T44n1839_理門論述記

大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1839 理門論述記

No. 1839 [cf. No. 1628]

理門論述記

泰法師撰

初言因明者。五明論中論。即是諸因明論之通名也。正理門論者。此論之別目也。初言因者。有其二種。一者生因。二者了因。今此所辨正說了因。兼辨生因。就了因中復有三種。一者義因。謂通是宗法。所作性義。二者言因。立論云者。所作性言。三者智因。諸敵論之者。及證義人。解前義因及言因。心心數法。通名為智。此之三因。並能顯照聲無常。如燈照物。故名明也。此即因是境名。明是智稱。又即此明智。能照因境。了得本宗。故云因明。此即因即是明為言說。名因明者。一從因明生。即因明其名因明。二生因明故名因明。從果名因明也。若因義即因明境。故名因明。又釋。因者即前智境具。明者辨也。謂此論辨明此因。故名因明。此因明二字。法比量論雲物名。言正理者。智慧照理。從名理因。理者起言故。言亦名理。智所照境。亦名為理。理有耶正。簡耶云正。理此正理。用此論為門。方能悟解。故名正理門。又解。正理者。即集量等五十餘教名也。此論為彼門故。名正理門。天主所造入正理者。此論名正理。彼能入此。名入正理。略無

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1839 理門論述記

No. 1839 [cf. No. 1628]

理門論述記

泰法師撰

最初說的『因明』（Hetu-vidya，論理學）。五明（Panca-vidya）論中的一種。是所有因明論的通稱。『正理門論』是此論的別名。最初說的『因』，有兩種：一是生因（janaka-hetu），二是了因（jnapaka-hetu）。現在這裡辨析的，主要說了因，兼辨生因。就了因中又有三種：一是義因（artha-hetu），指普遍符合宗法（paksa-dharma）的『所作性』的意義。二是言因（sabda-hetu），立論時所說的『所作性』的言語。三是智因（jnana-hetu），諸位與人辯論者，以及證明義理的人，理解前面的義因和言因的心和心所法（citta-caitta），統稱為『智』。這三種因，都能顯照聲音是無常的，就像燈照亮物體一樣，所以叫做『明』。這是以『因』作為境（visaya）的名稱，『明』是智慧的稱謂。又，就是這明智，能照亮因的境界，瞭解本宗（svasiddhanta）。所以說『因明』。這是以『因』就是『明』來說的。稱作『因明』，一是因明所生，即因明其名為因明。二是生因明，所以名叫因明，是從果（phala）來命名因明。如果因的意義就是因明的境界，所以名叫因明。又解釋，『因』就是前面所說的智的境界具備。『明』是辨別。說這部論辨明這個『因』，所以名叫『因明』。這『因明』二字，法比量論（Nyaya-bindu）說是物的名稱。說到『正理』，是智慧照亮真理，從名理的『因』。『理』是產生言語的原因，所以言語也叫做『理』。智慧所照亮的境界，也叫做『理』。理有邪正，簡別邪理而稱為『正理』。用這部論作為門徑，才能領悟理解，所以名叫『正理門』。又解釋，『正理』，就是集量論（Pramanasamuccaya）等五十餘種教義的名稱。這部論是它們的門徑，所以名叫『正理門』。天主（Isvara）所造的《入正理論》，那部論名叫『正理』，它能進入這部論，名叫『入正理』。省略了『論』字。

【English Translation】 English version T44 No. 1839 Commentary on the Treatise on the Door to Reasoning

No. 1839 [cf. No. 1628]

Commentary on the Treatise on the Door to Reasoning

Composed by Dharma Master Tai

The initial term 'Hetu-vidya' (因明, the science of reasoning) is one of the five sciences (Panca-vidya) and is the general name for all treatises on Hetu-vidya. 'Nyaya-pravesa' (正理門論, The Door to Correct Reasoning) is the specific title of this treatise. The initial term 'hetu' (因, cause or reason) has two types: first, 'janaka-hetu' (生因, productive cause); second, 'jnapaka-hetu' (了因, indicative cause). What is being analyzed here primarily concerns the indicative cause, while also discussing the productive cause. Within the indicative cause, there are three types: first, 'artha-hetu' (義因, reason as meaning), referring to the meaning of 'being a product' (所作性) that universally accords with 'paksa-dharma' (宗法, the property of the subject). Second, 'sabda-hetu' (言因, reason as word), referring to the words 'being a product' stated when establishing a thesis. Third, 'jnana-hetu' (智因, reason as knowledge), referring to the minds and mental functions (citta-caitta) of those who debate and those who prove the truth, which are collectively called 'jnana' (智, knowledge). These three causes can all illuminate that sound is impermanent, just as a lamp illuminates objects, hence the name 'vidya' (明, illumination or science). This uses 'hetu' as the name of the object (visaya, 境), and 'vidya' as the term for wisdom. Furthermore, this very wisdom can illuminate the realm of the cause and understand the original doctrine (svasiddhanta, 本宗). Therefore, it is called 'Hetu-vidya'. This is speaking of 'hetu' as being 'vidya'. It is called 'Hetu-vidya' because it arises from Hetu-vidya, that is, Hetu-vidya is named Hetu-vidya. Second, because it produces vidya, it is called Hetu-vidya, naming Hetu-vidya from the result (phala, 果). If the meaning of hetu is the realm of Hetu-vidya, then it is called Hetu-vidya. Another explanation is that 'hetu' is the previously mentioned possession of the realm of knowledge. 'Vidya' is discrimination. Saying that this treatise discriminates and clarifies this 'hetu', hence the name 'Hetu-vidya'. The two words 'Hetu-vidya' are said to be the name of a thing in the Nyaya-bindu (法比量論). As for 'Nyaya' (正理, correct reasoning), it is the wisdom that illuminates truth, from the 'hetu' of naming truth. 'Truth' is the cause of producing speech, so speech is also called 'truth'. The realm illuminated by wisdom is also called 'truth'. Truth has right and wrong, distinguishing wrong reasoning and calling it 'correct reasoning'. Using this treatise as a door, one can awaken and understand, hence the name 'Door to Correct Reasoning'. Another explanation is that 'correct reasoning' is the name for the teachings of Pramanasamuccaya (集量論) and other fifty-odd doctrines. This treatise is the door to them, hence the name 'Door to Correct Reasoning'. The 'Nyayapravesa' (入正理論) composed by Isvara (天主), that treatise is called 'Correct Reasoning', and it can enter this treatise, called 'Entering Correct Reasoning'. The word 'treatise' is omitted.

門字。其猶升階趣門。即天主所制之號。復猶因門入室。即此論云名也。又解。正理者。即法法道理。有正不邪。今以此論為門。通生正智悟至正理。故名正理門也。言正理者。陳那菩薩所造集量等。辨諸法正理。此論與彼論。為趣入方便門也。

太域龍者　本音云摩訶特(地力反)那(去聲)伽摩訶(此云大)特(此云域)那伽(此雲龍)此菩薩。如大方域之龍。有大威德故以名。

為欲等者　此論一部。分有其三焉。此之一論。是序述發起分。第二宗等多言下。辨釋正宗分。第三論末四句。顯所為契真分。自古九十五種外道。大小諸乘。各制因明。俱申立破。今欲于彼立破義中。簡智彩言。持取真實。謂智因明。或非過謂過。過謂非過。今顯簡智此持取過是過。非過云非過者。此即若能立能破似俱名能立。能破能立破名真實義。非一向取無過能立破。

宗等　一句如余處。

是中(至)名宗　有四種。一共所餘宗。如言青蓮華香。此有立已成過故不立。二本所習宗。于自教中立亦有已來過故不立。三義唯宗。如立聲是無常。唯是空無我。非本其所立故不立。四隨自意宗。及乃至自教中。立余教義。故無過也。廣如余處。

非彼相(至)遣者　宗有五過。名相違義。以此五過即義與

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『門』字，就像是登上臺階走向門戶。也就是天主（Brahman）所制定的名稱。又像是通過門戶進入房間，也就是這部論典所說的『名』。另一種解釋是，『正理』指的是一切事物的正確道理，具有正而不邪的特性。現在以這部論典作為門徑，使人通達正確的智慧，領悟到真正的道理，所以稱為『正理門』。所說的『正理』，是指陳那（Dignāga）菩薩所造的《集量論》等，辨析諸法的正確道理。這部論典與那些論典，是趣入真理的方便之門。『太域龍』，梵文原文是摩訶特那伽（Mahā-Dranāga），摩訶（Mahā）意為『大』，特那伽（Dranāga）意為『域龍』，這位菩薩就像是大方地域的龍，具有偉大的威德，因此得名。『為欲等者』，這部論典分為三個部分。這部論典是序述發起分。第二部分從『宗等』開始，是辨釋正宗分。第三部分是論典末尾的四句，顯示所要達到的契合真理的部分。自古以來，九十五種外道以及大小乘佛教，各自製定因明，都闡述自己的觀點並進行辯駁。現在想要在他們的觀點中，簡擇智慧的言辭，選取真實的內容。所謂的智慧因明，有時把不是過失的當作過失，把過失的當作不是過失。現在要顯明簡擇智慧，堅持認為過失就是過失，不是過失就不是過失。這就是說，如果能成立和能破的論證都看似能成立，那麼能成立和能破的論證就都符合真實意義。並非一味地選取沒有過失的能成立和能破的論證。『宗等』一句，如同其他地方所說。『是中（至）名宗』，有四種宗。一是共所餘宗，例如說『青蓮花是香的』。這種說法存在立論已成過失，所以不成立。二是本所習宗，在自己的教派中立論，也存在已來過失，所以不成立。三是義唯宗，例如立論說『聲音是無常的』，僅僅是空無我，並非原本所要立論的內容，所以不成立。四是隨自意宗，乃至在自己的教派中，立論其他教派的義理，所以沒有過失。詳細內容如同其他地方所說。『非彼相（至）遣者』，宗有五種過失，名為相違義。這五種過失就是義與

【English Translation】 English version 'Door'. It is like ascending steps towards a gate. It is the name created by Brahman (the Lord). It is also like entering a room through a door, which is what this treatise calls 'name'. Another explanation is that 'correct reasoning' refers to the correct principles of all things, possessing the characteristic of being correct and not deviant. Now, this treatise is taken as a gateway, enabling people to attain correct wisdom and comprehend the true principles, hence it is called 'The Door to Correct Reasoning'. The 'correct reasoning' refers to Dignāga Bodhisattva's 'Compendium on Valid Cognition' (Pramāṇasamuccaya) and other works, which analyze the correct reasoning of all dharmas. This treatise and those treatises are convenient gateways for entering into truth. 'Great Region Dragon', the original Sanskrit is Mahā-Dranāga, Mahā means 'great', Dranāga means 'region dragon'. This Bodhisattva is like a dragon in a vast region, possessing great power and virtue, hence the name. 'For the sake of etc.', this treatise is divided into three parts. This treatise is the introductory part. The second part, starting from 'thesis etc.', is the part that explains the main doctrine. The third part is the last four sentences of the treatise, which reveal the part of attaining the union with truth. Since ancient times, the ninety-five kinds of heretics and the Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism have each formulated their own Hetu-vidya (science of logic), all expounding their own views and arguing against each other. Now, I want to select wise words from their views and choose the true content. The so-called wise Hetu-vidya sometimes regards what is not a fault as a fault, and what is a fault as not a fault. Now, it is necessary to clarify the selection of wisdom, insisting that a fault is a fault, and what is not a fault is not a fault. That is to say, if the arguments that can establish and refute both seem to be able to establish, then the arguments that can establish and refute both conform to the true meaning. It is not simply a matter of choosing the arguments that can establish and refute without fault. The sentence 'thesis etc.' is as said elsewhere. 'In this (to) name thesis', there are four kinds of thesis. The first is the commonly remaining thesis, such as saying 'the blue lotus is fragrant'. This statement has the fault of already being established, so it is not established. The second is the thesis learned in one's own school, and establishing a thesis in one's own school also has the fault of already being established, so it is not established. The third is the thesis of meaning only, such as establishing the thesis that 'sound is impermanent', which is only emptiness and no-self, not the content that was originally intended to be established, so it is not established. The fourth is the thesis according to one's own intention, and even in one's own school, establishing the meaning of other schools, so there is no fault. The details are as said elsewhere. 'Not their appearance (to) send', the thesis has five faults, called contradictory meaning. These five faults are the meaning and

宗相違故。此相違義。能遣至業令成至以若非彼相違義。能遣至宗名正宗。

由宗(至)了義者　同小勝說。

故此(至)能立者　引天親所造諸論。亦立一因二唯為多言名能立。以證前文。言論式等。則等取論軌及論心。此三論並世親所造。弁等余比量論。皆一因二喻為能立。

一言(至)立性者　頌中宗所等三言總說名能立者。為顯一因二喻。總成一能立性。如椽梁壁戶多物總成一舍。不可以椽等前故至舍亦多。

由此(至)立過者　宗因喻三支中隨一種名缺減。能立性過。陳那已前。若言𨷂宗。或隨闕因喻。名能立過。一師釋云。自有宗而無因喻。自有因而無宗喻。自有喻而無宗因。為三句。有宗因而無喻。有宗喻而無因。有因喻無宗。因喻為第七句。如此七句。名能立缺減性過。復有師釋云。前之云句可然。第七句不可以。若有一二小余可云缺減。第七宗因喻俱無。何名𨷂耶。故不可也。陳那云。但于因同喻異喻能立之中有減性過。自賢愛以前師釋言。自有有因無同異喻。有同喻無因及異喻。有異喻無因及同喻。𨷂二為三句自有有因同喻無異喻。有同異喻無因。有異喻因即同喻。𨷂一為三句。自有無因同異二喻。為第七句。向實愛已后法師。不立第七句。如前所辨。言名能立過者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為宗（結論）是互相矛盾的。這種矛盾的意義在於，如果不是因為彼（指因）的矛盾意義能夠去除至業（所破的觀點），從而成立至（所立的）宗，那麼就不能稱為正宗（正確的結論）。

『由宗（至）了義者』：與小乘的說法相同，都認為宗是需要證明的。

『故此（至）能立者』：引用天親（Vasubandhu）所造的各種論著，也確立了一個因和兩個喻作為能立（論證）的要素，用以證明前面的論述。『言論式等』，『等』字包括了《論軌》（Vādavidhi）和《論心》（Vādahṛdaya）。這三部論著都是世親所造。弁（Bhāviveka）等其他比量論，都以一個因和兩個喻作為能立。

『一言（至）立性者』：頌文中的『宗』、『所』等三個詞語總括起來稱為能立，是爲了表明一個因和兩個喻總合起來構成一個能立的性質。就像椽、梁、墻壁、門戶等多種事物總合起來構成一個房屋一樣。不能因為椽等在前，就認為房屋也是多個。

『由此（至）立過者』：宗、因、喻這三個支分中，缺少任何一個都稱為缺減，是能立的過失。在陳那（Dignāga）之前，如果說缺少宗，或者缺少因喻，都稱為能立的過失。一位論師解釋說，有宗而沒有因喻，有因而沒有宗喻，有喻而沒有宗因，這是三句。有宗因而沒有喻，有宗喻而沒有因，有因喻而沒有宗，這是三句。因喻都沒有，這是第七句。這七句都稱為能立缺減的過失。另一位論師解釋說，前面的六句可以接受，第七句不成立。如果有一點或兩點缺少，還可以說是缺減，如果宗、因、喻都沒有，怎麼能說是缺少呢？所以是不可以的。陳那說，只是在因、同喻、異喻這些能立的要素中有缺減的過失。自賢愛（Śubhakara）之前的論師解釋說，有因而沒有同喻和異喻，有同喻而沒有因和異喻，有異喻而沒有因和同喻，缺少兩個，這是三句。有因和同喻而沒有異喻，有同喻和異喻而沒有因，有異喻和因而沒有同喻，缺少一個，這是三句。沒有因，只有同喻和異喻，這是第七句。向實愛（Śāntarakṣita）之後的法師，不立第七句，如前面所辨析的。說稱為能立的過失。

【English Translation】 English version: Because the thesis (宗, zōng, conclusion) is contradictory. The meaning of this contradiction is that if it were not for the contradictory meaning of that (因, yīn, reason) being able to remove the kārya (至業, zhì yè, the view to be refuted), thereby establishing the sādhya (至宗, zhì zōng, the thesis to be established), then it could not be called a samyak-pakṣa (正宗, zhèng zōng, correct thesis).

'From thesis (to) definitive meaning': It is the same as the Śrāvakayāna's (小乘, xiǎo chéng) view, both considering the thesis as something that needs to be proven.

'Therefore, this (to) means of proof': Quoting various treatises composed by Vasubandhu (天親, Tiānxīn), it also establishes one reason and two examples as the elements of sādhana (能立, néng lì, means of proof), in order to prove the preceding statements. 'Forms of arguments, etc.' The 'etc.' includes the Vādavidhi (論軌, lùn guǐ, 'The Method of Argument') and the Vādahṛdaya (論心, lùn xīn, 'The Heart of Argument'). These three treatises were all composed by Vasubandhu. Bhāviveka (弁, Biàn) and other anumāna (比量, bǐ liàng, inference) treatises all use one reason and two examples as the sādhana.

'One word (to) nature of proof': The words 'thesis', 'that', etc. in the verse are collectively called sādhana, in order to show that one reason and two examples together constitute the nature of a sādhana. Just as rafters, beams, walls, doors, and other things together constitute a house. It cannot be said that because the rafters, etc., come before, the house is also multiple.

'From this (to) fault of proof': If any one of the three members—thesis, reason, and example—is missing, it is called a deficiency, which is a fault of the sādhana. Before Dignāga (陳那, Chénnà), if it was said that the thesis was missing, or that the reason and example were missing, it was called a fault of the sādhana. One teacher explained that having a thesis but no reason and example, having a reason but no thesis and example, having an example but no thesis and reason, these are three sentences. Having a thesis and reason but no example, having a thesis and example but no reason, having a reason and example but no thesis, these are three sentences. Having neither reason nor example, this is the seventh sentence. These seven sentences are all called the fault of deficiency in the sādhana. Another teacher explained that the first six sentences are acceptable, but the seventh sentence is not valid. If one or two things are missing, it can be said to be a deficiency, but if the thesis, reason, and example are all missing, how can it be said to be a deficiency? Therefore, it is not acceptable. Dignāga said that only in the hetu (因, yīn, reason), sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta (同喻, tóng yù, example of similarity), and vipakṣa-dṛṣṭānta (異喻, yì yù, example of dissimilarity) of the sādhana are there faults of deficiency. Teachers before Śubhakara (賢愛, Xián'ài) explained that having a reason but no example of similarity and dissimilarity, having an example of similarity but no reason and example of dissimilarity, having an example of dissimilarity but no reason and example of similarity, lacking two, these are three sentences. Having a reason and an example of similarity but no example of dissimilarity, having an example of similarity and dissimilarity but no reason, having an example of dissimilarity and a reason but no example of similarity, lacking one, these are three sentences. Having no reason, only an example of similarity and dissimilarity, this is the seventh sentence. Teachers after Śāntarakṣita (向實愛, Xiàng Shí'ài) did not establish the seventh sentence, as analyzed earlier. It is said to be a fault of the sādhana.

此唯義解以。

是中(至)故名者　釋云。此是支語之端。如此方蓋聞若夫及唯等欲支言。釋前第一句宗義。故曰是中。次釋云。是宗等多言中。簡土因喻。持取其宗。故各是中。謂舉拱取別故。言是宗等中。故名是中也。或簡持者。簡增損邊。持其取中。謂似宗因喻過謂為真名增。真宗因喻謂非真名損。簡此二邊。持取中道。即是上文能立破能義中真實名是中。問真言非真名為損。似言非似何不爾耶。答真謂非真度生正理得名損。似謂非似度失非理不名減。亦可屬論皆得。問此文既釋真宗。何以是中亦中其似耶。答頌中第四句言。非彼相違義能遣。方簡似宗。當知前三句。譜含總語真似。又釋。是中之言。但是真宗等中。所以智然。既頌言為所成立說名宗。非彼相違義能遣。當智上句所說之宗。非彼相違義能遣。若言上句亦通似宗者。下句亦。應貫通真似。言是宗等中者。其宗因喻三。皆離增減二邊。謂于中離增減邊。而取中道。故言是中。或可簡耶持正宗等三中。故言是中。

言唯取等者　欲簡知因喻。別取其宗。或可能知因喻。簡取其宗。名簡別義。若唯復釋前簡持義者。亦應言簡取。不唯簡知也。二可簡謂簡擇。擇是即取擇非即知。謂若是宗簡取也。若是能立簡知也。別者異義。亦通知取。謂別

去因喻。別取其宗。若爾言簡即是。何須別耶。答簡名是通。今此簡知是簡別也。非謂簡持等。故復言別。

隨自(至)意立者　宗有四。如前釋。第四隨自樂宗。如薩波多現已辨才。不𩒐前三論宗。于自教中。隨其自意。假作余教師。立余教義。名隨自意立。即無過。

論云屬為(至)名宗者　業為兩字。簡似因喻。所立二字。簡真因喻。言樂為所成立者。諸立論者。但意樂作所成立。論者但意業作所成立宗謂宗義成。而欲成立。故名樂為所成立。是立論者本意也。真因真喻先格成故。故不樂為能成立性。若異此樂為之言。但云所立為宗。簡真因喻。能成立性者。說所成立。似因似喻。更須成立。應亦食宗。然雖是所立。非立論者本意所樂。雖是所立。而非宗也。言似因便更成立者。聲明論有二種。一立聲從緣生而不滅。二立聲但從緣顯不生不滅。如佛弟子對聲明論。立聲是無常(宗)。所作性故(因)。猶如極微(同喻)。此因對聲顯論。有隨一不成過。以彼敵論者。不許聲是所作性故。其因更須成立。聲是所作性(業)。從緣持實故(因)。猶如瓶等(同喻)。又極微喻。敵論者不許是無常故。有所立不成過。然更須成立云。極微是無常。(宗)。有質礙故(因)。猶如瓶等(同喻)。聲論師立極

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『去因喻。別取其宗。』如果這樣說，『簡』這個詞就足夠了，為什麼還要用『別』呢？回答：『簡』這個名稱是通用的，現在這個『簡』是簡別的意思，不是指『簡持』等。所以又說『別』。

『隨自意立者』：宗有四種，如前面解釋的。第四種是隨自樂宗。例如薩波多（Sarvadin，一切有部論師）現在已經很有辯才，不拘泥於前三種論宗。在自己的教派中，隨著自己的意願，假設其他的教師，創立其他的教義，這叫做隨自意立。這樣就沒有過失。

論中說『屬為名宗者』：『業』為兩個字，用來簡別相似的因和喻。『所立』兩個字，用來簡別真正的因和喻。說『樂為所成立者』，是因為立論者只是意樂於作為所成立的宗義，論者只是意業于作為所成立的宗義，宗是指宗義已經成立，而想要進一步成立它，所以說意樂於作為所成立。這是立論者的本意。真正的因和真正的喻，因為已經符合標準，所以不意樂於作為能成立的性質。如果不是這樣理解『樂為』的含義，只是說『所立為宗』，就會簡別掉真正的因和喻。能成立的性質，是說所成立的，相似的因和相似的喻，更需要成立，也應該被視為宗。然而，雖然是所立，但不是立論者本意所意樂的，所以雖然是所立，但不是宗。說『似因便更成立者』，聲明論（Shabda，聲論）有兩種觀點：一是立聲從緣生而不滅，二是立聲只是從緣顯現而不生不滅。例如，佛弟子對聲明論，立聲是無常（宗），因為是所作性（因），猶如極微（同喻）。這個因對於聲顯論來說，有隨一不成過的過失，因為對方論者不承認聲是所作性。所以這個因更需要成立，即聲是所作性（業），因為是從緣持實（因），猶如瓶子等（同喻）。又，極微這個喻，對方論者不承認是無常，所以有所立不成過的過失。所以更需要成立，即極微是無常（宗），因為有質礙（因），猶如瓶子等（同喻）。聲論師立論……

【English Translation】 English version: 'Eliminating the Hetu and दृष्टान्त (dṛṣṭānta, example), separately taking its thesis.' If that is the case, the word 'brief' is sufficient, why is 'separate' needed? Answer: The name 'brief' is general. Now, this 'brief' means to briefly distinguish, not referring to 'briefly holding' etc. Therefore, it is said again 'separate'.

'Those who establish according to their own intention': There are four types of thesis, as explained earlier. The fourth is the thesis established according to one's own pleasure. For example, Sarvadin (薩波多, an Everything-Exists-School philosopher) now has great eloquence and is not bound by the previous three types of thesis. Within his own school, according to his own intention, he assumes other teachers and establishes other doctrines, which is called establishing according to one's own intention. There is no fault in this.

The treatise says, 'Belonging to what is named thesis': 'Karma' (業) is two characters, used to distinguish similar Hetu (因, reason) and दृष्टान्त (dṛṣṭānta, example). The two characters 'what is established' are used to distinguish true Hetu and दृष्टान्त. Saying 'pleased to be what is established' is because the proponent is only pleased to make the thesis as what is to be established, and the debater is only karmically pleased to make the thesis as what is to be established. Thesis refers to the thesis that has been established and wants to be further established, so it is said to be pleased to be what is established. This is the proponent's original intention. True Hetu and true दृष्टान्त, because they have already met the standards, are not pleased to be the nature of what can be established. If this is not the understanding of the meaning of 'pleased to be', but only saying 'what is established is the thesis', it will distinguish the true Hetu and दृष्टान्त. The nature of what can be established is to say what is established, and similar Hetu and similar दृष्टान्त need to be further established, and should also be regarded as the thesis. However, although it is what is established, it is not what the proponent intends to be pleased with, so although it is what is established, it is not the thesis. Saying 'similar Hetu then needs to be further established', the Shabda (聲明, sound) theory has two views: one is to establish that sound arises from conditions and does not perish, and the other is to establish that sound only manifests from conditions and does not arise or perish. For example, a Buddhist disciple, against the Shabda theory, establishes that sound is impermanent (thesis), because it is produced (Hetu), like an atom ( दृष्टान्त). This Hetu, for the sound manifestation theory, has the fault of one being unestablished, because the opponent does not admit that sound is produced. Therefore, this Hetu needs to be further established, that is, sound is produced (karma), because it is held from conditions (Hetu), like a bottle etc. ( दृष्टान्त). Also, the दृष्टान्त of an atom, the opponent does not admit that it is impermanent, so there is the fault of what is established being unestablished. Therefore, it needs to be further established that an atom is impermanent (thesis), because it has obstruction (Hetu), like a bottle etc. ( दृष्टान्त). The sound theorist establishes...

微是常。而是有對故。此因及喻。受成立時。雖是所立。然立論者意。當時唯樂宗為所成立。不樂成立似因似喻。又釋。樂為所立宗。以宗不成宗。為所成立故。謂不樂為因喻。不成成立因喻。若異比樂為所立。乃業為能成立者。說所成立似因似喻。不成更成能成立性。應亦名宗。然似因似喻。雖更成立。得時唯是能成立性。非所成立宗。故知樂為所成立為宗。不樂成立。能成立似因似喻為宗也。成立因喻如前說。此文即是入理中。隨自樂為也然此文無極成有法。極成差別性故者法。論師釋云。商羯羅不樂此論者。如數論對釋子。立乘是恩。同是因中所依不成過。持以因必于有法上立。有法既無故。立因不成。只為敵論不信我故。便立乘斷有所過。言極成能別。如佛牧子數對論立聲減惱。此自是無同喻過。以數論宗。不許有惱滅法故。故無有喻。只為不信聲有滅惱。乘立滅惱。斷亦所過。言義性者。如立宗言聲是無常。無常與聲。受相差別。至言必爾。何須更以差別之言。而差別耶。是故比論無比之句也。

論云爲顯(至)義遣者　謂餘外道等立宗。即有五種過失。今為欲顯離餘外道等立宗過失。故有第四句言也。亦可立有過宗是無過宗我余。今欲明離余有過宗。故有斯言也。言非彼相違義遣者。即是顯文。但

略無能字也。言相違義者。即是以宗與正宗相違故。食相違義。即此真實宗。不為似宗所破。故言非相違義。能遣言義者。即是相違義。言聲下所詮義也。遣者即除破義也。此之一義。入理論無也。前雖業為所立。猶未成宗。要須知其五失。方成宗也。下出違義不能遣也。

論云若非(至)所遣者　其違義言聲。即是離五過。真宗言真宗言所目義。與有過宗相違。故名相違義。若有過宗。便為彼有過相違真義所遣。若無過宗。相違真宗所遣。即此宗若非彼五過宗言所遣。名為真宗。此即五過宗相擬代中。當其能遣。真宗為所遣也。下出能遣。顯此能遣不能遣真宗。又釋。以宗望真宗。非是能遣。以有過故。故言非彼相違義言聲所遣。謂真宗有所遣。下舉五過望其真宗。但為所遣。顯非彼為能遣也。即是釋頌第四句。

論云如立(至)是妄者　此自語相違過也。謂有外道。立一切語皆悉不實。此所發語便自相。何故。說一切語是妄者。汝口中語為實為妄。若言是實。何因言一切皆是妄語。若自言是妄。即應一切語皆實。若復救云。解我口中所語。餘一切語皆妄者。更有第二人聞汝所說一切語皆是妄。即復發言。汝此言諦實。彼人發語。為妄為實。若言是妄。汝語即虛。若言是實。何故便言除我所說。若復救

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本略無能字也。意思是說，如果一個論點（宗）與正確的論點（正宗）相違背，那就是『相違義』。『食相違義』的意思是，這個真實的論點（真實宗）不會被相似的論點（似宗）所駁倒，所以說『非相違義』。『能遣言義』指的是那些相違背的論點，也就是言語所表達的意義。『遣』的意思是排除或駁倒。這個意義在理論上是不可或缺的。即使之前已經建立了論點，但如果不知道它有五種過失，仍然不能算作一個完整的論點。下面會說明『違義』是不能被排除的。論中說：『若非（至）所遣者』，那麼這種相違背的言語，就是沒有五種過失的『真宗』所表達的意義。『真宗』所指的意義，與有缺陷的論點（有過宗）相違背，所以叫做『相違義』。如果是有缺陷的論點，就會被那個沒有缺陷的、真實的意義所駁倒。如果沒有缺陷的論點，就會被相違背的真實論點所駁倒。也就是說，如果這個論點沒有被那五種有缺陷的論點所駁倒，就叫做『真宗』。這就像在五種有缺陷的論點相互比較時，『真宗』能夠駁倒其他的論點，而其他的論點則被『真宗』所駁倒。下面會說明『能遣』，以此來顯示這種『能遣』不能駁倒『真宗』。進一步解釋，從論點的角度來看『真宗』，它不是『能遣』，因為它沒有過失。所以說，它不會被那些相違背的言語所駁倒。也就是說，『真宗』能夠駁倒其他的論點。下面會舉例說明五種有缺陷的論點是如何被『真宗』所駁倒的，以此來顯示它們不能駁倒『真宗』。這就是解釋頌文的第四句。論中說：『如立（至）是妄者』，這是一種自語相違的過失。比如，有些外道主張一切言語都是虛假的。那麼，他所說的話本身就自相矛盾。為什麼呢？如果說一切言語都是虛假的，那麼你口中所說的話是真實的還是虛假的？如果說是真實的，為什麼又說一切都是虛假的呢？如果說你所說的話是虛假的，那麼就應該一切言語都是真實的。如果有人辯解說，我所說的話除外，其他一切言語都是虛假的，那麼另一個人聽到你說一切言語都是虛假的，就會說，你這句話是真實的。這個人所說的話，是虛假的還是真實的？如果說是虛假的，那麼你的話就是虛假的。如果說是真實的，為什麼又說除了我所說的話之外，一切都是虛假的呢？如果有人辯解說...

【English Translation】 English version Slightly lacking the word 'ability'. 'The meaning of contradictory statements' means that if a thesis (zong) contradicts the correct thesis (zhengzong), it is called 'contradictory meaning'. 'The meaning of conflicting with food' means that this true thesis (zhenshizong) will not be refuted by a similar thesis (sizong), so it is called 'non-contradictory meaning'. 'The ability to dismiss the meaning of words' refers to those contradictory arguments, which are the meanings expressed by words. 'Dismiss' means to exclude or refute. This meaning is indispensable in theory. Even if a thesis has been established before, it cannot be considered a complete thesis if it does not know its five faults. The following will explain that 'contradictory meaning' cannot be dismissed. The treatise says: 'If not (to) dismissed', then the contradictory words are the meaning expressed by the 'true thesis' without five faults. The meaning referred to by 'true thesis' contradicts the flawed thesis (youguozong), so it is called 'contradictory meaning'. If it is a flawed thesis, it will be refuted by the flawless and true meaning. If there is no flawed thesis, it will be refuted by the contradictory true thesis. That is to say, if this thesis is not refuted by the five flawed theses, it is called 'true thesis'. This is like when the five flawed theses are compared with each other, the 'true thesis' can refute other theses, and other theses are refuted by the 'true thesis'. The following will explain 'the ability to dismiss', in order to show that this 'ability to dismiss' cannot refute the 'true thesis'. Further explanation, from the perspective of the thesis, the 'true thesis' is not 'the ability to dismiss' because it has no faults. Therefore, it will not be refuted by those contradictory words. That is to say, the 'true thesis' can refute other theses. The following will give examples to illustrate how the five flawed theses are refuted by the 'true thesis', in order to show that they cannot refute the 'true thesis'. This is the explanation of the fourth sentence of the verse. The treatise says: 'Such as establishing (to) is false', this is a fault of self-contradiction. For example, some heretics claim that all words are false. Then, what he said is self-contradictory. Why? If you say that all words are false, then is what you say true or false? If it is true, why do you say that everything is false? If you say that what you say is false, then all words should be true. If someone argues that everything except what I say is false, then another person who hears you say that all words are false will say that what you say is true. Is what this person says false or true? If it is false, then what you say is false. If it is true, why do you say that everything is false except what I say? If someone argues...

