T44n1840_因明入正理論疏
大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1840 因明入正理論疏
No. 1840 [cf. No. 1630]
因明入正理論疏捲上
大慈恩寺沙門基撰
詳夫。空桑啟聖。資六位以明玄。苦賴興仙。暢二篇而顯理。豈若智圓十力。陶萬像以凝規。悲極三輪。廓五乘而垂範。是以。應物機于雙樹。至教浹于塵洲。歸真寂于兩河。餘烈光乎沙劫。大矣哉。固難得而名也。暨乎二十八見。蟻聚於五天。一十六師。鴟張於四主。爰有菩薩。號商羯羅。聖者域龍之門人也。既資善誘。實號多聞。挹慧海于深衷。竦義山于奧腑。故乃鑿荊岑而采璞。游蛤浦以求珠。秘思優聚。乃制宏論。其旨繁而文約。其理幽而易曉。寔法戶之樞機。乃玄關之鈐鍵矣。遂令勝論數論。同嶠山之壓春卵。聲生聲顯。譬驚飆之卷秋萚。自時厥後。教思波紛。勝躅肇彰。耽玩終廣。粵以。金容皎夢。玉牒暉晨。雖至教已隆。而斯典未備。惟我親教。三藏大師。道貫五明。聲映千古。嗟。去聖之彌遠。慨心冰之未釋。遂乃振錫中區。以發覺城之地。尋師西夏。直詣耆阇之山。轥曩哲之未聞。並苞心極。架前賢之不覿。咸貫情樞。於是。貝葉撰于微言。家邦返以神足。方言既譯。道理攸暢。基。謬參資列。欣夕死於朝聞。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
大慈恩寺沙門基 撰
仔細考察，空桑（孔子）開啟聖人之道，憑藉六經闡明玄理。老子在苦縣興起，用《道德經》兩篇來彰顯真理。但這又怎能比得上佛陀智圓滿具足十種力量，教化萬象以凝聚法則；悲心至極，以身口意三輪教化，開闊五乘佛法而垂示規範。因此，佛應機于雙樹（娑羅雙樹），至高的教義普及於世間。佛陀的真寂歸於兩河（希連禪河和阿夷羅跋提河），遺留的光輝照耀無盡的時間。偉大啊！佛陀的功德實在難以用言語來形容。
到了後來，二十八種邪見像螞蟻一樣聚集在印度五天竺，十六外道大師像鴟鳥一樣在四方囂張。這時有一位菩薩，名叫商羯羅（Śaṅkarasvāmin），是聖者域龍（Devendra）的弟子。他既有良好的資質，又以博學多聞著稱。他從深邃的內心汲取智慧的海洋，從奧妙的腑臟聳立起義理的高山。因此，他開鑿荊山以采美玉，遊歷蛤浦以求珍珠。經過周密的思考，撰寫了這部宏偉的論著。它的宗旨既繁富又簡練，它的道理既深奧又容易理解，實在是佛法之門的樞紐，是通往玄妙之境的關鍵。於是，使得勝論派和數論派，如同嶠山壓住春天的鳥卵一樣無力反抗；聲生論和聲顯論，如同狂風捲起秋天的落葉一樣不堪一擊。自從那時以後，佛法的思潮紛繁涌現，殊勝的足跡開始顯彰，研究和玩味的人最終增多。況且，金色的佛像在夢中顯現，玉石的佛經閃耀著光輝。雖然佛教的至高教義已經興盛，但這部重要的典籍還沒有完備。只有我的親教師，三藏法師，他的學問貫通五明，聲名響徹千古。感嘆，距離聖人的時代越來越遠，心中疑惑像冰一樣沒有融化。於是，他拄著錫杖來到中土，從發覺城（菩提伽耶）出發，到西夏尋訪名師，直接前往耆阇崛山（Gṛdhrakūṭa）。超越了前人的見聞，包容了所有精妙的義理。架起了前人沒有見過的橋樑，全部貫穿了義理的關鍵。於是，用貝葉書寫了精妙的言辭，帶著佛經回到了自己的國家。用方言翻譯出來，道理於是暢通明瞭。我，基，有幸參與到翻譯的行列中，欣喜于早晨聽到真理，即使晚上死去也心滿意足。 English version
Composed by the Śrāmaṇa Ji of Daci'en Temple
Upon careful examination, Kong Sang (Confucius) initiated the way of the sages, elucidating profound principles through the Six Classics. Laozi arose in Ku County, revealing truth through the two chapters of the Tao Te Ching. Yet, how can these compare to the Buddha, whose wisdom is complete with the ten powers, shaping all phenomena into a unified law; whose compassion is boundless, teaching the Five Vehicles through body, speech, and mind, establishing a model for all. Therefore, the Buddha responded to beings at the twin trees (Śāla trees), and the supreme teachings spread throughout the world. The Buddha's true quiescence returned to the two rivers (Hiraṇyavatī and Ajitavatī), and the remaining radiance shines through countless kalpas. Great indeed! The Buddha's merits are truly beyond description.
Later, twenty-eight heretical views gathered like ants in the five regions of India (Pañca-deśa), and sixteen non-Buddhist masters clamored in the four directions like owls. At this time, there was a Bodhisattva named Śaṅkarasvāmin, a disciple of the venerable Devendra. He was both well-endowed and renowned for his vast learning. He drew from the ocean of wisdom within his profound heart and erected a mountain of righteousness from his mysterious inner being. Therefore, he chiseled the Jing Mountains to extract jade and traveled to Hapu to seek pearls. After meticulous contemplation, he composed this magnificent treatise. Its purpose is both extensive and concise, its principles both profound and easily understood. It is truly the linchpin of the Dharma gate and the key to the gate of the mysterious. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools were rendered powerless, like spring eggs crushed by Mount Qiao; the Śabdādvaita and Śabdaviveka schools were as vulnerable as autumn leaves swept away by a whirlwind. Since then, the currents of Buddhist thought have surged forth, the noble footprints have begun to manifest, and those who study and contemplate have ultimately increased. Moreover, golden images of the Buddha appeared in dreams, and jade scriptures shone with brilliance. Although the supreme teachings of Buddhism had already flourished, this important text was not yet complete. Only my own teacher, the Tripiṭaka Master, whose learning penetrated the five sciences (Pañca-vidyā), and whose reputation resounded through the ages. Alas, lamenting that the distance from the time of the sages is growing ever greater, and that the doubts in my heart remain like unmelted ice. Therefore, he carried his staff to the central lands, departing from the city of Enlightenment (Bodh Gaya), and traveled to Xixia to seek out renowned teachers, directly proceeding to Gṛdhrakūṭa Mountain. He surpassed the knowledge of his predecessors and encompassed all the subtle meanings. He built bridges that previous scholars had not seen, and completely penetrated the key points of the doctrine. Thus, he wrote down the profound words on palm leaves and returned to his country with the scriptures. Translated into the local language, the principles were then clearly understood. I, Ji, am fortunate to participate in the ranks of translators, rejoicing to hear the truth in the morning, even if I die in the evening, I will be content.
【English Translation】 Composed by the Śrāmaṇa Ji of Daci'en Temple Upon careful examination, Kong Sang (Confucius) initiated the way of the sages, elucidating profound principles through the Six Classics. Laozi arose in Ku County, revealing truth through the two chapters of the Tao Te Ching. Yet, how can these compare to the Buddha, whose wisdom is complete with the ten powers, shaping all phenomena into a unified law; whose compassion is boundless, teaching the Five Vehicles through body, speech, and mind, establishing a model for all. Therefore, the Buddha responded to beings at the twin trees (Śāla trees), and the supreme teachings spread throughout the world. The Buddha's true quiescence returned to the two rivers (Hiraṇyavatī and Ajitavatī), and the remaining radiance shines through countless kalpas. Great indeed! The Buddha's merits are truly beyond description. Later, twenty-eight heretical views gathered like ants in the five regions of India (Pañca-deśa), and sixteen non-Buddhist masters clamored in the four directions like owls. At this time, there was a Bodhisattva named Śaṅkarasvāmin, a disciple of the venerable Devendra. He was both well-endowed and renowned for his vast learning. He drew from the ocean of wisdom within his profound heart and erected a mountain of righteousness from his mysterious inner being. Therefore, he chiseled the Jing Mountains to extract jade and traveled to Hapu to seek pearls. After meticulous contemplation, he composed this magnificent treatise. Its purpose is both extensive and concise, its principles both profound and easily understood. It is truly the linchpin of the Dharma gate and the key to the gate of the mysterious. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools were rendered powerless, like spring eggs crushed by Mount Qiao; the Śabdādvaita and Śabdaviveka schools were as vulnerable as autumn leaves swept away by a whirlwind. Since then, the currents of Buddhist thought have surged forth, the noble footprints have begun to manifest, and those who study and contemplate have ultimately increased. Moreover, golden images of the Buddha appeared in dreams, and jade scriptures shone with brilliance. Although the supreme teachings of Buddhism had already flourished, this important text was not yet complete. Only my own teacher, the Tripiṭaka Master, whose learning penetrated the five sciences (Pañca-vidyā), and whose reputation resounded through the ages. Alas, lamenting that the distance from the time of the sages is growing ever greater, and that the doubts in my heart remain like unmelted ice. Therefore, he carried his staff to the central lands, departing from the city of Enlightenment (Bodh Gaya), and traveled to Xixia to seek out renowned teachers, directly proceeding to Gṛdhrakūṭa Mountain. He surpassed the knowledge of his predecessors and encompassed all the subtle meanings. He built bridges that previous scholars had not seen, and completely penetrated the key points of the doctrine. Thus, he wrote down the profound words on palm leaves and returned to his country with the scriptures. Translated into the local language, the principles were then clearly understood. I, Ji, am fortunate to participate in the ranks of translators, rejoicing to hear the truth in the morning, even if I die in the evening, I will be content.
恐此道不行。乃略述閱釋。示紀綱之旨。陳幽隱之宗。庶明懸智鏡者。幸留心而鑑照矣。
今此論中。略以四門分別。一敘所因。二釋題目。三彰妨難。四釋本文。
第一敘所因者。因明論者。源唯佛說。文廣義散。備在眾經。故地持云。菩薩求法。當於何求。當於一切五明處求。求因明者。為破邪論。安立正道。劫初足目。創標真似。爰暨世親。咸陳軌式。雖綱紀已列。而幽致未分。故使賓主對揚。猶疑立破之則。有陳那菩薩。是稱命世。賢劫千佛之一佛也。匿跡巖藪。棲慮等持。觀述作之利害。審文義之繁約。於時。崖谷震吼雲霞變彩。山神捧菩薩足。高數百尺。唱云。佛說因明。玄妙難究。如來滅后。大義淪絕。今幸福智悠邈。深達聖旨。因明論道。愿請重弘。菩薩乃放神光。照燭機感。時彼南印度。案達羅國王。見放光明。疑入金剛定。請證無學果。菩薩曰。入定觀察。將釋深經。心期大覺。非愿小果。王言。無學果者。諸聖攸仰。請尊速證。菩薩撫之。欲遂王請。妙吉祥菩薩。因彈指警曰。何舍大心。方興小志。為廣利益者。當傳慈氏所說瑜伽論。匡正頹綱。可制因明。重成規矩。陳那敬受指誨。奉以周旋。於是。覃思研精。作因明正理門論。正理者。諸法本真之體義。門者。權衡照解之所由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：恐怕這個方法行不通。因此我簡略地敘述和解釋，揭示紀綱的要旨，陳述幽深隱秘的宗旨，希望那些擁有明亮智慧之鏡的人，能夠留心觀察和鑑別。
現在在這部論著中，我將略微用四個方面來分別闡述：一是敘述緣起，二是解釋題目，三是彰顯妨難，四是解釋本文。
第一，敘述緣起。因明論的源頭，唯一來自佛陀的教說。經文廣博，義理分散，都完備地記載在各種經典中。所以《地持經》說：『菩薩尋求佛法，應當在哪裡求？應當在一切五明處求。』尋求因明，是爲了破斥邪論，安立正道。劫初的足目仙人，最初標立真和似的標準。到了世親菩薩，都陳述了因明的軌則和模式。雖然綱紀已經羅列，但幽深精微之處尚未區分，所以使得賓主雙方的對答，仍然疑惑于立論和破論的法則。有陳那（Dignāga）菩薩，被稱為應運而生的人才，是賢劫千佛中的一尊佛。他隱匿在山巖草澤之中，安住于等持的禪定。觀察著述的利弊，審視文義的繁簡。當時，山崖山谷震動轟鳴，雲霞變幻色彩，山神捧著菩薩的腳，高數百尺，唱道：『佛陀所說的因明，玄妙深奧難以窮究，如來滅度后，大義淪喪斷絕。如今您幸福地擁有悠遠的智慧，深刻通達聖人的旨意，關於因明論的道理，愿請您重新弘揚。』菩薩於是放出神光，照亮那些有感應的眾生。當時南印度案達羅（Andhra）國的國王，見到光明，懷疑菩薩進入金剛定，請求菩薩證得無學果。菩薩說：『我進入禪定觀察，將要解釋深奧的經典，心懷證悟大覺的目標，不是希愿小乘的果位。』國王說：『無學果是諸位聖人所仰慕的，請您迅速證得。』菩薩撫摸著國王，想要滿足國王的請求。妙吉祥（Mañjuśrī）菩薩，於是彈指警示說：『為何捨棄大乘之心，反而興起小乘的志向？爲了廣泛利益眾生，應當傳揚慈氏（Maitreya）菩薩所說的《瑜伽師地論》，匡正頹廢的綱紀，可以制定因明，重新形成規矩。』陳那恭敬地接受了指教，並奉行不違。於是，他深入思考，精勤研究，撰寫了《因明正理門論》。正理，是諸法本真之體義。門，是權衡照解的途徑和由來。
【English Translation】 English version: I fear this path may not be feasible. Therefore, I will briefly narrate and explain, revealing the essence of the framework and presenting the profound and hidden principles, hoping that those who possess the mirror of bright wisdom will pay attention to observe and discern.
Now, in this treatise, I will briefly elaborate using four aspects: first, narrating the cause; second, explaining the title; third, highlighting the objections; and fourth, explaining the main text.
First, narrating the cause. The origin of the Hetu-vidya (因明, science of reasoning) lies solely in the Buddha's teachings. The texts are extensive, and the meanings are scattered, all completely recorded in various sutras. Therefore, the Bodhisattvabhumi Sutra (地持經) says: 'Where should a Bodhisattva seek the Dharma? They should seek it in all five sciences.' Seeking Hetu-vidya is to refute heretical theories and establish the correct path. At the beginning of the kalpa, Aksapada (足目, 'eye-footed') initially established the standards of truth and semblance. Up to Vasubandhu (世親), they all presented the rules and models of Hetu-vidya. Although the framework has been listed, the profound and subtle points have not been distinguished, so that the answers between the host and guest still doubt the principles of establishing and refuting arguments. There was Bodhisattva Dignāga (陳那), known as a talent born in response to the times, one of the thousand Buddhas of the Bhadrakalpa (賢劫). He hid in the rocks and marshes, dwelling in meditative concentration. Observing the advantages and disadvantages of writing, examining the complexity and simplicity of the text and meaning. At that time, the cliffs and valleys shook and roared, the clouds and mists changed colors, and the mountain gods held the Bodhisattva's feet, hundreds of feet high, chanting: 'The Hetu-vidya spoken by the Buddha is profound and difficult to fathom. After the Tathagata's (如來) extinction, the great meaning will be lost and cut off. Now you are fortunate to have distant wisdom, deeply understanding the sage's intention. Regarding the principles of Hetu-vidya, I wish to invite you to re-propagate it.' The Bodhisattva then emitted divine light, illuminating those sentient beings who had a response. At that time, the king of Andhra (案達羅) in South India, seeing the light, suspected that the Bodhisattva had entered the Vajra Samadhi (金剛定), and requested the Bodhisattva to attain the state of no-more-learning (無學果). The Bodhisattva said: 'I am entering samadhi to observe, and I am about to explain the profound scriptures, harboring the goal of realizing great enlightenment, not desiring the fruit of the small vehicle.' The king said: 'The fruit of no-more-learning is admired by all the sages, please quickly attain it.' The Bodhisattva stroked the king, wanting to fulfill the king's request. Manjushri (妙吉祥) Bodhisattva then snapped his fingers to warn him, saying: 'Why abandon the great aspiration and instead raise the small ambition? In order to widely benefit sentient beings, you should propagate the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) spoken by Maitreya (慈氏) Bodhisattva, rectify the declining framework, and formulate Hetu-vidya, re-establishing the rules.' Dignāga respectfully accepted the instruction and followed it without deviation. Therefore, he thought deeply and studied diligently, and wrote the Nyayapravesa Hetu-vidya-sastra (因明正理門論). Nyaya (正理) is the true essence and meaning of all dharmas. Pravesa (門) is the path and origin of weighing and understanding.
。商羯羅主。即其門人也。豈若蘇張之師鬼谷。獨擅縱橫。游夏之事宣尼。空聞禮樂而已。既而善窮三量。妙盡二因。啟以八門。通以兩益。考覈前哲。規模后穎。總括綱紀。以為此論。大師行至北印度境迦濕彌羅國法救論師寺。逢大論師僧伽耶舍。此云眾稱。特善薩婆多。及因聲明論。創從考決。便曉玄猷。後於中印度境摩揭陀國。復遇尸羅跋陀菩薩等。重討幽微。更精厥趣。披枝葉而窮其根柢。尋波瀾而究其源穴。雖前修而桂悟。未烈我師之芳閑。旋踵弘揚。因訓初學。庶使對揚邪正。司南有軌。斯乃此論之因起也。
第二解題目者。梵云醯都費陀(次上二字並舌頭輕聲呼之)那耶缽羅吠奢奢薩怛羅。醯都言因。費陀云明。那耶稱正理。缽羅吠奢翻入。奢薩怛羅論也。唐云因明正理入論。今順此方言。稱因明入正理論。依此標名。合為五釋。一云。明者。五明之通名。因者。一明之別稱。入正理者。此論之別目。因體有二。所謂生了。二各有三。廣如下釋。今明此因義。故曰因明。所明者因。能明者教。因之明故。號曰因明。依主釋也。入者。達解。正理者。諸法本真自性差別。時移解昧。旨多沉隱。余雖解釋。邪而不中。今談真法。故名正理由明此二因。入解諸法之真性。即正理之入。亦入正理之因明。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：商羯羅主（Śaṅkarasvāmin，一位論師）是他的門人。這不像蘇秦、張儀的老師鬼谷子那樣，獨自擅長縱橫之術；也不像子游、子夏侍奉孔子那樣，只聽說過禮樂而已。商羯羅主善於窮盡三量（因明中的三種量：現量、比量、聖教量），精妙地掌握二因（能立因、能破因）。他開創了八門（比量八門），貫通了兩益（自利、利他）。考覈前代的哲人，規劃後來的英才，總括綱領和紀律，寫成了這部論著。大師（指陳那，Dignāga）前往北印度境內的迦濕彌羅國（Kashmir）法救論師寺，遇到了大論師僧伽耶舍（Saṃghayaśas，意為眾稱），他特別擅長薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的理論以及因明聲明論。陳那從考決入手，便領悟了玄妙的道理。後來在中印度境內的摩揭陀國（Magadha），他又遇到了尸羅跋陀羅菩薩（Śīlabhadra）等人，重新探討深奧微妙之處，更加精通其中的趣味。他披閱枝葉而窮究其根柢，尋找波瀾而探究其源頭。雖然前代的修行者有所領悟，但遠不如我的老師（指陳那）那樣芬芳美好。他隨即開始弘揚佛法，教導初學者，希望使人們在辯論邪正時，能夠像司南一樣有所遵循。這就是這部論著的緣起。 第二是解釋題目。梵文是Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra（醯都費陀那耶缽羅吠奢奢薩怛羅）。Hetu（醯都）意思是『因』，vidyā（費陀）意思是『明』，nyāya（那耶）稱作『正理』，praveśa（缽羅吠奢）翻譯為『入』，śāstra（奢薩怛羅）是『論』。唐朝翻譯為《因明正理入論》。現在順應此地的語言習慣，稱為《因明入正理論》。按照這個名稱來解釋，可以分為五種解釋。第一種解釋是：『明』是五明（聲明、工巧明、醫方明、因明、內明）的通稱，『因』是五明中的一種的別稱，『入正理』是這部論的別名。因的體性有兩種，即生因和了因。每種各有三種。詳細的解釋在後面。現在闡明這個『因』的意義，所以叫做『因明』。所闡明的是『因』，能闡明的是『教』。因為『因』的明瞭，所以叫做『因明』，這是依主釋。『入』是通達理解。『正理』是諸法（一切事物）的本真自性差別。由於時間推移，理解變得遲鈍，旨意大多沉沒隱晦。其他人雖然也有解釋，但邪而不中。現在談論真實的佛法，所以叫做『正理』。通過闡明這兩種『因』，來通達理解諸法的真性，這就是『正理』的『入』，也就是『入正理』的『因明』。
【English Translation】 English version: Śaṅkarasvāmin (a logician) was his disciple. This is not like the master of Su Qin and Zhang Yi, Guiguzi, who uniquely excelled in the art of diplomacy; nor like Ziyou and Zixia serving Confucius, who only heard about rituals and music. Śaṅkarasvāmin was skilled in exhausting the three pramāṇas (means of valid cognition in logic: perception, inference, and authoritative testimony), and subtly mastered the two hetus (reasons: affirmative and negative). He initiated the eight doors (of inference) and connected the two benefits (self-benefit and benefiting others). He examined the previous sages, planned for the later talents, and summarized the principles and disciplines to create this treatise. The great master (Dignāga) went to the Dharma-tranquility Master Temple in the country of Kashmir in North India and met the great logician Saṃghayasas (meaning 'renowned by the assembly'), who was particularly skilled in the theory of Sarvāstivāda (the doctrine of 'everything exists') and the science of logic. Dignāga, starting from examination and resolution, understood the profound principles. Later, in the country of Magadha in Central India, he met Bodhisattva Śīlabhadra and others, re-examined the profound subtleties, and became even more proficient in its interest. He examined the branches and leaves to exhaust its roots, and sought the waves to explore its source. Although the previous practitioners had some understanding, it was far inferior to the fragrance and beauty of my teacher (Dignāga). He then began to promote the Dharma and teach beginners, hoping that people could follow the compass when debating right and wrong. This is the origin of this treatise. Second is explaining the title. The Sanskrit is Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra. Hetu means 'cause', vidyā means 'knowledge', nyāya is called 'right reason', praveśa is translated as 'entrance', and śāstra is 'treatise'. The Tang Dynasty translated it as 'Treatise on Entering the Right Reason of Hetuvidya'. Now, following the local language habits, it is called 'Treatise on Entering the Hetuvidya of Right Reason'. According to this name, it can be divided into five explanations. The first explanation is: 'Knowledge' is the general name of the five knowledges (grammar, crafts, medicine, logic, and inner knowledge), 'cause' is the specific name of one of the five knowledges, and 'entering right reason' is the specific name of this treatise. There are two kinds of nature of cause, namely, the productive cause and the revealing cause. Each has three kinds. Detailed explanations are given later. Now, clarifying the meaning of this 'cause', it is called 'Hetuvidya'. What is clarified is the 'cause', and what can clarify is the 'teaching'. Because of the clarity of the 'cause', it is called 'Hetuvidya', which is a possessive compound. 'Entering' is thorough understanding. 'Right reason' is the true nature and differences of all dharmas (all things). Due to the passage of time, understanding becomes dull, and the meaning is mostly submerged and obscure. Although others have explanations, they are wrong and not to the point. Now, talking about the true Dharma, it is called 'right reason'. By clarifying these two 'causes', to thoroughly understand the true nature of all dharmas, this is the 'entrance' of 'right reason', that is, the 'Hetuvidya' of 'entering right reason'.
並依主釋也。明體是教。因明即論。持業釋也。簡藏為名。無重言失。二云。因明者。一明之都名。入正理者。此軸之別目。因謂立論者言。建本宗之鴻緒。明謂敵證者智。照義言之嘉由。非言無以顯宗。含智義而標因稱。非智無以洞妙。苞言義而舉明名。立破幽致。稱為正理。智解融貫。名之為入。由立論者立因等言。敵證智起。解立破義。明家因故。名曰因明。依主釋也。由言生智。達解法之幽致名入。正理之入。亦入正理之因明。並依主釋。三云。因者言生因。明者智了因。由言生故。未生之智得生。由智了故。未曉之義今曉。所曉宗稱正理。所生智名為入。因與明異。俱是因名。正理入殊。咸為果稱。由言生因故。敵者入解所宗。由智了明故。立者正理方顯。應云正理之入。入正理之因明。並依主釋也。立論雖假言生。方生敵論之智。必資智義始有言生。敵者雖假智了。方解所立之宗。必藉義言方有智了。故雖但標言生智了。即己兼說二了二生。攝法己周。略無餘也。四云。因明者。本佛經之名。正理者。陳那論之稱。陳那所造四十餘部。其中要最正理為先。入論者。天主教之號。因謂智了。照解所宗。或即言生。凈成宗果。明謂明顯。因即是明。持業釋也。故瑜伽論第十五言。云何因明處。謂于觀察義中。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『依主釋』（Tatpurusha）也。闡明本體是『教』（Doctrine）。『因明』（Hetuvidya）即是『論』（Treatise），是『持業釋』（Karmadharaya）。概括經典為『名』（Name），沒有重複的語病。第二種說法是，『因明』是一個總稱，『入正理』（Entering into the Correct Reasoning）是這部論著的別名。『因』（Hetu）指的是立論者所說的話，建立了本宗的宏偉開端。『明』（Vidya）指的是辯論對手的智慧，照亮義理的良好途徑。沒有言辭就無法彰顯宗旨，包含智慧的意義而標示『因』的名稱。沒有智慧就無法洞察精妙之處，包含言辭的意義而舉出『明』的名稱。建立和駁斥的精微之處，稱為『正理』（Correct Reasoning）。智慧的理解融會貫通，名為『入』（Entering）。由於立論者建立『因』等言辭，辯論對手的智慧興起，理解建立和駁斥的意義。因為是明理之家的緣故，所以名為『因明』，是『依主釋』。由於言辭產生智慧，通達理解佛法的精微之處名為『入』。『正理之入』，也是『入正理之因明』，都是『依主釋』。第三種說法是，『因』是言辭產生的『因』，『明』是智慧瞭解的『因』。由於言辭的產生，未產生的智慧得以產生。由於智慧的瞭解，未曉的義理現在得以曉悟。所曉悟的宗旨稱為『正理』，所產生的智慧名為『入』。『因』與『明』不同，都是『因』的名稱。『正理』與『入』不同，都是『果』的稱謂。由於言辭產生『因』的緣故，辯論對手得以進入並理解所宗。由於智慧瞭解『明』的緣故，立論者的『正理』才得以顯現。應該說『正理之入』，『入正理之因明』，都是『依主釋』。立論雖然憑藉言辭產生，才產生辯論對手的智慧，但必須憑藉智慧的義理才能有言辭的產生。辯論對手雖然憑藉智慧瞭解，才理解所立的宗旨，但必須憑藉義理的言辭才能有智慧的瞭解。所以雖然只標示言辭產生智慧，就已經兼說了兩種瞭解和兩種產生，涵蓋佛法已經周全，沒有遺漏。第四種說法是，『因明』，本來是佛經的名稱，『正理』，是陳那（Dignāga）論著的稱謂。陳那所造的四十餘部論著中，其中最重要的是以《正理》為先。《入論》是天主教（Brahmanism）的稱號。『因』指的是智慧瞭解，照亮理解所宗，或者就是言辭產生，清凈成就宗旨的結果。『明』指的是明顯，『因』就是『明』，是『持業釋』。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第十五卷說，什麼是『因明處』？就是在觀察義理之中。
【English Translation】 English version It is also 『Tatpurusha』 (Dependent Determinative Compound). Clarifying the essence is 『Doctrine』 (Teaching). 『Hetuvidya』 (Science of Reasoning) is 『Treatise』 (Shastra), which is 『Karmadharaya』 (Appositional Compound). Summarizing the scriptures is 『Name』 (Nāma), without the fault of repetition. The second view is that 『Hetuvidya』 is a general name, and 『Entering into the Correct Reasoning』 is another name for this treatise. 『Hetu』 (Reason) refers to the words spoken by the proponent, establishing the grand beginning of his own school. 『Vidya』 (Knowledge) refers to the wisdom of the opponent, illuminating the good path of righteousness. Without words, the doctrine cannot be manifested, containing the meaning of wisdom and marking the name of 『Hetu』. Without wisdom, the subtlety cannot be understood, containing the meaning of words and raising the name of 『Vidya』. The subtlety of establishing and refuting is called 『Correct Reasoning』. The understanding of wisdom is integrated, named 『Entering』. Because the proponent establishes words such as 『Hetu』, the opponent's wisdom arises, understanding the meaning of establishing and refuting. Because it is the family of understanding reason, it is called 『Hetuvidya』, which is 『Tatpurusha』. Because words produce wisdom, understanding the subtlety of Dharma is called 『Entering』. 『Entering into Correct Reasoning』 is also 『Entering into the Hetuvidya of Correct Reasoning』, both of which are 『Tatpurusha』. The third view is that 『Hetu』 is the 『cause』 of the arising of words, and 『Vidya』 is the 『cause』 of the understanding of wisdom. Because of the arising of words, the wisdom that has not yet arisen can arise. Because of the understanding of wisdom, the righteousness that has not yet been understood can now be understood. The doctrine that is understood is called 『Correct Reasoning』, and the wisdom that is produced is called 『Entering』. 『Hetu』 and 『Vidya』 are different, but both are names of 『cause』. 『Correct Reasoning』 and 『Entering』 are different, but both are names of 『fruit』. Because words produce 『Hetu』, the opponent can enter and understand the doctrine. Because wisdom understands 『Vidya』, the proponent's 『Correct Reasoning』 can be manifested. It should be said 『Entering into Correct Reasoning』, 『Entering into the Hetuvidya of Correct Reasoning』, both of which are 『Tatpurusha』. Although the establishment of the argument depends on the generation of words, the wisdom of the opponent's argument is generated, it must rely on the righteousness of wisdom to have the generation of words. Although the opponent relies on wisdom to understand, he understands the established doctrine, he must rely on the words of righteousness to have the understanding of wisdom. Therefore, although only the generation of wisdom by words is indicated, it already includes the two understandings and the two generations, covering the Dharma completely, without omission. The fourth view is that 『Hetuvidya』 was originally the name of a Buddhist scripture, and 『Correct Reasoning』 is the name of Dignāga's treatise. Among the forty-odd treatises written by Dignāga, the most important of them is 『Correct Reasoning』 first. 『Entering Treatise』 is the title of Brahmanism. 『Hetu』 refers to the understanding of wisdom, illuminating the understanding of the doctrine, or it is the generation of words, purely achieving the result of the doctrine. 『Vidya』 refers to clarity, 『Hetu』 is 『Vidya』, which is 『Karmadharaya』. Therefore, the fifteenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, what is the 『place of Hetuvidya』? It is in the observation of righteousness.
諸所有事。所建立法名觀察義。能隨順法名諸所有事。諸所有事即是因明。為因照明觀察義故。正理。簡邪。即諸法本真自性差別。陳那以外道等妄說浮翳。遂申趣解之由。名為門論。天主以旨微詞奧。恐後學難窮。乃綜括紀綱。以為此論。作因明之階漸。為正理之源由。窮趣二教稱之為入。故依梵語。因明正理入論。依主釋也。五言因明正理。俱陳那本論之名。入論者。方是此論之稱。由達此論。故能入因明正理也。或因明者。即入論名。正理者。陳那教稱。由此因明論。能入彼正理故。或因明者。能入所入論之通名。入正理者。能入所入論之別稱。由此因明能入論故。達解所入因明正理。或此應云。因即是明。正者即理。並持業釋。此五釋中。第一因之明。第二明之因。第三因與明異。第四因即是明。第五屬在何教。正理亦五。一諸法真性。二立破幽致。三所立義宗。四陳那本論。一一總通前四。由此一一別配。但為五解。綺互釋之。合成二十五釋。恐文繁廣。故略不述。然依初解。教亦因明。依后四釋。教是彼具。亦名因明。論者。量也。議也。量定真似。議詳立破。抉擇性相。教誡學徒。名之為論。依后四釋。既是所詮。論者是教。即因明入正理之論。依主釋也。欲令隨證。因生之明。而入正理。故說此論。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『諸所有事』（Sarva-vastu，一切事物）。『所建立法名觀察義』（Sthāpita-dharma-nāma-parīkṣā-artha，已建立的法名之觀察意義）。『能隨順法名諸所有事』（Anu-dharma-nāma-sarva-vastu，能隨順法名的所有事物）。『諸所有事』即是『因明』（Hetu-vidyā，因明學）。為因照明觀察義故，是為『正理』（Nyāya，正理）。簡別邪說，即是諸法根本真實的自性差別。陳那（Dignāga）以外道等虛妄之說矇蔽，於是闡述通達理解的途徑，名為『門論』（Dvāra-śāstra，入門論）。天主（Īśvarasena）以旨意精微，詞語深奧，恐怕後學者難以窮盡，於是綜合綱要，以此作為此論，作為因明的階梯，作為正理的源頭。窮盡趣入二教，稱之為『入』（Āveśa，進入）。所以依據梵語，名為『因明正理入論』（Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-āveśa-śāstra），是依主釋。『五言因明正理』，都是陳那本論的名稱。『入論』，才是此論的稱呼。通過通達此論，故能進入因明正理。或者『因明』，即是『入論』之名，『正理』，是陳那教的稱呼。由此因明論，能進入彼正理故。或者『因明』，是能入所入論的通名，『入正理』，是能入所入論的別稱。由此因明能入論故，通達理解所入的因明正理。或者此應說，『因』即是『明』，『正』即是『理』，並持業釋。這五種解釋中，第一種是『因』之『明』，第二種是『明』之『因』，第三種是『因』與『明』相異，第四種是『因』即是『明』，第五種是屬於何教。『正理』也有五種，一是諸法真性，二是立破幽微之處，三是所立義宗，四是陳那本論，一一總括前四種。由此一一分別配合，但為五種解釋，交錯地解釋，合成二十五種解釋，恐怕文字繁多，所以略去不述。然而依據最初的解釋，教也是因明，依據後面的四種解釋，教是彼之工具，也名因明。『論』，是衡量，是議論，衡量確定真實與虛假，詳細議論建立與破斥，決斷選擇自性與相狀，教誡學徒，名之為『論』。依據後面的四種解釋，既然是所詮釋的，『論』就是教，即『因明入正理』之論，是依主釋。想要使人隨順證悟，因所生的明，而進入正理，所以宣說此論。
【English Translation】 English version 『Sarva-vastu』 (All things). 『Sthāpita-dharma-nāma-parīkṣā-artha』 (The meaning of observing the established Dharma names). 『Anu-dharma-nāma-sarva-vastu』 (All things that accord with Dharma names). 『Sarva-vastu』 is 『Hetu-vidyā』 (The science of reasoning). For the sake of illuminating and observing the meaning of cause, it is called 『Nyāya』 (Right Reason). Distinguishing the correct from the incorrect is the fundamental, true, and distinct nature of all Dharmas. Dignāga (陳那) was obscured by the false teachings of heretics, so he expounded the means of understanding, called 『Dvāra-śāstra』 (The Gate Treatise). Īśvarasena (天主) feared that later students would have difficulty understanding his subtle and profound words, so he summarized the key points as this treatise, as a stepping stone to Hetu-vidyā and a source of Nyāya. Exhaustively entering the two teachings is called 『Āveśa』 (Entrance). Therefore, according to the Sanskrit, it is called 『Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-āveśa-śāstra』 (The Treatise on Entering Right Reason through the Science of Reasoning), which is a possessive compound. 『The five words Hetu-vidyā-nyāya』 are all names of Dignāga's original treatise. 『Āveśa-śāstra』 is the name of this treatise. By understanding this treatise, one can enter Hetu-vidyā-nyāya. Or 『Hetu-vidyā』 is the name of 『Āveśa-śāstra』, and 『Nyāya』 is the name of Dignāga's teaching. Because this Hetu-vidyā treatise can enter that Nyāya. Or 『Hetu-vidyā』 is the general name for the treatise that can enter what is to be entered, and 『Āveśa-nyāya』 is the specific name for the treatise that can enter what is to be entered. Because this Hetu-vidyā can enter the treatise, one can understand the Hetu-vidyā-nyāya that is to be entered. Or it should be said that 『Hetu』 is 『Vidyā』, and 『Nyāya』 is 『Right Reason』, which is a कर्मधारय compound. Among these five explanations, the first is 『Vidyā』 of 『Hetu』, the second is 『Hetu』 of 『Vidyā』, the third is that 『Hetu』 and 『Vidyā』 are different, the fourth is that 『Hetu』 is 『Vidyā』, and the fifth is to which teaching it belongs. There are also five types of 『Nyāya』: first, the true nature of all Dharmas; second, the subtle points of establishing and refuting; third, the established doctrine; fourth, Dignāga's original treatise, each of which encompasses the previous four. Therefore, each is separately matched, but there are five explanations, which are intertwined to form twenty-five explanations, but because the text would be too long, they are omitted. However, according to the first explanation, the teaching is also Hetu-vidyā, and according to the last four explanations, the teaching is its tool, also called Hetu-vidyā. 『Śāstra』 is measurement, is discussion, measuring and determining truth and falsehood, discussing in detail establishment and refutation, deciding and choosing self-nature and characteristics, and instructing students, which is called 『Śāstra』. According to the last four explanations, since it is what is being explained, 『Śāstra』 is the teaching, that is, the treatise on 『Entering Right Reason through the Science of Reasoning』, which is a possessive compound. Wishing to enable people to follow and realize the knowledge born of cause, and to enter Right Reason, therefore this treatise is expounded.
