樣。
述記：解釋頌文的第一句。『現覺』二字，指的是除了夢境等之外，其餘時候所產生的『見是事』等。這樣的現量，應當知道也是一樣，沒有外在的境界。這種現覺的產生，應該立一個量式來說明：除了夢境等之外，所有現覺所緣的都不是現實的境界。因為允許有現覺的緣故，就像夢境等現覺一樣。這裡的意思是說，如果是真實的現覺，如五識等，就不這樣解釋。『我今現證如是事境』，這樣解釋的人，是意識中的分別妄覺，不是指現量的心和心所法。《成唯識論》說，現量證知的時候，不執著為外在的，後來的意識分別，才妄生外在的想法。所以現量的境界，是自相分，是識所變現的緣故，也可以說是有的。意識所執著的外在真實的色等，是妄加計度的緣故，說它是沒有的。又那部論說，那是虛假的智詮，不能得到自相，只是在諸法的共相上運轉。所以現覺的人，一定沒有這種智慧以及這種論述，『我今現證如是事等』。
論：所以他們引用這個作為證據是不成立的。
述記：這是結論，說他們的說法是不對的。現覺所緣的境界，就像夢境一樣，其自性不是真實存在的。所以你們正量部的宗義，引用這個現覺作為證據，來證明離開心之外，外在的境界是真實存在的，這個理證是不成立的。
論：又如果那個時候有這種現覺，『我今現證如是色等』。
述記：接下來解釋下面三句頌文。首先破斥正量部等。這種解釋第二句頌文『若於爾時，起此現覺，我今現證如是心外色等實境者』，這是引述他們的觀點。
下面正式提出詰難。
論：那個時候對於境界能見的（五識）已經沒有了。
述記：解釋第三句『見已無』這幾個字，申述其中的詰難之意。正量部等認為，六識不能同時並起，在產生這種覺知的時候，能見的五識，如果是真實的現量，就已經進入過去了。
【English Translation】 English version 'I see this thing. I hear this thing, etc. This present awareness arises.'
The following is a lawful manifestation.
Treatise: It should be known that present awareness at other times is also like this.
Commentary: Explains the first line of the verse. The two words 'present awareness' refer to 'seeing this thing,' etc., which arise at times other than during dreams. Such direct perception should be known to be the same; there is no external realm. The arising of this present awareness should be established with a logical statement: All present awarenesses, except for those in dreams, arise from non-real realms. Because present awareness is allowed, like the present awarenesses in dreams. The meaning here is that if it is a real present awareness, such as the five consciousnesses, it is not explained this way. 'I now directly verify such a realm of things.' Those who explain it this way are the discriminating false awarenesses in consciousness, not referring to the mind and mental functions of direct perception. The Consciousness-Only Treatise says that when directly perceiving, one does not cling to it as external; later, the consciousness discriminates and falsely generates external thoughts. Therefore, the realm of direct perception is the self-aspect, transformed by consciousness, so it can be said to exist. The external real forms, etc., clung to by consciousness are falsely conceived, so they are said to be non-existent. Furthermore, that treatise says that it is a false intellectual explanation, unable to obtain the self-aspect, only revolving around the common aspects of all dharmas. Therefore, those with present awareness certainly do not have this wisdom or this discourse, 'I now directly verify such things, etc.'
Treatise: Therefore, their citing this as proof is not established.
Commentary: This is a conclusion, saying that their statement is incorrect. The realm perceived by present awareness, like the realm of dreams, is not real in nature. Therefore, your Sautrāntika school cites this present awareness as proof to demonstrate that apart from the mind, the external realm is real, but this logical proof is not established.
Treatise: Furthermore, if at that time there is this present awareness, 'I now directly verify such forms, etc.'
Commentary: Next, explains the following three lines of the verse. First, refutes the Sautrāntika school, etc. This explanation of the second line of the verse, 'If at that time, this present awareness arises, I now directly verify such external forms, etc., as real realms,' is quoting their view.
The following formally raises a challenge.
Treatise: At that time, the seeing (five consciousnesses) of the realm is already gone.
Commentary: Explains the words 'already gone' in the third line, stating the meaning of the challenge. The Sautrāntika school, etc., believes that the six consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously. When this awareness arises, the seeing five consciousnesses, if they are real direct perception, have already entered the past.
去。現在非有。
所以者何。
論。要在意識能分別故時眼等識必已謝故。
述曰。此顯二因成。能見識現在非有。彼此共許。要第六識。具三分別。方能起此分別現覺。五識不具三種分別。故不能起此等現覺。此等現覺。既在意識。起此覺時。故彼能見眼等五識。必入過去。落謝非有。先見是物。後方起覺。故正見及覺二。時必不俱。能見實現覺。此時既無。寧許此覺。有是現量。證外境有。若正現量。證色等時。緣心內法。無假智詮。故證不成。以正量部。心心所法。燈焰。鈴聲。唯滅相滅。唸唸生滅。色等法滅。亦待外緣。即隨此事長短一期。後方有滅。起證如是現量覺時。眼識不住。故入過去。其境色等。一期未滅。故此唯破起此覺時。能見已無。不破所見此時非有。設縱有故。應立量言 起此覺時必非現量。是散心位能見已無故。如散心位緣於過去百千劫事。破境一期。如餘論說。
論。剎那論者有此覺時。
述曰。下破薩婆多等。此等執境及心心所。皆唸唸滅。名剎那論 有此覺時。釋頌第二句。牒彼所計。
論。色等現境亦皆已滅。
述曰。此正申難。釋第三句頌。及境已無。眼等六識。不俱時起。起此覺時。要在意識。但非現覺。能緣已無。所緣現境。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
去。現在非有。 所以是什麼原因呢？ 論：關鍵在於意識能夠分別，因此當意識進行分別時，眼等識必然已經消逝。 述記說：這顯示了兩個原因成立。能見的識在現在不是存在的，這是彼此都認可的。關鍵在於第六意識（Manovijnana），具備三種分別（自性分別、隨念分別、計度分別），才能生起這種分別的現覺。前五識不具備這三種分別，所以不能生起這種現覺。這種現覺既然在意識中，那麼在意識生起這種覺知的時候，能見的眼等五識必然已經進入過去，衰落消逝不存在了。先見到事物，然後才生起覺知，所以正確的見和覺知這兩個時間必然不會同時存在。能見的識實現覺知，在這個時候已經不存在了，怎麼能允許這種覺知是現量（Pratyaksa），來證明外境是存在的呢？如果正確的現量在證明色等的時候，緣的是心內的法，沒有藉助智的詮釋，那麼這個證明就不能成立。因為正量部（Sautrantika）認為，心和心所法，燈焰，**（原文如此，可能指某種物質或現象），唯有滅的相狀是同時滅的，唸唸生滅。色等法的滅，也要等待外緣，也就是隨著這件事的長短而有一段時期，之後才會有滅。當生起像這樣的現量覺知的時候，眼識不住留，所以進入過去。而它的境界色等，一期還沒有滅，所以這裡只是破斥生起這種覺知的時候，能見的識已經不存在了，而不是破斥所見的境界在這個時候不存在。假設縱然存在，應該立一個量式說：生起這種覺知的時候，必然不是現量。因為是在散亂心位，能見的識已經不存在了。就像在散亂心位緣於過去百千劫的事情一樣。破斥境界的一期，就像其他論述所說的那樣。 論：剎那論者（Ksana-vadin）認為有這種覺知的時候。 述記說：下面破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins）等。這些宗派執著境界以及心和心所，都是念念滅的，稱為剎那論。『有這種覺知的時候』，解釋頌的第二句，是引述他們的觀點。 論：色等現在的境界也全部都已經滅了。 述記說：這是正式地提出責難，解釋頌的第三句。以及境界已經不存在了。眼等六識，不是同時生起的。生起這種覺知的時候，關鍵在於意識，但不是現覺，能緣的已經不存在了，所緣的現境也已經不存在了。
【English Translation】 English version:
Gone. It is not existent in the present. What is the reason for this? Treatise: The key lies in the fact that consciousness is capable of discrimination; therefore, when consciousness is engaged in discrimination, the eye-consciousness, etc., must have already ceased. Commentary: This reveals that two reasons are established. The seeing consciousness is not existent in the present; this is mutually acknowledged. The key is that the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana), possessing three types of discrimination (self-nature discrimination, recollection discrimination, and conceptual discrimination), is required to generate this discriminating present awareness. The five sense consciousnesses do not possess these three types of discrimination, so they cannot generate this kind of present awareness. Since this present awareness is in consciousness, when consciousness generates this awareness, the seeing eye-consciousness, etc., must have already entered the past, declined, and ceased to exist. One first sees the object and then generates awareness, so the correct seeing and the awareness cannot exist simultaneously. The seeing consciousness realizes awareness, but at this time it no longer exists; how can one allow this awareness to be direct perception (Pratyaksa) to prove that the external realm exists? If correct direct perception is proving forms, etc., and is based on internal mental phenomena without relying on intellectual interpretation, then this proof cannot be established. Because the Sautrantika school believes that mental states and mental factors, the flame of a lamp, **(original text, possibly referring to a substance or phenomenon), only the aspect of cessation ceases simultaneously, arising and ceasing moment by moment. The cessation of forms, etc., also depends on external conditions, that is, it lasts for a period of time depending on the length of the event, and then there is cessation. When generating such a present awareness, the eye-consciousness does not remain, so it enters the past. However, its object, forms, etc., have not yet ceased for their full term, so this only refutes that the seeing consciousness no longer exists when generating this awareness, but it does not refute that the seen object does not exist at this time. Assuming that it does exist, one should establish a logical statement: When generating this awareness, it is certainly not direct perception. Because it is in a distracted state of mind, the seeing consciousness no longer exists. It is like being in a distracted state of mind and thinking about events from hundreds of thousands of kalpas ago. Refuting the full term of the realm is as other treatises say. Treatise: Those who advocate momentary existence (Ksana-vadin) believe that there is this awareness. Commentary: Below, refuting the Sarvastivadins, etc. These schools adhere to the view that the realm, as well as mental states and mental factors, cease moment by moment, and are called advocates of momentary existence. 'There is this awareness' explains the second line of the verse, quoting their view. Treatise: The present realm of forms, etc., has also completely ceased. Commentary: This is formally raising an objection, explaining the third line of the verse. And the realm no longer exists. The six consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, etc., do not arise simultaneously. When generating this awareness, the key lies in consciousness, but it is not direct perception. The perceiver no longer exists, and the present object of perception no longer exists either.
亦皆已滅。即此現覺所有詮智。現在緣時。不及現境。此已滅故。故證不成。應立量言 起此覺時必非現量。是散心位境已無故。如散心位緣過去世百千劫事。大眾部等。剎那既同。六識俱時。雖小不同。頗亦同此。
論。如何此時許有現量。
述曰。此雙結難。釋第四句頌。正量部等。起此覺時。能見已無。如何此時。許有現量。證外境有。薩婆多等。起此覺時。其境亦無。如何此時。許有現量。證外境有。故說現覺證有外境。為證不成。既爾大乘。許六識並。起此覺時。能見所見。二俱現有。此現量覺。其義如何。五識俱意。若同五緣。是現量攝。不起此覺。若起此覺。必不同緣。假智詮故。五識前時。既由意引。今相續生。不假意識。意識起亦餘二量攝。或五同時。或剎那間。亦無過失。然緣心內境。有此現覺生。
論。要曾現受意識能憶是故決定有曾受境。
述曰。下破憶持。先外人救。謂彼救言。要曾過去眼等五識。現受此境。今時意識。方能憶持。非先未受后意能憶。此則泛說先緣后憶。是故決定。有曾受境。顯過去世現境非無。是曾五識。現所受故。
論。見此境者許為現量由斯外境實有義成。
述曰。曾現受境。明瞭五識。既許非無。能見此心追憶意識。亦定
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 也都已經滅去了。即使是這當下覺知的、帶有詮釋智慧的意識，在它緣取現在的境時，也無法直接觸及目前的境界，因為這個境界已經滅去了。因此，用現覺來證明外境存在是不成立的。應該這樣立論：當這種覺知生起時，它一定不是現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知），因為這是散亂心位的狀態，所緣的境已經不存在了。就像散亂心位緣取過去世百千劫的事情一樣。大眾部（Mahasamghika）等宗派認為，剎那（Kshana，極短的時間單位）既然是相同的，六識（Shad-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）同時生起，即使有細微的不同，也大致與此類似。 論：在這種情況下，如何允許有現量存在呢？ 述曰：這是雙重詰難，解釋第四句頌文。正量部（Sammitiya）等宗派認為，當這種覺知生起時，能見者已經不存在了，如何允許此時有現量存在，來證明外境存在呢？薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等宗派認為，當這種覺知生起時，它所緣的境也已經不存在了，如何允許此時有現量存在，來證明外境存在呢？所以說，用現覺來證明外境存在是不成立的。既然如此，大乘（Mahayana）認為六識同時生起，能見和所見二者都同時存在，這種現量覺知的意義又是什麼呢？與五識（Panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）同時生起的意識，如果與五識的緣取方式相同，就屬於現量所攝。如果沒有生起這種覺知，如果生起了這種覺知，必定與五識的緣取方式不同，因為它帶有假立的詮釋。五識生起之前，是由意識引導的，現在相續生起，不需要依賴意識。意識生起時，也屬於其餘二量（比量和聖教量）所攝。或者五識同時生起，或者在剎那之間生起，也沒有什麼過失。然而，緣取心內的境界，會有這種現覺生起。 論：必須要曾經現前領受過，意識才能回憶，因此可以確定有曾經領受過的境界。 述曰：下面破斥憶持。首先是外人的辯護。他們辯解說，必須要過去眼等五識曾經現前領受過這個境界，現在的意識才能回憶起來。如果先前沒有領受過，後來的意識就無法回憶。這是一種泛泛而談的，先緣取后回憶的說法。因此可以確定，有曾經領受過的境界。這表明過去世的現境並非不存在，因為那是曾經被五識現前領受過的。 論：見到這個境界的人，可以認為是現量，因此外境真實存在的意義就成立了。 述曰：曾經現前領受過的境界，明瞭的五識，既然允許它不是不存在的，那麼能見到這個境界、追憶的意識，也一定是存在的。
【English Translation】 English version: They have all already ceased. Even this present awareness, with its interpretive wisdom, when it cognizes the present object, cannot directly access the current realm, because this realm has already ceased. Therefore, using present awareness to prove the existence of external objects is not valid. One should establish the argument: when this awareness arises, it is certainly not direct perception (Pratyaksha), because it is a state of distracted mind, and the object of cognition no longer exists. Just like a distracted mind cognizing events of hundreds of thousands of kalpas (Kshana) in the past. The Mahasamghika and other schools believe that since the moment (Kshana) is the same, the six consciousnesses (Shad-vijnana) arise simultaneously, even if there are slight differences, they are roughly similar to this. Question: How can direct perception be allowed in this situation? Answer: This is a double refutation, explaining the fourth line of the verse. The Sammitiya and other schools believe that when this awareness arises, the seer no longer exists, so how can direct perception be allowed at this time to prove the existence of external objects? The Sarvastivada and other schools believe that when this awareness arises, the object it cognizes no longer exists, so how can direct perception be allowed at this time to prove the existence of external objects? Therefore, it is said that using present awareness to prove the existence of external objects is not valid. Since this is the case, the Mahayana believes that the six consciousnesses arise simultaneously, and both the seer and the seen exist simultaneously. What is the meaning of this direct perception awareness? The consciousness that arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana), if it is the same as the way the five consciousnesses cognize, is included in direct perception. If this awareness has not arisen, if this awareness has arisen, it must be different from the way the five consciousnesses cognize, because it carries fabricated interpretation. Before the five consciousnesses arise, they are guided by consciousness. Now they arise in a continuous stream, without relying on consciousness. When consciousness arises, it also belongs to the other two valid means of cognition (inference and scriptural authority). Either the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, or they arise in a moment, and there is no fault. However, when cognizing the internal realm of the mind, this present awareness arises. Question: It is necessary to have experienced it before in order for consciousness to recall it, therefore it can be determined that there is a realm that has been experienced before. Answer: The following refutes memory. First, the defense of outsiders. They argue that it is necessary for the past five consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness, to have experienced this realm before, in order for the present consciousness to recall it. If it has not been experienced before, the later consciousness cannot recall it. This is a general statement of first cognizing and then recalling. Therefore, it can be determined that there is a realm that has been experienced before. This shows that the present realm of the past is not non-existent, because it was once experienced by the five consciousnesses. Question: The person who sees this realm can be considered direct perception, therefore the meaning of the real existence of the external realm is established. Answer: The realm that has been experienced before, the clear five consciousnesses, since it is allowed that it is not non-existent, then the consciousness that sees this realm and recalls it must also exist.
是有。彼此二宗。許曾現識現量所攝。現量曾有境。今時方能憶。故此所緣。定心外法。又追憶識。由曾現受。亦現量攝。故知。外境實有義成。若無外境。無曾所受。無曾所受故現量亦無。云何今時有憶持識。由斯外境實有成也。
此外救已。下論主破。
論。如是要由先受后憶證有外境理亦不成。
述曰。下破有二。初總后別。此總非也。如是要由現量。先受外實有境。后意方憶。以此道理。證離心外境有不成。
論。何以故。
述曰。外人復問。為何義故證境不成。
下論主破。
論。頌曰如說似境識從此生憶念。
述曰。然舊論本。句句別明。分為二段。實如今者合一處。明義相違故。但申正理。奪彼憶持。如前所說。似境之識。後生憶持。非緣離心外境識。後有憶持也。
論曰。如前所說雖無外境而眼識等似外境現。
述曰。釋初句頌。奪彼曾受離心之外現境之識。謂如前說。識從自種生。似境相轉等。及初論首說識生時。似外境現。雖無外境。眼等五識。似外境現。已廣如前。
論。從此後位與念相應分別意識似前境現。
述曰。釋頌下句。奪彼憶持。謂從過去似境五識。今此後位。與別境念。相應之時。有緣過去分別意識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 外道：是的。彼此兩種宗派，都認可曾經親身經歷、現量所攝的事物。既然現量曾經有其所緣的境界，那麼現在才能回憶起來。因此，這個回憶所緣的，一定是心外的法。而且，追憶的意識，也是由於曾經親身感受過，所以也屬於現量所攝。因此可知，心外的境界是真實存在的。如果沒有心外的境界，就沒有曾經感受過的東西；沒有曾經感受過的東西，現量也就無從談起。那麼，現在怎麼會有憶持的意識呢？因此，心外的境界是真實存在的。
以上是外道的辯護。下面是論主的破斥。
論：像這樣，要通過先感受后回憶來證明外境存在，這個道理也是不成立的。
述記：下面的破斥分為兩部分，先總破，后別破。這裡是總破，認為外道的說法不成立。像這樣，要通過現量，先感受外在真實存在的境界，然後意識才能回憶，用這個道理來證明離開心之外的境界存在，是不成立的。
論：為什麼呢？
述記：外道反問，因為什麼緣故說證明外境存在不成立呢？
下面是論主的破斥。
論：頌曰：如說似境識，從此生憶念。
述記：舊的論本，是逐句分別解釋，分為兩段。實際上現在這個版本是合在一起的，但這樣一來，意義就互相矛盾了。所以這裡只是闡述正確的道理，否定外道的憶持。就像前面所說的，相似於外境的識，後來產生憶念，而不是緣于離開心之外的境界的識，後來才有憶念。
論曰：如前所說，雖無外境，而眼識等似外境現。
述記：解釋頌的第一句，否定外道曾經感受過離開心之外而顯現的境界的識。就像前面所說的，識從自己的種子生起，相似於外境的相狀而轉變等等，以及最初的論述中說，識產生的時候，相似於外境顯現。雖然沒有外在的境界，眼識等五識，也相似於外境顯現，這些都已經詳細地說明過了。
論：從此後位，與念相應，分別意識似前境現。
述記：解釋頌的下句，否定外道的憶持。就是說，從過去相似於外境的五識，到現在這個後來的階段，與別境中的念相應的時候，有緣於過去的分別意識。
【English Translation】 English version: Opponent: Yes. Both of our schools acknowledge things that have been personally experienced and apprehended by direct perception (pratyaksa). Since direct perception once had its object, it is now possible to recall it. Therefore, what is recalled must be a phenomenon external to the mind. Moreover, the consciousness of recollection is also included in direct perception because it was once personally experienced. Thus, it can be known that external objects are truly existent. If there were no external objects, there would be nothing that had been experienced; without anything having been experienced, there would be no direct perception. How, then, could there be a consciousness of retention now? Therefore, the existence of external objects is established.
The above is the opponent's defense. The following is the refutation by the treatise master.
Treatise: In this way, the reasoning that external objects exist because of prior experience and subsequent recollection is also not established.
Commentary: The following refutation is in two parts: first a general refutation, then a specific refutation. This is the general refutation, arguing that the opponent's statement is not established. In this way, the reasoning that one must first experience an external, truly existent object through direct perception, and then the mind can recall it, to prove that objects exist apart from the mind, is not established.
Treatise: Why is that?
Commentary: The opponent asks in return, for what reason is it said that proving the existence of external objects is not established?
The following is the treatise master's refutation.
Treatise: Verse: As said, consciousnesses resembling objects, from this arise recollection.
Commentary: The old treatise versions explained each line separately, dividing it into two sections. In reality, the current version combines them, but in doing so, the meanings contradict each other. Therefore, here it only elucidates the correct reasoning, negating the opponent's retention. Just as mentioned before, consciousnesses resembling external objects later give rise to recollection, not that consciousnesses arising from objects external to the mind later have recollection.
Treatise: As previously stated, although there are no external objects, the eye-consciousness (caksur-vijnana) and others appear as if they are external objects.
Commentary: Explaining the first line of the verse, negating the opponent's consciousness of having experienced objects that appear apart from the mind. As mentioned before, consciousness arises from its own seeds, transforming into aspects resembling external objects, etc., and as stated in the beginning of the treatise, when consciousness arises, it appears as if it is an external object. Although there are no external objects, the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, appear as if they are external objects; these have already been explained in detail.
Treatise: From this subsequent state, in conjunction with mindfulness (smrti), the discriminating consciousness (manas-vijnana) appears as if it is the former object.
Commentary: Explaining the latter line of the verse, negating the opponent's retention. That is to say, from the past five consciousnesses resembling external objects, in this subsequent stage, when in conjunction with mindfulness within the mental factors (caitta), there is a discriminating consciousness that is related to the past.
。變似前五識所緣境現 無曾現在受離心境。眼等五識。從此今時。與念相應。有一意識。緣前五識離心之境。
論。即說此為憶曾所受。
述曰。即說於此分別意識。緣曾現在不離識境。名為憶持曾所受識。所以者何。由曾五識。及同時意。緣即識境。熏成種子。今時相續。意於此位。能憶前境。名為憶持。非曾五識境實離於心。今時猶有意識緣之。名曾受識。
論。故以後憶證先所見實有外境其理不成。
述曰。此結非也。道理既爾。故汝所說。以憶持故。證曾五識所見實有。其義不成。直以自宗。釋外所難。奪他所說。更無異理。如說汝細心。即我第八識。然舊論本。上來所說。一頌半文。異常難解。披者當知。
論。若如夢中雖無實境而識得起覺時亦然。
述曰。自下大段第三有半頌。釋小乘外道。難以夢例覺時。應知境無失。先敘彼難。後方釋破。于敘難中。初牒論主所明唯識。后正申難。此即初也。論主前來所說理趣。如世夢中。無境既識起。其覺時識。無境得生者。即牒夢覺二識義同。
自下申難。
論。如世自知夢境非有覺時既爾何不自知。
述曰。夢覺二識。無境既同。世能自知夢境非有。其覺時識。自知應等。夢心無有境。覺時許知無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：變現出類似於前五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所緣的境界，沒有曾經或現在離開心而存在的境界。眼等五識，從過去到現在，與念頭相應，存在一個意識，緣於前五識不離心的境界。
論：這就是說，這個意識是憶念曾經感受過的。
述曰：就是說，這個分別意識，緣于曾經和現在不離識的境界，叫做憶持曾經感受過的識。為什麼呢？因為曾經的五識和同時的意識，緣于這個識的境界，熏習成種子。現在這個意識相續，能夠憶念之前的境界，叫做憶持。不是說曾經的五識境界實際上離開了心，現在仍然有意識緣於它，叫做曾經感受過的識。
論：所以，用後來的回憶來證明先前所見確實存在外境，這個道理是不成立的。
述曰：這是總結，說這種說法是不對的。道理既然是這樣，所以你說用憶持來證明曾經五識所見確實存在，這個說法是不成立的。這只是用自己的宗派來解釋外道的詰難，駁斥他們的說法，沒有其他的道理。就像說你的細微心，就是我的第八識（阿賴耶識）。然而舊的論本，上面所說的一頌半的文字，非常難以理解，閱讀的人應該知道。
論：如果像夢中一樣，雖然沒有真實的境界，但是識能夠生起，那麼醒來的時候也是一樣。
述曰：下面一大段（第三段還有半頌），解釋小乘外道難以用夢來比喻醒來的時候，應該知道境界沒有喪失。先敘述他們的詰難，然後才解釋駁斥。在敘述詰難中，先引用論主所說的唯識，然後正式提出詰難。這就是開始。論主前面所說的道理，就像世間的夢中，沒有境界，識也能生起，那麼醒來的時候，識沒有境界也能生起，這是引用夢和醒來兩種識的意義相同。
下面開始提出詰難。
論：就像世人自己知道夢境不是真實的，醒來的時候既然如此，為什麼不能自己知道呢？
述曰：夢和醒來兩種識，沒有境界既然相同，世人能夠自己知道夢境不是真實的，那麼醒來的時候的識，自己知道也應該相同。夢中的心沒有境界，醒來的時候也應該知道沒有境界。
【English Translation】 English version: It manifests as the perceived realm of the preceding five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness). There is no realm that has ever existed or currently exists apart from the mind. The five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, from the past to the present, are in accordance with thought. There is a consciousness that cognizes the realm of the preceding five consciousnesses, which is not separate from the mind.
Treatise: This is to say that this consciousness is the recollection of what has been previously experienced.
Commentary: That is to say, this discriminating consciousness, which cognizes the realm that is not separate from consciousness, whether in the past or present, is called the consciousness that recollects and retains what has been previously experienced. Why is this so? Because the past five consciousnesses and the simultaneous consciousness, cognizing the realm of this consciousness, have perfumed and formed seeds. Now, this consciousness continues and is able to recollect the previous realm, which is called recollection and retention. It is not that the realm of the past five consciousnesses is actually separate from the mind, and that there is still a consciousness that cognizes it, which is called the previously experienced consciousness.
Treatise: Therefore, using later recollection to prove that what was previously seen actually exists as an external realm is not a valid argument.
Commentary: This is a conclusion, saying that this statement is incorrect. Since the principle is such, therefore your statement that using recollection to prove that what the past five consciousnesses saw actually exists is not a valid argument. This is merely using one's own school to explain the challenges of externalists, refuting their statements, and there is no other principle. It is like saying that your subtle mind is my eighth consciousness (Ālaya-consciousness). However, the old treatise, the one and a half verses mentioned above, are very difficult to understand, and the reader should be aware of this.
Treatise: If it is like in a dream, although there is no real realm, consciousness can arise, then it is the same when awake.