言。除道我語此一人是實。除一切悟皆悉是妄。若爾受有第三人復云。此第二人語亦是實。此第三人語。為虛為實。若言是虛。此第二人並初人語是實應妄。若第三人語是實。何故言除我及此人。余虛妄耶。

論云或先(至)為常者　此自教相違。亦名自宗相違也。鵂鷭子宗中。先立聲是無而。設立聲是常。便於自宗中。違先所立。

論云又若(至)同有故者　此世間相違也。謂若於所立宗中。由不共故者。如月唯懷菟者。是月受無餘同類法是月。此月于余法更無。故名不共。亦如所聞性故因。此因不共。由同是不共法故。即無同喻等。萬成比量。故云無有比量。有法愚人見無比量。成立為月。遂即成立。言是非月。雖為此立。然為世間共說是月相違義遣。言極成者。世間共許是月也。言者說月之言也。相違義者。即言下所詮共許同義。即此共許同義。能遣其所立懷菟非月義。若唯此釋。前言非彼相違義能遣者。非謂以宗與真宗相違食相違也。謂若立宗有其過失。即與五種道理相違。即此道理與以宗相違。名相違義。真宗既順道理。則不同彼似宗為相違義遣。故言非彼相違義能遣。問如自言相違。以何為道理耶。答則前敵論人所知道理。合成自言相違過失。則是道理也。指事。則如說懷菟非月(宗)。有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

他說：『除了遵循我道的人，我說此人是真實的。除了所有覺悟，都完全是虛妄的。』如果這樣，假設有第三個人又說：『這第二個人說的話也是真實的。』那麼這第三個人說的話，是虛妄還是真實呢？如果說是虛妄的，那麼這第二個人以及最初那個人說的話，是真實還是虛妄呢？如果第三個人說的話是真實的，為什麼說除了我和這個人，其餘的都是虛妄的呢？』論中說：『或者先……成為常者』——這與自己的教義相違背，也叫做與自己的宗派相違背。就像鵂鷭子（owl-child，一種外道）的宗派中，先設立聲音是無常的，然後又設立聲音是常的，這就在自己的宗派中，違背了先前所設立的。論中說：『又如果……同有故者』——這與世間的常識相違背。如果對於所立的宗派中，因為不共同的緣故，例如月亮唯獨懷有玉兔（moon only contains a rabbit，指月亮的獨特之處），是月亮接受了沒有其餘同類的事物，這個月亮對於其餘的事物再也沒有了，所以叫做不共同。也像所聞性故（because of audibility，指聲音的特性）的因。這個因是不共同的。由於相同是不共同的法，就沒有相同的比喻等等，無法成就比量。所以說沒有比量。有愚人見到沒有比量，成立為月亮，於是就成立了，說這不是月亮。雖然為此設立，然而與世間共同說是月亮相違背，遣除了這個意義。說『極成』，是世間共同認可的月亮。『言』是指說月亮的話。『相違義』是指言語下所詮釋的共同認可的含義。就是這個共同認可的含義，能夠遣除其所立的懷有玉兔的不是月亮的意義。如果僅僅這樣解釋，前面說『不是與那個相違背的意義能夠遣除』，不是說用宗與真宗相違背而相違背。如果設立的宗派有其過失，就與五種道理相違背。就是這個道理與宗相違背，叫做相違義。真宗既然順應道理，就不同於那個相似的宗派作為相違義遣除。所以說『不是與那個相違背的意義能夠遣除』。問：像自相矛盾的話，用什麼作為道理呢？答：就是先前敵論的人所知道的道理，合成了自相矛盾的過失，這就是道理。指事，就像說懷有玉兔的不是月亮（宗），有……

【English Translation】 English version:

He said, 'Except for the one who follows my path, I say this person is real. Except for all enlightenment, all are completely false.' If so, suppose a third person says again, 'What the second person says is also true.' Then, is what this third person says false or true? If it is said to be false, then what the second person and the first person said, is it true or false? If what the third person says is true, why say that except for me and this person, the rest are false?' The treatise says: 'Or first...becoming constant' - This contradicts one's own teachings, and is also called contradicting one's own school. Like in the owl-child ( Hūxiūwānzi, a type of heretic) school, first establishing that sound is impermanent, and then establishing that sound is constant, this contradicts what was previously established in one's own school. The treatise says: 'Also if...having the same reason' - This contradicts worldly common sense. If in the established proposition, because of being non-common, such as the moon only containing a rabbit (Yuè Wéi Huái Tú, referring to the moon's uniqueness), is the moon receiving things that have no other similar kind, this moon has nothing more for other things, so it is called non-common. Also like the reason of audibility (Suǒ Wén Xìng Gù, referring to the characteristic of sound). This reason is non-common. Because the same is a non-common dharma, there are no similar metaphors, etc., and it is impossible to accomplish inference. Therefore, it is said that there is no inference. There are foolish people who see no inference, establish it as the moon, and then establish it, saying that it is not the moon. Although established for this purpose, it contradicts the worldly common saying that it is the moon, eliminating this meaning. Saying 'extremely established' (Jí Chéng), is the moon that is commonly recognized by the world. 'Words' refers to the words that say the moon. 'Contradictory meaning' refers to the commonly recognized meaning explained by the words. This commonly recognized meaning is able to eliminate the meaning of the established proposition that the moon containing a rabbit is not the moon. If only explained in this way, the previous saying 'not the meaning that contradicts that can eliminate' does not mean contradicting by using the proposition and the true proposition. If the established proposition has its faults, it contradicts the five kinds of reasons. This reason contradicts the proposition, and is called contradictory meaning. Since the true proposition conforms to reason, it is different from that similar proposition as a contradictory meaning to eliminate. Therefore, it is said 'not the meaning that contradicts that can eliminate'. Question: Like self-contradictory words, what is used as reason? Answer: It is the reason known by the previous opponent, which combines to form the fault of self-contradiction, this is the reason. Referring to the matter, like saying the moon containing a rabbit is not the moon (proposition), having...

故(因)。如日等喻。

論云又于(至)常等者　此文有二過。謂現量相違。及比量相違也。言又于有法者是宗。有法如言聲。或言瓶也。即彼所立者。謂即彼立論人。于聲有法上。立非所聞宗家法也。或於瓶上。立是常也。亦可即彼者即彼有法上。非所聞義及常義為立也。即是宗家法也。言為此極成現量比量相違義遣者。五識是世間共許現量。瓶盆等是世間共許比量。謂共智未有而有。有已還無。以前後二無。比知中間非常。而立言聲等非所聞等。瓶等是常等。雖如此立。然為世間共許現量比量相違義所遣也。下指事。如立聲非所聞。現量相違也。瓶等是常。比量相違也。問何故此中偏言于有法耶。答言等者。舉瓶等余盆等也。又釋。宗云等者等上五過。乃至初過中我母是石女等。問何故宗九過。但說五耶。答覆四過者。天主僈立也。且如所別不成。自是因不成過。能別不成。自無同喻過。如前解。俱不極成。即合前二。二既非過。此亦非過。至相符極成。如立聲為所聞。此本不成宗。何者。夫興立論妄。偵立敵論相違。方始立宗。如聲是所聞。無不共許。何成立宗。本自無宗。說誰為過。如有比丘。可說持前犯。于若無比丘。說誰持犯也。此亦如是。是故唯五是過。聞安立敵相違。方立宗者。何故前說宗有

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本故（因）。如日等喻（例如太陽等）。

論云又于（至）常等者：此文有兩個過失，即現量相違和比量相違。言又于有法者是宗（有法，指作為論證主體的對象）。有法如言聲（聲音），或言瓶（瓶子）。即彼所立者，謂即彼立論人，于聲有法上，立非所聞宗家法也（在聲音這個論證主體上，建立『聲音不是能被聽到的』這個宗）。或於瓶上，立是常也（或者在瓶子上，建立『瓶子是常』這個宗）。亦可即彼者即彼有法上，非所聞義及常義為立也（也可以說，『即彼』指的是在論證主體上，建立『非所聞』和『常』的宗）。即是宗家法也。言為此極成現量比量相違義遣者（說這是被極度成立的現量和比量相違背的觀點所駁斥的）：五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）是世間共許現量（被世間普遍認可的現量）。瓶盆等是世間共許比量（瓶子、盆子等是被世間普遍認可的比量）。謂共智未有而有，有已還無，以前後二無，比知中間非常（意思是說，普遍的認知是，事物從無到有，從有到無，通過前後兩個『無』，可以推知中間的狀態是『非常』，即無常）。而立言聲等非所聞等（而你卻建立『聲音不是能被聽到的』這樣的宗），瓶等是常等（『瓶子是常』這樣的宗）。雖如此立，然為世間共許現量比量相違義所遣也（雖然你這樣立論，但是卻被世間普遍認可的現量和比量相違背的道理所駁斥）。下指事。如立聲非所聞，現量相違也（例如，建立『聲音不是能被聽到的』，這與現量相違背）。瓶等是常，比量相違也（『瓶子是常』，這與比量相違背）。問：何故此中偏言于有法耶（為什麼這裡特別強調『于有法』呢）？答言等者，舉瓶等余盆等也（回答說，『等』字，是舉例說明，比如瓶子、盆子等）。又釋。宗云等者等上五過（另一種解釋是，『宗』字後面的『等』，是包括了前面的五種過失）。乃至初過中我母是石女等（乃至第一種過失中，『我的母親是石女』等）。問：何故宗九過，但說五耶（為什麼宗的九種過失，只說了五種呢）？答覆四過者，天主僈立也（回答說，剩下的四種過失，是天主僈立的觀點）。且如所別不成，自是因不成過（例如，『所別不成』，本身就是『因不成』的過失）。能別不成，自無同喻過（『能別不成』，本身就是『無同喻』的過失）。如前解。俱不極成，即合前二（『俱不極成』，就是合併了前面的兩種情況）。二既非過，此亦非過（既然前面兩種情況不是過失，那麼這種情況也不是過失）。至相符極成，如立聲為所聞（至於『相符極成』，例如建立『聲音是能被聽到的』）。此本不成宗（這本身就不能成立為宗）。何者？夫興立論妄，偵立敵論相違，方始立宗（為什麼呢？因為要發起立論，必須先觀察對方的論點是否相違背，才能建立自己的宗）。如聲是所聞，無不共許，何成立宗（如果『聲音是能被聽到的』，這是大家都認可的，還怎麼建立宗呢）？本自無宗，說誰為過（本來就沒有宗，又怎麼說它有過失呢）？如有比丘，可說持前犯（就像有比丘，才能說他持戒或犯戒）。于若無比丘，說誰持犯也（如果沒有比丘，又說誰持戒或犯戒呢）？此亦如是（這個道理也是一樣的）。是故唯五是過（所以只有五種是真正的過失）。聞安立敵相違，方立宗者，何故前說宗有（聽說要安立與對方相違的觀點，才能建立宗，那麼為什麼前面說宗有）

【English Translation】 English version Therefore (cause). Like the analogy of the sun, etc.

The treatise says, 'Also, regarding (to) permanence, etc.': This passage has two faults: contradiction with direct perception and contradiction with inference. The statement 'Also, regarding the subject of the dharma' refers to the thesis (the subject of the dharma refers to the object being argued about). The subject of the dharma is like saying 'sound' or 'bottle.' 'That which is established by him' means that the proponent establishes the thesis 'sound is not audible' on the subject of the dharma, sound. Or, regarding the bottle, establishes 'it is permanent.' It can also be said that 'that which is established by him' refers to establishing the meaning of 'inaudible' and 'permanent' on the subject of the dharma. This is the thesis. The statement 'to refute the meaning that contradicts extremely established direct perception and inference' means that the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) are direct perception universally accepted in the world. Bottles, basins, etc., are inferences universally accepted in the world. It means that common knowledge is that things come into existence from non-existence and return to non-existence after existence. By comparing the two non-existences before and after, it is inferred that the intermediate state is impermanent. However, you establish the thesis that 'sound is not audible,' etc., and 'bottles are permanent,' etc. Although you establish it in this way, it is refuted by the meaning that contradicts direct perception and inference universally accepted in the world. The following points to the matter. For example, establishing 'sound is not audible' contradicts direct perception. 'Bottles are permanent' contradicts inference. Question: Why is there a particular emphasis on 'regarding the subject of the dharma' here? Answer: The word 'etc.' is used to exemplify, such as bottles, basins, etc. Another explanation: The 'etc.' in 'thesis, etc.' includes the five faults mentioned earlier, even the first fault, such as 'my mother is a barren woman,' etc. Question: Why are only five of the nine faults of the thesis mentioned? Answer: The remaining four faults are the views of the heavenly lord Mānadeva. For example, 'the specific characteristic is not established' is itself a fault of 'the cause is not established.' 'The distinguishing characteristic is not established' is itself a fault of 'no similar example.' As explained earlier, 'both are not extremely established' combines the previous two. Since the two are not faults, this is also not a fault. As for 'extremely established as conforming,' such as establishing 'sound is audible,' this fundamentally cannot be established as a thesis. Why? Because to initiate an argument, one must first observe whether the opponent's viewpoint is contradictory before establishing one's own thesis. If 'sound is audible' is universally accepted, how can a thesis be established? Since there is fundamentally no thesis, who can be said to have a fault? Just as if there is a bhikshu, one can say that he upholds or violates the precepts. If there is no bhikshu, who can be said to uphold or violate the precepts? This is also the same. Therefore, only five are true faults. Hearing that one must establish a thesis that contradicts the opponent's view, why was it said earlier that the thesis has

三種共許亦名宗耶。答。

論云諸有(至)宗過者　上來辨正宗過。自下第二顯耶宗過。立因明師。及小乘外道。更立第六宗過名違過。以立因與宗相違故。亦應名因違過。然以宗先說故。名宗違過。今陳那牒取非之。故云此非宗過。

論云以于(至)故者　以于聲明論中。有立聲是常(宗)。一切皆是無常故(因)。然立諸師言彼聲常為(業)。以而皆無常為因。此宗與因相違故。是宗違過。今陳那牒取言是喻過。或是因過。非是宗過。不同立成因明師余也。

論云是喻方便忌立異法者　一切皆是無常之言。此是喻非因也。其故字是第五時聲。即是因義。彼聲明論師。但將因門方便。立此喻也。故言是喻方便。雖方便立喻。而復倒離異法喻也。故更立異法上言是喻。即異法喻。

論云由合喻現非一切故者　此顯彼方便立喻。陳那復以彼喻。合顯去有此因。何者。如立聲是常。以一切皆是無常。為異法喻。此異法喻。此異法喻。應云諸無常法者。法是一切。即以此異喻。反顯成彼同喻。應言非一切者。法是其常。由此同喻合故。即知聲是常宗。以非一切故為因也。

論云此因非有(至)故者　此非一切故因。于宗上非有。以即此聲上攝世一切中故。音聲上彼此不設有。其非一切義。即

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：三種共許也叫做宗嗎？回答：

《論》中說：『諸有（至）宗過者』，上面辨析了正宗的過失。下面第二部分闡明耶宗的過失。立因明論師以及小乘外道，又設立第六種宗的過失，名為違過，因為所立的因與宗相違背的緣故。也應該叫做因違過。然而因為宗先被提出，所以叫做宗違過。現在陳那駁斥並否定了這種觀點，所以說這不是宗的過失。

《論》中說：『以于（至）故者』，因為在聲明論中，有人立論說聲音是常（宗），一切都是無常的（因）。然而立論的諸位論師說，那個聲音是常（業），以一切都是無常作為因。這個宗與因相違背，所以是宗違過。現在陳那駁斥並否定說，這是比喻的過失，或者是因的過失，不是宗的過失。與那些成立因明的論師的觀點不同。

《論》中說：『是喻方便忌立異法者』，一切都是無常這句話，這是比喻而不是因。其中的『故』字是第五種時聲，也就是因的意義。那些聲明論師，只是將因的方便，設立了這個比喻。所以說是比喻的方便。雖然方便地設立了比喻，卻又顛倒地離開了異法喻。所以又在異法上立言說是比喻，也就是異法喻。

《論》中說：『由合喻現非一切故者』，這表明他們方便地設立比喻。陳那又用他們的比喻，結合來顯示去除此因。什麼呢？例如立論說聲音是常，以一切都是無常，作為異法喻。這個異法喻，應該說諸無常法者，法是一切。即用這個異喻，反過來顯示成立他們的同喻，應該說非一切者，法是其常。由此同喻結合的緣故，就知道聲音是常的宗，以非一切故作為因。

《論》中說：『此因非有（至）故者』，這個非一切故的因，在宗上是不存在的，因為就在這個聲音上，包含著世間的一切。在音聲上彼此不設立，那非一切的意義。

【English Translation】 English version: Are the three commonly accepted things also called 'thesis' (zong)? Answer:

The Treatise says: 'Those who have (up to) thesis faults' - Above, the faults of the 'correct thesis' have been distinguished. Below, the second part clarifies the faults of the 'ya thesis'. The logicians who establish Hetu-vidya (因明, science of logic) and the Hinayana (小乘, lesser vehicle) heretics further establish a sixth fault of the thesis, called 'contradiction' (違過), because the established reason (因, hetu) contradicts the thesis. It should also be called 'reason contradiction' (因違過). However, because the thesis is mentioned first, it is called 'thesis contradiction'. Now, Dignāga (陳那) refutes and rejects this view, so he says that this is not a fault of the thesis.

The Treatise says: 'Because in (up to) the reason' - Because in the Śabda-śāstra (聲明論, treatise on sound), someone posits that sound is permanent (thesis), and everything is impermanent (reason). However, the teachers who establish this say that sound is permanent (karma), with everything being impermanent as the reason. This thesis contradicts the reason, so it is a 'thesis contradiction'. Now, Dignāga refutes and rejects this, saying that it is a fault of the example (喻, dṛṣṭānta), or a fault of the reason, not a fault of the thesis. This is different from the views of those who establish Hetu-vidya.

The Treatise says: 'It is a skillful means of example to avoid establishing dissimilar instances' - The statement 'everything is impermanent' is an example, not a reason. The word 'because' (故) is the fifth temporal particle, which is the meaning of 'reason'. Those Śabda-śāstra teachers merely use the skillful means of reason to establish this example. Therefore, it is said to be a skillful means of example. Although they skillfully establish the example, they also perversely depart from the dissimilar instance (異法喻, vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Therefore, they further establish the statement on the dissimilar instance as an example, which is the dissimilar instance.

The Treatise says: 'Because by combining the example, it appears that it is not everything' - This shows that they skillfully establish the example. Dignāga, in turn, uses their example to combine and show the removal of this reason. What is it? For example, the thesis is that sound is permanent, with everything being impermanent as the dissimilar instance. This dissimilar instance should say that all impermanent things are everything. That is, using this dissimilar instance, they conversely show the establishment of their similar instance (同喻, sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), which should say that what is not everything is permanent. Because of this combination of similar instances, it is known that the thesis is that sound is permanent, with 'because it is not everything' as the reason.

The Treatise says: 'This reason is not present (up to) the reason' - This reason of 'because it is not everything' is not present in the thesis, because this sound itself encompasses everything in the world. There is no establishment of 'not everything' on sound.

是兩俱不成因。

論云或是(至)義故者　或可彼救云。聲上亦有非一切義。謂此聲但是一聲。非解一切故。亦有非一切義為因者。若爾。此因即是所立一分義故。謂所立宗有二分。有法及法。既是一聲故。名非一切。此非一切因。與所立中有法聲何別。然非一切言。唯世聲一法上故。不同所作性因通解法。然上故言。此但是所立一分義。然不成因。此亦多俱不成。若以自謂為因義邊。或可是他隨一不成也。

論此義不成名因過生者　此非一切因義不成。結成過也。

論喻亦有過者　謂不俱立因不成。至異法喻。亦有過也。

論由異(至)有過者　謂倒離過也。應言諸無常者定是一切。而喻離言諸一切者。法是無常。謂非非一切故義者。意異法喻中。所言一切者。但是度彼因。非一切故。言是一切。上非字即是能度。下非一切是所度也。由此度非一切義故。所以言一切也。即義當入理論言此中非所作言者。無所作中文也。

論因與以因多是宗法者　意因多分是宗家法。如六不定及四相違並正因。謂通是宗法性。是宗家法。其四不成。于宗上無。名為不成。既不成因。即非宗家之法。故此唯有四名。少余不定等。經少名多。故言多是宗法也。解文可解。

論頌曰宗法于同品(乃至

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『是兩俱不成因』。

論中說『或是(至)義故者』，或許可以這樣辯解：聲音也具有『非一切義』。也就是說，這個聲音只是一種聲音，不能解釋一切，所以也具有『非一切義』，可以作為因。如果這樣，這個因就是所立宗的一部分意義。所立的宗有兩部分：有法和法。既然只是一種聲音，就稱為『非一切』。這個『非一切因』與所立宗中的有法『聲』有什麼區別呢？然而，『非一切』只存在於世俗的聲音這一法上，不同於『所作性』因可以普遍解釋法。然而，『上故』說明這只是所立宗的一部分意義，因此是不成因。這也會導致多俱不成。如果從自認為因的意義方面來說，或許是他人隨一不成。

論中說『此義不成名因過生者』，這個『非一切因』的意義不成立，就構成了過失。

論中說『喻亦有過者』，指的是不俱立因不成，直到異法喻，也會有過失。

論中說『由異(至)有過者』，指的是倒離過。應該說『凡是無常的，必定是一切』，而喻離說『凡是一切的，法是無常』。所謂『非非一切故義者』，意思是異法喻中所說的一切，只是爲了衡量那個因是否『非一切』，所以說『是一切』。上面的『非』字就是能衡量，下面的『非一切』就是所衡量。因為衡量了『非一切』的意義，所以說『一切』。這個意義應當納入理論中，說『此中非所作言者』，就是沒有『所作』的文句。

論中說『因與以因多是宗法者』，意思是因的大部分是宗家的法，如六不定和四相違以及正因，普遍是宗法的性質，是宗家的法。而四不成，在宗上沒有，稱為不成。既然是不成因，就不是宗家的法。所以這裡只有四種名稱，其餘的不定等，經文中少而意義多，所以說大部分是宗法。解釋文句可以理解。

論中頌曰：『宗法于同品(乃至』

【English Translation】 English version: 'It is a reason that fails in both respects.'

The treatise says, 'Or (to) the meaning of the reason': Perhaps one could argue that sound also has a 'non-all meaning.' That is, this sound is only one sound and cannot explain everything, so it also has a 'non-all meaning' and can be used as a reason. If so, this reason is part of the meaning of the established proposition (paksha). The established proposition has two parts: the subject (dharmin) and the predicate (dharma). Since it is only one sound, it is called 'non-all.' What is the difference between this 'non-all reason' and the subject 'sound' in the established proposition? However, 'non-all' exists only in the worldly sound, which is one dharma, unlike the 'producedness' reason, which can universally explain dharma. However, 'above reason' indicates that this is only part of the meaning of the established proposition, so it is an unestablished reason. This will also lead to mutual unestablishment. If we consider it from the perspective of the meaning of the reason that one considers oneself, it may be unestablished by another.

The treatise says, 'The failure of this meaning is called a fault of the reason': The meaning of this 'non-all reason' is not established, which constitutes a fault.

The treatise says, 'The example also has faults': This refers to the unestablishment of the reason in both, up to the dissimilar example, which also has faults.

The treatise says, 'Due to the difference (to) having faults': This refers to the fallacy of reversed exclusion (viparita-vyatireka). It should be said, 'Whatever is impermanent is certainly all,' but the example excludes by saying, 'Whatever is all, the dharma is impermanent.' The so-called 'meaning of not non-all' means that what is said to be 'all' in the dissimilar example is only to measure whether that reason is 'non-all,' so it is said to be 'all.' The 'not' above is what measures, and the 'non-all' below is what is measured. Because the meaning of 'non-all' is measured, it is said to be 'all.' This meaning should be included in the theory, saying, 'Here, the words 'non-produced' are not used,' which means there is no sentence of 'produced'.

The treatise says, 'The reason and the reason are mostly properties of the proposition': This means that most of the reasons are the properties of the proponent's (vadin) proposition, such as the six uncertain reasons (anaikantika-hetu), the four contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu), and the correct reason (samyak-hetu), which are generally the nature of the proposition and are the properties of the proponent's proposition. The four unestablished reasons (asiddha-hetu), however, do not exist in the proposition and are called unestablished. Since it is an unestablished reason, it is not a property of the proponent's proposition. Therefore, there are only four names here, and the rest, such as the uncertain reasons, are few in the text but have many meanings, so it is said that most are properties of the proposition. The explanation of the sentences can be understood.

The treatise says in verse: 'The property of the proposition in the similar class (and so on.'

)二者　宗法者。即遍宗法性因也。其因於同品有。是一句。于同品非有。是第二句。于同品有非有。是第三句。如是于同品有非有等於異品。亦作三句。如是于同品有非有異品。亦為三句。即是同中有及非有。並俱于異品中。各有三句。如上言俱者。即是下及言也。此俱與二。即是有非有三句各有三。合有九種。初三者。一于同品有。于異品亦有。二于同品有。于異品非有。三于同品有。于異品及有非有。第二三者。一于同品非有。于異品有。二于同品非有。于異品亦非有。三于同品非有。于異品亦有非有。第三三者。一于同品有非有。于異品有。二于同品有非有。于異品非有。三于同品有非有。于異品亦有非有。如下文指事廣釋也。

論真不(至)有法者　此下先解宗法兩字。夫宗以有法及法和合名宗。其有法宗上有二種法。一不成法。即聲上無常法。二極成法。謂聲上所作性。其所作性。要共許始方成其因。證不成無常法。合極成也。總入言心之不總業者。持解此義。先舉外。外格云。心之不總業所成立。及法有法和合名今宗。何故此因法所依中宗意。不取其法。但取有法。若唯有法。不取其法。不應名宗。何故頌中乃言宗法耶。問頌中但言其宗。不言有法。何故外人智宗是有法。而不取法以為得耶。答

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：二者，宗法（zongfa）者。即普遍宗法性因（zongfaxing yin）也。其因在同品（tongpin）中有，這是一句。在同品中非有，這是第二句。在同品中有非有，這是第三句。像這樣，在同品中有非有等於異品（yipin），也作三句。像這樣，在同品中有非有，異品也為三句。即是同品中有及非有，並且俱在異品中，各有三句。如上面所說俱者，即是下及言也。此俱與二，即是有非有三句各有三，合有九種。初三者，一在同品中有，在異品中也有。二在同品中有，在異品中非有。三在同品中有，在異品中及有非有。第二三者，一在同品中非有，在異品中有。二在同品中非有，在異品中也非有。三在同品中非有，在異品中也有非有。第三三者，一在同品中有非有，在異品中有。二在同品中有非有，在異品中非有。三在同品中有非有，在異品中也有非有。如下文指事廣釋也。

論真不（至）有法者，此下先解釋宗法（zongfa）兩字。夫宗以有法（youfa）及法和合名宗。其有法宗上有二種法，一不成法，即聲上無常法。二極成法，謂聲上所作性。其所作性，要共許始方成其因，證不成無常法，合極成也。總入言心之不總業者，持解此義。先舉外。外格云，心之不總業所成立，及法有法和合名今宗。何故此因法所依中宗意，不取其法，但取有法。若唯有法，不取其法，不應名宗。何故頌中乃言宗法耶。問頌中但言其宗，不言有法。何故外人智宗是有法，而不取法以為得耶。答

【English Translation】 English version: The second is 'zongfa' (subject-property relation). This refers to the pervasive 'zongfaxing yin' (pervasive subject-property nature as reason). The reason exists in the 'tongpin' (similar instances), this is the first statement. The reason does not exist in the 'tongpin', this is the second statement. The reason exists and does not exist in the 'tongpin', this is the third statement. Likewise, the existence and non-existence in the 'tongpin' is equated to the 'yipin' (dissimilar instances), also forming three statements. Similarly, the existence and non-existence in the 'tongpin', the 'yipin' also forms three statements. That is, existence and non-existence in the 'tongpin', and both exist in the 'yipin', each having three statements. As mentioned above, 'both' refers to 'below and'. This 'both' and 'two' means that each of the three statements of existence and non-existence has three, totaling nine types. The first three are: one, exists in the 'tongpin', and also exists in the 'yipin'. Two, exists in the 'tongpin', and does not exist in the 'yipin'. Three, exists in the 'tongpin', and both exists and does not exist in the 'yipin'. The second three are: one, does not exist in the 'tongpin', and exists in the 'yipin'. Two, does not exist in the 'tongpin', and also does not exist in the 'yipin'. Three, does not exist in the 'tongpin', and both exists and does not exist in the 'yipin'. The third three are: one, both exists and does not exist in the 'tongpin', and exists in the 'yipin'. Two, both exists and does not exist in the 'tongpin', and does not exist in the 'yipin'. Three, both exists and does not exist in the 'tongpin', and also both exists and does not exist in the 'yipin'. As explained in detail in the following text.

Regarding 'lun zhen bu' (to) 'youfa' (possessing property), below, the two words 'zongfa' (subject-property relation) are first explained. 'Zong' (subject) is named by the combination of 'youfa' (possessing property) and property. The 'youfa' (possessing property) on the 'zong' (subject) has two types of properties: one is 'bucheng fa' (unestablished property), that is, impermanence on sound. The second is 'jicheng fa' (well-established property), referring to the produced nature on sound. This produced nature must be mutually acknowledged to establish its cause, proving the unestablished impermanence, combining to be well-established. 'Zong ru yan xin zhi bu zong ye zhe' (Generally entering the words of the mind not encompassing karma), holding and explaining this meaning. First, cite the external. The external argument says, 'What is established by the mind not encompassing karma, and the property and possessing property combined is named the current subject.' Why does the intention of the subject in this cause-property reliance not take its property, but only take the possessing property? If only possessing property is taken, and not its property, it should not be named subject. Why does the verse then say 'zongfa' (subject-property relation)? Question: The verse only speaks of the subject, not mentioning possessing property. Why does the externalist's wisdom subject have possessing property, but not take property as attainment? Answer:

如聲是有法。無常及所作性是。此二種法。皆屬有法宗故。多法自不相屬。雖聲及無常合名為。頌中既云宗法于同品有。故知所作性等因。是有法宗家之法。望于同品。得有非有俱三種差別。其所作性因。非是無常宗家之法。以兩法不相屬故也。

論此無有失(乃至)於法者　論主答也。言頌中因法所依即宗唯有法。此無有失。何者。以其總聲于別亦持者。其宗是總名俱。總言其宗。于別有法亦持。謂俱有法。亦得名宗。如言燒衣。衣是總名。雖燒衣即之一。通亦言燒衣。此亦如是。法及有法。總名為宗。唯言有法。亦名為宗。是故因法所依之宗。亦名宗也。下復舉倒俱。或有受論文言宗。唯詮宗法。不詮有法。如是既唯有宗法。亦得名宗。當知俱言有法名宗。亦無生也。所言宗聲者。即詮宗之名也。

論此中宗法(乃至)亦復如是　上來釋宗家。此下釋法名。即通是宗法性也。謂此立宗中。欲取宗法為因者。唯取立敵決定同許所作性宗法。不取無常宗法。立復敵不復故。有亦須立敵決定同許。此所作性因。于同品異品有非有等三句類前得。何故但言同品不言異品耶。答通是宗法性因。亦謂同許。故言亦復如是。下釋決定同許所以。

論何以故(至)起因者　何以要謂決定同許方比因故者。因有二

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：如果聲音是有法（dharmin，具有性質的事物），那麼無常和所作性（krtakatva，被製造的性質）也是有法。這兩種法都屬於有法宗（dharmin paksa，以有法為宗），因為多種法本身並不相互隸屬。即使聲音和無常合在一起，也只是一個名稱。頌中既然說宗法（paksa dharma，宗的性質）在同品（sapaksa，相似事例）中存在，因此可知所作性等因（hetu，理由）是有法宗家的法，相對於同品，可以有存在、不存在、亦存在亦不存在這三種差別。而所作性因，不是無常宗家的法，因為這兩種法並不相互隸屬。

論：『這沒有過失』（乃至）『對於法』——這是論主的回答。說頌中的因法所依，即宗（paksa，論題）只有有法，這沒有過失。為什麼呢？因為總的『聲』對於別（個別）也持有。宗是總名和俱名。總而言之，宗對於別的有法也持有，即俱有法也可以稱為宗。例如說『燒衣』，衣是總名，即使燒的是衣服的一部分，也可以說『燒衣』。這裡也是如此，法和有法，總稱為宗，只說有法，也可以稱為宗。因此，因法所依的宗，也可以稱為宗。下面又舉出倒俱。或者有人接受論文，說宗只詮釋宗法，不詮釋有法。如果只有宗法，也可以稱為宗，那麼應當知道，說有法名為宗，也沒有過失。所說的『宗』這個詞，就是詮釋宗的名詞。

論：『這其中宗法』（乃至）『也同樣如此』——上面解釋了宗家，下面解釋法名，即通是宗法性。也就是說，在這個立宗（paksa sthapana，確立論題）中，想要取宗法作為因，只取立論者和對方都確定認可的所作性宗法，不取無常宗法，因為立論者和對方不認可。有也需要立論者和對方都確定認可。這個所作性因，對於同品和異品（vipaksa，相異事例）有存在、不存在等三種情況，與前面相同。為什麼只說同品，不說異品呢？回答是，通是宗法性的因，也說是共同認可的，所以說『也同樣如此』。下面解釋確定共同認可的原因。

論：『為什麼』（至）『起因者』——為什麼一定要說確定共同認可才能作為因呢？因有兩種：

【English Translation】 English version: If sound is a dharmin (something possessing qualities), then impermanence and being produced (krtakatva, the quality of being made) are also dharmins. These two dharmas (qualities) both belong to the dharmin paksa (the side that takes dharmin as the subject), because multiple dharmas do not inherently belong to each other. Even if sound and impermanence are combined, it is just a name. Since the verse says that paksa dharma (the property of the subject) exists in the sapaksa (similar instances), it is known that the hetu (reason) such as being produced is a dharma of the dharmin's side. Relative to the sapaksa, there can be three kinds of differences: existence, non-existence, and both existence and non-existence. However, the hetu of being produced is not a dharma of the impermanence's side, because these two dharmas do not belong to each other.

Objection: 'There is no fault in this' (up to) 'regarding the dharma' – This is the answer of the commentator. Saying that the basis of the hetu in the verse, that is, the paksa (thesis) only has dharmin, there is no fault in this. Why? Because the general 'sound' also holds for the specific (individual). Paksa is a general name and a collective name. Generally speaking, paksa also holds for other dharmins, that is, coexisting dharmins can also be called paksa. For example, saying 'burning clothes', clothes is a general name, even if it is burning a part of the clothes, it can also be said 'burning clothes'. It is the same here, dharma and dharmin are generally called paksa, and only saying dharmin can also be called paksa. Therefore, the paksa on which the hetu is based can also be called paksa. Below, the inverted combination is also mentioned. Or someone accepts the thesis, saying that paksa only explains paksa dharma, not dharmin. If there is only paksa dharma, it can also be called paksa, then it should be known that saying dharmin is called paksa is also without fault. The word 'paksa' that is said is the name that explains paksa.

Objection: 'Among these paksa dharmas' (up to) 'it is also the same' – The above explains the paksa's side, and the following explains the name of dharma, which is generally the nature of paksa dharma. That is to say, in this paksa sthapana (establishing the thesis), if you want to take paksa dharma as the hetu, only take the paksa dharma of being produced that is determined and agreed upon by both the proponent and the opponent, and do not take the paksa dharma of impermanence, because the proponent and the opponent do not agree. Existence also requires the proponent and the opponent to determine and agree. This hetu of being produced has three situations such as existence and non-existence for sapaksa and vipaksa (dissimilar instances), which is the same as before. Why only say sapaksa and not vipaksa? The answer is that the hetu that is generally the nature of paksa dharma is also said to be commonly agreed upon, so it is said 'it is also the same'. The following explains the reason for determining common agreement.