如中觀論。或此辨說因明正理之能入。立此論名。如十地經。或依能入正理因明。而說此論。如水陸花。故以為號。商羯羅主菩薩造者。梵云商羯羅塞縛彌菩提薩埵訖栗底。商羯羅者。此云骨瑣。塞縛彌者。此云主。菩提薩埵。義如常釋。訖栗底者。造。唐音應云骨瑣主菩薩造。外道有言。成劫之始。大自在天人間化導。二十四相。匡利既畢。自在歸天。事者顧戀。遂立其像。像其苦行悴疲饑羸骨節相連形狀如瑣。故標此像名骨瑣天。劫初雖有千名。時減猶存十號。此骨瑣天即一名也。菩薩之親。少無子息。因從像乞。便誕異靈。用天為尊。因自立號。以天為主名骨瑣主。即有財釋。此論是彼之所造也。
第三明妨難者。一問何故不名宗明喻明。但稱因明。答因有三相。名義寬故。又諸能立皆名為因。非唯一相。宗由此立。總名因明。二問真因真明。可說因明。似因似明。應非因明。答舉真攝似。或已攝故。或兼明之。非正明故。三問量立量破。可名因明。過破似破。應非因明。答是因明類故。或似真俱因明。名略已攝故。四問立破有言智。可是因明。現比無智言。應非因明。答見因亦明。見因證明。自證亦因。故皆因明。五問智生。智了可名因明。二了。二生非智。應因非是明。答是明之因。或皆順照成宗義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 例如《中觀論》。或者此論辨說了因明正理的入門方法，因此立此論名為因明。又如《十地經》。或者依據能入門的正理因明，而宣說此論，好比水陸花一樣，故以此為名。此論是商羯羅主菩薩所造。梵語為『商羯羅塞縛彌菩提薩埵訖栗底』（Śaṅkarasvāmin Bodhisattva Kṛti）。『商羯羅』（Śaṅkara）這裡的意思是『骨瑣』，『塞縛彌』（svāmin）這裡的意思是『主』，『菩提薩埵』（Bodhisattva）的含義如常解釋，『訖栗底』（Kṛti）的意思是『造』。按照唐朝的音譯應該叫做『骨瑣主菩薩造』。外道有這樣的說法：在成劫之初，大自在天（Maheśvara）在人間化導，示現二十四相，匡扶利益完畢后，自在天返回天界。人們因為顧戀他，於是立了他的像。這像模擬了他苦行時憔悴疲憊、飢餓羸弱、骨節相連的樣子，形狀像鎖鏈一樣。因此，將這個像命名為骨瑣天。劫初雖然有千個名字，但隨著時間流逝，仍然保留了十個稱號。這骨瑣天就是其中一個名字。菩薩的親屬，很久沒有子嗣，因此向骨瑣天像祈求，便生下了奇異的嬰兒。因為尊重天神，因此自己立號，以天神為主，名為骨瑣主，也就是有財釋。這部論就是他所造的。 第三，說明妨難者提出的問題。一問：為什麼不稱為『宗明喻明』，而只稱為『因明』？答：因為『因』有三種相狀，名稱含義寬泛。而且，所有能成立論點的都稱為『因』，並非只有一種相狀。『宗』由此而成立，所以總稱為『因明』。二問：真正的『因』、真正的『明』，可以說成是『因明』，但相似的『因』、相似的『明』，應該不是『因明』吧？答：這是舉出真的來涵蓋相似的，或者已經涵蓋了，或者兼帶說明了，但不是主要說明的對象。三問：量立（pramāṇa-sthāpana）、量破（pramāṇa-khaṇḍana）可以稱為『因明』，但過破（doṣa-khaṇḍana）、似破（ābhāsa-khaṇḍana），應該不是『因明』吧？答：因為它們是『因明』的同類。或者說，相似的和真實的都屬於『因明』，只是名稱上省略了。四問：立論者和破論者有言語和智慧，可以說是『因明』，但現量（pratyakṣa）、比量（anumāna）沒有智慧和言語，應該不是『因明』吧？答：見到『因』也是一種『明』，見到『因』就能證明，自我證明也是一種『因』，所以都屬於『因明』。五問：智慧產生、智慧瞭解，可以稱為『因明』，但兩次瞭解、兩次產生不是智慧，那麼『因』應該不是『明』吧？答：它們是『明』的『因』。或者說，它們都順應並照亮了成就宗義。
【English Translation】 English version: For example, the Madhyamaka-kārikā (Treatise on the Middle Way). Or, this treatise elucidates the means of entering the hetu-vidyā (science of reasoning) and nyāya (logic), hence the name of this treatise is established as hetu-vidyā. Like the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra). Or, based on the hetu-vidyā that enables entry into correct reasoning, this treatise is expounded, like a flower in water and on land, hence it is named accordingly. This treatise was composed by Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin. In Sanskrit, it is Śaṅkarasvāmin Bodhisattva Kṛti. Śaṅkara here means 'bones intertwined', svāmin here means 'lord', the meaning of Bodhisattva is as commonly explained, and Kṛti means 'composed'. According to the Tang Dynasty transliteration, it should be called 'Composed by Bodhisattva Bones-Intertwined-Lord'. The heretics say that at the beginning of the formation of the kalpa (aeon), Maheśvara (the Great自在天) transformed and guided people in the human realm, manifesting twenty-four aspects. After completing the task of supporting and benefiting, Maheśvara returned to the heavens. People, because of their attachment to him, erected his image. This image simulated his emaciated, exhausted, hungry, and weak appearance during his ascetic practices, with his bones connected like chains. Therefore, this image was named Bones-Intertwined-Lord. Although there were thousands of names at the beginning of the kalpa, ten titles still remain as time passed. This Bones-Intertwined-Lord is one of those names. The Bodhisattva's relatives had no children for a long time, so they prayed to the image of Bones-Intertwined-Lord, and a strange infant was born. Because they respected the deity, they named themselves after the deity, with the deity as the lord, named Bones-Intertwined-Lord, which is also known as Wealthy Interpretation. This treatise was composed by him. Third, explaining the questions raised by the objectors. First question: Why is it not called 'Doctrine-Evidence-Example', but only called 'hetu-vidyā'? Answer: Because 'hetu' (reason) has three aspects, and the meaning of the name is broad. Moreover, all that can establish a point are called 'hetu', not just one aspect. The 'doctrine' is established by this, so it is generally called 'hetu-vidyā'. Second question: The true 'hetu', the true 'illumination', can be said to be 'hetu-vidyā', but the similar 'hetu', the similar 'illumination', should not be 'hetu-vidyā', right? Answer: This is to include the similar by mentioning the true, or it has already been included, or it is explained incidentally, but it is not the main object of explanation. Third question: Pramāṇa-sthāpana (establishing valid cognition) and pramāṇa-khaṇḍana (refuting valid cognition) can be called 'hetu-vidyā', but doṣa-khaṇḍana (refuting faults) and ābhāsa-khaṇḍana (refuting fallacies) should not be 'hetu-vidyā', right? Answer: Because they are of the same kind as 'hetu-vidyā'. Or, the similar and the true both belong to 'hetu-vidyā', but the name is abbreviated. Fourth question: The proponents and opponents have speech and wisdom, which can be said to be 'hetu-vidyā', but pratyakṣa (direct perception) and anumāna (inference) have no wisdom and speech, so they should not be 'hetu-vidyā', right? Answer: Seeing the 'hetu' is also a kind of 'illumination', seeing the 'hetu' can prove, and self-proving is also a 'hetu', so they all belong to 'hetu-vidyā'. Fifth question: Wisdom arises and wisdom understands, which can be called 'hetu-vidyā', but twice understanding and twice arising are not wisdom, so 'hetu' should not be 'illumination', right? Answer: They are the 'hetu' of 'illumination'. Or, they all conform to and illuminate the accomplishment of the doctrine.
故。六問因喻能立。可說因明。宗非能立應非因明。答由不決定故所立非。從定為名故無有失。又能因能明。正是因明。所因所明。兼亦因明。又今者所立唯宗。能立雖唯因喻。言不違古。宗亦因明。七問何故不名果明。但名因明。答果有果之明。非果皆即明。因有因之明。是因皆即明。果明不定。義亦有濫。因明兩定。義亦無濫。故名因明。本欲以因成果義故。不欲以果成因義故。
第四釋本文者。
論。能立與能破及似唯悟他現量與比量及似唯自悟。
述曰。一部之中。大文有二。初頌及長行。標宗隨釋分。末後一頌。顯略指廣分。初分有二。前之一頌。舉類標宗。后諸長行。隨標別釋。條貫義類。舉標論宗。於前所標。隨應釋故。初頌之中。談頌有一。彰悟有二。論句有四。明義有八。一頌四句。文矚可知。悟他自悟。論各別顯。四真四似。即為八義。一者能立。因喻具正宗義圓成。顯以悟他。故名能立(陳那能立。唯取因喻。古兼宗等。因喻有二義。一者具而無闕。離七等故。二者正而無邪。離十四等故。宗亦二義。一者支圓。能依所依皆滿足故。二者成就。能依所依俱無過故。由此論顯真而無妄。義亦兼彰具而無闕。發此誠言。生他正解。宗由言顯。故名能立。由此似立決定相違。雖無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，六個問題在於，通過因和喻可以確立論點，所以可以稱為『因明』（Hetu-vidya，因明學）。如果『宗』（Paksha，論題）不能確立論點，那就不應被稱為『因明』。回答是：因為『因』（Hetu，原因）是不確定的，所以所要確立的『宗』就不能成立。因為是從確定性來命名的，所以沒有錯誤。而且，『能因』（能夠作為原因的）能夠闡明，這正是『因明』的含義。『所因』（作為原因的）和『所明』（所要闡明的），也兼具『因明』的含義。此外，現在所要確立的只是『宗』，雖然能夠確立的只有『因』和『喻』（Drishtanta，例子），但這樣說並不違背古義。『宗』也屬於『因明』的範疇。第七個問題是：為什麼不稱為『果明』（Phala-vidya，結果明），而只稱為『因明』？回答是：『果』有『果』的明，但不是所有的『果』都直接是明；『因』有『因』的明，而且所有的『因』都直接是明。『果明』是不確定的，意義上也有混淆之處；而『因明』是兩者都確定的，意義上也沒有混淆之處。所以稱為『因明』。根本目的是要通過『因』來成就『果』的意義，而不是要通過『果』來成就『因』的意義。 第四部分是解釋本文的內容。 論：『能立』（Sadhana，能成立的論證）與『能破』（Dushana，能破斥的論證）以及相似的論證，只是爲了使他人領悟；『現量』（Pratyaksha，現量）與『比量』（Anumana，比量）以及相似的量，只是爲了自己領悟。 述記說：一部著作中，大的綱要有兩個。首先是頌和長行，分別標明宗旨和隨之進行的解釋；最後的一個頌，顯示了簡略地指出廣泛含義的部分。第一部分又分為兩個部分。前面的一個頌，舉例說明並標明宗旨；後面的各個長行，隨著標明的宗旨分別進行解釋，條理貫穿義理。舉例說明並標明宗旨，是爲了對前面所標明的宗旨，隨著情況相應地進行解釋。在第一個頌中，談到頌有一個，彰顯領悟有兩個，論句有四個，闡明意義有八個。一個頌有四句話，文句的結構顯而易見。使他人領悟和自己領悟，在論述中分別顯示。四種真實的和四種相似的，總共有八種意義。第一種是『能立』，『因』和『喻』具備了正確的『宗』的意義，圓滿完成，顯示出是爲了使他人領悟，所以稱為『能立』（陳那（Dignāga）的『能立』，只取『因』和『喻』，古代的說法兼顧『宗』等。『因』和『喻』有兩種意義：一是具備而沒有缺失，遠離七種過失的緣故；二是正確而沒有邪謬，遠離十四種過失的緣故。『宗』也有兩種意義：一是支分圓滿，能依和所依都滿足的緣故；二是成就，能依和所依都沒有過失的緣故。由此論述顯示了真實而沒有虛妄，意義上也兼顧了具備而沒有缺失。發出這種誠實的話語，產生他人正確的理解。『宗』通過言語來顯示，所以稱為『能立』。由此，相似的『能立』是決定性的相反，雖然沒有
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the six questions are that a thesis can be established through Hetu (reason) and Drishtanta (example), so it can be called 'Hetu-vidya' (the science of Hetu, i.e., logic). If Paksha (thesis) cannot establish the argument, then it should not be called 'Hetu-vidya'. The answer is: because Hetu (reason) is uncertain, the Paksha (thesis) to be established cannot be established. Because it is named from certainty, there is no error. Moreover, 'able to be the cause' (that which can serve as a cause) can clarify, which is precisely the meaning of 'Hetu-vidya'. 'That which is the cause' and 'that which is to be clarified' also have the meaning of 'Hetu-vidya'. Furthermore, what is to be established now is only Paksha (thesis), although what can be established is only Hetu (reason) and Drishtanta (example), saying this does not violate the ancient meaning. Paksha (thesis) also belongs to the category of 'Hetu-vidya'. The seventh question is: why is it not called 'Phala-vidya' (the science of result), but only called 'Hetu-vidya'? The answer is: 'Phala' (result) has the clarity of 'Phala', but not all 'Phala' are directly clear; 'Hetu' (reason) has the clarity of 'Hetu', and all 'Hetu' are directly clear. 'Phala-vidya' is uncertain, and there is also ambiguity in meaning; while 'Hetu-vidya' is certain in both, and there is no ambiguity in meaning. Therefore, it is called 'Hetu-vidya'. The fundamental purpose is to achieve the meaning of 'Phala' through 'Hetu', not to achieve the meaning of 'Hetu' through 'Phala'. The fourth part is to explain the content of this text. Treatise: 'Sadhana' (means of proof) and 'Dushana' (means of refutation) and similar arguments are only for others to understand; 'Pratyaksha' (perception) and 'Anumana' (inference) and similar means of knowledge are only for oneself to understand. The commentary says: In a work, there are two major outlines. First, the verses and prose, which respectively indicate the purpose and the subsequent explanation; the last verse shows the part that briefly points out the broad meaning. The first part is divided into two parts. The preceding verse illustrates and indicates the purpose; the subsequent prose explains separately according to the indicated purpose, connecting the meaning in an orderly manner. Illustrating and indicating the purpose is to explain the previously indicated purpose accordingly. In the first verse, there is one mention of the verse, two of manifesting understanding, four of the sentences, and eight of clarifying the meaning. A verse has four sentences, and the structure of the sentences is obvious. Making others understand and understanding oneself are shown separately in the discussion. The four true and four similar ones have a total of eight meanings. The first is 'Sadhana', 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta' have the correct meaning of 'Paksha', complete and accomplish, showing that it is for others to understand, so it is called 'Sadhana' (Dignāga's 'Sadhana' only takes 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta', the ancient saying takes into account 'Paksha' and so on. 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta' have two meanings: one is complete without missing, because it is far from the seven faults; the other is correct without being wrong, because it is far from the fourteen faults. 'Paksha' also has two meanings: one is that the branches are complete, and both the support and the supported are satisfied; the other is that it is accomplished, and neither the support nor the supported has faults. This discussion shows the truth without falsehood, and the meaning also takes into account completeness without missing. Speaking this honest word produces the correct understanding of others. 'Paksha' is shown through words, so it is called 'Sadhana'. From this, the similar 'Sadhana' is decisively opposite, although there is no
闕過。非正能立。不能令他正智生故也)二者能破。敵申過量。善斥其非。或妙徴宗。故名能破(此有二義。一顯他過。他立不成。二立量非他。他宗不立。諸論唯彰顯他過破。理亦兼有立量徴詰。發言申義。證敵俱明。敗彼由言。故名能破也)三者似能立。三支互闕。多言有過。虛功自陷。故名似立(此有二義。一者闕支。宗因喻三。隨應闕減。二者有過。設立具足。諸過隨生。偽立妄陳。邪宗謬顯。興言自陷。故名似立)四者似能破。敵者量圓。妄生彈詰。所申過起。故名似破(此有二義。一者敵無過量。妄生彈詰。十四過類等。二者自量有過。謂為破他。偽言謂勝。故名似破)文說與字。表多體相違(立破真似。體義有異。說與字者。顯體相違)致及似言。顯過通能立破(表前能立。有似能立。並顯能破。有似能破。舉真等似。故稱及也)宗義各定(本所解也)邪正難知(未共許故)由況既彰(由因況喻彰謂顯也)是非遂著(宗成曰是。不成曰非。著者明也。真似言興。是非宗曉)功成勝負。彼此俱明(能立能破。由自發言。功既成勝。證敵俱解。似立似破。自功成負。由他指述。證立俱明)故從多分。皆悟他也。理門論云。隨其所應。為開悟他。說此能立及似能立。能立悟敵及證義者。由自發言。生他解故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 闕過（闕：缺失，過：過失）。如果論證不正確，就無法使他人產生正確的智慧，因此稱為『闕過』。 二者能破（能破：善於駁斥對方觀點的人）。善於指出對方的過失，巧妙地揭示其論證的根本問題，因此稱為『能破』（這有兩種含義：一是揭示對方的過失，使其論證無法成立；二是提出的論證並非對方的觀點，導致對方的宗派無法成立。各種論辯都側重於揭示對方的過失，但實際上也包含著提出論證進行詰問。通過言語來闡述義理，使論證和反駁都清晰明瞭，通過言語擊敗對方，因此稱為『能破』）。 三者似能立（似能立：表面上像是能成立的論證）。論證的三個組成部分（宗、因、喻）相互缺失，言語過多反而產生過失，白費力氣反而使自己陷入困境，因此稱為『似立』（這有兩種含義：一是缺失論證的組成部分，即宗、因、喻三者，根據情況有所缺失或減少；二是有過失，即使論證的各個部分都完整，也會產生各種過失，虛假的論證、錯誤的陳述、邪惡的宗派謬誤顯現，通過言語使自己陷入困境，因此稱為『似立』）。 四者似能破（似能破：表面上像是能駁倒對方的論證）。對方的論證是圓滿的，卻妄加彈劾詰難，自己提出的過失反而成立，因此稱為『似破』（這有兩種含義：一是對方的論證沒有過失，卻妄加彈劾詰難，例如十四種過失等；二是自己的論證有過失，卻認為能駁倒對方，虛假的言語自以為勝利，因此稱為『似破』）。 文句的表達和文字的使用，表面上看起來有很多相互矛盾的地方（能立、能破、似能立、似能破，它們的本質和意義都有所不同，文句的表達和文字的使用，是爲了顯示它們本質上的差異）。 『致』和『似』這些詞語，表明過失貫穿于能立和能破（表明前面的能立，有似能立；並且表明能破，有似能破。既舉出真實的，也舉出相似的，所以稱為『及』）。 宗派的意義各自確定（這是原本所要解釋的）。 邪正難以分辨（因為還沒有得到共同的認可）。 通過因和比喻的闡明（通過因和比喻的闡明，『彰』是顯明的意思）。 是非於是就明確了（宗派成立就說是『是』，不成立就說是『非』，『著』是明確的意思。真實的和相似的言論興起，是非宗派就清楚了）。 成功或失敗，彼此都清楚明白（能立和能破，通過自己發表言論，成功了，論證和反駁雙方都明白；似立和似破，自己走向失敗，通過他人指出，論證和反駁雙方都明白）。 所以從大多數情況來看，都能領悟他人。理門論說：『根據具體情況，爲了啓發他人，說明這種能立以及相似能立。能立使對方和證明義理的人領悟，因為通過自己發表言論，使他人產生理解。』
【English Translation】 English version: 『Que Guo』 (闕過) (Que: deficiency, Guo: fault). If the argument is incorrect, it cannot cause others to generate correct wisdom, therefore it is called 『Que Guo』. 『Er Zhe Neng Po』 (二者能破) (Neng Po: someone who is good at refuting the other party's point of view). Being good at pointing out the other party's faults and skillfully revealing the fundamental problems of their arguments, therefore it is called 『Neng Po』 (This has two meanings: one is to reveal the other party's faults, making their argument untenable; the other is that the argument put forward is not the other party's point of view, causing the other party's sect to be untenable. Various debates focus on revealing the other party's faults, but in fact also include putting forward arguments for questioning. Articulating the meaning through words, making both arguments and rebuttals clear, defeating the other party through words, therefore it is called 『Neng Po』.) 『San Zhe Si Neng Li』 (三者似能立) (Si Neng Li: an argument that appears to be valid on the surface). The three components of the argument (proposition, reason, analogy) are mutually missing, and excessive words produce faults, wasting effort and trapping oneself, therefore it is called 『Si Li』 (This has two meanings: one is the lack of components of the argument, that is, the proposition, reason, and analogy, which are missing or reduced as appropriate; the other is that there are faults, even if all parts of the argument are complete, various faults will arise, false arguments, erroneous statements, evil sectarian fallacies appear, and one traps oneself through words, therefore it is called 『Si Li』.) 『Si Zhe Si Neng Po』 (四者似能破) (Si Neng Po: seemingly able to refute the other party's argument on the surface). The other party's argument is complete, but one rashly criticizes and questions it, and the faults one puts forward are established instead, therefore it is called 『Si Po』 (This has two meanings: one is that the other party's argument has no faults, but one rashly criticizes and questions it, such as the fourteen types of faults; the other is that one's own argument has faults, but one thinks that one can refute the other party, and false words are considered victorious, therefore it is called 『Si Po』.) The expression of sentences and the use of words seem to have many contradictions on the surface (Neng Li, Neng Po, Si Neng Li, Si Neng Po, their essence and meaning are different, and the expression of sentences and the use of words are to show the differences in their essence). The words 『Zhi』 and 『Si』 indicate that faults run through Neng Li and Neng Po (indicating the previous Neng Li, there is Si Neng Li; and indicating Neng Po, there is Si Neng Po. Both the real and the similar are mentioned, so it is called 『Ji』.). The meaning of each sect is determined (this is what was originally to be explained). It is difficult to distinguish between right and wrong (because it has not yet been commonly recognized). Through the clarification of reason and analogy (through the clarification of reason and analogy, 『Zhang』 means to clarify). Therefore, right and wrong are clear (the establishment of the sect is called 『Shi』, and the failure to establish it is called 『Fei』, and 『Zhe』 means clear. True and similar words arise, and the right and wrong sects are clear). Success or failure is clear to each other (Neng Li and Neng Po, through their own speeches, are successful, and both the argument and the rebuttal are clear; Si Li and Si Po, they fail themselves, and through others' pointing out, both the argument and the rebuttal are clear). Therefore, from the majority of situations, one can understand others. The Treatise on the Gate of Reason says: 『According to the specific situation, in order to enlighten others, explain this Neng Li and similar Neng Li. Neng Li enables the other party and those who prove the meaning to understand, because through their own speeches, others generate understanding.』
似立悟證及立論主。由他顯己。證自解生。故言隨應能破似破。準知亦爾。此論下文。能立能破。皆能悟他。似立似破不能悟他。正與彼同。故此頌中。據其多分。皆悟證者。言唯悟他。不言自悟。又真立破。唯悟於他。似雖亦自。從真名唯。五者現量。行離動搖。明證眾境。親冥自體。故名現量(能緣行相。不動不搖。因循照境。不籌不度。離分別心。照符前境。明局自體。故名現量。然有二類。一定位。二散心。定心澄湛。境皆明證。隨緣何法。皆名現量。一切散心。若親于境。冥得自體。亦皆現量)六者比量。用已極成。證非先許。共相智決。故名比量(因喻已成宗非先許。用已許法。成未許宗。如縷貫花。因義通被。共相智起。印決先宗。分別解生。故名比量。雖將已許。成未許宗。智生不決。非比量攝)七者似現量。行有籌度。非明證境。妄謂得體。名似現量(散心有二。一有分別。二無分別。諸似現量遍在二心。有分別心。妄謂分明得境自體。無分別心。不能分明冥證境故。名似現量。論據決定。唯說分別。非無分別心。皆唯現量故)八者似比量。妄興由況。謬成邪宗。相違智起。名似比量(妄起因喻。謬建邪宗。順智不生。違解便起。所立設成。此彼乖角。異生分別。名似比量)。及似等言。皆準前釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『似能立』、『悟證』以及『立論主』，都是通過他人來彰顯自己。『證自解生』，指的是通過自身的理解來產生證明。因此說，『隨應能破似破』，指的是根據對方的論點，能夠進行有效的反駁，但表面上看起來像是錯誤的駁斥。『準知亦爾』，可以推知其他情況也是如此。此論的下文提到，『能立』和『能破』都能夠啓發他人，而『似能立』和『似能破』則不能啓發他人，這與前面的觀點相同。因此，這首頌主要強調的是那些能夠啓發和證明的人。『言唯悟他』，只說啓發他人，沒有說自我啓發。此外，真正的『能立』和『能破』，只能啓發他人，而『似』雖然也涉及自身，但從『真』的角度來說，仍然是『唯』。第五是『現量』（Pratyaksha），其運作方式是遠離動搖，清晰地證明各種境界，直接與自體相契合，因此稱為『現量』（指能緣的行相不動不搖，遵循規律照亮境界，不進行籌劃和揣度，遠離分別心，與前面的境界相符，清晰地侷限於自體，因此稱為『現量』。然而，『現量』有兩種型別：一是『定位』，二是『散心』。『定位』時，心澄澈平靜，所有境界都清晰地被證明。無論緣於何種法，都稱為『現量』。一切『散心』，如果親近於境界，直接與自體相契合，也都是『現量』）。第六是『比量』（Anumana），使用已經成立的、證明並非先前認可的、共同認可的智慧來決斷，因此稱為『比量』（指因和喻已經成立，而宗並非先前認可。使用已經認可的法，來成立未被認可的宗，如同用線將花朵串起來。因的意義普遍被接受，共同的智慧生起，印證並決斷先前的宗，分別的理解產生，因此稱為『比量』。即使使用已經認可的，來成立未被認可的宗，但智慧的產生並不果斷，也不屬於『比量』的範疇）。第七是『似現量』（Pratyakshabhasa），其運作方式帶有籌劃和揣度，不能清晰地證明境界，錯誤地認為獲得了自體，稱為『似現量』（『散心』有兩種：一是有分別，二是無分別。各種『似現量』普遍存在於這兩種心中。有分別的心，錯誤地認為清晰地獲得了境界的自體。無分別的心，不能清晰地證明境界，因此稱為『似現量』。根據論的決定，只說分別，並非無分別心都只是『現量』）。第八是『似比量』（Anumanabhasa），錯誤地通過比況來建立錯誤的邪宗，產生與正見相違背的智慧，稱為『似比量』（錯誤地建立因和喻，錯誤地建立邪宗，順應真理的智慧不產生，相反的理解卻產生。所建立的如果成立，則與此彼相矛盾，產生不同的分別，稱為『似比量』）。以及『似』等等的說法，都參照前面的解釋。
【English Translation】 English version 'Seeming establishment', 'understanding and proof', and 'the proponent of the thesis' all manifest themselves through others. 'Proof arises from self-understanding' refers to generating proof through one's own comprehension. Therefore, it is said that 'responding appropriately can refute what seems like a refutation', meaning being able to effectively refute the opponent's arguments, even if it appears to be a flawed refutation on the surface. 'It can be inferred that it is also the same' implies that other situations are similar. The following text of this treatise mentions that both 'valid establishment' (Sadhana) and 'valid refutation' (Dushana) can enlighten others, while 'seeming establishment' (Sadhanabhasa) and 'seeming refutation' (Dushanabhasa) cannot enlighten others, which is consistent with the previous point. Therefore, this verse primarily emphasizes those who can enlighten and prove. 'Speaking only of enlightening others' refers to only enlightening others, without mentioning self-enlightenment. Furthermore, true 'establishment' and 'refutation' can only enlighten others, while 'seeming' also involves oneself, but from the perspective of 'true', it is still 'only'. Fifth is 'perception' (Pratyaksha), its mode of operation is to be free from agitation, clearly proving various realms, directly merging with the self-essence, hence it is called 'perception' (referring to the aspect of the cognizer being still and unmoving, following the law to illuminate the realm, without planning or speculation, free from discriminating mind, corresponding to the preceding realm, clearly limited to the self-essence, hence it is called 'perception'. However, there are two types of 'perception': one is 'fixed mind' (Samadhi), and the other is 'scattered mind' (Vikshepa). In 'fixed mind', the mind is clear and calm, and all realms are clearly proven. Whatever dharma is conditioned upon, it is called 'perception'. All 'scattered minds', if close to the realm and directly merge with the self-essence, are also 'perception'). Sixth is 'inference' (Anumana), using what has already been established, proving what was not previously acknowledged, using commonly acknowledged wisdom to make a decision, hence it is called 'inference' (referring to the reason and example being established, while the thesis was not previously acknowledged. Using what has already been acknowledged to establish the unacknowledged thesis, like stringing flowers with a thread. The meaning of the reason is universally accepted, common wisdom arises, confirming and deciding the previous thesis, and discriminating understanding arises, hence it is called 'inference'. Even if using what has already been acknowledged to establish the unacknowledged thesis, but the arising of wisdom is not decisive, it does not belong to the category of 'inference'). Seventh is 'seeming perception' (Pratyakshabhasa), its mode of operation involves planning and speculation, unable to clearly prove the realm, mistakenly believing that it has obtained the self-essence, hence it is called 'seeming perception' ('scattered mind' has two types: one with discrimination, and the other without discrimination. Various 'seeming perceptions' are universally present in these two minds. The mind with discrimination mistakenly believes that it has clearly obtained the self-essence of the realm. The mind without discrimination cannot clearly prove the realm, hence it is called 'seeming perception'. According to the determination of the treatise, only discrimination is mentioned, not that all minds without discrimination are only 'perception'). Eighth is 'seeming inference' (Anumanabhasa), mistakenly establishing a false and heretical thesis through analogy, giving rise to wisdom that contradicts the correct view, hence it is called 'seeming inference' (mistakenly establishing the reason and example, falsely establishing a heretical thesis, wisdom that accords with the truth does not arise, but the opposite understanding arises. If what is established is valid, it contradicts this and that, giving rise to different discriminations, hence it is called 'seeming inference'). And the terms 'seeming' and so on, all refer to the previous explanations.
。法有幽顯(幽微顯著也。若現量境。理幽事顯。若比量境所立為幽。能立為顯)行分明昧(行謂能緣心等行相。真現比于境。幽顯俱明。似現比于境。幽顯俱昧)。故此二刊定。唯悟自非他(現比因果唯自智。故二刊定悟自非他)。雖自不曉。無以悟他。理應頌中。后他先自。但以權衡之制。本以利人。故先悟他。後方自悟。辨此八義略以三門。一明古今同異。二辨八義同異。三釋體相同異。明古今同異者。初能立中。瑜伽十五。顯揚十一。說有八種。一立宗。二辨因。三引喻。四同類。五異類。六現量。七比量。八正教。對法亦說有八。一立宗。二立因。三立喻。四合。五結。六現量。七比量。八聖教。皆以自性差別。而為所立。瑜伽顯揚八能立中。三引喻者。總也。同類異類者。別也。于總比況假類法中。別引順違。同品異品。而為二喻。總別有殊。分為三種。離因喻外無別合結。故略合結而不別開。對法無著八為能立。順前師故。以因總別。既無離合。喻之總別。何假合離。故總說一不開二喻。離喻既虧故加合結。合結雖離。因喻非有。令所立義。重得增明。故須別立。喻過既說無合倒合。翻立真支。理須有合。合既別立。結亦須彰。由此亦八。古師又有說四能立。謂宗及因同喻異喻。世親菩薩。論軌等。說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法有幽顯（幽微顯著。現量境，理幽事顯；比量境，所立為幽，能立為顯）。行的分明與晦暗（行指能緣之心等的作用。真現比對於境，幽顯都明；似現比對於境，幽顯都晦暗）。因此，這兩種（現量和比量）的判定，只能通過自己領悟，不能依靠他人（現量、比量、因果只能通過自己的智慧來理解，所以這兩種判定只能自己領悟，不能依靠他人）。即使自己不明白，也無法使他人明白。理應在頌文中，先說他人後說自己。但因為權衡之術，本意是爲了利益他人，所以先使他人明白，然後自己才能明白。辨析這八個方面的意義，大致分為三個方面：一是說明古今的相同與不同；二是辨別八個方面的相同與不同；三是解釋體性的相同與不同。說明古今的相同與不同：最初的能立中，《瑜伽師地論》第十五卷和《顯揚聖教論》第十一卷中，說了有八種能立：一是立宗（確立宗義），二是辨因（辨明理由），三是引喻（引用比喻），四是同類（相同的事例），五是異類（不同的事例），六是現量（現量所證），七是比量（比量所證），八是正教（正確的教說）。《對法論》也說了有八種：一是立宗，二是立因，三是立喻，四是合（合比），五是結（結論），六是現量，七是比量，八是聖教（聖人的教導）。都是以自性的差別作為所立。《瑜伽師地論》和《顯揚聖教論》的八種能立中，三引喻是總的，同類和異類是別的。在總的比況假類法中，分別引用順和違、同品和異品作為兩種比喻。總和別有區別，所以分為三種。除了因和喻之外，沒有單獨的合和結，所以省略了合和結，沒有單獨分開。《對法論》的無著以八種作為能立，順從前人的說法，因為因的總和別沒有離合，那麼比喻的總和別，為什麼要假借合離呢？所以總的說一個，不分開兩種比喻。既然比喻缺少，所以加上合和結。合和結雖然分離，但因和喻並非沒有，使所立的意義，重新得到增明，所以需要單獨設立。既然說了比喻的過失，沒有合倒合，反過來設立真實的支分，理應有合。既然合單獨設立，結論也需要彰顯。因此也是八種。古代的老師也有說四種能立的，即宗、因、同喻、異喻。世親菩薩在《論軌》等中說
【English Translation】 English version The Dharma has both the subtle and the obvious (subtle and manifest. In the case of direct perception, the principle is subtle and the phenomenon is obvious; in the case of inference, what is established is subtle, and what establishes it is obvious). Conduct is divided into clarity and obscurity (conduct refers to the workings of the mind, etc., that cognize objects. True direct perception and inference are clear about both the subtle and the obvious aspects of the object; false direct perception and inference are obscure about both). Therefore, these two [types of cognition, direct perception and inference] are determined only through one's own understanding, not through others (direct perception, inference, cause, and effect can only be understood through one's own wisdom; therefore, these two determinations can only be understood by oneself, not by relying on others). Even if one does not understand oneself, one cannot make others understand. In the verses, one should speak of others before oneself. However, because the art of weighing [arguments] is primarily for the benefit of others, one should first enable others to understand, and then one can understand oneself. Analyzing these eight aspects of meaning can be roughly divided into three aspects: first, to explain the similarities and differences between ancient and modern times; second, to distinguish the similarities and differences among the eight aspects; and third, to explain the similarities and differences in essence. Explaining the similarities and differences between ancient and modern times: In the initial establishment of proof, the fifteenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) and the eleventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論) state that there are eight types of proof: first, establishing the thesis (立宗), second, distinguishing the reason (辨因), third, citing examples (引喻), fourth, similar instances (同類), fifth, dissimilar instances (異類), sixth, direct perception (現量), seventh, inference (比量), and eighth, correct teachings (正教). The Abhidharma (對法論) also states that there are eight types: first, establishing the thesis, second, establishing the reason, third, establishing the example, fourth, synthesis (合), fifth, conclusion (結), sixth, direct perception, seventh, inference, and eighth, the teachings of the saints (聖教). All use the differences in their own nature as what is to be established. Among the eight types of proof in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the third, citing examples, is general; similar instances and dissimilar instances are specific. In the general method of comparison and analogy, the favorable and unfavorable, similar and dissimilar instances are cited as two types of examples. The general and the specific are different, so they are divided into three types. Apart from the reason and the example, there are no separate synthesis and conclusion, so the synthesis and conclusion are omitted and not separated. Asaṅga (無著) in the Abhidharma uses eight types as proof, following the previous teachers' statements, because the general and specific aspects of the reason are not separated or combined, then why should the general and specific aspects of the example be borrowed for separation and combination? Therefore, he speaks of one in general and does not separate the two types of examples. Since the example is lacking, the synthesis and conclusion are added. Although the synthesis and conclusion are separated, the reason and the example are not absent, so that the meaning of what is to be established is re-illuminated, so it needs to be established separately. Since the faults of the example have been stated, there is no synthesis of inversion, and the true limbs are established in reverse, there should be synthesis. Since the synthesis is established separately, the conclusion also needs to be manifested. Therefore, there are also eight types. Ancient teachers also said that there are four types of proof, namely, thesis, reason, similar example, and dissimilar example. Vasubandhu (世親) Bodhisattva said in Vāda-vidhi (論軌) etc.