Commentary: The following large section (the third section has half a verse) explains why it is difficult for the Śrāvakayāna (small vehicle) externalists to use dreams to compare to being awake, and it should be understood that the realm has not been lost. First, it narrates their challenge, and then it explains and refutes it. In narrating the challenge, it first quotes the Consciousness-Only doctrine stated by the treatise master, and then formally raises the challenge. This is the beginning. The principle stated by the treatise master earlier is like in the world's dreams, where consciousness can arise without a realm, then when awake, consciousness can arise without a realm, which is quoting that the meaning of the two consciousnesses of dream and wakefulness is the same.
The challenge is now raised.
Treatise: Just as people know that dream realms are not real, since it is the same when awake, why can't they know it themselves?
Commentary: Since the two consciousnesses of dream and wakefulness are the same in that there is no realm, and people can know that dream realms are not real, then the consciousness when awake should also be able to know it themselves. The mind in a dream has no realm, and it should also be known that there is no realm when awake.
。覺識境既無。何不知非有。量云。世覺時識應知境無。許無境故。如知夢識。
論。既不自知覺境非有。寧如夢識實境皆無。
述曰。前難覺識應知境無。此顯不知實境定有。覺夢二境俱非有。即知夢識境成無。覺不自知無異於夢。故知覺識境實有。量云。世覺時識外實境有。許異夢故。如自真智。不言世覺。相符極成。亂真覺故。因不言許。隨一不成。生死。大乘說為夢故。或簡五識。不行夢故。或顯異於眠時夢故。喻不言自。其體便闕。大乘真智。無外境故。若說大乘真智為喻。所立不成。為此等過。宗等各簡。
此總難已。自下非之。
論。此亦非證。
述曰。此總非之。
自下別釋。
論。頌曰未覺不能知夢所見非有。
述曰。未得真智覺。不能自知生死夢所見。定非實有。即正理解於此頌文。或為喻顯。如世未覺。不能自知夢心所見。定非實有。覺時亦爾。以喻釋難。即此半頌通以法喻二義解之。亦無違也。舊論下句。今在上說。今此上句。舊論下說。舊依梵本。今從唐言。亦無乖返。諸上下頌。應如是知。
論曰。如未覺位不知夢境非外實有覺時乃知。
述曰。此舉世喻。以釋頌文。要覺方知夢境非有。彼此共許。故以為喻。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：既然覺和識的境界都是虛無的，為什麼不能認識到它們並非真實存在呢？ 答：因為在世俗的覺知和意識產生時，應當知道境界是虛無的，這是因為我們承認境界是虛無的。就像我們知道夢中的意識一樣。
論：既然不能自己認識到覺的境界並非真實存在，怎麼能像夢中的意識一樣，認為真實境界都是虛無的呢？
述記：前面是質疑覺和識應當知道境界是虛無的，這裡是表明不能認識到真實境界一定是存在的。覺和夢這兩種境界都不是真實存在的，因此知道夢中的意識境界是虛無的。覺不能自己認識到這一點，和夢沒有什麼不同。所以知道覺的意識境界是真實存在的。論證如下：在世俗的覺知和意識產生時，外在的真實境界是存在的，這是因為我們承認它和夢不同。就像我們自己的真智一樣。這裡不說『世俗的覺』，是因為它和極度真實的覺相符，會擾亂真正的覺。因為論證中沒有說『承認』，所以隨舉一例都不能成立。生死，在大乘佛教中被認為是夢。或者是爲了簡別五識，因為五識在夢中不起作用。或者爲了顯示它和睡眠時的夢不同。比喻中沒有說『自己的』，那麼它的本體就缺失了。大乘的真智，沒有外在境界。如果說大乘的真智作為比喻，那麼所要建立的論點就不能成立。因為這些過失，所以在宗（宗依）、因（因明）等方面都進行了簡別。
以上是總體的駁難，下面開始分別駁斥。
論：這個論證也是不成立的。
述記：這是總體的駁斥。
下面開始分別解釋。
論：頌詞說：『沒有覺悟就不能知道夢中所見並非真實存在。』
述記：沒有獲得真智的覺悟，就不能自己知道生死大夢中所見，一定不是真實存在的。這就是對這句頌詞的正確理解。或者用比喻來顯明：就像世人沒有覺醒時，不能自己知道夢中所見，一定不是真實存在的。覺醒時也是這樣。用比喻來解釋這個難題。這半句頌詞可以用佛法和比喻兩種意義來解釋，也沒有什麼衝突。舊論的下句，現在放在上面說。現在這句上句，舊論放在下面說。舊論依據梵文字，現在依據唐朝的語言，也沒有什麼矛盾顛倒。其他的上下頌，應當這樣理解。
論：就像沒有覺悟的時候不知道夢境並非外在真實存在，覺悟的時候才知道。
述記：這是舉世俗的比喻，來解釋頌詞。一定要覺悟才能知道夢境並非真實存在，這是彼此都認可的，所以用它來做比喻。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Since the realm of awareness and consciousness (覺識境) is non-existent, why can't we recognize that they are not real? Answer: Because when worldly awareness and consciousness arise, one should know that the realm is non-existent, as we acknowledge its non-existence. It's like knowing the consciousness in a dream.
Treatise: Since one cannot know for oneself that the realm of awareness is not real, how can one, like the consciousness in a dream, consider all real realms to be non-existent?
Commentary: The previous question challenged that awareness and consciousness should know the realm is non-existent. This clarifies that one cannot recognize that the real realm is definitely existent. Both the realms of awareness and dream are not real, thus knowing that the realm of dream consciousness is non-existent. Awareness not knowing this itself is no different from a dream. Therefore, know that the realm of awareness consciousness is real. The argument is as follows: When worldly awareness and consciousness arise, the external real realm exists, because we acknowledge it is different from a dream. Like our own true wisdom (真智). It doesn't say 'worldly awareness' because it matches the extremely real awareness, which would disturb true awareness. Because the argument doesn't say 'acknowledge', any example cited will not hold. Samsara (生死), in Mahayana Buddhism, is considered a dream. Or it is to distinguish the five consciousnesses (五識), because the five consciousnesses do not function in dreams. Or to show it is different from dreams during sleep. The metaphor doesn't say 'own', then its essence is missing. The true wisdom of Mahayana has no external realm. If the true wisdom of Mahayana is used as a metaphor, then the point to be established cannot be established. Because of these faults, distinctions are made in the thesis (宗), reason (因), etc.
The above is a general refutation; below begins the individual refutations.
Treatise: This argument is also not valid.
Commentary: This is a general refutation.
Below begins the individual explanations.
Treatise: The verse says: 'Without awakening, one cannot know that what is seen in a dream is not real.'
Commentary: Without attaining the awakening of true wisdom, one cannot know for oneself that what is seen in the great dream of samsara is definitely not real. This is the correct understanding of this verse. Or use a metaphor to illustrate: Just as ordinary people, when not awakened, cannot know for themselves that what is seen in a dream is definitely not real. It is the same when awakened. Use a metaphor to explain this difficulty. This half-verse can be explained with both Dharma and metaphorical meanings, and there is no conflict. The old treatise's lower sentence is now said above. Now this upper sentence, the old treatise said below. The old treatise is based on the Sanskrit text, now based on the Tang Dynasty language, and there is no contradiction or reversal. The other upper and lower verses should be understood in this way.
Treatise: Just as when not awakened, one does not know that the dream realm is not externally real, but knows when awakened.
Commentary: This uses a worldly metaphor to explain the verse. One must be awakened to know that the dream realm is not real, which is mutually acknowledged, so it is used as a metaphor.
論。如是世間虛妄分別串習惛熱如在夢中。
述曰。下以理解。此釋下句頌中夢字。生死之識。不稱實理。說為虛妄。無始已來。數數熏發。名為串習。蓋纏覆蔽。稱之為惛。毒火所煎。號之為熱。或復串習無明稱惛。聖智不生。名之為熱。猶如世間數習闇昧惛睡之識。名之為夢。生死亦爾。睡者惛熱義。夢睡心之異名。即說生死名世間爾。如經所說生死長夜。
論。諸有所見皆非實有。
述曰。釋后句頌下之四字。生死妄夢。異真智生。故此所緣。皆非實有。顛倒虛妄。所顯現故。量云。生死夢識所緣之境皆非實有。許夢境攝故。如極成夢境。
論。未得真覺不能自知。
述曰。釋頌初句。無始已來。串習虛妄。未植善種。真智不生。如何得知。生死夢境。不實顯現。如夢境無。此答前難。應立量言 生死之識不能稱理知自境無。許夢識攝故。如極成夢識 然亦許有少能自知。如今聞教。知境非有。如極成夢。亦少自知。不名真覺。恐違世間。及法差別隨一過故。宗云稱理。因有許言。世間眠夢。彼此共許。名為極成。簡生死夢。他不許故。外人伏難。既生死識。不能稱理如實自知何名真覺。而實得知今境非有。
論。若時得彼出世對治無分別智即名真覺。
述曰。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論：如此世間的虛妄分別，串習（重複薰染）而變得昏昧燥熱，就像在夢中一樣。
述曰：下面用理解來解釋。這是解釋下面偈頌中的『夢』字。生死的意識，不符合真實的道理，所以說是虛妄的。從無始以來，多次熏習引發，叫做串習。蓋指纏繞覆蓋，蔽指遮蔽，稱之為昏。被毒火煎熬，號之為熱。或者串習無明稱之為昏，聖智不生，名之為熱。就像世間多次習慣於闇昧昏睡的意識，名之為夢。生死也是這樣。睡者有昏熱的含義。夢和睡是心的不同名稱。就是說生死名為世間。如經中所說，生死長夜。
論：所有所見，都不是真實存在的。
述曰：解釋後面偈頌的四個字。生死妄夢，與真智的產生相反。因此，這些所緣，都不是真實存在的。因為是顛倒虛妄所顯現的。可以這樣立量：生死的夢識所緣的境界都不是真實存在的，因為屬於夢境所攝。就像已經成立的夢境一樣。
論：沒有得到真覺，就不能自己知道。
述曰：解釋偈頌的第一句。從無始以來，串習虛妄，沒有種植善根，真智不生，怎麼能知道生死的夢境，不是真實顯現的呢？就像夢境不存在一樣。這是回答前面的難題。應該這樣立量：生死的意識不能符合道理地知道自己的境界是虛無的，因為屬於夢識所攝。就像已經成立的夢識一樣。然而也允許有少數能自己知道，就像現在聽聞教法，知道境界不是真實存在的。就像已經成立的夢，也有少數自己知道。但這不叫真覺，恐怕違背世間以及法差別的其中一個過失。宗中說『符合道理』，因中有『允許』這個詞。世間的睡眠和夢，彼此共同認可，叫做已經成立。簡別生死的夢，因為他人不認可。外人反駁說，既然生死的意識，不能符合道理如實地自己知道，那什麼叫做真覺，而實際上得知現在的境界不是真實存在的呢？
論：如果得到那出世的對治無分別智，就叫做真覺。
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Thus, the false discriminations of the world, habituated (repeatedly perfumed) and becoming darkened and heated, are like being in a dream.
Commentary: The following uses understanding to explain. This explains the word 'dream' in the following verse. The consciousness of birth and death does not conform to true principles, so it is said to be false. From beginningless time, it has been repeatedly perfumed and aroused, called habituation. Covering and concealing is called darkening. Being scorched by poisonous fire is called heating. Or, habituating ignorance is called darkening, and the non-arising of holy wisdom is called heating. Just as the consciousness of the world repeatedly accustomed to darkness, obscurity, and sleepiness is called a dream. Birth and death are also like this. Sleepers have the meaning of darkening and heating. Dream and sleep are different names for the mind. That is to say, birth and death are called the world. As the sutra says, the long night of birth and death.
Treatise: All that is seen is not truly existent.
Commentary: Explains the four words of the following verse. The false dream of birth and death is the opposite of the arising of true wisdom. Therefore, these objects of perception are not truly existent. Because they are manifested by inverted falsehood. It can be established in this way: the realms perceived by the dream consciousness of birth and death are not truly existent, because they are included in the realm of dreams. Just like the already established realm of dreams.
Treatise: Without obtaining true enlightenment, one cannot know oneself.
Commentary: Explains the first line of the verse. From beginningless time, habituating falsehood, without planting good roots, true wisdom does not arise, how can one know that the dream realm of birth and death is not a true manifestation? Just like the dream realm does not exist. This is the answer to the previous difficulty. It should be established in this way: the consciousness of birth and death cannot conform to reason and know that its own realm is non-existent, because it is included in the dream consciousness. Just like the already established dream consciousness. However, it is also allowed that a few can know themselves, just like now hearing the teachings, knowing that the realm is not truly existent. Just like the already established dream, a few also know themselves. But this is not called true enlightenment, fearing to violate one of the faults of the world and the difference of Dharma. The proposition says 'conforms to reason', and the cause has the word 'allows'. The world's sleep and dreams are mutually recognized, called already established. Distinguishing the dream of birth and death, because others do not recognize it. Outsiders refute, since the consciousness of birth and death cannot conform to reason and truly know itself, then what is called true enlightenment, and in reality know that the present realm is not truly existent?
Treatise: If one obtains that transcendental antidote, non-discriminating wisdom, it is called true enlightenment.
乘見道。亦名真覺。然於後得。不知境無。加行不作唯識入故。菩薩見道無漏正智。超世間故。名為出世。能除生死。稱為對治。離世分別。及事分別。名無分別。此為無間道對治世間。契真如理。名無分別智。釋此名難如余處辨。不虛妄故名真。如實了故稱覺。此離諸縛。超諸粗重。得此名入諸聖朋流。故名真覺。簡異生死。少出夢時。亦言知。夢境皆非有。假名之覺。立真覺名。此翻頌中未覺之說。
論。此後所得世間凈智現在前位如實了知彼境非實其義平等。
述曰。于見道中。得此所說無分別智。後有緣世間無漏之智。現在前位。方能稱理。如實了知彼生死識境非實有。即后得智。緣世間故。名為世間。非體有漏名世間也。體非是漏。立以凈名。稱境而知。名如實知。前無分別。唯緣如理。但名真覺。此後得智。遍緣世間。能知境無。名如實知。亦名真覺。此智得起。藉無分別。無分別智。獨名真覺。若生死識。雖少自知。不名真覺。無分別智。雖名真覺。不能知境皆非實有。此後得智。遍緣理事。能知境無。異前二智。其義與前知世眠夢。平等無二。前處眠夢。得世覺時。知先夢境體非實有。今從生死。得於真智出世覺時。知先生死夢境。體非真實。相似無二。平等。相似。一義二名。解頌如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 乘見道（Kṣaṇa-mārga，頓悟之道）。亦名真覺（Satyajñāna，真實之覺）。然而在後得智（Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna，證悟后獲得的智慧）時，若不知所緣之境本無自性，且在加行位（Prayoga-mārga，修行位）不作唯識觀而直接進入見道位，則菩薩的見道無漏正智（Anāsrava-samyagjñāna，無煩惱的正確智慧）因超越世間，故名為出世（Lokottara，超越世間）。此智慧夠去除生死輪迴，稱為對治（Pratipakṣa，對抗）。遠離世間分別（Laukika-vikalpa，世俗的分辨）以及事分別（Vastu-vikalpa，對事物的分辨），名為無分別（Nirvikalpa，沒有分別）。此無間道（Anantarya-mārga，無間斷之道）能對治世間，契合真如（Tathatā，事物的真實本性）之理，故名無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jñāna，無分別的智慧）。解釋此名稱的困難之處如同其他地方所辨析的那樣。不虛妄，所以名為真（Satya，真實）；如實了知，所以稱為覺（Jñāna，覺悟）。此智遠離諸縛（Bandhana，束縛），超越諸粗重（Daurbalya，粗重），得到此智，便能進入諸聖者之流，故名真覺。爲了區別于生死輪迴，如同從短暫的夢中醒來，也可以說是知。但夢境皆非真實存在，只是假名安立的覺。因此，建立真覺之名，是爲了破斥頌文中所說的未覺之說。 論：此後所得世間凈智（Laukika-viśuddha-jñāna，世俗的清凈智慧）現在前位時，如實了知彼境非實，其義是相同的。 述曰：在見道中，得到此所說的無分別智后，有緣於世間的無漏之智，現在前位時，才能如理如實地了知彼生死識（Saṃsāra-vijñāna，輪迴的意識）之境並非真實存在。這即是后得智。因為緣於世間，所以名為世間。並非本體是有漏，才名為世間。本體並非有漏，所以立以凈名。稱合於境而知，名為如實知。之前的無分別智，只是緣于如理，所以只名為真覺。此後得智，普遍緣於世間，能夠知曉境無自性，名為如實知，也名真覺。此智的生起，依賴於無分別智。無分別智，單獨名為真覺。如果生死識，即使稍微有所覺知，也不能稱為真覺。無分別智，雖然名為真覺，但不能知曉一切境皆非真實存在。此後得智，普遍緣於事和理，能夠知曉境無自性，與前兩種智慧不同。其意義與之前所說的知世間眠夢，平等無二。之前在眠夢中，得到世間覺悟之時，知曉先前的夢境本體並非真實存在。現在從生死輪迴中，得到真智出世覺悟之時，知曉先前的生死夢境，本體並非真實。兩者相似無二，平等、相似，是一個意思的兩種說法。解釋頌文如同...
【English Translation】 English version Entering the Path of Seeing (Kṣaṇa-mārga), also known as True Awakening (Satyajñāna). However, in the stage of Subsequent Wisdom (Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), if one does not realize that the object of perception is without inherent existence, and if one does not engage in the Mind-Only practice during the Preparatory Stage (Prayoga-mārga) but directly enters the Path of Seeing, then the Bodhisattva's undefiled Right Knowledge (Anāsrava-samyagjñāna) in the Path of Seeing, because it transcends the world, is called Transcendent (Lokottara). This wisdom can eliminate the cycle of birth and death, and is called Antidote (Pratipakṣa). Being free from worldly discrimination (Laukika-vikalpa) and discrimination of things (Vastu-vikalpa), it is called Non-Discrimination (Nirvikalpa). This Path of Immediate Succession (Anantarya-mārga) can counteract the world and accord with the principle of Suchness (Tathatā), hence it is called Non-Discriminative Wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jñāna). The difficulty in explaining this name is as discussed elsewhere. Not false, therefore called True (Satya); knowing in accordance with reality, therefore called Awakening (Jñāna). This wisdom is free from all bonds (Bandhana), transcends all coarseness (Daurbalya), and upon obtaining this wisdom, one enters the stream of all sages, hence it is called True Awakening. To distinguish it from the cycle of birth and death, like waking up from a brief dream, it can also be said to be knowing. But dream states are not real, only nominally established awakenings. Therefore, the name True Awakening is established to refute the statement of non-awakening in the verse. Treatise: When this Subsequent Worldly Pure Wisdom (Laukika-viśuddha-jñāna) is present, it truly knows that the object is not real, and its meaning is the same. Commentary: In the Path of Seeing, after obtaining this Non-Discriminative Wisdom mentioned, when the undefiled wisdom that is related to the world is present, it can then truly and in accordance with reason know that the object of the consciousness of birth and death (Saṃsāra-vijñāna) is not real. This is Subsequent Wisdom. Because it is related to the world, it is called Worldly. It is not that the substance is defiled, hence it is called Worldly. The substance is not defiled, so it is given the name Pure. Knowing in accordance with the object is called Knowing in Accordance with Reality. The previous Non-Discriminative Wisdom is only related to reason, so it is only called True Awakening. This Subsequent Wisdom is universally related to the world, and can know that the object has no inherent nature, so it is called Knowing in Accordance with Reality, and also called True Awakening. The arising of this wisdom depends on Non-Discriminative Wisdom. Non-Discriminative Wisdom is solely called True Awakening. If the consciousness of birth and death, even if it has some awareness, cannot be called True Awakening. Although Non-Discriminative Wisdom is called True Awakening, it cannot know that all objects are not real. This Subsequent Wisdom is universally related to both phenomena and principle, and can know that the object has no inherent nature, which is different from the previous two types of wisdom. Its meaning is the same as the previous statement of knowing worldly sleep and dreams. Previously, in sleep and dreams, when one attains worldly awakening, one knows that the substance of the previous dream state is not real. Now, from the cycle of birth and death, when one attains True Wisdom and transcendent awakening, one knows that the substance of the previous dream state of birth and death is not real. The two are similar and not different, equal and similar, are two terms for the same meaning. Explaining the verse is like...
字故。若不知生死夢境非實有。但是未覺得真覺已。故能了知。攝大乘論。成唯識中。皆有此釋。義意既同。故不繁引。
論。若諸有情由自相續轉變差別似境識起不由外境為所緣生。
述曰。自下大文第四。復釋外難二識成決定。外境非無失。小乘外道。作如是難。若諸有情。由自身中心等相續。識自證分。轉變自體。有差別相。在內識上。似外境現。實非是外。識緣此起。不由外境。為其所緣引識等起。或從種子。轉變差別。乃有現行似境識起。不由外境為所緣生。
此則外人牒論主義。次申共許。後方正難。
論。彼諸有情近善惡友聞正邪法二識決定。
述曰。此申共許。如彼能緣不離識境。一切有情。或近善友。聞說正法。或近惡友。聞說邪法。如四親近行。近善知識。聽聞正法。正性決定。能教者識。成悲決定。能聽者識。成慧決定。近惡友時。成邪定亦爾。即能所教。二識決定。或近善惡二種友如。其能近者。各成正邪二識決定。準此下釋。即能所教。二識決定。前解為是。若準舊論。今此難中。文既含隱。其能近者。各隨所應。成於邪正二識決定。后解為是。然文既含隱。二解並得。任情取捨。
論。既無友教此云何成。
述曰。此正為難。諸識既緣不離
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這個緣故。如果不知道生死和夢境都不是真實存在的，但是還沒有覺悟到真正的覺醒。所以能夠了解。《攝大乘論》和《成唯識論》中，都有這樣的解釋。意義相同，所以不再繁瑣地引用。
論：如果各種有情眾生，由於自身相續的轉變差別，而生起類似外境的識，不是由外在的境界作為所緣而生起。
述記：下面是第四大段，再次解釋外人的詰難，說明二識的成立是決定的，外境並非沒有作用。小乘和外道，提出這樣的詰難：如果各種有情眾生，由於自身中心等的相續，識的自證分轉變自體，產生差別的相狀，在內識上，顯現出類似外境的現象，實際上不是外境，識緣取這些現象而生起，不是由外在的境界，作為所緣來引導識的生起。或者從種子，轉變差別，才產生現行的類似境界的識，不是由外在的境界作為所緣而生起。
這是外人引述論主的觀點，接下來陳述共同認可的觀點，最後才正式提出詰難。
論：那些有情眾生，親近善友或惡友，聽聞正法或邪法，兩種識是決定的。
述記：這是陳述共同認可的觀點。就像那些能緣取不離識境的一切有情眾生，或者親近善友，聽聞宣說正法，或者親近惡友，聽聞宣說邪法。就像四種親近行一樣，親近善知識，聽聞正法，正性決定。能教導的人的識，成為悲心決定；能聽聞的人的識，成為智慧決定。親近惡友的時候，成為邪定也是一樣。也就是能教導的人和所教導的人，兩種識是決定的。或者親近善友和惡友兩種，就像那些能夠親近的人，各自成為正和邪兩種識的決定。按照這個來解釋下面，也就是能教導的人和所教導的人，兩種識是決定的。前面的解釋是正確的。如果按照舊論，現在這個詰難中，文句既然包含隱晦，那些能夠親近的人，各自隨著所應，成為邪和正兩種識的決定。後面的解釋是正確的。然而文句既然包含隱晦，兩種解釋都可以，任憑自己的意願取捨。
論：既然沒有友和教導，這怎麼能成立呢？
述記：這是正式提出詰難。各種識既然緣取不離
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore. If one does not know that birth, death, and dream states are not real, but has not yet awakened to true enlightenment, then one can understand. The 'Mahāyānasaṃgraha' (Compendium of the Mahayana) and the 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) both have this explanation. The meaning is the same, so I will not quote them extensively.
Treatise: If various sentient beings, due to the transformation and differentiation of their own mind-streams, give rise to consciousnesses that resemble external objects, and are not produced by external realms as their object-condition (ālambana).
Commentary: The following is the fourth major section, further explaining the external objection, clarifying that the establishment of the two consciousnesses is definite, and that external realms are not without function. The Śrāvakayāna (small vehicle) and non-Buddhist schools raise the following objection: If various sentient beings, due to the continuous flow of their own minds and so on, the self-cognizing aspect (sva-saṃvedana) of consciousness transforms its own nature, producing differentiated appearances, manifesting on the inner consciousness as phenomena resembling external objects, but are not actually external objects, and consciousness arises in dependence on these phenomena, not being produced by external realms as their object-condition to initiate the arising of consciousness. Or, from seeds (bīja), transformation and differentiation occur, only then do manifest consciousnesses resembling realms arise, not being produced by external realms as their object-condition.
This is the external person quoting the treatise master's view, then stating a mutually accepted view, and finally formally raising an objection.
Treatise: Those sentient beings who associate with good or bad friends, and hear the correct or incorrect Dharma, the two consciousnesses are definite.
Commentary: This is stating a mutually accepted view. Just like those sentient beings who can apprehend objects that are not separate from consciousness-realms, either associating with good friends, hearing the correct Dharma being expounded, or associating with bad friends, hearing the incorrect Dharma being expounded. Just like the four kinds of close association, associating with good spiritual teachers, hearing the correct Dharma, the determination of correctness is definite. The consciousness of the one who can teach becomes definitely compassionate; the consciousness of the one who can listen becomes definitely wise. When associating with bad friends, becoming fixed on wrong views is also the same. That is, the one who can teach and the one who is taught, the two consciousnesses are definite. Or associating with both good and bad friends, like those who are able to associate, each becomes the determination of both correct and incorrect consciousnesses. According to this to explain below, that is, the one who can teach and the one who is taught, the two consciousnesses are definite. The previous explanation is correct. If according to the old treatise, in this objection now, since the text contains hidden meanings, those who are able to associate, each according to what is appropriate, becomes the determination of both incorrect and correct consciousnesses. The latter explanation is correct. However, since the text contains hidden meanings, both explanations are possible, choose according to one's own preference.
Treatise: Since there are no friends or teachings, how can this be established?