Objection: 'Why' (to) 'arising hetu' – Why must it be said that determining common agreement can be used as a hetu? There are two kinds of hetus:

種。一生因。二了因。今此唯依證了因故。謂如立聲是無常。以所作性故。此所作性。要謂立敵決定。同許聲上有此因義。方成至因。何以如此。如說所作性。此所作性是所說義。但由立敵智力。共知此義是有。方得成因。故言但由智力等也。亦可但由彼此知因智力。信知有此所作性因。方萬所說聲無常義。若彼不信有所作性。即不了無常宗義也。亦可但智力者。謂唯敵論人。知聲上有所作性因智也。由彼信知有因之力。即了立論人所說無常之義。亦可並得了所說所作性義。故下文云。合彼憶念本極成故也。言非如生等者。如違種為牙生因。不由智力智故即為因。不知故即可為因。但由違種有生牙之用。即是其因。不由智與不知。方成因也。言了因者。要由共了知故。方得成因也。故言非如生因由能起因。

論若爾(至)立義者　別人難云。若爾智爲了因。前說由宗等多言。說名能立。此之多言。便生能成立義。

論此亦(至)善說者　論主非前難。汝此難亦不然。因有三種。一者所作性等義因。二者知所作性等心心法總名智。三者說所作性等言因。今明言因。今彼敵論人。憶意此聲上有所作性。于瓶等同品上本極成定有異品。通無此所作性因。敵論人亦先成許有。名曰極成。然恐彼廢忘。復須多言。合

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：\n\n『種』是指生因，『一生因』和『二了因』。現在這裡只依據證了因的緣故，比如立論說『聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的』。這個『被製造出來的性質』，必須要立論者和對方都確定，並且都認可聲音具有這種原因的意義，才能成為真正的理由。為什麼這樣說呢？就像說『被製造出來的性質』，這個『被製造出來的性質』是被說出的意義。但只有通過立論者和對方的智慧力量，共同認知到這個意義是存在的，才能成為理由。所以說『但由智力等』。也可以說，只有通過彼此瞭解原因的智慧力量，確信存在這個『被製造出來的性質』的原因，才能完全理解所說的『聲音是無常的』這個意義。如果對方不相信存在『被製造出來的性質』，就不能理解無常的宗義。也可以說，『但智力者』，是指只有對方論辯的人，知道聲音上存在『被製造出來的性質』的原因的智慧。由於他相信並知道存在原因的力量，就能理解立論人所說的無常的意義。也可以說，同時理解了所說的『被製造出來的性質』的意義。所以下文說，『結合他憶念原本已經確立的緣故』。說『非如生等者』，比如違背種子而生出牙，不是通過智慧的認知才成為原因的，即使不知道也可以成為原因。只要違背種子具有產生牙的作用，就是它的原因，與是否通過智慧認知無關，都能成為原因。說『了因者』，必須要通過共同瞭解認知，才能成為原因。所以說『非如生因由能起因』。\n\n論：如果這樣（至）立義者：\n\n別人反駁說，如果智慧是了因，那麼前面所說的由宗等多言，說名為能立，這些多言，便能產產生立意義。\n\n論：此亦（至）善說者：\n\n論主否定前面的反駁，說：你的反駁也不對。原因有三種：一是『被製造出來的性質』等的意義原因；二是瞭解『被製造出來的性質』等的心和心法，總稱為智慧；三是說『被製造出來的性質』等的言語原因。現在說明言語原因。現在對方論辯的人，回憶起這個聲音上具有『被製造出來的性質』，在瓶子等同類事物上，原本已經確立，一定存在，而不同類的事物，普遍沒有這個『被製造出來的性質』的原因。對方論辯的人也先前承認存在，這叫做『極成』。然而恐怕他忘記了，所以需要多言，結合。" , "english_translations": [ "English version:\n\n'Seed' refers to the productive cause. 'One-life cause' and 'two-understanding causes'. Now, here, we rely solely on the evidential understanding cause. For example, stating 'sound is impermanent because it is produced'. This 'produced nature' must be determined by both the proponent and the opponent, and they must both acknowledge that sound possesses this causal meaning in order to become a true reason. Why is this so? Like saying 'produced nature', this 'produced nature' is the meaning being expressed. But only through the intellectual power of the proponent and the opponent, jointly recognizing that this meaning exists, can it become a reason. Therefore, it is said 'only through intellectual power, etc.'. It can also be said that only through the intellectual power of each other's understanding of the cause, believing that this 'produced nature' cause exists, can one fully understand the meaning of 'sound is impermanent' that is being stated. If the opponent does not believe that 'produced nature' exists, then they cannot understand the tenet of impermanence. It can also be said that 'only intellectual power' refers to the wisdom of only the opponent in the debate, knowing that the 'produced nature' cause exists on sound. Because he believes and knows the power of the cause exists, he can understand the meaning of impermanence stated by the proponent. It can also be said that he simultaneously understands the meaning of the 'produced nature' that is being stated. Therefore, the following text says, 'combining his recollection of the originally established reason'. Saying 'not like birth, etc.' For example, the sprouting of a sprout against the seed is not through intellectual cognition that it becomes a cause; even without knowing, it can become a cause. As long as the opposition to the seed has the function of producing a sprout, it is its cause, regardless of whether it is through intellectual cognition or not, it can become a cause. Saying 'understanding cause' must be through joint understanding and cognition in order to become a cause. Therefore, it is said 'not like the productive cause arising from the ability to initiate'.\n\nTreatise: If so (to) establishing meaning:\n\nSomeone refutes, saying, if wisdom is the understanding cause, then the previously mentioned multiple statements based on the tenet, said to be the establisher, these multiple statements, then, can produce the meaning of establishment.\n\nTreatise: This also (to) good saying:\n\nThe treatise master denies the previous refutation, saying: Your refutation is also incorrect. There are three types of causes: first, the meaning cause of 'produced nature', etc.; second, the mind and mental phenomena that understand 'produced nature', etc., collectively called wisdom; third, the verbal cause of saying 'produced nature', etc. Now explaining the verbal cause. Now the opponent in the debate recalls that this sound has 'produced nature', which has been originally established and certainly exists on similar things like bottles, and that dissimilar things universally do not have this 'produced nature' cause. The opponent in the debate also previously admitted that it exists, which is called 'extremely established'. However, fearing that he has forgotten, it is necessary to say more, combining." ] }

彼憶念本極成義。因生智因也。是故此宗有法中。唯取彼此俱決定許有所作性義。于同品定有等。如是即為善說。

論由是(至)見故者　由是若彼此立敵俱不許有此因義。其因即不成。欲反顯要須共許有此因義。其因即成也。由有此意故。遂明四不成過。此即兩俱不成。謂如立聲是無常。聞所見故。此聞所見。彼此俱不許聲宗上法。故言彼此同許非宗法也。余文可余。

和合火有者　火有二種。一者大種和合火。如炭火等。有地大火大種。及四塵和合總名火。此火于山深等中。或有或無。若性火唯一火大故。不名和合。不成立性火大是有。以性火一切受有故。但欲成立大種和合火是有。云如入理勝宗。量云。此山解受四大四塵是有法。有和合火是法。法及有法。合名為宗。以現煙故(因)。猶如廚等受(同喻)。

論或於(至)樂等故者　此第四所依不成過。論勝論師或於立論之受。對佛弟子。立我其體周通彼師所以如此立者。以彼立我是常我既是常。意無移持彼此方所之義。且如身世此受。其義即能生者。樂等受受違順等事。復生彼受。亦復如是。止止可常我如所依身。從此受移轉。往至彼受。用者樂事等耶。但可我體周通。略于彼彼更若順等　至便生示等有受用事。亦如於世世方即便證得。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本彼憶念本極成義，是因為產生智慧的因。因此，在這個宗派的論證中，只取彼此都確定認可的『有所作性』的意義，在同品中確定存在等等。像這樣，就是善巧的說法。

論：『由是（至）見故者』，意思是：如果彼此立論的雙方都不認可這個『因』的意義，那麼這個『因』就不成立。想要反過來顯明，就必須雙方都認可這個『因』的意義，那麼這個『因』才能成立。因為有這個意思，所以說明了四種不成立的過失。這指的是兩方都不成立。例如，立論說『聲音是無常的，因為是聞所見的』。這個『聞所見』，彼此都不認可在聲音這個『宗』上存在。所以說，彼此都認可的，不是『宗』的『法』。其餘的文字可以類推。

『和合火有者』，火有兩種。一種是『大種和合火』，例如炭火等。有地大、火大種，以及四塵和合，總稱為火。這種火在山深處等地方，有時有，有時沒有。如果是『性火』，只有火大，所以不稱為『和合』。不成立『性火大』是存在的，因為『性火』一切眾生都有。只是想要成立『大種和合火』是存在的。例如，按照入理勝宗的論證，量云：『這座山，解受四大四塵是有法，有和合火是法。法及有法，合稱為宗。因為有煙出現（因），猶如廚房等地方（同喻）。』

論：『或於（至）樂等故者』，這是第四種『所依不成』的過失。論：勝論師或者在立論的『受』上，對佛弟子，立『我』，其體是周遍通達的。他們這樣立論的原因是，他們立『我』是常的。『我』既然是常的，就沒有意念轉移持守彼此方所的意義。例如，身體和世界這個『受』，它的意義就是能產生樂等『受』，『受』違背順從等事情。又產生那個『受』，也是這樣。停止停止，可以常『我』如所依的身，從這個『受』轉移，前往那個『受』，用樂事等嗎？但可以『我』體周遍通達，略微在那個那個地方，更加順從等等，以至於產生顯示等等有受用事，也如在世界世間，立即便能證得。

【English Translation】 English version His recollection is fundamentally meaningful because it is the cause of generating wisdom. Therefore, in the arguments of this school, only the meaning of 'being produced' (有所作性) that is mutually and definitively acknowledged is taken, with the certainty of existence in similar instances, and so on. Saying it in this way is a skillful explanation.

The treatise 'Therefore (to) see because of...' means: If both the proponent and the opponent do not acknowledge the meaning of this 'cause,' then this 'cause' is not established. To show the opposite, it is necessary for both parties to acknowledge the meaning of this 'cause,' then this 'cause' is established. Because of this intention, the four faults of non-establishment are explained. This refers to both parties not establishing it. For example, the proposition is: 'Sound is impermanent because it is something heard and seen.' This 'something heard and seen' is not acknowledged by either party as existing on the 'subject' (宗) of sound. Therefore, it is said that what is mutually acknowledged is not a 'property' (法) of the 'subject.' The rest of the text can be inferred.

'The existence of combined fire' refers to two types of fire. One is 'fire of combined elements' (大種和合火), such as charcoal fire. It has earth element, fire element, and the combination of four dusts, collectively called fire. This fire may or may not exist in deep mountains, etc. If it is 'nature fire' (性火), it only has the fire element, so it is not called 'combined.' It is not established that 'nature fire element' exists because all beings have 'nature fire.' It only intends to establish that 'fire of combined elements' exists. For example, according to the reasoning of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school, the inference is: 'This mountain, experiencing the four great elements and four dusts, is the subject (有法); it has combined fire as the property (法). The property and the subject together are called the thesis (宗), because smoke appears (reason), like in a kitchen, etc. (example).'

The treatise 'Or in (to) pleasure, etc. because of...' is the fourth fault of 'unestablished substratum' (所依不成). The treatise: The Vaisheshika philosopher, regarding the 'experience' (受) in the proposition, to the Buddhist disciple, establishes 'self' (我), whose essence is all-pervading. The reason they establish it this way is that they establish 'self' as permanent. Since 'self' is permanent, there is no meaning of intention shifting and holding onto each other's locations. For example, the 'experience' of body and world, its meaning is that it can generate pleasure, etc. The 'experience' of experiencing agreement and disagreement, etc. Also generates that 'experience,' and so on. Stop, stop, can the permanent 'self,' like the body it relies on, transfer from this 'experience' and go to that 'experience,' using pleasurable things, etc.? But it can be that the 'self' is all-pervading, slightly in that place, even more agreeable, etc., to the point of generating displays, etc., of having experiences, just like in the world, one can immediately attain it.

此亦如是。是故立我其體周通(宗)。於一切更生示等故(因)。由佛弟子。不許有我故。其因所依有法不成。無有法可通故。亦非通是宗法性因故。亦是不成因。然有法外導因明中。唯有前二不成。謂兩俱不成。隨一不成。若異同彼所立。其得二弁攝世前二不成中。謂兩俱猶預不成。及隨一猶預不成。兩俱所依不成。及隨一所依不成。其陳那救別義故。遂開為四也。

論如是(至)能立者　上來四不成因。且各指事。以為不成。如是類釋。更于所說餘一切品類有法上。所有四不成言辭。皆非能立。又釋。此總結前。如是所說四不成。一切品類所有言辭。皆非能立。

論于其(至)是說者　上來明通是宗法性四名成因。自下類釋于同品定有性因。亦有兩俱。同品不成。隨一同品不成。猶預同品不成。所依同品不成。其同品中有非有等。皆隨所應。有四不成。

論于當所說(至)能破者　于當所說因。是正因也。即是下文言能立也。相違不定者。即是下能破。此文具足應言。于當所說正唯因中。有共許決定言詞。說名能立。于當所說相違及不定中。唯有決定共許言詞。說名能破也。云何相違及不定。說能破耶。謂彼立論人。因有相違及不定過。其敵論人。俱能現彼立因。有相違及不定過失。說此過真

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這也像這樣。因此，建立『我』，它的本體是周遍通達的（宗）。在一切更生中顯示等等（因）。由於佛弟子不承認有『我』的緣故，它的因所依據的有法不能成立，因為沒有法可以通達。也不是通達就是宗法的性質，因此是不成因。然而，在有法之外引導因明中，只有前兩種不成，即兩俱不成和隨一不成。如果與他們所建立的異同，那麼就得到二弁攝世前兩種不成，即兩俱猶豫不成，以及隨一猶豫不成，兩俱所依不成，以及隨一所依不成。陳那（Dignāga）爲了救濟不同的意義，於是開立為四種不成。

論：像這樣（到）能立者上面所說的四種不成因，姑且各自指出事情，作為不成。像這樣類似地解釋，更在所說的其餘一切品類的有法上，所有四種不成的言辭，都不是能立。又解釋，這總結了前面所說的，像這樣所說的四種不成，一切品類所有的言辭，都不是能立。

論：在於（到）是說者上面說明通達是宗法性質的四種成立因。從下面開始，類似地解釋在同品中決定存在的性質的因，也有兩俱同品不成，隨一同品不成，猶豫同品不成，所依同品不成。在同品中，有非有等等，都隨著所應，有四種不成。

論：在於當所說（到）能破者在於當所說的因，是正因。也就是下文所說的能立。相違和不定，也就是下文所說的能破。這段文字應該完整地說成：在於當所說的正唯因中，有共同認可的決定言辭，稱為能立。在於當所說的相違和不定中，只有決定的共同認可的言辭，稱為能破。為什麼相違和不定，說是能破呢？因為立論人，因有相違和不定的過失，他的敵論人，都能顯現他所立的因，有相違和不定的過失，說這種過失是真實的。

【English Translation】 English version: It is also like this. Therefore, establishing 'self', its essence is universally pervasive (thesis). Showing in all rebirths, etc. (reason). Because Buddhist disciples do not allow the existence of 'self', its reason's basis, the existent property (dharma) cannot be established, because there is no dharma that can be pervasive. Also, pervasiveness is not the nature of the thesis, therefore it is an unestablished reason. However, in guiding reasoning outside of the existent property, there are only the first two unestablished, namely, both mutually unestablished and one of them unestablished. If it is different or the same as what they establish, then it obtains the first two unestablished among the two 弁攝世 (bian she shi, a term referring to categories of fallacies), namely, both mutually uncertainly unestablished, and one of them uncertainly unestablished, both mutually basis unestablished, and one of them basis unestablished. Dignāga (Chenna) opened it into four unestablished in order to remedy different meanings.

Treatise: Like this (to) establisher The above four unestablished reasons, for the time being, each points out the matter, as unestablished. Explaining similarly like this, furthermore, on the remaining all categories of existent properties that are spoken of, all the words of the four unestablished are not establishers. Also explaining, this summarizes what was said earlier, like this the four unestablished that are spoken of, all the words of all categories are not establishers.

Treatise: In (to) is said The above explains that pervasiveness is the nature of the thesis, the four names of established reasons. From below, similarly explaining the reason of the nature of definite existence in the similar class, there are also both mutually similar class unestablished, one of them similar class unestablished, uncertainly similar class unestablished, basis similar class unestablished. In the similar class, there are non-existence, etc., all according to what is appropriate, there are four unestablished.

Treatise: In the to be spoken (to) destroyer In the reason to be spoken, it is the correct reason. That is, the establisher spoken of in the following text. Contradictory and uncertain, that is, the destroyer spoken of below. This text should be fully stated as: In the correct and only reason to be spoken, there are jointly acknowledged definite words, called establisher. In the contradictory and uncertain to be spoken, there are only definite jointly acknowledged words, called destroyer. Why are contradictory and uncertain said to be destroyers? Because the proponent, due to having the faults of contradictory and uncertain, his opponent can reveal that the reason he establishes has the faults of contradictory and uncertain, saying that this fault is true.

立敵俱許。即名能破。

論非互(至)成故者　以共許方成立破故。隨一不成過。是互不成。互不成是立因。不是言詞故。不能決定能立能破也。言復待成故者。如勝論對聲論。立聲是無常。所作性故。然此所作性因。若勝論師。以生為所作。即聲論不成。若聲論以顯為所作。即勝論不成。即應復立量。更成立聲是生所位(宗)。隨緣變故(因)。如燈焰(喻)。猶豫者是猶豫不成。若更成立言彼處決定無火。以有故非煙故。諸有蚊非煙處。必定無火。如余有蚊處。或云。彼處定有火。以近見煙故。如余近見有煙處。其俱不成。及所依不成。不可重成得。故不說也。

論夫立(至)云何者　總是外人間。夫立宗法用。故言立宗法。亦可有法宗眾法。故言立宗法。理重更以余通是宗法性為因。成立此宗家之法無常性也。不成立宗家有法。此不格也。若即余因法。成立有法為有。成或立有法為足。下指其更事。如猶僧佉。成立最勝為有。此最勝有法。今成立此有法為有(宗)現見別總有總類故(因)。猶如多片白檀香皆以本(喻)。當知二十三諦是別。故智亦有總最勝[穴/俱]凈。或立為無者。佛弟子即立最勝為無。最勝是有法。為無是法(宗)。不可得故(因)。猶如菟角(同喻)。如是以余因法。成立

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本『立敵俱許。即名能破。』——如果敵方和己方都認可某個觀點，那麼這個觀點就可以被用來駁倒對方。

『論非互(至)成故者』——因為雙方都認可的觀點才能成立駁論。如果其中一方不認可，就無法形成相互駁斥。這種相互不認可的情況是立論的原因，而不是言辭本身的原因，因此無法決定誰能立論，誰能駁論。『言復待成故者』——例如勝論派（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）與聲論派（Shabda，主張聲音是永恒的）的爭論。勝論派認為聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的。然而，這個『被製造出來』的原因，如果勝論師理解為『產生』，那麼聲論派就不會認可；如果聲論派理解為『顯現』，那麼勝論派就不會認可。因此，需要重新立論，進一步證明聲音是『產生』的（宗），因為它隨因緣變化（因），就像燈焰一樣（喻）。猶豫不決的情況就是不確定。如果進一步證明某個地方一定沒有火，因為有蚊子而不是煙，那麼所有有蚊子而沒有煙的地方，一定沒有火，就像其他有蚊子的地方一樣。或者說，某個地方一定有火，因為看到附近有煙，就像其他附近看到有煙的地方一樣。這些情況都無法成立，而且所依據的基礎也不成立，無法重新建立，所以不再討論。

『論夫立(至)云何者』——總的來說，這是外道之間的爭論。因為要確立宗的法則，所以說是『立宗法』。也可以有法、宗、眾法，所以說是『立宗法』。從道理上講，更要用其他普遍存在的宗法性質作為原因，來證明這個宗派的法則具有無常性。如果不成立宗派所具有的法，就不能算是駁倒。如果用其他原因的法，來證明有法是存在的，或者確立有法是完備的，那麼接下來會發生什麼呢？例如，僧佉派（Samkhya，印度哲學流派，主張二元論）認為『最勝』（Pradhana，根本質）是存在的。這個『最勝』是有法，現在要證明這個有法是存在的（宗），因為它具有現見、別總、有總類（因），就像許多片白檀香都具有本質一樣（喻）。應當知道，二十三種諦是不同的。因此，智慧也有總的『最勝』[穴/俱]凈。或者確立為不存在——佛弟子就認為『最勝』是不存在的。『最勝』是有法，『不存在』是法（宗），因為不可得（因），就像兔角一樣（同喻）。像這樣，用其他原因的法，來證明...

【English Translation】 English version 『If both the proponent and the opponent agree on a point, it can be used to refute the other.』

『Regarding the argument that it is not mutually established (up to) the reason for establishment』—Because only mutually agreed-upon points can establish a refutation. If one party does not agree, mutual refutation cannot occur. This mutual disagreement is the reason for the argument, not the words themselves, and therefore cannot determine who can establish the argument and who can refute it. 『Regarding the statement that it still needs to be established』—For example, the debate between the Vaisheshika (an Indian philosophical school advocating realism and atomism) and the Shabda (those who argue that sound is eternal). The Vaisheshika argues that sound is impermanent because it is produced. However, this reason of 『being produced,』 if understood as 『arising』 by the Vaisheshika, will not be accepted by the Shabda; if understood as 『manifestation』 by the Shabda, will not be accepted by the Vaisheshika. Therefore, it is necessary to re-establish the argument, further proving that sound is 『produced』 (thesis), because it changes with conditions (reason), like the flame of a lamp (example). Hesitation is uncertainty. If it is further proven that there is definitely no fire in a certain place because there are mosquitoes instead of smoke, then all places with mosquitoes and no smoke definitely have no fire, like other places with mosquitoes. Or, it is said that there must be fire in a certain place because smoke is seen nearby, like other places where smoke is seen nearby. These situations cannot be established, and the basis on which they rely is also not established, so they cannot be re-established and are not discussed further.

『Regarding the argument of establishing (up to) what is it』—Generally speaking, this is a debate between outsiders. Because the law of the thesis must be established, it is called 『establishing the law of the thesis.』 There can also be dharma, thesis, and multiple dharmas, so it is called 『establishing the law of the thesis.』 Logically, other universally existing properties of the thesis should be used as the reason to prove that the law of this school has impermanence. If the dharma possessed by the school is not established, it cannot be considered a refutation. If the dharma of another reason is used to prove that the possessor of dharma exists, or to establish that the possessor of dharma is complete, then what will happen next? For example, the Samkhya (an Indian philosophical school advocating dualism) believes that 『Pradhana』 (primordial matter) exists. This 『Pradhana』 is the possessor of dharma, and now it must be proven that this possessor of dharma exists (thesis), because it has direct perception, distinction, totality, and general categories (reason), just like many pieces of white sandalwood all have essence (example). It should be known that the twenty-three tattvas are different. Therefore, wisdom also has the total 『Pradhana』 [hole/both] pure. Or establish it as non-existent—Buddhist disciples believe that 『Pradhana』 does not exist. 『Pradhana』 is the possessor of dharma, 『non-existence』 is the dharma (thesis), because it is unobtainable (reason), like a rabbit's horn (similar example). In this way, using the dharma of another reason to prove...

有法。如是所成。非宗家法。違正理故。問言此義云何。

論此中(至)此失者　論主示其成立最勝有無所以。但約二十三諦別總為有。所定有一因是法。其所有一因。即是最勝。約二十三諦有法成立最勝為有。不即立最勝為宗。故無以法成立有法之失。立量云。此中二十三諦別物。定有一總因(宗)。以是別故(因)。猶如多行白檀(同喻)。

論若立為無(至)法過者　若立最勝為無。亦約二十三諦。假立最勝為無。以不可得故。立量云。二十三諦無有一最勝因(宗)。以最勝不可得故(因)。猶如菟角(同喻)。又釋云。若立為無者。如所說寂勝性升爲有。是是有法。我今立為無是法。法及有法。得名為宗。于破性升最勝上。亦假安立。不可得故為因。我今立最勝有法。是無為宗故。是故亦無有最勝有法過也。應立量云。汝所升最勝是足(宗)。不可得故(因)。猶如菟角(喻)。問此云何不有因足所依故。答因有三。一或有因唯應有法。如所作性因等。如雲虛空。實有德所依故。此因唯依有法。故對無空。所依不成。大乘人若樹小乘外道等。並第八識。有小乘等不許有第八識故。對無第八識論。若立其因。有法不極成故。亦是所依不成。二或有因唯依無法。謂不可得故。今明不可得因。唯依最勝

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：有法，像這樣所成立的，不是宗家的法，因為它違背了正理。有人問：『這是什麼意思呢？』論：『此中……此失者』——論主展示了成立最勝（Pradhāna，根本自性）為有或無的理由。只是根據二十三種諦（Tattva，真實）的差別，總括為有。所確定的一個因是法，它的所有一個因，就是最勝。根據二十三種諦，以有法成立最勝為有，不直接立最勝為宗（Paksha，論題），所以沒有以法成立有法的過失。立量（論證）如下：此中二十三種諦的差別事物，必定有一個總因（宗），因為它們是差別性的（因），就像許多條紋的白檀（同喻）。論：『若立為無……法過者』——如果立最勝為無，也是根據二十三種諦，假設立最勝為無，因為它不可得。立量如下：二十三種諦沒有一個最勝因（宗），因為最勝不可得（因），就像兔角（同喻）。又解釋說：如果立為無，就像所說的寂勝性（Prakriti，自性）升爲有，這是有法。我現在立為無是法，法和有法，可以稱為宗。在破斥自性升爲最勝上，也是假設安立。以不可得為因，我現在立最勝有法，是無為宗，所以也沒有最勝有法的過失。應該立量如下：你所升的最勝是足（宗），因為不可得（因），就像兔角（喻）。有人問：『為什麼這不成為有因足所依呢？』回答：因有三種。一是或者有因只應有法，如所作性因等。如說虛空，實在有德所依，這個因只依有法，所以對無空，所依不成。大乘人如果樹立小乘外道等，並第八識（Alaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識），因為小乘等不承認有第八識，所以對無第八識論，如果立它的因，有法不極成，也是所依不成。二是或者有因只依無法，就是不可得。現在說明不可得因，只依最勝。

【English Translation】 English version: There is a dharma. What is thus established is not the dharma of the proponent, because it contradicts correct reasoning. Someone asks: 'What does this mean?' Treatise: 'In this...this fault'—The treatise master demonstrates the reasons for establishing Pradhāna (the primary nature) as existent or non-existent. It is only based on the differences of the twenty-three Tattvas (realities), summarized as existent. The one cause that is determined is a dharma, and its one cause is Pradhāna. Based on the twenty-three Tattvas, establishing Pradhāna as existent with a dharma, does not directly establish Pradhāna as the Paksha (thesis), so there is no fault of establishing a dharma with a dharma. The establishment of the inference (argument) is as follows: Among these twenty-three differentiated entities, there must be a general cause (Paksha), because they are differentiated (Hetu, reason), like white sandalwood with many stripes (Drstanta, example). Treatise: 'If established as non-existent...fault of dharma'—If Pradhāna is established as non-existent, it is also based on the twenty-three Tattvas, hypothetically establishing Pradhāna as non-existent, because it is not obtainable. The establishment of the inference is as follows: Among the twenty-three Tattvas, there is no Pradhāna as a cause (Paksha), because Pradhāna is not obtainable (Hetu), like a rabbit's horn (Drstanta). Another explanation says: If established as non-existent, like the said Prakriti (nature) rising to existence, this is a dharma with existence. I now establish non-existence as a dharma, dharma and dharma with existence, can be called Paksha. In refuting the nature rising to Pradhāna, it is also hypothetically established. Taking non-obtainability as the Hetu, I now establish Pradhāna with existence, as non-existence as the Paksha, so there is also no fault of Pradhāna with existence. The inference should be established as follows: The Pradhāna you elevate is sufficient (Paksha), because it is not obtainable (Hetu), like a rabbit's horn (example). Someone asks: 'Why does this not become a basis for the cause being sufficient?' The answer: There are three types of causes. First, there are causes that should only be dharma with existence, such as the cause of being produced. For example, saying that space, in reality, has a basis for qualities, this cause only relies on dharma with existence, so regarding non-space, the basis is not established. If Mahayana practitioners establish Hinayana heretics, etc., along with the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñāna), because Hinayana, etc., do not acknowledge the existence of the eighth consciousness, so regarding the discussion of the non-eighth consciousness, if its cause is established, dharma with existence is not fully established, and the basis is also not established. Second, there are causes that only rely on dharma without existence, which is non-obtainability. Now explaining the cause of non-obtainability, it only relies on Pradhāna.

無法。于性升法上假立不可得故。因復無無有因無所依過。三或有因通依有無。謂所作性等也。是故若立有法為有。敵論必不許有法故。對無有法論。其因必是所依不成過也。若立有法為無。其有法若立為無。其敵論者。雖不得許。然不可得故。因唯依無法故。無所有依不成過。如對外道言。神我是無(宗)。不可得故(因)。猶如菟角(同喻)。此因雖無所依。然無過。

論若以(至)云何者　外人問。夫立因之正義。且所依性故因法。成立無常宗法。今論問云。若以有法。別立余有法。或以有法。成立其法。下指其事。如謬立量云。煙有火。煙是有法。火是其法(宗)。以是煙故(因)。猶如解煙(喻)。然煙之與火。俱是有法。彼人以煙有法。成立火有法為宗法。此心即不是以為有法。立余有法耶。言或以火立觸者。火是四塵假火。是有法。觸言熱觸是法。或立量云。此火有熱觸(宗)。以是大故(因)。猶如餘火(喻)。此止即不是有法。成立法耶。外人不了此二義。故得其義云何。

論今于(至)應物者　論主答。今於此宗因中。非以煙為因。成立火宗故。非是以煙有法。成立火有法。亦非以火為因。成立觸為宗故。以四塵總假火有法。成立別觸實法也。言但為成立此相應物者。但為成立此煙

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因為在自性生法上假立是不可得的。因此，會產生沒有原因，沒有所依的過失。或者，有些原因可以通用於有和無，比如所作性等。所以，如果立有法為有，對方辯論者一定不會允許有法成立。針對無有法進行辯論，那麼這個原因一定是所依不成（asraya-asiddha）的過失。如果立有法為無，這個有法如果被立為無，對方辯論者雖然不會允許，但是因為不可得，原因只能依賴於無法，所以會產生無所有依不成（nirālambana āśrayāsiddha）的過失。比如對外道說：『神我（ātman）是無（宗），因為不可得（因），就像兔角（同喻）。』這個原因雖然沒有所依，但是沒有過失。

論：如果以（至）云何者：外人問：建立原因的正確意義，是所依性，因此原因法成立無常的宗法。現在論中問到，如果以有法，另外建立其餘的有法，或者以有法，成立那個法，下面指明這件事。比如錯誤地建立量式說：『煙有火（宗），因為是煙（因），就像解煙（喻）。』然而煙和火，都是有法。那個人以煙的有法，成立火的有法作為宗法。這個心識難道不是以有法，建立其餘的有法嗎？說或者以火立觸，火是四大塵假合的火，是有法。觸，指熱觸，是法。或者建立量式說：『這個火有熱觸（宗），因為是大（因），就像其餘的火（喻）。』這難道不是以有法，成立法嗎？外人不明白這兩種意義，所以問它的意義是什麼？

論：今于（至）應物者：論主答：現在在這個宗因中，不是以煙為原因，成立火為宗，所以不是以煙的有法，成立火的有法。也不是以火為原因，成立觸為宗，而是以四大塵總合的假火有法，成立個別的觸實法。說『但為成立此相應物者』，只是爲了成立這個煙

【English Translation】 English version Because the hypothetical establishment on the nature-born dharma is unattainable. Therefore, the fallacy of having no cause and no basis arises. Or, some causes can be applied to both existence and non-existence, such as the nature of being produced, etc. Therefore, if an existent subject (dharmin) is posited as existent, the opponent will certainly not allow the existent subject to be established. When arguing against a non-existent subject, the reason must be the fallacy of 'unestablished basis' (āśraya-asiddha). If an existent subject is posited as non-existent, although the opponent will not allow this existent subject to be posited as non-existent, because it is unattainable, the reason can only rely on the non-existent, so the fallacy of 'unsupported basis' (nirālambana āśrayāsiddha) arises. For example, when saying to the non-Buddhist: 'The self (ātman) is non-existent (thesis), because it is unattainable (reason), like a rabbit's horn (example).' Although this reason has no basis, it is without fallacy.

Objection: 'If with (to) what?' The objector asks: The correct meaning of establishing a reason is that it has a basis, therefore the reason-dharma establishes the thesis-dharma of impermanence. Now the treatise asks, if with an existent subject, one separately establishes another existent subject, or with an existent subject, one establishes that dharma, below pointing out this matter. For example, erroneously establishing an inference saying: 'Smoke has fire (thesis), because it is smoke (reason), like kitchen smoke (example).' However, both smoke and fire are existent subjects. That person uses the existent subject of smoke to establish the existent subject of fire as the thesis-dharma. Is this mind not using an existent subject to establish another existent subject? Saying 'or with fire establishing touch,' fire is the fire compounded of the four great elements, which is an existent subject. 'Touch' refers to hot touch, which is a dharma. Or establishing an inference saying: 'This fire has hot touch (thesis), because it is large (reason), like other fire (example).' Is this not using an existent subject to establish a dharma? The objector does not understand these two meanings, so asks what its meaning is.

Treatise: 'Now in (to) corresponding thing.' The author replies: Now in this subject-reason, it is not using smoke as the reason to establish fire as the thesis, so it is not using the existent subject of smoke to establish the existent subject of fire. Nor is it using fire as the reason to establish touch as the thesis, but rather using the hypothetical fire existent subject compounded of the four great elements to establish the individual real dharma of touch. Saying 'but to establish this corresponding thing,' it is only to establish this smoke

火及觸處所。無相應物也。如立量云。此山谷處有火。以山谷四塵為有法。以有火為法。法及有法合為宗(宗)。以此山谷中若煙故(因)。猶如菟余有煙處(喻)。又立量云。此火爐處有熱觸(宗)。以有火故(因)。如余有火處(喻)。

論若不(至)為因者　論主破前謬立若不如我所說。可如汝所立比量。即應以宗義一分為因。如立宗云。聲是無常。聲是有法。無常是法。法及有法。是所立宗義。若言聲是無常(宗)。以是聲故(因)。此以宗中有法為因故。故是宗義兩分中。以一分為因過。汝亦如是。前立量云。煙是有法。火是法。法及有法。合成宗義。汝立因云以是煙故。豈不是以有法宗義一分為因耶。又立量云。此火有熱觸。火是有法分。熱觸是法分。法及有法二分。合為宗義。立因云以此大故。是亦以有法宗義一分為因。故不成也。以宗義二分是所立。因是能立故。不應以所立一分。為能立也。

論又于(至)有故者　論主重破。又於此比量中。非欲成立火是有法性。及熱觸是有性。以世人皆共知火及觸。有體性故。何謂成立者。是立已成過。但為不智火相觸應所依處有火有觸。復謂立量成立也。

論文于(至)有過者　又於此中立論者。要觀待前敵論人義。方有所立謂如佛弟子。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：火燃燒蔓延的地方，沒有與之相應的物體。例如，建立一個量式：『這個山谷有火』，以山谷的四種塵土作為『有法』（dharmin，具有特定性質的事物），以『有火』作為『法』（dharma，性質）。『法』和『有法』合在一起構成『宗』（paksha，論題）。因為這個山谷中有煙（『因』，hetu，理由），就像廚房裡有煙一樣（『喻』，drshtanta，例子）。又建立一個量式：『這個火爐處有熱觸』（宗），因為有火的緣故（因），就像其他有火的地方一樣（喻）。

論：如果不是（這樣），就成了『因』（hetu，理由）——論主駁斥之前錯誤的立論，如果不如我所說，可以像你所建立的比量一樣。那就應該把『宗義』（pakshartha，論題的意義）一分為二作為『因』。例如，建立論題說：『聲音是無常的』，聲音是『有法』，無常是『法』，『法』和『有法』是所要建立的『宗義』。如果說『聲音是無常的』（宗），因為它是聲音的緣故（因）。這是以『宗』中的『有法』作為『因』，所以是『宗義』兩部分中，以一部分作為『因』的過失。你也一樣。之前建立量式說，煙是『有法』，火是『法』，『法』和『有法』合成為『宗義』。你立『因』說因為有煙的緣故，難道不是以『有法』『宗義』的一部分作為『因』嗎？又建立量式說，這個火有熱觸，火是『有法』部分，熱觸是『法』部分，『法』和『有法』兩部分，合為『宗義』。立『因』說因為有熱的緣故，這也是以『有法』『宗義』的一部分作為『因』，所以不能成立。因為『宗義』的兩部分是所要建立的，『因』是能成立的，所以不應該以所要建立的一部分，作為能成立的。

論：又對於（這個比量）有『故』（的錯誤）——論主再次駁斥。又在這個比量中，並非想要成立火具有『有法』的性質，以及熱觸具有『有』的性質。因為世人都知道火和觸具有實體性。所謂成立，是立已成之過。只是爲了不明白火的相和觸應所依賴的地方有火有觸，又說建立量式來成立。

論文：在於（觀察）有『過』（的必要）——又在這裡，立論者，要觀察之前的敵論人的意義，才能有所立論，比如佛弟子。

【English Translation】 English version: Where fire spreads and touches, there is no corresponding object. For example, establishing an inference: 'This valley has fire,' with the four elements of the valley as the 'dharmin' (subject, that which possesses a certain property), and 'having fire' as the 'dharma' (property). The 'dharma' and 'dharmin' together constitute the 'paksha' (thesis). Because there is smoke in this valley ('hetu', reason), just like in a kitchen where there is smoke ('drshtanta', example). Another inference is established: 'This furnace has hot touch' (paksha), because there is fire (hetu), just like other places where there is fire (drshtanta).