能立有三。一宗。二因。三喻。以能立者。必是多言。多言顯彼所立便足。故但說三。且喻總別。終是見邊。故對法言。立喻者。謂以所見邊。與未所見邊。和合正說。師子覺釋。所見邊者。謂已所顯了分。未所見邊者。謂未所顯了分。以顯了分。顯未顯了分。令義平等。所有正說名為立喻。故總說一喻。已令所立見邊。何假別開。或三或二。喻中無合。義乃不明。倒合倒成。故說為過。離因及喻。都無勝體。故不說在真能立中。但說因初。喻隨其後。合義已明。重說有結。一何煩長。故總略之。立論。者現量等三。疏有悟他。故名能立。敵論者現量等三。親唯自悟。故非能立。今者陳那因喻為能立。宗為所立。自性差別二並極成。但是宗依未成所諍。合以成宗。不相離性。方為所諍。何成能立。故能立中。定除其宗。問然依聲明。一言云婆達喃。二言云婆達泥。多言云婆達。今此能立婆達聲說。既並多言。云何但說因喻二法以為能立。答陳那釋云。因有三相。一因二喻。豈非多言。非要三體。由是定說宗是所立。陳那以後。略有三釋。一云。宗言所詮義為所立。故瑜伽論第十五云。所成立義有二種。一自性。二差別。能成立法有八種。其宗能詮之言。及因等言義。皆名能立。其宗言。因喻成故。雖亦所立。彼于論說
。何故先立宗耶。為先顯示自所愛樂宗義。故亦所立。非定所立。能成義故。猶如於因。喻所成故。但名能立。宗所詮義。定唯所立。獨名所成。二云。諸法總集。自性差別。若教若理。俱是所立。論俱名義。隨應有故。總中一分。對敵所申。若言若義。自性差別。俱名為宗。即名能立。雖此對宗。亦是所立能立總故。得能立名。故陳那等宗名所立。與瑜伽等理不相違。瑜伽等不說宗非一向唯能立故 三云。自性差別。合所依義。名為所立。能依合宗說為能立。總立別故。非此總宗定唯能立。對敵合申。因喻成故。亦是所立。由非定所立。故得能立名。陳那但以共許因喻。成他未許。他未許者。唯是合宗。宗為所立。自性差別。但是宗依。非是所立。所立之具。所望義殊。不相違也。不爾慈氏無著天親。豈不解因明。說所為能立。次解能破中。諸論但有顯敵過破。無立量破。立量即顯彼之過故。顯過破中。古師有說八為能立。闕一有八。闕二有二十八。乃至闕七有八。闕八有一。亦有說四以為能立。闕一有四。闕二有六。闕三有四。闕四有一。世親菩薩。缺減過性。宗因喻中。闕一有三。闕二有三。闕三有一。世親已后皆除第七。以宗因喻三為能立。總闕便非。既本無體何成能立。有何所闕而得似名。陳那菩薩。因一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：為什麼要首先確立宗（pakṣa，論題）呢？ 答：爲了首先顯示自己所喜愛和信奉的宗義，所以要確立宗。但確立的宗並非一成不變，因為它能夠成立義理，就像因（hetu，理由）和喻（dṛṣṭānta，例證）一樣，它們能夠成立宗所要表達的意義，所以被稱為『能立』（sādhana，成立者）。而宗所要表達的意義，一定是『所立』（sādhya，被成立者），並且獨稱為『所成』。 二種觀點認為：諸法的總集和自性差別，無論是教（agama，聖言）還是理（yukti，推理），都是『所立』。因為論（vāda，辯論）中教和理都可稱為『義』，並且隨應存在。總集中的一部分，是針對辯論對手提出的，無論是言（vacana，陳述）還是義，其自性差別都可稱為『宗』，即『能立』。雖然這個針對辯論對手的宗也是『所立』，但因為它是『能立』的總和，所以可以稱為『能立』。因此，陳那（Dignāga）等人認為宗是『所立』的觀點，與瑜伽行派（Yogācāra）等人的理論並不矛盾，因為瑜伽行派等並未說宗一定只是『能立』。 三種觀點認為：自性差別與所依之義相結合，稱為『所立』。能依與宗相結合，則被稱為『能立』，因為這是總體的確立和個別的確立。但這個總體的宗並非一定只是『能立』，因為它針對辯論對手的綜合陳述，可以通過因和喻來成立，所以也是『所立』。由於它並非一成不變的『所立』，所以可以稱為『能立』。陳那只是用雙方都認可的因和喻，來成立對方尚未認可的觀點。對方尚未認可的，只是結合在一起的宗，所以宗是『所立』，而自性差別只是宗的所依，並非『所立』。『所立』的工具，以及所期望的意義不同，所以並不矛盾。否則，彌勒（Maitreya）、無著（Asaṅga）、世親（Vasubandhu）難道不了解因明（hetuvidyā，因明學）嗎？他們將『所為』說成『能立』。 接下來解釋『能破』（dūṣaṇa，能破論式）中的內容。各種論著中只有顯示對方過失的破斥，沒有成立量（pramāṇa，量）的破斥，因為成立量本身就顯示了對方的過失。在顯示過失的破斥中，古師們有的說有八種『能立』，缺少一種有八種情況，缺少兩種有二十八種情況，乃至缺少七種有八種情況，缺少八種有一種情況。也有的說有四種『能立』，缺少一種有四種情況，缺少兩種有六種情況，缺少三種有四種情況，缺少四種有一種情況。世親菩薩認為，在宗、因、喻中，缺少過失的性質，缺少一種有三種情況，缺少兩種有三種情況，缺少三種有一種情況。世親之後的人都去除了第七種情況，以宗、因、喻三種作為『能立』。全部缺少就不是『能立』。既然根本沒有實體，又如何能成為『能立』呢？有什麼缺少才能成為相似的名稱呢？陳那菩薩認為，因只有一種。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why is it necessary to establish the pakṣa (thesis) first? Answer: In order to first display the tenets of the school that one loves and believes in, the pakṣa is established. However, the established pakṣa is not fixed, because it can establish the meaning, just like the hetu (reason) and dṛṣṭānta (example), which can establish the meaning that the pakṣa wants to express, so they are called 'sādhana' (prover). And the meaning that the pakṣa wants to express must be 'sādhya' (to be proved), and is exclusively called 'the proven'. Two views hold that: the totality of all dharmas and the distinctions of their own-natures, whether it is agama (scripture) or yukti (reasoning), are all 'sādhya'. Because in vāda (debate), both agama and yukti can be called 'meaning' and exist accordingly. A part of the totality is proposed to the opponent in the debate, whether it is vacana (statement) or meaning, its distinctions of own-nature can be called 'pakṣa', that is, 'sādhana'. Although this pakṣa against the opponent is also 'sādhya', because it is the sum of 'sādhana', it can be called 'sādhana'. Therefore, the view that Dignāga (陳那) and others hold that the pakṣa is 'sādhya' does not contradict the theories of Yogācāra (瑜伽行派) and others, because Yogācāra and others did not say that the pakṣa must only be 'sādhana'. Three views hold that: the combination of the distinctions of own-nature and the meaning of the substratum is called 'sādhya'. The combination of the dependent and the pakṣa is called 'sādhana', because this is the establishment of the whole and the establishment of the individual. However, this overall pakṣa is not necessarily only 'sādhana', because its comprehensive statement against the opponent can be established through hetu and dṛṣṭānta, so it is also 'sādhya'. Since it is not a fixed 'sādhya', it can be called 'sādhana'. Dignāga only uses the hetu and dṛṣṭānta that both parties recognize to establish the views that the other party has not yet recognized. What the other party has not yet recognized is only the combined pakṣa, so the pakṣa is 'sādhya', and the distinctions of own-nature are only the substratum of the pakṣa, not 'sādhya'. The tools of 'sādhya' and the meanings that are expected are different, so there is no contradiction. Otherwise, do Maitreya (彌勒), Asaṅga (無著), and Vasubandhu (世親) not understand hetuvidyā (因明學)? They say that 'what is to be done' is 'sādhana'. Next, explain the content in 'dūṣaṇa' (refutation). In various treatises, there are only refutations that show the opponent's faults, and there are no refutations that establish pramāṇa (量), because establishing pramāṇa itself shows the opponent's faults. In the refutations that show faults, some ancient teachers said that there are eight kinds of 'sādhana', lacking one has eight situations, lacking two has twenty-eight situations, and so on, lacking seven has eight situations, and lacking eight has one situation. Some also said that there are four kinds of 'sādhana', lacking one has four situations, lacking two has six situations, lacking three has four situations, and lacking four has one situation. Vasubandhu Bodhisattva believed that in pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta, lacking the nature of faults, lacking one has three situations, lacking two has three situations, and lacking three has one situation. People after Vasubandhu have removed the seventh situation, and use pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta as 'sādhana'. If all are missing, it is not 'sādhana'. Since there is no entity at all, how can it become 'sādhana'? What is missing to become a similar name? Dignāga Bodhisattva believed that there is only one hetu.
喻二。說有六過。則因三相六過是也。闕一有三。闕二有三。無闕三者。大師至彼六十年前。施無厭寺。有一論師。名為賢愛。精確慈悲。特以貫世。因明一論。時無敵者。亦除第七。自余諸師。不肯除之。因一喻二。則因三相。雖有申宗。不申因喻。如數論者。執我為思。不申因喻。豈非過也。又雖有言。而三相併闕。如聲論師。對佛法者。立聲為常。德所依故。猶如擇滅諸非常者。皆非德依。如四大種。此德依因。雖有所說。三相併闕。何得非似。由此第七亦缺減過。似能立中。且九似宗陳那菩薩理門等論。立有五種。不說后四。謂能．所別．俱不極成．相符極成。以理門說宗等多言說能立。此中唯取隨自意。樂為所立說名宗。非彼相違義能遣后之四種既非相違所以略之。天主宗過。不但相違。故申九種。第二釋云。陳那菩薩。以能別不成。即是因中不共不定等過。亦是喻中所立不成。闕無同喻等過。所別不成。有法無故。即因過中所依不成過。其俱不極成。即合是二過。相符極成者。凡所立論。名義相違。既曰相符。便非所立。本非宗故。依何立過。如諸俗人不受戒者非受戒類。依何說有持戒破戒。是故不說后之四過。今者天主。加能別不成。以宗合取。不相離性方得成宗。若非能別誰不相離。若以因中是不共
不定等。亦是喻中所立不成。恐繁重故不須說者。因中已有闕同品。有不共等過。喻中復說能立不成。一何鄭重。是故加之。天主復加所別不成者。若以是因所依不成。亦恐重故略不須說者。因中已有異品遍轉等不定過。及是異品非遍無過異喻之中。更何須說能立不遣。何廢宗過亦為因過。余難同前是故加之。俱不成者。合二為之。要有二種。互相差別。不相離性。方得成宗。彼二並非。何成宗義。是故加之。若此上三不立過者。所依非極。便更須成。宗既非真。何名所立。相符極成者。若以相符本非宗故。依何立過。兩俱不成及俱不成。並俱不遣。本非因喻。依何立過。若以因喻有所申述何非過者。宗亦有說。如何非過。是故加之。但陳那影略說。天主委具陳之。非是師資自為矛盾。又陳那以前古師。宗中復說宗因相違過。陳那理門自破之云。諸有說言。宗因相違名宗違者此非宗過。以於此中立聲為常。一切皆是無常故者。是喻方便惡立異法。由合喻顯非一切故。陳那意言。如聲論者立聲為常。一切皆是無常故因。是彼外道立宗之喻。方便矯智。惡立異法無常之義非欲成宗所立聲常。釋所因云。由合喻顯非一切故。陳那正云。立聲為常。正因應言非一切故。以外道說非常之法。有多品類。種種差別。名為一切。故立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不定等，也是比喻中要成立的無法成立。恐怕過於繁瑣，所以不必再說。因為論因中已經有了缺少同品、有不共等等過失。比喻中又說能立不成，為何如此鄭重？所以加上了這一點。天主又加上了所別不成，如果以這個論因為所依不成，也恐怕重複，所以省略不說。因為論因中已經有了異品遍轉等不定過失，以及這個異品並非遍無過失的異喻之中，更何須說能立不遣？為何廢宗過也作為論因的過失？其餘的責難與前面相同，所以加上了這一點。俱不成，是把兩種合二為一。必須要有兩種，互相差別，不相離的性質，才能成立宗義。如果這兩種都不是，如何成立宗義？所以加上了這一點。如果這以上三種不成立過失，所依就不是極成，便更需要成立。宗既然不是真實的，如何稱為所立？相符極成，如果認為相符本來就不是宗，依據什麼來成立過失？兩俱不成以及俱不成，並且俱不遣，本來就不是論因論喻，依據什麼來成立過失？如果認為論因論喻有所申述，為何不是過失？宗也有所說明，如何不是過失？所以加上了這一點。但陳那（Dignāga）簡略地說，天主（Īśvarasena）詳細地陳述，並非是師徒之間自相矛盾。而且陳那以前的古師，在宗中又說宗因相違的過失。陳那的《理門論》（Hetucakraḍamaru）親自破斥它說：『如果有人說，宗因相違稱為宗違，這不是宗的過失。因為在這裡立聲為常，一切都是無常的緣故。』這是比喻方便惡立異法，因為合喻顯示並非一切。陳那的意思是說，如聲論者立聲為常，一切都是無常的緣故這個論因，是那些外道設立宗的比喻，方便矯智，惡立異法無常的意義，並非想要成立宗所立的聲常。解釋所因說：『因為合喻顯示並非一切。』陳那正確地說：『立聲為常，正因應該說並非一切的緣故。』因為外道所說的非常之法，有很多品類，種種差別，稱為一切，所以設立。
【English Translation】 English version 'Undetermined' and so on, are also instances where what is to be established in the analogy cannot be established. Fearing excessive repetition, it is unnecessary to elaborate. Because the reason already contains the faults of lacking homogeneity and having non-commonality, etc. In the analogy, it is again stated that the 'prover' cannot be established. Why such emphasis? Therefore, it is added. Īśvarasena further adds 'what is to be distinguished cannot be established'. If this reason is used because the basis is not established, it is also feared to be repetitive, so it is omitted. Because the reason already contains the faults of 'heterogeneity pervading', etc., and in this heterogeneous analogy where 'heterogeneity is not pervasive and without fault', why is it necessary to say that 'the prover is not rejected'? Why is the fault of abandoning the thesis also considered a fault of the reason? The remaining objections are the same as before, so it is added. 'Both unestablished' combines the two into one. There must be two kinds, mutually different, with inseparable natures, in order to establish the thesis. If these two are not the case, how can the meaning of the thesis be established? Therefore, it is added. If these above three 'unestablished' faults exist, the basis is not fully established, and further establishment is needed. Since the thesis is not true, how can it be called 'what is to be established'? 'Consistent and fully established', if it is considered that consistency is not originally the thesis, based on what is the fault established? 'Both unestablished' and 'unestablished', and 'both unrejected', are not originally the reason and analogy, based on what is the fault established? If it is considered that the reason and analogy have something to state, why is it not a fault? The thesis also has something to say, how is it not a fault? Therefore, it is added. Dignāga only stated it briefly, while Īśvarasena stated it in detail. It is not a contradiction between teacher and student. Moreover, ancient teachers before Dignāga, in the thesis, also stated the fault of 'thesis and reason contradicting'. Dignāga's Hetucakraḍamaru refutes it himself, saying: 'If someone says that 'thesis and reason contradicting' is called 'thesis contradiction', this is not a fault of the thesis. Because here, establishing sound as permanent, because everything is impermanent.' This is an analogy that conveniently and wrongly establishes a different dharma, because the combined analogy shows that it is not everything. Dignāga's meaning is that, like the sound theorists establishing sound as permanent, the reason 'because everything is impermanent' is an analogy of those non-Buddhists establishing the thesis, conveniently and cleverly, wrongly establishing the meaning of impermanence, not intending to establish the sound established by the thesis as permanent. Explaining the reason, it says: 'Because the combined analogy shows that it is not everything.' Dignāga correctly says: 'Establishing sound as permanent, the correct reason should say 'because it is not everything'.' Because the non-Buddhists' impermanent dharmas have many categories, various differences, called 'everything', therefore it is established.
聲常。非一切因。合喻中雲。諸非一切故者。皆體是常。猶如虛空。何得乃以一切皆是無常之因。立常宗也。復云此因非有。以聲攝在一切中故。陳那意言。此古所引一切皆是無常故因。于其所立常聲非有。以聲攝在一切皆是無常中故。便是因中兩俱不成。共不許因。有法有故。其立聲常。非一切因。陳那復云。或是所立一分義故。唯外道許非一切因。于宗中有。內道不許聲非一切。因於宗無。即是隨一不成因過。故此二徒。皆非宗過。名因過失。亦是異喻倒離之過。一切離法。先宗后因。既立常宗。非一切因。異喻離言。諸無常者。皆是一切。而今說言一切皆是無常故。故先因后宗。故成倒離惡立異法之無常義。由此宗違。非是宗過。是因喻過。陳那既破。天主順從。故亦不立。若以因過。宗中不立。既是喻過。因應不立。且如相違。及不共不定應非喻中能立不成。今釋不然。因有三相體義最寬。但陳其因。有是相違不共不定。未舉其喻。過已彰訖。今陳其宗。猶未有過。舉因方過。何得推過乃在宗中。不同比量相違。彼但舉宗。已違因訖。今此不爾。是故但應如陳那說。外道因明。四不成中。但說兩俱及隨一過。不說猶預所依不成。此不成因。亦不成宗。立敵或偏所不成故。陳那說言。其理雖爾。因依于宗。或決
或疑。宗或有無。既有差別。總合難知。故開為四。理門論中。古亦有說不定有五。除不共因。異品無故。陳那加之。由不共故。此如何等。諸量之中。古說或三。現量。比量。及聖教量。亦名正教及至教量。或名聲量。觀可信聲而比義故。或立四量。加譬喻量。如不識野牛。言似家牛。方以喻顯故。或立五量。加義準量。謂若法無我準知必無常。無常之法。必無我故。或立六量。加無體量。入此室中見主不在。知所往處。如入鹿母堂不見苾芻。知所往處。陳那菩薩廢后四種。隨其所應攝入現比。故理門云。彼聲喻等。攝在此中。由斯論主。但立二量。此上略明古今同異。別義所以。至下當知。辨八義同異者。有是能立而非能破。如真能立建立自宗。有釋。無此。能立自宗即能破敵。必對彼故。有是能破而非能立。如顯過破。有釋。無此。但破他宗自便立故。有是能立亦是能破。如真立破他所不成。有釋。無此。立謂能申自。破謂就他宗。有非能立亦非能破。謂似立破。有是能立而非似立。謂真能立。有是似立而非能立。除決定相違。所餘似立。有是能立亦是似立謂決定相違。有釋。無此。此唯似立非能立故。立者雖具言。他智不決故。有非能立亦非似立。謂妄破他所成立義。有是能立而非似破。如無過量。有是似破
【現代漢語翻譯】 或有人疑惑：宗（paksa，論題）或者是有，或者是無，既然有差別，總合起來難以理解，所以分為四種。在《理門論》中，古代也有說不定有五種情況，排除了不共因（ananya-hetu，不共的理由），因為在異品（vipaksa，反例）中沒有。陳那（Dignāga）增加了這種情況，因為是不共的緣故。這些是什麼樣的呢？在各種量（pramana，認識的工具）之中，古代的說法或者有三種：現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）、比量（anumana，推論）以及聖教量（āgama-pramāṇa，聖典的權威），也稱為正教量或至教量，或者稱為聲量（sabda-pramāṇa，語言的權威），因為觀察可信的聲音而推比其意義的緣故。或者建立四量，加上譬喻量（upamana，類比），例如不認識野牛，說它像家牛，用比喻來顯明。或者建立五量，加上義準量（arthapatti，意義推斷），意思是如果法（dharma，事物）是無我的，那麼就可以推知必定是無常的，因為無常的法必定是無我的。或者建立六量，加上無體量（anupalabdhi，不可得），進入這個房間，看見主人不在，就知道他去了哪裡，例如進入鹿母堂，沒有看見比丘（bhiksu，僧侶），就知道他去了哪裡。陳那菩薩廢除了後面的四種量，根據情況將它們攝入現量和比量之中，所以《理門論》說：『那些聲量、譬喻量等，都包含在這裡面。』因此，論主只建立二量。以上簡略地說明了古今的相同和不同之處，以及個別意義的原因，到後面自然會知道。 辨別八義的同異：有的是能立（sādhana，論證），而不是能破（dūṣaṇa，反駁），例如真正的能立建立自己的宗派。有一種解釋說：沒有這種情況，能立自己的宗派就能破斥敵人，因為必定是針對對方的。有的是能破，而不是能立，例如揭示過失來破斥。有一種解釋說：沒有這種情況，只是破斥他人的宗派，自己就自然成立了。有的是能立，也是能破，例如真正的立破他人所不能成立的。有一種解釋說：沒有這種情況，立是指能夠闡述自己，破是指就他人的宗派而言。有的是非能立，也不是能破，指的是相似的立破。有的是能立，而不是似立（hetvābhāsa，似是而非的論證），指的是真正的能立。有的是似立，而不是能立，除了決定相違（viruddha，矛盾的）之外，其餘的都是似立。有的是能立，也是似立，指的是決定相違。有一種解釋說：沒有這種情況，這只是似立，而不是能立，立者雖然說了，但對方的智慧沒有決斷。有的是非能立，也不是似立，指的是虛妄地破斥他人所成立的意義。有的是能立，而不是似破（dūṣaṇābhāsa，似是而非的反駁），例如沒有過失的量。有的是似破
【English Translation】 Someone might doubt: Is the paksa (thesis) either existent or non-existent? Since there are differences, it's difficult to understand when combined, so it's divided into four. In the Nyaya-mukha-sastra (The Gate of Reasoning), ancient scholars also said there might be five possibilities, excluding the ananya-hetu (non-common reason), because it's not found in the vipaksa (counter-example). Dignāga added this case because it is non-common. What are these like? Among the various pramanas (means of knowledge), ancient scholars said there were three: pratyaksa (direct perception), anumana (inference), and āgama-pramāṇa (scriptural authority), also called valid teaching or authoritative teaching, or sabda-pramāṇa (verbal authority), because one infers the meaning by observing trustworthy speech. Or, four pramanas are established, adding upamana (analogy), such as not recognizing a wild ox and saying it's like a domestic ox, using analogy to clarify. Or, five pramanas are established, adding arthapatti (implication), meaning if a dharma (phenomenon) is without self, then it can be inferred that it is necessarily impermanent, because an impermanent dharma is necessarily without self. Or, six pramanas are established, adding anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), entering this room and seeing the master is not there, one knows where he went, such as entering the Deer Mother Hall and not seeing a bhiksu (monk), one knows where he went. Dignāga Bodhisattva abolished the latter four pramanas, incorporating them into direct perception and inference as appropriate. Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha-sastra says: 'Those verbal authority, analogy, etc., are all included here.' Therefore, the author of the treatise only establishes two pramanas. The above briefly explains the similarities and differences between ancient and modern times, and the reasons for the individual meanings, which will be known later. Distinguishing the similarities and differences of the eight meanings: Some are sadhana (proof), but not dūṣaṇa (refutation), such as a true proof establishing one's own doctrine. One explanation says: There is no such case, establishing one's own doctrine can refute the enemy, because it is necessarily directed at the opponent. Some are dūṣaṇa, but not sadhana, such as revealing faults to refute. One explanation says: There is no such case, merely refuting others' doctrines, one's own is naturally established. Some are both sadhana and dūṣaṇa, such as a true establishment refuting what others cannot establish. One explanation says: There is no such case, establishment refers to being able to explain oneself, refutation refers to being in terms of others' doctrines. Some are neither sadhana nor dūṣaṇa, referring to similar establishment and refutation. Some are sadhana, but not hetvābhāsa (fallacious argument), referring to true sadhana. Some are hetvābhāsa, but not sadhana, except for viruddha (contradictory), the rest are hetvābhāsa. Some are both sadhana and hetvābhāsa, referring to viruddha. One explanation says: There is no such case, this is only hetvābhāsa, not sadhana, although the establisher has spoken, the opponent's wisdom has not decided. Some are neither sadhana nor hetvābhāsa, referring to falsely refuting the meaning established by others. Some are sadhana, but not dūṣaṇābhāsa (fallacious refutation), such as a means of knowledge without fault. Some are dūṣaṇābhāsa
而非能立。如十四過類等。有是能立亦是似破。如決定相違。有釋。無此。此但似破。非真立故。有非能立亦非似破。謂顯過破。有釋。無此。顯他過非。自便立故。能破定非似立亦非似破。真似異故。有是似立而非似破。謂有過量建立自宗。有釋。無此。自宗義成。即是真破。自既不立。即似破他。有是似破而非似立。謂妄顯他非。十四過類。有釋。無此。妄謂破他。即妄立故。有似能立亦是似破。如以過量破他不成。有非似立亦非似破。謂真能立。或真能破。似現似比。總入非量。由此可言現量非比及非非量。比量亦是非非量攝。有是現量非比非量。謂證自相真現量智。有比非量非真現量。即證共相。比量智及諸非量。此依見分。若依心體。見分通比非。自證必現故。是故八義體唯有七。雖就他宗。真能立體。即真能破。有顯過破。非真能立。雖似能立則似能破。妄出過破。非似能立。故能立外。別顯能破。似立之外別顯似破。真現真比。似現似比。智了因攝。二智了故。由斯八義。體唯七種。真似相明。故義成八。釋體相同異者。即解論文。辨八體相之同異也。
論。如是總攝諸論要義。
述曰。自下第二隨標別釋。于中有三。初總綰群機。次依標隨釋。后且止斯事。方隅略示顯息繁文。此即初也
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 而非能立（能夠成立論證）。例如十四過類等。有是能立也是似破（看似駁倒）。例如決定相違。有解釋說，沒有這種情況。這種情況只是似破，不是真正的成立論證。有非能立也並非似破，指的是顯過破（揭示對方過失的駁斥）。有解釋說，沒有這種情況。因為揭示他人的過失，並非爲了自己成立論證。能破（能夠駁倒）必定不是似立（看似成立論證），也不是似破，因為真和似是不同的。有的是似立而非似破，指的是用過量建立自己的宗派。有解釋說，沒有這種情況。因為自己的宗派義理成立，就是真正的駁倒對方。自己既然沒有成立論證，就是看似駁倒他人。有的是似破而非似立，指的是虛妄地揭示他人的錯誤，即十四過類。有解釋說，沒有這種情況。因為虛妄地駁倒他人，也就是虛妄地成立論證。有似能立也是似破，例如用過量駁倒他人卻不成功。有並非似立也並非似破，指的是真正的能立，或者真正的能破。似現（看似現量）似比（看似比量），總歸屬於非量（非量知識）。由此可以說現量（現量知識）不是比量，也不是非量。比量也是非非量所包含的。有的是現量，不是比量，也不是非量，指的是證悟自相的真現量智。有的是比量、非量，不是真現量，指的是證悟共相的比量智以及各種非量。這是依據見分（認識作用）來說的。如果依據心體（心的本體），見分貫通比量和非量，因為自證（自我認知）必定是現量。因此，八義的本體只有七種。雖然就他宗（其他宗派）而言，真正的能立的本體，就是真正的能破。有揭示過失的駁斥，不是真正的能立。雖然看似能立，也就看似能破。虛妄地提出過失的駁斥，不是看似能立。所以，在能立之外，另外揭示能破。在似立之外，另外揭示似破。真現（真實現量）、真比（真實比量）、似現、似比，都屬於智了因（智慧的了知作用）所包含的。因為是兩種智慧的了知作用。由於這八義，本體只有七種。真和似相互闡明，所以義理上成立八種。解釋本體相同和不同的，就是解釋論文，辨別八種本體的體相的相同和不同。
論：像這樣總括諸論的要義。
述曰：從下面第二部分開始，隨著標題分別解釋。其中有三個部分。首先是總括各種關鍵，其次是根據標題進行解釋，最後是暫且停止這些事情，方位略微指示，顯示停止繁瑣的文字。這就是第一部分。
【English Translation】 English version: And not a valid proof (able to establish an argument). For example, the fourteen fallacies, etc. There are those that are valid proofs and also pseudo-refutations (seemingly refuting). For example, contradictory conclusions. Some explain that this does not exist. This is only a pseudo-refutation, not a true establishment. There are those that are not valid proofs and also not pseudo-refutations, referring to refutations that reveal faults (exposing the opponent's errors). Some explain that this does not exist. Because revealing others' faults is not for establishing one's own argument. A refutation (able to refute) is definitely not a pseudo-establishment (seemingly establishing an argument) nor a pseudo-refutation, because the true and the seeming are different. There are those that are pseudo-establishments but not pseudo-refutations, referring to establishing one's own doctrine with excessive arguments. Some explain that this does not exist. Because the meaning of one's own doctrine is established, it is a true refutation. Since one does not establish an argument, it seems to refute others. There are those that are pseudo-refutations but not pseudo-establishments, referring to falsely revealing others' errors, i.e., the fourteen fallacies. Some explain that this does not exist. Because falsely refuting others is also falsely establishing an argument. There are pseudo-valid proofs that are also pseudo-refutations, such as failing to refute others with excessive arguments. There are those that are neither pseudo-establishments nor pseudo-refutations, referring to true valid proofs or true refutations. Pseudo-perception (seemingly perception) and pseudo-inference (seemingly inference) are generally included in non-valid knowledge (non- ಪ್ರಮಾಣ). From this, it can be said that perception (ಪ್ರಮಾಣ) is not inference nor non-valid knowledge. Inference is also included in what is not non-valid knowledge. There are those that are perception, not inference, nor non-valid knowledge, referring to the true perceptual wisdom that realizes its own unique nature. There are inferences and non-valid knowledge that are not true perceptions, referring to the inferential wisdom and various non-valid knowledge that realize the common characteristics. This is based on the cognitive aspect (見分). If based on the mind's essence (心體), the cognitive aspect encompasses inference and non-valid knowledge, because self-awareness (self-cognition) is necessarily perception. Therefore, the essence of the eight meanings has only seven types. Although in other schools (other doctrines), the essence of a true valid proof is the true refutation. There are refutations that reveal faults, which are not true valid proofs. Although seemingly valid proofs, they are also seemingly refutations. Falsely presenting refutations that reveal faults is not a pseudo-valid proof. Therefore, outside of valid proofs, refutations are separately revealed. Outside of pseudo-establishments, pseudo-refutations are separately revealed. True perception, true inference, pseudo-perception, and pseudo-inference are all included in the causal conditions of wisdom's understanding (智了因). Because they are the understanding of two types of wisdom. Due to these eight meanings, the essence has only seven types. The true and the seeming mutually clarify, so the meaning establishes eight types. Explaining the similarities and differences in essence is explaining the treatise, distinguishing the similarities and differences in the characteristics of the eight essences.
Treatise: Thus, summarizing the essential meanings of all treatises.
Commentary: From the second part below, explain separately according to the headings. There are three parts in it. First, summarize all the key points; second, explain according to the headings; and third, temporarily stop these matters, slightly indicate the directions, showing the cessation of verbose texts. This is the first part.
。如是者。指頌所說。總攝者。以略貫多。諸論者。今古所制一切因明。要義者。立破正邪紀綱道理。此義總顯瑜伽．對法．顯揚等說。因明有七。頌曰。論體。論處所。論據論莊嚴。論負論出離。論多所作法。一者論體。謂言生因。立論之體。二者論處。所謂于王家證義者等。論議處所。三者論據。謂論所依。即真能立及以真現比量等。其自性差別義為言詮。亦所依攝。四者論莊嚴。謂真能破。五者論負。謂似立似破。六者論出離。將興論時。立敵安處身心之法。七者論多所作法。由具上六能多所作。今此括要。總為一頌。雖說八門即彼四種。第一第三第四第五。但敘紀綱。不彰余理。名攝要義。又世親所造論軌論式等。法雖全備。文繁義雜。陳那詳考。更為因明理門等論。雖教理綸煥。而旨幽詞邃。令初習之者莫究其微。天主此論。纂二先之妙。鳩群藉之玄。奧義咸殫。深機並控。匪唯提綜周備。實亦易葉成功。既彰四句之能。兼明八義之益。故言總攝諸論要義。
論。此中宗等多言名為能立。
述曰。自下第二依標隨釋。于中分六。一明能立。二明似立。三明二真量。四明二似量。五明能破。六明似能破。問何故長行。牒前頌文。不依次釋。又與前頌。開合不同。答略有三釋。一云。前頌標宗。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 如上所述，『指頌所說』指的是總結概括。『總攝者』指的是以簡略的方式貫穿眾多內容。『諸論者』指的是古今所作的一切因明（Hetu-vidya，論理學）。『要義者』指的是建立、破斥正邪的綱紀道理。這些意義總括地顯現在《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）、《阿毗達磨對法論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）、《顯揚聖教論》（Asanga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching）等論著中。 因明有七種，用偈頌概括為：論體、論處所、論據、論莊嚴、論負、論出離、論多所作法。第一是論體，指的是產生原因的言論，是立論的基礎。第二是論處，指的是在王家、證義者等處進行論議的場所。第三是論據，指的是論所依據的，即真實的能立（sadhana，論證）以及真實的現量（pratyaksha，現量）和比量（anumana，比量）等。其自性差別義用言語表達，也屬於所依據的範疇。第四是論莊嚴，指的是真實的能破（dusana，反駁）。第五是論負，指的是相似的立論和相似的破斥。第六是論出離，指的是在開始論辯時，立論者和對方安頓身心的方法。第七是論多所作法，指的是具備以上六種要素，能夠完成多種任務。現在將這些要點概括為一個偈頌。雖然說了八門，實際上就是那四種（能立、能破、似能立、似能破），只是敘述了綱紀，沒有詳細闡述其他的道理，所以稱為『攝要義』。 此外，世親（Vasubandhu）所造的《論軌》（Vada-vidhi）和《論式》（Vada-yukti）等，雖然法義完備，但文字繁瑣，義理複雜。陳那（Dignaga）詳細考察后，撰寫了《因明理門論》（Hetu-cakra-damaru）等論著，雖然教理清晰明亮，但旨意深奧，詞語隱晦，使初學者難以理解其中的精微之處。天主（Isvarasena）的這部論，彙集了前兩位大師的精妙之處，聚集了眾多典籍的玄奧之處，窮盡了奧妙的義理，掌握了深刻的機要。不僅提綱挈領，周全完備，而且容易理解，容易成功。既闡明了四句（catushkoti）的作用，又闡明了八義的益處，所以說『總攝諸論要義』。 論中，宗（paksha，論題）等多種言論被稱為能立（sadhana，論證）。 述曰：下面第二部分是依據標題進行解釋。其中分為六個方面：一、闡明能立；二、闡明似立（hetvabhasa，似因）；三、闡明二真量（pramana，量），即現量和比量；四、闡明二似量（pramanabhasa，似量），即似現量和似比量；五、闡明能破；六、闡明似能破。 問：為什麼長行（散文）要引用前面的偈頌，而不按照順序解釋？又為什麼與前面的偈頌，在開合上有不同？答：略有三種解釋。第一種說法是：前面的偈頌是標明宗旨，第二
【English Translation】 As it is, 'what is said in the verses' refers to summarizing and generalizing. 'The comprehensive one' refers to penetrating many contents in a concise way. 'The treatises' refers to all Hetu-vidya (the science of reasoning) made in ancient and modern times. 'The essentials' refers to the principles and reasons for establishing and refuting what is right and wrong. These meanings are comprehensively manifested in treatises such as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), and Asanga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching. There are seven aspects of Hetu-vidya, summarized in a verse: the nature of the argument, the place of the argument, the basis of the argument, the adornment of the argument, the defeat in the argument, the departure from the argument, and the many functions of the argument. The first is the nature of the argument, which refers to the statement that generates the cause, which is the basis of the argument. The second is the place of the argument, which refers to the place where arguments are conducted, such as in the royal court or among those who testify to the truth. The third is the basis of the argument, which refers to what the argument is based on, namely the true sadhana (proof) and the true pratyaksha (perception) and anumana (inference). Its nature and differences are expressed in words, and are also included in what is relied upon. The fourth is the adornment of the argument, which refers to the true dusana (refutation). The fifth is the defeat in the argument, which refers to the pseudo-establishment and pseudo-refutation. The sixth is the departure from the argument, which refers to the method by which the proponent and the opponent settle their minds and bodies when starting a debate. The seventh is the many functions of the argument, which refers to the ability to perform many tasks by possessing the above six elements. Now, these key points are summarized into one verse. Although eight aspects are mentioned, they are actually the four (establishment, refutation, pseudo-establishment, pseudo-refutation), only describing the principles and not elaborating on other reasons, so it is called 'comprehensive essentials'. In addition, the Vada-vidhi (Method of Argumentation) and Vada-yukti (Techniques of Argumentation) etc. composed by Vasubandhu, although the Dharma is complete, the text is verbose and the meaning is complex. Dignaga, after detailed examination, wrote treatises such as the Hetu-cakra-damaru (The Wheel of Reason), although the teachings are clear and bright, the meaning is profound and the words are obscure, making it difficult for beginners to understand the subtleties. This treatise by Isvarasena gathers the essence of the previous two masters, gathers the mysteries of many scriptures, exhausts the subtle meanings, and grasps the profound secrets. It not only provides a comprehensive overview, but is also easy to understand and succeed. It clarifies the function of the four alternatives (catushkoti) and also clarifies the benefits of the eight meanings, so it is said to 'comprehensively summarize the essentials of all treatises'. In the treatise, the paksha (thesis) and other statements are called sadhana (proof). Commentary: The second part below explains according to the title. It is divided into six aspects: 1. Explaining sadhana; 2. Explaining hetvabhasa (fallacious reason); 3. Explaining the two true pramana (means of knowledge), namely perception and inference; 4. Explaining the two pseudo-pramana (pseudo-means of knowledge), namely pseudo-perception and pseudo-inference; 5. Explaining dusana; 6. Explaining pseudo-dusana. Question: Why does the prose quote the previous verses instead of explaining them in order? And why is there a difference in the opening and closing compared to the previous verses? Answer: There are three explanations. The first explanation is: the previous verses indicate the purpose, the second
悟類別。立破真似。相對次用。所以八義。次第如是。長行廣釋。逐便即牒。性相求之。何須次牒。頌以真似各別。開成八義。長行以體類有同。合成六段。亦不相違。二云。頌中以因明之旨。本欲立正破邪。故先能立。次陳能破。理門論云。為欲簡持能立能破義中真實。作斯論故。所申無過。立破義成。所述過生。何成立破。故立破后。次陳二似。雖知真似二悟不同。開示證人。俱悟他攝。刊定法體。要須二量。現量則得境親明。比量亦度義無謬。故先現量。比量后陳。刊定則雖成。謬妄還難楷準。故當對二真。次明二似。故頌八義。次第如是。長行同于理門所說。以因明法。先立后破。免脫他論。摧伏他論。為勝利故。立義之法。一者真立。正成義故。二者立具。立所依故。真因喻等。名為真立。現比二量。名為立具。故先諸師。正稱能立。陳那以後。非真能立。但為立具。能立所須。故能破前先明二量。親疏能立。皆有真似。以自相明。故真立后即明似立。二真量后。明二似量。此之六門。由是能立及眷屬故。理門說上六名真似立故。立義成已次方破他。故後方明能破似破。三云。真立似立。真量似量。各有別體。真立體即無過多言。似立體即有過多言。真量明決之智。似量闇疑之智。各有別故。若真能立。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 悟的類別，在於確立真與似，以及相對的次序和作用。這就是所謂的八義，其排列順序如上所述。長行部分對此進行廣泛解釋，並根據需要進行補充說明。如果已經探求了體性和現象，又何必再次贅述次序呢？ 頌文將真與似區分開來，從而形成了八義。長行部分則因為體類有相同之處，將它們合併爲六段。但這兩種方式並不矛盾。有人說，頌文以因明（Hetu-vidya，古印度邏輯學）的宗旨，本意在於確立正確的觀點，駁斥錯誤的觀點，所以先闡述『能立』（Sadhana，論證），再陳述『能破』（Dushana，反駁）。 《理門論》（Nyaya-pravesa）中說，爲了辨別能立和能破的真實含義，才撰寫此論。因此，所闡述的內容沒有超出確立和駁斥的範疇。如果只闡述過失的產生，又如何確立和駁斥呢？所以，在確立和駁斥之後，再陳述兩種『似』（相似）。 即使知道真與似這兩種領悟不同，但爲了開示證人，都將它們歸入『悟他』（Parartha-anumana，為他人進行的推理）。要判定法的體性，必須依靠兩種量（Pramana，認識的工具）：現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知）能夠清晰地認識對象，比量（Anumana，推理）也能準確地推斷意義，沒有謬誤。因此，先陳述現量，再陳述比量。 即使判定已經完成，但謬誤仍然難以作為標準。所以，應當對照兩種『真』（真實），再闡明兩種『似』（相似）。因此，頌文中的八義，次序就是這樣安排的。長行部分與《理門論》所說的相同，以因明的方法，先確立后駁斥，是爲了避免其他論點的干擾，並摧毀其他論點，從而取得勝利。確立義的方法有：一是『真立』（真實的論證），因為能夠正確地成立義理；二是『立具』（論證的工具），因為是論證所依賴的基礎。真因（真實的原因）、真喻（真實的例子）等，被稱為『真立』。現量和比量，被稱為『立具』。所以，以前的論師，正確地稱之為『能立』。陳那（Dignaga）以後，不再稱之為『真能立』，而只是『立具』，是能立所需要的工具。因此，在能破之前，先闡明兩種量。親疏不同的能立，都有真似之分。爲了用自相（Svalakshana，事物獨特的性質）來闡明，所以在真立之後，立即闡明『似立』（相似的論證）。在兩種真量之後，闡明兩種『似量』（相似的量）。這六個方面，都是能立及其眷屬。 《理門論》說，以上六個方面，被稱為『真似立』。確立義理之後，才能夠駁斥他人。所以，之後才闡明『能破』和『似破』。有人說，真立和似立，真量和似量，各有不同的體性。真立體沒有過多的言辭，似立體則有過多的言辭。真量是明確決斷的智慧，似量是黑暗疑惑的智慧，各有不同。
【English Translation】 English version The categories of understanding lie in establishing the true and the false, as well as relative order and function. These are the so-called Eight Aspects (Ashtanga), arranged in the order described above. The prose section elaborates on this extensively, supplementing as needed. If the essence and phenomena have already been explored, why reiterate the order? The verses distinguish between the true and the false, thus forming the Eight Aspects. The prose section, due to similarities in essence and category, combines them into six sections. These two approaches are not contradictory. Some say that the verses, with the aim of Hetu-vidya (ancient Indian logic), intend to establish correct views and refute incorrect ones, so they first elaborate on 'Sadhana' (proof) and then present 'Dushana' (refutation). The Nyaya-pravesa (Introduction to Logic) states that this treatise is written to discern the true meaning of Sadhana and Dushana. Therefore, what is elaborated does not exceed the scope of establishing and refuting. If only the arising of faults is elaborated, how can one establish and refute? Therefore, after establishing and refuting, the two 'similitudes' are presented. Even if it is known that the two understandings of true and false are different, they are both categorized under 'Parartha-anumana' (inference for others) to enlighten the witnesses. To determine the nature of the Dharma, one must rely on two Pramanas (instruments of cognition): Pratyaksha (direct perception) can clearly recognize the object, and Anumana (inference) can accurately infer the meaning without error. Therefore, Pratyaksha is presented first, followed by Anumana. Even if the determination is complete, errors are still difficult to use as a standard. Therefore, one should compare the two 'true' (real) aspects and then clarify the two 'similitudes' (similar) aspects. Therefore, the order of the Eight Aspects in the verses is arranged in this way. The prose section is the same as what is said in the Nyaya-pravesa, using the method of Hetu-vidya, establishing first and then refuting, in order to avoid interference from other arguments and to destroy other arguments, thereby achieving victory. The methods of establishing meaning are: first, 'true establishment' (valid proof), because it can correctly establish the meaning; second, 'tools of establishment' (instruments of proof), because they are the foundation upon which the proof relies. True Hetu (true reason), true example, etc., are called 'true establishment'. Pratyaksha and Anumana are called 'tools of establishment'. Therefore, previous teachers correctly called it 'Sadhana'. After Dignaga, it is no longer called 'true Sadhana', but only 'tools of establishment', which are the tools needed for Sadhana. Therefore, before Dushana, the two Pramanas are first clarified. Sadhana, whether close or distant, has both true and false aspects. In order to clarify with Svalakshana (the unique nature of things), 'similar establishment' (fallacious proof) is immediately clarified after true establishment. After the two true Pramanas, the two 'similar Pramanas' (fallacious Pramanas) are clarified. These six aspects are all Sadhana and its retinue. The Nyaya-pravesa says that the above six aspects are called 'true and false establishment'. Only after establishing the meaning can one refute others. Therefore, 'Dushana' and 'fallacious refutation' are clarified later. Some say that true establishment and fallacious establishment, true Pramana and fallacious Pramana, each have different natures. True establishment does not have excessive words, while fallacious establishment has excessive words. True Pramana is the wisdom of clear decision, while fallacious Pramana is the wisdom of darkness and doubt, each being different.