Commentary: This is formally raising an objection. Since the various consciousnesses apprehend objects that are not separate from
識境。無心外法。理即便無善惡二友。亦無他說正邪二法。此能聽者。或正或邪。二識決定。云何得成。或無外境。云何得有。能教所教。二識決定。
論。非不得成。
述曰。下釋妨難。此總答難。非不得成。
論。頌曰展轉增上力二識成決定。
述曰。下別答難。由能所教二人。展轉增上緣力。其能聽者。正邪二識。成決定也。或增上力。能所教者。二人之識得成決定。準前二釋。
論曰。以諸有情自他相續諸識展轉為增上緣。
述曰。此釋初句頌。以諸有情。他能教者。自能聽者。各各相續八種諸識。此彼展轉為增上緣。此意即顯親緣心內自所變境。名為唯識。非遮心外他有情等。外人說心緣心外法親得他人所說之法。今則不然。能所教者。展轉互為增上緣故。自識變似能教所聽。為自相續識親所緣。不能親取他所說法。為疏所緣。于義無失。此說展轉為增上緣故。成唯識說。為疏所緣故。
論。隨其所應二識決定。
述曰。隨其所應顯義不定。由增上緣。若近善友。聽聞正法。自相續中正識決定。若近惡友。聽聞邪法。自相續中邪識決定。或近善惡友。及由展轉為增上緣。能說法者。正邪悲愛。能聽法者。正邪智慧。二識決定。言隨所應二識決定。此由未
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 辨識境界。如果認為心外沒有法，那麼從理上講，就沒有善友和惡友的區別，也沒有正法和邪法的區別。那麼，這個能聽法的人，他的識是正還是邪，如何才能確定呢？如果認為沒有外境，那麼能教的人和所教的法又如何存在呢？能教和所教，這兩種識又如何確定呢？
論：並非不能確定。
述記：下面解釋這個疑問。這裡總的回答這個疑問：並非不能確定。
論：頌詞說：輾轉增上力，二識成決定。
述記：下面分別回答這個疑問。由於能教的人和所教的法，這二者之間輾轉的增上緣的力量，使得能聽法的人，他的正識或邪識，得以確定。或者說，由於增上力的作用，能教的人和所教的法的這二者的識得以確定。參照前面的兩種解釋。
論：因為一切有情眾生，各自和他人的相續諸識，輾轉成為增上緣。
述記：這裡解釋頌詞的第一句。因為一切有情眾生，包括能教的人和他能聽的人，各自相續的八種識，彼此輾轉成為增上緣。這個意思就顯示了，親緣于內心所變現的境界，才叫做『唯識』。並不是要否定心外有其他有情眾生等。外道認為心可以緣心外的法，可以直接獲得他人所說的法。現在不是這樣。能教的人和所教的法，輾轉互相成為增上緣的緣故，自己的識變現出類似於能教的人和所聽的法，作為自己相續識所親緣的對象。不能直接獲取他人所說的法，作為疏遠所緣的對象。在義理上沒有缺失。這裡說輾轉成為增上緣的緣故，成就了唯識的說法。因為是疏遠所緣的緣故。
論：隨著各自所應的情況，兩種識得以確定。
述記：隨著各自所應的情況，顯示義理的不確定性。由於增上緣的作用，如果親近善友，聽聞正法，那麼在自己的相續中，正識得以確定。如果親近惡友，聽聞邪法，那麼在自己的相續中，邪識得以確定。或者親近善友和惡友，以及由於輾轉成為增上緣，能說法的人，他的識是正是邪，是慈悲還是愛，能聽法的人，他的識是正是邪，是智慧還是愚癡，這兩種識得以確定。說隨著各自所應的情況，兩種識得以確定，這是因為還沒有...
【English Translation】 English version Discriminating realms. If there is no dharma outside the mind, then logically, there would be no distinction between good and bad friends, nor between right and wrong teachings. Then, how can the listener's consciousness, whether it is right or wrong, be determined? If there is no external realm, how can the teacher and the taught exist? How can the two consciousnesses of the teacher and the taught be determined?
Treatise: It is not impossible to determine.
Commentary: The following explains the objection. This is a general answer to the objection: it is not impossible to determine.
Treatise: The verse says: 'Through the force of mutual conditioning, the two consciousnesses are determined.'
Commentary: The following answers the objection separately. Due to the force of the mutual conditioning between the teacher and the taught, the listener's right or wrong consciousness is determined. Or, due to the force of conditioning, the consciousnesses of the teacher and the taught are determined. Refer to the previous two explanations.
Treatise: Because all sentient beings, each with their own and others' continuous consciousnesses, mutually become conditioning factors.
Commentary: This explains the first line of the verse. Because all sentient beings, including the teacher and the listener, each with their own continuous eight consciousnesses, mutually become conditioning factors. This means that only the realm transformed within the mind is called 'Vijnaptimatra (唯識, Consciousness-only)'. It does not deny the existence of other sentient beings outside the mind. Externalists believe that the mind can perceive dharmas outside the mind and directly receive the teachings of others. This is not the case now. Because the teacher and the taught mutually become conditioning factors, one's own consciousness transforms into something similar to the teacher and the taught, which is the object directly perceived by one's own continuous consciousness. One cannot directly obtain the teachings of others, which are objects perceived indirectly. There is no loss in meaning. It is said here that they mutually become conditioning factors, thus establishing the doctrine of Vijnaptimatra. Because they are objects perceived indirectly.
Treatise: According to their respective circumstances, the two consciousnesses are determined.
Commentary: According to their respective circumstances, it shows the uncertainty of the meaning. Due to the effect of conditioning factors, if one is close to good friends and hears the right teachings, then in one's own continuum, the right consciousness is determined. If one is close to bad friends and hears the wrong teachings, then in one's own continuum, the wrong consciousness is determined. Or, if one is close to both good and bad friends, and due to mutual conditioning, the teacher's consciousness is right or wrong, compassionate or loving, and the listener's consciousness is right or wrong, wise or foolish, these two consciousnesses are determined. It is said that according to their respective circumstances, the two consciousnesses are determined, because it has not yet...
顯。
論。謂余相續識差別故令余相續差別識生各成決定不由外境。
述曰。此即廣前增上緣義。答外所徴。謂能教者。余相續中見相分識。正邪差別。增上緣故。令能聽者。余相續中差別見相諸識得生。能所教者二識。各各得成決定。或聽者正邪二識。各成決定。不由外境識決定成。即由自他增上緣力。識得決定。非由自他親相緣見。成決定識。故知識生不是親緣。由於外境增上緣。由我亦許有故。雖無外境。而友教亦成。
論。若如夢中境雖無實而識得起覺時亦然。
述曰。自下半頌。大文第五。又釋外難夢覺心無異。無造行果差失。初外人難。后論主釋。初難之中。先牒此義。後方為難。此即牒也。若覺時識。猶如夢中。境雖無實。而亦得起。
論。何緣夢覺造善惡行愛非愛果當受不同。
述曰。此申難也。夢時與覺。無境是同。覺時與夢。俱造眾業。何故覺行。感果苦楚。或有現報等。夢時造行。感果微劣。或無果等。如夢殺人定無現在為他報殺。若覺時殺。定為現在他人殺報。未來感果故定不同。如殺他人。淫他人等。餘一切行。其果亦爾。此外人質以問論主。
論。頌曰心由睡眠壞夢覺果不同。
述曰。下論主答。上句顯理。下顯不同。由在夢位。造
【現代漢語翻譯】 顯。
論。意思是說，由於其他眾生的相續識的差別，導致其他眾生的相續差別識產生，各自形成決定，並非由外境所決定。
述曰。這即是擴充套件了前面的增上緣的意義，回答了外人的質疑。意思是說，能教導者，在其他眾生的相續中，所見的相分識，有正有邪的差別，作為增上緣，使得能聽受者，在其他眾生的相續中，產生差別的見相諸識。能教導者和能聽受者這兩種識，各自得以形成決定，或者聽者的正識和邪識，各自形成決定，並非由外境的識決定形成。而是由自身和他人的增上緣的力量，使得識得以決定，並非由自身和他人的親相緣見，形成決定的識。所以知識的產生不是親緣，而是由於外境的增上緣。因為我也允許有這種情況，所以即使沒有外境，朋友的教導也能成立。
論。如果像夢中一樣，境雖然沒有真實的體性，但是識也能生起，那麼覺醒的時候也是一樣。
述曰。下面是半頌，屬於第五大段，再次解釋外人的疑問，夢境和覺醒時的心沒有差別，不會有造作行為和果報的差異。首先是外人的提問，然後是論主的解釋。首先是引述這個觀點，然後才提出疑問。這就是引述。如果覺醒時的識，就像夢中一樣，境雖然沒有真實的體性，但是也能生起。
論。為什麼夢中和覺醒時造作善惡行為，所感受的可愛和不可愛的果報會有不同？
述曰。這是進一步提出疑問。夢境和覺醒時，沒有真實的境是相同的。覺醒時和夢中，都造作各種業。為什麼覺醒時的行為，會感得痛苦的果報，或者有現世的報應等等。而夢中的造作行為，感得的果報卻很微弱，或者沒有果報等等。比如夢中殺人，一定不會有現在被他人報殺的事情發生。如果覺醒時殺人，一定會受到現在被他人殺的報應。未來感受的果報一定不同。比如殺害他人，姦淫他人等等，其他一切行為，其果報也是這樣。這是外人以此來質問論主。
論。頌曰：心由睡眠壞，夢覺果不同。
述曰。下面是論主的回答。上句顯示道理，下句顯示不同。由於在夢中的位置，造
【English Translation】 Manifestation.
Treatise: It means that due to the differences in the consciousness streams of other beings, the differentiated consciousnesses of other beings arise, each forming a determination, not determined by external objects.
Commentary: This expands the meaning of the previous 'causal condition' (adhipati-pratyaya), answering the question from outsiders. It means that the teacher, in the consciousness stream of other beings, the appearance-aspect consciousness (nimitta-bhāga) that is seen, with its right and wrong differences, acts as a causal condition, causing the listener, in the consciousness stream of other beings, to generate differentiated appearance-aspect consciousnesses. The consciousnesses of the teacher and the listener each become determined, or the right and wrong consciousnesses of the listener each become determined, not determined by the consciousness of external objects. Rather, it is by the power of one's own and others' causal conditions that consciousness becomes determined, not by the direct perception of appearances by oneself and others that a determined consciousness is formed. Therefore, the arising of knowledge is not a direct cause, but due to the causal condition of external objects. Because I also allow for this, even without external objects, the teachings of a friend can be established.
Treatise: If, like in a dream, the object has no real substance but consciousness can still arise, then it is the same when awake.
Commentary: The following is the second half of the verse, belonging to the fifth major section, further explaining the outsider's question that there is no difference between the mind in dreams and when awake, and that there will be no difference in actions and consequences. First is the outsider's question, then the treatise master's explanation. First, the view is quoted, and then the question is raised. This is the quotation. If the consciousness when awake is like in a dream, where the object has no real substance but can still arise.
Treatise: Why is it that when good and bad actions are performed in dreams and when awake, the agreeable and disagreeable consequences that are experienced are different?
Commentary: This is a further question. Dreams and being awake are the same in that there are no real objects. When awake and in dreams, all kinds of karma are created. Why is it that actions when awake lead to painful consequences, or even immediate retribution, etc., while actions in dreams lead to weak consequences, or no consequences at all, etc.? For example, killing someone in a dream will definitely not lead to being killed in retaliation in the present life. If someone is killed when awake, there will definitely be retaliation in the present life. The consequences experienced in the future are definitely different. For example, killing others, committing adultery with others, etc., all other actions are the same in their consequences. This is the outsider using this to question the treatise master.
Treatise: The verse says: 'The mind is impaired by sleep, the consequences of dreams and being awake are different.'
Commentary: The following is the treatise master's answer. The first line reveals the principle, the second line reveals the difference. Because in the state of dreaming, creating
善惡心。睡眠所壞。故夢與覺。感果不同。
論。在夢位心由睡眠壞勢力羸劣覺心不爾。
述曰。釋上句頌。不定四中。睡眠心所。能令有情。身份沉重。心分惛昧。在寐夢心。為此所壞。令心昧故。慮不分明。勢力羸劣。其覺時心。既無眠壞。緣境明瞭。勢力增強。不同夢位。其狂醉等。為緣壞心。羸劣亦爾。此但答問如夢位心。
論。故所造行當受異熟勝劣不同非由外境。
述曰。由夢壞心。覺時不爾。故此二位所造善惡。當受異熟。非夢果勝。夢果乃劣非由外境其果不同 外人伏問。既爾夢心。為睡所壞。覺心不爾。何不夢位。由眠所壞。其境實無覺境便有。復由此理。當果異耶 既爾汝宗覺時見色等。既是實有。夢時見色等。應例非無。見色雖復義齊。其境有無不等 或薩婆多。夢覺境俱是有。造行當果不同。何妨我義無境覺夢雖同。造行感果有別。此中難釋。返覆無窮。恐厭煩文。略示綱要。諸有智者。準此應思。
論。若唯有識無身語等羊等云何為他所殺。
述曰。自下二頌。大文第六。又釋外難無境殺等無。返詰他宗失。初敘外二難。次一頌解。后一頌詰。此即初難。若唯有識。色等境無。由此便無身語業等。彼羊等云何為他人所殺。心外法故。方今世士此難多
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：善惡之心，被睡眠所擾亂，因此夢境和清醒時所感受的果報不同。
論：在夢中的心，由於睡眠的擾亂，其力量微弱；而清醒時的心則不然。
述曰：解釋上面的偈頌。在不定的四種心中，睡眠心所能使有情眾生的身軀沉重，心識昏昧。在睡眠中的夢心，因此受到擾亂，使心識昏昧，思慮不清晰，力量微弱。而清醒時的心，沒有睡眠的擾亂，緣取境界明瞭，力量增強，與夢中的狀態不同。至於狂亂、醉酒等狀態，也是因為外緣擾亂了心識，使其力量微弱。這裡只是回答了像夢中狀態的心。
論：因此，所造作的行為，所感受的異熟果報，其殊勝或低劣是不同的，不是由於外在的境界。
述曰：由於夢中的心被擾亂，而清醒時則不然，因此這兩種狀態下所造作的善惡行為，所感受的異熟果報也不同。不是說夢中的果報殊勝，夢中的果報是低劣的，也不是由於外在的境界導致果報不同。外人反駁提問：既然如此，夢中的心被睡眠擾亂，清醒時的心則不然，為什麼夢中因為睡眠的擾亂，境界實際上不存在，而清醒時的境界就存在呢？又因此道理，果報才會有不同嗎？既然如此，你們宗派認為清醒時所見到的色等是真實存在的，那麼夢中所見到的色等，也應該同樣不是虛無的。雖然見到色這件事在意義上相同，但是境界的有無卻不同。或者薩婆多部認為，夢境和清醒時的境界都是存在的，造作行為所感受的果報不同，這又妨礙了我的觀點，即沒有境界的覺和夢雖然相同，但是造作行為所感受的果報卻有區別。這裡面的辯難解釋，反覆無窮無盡，恐怕使人厭煩，所以略微提示綱要。各位有智慧的人，應該根據這個來思考。
論：如果只有識，沒有身語等，那麼羊等眾生怎麼會被他人所殺害呢？
述曰：從下面兩首偈頌開始，是第六大段。再次解釋外人的詰難，即沒有境界的殺害等是不成立的，反過來詰難對方宗派的過失。首先敘述外人的兩個詰難，然後用一首偈頌來解釋，最後一首偈頌用來反駁。這裡是第一個詰難。如果只有識，色等境界不存在，因此就沒有身語業等，那麼羊等眾生怎麼會被他人所殺害呢？因為心外的法不存在的緣故。當今世人大多有這個疑問。
【English Translation】 English version: Good and evil minds are disturbed by sleep. Therefore, the karmic consequences felt in dreams and while awake are different.
Treatise: In the state of dreaming, the mind is weakened by the disruptive force of sleep; the waking mind is not.
Commentary: Explaining the verse above. Among the four uncertain mental factors, the mental factor of sleep can cause sentient beings to experience heaviness in the body and dullness in the mind. The dreaming mind in sleep is thus disturbed, causing the mind to be dull, thoughts unclear, and strength weak. The waking mind, however, is not disturbed by sleep, perceives objects clearly, and its strength is enhanced, unlike the state of dreaming. As for states of madness, drunkenness, etc., they are also due to external conditions disturbing the mind, weakening its strength. This only answers the question about the mind in a dream state.
Treatise: Therefore, the actions performed and the resulting karmic consequences experienced, whether superior or inferior, are different, not due to external objects.
Commentary: Because the mind in a dream is disturbed, while the waking mind is not, the good and evil actions performed in these two states result in different karmic consequences. It is not that the consequences in dreams are superior, but rather that the consequences in dreams are inferior, and it is not due to external objects that the consequences are different. An outsider raises a counter-argument: If that is the case, the mind in a dream is disturbed by sleep, while the waking mind is not, why is it that in dreams, due to the disturbance of sleep, the objects do not actually exist, while the objects in the waking state do exist? And is it because of this reason that the consequences are different? If that is the case, your school believes that the forms etc. seen in the waking state are real, then the forms etc. seen in dreams should also be non-existent. Although seeing forms is the same in meaning, the existence or non-existence of the objects is different. Or the Sarvastivadins believe that the objects in dreams and in the waking state both exist, and the different karmic consequences experienced from actions performed interfere with my view that although the waking state and dreams are the same without objects, the karmic consequences experienced from actions performed are different. The debates and explanations here are endless and repetitive, fearing that it will cause annoyance, so I will briefly point out the key points. All wise people should think about this accordingly.
Treatise: If there is only consciousness and no body, speech, etc., then how can sheep and other beings be killed by others?
Commentary: Starting from the following two verses, is the sixth major section. Again, explaining the outsider's challenge, that killing etc. without objects is not established, and in turn challenging the faults of the other's school. First, narrating the outsider's two challenges, then explaining with one verse, and finally refuting with one verse. Here is the first challenge. If there is only consciousness and the objects of form etc. do not exist, therefore there are no actions of body, speech, etc., then how can sheep and other beings be killed by others? Because the dharma outside the mind does not exist. Most people in the world today have this question.
生。達此論文。應休劣意。
論。若羊等死不由他害屠者云何得殺生罪。
述曰。此第二難。心外羊等。若其死位。不由他人之所害者。世間殺羊魚等。屠者云何可得殺生之罪。若許罪是有。即殺心外之羊。心外羊無屠者。云何得罪。返覆二責。無所逃刑。
論。頌曰由他識轉變有殺害事業如鬼等意力令他失念等。
述曰。上二句頌。先以理釋。下二句頌。舉喻以成。由能殺者。為增上緣。起殺害識。轉變力故。令所殺者。有殺害已。斷命事成。故能殺者。得殺生罪。如由鬼等意念等故。令他有情。有失念等。至下當知。
論曰。如由鬼等意念勢力。令他有情失念得夢。
述曰。先釋下半頌能成喻也。如世間鬼。惱亂有情內意念力。令他有情。失本正念。心發狂等。或鬼意變彼。令他得異夢 如鬼等者。瞿波解云。等取天神。龍神。犍達縛。夜叉神。仙人等。及如胎中子。由母憂惱。子心變異。或生。或死。或子起欲樂。母隨子欲得夢。
已下釋頌末句失念等字。
論。或著魅等變異事成。
述曰。由貓鬼等意念勢力。令他著魅變異事成。既彼親能令他作此。但由意念增上緣故。此事便成。殺羊等亦爾。雖無外身語。殺事亦成。
上解失念。下解得夢
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生：通達這個論點，應該停止低劣的想法。 論：如果羊等動物的死亡不是由其他原因造成的，屠夫為什麼會有殺生的罪過？ 述曰：這是第二個詰難。心外的羊等動物，如果它們的死亡不是由其他人所造成的，那麼世間屠殺羊、魚等動物的屠夫，怎麼會有殺生的罪過呢？如果承認有罪，那就是殺害了心外的羊。心外的羊不存在，屠夫又怎麼會犯罪呢？反覆詰難，無從逃避。 論：頌詞說：由於他識的轉變，才有殺害的行為，就像鬼等的意念力量，使他人失去正念等。 述曰：上面兩句頌詞，先用道理來解釋；下面兩句頌詞，舉例來論證。由於能殺者作為增上緣，生起殺害的意識，通過轉變的力量，使被殺者有了被殺害的事實，斷命的事情得以完成，所以能殺者就有了殺生的罪過。就像由於鬼等的意念等，使其他有情眾生，有了失去正念等情況，這在後面會講到。 論曰：就像由於鬼等的意念勢力，使其他有情眾生失去正念，得到夢境。 述曰：先解釋下半頌，用來成就比喻。就像世間的鬼，惱亂有情眾生的內在意念，使其他有情眾生，失去原本正確的念頭，心發狂等。或者鬼的意念改變他們，使他們得到奇異的夢境。像鬼等，瞿波（Gopa）解釋說，『等』包括天神、龍神、犍達縛（Gandharva，一種天神）、夜叉神（Yaksa，一種鬼神）、仙人等。以及像胎中的嬰兒，由於母親的憂愁煩惱，嬰兒的心也隨之變異，或者出生，或者死亡，或者嬰兒生起慾望和快樂，母親隨著嬰兒的慾望而得到夢境。 以下解釋頌詞末句『失念等』字。 論：或者被邪魔附身等，變異的事情得以完成。 述曰：由於貓鬼等的意念勢力，使他人被邪魔附身，變異的事情得以完成。既然它們能夠使他人做出這些事情，僅僅由於意念的增上緣，這件事就得以完成。殺羊等也是這樣，即使沒有外在的身語行為，殺害的事情也得以完成。 上面解釋了『失念』，下面解釋『得夢』。
【English Translation】 English version: Verse: Having understood this treatise, one should abandon inferior thoughts. Treatise: If the death of sheep and other animals is not caused by others, why does the butcher incur the sin of killing? Commentary: This is the second objection. If the sheep and other animals external to the mind die not by the actions of others, how can butchers who kill sheep, fish, and other animals in the world incur the sin of killing? If the sin is admitted, it means killing sheep external to the mind. Since sheep external to the mind do not exist, how can the butcher be guilty? This is a repeated challenge, leaving no escape. Treatise: The verse says: 'Due to the transformation of another's consciousness, there is the act of killing, just as the power of ghosts and other beings causes others to lose mindfulness, etc.' Commentary: The first two lines of the verse explain the principle, while the last two lines use an analogy to establish it. Because the killer acts as a dominant condition, generating the consciousness of killing, through the power of transformation, the killing of the victim is accomplished, and the act of ending life is completed. Therefore, the killer incurs the sin of killing. It is like the thoughts of ghosts and other beings causing other sentient beings to lose mindfulness, etc., as will be explained later. Treatise: It is like the power of the thoughts of ghosts and other beings causing other sentient beings to lose mindfulness and have dreams. Commentary: First, the latter half of the verse is explained to establish the analogy. It is like worldly ghosts disturbing the inner thoughts of sentient beings, causing them to lose their original correct mindfulness and become mentally deranged, etc. Or the thoughts of ghosts transform them, causing them to have strange dreams. Regarding ghosts, Gopa explains that 'etc.' includes gods, dragons, Gandharvas (a type of celestial musician), Yakshas (a type of spirit), immortals, etc. It is also like a fetus in the womb, whose mind changes due to the mother's worries and distress, resulting in birth, death, or the fetus experiencing desires and pleasures, and the mother having dreams according to the fetus's desires. The following explains the word 'etc.' in the last line of the verse, 'loss of mindfulness, etc.' Treatise: Or being possessed by demons, etc., causing the completion of transformed events. Commentary: Due to the power of the thoughts of cat-ghosts, etc., others are possessed by demons, and transformed events are completed. Since they can cause others to do these things, merely through the dominant condition of their thoughts, these events are completed. Killing sheep, etc., is also like this. Even without external physical or verbal actions, the act of killing is completed. The above explains 'loss of mindfulness'; the following explains 'having dreams'.
有二事。
論。具神通者意念勢力令他夢中見種種事。
述曰。頌言鬼等。等中等此。
此則總舉。下別指事。
論。如大迦多衍那意願勢力令婆剌拏王等夢見異事。
述曰。即佛在世。摩訶迦旃延。摩訶言大。迦多衍。此云剪剃。如常所釋。此即其姓。那者男聲。即剪剃種。男聲中。呼表是男也。如言尼者。女聲中。呼表其女也。婆剌拏者。舊言娑羅那。此云流轉。即由剪剃神通意願。令王得夢。說此緣者。如舊中阿含經說娑羅那王。是眉稀羅國主。容貌端政。自謂無雙。求覓好人。欲自方比顯己殊勝。時有人曰。王舍城內。有大迦旃延。形容甚好。世中無比。王遣迎之。迦旃延至。王出宮迎。王不及彼。人睹迦延。無看王者。王問所以。眾曰。迦延容貌勝王。王問大德今果宿因。迦延答曰。我昔出家。王作乞兒。我掃寺地。王來乞食。我掃地竟。令王除糞。除糞既訖。方與王食。以此業因。生人天中得報端政。王聞此已尋請出家。為迦延弟子。后共迦延往阿盤地國中。山中修道。別處坐禪。阿盤地王。名缽樹多。時將諸宮人入山遊戲。宮人見王形貌端政。圍繞看之。缽樹多王。見娑羅那王。疑有欲意。問娑羅那曰。汝是阿羅漢耶。王答言非。次第一一問餘三果。王皆答言非。又問
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有兩件事需要討論。
論：具有神通的人用意念的力量，使他人在夢中見到各種事情。
述曰：頌文中提到的『鬼等』，『等』字包括了這些。
這裡是總體的概括，下面分別指出具體的事例。
論：例如，大迦多衍那（Mahākatyāyana，大迦旃延的另一種音譯，意為『大剪剃』）用意願的力量，使婆剌拏王（國王名，舊譯娑羅那）等人在夢中見到奇異的事情。
述曰：佛陀在世時，有摩訶迦旃延（Mahākatyāyana，大迦旃延）。摩訶（Mahā）意為『大』。迦多衍（Kātyāyana），這裡的意思是『剪剃』，如常解釋的那樣，這是他的姓氏。『那』（na）是男性的聲音，表示是男性。例如說『尼』（nī），是女性的聲音，表示是女性。婆剌拏（Bharana），舊譯為娑羅那（Sāranā），意思是『流轉』。這是因為剪剃的神通意願，使國王做了夢。說這個因緣是這樣的：如《中阿含經》所說，娑羅那王是眉稀羅國（不確定）的國王，容貌端正，自認為無人能比，想尋找容貌好的人，想通過比較來顯示自己的殊勝。當時有人說：『王舍城內，有大迦旃延，形容非常俊美，世間無人能比。』國王派人去迎接他。迦旃延到達后，國王出宮迎接。國王的容貌不如他，人們看到迦旃延，都不看國王。國王問原因，眾人說：『迦旃延的容貌勝過國王。』國王問大德（指迦旃延）今生容貌端正的宿世因緣。迦旃延回答說：『我過去出家時，國王您是乞丐。我打掃寺院的地面，您來乞討食物。我掃完地后，讓您清除糞便。清除糞便完畢后，才給您食物。因為這個業因，生在人天中得到端正的果報。』國王聽了這些，隨即請求出家，做了迦旃延的弟子。後來一同和迦旃延前往阿盤地國（Avanti）的山中修行，分別在不同的地方坐禪。阿盤地國的國王，名叫缽樹多（Bāhuda），當時帶著眾宮人入山遊玩。宮人看到娑羅那王形貌端正，就圍著觀看。缽樹多王看到娑羅那王，懷疑他有非分之想，問娑羅那說：『你是阿羅漢嗎？』國王回答說不是。又依次詢問其他三種果位，國王都回答說不是。又問
【English Translation】 English version There are two matters to discuss.
Treatise: Those with supernatural powers use the power of their minds to cause others to see various things in dreams.
Commentary: The verse mentions 'ghosts, etc.' The 'etc.' includes these.
This is a general summary; the following specifically points out concrete examples.
Treatise: For example, Mahākatyāyana (Great Katyayana) used the power of his will to cause King Bharana (name of a king, formerly translated as Sāranā) and others to see strange things in dreams.