Argument: If it is not (so), it becomes the 'hetu' (reason) – The arguer refutes the previous erroneous proposition, if it is not as I say, it can be like the inference you established. Then the 'pakshartha' (meaning of the thesis) should be divided into two parts as the 'hetu'. For example, establishing the thesis saying: 'Sound is impermanent,' sound is the 'dharmin', impermanence is the 'dharma', the 'dharma' and 'dharmin' are the 'pakshartha' to be established. If you say 'Sound is impermanent' (paksha), because it is sound (hetu). This is taking the 'dharmin' in the 'paksha' as the 'hetu', so it is the fault of taking one part of the two parts of the 'pakshartha' as the 'hetu'. You are the same. Previously, you established the inference saying that smoke is the 'dharmin', fire is the 'dharma', the 'dharma' and 'dharmin' together constitute the 'pakshartha'. You establish the 'hetu' saying because there is smoke, isn't it taking a part of the 'dharmin' 'pakshartha' as the 'hetu'? Another inference is established saying that this fire has hot touch, fire is the 'dharmin' part, hot touch is the 'dharma' part, the 'dharma' and 'dharmin' two parts together constitute the 'pakshartha'. Establishing the 'hetu' saying because there is heat, this is also taking a part of the 'dharmin' 'pakshartha' as the 'hetu', so it cannot be established. Because the two parts of the 'pakshartha' are what is to be established, the 'hetu' is what can establish, so it should not take a part of what is to be established as what can establish.

Argument: Also, regarding (this inference) there is the error of 'because' – The arguer refutes again. Also, in this inference, it is not intended to establish that fire has the nature of 'dharmin', and that hot touch has the nature of 'being'. Because everyone knows that fire and touch have substantiality. What is called establishing is the fault of establishing what has already been established. It is only because they do not understand that the place where the characteristic of fire and touch should rely has fire and touch, and then they say that establishing an inference establishes it.

Text: In (observing) there is the necessity of 'fault' – Also here, the arguer must observe the meaning of the previous opponent in order to establish something, such as a Buddhist disciple.

欲立聲是無常。要觀待前敵論人立聲是常故。方立無常。為所立法及有法也。言一切人既不格煙下有火無火。火復是熱。何得根即成宗。既要觀待他成所立。非如吠世德句有德句。不由觀待而成也。言有位者。即是實句義。能有德句故。德句是所有也。應言非如德有德。

論量頌(至)有法者　重說子頌。頌上義也。言有法非成有法者。謂不應以煙有法。成立火有法也。言及法者。亦不應以火有法。成立觸法也。其熱觸是火家一分義故是法也。其句上中上五字。貫通此法以及字及之。言此非成有法者。謂此法不應成有法也。即是上文。以余別法。成立最勝為有為無也。下兩句正義。謂但由因法。成立宗法。如是法與有法。既不相離。亦即成有法也。此是正義。了由因有所依故。如是以法成法時。亦兼成立有法。不可以法正成立有法。

論若有(至)宗法者　宗法有二。一不極成法。聲上無常。以聲論者不許故。此即宗是法。故言宗法。二極成法。即聲上所作性。在敵但許故。此宗家法。故名宗法。上成所明因法。在其宗有法上。名為宗法。今陳那既造論。所有古因明中。立量有隱伏者。並敘人言釋。故舉外人格云。如勝論師。對聲論者立宗云。聲非即常。立因云。業等應常故。謂第三業句行來俯仰。等者

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：欲立『聲是無常』（Shēng shì wúcháng，聲音是無常的）。需要觀察對待前敵論人，因為他們認為『聲是常』（Shēng shì cháng，聲音是常的）。所以才立『無常』（Wúcháng，無常）這個論點，作為所立法和有法。如果說一切人都不認可『煙下有火』（Yān xià yǒu huǒ，煙下有火）或者『無火』（Wú huǒ，無火），而且火又是熱的，那麼怎麼能以根作為宗呢？既然需要觀察對待他人才能成立所立，那就不同於吠世德句（Fèishìdé jù）和有德句（Yǒu dé jù），它們不需要觀察對待就能成立。所說的『有位者』（Yǒu wèi zhě），就是『實句義』（Shí jù yì，實在的句子意義），能夠成為『有德句』（Yǒu dé jù，具有屬性的句子），『德句』（Dé jù，屬性的句子）是所有。應該說『並非像德有德』（Bìngfēi xiàng dé yǒu dé，並非像屬性和具有屬性一樣）。

論量頌（Lùn liàng sòng）(至)有法者（Yǒu fǎ zhě）：重新解釋子頌。解釋頌文的含義。所說的『有法非成有法者』（Yǒu fǎ fēi chéng yǒu fǎ zhě），是指不應該以『煙有法』（Yān yǒu fǎ，具有煙的有法）來成立『火有法』（Huǒ yǒu fǎ，具有火的有法）。所說的『及法者』（Jí fǎ zhě），也不應該以『火有法』（Huǒ yǒu fǎ，具有火的有法）來成立『觸法』（Chù fǎ，觸覺的法）。因為熱觸是火家的一部分意義，所以是法。『其句上中上五字』（Qí jù shàng zhōng shàng wǔ zì），貫通此法以及『及』字所及之處。所說的『此非成有法者』（Cǐ fēi chéng yǒu fǎ zhě），是指此法不應該成立有法。這就是上文所說的，以其餘的別法，成立最勝為有為無。下面兩句是正義。意思是說，僅僅通過因法，成立宗法。像這樣，法和有法既然不相分離，也就成立了有法。這是正義。因為通過因可以知道有所依。像這樣以法成立法時，也兼顧成立有法。不可以法直接成立有法。

論若有（Lùn ruò yǒu）(至)宗法者（Zōng fǎ zhě）：宗法有兩種。一種是不極成法（Bù jíchéng fǎ），例如聲上無常（Shēng shàng wúcháng，聲音是無常的），因為聲論者不認可。這也就是宗是法，所以說是宗法。另一種是極成法（Jíchéng fǎ），例如聲上所作性（Shēng shàng suǒzuò xìng，聲音是所作性），在敵論者那裡是被認可的。這是宗家的法，所以叫做宗法。上面所說的成立所明因法，在宗的有法上，叫做宗法。現在陳那（Chénnà）既然造論，所有古代因明中，立量有隱伏的地方，都敘述人言來解釋。所以舉外道人格來說，例如勝論師（Shènglùn shī），對聲論者立宗說：『聲非即常』（Shēng fēi jí cháng，聲音並非永恒）。立因說：『業等應常故』（Yè děng yìng cháng gù，因為業等應該是常的）。這裡說的第三業句，指的是行走、來去、俯仰等等。

【English Translation】 English version: The proposition to be established is 'sound is impermanent' (Shēng shì wúcháng). It is necessary to observe and consider the opponent, because they believe 'sound is permanent' (Shēng shì cháng). Therefore, the proposition of 'impermanence' (Wúcháng) is established as the property to be proven and the subject possessing the property. If it is said that everyone does not accept 'fire under the smoke' (Yān xià yǒu huǒ) or 'no fire' (Wú huǒ), and fire is also hot, then how can the root become the thesis? Since it is necessary to observe and consider others to establish the proposition, it is different from the Vaisheshika sentence (Fèishìdé jù) and the attributive sentence (Yǒu dé jù), which can be established without observation and consideration. The so-called 'one who has a position' (Yǒu wèi zhě) is the 'meaning of a real sentence' (Shí jù yì), which can become an 'attributive sentence' (Yǒu dé jù), and the 'attribute sentence' (Dé jù) is the possessor. It should be said 'not like attribute and possessor of attribute' (Bìngfēi xiàng dé yǒu dé).

On the verse of inference (Lùn liàng sòng) (to) the subject possessing the property (Yǒu fǎ zhě): Re-explaining the sub-verse. Explaining the meaning of the verse. The so-called 'subject possessing the property is not to establish the subject possessing the property' (Yǒu fǎ fēi chéng yǒu fǎ zhě) means that one should not use 'smoke possessing the property' (Yān yǒu fǎ) to establish 'fire possessing the property' (Huǒ yǒu fǎ). The so-called 'and the property' (Jí fǎ zhě) also means that one should not use 'fire possessing the property' (Huǒ yǒu fǎ) to establish 'tangible property' (Chù fǎ). Because hot touch is a part of the meaning of the fire family, it is a property. 'The five characters above, middle, and above in the sentence' (Qí jù shàng zhōng shàng wǔ zì) connect this property and what is reached by the word 'and'. The so-called 'this is not to establish the subject possessing the property' (Cǐ fēi chéng yǒu fǎ zhě) means that this property should not establish the subject possessing the property. This is what was said above, using other separate properties to establish the most superior as existent or non-existent. The following two sentences are the correct meaning. It means that only through the reason property can the thesis property be established. In this way, since the property and the subject possessing the property are not separated, the subject possessing the property is also established. This is the correct meaning. Because it can be known that there is a basis through the reason. In this way, when establishing a property with a property, it also takes into account the establishment of the subject possessing the property. One cannot directly establish the subject possessing the property with a property.

On if there is (Lùn ruò yǒu) (to) the thesis property (Zōng fǎ zhě): There are two types of thesis properties. One is the unestablished property (Bù jíchéng fǎ), such as impermanence on sound (Shēng shàng wúcháng), because the sound theorists do not accept it. This is because the thesis is a property, so it is called the thesis property. The other is the established property (Jíchéng fǎ), such as the property of being produced on sound (Shēng shàng suǒzuò xìng), which is accepted by the opponent. This is the property of the thesis family, so it is called the thesis property. The above-mentioned establishment of the reason property to be proven, on the subject possessing the property of the thesis, is called the thesis property. Now that Chenna (Chénnà) has created the treatise, all the hidden places in the establishment of inference in ancient Hetu-vidya are explained by narrating people's words. Therefore, taking the personality of an outsider as an example, such as the Vaisheshika (Shènglùn shī), establishing the thesis to the sound theorists says: 'Sound is not permanent' (Shēng fēi jí cháng). Establishing the reason says: 'Because actions and so on should be permanent' (Yè děng yìng cháng gù). The third action sentence mentioned here refers to walking, coming and going, bowing and raising the head, and so on.

等取第二德句中者示法也。此業等應常之因。白是第三業句應常。不世第二德句聲上。此即非宗義之法。何得言宗家法故名宗法。又立因云。常應可得故。謂此聲應一切時。常應可得聞。如是常應可得義。于其聲上。無此因義。此自他俱不許。聲一切時中常為耳識可得。自是別明常應別得。非關聲事。可得言宗家法。複名宗法耶。

論此說(至)彼過者　述曰。此論主通難。此是勝論說。彼聲論過。由約因為門。及宗為門。以立論者。先有所立。復敵論者說。應言難也。示等應常。說應言故。故智是說彼過言也。以先聲論師。對勝論。立聲是常(宗)。無形質故(因)。猶如虛空(同喻)。后時勝論。約因宗門。以斥彼過。若汝言無形質為因。故德句中聲是常者。第三業句等亦形質。亦應是常也。又汝先立宗云。聲是其常。今又約彼宗門。以斥彼過云。聲若是常者。常應為耳識得。今既共不常聲。不常為耳識得故。故知聲非是常。

論若如是(至)云何者　此更舉外格云。如勝論對聲論。立聲是無常為宗。所作非常故為因。常非所作故為因。此之二因。俱不世聲宗之上。何得言宗家法故。名為宗法。故言此復云何。

論云是喻(至)無因故名　此下論主量人言通。如同所立所作非常故等。非因是喻

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『等取第二德句中者示法也』，這句話的意思是，從第二個德（guna）的句子中提取出來的內容，是爲了展示正法（dharma）。『此業等應常之因』，這種業（karma）等等應該是常（nitya）的原因。『白是第三業句應常』，白色是第三種業的句子，也應該是常。『不世第二德句聲上』，不在第二個德的句子聲音之上。『此即非宗義之法』，這並非宗義（siddhanta）之法。『何得言宗家法故名宗法』，怎麼能說因為是宗家的法，所以叫做宗法呢？又立因云：『常應可得故』，又設立論證說：『因為常應該是可以獲得的』。謂此聲應一切時，常應可得聞，意思是說，這個聲音應該在所有時間，常時可以被聽到。『如是常應可得義，于其聲上，無此因義』，像這樣常時可以獲得的意義，在聲音之上，沒有這種原因的意義。『此自他俱不許』，這個無論自己還是他人都不允許。『聲一切時中常為耳識可得』，聲音在所有時間中常常可以被耳識所獲得。『自是別明常應別得，非關聲事』，這只是分別說明常和應該分別獲得，與聲音的事情無關。『可得言宗家法，複名宗法耶』，可以獲得就說是宗家的法，又叫做宗法嗎？

論：『此說(至)彼過者』，述曰：此論主通難，這段話是論主的普遍責難。『此是勝論說，彼聲論過』，這是勝論（Vaisheshika）學派說的，聲論（Shabda）學派的過失。『由約因為門，及宗為門』，通過依據因（hetu）作為門徑，以及宗（paksha）作為門徑。『以立論者，先有所立，復敵論者說，應言難也』，因為立論者，先有所立論，然後敵論者說，應該進行詰難。『示等應常，說應言故』，展示等等應該是常，因為說了應該這樣說。『故智是說彼過言也』，所以智慧是說他們的過失的話。『以先聲論師，對勝論，立聲是常(宗)，無形質故(因)，猶如虛空(同喻)』，因為先前的聲論師，針對勝論學派，立論說聲音是常（宗），因為沒有形質（因），就像虛空（同喻）。『后時勝論，約因宗門，以斥彼過』，後來的勝論學派，依據因和宗的門徑，來駁斥他們的過失。『若汝言無形質為因，故德句中聲是常者，第三業句等亦形質，亦應是常也』，如果你們說沒有形質作為原因，所以在德的句子中聲音是常，那麼第三種業的句子等等也沒有形質，也應該是常。『又汝先立宗云，聲是其常，今又約彼宗門，以斥彼過云，聲若是常者，常應為耳識得，今既共不常聲，不常為耳識得故，故知聲非是常』，而且你們先前立宗說，聲音是常，現在又依據那個宗的門徑，來駁斥他們的過失說，聲音如果是常，那麼常應該被耳識所獲得，現在既然共同承認不常的聲音，不常被耳識所獲得，所以知道聲音不是常。

論：『若如是(至)云何者』，這段話是更進一步舉出外人的觀點說。『如勝論對聲論，立聲是無常為宗，所作非常故為因，常非所作故為因』，例如勝論學派針對聲論學派，立論說聲音是無常作為宗，因為所作的不是常作為因，常不是所作作為因。『此之二因，俱不世聲宗之上，何得言宗家法故，名為宗法』，這兩種原因，都不在聲音的宗之上，怎麼能說因為是宗家的法，所以叫做宗法呢？『故言此復云何』，所以說這又是什麼呢？

論：『云是喻(至)無因故名』，這段話是論主用量人的話來普遍說明。『如同所立所作非常故等，非因是喻』，如同所立的所作不是常等等，不是原因，是比喻。

【English Translation】 English version: '等取第二德句中者示法也' (Děng qǔ dì'èr dé jù zhōng zhě shì fǎ yě): 'Taking from the second guna (quality) sentence is to show the Dharma (law)'. '此業等應常之因' (Cǐ yè děng yìng cháng zhī yīn): 'This karma (action) etc. should be the cause of permanence (nitya)'. '白是第三業句應常' (Bái shì dì sān yè jù yìng cháng): 'Whiteness is the third karma sentence, it should also be permanent'. '不世第二德句聲上' (Bù shì dì'èr dé jù shēng shàng): 'Not on the sound of the second guna sentence'. '此即非宗義之法' (Cǐ jí fēi zōng yì zhī fǎ): 'This is not the Dharma of siddhanta (established doctrine)'. '何得言宗家法故名宗法' (Hé dé yán zōng jiā fǎ gù míng zōng fǎ): 'How can it be said that because it is the Dharma of the school, it is called the school's Dharma?' Also, establishing the reason says: '常應可得故' (Cháng yìng kě dé gù): 'Because permanence should be obtainable'. Meaning this sound should be constantly audible at all times. '如是常應可得義，于其聲上，無此因義' (Rú shì cháng yìng kě dé yì, yú qí shēng shàng, wú cǐ yīn yì): 'Like this meaning of permanence being obtainable, on the sound, there is no meaning of this cause'. '此自他俱不許' (Cǐ zì tā jù bù xǔ): 'This is not allowed by both self and others'. '聲一切時中常為耳識可得' (Shēng yīqiè shí zhōng cháng wèi ěr shí kě dé): 'Sound is constantly obtainable by ear consciousness at all times'. '自是別明常應別得，非關聲事' (Zì shì bié míng cháng yìng bié dé, fēi guān shēng shì): 'This is separately clarifying that permanence and should be separately obtained, it is not related to the matter of sound'. '可得言宗家法，複名宗法耶' (Kě dé yán zōng jiā fǎ, fù míng zōng fǎ yé): 'Can obtainable be said to be the school's Dharma, and again be called the school's Dharma?'

Treatise: '此說(至)彼過者' (Cǐ shuō (zhì) bǐ guò zhě), Commentary says: This treatise master universally criticizes. '此是勝論說，彼聲論過' (Cǐ shì Shèng Lùn shuō, bǐ Shēng Lùn guò): 'This is what the Vaisheshika school says, the fault of the Shabda school'. '由約因為門，及宗為門' (Yóu yuē yīn wèi mén, jí zōng wèi mén): 'Through relying on hetu (cause) as the gateway, and paksha (thesis) as the gateway'. '以立論者，先有所立，復敵論者說，應言難也' (Yǐ lìlùn zhě, xiān yǒu suǒ lì, fù dílùn zhě shuō, yìng yán nán yě): 'Because the establisher of the argument, first has something established, and then the opponent says, there should be a refutation'. '示等應常，說應言故' (Shì děng yìng cháng, shuō yìng yán gù): 'Showing etc. should be permanent, because it is said that it should be said'. '故智是說彼過言也' (Gù zhì shì shuō bǐ guò yán yě): 'Therefore, wisdom is saying their fault'. '以先聲論師，對勝論，立聲是常(宗)，無形質故(因)，猶如虛空(同喻)' (Yǐ xiān Shēng Lùn shī, duì Shèng Lùn, lì shēng shì cháng (zōng), wú xíngzhì gù (yīn), yóurú xūkōng (tóngyù)): 'Because the previous Shabda school, against the Vaisheshika school, established that sound is permanent (thesis), because it has no form (cause), like space (example)'. '后時勝論，約因宗門，以斥彼過' (Hòu shí Shèng Lùn, yuē yīn zōng mén, yǐ chì bǐ guò): 'Later, the Vaisheshika school, relying on the cause and thesis gateways, to refute their fault'. '若汝言無形質為因，故德句中聲是常者，第三業句等亦形質，亦應是常也' (Ruò rǔ yán wú xíngzhì wèi yīn, gù dé jù zhōng shēng shì cháng zhě, dì sān yè jù děng yì xíngzhì, yì yìng shì cháng yě): 'If you say that having no form is the cause, therefore the sound in the guna sentence is permanent, then the third karma sentence etc. also has no form, it should also be permanent'. '又汝先立宗云，聲是其常，今又約彼宗門，以斥彼過云，聲若是常者，常應為耳識得，今既共不常聲，不常為耳識得故，故知聲非是常' (Yòu rǔ xiān lì zōng yún, shēng shì qí cháng, jīn yòu yuē bǐ zōng mén, yǐ chì bǐ guò yún, shēng ruò shì cháng zhě, cháng yìng wèi ěr shí dé, jīn jì gòng bù cháng shēng, bù cháng wèi ěr shí dé gù, gù zhī shēng fēi shì cháng): 'Also, you previously established the thesis saying that sound is permanent, now again relying on that thesis gateway, to refute their fault saying that if sound is permanent, then permanence should be obtained by ear consciousness, now since it is commonly acknowledged that impermanent sound is not obtained by ear consciousness, therefore it is known that sound is not permanent'.

Treatise: '若如是(至)云何者' (Ruò rú shì (zhì) yúnhé zhě), This passage is further raising the view of outsiders. '如勝論對聲論，立聲是無常為宗，所作非常故為因，常非所作故為因' (Rú Shèng Lùn duì Shēng Lùn, lì shēng shì wúcháng wèi zōng, suǒ zuò fēicháng gù wèi yīn, cháng fēi suǒ zuò gù wèi yīn): 'For example, the Vaisheshika school against the Shabda school, established that sound is impermanent as the thesis, because what is made is not permanent as the cause, permanence is not what is made as the cause'. '此之二因，俱不世聲宗之上，何得言宗家法故，名為宗法' (Cǐ zhī èr yīn, jù bù shì shēng zōng zhī shàng, hé dé yán zōng jiā fǎ gù, míng wèi zōng fǎ): 'These two causes, are not on the sound thesis, how can it be said that because it is the school's Dharma, it is called the school's Dharma?' '故言此復云何' (Gù yán cǐ fù yúnhé): 'Therefore, it is said what is this again?'

Treatise: '云是喻(至)無因故名' (Yún shì yù (zhì) wú yīn gù míng), This passage is the treatise master using the words of measuring people to universally explain. '如同所立所作非常故等，非因是喻' (Rútóng suǒ lì suǒ zuò fēicháng gù děng, fēi yīn shì yù): 'Like what is established, what is made is not permanent etc., not the cause is the example'.

。然依第五持故聲。方便安立所作性因。所作非常故。謂法所作者。皆非是常故。如瓶盆等。是同品法喻。若法是常見應言者非因喻。然非所作。如虛空等。是異法喻。如其次第配也。宣說其因宗定隨遂。如犢子隨母。所作非常故。是同法喻。若宗無處合無因故。常非所作。故言是異法喻。

論以於此中(至)宗法者　此之二喻。實不世聲上。非宗家法。然以於此中喻中。由同喻合。方便顯示聲上有所作性因。謂法所作者。即是無常。聲既所作。故是無常也。彼立論者。文中雖不作此合意。亦有此合。故宗法因世聲宗上。如是由合喻顯聲定是所作性。非是非所作性故。此所作性。定是宗家法。故名宗法。

論量說(至)知因者　此本頌。初句頌前同喻。第二句頌前異喻依第五顯喻者。喻是初轉。𠆩聲前云所作非常故。非所作故者。其故字結喻因法。是第五持因聲。依此第五持因聲。說同喻異喻。故云顯喻。言由合故知因者。由同喻順合。由異喻返顯。方知其因。此即依因聲顯喻。借喻顯因也。又解。若依五分是無常(宗)。所作性故(因)。法所作者。皆是無常。猶如瓶等(喻)。聲既是所作(合喻同法)。是故無常(結)。今言由合故知因者。由第四分合喻故。智聲所作性因。文中雖不說因。以宗由合

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：然後依據第五種『持』（dharana）的緣故，宣說『聲』（shabda，聲音）是『方便安立所作性因』（upaya-sthāpita-kṛtakatva-hetu，通過方便設立的「所作性」之因）。因為『所作』（kṛtaka，被製造的）是『非常』（anitya，無常）的緣故。也就是說，凡是法（dharma，事物）被製造出來的，都不是常（nitya，恒常）的，比如瓶子、盆子等等，這是同品法喻（sapaksha-dharma-dṛṣṭānta，同類事物的例子）。如果某個法是常，應該說它不是因喻（hetu-dṛṣṭānta，作為理由的例子），然而它不是被製造的，比如虛空等等，這是異法喻（vipaksha-dharma-dṛṣṭānta，異類事物的例子），按照這樣的次序來配合。宣說它的因（hetu，理由）宗（paksha，論題）定（niyama，確定）隨遂（anvaya，隨順），就像小牛跟隨母牛一樣。『所作非常故』，這是同法喻。如果宗沒有可以結合的地方，就沒有因的緣故。『常非所作』，所以說是異法喻。論：因為在此之中（直到）宗法者。這兩個比喻，實際上不是『聲』（shabda，聲音）上的，不是宗家法（paksha-dharma，論題的性質）。然而在此比喻中，通過同喻的結合，方便地顯示『聲』上有所作性因。也就是說，凡是法被製造出來的，就是無常的，『聲』既然是被製造的，所以是無常的。那些立論者，在文中雖然沒有作出這樣的結合之意，也包含著這樣的結合。所以宗法因（paksha-dharma-hetu，論題性質的理由）在『聲』這個論題上，像這樣通過結合比喻顯示『聲』一定是所作性，而不是非所作性。因此，這個所作性，一定是宗家法，所以叫做宗法。論：量說（直到）知因者。這本頌，第一句頌揚前面的同喻，第二句頌揚前面的異喻。依據第五種顯喻者，比喻是初轉。在『聲』前面說『所作非常故』，『非所作故』，其中的『故』字總結了比喻的因法，是第五種持因聲。依據這第五種持因聲，說同喻異喻，所以叫做顯喻。說『由合故知因者』，通過同喻的順合，通過異喻的返顯，才能知道它的因。這就是依據因聲顯喻，借比喻顯因。又一種解釋，如果依據五分，是無常（宗），所作性故（因），法所作者，皆是無常，猶如瓶等（喻），『聲』既然是被製造的（合喻同法），所以是無常（結）。現在說『由合故知因者』，通過第四分的合喻，智慧之聲的所作性因，文中雖然沒有說因，以宗由合

【English Translation】 English version: Then, based on the fifth 'holding' (dharana), it is declared that 'sound' (shabda, voice) is the 'conveniently established cause of being made' (upaya-sthāpita-kṛtakatva-hetu, the cause of 'being made' established through skillful means). Because 'that which is made' (kṛtaka, manufactured) is 'impermanent' (anitya, transient). That is to say, whatever dharma (thing) is made is not permanent (nitya, eternal), such as pots, basins, etc., which are examples of similar-class dharma (sapaksha-dharma-dṛṣṭānta, examples of things of the same kind). If a certain dharma is permanent, it should be said that it is not a cause-example (hetu-dṛṣṭānta, an example serving as a reason), but it is not made, such as space, etc., which are examples of dissimilar-class dharma (vipaksha-dharma-dṛṣṭānta, examples of things of a different kind), arranged in that order. Declaring its cause (hetu, reason), thesis (paksha, topic), determination (niyama, certainty), and consequence (anvaya, following), like a calf following its mother. 'Because that which is made is impermanent,' this is a similar-dharma example. If the thesis has no place to combine, there is no cause. 'The permanent is not made,' so it is said to be a dissimilar-dharma example. Treatise: Because in this (until) the property of the thesis. These two metaphors are actually not on 'sound' (shabda, voice), not the property of the thesis (paksha-dharma, the nature of the topic). However, in this metaphor, through the combination of similar metaphors, it conveniently shows that there is a cause of being made on 'sound'. That is to say, whatever dharma is made is impermanent, and since 'sound' is made, it is impermanent. Those who establish the argument, although they do not make this combination of meanings in the text, also contain this combination. Therefore, the cause of the property of the thesis (paksha-dharma-hetu, the reason for the nature of the topic) on the thesis of 'sound', like this, through the combination of metaphors, shows that 'sound' must be the property of being made, not the property of not being made. Therefore, this property of being made must be the property of the thesis, so it is called the property of the thesis. Treatise: Measuring and saying (until) knowing the cause. This original verse, the first sentence praises the previous similar metaphor, and the second sentence praises the previous dissimilar metaphor. According to the fifth type of manifest metaphor, the metaphor is the first turn. In front of 'sound', it is said 'because that which is made is impermanent', 'because that which is not made', in which the word 'because' summarizes the cause-dharma of the metaphor, which is the fifth type of holding-cause sound. According to this fifth type of holding-cause sound, similar and dissimilar metaphors are spoken, so it is called manifest metaphor. Saying 'knowing the cause by combination', through the direct combination of similar metaphors, and through the reverse manifestation of dissimilar metaphors, one can know its cause. This is to manifest the metaphor according to the cause-sound, and to manifest the cause by borrowing the metaphor. Another explanation, if according to the five parts, it is impermanent (thesis), because of being made (cause), whatever dharma is made is impermanent, like a bottle, etc. (metaphor), since 'sound' is made (combining metaphor with the same dharma), therefore it is impermanent (conclusion). Now saying 'knowing the cause by combination', through the combination of the fourth part of the metaphor, the cause of the property of being made of the sound of wisdom, although the cause is not mentioned in the text, the thesis is combined

故。白智其因。故不說也。陳那已復法因明師云。第四合是量說第二因。第五結是量說第一宗故。復二分是前三分是前三分攝。

論由此(至)傍論者　由此前來順反三喻。乃得立義。即是已釋僧佉。唯立反喻方便立義不成也。如僧佉云。內身有我(宗)。以能自動搖及有心識故(因)。法不能動搖無心識者。必定無我。猶如樹木(異喻)。以無順喻故。唯以反破內身無我之異喻為方便。成立內身有我也。下指要論二喻事。以所作性因。于無常品見故。于常品不見故。具此二喻。方立義成。勝論對聲論云。如如是我成立聲非是常。若是常者。應非所作性也。以上成要論順反二喻。方得與決定余為因故。是故順成同喻。反破異喻。二種喻之方法。同爲一決定余非如數論。本唯以異喻。反破方便。為別生決定余因也。如我破數論。唯以異喻。成立有我。反破方便之因。如我造破數論。論有六千頌。我已廣辨。數論唯立返破方便。為別解因過故。今於此論中。且止廣諦倍論也。

造數論師。是黃頭仙人。本音劫比羅。此云黃。以頭面黃口也。舊云迦毗羅。音訛也。此師立二十五諦義。付樂弟子訖欲入真。弟子請云。師可留身常住在世。復人若有不信二十五信。現身為說。其教即可常行。師云可爾。為實一大石作

【現代漢語翻譯】故，因為明白其中的原因，所以不說。陳那（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家）已經恢復了法稱（Dharmakīrti，古印度佛教邏輯學家）的因明學說，認為第四部分『合』是量式中說明第二『因』，第五部分『結』是量式中說明第一『宗』。因此，后兩部分包含於前三部分之中。

論：由此（至）傍論者。由此處所說的順喻、反喻和三喻，才能成立論義。這實際上已經解釋了僧佉派（Sāṃkhya，古印度哲學流派）的觀點，即僅僅依靠反喻無法成立論義。例如，僧佉派認為：『內身有我（Ātman，靈魂）（宗），因為能夠自動搖動以及有心識（因）。凡是不能動搖且沒有心識的事物，必定沒有我，例如樹木（異喻）。』因為沒有順喻，所以僅僅以反駁內身無我的異喻作為方便，來成立內身有我。下面指向要論中關於二喻的事情。以『所作性』（Kṛtakatva，被製造的性質）作為因，在無常的事物中可以見到，在常的事物中則見不到，具備這兩種比喻，才能成立論義。勝論派（Vaiśeṣika，古印度哲學流派）針對聲論派（Śabda，聲音的理論）說：『正如我成立聲音不是常住的，如果聲音是常住的，就不應該是被製造的。』以上說明要論中順喻和反喻兩種比喻，才能作為決定性的原因。因此，順喻成立同喻，反喻破斥異喻，這兩種比喻的方法，共同構成一個決定性的原因，而不是像數論派那樣，僅僅以異喻反駁作為方便，來產生不同的決定性原因。例如我破斥數論派，僅僅以異喻成立有我，反駁方便之因。如我所造的《破數論》，論中有六千頌，我已經廣泛辨析。數論派僅僅立足於反駁方便，作為區分理解的原因，所以存在過失。現在在此論中，暫且停止對廣諦倍論的詳細論述。

創造數論的論師，是黃頭仙人，本名劫比羅（Kapila，數論派的創始人），這裡稱他為『黃』，是因為他的頭面是黃色的。舊譯為迦毗羅，是音譯的訛誤。這位論師建立了二十五諦的義理，交付給弟子樂（Āsuri，阿修利）后想要進入真理。弟子請求說：『老師可以留下身體，常住在世間，如果有人不相信二十五諦，您可以現身說法，這樣您的教義就可以長久流傳。』老師說：『可以。』於是用一塊巨大的石頭作為...

【English Translation】 Therefore, because he understands the reasons, he does not explain it. Dignāga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) has already restored Dharmakīrti's (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) Hetuvidyā (science of reasoning), stating that the fourth part, 『Synthesis,』 is the statement of the second 『Reason』 in the syllogism, and the fifth part, 『Conclusion,』 is the statement of the first 『Thesis』 in the syllogism. Thus, the latter two parts are included within the former three parts.

Treatise: From 『Therefore』 to 『Side Discussions.』 Only through the direct, indirect, and three analogies mentioned here can a thesis be established. This actually explains the view of the Sāṃkhya school (an ancient Indian philosophical school), that a thesis cannot be established solely through indirect analogy. For example, the Sāṃkhya school argues: 『The inner self possesses Ātman (soul) (Thesis), because it can move autonomously and has consciousness (Reason). Whatever cannot move and lacks consciousness certainly does not have Ātman, like trees (Dissimilar Example).』 Because there is no direct analogy, they only use the indirect analogy of refuting the absence of Ātman in the inner self as a means to establish the presence of Ātman in the inner self. The following refers to the matter of two analogies in the essential treatise. Using 『Kṛtakatva』 (the property of being created) as the reason, it can be seen in impermanent things but not in permanent things. Only by possessing these two analogies can a thesis be established. The Vaiśeṣika school (an ancient Indian philosophical school) argues against the Śabda school (the theory of sound): 『Just as I establish that sound is not permanent, if sound were permanent, it should not be created.』 The above illustrates that only the direct and indirect analogies in the essential treatise can serve as a decisive reason. Therefore, the direct analogy establishes similarity, and the indirect analogy refutes dissimilarity. These two methods of analogy together constitute a decisive reason, unlike the Sāṃkhya school, which only uses indirect analogy as a means of refutation to generate different decisive reasons. For example, I refute the Sāṃkhya school by only establishing the existence of Ātman through indirect analogy, refuting the reason of means. As in my work 『Refutation of Sāṃkhya,』 which contains six thousand verses, I have extensively analyzed it. The Sāṃkhya school only relies on refuting means as a reason for distinguishing understanding, thus having faults. Now, in this treatise, I will temporarily cease detailed discussion of the extensive theory of principles.

The teacher who created the Sāṃkhya theory is the Yellow-Headed Immortal, whose original name was Kapila (the founder of the Sāṃkhya school). He is called 『Yellow』 here because his head and face are yellow. The old translation as Kāpilā is a transliteration error. This teacher established the doctrine of the twenty-five principles and, after entrusting it to his disciple Āsuri (阿修利), desired to enter into truth. The disciple requested: 『Teacher, may you leave your body and reside permanently in the world. If someone does not believe in the twenty-five principles, you can appear and explain them, so that your teachings can be perpetuated.』 The teacher said: 『It is possible.』 So he used a large stone as...