能立具。皆能立故。先首明之。能破似破雖體即言。境無有異。能破之境。體即似立。似破之境。即真能立。須識立境。方可申破。立已方破。故后明之。開合別明。體類同故。長行與頌。由此不同。初解能立中。大文有三。初舉體釋義。次示相廣陳。后總結成前。簡擇同異。初中復二。初舉體。后釋義。此舉體也。總舉多法。方成能立。梵能立義。多言中說。故理門論陳那。指彼天親論云。故此多言。于論式等。說名能立。言此中者。理門二解。一起論端義。二簡持義。凡發論端。泛詞標舉。故稱此中起論端義。簡持有二義。一簡去邪宗增減。持取正宗中道。邪增者。增似立為真立。以似破為真破。邪減者。以真立為似立。以真破為似破。中道者。二真為真。二似為似。二云。此論所明總有八義。且明能立。未論餘七。簡去餘七。持明此一。故稱此中是簡持義。清辯菩薩。般若燈論。釋有四義。謂發端標舉簡持指斥。宗是何義。所尊所崇所主所立之義。等者。等取因之與喻。世親以前。宗為能立。陳那但以因之三相。同異喻。而為能立。以能立者。必多言故。今言宗等名能立者。略有二釋。一云。宗是所立因等能立。若不舉宗。以顯能立。不知因喻誰之能立。恐謂同古。自性差別二之能立。今標其宗。顯是所立。能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『能立具（sādhanavākya，能成立論證的陳述）。皆能立故。』因為它們都能成立論證。首先闡明它。『能破似破雖體即言。境無有異。』能破之境（pramāṇa-bādhita，被有效認知推翻的），雖然在本質上與言語相同，但在對像上沒有區別。『能破之境。體即似立。似破之境。即真能立。』能破的對象，本質上類似於能立。類似於破斥的對象，實際上是真正的能立。『須識立境。方可申破。立已方破。故后明之。』必須認識能立的境，才能進行破斥。先確立，然後才能破斥，所以後面才闡明它。『開合別明。體類同故。』分開和合並地分別闡明，因為它們的本質和類別相同。『長行與頌。由此不同。』散文和頌文，因此而不同。 最初解釋能立中，大體上有三個方面。首先是舉出本體並解釋其含義，其次是展示其相狀並廣泛陳述，最後是總結前述內容，簡要選擇相同和不同的地方。最初的部分又分為兩個方面：首先是舉出本體，然後是解釋其含義。這裡是舉出本體。總括多種方法，才能成就一個能立。梵語中能立的含義，在多種言語中都有說明。所以理門論（Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra）中陳那（Dignāga）指出天親（Vasubandhu）的論著說：『所以這些多種言語，在論式等等中，被稱為能立。』 說到『此中』，理門有兩種解釋。一是發起論端的意思，二是簡別持取的意思。凡是發起論端，泛泛地用詞語標舉，所以稱作『此中』是發起論端的意思。簡別持取有兩種含義。一是簡別去除邪宗的增減，持取正宗的中道。邪宗增加，是指把類似於能立的當作真正的能立，把類似於破斥的當作真正的破斥。邪宗減少，是指把真正的能立當作類似於能立的，把真正的破斥當作類似於破斥的。中道，是指兩個真正的就是真正的，兩個類似於的就是類似於的。二是說，這部論所要闡明的總共有八個意義，現在先闡明能立，暫且不討論其餘七個。簡別去除其餘七個，持守闡明這一個，所以稱作『此中』是簡別持取的意思。 清辯（Bhāvaviveka）菩薩在般若燈論（Prajñāpradīpa）中，解釋有四個意義，即發起論端、標舉、簡別持取、指斥。『宗（pakṣa，論題）』是什麼意思？是所尊重、所崇尚、所主張、所要成立的意思。『等』字，是等取因（hetu，理由）和喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）。在世親以前，宗就是能立。陳那只是用因的三相（trairūpya-hetu），以及同喻（sapakṣa）和異喻（vipakṣa），來作為能立。因為能立，必定是多種言語。現在說宗等等叫做能立，大概有兩種解釋。一種說法是，宗是所要成立的，因等等是能成立的。如果不舉出宗，來顯示能立，就不知道因喻是誰的能立。恐怕會認為是同於古代的，自性（svabhāva）差別（viśeṣa）二者的能立。現在標出宗，顯示是所要成立的，能
【English Translation】 English version: 'sādhanavākya (能立具, statement that establishes a thesis). Because they all establish.' Because they can all establish the argument. It is explained first. 'Though the nature of what can be refuted and what appears to be refuted is the same in terms of speech, there is no difference in terms of the object.' The object of what can be refuted (pramāṇa-bādhita, that which is overturned by valid cognition), though essentially the same as speech, has no difference in object. 'The object of what can be refuted is essentially like the establishment. The object of what appears to be refuted is the real establishment.' The object of what can be refuted is essentially similar to the establishment. The object that appears to be refuted is actually the real establishment. 'One must recognize the realm of establishment before one can refute. After establishing, then one can refute, so it is explained later.' One must recognize the realm of establishment in order to refute. First establish, then refute, so it is explained later. 'Separate and combined explanations are given separately, because their nature and category are the same.' Separate and combined explanations are given separately because their nature and category are the same. 'Prose and verse differ because of this.' Prose and verse differ because of this. In the initial explanation of sādhanavākya (能立), there are three main aspects. First, to present the entity and explain its meaning; second, to show its characteristics and extensively elaborate; and third, to summarize the foregoing and briefly select the similarities and differences. The initial part is further divided into two aspects: first, to present the entity, and then to explain its meaning. This is the presentation of the entity. A collection of many methods is needed to accomplish an establishment. The meaning of sādhanavākya (能立) in Sanskrit is explained in many languages. Therefore, Dignāga (陳那) in the Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra (理門論) points out that Vasubandhu's (天親) treatise says: 'Therefore, these many words, in the logical form, etc., are called sādhanavākya (能立).' Regarding 'herein,' the Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra (理門) has two explanations. One is the meaning of initiating the discussion, and the other is the meaning of distinguishing and upholding. Whenever initiating a discussion, general terms are used to indicate, so it is called 'herein' as the meaning of initiating the discussion. Distinguishing and upholding has two meanings. One is to distinguish and remove the increase and decrease of heretical doctrines, and to uphold the middle way of the orthodox doctrine. Heretical increase refers to treating what is similar to establishment as real establishment, and treating what is similar to refutation as real refutation. Heretical decrease refers to treating real establishment as similar to establishment, and treating real refutation as similar to refutation. The middle way is that two real ones are real, and two similar ones are similar. The second is that this treatise aims to explain a total of eight meanings, and now it first explains sādhanavākya (能立), temporarily not discussing the other seven. Distinguishing and removing the other seven, and upholding and clarifying this one, so it is called 'herein' as the meaning of distinguishing and upholding. Bhāvaviveka (清辯) Bodhisattva, in the Prajñāpradīpa (般若燈論), explains that there are four meanings, namely, initiating the discussion, indicating, distinguishing and upholding, and pointing out. What is the meaning of 'pakṣa (宗, thesis)'? It is the meaning of what is respected, revered, advocated, and to be established. The word 'etc.' includes hetu (因, reason) and dṛṣṭānta (喻, example). Before Vasubandhu (世親), pakṣa (宗) was the sādhanavākya (能立). Dignāga (陳那) only used the three aspects of hetu (因) (trairūpya-hetu), as well as sapakṣa (同喻) and vipakṣa (異喻), as sādhanavākya (能立). Because sādhanavākya (能立) must be many words. Now, saying that pakṣa (宗), etc., are called sādhanavākya (能立), there are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that pakṣa (宗) is what is to be established, and hetu (因), etc., are what establish. If pakṣa (宗) is not mentioned to show sādhanavākya (能立), then it is not known whose sādhanavākya (能立) the hetu (因) and dṛṣṭānta (喻) are. It is feared that it will be considered the same as the ancient, svabhāva (自性) and viśeṣa (差別), the two sādhanavākya (能立). Now, indicating the pakṣa (宗) shows what is to be established, and can
立因喻。是此所立宗之能立。雖舉其宗。意取所等一因二喻為能立體。若不爾者。即有所立。濫于古釋。能立亦濫彼能立過。為簡彼失故舉宗等。二云。陳那等意。先古皆以宗為能立。自性差別二為所立。陳那遂以二為宗依。非所乖諍。說非所立。所立即宗。有許不許。所諍義故。理門論云。以所成立性。說是名為宗。此論亦言。隨自樂為所成立性。是名為宗。因及二喻。成此宗故。而為能立。今論若言因喻多言名為能立。不但義旨見乖古師。文亦相違。遂成乖競。陳那。天主。二意皆同。既稟先賢而為后論。文不乖古。舉宗為能等。義別先師。取所等因喻為能立性。故能立中舉其宗等。問宗若所立。頌中八義。攝法不盡。答隨八所成。即是宗故。又宗所立。隨能立中。便次明之。彼所成故。攝法亦盡。又觀察義中。諸所有事。名因明故。不舉其宗於何觀察。故今舉宗。顯所有事。能立體。問能立因喻有言義智。論何不說。多智多義。名為能立。而說多言名為能立。答立論之法。本生他解。他解照達。所立宗義。本由立者。能立之言。其言生因。正是能立。智義順此亦得因名。由言生因。生敵證智。敵證智解為正了因。理門論難云。若爾。既取智爲了因。是言便失能成立性。此難言因應非能立。彼自釋云。此亦不然。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 立因喻（建立論證的理由、例子）是此所立宗（要證明的命題）的能立（能成立的）。雖然提出了宗，但意思是選取所等（與宗相關的）一個因（理由）二喻（例子）作為能立的整體。如果不是這樣，那麼所立（要證明的）就會和古老的解釋相混淆，能立也會混淆于那個能立的過失。爲了避免那些錯誤，所以提出了宗等。 二云，陳那（Dignāga）等人的意思是，先前的古人都以宗為能立，自性差別二者為所立。陳那於是以二者為宗依，並非所要爭論的。說非所立，所立即是宗，有允許和不允許兩種情況，因為這是所爭論的意義。理門論（Nyāyamukha）說，以所成立的性質，說這就是宗。此論也說，隨自己的意願作為所成立的性質，這就是宗。因以及二喻，成就這個宗，所以是能立。 現在的論如果說因喻多言名為能立，不僅義旨上與古師相違背，文字上也相互矛盾，於是就形成了爭論。陳那、天主（Īśvarasena）二人的意思都相同。既然遵循先賢而作為後來的論述，文字上不違背古義，舉宗為能等，意義上區別于先前的老師，選取所等因喻作為能立的性質，所以在能立中提出了宗等。 問：宗如果是所立，頌中的八義（八種性質）不能完全包含所有法（事物）。答：隨著八種性質所成就的，就是宗。而且宗是所立，隨著能立的內容，就接著說明它，因為它是由能立所成就的，所以能完全包含所有法。而且在觀察意義中，所有的事情，都叫做因明（Hetuvidyā），如果不提出宗，要觀察什麼呢？所以現在提出宗，顯示所有的事情，都是能立的整體。 問：能立的因喻有言義智（語言、意義、智慧），論為什麼不說多智多義名為能立，而說多言名為能立？答：立論的方法，本來是爲了使他人產生理解。他人的理解照亮並通達所立的宗義，本來是由立論者能立的言語。這些言語產生的原因，正是能立。智慧和意義順應這一點，也可以得到因的名稱。由言語產生的原因，產生敵方的論證智慧，敵方的論證智慧的理解，才是正確的了因。理門論反駁說，如果這樣，既然選取了智慧作爲了因，那麼言語就失去了能成立的性質。這個反駁說，言語的原因不應該是能立。他自己解釋說，這也不對。
【English Translation】 English version The establishment of Hetu (reason) and Dṛṣṭānta (example) is what establishes the proposition (Sādhyadharma) that is to be established. Although the proposition is stated, the intention is to take one Hetu and two Dṛṣṭāntas related to what is to be established as the entity that establishes. If it were not so, then what is to be established would be confused with the ancient interpretations, and the establishment would also be confused with the faults of that establishment. To avoid those errors, the proposition and so on are stated. Secondly, Dignāga and others meant that the ancient masters all regarded the proposition as the establishment, and Svarūpa (self-nature) and Viśeṣa (difference) as what is to be established. Dignāga then regarded the two as the basis of the proposition, which is not what is to be disputed. Saying 'not what is to be established,' what is to be established is the proposition, which is either accepted or not accepted, because this is the meaning to be disputed. The Nyāyamukha (Introduction to Logic) says, 'By the nature of what is to be established, it is said to be the proposition.' This treatise also says, 'According to one's own pleasure, the nature of what is to be established is called the proposition.' The Hetu and the two Dṛṣṭāntas accomplish this proposition, so they are the establishment. If the present treatise says that 'Hetu and Dṛṣṭānta, many words, are called the establishment,' not only does the meaning contradict the ancient masters, but the words also contradict each other, thus forming a dispute. Dignāga and Īśvarasena both have the same meaning. Since they follow the ancient sages and make later arguments, the words do not contradict the ancient meanings. Stating the proposition as the establishment and so on distinguishes the meaning from the previous teachers, taking the Hetu and Dṛṣṭāntas related to what is to be established as the nature of the establishment, so the proposition and so on are stated in the establishment. Question: If the proposition is what is to be established, the eight characteristics (Aṣṭalakṣaṇa) in the verse do not completely encompass all Dharmas (phenomena). Answer: Whatever is accomplished by the eight characteristics is the proposition. Moreover, the proposition is what is to be established, and it is then explained following the content of the establishment, because it is accomplished by the establishment, so it completely encompasses all Dharmas. Moreover, in the observation of meaning, all things are called Hetuvidyā (the science of reasoning), so if the proposition is not stated, what is to be observed? Therefore, the proposition is now stated to show that all things are the entity that establishes. Question: The Hetu and Dṛṣṭānta of the establishment have words, meanings, and wisdom (Vacana, Artha, Jñāna), so why does the treatise not say that 'much wisdom and much meaning are called the establishment,' but says that 'many words are called the establishment'? Answer: The method of establishing an argument is originally to generate understanding in others. The understanding of others illuminates and penetrates the meaning of the proposition to be established, which originally comes from the words of the establisher. The cause of these words is precisely the establishment. Wisdom and meaning conform to this, and can also obtain the name of Hetu. The cause generated by words generates the wisdom of the opponent's argument, and the understanding of the opponent's argument is the correct reason. The Nyāyamukha refutes, 'If so, since wisdom is taken as the reason, then words lose the nature of being able to establish.' This refutation says that the cause of words should not be the establishment. He himself explains, 'This is also not correct.'
令彼憶念本極成故。此釋意云。由言因故。令敵證智。了本極成因。解所立宗義。故立論者言。正為能立。敵證智了亦為能立性。若不爾者。相違決定。言支具足。應名能立。既由他智。不生決解。名為似立。故知。通取言生智了為能立體。今此據本。故但標言名為能立。瑜伽亦云。六種言論。是論體性。不說智生義生義了名為能立。言了則言生。故體亦可爾。問何故能立。要在多言。一二之言寧非能立。答理門論云。于論式等。說此多言。名能立故。世親所造論軌論式。彼說多言名為能立。今不違古。故說多言。彼論復言。又比量中。唯見此理。若所比處。此相定遍。于余同類。念此定有。于彼無處。念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。因之三相。既宗法性。同有異無。顯義圓具。必籍多言。故說多言名為能立。又一二之言。宗由未立。多言義具。所立方成。若但說因。無同喻比。義不明顯。何得見邊。若但同無異。雖比附宗。能立之因。或返成法。無異止濫。何能建宗。設有兩喻闕遍宗因。宗法既自不成。宗義何由得立。果宗不決。因比徒施。空致紛紜。競何由消。故詳今古。能立具足。要藉多言。
論。由宗因喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故。
述曰。釋能立義。宗義舊定。因喻先成。何故今說為能立也
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了使對方憶念起本極成（bên jí chéng，自明的真理）的緣故。這裡的解釋是說，因為言辭的緣故，使對方的智慧能夠證實，瞭解本極成因，理解所要建立的宗義。所以立論者說，正確的言論才是能立（néng lì，能夠成立論證）的。對方的智慧能夠證實，也具有能立的性質。如果不是這樣，就會產生自相矛盾的決定。如果論證的各個部分都完備，就應該被稱為能立。既然通過他人的智慧，不能產生決定的理解，就被稱為似立（sì lì，似乎成立的論證）。所以要知道，普遍地採取言辭產生智慧和理解，才是能立的本體。現在這裡是根據根本，所以只標明言辭被稱為能立。《瑜伽師地論》也說，六種言論是論證的體性，沒有說智慧的產生、意義的產生和理解是能立。理解了言辭，也就理解了言辭的產生，所以本體也可以這樣認為。問：為什麼能立一定要用很多言辭？一兩句話難道就不能成為能立嗎？答：《理門論》說，在論式等等中，說這些多言被稱為能立。世親（Vasubandhu）所造的《論軌論式》，其中說多言被稱為能立。現在不違背古人的說法，所以說多言。那部論又說，而且在比量（bǐ liàng，推理）中，只看到這個道理。如果所比之處，這個相狀是確定的、普遍的，在其餘同類事物中，憶念這個相狀是確定的存在；在沒有這個相狀的地方，憶念這個相狀是普遍不存在的。所以由此產生決定的理解。因為因的三相，既有宗法性（zōng fǎ xìng，與宗相關的性質），又有同有異無（tóng yǒu yì wú，在同類中有，在異類中無），顯明意義圓滿具備，必定要憑藉多言。所以說多言被稱為能立。而且一兩句話，宗義還沒有確立。多言義理完備，所要建立的宗義才能成立。如果只說原因，沒有同喻（tóng yù，正面的例子）來比較，意義就不明顯，怎麼能看到邊際？如果只有同喻而沒有異喻（yì yù，反面的例子），即使比附於宗義，能夠成立的原因，或許反而會成為法。沒有異喻來阻止氾濫，怎麼能建立宗義？如果設定了兩個比喻，缺少普遍性，宗義和原因，宗法既然自身不能成立，宗義又怎麼能夠成立？如果宗義的結果不能確定，原因和比喻都是徒勞的，白白地導致紛亂，爭論又怎麼能夠消除？所以詳細考察古今，能立要完備，一定要憑藉多言。 論：由於宗、因、喻（yù，比喻）等多種言辭開示，使那些有疑問的人，理解了未理解的意義。 述曰：解釋能立的意義。宗義舊時已經確定，因和比喻先前已經成立，為什麼現在又說它們是能立呢？
【English Translation】 English version: In order to make the opponent recall the inherently established (bên jí chéng, self-evident truth). The explanation here is that, because of the words, the opponent's wisdom can verify and understand the inherently established cause, and understand the meaning of the proposition to be established. Therefore, the proponent says that correct speech is the means of establishment (néng lì, capable of establishing an argument). The opponent's wisdom can verify, and it also has the nature of establishment. If this is not the case, a contradictory decision will arise. If all parts of the argument are complete, it should be called establishment. Since a decisive understanding cannot arise through the wisdom of others, it is called pseudo-establishment (sì lì, seemingly established argument). Therefore, it should be known that universally adopting words to generate wisdom and understanding is the essence of establishment. Now, this is based on the root, so only the words are labeled as the means of establishment. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra also says that the six kinds of speech are the nature of the argument, and it does not say that the generation of wisdom, the generation of meaning, and understanding are the means of establishment. Understanding the words also means understanding the generation of the words, so the essence can also be considered in this way. Question: Why must the means of establishment use many words? Can't one or two sentences be the means of establishment? Answer: The Hetuvidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra says that in the argument form, etc., these many words are called the means of establishment. The Vada-vidhi composed by Vasubandhu says that many words are called the means of establishment. Now, not contradicting the ancient sayings, so it is said that many words. That treatise also says, moreover, in inference (bǐ liàng, reasoning), only this principle is seen. If the place being compared, this characteristic is definite and universal, in the remaining similar things, remember that this characteristic is definitely present; in the place where this characteristic is not present, remember that this characteristic is universally absent. Therefore, a definite understanding arises from this. Because the three aspects of the cause, both have the property of the proposition (zōng fǎ xìng, properties related to the proposition), and have presence in similar instances and absence in dissimilar instances (tóng yǒu yì wú, presence in similar instances and absence in dissimilar instances), clearly showing that the meaning is fully equipped, it must rely on many words. Therefore, it is said that many words are called the means of establishment. Moreover, in one or two sentences, the proposition has not yet been established. When many words are complete in meaning, the proposition to be established can be established. If only the cause is stated, without a similar example (tóng yù, positive example) for comparison, the meaning is not clear, how can the boundary be seen? If there is only a similar example and no dissimilar example (yì yù, negative example), even if it is attached to the proposition, the cause that can be established may instead become the law. Without a dissimilar example to prevent abuse, how can the proposition be established? If two metaphors are set up, lacking universality, the proposition and the cause, since the property of the proposition itself cannot be established, how can the meaning of the proposition be established? If the result of the proposition cannot be determined, the cause and the metaphor are in vain, leading to confusion in vain, how can the dispute be eliminated? Therefore, after detailed examination of ancient and modern times, the means of establishment must be complete and must rely on many words. Treatise: Because of the many words of the proposition, cause, and metaphor (yù, metaphor), those who have questions understand the meaning that they have not understood. Commentary: Explaining the meaning of the means of establishment. The meaning of the proposition has been determined in the past, and the cause and metaphor have been established earlier, so why are they now said to be the means of establishment?
。理門亦云。由宗因喻多言。辨說他未了義。諸有問者。謂敵證等。未了義者。立論者宗。其敵論者。一由無知。二為疑惑。三各宗學。未了立者立何義旨。而有所問。故以宗等如是多言。成立宗義。除彼無知。猶預僻執。令了立者。所立義宗。其論義法。瑜伽等說。有六處所。一于王家。二于執理家。三于大眾中。四于賢哲者前。五于善解法義沙門婆羅門前。六於樂法義者前。於此六中。必須證者。善自他宗。心無偏儻。出言有則。能定是非。證者有問立何論宗。今以宗等。如是多言。申其宗旨。令證義者。了所立義。故者。所以。第五轉聲。由者因由。第三轉攝。因由敵證。問所立宗。說宗因喻。開示于彼。所以多言名為能立。開示有三。一敵者未閑。今能立等。創為之開。證者先解。今能立等。重為之示。二雙為言開示其正理。三為廢忘宗而問為開。為欲憶宗而問為示。諸有問者未了義故。略有二釋。一諸問者。通證及敵。敵者發問。理不須疑。證者久識自他宗義。寧容發問未了義耶。一年邁久忘。二賓主紛紜。三理有百途問依何轍。四初聞未審須更審知。五為破疑心。解師明意。故審問宗之未了義。二應分別。為其證者。論但應言多言。開示問者義故。證者久閑而無未了。為其敵論者。論應說言多言。開示諸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：理門（Hetu-vidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra，因明學）也說，由於宗（paksa，論題）、因（hetu，理由）、喻（drstanta，例證）需要多加言語，才能辨明對方尚未理解的意義。這裡所說的『諸有問者』，指的是敵論者（prati-vadin，論敵）和證義者（sabhapati，論證人）等。『未了義』指的是立論者（vadin，論者）所提出的論宗（paksa，論題）。而敵論者之所以提問，一是因為無知，二是因為疑惑，三是因為各自所宗的學說不同，所以不明白立論者究竟要闡述什麼義理，因此才會有所提問。所以需要用宗、因、喻這些方式，用很多言語來成立宗義，消除對方的無知、猶豫和偏執，使他們明白立論者所要建立的義理。關於論義的方法，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）等經典中說了六個場所：一是在王家，二是在執理家（法官），三是在大眾中，四是在賢哲者面前，五是在善解法義的沙門（sramana，出家修行者）婆羅門（brahmana，祭司）面前，六是在樂於聽聞法義的人面前。在這六種場合中，必須要有證義者，他們要精通自己和他人的宗義，內心沒有偏頗，說話有條理，能夠判定是非。證義者會問立論者所立的論宗是什麼，現在用宗、因、喻這些方式，詳細闡述宗旨，讓證義者明白所要建立的義理。『故』，是『所以』的意思，是第五格的轉聲。『由』，是『因由』的意思，是第三格的攝受。因為敵論者和證義者會詢問所立的宗義，所以要用宗、因、喻來開示他們，因此多加言語被稱為『能立』（sadhana，論證）。開示有三種情況：一是敵論者不熟悉，現在用能立等方式，初次為之開示；二是證義者先前已經理解，現在用能立等方式，再次為之指示；三是雙方都爲了言語而開示其正理；四是爲了廢忘宗義而提問，是爲了憶念宗義而指示。諸有問者因為不明白義理，所以略有二種解釋：一是諸位提問者，包括證義者和敵論者。敵論者發問，理應沒有懷疑。證義者長久以來熟悉自己和他人的宗義，怎麼會發問不明白的義理呢？一是因為年邁而遺忘，二是因為賓主之間紛紜複雜，三是因為道理有百種途徑，不知道依據哪一種，四是因為初次聽聞還不審慎，需要進一步瞭解，五是爲了消除疑心，瞭解老師的用意，所以審問宗義中不明白的地方。二是應該分別對待，如果是證義者，論述時只需要說多言，開示提問者的義理就可以了，因為證義者長久以來熟悉，沒有不明白的地方。如果是敵論者，論述時應該說多言，開示諸
【English Translation】 English version: The Hetu-vidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra (Logic Gate) also states that due to the need for extensive language regarding the paksa (thesis), hetu (reason), and drstanta (example), it is necessary to clarify meanings that the other party has not yet understood. The 'those who ask' refer to the prati-vadin (opponent) and sabhapati (verifier), etc. 'Meanings not yet understood' refer to the paksa (thesis) proposed by the vadin (proponent). The reasons why the opponent asks questions are: first, due to ignorance; second, due to doubt; and third, due to differing doctrines they adhere to. Therefore, they do not understand what the proponent intends to elucidate, hence the questions. Thus, it is necessary to use paksa, hetu, and drstanta, employing extensive language to establish the thesis, eliminating the opponent's ignorance, hesitation, and bias, enabling them to understand the doctrine the proponent seeks to establish. Regarding the methods of argumentation, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and other scriptures mention six venues: first, in the royal court; second, in the house of the judge; third, in the assembly of the masses; fourth, in the presence of the wise; fifth, in the presence of sramanas (ascetics) and brahmanas (priests) who are well-versed in the Dharma; and sixth, in the presence of those who delight in hearing the Dharma. In these six situations, it is essential to have verifiers who are proficient in their own and others' doctrines, with impartiality in their hearts, speaking with order, and capable of determining right and wrong. The verifier will ask what thesis the proponent is establishing. Now, using paksa, hetu, and drstanta, the purpose is elaborated in detail, allowing the verifier to understand the doctrine being established. 'Therefore' (故) means 'the reason why,' and it is the transformed sound of the fifth case. 'Due to' (由) means 'because of,' and it is the reception of the third case. Because the opponent and verifier inquire about the established thesis, it is necessary to use paksa, hetu, and drstanta to enlighten them. Therefore, adding more words is called 'sadhana' (proof). There are three situations for enlightenment: first, the opponent is unfamiliar, and now, using sadhana and other methods, it is the first time to enlighten them; second, the verifier has previously understood, and now, using sadhana and other methods, it is to instruct them again; third, both sides enlighten each other with correct reasoning through words; fourth, asking is for forgetting the thesis, and instructing is for remembering the thesis. Those who ask questions do so because they do not understand the meaning, so there are two brief explanations: first, all questioners include both the verifier and the opponent. The opponent asks questions, and there should be no doubt. The verifier has long been familiar with their own and others' doctrines, so how could they ask about meanings they do not understand? It is because of old age and forgetting, second, because of the complexity between host and guest, third, because there are hundreds of paths of reasoning, and it is not known which one to follow, fourth, because the first hearing is not yet cautious and needs further understanding, and fifth, to eliminate doubts and understand the teacher's intention, so they carefully inquire about the unclear points in the thesis. Second, there should be separate treatment. If it is the verifier, the discussion should only say more words to enlighten the questioner's meaning, because the verifier has long been familiar and there is nothing they do not understand. If it is the opponent, the discussion should say more words to enlighten all
有問者未了義故。敵者于宗有未了故。今合為文。非彼證者亦名未了。由開示二故說多言名為能立。問能立有多。何故一言說為能立。答理門解云。為顯總成一能立性。由此應知。隨有所闕名能立過。闕支便非能立性故。
論。此中宗者。
述曰。自下第二示相廣陳。于中有三。一示宗相。二示因相。三示喻相。瑜伽論云。問若一切法自相成就。各自安立已法性中。復何因緣。建立二種所成立義耶。答為欲令他生信解故。非為產生諸法性相。問為欲成就所成立義。何故先立宗耶。答為先顯示自所愛樂宗義故。問何故次辯因耶。答為欲開顯依現見事。決定現理。令他攝受所立宗義故。問何故次引喻耶。答為欲顯示能成道理之所依止現見事故。問何故復說同類異類。現量比量正教量等耶。答為欲開示因喻二種相違不相違智故。相違謂異類。不相違謂同類。則于因喻皆有現比量等相違不相違。隨其所應真似所攝。彼又重言。又相違者。由二因緣。一不決定故。二同所成故。初是六不定。因於同異二喻。或成或違故。后是四不成及四相違。因於宗過名為不成。於二喻中。一向相返名曰相違。本立共因。擬成宗果。因既帶似。理須更成。若更成之。與宗莫別。名同所成。似宗二喻亦在此攝。不相違者亦二因緣。一決
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有人提問，因為對意義沒有完全理解的緣故。辯論的對方對於論題也有未理解之處。現在將兩者合在一起進行闡述。即使不是對方所提出的證據，也可以稱為未完全理解。因為要開示兩種意義，所以多加言語，稱之為『能立』（Sadhana，論證）。有人問：『能立』有很多種，為什麼只說一種言語為『能立』呢？答：理門解釋說，爲了顯示總括而成的『能立』的性質。由此應該知道，凡是有所欠缺的，就叫做『能立』的過失。缺少了任何一個部分，就不能成立『能立』的性質。
論：這裡所說的『宗』（Paksha，論題）是指……
述曰：下面第二部分是詳細地闡述『相』（Lakshana，特徵）。其中有三個方面：一是闡述『宗』的『相』，二是闡述『因』（Hetu，理由）的『相』，三是闡述『喻』（Drishtanta，例子）的『相』。《瑜伽師地論》中說：『問：如果一切法都各自成就，各自安立於自己的法性之中，那麼又是什麼因緣要建立兩種所要成立的意義呢？』答：『爲了讓他人產生信解的緣故，而不是爲了產生諸法的性質和現象。』問：『爲了成就所要成立的意義，為什麼要先立『宗』呢？』答：『爲了先顯示自己所喜愛和樂於接受的『宗』的意義。』問：『為什麼要接著辨析『因』呢？』答：『爲了開顯依據現見的事實，來決定呈現道理，使他人接受所立的『宗』的意義。』問：『為什麼要接著引用『喻』呢？』答：『爲了顯示能夠成立道理的所依據的現見事實。』問：『為什麼又要說同類、異類，現量（Pratyaksha，現量）、比量（Anumana，比量）、正教量（Agama，聖言量）等呢？』答：『爲了開示『因』和『喻』兩種相違和不相違的智慧。』相違指的是異類，不相違指的是同類。那麼對於『因』和『喻』，都有現量、比量等相違和不相違的情況，根據情況的不同，可以歸屬於真實或相似。』 彼論又重複說：『又，相違有兩種因緣：一是不決定的緣故，二是與所要成立的相同。』最初的是六種不決定，因為『因』對於同類和異類兩種『喻』，或者成立或者相違。後者是四種不成和四種相違，因為『因』對於『宗』的過失稱為不成，在兩種『喻』中，完全相反的叫做相違。本來建立共同的『因』，想要成立『宗』的果，『因』既然帶有相似性，理應需要進一步成立。如果進一步成立，與『宗』沒有區別，就叫做與所要成立的相同。相似的『宗』和兩種『喻』也包含在這裡面。不相違也有兩種因緣：一是決定的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: Someone asks because the meaning is not fully understood. The opponent in the debate also has misunderstandings about the thesis. Now, these two are combined for explanation. Even if it's not the evidence presented by the opponent, it can still be called not fully understood. Because two meanings need to be revealed, more words are used, which is called 'Sadhana' (means of proof). Someone asks: 'There are many kinds of 'Sadhana', why is only one statement called 'Sadhana'?' The answer is: The 'Nyaya-mukha' (Introduction to Logic) explains that it is to show the nature of 'Sadhana' as a whole. From this, it should be known that whatever is lacking is called a fault of 'Sadhana'. If any part is missing, the nature of 'Sadhana' cannot be established.
Treatise: Here, 'Paksha' (thesis) refers to...
Commentary: The second part below elaborates on 'Lakshana' (characteristics). There are three aspects: first, elaborating on the 'Lakshana' of 'Paksha'; second, elaborating on the 'Lakshana' of 'Hetu' (reason); and third, elaborating on the 'Lakshana' of 'Drishtanta' (example). The 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says: 'Question: If all dharmas are accomplished by themselves and established in their own nature, then what is the reason for establishing two kinds of meanings to be established?' Answer: 'It is for the sake of causing others to generate faith and understanding, not for generating the nature and phenomena of all dharmas.' Question: 'In order to accomplish the meaning to be established, why establish 'Paksha' first?' Answer: 'In order to first show the meaning of 'Paksha' that one loves and delights in.' Question: 'Why analyze 'Hetu' next?' Answer: 'In order to reveal the reason based on observable facts, to determine and present the truth, so that others accept the meaning of the established 'Paksha'.' Question: 'Why cite 'Drishtanta' next?' Answer: 'In order to show the observable facts on which the ability to establish the truth relies.' Question: 'Why mention similar and dissimilar instances, 'Pratyaksha' (direct perception), 'Anumana' (inference), 'Agama' (scriptural testimony), etc.?' Answer: 'In order to reveal the wisdom of agreement and disagreement between 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta'.' Agreement refers to similar instances, and disagreement refers to dissimilar instances. Then, for 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta', there are cases of agreement and disagreement in 'Pratyaksha', 'Anumana', etc., which can be categorized as either true or similar, depending on the situation.' That treatise repeats: 'Furthermore, disagreement has two causes: one is because it is uncertain, and the other is the same as what is to be established.' The first is the six uncertain ones, because 'Hetu' either establishes or contradicts the two 'Drishtanta' of similar and dissimilar instances. The latter is the four unestablished and four contradictory ones, because the fault of 'Hetu' for 'Paksha' is called unestablished, and what is completely opposite in the two 'Drishtanta' is called contradictory. Originally, a common 'Hetu' was established to establish the result of 'Paksha'. Since 'Hetu' has similarity, it should be further established. If it is further established, there is no difference from 'Paksha', which is called the same as what is to be established. Similar 'Paksha' and two 'Drishtanta' are also included here. There are also two causes for non-disagreement: one is because it is certain.