Commentary: When the Buddha was in the world, there was Mahākatyāyana (Great Katyayana). Mahā means 'great.' Kātyāyana means 'shaved,' as commonly explained; this is his surname. 'Na' is a masculine sound, indicating that he is male. For example, 'nī' is a feminine sound, indicating that she is female. Bharana, formerly translated as Sāranā, means 'flowing.' This is because the supernatural power of shaving caused the king to have a dream. The reason for this is as follows: As stated in the Madhyama-āgama Sutra, King Sāranā was the ruler of the country of Mekhila (uncertain), with a handsome appearance, considering himself unparalleled, wanting to find someone with a good appearance, wanting to show his superiority through comparison. At that time, someone said: 'Within Rājagṛha, there is Mahākatyāyana, with a very beautiful appearance, unparalleled in the world.' The king sent someone to welcome him. When Katyayana arrived, the king went out of the palace to greet him. The king's appearance was not as good as his, and people looked at Katyayana without looking at the king. The king asked the reason, and the people said: 'Katyayana's appearance is better than the king's.' The king asked the great virtuous one (referring to Katyayana) about the karmic causes of his handsome appearance in this life. Katyayana replied: 'In the past, when I was a monk, you were a beggar. I swept the ground of the temple, and you came to beg for food. After I finished sweeping the ground, I had you remove the dung. After removing the dung, I gave you food. Because of this karmic cause, I was born in the human and heavenly realms and received the reward of a handsome appearance.' After hearing this, the king immediately requested to become a monk and became a disciple of Katyayana. Later, he went with Katyayana to the mountains of the country of Avanti to practice, meditating in separate places. The king of the country of Avanti, named Bāhuda, at that time took the palace women into the mountains to play. The palace women saw that King Sāranā had a handsome appearance, so they surrounded him and watched. King Bāhuda saw King Sāranā and suspected that he had improper intentions, and asked Sāranā: 'Are you an Arhat?' The king replied that he was not. He then asked about the other three stages one by one, and the king replied that he was not. He also asked
汝離欲不。又答言非。缽樹多瞋曰。若爾汝何故。入我婇女中看我婇女。遂鞭身破。悶絕而死。至夜方醒。從本處起至迦延所。迦延見已心生悲愍。共諸同學。同爲療治娑羅那王。語迦延曰。我從師乞暫還本國。集軍破彼阿盤地國。殺缽樹多王。事竟當還從師修道。迦延從請語王欲去。且停一宿。迦延安置好家令眠愿令感夢。夢見集軍征阿盤地。自軍破敗。身為他獲。堅縛手足。赤花插頭。嚴鼓欲殺。王于夢中恐怖。大叫呼失聲云。我今無歸。愿師濟拔。作歸依處。得壽命長。迦延以神力。手指出火。喚之令寤。問言。何故其猶未醒。尚言災事。迦延以火照而問之。此是何處。汝可自看。王心方寤。迦延語言。汝若征彼。必當破敗。如夢所見。王言愿師為除毒意。迦延為說。一切諸法。譬如國土。假名無實。離舍屋等。無別國土。離柱木等。無別舍屋。乃至廣說。至於極微。亦非實事。無彼無此。無怨無親。王聞此法。得預流果。后漸獲得阿羅漢果。故知依自意。他夢事亦成。
論。又如阿練若仙人意憤勢力令吠摩質咀利王夢見異事。
述曰。此第三喻。阿練若者。舊云阿蘭若。此云閑寂曠野處也。離村空野。名阿練若。此中仙人。名阿練若仙人。吠摩質咀利王者。即舊云毗摩質多羅阿修羅王也。天帝釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 你是否已經離欲？』他回答說：『沒有。』缽樹多瞋（Potashuchan，人名，意為『多嗔』）說：『如果這樣，你為什麼進入我的婇女（Cainu，宮女）中觀看我的婇女？』於是鞭打他，身體破裂，昏厥而死。直到夜晚才醒來，從原來的地方起身前往迦延（Kayan，人名）處。迦延見到後心生悲憫，與眾同學一同為他療治。娑羅那王（Saluonawang，人名）對迦延說：『我向老師請求暫時返回本國，集結軍隊攻破阿盤地國（Apandi，地名），殺死缽樹多王。事情結束后，我將回來跟隨老師修道。』迦延應允了他的請求，告訴國王如果要走，先停留一宿。迦延安置好住所讓他入睡，希望他能感應到夢境。國王夢見集結軍隊征討阿盤地，自己的軍隊被打敗，自己也被俘獲，手腳被牢牢捆綁，頭上插著紅花，擂著戰鼓準備處決。國王在夢中驚恐，大聲呼喊，失聲說：『我現在無處可歸，希望老師救拔我，作為我的歸依之處，讓我得以長壽。』迦延用神力，手指發出火焰，喚醒了他。問他說：『為什麼你還沒有醒來，還在說災禍之事？』迦延用火光照著他問：『這是什麼地方？你自己看看。』國王的心才醒悟過來。迦延對他說：『你如果征討他們，必定會失敗，就像夢中所見。』國王說：『希望老師為我消除毒害之意。』迦延為他說法，一切諸法，譬如國土，只是假名，沒有實體。離開房屋等，就沒有別的國土；離開柱子木頭等，就沒有別的房屋。乃至廣泛地說，直到極微之物，也不是真實存在的。沒有彼，沒有此，沒有怨，沒有親。』國王聽聞此法，證得預流果（Xuliuguo，佛教果位之一）。後來逐漸獲得阿羅漢果（A Luohan Guo，佛教果位之一）。所以知道依靠自己的意念，他人的夢境之事也能成就。
論：又如阿練若仙人（A lian ruo xian ren，指居住在寂靜處的仙人）意憤勢力，令吠摩質咀利王（Fei mo zhi ju li wang，阿修羅王名）夢見異事。
述曰：這是第三個比喻。阿練若，舊譯為阿蘭若，這裡的意思是閑寂曠野之處。離開村莊的空曠原野，叫做阿練若。這裡的仙人，叫做阿練若仙人。吠摩質咀利王，就是舊譯的毗摩質多羅阿修羅王。天帝釋（Ti di shi，佛教護法神）
【English Translation】 English version 『Have you renounced desire?』 He replied, 『No.』 Potashuchan (Potashuchan, a name meaning 『much anger』) said, 『If so, why did you enter my Cainu (Cainu, concubines) to look at my concubines?』 Thereupon he was whipped, his body was broken, and he fainted and died. He awoke only at night, and from where he was, he went to Kayan (Kayan, a name). When Kayan saw him, he felt compassion and, together with his fellow students, treated him. King Saluonawang (Saluonawang, a name) said to Kayan, 『I ask the teacher for permission to return temporarily to my country, gather an army to conquer the country of Apandi (Apandi, a place name), and kill King Potashuchan. After this is done, I will return to follow the teacher and cultivate the Way.』 Kayan granted his request and told the king that if he wanted to leave, he should stay for one night first. Kayan arranged a good place for him to sleep, hoping that he would sense a dream. The king dreamed of gathering an army to conquer Apandi, but his own army was defeated, and he himself was captured, his hands and feet were tightly bound, red flowers were stuck in his head, and drums were being beaten to prepare for his execution. The king was terrified in the dream and shouted loudly, crying out, 『I have nowhere to turn now, I hope the teacher will save me, be my refuge, and grant me long life.』 Kayan used his divine power, his finger emitted flames, and he woke him up. He asked him, 『Why haven't you woken up yet, and are still talking about disaster?』 Kayan shone the light on him and asked, 『Where is this? Look for yourself.』 The king's mind then awakened. Kayan said to him, 『If you conquer them, you will surely be defeated, just as you saw in the dream.』 The king said, 『I hope the teacher will remove the poison from my mind.』 Kayan preached the Dharma to him, saying that all dharmas, like countries, are merely names, without substance. Apart from houses, there is no other country; apart from pillars and wood, there is no other house. And so on, broadly speaking, even the smallest things are not real. There is no 'that', no 'this', no enemy, no relative.』 When the king heard this Dharma, he attained the state of Stream-enterer (Xuliuguo, one of the Buddhist stages of enlightenment). Later, he gradually attained the state of Arhat (A Luohan Guo, one of the Buddhist stages of enlightenment). Therefore, it is known that relying on one's own mind, the affairs of another's dream can also be accomplished.
Treatise: Furthermore, like the hermit A lian ruo xian ren (A lian ruo xian ren, refers to hermits living in quiet places) with his angry power, caused King Feimo Zhijuli (Fei mo zhi ju li wang, name of an Asura king) to dream of strange things.
Commentary: This is the third analogy. A lian ruo, formerly translated as Aranya, here means a quiet and desolate wilderness. An empty wilderness away from villages is called A lian ruo. The hermit here is called A lian ruo xian ren. King Feimo Zhijuli is the former translation of King Vimacitraraja Asura. Ti di shi (Ti di shi, a Buddhist protector deity)
設支夫人之父也。此云綺飾。或雲彩畫。由仙人意瞋。令阿修羅王。夢見異事。舊論言見恐怖事。此則不同。中阿含經云。有七百仙人。住阿練若時。天帝釋嚴身。入中於下風坐。諸天皆來。恭敬帝釋。毗摩質多羅阿修羅王。見帝是事。忽變為天。著好嚴具。破其籬垣。入仙人處。在上風坐。仙怪是事。皆不敬之。甚生憤恨云。汝等何故。但敬帝釋。而輕蔑我。欲苦諸仙。諸仙懺謝。其恨不已。不受仙悔。諸仙心念。令返衰惱。應時毗摩質多羅王即大困苦。遂生悔心。漸謝仙等。仙等心念。赦其僣失。即還如本。今此論說阿修羅得夢。經說覺時遭苦。然理大同。此前所說。皆增上緣。令他事起。非親為緣令有此事。
論。如是由他識轉變故令他違害命根事起。
述曰。釋上半頌。如是者結法也。增上緣中。由他能殺起殺害識。轉變力故。令所殺者。違害於己命根事起。如由鬼等意念勢力。他失念等。直以事喻。令義增明。不繁比量。
論。應知死者謂眾同分由識變異相續斷滅。
述曰。雖知命斷。未知死相。故今重顯。眾同分者。成唯識等說。依有情身心相似分位差別。而假建立此眾同分。隨何生趣。若未舍時。阿賴耶識。即此趣生。相續一類。前之與后。趣等皆同。若遇他識增上違緣。舍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 設支夫人的父親。這裡說的是綺麗的裝飾，或者說是彩色的圖畫。由於仙人的嗔怒，使得阿修羅王（Asura King）夢見奇異的事情。《舊論》中說見到恐怖的事情，這則不同。《中阿含經》中說，有七百仙人住在阿練若（Aranya，寂靜處）時，天帝釋（Śakra，帝釋天）莊嚴自身，進入其中坐在下風處。諸天都來恭敬帝釋。毗摩質多羅阿修羅王（Vemacitrin Asura King）見到此事，忽然變成天人，穿著美好的裝飾，打破籬笆，進入仙人處，在上風處坐。仙人覺得奇怪，都不尊敬他，非常憤恨地說：『你們為什麼只尊敬帝釋，而輕蔑我？』想要苦惱諸仙。諸仙懺悔謝罪，他的恨意不止，不接受仙人的懺悔。諸仙心想，讓他返回衰惱。當時毗摩質多羅王（Vemacitrin）立即感到極大的困苦，於是產生悔恨之心，逐漸向仙人等謝罪。仙人等心想，赦免他的僭越過失，他立即恢復如初。現在此論說阿修羅（Asura）得到夢境，經中說醒來時遭遇痛苦，然而道理大致相同。此前所說，都是增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣），使其他事情發生，並非親因為緣使有此事。
論：如是由他識轉變故令他違害命根事起。
述曰：解釋上半頌。如是者，總結前文之法。增上緣中，由他能殺者生起殺害之識，由於識的轉變力量，使被殺者發生違害自己命根的事情。比如由於鬼等的意念勢力，他人失去正念等。直接用事例來比喻，使意義更加明白，不繁瑣地進行比量。
論：應知死者謂眾同分由識變異相續斷滅。
述曰：雖然知道命斷，但不知道死的相狀，所以現在重新顯明。眾同分（nikāya-sabhāga，眾同分）者，《成唯識論》等說，依據有情身心相似的分位差別，而假立此眾同分。隨其生於何趣，若未捨棄時，阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）即是此趣的生命，相續一類，前與后，趣等都相同。若遇到他識的增上違緣，捨棄。
【English Translation】 English version: The father of Lady Setaka. This refers to elaborate decorations or colorful paintings. Due to the anger of the immortals, the Asura King (Asura King) dreamt of strange events. The old commentaries say he saw terrifying things, which is different here. The Madhyama-āgama says that when seven hundred immortals were dwelling in the Aranya (Aranya, a quiet place), Śakra (Śakra, Lord Indra) adorned himself and sat downwind among them. All the devas came and paid homage to Śakra. Vemacitrin Asura King (Vemacitrin Asura King), seeing this, suddenly transformed into a deva, wearing fine ornaments, broke through the fence, entered the immortals' abode, and sat upwind. The immortals found this strange and did not respect him, becoming very resentful, saying, 'Why do you only respect Śakra and despise me?' He wanted to trouble the immortals. The immortals repented and apologized, but his resentment did not cease, and he did not accept their repentance. The immortals thought, 'Let him return to decline and suffering.' Immediately, Vemacitrin (Vemacitrin) felt great distress and then repented, gradually apologizing to the immortals. The immortals thought, 'Forgive his transgression,' and he immediately returned to his original state. Now, this treatise says that the Asura (Asura) had a dream, while the sutra says he suffered when he woke up, but the principle is largely the same. What was said earlier is all an Adhipati-pratyaya (Adhipati-pratyaya, dominant condition), causing other things to happen, not a direct cause making this happen.
Treatise: 'Thus, due to the transformation of another's consciousness, events that harm the root of life arise.'
Commentary: Explaining the first half of the verse. 'Thus' summarizes the preceding Dharma. Among the dominant conditions, the consciousness of killing arises from another who is capable of killing. Due to the transformative power of consciousness, events that harm the life root of the one being killed arise. For example, due to the power of the thoughts of ghosts, others lose mindfulness, etc. Using examples directly makes the meaning clearer, without cumbersome reasoning.
Treatise: 'It should be known that the dead are those whose commonality of beings is interrupted and extinguished due to the transformation of consciousness.'
Commentary: Although it is known that life is severed, the appearance of death is not known, so it is now re-explained. 'Commonality of beings' (nikāya-sabhāga, commonality of beings), the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and others say, is hypothetically established based on the differences in the similar states of sentient beings' bodies and minds. Whichever realm they are born into, if they have not yet abandoned it, the Ālaya-vijñāna (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is the life of that realm, a continuous category, the same in terms of realm, etc., from beginning to end. If it encounters a dominant adverse condition from another's consciousness, it is abandoned.
眾同分。阿賴耶識。即便變異。異舊趣生。此趣生者。舊時相續。今便斷滅。余識亦爾。舊續今斷。名之為死。死者滅相。總有二時。一者將滅。說名為死。即是現在。如觸處中所立死觸。死支亦爾。若正滅相名死。觸支應成過去。二者正滅。說名為死。如今所說。識相斷滅。即是過去。故此說死。但是滅相。非死觸支。
論。複次頌曰彈宅迦等空云何由仙忿意罰為大罪此復云何成。
述曰。此下返詰。上半頌不許前說。詰林等空。云何由仙忿。下半頌。彼若救義。詰非意云何成大罪。舊論由此遂分二段。前後別明。初句等者。等下二林。文意易詳。至下當悉。
論。若不許由他識轉變增上力故他有情死。
述曰。將為詰彼。先敘彼計。前我所說。由能殺者。他識轉變增上緣力。令所殺者他有情死。汝不許者。以他宗。說由他親能殺他身故。他有情死。故彼不許此前所說。今牒彼計。
論。云何世尊為成意罰是大罪故返問長者鄔婆離言。
述曰。自下正詰。三業諸罪。現為人天之所呵責。未來當受諸惡苦報。可治罰故。可毀責故。名之為罰。三業校量。意罰最大。佛為成此。返問長者鄔波離也。鄔婆離者。此云近執。親近於王。執王事也。如世說言朝庭執事。如阿羅漢持律上首
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 諸位同修，阿賴耶識（ālài yéshì，梵文Alaya-vijñāna，一切種子識）即便發生變異，導致從舊有的生命狀態進入新的生命狀態，這種新的生命狀態的產生，是基於舊有的相續，而現在卻要斷滅。其他的識也是如此，舊的相續現在斷滅，這就被稱為『死亡』。死亡，是一種滅亡的現象，總共有兩種情況：一種是即將滅亡，這被稱為『死亡』，指的是當下正在發生的狀態，就像在觸處中所建立的死觸（sǐ chù，感受死亡的觸覺）。死亡支也是如此。如果將真正的滅亡狀態稱為死亡，那麼觸支就應該屬於過去時了。另一種是正在滅亡，這被稱為『死亡』，就像現在所說的，識相斷滅，這屬於過去時。因此，這裡所說的死亡，僅僅是滅亡的現象，而不是死亡支。
論：再次，頌文說：彈宅迦（Tánzhái jiā）等森林的空無，怎麼能說是由於仙人的憤怒，以懲罰的方式造成的大罪？這又是怎麼成立的呢？
述：以下是反駁。上半頌不允許之前的說法，反駁森林等的空無，怎麼能說是由於仙人的憤怒造成的。下半頌，如果他們要辯解，就反駁說，非意（fēi yì，非故意）的行為怎麼能構成大罪。舊的論典因此將此分為兩段，前後分別說明。第一句的『等』字，包括下面的兩個森林，文意容易理解，到後面會詳細說明。
論：如果不允許由於其他識的轉變增上力的緣故，導致其他有情眾生的死亡。
述：將要反駁他們，先敘述他們的觀點。之前我所說的，由於能夠殺害眾生的其他識的轉變增上緣力的作用，導致被殺害的眾生死亡。如果你們不允許這種說法，因為其他宗派認為，由於其他人親自能夠殺害其他人的身體，所以其他有情眾生才會死亡。因此，他們不允許之前所說的。
論：為什麼世尊爲了成就意罰（yì fá，思想上的懲罰）是最大的罪過，所以反過來問長者鄔波離（Wūbōlí）呢？
述：下面正式反駁。身、語、意三業所造的罪過，現在會被人天呵責，未來會遭受各種惡果報應，因為可以被懲治，可以被譴責，所以稱為『罰』。三業進行比較，意罰最大。佛爲了成就這個觀點，反過來問長者鄔波離。鄔波離，意思是『近執』，親近於國王，執掌國王的事務。就像世俗所說的朝廷執事，如同阿羅漢中持戒律的上首。
【English Translation】 English version: Fellow practitioners, even if the Alaya-vijñāna (ālài yéshì, Sanskrit: Alaya-vijñāna, the storehouse consciousness) undergoes transformation, leading to a transition from an old state of existence to a new one, this new state arises based on the old continuity, which is now about to be severed. The other consciousnesses are also like this; the old continuity is now severed, and this is called 'death'. Death is a phenomenon of cessation, and there are two general situations: one is the state of impending cessation, which is called 'death', referring to the state that is currently happening, just like the death-touch (sǐ chù, the sensation of touching death) established in the sense bases. The death limb is also like this. If the true state of cessation is called death, then the touch limb should belong to the past. The other is the state of actual cessation, which is called 'death', as it is said now, the cessation of the characteristics of consciousness, which belongs to the past. Therefore, the death mentioned here is merely the phenomenon of cessation, not the death limb.
Treatise: Furthermore, the verse says: How can the emptiness of forests like Tánzhái jiā be said to be a great sin caused by the anger of a sage as a form of punishment? How can this be established?
Commentary: The following is a rebuttal. The first half of the verse does not allow the previous statement, refuting how the emptiness of forests, etc., can be said to be caused by the anger of a sage. The second half of the verse, if they want to argue, refutes how an unintentional (fēi yì, unintentional) act can constitute a great sin. The old treatise therefore divides this into two sections, explaining them separately before and after. The word 'etc.' in the first sentence includes the two forests below, and the meaning of the text is easy to understand, and will be explained in detail later.
Treatise: If it is not allowed that the death of other sentient beings is due to the increased power of the transformation of other consciousnesses.
Commentary: Preparing to refute them, first narrate their views. What I said before is that, due to the increased causal power of the transformation of other consciousnesses that can kill sentient beings, the sentient beings who are killed die. If you do not allow this statement, it is because other schools believe that other sentient beings die because other people can personally kill other people's bodies. Therefore, they do not allow what was said before.
Treatise: Why did the World Honored One, in order to establish that intentional punishment (yì fá, mental punishment) is the greatest sin, ask the elder Upali (Wūbōlí) in return?
Commentary: The following is a formal refutation. The sins committed by the three karmas of body, speech, and mind are now rebuked by humans and devas, and will suffer various evil retributions in the future. Because they can be punished and condemned, they are called 'punishment'. Comparing the three karmas, intentional punishment is the greatest. In order to establish this view, the Buddha asked the elder Upali in return. Upali means 'close attendant', close to the king, and in charge of the king's affairs. Just like the secular saying of court affairs, like the foremost of the Arhats who uphold the precepts.
。親近太子。執事之人。名鄔波離矣。中阿含經說。有尼犍子。名阇提弗多羅。其有弟子。名為長熱。往至佛所。佛問長熱。師教汝法。三業之中。何罰業重。答云。身重。次口。后意。長熱反問。瞿曇今說何業最重。佛言。意重。身語乃輕。長熱還去。阇提問云。汝至彼所。瞿曇何言。長熱具說。阇提讚歎。汝真我子。從我口生。善受我教。所說無異。汝可更往。破瞿曇義。提取將來。作我弟子。長熱不從。有大富長者。名鄔波離。伏事尼干阇提。使往破佛立義。長熱報云。此事不可。彼瞿曇者。容貌辯才。過人無量。兼有幻術。能轉人心。無量眾生。為其弟子。寧可降伏。阇提不信。令長者往。長者往已。欲破佛義。遂立義云。我立三罰。身為最量。次口後心。瞿曇云何。說心罰重。世尊於時在眉絺羅國。國城五日方行一邊。佛問長者。若人行殺。幾日殺此國人得盡。長者答曰。大能七日。或十日。或一月。復問。仙人超瞋心殺。幾日得盡。答曰。一時國人皆盡。又問。一百日。二百日。三百日。行於佈施。有人一時。入八禪定。何者為勝。有人多時持戒。有人一時入無漏觀。何者為勝。長者答言。入禪無漏功德大勝。佛言長者。云何乃說身口罰重。心罰最輕。長者理屈。乞為弟子。乃至得果。自立誓言。我所住
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 親近太子的一位執事之人，名叫鄔波離（Upali，在家弟子）。《中阿含經》中說，有一位尼犍子（Nigantha，耆那教苦行者），名叫阇提弗多羅（Jatipotra）。他有一位弟子，名叫長熱（Dirghatapas），前往佛陀處。佛陀問長熱：『你的老師教導你的法中，身、口、意三業之中，哪種罪業最重？』長熱回答說：『身業最重，其次是口業，最後是意業。』長熱反問佛陀：『瞿曇（Gotama，佛陀的姓氏）現在說哪種業最重？』佛陀說：『意業最重，身語業較輕。』長熱回去后，阇提問他：『你到那邊去，瞿曇說了什麼？』長熱詳細地說了。阇提讚歎說：『你真是我的兒子，從我口中生出，很好地接受了我的教導，所說沒有差異。你可以再去，駁倒瞿曇的義理，把他拉過來，做我的弟子。』長熱不聽從。有一位大富長者，名叫鄔波離（Upali），侍奉尼犍子阇提，讓他去駁倒佛陀的立義。長熱報告說：『這件事不可行。那位瞿曇，容貌辯才，超過常人無數倍，兼有幻術，能轉移人心，無數眾生，都成為他的弟子，怎麼可能降伏？』阇提不相信，命令長者去。長者去了之後，想要駁倒佛陀的義理，於是立義說：『我立三種罪業，身業最為重要，其次是口業，最後是心業。瞿曇怎麼說心業最重？』世尊當時在眉絺羅國（Meghila），國城五日才能走完一邊。佛陀問長者：『如果有人行殺戮，幾天能殺完這個國家的人？』長者回答說：『最多七天，或者十天，或者一個月。』佛陀又問：『仙人以超強的嗔恨心殺人，幾天能殺完？』回答說：『一時之間，全國的人都會被殺盡。』又問：『一百天，二百天，三百天，都在行佈施，有人一時之間，進入八禪定（Eight Jhanas），哪個更為殊勝？有人長時間持戒，有人一時之間進入無漏觀（Anasrava-darsana，無煩惱的觀察），哪個更為殊勝？』長者回答說：『入禪定和無漏觀的功德最為殊勝。』佛陀說：『長者，為什麼你說身口罪業重，心業最輕呢？』長者理屈詞窮，請求做佛陀的弟子，乃至證得果位。自己立下誓言：『我所居住的地方，』
【English Translation】 English version An attendant who was close to the prince was named Upali (Upali, a lay disciple). The Madhyama Agama Sutra says that there was a Nigantha (Nigantha, a Jain ascetic) named Jatipotra. He had a disciple named Dirghatapas, who went to the Buddha. The Buddha asked Dirghatapas, 'In the Dharma that your teacher taught you, among the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, which is the heaviest sin?' Dirghatapas replied, 'Body karma is the heaviest, followed by speech karma, and lastly mind karma.' Dirghatapas asked the Buddha in return, 'What does Gotama (Gotama, the Buddha's surname) now say is the heaviest karma?' The Buddha said, 'Mind karma is the heaviest, while body and speech karma are lighter.' After Dirghatapas returned, Jatipotra asked him, 'What did Gotama say when you went there?' Dirghatapas explained in detail. Jatipotra praised, 'You are truly my son, born from my mouth, and have well received my teachings, and what you say is no different. You can go again, refute Gotama's doctrines, and bring him over to be my disciple.' Dirghatapas did not obey. There was a wealthy elder named Upali, who served the Nigantha Jatipotra, and asked him to refute the Buddha's established doctrines. Dirghatapas reported, 'This is not feasible. That Gotama, his appearance and eloquence, surpass ordinary people countless times, and he also has illusions that can shift people's hearts. Countless beings have become his disciples. How can he be subdued?' Jatipotra did not believe him and ordered the elder to go. After the elder went, wanting to refute the Buddha's doctrines, he established the doctrine, saying, 'I establish three sins, with body karma being the most important, followed by speech karma, and lastly mind karma. What does Gotama say about mind karma being the heaviest?' At that time, the World Honored One was in Meghila, and it took five days to walk one side of the country's city. The Buddha asked the elder, 'If someone were to commit slaughter, how many days would it take to kill all the people in this country?' The elder replied, 'At most seven days, or ten days, or a month.' The Buddha then asked, 'If a sage were to kill with extreme hatred, how many days would it take to kill everyone?' He replied, 'In an instant, all the people in the country would be killed.' He also asked, 'If one were to practice giving for one hundred days, two hundred days, three hundred days, and someone were to enter the Eight Jhanas (Eight Jhanas) in an instant, which would be more superior? If someone were to uphold the precepts for a long time, and someone were to enter Anasrava-darsana (Anasrava-darsana, observation without afflictions) in an instant, which would be more superior?' The elder replied, 'The merit of entering Jhana and Anasrava-darsana is the most superior.' The Buddha said, 'Elder, why do you say that the sins of body and speech are heavy, and the sins of mind are the lightest?' The elder was at a loss for words and asked to become the Buddha's disciple, and even attained the fruit. He made a vow: 'Where I live,'
處。常擬供養三寶。一切尼干。悉不得入我家。長者得道。后還本家。阇提怪遲遣人往覓。長者家人。不許入舍。阇提不測。自往覓之。長者莊嚴高座。自坐。別安小座。以待阇提。阇提見之法用如此。訶責長者。長者答云。今人非昔人。我今已勝汝。是佛弟子。何得不然。阇提乃云。我令汝取瞿曇。作我弟子。彼既不得。今復失汝。我今為汝。說一譬喻。遂作喻云。譬如有人。須郁婆羅根。取欲食之。令人入池處處求覓。求覓不得。自拔男根。不得郁婆羅根。又自失根。汝亦如是。如是求覓瞿曇。不得。反更失汝。汝如男根。長者答言。我為汝喻。譬如有人性甚愚癡取一黠婦。婚姻以後。遂便有娠。婦言。兒生應須戲具。語婿預覓。時婿覓得一獼猴子。將還與婦。婦語其婿。汝須浣染舂。方堪為戲具。婿將僱人。欲浣染舂。他謂其曰。乃可浣洗。云何染舂。此若是衣。可作三事。獼猴不然。其云何作。他為洗之。洗之既訖。置熱汁中。染其獼猴。皮肉時已爛壞。后取舂之。形相都失。亦復不堪為兒戲具。汝法亦爾。既非凈物。唯可浣洗。不可受持。如不可染。不可修行。如不可舂。云何令我受持修學。阇提於是慚恥而去。此指于彼故言返問。然婆沙第二十七。亦有此文。
論。汝頗曾聞何因緣故彈宅迦林末蹬
【現代漢語翻譯】 處。常想供養佛法僧三寶。一切尼干外道，一概不得進入我的家門。長者悟道后，回到家中。阇提覺得奇怪，遲遲不見，便派人前去尋找。長者的家人不許他們進入住宅。阇提感到不解，親自前去尋找。長者已經莊嚴地佈置好高座，自己坐在上面，另外安排了一個小座位，用來等待阇提。阇提見到這種情形，認為長者違背了舊俗，便責備長者。長者回答說：『現在的我已不是過去的那個我了，我如今已經勝過你，是佛陀的弟子，為何不能這樣做？』阇提於是說：『我本想讓你把喬達摩（Gautama，釋迦牟尼佛的姓）抓來，做我的弟子，結果沒能成功，現在又失去了你。我為你打個比方。』於是他打比方說：『譬如有人，需要優缽羅（Utpala，一種藍色蓮花）的根，想取來食用，便讓人到池塘里到處尋找，卻怎麼也找不到。他一氣之下，竟然拔掉自己的男根，結果既沒有得到優缽羅根，又失去了自己的男根。你也像這樣，想去尋找喬達摩，沒有成功，反而失去了自己。你就像那男根一樣。』長者回答說：『我也為你打個比方。譬如有一個人，生性非常愚癡，娶了一個聰明的妻子。結婚以後，妻子懷孕了。妻子說，孩子出生后應該需要玩具，告訴丈夫提前去找。丈夫找到了一隻小猴子，帶回家給妻子。妻子對丈夫說，你需要對它進行洗滌、染色、舂搗，才能作為玩具。丈夫便僱人，想要對猴子進行洗滌、染色、舂搗。別人對他說，洗滌還可以，怎麼能染色、舂搗呢？如果是衣服，可以做這三件事，猴子可不行啊，要怎麼做呢？那人便為猴子洗滌，洗滌完畢后，放在熱水中，給猴子染色，結果猴子的皮肉都爛壞了。後來又拿去舂搗，猴子的形狀完全消失了，也無法作為孩子的玩具了。你的法也是這樣，既然不是清凈之物，只能洗滌，不能受持，就像不能染色一樣，不能修行，就像不能舂搗一樣，怎麼能讓我受持修學呢？』阇提聽了，感到慚愧羞恥，便離開了。這是指對於他的反問。然而，《婆沙論》（Vibhasa，即《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》）第二十七卷，也有這段文字。 論：你可曾聽聞，因為什麼因緣，彈宅迦林（Tandaka Forest）和末蹬伽（Matanga）...