琉璃。可數丈許。隱身在中。設人請者。時為現身。后至陳那出世。造傳佉論。弟子不師救。仰推其陳。師那往其石所。書破二十五諦義。于其石上以封其上。經宿必重救之。陳那重破。復若不救。方出為論。如是立破。有六千偈。具破二十五諦訖。其石大吼。今言破數論者。指彼所造六千偈。破僧佉論。

論如是宗法(至)及家者　宗法有二。一不極成法。謂聲上無常法。二極成法。謂聲上所化性。今牒上來所羅極成法。即是因法。故言如是宗法也。此因有三種差別。一謂同品中有。二同品中非有。三同品中通有非有。故言及俱。若不置及字。恐其有與非有。即且為但。若安及字。即愿有非有外別有其俱。然先頌中但言宗法。于同品謂有非有俱。以頌迮故。先頌中除及字。今長行中方置。

論此中(至)異品者　上來已辨宗法故。此下但釋同品名也。言此中者。謂宗法中。若品者。品謂品別。如瓶聲等是。宗法無常。所依品別也。言與所立法鄰近均等說名同品者。若瓶品上無常。與聲上所主無常法相似。故各鄰近均等。故說瓶為同品類也。以一切體義皆名品別故也。若於空等品別法法上。所立無常宗無。說名異品也。

論非與(至)或異者　此下牒古師破。古因明師。釋異品名。兩師不同。初師

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：琉璃（Lapis Lazuli，一種寶石）。大約有數丈高。有人隱身在其中。如果有人祈請，（琉璃）會適時顯現身形。後來到了陳那（Dignāga，佛教邏輯學家）出世，造了《傳佉論》（Saṃkhyā-karika，數論頌）的註釋。他的弟子不師救（Buddhaśānta，佛教論師）仰慕推崇陳那。陳那前往那塊石頭所在之處，在石頭上書寫了破斥二十五諦（Tattvas，數論的二十五個基本原理）的義理，並封蓋其上。經過一夜，不師救必定會重新救護（數論）。陳那再次破斥，如果（不師救）不能救護，才將（破斥之論）發表出來。像這樣立論和破斥，有六千頌偈。完全破斥了二十五諦之後，那塊石頭發出巨大的吼聲。現在所說的破斥數論者，就是指陳那所造的六千頌偈，用以破斥僧佉論（Saṃkhya，數論）。

論：『如是宗法（至）及家者』。宗法有兩種。一是『不極成法』，例如聲音上的無常法。二是『極成法』，例如聲音上的所化性。現在引用上面所說的極成法，就是因法。所以說『如是宗法』。這個因有三種差別。一是『同品中有』，二是『同品中非有』，三是『同品中通有非有』。所以說『及俱』。如果不加『及』字，恐怕（人們認為）有與非有，就僅僅是『但』。如果加上『及』字，就希望在有和非有之外，另外有『俱』。然而，先前的頌文中只說了『宗法』，對於同品，說了有、非有、俱。因為頌文簡略的緣故。先前的頌文中省略了『及』字，現在長行中才加上。

論：『此中（至）異品者』。上面已經辨明了宗法，下面只是解釋同品的名稱。『此中』，指的是宗法中。『若品者』，品指的是品類差別，例如瓶子、聲音等。宗法無常，所依賴的品類差別。『與所立法鄰近均等說名同品者』，例如瓶子的品類上的無常，與聲音上的所主無常法相似。所以各自鄰近均等。所以說瓶子是同品類。因為一切體義都叫做品類差別。如果在空等品類差別法法上，所立的無常宗不存在，就叫做異品。

論：『非與（至）或異者』。下面是引用古代論師的破斥。古代因明論師解釋異品的名稱。兩位論師的觀點不同。最初的論師

【English Translation】 English version: Lapis Lazuli (a gemstone). It is about several 'zhang' (丈, a unit of length) tall. Someone hides inside it. If someone prays, it will appear at the right time. Later, when Dignāga (陳那, a Buddhist logician) appeared in the world, he created a commentary on the Saṃkhyā-karika (傳佉論, the Verses on Saṃkhya). His disciple Buddhaśānta (不師救, a Buddhist commentator) admired and revered Dignāga. Dignāga went to the place where the stone was located, wrote on the stone the meaning of refuting the twenty-five Tattvas (二十五諦, the twenty-five fundamental principles of Saṃkhya), and sealed it. After one night, Buddhaśānta would definitely try to save (Saṃkhya). Dignāga refuted it again, and if (Buddhaśānta) could not save it, he would publish (the refutation). In this way, establishing and refuting, there were six thousand verses. After completely refuting the twenty-five Tattvas, the stone roared loudly. The so-called refuter of Saṃkhya now refers to the six thousand verses created by Dignāga to refute the Saṃkhya school (僧佉論).

Treatise: 'Such as the property of the subject (up to) and both.' There are two kinds of properties of the subject. One is 'unestablished property' (不極成法), such as impermanence on sound. The other is 'established property' (極成法), such as the quality of being produced on sound. Now, quoting the established property mentioned above is the reason. Therefore, it is said 'such as the property of the subject.' This reason has three kinds of differences. One is 'present in similar instances' (同品中有), the second is 'not present in similar instances' (同品中非有), and the third is 'sometimes present and sometimes not present in similar instances' (同品中通有非有). Therefore, it is said 'and both' (及俱). If the word 'and' (及) is not added, it is feared that (people will think) presence and absence are merely 'only' (但). If the word 'and' is added, it is hoped that besides presence and absence, there is also 'both' (俱). However, the previous verse only mentioned 'property of the subject,' and for similar instances, it mentioned presence, absence, and both. This is because the verse was concise. The word 'and' was omitted in the previous verse, and now it is added in the prose.

Treatise: 'In this (up to) dissimilar instances.' Above, the property of the subject has been clarified, and below is only an explanation of the name of similar instances. 'In this' refers to the property of the subject. 'If instances' (若品者), instances refer to the difference in categories, such as a pot, sound, etc. The property of the subject is impermanent, and the difference in categories it relies on. 'Saying that what is close and equal to the established property is called similar instances' (與所立法鄰近均等說名同品者), for example, the impermanence on the category of a pot is similar to the impermanent property of what is established on sound. Therefore, they are close and equal to each other. Therefore, it is said that a pot is a similar category. Because all substantial meanings are called differences in categories. If the established impermanent subject does not exist on the differences in categories of emptiness, etc., it is called dissimilar instances.

Treatise: 'Not with (up to) or different.' Below is a quotation of the refutation by ancient teachers. Ancient logicians explained the name of dissimilar instances. The views of the two teachers are different. The first teacher

云。如立聲是無常。以瓶等為同品。空等為異品。其空等上。能違害宗。及同品上無常。說名相違。此相違說名異品。猶如怨家相害。名為相違。及至暖為宗。則以詮為相違為異名。第二師云。如立聲是無常。但非無常已外一切皆名異品。今論主余。若所立無常宗無處。即名異品。不同初師與同品相違。復師與宗異故。名為異品。故言非與同品相違式異也。

論若相違者應唯簡別者　如雲此更有暖(宗)以有火故(因)。諸有火處悉皆有暖猶如廚上(喻)。諸無火處並皆無暖(異)。此是正立。若云此處有暖(宗)。以有火故(因)。猶如廚(喻)。若有冷處即無有火。如宙山處。此以有冷處。違有暖處。為異喻故。此應唯簡別異法喻。異同法喻而已。其異喻不能返顯宗定隨因事其云何。若對暖宗。以冷違暖為異法喻者。其非冷暖處。不知定屬所品若雖有暖同喻。其非冷暖處。即無有火。若準相違異喻。諸有冷處。即無有火。其中庸處。既非有冷。復應有火。異喻乃返合有火雲因成不定過。為如廚上有火處。以有火故有暖耶。為如中庸處火故無暖耶。其有火之因不定故。不能定證有暖也。若不以與有暖相違。唯以有證為異法喻者。便無有火之因不定過也。若言諸無火處即無有暖者。其詮處故中庸處並無有火。皆

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：云：如果立聲是無常的，那麼以瓶子等作為同品（Sapaksha，相似的例子），以空等作為異品（Vipaksha，不相似的例子）。在空等異品上，能夠違害宗（Paksha，論題），以及同品上的無常，這被稱為相違（Viruddha，矛盾）。這種相違被稱為異品，就像怨家互相傷害一樣，被稱為相違。以及以暖為宗（Paksha，論題），那麼以詮為相違，作為異名。第二位老師說：如果立聲是無常的，那麼除了無常以外的一切都被稱為異品。現在論主說，如果所立的無常宗沒有處所，那麼就被稱為異品，不同於第一位老師所說的與同品相違。另外的老師說，因為與宗不同，所以被稱為異品，所以說不是與同品相違的樣式。\n\n論：如果相違，那麼應該只簡別異法喻（Vaidharmya-drishtanta，通過不同性質來例證）嗎？例如說：此處更有暖（宗，Paksha），因為有火的緣故（因，Hetu）。凡是有火的地方都有暖，就像廚房裡一樣（喻，Drishtanta）。凡是沒有火的地方都沒有暖（異，Vaidharmya）。這是正確的立論。如果說：此處有暖（宗，Paksha），因為有火的緣故（因，Hetu），就像廚房一樣（喻，Drishtanta）。如果有冷的地方就沒有火，就像宙山處。這是以有冷的地方，違背有暖的地方，作為異喻的緣故。這應該只簡別異法喻，異同法喻而已。這個異喻不能反過來顯示宗的確定性，隨因的事情是什麼呢？如果針對暖宗，以冷違背暖作為異法喻，那麼非冷非暖的地方，不知道確定屬於哪個品類。如果雖然有暖的同喻，但是非冷非暖的地方，就沒有火。如果按照相違的異喻，凡是有冷的地方，就沒有火。那麼中庸的地方，既然不是有冷，就應該有火。異喻就反過來結合有火，說因成為不定過（Anityata，不確定性）。就像廚房裡有火的地方，因為有火的緣故就有暖嗎？就像中庸的地方有火的緣故就沒有暖嗎？因為有火的因是不確定的，所以不能確定地證明有暖。如果不以與有暖相違，只以有證作為異法喻，那麼就沒有有火的因不定過。如果說凡是沒有火的地方就沒有暖，那麼詮處的中庸之處都沒有火，都 English version: It is said: If sound is asserted to be impermanent, then examples like 'jar' are considered similar instances (Sapaksha), and examples like 'space' are considered dissimilar instances (Vipaksha). In the case of dissimilar instances like 'space', that which can contradict the thesis (Paksha), as well as the impermanence in similar instances, is called contradiction (Viruddha). This contradiction is called a dissimilar instance, just as enemies harming each other are called contradiction. And if 'warmth' is the thesis (Paksha), then 'expression' is the contradiction, serving as a different name. The second teacher says: If sound is asserted to be impermanent, then everything other than impermanence is called a dissimilar instance. Now, the author of the treatise says that if the asserted impermanent thesis has no location, then it is called a dissimilar instance, different from what the first teacher said about contradicting similar instances. Another teacher says that because it is different from the thesis, it is called a dissimilar instance, so it is said that it is not a form of contradicting similar instances.\n\nArgument: If there is contradiction, should one only distinguish the example of differing properties (Vaidharmya-drishtanta)? For example, saying: 'There is warmth here (thesis, Paksha) because there is fire (reason, Hetu). Wherever there is fire, there is warmth, like in the kitchen (example, Drishtanta). Wherever there is no fire, there is no warmth (dissimilar instance, Vaidharmya).' This is a correct assertion. If one says: 'There is warmth here (thesis, Paksha) because there is fire (reason, Hetu), like in the kitchen (example, Drishtanta). If there is cold, there is no fire, like in the Joushan mountain.' This is because the place with cold contradicts the place with warmth, serving as a dissimilar example. This should only distinguish the example of differing properties, and the example of differing and similar properties. This dissimilar example cannot conversely show the certainty of the thesis; what is the matter of following the reason? If, regarding the thesis of warmth, cold is used to contradict warmth as a dissimilar example, then it is not known to which category the places that are neither cold nor warm certainly belong. If there is a similar example of warmth, but the places that are neither cold nor warm do not have fire. If according to the contradictory dissimilar example, wherever there is cold, there is no fire. Then the neutral places, since they are not cold, should have fire. The dissimilar example then conversely combines with fire, saying that the reason becomes an uncertain fallacy (Anityata). Is it like in the kitchen, where there is fire because there is fire, there is warmth? Is it like in the neutral place, where there is fire, there is no warmth? Because the reason of having fire is uncertain, it cannot certainly prove that there is warmth. If one does not use that which contradicts warmth, but only uses the evidence as a dissimilar example, then there is no fallacy of the reason of having fire being uncertain. If one says that wherever there is no fire, there is no warmth, then the neutral places of expression do not have fire, all

【English Translation】 Cloud. If establishing sound as impermanent, then using 'jar' etc. as similar instances (Sapaksha). Using 'space' etc. as dissimilar instances (Vipaksha). On those dissimilar instances like 'space', that which can contradict the thesis (Paksha), and the impermanence on similar instances, is called contradiction (Viruddha). This contradiction is called a dissimilar instance, just as enemies harming each other is called contradiction. And if warmth is the thesis (Paksha), then using 'expression' as contradiction is a different name. The second teacher says, if establishing sound as impermanent, then everything outside of impermanence is called a dissimilar instance. Now the treatise master says, if the established impermanent thesis has no place, then it is called a dissimilar instance, different from the first teacher's saying of contradicting similar instances. Another teacher says, because it is different from the thesis, it is called a dissimilar instance, so it is said that it is not a form of contradicting similar instances. Argument: If there is contradiction, should one only distinguish the example of differing properties (Vaidharmya-drishtanta)? For example, saying: 'There is warmth here (thesis, Paksha) because there is fire (reason, Hetu). Wherever there is fire, there is warmth, like in the kitchen (example, Drishtanta). Wherever there is no fire, there is no warmth (dissimilar instance, Vaidharmya).' This is a correct assertion. If one says: 'There is warmth here (thesis, Paksha) because there is fire (reason, Hetu), like in the kitchen (example, Drishtanta). If there is cold, there is no fire, like in the Joushan mountain.' This is because the place with cold contradicts the place with warmth, serving as a dissimilar example. This should only distinguish the example of differing properties, and the example of differing and similar properties. This dissimilar example cannot conversely show the certainty of the thesis; what is the matter of following the reason? If, regarding the thesis of warmth, cold is used to contradict warmth as a dissimilar example, then it is not known to which category the places that are neither cold nor warm certainly belong. If there is a similar example of warmth, but the places that are neither cold nor warm do not have fire. If according to the contradictory dissimilar example, wherever there is cold, there is no fire. Then the neutral places, since they are not cold, should have fire. The dissimilar example then conversely combines with fire, saying that the reason becomes an uncertain fallacy (Anityata). Is it like in the kitchen, where there is fire because there is fire, there is warmth? Is it like in the neutral place, where there is fire, there is no warmth? Because the reason of having fire is uncertain, it cannot certainly prove that there is warmth. If one does not use that which contradicts warmth, but only uses the evidence as a dissimilar example, then there is no fallacy of the reason of having fire being uncertain. If one says that wherever there is no fire, there is no warmth, then the neutral places of expression do not have fire, all

為異品故。今其有火之因。定愿有暖故。其有火因。無不定過也。

論若別異者應無有因者　此下破第二師。若汝以與宗異故名異品者。應無有決定正因也。何者。如立聲是無常。即聲上無我。與無常宗異。則是異品。然所作性因。于無我異品義中有。若爾此因便是不定因。以于異品有故便無。唯同品有異品無。故此決定因無有也。

論由此(至)違故者　由所立無處。是異品道理故。其所作性因。能正成無常。傍成無我及宮。故言等也。如言聲是無我。所作性故。如瓶等是。即此亦成立聲是無我。以所作性。與無我宗。不相違故。亦可無我與無常。相不違故。得同以所作性為因也。何者。即聲無有常我可得故。亦得言無常亦得言無我。以一切無常法皆無我故。故不相違也。此意欲顯法無常處。名為異品其無我不得名異品也。以即聲亦無我。非離無常處。亦于無我。有此因故。又釋。其所作性因。能正成無常。即不同相違名異品。彼不能正成故。何者。如聲是無常。所作性故。其虛空等常。是相違名異品。此相違異品。不能正顯聲是無常。以不簡別因故。謂于非相違菟角等中。猶格有因故。若如我釋。所立無處。名為異品。亦即簡去其因。即顯彼所作性。正能成無常也。其所作性。正能成無常也。其所作

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：因為是不同的類別，現在它有火的起因，必定是因為想要有溫暖的緣故。如果它有火的起因，沒有不普遍存在的。

論：如果認為是不同的，就應該沒有原因。以下是駁斥第二位老師的觀點。如果你因為與宗義不同而稱之為不同的類別，那麼就應該沒有確定的正因。為什麼呢？例如，如果立論『聲音是無常的』，那麼在聲音上就沒有『我』。與『無常』這個宗義不同，那就是不同的類別。然而，『所作性』這個因，在『無我』這個不同的類別中是存在的。如果這樣，這個因就是不確定的因，因為它在不同的類別中存在。因此，就缺少了唯有在相同類別中存在，而在不同類別中不存在的特性，所以這個確定的因是不存在的。

論：由此（到）違背的緣故。由於所立的沒有之處，是不同類別的道理，所以『所作性』這個因，能夠正確地成立『無常』，同時也能旁證『無我』以及宮殿等，所以說『等』。例如，說『聲音是無我的，因為是所作性』，就像瓶子等一樣。這也能成立『聲音是無我的』，因為『所作性』與『無我』這個宗義不相違背。也可以說『無我』與『無常』不相違背，因此可以同樣以『所作性』作為原因。為什麼呢？因為在聲音中沒有常『我』可以得到，所以也可以說『無常』，也可以說『無我』，因為一切無常的法都是無我的，所以不相違背。這裡的意思是想要表明，法無常的地方，可以稱為不同的類別，但無我不能稱為不同的類別。因為聲音也是無我的，並非脫離無常之處，也在無我中存在這個原因。另一種解釋是，『所作性』這個因，能夠正確地成立『無常』，即不同於相違背的稱為不同的類別，因為它不能正確地成立。為什麼呢？例如，『聲音是無常的，因為是所作性』，而虛空等是常的，這是相違背的，稱為不同的類別。這種相違背的不同類別，不能正確地顯示聲音是無常的，因為它沒有區分原因。也就是說，在非相違背的兔角等中，仍然有原因存在。如果像我解釋的那樣，所立的沒有之處，稱為不同的類別，也就排除了那個原因，即顯示了那個『所作性』，真正能夠成立『無常』。那個『所作性』，真正能夠成立『無常』。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of being a different category, now it has the cause of fire, certainly because it desires to have warmth. If it has the cause of fire, there is nothing that is not universally present.

Treatise: If it is considered different, then there should be no cause. The following refutes the view of the second teacher. If you call it a different category because it is different from the tenet, then there should be no definite valid reason. Why? For example, if the proposition is 'sound is impermanent,' then there is no 'self' on sound. Being different from the tenet of 'impermanence,' it is a different category. However, the cause of 'being produced' exists in the different category of 'no-self.' If so, this cause is an uncertain cause, because it exists in the different category. Therefore, it lacks the characteristic of existing only in the same category and not existing in the different category, so this definite cause does not exist.

Treatise: From this (to) the reason of contradiction. Because the place where the established is absent is the reason for being a different category, the cause of 'being produced' can correctly establish 'impermanence,' and can also indirectly prove 'no-self' and palaces, etc., hence the word 'etc.' For example, saying 'sound is no-self, because it is produced,' like a bottle, etc. This can also establish 'sound is no-self,' because 'being produced' is not contradictory to the tenet of 'no-self.' It can also be said that 'no-self' is not contradictory to 'impermanence,' so it can also use 'being produced' as the cause. Why? Because there is no permanent 'self' to be found in sound, so it can also be said 'impermanent,' and it can also be said 'no-self,' because all impermanent dharmas are no-self, so they are not contradictory. The intention here is to show that the place where dharma is impermanent can be called a different category, but no-self cannot be called a different category. Because sound is also no-self, it is not separated from the place of impermanence, and this cause also exists in no-self. Another explanation is that the cause of 'being produced' can correctly establish 'impermanence,' which is different from calling contradictory things different categories, because it cannot correctly establish it. Why? For example, 'sound is impermanent, because it is produced,' while emptiness, etc., is permanent, which is contradictory, and is called a different category. This contradictory different category cannot correctly show that sound is impermanent, because it does not distinguish the cause. That is to say, in non-contradictory rabbit horns, etc., there is still a cause. If I explain it like this, the place where the established is absent is called a different category, which also excludes that cause, which shows that 'being produced' can truly establish 'impermanence.' That 'being produced' can truly establish 'impermanence.'

性。若傍成無常。即不同復師與宗異故。名為異品。若與宗異。名則異品。至無我亦與無常異。亦即異品。凡異品中。即無有所作性。若爾其所作性因。即不能傍證無我。若如我釋。所立無處。因遍非有。其聲亦無我。亦是所立無處。以無常法必無我故。是故所作性因。亦能傍成無我。言不相違者。同前二解也。所言等者等取宮。以道諦非者而是所作性故。

論若法(至)似因者　此舉相違因過。顯所作性證無常。及傍成無我等無有過也。言若法者。謂因法也。若因能成相違所立者。如立言眼等必為他用。即以積聚性故為因。以臥具為同喻。今積聚性因。亦聲成立。所立眼等。必為積聚他用。即此積聚他用。是其所立。一即此所立前無積聚他用宗。正相違故。名為相違。其積聚性因。與此相違所立為因。故言若法能成相違所立。如此是相違過名似因也。

論如無違法相違亦爾者　此出相違過也。謂僧佉本立。必為他用為正宗。以積聚性為正因。本所立宗。名為無違。其積聚因。正能成立無違宗故。名無違法。即此積聚性因。不但成無違宗。亦能傍成眼等。必為積聚他用。即此積聚他用。即此積聚他用。是其所立。與前必為他用宗相返。故名相違亦爾。得宗名為相違。當知前宗名無違也。以非得故。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『性』。如果旁證『無常』，就與『復師』（重複的老師）和『宗異』（宗派差異）不同，因此稱為『異品』。如果與『宗』不同，則名稱為『異品』。至於『無我』也與『無常』不同，也屬於『異品』。凡是在『異品』中，就沒有『所作性』。如果這樣，那麼『所作性』這個『因』，就不能旁證『無我』。如果像我解釋的那樣，所立的『無處』，『因』普遍不存在。聲音也是『無我』，也是所立的『無處』。因為『無常』的法必定『無我』。因此，『所作性』這個『因』，也能旁證『無我』。說『不相違』，與前面的兩種解釋相同。所說的『等』，包括宮殿，因為『道諦』不是『非』，而是『所作性』。

論：如果法（到）似因者。這裡舉出『相違因』的過失，顯示『所作性』證明『無常』，以及旁證『無我』等沒有過失。所說的『如果法』，是指『因法』。如果『因』能成立與所立相反的結論，例如立論說眼睛等必定為他人所用，以『積聚性』為『因』，以臥具為同喻。現在『積聚性』這個『因』，也成立聲音等，所立的眼睛等，必定為積聚的他物所用。這個『積聚他用』，就是所立的結論。這個所立的結論之前沒有『積聚他用』的『宗』，與正宗相反，因此稱為『相違』。『積聚性』這個『因』，與這個相反的所立結論作為『因』，所以說『如果法能成立相反的所立』。這種情況是『相違』的過失，稱為『似因』。

論：如無違法相違亦爾者。這裡指出『相違』的過失。僧佉派原本立論，必定為他人所用為正宗，以『積聚性』為正因。原本所立的『宗』，稱為『無違』。『積聚因』，正好能成立『無違宗』，因此稱為『無違法』。這個『積聚性』的『因』，不僅能成立『無違宗』，也能旁證眼睛等，必定為積聚的他物所用。這個『積聚他用』，就是所立的結論，與前面『必定為他人所用』的『宗』相反，因此稱為『相違』。得到『宗』，稱為『相違』。應當知道前面的『宗』稱為『無違』。因為不是得到（相違的結論）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Nature'. If it indirectly proves 'impermanence' (anitya), it is different from 'repeating teachers' (punarukta-acharya) and 'sectarian differences' (sampradaya-bheda), hence it is called 'dissimilar class' (vipaksa). If it is different from the 'thesis' (paksa), then the name is 'dissimilar class'. As for 'no-self' (anatman), it is also different from 'impermanence', and it also belongs to the 'dissimilar class'. In all 'dissimilar classes', there is no 'produced nature' (krtakatva). If so, then the 'reason' (hetu) of 'produced nature' cannot indirectly prove 'no-self'. If it is as I explain, the established 'no place' (asiddha-desa), the 'reason' is universally non-existent. Sound is also 'no-self', and it is also the established 'no place'. Because the 'dharma' (law) of 'impermanence' must be 'no-self'. Therefore, the 'reason' of 'produced nature' can also indirectly prove 'no-self'. Saying 'not contradictory' is the same as the previous two explanations. The 'etc.' includes palaces, because 'path truth' (marga-satya) is not 'non-', but 'produced nature'.

Treatise: If a dharma (to) resembles a reason. This cites the fault of 'contradictory reason' (viruddha-hetu), showing that 'produced nature' proving 'impermanence', and indirectly proving 'no-self', etc., have no fault. The 'if a dharma' refers to the 'reason dharma'. If the 'reason' can establish a conclusion contradictory to what is established, such as arguing that eyes, etc., must be used by others, with 'accumulated nature' (samudaya-dharma) as the 'reason', and bedding as the similar example. Now, the 'reason' of 'accumulated nature' also establishes sounds, etc., and the established eyes, etc., must be used by accumulated others. This 'accumulated other use' is the established conclusion. This established conclusion previously had no 'accumulated other use' 'thesis', which is contrary to the correct thesis, hence it is called 'contradictory'. The 'reason' of 'accumulated nature' takes this contradictory established conclusion as the 'reason', so it says 'if a dharma can establish a contradictory established conclusion'. This situation is the fault of 'contradictory', called 'resembling reason' (hetvabhasa).

Treatise: Like non-violation, contradiction is also like this. This points out the fault of 'contradiction'. The Samkhya school originally argued that it must be used by others as the correct thesis, with 'accumulated nature' as the correct reason. The originally established 'thesis' is called 'non-violation' (anupalabdhi). The 'accumulated reason' can exactly establish the 'non-violation thesis', hence it is called 'non-violation dharma'. This 'reason' of 'accumulated nature' can not only establish the 'non-violation thesis', but also indirectly prove that eyes, etc., must be used by accumulated others. This 'accumulated other use' is the established conclusion, which is contrary to the previous 'thesis' of 'must be used by others', hence it is called 'contradiction'. Obtaining the 'thesis' is called 'contradiction'. It should be known that the previous 'thesis' is called 'non-violation'. Because it is not obtaining (a contradictory conclusion).

論所成立法無定無有故者　此出亦爾之言也。謂如立眼等。必為無積聚他用為宗。以積聚性故為因。于同品定有。所立無處。受品遍無。今相違因亦爾。謂所立必為積聚他用宗。無處其積聚性因。定無有故。言所成法無有。即是所立無也。謂必為積聚他宗是也。定無有故者。即是積聚性因無也。言積聚性因。能成前無違宗。于異品遍無。今成相違宗。亦于異品遍無。故言亦爾。此是真實相違因也。下舉不定。顯非相違因。

論如(至)有故者　言積並性因。能成積並他用。其因決定。非如瓶等因不定也。何者。如立聲是無常。所化性故。如瓶等似說。有人難言。聲應是瓶。以作性故。如瓶。此因即有不定過。故成猶豫。以于彼展轉無中有故。謂若立聲是瓶衣等。即為異品。此所作性。于瓶無處衣上亦有故。或復難云。聲應是衣。所作性故。猶如其衣。唯衣為同品。瓶等即為異品。此所作性。于無衣處瓶等上有故。言展轉無中有故。其所作性因。既于異品中有故。不定此一解。第二更云。此文乘前正因。有此文也。謂前所作性故。能成無常。亦能立傍成無我。此因決定。非如瓶等因成猶豫。其文義如向解。

論以所(至)有故者　此釋出不定。連樂前文。總為一時文也。謂以所作性現見離瓶于衣等有者。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本關於所成立的法沒有確定性，因為沒有（普遍）存在的情況：這與前面『也一樣』的說法相呼應。例如，如果主張『眼』等事物，必定以『沒有積聚，為他所用』作為宗（命題），以『具有積聚性』作為因（理由）。在同品（相似的事物）中，這種『具有積聚性』是確定的。所立的宗（『眼』等事物『沒有積聚，為他所用』）沒有成立之處，在受品（相反的事物）中普遍不存在。現在，這種相違因也是如此。也就是說，所立的宗必定是『積聚，為他所用』，而『沒有積聚性』的因，在沒有成立之處是確定的。『所成立的法沒有』，就是所立的宗沒有。也就是說，必定是『積聚，為他所用』的宗。『沒有確定性』，就是『具有積聚性』的因沒有。『具有積聚性』的因，能夠成立先前的『沒有』，與宗相違背，在異品（不相似的事物）中普遍不存在。現在，成立相違的宗，也在異品中普遍不存在，所以說『也一樣』。這是真實的相違因。下面舉出不定因，是爲了顯示它不是相違因。

關於『如（瓶等）有故』：『積聚並用』的因，能夠成立『積聚併爲他用』，這個因是確定的，不像瓶子等因那樣不確定。為什麼呢？例如，如果主張『聲音是無常的』，以『是所化性』為理由，就像瓶子等一樣。有人可能會反駁說，『聲音應該是瓶子，因為它是被製造出來的，就像瓶子一樣』。這個因就有了不定過的毛病，因此造成猶豫不決。因為它在彼（異品）中輾轉沒有或有。也就是說，如果主張『聲音是瓶子、衣服等』，那麼瓶子和衣服就是異品。這種『所作性』，在沒有瓶子的地方，衣服上也有。或者有人反駁說，『聲音應該是衣服，因為它是被製造出來的，就像衣服一樣』。只有衣服是同品，瓶子等就是異品。這種『所作性』，在沒有衣服的地方，瓶子等上面也有。『輾轉沒有或有』，就是說，『所作性』的因，既然在異品中也有，就不確定。這是一種解釋。第二種解釋是，這段文字承接前面的正因，也有這段文字的意思。也就是說，前面的『所作性』，能夠成立『無常』，也能順帶成立『無我』。這個因是確定的，不像瓶子等因那樣造成猶豫不決。這段文字的含義就像前面解釋的那樣。

關於『以所（作性）有故』：這段解釋是爲了說明不定因，連線前面的文字，總合成為一段文字。也就是說，以『所作性』，現在看到它離開了瓶子，在衣服等上面也有。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding 'the established dharma is not definite because it does not exist': This echoes the previous statement 'it is also the same.' For example, if one posits 'eye' etc., one must establish 'without accumulation, used by others' as the thesis (proposition), with 'having the nature of accumulation' as the reason (cause). In the similar class (homologous instances), this 'having the nature of accumulation' is definite. The established thesis (that 'eye' etc. 'is without accumulation, used by others') has no place to stand; in the dissimilar class (heterologous instances), it universally does not exist. Now, this contradictory reason is also the same. That is to say, the established thesis must be 'accumulation, used by others,' while the reason of 'not having the nature of accumulation' is definite in the place where it is not established. 'The established dharma does not exist' means that the established thesis does not exist. That is to say, it must be the thesis of 'accumulation, used by others.' 'Not definite' means that the reason of 'having the nature of accumulation' does not exist. The reason of 'having the nature of accumulation' can establish the previous 'non-existence,' contradicting the thesis, and it universally does not exist in the dissimilar class. Now, establishing the contradictory thesis also universally does not exist in the dissimilar class, so it is said 'it is also the same.' This is a true contradictory reason. The following example of an indefinite reason is to show that it is not a contradictory reason.

Regarding 'like (pot etc.) exists': The reason of 'accumulation and use' can establish 'accumulation and used by others,' this reason is definite, unlike the reason of pot etc. which is indefinite. Why? For example, if one posits 'sound is impermanent,' with 'being a product of conditioning' as the reason, like a pot etc. Someone might retort, 'sound should be a pot, because it is made, like a pot.' This reason has the fault of being indefinite, thus causing hesitation. Because it alternately does not exist or exists in that (dissimilar class). That is to say, if one posits 'sound is a pot, clothing etc.,' then pot and clothing are dissimilar classes. This 'being made' exists on clothing where there is no pot. Or someone might retort, 'sound should be clothing, because it is made, like clothing.' Only clothing is the similar class, pot etc. are dissimilar classes. This 'being made' exists on pot etc. where there is no clothing. 'Alternately does not exist or exists' means that since the reason of 'being made' also exists in the dissimilar class, it is indefinite. This is one explanation. A second explanation is that this passage follows the previous correct reason, and also has the meaning of this passage. That is to say, the previous 'being made' can establish 'impermanence,' and can also incidentally establish 'no-self.' This reason is definite, unlike the reason of pot etc. which causes hesitation. The meaning of this passage is like the previous explanation.

Regarding 'because of (being made) exists': This explanation is to clarify the indefinite reason, connecting the previous passage, and combining them into one passage. That is to say, with 'being made,' now seeing that it is separate from the pot, it also exists on clothing etc.

即是上文。于彼展轉無中有故。謂無瓶處異品衣中。有所作性因。故是不定。非離無常于無我等此因有故者。謂若以所作性。傍證無我。因即決定。即是釋上非如兩字也。何者。如立聲應是瓶。此亦縱許成宗也。以所作性故。猶如其瓶。其因於無瓶更衣等上亦轉。若聲是無常。所作性故。如瓶等無常。此因非是轉彼瓶等無常處。別於余無我上。此因亦轉。以瓶等若是無常。即是無我。無有離無常外。別有無我。有所作性因也。是故所作性因。若證無常。即能傍證無我等。其因決定。非如瓶等因。成猶豫等也。

論云何別(至)處轉者　此外人問。其宗上因法。與瓶等同品等別故。故名別法。即瓶衣等。與宗法處。不名為別處。今問意云。如所作性。是聲宗家法。云何宗家法。乃于瓶上立有耶。

論由彼相似不說異名者　論主答也。謂彼瓶上所作性。與聲上所作性。極是相似。總名所作性。不證有異名故。是故亦智相同品瓶等轉。此釋于同品定有性之言。

論言即是(至)有失者　言瓶上所作性。即是體聲上所作性。極相似故。故言即是。猶縷貫兩華。其縷一頭貫此華。一頭貫彼華。此亦如是總一所化性。一頭世聲上。一頭世瓶上故無有別法于別處轉失。以如其一故。若子細分折。其聲及瓶上所作性

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『即是上文。于彼展轉無中有故。謂無瓶處異品衣中。有所作性因。故是不定。』意思是說，在沒有瓶子的地方，例如不同的物品衣服中，也存在『所作性』這個原因，因此這個原因是不確定的。『非離無常于無我等此因有故者。』意思是說，如果用『所作性』來旁證『無我』，那麼這個原因就是確定的。這解釋了前面『非如』兩個字。『何者。如立聲應是瓶。此亦縱許成宗也。以所作性故。猶如其瓶。其因於無瓶更衣等上亦轉。』例如，如果立論說『聲音應該是瓶子』，即使勉強成立這個論點，因為『所作性』的緣故，就像瓶子一樣，這個原因也會在沒有瓶子的其他物品上出現。『若聲是無常。所作性故。如瓶等無常。此因非是轉彼瓶等無常處。別於余無我上。此因亦轉。以瓶等若是無常。即是無我。無有離無常外。別有無我。有所作性因也。』如果說『聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的，就像瓶子一樣是無常的』，這個原因不僅僅存在於瓶子等無常的事物上，也會在其他的『無我』事物上出現。因為瓶子等如果是無常的，那麼它們就是『無我』的，沒有脫離『無常』之外的『無我』，也沒有『所作性』這個原因。『是故所作性因。若證無常。即能傍證無我等。其因決定。非如瓶等因。成猶豫等也。』因此，『所作性』這個原因，如果用來證明『無常』，就能旁證『無我』等，這個原因就是確定的，不像瓶子等原因，會造成猶豫不決。

『論云何別(至)處轉者』意思是，有人問：宗（Sect）上的因法，與瓶子等同類事物不同，所以稱為『別法』，即瓶子、衣服等。與宗法處，不稱為『別處』。現在問的意思是，像『所作性』，是聲音宗的家法，為什麼宗的家法，會在瓶子上成立呢？

『論由彼相似不說異名者』意思是，論主回答說，瓶子上的『所作性』，與聲音上的『所作性』，極其相似，總稱為『所作性』，沒有證明它們有不同的名稱，因此也認為它們與同類事物瓶子等相同。這解釋了『于同品定有性』這句話。

『論言即是(至)有失者』意思是，瓶子上的『所作性』，就是聲音上的『所作性』，極其相似，所以說是『即是』，就像用線串聯兩朵花，線的一頭穿過這朵花，另一頭穿過那朵花，這裡也是一樣，總的來說，『所作性』的一頭在聲音上，一頭在瓶子上，所以沒有『別法』在『別處』轉移的過失，因為它們就像一個整體。如果仔細分析，聲音和瓶子上的『所作性』。

【English Translation】 English version: 'That is the above text. Because there is no middle ground in their transformation, it means that in a place without a pot, such as in a garment of a different kind, there is the cause of 'being made'. Therefore, this is uncertain.' This means that in a place where there is no pot, such as in different items of clothing, the cause of 'being made' exists, so this cause is uncertain. 'If not apart from impermanence, this cause exists in non-self, etc.' means that if 'being made' is used to indirectly prove 'non-self', then this cause is certain. This explains the previous words 'not like'. 'What? For example, establishing that a sound should be a pot, even if this proposition is reluctantly established, because of 'being made', just like a pot, this cause will also appear on other items without a pot.' For example, if one argues that 'a sound should be a pot', even if this argument is barely valid, because of 'being made', just like a pot, this cause will also appear on other items that are not pots. 'If sound is impermanent, because it is made, like a pot is impermanent, this cause is not only present in the impermanent places of pots, etc., but also appears on other 'non-self' things. Because if pots, etc., are impermanent, then they are 'non-self'. There is no 'non-self' apart from 'impermanence', and there is no cause of 'being made'.' If it is said that 'sound is impermanent because it is made, just like a pot is impermanent', this cause not only exists in impermanent things like pots, but also appears in other 'non-self' things. Because if pots, etc., are impermanent, then they are 'non-self'. There is no 'non-self' apart from 'impermanence', and there is no cause of 'being made'. 'Therefore, the cause of 'being made', if it proves impermanence, can indirectly prove non-self, etc. This cause is certain, unlike the cause of pots, etc., which causes hesitation.' Therefore, the cause of 'being made', if used to prove 'impermanence', can indirectly prove 'non-self', etc. This cause is certain, unlike the cause of pots, etc., which causes hesitation.