定故。二異所成故。初是真因真喻。定成宗故。后則是此真因真喻。無諸過失。體能成故。異於所成。其相違者。于為成就所立宗義。不能為量故不名量。謂似因喻。及似現比量名相違。不成宗故不名真量。不相違者。于為成就所立宗義。能為正量。故名為量。謂真因喻及真現比。正成宗故正名為量。今此雖不同彼次第。宗之所依。及宗因喻現比量等。次第生起。亦準彼釋。初中復三。初牒章。次示相。后指法。此即初也。
論。謂極成有法極成能別。
述曰。下示相有四。一顯依。二出體三簡濫。四結成。此顯依也。極者。至也。成者。就也。至極成就故名極成。有法能別但是宗依。而非是宗。此依必須兩宗至極共許成就。為依義立。宗體方成。所依若無能依何立。由此宗依必須共許。共許名為至極成就。至理有故。法本真故。若許有法能別二種非兩共許。便有二過。一成異義過。謂能立本欲立此二上不相離性和合之宗。不欲成立宗二所依。所依若非先兩共許。便更須立此不成依。乃則能立成於異義。非成本宗。故宗所依必須共許。依之宗性方非極成。極成便是立無果故。更有餘過。若許能別非兩極成。闕宗支故。非為圓成。因中必有是因同品非定有性過。必闕同喻。同喻皆有所立不成。異喻一分或遍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，（真量）是確定的。因為由兩種不同的事物構成。（真量）最初是真實的因和真實的喻，因為它能確定地成立宗義。後者則是這真實的因和真實的喻，沒有各種過失，其體效能成立宗義，並且不同於所要成立的宗義。與此相反的，對於爲了成就所立的宗義，不能作為衡量標準，所以不稱為量，例如相似的因、喻，以及相似的現量和比量，因為不能成立宗義，所以不稱為真量。不相違背的，對於爲了成就所立的宗義，能作為正確的衡量標準，所以稱為量，例如真實的因、喻，以及真實的現量和比量，因為能正確地成立宗義，所以正確地稱為量。現在這裡雖然不同於彼（《因明入正理論》）的次第，但宗的所依，以及宗、因、喻、現量、比量等，次第生起，也按照彼論來解釋。最初的部分中又有三重含義：首先是標明章節，其次是顯示體相，最後是指示法則。這裡就是最初的部分。
論：所謂的『極成有法』（雙方都認可的有法）和『極成能別』（雙方都認可的能別）。
述曰：下面顯示體相有四個方面：一是顯示所依，二是闡述本體，三是簡別排除，四是總結成立。這裡是顯示所依。『極』是至極的意思，『成』是成就的意思。達到至極的成就，所以稱為『極成』。『有法』和『能別』只是宗的所依，而不是宗本身。這個所依必須是兩宗都至極認可和成就的，才能作為立宗的依據。所依如果不存在，能依又如何成立？因此，宗的所依必須是雙方都認可的。雙方都認可，就稱為『至極成就』。因為至理存在，法本真實。如果允許『有法』和『能別』這兩種不是雙方都認可的，就會有兩個過失：一是造成成立不同意義的過失，即能立者本來想要成立這二者之上不相分離的和合之宗，而不是想要成立宗的兩個所依。所依如果不是事先雙方都認可的，就需要進一步成立這個不成依據的依據，那麼能立者就成了成立不同的意義，而不是成立本宗。所以宗的所依必須是雙方都認可的，依據的宗性才不是『極成』。『極成』就是立論沒有結果。還有其他的過失，如果允許『能別』不是雙方都極成，就會缺少宗的支分，所以不能圓滿成立。因中必然有『是因同品非定有性』的過失，必然缺少同喻，同喻都與所立不符，異喻一部分或者全部不符。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, (a true means of valid cognition) is definite, because it is composed of two different things. Initially, (a true means of valid cognition) is a true reason and a true example, because it can definitely establish the tenet. The latter is this true reason and true example, without various faults, its substance can establish the tenet, and it is different from the tenet to be established. Conversely, that which contradicts this, for the established tenet to be accomplished, cannot be used as a measure, so it is not called a means of valid cognition, such as similar reasons, examples, and similar perception and inference, because it cannot establish the tenet, so it is not called a true means of valid cognition. That which does not contradict, for the established tenet to be accomplished, can be used as a correct measure, so it is called a means of valid cognition, such as true reasons, examples, and true perception and inference, because it can correctly establish the tenet, so it is correctly called a means of valid cognition. Although this is different from the order of that (Nyāyapraveśa), the basis of the tenet, as well as the tenet, reason, example, perception, inference, etc., arise in order, and are also explained according to that treatise. In the initial part, there are three meanings: first, to indicate the chapter; second, to show the characteristics; and third, to point out the Dharma. This is the initial part.
Treatise: The so-called 'extremely established subject' (both parties recognize the subject) and 'extremely established differentiator' (both parties recognize the differentiator).
Commentary: Below, showing the characteristics has four aspects: first, to show the basis; second, to explain the substance; third, to distinguish and exclude; and fourth, to summarize and establish. Here is showing the basis. 'Extremely' means ultimate, 'established' means accomplished. Reaching ultimate accomplishment, so it is called 'extremely established'. 'Subject' and 'differentiator' are only the basis of the tenet, not the tenet itself. This basis must be extremely recognized and accomplished by both schools, in order to be used as the basis for establishing the tenet. If the basis does not exist, how can the supported be established? Therefore, the basis of the tenet must be recognized by both parties. Mutual recognition is called 'extremely established'. Because the ultimate truth exists, the Dharma is originally true. If it is allowed that these two, 'subject' and 'differentiator', are not both extremely established, there will be two faults: one is causing the fault of establishing a different meaning, that is, the proponent originally wants to establish the inseparable and harmonious tenet on these two, not wanting to establish the two bases of the tenet. If the basis is not recognized by both parties in advance, it is necessary to further establish this basis that is not a basis, then the proponent becomes establishing a different meaning, not establishing the original tenet. Therefore, the basis of the tenet must be recognized by both parties, so that the tenet of the basis is not 'extremely established'. 'Extremely established' means that the argument has no result. There are other faults, if it is allowed that the 'differentiator' is not extremely established by both parties, then the branch of the tenet will be missing, so it cannot be completely established. In the reason, there will inevitably be the fault of 'the same class of reason is not necessarily existent', the similar example will inevitably be missing, the similar example does not conform to what is established, and a part or all of the dissimilar example does not conform.
轉過。若許有法非兩極成。闕宗支故。亦非圓成。能別無依是誰之法。因中亦有所依隨一兩俱不成。由此宗依必依共許。能依宗性方非極成。能立成之本所諍故。一切法中略有二種。一體。二義。且如五蘊。色等是體。此上有漏無漏等義。名之為義。體之與義。各有三名。體三名者。一名自性。瑜伽等中古師所說自性是也。二名有法。即此所說有法者是。三名所別。如下宗過中名所別不成是。義三名者。一名差別。瑜伽論等古師所說差別是也。二名為法。下相違中雲。法自相相違因等是。三名能別。則如此中名能別是。佛地論云。彼因明論諸法自相。唯局自體。不通他上。名為自性。如縷貫花。貫通他上諸法差別義。名為差別。此之三種。不定屬一門。不同大乘。以一切法不可言說一切為自性。可說為共相。如可說中。五蘊等為自。無常等為共。色蘊之中色處為自。色蘊為共。色處之中青等為自。色處為共。青等之中衣花為自。青等為共。衣花之中極微為自。衣花為共。如是乃至離言為自。極微為共。離言之中聖智內冥得本真故。名之為自。說為離言名之為共。共相假有。假智變故。自相可真。現量親緣。聖智證故。除此以外說為自性。皆假自性非真自性。非離假智及詮言故。今此因明。但局自體名為自性。通他之上
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 轉過。如果允許有不是兩極成立的法，因為缺少宗和支的緣故，也不是圓成。能夠區分而沒有所依的是誰的法？在因中也有所依，無論是隨一還是兩者都不成立。因此，宗和所依必定依賴共同認可。能夠作為所依的宗的性質才不是極成，因為它是能夠成立的根本，也是所爭論的對象。一切法中大致有兩種：一是體，二是義。比如五蘊，色等是體，其上的有漏、無漏等意義，稱之為義。體和義各有三個名稱。體的三個名稱是：一是自性，瑜伽等古代論師所說的自性就是；二是有法，就是這裡所說的有法；三是所別，如下面宗過中的『所別不成』就是。義的三個名稱是：一是差別，瑜伽論等古代論師所說的差別就是；二名為法，如下面相違中說的『法自相相違因』等就是；三名能別，則如此處所說的『能別』就是。《佛地論》說：『彼因明論諸法自相，唯局自體，不通他上，名為自性。如縷貫花，貫通他上諸法差別義，名為差別。』這三種並不一定屬於一個門類，不同於大乘，因為一切法不可言說，一切都是自性，可說的是共相。比如可說之中，五蘊等是自，無常等是共。色蘊之中，色處是自，色蘊是共。色處之中，青等是自，色處是共。青等之中，衣花是自，青等是共。衣花之中，極微是自，衣花是共。這樣乃至離言是自，極微是共。離言之中，聖智內心冥合而得到本真，所以稱之為自。說為離言，稱之為共。共相是假有的，因為是假智變現的緣故。自相是可真的，因為是現量親身經歷，聖智證實的緣故。除了這些以外，說為自性的，都是假自性，不是真自性，因為沒有離開假智和詮釋言語的緣故。現在這個因明，只侷限於自體，稱之為自性，貫通其他之上。
【English Translation】 English version Turned over. If it is allowed that there is a dharma (law, principle) that is not established by two extremes, it is also not perfectly established because of the lack of the zong (thesis, proposition) and zhi (support, reason). Whose dharma is it that can distinguish without reliance? There is also reliance in the cause; whether it follows one or both, neither is established. Therefore, the zong and the reliance must rely on common agreement. Only the nature of the zong that can be relied upon is not extremely established, because it is the root of what can be established and is also the object of dispute. In all dharmas, there are roughly two kinds: one is ti (substance, entity), and the other is yi (meaning, attribute). For example, the five skandhas (aggregates) (wuyun) are ti, such as form (se). The meanings such as with outflows (youlou) and without outflows (wulou) on top of them are called yi. Ti and yi each have three names. The three names of ti are: one is zixing (self-nature), which is the zixing spoken of by ancient teachers in Yoga (瑜伽) and others; the second is youfa (possessor of dharma), which is the youfa spoken of here; the third is suobie (that which is distinguished), such as the 'unestablished suobie' in the fallacy of zongguo (fallacy of the thesis) below. The three names of yi are: one is chabie (difference), which is the chabie spoken of by ancient teachers in Yoga and other treatises; the second is called fa (dharma), such as the 'cause of fa self-nature contradicting each other' in the contradiction below; the third is called nengbie (that which can distinguish), which is the nengbie spoken of here. The Buddhabhumi Sutra (佛地論) says: 'The self-nature of all dharmas in that Hetu-vidya (因明) treatise is only limited to the self-entity and does not extend to others, and is called zixing. Like a thread stringing flowers, it penetrates the meaning of the differences of all dharmas on top of others, and is called chabie.' These three are not necessarily in one category, unlike Mahayana (大乘), because all dharmas are unspeakable, and everything is self-nature, and what can be said is common nature. For example, in what can be said, the five skandhas are self, and impermanence (wuchang) is common. Among the rupa-skandha (色蘊), the rupa-ayatana (色處) is self, and the rupa-skandha is common. Among the rupa-ayatana, blue (qing) etc. is self, and the rupa-ayatana is common. Among blue etc., clothing and flowers (yihua) are self, and blue etc. are common. Among clothing and flowers, the paramanu (極微) is self, and clothing and flowers are common. Thus, even the separation from words (liyan) is self, and the paramanu is common. Among the separation from words, the inner union of the arya-jnana (聖智) attains the original truth, so it is called self. Saying it is separation from words is called common. The common nature is falsely existent, because it is transformed by false wisdom. The self-nature is truly verifiable, because it is personally experienced by direct perception and verified by arya-jnana. Apart from these, what is said to be self-nature is all false self-nature, not true self-nature, because it has not left false wisdom and explanatory words. Now this Hetu-vidya is only limited to the self-entity and is called self-nature, penetrating above others.
名為差別。準相違中。自性差別。復各別有自相差別。謂言所帶名為自相。不通他故。言中不帶意所許義。名為差別。以通他故。今憑因明總有三重。一者局通。局體名自性。狹故。通他名差別。寬故。二者先後。先陳名自性。前未有法可分別故。后說名差別。以前有法可分別故。三者言許。言中所帶名自性。意中所許名差別。言中所申之別義故。釋彼名者。自性差別二名如前。第二自性亦名有法。差別亦名法者。法有二義。一能持自體。二軌生他解。故諸論云。法謂軌持。前持自體。一切皆通。后軌生解。要有屈曲。初之所陳前未有說。逕廷持體。未有屈曲生他異解。后之所陳。前已有說。可以後說分別前陳。方有屈曲生他異解。其異解生。唯待后說。故初所陳。唯具一義。能持自體。義不殊勝。不得法名。后之所陳。具足兩義。能持復軌。義殊勝故。獨得法名。前之所陳。能有後法。複名有法。第三自性亦名所別。差別亦名為能別者。立敵所許不諍先陳。諍先陳上有後所說。以後所說別彼先陳。不以先陳別於后。先自性名為所別。后陳差別名為能別。若爾。此三名皆有失。其失者何。難初名云。若體名自性。義名差別者。何故下云。如數論師立我是思。我為自性。思為差別。彼文便以義為自性。體為差別。我無我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 名為差別（visesa）。在準相違中，自性（svarupa）差別（visesa），又各自別有自相（svalaksana）差別。所謂言語所包含的，名為自相，因為它不與其他相通。言語中不包含，而意念所允許的意義，名為差別，因為它與其他相通。現在憑藉因明（hetuvidya），總共有三重意義：一是局通，侷限於自身形體的，名為自性，因為它狹隘；通於其他的，名為差別，因為它寬泛。二是先後，先陳述的，名為自性，因為之前沒有法（dharma）可以分別；后說的，名為差別，因為之前已經有法可以分別。三是言許，言語中所包含的，名為自性；意念中所允許的，名為差別。因為言語中申明了區別的意義。解釋這些名稱，自性、差別這兩個名稱如前所述。第二，自性也稱為有法（dharmin），差別也稱為法者（dharma），法有兩種含義：一是能保持自身，二是能引導產生他人的理解。所以諸論中說，法就是軌持。前者保持自身，一切都相通；後者引導產生理解，必須要有屈曲。最初所陳述的，之前沒有說過，直接保持自身形體，沒有屈曲產生其他的不同理解。之後所陳述的，之前已經說過，可以用後來的陳述來分別之前的陳述，才能有屈曲產生其他的不同理解。這種不同理解的產生，完全依賴於後來的陳述。所以最初所陳述的，只具備一種含義，即能保持自身，意義不殊勝，不能稱為法。之後所陳述的，具備兩種含義，既能保持自身，又能引導，意義殊勝，所以才能稱為法。之前所陳述的，能擁有後來的法，又稱為有法。第三，自性也稱為所別（visesya），差別也稱為能別（visesana），立論者和對方所認可的，不爭論先前的陳述，爭論的是先前的陳述之上，有後來說的。用後來說的來區別先前的陳述，而不是用先前的陳述來區別後來的。先前的自性，稱為所別；后陳述的差別，稱為能別。如果這樣，這三個名稱都有缺失。缺失是什麼呢？反駁第一個名稱說，如果形體名為自性，意義名為差別，為什麼下文說，如數論師（Samkhya）立『我（atman）是思（buddhi）』，我為自性，思為差別。那段文字就用意義作為自性，形體作為差別。我（atman）和無我（anatman）。
【English Translation】 English version It is called difference (visesa). Within quasi-contradiction, the difference of self-nature (svarupa), each separately has its own characteristic (svalaksana) difference. What is conveyed by words is called self-characteristic, because it does not communicate with others. What is not conveyed by words but is permitted by intention is called difference, because it communicates with others. Now, relying on Hetuvidya (hetuvidya), there are three levels in total: First, limited communication. Being limited to the entity is called self-nature, because it is narrow; communicating with others is called difference, because it is broad. Second, precedence. What is stated first is called self-nature, because there is no dharma (dharma) to distinguish it beforehand; what is stated later is called difference, because there is dharma to distinguish it beforehand. Third, verbal permission. What is conveyed in words is called self-nature; what is permitted in intention is called difference. Because the meaning of distinction is declared in words. Explaining these names, the two names of self-nature and difference are as before. Second, self-nature is also called the possessor of dharma (dharmin), and difference is also called dharma (dharma), which has two meanings: one is to maintain itself, and the other is to guide the generation of others' understanding. Therefore, the treatises say that dharma is guidance and maintenance. The former maintains itself, and everything is connected; the latter guides the generation of understanding, and there must be curvature. What is stated first has not been said before, and it directly maintains its own form, without curvature to generate other different understandings. What is stated later has been said before, and the previous statement can be distinguished by the later statement, so that there can be curvature to generate other different understandings. The generation of this different understanding depends entirely on the later statement. Therefore, what is stated first only has one meaning, that is, it can maintain itself, and the meaning is not outstanding, so it cannot be called dharma. What is stated later has two meanings, both maintaining itself and guiding, and the meaning is outstanding, so it can be called dharma. What is stated first, which can possess the later dharma, is also called the possessor of dharma. Third, self-nature is also called the qualified (visesya), and difference is also called the qualifier (visesana). What is recognized by the proponent and the opponent does not dispute the previous statement, but disputes that there is a later statement on the previous statement. The later statement is used to distinguish the previous statement, rather than the previous statement to distinguish the later statement. The previous self-nature is called the qualified; the later stated difference is called the qualifier. If so, all three names have flaws. What are the flaws? Refuting the first name, if the entity is called self-nature and the meaning is called difference, why does the following say, such as the Samkhya (Samkhya) school establishing 'I (atman) am thought (buddhi)', I is self-nature, and thought is difference. That passage uses meaning as self-nature and entity as difference. Atman (atman) and Anatman (anatman).
等分別思故。難次名云。若具一義得有法名。若具二義但名法者。如即此師立我是思。何故思唯一義乃名為法。我具二義得有法名。難后名云。若以後陳別彼前說。前為所別。后為能別。如世說言青色蓮花。但言青色不言蓮花。不知何青。為衣為樹為瓶等青。唯言蓮花不言青色。不知何花。為赤為白為紅等花。今言青者。簡赤等華。言蓮花者。簡衣等青。先陳后說更互有簡。互為所別。互為能別。此亦應爾。后陳別前。前陳別後。應互名為能別所別。釋初難言。此因明宗。不同諸論。此中但以局守自體名為自性。不通他故。義貫於他。如縷貫花。即名差別。前所陳者。局在自體。后所說者。義貫於他。貫於他者。義對眾多。局自體者。義對便少。以後法解前。不以前解后。故前陳名自性。后陳者名差別。
釋次難言。先陳有法立敵無違。此上別義兩家乖競。乖競之義彼此相違。可生軌解名之為法。非所諍競。彼此無軌。逕廷自體。無別軌解。但名有法。談其實理。先陳后說皆具二義。依其增勝論與別名。故前陳者名有法。后陳者名法。故理門論云。觀所成故立法有法。非德有德法與有法。一切不定。但先陳皆有法。后說皆名法。觀所立故。非如勝論德。及有德一切決定。釋第三難言。前後所陳互相簡別。皆應得
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為要分別思量這個緣故，所以有『難次名云』這樣的提問。如果具備一個意義就能得到『法』的名稱，如果具備兩個意義卻只能稱為『有法』，例如，就像這位老師主張『我是思』。為什麼『思』只有一個意義卻被稱為『法』，而『我』具備兩個意義卻只能得到『有法』的名稱？ 爲了反駁後面的提問，所以說『若以後陳別彼前說』，前面的是被區別的，後面的是能區別的。就像世俗所說『青色蓮花』，只說『青色』而不說『蓮花』，就不知道是什麼青色，是衣服的青色、樹木的青色還是瓶子的青色等等。只說『蓮花』而不說『青色』，就不知道是什麼花，是紅色的、白色的還是粉色的等等。現在說『青色』，是爲了區分紅色等花。說『蓮花』，是爲了區分衣服等青色。先陳述的和后說的互相簡別，互相作為被區別的和能區別的，這裡也應該這樣。後面陳述的區分前面的，前面陳述的區分後面的，應該互相稱為能區別的和被區別的。 解釋最初的提問：這個因明宗（因明的宗旨），不同於其他的論述。這裡只是以侷限於自身為『自性』（事物自身獨有的性質），不與其他事物相通的緣故。『義』（意義）貫穿于其他事物，就像線貫穿于花朵，就稱為『差別』（區別）。前面所陳述的，侷限在自身。後面所說的，意義貫穿于其他事物。貫穿于其他事物的，意義對應眾多。侷限於自身的，意義對應就少。用後面的法來解釋前面的，不用前面的來解釋後面的。所以前面陳述的稱為『自性』，後面陳述的稱為『差別』。 解釋第二個提問：先陳述『有法』（具有某種性質的事物），立論者和對方都沒有異議。在這個『別義』（區別的意義）上，兩家爭論不休。爭論不休的意義彼此相違，可以產生規範性的理解，稱之為『法』（規律，原則）。不是爭論不休的，彼此沒有規範。直接陳述自身，沒有區別性的理解，只能稱為『有法』。談論其實際道理，先陳述的和后說的都具備兩個意義，根據其增勝之處來論述並給予區別性的名稱。所以前面陳述的稱為『有法』，後面陳述的稱為『法』。所以《理門論》說：『觀察所要成立的，所以立『法』和『有法』，不是像勝論（印度哲學流派）那樣，『德』（性質）和『有德』（具有性質的事物），一切都不確定。』只是先陳述的都是『有法』，後面說的都稱為『法』，觀察所要建立的緣故。不是像勝論的『德』和『有德』那樣一切都是決定的。 解釋第三個提問：前後所陳述的互相簡別，都應該得到...
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the need to separately contemplate this, there is the question of 'Nan Ci Ming Yun' (Difficult Sequence Name Says). If one possesses one meaning, one can obtain the name 'Dharma' (law, principle). If one possesses two meanings but can only be called 'Dharmin' (possessor of Dharma), such as this teacher asserting 'I am thought'. Why is it that 'thought' has only one meaning but is called 'Dharma', while 'I' possesses two meanings but can only obtain the name 'Dharmin'? To refute the later question, it is said, 'If the later statement distinguishes the former statement', the former is the distinguished, and the latter is the distinguishing. It's like the common saying 'blue lotus flower'. If only 'blue' is said without mentioning 'lotus flower', one doesn't know what kind of blue it is, whether it's the blue of clothing, trees, or bottles, etc. If only 'lotus flower' is said without mentioning 'blue', one doesn't know what kind of flower it is, whether it's red, white, or pink, etc. Now, saying 'blue' is to distinguish it from red flowers, etc. Saying 'lotus flower' is to distinguish it from the blue of clothing, etc. The first stated and the later said mutually distinguish, mutually serving as the distinguished and the distinguishing. It should be the same here. The later statement distinguishes the former, and the former statement distinguishes the latter. They should mutually be called the distinguishing and the distinguished. Explaining the initial question: This Hetu-vidya-naya (the principle of Hetu-vidya), is different from other treatises. Here, it is only that being limited to oneself is called 'Svalaksana' (own-characteristic), because it doesn't connect with other things. 'Artha' (meaning) permeates other things, like a thread through flowers, and is called 'Visesa' (difference). What is stated earlier is limited to oneself. What is said later, the meaning permeates other things. That which permeates other things, the meaning corresponds to many. That which is limited to oneself, the meaning corresponds to few. Use the later Dharma to explain the former, not the former to explain the latter. Therefore, what is stated earlier is called 'Svalaksana', and what is stated later is called 'Visesa'. Explaining the second question: First stating 'Dharmin', the proponent and opponent have no disagreement. On this 'Visesartha' (distinct meaning), the two sides argue endlessly. The meaning of endless argument contradicts each other, and can produce normative understanding, which is called 'Dharma'. That which is not endlessly argued, there is no norm for each other. Directly stating oneself, there is no distinguishing understanding, and can only be called 'Dharmin'. Discussing its actual principle, both the first stated and the later said possess two meanings, and based on their increasing superiority, discuss and give distinguishing names. Therefore, what is stated earlier is called 'Dharmin', and what is stated later is called 'Dharma'. Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha says: 'Observing what is to be established, therefore establishing 'Dharma' and 'Dharmin', not like the Vaisesika (Indian philosophical school), 'Guna' (quality) and 'Gunin' (possessor of quality), everything is uncertain.' It's just that what is stated earlier is all 'Dharmin', and what is said later is all called 'Dharma', because of observing what is to be established. It's not like the Vaisesika's 'Guna' and 'Gunin' where everything is determined. Explaining the third question: The former and latter statements mutually distinguish, and should all obtain...
名能別所別。如成宗言差別性故。然前陳者非所乖諍。后說于上彼此相違。今陳兩諍。但體上義。故以前陳名為所別。后名能別。亦約增勝以得其名。又但先陳。真名自性有法所別。但是后說。皆名差別法及能別。但諍後於前。非諍前於後故。舉後方諍。非舉前諍故。能立立於后。不立於前故。起智了不由前故。由此得名前後各定。問前陳后說既各三名。何故極成初言有法。後言能別。不以自性差別名顯。又復不以法及有法。能別所別相對為名。而各舉一有法能別。答初有三釋。一云。設致餘名必有此難。隨舉一種。何假為徴。二云。有法能有他勝。故先陳舉。明必有後法。以釋於前陳。能別別於他勝。此宗后陳。必與彼宗后陳義異。以後所說能別前陳。故后舉能別。三云自性差別。諸法之上。共假通名。有法能別。宗中別稱。偏舉別名。隱余通號。亦不相違。答后難言。前舉有法影顯后法。后舉能別影前所別。二燈二炬。二影二光。互舉一名相影發故。欲令文約而義繁故。宗之別名皆具顯故。攝名已周。理實無咎。問既言極成。何所簡別。有幾非成。言成簡別。答能別定成。且所別中有自不成。有他不成。有俱不成。有俱非不成。前三是過。第四句非。又有自一分不成。有他一分不成。有俱一分不成。有俱非一分不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『名能別所別』（能別和所別，指能區分事物和被區分的事物）。例如，成宗（Svatantrika，中觀自續派）說，因為有差別性。然而，前面陳述的並非爭論的焦點。後面所說的與前面彼此相違背。現在陳述兩種爭論，只是在本體上的意義。所以，前面的陳述被稱為『所別』，後面的被稱為『能別』。也是根據增勝的方面來得到這些名稱。又只是先陳述的，真正的名稱是自性，是有法（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物）所區分的。但是後面所說的，都稱為差別法以及能別。只是爭論後面的對於前面的，不是爭論前面的對於後面的。所以，舉出後面的才爭論，不是舉出前面的爭論。所以，能立（sadhana，論證）是建立在後面的，不是建立在前面的。生起智慧不是由於前面的緣故。由此得到名稱的前後各自確定。問：前面陳述和後面所說的既然各有三個名稱，為什麼極成（prasiddha，公認的）的最初用語是有法，後面用語是能別，不用自性、差別這些名稱來顯明？又為什麼不用法和有法、能別和所別相對作為名稱，而各自舉出一個有法、能別？答：最初有三種解釋。一種說法是，假設設定其他名稱必定有這個責難，隨便舉出一種，何必責問？第二種說法是，有法能夠有他勝，所以先陳述舉出，表明必定有後面的法，用來解釋前面的陳述。能別區別於他勝，這個宗派（paksha，論題）的後面陳述，必定與那個宗派的後面陳述意義不同。因為後面所說的能別前面的陳述，所以後面舉出能別。第三種說法是，自性、差別，在諸法之上，共同假立的通名。有法、能別，是宗派中特別的稱呼。偏舉出特別的名稱，隱藏其餘的通用名稱，也不相違背。回答後面的責難說，前面舉出有法，暗中顯示後面的法。後面舉出能別，暗中顯示前面的所別。如同兩盞燈、兩支火炬，兩個影子、兩道光芒，互相舉出一個名稱，互相輝映而顯發，想要使文字簡略而意義繁多，宗派的別名都完全顯現，包含名稱已經周全，道理上實在沒有過失。問：既然說是極成，要簡別什麼？有幾種非成？用『成』來簡別什麼？答：能別一定是成立的。而且所別之中，有自己不成立的，有他人不成立的，有雙方都不成立的，有雙方都不是不成立的。前面三種是過失，第四種不是。又有自己一部分不成立的，有他人一部分不成立的，有雙方一部分不成立的，有雙方都不是一部分不 成。
【English Translation】 English version 'Nama-nabhidheya-bhedaka' (that which distinguishes and that which is distinguished, referring to that which can distinguish things and that which is distinguished). For example, the Svatantrika (Independent School of Madhyamaka) says, because there is difference. However, what was stated earlier is not the focus of the dispute. What is said later contradicts the former. Now, two disputes are presented, only in the sense of the entity itself. Therefore, the former statement is called 'that which is distinguished' (所別), and the latter is called 'that which distinguishes' (能別). These names are also obtained based on the aspect of increase and superiority. Moreover, only what is stated first, the true name is self-nature, which is distinguished by the dharmin (有法, that which possesses a certain quality). But what is said later is all called the differentiating dharma and that which distinguishes. It is only a dispute of the latter against the former, not a dispute of the former against the latter. Therefore, it is only by raising the latter that there is a dispute, not by raising the former. Therefore, the sadhana (能立, proof) is established in the latter, not in the former. The arising of wisdom is not due to the former. From this, the order of the names is determined. Question: Since the former statement and the latter statement each have three names, why is the initial term of prasiddha (極成, well-known) dharmin (有法), and the latter term that which distinguishes (能別), without using the names of self-nature and difference to make it clear? And why not use dharma and dharmin, that which distinguishes and that which is distinguished, as relative names, but each cite a dharmin and that which distinguishes? Answer: There are three explanations for the initial term. One explanation is that if other names were set up, there would inevitably be this difficulty. Whatever kind is cited, why question it? The second explanation is that the dharmin can have superiority over others, so it is stated first, indicating that there must be a later dharma to explain the former statement. That which distinguishes is different from superiority over others. The latter statement of this paksha (宗派, thesis) must have a different meaning from the latter statement of that school. Because what is said later distinguishes the former statement, the latter cites that which distinguishes. The third explanation is that self-nature and difference are common, provisional names above all dharmas. Dharmin and that which distinguishes are special terms in the school. Partially citing the special name conceals the remaining common names, which is not contradictory. Answering the later question, the former citation of dharmin implicitly shows the later dharma. The latter citation of that which distinguishes implicitly shows the former that which is distinguished. Like two lamps, two torches, two shadows, two lights, citing one name mutually reflects and reveals, wanting to make the text concise and the meaning abundant, the special names of the school are all fully revealed, including the names is already complete, and there is really no fault in principle. Question: Since it is said to be prasiddha, what is to be distinguished? How many are not established? What is distinguished by 'established'? Answer: That which distinguishes is certainly established. Moreover, among that which is distinguished, there is that which is not established by itself, that which is not established by others, that which is not established by both, and that which is not not established by both. The first three are faults, and the fourth is not. There is also that which is not established by one's own part, that which is not established by another's part, that which is not established by both parts, and that which is not not established by both parts. established.
成。前三並非。第四有是。所別定成。能別不成為句亦爾。如是偏句總別合有四種四句。其俱不成全有五種四句。有自能別不成他所別。有他能別不成自所別。有俱能別不成自所別。有俱能別不成他所別。有自能別不成俱所別。有他能別不成俱所別。有俱能別不成俱所別。有俱能別不成俱非所別。如能別不成為首有二全四句。所別不成亦如是。二四句中。其前七句。皆是此過。其第八句是前偏過。雖總有四體唯有二。后則是前更無異故。所以但名二四句。有自兩俱不成非他。有他兩俱不成非自。有俱兩俱不成。有俱非自他兩俱不成。前三句非。第四句是。如是合有五種全句。一一離之。為一分句。復有五句。總成十句。復將一分句。對余全句。復將全句。對餘一分句。如理應思。恐繁且止。其初有法不成偏句。如下所別不成中解。能別不成偏句。如下能別不成中解。兩俱不成諸句。如下兩俱不成中解。其兩俱全分一分不極成。則宗兩俱不成。其自他全分一分不極成。則宗隨一不成。義準亦有宗猶豫不成。兩俱隨一全分一分等過。至似宗中當廣分別。二種自性及二差別不極成。此皆總攝。為簡彼非。故二宗依皆言極成。問何故宗過有其九種。今極成簡但簡於三。答此中但以宗不極成。所依須極成。故但簡三。非欲具簡一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不成。前三句不成立。第四句成立。這是所別（所要區分的對象）的確定成立。能別（能進行區分的性質）不成立的情況也一樣。像這樣，偏句、總句、別句結合起來，共有四種四句式。它們全部不成立的情況共有五種四句式： 有自身能區分，但不能區分其他對像；有其他對像能區分，但不能區分自身；有都能區分，但不能區分自身；有都能區分，但不能區分其他對像；有自身能區分，但不能區分所有對象；有其他對像能區分，但不能區分所有對象；有都能區分，但不能區分所有對象；有都能區分，但不能區分既非自身也非其他對象。 如果能區分的性質不成立作為開頭，則有二種完整的四句式。所要區分的對象不成立的情況也一樣。在這二種四句式中，前面的七句都是這種過失。第八句是前面的偏句過失。雖然總共有四個方面，但只有兩種情況，因為後面的情況與前面的情況沒有區別，所以只稱為二種四句式。 有自身兩方面都不成立，但並非其他對像；有其他對像兩方面都不成立，但並非自身；有兩方面都不成立；有既非自身也非其他對象的兩方面都不成立。前三句不成立，第四句成立。像這樣，總共有五種完整的句子，每一句都分開，成為一個分句，又有五句，總共形成十句。再將一個分句與其餘的完整句子對應，再將完整的句子與其餘的一個分句對應，應該按照道理進行思考，因為過於繁瑣，所以就此停止。 最初有法不成立的偏句，在下面的所別不成立中解釋。能區分的性質不成立的偏句，在下面的能別不成立中解釋。兩方面都不成立的句子，在下面的兩方面都不成立中解釋。兩方面都完全不成立，一部分不極成，那麼宗（論題）的兩方面都不成立。自身和其他對像完全不成立，一部分不極成，那麼宗的隨一不成立。按照這個意思，也有宗猶豫不成立的情況。兩方面都隨一完全不成立，一部分等等過失，到似宗中應當廣泛分別。二種自性以及二種差別不極成，這些都總括在一起。爲了簡別那些不是的情況，所以二宗所依據的都說是極成。 問：為什麼宗的過失有九種，現在極成簡別只簡別三種？答：這裡只因爲宗不極成，所依據的必須極成，所以只簡別三種，並非想要全部簡別。
【English Translation】 English version Not established. The first three are not. The fourth one is. This is the definite establishment of what is to be distinguished (the object to be distinguished). It is the same when the distinguishing characteristic (the characteristic that can distinguish) is not established. Thus, partial sentences, general sentences, and specific sentences combined have four types of four-line verses. There are five types of four-line verses in which all of them are completely unestablished: There is that which can distinguish itself but cannot distinguish others; there is that which others can distinguish but cannot distinguish itself; there is that which both can distinguish but cannot distinguish itself; there is that which both can distinguish but cannot distinguish others; there is that which can distinguish itself but cannot distinguish all; there is that which others can distinguish but cannot distinguish all; there is that which both can distinguish but cannot distinguish all; there is that which both can distinguish but cannot distinguish neither itself nor others. If the distinguishing characteristic not being established is taken as the beginning, then there are two complete four-line verses. It is the same when what is to be distinguished is not established. In these two four-line verses, the first seven lines are all this fault. The eighth line is the fault of the previous partial sentence. Although there are four aspects in total, there are only two situations, because the latter situation is no different from the former situation, so it is only called two four-line verses. There is that in which both aspects of itself are not established, but not others; there is that in which both aspects of others are not established, but not itself; there is that in which both aspects are not established; there is that in which both aspects of neither itself nor others are not established. The first three lines are not established, the fourth line is established. Thus, there are five complete sentences in total, each sentence is separated to become a partial sentence, and there are five more sentences, forming ten sentences in total. Then, a partial sentence is matched with the remaining complete sentences, and then the complete sentence is matched with the remaining partial sentence, and one should think according to reason, but because it is too cumbersome, it stops here. The partial sentence in which the initial dharma (phenomenon) is not established is explained in the following explanation of what is to be distinguished not being established. The partial sentence in which the distinguishing characteristic is not established is explained in the following explanation of the distinguishing characteristic not being established. The sentences in which both aspects are not established are explained in the following explanation of both aspects not being established. If both aspects are completely unestablished, and one part is not fully established, then both aspects of the thesis (宗) are not established. If oneself and others are completely unestablished, and one part is not fully established, then one of the thesis is not established. According to this meaning, there is also the situation where the thesis is hesitant and not established. The faults such as both aspects being completely unestablished, one part, etc., should be widely distinguished in the pseudo-thesis. The two kinds of self-nature and the two kinds of difference are not fully established, these are all summarized together. In order to distinguish those that are not, therefore, the basis of the two theses are said to be fully established. Question: Why are there nine kinds of faults of the thesis, and now the fully established distinction only distinguishes three kinds? Answer: Here, only because the thesis is not fully established, the basis must be fully established, so only three kinds are distinguished, not wanting to distinguish all.
切宗過。理門成宗但簡五過。由言非彼相違義能遣。此論以彼簡五。故但說三隨自則簡相符極成。簡非周備。理門略五。如前已說。亦如喻言顯因同品決定有性。不簡合結。故此但三。問既兩共許。何故不名共成而言極成。答自性差別。乃是諸法至極成理。由彼不悟。能立立之。若言共成。非顯真極。又因明法有自比量及他比量能立能破。若言共成應無有此。又顯宗依。先須至于理極究竟。能依宗性方是所諍。故言極成而不言共。問宗依須兩許言成簡不成。因喻必共成。言極簡不。極何因因喻不標極成。獨于宗依致極成簡。答有四義。一宗依極成宗不極。為簡不極言極成。因喻依體並須極成。無所簡故不說極。二因喻能立皆須極。無不極故不須簡。宗是所立非共成。為有所簡須言極。因喻之中自比言許。他比言執。而簡別之。故無不極。三因喻成中無不成。無濫簡故。不言極成宗之中有不成。有濫簡故獨言極。四因不成等攝非極。從寬為名不名極。宗不成中無別攝。故說極成簡不極。因中兩俱隨一等過。喻中所立能立不成。此等過中已攝不極。兩俱等寬。從余為稱。有體無體皆此過故。宗過不爾。言極簡之。兩許有體。便非是過。故於宗內獨言極成。然理門云。此中宗法。唯取立論及敵論者決定同許。于同品中有非有
等。亦復如是。故知因喻必須極成。但此論略。唯識亦言極成六識。隨一攝故。如極成余。故知此略。
論。差別性故。
述曰。出宗體。差別者。謂以一切有法。及法互相差別。性者體也。此取二中互相差別不相離性。以為宗體。如言色蘊無我。色蘊者有法也。無我者法也。此之二種。若體若義。互相差別。謂以色蘊簡別無我。色蘊無我。非受無我。及以無我簡別色蘊。無我色蘊。非我色蘊。以此二種互相差別合之一處。不相離性方是其宗。即簡先古諸因明師。但說有法為宗。以法成有法故。或但說法為宗。有法上法是所諍故。或以有法及法為宗。彼別非宗。合此二種宗所成故。此皆先共許。何得成宗。既立已成而無果故。但應取互相差別不相離性。有許不許以為宗體。問先陳能別唯在法中。何故今言互相差別。答立敵相形法為能別。體義相待。互通能所。對望有異亦不相違。問互相差別則為宗性。何假此中須說故字。答故者所以。此有二義。一簡古說。但以能別或但所別。或雙以二而為共宗。陳那簡之。皆非宗諍。取此二上互相差別不相離性所諍之義。方成宗故。其能別等。彼先共許。非兩所諍。皆非是宗。為簡古師遂說故字。二釋所依。釋前有法。及以能別極成之言。但以有法及法互相差別不相離
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：等等，也是如此。因此可知，作為比喻的原因必須是完全成立的。但此論述較為簡略。《唯識論》也說，完全成立的六識，由於被其中之一所包含。如同完全成立的其他事物一樣。因此可知這裡是簡略的說法。
論：因為有差別性。
述記：闡述宗體的含義。差別，是指以一切存在的事物（有法）以及法本身互相區別。性，指的是本體。這裡取二者互相區別且不可分離的性質，作為宗體。例如說『色蘊無我』（Skandha of form is without self）。色蘊是有法，無我是法。這二者，無論是本體還是意義，都互相區別。用色蘊來區分無我，即色蘊是無我，而不是受蘊無我。用無我來區分色蘊，即無我的色蘊，而不是我的色蘊。這兩種互相區別的性質結合在一起，且不可分離，才是宗的本體。這與先前的因明學家不同，他們只說有法是宗，因為用法來成立有法；或者只說法是宗，因為有法上的法是爭論的焦點；或者以有法和法都是宗。那些單獨的都不是宗，因為結合這二者才是宗所成立的。這些都是先前共同認可的，怎麼能成為宗呢？既然已經成立，就沒有結果了。因此，應該取互相區別且不可分離的性質。有認可和不認可的，作為宗體。有人問，先前的陳述，能區分的只在法中，為什麼現在說互相區別？回答是，立論和反駁相互對應，法是能區分的。本體和意義相互依存，互為能所。對望不同，也不互相矛盾。有人問，互相區別就是宗的性質，為什麼這裡還要說『故』字？回答是，『故』是原因。這裡有兩個含義。一是區分古老的說法，只用能區分的，或者只用所區分的，或者兩者都作為共同的宗。陳那（Dignāga）對此進行了簡化，這些都不是宗的爭論點。取這二者互相區別且不可分離的性質，才是爭論的意義，才能成為宗。那些能區分的等等，是先前共同認可的，不是雙方爭論的，都不是宗。爲了區分古老的說法，所以說了『故』字。二是解釋所依據的，解釋前面的有法，以及能區分的完全成立的說法。只用有法和法互相區別且不可分離
【English Translation】 English version: And so on, it is also like that. Therefore, it is known that the reason used as an analogy must be fully established. However, this treatise is brief. The Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi also states that the fully established six consciousnesses are included in one of them, just like other fully established things. Therefore, it is known that this is a brief statement.