【English Translation】 There, he often thought of making offerings to the Triple Gem (Three Jewels: Buddha, Dharma, Sangha). All the Niganthas (a Jain sect) were not allowed to enter my house. After the elder attained enlightenment, he returned to his home. Jati (name of a person) felt strange about the delay and sent someone to look for him. The elder's family members did not allow them to enter the house. Jati, feeling puzzled, went to find him himself. The elder had already decorated a high seat and sat on it himself, setting up a small seat separately to wait for Jati. When Jati saw this situation, he rebuked the elder. The elder replied, 'The person now is not the person of the past. I have now surpassed you and am a disciple of the Buddha. Why can't I do this?' Jati then said, 'I wanted you to capture Gautama (Gautama, the family name of Sakyamuni Buddha) and make him my disciple, but I failed. Now I have lost you as well. I will tell you a parable.' So he made a parable, saying, 'For example, someone needs the root of an Utpala (Utpala, a blue lotus) flower and wants to eat it. He sends someone to search for it everywhere in the pond, but they cannot find it. In a fit of anger, he pulls out his own male organ, and as a result, he neither obtains the Utpala root nor retains his own organ. You are like this. You tried to find Gautama but failed, and instead, you lost yourself. You are like that male organ.' The elder replied, 'I will also tell you a parable. For example, there is a very foolish person who marries a clever wife. After the marriage, the wife becomes pregnant. The wife says that the child will need toys when it is born, and tells her husband to find them in advance. The husband finds a baby monkey and brings it home to his wife. The wife says to her husband, 'You need to wash, dye, and pound it to make it suitable as a toy.' The husband hires someone to wash, dye, and pound the monkey. Others say to him, 'Washing is fine, but how can you dye and pound it? If it were clothing, you could do these three things, but not a monkey. How can you do it?' So the person washes the monkey. After washing it, he puts it in hot water to dye it, and as a result, the monkey's skin and flesh rot. Later, he takes it to pound it, and the monkey's shape is completely lost, and it cannot be used as a child's toy. Your Dharma is also like this. Since it is not pure, it can only be washed, not accepted and held, just as it cannot be dyed, not practiced, just as it cannot be pounded. How can you make me accept, hold, and practice it?' Jati, upon hearing this, felt ashamed and left. This refers to his counter-question. However, the twenty-seventh volume of the Vibhasa (Vibhasa, Abhidharma-maha-vibhāṣā-śāstra), also contains this passage. Discussion: Have you ever heard, due to what causes and conditions, the Tandaka Forest (Tandaka Forest) and Matanga (Matanga)...
伽林。羯陵伽林。皆空閑寂。
述曰。此佛問詞。彈宅迦者。真諦云檀陀柯。此云治罰。治罰罪人處也。今罰罪人。尚置其內。中阿含云。是王名也。有摩登伽婦人。是婆羅門女。極有容貌。婿為仙人。名摩登伽。于山中坐。婦為其夫。營辦食送。檀陀訶王。入山戲游。逢見此婦。問是何人。有人答言。是仙人婦。王云。仙人離欲。何用婦為。遂令提取將還宮內。仙至食時。望婦不來。心生恚恨。借問餘人。餘人為說。是王將去。仙往王所。慇勤求覓。不肯還云。汝是仙人。何須畜婦。仙言。我食索此婦人。王便不還。仙人意憤。語其婦曰。汝一心念我。勿暫舍我。今夜欲令此國土破壞。仙人夜念。時雨大石。王及國人。一切皆死。俄頃成山。此婦一心。念彼仙人。唯身不死。還就山中。本是彈宅迦王國。今成山林。從本為名。名彼林也。人物皆盡。故名空寂。舊人解云。諸仙修定處名空寂 末蹬伽者。舊云迦陵伽。此云憍逸。仙人之名。舊云王名。有梵本云缽蹬伽。此翻云蛾。即赴火者。昔有仙人。形甚醜陋。世間斯極。修得五通。山中坐禪。有一淫女甚愛于王。王亦愛之。后觸忤王。王遂驅出。淫女入山。見仙醜陋。謂是不祥之人。恐有不祥之事。淫女切念。我今被出。是不吉祥。若還此不祥。我應吉祥。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 伽林（Galin）。羯陵伽林（Kalinggalin）。皆空閑寂。
述曰：這是佛陀的提問。彈宅迦（Tanzhaijia），真諦法師譯為檀陀柯（Tantuoke），意思是『治罰』，即懲罰罪人的地方。現在懲罰罪人，尚且安置在其中。《中阿含經》說，這是國王的名字。有一位摩登伽（Modengjia）婦人，是婆羅門女子，容貌極其美麗。她的丈夫是位仙人，名叫摩登伽（Modengjia），在山中打坐。婦人為丈夫準備食物並送去。檀陀訶（Tantuoke）國王入山遊玩，遇見這位婦人，問她是誰。有人回答說，是仙人的妻子。國王說：『仙人離欲，要妻子做什麼？』於是命令抓走她，帶回宮中。仙人到了吃飯的時候，盼望妻子不來，心中生起嗔恨。向其他人打聽，別人告訴他，是被國王帶走了。仙人前往國王那裡，懇切地請求歸還，國王不肯，說：『你是仙人，何必蓄養妻子？』仙人說：『我吃飯需要這個婦人。』國王便不歸還。仙人意憤，對他的妻子說：『你一心念著我，不要暫時離開我。今夜我要讓這個國家毀滅。』仙人夜裡唸咒，當時降下大石雨，國王和國人，全部都死了，頃刻間變成山。這位婦人一心念著那位仙人，唯獨自身沒有死，回到山中。原本是彈宅迦（Tanzhaijia）王國，現在變成了山林，因此沿用原來的名字，稱呼那片林子。人物都死盡了，所以叫做空寂。舊時的解釋說，諸位仙人修定的地方叫做空寂。 末蹬伽（Modengjia），舊譯為迦陵伽（Kalingjia），意思是『憍逸』，是仙人的名字。舊譯說是國王的名字。有的梵文版本說是缽蹬伽（Bodengjia），翻譯過來是『蛾』，就是飛蛾撲火的意思。過去有位仙人，形貌極其醜陋，世間罕見。修得了五神通，在山中打坐。有一位非常愛慕國王，國王也很愛她。後來觸怒了國王，國王就把她趕了出來。進入山中，看見仙人醜陋，認為是會帶來不祥的人，恐怕會有不祥的事情發生。**心裡想：『我現在被趕了出來，是不吉祥的。如果還給這個不祥的人，我就應該吉祥。』
【English Translation】 English version Galin (Galin). Kalinggalin (Kalinggalin). All empty and still.
Commentary: This is a question from the Buddha. Tanzhaijia (Tanzhaijia), translated by Paramārtha as Tantuoke (Tantuoke), means 'punishment,' the place where criminals are punished. Now, even those who punish criminals are placed within it. The Madhyama-āgama Sutra says that this is the name of a king. There was a woman named Modengjia (Modengjia), a Brahmin woman of extreme beauty. Her husband was a sage named Modengjia (Modengjia), who sat in meditation in the mountains. The woman prepared food for her husband and delivered it. King Tantuoke (Tantuoke) entered the mountains for recreation and encountered this woman, asking who she was. Someone replied that she was the wife of a sage. The king said, 'Sages are free from desire, what need do they have for a wife?' He then ordered her to be seized and taken back to the palace. When the sage came to mealtime, he waited for his wife but she did not come, and anger arose in his heart. He inquired of others, who told him that she had been taken away by the king. The sage went to the king, earnestly requesting her return, but the king refused, saying, 'You are a sage, why do you need to keep a wife?' The sage said, 'I need this woman to eat.' The king still refused to return her. The sage, filled with resentment, said to his wife, 'Keep me in your thoughts, do not leave me even for a moment. Tonight, I will destroy this kingdom.' That night, the sage chanted, and a great rain of stones fell, killing the king and all the people of the kingdom, turning it into a mountain in an instant. The woman, with her mind focused on the sage, was the only one who did not die, and she returned to the mountains. Originally, it was the kingdom of Tanzhaijia (Tanzhaijia), but now it has become a mountain forest, so it is named after the original kingdom. All the people are dead, so it is called empty and still. The old explanation says that the place where the sages cultivate meditation is called empty and still. Modengjia (Modengjia), formerly translated as Kalingjia (Kalingjia), means 'arrogant and unrestrained,' and is the name of a sage. The old translation says it is the name of a king. Some Sanskrit versions say Bodengjia (Bodengjia), which translates to 'moth,' meaning one who rushes to the fire. In the past, there was a sage who was extremely ugly, the worst in the world. He cultivated and attained the five supernatural powers, and sat in meditation in the mountains. There was a ** who deeply loved the king, and the king also loved her. Later, she offended the king, and the king drove her out. The ** entered the mountains and saw the sage, who was ugly, and thought he was an ominous person, fearing that something unlucky would happen. The ** thought, 'Now that I have been driven out, it is unlucky. If I return to this ominous person, I should be lucky.'
乃取糞穢洗不凈汁。令婢送山。澆灌仙人。仙人忍受。不生瞋恨。有婆羅門。為仙洗浣。淫女自後。王還寵之。有一國師。亦有衰惱。淫女語曰。以不吉祥。還於仙者。必還吉祥。國師依言。以糞汁洗。仙亦忍受。弟子婆羅門。還為洗浣。其後國師。還得吉事。事既皆驗。人普知。之。王后欲征。國師進諫。以不吉祥。與仙人者。必獲吉祥。王復遂語。山中起屋。恒取糞汁。洗灌仙人。征遂得勝。自後若有不稱心事。輒以糞汁洗之。仙人不復能忍。心生恚恨。乃雨石下。王人皆死。唯事仙者。得免斯苦。須臾之間。國成山林。此林從本。名末蹬伽 羯陵迦者。此雲和雅。如彼鳥名。陵字去聲呼也。舊云。摩登伽仙人之名。昔有一人。語此仙曰。汝若有子。當爲國師。摩登伽是旃陀羅種。既聞此語。求女于王。王甚訶責。汝非好種。何故求我為婚。仙既數求不得。女意欲適仙處。令母白王。彼雖惡種。猶是仙人。深為可重。我情慾適。王決不許。女盜往彼。為仙人妻。遂生一子。王既失女。處處尋求。求知仙處。遣旃荼羅。縛仙及女。相著擲著恒河水中。仙語恒河神曰。汝莫令我沒。若我沒者。須臾之間。令水涸竭。河神於是割繩。放令仙還去。仙瞋作念。須臾雨石。王人皆死。國變山林。從本為名。名摩登伽也。此三
【現代漢語翻譯】 於是（王后）取來糞便和洗不乾淨的污水，命令婢女送到山中，澆灌在仙人身上。仙人忍受著，沒有生起嗔恨之心。有一位婆羅門為仙人清洗乾淨。之後，國王重新寵愛（王后）。有一位國師，也遇到了衰敗和煩惱的事情，（有人）告訴他說：『把不吉祥的東西還給那位仙人，必定會重新獲得吉祥。』國師聽從了他的話，用糞汁清洗仙人，仙人也忍受了。弟子婆羅門再次為他清洗乾淨。之後，國師重新獲得了吉祥的事情。事情既然都應驗了，人們普遍知道了這件事。王后想要出征，國師勸諫說：『把不吉祥的東西給仙人的人，必定會獲得吉祥。』國王又聽從了他的話，在山中建造房屋，經常用糞汁清洗澆灌仙人，出征最終獲得了勝利。之後，如果有什麼不如意的事情，就用糞汁清洗仙人。仙人不再能夠忍受，心中生起怨恨，於是降下石頭雨，國王的人都被砸死了，只有侍奉仙人的人，才免除了這種痛苦。須臾之間，國家變成了山林。這片森林從一開始，就被命名為末蹬伽（Matanga）。羯陵迦（Kalinga）這個詞，意思是和雅，就像那種鳥的名字一樣。陵字要讀去聲。舊譯說，摩登伽（Matanga）是仙人的名字。過去有一個人，對這位仙人說：『你如果有了兒子，應當做國師。』摩登伽（Matanga）是旃陀羅（Chandala）種姓。聽了這話之後，向國王求婚，國王非常呵斥他，說：『你不是好的種姓，為什麼向我求婚？』仙人多次求婚沒有成功，國王的女兒卻想要嫁給仙人，讓她的母親告訴國王，說：『他雖然是惡劣的種姓，但仍然是仙人，非常值得尊重，我心甘情願嫁給他。』國王堅決不允許。女兒偷偷地去了仙人那裡，做了仙人的妻子，於是生了一個兒子。國王失去了女兒，到處尋找，找到了仙人的住處，派遣旃荼羅（Chandala），把仙人和女兒捆綁起來，扔到恒河水中。仙人對恒河神說：『你不要讓我沉沒，如果我沉沒了，須臾之間，就會讓河水乾涸。』河神於是割斷繩索，放仙人回去。仙人生氣地想，須臾之間降下石頭雨，國王的人都被砸死了，國家變成了山林，從一開始就命名為摩登伽（Matanga）。這就是這三（個故事）。
【English Translation】 Then (the queen) took feces and unclean washing water, and ordered a maid to send it to the mountain to pour on the hermit. The hermit endured it without generating anger. There was a Brahmin who washed the hermit clean. Afterwards, the king favored (the queen) again. There was a state preceptor who also experienced decline and trouble. (Someone) told him, 'Return the inauspicious things to that hermit, and you will surely regain auspiciousness.' The state preceptor followed his words and washed the hermit with fecal juice, which the hermit also endured. The disciple Brahmin washed him clean again. Afterwards, the state preceptor regained auspicious things. Since the events were all verified, people generally knew about it. The queen wanted to go on a military expedition, and the state preceptor advised, 'Those who give inauspicious things to the hermit will surely obtain auspiciousness.' The king again followed his words, built a house in the mountain, and constantly used fecal juice to wash and pour on the hermit. The expedition eventually resulted in victory. Afterwards, if there was anything unsatisfactory, they would wash the hermit with fecal juice. The hermit could no longer endure it, and resentment arose in his heart, so he rained down stones, and the king's people were all killed. Only those who served the hermit were spared this suffering. In an instant, the country turned into a mountain forest. This forest was originally named Matanga. The word Kalinga means harmony and elegance, like the name of that bird. The character 'ling' should be pronounced in the falling tone. The old translation says that Matanga is the name of the hermit. In the past, there was a person who said to this hermit, 'If you have a son, he should become the state preceptor.' Matanga was of the Chandala caste. After hearing these words, he sought marriage from the king. The king scolded him severely, saying, 'You are not of a good caste, why are you seeking marriage with me?' The hermit sought marriage many times without success, but the king's daughter wanted to marry the hermit, so she had her mother tell the king, saying, 'Although he is of a bad caste, he is still a hermit, and he is very worthy of respect. I am willing to marry him.' The king firmly refused. The daughter secretly went to the hermit and became his wife, and then gave birth to a son. The king lost his daughter and searched everywhere, found the hermit's dwelling, and sent Chandalas to tie up the hermit and his daughter and throw them into the Ganges River. The hermit said to the Ganges River god, 'Do not let me sink, for if I sink, in an instant, I will cause the water to dry up.' The river god then cut the ropes and let the hermit return. The hermit angrily thought, and in an instant rained down stones, and the king's people were all killed, and the country turned into a mountain forest, originally named Matanga. These are the three (stories).
舊國。今變成林。佛問波離。汝知何緣此林空寂。
論。長者白佛言喬答摩我聞由仙意憤恚故。
述曰。喬答摩者。先云瞿曇。此云甘蔗種。或日炙種。或牛糞種等。如舊所釋。佛是此種。號喬答摩。長者答佛。我雖不見。曾聞仙人。由如上事。意憤恚故。國變成林。所以空寂。由此所說仙人意嗔。殺此三國諸有情類。國變成林。故知。由他諸識轉變增上力故。他有情死。非以身語親能殺之。準經但總問仙人意殺。今論乃別言仙殺三國。
論。若執神鬼敬重仙人知嫌為殺彼有情類不但由仙意憤恚者。
述曰。彼宗意說。唯意不能成殺業道。令有情死。仙人起欲。鬼神敬重。見仙意嗔。遂為仙殺彼有情類。不唯由仙意嗔力故。有情死也。牒彼計救。故言若者。
論。云何引彼成立意罰為大罪性過於身語。
述曰。釋下半頌。詰意罰為大。若鬼神為殺。云何世尊。引彼林事反問長者。成立意罰。為大罪性。過於身語。由於此殺在身語故。非意罪大。如俱舍說。三罰業中。自比校者。意罰為大。五無間中。破僧為大。於五偏見。邪見最大。故知。意殺無量眾生。過破僧罪。破僧罪是虛誑語故。若爾。論說破僧。能感無間一劫。惡異熟果。此中意殺感果如何。大乘中說。感無量劫。受無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 舊國變成了森林。佛陀問波離（Polli，人名）：『你知道什麼原因導致這片森林如此空寂嗎？』
論中說：『長者對喬答摩（Gotama，釋迦牟尼的姓）佛說，我聽說是因為仙人意念憤恨惱怒的緣故。』
述記中說：『喬答摩，以前叫做瞿曇，意思是甘蔗種，或者日炙種，或者牛糞種等等，就像以前解釋的那樣。佛陀是這個種姓，號為喬答摩。長者回答佛陀說，我雖然沒有親眼看見，但曾經聽說仙人因為上述的事情，意念憤恨惱怒，國家變成了森林，所以空寂。由此所說，仙人意念嗔怒，殺害了這個三國的所有有情眾生，國家變成了森林。因此可知，由於其他諸識轉變的增上力，其他有情眾生死去，不是憑藉身體和語言親自殺害的。根據經文，只是總的問仙人意念殺害，現在論中卻分別說仙人殺害三國。』
論中說：『如果認為神鬼敬重仙人，知道仙人嫌惡而殺害那些有情眾生，不僅僅是因為仙人意念憤恨惱怒的緣故。』
述記中說：『他們的宗派意思是說，僅僅憑藉意念不能成就殺業之道，令有情眾生死去。仙人產生慾望，鬼神敬重仙人，看見仙人意念嗔怒，於是替仙人殺害那些有情眾生，不僅僅是因為仙人意念嗔怒的力量，有情眾生才死去的。』這是駁斥他們的計較和辯解，所以說『如果』。
論中說：『如何引用這件事來成立意念的懲罰是最大的罪性，超過了身體和語言？』
述記中說：『解釋下半頌。詰難意念的懲罰是最大的。如果鬼神替仙人殺害，那麼世尊如何引用這片森林的事情反問長者，來成立意念的懲罰是最大的罪性，超過了身體和語言？因為這種殺害是在身體和語言的緣故。不是意念的罪過大。』如《俱舍論》所說，三種懲罰的業中，自己比較的話，意念的懲罰是最大的。五無間罪中，破僧罪是最大的。在五種偏見中，邪見是最大的。因此可知，意念殺害無量眾生，超過了破僧罪。破僧罪是虛誑語的緣故。如果這樣，論中說破僧罪，能夠感得無間地獄一劫的惡劣異熟果報，這其中意念殺害感得的果報如何？大乘中說，感得無量劫，受苦。
【English Translation】 English version The old kingdom has now become a forest. The Buddha asked Polli (name of a person): 'Do you know what caused this forest to be so desolate?'
The treatise says: 'The elder replied to the Buddha Gotama (Gotama, the surname of Sakyamuni), I heard that it was due to the anger and resentment in the mind of a hermit.'
The commentary says: 'Gotama, formerly called Gautama, means sugarcane lineage, or sun-scorched lineage, or cow dung lineage, etc., as explained before. The Buddha belongs to this lineage, named Gotama. The elder replied to the Buddha, I have not seen it myself, but I have heard that the hermit, because of the above-mentioned matter, had anger and resentment in his mind, and the country turned into a forest, so it is desolate. From this, it is said that the hermit's anger killed all sentient beings in these three kingdoms, and the country turned into a forest. Therefore, it can be known that due to the increased power of the transformation of other consciousnesses, other sentient beings died, not by personally killing them with body and speech. According to the sutra, it only generally asks about the hermit's intentional killing, but now the treatise separately says that the hermit killed the three kingdoms.'
The treatise says: 'If one holds that gods and ghosts respect hermits, know their dislikes, and kill those sentient beings, it is not only because of the hermit's anger and resentment.'
The commentary says: 'Their sect means that intention alone cannot accomplish the path of killing karma, causing sentient beings to die. Hermits generate desires, and gods and ghosts respect hermits. Seeing the hermit's anger, they kill those sentient beings for the hermit, not only because of the power of the hermit's anger that sentient beings die.' This is refuting their calculations and defenses, so it says 'if'.
The treatise says: 'How can this matter be cited to establish that the punishment of intention is the greatest sinful nature, exceeding body and speech?'
The commentary says: 'Explaining the second half of the verse. Questioning that the punishment of intention is the greatest. If gods and ghosts kill for the hermit, then how can the World Honored One cite the matter of this forest to ask the elder in return, to establish that the punishment of intention is the greatest sinful nature, exceeding body and speech? Because this killing is in the body and speech. It is not that the sin of intention is great.' As the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says, among the three types of punishment karma, if one compares them oneself, the punishment of intention is the greatest. Among the five heinous crimes, the crime of destroying the Sangha is the greatest. Among the five biases, wrong view is the greatest. Therefore, it can be known that intentional killing of countless sentient beings exceeds the crime of destroying the Sangha. The crime of destroying the Sangha is due to false speech. If so, the treatise says that the crime of destroying the Sangha can cause the evil retribution of one kalpa in Avici hell. How about the retribution gained from intentional killing in this case? The Mahayana says that it causes suffering for countless kalpas.