'The treatise asks, how is it different (to) where it transfers?' This means that someone asks: The causal law on the Sect (宗), is different from the same kind of things like pots, so it is called 'different law', that is, pots, clothes, etc. The place of the Sect law is not called 'different place'. The meaning of the question now is, like 'being made', is the family law of the sound Sect, why is the family law of the Sect established on the pot?

'The treatise answers, because they are similar, no different names are mentioned.' This means that the treatise master answers that the 'being made' on the pot is extremely similar to the 'being made' on the sound, and is generally called 'being made'. There is no proof that they have different names, so it is also considered that they are the same as the same kind of things like pots. This explains the sentence 'definitely has the nature of being in the same kind'.

'The treatise says that it is (to) there is no loss.' This means that the 'being made' on the pot is the 'being made' on the sound, which is extremely similar, so it is said to be 'is'. It's like stringing two flowers with a thread, one end of the thread goes through this flower, and the other end goes through that flower. It's the same here. Generally speaking, one end of 'being made' is on the sound, and the other end is on the pot, so there is no fault of 'different law' transferring in 'different places', because they are like a whole. If you analyze carefully, the 'being made' on the sound and the pot.

各別也。但可總說一所作性。名為宗法也。

論若不(至)宗法者　外人復難云。若瓶上所作性。不說聲上所作性異。云何此所作性因。名為宗法。亦應非宗法。以一頭所作性因。世瓶上故。

論此中但(至)宗法者　論主答也。謂此宗法中。但說定是宗法。然不欲說言唯是宗法。若言唯是宗法相。瓶上不得有此因性。但說于宗上同定是宗法。不言其因唯是宗法。以因有非宗法者。謂所作性同。一頭世瓶上故。

論若爾(至)名宗者　外人得難云。若作所性。一頭世瓶上。亦得名因者亦可其所立無常。亦一頭在同品瓶上。亦應名宗。

論不然(至)相似者　論主答也。論汝外人所難。令瓶上無常。亦名宗者。此不然也。何者。別處說所成故。謂聲望瓶。是瓶家別處。於此別處。成立無常。其聲上無常。由敵論人不許是無常。今以因成立。即說聲上無常。為所成立。此所立可名為宗。其瓶上無常。立敵先成共許。不須成立。既不欲成立。何名所成。既非所成。故不名宗。若其所作性因。必須立敵共許。故言因必無異。以此因彼此同許。方成因故。由共許聲之與瓶。俱有此因故。方成比量。故不同所成立宗。不共許故。宗為宗也。故不相似。

論又此一一乃至三種者　上來問欲法總釋宗法

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本各別不同。但可以總括地說，『所作性』可以作為一種『宗法』（pakṣa-dharma，論證的性質）。

論：如果不是（符合）『宗法』（的條件）——外人再次提出疑問：如果瓶子上的『所作性』（kṛtakatva，被製造的性質）不說與聲音上的『所作性』不同，為什麼這個『所作性』因（hetu，理由、原因）被稱為『宗法』？也應該不是『宗法』，因為『所作性』因的一部分存在於世俗的瓶子上。

論：這裡只是（確定）『宗法』——論主回答說：在這個『宗法』中，只是確定地說是『宗法』，但不是想要說只有是『宗法』。如果說只有是『宗法』的相（lakṣaṇa，特徵），瓶子上就不能有這個因性。只是說在『宗』（pakṣa，論題）上共同確定是『宗法』，不說是這個因只有是『宗法』。因為因有不是『宗法』的情況，即『所作性』相同，一部分存在於世俗的瓶子上。

論：如果這樣（就說得通了）——外人提出疑問：如果『所作性』一部分存在於世俗的瓶子上，也可以被稱為『因』，那麼，所立的『無常』（anitya，非永恒性）也一部分存在於同品（sapakṣa，相似例子）的瓶子上，也應該被稱為『宗』。

論：不是這樣（不能這樣說）——論主回答說：你外人所提出的疑問，使得瓶子上的『無常』也被稱為『宗』，這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為在別處說所要成立的（內容）。所謂聲音與瓶子，是瓶子的別處。在這個別處，成立『無常』。聲音上的『無常』，由於敵論人不承認是『無常』，現在用『因』來成立，就說聲音上的『無常』是所要成立的。這個所立的可以被稱為『宗』。而瓶子上的『無常』，立論者和對方先前已經共同認可，不需要成立。既然不想要成立，怎麼能叫『所成』？既然不是『所成』，所以不叫『宗』。如果『所作性』因，必須立論者和對方共同認可，所以說『因』必定沒有不同。因為這個『因』彼此共同認可，才能成為『因』。因為共同認可聲音和瓶子都有這個『因』，才能構成比量（anumāna，推論）。所以不同於所成立的『宗』，因為不共同認可。『宗』之所以為『宗』，所以不相似。

論：又，這一個一個乃至三種——上面是提問，想要總括地解釋『宗法』。

【English Translation】 English version They are distinct. But it can be generally said that 'being produced' (kṛtakatva) can be considered a 'pakṣa-dharma' (property of the subject).

Objection: If it is not (in accordance with) 'pakṣa-dharma' – The outsider raises a question again: If the 'being produced' (kṛtakatva, the property of being made) on a pot is not said to be different from the 'being produced' on a sound, why is this 'being produced' hetu (reason, cause) called 'pakṣa-dharma'? It should also not be 'pakṣa-dharma', because a part of the 'being produced' hetu exists on a mundane pot.

Response: Here, it is only (determined) 'pakṣa-dharma' – The proponent answers: In this 'pakṣa-dharma', it is only determined to be 'pakṣa-dharma', but it is not intended to say that it is only 'pakṣa-dharma'. If it is said that it is only the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of 'pakṣa-dharma', then the pot cannot have this causal property. It is only said that it is jointly determined to be 'pakṣa-dharma' on the 'pakṣa' (subject), not that this cause is only 'pakṣa-dharma'. Because there are cases where the cause is not 'pakṣa-dharma', that is, the 'being produced' is the same, and a part exists on a mundane pot.

Objection: If that's the case (it makes sense) – The outsider raises a question: If 'being produced' partly exists on a mundane pot and can also be called 'hetu', then the established 'impermanence' (anitya) also partly exists on a pot of the same class (sapakṣa), and should also be called 'pakṣa'.

Response: It is not so (it cannot be said like that) – The proponent answers: Your outsider's question, which makes the 'impermanence' on the pot also called 'pakṣa', is not correct. Why? Because what is to be established is stated elsewhere. The sound and the pot are different places for the pot. In this different place, 'impermanence' is established. The 'impermanence' on the sound, because the opponent does not admit it as 'impermanence', is now established with 'hetu', and it is said that the 'impermanence' on the sound is what is to be established. This established thing can be called 'pakṣa'. The 'impermanence' on the pot, however, is already jointly acknowledged by the proponent and the opponent, and does not need to be established. Since it is not intended to be established, how can it be called 'established'? Since it is not 'established', it is not called 'pakṣa'. If the 'being produced' hetu must be jointly acknowledged by the proponent and the opponent, then it is said that the 'hetu' must have no difference. Because this 'hetu' is mutually acknowledged, it can become a 'hetu'. Because it is jointly acknowledged that both the sound and the pot have this 'hetu', it can constitute inference (anumāna). Therefore, it is different from the established 'pakṣa', because it is not jointly acknowledged. The reason why 'pakṣa' is 'pakṣa' is that they are not similar.

Treatise: Furthermore, each and every one up to three – The above is a question, wanting to comprehensively explain 'pakṣa-dharma'.

。此下解頌中於同品等言。如即此宗法。于同品中有三種。謂有及非有及俱。此三一一為三。故有九種。

論謂于(至)非有者　謂三種中初一也。即是于同品中有。于異品中有。或非有。或有非有。此是初也。

論于其同品非有者　于同品三種中。第二非有。于異品亦三。如前。

論及俱者　于同品中。第三俱也。于異品亦有三。如前。

論各有如是三種差別者　即前非有及俱。各有三種也。

論若欲(至)此無如者　勝論對經教。立聲是無常。以所作性故。以虛空為異品。其經教既不立處空。云何于彼虛空處。說此所作性無。此外人問。

論以若彼(至)過者　論主答也。謂若彼虛空無有。其所作性。于彼不轉至經教。若是敵論。定不輅所作性。于彼虛空轉也。但遮義成故。則名異品。不要須指有異品法。方名異品。雖然對敵論者。然須異品。言遠離也。問如菟角等是非有。無對無常有宗。云何非異品耶。答若遮無常故。名為異品。菟角等非無常故。亦名為常。應是異品。為約直詮了異品。對無空論轉。故明所立於彼處無。若無異品。其所立因。于彼不轉。合無有輅。故無過。

論如是合成九種宗法隨其次第略辨其相者　如是宗法相。同品中有非有及俱三種。一一各

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：此下解釋頌文中關於『同品』等詞的含義。例如，『即此宗法』，在同品中有三種情況：即『有』、『非有』和『俱』（既有也有非有）。這三種情況每一種又分為三種，所以共有九種。

論中說『于...非有者』，指的是三種情況中的第一種，即在同品中『有』的情況。在異品中，可以是『有』，也可以是『非有』，或者『有非有』。這是第一種情況。

論中說『于其同品非有者』，指的是在同品三種情況中的第二種『非有』。在異品中也有三種情況，如前所述。

論中說『及俱者』，指的是在同品中的第三種情況『俱』（既有也有非有）。在異品中也有三種情況，如前所述。

論中說『各有如是三種差別者』，指的是前面的『非有』和『俱』，各自也有三種情況。

論中說『若欲...此無如者』，是勝論派針對經教派的觀點，立論說『聲是無常的，因為它是所作性』，並以虛空作為異品。既然經教派不承認虛空的存在，那麼如何在虛空之處說這個『所作性』不存在呢？這是外人的提問。

論中說『以若彼...過者』，是論主的回答。意思是說，如果那個虛空沒有『所作性』，那麼『所作性』就不會轉移到經教派那裡。如果是敵對的論點，一定不會承認『所作性』在虛空中轉移。但是遮止意義成立，就可以稱為異品，不一定需要指出有異品法才能稱為異品。雖然是對敵論者，但必須遠離異品。有人問，像兔角等『非有』之物，沒有與無常相對立的宗派，為什麼不是異品呢？回答是，如果遮止無常，就可以稱為異品。兔角等不是無常，因此也可以說是常，應該算是異品。這是爲了直接詮釋異品，針對沒有虛空論點的人而說的，說明所立的論點在那個地方不存在。如果沒有異品，那麼所立的因就不會轉移到那裡，就不能成立，所以沒有過失。

論中說『如是合成九種宗法隨其次第略辨其相者』，像這樣，宗法的相，在同品中有『有』、『非有』和『俱』三種情況，每一種各

【English Translation】 English version: Hereafter, the explanation in the verses refers to terms like 'same class'. For example, 'this very property of the thesis' has three possibilities within the same class: namely, 'existent', 'non-existent', and 'both'. Each of these three is further divided into three, resulting in nine types.

The treatise states 'regarding...non-existent': This refers to the first of the three possibilities, which is 'existent' within the same class. Within the different class, it can be 'existent', 'non-existent', or 'existent and non-existent'. This is the first case.

The treatise states 'regarding its non-existence in the same class': This refers to the second of the three possibilities within the same class, which is 'non-existent'. In the different class, there are also three possibilities, as before.

The treatise states 'and both': This refers to the third possibility within the same class, which is 'both' (existent and non-existent). In the different class, there are also three possibilities, as before.

The treatise states 'each has such three distinctions': This refers to the aforementioned 'non-existent' and 'both', each of which also has three possibilities.

The treatise states 'if one wishes...this is not like that': The Vaisheshika school argues against the scriptural school, asserting that 'sound is impermanent because it is produced', using space (akasha) as the dissimilar instance (vipaksha). Since the scriptural school does not posit the existence of space, how can one say that this 'producedness' does not exist in that space? This is a question from an outsider.

The treatise states 'because if that...fault': This is the treatise master's response. It means that if that space does not have 'producedness', then 'producedness' will not transfer to the scriptural school. If it is an opposing argument, it will certainly not acknowledge that 'producedness' transfers in that space. However, because the meaning of negation is established, it can be called a dissimilar instance. It is not necessary to point out that there is a dissimilar property to be called a dissimilar instance. Although it is against the opposing argument, it is necessary to stay away from dissimilar instances. Someone asks, like rabbit horns and other 'non-existent' things, there is no school opposing impermanence, why are they not dissimilar instances? The answer is, if it prevents impermanence, it can be called a dissimilar instance. Rabbit horns and other things are not impermanent, so they can also be said to be permanent, and should be considered dissimilar instances. This is to directly explain the dissimilar instance, addressing those who do not have the argument of space, clarifying that what is established does not exist in that place. If there is no dissimilar instance, then the established reason will not transfer there, and it cannot be established, so there is no fault.

The treatise states 'thus, combining these nine types of properties of the thesis, briefly distinguishing their characteristics in order': Thus, the characteristic of the property of the thesis, in the same class, there are three possibilities: 'existent', 'non-existent', and 'both', each of which

有三句故。如是合成九種宗法。如其前列次第。今略辨相。先明初三所立。通是宗法性中。初于同品有異品亦有。謂立聲常是立宗。言所量性故是立因言聲常宗。以空等為同品。以瓶等為異品。所量因通常無常品故。此因於同品有。異品亦有。同入理論六不定中。第一共也。二或立聲無常(宗)。作性故(因)。猶如瓶等(喻)。此所作性因。于同品有異品無故。是正因也。三或世聲勤勇無間所發宗。無常性故(因)。是入正理論六不定中。第四異品一分轉。同品通轉。此中勤勇無間所發宗。以瓶等為同品。此無常因。於此通有。以電空等為異品。于彼一分電等此有。空等是無。上成初同品有異品亦有。亦同品有異品無。三同品有異品有非有。是初三也。次明中三相違因。初或立聲常(宗)。所作性故(因)。此中常宗。以空等為同品瓶等為異品。所作性因。于同品無。于異品有。是初句。二或立聲為常。所聞性故。同入理論六不空中。第二不共。彼論云。言不共者。如說聲常所聞性故。常無常品。皆離此因。常無常外。解非有故。是猶豫因。此所聞性。其猶何等。解云。立聲常宗。以云等為同品。以瓶等為異品。所聞性者。是六句義。第四有句義。此因常無常品法。無此因故。是于同品無。異品亦無。是第二句相違

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本有三種原因。這樣合成了九種宗法。按照前面排列的次序，現在簡略地辨別它們的相狀。首先說明最初三種所建立的，都屬於宗法的性質。第一種情況是，在同品中有，在異品中也有。例如，立論『聲音是常』（宗），理由是『具有可量性』（因）。說『所量性』是立因。以虛空等為同品，以瓶子等為異品。因為『所量』這個因通常存在於常與無常的事物中。所以這個因在同品中有，在異品中也有。這與《正理論》中的六種不定因中的第一種『共同不定』相符。第二種情況是，或者立論『聲音是無常的』（宗），理由是『是造作產生的』（因），就像瓶子等（喻）。這個『造作產生』的因，在同品中有，在異品中沒有，所以是正因。第三種情況是，或者立論『聲音是經過努力和不間斷的意願所產生的』（宗），理由是『具有無常性』（因）。這與《正理論》六種不定因中的第四種『異品一部分轉』、『同品普遍轉』相符。這裡，『經過努力和不間斷的意願所產生的』（宗），以瓶子等為同品。這個『無常』的因，在這些同品中普遍存在。以閃電、虛空等為異品，在閃電等一部分異品中存在，在虛空等中不存在。以上構成了最初的三種情況：同品有異品也有，同品有異品沒有，同品有異品有非有。這是最初的三種情況。接下來闡明中間的三種相違因。第一種情況是，或者立論『聲音是常』（宗），理由是『是造作產生的』（因）。在這個『常』的宗中，以虛空等為同品，瓶子等為異品。『造作產生』的因，在同品中沒有，在異品中有。這是第一種情況。第二種情況是，或者立論『聲音是常』，理由是『是可聽聞的』。這與《正理論》六種不定因中的第二種『不共不定』相符。該論典中說：『所謂不共，例如說聲音是常，理由是具有可聽聞性。常與無常的事物，都遠離這個因。』常與無常之外，解釋為非有。這是猶豫不定之因。這個『可聽聞性』，它的情況是怎樣的呢？解釋說：立論『聲音是常』（宗），以云等為同品，以瓶等為異品。『可聽聞性』，是六句義中的第四句『有』的含義。這個因在常與無常的事物中都不存在，因為這些事物沒有這個因。這是在同品中沒有，在異品中也沒有。這是第二種相違的情況。

【English Translation】 English version There are three reasons. Thus, nine types of Hetu-chakras (宗法, systems of logical reasons) are synthesized. According to the order listed earlier, I will now briefly distinguish their characteristics. First, I will explain the initial three established, which all belong to the nature of Hetu-chakras. The first case is that it exists in the similar class (同品, Sapaksha) and also exists in the dissimilar class (異品, Vipaksha). For example, the proposition 'Sound is permanent' (宗, Paksha), the reason is 'because it possesses measurability' (因, Hetu). Saying 'measurability' is establishing the reason. Taking space (虛空, Akasha) etc. as the similar class, and taking pot (瓶子, Ghata) etc. as the dissimilar class. Because the reason 'measurable' usually exists in both permanent and impermanent things. Therefore, this reason exists in the similar class and also exists in the dissimilar class. This corresponds to the first 'common uncertain' (共同不定, Sadharana-anaikantika) among the six uncertain reasons in the Nyaya theory (正理論). The second case is, or the proposition 'Sound is impermanent' (宗, Paksha), the reason is 'because it is produced by effort' (因, Hetu), like a pot etc. (喻, Drstanta). This reason of 'produced by effort' exists in the similar class but does not exist in the dissimilar class, so it is a valid reason (正因, Sadvetu). The third case is, or the proposition 'Sound is produced by effort and uninterrupted volition' (宗, Paksha), the reason is 'because it possesses impermanence' (因, Hetu). This corresponds to the fourth 'partially turning in the dissimilar class' (異品一部分轉, Vipaksha-ekadesavrtti) and 'universally turning in the similar class' (同品普遍轉, Sapaksha-vyapi) among the six uncertain reasons in the Nyaya theory. Here, 'produced by effort and uninterrupted volition' (宗, Paksha), taking pot etc. as the similar class. This reason of 'impermanence' universally exists in these similar classes. Taking lightning (閃電, Vidyut), space (虛空, Akasha) etc. as the dissimilar class, it exists in a part of the dissimilar classes such as lightning, and does not exist in space etc. The above constitutes the initial three cases: existing in the similar class and also existing in the dissimilar class, existing in the similar class but not existing in the dissimilar class, existing in the similar class and existing and not existing in the dissimilar class. These are the initial three cases. Next, I will explain the middle three contradictory reasons. The first case is, or the proposition 'Sound is permanent' (宗, Paksha), the reason is 'because it is produced by effort' (因, Hetu). In this proposition of 'permanent', taking space etc. as the similar class, and pot etc. as the dissimilar class. The reason of 'produced by effort' does not exist in the similar class, but exists in the dissimilar class. This is the first case. The second case is, or the proposition 'Sound is permanent', the reason is 'because it is audible'. This corresponds to the second 'uncommon uncertain' (不共不定, Asadharana-anaikantika) among the six uncertain reasons in the Nyaya theory. That treatise says: 'The so-called uncommon, for example, saying sound is permanent, the reason is because it possesses audibility. Permanent and impermanent things are both far from this reason.' Outside of permanent and impermanent, it is explained as non-existent. This is a hesitant reason. What is the situation of this 'audibility'? The explanation says: the proposition 'Sound is permanent' (宗, Paksha), taking clouds (雲, Megha) etc. as the similar class, and pot etc. as the dissimilar class. 'Audibility' is the meaning of the fourth sentence 'existent' (有, Asti) among the six sentence meanings. This reason does not exist in permanent and impermanent things, because these things do not have this reason. This is not existing in the similar class and also not existing in the dissimilar class. This is the second contradictory case.

因也。或立聲常宗。勤勇無間所發性故(因)。此中常宗。以空等為同品。電瓶等為異品。勤勇無間所發性因。于空等一向無。于異品中瓶等有。電等無。故此因於同品一向無。于異品有及非有。是第三句也。上來初句同品無異品有。第二句同品無異品亦無。第三句于同品無于異品亦有亦無。總是中三句也。次復三句中。或立聲非勤勇無間所發(宗)。無常性故(因)。此同入理論六不定中。第四同品一分轉異品通轉。者如說聲非勤勇無間所發無常故(云云廣解彼文)。二或立聲無常(宗)。勤勇無間所發故(因)。此中無常宗。以電瓶等為同品。勤勇無間所發因。于瓶等有。于電等無。其無常宗。以空等為異品。異勤勇無間所發因。于彼通無。是第二句。此亦正因。三或立絡為常(宗)。無觸對故(因)。同入理論中。第五俱品一分轉者。如說聲常(宗)。無質礙故(因)。此中常宗(云云廣舉彼文)。解云。上來初句同品有非有。異品通有。二品同有非有。異品通無。三品同有非有。異品有非有。總是復三。

論如是(至)等九者　如是九宗九因。二頌攝也。一常。二無常。三勤勇。初三宗。一墮。二住。三堅牢性。此中三宗。一非勤。二遷。三不實。是復三宗。由所量等九者。所量性是初宗因。由字是第

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：『因也。或立聲常宗。勤勇無間所發性故(因)。』意思是說，可以建立『聲音是常』的宗（命題），因為它是『勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』的性質（因）。這裡，『常』宗，以『空』等作為同品（相似的例子），『電』、『瓶』等作為異品（不同的例子）。『勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』這個因，對於『空』等來說，完全沒有；對於異品中的『瓶』等來說，有；對於『電』等來說，沒有。因此，這個因對於同品完全沒有，對於異品來說，有和沒有的情況都存在，這就是第三句所描述的情況。總結以上，第一句是同品沒有，異品有；第二句是同品沒有，異品也沒有；第三句是同品沒有，異品有和沒有的情況都存在。總而言之，這是中三句。『次復三句中。或立聲非勤勇無間所發(宗)。無常性故(因)。』接下來又是三句。或者建立『聲音不是勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』的宗（命題），因為它是『無常』的性質（因）。這屬於理論中的六不定情況。『第四同品一分轉異品通轉。者如說聲非勤勇無間所發無常故(云云廣解彼文)。』第四種情況是，同品中一部分成立，而異品中普遍成立。例如，說『聲音不是勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』，因為它是『無常』的（詳細解釋見原文）。『二或立聲無常(宗)。勤勇無間所發故(因)。』第二種情況是，或者建立『聲音是無常』的宗（命題），因為它是『勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』的（因）。這裡，『無常』宗，以『電』、『瓶』等作為同品。『勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』這個因，對於『瓶』等來說，有；對於『電』等來說，沒有。『無常』宗，以『空』等作為異品。『勤奮努力且無間斷地產生』這個因，對於它們來說，普遍沒有。這是第二句，也是正因。『三或立絡為常(宗)。無觸對故(因)。』第三種情況是，或者建立『絡是常』的宗（命題），因為它是『沒有觸對』的（因）。這屬於理論中的第五種情況。『第五俱品一分轉者。如說聲常(宗)。無質礙故(因)。』第五種情況是，同品和異品中都有一部分成立。例如，說『聲音是常』（宗），因為它是『沒有質礙』的（因）（詳細解釋見原文）。解釋說，以上第一句是同品有和沒有的情況都存在，異品普遍有；第二句是同品有和沒有的情況都存在，異品普遍沒有；第三句是同品有和沒有的情況都存在，異品有和沒有的情況都存在。總而言之，這是復三。『論如是(至)等九者　如是九宗九因。二頌攝也。』論述像這樣（直到結束）等九種情況，像這樣九種宗和九種因，可以用兩個頌來概括。『一常。二無常。三勤勇。初三宗。一墮。二住。三堅牢性。此中三宗。一非勤。二遷。三不實。是復三宗。』第一是『常』（永恒），第二是『無常』（變化），第三是『勤勇』（努力）。這是最初的三種宗（命題）。第一是『墮』（墮落），第二是『住』（停留），第三是『堅牢性』（堅固性）。這是其中的三種宗（命題）。第一是『非勤』（非努力），第二是『遷』（遷移），第三是『不實』（不真實）。這是另外的三種宗（命題）。『由所量等九者。所量性是初宗因。由字是第』因為所量等九種情況，所量性是最初宗的因，『由』字是第...

【English Translation】 English version: 『因也。或立聲常宗。勤勇無間所發性故(因).』 This means, one can establish the thesis (宗, zong) that 『sound is permanent (常, chang),』 because it has the nature of being 『produced through diligent effort without interruption』 (因, yin). Here, for the 『permanent』 thesis, 『emptiness』 (空, kong) etc. are taken as similar examples (同品, tongpin), and 『electricity』 (電, dian), 『bottle』 (瓶, ping) etc. are taken as dissimilar examples (異品, yipin). The reason (因) of 『produced through diligent effort without interruption』 is completely absent in 『emptiness』 etc.; it is present in 『bottle』 etc. among the dissimilar examples; it is absent in 『electricity』 etc. Therefore, this reason is completely absent in the similar examples, and in the dissimilar examples, there are both presence and absence. This is the situation described by the third sentence. Summarizing the above, the first sentence is: absent in similar examples, present in dissimilar examples; the second sentence is: absent in similar examples, also absent in dissimilar examples; the third sentence is: absent in similar examples, both present and absent in dissimilar examples. In short, these are the middle three sentences. 『次復三句中。或立聲非勤勇無間所發(宗)。無常性故(因).』 Next are three more sentences. Or, establish the thesis that 『sound is not produced through diligent effort without interruption,』 because it has the nature of 『impermanence』 (無常, wuchang). This belongs to the six uncertain cases in the theory. 『第四同品一分轉異品通轉。者如說聲非勤勇無間所發無常故(云云廣解彼文).』 The fourth case is that it is partially true in similar examples and universally true in dissimilar examples. For example, saying 『sound is not produced through diligent effort without interruption』 because it is 『impermanent』 (detailed explanation in the original text). 『二或立聲無常(宗)。勤勇無間所發故(因).』 The second case is, or establish the thesis that 『sound is impermanent,』 because it is 『produced through diligent effort without interruption.』 Here, for the 『impermanent』 thesis, 『electricity,』『bottle』 etc. are taken as similar examples. The reason of 『produced through diligent effort without interruption』 is present in 『bottle』 etc.; it is absent in 『electricity』 etc. For the 『impermanent』 thesis, 『emptiness』 etc. are taken as dissimilar examples. The reason of 『produced through diligent effort without interruption』 is universally absent in them. This is the second sentence, and it is also a valid reason. 『三或立絡為常(宗)。無觸對故(因).』 The third case is, or establish the thesis that 『network (絡, luo) is permanent,』 because it is 『without contact』 (無觸對, wuchudui). This belongs to the fifth case in the theory. 『第五俱品一分轉者。如說聲常(宗)。無質礙故(因).』 The fifth case is that it is partially true in both similar and dissimilar examples. For example, saying 『sound is permanent』 because it is 『without material obstruction』 (無質礙, wuzhiai) (detailed explanation in the original text). The explanation says that the first sentence above is that there are both presence and absence in similar examples, and it is universally present in dissimilar examples; the second sentence is that there are both presence and absence in similar examples, and it is universally absent in dissimilar examples; the third sentence is that there are both presence and absence in similar examples, and there are both presence and absence in dissimilar examples. In short, this is the repeated three. 『論如是(至)等九者　如是九宗九因。二頌攝也。』 Discussing like this (until the end) and the nine cases, these nine theses and nine reasons can be summarized by two verses. 『一常。二無常。三勤勇。初三宗。一墮。二住。三堅牢性。此中三宗。一非勤。二遷。三不實。是復三宗。』 First is 『permanent,』 second is 『impermanent,』 third is 『diligent effort.』 These are the initial three theses. First is 『falling,』 second is 『staying,』 third is 『firmness.』 These are the three theses among them. First is 『non-effort,』 second is 『migration,』 third is 『unreal.』 These are the other three theses. 『由所量等九者。所量性是初宗因。由字是第…』 Because of the nine cases such as what is measured, the nature of what is measured is the reason for the initial thesis, the word 『由』 is the...

三轉聲。前之九宗。由所量等九因來也。一所量。二作。三無常。是初三因也。一作性。二聞。三曾發。是中三因也。一無常。二勇。三觸。是復三因也。此之九因是宗法。復依前常性等九宗立也。依字是第亦轉聲。

論云如是分別(乃至)所解法不定者　如是分別九因中。二因說名為正因。二因說名為相違因。五因說名為不定因。前二頌是因論生論謗生頌。自下一頌是根本論正頌。故云本言也。二正因中。一于同品通有。故言于同品有。二于同品有及非有。故云于同及二。此之二同立異品通無。合是正因。故云世異無是正因也。翻此名相違者。翻此二正因。即名二相違因。故言翻此名相違。應作頌云。于用品通無。世異有及二也。所餘名不定者。餘二正因。及二相違因外。所餘五種。皆不定因攝。上來九因。皆通是宗法性因。然對同品異品。有此九句不同。四不成因。無來不成因。非通是宗法性因故。此中不說。

論此中(乃至)各取中一者　於九因中。故云此中唯有二種名為正因。七非正因。謂于同品一切有。異品通無。是初正因。及於同品通有非有。異品通無。是第二正因也。此二因於初三中及復三中。各取中問一因。謂或立聲無常(宗)。所作性故(因)。此因於同品遍有。于異品遍無。是初三

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本三轉聲。之前的九個宗（Sect，佛教中的派別），由所量等九個因（Hetu，論證的原因或理由）而來。一、所量（that which is to be measured），二、作（making），三、無常（impermanence），是最初的三個因。一、作性（the nature of making），二、聞（hearing），三、曾發（having arisen before），是中間的三個因。一、無常（impermanence），二、勇（courage），三、觸（contact），是最後的三個因。這九個因是宗法（properties of the thesis），又依據之前的常性等九個宗而成立。『依』字是『第』，也是轉聲。

論中說：『像這樣分別（乃至）所解法不定者』，像這樣分別九個因中，有兩個因被稱為正因（valid reason），有兩個因被稱為相違因（contradictory reason），五個因被稱為不定因（uncertain reason）。前面的兩個頌是因論中產生誹謗的頌，後面的一個頌是根本論的正頌，所以說是本言。兩個正因中，一個在同品（similar instances）中普遍存在，所以說『于同品有』；另一個在同品中存在和不存在，所以說『于同及二』。這兩個同品成立，在異品（dissimilar instances）中普遍不存在，合起來是正因，所以說『世異無是正因』。翻轉這個就叫做相違，翻轉這兩個正因，就叫做兩個相違因，所以說『翻此名相違』，應該作頌說：『于用品通無，世異有及二』。其餘的叫做不定，其餘的兩個正因，以及兩個相違因之外，其餘的五種，都屬於不定因。上面說的九個因，都普遍是宗法性因，然而對於同品異品，有這九句不同。四種不成因（invalid reason），無來不成因，並非普遍是宗法性因，所以這裡不說。

論中說：『此中（乃至）各取中一者』，在九個因中，所以說這裡只有兩種叫做正因，七種不是正因。所謂在同品中一切存在，在異品中普遍不存在，是最初的正因；以及在同品中普遍存在和不存在，在異品中普遍不存在，是第二個正因。這兩個因在最初三個中以及最後三個中，各自取中間的一個因，比如或者立聲無常（宗），所作性故（因）。這個因在同品中普遍存在，在異品中普遍不存在，是最初的三個

【English Translation】 English version The three turn sounds. The previous nine Sects (宗, schools or tenets), come from the nine Hetus (因, reasons or grounds for inference) such as 'that which is to be measured'. One, 'that which is to be measured' (所量), two, 'making' (作), three, 'impermanence' (無常), are the first three Hetus. One, 'the nature of making' (作性), two, 'hearing' (聞), three, 'having arisen before' (曾發), are the middle three Hetus. One, 'impermanence' (無常), two, 'courage' (勇), three, 'contact' (觸), are the last three Hetus. These nine Hetus are the properties of the thesis (宗法), and are established based on the previous nine Sects such as permanence. The word '依' (depending on) is '第' (number), and also a turn sound.

The treatise says: 'Like this distinguishing (up to) the understood dharma is uncertain', like this distinguishing among the nine Hetus, two Hetus are called valid reasons (正因), two Hetus are called contradictory reasons (相違因), and five Hetus are called uncertain reasons (不定因). The previous two verses are verses that generate slander in the Hetu treatise, and the following verse is the correct verse of the fundamental treatise, so it is said to be the original words. Among the two valid reasons, one is universally present in similar instances (同品), so it is said 'present in similar instances'; the other is present and not present in similar instances, so it is said 'in similar and two'. These two similar instances are established, and universally absent in dissimilar instances (異品), together they are valid reasons, so it is said 'different in the world, absent, is a valid reason'. Reversing this is called contradictory, reversing these two valid reasons is called two contradictory reasons, so it is said 'reversing this is called contradictory', it should be composed as a verse saying: 'universally absent in similar instances, different in the world, present and two'. The remaining are called uncertain, the remaining two valid reasons, and outside the two contradictory reasons, the remaining five types all belong to uncertain reasons. The above-mentioned nine Hetus are all universally properties of the thesis, but regarding similar and dissimilar instances, there are these nine different sentences. The four invalid reasons (不成因), the unarisen invalid reason, are not universally properties of the thesis, so they are not discussed here.