Treatise: Because of the characteristic of difference.
Commentary: Explaining the meaning of the subject of the proposition (pakṣa-dharma). 'Difference' refers to the mutual distinction between all existing things (dharma) and the dharma itself. 'Characteristic' refers to the essence. Here, we take the mutually distinct and inseparable nature of the two as the subject of the proposition. For example, saying 'the skandha of form is without self'. The skandha of form is the existing thing (dharma), and 'without self' is the dharma. These two, whether in essence or meaning, are mutually distinct. Using the skandha of form to distinguish 'without self', that is, the skandha of form is without self, not the skandha of feeling is without self. Using 'without self' to distinguish the skandha of form, that is, the skandha of form is without self, not the self's skandha of form. These two mutually distinct characteristics combined together and inseparable are the essence of the proposition. This is different from the previous logicians, who only said that the existing thing (dharma) is the proposition, because the dharma is used to establish the existing thing; or only said that the dharma is the proposition, because the dharma on the existing thing is the focus of the dispute; or both the existing thing and the dharma are the proposition. Those separate ones are not the proposition, because the combination of these two is what the proposition is established upon. These are all previously commonly accepted, how can they become the proposition? Since it is already established, there is no result. Therefore, one should take the mutually distinct and inseparable nature. Having acceptance and non-acceptance as the subject of the proposition. Someone asks, the previous statement, what can be distinguished is only in the dharma, why now say mutually distinct? The answer is, the establishment and refutation correspond to each other, and the dharma is what can be distinguished. Essence and meaning are interdependent, mutually being the distinguisher and the distinguished. Differing in perspective, they are not contradictory. Someone asks, mutual distinction is the nature of the proposition, why is the word 'therefore' (gu) needed here? The answer is, 'therefore' is the reason. There are two meanings here. One is to distinguish the old sayings, only using what can be distinguished, or only using what is distinguished, or both as the common proposition. Dignāga simplified this, these are not the points of dispute of the proposition. Taking the mutually distinct and inseparable nature of these two is the meaning of the dispute, and can become the proposition. Those that can be distinguished, etc., are previously commonly accepted, not disputed by both parties, and are not the proposition. In order to distinguish the old sayings, the word 'therefore' is said. The second is to explain what is relied upon, explaining the previous existing thing (dharma), and the fully established saying that can be distinguished. Only using the existing thing and the dharma that are mutually distinct and inseparable.
性一許一不許而為宗故。宗之所依有法能別。皆須極成。由此宗中說其故字。不爾所依須更成立哉。或有於此不悟所由。遂改論云差別為性。非直違因明之軌轍。亦乃闇唐梵之方言。輒改論文深為可責。彌天釋道安法師。尚商略于翻譯。為五失三不易云。結集之羅漢兢兢若此。末代之凡夫平平若是。改千代之上微言。同百王之下末俗。豈不痛哉。況非翻經之侶。但是膚受之輩。誑后徒之幼識。誘初學之童蒙。妄率胸襟。回換聖教。當來慧眼。定永不生。現在智心。由斯自滅。諸有學者。應閑此義。依舊正云。差別性故。問何故但宗說差別性。因喻中無。答宗有一成一不成。故但說宗差別性。因喻唯成。無不成。無簡不說差別性。如因三相。雖有差別。不欲取此上不相離性一許一不許成其能立。所依便非。由斯不說差別性故。理門唯云。宗等多言說能立。是中唯隨自意樂為所成立說名宗。非彼相違義能遣。不說所別能別極成及差別性。此論獨言。
論。隨自樂為所成立性。
述曰。此簡濫失。隨自者。簡別于宗。樂為所成立性者。簡別因喻。故理門云。隨自意。顯不顧論宗隨自意立。樂為所立。謂不樂為能成立性。若異此者說所成立。似因似喻應亦名宗。凡宗有四。一遍所許宗。如眼見色。彼此兩宗皆共許
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以『性一許一不許』作為根本宗旨。這個根本宗旨所依賴的論點，必須有能夠區分的法則，而且這些法則都必須是完全成立的。因此，在立宗時要說明理由。否則，所依賴的論點就需要進一步去成立。有些人不明白其中的道理，於是將論點改為『差別為性』。這不僅違反了因明的規則，也曲解了梵語的含義。擅自更改經文，實在應該受到譴責。彌天釋道安法師在翻譯時，尚且仔細斟酌，提出了『五失三不易』。結集的羅漢們如此兢兢業業，末世的凡夫卻如此草率。更改千年前的精妙言辭，使其變得和當今世俗的言論一樣，這難道不令人痛心嗎？更何況這些人並非翻譯經典的僧侶，只是略懂皮毛之輩，用虛假的知識欺騙後來的學徒，誘導初學者，隨意按照自己的想法，篡改聖教。這樣的人，將來必定無法生出智慧之眼，現在的智慧之心也會因此而消失。所有學習佛法的人，都應該明白這個道理，仍然按照原來的說法，即『差別性故』。 問：為什麼只在立宗時說明『差別性』，而在因和喻中沒有說明？ 答：因為立宗時，有一部分是成立的，有一部分是不成立的，所以只在立宗時說明『差別性』。而因和喻都是完全成立的，沒有不成立的部分，所以不需要說明『差別性』。例如，因的三相雖然有差別，但我們不取用這種不相離的性質，因為『性一許一不許』才能成立能立，所依賴的論點就不能成立。因此，因和喻中沒有說明『差別性』。所以，《理門》中說，立宗等同於用多種言辭來說明能立，其中只有隨順自己的意願而成立的論點才稱為立宗，而不是那些與此相違背的含義能夠排除的。因此，因和喻中沒有說明所別、能別完全成立以及差別性。只有這部論典單獨說明了這些。 論：隨順自己的意願而成立的性質。 述曰：這是爲了簡別濫用。『隨順自己的』，是爲了簡別于立宗。『意願而成立的性質』，是爲了簡別因和喻。所以，《理門》中說，隨順自己的意願，表明不顧及論宗，隨順自己的意願而立。『意願而成立』，是指不樂意作為能成立的性質。如果不是這樣，那麼所成立的論點，類似於因或喻，也應該稱為立宗。凡是立宗有四種：普遍認可的立宗，例如『眼見色』，彼此雙方都共同認可。
【English Translation】 English version: The fundamental principle is based on 'one nature, one accepted, one not accepted'. The arguments upon which this principle relies must have distinguishable rules, and these rules must all be fully established. Therefore, the reason must be stated when establishing the proposition (zong). Otherwise, the arguments upon which it relies need to be further established. Some people do not understand the reason for this, and thus change the argument to 'difference as nature'. This not only violates the rules of Hetu-vidya (因明, science of logic), but also distorts the meaning of the Sanskrit language. Arbitrarily changing the scriptures is truly reprehensible. The Venerable Dao'an (道安) of Mount Mitian (彌天) carefully deliberated during translation, proposing 'five losses and three difficulties'. The Arhats (羅漢, enlightened disciples) who compiled the scriptures were so conscientious, while the ordinary people of the latter age are so careless. Changing the subtle words of a thousand years ago, making them the same as the secular words of today, is this not painful? Moreover, these people are not monks who translate scriptures, but only those who have a superficial understanding, deceiving later students with false knowledge, and misleading beginners, arbitrarily changing the sacred teachings according to their own ideas. Such people will certainly not be able to generate the eye of wisdom in the future, and their present wisdom will also disappear because of this. All those who study Buddhism should understand this principle, and still follow the original statement, that is, 'because of the nature of difference'. Question: Why is 'difference' only stated in the proposition (zong), but not in the reason (yin) and example (yu)? Answer: Because in the proposition (zong), some parts are established and some parts are not established, so 'difference' is only stated in the proposition (zong). But the reason (yin) and example (yu) are all fully established, with no parts that are not established, so there is no need to state 'difference'. For example, although the three aspects of the reason (yin) have differences, we do not take this inseparable nature, because 'one nature, one accepted, one not accepted' can establish the proof, and the arguments upon which it relies cannot be established. Therefore, 'difference' is not stated in the reason (yin) and example (yu). Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha (理門, The Gate of Logic) says that establishing the proposition (zong) is equivalent to using multiple words to explain the proof, and only the arguments that are established according to one's own wishes are called the proposition (zong), not those that can be excluded by meanings that contradict this. Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha (理門) does not state the distinguished (所別), the distinguishing (能別) being fully established, and the difference. Only this treatise alone states these. Treatise: The nature of being established according to one's own wishes. Commentary: This is to distinguish abuse. 'According to one's own', is to distinguish from the proposition (zong). 'The nature of being established according to one's wishes', is to distinguish the reason (yin) and example (yu). Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha (理門) says, according to one's own wishes, indicating that it does not consider the proposition (zong), and establishes it according to one's own wishes. 'Established according to one's wishes' means that it is not willing to be the nature of being able to establish. If this is not the case, then the established argument, similar to the reason (yin) or example (yu), should also be called the proposition (zong). There are four types of propositions (zong): universally accepted propositions (zong), such as 'the eye sees color', which are commonly accepted by both parties.
故。二先承稟宗。如佛弟子習諸法空。鵂鹠弟子立有實我。三傍憑義宗。如立聲無常。傍憑顯無我。四不顧論宗。隨立者情所樂便立。如佛弟子立佛法義。若善外宗。樂之便立不須定顧。此中前三不可建立。初遍許宗。若許立者。便立已成。先來共許。何須建立。次承稟者。若二外道。共稟僧佉。對諍本宗亦空無果。立已成故。次義憑宗。非言所諍。此復何用。本諍由言。望他解起。傍顯別義。非為本成。故亦不可立為正論。然于因明未見其過。既于因過。說法差別相違之因。即傍準宗可成宗義。然非正立。今簡前三皆不可立。唯有第四不顧論宗。可以為宗。是隨立者自意所樂。前三皆是自不樂故。樂為所成立性。簡能成立者。能成立法者。謂則因喻。因喻成立自義亦應名宗。但名能立。非所成立。舊已成故不得名宗。今顯樂為新所成立方是其宗。雖樂因喻非新成立。立便相符。故不名宗。既爾。似宗似因似喻應得名宗。先所未成應更成故。當時所競方是真宗。因喻時申故須簡別。似宗因喻雖更可成。非是所樂。第二時所可成故。非今所諍。疏故非宗。此上一解。依理門論。唯簡于真。不簡于似。又解。樂者。貫通上下。隨自樂言。簡前三宗非隨自樂。唯第四宗是意所樂。樂為之言。簡似宗等。雖於後時更可成立。非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，有四種情況不能作為真正的宗（pakṣa，論題）：第一種是遍許宗，第二種是承稟宗，第三種是傍憑義宗，第四種是不顧論宗。 第一種，遍許宗。如果允許建立這種宗，那麼這種宗已經是成立的，因為先前已經被大家共同認可了，又何必再建立呢？ 第二種，承稟宗。如果兩個外道都信奉僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派），那麼他們爭論的本宗也是空無結果的，因為他們所建立的已經是成立的了。 第三種，義憑宗。如果爭論的不是言語本身，那又有什麼用呢？原本的爭論是由言語引起的，希望通過言語讓對方理解。如果只是附帶地顯示別的意義，而不是爲了原本要成立的論點，那麼也不能將其作為正確的論點。然而，在因明（hetuvidyā，因明學）中，並沒有看到這種過失。既然在因的過失中，說法差別相違的因，就可以作為傍準宗來成立宗義，但這並不是真正的建立。現在簡要說明前三種都不能成立，只有第四種不顧論宗，可以作為宗，因為它是隨建立者自己的意願所喜好的。前三種都不是自己所喜好的。 喜好作為所成立的性質，簡別能成立者。能成立法者，指的是因（hetu，理由）和喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）。因和喻能夠成立自己的意義，也應該被稱為宗，但只能稱為能立，而不是所成立。因為舊的已經成立了，所以不能稱為宗。現在顯示喜好作為新成立的才是宗。雖然喜好因和喻，但它們不是新成立的，建立便相符，所以不稱為宗。 既然如此，似宗、似因、似喻應該可以被稱為宗，因為先前沒有成立的應該可以再次成立。當時所競爭的才是真正的宗，因和喻是在當時陳述的，所以需要簡別。似宗、似因、似喻雖然可以再次成立，但不是所喜好的。因為是第二時可以成立的，不是現在所爭論的，所以疏遠，不是宗。以上是一種解釋，依據《理門論》。只簡別真的，不簡別假的。 另一種解釋，喜好貫通上下。隨自己的喜好而言，簡別前三種宗不是隨自己的喜好，只有第四種宗是意願所喜好的。喜好作為之言，簡別似宗等。雖然在之後可以再次成立，但不是...
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, there are four cases that cannot be taken as true pakṣa (thesis): the first is the universally accepted pakṣa, the second is the pakṣa based on acceptance, the third is the pakṣa relying on implied meaning, and the fourth is the pakṣa disregarding treatises. First, the universally accepted pakṣa. If establishing this pakṣa is allowed, then this pakṣa is already established, because it has been commonly accepted by everyone before, so why establish it again? Second, the pakṣa based on acceptance. If two heretics both believe in Sāṃkhya (enumerationist school), then the original pakṣa they are arguing about is also empty and fruitless, because what they are establishing is already established. Third, the pakṣa relying on implied meaning. If what is being argued is not the words themselves, then what is the use? The original argument is caused by words, hoping to make the other party understand through words. If it only incidentally shows other meanings, instead of for the original point to be established, then it cannot be taken as a correct thesis. However, in hetuvidyā (the science of reasoning), this fault is not seen. Since in the fault of the hetu, the hetu of contradictory causes of different statements can be used as a parāśraya-pakṣa (dependent thesis) to establish the meaning of the pakṣa, but this is not a true establishment. Now briefly explain that the first three cannot be established, only the fourth, the pakṣa disregarding treatises, can be taken as a pakṣa, because it is according to the establisher's own wishes and preferences. The first three are not what one prefers. Preference is taken as the nature of what is to be established, distinguishing the establisher. The establisher refers to hetu (reason) and dṛṣṭānta (example). Hetu and dṛṣṭānta can establish their own meaning and should also be called pakṣa, but can only be called establisher, not what is established. Because the old has already been established, it cannot be called pakṣa. Now it is shown that preference as newly established is the pakṣa. Although preference is given to hetu and dṛṣṭānta, they are not newly established, and the establishment is consistent, so they are not called pakṣa. Since this is the case, pseudo-pakṣa, pseudo-hetu, and pseudo-dṛṣṭānta should be able to be called pakṣa, because what was not established before should be able to be established again. What was competed for at that time is the true pakṣa, and hetu and dṛṣṭānta are stated at that time, so they need to be distinguished. Although pseudo-pakṣa, pseudo-hetu, and pseudo-dṛṣṭānta can be established again, they are not what is preferred. Because it can be established in the second time, it is not what is being argued now, so it is distant and not a pakṣa. The above is one explanation, based on the Nyāyamukha. It only distinguishes the true, not the false. Another explanation, preference runs through above and below. According to one's own preference, distinguishing the first three pakṣas is not according to one's own preference, only the fourth pakṣa is what the intention prefers. Preference as a word distinguishes pseudo-pakṣa, etc. Although it can be established again later, it is not...
是此時所樂為故。所成立性。簡真因喻不可名宗。雖成已義是能成立。先已成故非今所成。今所成立體義名宗。若依后解雖異理門。簡真與似略圓備故。問何故因喻無隨自樂。宗獨有之。答宗兩乖諍須隨自簡。因喻共許。故無隨自。因喻二種。如共比量。必先共許方成能立。無遍許失及承稟失。要言所陳方名因喻。不說亦有傍義差別。無義準失。自他比量言亦有簡。說許執故隨其不顧。故於因喻不說隨自。問何故宗中傍有義準。名為差別。因喻便無。答能立本成。成自所立隨應之義。立乃乖角共自相違。故於宗中傍有義準。則四相違所違差別。言申決定方成能立。故於因喻不說亦有義準能立。問何故宗內獨言樂為。因喻不說。答似宗因喻當更成立可以為宗。今顯當時所諍為宗。不以彼為。故言樂為簡彼三似宗似因喻。設今及后俱不可說為因。為喻亦爾。若更立之只是宗攝。不說樂為。設更成立以為宗訖。義既成已方為因喻。展轉疏成不同於宗。故於因喻不說樂為。又于宗內說樂為言。簡似周訖。因喻略之。又宗有諍以更須成。宗義相濫故獨言樂為。因喻必須極成。不成便非因喻。無所濫故不言樂為。問何獨宗標所成立性。因喻不說能成立也。答宗言所立。已顯因喻是能成立。顯法已周更不須說。又宗前未說。恐濫須陳
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 這是因為此時所樂意成立的性質（所成立性）。爲了區分真實的『因』（hetu，理由）、『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子），而不能稱之為『宗』（pakṣa，論題）。雖然已經成立的意義是能夠成立的，但因為是先前已經成立的，所以不是現在所要成立的。現在所要成立的本體意義才叫做『宗』。如果依照後面的解釋，雖然在理路上有所不同，但爲了區分真實和相似，所以簡略而圓滿地具備了這些要素。 問：為什麼『因』和『喻』沒有隨順自己意樂的說法，而只有『宗』有呢？ 答：『宗』的雙方存在爭議，需要隨順自己的意願來簡別。而『因』和『喻』是雙方都認可的，所以沒有隨順自己意願的說法。『因』和『喻』這兩種，就像共同比量（sādhāraṇa anumāna）一樣，必須先得到雙方的認可才能成為能立（sādhana，證明）。沒有普遍認可的過失以及承受稟賦的過失。只有所陳述的言辭才能稱為『因』和『喻』，即使不說也有旁生的意義差別，沒有意義準則的缺失。自比量（svārtha-anumāna）和他比量（parārtha-anumāna）的言辭也有簡別，因為說了認可和執著，所以隨其不顧。因此，對於『因』和『喻』，不說隨順自己意願的說法。 問：為什麼在『宗』中，旁生的意義準則被稱為差別，而『因』和『喻』就沒有呢？ 答：能立的根本在於成立自己所要成立的，隨順相應的意義。而『立』（sthapana，建立）乃是乖戾牴觸，共同和自己相違背。所以在『宗』中，旁生的意義準則，就是四種相違（四相違：自相違、法相違、因相違、宗相違）所違背的差別。言辭申明決定才能成為能立。因此，對於『因』和『喻』，即使不說也有意義準則，也能成為能立。 問：為什麼在『宗』內，唯獨說『樂為』（abhipreta，意樂），而『因』和『喻』不說呢？ 答：相似的『宗』、『因』、『喻』，應當進一步成立，可以作為『宗』。現在顯示當時所爭論的作為『宗』，不以其他的作為『宗』。所以說『樂為』，是爲了簡別那三種相似的『宗』、相似的『因』、『喻』。假設現在和以後都不可說為『因』，為『喻』也是一樣。如果進一步建立，只是『宗』所攝。不說『樂為』，假設進一步成立，以為『宗』完畢，意義既然已經成立，才作為『因』和『喻』。輾轉疏遠成立，不同於『宗』。因此，對於『因』和『喻』，不說『樂為』。又在『宗』內說『樂為』，是爲了簡別相似的周遍完畢。『因』和『喻』則省略了。又『宗』有爭論，因此更需要成立。『宗』的意義相互混淆，所以唯獨說『樂為』。『因』和『喻』必須是極其成立的，不成立就不是『因』和『喻』，沒有混淆的地方，所以不說『樂為』。 問：為什麼唯獨『宗』標明『所成立性』（sādhyatva），而『因』和『喻』不說『能成立』（sādhanatva）呢？ 答：『宗』說『所立』，已經顯示『因』和『喻』是『能成立』。顯明瞭法義已經周遍，更不需要說了。又『宗』前面沒有說，恐怕混淆，所以需要陳述。
【English Translation】 English version It is because of the nature of what is desired to be established (sva-abhipreta-siddhatva). To distinguish the true 'reason' (hetu), 'example' (dṛṣṭānta), it cannot be called 'thesis' (pakṣa). Although the meaning that has already been established is capable of establishing, it is not what is to be established now because it has already been established. Only the essential meaning that is to be established now is called 'thesis'. If according to the later explanation, although there are differences in the line of reasoning, it is to distinguish the true and the similar, so it is briefly and completely equipped with these elements. Question: Why do 'reason' and 'example' not have the statement of following one's own intention, but only 'thesis' has it? Answer: The two sides of the 'thesis' have disputes, and it is necessary to distinguish according to one's own wishes. The 'reason' and 'example' are recognized by both parties, so there is no statement of following one's own wishes. These two kinds of 'reason' and 'example' are like common inference (sādhāraṇa anumāna), and must be recognized by both parties before they can become the means of proof (sādhana). There is no fault of universal recognition and the fault of inheriting endowment. Only the words stated can be called 'reason' and 'example', even if it is not said, there are differences in the meaning of the side, and there is no lack of meaning criteria. There are also distinctions in the words of self-inference (svārtha-anumāna) and other-inference (parārtha-anumāna), because it is said that recognition and attachment, so follow it regardless. Therefore, for 'reason' and 'example', there is no statement of following one's own wishes. Question: Why in the 'thesis', the meaning criterion of the side is called difference, but 'reason' and 'example' do not have it? Answer: The root of the means of proof lies in establishing what one wants to establish, following the corresponding meaning. And 'establishment' (sthapana) is perverse and contradictory, both common and self-contradictory. Therefore, in the 'thesis', the meaning criterion of the side is the difference violated by the four contradictions (four contradictions: self-contradiction, dharma-contradiction, cause-contradiction, thesis-contradiction). The statement clarifies that the decision can become the means of proof. Therefore, for 'reason' and 'example', even if it is not said, there is a meaning criterion, which can also become the means of proof. Question: Why in the 'thesis', only 'desire to do' (abhipreta) is said, but 'reason' and 'example' are not said? Answer: Similar 'thesis', 'reason', and 'example' should be further established and can be used as 'thesis'. Now it shows that what is disputed at that time is used as 'thesis', and others are not used as 'thesis'. Therefore, saying 'desire to do' is to distinguish the three similar 'thesis', similar 'reason', and 'example'. Suppose that neither now nor later can be said to be 'reason', and the same is true for 'example'. If it is further established, it is only included in the 'thesis'. Without saying 'desire to do', suppose it is further established, thinking that the 'thesis' is completed, and since the meaning has been established, it is used as 'reason' and 'example'. The establishment is far away, which is different from the 'thesis'. Therefore, for 'reason' and 'example', 'desire to do' is not said. Also, saying 'desire to do' in the 'thesis' is to distinguish the similar completeness. 'Reason' and 'example' are omitted. Also, the 'thesis' has disputes, so it needs to be established further. The meanings of the 'thesis' are mixed up, so only 'desire to do' is said. 'Reason' and 'example' must be extremely established, and if they are not established, they are not 'reason' and 'example', and there is no place for confusion, so 'desire to do' is not said. Question: Why does only 'thesis' mark 'the nature of what is to be established' (sādhyatva), while 'reason' and 'example' do not say 'the ability to establish' (sādhanatva)? Answer: 'Thesis' says 'what is to be established', which already shows that 'reason' and 'example' are 'the ability to establish'. It is clear that the meaning of the Dharma has been completed, and there is no need to say more. Also, the 'thesis' was not said before, and I am afraid of confusion, so it needs to be stated.
。因喻已彰更何須說。又宗違古。言所成立以別古今。因喻不違。不說能立言以簡別也。又前標云宗等多言名為能立。先已說訖。后更不須。
論。是名為宗。
述曰。此結成也。
論。如有成立聲是無常。
述曰。三指法也。如佛弟子對聲論師。立聲無聲。聲是有法。無常為能別。彼此共許。有聲及無常。名極成有法。極成能別。為宗所依。彼聲論師。不許聲上有此無常。今佛弟子合之一處。互相差別不相離性云聲無常。聲論不許。故得成宗。既成隨自亦是樂為所成立性故名真宗。恐義不明。指此令解。瑜伽論云。立宗者。謂依二種所成立義。各別攝受自品所許。攝受者。是自意樂義。品是宗義。故顯揚云。各別攝受自宗所許。此中意說。依二所立立論各別。隨自意樂自宗所許。故說名宗。此中三釋。一者以言對理。取依義能詮。名為各別自宗所許。二者以別對總。取依總之別言及義二。名自所許。三者以合對離。取彼能依不相離性合以之為自宗所許。正與此同。此文總也。
下有十句。分為三類。初二句是宗體。一攝受論宗。二若自辯才。初依自所師宗。對異師敵而立自宗。不爾便為相符極成。後由自辯才立他宗義。隨自意樂不顧論宗。唯此二種是正所宗。若遍所許。若二同宗承
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為比喻已經很明顯了，為什麼還要多說呢？而且，立宗如果違背古義，用所成立的言論來區分古今，但因和喻並不違背古義，不說能成立的言論來簡別古今。而且前面已經標明『宗』等多種言論名為能立，先前已經說完了，後面就不需要再說了。
論：這叫做宗（proposition）。
述曰：這是總結。
論：例如成立『聲音是無常』這個命題。
述曰：這是舉例說明。例如佛弟子對聲論師（Shabda philosopher，主張聲音是常住的印度哲學派別）說，『聲音是無常的』。『聲音』是有法（subject of the proposition），『無常』是能別（predicate）。彼此都認可有『聲音』以及『無常』，這叫做極成有法（perfectly established subject）。極成能別（perfectly established predicate）是宗所依賴的基礎。那個聲論師不承認聲音上有這種無常的性質。現在佛弟子把聲音和無常合在一起，互相差別不相離的性質，就說是『聲音是無常的』。聲論師不認可，所以才能成立為宗。既然成立了，隨順自己的意願，也是樂於成立的性質，所以叫做真宗（true proposition）。恐怕意思不明白，所以舉這個例子來解釋。《瑜伽師地論》說：『立宗的人，是依據兩種所成立的意義，各自攝取自己宗派所認可的。』攝取，是自己意樂的意義。品，是宗的意義。所以《顯揚聖教論》說：『各自攝取自己宗派所認可的。』這裡的意思是說，依據兩種所立的立論，各自隨順自己的意願，自己宗派所認可的，所以叫做宗。這裡有三種解釋：第一種，以言論對應道理，取其依據意義的能詮，叫做各自宗派所認可的。第二種，以差別對應總相，取其依據總相的差別言論以及意義，叫做自己所認可的。第三種，以結合對應分離，取其能依據的不相離的性質，結合起來作為自己宗派所認可的。這和正文的意思相同。這段文字是總體的概括。
下面有十句，分為三類。最初兩句是宗的本體。一是攝受論宗（accepting the established doctrine），二是憑藉自己的辯才（relying on one's own eloquence）。最初是依據自己所師承的宗派，針對不同的論敵而樹立自己的宗派，否則就成了互相符合的極成（perfectly established）。後面是由自己的辯才來樹立其他宗派的義理，隨順自己的意願，不顧論宗。只有這兩種是真正的宗。如果是普遍認可的，或者兩種相同的宗派互相承
【English Translation】 English version: Since the analogy is already clear, why say more? Moreover, if the proposition violates ancient meanings, using the established statements to differentiate between ancient and modern, but the reason and analogy do not violate ancient meanings, there is no need to use the established statements to simply differentiate. Furthermore, it has already been stated that 'proposition' and other statements are called 'establishing arguments,' which has already been said, so there is no need to repeat it.
Treatise: This is called a proposition (宗, zōng).
Commentary: This is a conclusion.
Treatise: For example, establishing the proposition 'sound is impermanent'.
Commentary: This is an illustration. For example, a Buddhist disciple says to a Shabda philosopher (聲論師, shēng lùn shī, a school of Indian philosophy that asserts sound is eternal), 'sound is impermanent.' 'Sound' is the subject of the proposition (有法, yǒu fǎ), and 'impermanent' is the predicate (能別, néng bié). Both sides acknowledge the existence of 'sound' and 'impermanence,' which is called a perfectly established subject (極成有法, jí chéng yǒu fǎ). A perfectly established predicate (極成能別, jí chéng néng bié) is the basis upon which the proposition relies. That Shabda philosopher does not acknowledge that sound has this quality of impermanence. Now, the Buddhist disciple combines sound and impermanence, the mutually differentiating and inseparable nature, and says 'sound is impermanent.' The Shabda philosopher does not accept this, so it can be established as a proposition. Once established, according to one's own intention, it is also the nature of being happy to establish, so it is called a true proposition (真宗, zhēn zōng). Fearing that the meaning is unclear, this example is given to explain. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'One who establishes a proposition relies on two kinds of established meanings, each separately embracing what their own school accepts.' Embracing is the meaning of one's own intention. 'Category' is the meaning of the proposition. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Each separately embraces what their own school accepts.' The meaning here is that, based on the two kinds of established arguments, each follows their own intention, what their own school accepts, so it is called a proposition. There are three explanations here: First, in relation to principle, taking the expressive ability that relies on meaning, it is called what each school accepts. Second, in relation to the general, taking the differentiated statements and meanings that rely on the general, it is called what one accepts. Third, in relation to combination and separation, taking the inseparable nature that relies on it, combining it as what one's own school accepts. This is the same as the main text. This passage is a general summary.
Below are ten sentences, divided into three categories. The first two sentences are the essence of the proposition. One is accepting the established doctrine (攝受論宗, shè shòu lùn zōng), and the other is relying on one's own eloquence (自辯才, zì biàn cái). The first is based on the school one has inherited, establishing one's own school against different opponents, otherwise it becomes a mutually consistent perfectly established (極成, jí chéng) proposition. The latter is establishing the doctrines of other schools through one's own eloquence, following one's own intention, regardless of the established doctrine. Only these two are true propositions. If it is universally accepted, or two identical schools mutually acknowledge
。若傍義準。非別攝受。非隨自樂。故非真宗。立已成故。非本成故。次三句是立宗因緣。一若輕蔑他。二從他聞。三若覺真實而申宗趣。是名因緣。立他義輕他故。立自義從他聞。覺真實自悟故。如次配之。后五句是立宗意。初二句標一切立宗。不過此故。一為成立自宗。二為破壞於他。后三句釋。一為制伏於他。釋上成立自宗。二為摧屈於他。釋上破壞他宗。三為悲愍於他。成自破他皆悲愍故。
論。因有三相。
述曰。上示宗相。下示因相。此相略以四門分別。一出體。二釋名。三辯差別。四明廢立。初出體者。因有二種。一生。二了。如種生芽。能起用故名為生因。故理門云。非如生因由能起用。如燈照物。能顯果故。名爲了因。生因有三。一言生因。二智生因。三義生因。言生因者。謂立論者立因等言。能生敵論決定解故。名曰生因。故此前云。此中宗等多言名為能立。由此多言。開示諸有問者未了義故。智生因者。謂立論者發言之智。正生他解實在多言。智慧起言言生因因。故名生因。義生因者。義有二種。一道理名義。二境界名義。道理義者。謂立論者言所詮義。生因詮故名為生因。境界義者。為境能生敵證者智。亦名生因。根本立義擬生他解。他智解起本籍言生。故言為正生。智義兼生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果依據意義來衡量標準，就不是單獨攝受，也不是隨順自己的喜好，所以不是真正的宗旨。因為是已經成立的，不是本來就成立的。接下來的三句話是確立宗旨的因緣：一是輕蔑他人，二是從他人那裡聽聞，三是覺悟到真實而闡述宗旨。這被稱為因緣。確立他人的觀點是因為輕蔑他人，確立自己的觀點是從他人那裡聽聞，覺悟到真實是因為自己領悟。按照順序對應。後面的五句話是確立宗旨的意圖。最初的兩句表明一切確立宗旨，都離不開這些原因。一是為成立自己的宗旨，二是為破壞他人的宗旨。後面的三句解釋：一是為制伏他人，解釋上面成立自己的宗旨。二是為摧折屈服他人，解釋上面破壞他人的宗旨。三是為悲憫他人，成立自己的宗旨和破壞他人的宗旨都是因為悲憫的緣故。
論：因有三種相。
述曰：上面闡述了宗旨的相狀，下面闡述原因的相狀。這個相狀大致可以從四個方面來分別：一是指出本體，二是解釋名稱，三是辨別差別，四是闡明廢立。首先指出本體：原因有兩種，一是生因（hetu），二是了因（alambana）。比如種子生出芽，因為它能夠產生作用，所以稱為生因。所以《理門》中說：不像生因那樣能夠產生作用。比如燈照亮物體，因為它能夠顯現結果，所以稱爲了因。生因有三種：一是言生因，二是智生因，三是義生因。言生因是指，確立論點的人所說的因等言語，能夠使對方產生確定的理解，所以稱為生因。所以前面說：『這裡面宗旨等多種言語被稱為能立』，因為這些言語，開示了那些有疑問的人尚未理解的意義。智生因是指，確立論點的人所發出的言語的智慧，真正產生了他人的理解，實在是因為多種言語。智慧能夠產生言語，言語是生因的原因，所以稱為生因。義生因是指，意義有兩種：一是道理的意義，二是境界的意義。道理的意義是指，確立論點的人所說的言語所詮釋的意義，因為產生原因的詮釋，所以稱為生因。境界的意義是指，作為境界能夠產生對方辯證者的智慧，也稱為生因。根本上確立意義是爲了產生他人的理解，他人智慧的理解產生於言語，所以言語是正生，智慧和意義是兼生。
【English Translation】 English version: If one measures the standard by meaning, then it is neither a separate acceptance nor following one's own pleasure; therefore, it is not a true tenet. Because it is already established, not originally established. The next three sentences are the causes and conditions for establishing a tenet: first, belittling others; second, hearing from others; third, realizing the truth and expounding the tenet. This is called the cause and condition. Establishing others' views is because of belittling others; establishing one's own views is from hearing from others; realizing the truth is because of one's own understanding. Correspond in order. The following five sentences are the intention of establishing a tenet. The first two sentences indicate that all establishing of tenets cannot be separated from these reasons: first, to establish one's own tenet; second, to destroy others' tenets. The following three sentences explain: first, to subdue others, explaining the above establishing one's own tenet; second, to crush and subdue others, explaining the above destroying others' tenets; third, to have compassion for others, establishing one's own tenet and destroying others' tenets are all because of compassion.
Treatise: A cause has three characteristics.
Commentary: The above explains the characteristics of a tenet, and the following explains the characteristics of a cause. These characteristics can be roughly distinguished from four aspects: first, to point out the substance; second, to explain the name; third, to distinguish the differences; fourth, to clarify the establishment and abolition. First, to point out the substance: there are two types of causes: the productive cause (hetu) and the illuminative cause (alambana). For example, a seed produces a sprout because it can generate function, so it is called a productive cause. Therefore, the Hetu-vidya says: 'Not like a productive cause that can generate function.' For example, a lamp illuminates an object because it can reveal the result, so it is called an illuminative cause. There are three types of productive causes: first, the verbal productive cause; second, the intellectual productive cause; third, the semantic productive cause. The verbal productive cause refers to the words of the person establishing the argument, such as the cause, which can cause the opponent to have a definite understanding, so it is called a productive cause. Therefore, it was said earlier: 'Here, the many words such as the tenet are called the establisher,' because these words reveal the meanings that those who have questions have not yet understood. The intellectual productive cause refers to the wisdom of the person establishing the argument in uttering words, which truly produces the understanding of others, truly because of many words. Wisdom can produce words, and words are the cause of the productive cause, so it is called a productive cause. The semantic productive cause refers to the meaning, which has two types: the meaning of principle and the meaning of realm. The meaning of principle refers to the meaning explained by the words of the person establishing the argument, because it produces the explanation of the cause, so it is called a productive cause. The meaning of realm refers to the fact that as a realm, it can produce the wisdom of the opponent's debater, and it is also called a productive cause. Fundamentally establishing the meaning is to produce the understanding of others, and the understanding of others' wisdom arises from words, so words are the direct producer, and wisdom and meaning are the indirect producers.