間果。過於破僧。從初為名。皆名生報。說色業道立五無間。于中重者。謂是破僧。破僧不能重過意罰。故說意罰。為大罪性。俱舍又說。或依大果。說破僧重。害多有情。說意罰大。斷諸善根。說邪見重。依彼宗說。即其罪大。後感果時。雖但一劫。倍于破僧。受無間等。皆生報故。不可多生。感無間果。不同大乘。
論。由此應知但由仙忿彼有情死理善成立。
述曰。此結前也。謂此佛說意罰大故。汝應當知。但由仙忿。三國眾生。皆被殺死。今變成林。理善成立。意罰為重。非由神鬼。敬重仙人。知嫌為殺 又解。亦即返顯。自識轉變增上緣力。他有情死。唯識義成。非是要由緣識外境。親能殺彼。彼方說死。
論。若唯有識諸他心智知他心不。
述曰。自下大文第七一頌。解釋外難。不照他心。智識不成失。于中有八。一問。二詰。三難。四釋。五徴。六解。七逐。八答。此即初也。謂外問言。若唯有識。不緣心外所有境者。若凡。若聖。諸他心智。緣他心不。
論。設爾何失。
述曰。論主返詰。設緣不緣。二俱何過。
論。若不能知何謂他心智。
述曰。下外人難。論主既說緣與不緣。有何過者。今為二難。先難不緣。后難許緣。此即初也。若說一切
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 間果（antara-phala）：指異熟果報之間的間隔時間。 過於破僧（sanghabheda）：比破壞僧團的罪過更嚴重。 從初為名：從最初開始就稱為。 皆名生報：都稱為現世報。 說色業道立五無間：關於色身所造的惡業，設立五無間地獄。 于中重者。謂是破僧：其中最重的罪業，就是破壞僧團。 破僧不能重過意罰：破壞僧團的罪過不能超過意業的懲罰。 故說意罰。為大罪性：所以說意業的懲罰，是最大的罪性。 俱舍又說。或依大果。說破僧重：俱舍宗又說，或者依據其會導致巨大的惡果，說破壞僧團的罪過嚴重。 害多有情。說意罰大：因為傷害眾多有情，所以說意業的懲罰巨大。 斷諸善根。說邪見重：因為斷絕一切善根，所以說邪見的罪過嚴重。 依彼宗說。即其罪大：依據他們的宗義來說，邪見的罪過最大。 後感果時。雖但一劫。倍于破僧。受無間等：後來感受果報時，即使只有一個劫的時間，也比破壞僧團所受的無間地獄之苦更為嚴重。 皆生報故。不可多生。感無間果。不同大乘：因為都是現世報的緣故，不可能多次產生，感受無間地獄的果報，這與大乘的觀點不同。 論。由此應知但由仙忿彼有情死理善成立： 論：由此應該知道，僅僅由於仙人的憤怒，那些有情眾生死亡的道理是可以成立的。 述曰。此結前也。謂此佛說意罰大故。汝應當知。但由仙忿。三國眾生。皆被殺死。今變成林。理善成立。意罰為重。非由神鬼。敬重仙人。知嫌為殺： 述記：這是總結前面的內容。因為佛說意業的懲罰巨大，你應該知道，僅僅由於仙人的憤怒，三個國家的眾生都被殺死，現在變成了森林，這個道理是可以成立的。意業的懲罰是嚴重的，不是因為神鬼敬重仙人，知道仙人憎恨而殺人。 又解。亦即返顯。自識轉變增上緣力。他有情死。唯識義成。非是要由緣識外境。親能殺彼。彼方說死： 另一種解釋是，這也反過來顯示了，自身的識的轉變作為增上緣的力量，導致其他有情眾生的死亡，唯識宗的義理得以成立。不是一定要通過緣識外在的境界，親自能夠殺死他們，才能說他們死亡。 論。若唯有識諸他心智知他心不： 論：如果只有識，那麼各種他心智（para-citta-jñana）能否知道其他人的心識？ 述曰。自下大文第七一頌。解釋外難。不照他心。智識不成失。于中有八。一問。二詰。三難。四釋。五徴。六解。七逐。八答。此即初也。謂外問言。若唯有識。不緣心外所有境者。若凡。若聖。諸他心智。緣他心不： 述記：從下面開始，第七大段用一頌來解釋外來的詰難，即不能照見他人心識，智慧和識就不能成立的過失。其中有八個部分：一問，二詰，三難，四釋，五征，六解，七逐，八答。這裡是第一個部分，也就是提問。外人問道：如果只有識，不緣取心識之外的所有境界，那麼無論是凡夫還是聖人，各種他心智慧否緣取其他人的心識？ 論。設爾何失： 論：如果這樣，會有什麼過失？ 述曰。論主返詰。設緣不緣。二俱何過： 述記：論主反過來詰問，假設緣取或者不緣取，兩種情況各有什麼過失？ 論。若不能知何謂他心智： 論：如果不能知道，那還叫什麼他心智？ 述曰。下外人難。論主既說緣與不緣。有何過者。今為二難。先難不緣。后難許緣。此即初也。若說一切： 述記：下面是外人的詰難。論主既然說緣取或者不緣取，各有什麼過失，現在提出兩個詰難。先詰難不緣取，后詰難允許緣取。這裡是第一個詰難。如果說一切：
【English Translation】 English version Antara-phala: Refers to the interval between the maturation of karmic results. Sanghabheda: More severe than the offense of disrupting the Sangha (monastic community). Cong chu wei ming: Called from the very beginning. Jie ming sheng bao: All are called retribution in this lifetime. Shuo se ye dao li wu wu jian: Regarding the evil deeds created by the physical body, the five Avici hells are established. Yu zhong zhong zhe. Wei shi po seng: Among them, the most serious offense is disrupting the Sangha. Po seng bu neng zhong guo yi fa: The offense of disrupting the Sangha cannot exceed the punishment of mental karma. Gu shuo yi fa. Wei da zui xing: Therefore, it is said that the punishment of mental karma is the greatest sinful nature. Jushe you shuo. Huo yi da guo. Shuo po seng zhong: The Abhidharmakosa also says that, or based on the fact that it leads to huge evil consequences, it is said that the offense of disrupting the Sangha is serious. Hai duo you qing. Shuo yi fa da: Because it harms many sentient beings, it is said that the punishment of mental karma is great. Duan zhu shan gen. Shuo xie jian zhong: Because it cuts off all roots of goodness, it is said that the offense of wrong views is serious. Yi bi zong shuo. Ji qi zui da: According to their doctrine, the offense of wrong views is the greatest. Hou gan guo shi. Sui dan yi jie. Bei yu po seng. Shou wu wu jian deng: Later, when experiencing the karmic result, even if it is only for one kalpa (aeon), it is more severe than the suffering of Avici hell experienced for disrupting the Sangha. Jie sheng bao gu. Bu ke duo sheng. Gan wu wu jian guo. Bu tong da cheng: Because they are all retributions in this lifetime, it is impossible to arise multiple times and experience the result of Avici hell, which is different from the view of Mahayana. Treatise: From this, it should be known that the principle of those sentient beings dying solely due to the anger of the Rishi (sage) is well established. Commentary: This concludes the preceding. Because the Buddha said that the punishment of mental karma is great, you should know that solely due to the anger of the Rishi, the sentient beings of three kingdoms were all killed and have now become forests. This principle is well established. The punishment of mental karma is severe, not because the gods and ghosts respect the Rishi and kill because they know the Rishi hates them. Another explanation is that this also conversely shows that the power of the transformation of one's own consciousness as a dominant condition causes the death of other sentient beings. The meaning of Vijnanavada (Yogacara) is established. It is not necessary to rely on cognizing external objects to be able to personally kill them in order to say that they have died. Treatise: If there is only consciousness, can the various para-citta-jñana (knowledge of others' minds) know the minds of others? Commentary: From here onwards, the seventh major section uses one verse to explain the external challenge, namely the fault that wisdom and consciousness cannot be established if one cannot illuminate the minds of others. There are eight parts: 1. Question, 2. Interrogation, 3. Challenge, 4. Explanation, 5. Inquiry, 6. Resolution, 7. Pursuit, 8. Answer. This is the first part, which is the question. The outsider asks: If there is only consciousness and it does not cognize all objects outside of consciousness, then whether they are ordinary beings or sages, can the various para-citta-jñana cognize the minds of others? Treatise: If so, what fault would there be? Commentary: The author of the treatise interrogates in return, asking what fault there would be in either cognizing or not cognizing. Treatise: If one cannot know, what is meant by para-citta-jñana? Commentary: Below is the outsider's challenge. Since the author of the treatise said that there would be faults in either cognizing or not cognizing, now two challenges are presented. First, the challenge against not cognizing, and then the challenge against allowing cognizing. This is the first challenge. If one says that everything:
諸他心智。不能親知他心等者。云何說之。為他心智。便立量言。汝之他心智應非他心智。不能親緣他心等故。如自色等智。
論。若能知者唯識應不成。
述曰。此即第二。難彼許緣。若凡及聖。諸他心智。親能緣知他心等者。所說唯識理應不成。許此智緣心外境故。復立量言。汝他心智應非唯識。許此智緣心外境故。如我此智。喻中不言如我此智。便闕同喻。然他心智。亦能了知。他心所法。唯名他心者。從主勝說故。然此不能了知。他心能緣心等。亦不了知彼所緣境。若許知者。便有自心。知自心過。自心有緣彼。彼有緣自心。故若許知。便有此失。若別時緣。即無此過。自心前後。許相緣故。既爾大乘。許一剎那自心。返緣彼能緣彼能緣等。何不許緣。此亦不爾。但許一念自心自緣謂自證心。緣見分等。猶尚不許一念見分。返緣自證。豈許見分一念自緣。唯見分能緣他心故。若爾他心。緣自身自證。亦應得說。一念他心智。得緣彼境。此亦不爾。前已說故。謂前已說一念見分。不許能緣自自證分。證自證分。類此亦爾。故他心智。但知他身心心所法。不緣彼境。及彼能緣自自證分。不名他心智故。此說因位。非佛等心。
論。雖知他心然不如實。
述曰。此論主釋。由知他心。名他
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說其他的他心智（能夠了解他人內心的智慧）不能直接瞭解其他人的心等等，那又該如何解釋它被稱為『他心智』呢？可以這樣立論：你的他心智應該不是真正瞭解他人內心的智慧，因為它不能直接認知他人的心等等，就像認知自己色身等等的智慧一樣。
論：如果他心智慧夠完全瞭解他人的心，那麼唯識（一切唯心所造）的理論就應該不成立了。
述曰：這是第二個難點，針對對方承認他心智慧夠緣取（認知）他心。如果無論是凡夫還是聖人的各種他心智，都能夠直接緣取並瞭解他人的心等等，那麼所說的唯識理論就應該不成立了，因為這等於承認這種智慧能夠緣取心外的境界。可以再次立論：你的他心智應該不是唯識，因為它承認這種智慧能夠緣取心外的境界，就像我的這種智慧一樣。比喻中沒有說『就像我的這種智慧一樣』，就缺少了同喻。然而，他心智也能瞭解他心所法（伴隨心識產生的心理活動），之所以稱為『他心』，是從主體的角度來說的。然而，他心智不能瞭解他心的能緣之心等等，也不能瞭解他心所緣的境界。如果承認他心智慧夠了解這些，那麼就會出現自己的心瞭解自己的心的過失，因為自己的心能夠緣取彼心，彼心也能緣取自己的心。如果承認他心智慧夠了解這些，就會有這樣的過失。如果是在不同的時間緣取，就沒有這個過失，因為自己的心前後相續，可以互相緣取。既然如此，大乘佛教承認一個剎那的自心能夠反過來緣取彼能緣、彼能緣等等，為什麼不承認他心智也能緣取呢？這也不對。大乘只承認一念的自心能夠自我緣取，也就是自證心，緣取見分等等，尚且不承認一念的見分能夠反過來緣取自證，怎麼會承認見分能夠一念自我緣取呢？因為只有見分才能緣取他人的心。如果這樣，他人的心緣取自身自證也應該可以成立，一念的他心智也應該能夠緣取彼境。這也是不對的，前面已經說過了，前面已經說過一念的見分不能緣取自己的自證分，證自證分，此類推也是一樣。所以，他心智只能瞭解他人身心和心所法，不能緣取彼境以及彼能緣的自自證分，因為這不屬於他心智的範圍。這裡說的是因位（修行階段），不是佛等等的心。
論：雖然能夠了解他人的心，但並不如實。
述曰：這是論主的解釋，因為能夠了解他人的心，所以稱為『他』
【English Translation】 English version: If other 'other-minds' (wisdom that understands the minds of others) cannot directly know the minds of others, etc., how can it be explained as 'other-mind'? One can argue: Your other-mind should not be a true understanding of the minds of others, because it cannot directly cognize the minds of others, etc., just like the wisdom that cognizes one's own physical body, etc.
Treatise: If other-mind can fully understand the minds of others, then the theory of 'Vijñānavāda' (consciousness-only) should not hold.
Commentary: This is the second difficulty, targeting the opponent's admission that other-mind can apprehend (cognize) other minds. If various other-minds, whether of ordinary beings or sages, can directly apprehend and understand the minds of others, etc., then the theory of Vijñānavāda should not hold, because this is equivalent to admitting that this wisdom can apprehend objects outside of the mind. One can argue again: Your other-mind should not be Vijñānavāda, because it admits that this wisdom can apprehend objects outside of the mind, just like my wisdom. The analogy does not say 'just like my wisdom', so it lacks a similar example. However, other-mind can also understand other-mind-related dharmas (mental activities that accompany consciousness). The reason it is called 'other-mind' is from the perspective of the subject. However, other-mind cannot understand the mind that apprehends other minds, etc., nor can it understand the object apprehended by other minds. If it is admitted that other-mind can understand these, then the fault of one's own mind understanding one's own mind will arise, because one's own mind can apprehend that mind, and that mind can also apprehend one's own mind. If it is admitted that other-mind can understand these, there will be this fault. If it is apprehended at different times, there is no such fault, because one's own mind is continuous, and can apprehend each other. Since this is the case, Mahayana Buddhism admits that a single moment of one's own mind can in turn apprehend the apprehending of that, the apprehending of that, etc., why not admit that other-mind can also apprehend? This is also not correct. Mahayana only admits that a single thought of one's own mind can self-apprehend, that is, self-awareness, apprehending the appearance-aspect, etc., and does not even admit that a single thought of the appearance-aspect can in turn apprehend self-awareness. How can it admit that the appearance-aspect can self-apprehend in a single thought? Because only the appearance-aspect can apprehend the minds of others. If this is the case, the other's mind apprehending its own self-awareness should also be valid, and a single thought of other-mind should also be able to apprehend that object. This is also not correct, as it has been said before. It has been said before that a single thought of the appearance-aspect cannot apprehend its own self-awareness-aspect, awareness-of-self-awareness-aspect, and the same applies by analogy. Therefore, other-mind can only understand the body and mind and mental activities of others, and cannot apprehend that object and the self-awareness-aspect of that apprehending, because this is not within the scope of other-mind. This refers to the stage of practice, not the mind of the Buddha, etc.
Treatise: Although it can understand the minds of others, it is not in accordance with reality.
Commentary: This is the explanation of the treatise master, because it can understand the minds of others, it is called 'other'.
心智。不如實故。可說唯識。論主且約菩薩已下他心智答。所以者何。此等他心智。雖緣他心。不能如實稱似彼心。以他心為質。大分雖同。不親緣著。與彼少異。名不如實。至下當知。
論。頌曰他心智云何知境不如實如知自心智不知如佛境。
述曰。此頌文意。有徴。有解。有逐。有答。所以者何 他心智云何。知境不如實。此外人徴 如知自心智。此論主解 伏意亦有自心智。云何知境。不如實。外人復逐 第四句頌。不知二字。論主復答。不知者。無知也。由無知故。不能自知。總言不知如佛境者。顯成二智。不如實知。然依梵本。頌不知字。應言無知。不知無知答逐。不知總顯二不如實。今此文略。合言不知。義亦含二。至下當知。
論曰。諸他心智云何于境不如實知。
述曰。此外人徴。釋上半頌。汝前所說。若凡若聖。諸他心智。既緣他心。云何于境。不如實知。然此等文。勘舊論文。非有難解。極有少略。不能繁述。學者當知。
論。如自心智。
述曰。此論主解。釋第三句頌。以他心為質。而心變緣。名他心智。非能親取他心等故。名他心智。如緣自心諸所有智。亦不親取。但變而緣。與本質異。名不如實。此自心智。說見分者。前後許自變相緣故。非自證
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心智如果不真實，就可以說是『唯識』。論主暫且根據菩薩以下眾生的他心智來回答。為什麼呢？因為這些他心智，雖然緣於他人的心，卻不能如實地、完全地瞭解對方的心。雖然以他人的心作為基礎，大部分是相同的，但並非直接地、親身地去體驗，與對方的心存在細微的差異，所以說是不如實的。這一點在後面會進一步說明。
論：頌文說：『他心智如何，知境不如實，如知自心智，不知如佛境。』
述：這句頌文的意思，有提問，有解釋，有追問，有回答。為什麼這麼說呢？『他心智如何，知境不如實』，這是外人的提問。『如知自心智』，這是論主的解釋。外人暗含的意思是，也有自心智，如何知境，不如實？外人再次追問。第四句頌文，『不知』二字，是論主的再次回答。『不知』，就是沒有知。因為沒有知，所以不能自己瞭解。總而言之，『不知如佛境』，顯示了兩種智慧，都不能如實地瞭解。然而根據梵文字，頌文中的『不知』二字，應該說成『無知』。用『不知』或『無知』來回答追問，『不知』總括地顯示了兩種不如實。現在的文字比較簡略，合起來說成『不知』，意思也包含了兩種情況。這一點在後面會進一步說明。
論：各種他心智，如何對境不如實地瞭解？
述：這是外人的提問，解釋上半句頌文。你前面所說的，無論是凡夫還是聖人，各種他心智，既然緣於他人的心，如何對境不如實地瞭解呢？然而這些文字，對照舊的論文，並非難以理解，只是有些簡略，不能詳細敘述。學者應該明白。
論：如同自心智。
述：這是論主的解釋，解釋第三句頌文。以他人的心作為基礎，而心識變化緣取，稱為他心智。不能直接獲取他人的心等，所以稱為他心智。如同緣取自身心的各種智慧，也不能直接獲取，只是變化而緣取，與本質不同，所以說是不如實的。這裡的自心智，指的是見分（vijñāna-bhāga），前後都允許自身變化出相分（ākāra）來緣取，而不是自證分（sva-saṃvedana）。
【English Translation】 English version: If the mind is not real, then it can be said to be 'Vijñapti-mātra' (Consciousness-only). The author of the treatise answers based on the other-minds-wisdom (paracitta-jñāna) of Bodhisattvas and below. Why? Because these other-minds-wisdom, although they cognize the minds of others, cannot truly and completely understand the other person's mind. Although they take the other person's mind as a basis, and are mostly the same, they do not directly and personally experience it, and there are subtle differences from the other person's mind, so it is said to be unreal. This will be further explained later.
Treatise: The verse says: 'How does other-minds-wisdom know the object unreal, like knowing one's own mind-wisdom, not knowing like Buddha's realm.'
Commentary: The meaning of this verse has a question, an explanation, a follow-up question, and an answer. Why is that? 'How does other-minds-wisdom know the object unreal,' this is the question from an outsider. 'Like knowing one's own mind-wisdom,' this is the explanation from the author of the treatise. The implicit meaning of the outsider is, there is also self-mind-wisdom (svacitta-jñāna), how does it know the object unreal? The outsider asks again. The fourth line of the verse, the words 'not knowing,' are the author of the treatise's answer again. 'Not knowing' means without knowing. Because there is no knowing, one cannot understand oneself. In short, 'not knowing like Buddha's realm,' shows that both wisdoms cannot truly understand. However, according to the Sanskrit version, the words 'not knowing' in the verse should be 'without knowing' (ajñāna). Using 'not knowing' or 'without knowing' to answer the follow-up question, 'not knowing' generally shows both unrealities. The current text is relatively brief, combining them into 'not knowing,' and the meaning also includes both situations. This will be further explained later.
Treatise: How do various other-minds-wisdom unrealistically understand the object?
Commentary: This is the outsider's question, explaining the first half of the verse. What you said earlier, whether it is ordinary people or sages, various other-minds-wisdom, since they cognize the minds of others, how do they unrealistically understand the object? However, these words, compared with the old treatises, are not difficult to understand, but are somewhat brief and cannot be described in detail. Scholars should understand.
Treatise: Like self-mind-wisdom.
Commentary: This is the author of the treatise's explanation, explaining the third line of the verse. Taking the minds of others as a basis, and the consciousness transforms and cognizes, it is called other-minds-wisdom. It cannot directly obtain the minds of others, so it is called other-minds-wisdom. Like the various wisdoms that cognize one's own mind, it cannot directly obtain it either, but only transforms and cognizes, which is different from the essence, so it is said to be unreal. The self-mind-wisdom here refers to the seeing-division (darśana-bhāga), which allows the self to transform into an image-division (ākāra) to cognize, not the self-awareness-division (sva-saṃvedana).
分等。名為自心智。彼如實知。無異解故。
論。此自心智云何于境不如實知。
述曰。此外人逐。既言他心智。如知自心智者。此知自心智。云何于自心所取之境。不如實知。
論。由無知故。
述曰。此論主答。釋頌末句。不知二字。此一頌翻釋。由菩薩等。無始已來。法執所蔽。有此無知。覆其心境。令知自心。亦不如實。故他心智。由法執力。如知自心。亦不如實。
論。二智于境各由無知所覆蔽故。不知如佛凈智所行不可言境。
述曰。下顯總成他自心智。不如實知。一無知言。通答上問。及釋下因。若菩薩等。能知他心。及知自心。二種諸智。名為二智。或現行法執。俱無明所覆。或法執種子。俱無明所蔽。故言無知所覆蔽也。覆謂覆障。蔽謂隱蔽。覆障所知離言法性。隱蔽自心。不稱實故。如來凈智。斷法執故。所行真俗。依他圓成二種。諸境體性。離言超思議道。名有為等。皆假強名故。佛他心智。緣他心時既稱彼境。如實離言。名如實知。諸菩薩等。他心智等。不知彼境性離言等。不稱彼緣。雖緣他心。及緣自心。名不如實。故此說言諸菩薩等二智。于境無知所覆。不能了知。如佛所行。有為無為。性離言境。故說彼智。名不如實。
論。此二于境不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：分門別類地進行辨別，這被稱為『自心智』（能夠了解自己內心的智慧）。因為這種智慧不能如實地瞭解實情，所以說它『無異解故』（沒有不同的理解）。
論：這種『自心智』為什麼不能如實地瞭解所觀察的境（對像）呢？
述曰：外道之人追問，既然說了『他心智』（能夠了解他人內心的智慧），就像瞭解『自心智』一樣，那麼這種瞭解『自心智』的智慧，為什麼對於自己內心所觀察的境，不能如實地瞭解呢？
論：因為有『無知』（對事物真相的迷惑）的緣故。
述曰：這是論主的回答，解釋頌文的最後一句『不知』二字。這一頌是用來翻譯和解釋的。由於菩薩等等，從無始以來，被『法執』（對事物本質的執著）所遮蔽，產生了這種『無知』，覆蓋了他們的心和境，使得他們瞭解自己的內心，也不能如實。所以『他心智』，由於『法執』的力量，就像瞭解自己的內心一樣，也不能如實。
論：這兩種智慧對於所觀察的境，都是由於被『無知』所覆蓋和遮蔽的緣故，所以不能瞭解像佛的清凈智慧所能通達的不可言說的境。
述曰：下面總的說明『他心智』和『自心智』不能如實地瞭解實情。一個『無知』，既回答了上面的問題，又解釋了下面的原因。如果菩薩等等，能夠了解他人之心，以及瞭解自己之心的這兩種智慧，被稱為『二智』。或者現行的『法執』，都被無明所覆蓋；或者『法執』的種子，都被無明所遮蔽。所以說『無知所覆蔽也』。『覆』是覆蓋和障礙，『蔽』是隱蔽。覆蓋和障礙所能瞭解的離言語的法性，隱蔽自己的內心，不符合實情。如來的清凈智慧，斷除了『法執』的緣故，所通達的真諦和俗諦，以及依他起性和圓成實性這兩種境的體性，都是離言語而超脫思議的，名為『有為』等等，都是假借的名稱。所以佛的『他心智』，在觀察他人之心的時候，既然符合那個境，如實地離開了言語，就稱為『如實知』。而諸位菩薩等等的『他心智』等等，不能瞭解那個境的離言語的自性等等，不符合他們所觀察的境，雖然觀察他人之心，以及觀察自己的內心，也稱為『不如實』。所以這裡說諸位菩薩等等的兩種智慧，對於所觀察的境，被『無知』所覆蓋，不能瞭解像佛所通達的『有為』和『無為』，自性離言語的境。所以說他們的智慧，名為『不如實』。
論：這兩種智慧對於所觀察的境，不能……
【English Translation】 English version: Distinguishing and categorizing is called 'Self-Mind Wisdom' (the wisdom to understand one's own mind). Because this wisdom cannot truly understand the reality, it is said to be 'without different understanding' (without differing interpretations).
Treatise: Why does this 'Self-Mind Wisdom' not truly understand the observed object (境, object of observation)?
Commentary: The heretics inquire, since 'Other-Mind Wisdom' (the wisdom to understand others' minds) is mentioned, just like understanding 'Self-Mind Wisdom,' then why is it that this wisdom of understanding 'Self-Mind Wisdom' cannot truly understand the object observed by one's own mind?
Treatise: Because of 'ignorance' (無知, delusion about the true nature of things).
Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer, explaining the last sentence of the verse, 'not knowing.' This verse is used for translation and explanation. Because Bodhisattvas, etc., from beginningless time, are obscured by 'attachment to dharma' (法執, clinging to the essence of things), this 'ignorance' arises, covering their mind and object, causing them to not truly understand their own mind. Therefore, 'Other-Mind Wisdom,' due to the power of 'attachment to dharma,' is like understanding one's own mind, and is also not truly understanding.
Treatise: These two wisdoms, regarding the observed object, are both covered and obscured by 'ignorance,' so they cannot understand the ineffable object that the Buddha's pure wisdom can penetrate.
Commentary: Below, it is generally explained that 'Other-Mind Wisdom' and 'Self-Mind Wisdom' cannot truly understand the reality. One 'ignorance' answers the above question and explains the reason below. If Bodhisattvas, etc., can understand the minds of others, and these two wisdoms of understanding their own minds are called 'two wisdoms.' Either the current 'attachment to dharma' is covered by ignorance, or the seeds of 'attachment to dharma' are obscured by ignorance. Therefore, it is said 'obscured by ignorance.' 'Covering' means covering and obstructing, and 'obscuring' means concealing. Covering and obstructing the dharma-nature that can be understood beyond words, concealing one's own mind, not conforming to reality. The Tathagata's pure wisdom, because it has cut off 'attachment to dharma,' the true and conventional truths that are penetrated, and the nature of the two objects of dependent origination and perfect accomplishment, are all beyond words and transcend thought, and are called 'conditioned' etc., which are all borrowed names. Therefore, the Buddha's 'Other-Mind Wisdom,' when observing the minds of others, since it conforms to that object, truly departs from words, and is called 'truly knowing.' And the 'Other-Mind Wisdom' etc. of the Bodhisattvas etc., cannot understand the nature of that object beyond words, etc., and does not conform to the object they observe, although they observe the minds of others, and observe their own minds, it is also called 'not truly understanding.' Therefore, it is said here that the two wisdoms of the Bodhisattvas etc., regarding the observed object, are covered by 'ignorance' and cannot understand the 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned' that the Buddha penetrates, the object of nature beyond words. Therefore, it is said that their wisdom is called 'not truly understanding.'
Treatise: These two regarding the object are not...
如實知由似外境虛妄顯現故。
述曰。此重釋前不如實義。除佛智外。余他心智。及自心智。由有法執。似外境相。虛妄現故。虛者不實。妄者顛倒。是故於境。不如實知此第一義。故不如實。
論。所取能取分別未斷故。
述曰。此第二釋不如實義。由自身中法執。能取所取。分別種子。猶未斷故。此二于境。不如實知。此則總說。若別說者。此他心智。通有無漏。若有漏者。略有二說。安慧等云。諸有漏心。唯有自體。無相見分。如此卷初。唯識中說。所說見相。皆是所執。謂此識體轉。似他心相貌生起。他本質心。實不緣著。亦自心內。不變相分。似於他心。由善等心有法執故。自證分上。似他相生。此似彼相。遍計所執。體性非有。其自體分。依他起攝。即說此為他心智也。然護法等。此唯識釋。亦無異解。如成唯識。護法等云。謂諸有漏心。依他性中。亦有三分。遂作難言。外色實無。可非內識境。他心實有。寧非自所緣。誰說他心。非自識境。但不說彼是親所緣。謂識生時。無實作用。非如手等。親執外物。日等舒光。親照外境。但如鏡等。似外境現。名了他心。非親能了。親所了者。謂自所變。故契經言。無有小法能取少法。但識生時。似彼相現。名取彼物。即自心等。以他實心。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如實了知是因為外境虛妄顯現的緣故。
解釋：這是對前面『不如實』含義的進一步解釋。除了佛的智慧之外，其他的他心智以及自心智，因為有法執，所以會顯現出類似外境的虛妄之相。『虛』是不真實，『妄』是顛倒。因此，對於外境，不能如實了知，這是第一層含義上的『不如實』。
論：因為所取和能取的分別沒有斷除的緣故。
解釋：這是第二層含義上的『不如實』。由於自身中法執，能取和所取的分別種子還沒有斷除。這兩種原因導致對於外境不能如實了知。這是總的來說。如果分別來說，這種他心智，包括有漏和無漏。如果是有漏的他心智，大概有兩種說法。安慧等人認為，所有的有漏心，只有自體，沒有相分和見分，就像本捲開頭在唯識中所說的那樣。所說的見分和相分，都是所執著的，意思是說這個識的本體轉變，顯現出類似他人心的相貌，但實際上並沒有緣著他人的本質心，也沒有在自己的心中變現出相分，只是因為有善等心和法執，所以在自證分上，顯現出類似他人的相。這種類似他人的相，是遍計所執，體性上是不存在的，而自體分，屬於依他起。這就是所謂他心智。然而，護法等人對唯識的解釋，也沒有不同的理解。就像《成唯識論》中，護法等人說，有漏心在依他性中，也有三分。於是提出疑問：外在的色法實際上不存在，所以不是內在識的境界，而他人的心是真實存在的，難道不是自己所緣的嗎？誰說他人的心不是自己識的境界？只是不說那是親所緣。意思是說，識產生的時候，沒有實際的作用，不像手等，親自執取外物，像太陽等發出光芒，親自照耀外境，只是像鏡子等，顯現出外境的影像，所以說了解他人的心，但不是親自了解，親自了解的是自己所變現的。所以契經上說，沒有小的法能夠取到小的法，只是識產生的時候，顯現出類似那個事物的相，就說是取到了那個事物。也就是自己的心等，以他人的真實心。
【English Translation】 English version: To know truthfully is because external environments appear as illusory manifestations.