The treatise says: 'In this (up to) each taking one in the middle', among the nine Hetus, so it is said that here only two types are called valid reasons, and seven are not valid reasons. What is called universally present in all similar instances, and universally absent in dissimilar instances, is the first valid reason; and universally present and not present in similar instances, and universally absent in dissimilar instances, is the second valid reason. These two Hetus, in the first three and the last three, each take the middle Hetu, for example, or establish sound as impermanent (thesis), because of being made (reason). This Hetu is universally present in similar instances, and universally absent in dissimilar instances, is the first three

中之因也。第二或立聲無常(宗)。勤勇無間所發性故(因)此因於同品一分轉。異品遍無。是復三因之中因也。

論復唯二種(乃至)取初復二者　次明二相違因。不但正因唯二。相違因亦唯二。故云復唯二種說名相違因。其所立因。能返前宗。故云能倒立故。又釋返前二正因故。云能倒立。正釋頌本翻此名相違。下指其事。謂一相異品遍有。二相異品有及非有。故云及二種。此之二因。于其同品一切遍無。其二因者是前第二三中。取初一及復一合為二。故云第二三中取初復二也。前明第二三中初者。或立聲為常宗。所作性故(因)。其聲常宗。以空等為同品。此勤勇無間所支性因。於此遍無。其聲宗以電瓶等為異品。此勤勇無間所支性因。于瓶等有。于電等無故。此因於同品遍無。于異品有及非有也。

論所餘五種因及相違皆不決定輅因義者　九因中。許前二正因及二相違外。余有五種。望前二正因及二相違因。皆不決定是正因。亦不決定是相違故。是□因之義也。

論又於一切因等相中皆說所說一數同類者　前頌中九因。總為三類。二是正因。二是相違因。五是不定因。依西方有三種言。謂一言二言多言。既正因有二。應二言中說。相違有二。應以二言中說。不定有五。應以多言中說。何故

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這是『中之因』。第二種是『或立聲無常』（宗），因為『勤勇無間所發性』（因）。這個『因』在同品的一部分中出現，在異品中普遍不存在。這是『復三因』中的『中之因』。

論：只有兩種（乃至）取最初的兩種。接下來闡明兩種『相違因』。不僅『正因』只有兩種，『相違因』也只有兩種。所以說只有兩種，稱為『相違因』。它所立的『因』，能夠推翻之前的『宗』。所以說能夠顛倒所立。又解釋了推翻之前的兩種『正因』，所以說能夠顛倒所立。正確地解釋了頌文的本意，稱之為『相違』。下面指出了具體情況：第一種是在相異品中普遍存在；第二種是在相異品中存在以及不存在。所以說以及兩種。這兩種『因』，在它們的同品中普遍不存在。這兩種『因』是前面第二種和第三種中的，取第一個和再一個，合為兩種。所以說是第二種和第三種中取最初的和再一個。前面說明了第二種和第三種中的第一個，例如立『聲為常』（宗），『所作性』（因）。這個『聲常』（宗），以『空』等作為同品。這個『勤勇無間所支性』（因），在這些同品中普遍不存在。這個『聲』（宗）以『電』、『瓶』等作為異品。這個『勤勇無間所支性』（因），在『瓶』等中存在，在『電』等中不存在。所以這個『因』在同品中普遍不存在，在異品中存在以及不存在。

論：其餘五種『因』以及『相違』，都是不決定的『輅因』的含義。在九種『因』中，除了前兩種『正因』和兩種『相違因』之外，其餘有五種。相對於前兩種『正因』和兩種『相違因』，都是不決定的，既不一定是『正因』，也不一定是『相違因』。這就是『□因』的含義。

論：又在一切『因』等『相』中，都說所說的一個數量是同類的。前面的頌文中，九種『因』總共分為三類：兩種是『正因』，兩種是『相違因』，五種是『不定因』。按照西方的三種說法，即一言、二言、多言。既然『正因』有兩種，應該在二言中說。『相違』有兩種，應該以二言中說。『不定』有五種，應該以多言中說。為什麼...

【English Translation】 English version: This is the 'middle cause'. The second is 'or establish sound as impermanent' (thesis), because of 'the nature of being produced by diligent effort without interruption' (reason). This 'reason' occurs in a portion of the similar instances and is universally absent in the dissimilar instances. This is the 'middle cause' among the 'repeated three causes'.

Treatise: There are only two kinds (and so on) taking the first two again. Next, clarify the two 'contradictory causes'. Not only are there only two 'valid causes', but there are also only two 'contradictory causes'. Therefore, it is said that there are only two kinds, called 'contradictory causes'. The 'reason' it establishes can overturn the previous 'thesis'. Therefore, it is said that it can reverse what is established. It also explains overturning the previous two 'valid causes', so it is said that it can reverse what is established. It correctly explains the original meaning of the verse, calling it 'contradictory'. Below, it points out the specific situations: the first is universally present in dissimilar instances; the second is present and not present in dissimilar instances. Therefore, it says 'and two kinds'. These two 'causes' are universally absent in all of their similar instances. These two 'causes' are from the first and the third of the previous second and third, taking the first and another one, combining them into two. Therefore, it is said that it takes the first and another one from the second and third. The previous explanation of the first of the second and third, for example, establishing 'sound as permanent' (thesis), 'the nature of being produced' (reason). This 'sound permanent' (thesis) takes 'space' and so on as similar instances. This 'nature of being supported by diligent effort without interruption' (reason) is universally absent in these similar instances. This 'sound' (thesis) takes 'lightning', 'bottle' and so on as dissimilar instances. This 'nature of being supported by diligent effort without interruption' (reason) is present in 'bottle' and so on, and absent in 'lightning' and so on. Therefore, this 'reason' is universally absent in similar instances and is present and not present in dissimilar instances.

Treatise: The remaining five kinds of 'causes' and 'contradictory' are all uncertain, meaning 'Luga cause'. Among the nine 'causes', besides the previous two 'valid causes' and two 'contradictory causes', there are five remaining. Relative to the previous two 'valid causes' and two 'contradictory causes', they are all uncertain, neither necessarily 'valid causes' nor necessarily 'contradictory causes'. This is the meaning of '□ cause'.

Treatise: Also, in all 'cause' and other 'characteristics', it is said that the number of what is said is of the same kind. In the previous verse, the nine 'causes' are divided into three categories: two are 'valid causes', two are 'contradictory causes', and five are 'uncertain causes'. According to the three Western sayings, namely one word, two words, and many words. Since there are two 'valid causes', it should be said in two words. There are two 'contradictory', it should be said in two words. There are five 'uncertain', it should be said in many words. Why...

頌中但以一言中說因。乃至一言中說不定。故前頌中二正因。總名正因。二相違亦總名違因。五不定因亦總名不定因。言又於一切因等相中皆說所說一數同類者。如前頌中所明一切亦正因。等取二相違。五不定相中。雖有二因。應二言中說。五不定應多言中說。然前頌中。皆一言中說者。若法法同相。皆不可說。今就意識相分。於二正因上。現一正因相分。括二正因上。如線貫華。此是彼立為一數。可言說法。又其二正因上假立一法種類。亦可言說。故言皆說所說一解數似同類。二故違因。總說為一相違因類。五不定因。總說為一不定因亦爾。

論勿說(至)遍因者　若如勝論第二佐句義中。有一實數。指二因上。名一正因。復有一第五同異句義。括二因上。令二因相似。名為同類。相違不定亦爾。今陳那破。若以實一數及實同類。括二因上。說為一正因。或一相違。或一不定者。便捨本因自相。不得為本因。文中先非一實數。故云勿說二相乃至猶為因等。至事云何。如二因若別合說。即成一正因。如勝論師。對聲論師。立聲無常(宗)。所作性故(因)。猶如瓶等(喻)。更于復時。別令聲論師。對勝論師。立聲是常(宗)。所聞性故(因)。猶如聲性(喻)。此二師復別立故皆無過。若此二師。同一令說合

此二因。為一數及一同類括布便轉。作相違因。

論理應四種(至)皆云何者　此古因明師。不許四不定外。別有不共不定。故徴問云。以道理言之。除決定相違。餘四不定。于同異二品。若遍不遍。皆悉偈有。以攝屬異類法故。此因可名不定。今聲論對佛弟子。立所聞性因。既不屬異類。何故所云不定。為愿此難。立比量云。所聞性因。非不定攝(宗)。異品無故(因)。猶如正因(喻)。又所聞性因。非不定攝(宗)。同品無故(因)如故違因(喻)。

論由不共故者　此下陳那答。此句是總。餘四不定屬同異二品。不唯屬一。故是不定。今所聞性。成不定因。由不共故。謂如山中樹木。無的攝屬。然有或屬此人彼人之義。故是不定。今此所聞性因亦爾。不在同異二品之上。然容即通世二品之義。觸通同異二品。無定所屬。故名不空。

論以若不共(至)離故者　此解上由不共故。以若前不共所聞性因。所來宗法。若常無常等。所有差別。遍攝佛法。衛世僧佉尼楗子。一切所立。自示宗法。皆是數因。謂佛法立等十八界。立聲是色界。或云聲界。或云乃至聲是法界。或云無常等(宗)。所聞性故(因)。若衛世師。立六句義。立云聲是實句。乃至或云聲是和合句義(宗)。所聞性故(因)。若

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：這兩種原因，如果將一個數字和同一類別的概念混淆，就會導致推理方向的轉變，從而產生相反的結論。

論：按照邏輯，應該有四種情況（直到）都是什麼意思？這是古代因明學派的觀點。他們不承認在四種不定因之外，還存在一種不共不定因。因此提出疑問：按照道理來說，除了決定和相違之外，其餘四種不定因，在同品和異品中，如果不是普遍存在，就應該普遍不存在，這些情況都包含在偈頌中。因為這種原因屬於異類法的範疇，所以可以被稱為不定因。現在，聲明論者針對佛陀的弟子，提出了『所聞性』作為因。既然『所聞性』不屬於異類，為什麼你們說它是不定因呢？爲了駁斥這個難題，我建立一個比量：『所聞性』不是不定因所包含的（宗），因為它在異品中不存在（因），就像正因一樣（喻）。此外，『所聞性』不是不定因所包含的（宗），因為它在同品中不存在（因），就像相違因一樣（喻）。

論：因為不共的緣故。這是陳那（Dignāga）的回答。這句話是總綱。其餘四種不定因屬於同品和異品，而不是隻屬於其中之一，所以是不定因。現在，『所聞性』之所以成為不定因，是因為它具有『不共』的特性。就像山中的樹木，沒有明確的歸屬，但可能屬於這個人或那個人一樣，所以是不定的。現在的『所聞性』也是如此，它不屬於同品或異品，但可能同時與兩者相關聯，觸及同品和異品，沒有固定的歸屬，所以被稱為不空。

論：如果因為不共（直到）分離的緣故。這是對上面『因為不共的緣故』的解釋。如果先前不共的『所聞性』，所依據的宗法，例如常或無常等，所有的差別，都普遍包含佛法、衛世（Vaisheshika）、僧佉（Samkhya）、尼楗子（Nigantha）等一切宗派所建立的理論。這表明宗法都是數因。例如，佛法認為有十八界，認為聲音是**，或者說是聲界，或者說是法界，或者說是無常等（宗），因為它是『所聞性』（因）。如果衛世派認為有六句義，認為聲音是實句，或者認為是和合句義（宗），因為它是『所聞性』（因）。

【English Translation】 English version: These two causes, if one confuses a number and a concept of the same category, will lead to a shift in the direction of reasoning, thus producing the opposite conclusion.

Argument: Logically, there should be four types (up to) what does it all mean? This is the view of ancient epistemologists. They do not admit that besides the four uncertain causes, there is another uncommon uncertain cause. Therefore, they ask: According to logic, apart from the definite and contradictory, the remaining four uncertain causes, in the similar and dissimilar categories, if they are not universally present, they should be universally absent, all of which are contained in the verses. Because this cause belongs to the category of dissimilar dharmas, it can be called an uncertain cause. Now, the sound theorists, targeting the Buddha's disciples, propose 'audibility' as the cause. Since 'audibility' does not belong to the dissimilar category, why do you say it is an uncertain cause? To refute this difficulty, I establish a syllogism: 'Audibility' is not included in the uncertain cause (thesis), because it does not exist in the dissimilar category (reason), just like the correct cause (example). Furthermore, 'audibility' is not included in the uncertain cause (thesis), because it does not exist in the similar category (reason), just like the contradictory cause (example).

Argument: Because of the uncommonness. This is Dignāga's answer. This sentence is the general outline. The remaining four uncertain causes belong to both the similar and dissimilar categories, not just one of them, so they are uncertain causes. Now, the reason why 'audibility' becomes an uncertain cause is because it has the characteristic of 'uncommonness'. Just like the trees in the mountains, which do not have a clear belonging, but may belong to this person or that person, so they are uncertain. The current 'audibility' is also like this, it does not belong to the similar or dissimilar category, but may be related to both at the same time, touching both the similar and dissimilar categories, without a fixed belonging, so it is called not empty.

Argument: If because of the uncommonness (up to) the reason for separation. This is an explanation of the above 'because of the uncommonness'. If the previously uncommon 'audibility', the doctrinal basis it relies on, such as permanence or impermanence, all the differences, universally include the theories established by all schools such as Buddhism, Vaisheshika (衛世), Samkhya (僧佉), Nigantha (尼楗子). This shows that the doctrinal bases are all numerical causes. For example, Buddhism believes that there are eighteen realms, believing that sound is **, or the sound realm, or the dharma realm, or impermanence, etc. (thesis), because it is 'audibility' (reason). If the Vaisheshika school believes that there are six categories, believing that sound is a real category, or a combined category (thesis), because it is 'audibility' (reason).

僧佉立二十五諦義。立聲[穴/俱]性。乃至或云聲是神我(宗)。所聞性故(因)。若尼楗子。唯立有命無命兩句義。論有動搖增長之者名有命。若不動搖無增長者名無命。立云聲是有命。或云聲是無命(宗)。所聞性故(因)。遍攝如此等類一切法宗。此所聞性因。皆同異品無。不能合宗。體性決定。是疑因。下釋比量。所聞因唯彼有性。有法之聲。即彼有法聲之所攝。不為唯同品所攝。或唯異品所攝。故成不定。又釋言。唯彼有性者。即所聞性因也。彼所攝者。即所聞性因。為彼有法聲所攝也。上雖釋直難。未解比量。為破前量。故云一向。者面也。邊相也。即因有三相。或名三面三邊也。此所聞性因。離一相故。名離一向。謂離同品有相向也。此因有遍是宗法。異品遍無。辨因品定有。故𨷂一向。若如相違因。𨷂同品遍有。及𨷂異品遍無故。是兩向離。故此量云。何聞性因是不定(宗)。𨷂一相故(因)。猶如共等四種不定。以此四種法。𨷂異品遍無相故。是同喻也。此即與前二量。作決定相違過也。

法有(至)疑因性者　此下簡不共。與解四不定差別。此簡共不定也。諸有立因。于同異品。皆共有性。無有簡別。如立聲常。所量性故因。唯于彼同異品。連皆遍有。俱不相違。望此義故。是疑因性。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本僧佉派（Samkhya）建立了二十五諦的理論。他們認為聲音是自性（Prakriti）的一種屬性，甚至有人說聲音是神我（Purusha）（宗）。因為聲音可以被聽見（因）。耆那教（Nigantha）只建立了有命和無命兩種範疇。他們認為，能夠動搖和增長的事物是有命的，不能動搖和增長的事物是無命的。他們認為聲音是有命的，或者說聲音是無命的（宗）。因為聲音可以被聽見（因）。以上這些宗派的觀點，都使用了『所聞性』作為原因。這個『所聞性』的原因，在同品和異品中都無法排除，不能確定宗的體性，因此是一個疑因。下面解釋比量。『所聞因』僅僅具有『彼有性』，即有法之聲，被『彼有法聲』所包含，既不只被同品包含，也不只被異品包含，因此構成了不定因。進一步解釋，『唯彼有性』指的是『所聞性』這個原因。『彼所攝者』，指的是『所聞性』這個原因，被『彼有法聲』所包含。上面雖然解釋了直接的詰難，但沒有解釋比量。爲了駁斥前面的比量，所以說『一向』，指的是一個方面，一個邊相，也就是原因有三個相，或者說三個面三個邊。這個『所聞性』的原因，缺少一個相，所以叫做『離一向』，指的是缺少同品有相。這個原因具有遍是宗法，異品遍無的特點，可以確定原因的品類，所以是『𨷂一向』。如果像相違因那樣，既『𨷂同品遍有』，又『𨷂異品遍無』，那就是『兩向離』。所以這個比量說，為什麼『所聞性』的原因是不定的（宗）？因為缺少一個相（因）。就像共等四種不定，因為缺少異品遍無的相，所以是同喻。這實際上是與前兩個比量，作出了決定性的相違過失。法有(至)疑因性者：下面區分不共，並解釋四種不定的差別。這裡區分的是共不定。如果所立的原因，在同品和異品中都具有，沒有簡別，比如立『聲常』，因為『所量性』這個原因，在同品和異品中都普遍存在，彼此不相違背，從這個意義上來說，是疑因。

【English Translation】 English version The Samkhya school establishes the doctrine of the twenty-five Tattvas (realities). They posit that sound is a property of Prakriti (primordial nature), and some even say that sound is Purusha (the self) (thesis). Because sound is audible (reason). The Niganthas (Jains) only establish two categories: animate and inanimate. They consider things that can move and grow to be animate, and things that cannot move or grow to be inanimate. They posit that sound is animate, or that sound is inanimate (thesis). Because sound is audible (reason). The views of these schools all use 'audibility' as the reason. This reason of 'audibility' cannot be excluded from either similar or dissimilar instances, and cannot determine the nature of the thesis, therefore it is a doubtful reason. The following explains inference. The 'audible reason' only possesses 'that-having-ness', that is, the sound that is the subject of the property, is included in 'that-subject-of-the-property-sound', and is neither included only in similar instances nor only in dissimilar instances, therefore it constitutes an inconclusive reason. Further explanation: 'only possessing that-having-ness' refers to the reason of 'audibility'. 'That which is included in that' refers to the reason of 'audibility', which is included in 'that-subject-of-the-property-sound'. Although the direct refutation has been explained above, the inference has not been explained. In order to refute the previous inference, it is said 'one-sided', which refers to one aspect, one side, that is, the reason has three aspects, or three faces and three sides. This reason of 'audibility' lacks one aspect, so it is called 'deviating from one-sidedness', which refers to lacking the aspect of being present in similar instances. This reason has the characteristics of being universally present in the thesis and universally absent in dissimilar instances, and can determine the category of the reason, so it is 'completely one-sided'. If it is like a contradictory reason, which is 'universally present in similar instances' and 'universally absent in dissimilar instances', then it is 'deviating from two-sidedness'. Therefore, this inference says, why is the reason of 'audibility' inconclusive (thesis)? Because it lacks one aspect (reason). Like the four types of common inconclusive reasons, because they lack the aspect of being universally absent in dissimilar instances, therefore it is a similar example. This is actually making a decisive contradictory fault with the previous two inferences. The Dharma has (to) the nature of doubtful reason: The following distinguishes the uncommon and explains the differences between the four types of inconclusive reasons. Here, the common inconclusive is distinguished. If the established reason is present in both similar and dissimilar instances, without distinction, such as establishing 'sound is permanent', because the reason of 'measurability' is universally present in both similar and dissimilar instances, and does not contradict each other, from this meaning, it is a doubtful reason.

若不共因。于同異二品。並皆非有。俱相違故。是疑因性。所言唯者。即簡不共也。又釋。此唯于彼等者。宗有二種。一寬。二狹。寬宗者。如雲內身無我。除宗已外餘一切法。連法無我。故是其寬。狹者。如立音聲是常。除宗已外。即有無常。故是其狹。因亦有三寬二狹。寬者。取量性所智性等。諦此已外。更無非所智等故。狹者。勤勇所支性。或所作性等。諦此已外。更有勤勇所發性。或非所作性等故。若立狹宗言。聲是其常。立寬因云。所量性故。此因於其同異二品。皆共此竟因。唯于彼狹宗。望同異二品。俱不相違。是疑因性。若望彼寬宗云。內身無我此寬。所量性因。即是正因。或狹因云。所作性故。亦即正因。作不定攝。今簡寬宗故言唯。又簡狹因故云唯。謂唯此族宗其所量寬因。即成不定。非於寬宗而成猶豫。又唯此寬因。于其狹宗。成其猶豫。非彼狹因。于彼狹宗寬宗。而成不定也。此共因望寬狹宗。有定不定。至不共因。一向恒是不定。而非定也。故有差別。

論若於(至)別余故者　若所立因。于不定中同異品上。俱悉分有。不俱是不定因。亦是相違及正因也。言差別解故者。以所立因。不於一分異品轉故。是定因。論如立聲常(宗)。無質礙故(因)。諸無質礙皆連是。猶如虛空(同喻

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本若是不共因，在同品和異品兩種情況下，都不存在，因為它與兩者都相違背，所以是疑因的性質。這裡所說的『唯』，就是簡別不共因。另一種解釋是，這個『唯』是相對於『彼等』而言的。宗有兩種，一種是寬宗，一種是狹宗。寬宗，比如立論『內身無我』（內身：指五蘊和合之身；無我：沒有常一不變的實體），除了宗本身以外，其餘一切法，都連帶『法無我』，所以是寬宗。狹宗，比如立論『音聲是常』，除了宗本身以外，就存在『無常』。因也有三種，寬、狹兩種。寬因，比如取『所量性』、『所智性』等（所量性：可以被量度的性質；所智性：可以被認知理解的性質），除了這些以外，就沒有『非所智性』等。狹因，比如『勤勇所支性』或『所作性』等（勤勇所支性：由努力和行為支援的性質；所作性：被製造出來的性質），除了這些以外，還有『勤勇所發性』或『非所作性』等。如果立狹宗，說『聲是常』，立寬因，說『所量性故』，這個因在同品和異品兩種情況下，都共同存在，這個因只在狹宗的情況下，相對於同品和異品，都不相違背，是疑因的性質。如果相對於寬宗，說『內身無我』這個寬宗，『所量性』這個因，就是正因。或者狹因，說『所作性故』，也就是正因，屬於不定因。現在簡別寬宗，所以說『唯』。又簡別狹因，所以說『唯』。意思是隻有這種宗的『所量性』這種寬因，才成為不定因，而不是在寬宗的情況下才產生猶豫。又只有這種寬因，在狹宗的情況下，才產生猶豫，而不是狹因在狹宗或寬宗的情況下，才成為不定因。這種共因相對於寬狹宗，有定和不定兩種情況，而不共因，始終是不定的，而不是確定的。所以有差別。

論：如果（所立的因）在不定因中，在同品和異品上，都部分存在，不完全存在，就是不定因，也是相違因和正因。『差別解故』的意思是，因為所立的因，不是在異品的一部分上轉化，所以是定因。論：比如立論『聲是常』（宗），因為『沒有質礙』（因）。所有沒有質礙的東西都是常，比如虛空（同喻）。

【English Translation】 English version If it is a non-common cause (若不共因), it does not exist in either the similar or dissimilar categories (于同異二品), because it contradicts both (俱相違故). Therefore, it is the nature of a doubtful cause (是疑因性). The word 'only' (唯) here means to distinguish it from the non-common cause (即簡不共也). Another explanation is that this 'only' (唯) is relative to 'those' (彼等). There are two types of thesis (宗), one broad and one narrow. A broad thesis is like asserting 'the inner self is without self' (內身無我) (inner self: referring to the aggregation of the five skandhas; without self: lacking a permanent and unchanging entity). Apart from the thesis itself, all other dharmas are connected to 'dharma without self' (法無我), so it is a broad thesis. A narrow thesis is like asserting 'sound is permanent' (音聲是常). Apart from the thesis itself, there exists 'impermanence' (無常). There are also three types of cause (因): broad, narrow. A broad cause is like taking 'measurability' (所量性) (can be measured) , 'knowability' (所智性) (can be known and understood), etc. Apart from these, there is no 'unknowability' (非所智性), etc. A narrow cause is like 'being supported by effort' (勤勇所支性) (supported by effort and action) or 'being produced' (所作性) (being manufactured). Apart from these, there is 'being caused by effort' (勤勇所發性) or 'not being produced' (非所作性), etc. If a narrow thesis is established, saying 'sound is permanent' (聲是其常), and a broad cause is established, saying 'because it is measurable' (所量性故), this cause exists in both the similar and dissimilar categories. This cause only in the case of the narrow thesis, relative to the similar and dissimilar categories, does not contradict either, and is the nature of a doubtful cause. If relative to the broad thesis, saying 'the inner self is without self' (內身無我), this broad thesis, the cause of 'measurability' (所量性), is a correct cause. Or a narrow cause, saying 'because it is produced' (所作性故), is also a correct cause, belonging to the uncertain cause. Now, distinguishing the broad thesis, therefore it is said 'only' (唯). Also distinguishing the narrow cause, therefore it is said 'only' (唯). It means that only this type of thesis with the broad cause of 'measurability' becomes an uncertain cause, and it is not in the case of the broad thesis that hesitation arises. Also, only this broad cause, in the case of the narrow thesis, causes hesitation, and it is not the narrow cause, in the case of the narrow or broad thesis, that becomes an uncertain cause. This common cause, relative to the broad and narrow thesis, has both certain and uncertain situations, while the non-common cause is always uncertain, and not certain. Therefore, there is a difference.

Treatise: If (the established cause) in the uncertain cause, partially exists in both the similar and dissimilar categories, and does not fully exist, it is an uncertain cause, and also a contradictory cause and a correct cause. The meaning of 'because of the difference in explanation' (差別解故) is that because the established cause does not transform in a part of the dissimilar category, it is a certain cause. Treatise: For example, establishing the thesis 'sound is permanent' (聲是常) (thesis), because it 'lacks materiality' (無質礙故) (cause). All things that lack materiality are permanent, like space (虛空) (example).

)。若是無常。即有質礙。猶如瓶等(異喻)。以虛空為同品。以瓶等為異品。既簡瓶等無常有礙法故。復望虛空為同喻。故是正因。若望心心法等。其因即成相違。謂聲是無常(宗)。無質礙故(因)。諸無質礙法悉無常。如心心法(同喻)。若是其常。即有質礙。猶如極微(異喻)。此三不定望異品一分無邊。即成決定。望異品一分有邊。即是猶豫。其不共因。於一切宗。無有空義。故有差別。

論是名差別者　是名四種不定與不共。與不共不定差別也。

論若對許有聲性是常此應成因者　此外人難云。汝既云不共。云因恒不定者。若所聞性因。對衛世許。立聲性同異句義。體是所皆。而是其常。應成正因。何故唯云不定。

論若於爾時(乃至)是猶豫因者　此通難也。若衛世師。于立論時。愚鈍無智。不能與彼聲論。顯示所作性。或勤勇無間所發性。是無常因。作決定相違過者。容可對彼衛世。此因是定。然衛世。于聲論立量之時。相違決定。必定可得故。所聞因量。是不定也。言俱者。同立時也。問所聞性容決定。即言遍攝恒不定。餘四別義雖有定。應約別義恒不定。答餘四義恒是有故。不唯不定不共。但對世衛成。故言唯不定。下釋此二成猶豫因。一有法聲義。世常無常。更互相違。不

【現代漢語翻譯】若是無常，即有質礙，猶如瓶等（異喻）。以虛空為同品，以瓶等為異品。既簡瓶等無常有礙法故，復望虛空為同喻，故是正因。若望心心法等，其因即成相違。謂聲是無常（宗），無質礙故（因）。諸無質礙法悉無常，如心心法（同喻）。若是其常，即有質礙，猶如極微（異喻）。此三不定望異品一分無邊，即成決定；望異品一分有邊，即是猶豫。其不共因，於一切宗，無有空義，故有差別。論曰：是名差別者，是名四種不定與不共，與不共不定差別也。論曰：若對許有聲性是常此應成因者，此外人難云：汝既云不共，云因恒不定者，若所聞性因，對衛世（Vaisheshika）許，立聲性同異句義，體是所皆，而是其常，應成正因，何故唯云不定？論曰：若於爾時（乃至）是猶豫因者，此通難也。若衛世師，于立論時，愚鈍無智，不能與彼聲論，顯示所作性，或勤勇無間所發性，是無常因，作決定相違過者，容可對彼衛世，此因是定。然衛世，于聲論立量之時，相違決定，必定可得故，所聞因量，是不定也。言俱者，同立時也。問：所聞性容決定，即言遍攝恒不定，餘四別義雖有定，應約別義恒不定。答：餘四義恒是有故，不唯不定不共，但對世衛成，故言唯不定。下釋此二成猶豫因，一有法聲義，世常無常，更互相違，不

【English Translation】 If it is impermanent, it has substance and obstruction, like a bottle (heterogeneous analogy). Taking space as the homogeneous class and bottles as the heterogeneous class, since it excludes the impermanent and obstructive nature of bottles, and further regards space as a homogeneous analogy, therefore it is a correct reason. If considering mental states, the reason becomes contradictory. That is, sound is impermanent (thesis), because it is without substance and obstruction (reason). All things without substance and obstruction are impermanent, like mental states (homogeneous analogy). If it were permanent, it would have substance and obstruction, like atoms (heterogeneous analogy). These three uncertainties, when considering one part of the heterogeneous class as boundless, become definite; when considering one part of the heterogeneous class as bounded, it is uncertain. The non-common reason, in all schools, has no empty meaning, therefore there is a difference. The treatise says: 'This is called difference,' this is the difference between the four kinds of uncertain and non-common, and the uncertain of non-common. The treatise says: 'If one argues that the nature of sound is permanent, this should become a reason,' an outsider objects: 'Since you say it is non-common and the reason is always uncertain, if the reason of 'audibility' is presented to the Vaisheshika school, establishing the meaning of the sameness and difference of the nature of sound, its essence is all that exists, and it is permanent, it should become a correct reason, why do you only say it is uncertain?' The treatise says: 'If at that time (and so on) it is an uncertain reason,' this is a general difficulty. If the Vaisheshika teacher, at the time of establishing the thesis, is dull and without wisdom, unable to show the nature of being produced or the nature of being produced by diligent and uninterrupted effort, which is the reason for impermanence, and makes a definitely contradictory mistake, it may be that this reason is definite for that Vaisheshika. However, when the Vaisheshika establishes the inference about sound, a contradictory determination can certainly be obtained, therefore the measure of the reason of audibility is uncertain. 'Together' means at the same time of establishing. Question: The nature of audibility may be definite, that is, the statement universally encompasses what is always uncertain, although the other four separate meanings are definite, it should be about the separate meaning that is always uncertain. Answer: The other four meanings are always present, therefore it is not only uncertain and non-common, but only becomes so for the Vaisheshika school, therefore it is said to be only uncertain. The following explains that these two become uncertain reasons, one is the meaning of the existence of sound, the world is permanent and impermanent, contradicting each other, not

容有故。俱是猶豫。此所立宗。常與無常。雖不可定。若論勝負。前負復勝。如殺遲棋。

論文於此中現教力勝故應依此思求決定者　此陳那師理勝負如前。以理而言。何非何是者。衛世所立無常者是。以現教力勝故。謂一現量力。世間現見聲是間斷。有不聞時。二比量教。所作性是比量教力故勝。聲論唯比量教故劣也。又佛所說。亦云聲是無常。佛於一切說教中勝故。衛世勝也。故可依此現教二勝。思求二量。無間前復。縱衛世先立。以現教勝故理亦是。又釋。如來現見。聲是無常。所發言教。當佛言教。故佛言教是勝。可依此勝教。思求聲無常。又釋。教者至教。即一切世間所有言教。合其理者。即是至教。世間現見。聲從緣起。猶如瓶盆。體是生或。有不聞時。依此現見之。以發無常至教故。衛世義同此故。聲無常是也。

論攝上頌者　言攝上散文也。下頌中雖明餘三相違。上文中無。以不言唯攝上頌故無過。

論若法是不共(乃至)皆是輅因性者　此頌六不定也。若法者因法也。是不共者。所聞性因也。共者所量性等四因也。以共同異品故。決定相違者。聲論衛世所立。決定相違因也。遍一切者。如此六種不定。遍法界一切諸法也。于彼皆是疑因性者。于彼一切諸法。此六法是疑。或不定

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：

容有故，俱是猶豫。此所立宗（所建立的宗義），常與無常，雖不可定。若論勝負，前負復勝，如殺遲棋（像下棋一樣，開始輸了，後來又贏了）。

論文於此中現教力勝故應依此思求決定者：此陳那（Dignāga）師理勝負如前。以理而言，何非何是者？衛世（Vaisheshika）所立無常者是。以現教力勝故，謂一現量力（直接感知的力量）。世間現見聲是間斷，有不聞時。二比量教（通過推理和教義的力量）。所作性是比量教力故勝。聲論（Shabda）唯比量教故劣也。又佛所說，亦云聲是無常。佛於一切說教中勝故，衛世勝也。故可依此現教二勝，思求二量，無間前復。縱衛世先立，以現教勝故理亦是。又釋，如來現見，聲是無常。所發言教，當佛言教。故佛言教是勝，可依此勝教，思求聲無常。又釋，教者至教，即一切世間所有言教。合其理者，即是至教。世間現見，聲從緣起，猶如瓶盆，體是生或。有不聞時。依此現見之，以發無常至教故，衛世義同此故，聲無常是也。

論攝上頌者：言攝上散文也。下頌中雖明餘三相違，上文中無。以不言唯攝上頌故無過。

論若法是不共（乃至）皆是輅因性者：此頌六不定也。若法者因法也。是不共者，所聞性因也。共者所量性等四因也。以共同異品故，決定相違者，聲論衛世所立，決定相違因也。遍一切者，如此六種不定，遍法界一切諸法也。于彼皆是疑因性者，于彼一切諸法，此六法是疑，或不定。

【English Translation】 English version:

There is a reason for doubt; all are hesitant. This established tenet (the established doctrine), whether permanent or impermanent, cannot be definitively determined. If discussing victory or defeat, the initial defeat turns into victory, like a slow chess game (like playing chess, losing at the beginning but winning later).

Regarding the treatise 'Here, relying on the superior power of manifest teachings, one should contemplate and seek certainty': Here, the master Dignāga's reasoning about victory and defeat is as before. In terms of reason, what is incorrect and what is correct? The impermanence established by the Vaisheshika school is correct. Because the power of manifest teachings is superior, namely, the power of direct perception. The world directly perceives that sound is intermittent, with times when it is not heard. Secondly, the teachings of inference (through reasoning and doctrine). The characteristic of being produced is superior because it is the power of inferential teachings. The Shabda school is inferior because it relies solely on inferential teachings. Furthermore, the Buddha also said that sound is impermanent. Because the Buddha is superior in all teachings, the Vaisheshika school is also victorious. Therefore, one can rely on these two superior manifest teachings to contemplate the two types of evidence, with no interval before the reversal. Even if the Vaisheshika school establishes it first, the reasoning is also correct because the manifest teachings are superior. Another explanation is that the Tathagata directly perceives that sound is impermanent. The teachings spoken are equivalent to the Buddha's teachings. Therefore, the Buddha's teachings are superior, and one can rely on these superior teachings to contemplate the impermanence of sound. Another explanation is that 'teachings' refers to ultimate teachings, that is, all the teachings in the world. That which aligns with reason is the ultimate teaching. The world directly perceives that sound arises from conditions, like a pot or a basin, its nature is to be produced or not. There are times when it is not heard. Relying on this direct perception, because the ultimate teaching of impermanence is proclaimed, the meaning of the Vaisheshika school is the same, therefore, sound is impermanent.

Regarding the treatise 'Summarizing the above verse': It refers to summarizing the above prose. Although the following verse clarifies the remaining three contradictions, they are not in the above text. There is no fault because it does not say that it only summarizes the above verse.

Regarding the treatise 'If a dharma is non-common (etc.) all are the cause of doubt': This verse is about the six uncertainties. 'If a dharma' refers to the causal dharma. 'Non-common' refers to the cause of audibility. 'Common' refers to the four causes such as measurability. Because of the common and different categories, 'definitely contradictory' refers to the definitely contradictory cause established by the Shabda and Vaisheshika schools. 'Pervading all' means that these six types of uncertainties pervade all dharmas in the entire dharma realm. 'In them, all are the nature of the cause of doubt' means that in all those dharmas, these six dharmas are doubtful or uncertain.