攝。故論上下所說多言。開悟他時。名能立等。智了因者。謂證敵者解能立言。了宗之智照解所說。名爲了因。故理門云。但由智力了所說義。言了因者。謂立論主能立之言。由此言故敵證二徒瞭解所立。了因因故名爲了因。非但由智了能照解。亦由言故。照顯所宗名爲了因。故理門云。若爾既取智爲了因。是言便失能成立義。此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。因喻舊許名本極成。由能立言成所立義。令彼智憶本成因喻故名了因。義了因者。謂立論主能立言下所詮之義。為境能生他之智了。了因因故名爲了因。亦由能立義。成自所立宗。照顯宗故亦名了因。故理門云。如前二因於義所立。立者之智久已解宗。能立成宗。本生他解。故他智解正是了因。言義兼之亦了因攝。分別生了雖成六因。正意唯取言生智了。由言生故敵證解生。由智了故隱義今顯。故正取二為因相體。兼余無失次釋名者。因者所由。釋所立宗義之所由也。或所以義。由此所以所立義成。又建立義。能建立彼所立宗故。或順益義。由立此因。順益宗義。令宗義立。是故名因。故瑜伽云。辯因者。謂為成就所立宗義。依所引喻。同類異類。現量比量。及正教量。建立順益道理言論。問喻既建成宗。亦能順益。何不名因。答喻謂譬況。正云見邊。令所立義見
其邊際。究竟圓滿故名見邊。雖亦順益。非是正釋宗之所以。親初建立得此因名。喻疏后成不得因稱。是故此因不名見邊。說所因時義未成故。至后當知。辨差別者。雖依建立順益等義。總得因名。有果不同。疏成生了。各類有別。分言義智。體異便成立敵二智。義之與言生了各殊。別開六種。由此應言得果分兩。約體成四。據類有三。望義為六。智了因。唯是生因果。而非生因因。智生因。唯是生因因。而非了因果。言義二生因。為智生因果。為智了因因。言義二了因。為智了因因。非為智了果。得為智生果。不作智生因以言望于義。亦成顯了因以義望于言。亦成顯了果。以義望于言。亦作能生因。以言望于義。亦為所生果。由此應說唯因不是果。謂智生因。為果亦成因。餘五果。又為四句。有唯生因而非了因。謂智生因。有是了因而非生因。謂智了因。有是生因亦是了因。謂言義。有非生因亦非了因謂所立宗。明廢立者。一問何故一因。喻分二種。答因正建宗。總苞稱一。喻有違順。別離分兩。至下喻中當廣分別。二問何故一因體分生了。答智境疏寬。照顯名了。言果親狹。令起名生。果既有差。因分生了。同能得果。但總名因。三問何故二因各分三種。答生果照果義用不同。隨類有能故分三種。立智隔于言義。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 其邊際（指不究竟之處）。究竟圓滿的緣故，稱為『見邊』。雖然也順帶有所助益，但不是正釋宗（指正宗的解釋）所要表達的。最初建立時得到這個因，所以得名。譬如疏（指註釋）是後來才完成的，所以不能稱為『因』。因此，這個因不能稱為『見邊』。因為在說所因的時候，意義還沒有完全成立。這一點到後面會明白。 辨別差別在於，雖然依據建立、順益等意義，總的來說都可以稱為『因』，但果卻不同。疏的完成，產生了了因和生因。各類之間有區別。分開來說，言（語言）和義（意義）與智（智慧）的體性不同，因此可以成立敵智和二智。義和言的生因和了因各有不同，所以可以分開為六種。由此應該說，得到果的份量。從體性上來說，可以分為四種。從類別上來說，可以分為三種。從意義上來說，可以分為六種。 智的了因，只是生因的果，而不是生因的因。智的生因，只是生因的因，而不是了因的果。言和義這兩個生因，是智的生因果，是智的了因因。言和義這兩個了因，是智的了因因，而不是智的了果。可以作為智的生果，但不作為智的生因。以言來看義，也可以成為顯了因。以義來看言，也可以成為顯了果。以義來看言，也可以作為能生因。以言來看義，也可以作為所生果。由此應該說，只有因而不是果，指的是智的生因。作為果也成為因，指的是其餘五果。又可以分為四句：有隻是生因而不是了因，指的是智的生因；有是了因而不是生因，指的是智的了因；有是生因也是了因，指的是言和義；有既不是生因也不是了因，指的是所立宗（所要建立的宗義）。 闡明廢立（指廢除和建立）的人會問：為什麼一個因，譬喻卻分為兩種？回答是：因是正建立宗義的，總括起來稱為一個。譬喻有違背和順從，所以要分別開來。到後面的譬喻中會詳細分別。 又問：為什麼一個因，體性上要分為生因和了因？回答是：智的境界疏遠而寬廣，照亮顯現，所以稱為『了』。言果親近而狹窄，使之生起，所以稱為『生』。果既然有差別，因就要分為生因和了因。雖然都能得到果，但總的來說都稱為『因』。 又問：為什麼兩個因（指生因和了因）各自要分為三種？回答是：生果和照果的意義和作用不同，根據類別有不同的能力，所以要分為三種。建立智，要隔開言和義。
【English Translation】 English version: Its margins (referring to incompleteness). Because of ultimate perfection, it is called 'seeing the edge' (Jian Bian). Although it also brings incidental benefits, it is not what the Zheng Shi Zong (正釋宗, the orthodox interpretation) intends to express. Initially establishing this cause, it is named accordingly. For example, a commentary (喻疏, Yu Shu) is completed later, so it cannot be called a 'cause'. Therefore, this cause cannot be called 'seeing the edge' because when speaking of the cause, the meaning is not fully established. This will be understood later. Distinguishing the differences lies in that, although based on the meanings of establishment, incidental benefits, etc., generally they can all be called 'cause', the result is different. The completion of the commentary produces both the direct cause (了因, Liao Yin) and the productive cause (生因, Sheng Yin). There are distinctions between the categories. Separately speaking, language (言, Yan) and meaning (義, Yi) are different from the nature of wisdom (智, Zhi), therefore, opposing wisdom (敵智, Di Zhi) and two wisdoms (二智, Er Zhi) can be established. The productive cause and direct cause of meaning and language are different, so they can be divided into six types. Therefore, it should be said that the amount of result obtained. In terms of nature, it can be divided into four types. In terms of category, it can be divided into three types. In terms of meaning, it can be divided into six types. The direct cause of wisdom is only the result of the productive cause, not the cause of the productive cause. The productive cause of wisdom is only the cause of the productive cause, not the result of the direct cause. The two productive causes of language and meaning are the result of the productive cause of wisdom and the cause of the direct cause of wisdom. The two direct causes of language and meaning are the cause of the direct cause of wisdom, not the result of the direct cause of wisdom. It can be the productive result of wisdom, but not the productive cause of wisdom. Looking at meaning from language, it can also become a manifest direct cause. Looking at language from meaning, it can also become a manifest direct result. Looking at language from meaning, it can also be a productive cause. Looking at meaning from language, it can also be a produced result. Therefore, it should be said that only the cause and not the result refers to the productive cause of wisdom. As a result, it also becomes a cause, referring to the remaining five results. It can also be divided into four sentences: there is only a productive cause and not a direct cause, referring to the productive cause of wisdom; there is a direct cause and not a productive cause, referring to the direct cause of wisdom; there is both a productive cause and a direct cause, referring to language and meaning; there is neither a productive cause nor a direct cause, referring to the established doctrine (所立宗, Suo Li Zong, the doctrine to be established). Those who clarify the abolition and establishment (廢立, Fei Li, referring to abolishing and establishing) will ask: Why is one cause divided into two types of metaphors (喻, Yu)? The answer is: the cause is the correct establishment of the doctrine, and it is collectively called one. Metaphors have opposition and compliance, so they must be distinguished. This will be explained in detail in the metaphors below. It is also asked: Why is one cause divided into productive cause and direct cause in nature? The answer is: the realm of wisdom is distant and broad, illuminating and manifesting, so it is called 'direct'. The result of language is close and narrow, causing it to arise, so it is called 'productive'. Since the results are different, the cause must be divided into productive cause and direct cause. Although both can obtain the result, they are generally called 'cause'. It is also asked: Why are the two causes (referring to productive cause and direct cause) each divided into three types? The answer is: the meaning and function of producing the result and illuminating the result are different, and according to the category, there are different abilities, so they must be divided into three types. To establish wisdom, language and meaning must be separated.
不得相從名了。敵智不生立解。無由可得名生。故但分三不增不減。四問何故六因體唯有四。答順果義別。分成六因。立者義言。望果二用。除此無體。故唯有四。五問何故因中獨開三相。宗喻不開。答別名宗喻。通即稱因。遍是宗喻二之法故。又因必寬。宗喻性狹。如貫花縷貫二門故。由此開因不開宗喻。示因相中有五。一標舉。二徴數。三列名。四別釋。五示法。此即初也。其言生因。及敵證智所詮之義。各有三相。相者向也。正取言生。正能立故。此生智了。照解宗故。故正因體。言生智了。兼亦義生。能建宗故。宗同異喻各有一體。因相貫三更無別體。由此故說相者向義。故理門云。不共不定。一向離故。闕一相也。又此相者。面也。邊也。三面三邊。若爾既一因。如何說多言名為能立。其相義多。能詮言一。於三相中致一因言。故一因所依貫三別處。故多相之言名為多言。非言多故名為多言。古師解云。相者體也。初相同此。餘二各以有法為性。陳那不許。同異有法非能立故。但取彼義。故相非體。
論。何等為三。
述曰。二徴數也。
論。謂遍是宗法性同品定有性異品遍無性。
述曰。三列名也。遍是宗法性。此列初相。顯因之體以成宗故。必須遍是宗之法性。據所立宗。要
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不得以其他名稱來理解它。如果對方的智慧無法產生，就能立即理解。沒有理由可以稱之為『生』。所以只是分為三相，不多不少。四問：為什麼六因的本體只有四種？答：順應結果的意義不同，所以分成六因。『立者』是就意義而言，相對於結果有兩種作用。除了這些就沒有本體了，所以只有四種。五問：為什麼在『因』中單獨開立三相，而在『宗』和『喻』中不開立？答：『宗』和『喻』是特別的名稱，『因』是通用的稱謂。普遍存在於『宗』和『喻』兩種事物中的緣故。而且『因』必然寬泛，『宗』和『喻』的性質狹窄，就像用線貫穿花朵一樣貫穿兩個門。因此開立『因』而不開立『宗』和『喻』。顯示『因』的相狀有五種：一是標舉，二是征數，三是列名，四是別釋，五是示法。這裡是第一種。所說的『生因』，以及對方證智所詮釋的意義，各有三相。『相』是趨向的意思，正是取『言生』，因為能正確地建立。這個『生智』理解了，照亮並理解了『宗』，所以是正因的本體。『言生智了』，也兼顧了意義的產生，因為能建立『宗』。『宗』、『同喻』、『異喻』各自有一個本體，『因相』貫穿三者，沒有其他的本體。因此說『相』是趨向的意義。所以理門說，不共、不定，一向遠離，缺少一個相。而且這個『相』，是面，是邊，有三個面三個邊。如果這樣，既然是一個『因』，為什麼說多言名為能立？是相的意義多，能詮釋的言語只有一個。在三相中導致一個『因』的言語，所以一個『因』所依據的貫穿三個不同的地方，所以多相的言語稱為多言，不是因為言語多才稱為多言。古師解釋說，『相』是本體。第一個相與此相同，其餘兩個各自以有法為性質。陳那（Dignāga）不認可，因為同喻和異喻的有法不是能立，只是取它們的意義，所以相不是本體。 論：什麼是三相？ 述曰：這是第二種，征數。 論：所謂遍是宗法性（pakṣadharmatva，宗所依性），同品定有性（sapakṣe sattvam eva，在同類中必然存在），異品遍無性（vipakṣe ca asattvam eva，在異類中完全不存在）。 述曰：這是第三種，列名。『遍是宗法性』，這是列出第一個相，顯示『因』的本體以成就『宗』，所以必須普遍是『宗』的法性。根據所立的『宗』，要
【English Translation】 English version It should not be understood by other names. If the opponent's wisdom cannot arise, then it can be immediately understood. There is no reason to call it 'arising'. Therefore, it is only divided into three aspects, no more and no less. Fourth question: Why does the substance of the six causes only have four types? Answer: According to the different meanings of the results, it is divided into six causes. 'Establisher' refers to the meaning, and has two functions relative to the result. Apart from these, there is no substance, so there are only four. Fifth question: Why are the three aspects established separately in 'cause', but not in 'thesis' and 'example'? Answer: 'Thesis' and 'example' are special names, and 'cause' is a general term. It is because it universally exists in the two things of 'thesis' and 'example'. Moreover, 'cause' must be broad, and the nature of 'thesis' and 'example' is narrow, just like threading flowers with a thread to connect two doors. Therefore, 'cause' is established but 'thesis' and 'example' are not. Showing that there are five aspects of 'cause': first, indication; second, enumeration; third, naming; fourth, separate explanation; fifth, showing the Dharma. This is the first type. The so-called 'arising cause', and the meaning explained by the opponent's proving wisdom, each have three aspects. 'Aspect' means tendency, and it is precisely taking 'speech arising', because it can correctly establish. This 'arising wisdom' understands, illuminates and understands 'thesis', so it is the substance of the correct cause. 'Speech arising wisdom understands', also takes into account the arising of meaning, because it can establish 'thesis'. 'Thesis', 'homologous example', and 'heterologous example' each have one substance, and 'cause aspect' penetrates the three, and there is no other substance. Therefore, it is said that 'aspect' is the meaning of tendency. Therefore, the Logic Gate says that non-common and uncertain are always far away, lacking one aspect. Moreover, this 'aspect' is a face, a side, with three faces and three sides. If so, since it is one 'cause', why is it said that many words are called establishment? It is that the meaning of the aspect is many, and the words that can explain it are only one. Leading to one 'cause' in the three aspects, so one 'cause' relies on penetrating three different places, so many words of aspect are called many words, not because there are many words that are called many words. The ancient teacher explained that 'aspect' is the substance. The first aspect is the same as this, and the remaining two each take the property of having Dharma as their nature. Dignāga did not approve, because the Dharma of homologous and heterologous examples is not establishment, but only takes their meaning, so the aspect is not the substance. Treatise: What are the three aspects? Commentary: This is the second type, enumeration. Treatise: The so-called pervading is pakṣadharmatva (property of being the property of the thesis), sapakṣe sattvam eva (definitely existing in similar instances), and vipakṣe ca asattvam eva (completely non-existent in dissimilar instances). Commentary: This is the third type, naming. 'Pervading is the property of the thesis', this is listing the first aspect, showing the substance of 'cause' to achieve 'thesis', so it must universally be the property of 'thesis'. According to the established 'thesis', it is necessary to
是極成法及有法不相離性。此中宗言。唯詮有法。有法之上所有別義名之為法。此法有二。一者不共有。宗中法是。二者共有。即因體是。理門論云。此中宗法。唯取立論及敵論者決定同許今此唯依證了因故。彼自難云。既爾便失前說言為能成立性。論主解云。由有言生。令彼憶念本極成故。意以因體共許之法。成宗之中不共許法。故此二法。皆是有法之上別義。故今唯以有法名宗。對敵所申因喻成立。雖取二依不相離性以為宗體。有法既為二法總主。總宗一分故亦名宗。理門論云。豈不總以樂所成立合說為宗。云何此中乃言宗者唯取有法。此無有失。以其總聲于別亦轉。如言燒衣。或有宗聲唯詮於法。若以宗中后陳名法。即宗是法。持業為名。總宗之法。亦依主釋。具二得名。今因名法。宗之法性。唯依主釋性者。體也。此唯義性。非是體性。義相應故。餘二亦然。此共許因唯得遍是有法宗性。以宗之法成即宗法故。不遍是法宗之性。因犯兩俱不成過故。又不欲成宗有法故。然因明理。有法不成於有法。此亦不成於法。因犯所依不成過故。理門難云。若以有法立余有法或立其法。如以煙立火。或以火立觸。其義云何。此義難云。如遠見煙立下有火。以有煙故。豈非彼以有法成有法。煙之與火俱有法故。又如見火雲定
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『是極成法及有法不相離性』，這句話說明了極成法（雙方都認可的法）和有法（具有某種屬性的事物）之間不可分離的性質。這裡所說的『宗』（命題），僅僅是用來詮釋『有法』的。在『有法』之上的所有特殊含義，都被稱為『法』（屬性）。這種『法』有兩種：一種是不共有的，也就是『宗』中的『法』；另一種是共有的，也就是『因』（理由）的本體。 《理門論》中說：『這裡所說的「宗法」，僅僅選取立論者和敵論者都一致認可的部分。』現在這樣做，僅僅是因為要依靠已經證明的『因』。對方反駁說：『既然這樣，那就失去了前面所說的「能夠成立的性質」。』 論主解釋說：『因為有了「有」這個詞，才讓對方回憶起原本已經認可的事實。』意思是說，用『因』的本體中雙方都認可的『法』，來成立『宗』中不被雙方共同認可的『法』。所以這兩種『法』，都是在『有法』之上的特殊含義。因此，現在僅僅用『有法』來作為『宗』，以此來應對對方提出的『因』和『喻』，從而成立論點。 雖然選取了兩種依據之間不可分離的性質作為『宗』的本體，但是『有法』是這兩種『法』的總的歸屬。作為總的『宗』的一部分，也可以被稱為『宗』。《理門論》中說：『難道不是將總的、用樂受所成立的結論合在一起稱為「宗」嗎？為什麼這裡卻說「宗」僅僅選取「有法」呢？』 這沒有錯誤，因為總稱也可以用於別稱。比如，說『燒衣』。或者有的『宗』僅僅詮釋『法』。如果用『宗』中后陳述的部分來命名為『法』，那麼『宗』就是『法』，這是持業釋的命名方式。總的『宗』的『法』，也是依主釋，兼具兩種命名方式。現在『因』被稱為『法』，是『宗』的『法性』，僅僅是依主釋。『性』指的是本體。這裡僅僅是義理上的『性』，不是本體上的『性』，因為是義理上相應的緣故。其餘兩種情況也是如此。 這種雙方都認可的『因』，只能普遍地成為『有法』的『宗性』，因為『宗』的『法』成立，也就是『宗法』成立。不能普遍地成為『法』的『宗性』，因為『因』會犯兩俱不成過的錯誤。而且也不想成立『宗』的『有法』。然而，在因明理論中，『有法』不能成立『有法』，這也不能成立『法』，因為『因』會犯所依不成過的錯誤。 《理門論》反駁說：『如果用「有法」來成立另一個「有法」，或者成立它的「法」，比如用煙來成立火，或者用火來成立觸，這又是什麼意思呢？』 這裡反駁說：『比如遠遠地看到煙，就可以推斷下面有火，因為有煙的緣故。難道這不是用「有法」來成立「有法」嗎？煙和火都是「有法」啊。』又比如看到火，就一定...
【English Translation】 English version: 『Is the nature of inseparable existence between the perfectly established dharma (a mutually agreed-upon principle) and the dharmin (a subject possessing a certain attribute).』 This statement explains the inseparable nature between the perfectly established dharma (prasiddha-dharma) and the dharmin (dharmi) (the subject possessing a certain attribute). Here, the 『thesis』 (paksha) is solely used to explain the 『dharmin』. All special meanings above the 『dharmin』 are called 『dharma』 (attribute). This 『dharma』 is of two types: one is non-common, which is the 『dharma』 in the 『thesis』; the other is common, which is the essence of the 『reason』 (hetu). The Nyaya-mukha states: 『Here, the 「thesis-dharma」 (paksha-dharma) only selects the part that is consistently agreed upon by both the proponent and the opponent.』 Now, this is done solely because it relies on the already proven 『reason』. The opponent retorts: 『If that's the case, then it loses the previously stated 「nature of being able to establish」.』 The author explains: 『Because of the word 「existence」, it reminds the opponent of the originally agreed-upon fact.』 The meaning is that the 『dharma』 in the essence of the 『reason』, which is mutually agreed upon, is used to establish the 『dharma』 in the 『thesis』 that is not mutually agreed upon. Therefore, these two types of 『dharma』 are both special meanings above the 『dharmin』. Thus, now only the 『dharmin』 is used as the 『thesis』 to respond to the 『reason』 and 『example』 (drstanta) proposed by the opponent, thereby establishing the argument. Although the inseparable nature between the two bases is selected as the essence of the 『thesis』, the 『dharmin』 is the overall belonging of these two 『dharmas』. As a part of the overall 『thesis』, it can also be called 『thesis』. The Nyaya-mukha states: 『Isn't the overall conclusion established by pleasure combinedly called the 「thesis」? Why does it say here that the 「thesis」 only selects the 「dharmin」?』 This is not a mistake, because the general term can also be used for the specific term. For example, saying 『burning clothes』. Or some 『theses』 only explain 『dharma』. If the latter statement in the 『thesis』 is named 『dharma』, then the 『thesis』 is 『dharma』, which is a karmadharaya compound (a type of Sanskrit compound). The 『dharma』 of the overall 『thesis』 is also a tatpurusha compound (another type of Sanskrit compound), possessing both naming methods. Now, the 『reason』 is called 『dharma』, which is the 『dharma-nature』 of the 『thesis』, and is only a tatpurusha compound. 『Nature』 refers to the essence. Here, it is only the 『nature』 in terms of meaning, not the 『nature』 in terms of essence, because it is corresponding in meaning. The other two cases are also the same. This mutually agreed-upon 『reason』 can only universally become the 『thesis-nature』 of the 『dharmin』, because the 『dharma』 of the 『thesis』 is established, which means the 『thesis-dharma』 is established. It cannot universally become the 『thesis-nature』 of the 『dharma』, because the 『reason』 will commit the fallacy of both being unestablished (ubhayasiddha). Moreover, it is not intended to establish the 『dharmin』 of the 『thesis』. However, in the theory of logic, the 『dharmin』 cannot establish the 『dharmin』, and this cannot establish the 『dharma』, because the 『reason』 will commit the fallacy of the unestablished locus (ashrayasiddha). The Nyaya-mukha retorts: 『If the 「dharmin」 is used to establish another 「dharmin」, or to establish its 「dharma」, such as using smoke to establish fire, or using fire to establish touch, what does this mean?』 Here it is retorted: 『For example, seeing smoke from afar, one can infer that there is fire below, because there is smoke. Isn't this using 「dharmin」 to establish 「dharmin」? Smoke and fire are both 「dharmin」.』 Also, for example, seeing fire, one can certainly...
有熱。以有火故。熱觸既是火家之法。豈不以有法成於法耶。陳那釋云。今於此中。非以成立火觸為宗。但為成立此相應物。謂成山處決定有火。以有煙故。爐中定熱以有火故。名為煙火相應之物。非以有法煙。還成有法火。亦不以有法火。而成熱觸法。彼論又云。若不爾者。依煙立火。依火立觸。應成宗義一分為因。還以宗中一分有法而為因故。便為不可。故因乃有所依不成。無所依故。亦不以法成立有法。宗中所陳。后能別前。名為能別。亦名為法。因成於此。不欲以因成前所陳。是所別故。非別後故。理門又云。又於此中。觀所成故。立法有法。非德有德。故無有過。前陳名有法。后陳皆名法。非法有法法性決定。如勝論師德與有德。有德謂實。彼決定故。理門頌云。有法非成於有法。及法此非成有法。但由法故成其法。如是成立於有法。謂有法因法二俱極成。宗中之法。敵先不許。但得共許因在宗中有法之上。成不共許宗中之法。如是資益有法義成。可得因在不共許中。許在彼中何所成立。又若共許之因。依不共許法。凡所立因。皆有他隨一所依不成過。不說有法而為所依。但以其法而為所依。法非共許。縱唯立許豈定無此過。又如立宗聲是無常所作性故。無常滅義。所作生義。聲有滅者。以有生故。一切生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有熱，是因為有火的緣故。熱的觸感既然是火的特性，難道不是因為有特性而成就了特性嗎？陳那（Dignāga）解釋說：『現在在這裡，不是爲了成立火的觸感作為論題，只是爲了成立與此相應的物體，即成立在山的地方一定有火，因為有煙的緣故；爐子中一定有熱，因為有火的緣故。』這被稱為煙火相應的物體。不是因為有煙的特性，反過來成立有火的特性；也不是因為有火的特性，而成立熱觸的特性。他的論著又說：『如果不是這樣，依據煙來成立火，依據火來成立觸感，就應該成為宗義的一部分作為因，反過來用宗義中的一部分有法作為因，就變得不可行。』所以，因就有所依據而不能成立，因為沒有所依據。也不是用特性來成立有法。宗義中所陳述的，后能區別於前，被稱為能區別，也稱為特性。因成立於此，不是想要用因來成立先前所陳述的，因為那是所區別的，不是區別於後。理門（Nyāyamukha）又說：『又在這裡，觀察所要成立的，所以立特性有法，不是德與有德，所以沒有過失。』先前陳述的稱為有法，後面陳述的都稱為特性。非法、有法、法性是決定的，就像勝論師（Vaiśeṣika）的德與有德，有德指的是實體，那是決定的緣故。理門頌說：『有法不能成立於有法，以及特性不能成立有法，但因為特性的緣故成立其特性，這樣成立在於有法。』所謂有法、因、特性二者都完全成立，宗義中的特性，對方先前不認可，但得到共同認可的因在宗義中的有法之上，成立不共同認可的宗義中的特性。這樣資助有法的意義得以成立，可以得到因在不共同認可中，認可在那裡面成立什麼？又如果共同認可的因，依據不共同認可的特性，凡是所立的因，都有他隨一所依不能成立的過失。不說有法作為所依，只是用其特性作為所依，特性不是共同認可的，縱然隻立認可，難道一定沒有這個過失嗎？又如立宗：『聲音是無常的，因為是所作性的緣故。』無常是滅的意義，所作是生的意義，聲音有滅的，因為有生的緣故，一切生 English version: There is heat because there is fire. Since the sensation of heat is a characteristic of fire, isn't it because of having a characteristic that a characteristic is established? Dignāga explains: 'Here, it is not to establish the sensation of fire as the thesis, but only to establish the object corresponding to it, that is, to establish that there must be fire in the place of the mountain because there is smoke; there must be heat in the furnace because there is fire.' This is called the object corresponding to smoke and fire. It is not because of having the characteristic of smoke that the characteristic of fire is established in return; nor is it because of having the characteristic of fire that the characteristic of heat sensation is established. His treatise also says: 'If it is not like this, relying on smoke to establish fire, and relying on fire to establish sensation, it should become a part of the thesis as the reason, and in turn, using a part of the subject (dharmin) in the thesis as the reason, it becomes impossible.' Therefore, the reason is based on something and cannot be established because there is nothing to rely on. Nor is it to establish the subject (dharmin) with a characteristic. What is stated in the thesis, what can distinguish the former from the latter, is called the distinguisher, and is also called a characteristic. The reason is established here, not wanting to use the reason to establish what was stated earlier, because that is what is distinguished, not distinguishing the latter. Nyāyamukha also says: 'Also here, observing what is to be established, so establish the characteristic subject (dharma-dharmin), not quality and the possessor of quality, so there is no fault.' What is stated earlier is called the subject (dharmin), and what is stated later is called the characteristic. Non-characteristic, subject (dharmin), and the nature of characteristic are definite, just like the quality and the possessor of quality of the Vaiśeṣika, the possessor of quality refers to the substance, that is definite. The Nyāyamukha verse says: 'The subject (dharmin) cannot be established in the subject (dharmin), and the characteristic cannot establish the subject (dharmin), but because of the characteristic, its characteristic is established, thus establishing in the subject (dharmin).' The so-called subject (dharmin), reason, and characteristic are all completely established, the characteristic in the thesis, the opponent did not recognize it before, but the commonly recognized reason is obtained on the subject (dharmin) in the thesis, establishing the uncommonly recognized characteristic in the thesis. In this way, the meaning of assisting the subject (dharmin) can be established, and the reason can be obtained in the uncommonly recognized, what is established in that recognition? Also, if the commonly recognized reason is based on the uncommonly recognized characteristic, all the established reasons have the fault of not being able to establish one of the dependencies. Not saying that the subject (dharmin) is the basis, but only using its characteristic as the basis, the characteristic is not commonly recognized, even if only recognition is established, is it certain that there is no such fault? Also, such as establishing the thesis: 'Sound is impermanent because it is produced.' Impermanence is the meaning of extinction, production is the meaning of arising, sound has extinction because it has arising, all arising
【English Translation】 There is heat. Because there is fire. Since the heat sensation is a characteristic of fire, isn't it because of having a characteristic that a characteristic is established? Chenna (Dignāga) explains: 'Now, in this case, it is not to establish the fire sensation as the thesis, but only to establish the corresponding object, that is, to establish that there must be fire in the mountain because there is smoke; there must be heat in the furnace because there is fire.' This is called the corresponding object of smoke and fire. It is not because of the characteristic of smoke that the characteristic of fire is established in return; nor is it because of the characteristic of fire that the heat sensation characteristic is established. His treatise also says: 'If not, relying on smoke to establish fire, and relying on fire to establish sensation, it should become a part of the thesis as the reason, and in turn, using a part of the subject (dharmin) in the thesis as the reason, it becomes impossible.' Therefore, the reason is based on something and cannot be established because there is nothing to rely on. Nor is it to establish the subject (dharmin) with a characteristic. What is stated in the thesis, what can distinguish the former from the latter, is called the distinguisher, and is also called a characteristic. The reason is established here, not wanting to use the reason to establish what was stated earlier, because that is what is distinguished, not distinguishing the latter. The Treatise on Logic (Nyāyamukha) also says: 'Also here, observing what is to be established, so establish the characteristic subject (dharma-dharmin), not quality and the possessor of quality, so there is no fault.' What is stated earlier is called the subject (dharmin), and what is stated later is called the characteristic. Non-characteristic, subject (dharmin), and the nature of characteristic are definite, just like the quality and the possessor of quality of the Vaisheshika (Vaiśeṣika), the possessor of quality refers to the substance, that is definite. The Treatise on Logic verse says: 'The subject (dharmin) cannot be established in the subject (dharmin), and the characteristic cannot establish the subject (dharmin), but because of the characteristic, its characteristic is established, thus establishing in the subject (dharmin).' The so-called subject (dharmin), reason, and characteristic are all completely established, the characteristic in the thesis, the opponent did not recognize it before, but the commonly recognized reason is obtained on the subject (dharmin) in the thesis, establishing the uncommonly recognized characteristic in the thesis. In this way, the meaning of assisting the subject (dharmin) can be established, and the reason can be obtained in the uncommonly recognized, what is established in that recognition? Also, if the commonly recognized reason is based on the uncommonly recognized characteristic, all the established reasons have the fault of not being able to establish one of the dependencies. Not saying that the subject (dharmin) is the basis, but only using its characteristic as the basis, the characteristic is not commonly recognized, even if only recognition is established, is it certain that there is no such fault? Also, such as establishing the thesis: 'Sound is impermanent because it is produced.' Impermanence is the meaning of extinction, production is the meaning of arising, sound has extinction because it has arising, all arising
者。皆有滅故。聲既因生。明有果滅。若因所作。不遍聲宗。豈得遍在無常上有。一切正因中。應皆有兩俱不成。無常之上本無生故。由此故知。因但是宗有法之法。非法法也。問稱為宗法。即已是因。何須言遍。初既云遍因義已明。何須復云是宗法性。答若因不遍宗有法上。此所不遍便非因成。有所不立。顯皆因立。是故稱遍。若但言遍不言宗法。即不能顯因是有法宗之法效能成於法。又因於宗過名為不成。於二喻中俱有俱無名為不定。於二喻中有無相違名曰相違。若唯言法性不言遍者。因於宗過即是不成。或兩俱不遍。或隨一不遍。或猶預不遍。或所依不遍。全分一分等隨應有之。為簡此失是故言遍。若但言遍不言宗法。不知此因誰家之因。為顯是宗有法之因。成於宗法。故言法性。由此應為諸句分別。有宗法而非遍。有是遍亦宗法。有非遍非宗法。必無是遍非宗法句。但遍有法。若有別體。若無別體。並能成宗。義相關故。必是宗法。如薩婆多對大乘者。立命根實。以有業故。如五根等。豈以命根。與業別體。即非正因。故有別體。若無別體。義相關帶。必是宗法。皆得說為宗之法性。非無體是。非有體非。初有宗法而非遍者。四不成中皆一分攝。初兩俱一分兩俱不成者。如勝論師對聲生者。立一切聲皆是無常
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 這些（聲音）都有消滅的時候。聲音既然是因緣而生，就表明有產生和消滅的結果。如果（無常）是因為（聲音）所產生，那就不能普遍存在於所有聲音的類別中。怎麼能普遍存在於無常之上呢？在一切正確的論證中，應該都有兩種情況同時不成立，因為在無常之上本來就沒有產生。由此可知，『因』只是存在於『宗』所具有的『法』的『法』，而不是非『法』的『法』。問：如果稱為『宗法』，就已經可以作為『因』了，為什麼還要說『遍』呢？最初既然說了『遍』，『因』的意義已經很明顯了，為什麼還要再說『是宗法性』呢？答：如果『因』沒有普遍存在於『宗』所具有的『法』之上，那麼這種不普遍存在的情況就不能構成『因』。有所不成立，就表明都是因為『因』的成立。所以要說『遍』。如果只說『遍』而不說『宗法』，就不能夠表明『因』是『有法宗』的『法』，能夠成立『法』。而且，『因』對於『宗』的過失稱為『不成』，在兩個比喻中同時存在或同時不存在稱為『不定』，在兩個比喻中存在和不存在相互矛盾稱為『相違』。如果只說法性而不說『遍』，那麼『因』對於『宗』的過失就是『不成』，或者兩者都不普遍存在，或者其中一個不普遍存在，或者猶豫不決地不普遍存在，或者所依賴的不普遍存在，全部或一部分等等，根據情況而定。爲了避免這些過失，所以要說『遍』。如果只說『遍』而不說『宗法』，就不知道這個『因』是誰家的『因』。爲了表明這是『宗』所具有的『法』的『因』，能夠成立『宗法』，所以要說『法性』。因此，應該對這些句子進行分別。有的是『宗法』而不是『遍』，有的是『遍』也是『宗法』，有的既不是『遍』也不是『宗法』，一定沒有是『遍』而不是『宗法』的情況。只要普遍存在於『有法』，無論有沒有不同的本體，都能夠成立『宗』，因為意義相關聯。一定是『宗法』。例如，薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）對於大乘（Mahayana）的人，主張命根（jīvitendriya，生命力）是真實的，因為有業（karma，行為）的緣故，就像五根（pañcendriya，五種感官能力）等一樣。難道因為命根與業是不同的本體，就不是正確的『因』了嗎？所以有不同的本體。如果沒有不同的本體，意義相關聯，一定是『宗法』，都可以說是『宗』的『法性』。不是沒有本體，也不是有本體就不是。最初有『宗法』而不是『遍』的情況，四種『不成』都包含在其中一部分。最初兩種情況的一部分，兩種情況都不成立，例如，勝論師（Vaisheshika）對於主張聲音是產生的人，主張一切聲音都是無常的。
【English Translation】 English version These (sounds) all have cessation. Since sound arises from conditions, it indicates that there are results of arising and ceasing. If (impermanence) is caused by (sound), then it cannot be universally present in all categories of sound. How can it be universally present on impermanence? In all correct arguments, there should be two situations that are not established simultaneously, because there is originally no arising on impermanence. From this, it can be known that the 'cause' is only the 'dharma' of the 'dharma' that exists in the 'thesis', and not the 'dharma' of the non-'dharma'. Question: If it is called 'property of the thesis', it can already be regarded as a 'cause', why is it necessary to say 'pervasive'? Since 'pervasive' was mentioned at the beginning, the meaning of 'cause' is already very clear, why is it necessary to say 'is the nature of the property of the thesis' again? Answer: If the 'cause' is not universally present on the 'dharma' possessed by the 'thesis', then this non-universal presence cannot constitute a 'cause'. What is not established indicates that it is all because of the establishment of the 'cause'. Therefore, it is necessary to say 'pervasive'. If only 'pervasive' is said without mentioning 'property of the thesis', it cannot indicate that the 'cause' is the 'dharma' of the 'thesis possessing dharma', which can establish the 'dharma'. Moreover, the fault of the 'cause' in relation to the 'thesis' is called 'unestablished', the simultaneous existence or non-existence in the two analogies is called 'uncertain', and the contradiction between existence and non-existence in the two analogies is called 'contradictory'. If only the nature of the property is mentioned without mentioning 'pervasive', then the fault of the 'cause' in relation to the 'thesis' is 'unestablished', either both are not universally present, or one of them is not universally present, or hesitantly not universally present, or what is relied upon is not universally present, all or part, etc., depending on the situation. In order to avoid these faults, it is necessary to say 'pervasive'. If only 'pervasive' is said without mentioning 'property of the thesis', it is not known whose 'cause' this 'cause' is. In order to indicate that this is the 'cause' of the 'dharma' possessed by the 'thesis', which can establish the 'property of the thesis', it is necessary to say 'nature of the property'. Therefore, these sentences should be distinguished. Some are 'property of the thesis' but not 'pervasive', some are 'pervasive' and also 'property of the thesis', some are neither 'pervasive' nor 'property of the thesis', there is definitely no situation where it is 'pervasive' but not 'property of the thesis'. As long as it is universally present in 'possessing dharma', whether there is a different entity or not, it can establish the 'thesis', because the meanings are related. It must be 'property of the thesis'. For example, the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins) argue to the Mahayana (Mahayana) that the life faculty (jīvitendriya) is real because of karma (karma), just like the five faculties (pañcendriya) and so on. Is it not a correct 'cause' because the life faculty and karma are different entities? Therefore, there are different entities. If there is no different entity, the meanings are related, it must be 'property of the thesis', and it can be said to be the 'nature of the property' of the 'thesis'. It is not that there is no entity, nor is it that having an entity is not. Initially, there is a situation where it is 'property of the thesis' but not 'pervasive', and the four types of 'unestablished' are all included in one part of it. Initially, a part of the two situations, both situations are not established, for example, the Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika) argues to those who claim that sound is produced that all sounds are impermanent.