Explanation: This further explains the meaning of 'not knowing truthfully' mentioned earlier. Except for the wisdom of the Buddha, other minds and one's own mind, due to the attachment to dharma (法執), appear as illusory aspects similar to external environments. 'Illusory' means unreal, and 'manifestation' means inverted. Therefore, one cannot truthfully know the external environment; this is the first meaning of 'not knowing truthfully'.
Treatise: Because the distinctions between what is grasped (所取) and who grasps (能取) have not been severed.
Explanation: This is the second meaning of 'not knowing truthfully'. Due to the attachment to dharma within oneself, the seeds of distinction between what is grasped and who grasps have not been severed. These two reasons lead to the inability to truthfully know the external environment. This is a general statement. Specifically, this other-mind-wisdom includes both defiled (有漏) and undefiled (無漏) states. If it is a defiled other-mind-wisdom, there are roughly two views. Anhui (安慧) and others believe that all defiled minds only have self-nature (自體), without aspect-division (相分) and seeing-division (見分), as mentioned at the beginning of this volume in the Vijnaptimatrata (唯識). The mentioned aspect-division and seeing-division are all that is clung to, meaning that the essence of this consciousness transforms, manifesting aspects similar to the minds of others, but in reality, it does not cling to the essential mind of others, nor does it transform aspects within one's own mind. It is only because of good intentions and attachment to dharma that aspects similar to others appear on the self-awareness division (自證分). This similarity to others is a completely conceptualized (遍計所執) phenomenon, which does not exist in nature, while the self-nature division belongs to dependent origination (依他起). This is what is called other-mind-wisdom. However, the interpretations of Vijnaptimatrata by Dharmapala (護法) and others do not differ. As in the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (成唯識論), Dharmapala and others say that defiled minds also have three divisions in dependent nature. Thus, they raise the question: External forms do not actually exist, so they are not the realm of inner consciousness, but the minds of others are real, so are they not what one grasps? Who says that the minds of others are not the realm of one's own consciousness? It is just not said that it is the directly grasped. It means that when consciousness arises, it has no actual function, unlike hands, which personally grasp external objects, like the sun emitting light, personally illuminating external environments, but like mirrors, which reflect the images of external environments, so it is said to understand the minds of others, but not personally understand, what is personally understood is what one transforms. Therefore, the sutras say that no small dharma can grasp a small dharma, but when consciousness arises, it manifests an aspect similar to that thing, and it is said to have grasped that thing. That is, one's own mind, etc., with the real mind of others.
為增上緣。所取本質。自心別變。作相分心。似他本物。說此見分。爲了他心。名他心智。此前二說。皆有漏智。若是無漏他心智者。如成唯識。略有三說。諸后得智。有二分耶。有義俱無。離二取故。同有漏心初師所說。然佛地論。雖無漏心。有相無相。略有三說。約后得智。既無此義。此師菩薩。及二乘等。諸無漏心。皆有法執。佛地論中。亦有此義。似二取現。說有見相。見相即是遍計所執。體是無法。說能所取是所執故。無處正說依他起故。唯二等者。但自證分。似於二現。說之為二。依他性中。實無有二。說為他心智。如有漏心說 問然佛此智。有相見不 答有見無相。不同二乘等。諸無漏心。佛之見分。親了他心。名他心智。釋此理妨。如次下師。故此論說除佛以外。知自他心智。虛妄顯現。二取分別。猶未斷等。與佛有異。佛無執故。不知如佛凈智行境。有義。后得智見有相無。說此智品。有分別故。聖智皆能親照境故。不執著故。說離二取。此第二說佛地論中。更有證文。不能繁引。釋此文者。若有漏心。便變相分。二取未除。不知如佛凈智所行性離言。境都無相分。名不如實。若除佛外。諸無漏智。雖能親取。然自身中。有法執種猶未斷故。出觀已后。諸法可言。或猶起執。名不如實。佛則不爾。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 爲了增上緣（幫助增長和發展的條件）。所取本質（被認知事物的本質），是自心（自己的心識）的特別變現。產生相分心（作為被認知對象的心識部分），看起來像是外在的真實事物。說這個見分（能認知的心識部分），是爲了認知他人的心識，稱為他心智（瞭解他人想法的智慧）。以上兩種說法，都是有漏智（受煩惱影響的智慧）。 如果是無漏他心智（不受煩惱影響的智慧），就像《成唯識論》中略有三種說法。諸后得智（證悟后獲得的智慧），有見分和相分嗎？有一種觀點認為兩者都沒有，因為它已經脫離了能取和所取二取。這與有漏心的最初說法相同。然而，《佛地經論》中，雖然是無漏心，但對於有相無相，略有三種說法。因為針對后得智，沒有這種意義，所以這位論師認為菩薩以及二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）等，所有的無漏心，都有法執（對法的執著）。《佛地經論》中，也有這種意義，看起來像是二取顯現，所以說有見分和相分。見分和相分就是遍計所執（虛妄分別的執著），其體性是空無的，因為說能取和所取是所執著的，沒有真正說明依他起性（事物相互依存的性質）。 只有自證分（能證明自身存在的心識部分）看起來像是二取顯現，所以說它是二。在依他性中，實際上沒有二，所以說它是他心智，就像有漏心一樣。 問：然而佛的這種智慧，有相分和見分嗎？答：有見分，沒有相分，不同於二乘等所有的無漏心。佛的見分，直接瞭解他人的心識，稱為他心智。解釋這個道理是爲了防止像下面的論師一樣。所以這部論典說，除了佛以外，知道自己和他人的心智，都是虛妄顯現，二取分別（能取和所取的分別）還沒有斷除等等，與佛有所不同，因為佛沒有執著。不知道像佛的清凈智慧所行之境，有一種觀點認為，后得智的見分有相無相。說這種智慧的品類，有分別，因為聖智（聖人的智慧）都能直接照見境界，不執著，所以說它脫離了二取。這第二種說法在《佛地經論》中，還有證據，不能一一引用。 解釋這段文字的人認為，如果有漏心，就會變現相分，二取沒有消除，不知道像佛的清凈智慧所行之性，遠離言語，境界都沒有相分，所以說它不如實。如果除了佛以外，其他的無漏智，雖然能夠直接認知，但是自身中，有法執的種子還沒有斷除，出觀以後，諸法可以言說，或者仍然會產生執著，所以說它不如實。佛則不是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version For the augmenting condition (conditions that help growth and development). The essence taken (the essence of the things perceived) is a special transformation of one's own mind (one's own consciousness). It produces the appearance-division mind (the part of consciousness that serves as the perceived object), which looks like an external real thing. Saying this seeing-division (the part of consciousness that can perceive) is to know the minds of others, called telepathy (wisdom to understand the thoughts of others). The above two statements are both contaminated wisdom (wisdom affected by afflictions). If it is uncontaminated telepathy (wisdom unaffected by afflictions), as in the 'Consciousness-Only Treatise', there are roughly three statements. Do the subsequent wisdoms (wisdoms obtained after enlightenment) have a seeing-division and an appearance-division? One view is that neither exists, because it has been separated from the dualistic grasping of the grasper and the grasped. This is the same as the initial statement of the contaminated mind. However, in the 'Buddha-Land Treatise', although it is an uncontaminated mind, there are roughly three statements regarding having appearance or not having appearance. Because there is no such meaning for subsequent wisdom, this teacher believes that all uncontaminated minds of Bodhisattvas and the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), have attachment to dharma (attachment to the teachings). In the 'Buddha-Land Treatise', there is also this meaning, which looks like the manifestation of dualistic grasping, so it is said to have a seeing-division and an appearance-division. The seeing-division and appearance-division are the completely conceptualized (the attachment of false discrimination), and its nature is empty, because saying that the grasper and the grasped are what is attached to, it does not truly explain the dependent nature (the nature of things that are interdependent). Only the self-awareness division (the part of consciousness that can prove its own existence) looks like the manifestation of duality, so it is said to be two. In the dependent nature, there is actually no two, so it is said to be telepathy, just like the contaminated mind. Question: However, does the Buddha's wisdom have an appearance-division and a seeing-division? Answer: There is a seeing-division, but no appearance-division, which is different from all the uncontaminated minds of the Two Vehicles, etc. The Buddha's seeing-division directly understands the minds of others, called telepathy. Explaining this principle is to prevent it from being like the following teachers. Therefore, this treatise says that, except for the Buddha, knowing one's own and others' minds is a false manifestation, the dualistic discrimination (the discrimination of the grasper and the grasped) has not been eliminated, etc., which is different from the Buddha, because the Buddha has no attachment. Not knowing the realm of the Buddha's pure wisdom, one view is that the seeing-division of subsequent wisdom has appearance or no appearance. Saying that this type of wisdom has discrimination, because the holy wisdom (the wisdom of the saints) can directly see the realm, without attachment, so it is said to be separated from the dualistic grasping. This second statement has evidence in the 'Buddha-Land Treatise', which cannot be cited one by one. Those who explain this passage believe that if there is a contaminated mind, it will transform the appearance-division, the dualistic grasping has not been eliminated, not knowing the nature of the Buddha's pure wisdom, which is far from words, and the realm has no appearance-division, so it is said to be unreal. If, except for the Buddha, other uncontaminated wisdoms, although they can directly perceive, but in themselves, the seeds of attachment to dharma have not been eliminated, after coming out of meditation, the dharmas can be spoken, or they may still produce attachment, so it is said to be unreal. The Buddha is not like this.
故除佛外。無漏此智。不知如佛凈智所行不可言境。與佛有異 若爾此智。既不變相。親取外境。何名唯識 答唯識者。據有漏心所起妄執境非實有。由此理故。唯識但遮所執外法。識能親取。非執外法。何妨親取。故唯識理。此師亦成。或唯識言。據妄心說。無漏心等。即非唯識。經中但說三界唯心。不說無漏亦唯心故。此違比量。解深密等如前引教。通無漏故。今此二義。前解為勝 有義。后得智二分俱有。說此思惟似真如相。不見真實真如性故。乃至廣說。又若此智。不變似境。離自體法。應非所緣。緣色等智。應緣聲等。又緣無等。應無所緣緣。彼體非實。無緣用故。佛地論中。亦作是說。后得智品。有分別故。所緣境界。或離體故。如有漏心。似境相現。分明緣照如是境相。同無漏心。無漏種起。雖有相似有漏法者。體非有漏。如有漏心。似無漏相。非無漏故。成唯識中。又作是說。現在彼聚心心所法。非此聚識親所緣緣。他聚攝攝故。如非所緣。然真如等。與能緣心。不異不一。非他所攝。不可為例。余所引證。如有漏中。由斯教理。若佛非佛。諸后得智無漏心者。定有相分。亦有見分。然除佛外。余無漏他心智。法執未斷。有漏此智。虛妄現故。不知如佛凈智所行不可言境。與佛無漏他心智異。佛他心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，除了佛陀之外，沒有無漏的智慧能夠知曉如佛陀清凈智慧所行的不可言說的境界。這與佛陀有所不同。如果這樣，這種智慧既然不改變其相狀，直接取外境，為什麼稱之為『唯識』呢？回答是，『唯識』是根據有漏心所產生的虛妄執著，認為外境並非真實存在。因為這個道理，『唯識』只是遮止所執著的外在法，而識能夠直接取境，並非執著外在的法，這又妨礙了直接取境呢？所以『唯識』的道理，在這個論師看來也是成立的。或者說，『唯識』是根據虛妄心來說的，無漏心等，就不是『唯識』了。經中只說了三界唯心，沒有說無漏也是唯心。這違反了比量。《解深密經》等如前面引用的教義，是通於無漏的。現在這兩種解釋，前一種解釋更為殊勝。有種觀點認為，后得智具有見分和相分。說這種思惟類似於真如的相狀，但並沒有見到真實的真如自性。乃至廣說。又如果這種智慧，不改變而類似於外境，離開自體法，就不應該是所緣。緣色的智慧，就應該緣聲等。又緣無等，就應該沒有所緣緣，因為它的體性並非真實，沒有緣用的功能。在《佛地論》中，也是這樣說的。后得智的品類，因為有分別，所以所緣的境界，或者離開體性，就像有漏心，顯現出類似於外境的相狀，分明地緣照這樣的境相，與無漏心相同。無漏種子生起，雖然有相似的有漏法，但體性並非有漏，就像有漏心，顯現出類似於無漏的相狀，但並非無漏。在《成唯識論》中，又是這樣說的。現在彼聚的心心所法，不是此聚識直接的所緣緣，因為是他聚所攝，就像非所緣。然而真如等，與能緣的心，不異也不一，不是他所攝，不能作為例子。其餘所引用的證據，就像有漏中一樣。因為這些教理，無論是佛還是非佛，所有的后得智和無漏心，一定有相分，也有見分。然而除了佛陀之外，其餘無漏的他心智，法執還沒有斷，有漏的這種智慧，虛妄顯現，所以不能知曉如佛陀清凈智慧所行的不可言說的境界。與佛陀的無漏他心智不同，佛陀的他心
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, apart from the Buddha, no 'anāsrava-jñāna' (無漏智, non-outflow wisdom) can know the inexpressible realm traversed by the Buddha's pure wisdom. This differs from the Buddha. If this is the case, since this wisdom does not change its appearance and directly takes external objects, why is it called 'Vijñānavāda' (唯識, Consciousness-only)? The answer is that 'Vijñānavāda' is based on the false attachments arising from 'sāsrava-citta' (有漏心, outflow mind), considering external objects to be unreal. Because of this principle, 'Vijñānavāda' only negates the external 'dharmas' (法, phenomena) that are clung to, while consciousness can directly take objects without clinging to external 'dharmas'. What hinders direct apprehension then? Therefore, the principle of 'Vijñānavāda' is also established in the view of this teacher. Alternatively, 'Vijñānavāda' is spoken of in terms of the deluded mind; 'anāsrava-citta' (無漏心, non-outflow mind), etc., are not 'Vijñānavāda'. The 'sūtras' (經, scriptures) only speak of the 'Three Realms' (三界, Trailokya) as being mind-only, and do not say that the 'anāsrava' is also mind-only. This contradicts the inference. The teachings in the 'Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra' (解深密經) and others, as quoted earlier, are common to the 'anāsrava'. Of these two interpretations, the former is superior. Some argue that 'pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna' (後得智, wisdom attained subsequently) has both 'darśana-bhāga' (見分, seeing-aspect) and 'ākāra-bhāga' (相分, appearance-aspect). They say that this thought resembles the appearance of 'tathatā' (真如, suchness), but does not see the true nature of 'tathatā'. And so on. Furthermore, if this wisdom does not change and resemble external objects, and is separate from its own 'svalakṣaṇa' (自體法, own-being), it should not be the object of cognition. The wisdom that cognizes form should cognize sound, etc. Also, cognizing non-existence, there should be no object of cognition, because its nature is not real and has no function of cognition. In the 'Buddhabhūmi Sūtra' (佛地論), it is also said that the category of 'pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna', because it has discrimination, the object of cognition either departs from its nature, like the 'sāsrava-citta', which manifests an appearance similar to external objects, clearly cognizing such an appearance, similar to the 'anāsrava-citta'. The arising of 'anāsrava-bīja' (無漏種, non-outflow seed), although there are similar 'sāsrava-dharmas', its nature is not 'sāsrava', just as the 'sāsrava-citta' manifests an appearance similar to the 'anāsrava', but is not 'anāsrava'. In the 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi' (成唯識論), it is also said that the mental factors of that aggregate are not the direct object of cognition of this aggregate of consciousness, because they are included in another aggregate, like a non-object of cognition. However, 'tathatā', etc., are neither different nor the same as the cognizing mind, and are not included in another, so they cannot be taken as an example. The remaining cited evidence is like that in the 'sāsrava'. Because of these teachings and principles, whether Buddha or non-Buddha, all 'pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna' and 'anāsrava-citta' certainly have 'ākāra-bhāga' and also 'darśana-bhāga'. However, apart from the Buddha, the 'paracitta-jñāna' (他心智, mind-reading wisdom) of others that is 'anāsrava' has not severed the attachment to 'dharmas', and this wisdom that is 'sāsrava' manifests falsely, so it cannot know the inexpressible realm traversed by the Buddha's pure wisdom. It is different from the Buddha's 'anāsrava-paracitta-jñāna', the Buddha's 'paracitta'
智。雖變為境。親似他心。名為如實。以無執故。知性離言。余他心智。亦變為境。未斷執故。疏似他心。名不如實。以有執故。不知諸法體性離言。故說有異。此中通說除佛以外諸他心智。說不如實。非佛此智。親能照了他心等故。名為如實。成唯識說。誰說他心。非自識境。但不說彼是親所緣。故佛亦變。若說佛心。親能了者。便與上說理教相違。故佛之心。亦名唯識。於此義中。略為褒貶。初說無漏心。亦無相見。亦有法執。此不須說。如成唯識。破無二分。佛地論中廣破。相分亦有。緣無之心。非所緣緣故。然後二師。或說無漏。親所取緣。或說佛心。亦變影像。若許親取。云何應取無法無法無體。非所緣緣。觀所緣說。要具二支。是所緣義。此師意說。此心不具所緣緣。余具所緣。心必具二支故。若許無法得為緣者。破經部師。量有不定。自許無法得成緣故。若破他為量。非述自宗故。無不定者。又唯識理。亦復相違。親取心外法。何得名唯識。破他心等。取心外法。比量相違。及不定過。此師意說。如下當知。其第三師。若佛之心。亦變影像。不親取者。應不知無。心內相分。是有法故。又應不說遍計所執。是凡夫境。由此故知。二說皆是。二說並非。此則雙貶。若別褒者。護法等說。除無分別。必有影
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 智：即使轉變為外境，如果像瞭解自己的內心一樣清楚，就稱為『如實』，因為沒有執著。瞭解自性是超越言語的。其他的他心智（能夠了解他人想法的智慧），也會轉變為外境，但因為沒有斷除執著，所以不像瞭解自己的內心一樣清楚，稱為『不如實』，因為有執著。因為不瞭解諸法的體性是超越言語的，所以說有差別。這裡總的來說，除了佛以外的所有的他心智，都說是不如實的。但佛的這種智慧，能夠直接照見他人的內心等等，所以稱為『如實』。《成唯識論》中說，誰說他人的心不是自己的識所變現的境界呢？只是不說那是直接的所緣。所以佛也會變現。如果說佛的心能夠直接了知，就與上面所說的道理和教義相違背。所以佛的心，也稱為唯識。對於這個意義，略微進行褒貶。最初說無漏心（沒有煩惱的心）也沒有相見（能見和所見的區分），也有法執（對法的執著），這不需要多說，就像《成唯識論》中破斥沒有二分一樣。《佛地論》中廣泛地破斥，相分（識所變現的影像）也是有的。緣無的心，不是所緣緣的緣故。然後兩位論師，或者說無漏心是直接的所取緣，或者說佛的心也會變現影像。如果允許直接取，怎麼能取無法、無法體的東西作為非所緣緣呢？觀察所緣的時候說，要具備能取和所取兩個方面，才是所緣的意義。這位論師的意思是說，這個心不具備所緣緣，其餘的具備所緣。心必定具備兩個方面。如果允許無法可以作為緣，那麼破斥經部師的量（推理）就有不確定的過失，因為自己也允許無法可以成為緣。如果破斥他人作為量，而不是陳述自己的宗義，就沒有不確定的過失。而且與唯識的道理也相違背，直接取心外之法，怎麼能稱為唯識呢？破斥他人的心等等，取心外之法，有比量相違和不確定的過失。這位論師的意思是說，如下面將要說明的。第三位論師說，如果佛的心也變現影像，但不直接取，那麼應該不知道無，因為心內的相分是有法。而且不應該說遍計所執（虛妄分別的執著）是凡夫的境界。由此可知，兩種說法都是，兩種說法都不是。這是雙重貶斥。如果分別褒揚，護法等人說，除了無分別智（沒有分別的智慧）以外，必定有影像。
【English Translation】 English version Intelligence: Even when transformed into an external realm, if it is as clear as understanding one's own mind, it is called 'as it is' (如實), because there is no attachment. Understanding the self-nature is beyond words. Other 'other-minds intelligences' (他心智) (wisdom capable of understanding others' thoughts) also transform into external realms, but because they have not severed attachments, they are not as clear as understanding one's own mind, and are called 'not as it is' (不如實), because there is attachment. Because they do not understand that the nature of all dharmas (法) (phenomena) is beyond words, it is said that there is a difference. Here, generally speaking, all 'other-minds intelligences' (他心智) other than the Buddha's are said to be 'not as they are' (不如實). However, the Buddha's intelligence can directly illuminate the minds of others, and so it is called 'as it is' (如實). The Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論) [Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only] says, 'Who says that the minds of others are not the realms transformed by one's own consciousness?' It simply does not say that they are direct objects of perception. Therefore, the Buddha also transforms. If it is said that the Buddha's mind can directly know, it contradicts the principles and teachings mentioned above. Therefore, the Buddha's mind is also called Consciousness-only (唯識). Regarding this meaning, a slight praise and criticism will be made. Initially, it is said that the unconditioned mind (無漏心) (mind without afflictions) also has no 'seeing' (相見) (distinction between the seer and the seen), and also has 'dharma attachment' (法執) (attachment to phenomena), which does not need to be discussed further, just as the Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論) refutes the absence of two aspects. The Buddhabhumi Sutra (佛地論) [Discourse on the Buddha-land] extensively refutes that the 'image aspect' (相分) (the image transformed by consciousness) also exists. The mind that cognizes non-existence is not the condition of the object of cognition. Then, two teachers either say that the unconditioned mind is the direct object of perception, or that the Buddha's mind also transforms images. If direct perception is allowed, how can one take non-existence, the absence of substance, as a non-object condition? When observing the object of cognition, it is said that it must have two aspects, the perceiver and the perceived, to be the meaning of the object of cognition. This teacher means that this mind does not have the object condition, and the rest have the object of cognition. The mind must have two aspects. If it is allowed that non-existence can be a condition, then refuting the inference of the Sautrantika (經部) school has an uncertain fault, because they themselves also allow non-existence to be a condition. If refuting others as a measure, rather than stating one's own doctrine, there is no uncertain fault. Moreover, it also contradicts the principle of Consciousness-only (唯識), how can directly taking external dharmas (法) (phenomena) be called Consciousness-only (唯識)? Refuting the minds of others, etc., taking external dharmas (法) (phenomena), has the fault of contradictory inference and uncertainty. This teacher means, as will be explained below. The third teacher says, if the Buddha's mind also transforms images, but does not directly take them, then one should not know non-existence, because the image aspect within the mind is an existent dharma (法) (phenomenon). Moreover, one should not say that the 'imagined nature' (遍計所執) (the nature of false discrimination) is the realm of ordinary beings. From this, it can be known that both statements are, and both statements are not. This is a double criticism. If praising separately, Dharmapala (護法) and others say that, except for non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智) (wisdom without discrimination), there must be images.
像。其理稍勝。所以者何。既說諸心。同鏡照物必有影生。理無乖返。若無影像。違親所緣。如佛地論。成唯識。瑜伽論說。心心所法。從四緣生。說緣于無。無漏之心。無此緣者。便違聖教。及違比量。遍計所執。說凡夫境。意說。凡夫若心起執。必變為依他內影像相分。此性離言。及離假智識有執故。執此以為色聲法等。不稱所變離言影像。說能執心。名為遍計。遍計所取。名為所執。此是無法。不能與識作所緣緣。所變影像。體是有法。與能遍計。作所緣緣。亦不違理。但是凡夫起能執心。當體顯現。名凡夫境。非說為境故。即是所緣緣。但作所緣。不能作緣。當情現故。無體性故。如見於繩眼識無執。是現量攝。得法自相。但見青等離言之境。意識於此。亦自變為離言影像。不知此影像。非繩。非非繩。非蛇。非非蛇。遂執為蛇。不稱影像。說此執心。名能遍計。體是有法。所變影像。體亦有法。名所遍計。遍計所取。當情所現。情有理無。說為所執。遍計性成。此唯凡夫所行之境。名非聖境。非許無法。作所緣緣。若說不稱本質。名所執無。應五識等中。亦有法執。有緣順境。亦生瞋故 因論生論。圓成實性。聖能親證。凡夫心緣。但可心變。不能親取。聖人若知遍計無時。亦心變作無之影像。有似於無。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這種說法在理上稍微勝過前一種。為什麼這麼說呢？既然說所有的心，都像鏡子照物一樣必然有影像產生，這個道理沒有錯謬。如果沒有影像，就違背了『親所緣』的說法，就像《佛地論》、《成唯識論》、《瑜伽師地論》所說，心和心所法是從四種因緣產生的。如果說心緣于『無』，那麼無漏之心就沒有這種因緣，這就違背了聖教，也違背了比量（通過推理得出的結論）。 遍計所執性，是說凡夫的境界。意思是說，凡夫如果心生執著，必然會變為依他的內在影像相分。這個自性是離言的，並且因為有虛假的智識執著，所以執著這個影像為色、聲、法等。這個影像不符合所變的離言影像，所以說能執著的心，名為遍計；遍計所取，名為所執。這個『所執』是無法，不能作為識的所緣緣。所變的影像，本體是有法，可以作為能遍計的所緣緣，這也不違背道理。但這只是凡夫生起能執著的心時，當體顯現的，名為凡夫境，不是因為說是境界，就成了所緣緣。它只是作為所緣，不能作為緣，因為是當情顯現，沒有體性。比如眼識見到繩子，沒有執著，屬於現量，得到法的自相，只是見到青色等離言的境界。意識對此，也自己變為離言影像，不知道這個影像非繩、非非繩、非蛇、非非蛇，於是執著為蛇，不符合影像。所以說這個執著的心，名為能遍計，本體是有法；所變的影像，本體也是有法，名為所遍計。遍計所取，是當情所現，情有理無，所以說為所執。遍計性由此成立。這只是凡夫所行的境界，名為非聖境，不是允許無法作為所緣緣。 如果說不符合本質，名為所執的『無』，那麼五識等中，也應該有法執，因為有緣于順境，也會生起嗔恨。因為論而生論，圓成實性，是聖人能夠親自證得的，凡夫的心緣，只能心變，不能親取。聖人如果知道遍計是『無』的時候，也會心變作出『無』的影像，有類似於『無』的樣子。
【English Translation】 English version: This reasoning is slightly superior. Why is that? Since it is said that all minds, like mirrors reflecting objects, inevitably produce images, this principle is without error. If there were no images, it would contradict the concept of 'direct object of perception' (親所緣, qīn suǒ yuán), as stated in treatises like the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (成唯識論), and Fo di lun (佛地論). These texts say that mind and mental factors arise from four conditions. If it is said that the mind cognizes 'non-existence,' then the undefiled mind would lack this condition, which contradicts the sacred teachings and logical inference (比量, bǐ liàng). The nature of what is completely conceptualized (遍計所執性, biàn jì suǒ zhí xìng) refers to the realm of ordinary beings. It means that if an ordinary person's mind gives rise to attachment, it will inevitably transform into the dependent (依他, yī tā) internal image aspect. This nature is beyond words, and because of the attachment of false knowledge, this image is grasped as form, sound, dharma, etc. This image does not correspond to the transformed image that is beyond words. Therefore, the mind that grasps is called 'completely conceptualizing' (遍計, biàn jì); what is grasped by complete conceptualization is called 'what is conceptualized' (所執, suǒ zhí). This 'what is conceptualized' is non-existent and cannot serve as the object-condition (所緣緣, suǒ yuán yuán) for consciousness. The transformed image, in its essence, is existent and can serve as the object-condition for the completely conceptualizing mind, which does not contradict reason. However, this is only the manifestation of the ordinary person's mind when it gives rise to attachment, called the realm of ordinary beings. It is not that because it is called a realm, it becomes an object-condition. It only serves as an object of perception, not as a condition, because it manifests in the moment and lacks inherent existence. For example, when the eye-consciousness sees a rope without attachment, it belongs to direct perception (現量, xiàn liàng), obtaining the self-nature of the dharma, only seeing the realm of blue, etc., which is beyond words. The mind also transforms itself into an image that is beyond words, not knowing that this image is neither rope nor not-rope, neither snake nor not-snake, and then grasps it as a snake, which does not correspond to the image. Therefore, this grasping mind is called 'able to completely conceptualize' (能遍計, néng biàn jì), its essence is existent; the transformed image, its essence is also existent, called 'what is completely conceptualized' (所遍計, suǒ biàn jì). What is grasped by complete conceptualization is what manifests in the moment, existing in perception but not in reality, so it is called 'what is conceptualized' (所執, suǒ zhí). The nature of complete conceptualization is thus established. This is only the realm traversed by ordinary beings, called the non-holy realm, not allowing non-existence to serve as the object-condition. If it is said that not corresponding to the essence is called the 'non-existence' of what is conceptualized, then there should also be dharma-attachment in the five consciousnesses, because there is also aversion arising from favorable circumstances. Because of discussing the discussion, the perfectly established nature (圓成實性, yuán chéng shí xìng) is what the sages can personally realize, the mind of ordinary beings can only transform, not directly grasp. If the sages know that complete conceptualization is 'non-existence,' they will also transform the mind to create an image of 'non-existence,' resembling 'non-existence.'