因。

論耶證法有法(乃至)若無所違害者　此頌相違因也。若前因法能耶倒證法。自性差別。有法自性差別。然不違害宗。如宗五過故。或相違因。非宗過也。準上散文。但有法自性一相違因。

論觀宗法(乃至)似因者　此覆結不定相違。敵論之者。觀宗家因法。若言即是正因。若起審察思量。疑不定心。即成躕躇。六不定因。言審察者。以不定故。故審察也。若觀宗家因法。違彼立論之者。所樂法有法等。即成顛倒。四相違因。異此不定相違二似因外。更無似因名也。以古因明師。或外道等。所聞性因。不名不定。別作餘名。決定相違。亦別作名。遮此異說。故云異此無似因也。四不成因。本非宗法。今望宗法。明其似故。不名似因也。又解。今望同異二品。明其真似。不說不成故也。

論如是已辨因及似因喻今當說者　此結上生下也。依梵本云。達利風咜案多。此正解為見邊立因。但遍是宗法義顯。同有異無不彰。令解宗之見。不至究竟。今以喻重顯同有異無二相。令解宗之見。至其過極。故云見邊也。今且同舊翻名。名為喻。即曉喻。

論說因(至)相似者　說因宗所隨者。即同法喻也。先說其因。宗即隨遂。如言法所作者皆是無常。但所作性智處。其無常性必定隨知。猶如牛母

【現代漢語翻譯】因（Hetu，原因、理由）。

論耶證法有法(乃至)若無所違害者：此頌相違因也。若前因法能耶倒證法，自性差別，有法自性差別，然不違害宗，如宗五過故。或相違因，非宗過也。準上散文，但有法自性一相違因。

現代漢語譯本：討論如果用來證明『有法』的『法』沒有衝突（乃至），那麼這個偈頌就是『相違因』。如果前面的『因法』能夠顛倒證明『法』，即自性差別，『有法』的自性差別，然而不違背『宗』，就像『宗』的五種過失一樣。或者說是『相違因』，而不是『宗』的過失。依照上面的散文，只有『有法』的自性是『相違因』。

論觀宗法(乃至)似因者：此覆結不定相違。敵論之者，觀宗家因法，若言即是正因，若起審察思量，疑不定心，即成躕躇，六不定因。言審察者，以不定故，故審察也。若觀宗家因法，違彼立論之者，所樂法有法等，即成顛倒，四相違因。異此不定相違二似因外，更無似因名也。以古因明師，或外道等，所聞性因，不名不定，別作餘名，決定相違，亦別作名。遮此異說，故云異此無似因也。四不成因，本非宗法，今望宗法，明其似故，不名似因也。又解，今望同異二品，明其真似，不說不成故也。

現代漢語譯本：討論觀察『宗法』（Paksa-dharma，宗所法）(乃至)『似因』（Hetvābhāsa，似是而非的因）：這是重複總結『不定』和『相違』。與對方辯論的人，觀察『宗家』的『因法』，如果說這就是『正因』（Saddhetu，正確的因），如果開始審察思量，產生懷疑不定的心，就成了猶豫，即六種『不定因』。說『審察』，是因為不確定，所以才審察。如果觀察『宗家』的『因法』，違背了對方立論的人所喜歡的『法』、『有法』等，就成了顛倒，即四種『相違因』。除了這『不定』和『相違』兩種『似因』之外，再沒有其他的『似因』名稱了。因為古代的因明師，或者外道等，所說的『所聞性因』，不稱為『不定』，另外起其他的名稱，確定『相違』，也另外起名稱。爲了阻止這種不同的說法，所以說除了這些就沒有其他的『似因』了。四種『不成因』，本來不是『宗法』，現在相對於『宗法』，說明它的相似之處，所以不稱為『似因』。另一種解釋是，現在相對於相同和相異兩種品類，說明它的真假，所以不說『不成』。

論如是已辨因及似因喻今當說者：此結上生下也。依梵本云，達利風咜案多。此正解為見邊立因。但遍是宗法義顯，同有異無不彰。令解宗之見，不至究竟。今以喻重顯同有異無二相。令解宗之見，至其過極。故云見邊也。今且同舊翻名，名為喻，即曉喻。

現代漢語譯本：討論像這樣已經辨別了『因』和『似因』，現在應當說的是『喻』（ दृष्टान्त， दृष्टान्त）。這是總結上面，引出下面。依照梵文版本，是『達利風咜案多』。正確的解釋是『見邊立因』。但是『遍』是『宗法』的意義顯現，相同存在和不同不存在不明顯。使理解『宗』的見解，不能達到究竟。現在用『喻』重新顯現相同存在和不同不存在的兩種相狀。使理解『宗』的見解，達到極致。所以說是『見邊』。現在暫且沿用舊的翻譯名稱，稱為『喻』，也就是曉喻。

論說因(至)相似者：說因宗所隨者，即同法喻也。先說其因，宗即隨遂。如言法所作者皆是無常。但所作性智處，其無常性必定隨知。猶如牛母。

現代漢語譯本：討論『說因』（說明原因）(乃至)『相似』：說明『因』隨著『宗』，這就是『同法喻』（Sādhyasādhana-dṛṣṭānta，同法例）。先說它的『因』，『宗』就隨著實現。例如說法，凡是所作的事物都是無常的。只要是所作的性質存在的地方，它的無常性質必定隨著被認知。猶如牛和它的母親。

【English Translation】 Hetu (Cause, reason).

Discussion on 'If the dharma (quality) used to prove the 'possessor of dharma' (dharmin) does not have contradictions (and so on)': This verse is about 'contradictory reason' (viruddha-hetu). If the preceding 'reason-dharma' can inversely prove the 'dharma', that is, the difference in nature, the difference in nature of the 'possessor of dharma', yet it does not contradict the 'thesis' (paksa), like the five faults of the 'thesis'. Or it is a 'contradictory reason', not a fault of the 'thesis'. According to the above prose, only the nature of the 'possessor of dharma' is a 'contradictory reason'.

English version: Discussion on 'Observing the 'thesis-dharma' (Paksa-dharma) (and so on) 'pseudo-reason' (Hetvābhāsa)': This is a repeated conclusion of 'indefinite' (anaikāntika) and 'contradictory' (viruddha). The one who debates with the opponent observes the 'reason-dharma' of the 'thesis-holder'. If it is said that this is the 'correct reason' (Saddhetu), if one begins to examine and contemplate, and a doubtful and indefinite mind arises, it becomes hesitation, that is, the six types of 'indefinite reasons'. Saying 'examine' is because it is indefinite, therefore it is examined. If observing the 'reason-dharma' of the 'thesis-holder' contradicts the 'dharma', 'possessor of dharma', etc., that the proponent of the argument likes, it becomes inverted, that is, the four types of 'contradictory reasons'. Apart from these two types of 'pseudo-reasons', 'indefinite' and 'contradictory', there are no other names for 'pseudo-reasons'. Because ancient logicians, or heretics, etc., the 'reason of audibility' they speak of is not called 'indefinite', but given other names, and 'definitely contradictory' is also given another name. To prevent this different saying, it is said that apart from these, there are no other 'pseudo-reasons'. The four types of 'unestablished reasons' (asiddha-hetu) are originally not 'thesis-dharma', but now, in relation to 'thesis-dharma', their similarity is explained, so they are not called 'pseudo-reasons'. Another explanation is that now, in relation to the two categories of same and different, their truth and falsehood are explained, so 'unestablished' is not mentioned.

Discussion on 'Having thus distinguished the 'reason' and 'pseudo-reason', now what should be said is 'example' ( दृष्टान्त, दृष्टान्त)': This concludes the above and introduces the below. According to the Sanskrit version, it is 'Dali Fengta Anta'. The correct explanation is 'establishing the reason by seeing the edge'. However, 'pervasion' (vyāpti) is the meaning of 'thesis-dharma' that is manifested, and the presence of the same and the absence of the different are not clear. It prevents the understanding of the 'thesis' from reaching the ultimate. Now, the two aspects of the presence of the same and the absence of the different are re-manifested with 'example'. It makes the understanding of the 'thesis' reach its extreme. Therefore, it is called 'seeing the edge'. Now, let's temporarily follow the old translation name and call it 'example', which is to say, to make understand.

Discussion on 'Explaining the reason' (explaining the cause) (and so on) 'similarity': Explaining that the 'reason' follows the 'thesis' is the 'example of similarity' (Sādhyasādhana-dṛṣṭānta). First, explain its 'reason', and the 'thesis' will follow and be realized. For example, it is said that all things that are made are impermanent. As long as the nature of being made exists, its nature of impermanence will definitely be known. Like a cow and its mother.

English version: Discussion on 'Explaining the reason' (explaining the cause) (and so on) 'similarity': Explaining that the 'reason' follows the 'thesis' is the 'example of similarity' (Sādhyasādhana-dṛṣṭānta). First, explain its 'reason', and the 'thesis' will follow and be realized. For example, it is said that all things that are made are impermanent. As long as the nature of being made exists, its nature of impermanence will definitely be known. Like a cow and its mother.

者處犢子必隨。此意所作性者。至瓶等上。其無常性。亦必隨至瓶盆等上。故知所作性因。成至聲上。其無常性。亦來其聲上也。瓶上無常。共許故實。非宗以似宗故名宗也。宗無因不有者。即異法喻也。先說宗無。復說因無。如言法常住者。即非所作。但是無有所立宗處。謂虛空等。此所作因。必不有此。猶如母牛不行之處。犢子不行。此處無有無常宗虛。如虛空等。其所作因。必定非有。故知音聲有所作因。定是無常也。此二名譬喻也。余皆此相似者。此二正喻之餘。皆是此正喻之相似喻。

論日法者　此牒業也。

論謂立聲無常勤勇無間所發性故　舉宗因也。此但略舉爪。其所作性因。亦同此也。

論以法勤勇無間所支皆是無常者　此喻體也。

論瓶等者　舉喻所依事也。正取喻體。但是所作。合無常為喻者。義兼取也。以此因喻。即是因三相中之一相故。既更無別法。故但所作是其正喻。然以喻身能證無常故。兼最無常以為喻。因中何不兼最無常。答因言所作性故。此之故言即兼最上宗。謂所作性故。是無常言中離不定彰而。故言合最宗無常也。然似宗因別故。因外說宗。今喻中雖有因宗同。欲彼所作性同。澄無常義。故兼入喻中不名宗。余上下文亦說瓶上無常以為宗者。自據宗之

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：凡是犢子必定跟隨母牛。如果『所作性』存在，那麼無常性也必然伴隨，就像在瓶子等事物上一樣。因此，『所作性』這個因，成立在聲音之上，那麼無常性也必然伴隨聲音。瓶子的無常性，是大家公認的事實，不是因為類似宗（pakṣa，有爭議的主題）而被命名為宗。宗沒有因就不存在，這就是異法喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta，反例）。先說宗不存在，再說因不存在，例如說『法是常住的』，那就不是所作的。只是沒有所要建立的宗的地方，比如虛空等。這個『所作』的因，必定不存在於這些地方，就像母牛不去的地方，犢子也不會去。此處沒有無常的宗，比如虛空等，那麼『所作』的因必定不存在。因此可知，聲音有所作的因，必定是無常的。以上兩種情況，稱為譬喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）。其餘與此相似的，都是與此正喻相似的譬喻。

論述『法』的人，這是指業（karma，行為）。

論述『建立聲音是無常的，因為它是勤勇無間所發性』，這是舉出宗和因。這裡只是簡略地舉出，『所作性』這個因，也與此相同。

論述『凡是勤勇無間所支援的法都是無常的』，這是喻體（dṛṣṭānta-dharma，例子的性質）。

論述『瓶子等』，這是舉出喻所依據的事物。正確地選取喻體，但是『所作』，結合『無常』作為譬喻，是兼顧其意義。因為這個因喻，就是因三相（trairūpya，因的三種性質）中的一種。既然沒有其他不同的法，所以只有『所作』是其正喻。然而因為喻本身能夠證明無常，所以兼取『最無常』作為喻。為什麼因中不兼取『最無常』呢？回答說，因為因說的是『所作性』。這裡的『故』字，就兼顧了最上的宗，即『所作性』。因此，『是無常』這句話中，離開了不定（anaikāntika，不確定）而彰顯。所以說結合最上的宗——無常。然而，因為類似宗和因是不同的，所以在因之外說宗。現在在譬喻中，雖然有因和宗相同，想要使『所作性』相同，澄明無常的意義，所以兼入譬喻中，不稱為宗。其餘的上下文也說瓶子的無常性作為宗，是根據宗自身。

【English Translation】 English version: Wherever the calf goes, the cow must follow. If 『being produced』 (kṛtakatva) exists, then impermanence (anitya) must also accompany it, just as it does on things like pots. Therefore, the reason of 『being produced』 being established on sound, impermanence must also come to that sound. The impermanence of a pot is a commonly accepted fact, and it is not named pakṣa (the subject of debate) because it is similar to pakṣa. The pakṣa cannot exist without the reason; this is the vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta (negative example). First, it is said that the pakṣa does not exist, and then it is said that the reason does not exist, such as saying 『dharma is permanent,』 then it is not produced. It is just that there is no place to establish the pakṣa, such as space. The reason of 『being produced』 certainly does not exist in these places, just as the calf does not go where the cow does not go. Here, there is no impermanent pakṣa, such as space, then the reason of 『being produced』 certainly does not exist. Therefore, it can be known that sound has the reason of being produced, and it must be impermanent. The above two situations are called dṛṣṭānta (example). The rest that are similar to this are examples similar to this positive example.

Those who discuss 『dharma』 refer to karma (action).

Discussing 『establishing that sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort without interval』 is citing the pakṣa and the reason. Here, it is only briefly cited; the reason of 『being produced』 is also the same as this.

Discussing 『all dharmas supported by effort without interval are impermanent』 is the dṛṣṭānta-dharma (property of the example).

Discussing 『pots, etc.』 is citing the things on which the example relies. Correctly selecting the dṛṣṭānta-dharma, but 『being produced,』 combined with 『impermanence』 as an example, is considering its meaning. Because this reason-example is one of the three aspects of the reason (trairūpya). Since there is no other different dharma, only 『being produced』 is its positive example. However, because the example itself can prove impermanence, 『most impermanent』 is also taken as an example. Why is 『most impermanent』 not also taken in the reason? The answer is because the reason speaks of 『being produced.』 The word 『therefore』 here also considers the supreme pakṣa, which is 『being produced.』 Therefore, in the statement 『is impermanent,』 it is revealed by departing from the uncertain (anaikāntika). Therefore, it is said to combine the supreme pakṣa—impermanence. However, because the similar pakṣa and the reason are different, the pakṣa is spoken of outside the reason. Now, in the example, although the reason and the pakṣa are the same, wanting to make 『being produced』 the same, clarifying the meaning of impermanence, it is therefore included in the example and not called the pakṣa. The rest of the context also speaks of the impermanence of the pot as the pakṣa, which is based on the pakṣa itself.

類故。假名為宗也。其異法喻。亦正最無因。兼最宗無。一如同喻解釋。

論異法者　此牒業也。

論謂諸有常住見非勤勇無間所支者　此喻體也。

如虛空等者　此舉喻所依事也。等者等取擇滅非擇滅。若大乘。等最。七無為也。若違世等。隨共許者。皆等最也。

論前是遮詮復唯止濫者　此簡二喻差別。前者同喻也。復者異喻也。諸法有二相。一自相。唯眼等五識等得。非散心意等得也。二共相。即散心意識等約也。名言但詮共相。不能詮表諸法因相。以自相離言說故。詮共相要遣遮余法。方詮顯此法。如言青遮非青黃等。方能顯彼青之共相。若不遮黃等。喚青黃即應來故。一切名言。欲最其法。要遮余詮此。無有不遮而詮法也。然有名言但遮余法。更無別詮。如言無青。更不別顯無青體也。今同喻云。諸是勤勇無問所發。遮非勤勇無間所支顯勤勇無間所支。皆是無常。遮是常住。詮顯無常生滅之法。故云前是其遮覆是詮也。其異法喻云。諸常住者。但遮無常。故云常住。不欲更別詮常住。即非所作。但欲遮其所作。不別詮顯非作法體。此意但是無常宗無之處。皆無所作。但是止濫而已。不欲詮顯法體。故言復唯止濫也。

論由合及離比度義故者　此釋上差別。由同喻合本宗因。

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：類似於此，假名是其根本宗旨。其反例的譬喻，也是完全沒有原因，並且完全沒有宗（指所要證明的論題）。與正例的譬喻解釋相同。

關於反例的論述——這是指業（karma）。

論述中說，凡是那些被認為是常住不變，並非由勤奮努力和持續不斷的作用所產生的——這是譬喻的本體。

例如虛空等等——這是舉例說明譬喻所依據的事物。『等等』包括擇滅和非擇滅。如果按照大乘佛教的觀點，『等等』包括最勝的七種無為法。如果違背世俗常理，那麼隨順共同認可的事物，都可以包括在『等等』之中。

論述中說，前者是遮詮，並且只是爲了防止氾濫——這是爲了區分兩種譬喻的差別。前者指的是正例的譬喻，後者指的是反例的譬喻。一切法都有兩種相：一是自相，只有眼識等五識才能獲得，不是散亂的心意等能夠獲得的；二是共相，即散亂的心意識等所能認識的。名言只能詮釋共相，不能詮釋諸法的因相，因為自相是無法用語言表達的。詮釋共相需要排除和遮止其他法，才能顯現此法。例如說『青色』，就要遮止非青色，如黃色等，才能顯現青色的共相。如果不遮止黃色等，那麼叫『青色』，黃色等就應該出現。一切名言，想要最勝地表達其法，就要遮止其他，才能詮釋此法，沒有不遮止而能詮釋法的。然而，有的名言只是遮止其他法，不再有別的詮釋，例如說『無青』，不再另外顯現無青的本體。現在正例的譬喻說：『凡是由勤奮努力和持續不斷的作用所產生的，遮止了非勤奮努力和持續不斷的作用所產生的，顯現了勤奮努力和持續不斷的作用所產生的，都是無常的』，遮止了常住，詮釋顯現了無常生滅之法。所以說『前者是遮詮，並且是詮釋』。而反例的譬喻說：『凡是常住的』，只是遮止了無常，所以說『常住』，不想再另外詮釋常住，即不是所作。只是想要遮止所作，不另外詮釋顯現非所作的本體。這個意思是說，凡是沒有無常宗的地方，都沒有所作。這只是爲了防止氾濫而已，不想詮釋顯現法體，所以說『並且只是爲了防止氾濫』。

論述中說，由於結合和分離來比較推度的緣故——這是解釋上述差別。由於正例的譬喻結合了本宗的因。

【English Translation】 English version: Similarly, the imputed name is its fundamental principle. Its dissimilar example is also completely without a cause and completely without a thesis (referring to the proposition to be proven). It is the same as the explanation of the similar example.

Regarding the discussion of dissimilar examples—this refers to karma.

The discussion states, 'Those that are considered permanent and unchanging, not produced by diligent effort and continuous action'—this is the substance of the example.

For example, space, etc.—this illustrates the things upon which the example relies. 'Etc.' includes cessation by discrimination and cessation without discrimination. According to the Mahayana view, 'etc.' includes the seven unconditioned dharmas. If it contradicts worldly norms, then following what is commonly accepted can be included in 'etc.'.

The discussion states, 'The former is exclusion and also solely prevents overgeneralization'—this is to distinguish the difference between the two examples. The former refers to the similar example, and the latter refers to the dissimilar example. All dharmas have two aspects: first, the self-characteristic, which only the five consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness can attain, not the scattered mind-consciousness, etc.; second, the common characteristic, which the scattered mind-consciousness, etc., can recognize. Words and names can only explain the common characteristic and cannot explain the causal aspect of dharmas because the self-characteristic is beyond verbal expression. Explaining the common characteristic requires excluding and preventing other dharmas in order to reveal this dharma. For example, saying 'blue' requires excluding non-blue, such as yellow, etc., in order to reveal the common characteristic of blue. If yellow, etc., are not excluded, then when 'blue' is called, yellow, etc., should appear. All words and names, in order to best express their dharma, must exclude others in order to explain this dharma; there is no explanation of dharma without exclusion. However, some words and names only exclude other dharmas and have no other explanation, such as saying 'non-blue,' which does not separately reveal the substance of non-blue. Now, the similar example says, 'Whatever is produced by diligent effort and continuous action, excluding what is not produced by diligent effort and continuous action, revealing what is produced by diligent effort and continuous action, is impermanent,' excluding permanence and explaining and revealing the dharma of impermanent arising and ceasing. Therefore, it is said, 'The former is exclusion and also explanation.' The dissimilar example says, 'Whatever is permanent,' only excludes impermanence, so it says 'permanent,' not wanting to separately explain permanence, which is not produced. It only wants to exclude what is produced, not separately explaining and revealing the substance of non-produced. This means that wherever there is no impermanent thesis, there is no produced. This is only to prevent overgeneralization and does not want to explain and reveal the substance of dharma, so it is said, 'And also solely to prevent overgeneralization.'

The discussion states, 'Because of comparing and inferring through combination and separation'—this explains the above difference. Because the similar example combines the cause of the thesis.

而比度故。故是遮而得詮。以本宗因是遮詮。故由異喻。但欲離本宗因。而比度故。故唯止濫。不欲別有詮表也。

論雖處(至)義成者　比顯立一切義。對一切宗。皆有異法喻也。由如上解異法喻意故。雖對經教等。不許有彼太虛空性也以虛空為異喻。而得顯爾。但無宗處。如亦[孑*凡]毛等無因義成。為異法喻。不必要最有體。為異法喻。設有所詮。此亦無妨也。

論復以何緣(乃至)宗不有耶者　此解人間。汝論師何因緣故。第一同喻。先說至因復說宗隨。第二異喻。先說宗無。復說因無。而不同同喻。先說因無。復說宗無。義準異喻。既先說宗無。復說因無。同喻何故不先說其宗。復說因耶。

論由如是說(乃至)非顛倒說者　此下見此先長行兄之。由如是二喻。先得不同說故。便能顯示勤勇因。同品上定有。異品遍無故。非顛倒說。若同品中。言聲是無常(宗)。勤勇支故(因)。若言諸無常者皆勤勇支為因喻者。即同品不定有。以電是無常品。然無勤勇因故。若異品言諸非勤勇所發即是常者。然電等雖非勤勇支。而非是常。故不得言非勤勇發即是常也。

論又說頌云(乃至)等合離者　此舉頌答也。言等合離者。此牒難也。合即同喻。離即異喻。等即類也。若汝外人言。此合

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本因此需要比度（anumāna，推論）。『故』是遮止而得以詮釋，因為在本宗（svasiddhānta，自宗）中，『因』是遮詮（prasajyapratiṣedha，遣余），所以需要通過異喻（vyatirekidṛṣṭānta，反例）來比度。因此，僅僅是爲了排除本宗的『因』，而進行比度。所以，僅僅是爲了防止混淆，而不是爲了另外有所詮釋。

論中雖然提到『處』，但『義成』是指通過比量來顯示和確立一切義理。對於一切宗派，都有異法喻（反例）。這是因為如上解釋了異法喻的意義。雖然對於經教等，不承認有彼太虛空性（ākāśa-svabhāva，虛空自性），但以虛空作為異喻，就可以顯示這一點。但是，在沒有宗（pakṣa，有法）的地方，比如像亦[孑*凡]毛等，沒有『因』的義理成立，可以作為異法喻。不必要求最有實體的法作為異法喻，即使有所詮釋，也沒有妨礙。

論中又問『以何緣故』，這是爲了解釋人間（即對方論師）。你（對方）論師是何因緣故，第一，在同喻（sādharmyadṛṣṭānta，同法喻）中，先說『至因』，再說『宗隨』；第二，在異喻中，先說『宗無』，再說『因無』。而不同於同喻，先說『因無』，再說『宗無』。按照異喻的義準，既然先說『宗無』，再說『因無』，那麼同喻為什麼不先說其宗，再說其因呢？

論中說『由如是說』，以下解釋這段長行。由於這樣兩種比喻，先得到不同的說法，便能顯示勤勇因（prayatnānantarīyakatva，功用生）在同品（sapakṣa，同類）上必定存在，在異品（vipakṣa，異類）上普遍不存在，所以不是顛倒的說法。如果在同品中說，『言聲是無常（宗），因為是勤勇支（因）』，如果說『凡是無常的，都是勤勇支為因喻』，那麼就成了同品不定有，因為閃電是無常的，但沒有勤勇因。如果在異品中說，『凡不是勤勇所發的，就是常』，然而閃電等雖然不是勤勇支，但也不是常，所以不能說『非勤勇發即是常』。

論中又說頌云，這是舉頌來回答。『言等合離者』，這是重複對方的提問。『合』即同喻，『離』即異喻，『等』即類也。如果你們外人說，這個『合』

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, anumāna (inference) is needed. 'Therefore' is that which is qualified by exclusion, because in one's own tenet (svasiddhānta), the 'reason' is prasajyapratiṣedha (exclusion), so it is inferred by means of vyatirekidṛṣṭānta (counter-example). Therefore, it is only to exclude the 'reason' of one's own tenet that the inference is made. Therefore, it is only to prevent confusion, and not to express anything else.

Although the treatise mentions 'place', 'accomplishment of meaning' refers to revealing and establishing all meanings through inference. For all schools, there are counter-examples. This is because the meaning of counter-examples is explained as above. Although for scriptures and teachings, the nature of ākāśa-svabhāva (emptiness) is not admitted, it can be shown by using emptiness as a counter-example. However, where there is no pakṣa (subject), such as hair, etc., the meaning of 'reason' is not established, and it can be used as a counter-example. It is not necessary to have the most substantial dharma as a counter-example, and even if there is something to be expressed, there is no harm.

The treatise asks 'For what reason', this is to explain the human world (i.e., the opponent's teacher). For what reason do you (the opponent) teachers, firstly, in sādharmyadṛṣṭānta (example of similarity), first say 'to the reason', and then say 'concomitance of the subject'; secondly, in vyatirekidṛṣṭānta (example of difference), first say 'absence of the subject', and then say 'absence of the reason'. But it is different from sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, which first says 'absence of the reason', and then says 'absence of the subject'. According to the meaning of vyatirekidṛṣṭānta, since it first says 'absence of the subject', and then says 'absence of the reason', why doesn't sādharmyadṛṣṭānta first say its subject, and then say its reason?

The treatise says 'Because of such saying', the following explains this long passage. Because of these two metaphors, first obtaining different statements, it can show that the effort-produced cause (prayatnānantarīyakatva) must exist in the similar class (sapakṣa), and does not exist universally in the dissimilar class (vipakṣa), so it is not an inverted statement. If it is said in the similar class, 'Speech is impermanent (subject), because it is a product of effort (reason)', if it is said 'All that is impermanent is a product of effort as an example of reason', then it becomes uncertain in the similar class, because lightning is impermanent, but there is no effort-produced cause. If it is said in the dissimilar class, 'All that is not produced by effort is permanent', however, lightning, etc., although not a product of effort, is not permanent, so it cannot be said 'What is not produced by effort is permanent'.

The treatise also says in verse, this is to answer by citing the verse. 'Those who speak of equality, combination, and separation', this is repeating the opponent's question. 'Combination' is sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, 'separation' is vyatirekidṛṣṭānta, 'equality' is category. If you outsiders say, this 'combination'

彰離先宗復因。以離彰合先因得宗者。前之二句文。答所作遍因復有四字及。答勤勇無間所支不遍因也。若以離彰合先因覆宗者。即應以非作性因。證其常住。以云諸非作者。皆是常故。若如此者。即應成立非汝根本所說無常。即宗自別成立常住為宗。故云應成非所說。又空常住。立敵但許。何須成立。若成立者。即應非所。應說宗故。應成非所說。既不可立無常為宗。別成常義故。不應先說非所作性因。復說常以為宗也。若以合類離。先宗得因者。即應以無常為因。證成所作。以云諸無常法皆是所作故。若如此者。即應成立非汝根本所說無常之宗。自別成立所作為宗。故云若爾應成非所說。又瓶所作立敵俱許。何論成立。若成立者。即應成非所說宗故。云應成非所說。問瓶所作共許。不可更成者。瓶無常同信。亦不應更成立。若言諸所作者皆無常。助聲所作證無常。不可立無常。無成瓶即無常過。若以無常成所作。不助聲上無常證所作。自別成所作故。成以所作也。既不可立無常為宗。別成所作故。不應先說無常。復說所作也。問同喻合宗因。應因先宗后說。覺如執人理勝。若言不遍非宗者。此反元勤勇無間所支性因。言不遍者。非勤勇所支因寬。常住宗狹。此宗不遍因。故言不遍。又無常寬。勤發宗狹。宗不遍因

。故云不遍。若以離類合先因覆宗者。即應以非勤勇無間所支。證其常住。若以合類離先宗復因者。即應以無常。成是勤勇無間所支。若如此爾。應成非所說也。遮準前釋。如此之過。不遍勤勇所支性因。亦同所作因。今文應言及不遍。略故但言不遍。非示者。此不遍因。別成立不身身宗過。謂若以離類合言。諸非勤勇無間所支。皆是常住者。空等非是勤勇所支。而是至常。此即可示。電等既非常住。何得云諸非勤勇所支皆即是常。此即異品中有。成不具因。此即成立非自所愛電等是常。以為宗也。汝既不示。何得。先云諸非勤支皆即是常耶。又若以合類離言。諸無常者皆是勤勇無間所支。盆等體無常。而是勤勇無間所支。此即可樂電。等既非勤勇所支。何得云諸無常者皆是勤勇無間所支。此即異品中有。成不定因。此即成立非自所愛電等體。是勤勇所支。以為宗也。汝既不示。何得云諸無常者皆是勤勇無間所支耶。

論如是已說二法合離順反兩喻者　此結前。如是上來已說二喻是宗家法。同喻名合名順喻。異喻名離名反喻。此二是真喻。

論余此相似是似喻義者　自下明似喻也。好前二生喻外。余有十喻。是此真喻相似故。是似喻義。非真喻義也。

論何謂此餘者　問也。

論謂於是處(

【現代漢語翻譯】因此說它不周遍。如果用『離類合先因覆宗』的方法，就應該用『非勤勇無間所支』來證明它是常住的。如果用『合類離先宗復因』的方法，就應該用『無常』來成立『是勤勇無間所支』。如果這樣，就應該成為非所說。遮止的方法參照前面的解釋。這樣的過失，不周遍『勤勇所支性』的因，也和『所作因』相同。現在的文句應該說『及不遍』，因為省略所以只說『不遍』。『非示者』，這個不周遍的因，另外成立了『不身身宗』的過失。如果用『離類合言』，說『所有非勤勇無間所支，都是常住的』，那麼虛空等不是勤勇所支，而是至常。這就可以顯示。閃電等既然不是常住的，怎麼能說所有非勤勇所支都是常住的呢？這就是在異品中有，成立了不具足因。這就是成立非自己所喜愛的閃電等是常住的，作為宗。你既然不顯示，怎麼能先說所有非勤支都是常住的呢？又如果用『合類離言』，說『所有無常的，都是勤勇無間所支』，盆等體是無常的，而是勤勇無間所支。這就可以樂電等既然不是勤勇所支，怎麼能說所有無常的都是勤勇無間所支呢？這就是在異品中有，成立了不定因。這就是成立非自己所喜愛的閃電等體，是勤勇所支，作為宗。你既然不顯示，怎麼能說所有無常的都是勤勇無間所支呢？

論：像這樣已經說了二法，結合分離，順反兩種比喻——這是總結前面所說的。像這樣，上面已經說了兩種比喻，是宗家的法。同喻叫做『合』，叫做『順喻』；異喻叫做『離』，叫做『反喻』。這兩種是真喻。

論：其餘與此相似的是似喻的意義——下面說明似喻。在前面兩種真喻之外，其餘有十種比喻，是與真喻相似的，所以是似喻的意義，不是真喻的意義。

論：什麼是這『其餘』呢？——這是提問。

論：所謂在某個地方（……

【English Translation】 Hence, it is said to be non-pervasive. If one uses the method of 'separating the class, combining the prior cause, and reiterating the thesis,' then one should use 'not supported by diligent effort without interval' to prove its permanence. If one uses the method of 'combining the class, separating the prior thesis, and reiterating the cause,' then one should use 'impermanence' to establish 'is supported by diligent effort without interval.' If it is so, then it should become non-asserted. The method of refutation refers to the previous explanation. Such a fault, the cause of the nature of 'supported by diligent effort' being non-pervasive, is the same as the 'produced cause.' The current text should say 'and non-pervasive,' but it is abbreviated, so it only says 'non-pervasive.' 'Non-demonstrator' means that this non-pervasive cause separately establishes the fault of 'non-self-self thesis.' If one uses 'separating the class and combining the statement,' saying 'all that is not supported by diligent effort without interval is permanent,' then space, etc., is not supported by diligent effort, but is supremely permanent. This can be demonstrated. Since lightning, etc., is not permanent, how can one say that all that is not supported by diligent effort is permanent? This is in the dissimilar class, establishing an incomplete cause. This is establishing that lightning, etc., which is not self-cherished, is permanent, as the thesis. Since you do not demonstrate, how can you first say that all that is not supported by diligent effort is permanent? Furthermore, if one uses 'combining the class and separating the statement,' saying 'all that is impermanent is supported by diligent effort without interval,' then a pot, etc., is impermanent, but is supported by diligent effort without interval. This can be enjoyed. Since lightning, etc., is not supported by diligent effort, how can one say that all that is impermanent is supported by diligent effort without interval? This is in the dissimilar class, establishing an uncertain cause. This is establishing that the nature of lightning, etc., which is not self-cherished, is supported by diligent effort, as the thesis. Since you do not demonstrate, how can you say that all that is impermanent is supported by diligent effort without interval?

Treatise: Having thus spoken of the two dharmas, combining and separating, the two analogies of accordance and opposition—this concludes the foregoing. Thus, the two analogies mentioned above are the dharma of the proponent. The similar analogy is called 'combination,' called 'accordant analogy'; the dissimilar analogy is called 'separation,' called 'opposite analogy.' These two are true analogies.

Treatise: The rest, similar to these, are the meaning of pseudo-analogies—below explains pseudo-analogies. Apart from the two true analogies mentioned earlier, there are ten other analogies, which are similar to these true analogies, so they are the meaning of pseudo-analogies, not the meaning of true analogies.

Treatise: What is this 'rest'?—This is a question.

Treatise: So-called in a certain place (...

乃至)而顛倒說者　此下答。此文同入理論倒合倒離二喻也。謂於是瓶等處所立無常。能立所作。是同品也。及不同品者。如虛空等。是異喻也。雖有食而顛倒說者。雖有同喻合異喻離。而倒合倒離也。入理論云。倒合者。謂應說言諸所作者皆是無常。而倒說言諸無常者皆是所作。倒離者。謂應說言若皆是常見非所作。而倒說言若非所作見彼是常。

理門論述記

【現代漢語翻譯】現代漢語譯本：乃至顛倒解說（事物）的人——以下是解答。這段文字與入理論中的『倒合』和『倒離』兩種比喻相通。意思是說，在瓶子等事物上建立『無常』這一論題，能成立論題的『所作』（事物），是同品（相似的例子）。以及不同品（不相似的例子），比如虛空等，是異喻（不同的比喻）。雖然有（正確的）比喻，卻顛倒解說，雖然有同喻的『合』和異喻的『離』，卻是『倒合』和『倒離』。入理論中說，『倒合』是指，應該說『凡是所作的事物都是無常的』，卻顛倒過來說『凡是無常的事物都是所作的』。『倒離』是指，應該說『如果都是常見的，就不是所作的』，卻顛倒過來說『如果不是所作的，就看到它是常的』。

《理門論述記》

【English Translation】 English version: Even those who speak perversely—the following is the answer. This passage corresponds to the two analogies of 'inverted conjunction' (倒合, dǎo hé) and 'inverted separation' (倒離, dǎo lí) in the Nyaya-pravesa (入理論, Rù lǐlùn). It means that establishing 'impermanence' (無常, wúcháng) as a thesis regarding things like jars, 'produced' (所作, suǒ zuò) things, which can establish the thesis, are similar examples (同品, tóng pǐn). And dissimilar examples (不同品, bùtóng pǐn), such as space (虛空, xūkōng), are dissimilar analogies (異喻, yìyù). Although there are (correct) analogies, they are explained perversely; although there is the 'conjunction' (合, hé) of similar examples and the 'separation' (離, lí) of dissimilar examples, they are 'inverted conjunction' and 'inverted separation'. In the Nyaya-pravesa, 'inverted conjunction' refers to saying 'whatever is produced is impermanent' should be said, but instead it is perversely said 'whatever is impermanent is produced'. 'Inverted separation' refers to saying 'if something is always permanent, it is not produced' should be said, but instead it is perversely said 'if something is not produced, then it is seen as permanent'.

Commentary on the Treatise on Logic