非即親緣遍計所執。依他起性。凡聖之心。俱能親變。亦親緣之。約親所緣。遍計所執。唯凡夫境。圓成實性。唯聖人境。若疏所緣。遍計所執。亦通聖境。圓成實性。亦通凡境。不爾凡夫加行智等。或遍計心。聞說圓成。應不緣執。聖應不知所執非有。各據差別。亦不相違。依他親疏緣皆通二。又前有難。若無漏心。不能親取境。應不知無者。此亦不然。佛知諸法皆性離言。非無非有。疏所緣中。以所執境。為其本質。增上力故。心變為無。體實是有。相似無法。知此離言法。非如凡夫假智。及言二法所取。對凡夫說此離言法上。凡境為無。名為知無。非是親以無為相分。佛地論云。心所變無。依他起攝。真如理無。圓成實攝。遍計所執。體既非有。若非前二攝。智何所知。由如是等所說理趣。護法為勝。此中但說。除佛無漏智。猶自身中。有法執種。凡夫之身。或有現行。並言不如佛。非佛此智。親取他心。說緣過去諸無法等。皆準此知。此前七段。一四事難議境無。卻徴境實執。二釋現量證境有。返破憶持執。三釋以夢例覺時。應知境無失。四釋二識成決定。外境非無失。五釋難夢覺心不異。無造行果差失。六釋無境殺無罪。返詰他宗失。七釋不照他心。智識不成失。
總是第二。釋外所徴。廣破外執。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 並非直接作為親緣所緣而緣取的遍計所執性（Parikalpita，虛妄分別）。依他起性（Paratantra，依他起性）既能被凡夫之心直接緣取，也能被聖人之心直接緣取。也就是說，就直接所緣而言，遍計所執性只是凡夫的境界，而圓成實性（Parinispanna，圓成實性）只是聖人的境界。如果說是間接所緣，那麼遍計所執性也通於聖人的境界，圓成實性也通於凡夫的境界。如果不是這樣，那麼凡夫的加行智等，或者遍計心，在聽聞圓成實性時，就不應該緣取執著；聖人也不應該不知道所執著的並非真實存在。各自根據差別而說，彼此並不矛盾。依他起性的親緣和疏緣都通於二者（凡夫和聖人）。 此外，前面有個疑問，如果無漏心不能直接取境，那麼就不應該知道『無』。對此，並非如此。佛知道諸法都是自性離言的，既非『無』也非『有』。在間接所緣中，以所執著的境作為其本質，由於增上力的緣故，心變為『無』，但其體性實際上是『有』，只是相似於『無法』。知道這種離言法，不像凡夫的虛假智慧以及言語二法所取。對凡夫說這種離言法上，凡夫的境界是『無』，這叫做『知無』，並非是直接以『無』作為相分。在《佛地論》中說，心所變的『無』，屬於依他起性所攝；真如理『無』，屬於圓成實性所攝；遍計所執性，其體性本來就不是『有』，如果不是前二者所攝，那麼智慧又知道什麼呢？由於像這樣所說的理趣，護法（Dharmapala）的觀點更為殊勝。這裡只是說，除了佛的無漏智，仍然在自身中有法執的種子，凡夫之身，或者有法執現行，並且說不如佛。並非佛的智慧直接取他心。說緣過去諸『無法』等，都參照此理來理解。以上七段，一是通過四事來質疑境『無』，反過來徵詢境的真實執著；二是解釋現量證明境『有』，反過來駁斥憶持的執著；三是解釋用夢來比喻覺時，應該知道境『無』的過失；四是解釋二識成就決定，外境並非『無』的過失；五是解釋夢覺之心沒有差異，沒有造作行為果報的差別過失；六是解釋沒有外境殺人無罪，反過來詰難他宗的過失；七是解釋不照了他心，智慧識不成就的過失。 總而言之，以上是第二部分，解釋外人所提出的質疑，廣泛地破斥外人的執著。
【English Translation】 English version: The Parikalpita (imaginary nature) is not directly apprehended as a closely related object. The Paratantra (dependent nature), both the minds of ordinary beings and sages can directly transform and apprehend it. That is to say, in terms of direct objects, the Parikalpita is only the realm of ordinary beings, while the Parinispanna (perfected nature) is only the realm of sages. If it is an indirectly related object, then the Parikalpita also extends to the realm of sages, and the Parinispanna also extends to the realm of ordinary beings. If this were not the case, then the progressive wisdom of ordinary beings, or the Parikalpita mind, upon hearing about the Parinispanna, should not apprehend and cling to it; sages should also not be unaware that what they cling to is not truly existent. Each is based on differences, and there is no contradiction. Furthermore, there was a previous question: if the undefiled mind cannot directly grasp objects, then it should not know 'non-existence'. This is not the case. The Buddha knows that all dharmas are by nature beyond words, neither 'non-existent' nor 'existent'. In indirect apprehension, the object of clinging is taken as its essence. Due to the power of conditioning, the mind transforms into 'non-existence', but its essence is actually 'existence', merely resembling 'non-existence'. Knowing this dharma beyond words is not like the false wisdom of ordinary beings and the two dharmas of language that are grasped. To ordinary beings, it is said that in this dharma beyond words, the realm of ordinary beings is 'non-existent', which is called 'knowing non-existence'. It is not directly taking 'non-existence' as the image-component. In the Buddhabhumi Sutra, it is said that the 'non-existence' transformed by the mind belongs to the Paratantra; the 'non-existence' of Suchness belongs to the Parinispanna; the Parikalpita, its essence is originally not 'existent'. If it is not included in the former two, then what does wisdom know? Due to such principles as these, Dharmapala's view is more superior. Here it is only said that, except for the undefiled wisdom of the Buddha, there are still seeds of attachment to dharma within oneself, and in the body of ordinary beings, there may be active attachment to dharma, and it is said to be inferior to the Buddha. It is not that the Buddha's wisdom directly grasps the minds of others. The statement about apprehending past 'non-existences', etc., should be understood in accordance with this principle. The above seven sections are: first, questioning the 'non-existence' of objects through the four aspects, and in turn, inquiring about the real clinging to objects; second, explaining that direct perception proves the 'existence' of objects, and in turn, refuting the clinging to memory; third, explaining that using dreams to compare with waking moments, one should know the fault of the 'non-existence' of objects; fourth, explaining that the accomplishment of the two consciousnesses determines that the external environment is not the fault of 'non-existence'; fifth, explaining that there is no difference between the mind of dreams and waking, and there is no fault of the difference in the results of actions; sixth, explaining that killing without an external environment is not a crime, and in turn, questioning the faults of other schools; seventh, explaining that not illuminating the minds of others is the fault of the non-accomplishment of wisdom consciousness. In summary, the above is the second part, explaining the questions raised by outsiders and extensively refuting the clinging of outsiders.
從斯論首已有二文。初立論宗唯識無境。及此所說。釋外徴等。總是第一。正辨本宗。破執釋難。自下第二。結己所造。嘆深推佛。
論。唯識理趣無邊抉擇品類差別難度甚深。
述曰。此下有二。初略。總舉嘆深推佛。后廣別顯結造推深。就初之中。先嘆深。后推佛。此即初也。理者道理。趣者趣況所趣處也。無邊者。無際也。抉擇者。以覺慧決了簡擇也。決簡染疑。擇簡邪見。邪見決而不擇。疑擇而不決。今顯智慧所證量法。異邪見疑所行境界。故言抉擇。品類者。同此等流也。差別者。體有異也。寬廣故難度。無底故甚深。此中意說。唯識理趣。若抉擇品類。有無邊差別。弘廣難度。無底甚深。嘆有無邊深廣理趣。
論。非佛誰能具廣抉擇。
述曰。此推于佛。如是所說。唯識理趣。無邊深廣。非佛以外。誰能於此。具廣抉擇。顯己抉擇非具廣也。
論。頌曰我已隨自能略成唯識義此中一切種難思佛所行。
述曰。下廣。別顯結推深。頌中初半。顯己隨能略已成立唯識義理。後半。別顯唯識之理。除此所明。以外諸義。一切種別。難可思議。唯佛所知。非己能說。故應止也。
論。唯識理趣品類無邊我隨自能已略成立。
述曰。釋上半頌。然其唯識所有理趣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 從這部論著的開頭已經有了兩部分內容。第一部分是確立論宗，主張唯識無境（一切事物都只是意識的顯現，沒有獨立於意識之外的客觀存在）。以及這裡所說的解釋外人的提問等等，都是第一部分的內容，主要辨析本宗的觀點，駁斥其他宗派的執著，解釋各種疑問。從下面開始是第二部分，總結自己所作的論述，讚歎佛法的精深，推崇佛陀的智慧。
論：唯識的道理和趣味，無邊無際，決斷抉擇的品類差別，難度極大，非常深奧。
述曰：下面有兩部分內容。首先是簡略地總括，讚歎佛法的精深，推崇佛陀的智慧。然後是廣泛而詳細地分別闡述，總結自己所作的論述，推崇佛法的精深。在第一部分中，先讚歎佛法的精深，后推崇佛陀的智慧。這裡就是第一部分。理，指的是道理。趣，指的是趣味，以及所趨向的地方。無邊，指的是沒有邊際。抉擇，指的是用覺悟的智慧來決斷和選擇。決斷染污和疑惑，選擇正確的見解，排除邪見。邪見是決斷而不選擇，疑惑是選擇而不決斷。現在顯現智慧所證量的法，不同於邪見和疑惑所行的境界，所以說是抉擇。品類，指的是同類的等流。差別，指的是本體上的差異。因為寬廣所以難度大，因為沒有底所以非常深奧。這裡的意思是說，唯識的道理和趣味，如果決斷抉擇品類，就有無邊的差別，弘揚廣大，難度極大，沒有底蘊，非常深奧。讚歎唯識有無邊深廣的道理和趣味。
論：除了佛陀，誰能夠完全而廣泛地決斷和抉擇呢？
述曰：這裡是推崇佛陀。像這樣所說的唯識道理和趣味，無邊無際，深奧廣博，除了佛陀以外，誰能夠對此完全而廣泛地決斷和抉擇呢？顯示自己所作的決斷和抉擇並非完全而廣泛。
論：頌說：我已經隨自己的能力，略微成就了唯識的意義，這其中一切種類的道理，難以思議，是佛陀所行的境界。
述曰：下面是廣泛而詳細地分別闡述，總結自己所作的論述，推崇佛法的精深。頌文的前半部分，顯示自己隨自己的能力，略微地成立了唯識的義理。後半部分，分別顯示唯識的道理，除了這裡所闡明的以外，其他的各種道理，一切種類，難以思議，只有佛陀才能知道，不是自己能夠說清楚的，所以應該停止。
論：唯識的道理和趣味，品類無邊無際，我隨自己的能力，已經略微地成立了。
述曰：解釋頌文的上半部分。然而唯識所有的道理和趣味
【English Translation】 English version: From the beginning of this treatise, there are already two parts. The first part establishes the doctrine of Consciousness-Only without external objects (everything is merely a manifestation of consciousness, with no objective existence independent of consciousness). And what is said here, explaining external inquiries, etc., all belongs to the first part, mainly analyzing the views of this school, refuting the attachments of other schools, and explaining various doubts. From below begins the second part, summarizing one's own writings, praising the profundity of the Dharma, and extolling the wisdom of the Buddha.
Treatise: The principles and interests of Consciousness-Only are boundless, the categories and differences of discernment and selection are extremely difficult, and it is very profound.
Commentary: Below there are two parts. First, a brief summary, praising the profundity and extolling the Buddha. Then, a broad and detailed separate exposition, concluding one's own writings and extolling the depth. In the first part, first praise the profundity, then extol the Buddha. This is the first part. 'Principle' refers to reason. 'Interest' refers to the interest and the place to which it tends. 'Boundless' refers to without limit. 'Discernment' refers to using enlightened wisdom to discern and select. Discernment decides on defilements and doubts, and selection chooses correct views, excluding wrong views. Wrong views are decided but not selected, and doubts are selected but not decided. Now, the Dharma that wisdom proves is different from the realm practiced by wrong views and doubts, so it is called discernment. 'Categories' refers to the same kind of outflow. 'Differences' refers to differences in substance. Because it is broad, it is difficult; because it has no bottom, it is very profound. The meaning here is that if the principles and interests of Consciousness-Only discern and select categories, there will be boundless differences, promoting and expanding, extremely difficult, without foundation, and very profound. Praising Consciousness-Only for having boundless, profound, and broad principles and interests.
Treatise: Who other than the Buddha can fully and broadly discern and select?
Commentary: This is extolling the Buddha. Like what has been said, the principles and interests of Consciousness-Only are boundless, profound, and broad. Who other than the Buddha can fully and broadly discern and select this? Showing that one's own discernment and selection are not complete and broad.
Treatise: The verse says: I have already, according to my ability, slightly accomplished the meaning of Consciousness-Only; within this, all kinds of principles are difficult to conceive, and are the realm practiced by the Buddha.
Commentary: Below is a broad and detailed separate exposition, concluding one's own writings and extolling the depth. The first half of the verse shows that one has slightly established the meaning of Consciousness-Only according to one's ability. The second half separately shows the principles of Consciousness-Only. Apart from what is explained here, the other various principles, all kinds, are difficult to conceive, and only the Buddha knows them. One cannot explain them clearly, so one should stop.
Treatise: The principles and interests of Consciousness-Only, the categories are boundless; I have already slightly established it according to my ability.
Commentary: Explaining the first half of the verse. However, all the principles and interests of Consciousness-Only
。品類差別。無量無邊。嘆甚深廣。今我隨自所見之能。已略成立少分之義。結所明也。
論。餘一切種非所思議。
述曰。釋下半頌。其唯識理。我所明外。餘一切種。甚深之義。非是我意。之所思惟。亦非我語。所言議也。一切種者。差別理也。
所以者何。
論。超諸尋思所行境故。
述曰。此釋非已所能思議。尋思者。有分別有漏心等。或四尋伺。其唯識理。要得無漏真智覺時。方能少證。若在佛位。證乃圓明。然我世親。處在地前。住尋思位。不能如實證唯識理。故非是我之所思議。其唯識理。超尋思境。以上總釋頌難思字。
論。如是理趣唯佛所行。
述曰。以下釋頌佛所行也。如是所說。超尋思理。唯佛所行。圓滿現證。非余所知。
有何所以。非余所能。獨佛圓證。
論。諸佛世尊於一切境及一切種智無礙故。
述曰。一切境者。諸法共相。即一切智境 一切種者。諸法自相一切種智境 智者。即是緣此如理如量二智。若依梵本。應言一切智。此中言略。二境所緣。一智慧緣。由佛世尊。於此二境所有二智。斷結種故。皆無障礙。故於唯識一切種理。皆能了知。二障盡故。無有漏故。長時修故。智圓滿故。所以非佛。不能圓滿行盡理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
品類的差別，無量無邊，深奧廣博令人讚嘆。現在我根據自己所見所能，已經略微成立了少分的意義，這是總結所闡明的內容。
論：其餘一切種類，不是（凡夫）所能思議的。
述記說：解釋下半頌。那唯識的道理，在我所闡明之外，其餘一切種類甚深的意義，不是我的心意所能思惟的，也不是我的言語所能議論的。『一切種』，指的是差別的道理。
為什麼這樣說呢？
論：因為它超越了各種尋思所能到達的境界。
述記說：這解釋了為什麼不是自己所能思議的。『尋思』指的是有分別的有漏心等，或者指四尋伺。那唯識的道理，要得到無漏真智覺悟時，才能稍微證得。如果在佛的地位，證悟才圓滿明瞭。然而我世親，處在地前，住在尋思的階段，不能如實地證悟唯識的道理，所以不是我所能思議的。那唯識的道理，超越了尋思的境界。以上總的解釋了頌中的『難思』二字。
論：像這樣的理趣，只有佛才能行證。
述記說：以下解釋頌中的『佛所行』。像這樣所說的，超越尋思的道理，只有佛才能行證，圓滿地現前證悟，不是其他人所能知道的。
有什麼原因，不是其他人所能，只有佛才能圓滿證悟呢？
論：諸佛世尊對於一切境（Sarva-dharma-laksana，諸法共相）以及一切種智（Sarva-akara-jnata，諸法自相）沒有障礙的緣故。
述記說：『一切境』，指的是諸法的共相，即一切智（Sarvajnatva）的境界。『一切種』，指的是諸法的自相，即一切種智的境界。『智』，就是緣此如理如量的兩種智慧。如果依照梵文字，應該說『一切智』，這裡省略了。兩個境界所緣，一個智慧緣。由於佛世尊，對於這兩種境界所有的兩種智慧，斷除了煩惱的種子，所以都沒有障礙，因此對於唯識的一切種類道理，都能了知。因為兩種障礙都斷盡了，沒有有漏的緣故，長時間修習的緣故，智慧圓滿的緣故，所以不是佛，不能圓滿地行證窮盡這個道理。
【English Translation】 English version:
The distinctions of categories are immeasurable and boundless, profound and vast, worthy of praise. Now, according to my own perception and ability, I have slightly established a small portion of its meaning. This concludes what has been elucidated.
Treatise: All other kinds are beyond comprehension.
Commentary: Explaining the latter half of the verse. The principle of Vijnapti-matrata (Consciousness-only), beyond what I have elucidated, all other kinds of profound meanings are not what my mind can contemplate, nor what my words can discuss. 'All kinds' refers to the principle of distinctions.
Why is this so?
Treatise: Because it transcends the realm of all seeking and contemplation.
Commentary: This explains why it is not something one can comprehend on one's own. 'Seeking and contemplation' refers to minds with discrimination and afflicted minds, or the four seekings and contemplations. The principle of Vijnapti-matrata can only be slightly realized when one attains the unconditioned true wisdom and enlightenment. If one is in the position of a Buddha, the realization is complete and clear. However, I, Vasubandhu (世親), being before the Bhumi (地, stages of Bodhisattva), dwelling in the stage of seeking and contemplation, cannot truly realize the principle of Vijnapti-matrata, so it is not something I can comprehend. The principle of Vijnapti-matrata transcends the realm of seeking and contemplation. The above generally explains the word 'incomprehensible' in the verse.
Treatise: Such a principle is only practiced by the Buddhas.
Commentary: The following explains 'practiced by the Buddhas' in the verse. Such a principle as described, transcending seeking and contemplation, is only practiced by the Buddhas, completely and directly realized, not known by others.
What is the reason that others cannot, and only the Buddhas can completely realize it?
Treatise: Because the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, have no obstruction in all realms (Sarva-dharma-laksana, the general characteristics of all dharmas) and all-aspect wisdom (Sarva-akara-jnata, the specific characteristics of all dharmas).
Commentary: 'All realms' refers to the general characteristics of all dharmas, which is the realm of Sarvajnatva (一切智, all-knowing wisdom). 'All kinds' refers to the specific characteristics of all dharmas, which is the realm of Sarva-akara-jnata (一切種智, wisdom of all aspects). 'Wisdom' refers to the two kinds of wisdom that accord with reality and measure, which are the objects of these two realms. If based on the Sanskrit text, it should say 'Sarvajnatva', which is abbreviated here. Two realms are the objects, and one wisdom is the subject. Because the Buddhas, the World Honored Ones, have no obstruction in the two wisdoms pertaining to these two realms, having eradicated the seeds of affliction, they are able to know all the principles of Vijnapti-matrata. Because the two obstructions are completely eradicated, there is no affliction, due to long-term practice, and because wisdom is complete, therefore, it is not possible for anyone other than the Buddhas to completely practice and exhaust this principle.
趣。故我今時。且說少分。成唯識說。謂諸菩薩。于識性相。資糧位中。能深信解。在加行位。能漸伏斷所取能取。引發真見。在通達位。如實通達。修習位中。如所見理。數數修習。伏斷余障。至究竟位。出障圓明。能盡未來。化有情類。復令悟入唯識相性。辨中邊論護月釋云。無著菩薩。先住地前加行位中。增上忍時。聞慈氏尊。說此中邊所有頌已。得入初地。為世親說。世親菩薩。先住地前順解脫分迴向終心。聞無著說此彌勒頌。令其造釋。得入加行初暖位中。應是聖者。相傳此說。所以護月。遂有此言。非無逗留。而為此義。真諦說。是十回向中。第二回向中。世親既住地前位中如成唯識。未證唯識真實道理。仰推于佛。理不為疑。雖可推上入地菩薩未圓出障。故但推佛。已隨執筆敢受指麾。略述斯疏。其間文義。有所虧拙。是已寡學。拙智窮思。幸諸學者。詳而靡尤。
二十唯識論述記第二
承久二(癸辰)七月二十八日一乘院長講堂談義料書之永恩(生年五十四)
同三年長講會談了憲幸得業
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此我現在，且說少部分《成唯識論》的內容。所謂諸位菩薩，對於識的體性和現象，在資糧位中，能夠深深地相信和理解；在加行位中，能夠逐漸地降伏和斷除所取和能取，引發真實的見解；在通達位中，如實地通達；在修習位中，按照所見的道理，反覆地修習，降伏和斷除剩餘的障礙；直至究竟位，脫離障礙，圓滿光明，能夠盡未來際，教化有情眾生，又令他們領悟和進入唯識的體性和現象。《辨中邊論》護月釋中說，無著菩薩（Asanga，一位偉大的佛教論師），先前住在十地前的加行位中，在增上忍時，聽聞慈氏尊（Maitreya，彌勒菩薩）宣說這部《辨中邊論》的所有偈頌后，得以進入初地。他為世親（Vasubandhu，一位偉大的佛教論師）講述這些內容，世親菩薩先前住在十地前的順解脫分迴向終心，聽聞無著講述這些彌勒菩薩的偈頌，令他造作解釋，得以進入加行位的初暖位中。這應該是聖者的相傳說法，所以護月才有這樣的言論，並非沒有停留，而是爲了這個意義。真諦（Paramārtha，一位翻譯家）說，這是十回向中的第二回向中。世親既然住在十地前的位置中，如《成唯識論》所說，尚未證得唯識真實的道理，仰仗推崇于佛，道理上不應該有所懷疑。雖然可以推及到入地菩薩尚未圓滿脫離障礙，所以只推崇佛。我已經隨意執筆，膽敢接受您的指揮，略微敘述這部疏解。其間文義，如果有所缺失和笨拙，是因為我學識淺薄，拙劣的智慧已經窮盡思考。希望各位學者，詳細地閱讀，不要過分責備。
《二十唯識論述記》第二
承久二年（癸辰）七月二十八日，一乘院長講堂談義料書之永恩（生年五十四）
同三年長講會談了憲幸得業
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, I will now speak a little about the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only). It is said that all Bodhisattvas, regarding the nature and characteristics of consciousness, in the Stage of Accumulation (saṃbhāra-mārga), are able to deeply believe and understand; in the Stage of Application (prayoga-mārga), they are able to gradually subdue and sever the grasped and the grasper, and bring forth true insight; in the Stage of Insight (darśana-mārga), they truly understand; in the Stage of Cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga), according to the principles seen, they repeatedly cultivate, subdue and sever the remaining obstacles; until the Ultimate Stage (niṣṭhā-mārga), they are free from obstacles, perfectly luminous, and able to teach sentient beings for the rest of their future, and also enable them to awaken and enter the nature and characteristics of Consciousness-Only. In the commentary of Madhyāntavibhāga (Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes) by H護月 (Hùyuè), it is said that Asanga (無著菩薩, a great Buddhist philosopher), previously residing in the Stage of Application before the Ten Grounds, at the time of increased forbearance, after hearing Maitreya (慈氏尊, the Future Buddha) speak all the verses of this Madhyāntavibhāga, was able to enter the First Ground. He told these contents to Vasubandhu (世親菩薩, a great Buddhist philosopher), who previously resided in the final mind of dedication in the Part of Liberation in Accordance before the Ten Grounds, and after hearing Asanga speak these verses of Maitreya, he was able to create explanations, and was able to enter the initial Warmth Stage of the Stage of Application. This should be the transmitted saying of the sages, so H護月 had this statement, not without lingering, but for this meaning. Paramārtha (真諦, a translator) said that this is in the Second Dedication of the Ten Dedications. Since Vasubandhu resided in the position before the Ten Grounds, as the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says, he had not yet realized the true principles of Consciousness-Only, and relied on the Buddha for reverence, and there should be no doubt in principle. Although it can be extended to the Bodhisattvas who have entered the Grounds but have not yet fully escaped the obstacles, so only the Buddha is revered. I have already taken up the pen at will, daring to accept your command, and briefly narrated this commentary. If there are any deficiencies and clumsiness in the meaning of the text, it is because I have little knowledge, and my clumsy wisdom has exhausted my thinking. I hope that all scholars will read it in detail and not be too critical.
Notes on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, Volume 2
On the 28th day of the seventh month of Chengjiu 2 (Gui Chen), Yongen (born in the 54th year) of the Yicheng Abbot's Hall wrote the meaning of the lecture.
In the same three years, the head lecture meeting discussed the achievements of Xianxing.