宗。勤勇無間所發性因。立敵二宗。唯許內聲有勤勇發。外聲非有。立敵俱說此因於宗半有半無。故此過是兩俱有體一分不成。余無體兩俱一分一種不成。若有體若無體。若自若他。合四種一分隨一不成。兩俱一分。若自若他。合三種一分猶豫不成。兩俱有體一分。若他若自。有體一分隨一。合三所依不成。如是更有十一。並前十二一分不成。皆如下釋。后句非遍非宗法者。四不成中並全分過。如聲論師對佛弟子。立聲為常。眼所見故。俱說此因於聲無故。此是有體兩俱全分兩俱不成。余無體兩俱全分一種不成。有體無體。若自若他。四種全分隨一不成。兩俱全分。若自若他。三種猶豫不成有體無體兩俱全分。有體無體若自若他。隨一全分六種所依不成。如是更有十四。並前十五全分不成。亦如下釋。此二遍句。並皆是過。唯第二句遍亦宗法。是正因相。為簡非句故說遍是宗法性。言同品定有性者。顯第二相。同是相似義。品是體類義。相似體類名為同品。故理門云。此中若品與所立法。鄰近均等。說名同品。以一切義皆名品故。彼言意說雖一切義皆名為品。今取其因正所成法。若言所顯法之自相。若非言顯意之所許。但是兩宗所諍義法。皆名所立。隨應有此所立法處說名同品。以隨有無體名同品。由此品者是體類故
。若唯言所陳所諍法之自相名為所立。有此法處名同品者。便無有四相違之因。比量相違。決定相違。皆應無四。若全同有法上所有一切義者。便無同品。亦無異品。宗有一分相符極成。非一切義皆相違故。故但取所立有此名同。然下論云。如立無常。瓶等無常名同品者。唯舉所陳兩宗本諍法之自相名為同品。以余意所許是傍所諍。略而不說。理皆同品。以此釋文。應當深義。同品有二。一宗同品。故下論云。謂所立法均等義品。是名同品。二因同品。下文亦言。若於是處顯因同品決定有性。然論多說宗之同品名為同品。宗相似故。因之同品名為同法宗之法故。何須二同。因之在處說宗同品。欲顯其因。遍宗喻故。宗法隨因說因同法。顯有因處立法必隨故。且宗同品。何者名同。若同有法。全不相似。聲為有法瓶為喻故。若法為同。敵不許法于有法有。亦非因相遍宗法中。何得取法而以為同。此中義意。不別取二。總取一切有宗法處名宗同品。故論說言。如立無常。瓶等無常是名同品。有此宗處決定有因。名因同品。然實同品正取因同。因貫宗喻體性寬遍。有此共許因法之處。不共許法定必隨故。今明一切有宗法處其因定有。故說宗同。不欲以宗成因義故。非正同品。其因於彼宗同品處決定有性。故言同品定有性也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果僅僅將所陳述、所爭論的法的自性稱為『所立』（Svalakshana，自相）。有此法存在的地方稱為『同品』（Sapaksha，相似例子），那麼就不會有四種相違的因（Hetu，理由）。比量相違（Anumana-viruddha，與推論相違）、決定相違（Niscaya-viruddha，與確定相違）都應不存在。如果完全等同於有法（Dharmin，具有屬性的事物）上所有的一切意義，那麼就不會有同品，也不會有異品（Vipaksha，不相似例子）。宗（Paksha，論題）有一部分與極成（Prasiddha，已證實）相符，並非一切意義都相違背。所以只取『所立』具有此名稱為『同』。然而下文論述說：『例如立『無常』（Anitya，impermanence），瓶等無常稱為同品』，僅僅舉出所陳述的兩宗（Paksha，論題）原本爭論的法的自性稱為同品。因為其餘意義所允許的是旁側所爭論的，省略而不說，道理都相同于同品。用這個解釋文，應當深入理解其意義。同品有兩種：一是宗同品。所以下文論述說：『所謂所立之法均等的意義品類，這稱為同品。』二是因同品。下文也說：『如果在某個地方顯示因同品決定具有自性。』然而論述大多說宗的同品稱為同品，因為與宗相似。因的同品稱為同法，因為是宗的法。為什麼需要兩種同品？在因存在的地方說宗的同品，想要顯示其因遍及宗和喻（Drishtanta，例子）。宗法隨著因說因的同法，顯示有因的地方，所立之法必定跟隨。而且宗同品，什麼稱為『同』？如果與有法相同，完全不相似，聲音作為有法，瓶作為喻。如果法相同，對方不承認法在有法中存在，也不是因相遍及宗法之中，怎麼能取法而作為『同』？這裡的意思是，不分別取二者，總取一切具有宗法的地方，稱為宗同品。所以論述說：『例如立『無常』，瓶等無常，這稱為同品。』有此宗存在的地方，決定有因，稱為因同品。然而實際上同品正確地取因同品，因為因貫穿宗和喻，體性寬廣普遍。有此共同認可的因法存在的地方，不共同認可的法必定跟隨。現在說明一切具有宗法的地方，其因必定存在。所以說宗同，不是想要用宗來成就因的意義。不是真正的同品，其因在那個宗同品的地方決定具有自性。所以說『同品決定有自性』。 English version: If only the self-nature of the dharma (phenomenon) that is stated and disputed is called 'established' (Svalakshana, self-characteristic). The place where this dharma exists is called 'similar instance' (Sapaksha, similar example), then there would be no four contradictory reasons (Hetu, reason). Contradiction by inference (Anumana-viruddha, contradicted by inference), contradiction by determination (Niscaya-viruddha, contradicted by determination) should all not exist. If it is completely identical to all the meanings on the subject (Dharmin, the subject possessing attributes), then there would be no similar instance, nor would there be dissimilar instance (Vipaksha, dissimilar example). The thesis (Paksha, proposition) has a part that corresponds to what is extremely established (Prasiddha, proven), not all meanings are contradictory. Therefore, only taking 'established' as having this name as 'similar'. However, the following discussion says: 'For example, establishing 'impermanence' (Anitya, impermanence), the impermanence of a pot, etc., is called a similar instance,' only citing the self-nature of the dharma that is originally disputed by the two theses (Paksha, proposition) that are stated as a similar instance. Because what is permitted by other meanings is what is disputed on the side, it is omitted and not said, the principles are all the same as similar instances. With this explanatory text, one should deeply understand its meaning. There are two types of similar instances: one is the thesis similar instance. Therefore, the following discussion says: 'What is called the category of meanings equal to the established dharma, this is called a similar instance.' The second is the reason similar instance. The following text also says: 'If it is shown in a certain place that the reason similar instance definitely has its own nature.' However, the discussion mostly says that the similar instance of the thesis is called a similar instance, because it is similar to the thesis. The similar instance of the reason is called similar dharma, because it is the dharma of the thesis. Why are two types of similar instances needed? Saying the similar instance of the thesis in the place where the reason exists, wanting to show that its reason pervades the thesis and example (Drishtanta, example). The thesis dharma follows the reason to say the similar dharma of the reason, showing that where there is a reason, the established dharma must follow. Moreover, the thesis similar instance, what is called 'similar'? If it is the same as the subject, it is completely dissimilar, sound is taken as the subject, and a pot is taken as the example. If the dharma is the same, the opponent does not admit that the dharma exists in the subject, nor is it that the characteristic of the reason pervades the thesis dharma, how can one take the dharma as 'similar'? The meaning here is that one does not separately take the two, but generally takes all places with the thesis dharma, and calls it the thesis similar instance. Therefore, the discussion says: 'For example, establishing 'impermanence', the impermanence of a pot, etc., this is called a similar instance.' Where this thesis exists, there is definitely a reason, which is called the reason similar instance. However, in reality, the similar instance correctly takes the reason similar instance, because the reason penetrates the thesis and example, and its nature is broad and universal. Where this commonly recognized reason dharma exists, the not commonly recognized dharma must follow. Now it is explained that in all places with the thesis dharma, its reason must exist. Therefore, it is said that the thesis is the same, not wanting to use the thesis to accomplish the meaning of the reason. It is not a true similar instance, its reason definitely has its own nature in that thesis similar instance. Therefore, it is said that 'the similar instance definitely has its own nature.'
【English Translation】 English version: If only the self-nature of the dharma (phenomenon) that is stated and disputed is called 'established' (Svalakshana, self-characteristic). The place where this dharma exists is called 'similar instance' (Sapaksha, similar example), then there would be no four contradictory reasons (Hetu, reason). Contradiction by inference (Anumana-viruddha, contradicted by inference), contradiction by determination (Niscaya-viruddha, contradicted by determination) should all not exist. If it is completely identical to all the meanings on the subject (Dharmin, the subject possessing attributes), then there would be no similar instance, nor would there be dissimilar instance (Vipaksha, dissimilar example). The thesis (Paksha, proposition) has a part that corresponds to what is extremely established (Prasiddha, proven), not all meanings are contradictory. Therefore, only taking 'established' as having this name as 'similar'. However, the following discussion says: 'For example, establishing 'impermanence' (Anitya, impermanence), the impermanence of a pot, etc., is called a similar instance,' only citing the self-nature of the dharma that is originally disputed by the two theses (Paksha, proposition) that are stated as a similar instance. Because what is permitted by other meanings is what is disputed on the side, it is omitted and not said, the principles are all the same as similar instances. With this explanatory text, one should deeply understand its meaning. There are two types of similar instances: one is the thesis similar instance. Therefore, the following discussion says: 'What is called the category of meanings equal to the established dharma, this is called a similar instance.' The second is the reason similar instance. The following text also says: 'If it is shown in a certain place that the reason similar instance definitely has its own nature.' However, the discussion mostly says that the similar instance of the thesis is called a similar instance, because it is similar to the thesis. The similar instance of the reason is called similar dharma, because it is the dharma of the thesis. Why are two types of similar instances needed? Saying the similar instance of the thesis in the place where the reason exists, wanting to show that its reason pervades the thesis and example (Drishtanta, example). The thesis dharma follows the reason to say the similar dharma of the reason, showing that where there is a reason, the established dharma must follow. Moreover, the thesis similar instance, what is called 'similar'? If it is the same as the subject, it is completely dissimilar, sound is taken as the subject, and a pot is taken as the example. If the dharma is the same, the opponent does not admit that the dharma exists in the subject, nor is it that the characteristic of the reason pervades the thesis dharma, how can one take the dharma as 'similar'? The meaning here is that one does not separately take the two, but generally takes all places with the thesis dharma, and calls it the thesis similar instance. Therefore, the discussion says: 'For example, establishing 'impermanence', the impermanence of a pot, etc., this is called a similar instance.' Where this thesis exists, there is definitely a reason, which is called the reason similar instance. However, in reality, the similar instance correctly takes the reason similar instance, because the reason penetrates the thesis and example, and its nature is broad and universal. Where this commonly recognized reason dharma exists, the not commonly recognized dharma must follow. Now it is explained that in all places with the thesis dharma, its reason must exist. Therefore, it is said that the thesis is the same, not wanting to use the thesis to accomplish the meaning of the reason. It is not a true similar instance, its reason definitely has its own nature in that thesis similar instance. Therefore, it is said that 'the similar instance definitely has its own nature.'
因既決定有。顯宗法必隨。理門亦云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有等。依上二相。理門論云。云何別法于別處轉。此中問意。如所作因必隨附聲。與瓶等上所作性別。如何聲宗之上別因。于瓶等中別處而轉。或所作因。是聲有法。宗上別法。云何于彼別瓶處轉。而言共相貫在宗喻。遍是宗法。同品定有。陳那釋云。由彼相似不說異名。言即是此故無有失。此答意言。由聲瓶上共所作性相似而有。總相合說。不說聲瓶二異名中。聲所作性即喻處所作性。言彼即此故無有失。彼復難云。若不說異。云何此因說名宗法。前難聲宗所作性因。云何得於別瓶上轉。此難云何瓶所作性說為宗法。既不說彼所作性異總合說者。所作性因既于瓶有。云何此因說名宗法。彼復釋言。此中但說定是宗法。不欲說言唯是宗法。此釋意言。總因之中但說定遍宗法性。不欲說言唯是宗法。故一總言貫通二處。宗非宗上悉皆得有。其中可有遍是宗法。若別異說。唯聲所作唯宗法性。別不容有舉喻成宗。又別異說唯瓶所作。亦不得成是宗法性。何所成立。彼復難言。若爾。同品應亦名宗。此意難云。二中所作總貫稱因。二上無常應皆宗諍。彼自釋云。不然。別處說所成故。因必無異方成比量。故不相似。答難不然。唯別聲上有無常義是其所成。共所諍故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果因已經確定存在，那麼顯宗的法則必然遵循。理門（Hetu-cakra-damaru，因明理論的著作）也說：『所說的因必然伴隨宗（paksha，論題）。』宗如果沒有因，就不會存在等等。依據以上兩種情況，《理門論》中說：『為什麼別法會在別處轉變？』這裡的問題是，例如所作的因必然伴隨聲（shabda，聲音），與瓶子等上面的所作性別（karya-jati，作用種類）一樣，為什麼聲宗（以聲音為論題的論證）之上的別因（vyatireki-hetu，反證），會在瓶子等其他地方轉變？或者說，所作的因，是聲有法（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物），是宗上的別法，為什麼會在那其他瓶子處轉變？而說共相（samanya-lakshana，普遍性質）貫穿在宗和喻（drstanta，例子）中，普遍是宗法（paksha-dharma，論題的性質），在同品（sapaksha，相似例子）中必定存在。陳那（Dignaga，古印度佛教邏輯學家）解釋說：『由於它們相似，所以不說不同的名稱，說這就是它，因此沒有過失。』這個回答的意思是，由於聲音和瓶子上共同的所作性相似而存在，所以用總相（samanya-lakshana，普遍性質）來合併說明，不說聲音和瓶子這兩個不同的名稱，聲音的所作性就是喻處的所作性，說『彼即是此』，因此沒有過失。 對方又提出疑問：『如果不是說不同，為什麼這個因被稱為宗法？』前面的疑問是聲宗的所作性因，為什麼能在其他瓶子上轉變？這個疑問是為什麼瓶子的所作性被稱為宗法？既然不說它們所作性不同，而是總合來說，所作性因既然在瓶子上存在，為什麼這個因被稱為宗法？對方又解釋說：『這裡只是說確定是宗法，不是想說只有是宗法。』這個解釋的意思是，在總因（samanya-hetu，普遍的因）之中，只是說確定普遍具有宗法的性質，不是想說只有是宗法的性質，所以用一個總的說法貫通兩個地方，宗和非宗上都可以存在。其中可以有普遍是宗法的。如果分別異說，只有聲音的所作才是宗法的性質，分別來說不允許用舉例來成立宗。又分別異說只有瓶子的所作，也不能成立是宗法的性質，要成立什麼呢？對方又提出疑問：『如果是這樣，同品也應該被稱為宗。』這個意思的疑問是，兩個地方的所作總括起來稱為因，兩個上面的無常（anitya，事物變化無常的性質）都應該成為爭論的論題。 對方自己解釋說：『不是這樣的，因為在別處說所成立的。』因必然沒有不同才能成立比量（anumana，推理），所以不相似。回答這個疑問說，不是這樣的，只有在聲音上，無常的意義才是它所要成立的，因為是共同爭論的。
【English Translation】 English version: If the cause is already determined to exist, then the tenets of Manifestation School (Vaibhashika, a school of early Buddhism) must follow. The 'Hetu-cakra-damaru' (a treatise on logic) also states: 'The stated cause necessarily accompanies the thesis (paksha).' Without a cause, the thesis cannot exist, and so on. Based on the above two aspects, the 'Hetu-cakra-damaru' says: 'Why does a distinct property transform in a distinct place?' The question here is, for example, the cause of 'being produced' necessarily accompanies sound (shabda), just like the property of 'being produced' (karya-jati) on pots, etc. How can the distinct cause (vyatireki-hetu) on the sound thesis (an argument with sound as the subject) transform in other places like pots? Or, the cause of 'being produced' is a property-possessor (dharmin) of sound, a distinct property on the thesis, why does it transform in that other place of pots? And it is said that the common characteristic (samanya-lakshana) pervades the thesis and example (drstanta), universally being a property of the thesis (paksha-dharma), necessarily existing in the similar instance (sapaksha). Dignaga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) explains: 'Because they are similar, different names are not mentioned, saying that this is it, therefore there is no fault.' The meaning of this answer is that because the common property of 'being produced' exists similarly on sound and pots, it is explained by combining the general characteristic (samanya-lakshana), not mentioning the two different names of sound and pots, the property of 'being produced' of sound is the property of 'being produced' in the example, saying 'that is this,' therefore there is no fault. The opponent further asks: 'If it is not said to be different, why is this cause called a property of the thesis?' The previous question was why the cause of 'being produced' of the sound thesis can transform on other pots? This question is why is the property of 'being produced' of pots called a property of the thesis? Since it is not said that their properties of 'being produced' are different, but rather collectively speaking, since the cause of 'being produced' exists on pots, why is this cause called a property of the thesis? The opponent further explains: 'Here it is only said that it is definitely a property of the thesis, not intending to say that it is only a property of the thesis.' The meaning of this explanation is that in the general cause (samanya-hetu), it is only said that it definitely universally possesses the nature of a property of the thesis, not intending to say that it is only a property of the thesis, therefore a general statement pervades both places, existing on both the thesis and non-thesis. Among them, there can be what is universally a property of the thesis. If it is said separately and differently, only the 'being produced' of sound is the nature of the property of the thesis, separately speaking, it is not allowed to establish the thesis by giving an example. Also, separately and differently saying only the 'being produced' of pots, it also cannot establish the nature of being a property of the thesis, what is to be established? The opponent further asks: 'If that is the case, the similar instance should also be called the thesis.' The question in this sense is that the 'being produced' in two places is collectively called the cause, the impermanence (anitya) on both should become the subject of dispute. The opponent himself explains: 'It is not like that, because what is established is said in a different place.' The cause must not be different in order to establish inference (anumana), therefore it is not similar. Answering this question, it is not like that, only on sound, the meaning of impermanence is what is to be established, because it is commonly disputed.
。非於瓶上。夫立因者。必須立敵宗喻之上兩俱無異方成比量。故能立通。所立義局。理不相似。故答不然。問何故此因於宗異品皆說遍字。于同品上獨說定言。答因本成宗。不遍成者非立。異喻止濫。不遍止者非遮。成不遍故不成過生。遮不盡故不定等起。成宗不遍。如上已陳。止濫不盡。至下當悉。同喻本順成宗。宗成即名同喻。豈由喻遍能順所立方成宗義。但欲以因成宗。因有宗必隨逐。不欲以宗成因。有宗因不定有。故雖宗同品。不須因遍有。于異品有。同品半有半無。雖並不定。由因於異有故成過。非因於同不遍為失。即九句內。后三句中初后句是。后三中句正因所攝。于異品中止濫盡故。初后二句不定過收。皆止異品濫不盡故。由此同品說定有性。宗異品中皆說遍也。其九句者。理門論云。宗法于同品。謂有非有俱。于異品各三。有非有及二。言宗法者。謂宗之法。即因是也。于同品者。宗同品也。體即同喻。謂能立因於同品喻成其三種。一有。二非有。三亦有亦非有。彼名為俱。此三種因。于宗異品異法喻上。亦各有三。一有。二非有。三亦有亦非有。彼名及二。且同品有異品三者。謂因於同品有異品亦有。于同品有異品非有。于同品有異品有非有。如是因於同品非有。異品亦三。于同品有非有。異品
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：並非在瓶子上。如果建立一個『因』（hetu，理由），必須建立一個與『敵宗』（pakṣa，對立宗派）的『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子），之上兩者都無差異，這樣才能構成『比量』（anumāna，推論）。因此，『能立』（sādhana，論證）是通達的，而『所立義』（sādhya，待證之義）是侷限的，道理並不相似，所以回答『不然』（na，否定）。 問：為什麼這個『因』在『宗』（pakṣa，論題）的『異品』（vipakṣa，反例）上都說『遍』（vyāpaka，周遍），而在『同品』（sapakṣa，同例）上只說『定』（niyata，決定）呢？ 答：『因』本來是爲了成就『宗』，不周遍就不能成立。『異喻』是爲了阻止氾濫，不阻止就不能遮止。成就的不周遍，就會產生『不成』（asiddha，未證成）的過失；遮止的不徹底，就會產生『不定』（anaikāntika，不決定）等過失。成就『宗』的不周遍，如上面已經陳述。阻止氾濫的不徹底，到下面會詳細說明。 『同喻』（sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta，同例）本來是順應成就『宗』的，『宗』成就了就叫做『同喻』。難道是因為『喻』的周遍才能順應『所立』（sādhya，待證）而成就『宗義』（pakṣa-dharma，論題之法）嗎？只是想用『因』來成就『宗』，『因』有『宗』必定跟隨，不想用『宗』來成就『因』，有『宗』『因』不一定有。所以即使『宗』在『同品』中，也不需要『因』周遍存在。在『異品』中存在，『同品』中一半存在一半不存在，雖然並不決定，因為『因』在『異品』中存在就會有過失，而不是因為『因』在『同品』中不周遍而成為過失。這就是九句中的后三句中的第一句和最後一句。后三句中的中間一句是『正因』（samyak hetu，正確的因）所包含的，因為它在『異品』中阻止氾濫是徹底的。最初和最後兩句是不定過失所包含的，都是因為阻止『異品』氾濫不徹底。因此，『同品』中說『定有性』，『宗異品』中都說『遍』。 這九句是：《理門論》說：『宗法于同品，謂有非有俱。于異品各三，有非有及二。』 所說的『宗法』，是指『宗』的法，也就是『因』。『于同品』，是指『宗』的『同品』，其體就是『同喻』。意思是說，『能立因』在『同品喻』上成就三種情況：一、有；二、非有；三、亦有亦非有。這三種『因』，在『宗』的『異品』（異法喻）上，也各有三種情況：一、有；二、非有；三、亦有亦非有。稱為『及二』。比如，『因』在『同品』中有，『異品』有三種情況：『因』在『同品』中有，『異品』也有；『因』在『同品』中有，『異品』沒有；『因』在『同品』中有，『異品』有非有。如果『因』在『同品』中沒有，『異品』也有三種情況：『因』在『同品』中有非有，『異品』...
【English Translation】 English version: It is not on the jar. If one establishes a 『hetu』 (reason), one must establish an 『example』 (dṛṣṭānta) with the 『pakṣa』 (opponent's thesis), such that there is no difference between the two, only then can a 『anumāna』 (inference) be formed. Therefore, the 『sādhana』 (means of proof) is comprehensive, while the 『sādhya』 (that which is to be proven) is limited, and the reasoning is not similar, so the answer is 『na』 (no). Question: Why does this 『hetu』 always say 『vyāpaka』 (pervading) in the 『vipakṣa』 (dissimilar instances) of the 『pakṣa』 (thesis), but only says 『niyata』 (definite) in the 『sapakṣa』 (similar instances)? Answer: The 『hetu』 is originally for establishing the 『pakṣa』; if it is not pervasive, it cannot be established. The 『dissimilar example』 is to prevent overextension; if it does not prevent, it cannot stop. If the accomplishment is not pervasive, it will produce the fault of 『asiddha』 (unproven); if the prevention is not thorough, it will produce faults such as 『anaikāntika』 (uncertain). The non-pervasiveness of accomplishing the 『pakṣa』 has been stated above. The incompleteness of preventing overextension will be explained in detail below. The 『sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta』 (similar example) is originally in accordance with accomplishing the 『pakṣa』; when the 『pakṣa』 is accomplished, it is called 『sapakṣa』. Is it because the pervasiveness of the 『example』 can accord with the 『sādhya』 (that which is to be proven) and accomplish the 『pakṣa-dharma』 (property of the thesis)? It is only intended to use the 『hetu』 to accomplish the 『pakṣa』; if there is 『pakṣa』, the 『hetu』 must follow. It is not intended to use the 『pakṣa』 to accomplish the 『hetu』; if there is 『pakṣa』, the 『hetu』 is not necessarily present. Therefore, even if the 『pakṣa』 is in the 『sapakṣa』, it is not necessary for the 『hetu』 to be pervasive. If it exists in the 『vipakṣa』, and half exists and half does not exist in the 『sapakṣa』, although it is not definite, because the 『hetu』 exists in the 『vipakṣa』, there will be a fault, rather than the 『hetu』 not being pervasive in the 『sapakṣa』 becoming a fault. This is the first and last sentence of the last three sentences in the nine sentences. The middle sentence of the last three sentences is included in the 『samyak hetu』 (correct reason), because its prevention of overextension in the 『vipakṣa』 is thorough. The first and last two sentences are included in the fault of uncertainty, all because the prevention of overextension in the 『vipakṣa』 is not thorough. Therefore, 『definite existence』 is said in the 『sapakṣa』, and 『pervading』 is said in the 『vipakṣa』 of the 『pakṣa』. These nine sentences are: The Nyāyamukha says: 『The property of the thesis in the similar instances, is said to be existent, non-existent, and both. In the dissimilar instances, there are three each, existent, non-existent, and two.』 What is said as 『property of the thesis』 refers to the property of the 『pakṣa』, which is the 『hetu』. 『In the similar instances』 refers to the 『sapakṣa』 of the 『pakṣa』, whose substance is the 『similar example』. It means that the 『sādhana hetu』 (means of proof) accomplishes three situations in the 『similar example』: one, existent; two, non-existent; three, both existent and non-existent. These three types of 『hetu』 also have three situations each in the 『vipakṣa』 (dissimilar example) of the 『pakṣa』: one, existent; two, non-existent; three, both existent and non-existent. These are called 『and two』. For example, if the 『hetu』 exists in the 『sapakṣa』, the 『vipakṣa』 has three situations: the 『hetu』 exists in the 『sapakṣa』, and the 『vipakṣa』 also exists; the 『hetu』 exists in the 『sapakṣa』, and the 『vipakṣa』 does not exist; the 『hetu』 exists in the 『sapakṣa』, and the 『vipakṣa』 is both existent and non-existent. If the 『hetu』 does not exist in the 『sapakṣa』, the 『vipakṣa』 also has three situations: the 『hetu』 is both existent and non-existent in the 『sapakṣa』, and the 『vipakṣa』...
亦三。故成九句。理門論中示九宗云。常無常勤勇。恒住堅牢性。非勤遷不變。由所量等九。恒住堅牢性及不變。此四皆常義。遷是無常。此四句中。上之三句顯示九宗。下之一句結由九因而成九類。其九因者。理門論云。所量作無常。作性聞勇發。無常勇無觸。依常性等九言無觸者。無質礙義。上之三句顯示九因。下之一句結由九宗而成九類。以此上三句成前上三句。一一句中皆有三種。次第配之。即成九也。一同品有異品有。如聲論師。立聲為常。所量性故。喻如虛空。此中常宗瓶為異品。所量性因於同異品皆遍共有。二同品有異品非有。如勝論師。立聲無常。所作性故。喻如瓶等。無常之宗空為異品。所作性因於同品有于異品無。三同品有異品有非有。如勝論師。立聲勤勇無間所發。無常性故。喻如瓶等。勤勇之宗。以電空等而為異喻。無常性因。于同品亦有。于異品喻電等上有。空等上無。此是初三。中三句者。一同品非有異品有。如聲論師。立聲為常。所作性故。喻若虛空。此中常宗瓶為異喻。所作性因於同品空上無。于異品瓶上有。二同品非有異品非有。如聲論師對佛弟子。立聲為常。所聞性故。喻若虛空。此中常宗瓶為異喻。所聞性因同異品中二俱非有。三同品非有異品有非有。如聲論師。立聲為常。
【現代漢語翻譯】 亦有三種情況，因此構成九句。在《理門論》中，闡述九宗時說：『常、無常、勤勇（kinnara，人非人）、恒住堅牢性、非勤、遷變、不變、由所量等九。』恒住堅牢性以及不變，這四種都屬於『常』的含義，『遷』是『無常』。這四句中，上面的三句顯示了九宗，下面的一句總結了由九因而構成九類。這九因是，《理門論》中說：『所量、作、無常、作性、聞、勇發、無常、勇、無觸。』這裡說的『無觸』，是沒有質礙的意思。上面的三句顯示了九因，下面的一句總結了由九宗而構成九類。用這上面的三句構成前面上面的三句，每一句中都有三種情況，依次配合，就構成了九種情況。第一種，在同品中有，在異品中也有。例如，聲明論師，立論『聲是常』，因為具有『所量性』（pramana，可以被衡量），例如虛空。這裡，『常』宗的『瓶』是異品，『所量性』這個因在同品和異品中都普遍存在。第二種，在同品中有，在異品中沒有。例如，勝論師，立論『聲是無常』，因為具有『所作性』（karya，被製造），例如瓶子等。『無常』之宗的『空』是異品，『所作性』這個因在同品中有，在異品中沒有。第三種，在同品中有，在異品中有，也有沒有的情況。例如，勝論師，立論『聲是勤勇無間所發』，因為具有『無常性』，例如瓶子等。『勤勇』之宗，用閃電和虛空等作為不同的比喻，『無常性』這個因，在同品中也有，在異品中，例如閃電等上有，在虛空等上沒有。這是最初的三種情況。中間的三句是：第一種，在同品中沒有，在異品中有。例如，聲明論師，立論『聲是常』，因為具有『所作性』，例如虛空。這裡，『常』宗的『瓶』是不同的比喻，『所作性』這個因在同品虛空上沒有，在異品瓶上有。第二種，在同品中沒有，在異品中也沒有。例如，聲明論師對佛弟子，立論『聲是常』，因為具有『所聞性』，例如虛空。這裡，『常』宗的『瓶』是不同的比喻，『所聞性』這個因在同品和異品中都沒有。第三種，在同品中沒有，在異品中有，也有沒有的情況。例如，聲明論師，立論『聲是常』。
【English Translation】 There are also three situations, thus forming nine sentences. In the Nyayapravesa (理門論), when explaining the nine tenets, it says: 'Permanent, impermanent, diligent (kinnara, non-human beings), eternally abiding steadfast nature, non-diligent, changing, unchanging, due to what is measurable, etc., nine.' Eternally abiding steadfast nature and unchanging, these four all belong to the meaning of 'permanent'; 'changing' is 'impermanent.' Among these four sentences, the upper three sentences show the nine tenets, and the lower sentence summarizes that the nine causes constitute nine categories. These nine causes are, as the Nyayapravesa says: 'Measurable, made, impermanent, made-nature, heard, diligently produced, impermanent, diligent, without contact.' The 'without contact' mentioned here means without obstruction. The upper three sentences show the nine causes, and the lower sentence summarizes that the nine tenets constitute nine categories. These upper three sentences constitute the previous upper three sentences. Each sentence has three situations, which are sequentially matched to form nine situations. The first type is present in the similar class and also present in the dissimilar class. For example, the sound theorist establishes 'sound is permanent' because it has 'measurability' (pramana, can be measured), like space. Here, the 'jar' of the 'permanent' tenet is a dissimilar class, and the cause of 'measurability' is universally present in both similar and dissimilar classes. The second type is present in the similar class but not present in the dissimilar class. For example, the Vaisheshika (勝論師) establishes 'sound is impermanent' because it has 'made-nature' (karya, being manufactured), like jars, etc. The 'space' of the 'impermanent' tenet is a dissimilar class, and the cause of 'made-nature' is present in the similar class but not present in the dissimilar class. The third type is present in the similar class, and in the dissimilar class, there are both present and absent situations. For example, the Vaisheshika establishes 'sound is diligently produced without interruption' because it has 'impermanent nature,' like jars, etc. The 'diligent' tenet uses lightning and space, etc., as different metaphors. The cause of 'impermanent nature' is also present in the similar class, and in the dissimilar class, it is present on lightning, etc., but not present on space, etc. These are the first three situations. The middle three sentences are: The first type is not present in the similar class but present in the dissimilar class. For example, the sound theorist establishes 'sound is permanent' because it has 'made-nature,' like space. Here, the 'jar' of the 'permanent' tenet is a different metaphor. The cause of 'made-nature' is not present on space in the similar class but present on jars in the dissimilar class. The second type is not present in the similar class and not present in the dissimilar class. For example, the sound theorist, to the Buddhist disciples, establishes 'sound is permanent' because it has 'heard-nature,' like space. Here, the 'jar' of the 'permanent' tenet is a different metaphor. The cause of 'heard-nature' is not present in both the similar and dissimilar classes. The third type is not present in the similar class, and in the dissimilar class, there are both present and absent situations. For example, the sound theorist establishes 'sound is permanent.'
勤勇無間所發性故。喻若虛空。此中常宗。以電瓶等為異品。勤勇之因。于同品空一向非有。于其異品瓶等上有。電等上無。此是中三。后三句者。一同品有非有異品有。如聲論師。立聲非勤勇無間所發。無常性故。喻若電空。此非勤宗瓶為異喻。無常性因。于同品電上有空上非有。異品瓶中一向是有。二同品有非有異品非有。如勝論師。立內聲無常。勤勇無間所發性故。喻若電瓶。此無常宗空為異喻。勤勇之因。于同品瓶等上有。電等上無。異品空中一向非有。三同品有非有異品有非有。如聲論師對勝論師。立聲為常。無質礙故。喻若極微及太虛空。此中常宗。以瓶樂等而為異喻。無質礙因。于其同品虛空上有。極微上無。亦于異品瓶等上無。樂受等有。是名九句。然理門論料簡此云。于同有及二。在異無是因。翻此名相違。所餘皆不定。于同有者。謂能立因於同品有。言及二者。于同品中亦有非有。在異無者。此能立因。于同品有在異品無。及同品中亦有非有于異品無。言是因者。此之二句皆是正因。於九句中第二第八兩句所攝。翻此名相違者。翻此二正因即名相違。翻初句云。于同非有于異品有。翻第二云。于同非有于異品中亦有非有。即九句中第四第六兩句所攝。皆相違因。是法自相相違因故。攝余不盡。所
余皆不定者。余之五句皆為不定。謂九句中。第一第三第五第七第九句。第一句者。共不定攝。第三句者。異品一分轉同品遍轉。第五句者。不共不定。第七句者。同品一分轉異品遍轉。第九句者。俱品一分轉。此等諸句至下當知。上九宗中。五常。初三初一。中三皆。后三后一。二無常。初后三皆中。一勤。初三后一。一非勤。后三初一。總為四類。問第八句因若正因攝。有比量相違。第八句非正因攝。同品俱故。如第七九。答此有決定相違。量云。第八句因正因所攝。九句因中具三相故。如第二句。不言九句但言具三相。恐有不定過。為如第二句具三相故。此第八句正因所攝。為如決定相違等具三相故。此第八句非正因攝。故言九句中。便無此過。或決定相違不具三相。他智不決定故。問言定有性已顯有因。宗必隨逐。何須言同品。既云同品。即顯有宗。因必隨逐。何須復云定有性也。答但言定有不言同品。乃顯此因成義不定。非定成宗。但言同品不言定有。亦顯此因成相違法等。非本宗義。今顯定成宗。及非成異品。故說同品決定有性。由此應為四句分別。有同品非定有。謂宗同品非定有因。即九句中中三句是。第四第六相違過收。第五句者不共不定。有定有非同品。謂定有因非宗同品。於九句中。除二五八。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 其餘都是不確定的情況。我所說的五種情況都是不確定的。指的是九句話中的第一句、第三句、第五句、第七句和第九句。第一句，是共同不定所包含的情況。第三句，是從異品的一部分轉化為同品的普遍情況。第五句，是不共不定。第七句，是從同品的一部分轉化為異品的普遍情況。第九句，是兩品的一部分轉化。這些句子在後面會詳細解釋。在前面的九個宗中，有五種是常的：前三個宗的前一句，中間三個宗的全部，后三個宗的后一句。有兩種是無常的：前三個和后三個宗的全部，中間一個宗。有一種是勤的：前三個宗的后一句。有一種是非勤的：后三個宗的前一句。總共分為四類。 問：第八句的因如果是正因所包含的，就會有比量相違的情況。第八句如果不是正因所包含的，就和第七句和第九句一樣，因為同品都存在。答：這裡有決定相違的情況。量云：第八句的因是正因所包含的，因為在九句因中具備三種特徵，就像第二句一樣。如果不說九句，只說具備三種特徵，恐怕會有不定過失。因為像第二句一樣具備三種特徵，所以這第八句是正因所包含的。因為像決定相違等具備三種特徵，所以這第八句不是正因所包含的。所以說在九句中，就沒有這種過失。或者決定相違不具備三種特徵，因為他人的智慧是不確定的。問：既然說『定有性』已經顯示有因，宗一定會隨之出現，為什麼還要說『同品』呢？既然說『同品』，就顯示有宗，因一定會隨之出現，為什麼還要說『定有性』呢？答：只說『定有』而不說『同品』，就顯示這個因在成立意義上是不確定的，不是一定能成立宗。只說『同品』而不說『定有』，也顯示這個因在成立相違法等方面，不是本宗的意義。現在要顯示一定能成立宗，以及不能成立異品，所以說『同品決定有性』。由此應該分為四句來分別：有同品但不是定有的，指的是宗的同品不是定有的因，就是九句中的中間三句。第四句和第六句被相違過所包含。第五句是不共不定。有定有但不是同品的，指的是定有的因不是宗的同品，在九句中，除了第二句、第五句和第八句。
【English Translation】 English version The rest are uncertain cases. The five cases I mentioned are all uncertain. This refers to the first, third, fifth, seventh, and ninth sentences of the nine sentences. The first sentence is included in the common uncertain. The third sentence is the universal transformation from a part of the heterologous to the homologous. The fifth sentence is the uncommon uncertain. The seventh sentence is the universal transformation from a part of the homologous to the heterologous. The ninth sentence is the transformation of a part of both categories. These sentences will be explained in detail later. Among the previous nine theses (zong), five are constant: the first sentence of the first three theses, all of the middle three theses, and the last sentence of the last three theses. There are two that are impermanent: all of the first three and last three theses, and one of the middle theses. There is one that is diligent: the last sentence of the first three theses. There is one that is non-diligent: the first sentence of the last three theses. In total, they are divided into four categories. Question: If the cause (yin) of the eighth sentence is included in the valid cause (zheng yin), there will be a contradiction in inference (bi liang xiang wei). If the cause of the eighth sentence is not included in the valid cause, it is the same as the seventh and ninth sentences, because the homologous (tong pin) exists in both. Answer: There is a definite contradiction here. The inference (liang) says: The cause of the eighth sentence is included in the valid cause, because it possesses three characteristics in the nine causes, just like the second sentence. If we don't say nine sentences, but only say possessing three characteristics, there may be an uncertain fault. Because it possesses three characteristics like the second sentence, this eighth sentence is included in the valid cause. Because it possesses three characteristics like definite contradiction, this eighth sentence is not included in the valid cause. Therefore, by saying 'in the nine sentences', there is no such fault. Or the definite contradiction does not possess three characteristics, because the wisdom of others is uncertain. Question: Since saying 'definite existence (ding you xing)' already shows that there is a cause, the thesis (zong) will definitely follow, why do we still need to say 'homologous (tong pin)'? Since saying 'homologous', it shows that there is a thesis, the cause will definitely follow, why do we still need to say 'definite existence'? Answer: Only saying 'definite existence' without saying 'homologous' shows that this cause is uncertain in establishing meaning, and cannot necessarily establish the thesis. Only saying 'homologous' without saying 'definite existence' also shows that this cause is not the meaning of this thesis in terms of establishing contradiction and so on. Now we want to show that it can definitely establish the thesis, and cannot establish the heterologous (yi pin), so we say 'homologous definitely exists'. Therefore, it should be divided into four sentences to distinguish: There is a homologous but not definite existence, which refers to the cause of the homologous of the thesis that is not definite existence, which is the middle three sentences of the nine sentences. The fourth and sixth sentences are included in the contradiction fault. There is definite existence but not homologous, which refers to the cause of definite existence that is not the homologous of the thesis, in the nine sentences, except for the second, fifth, and eighth sentences.
餘六句是。第四第六是相違因。余之四句不定過攝。第一句共。第三句者異品一分轉同品遍轉。第七句者同品一分轉異品遍轉。第九句者俱品一分轉。有亦定有亦同品。謂是宗同品亦定有因。於九句中。除中三句。初后三是。實若無過。唯取第二第八正因。若通有過。即通六句二正因四不定。有非同品亦非定有。謂非宗同品亦非定有因。即異品遍無性。於九句中第二五八三句所攝。二八正因。第五不定。此初三句內。唯第三句少分正因。余皆有過。為簡過句顯自無過。故說同品定有性也。異品遍無性者。顯第三相。異者別義。所立無處即名別異。品者聚類。非體類義。許無體故。不同同品體類解品。隨體有無。但與所立別異聚類即名異品。古因明云。與其同品相違。或異說名異品。如立善宗不善違害。故名相違。苦樂明闇冷熱大小常無常等。一切皆爾。要別有體違害於宗。方名異品。或說與前所立有異名為異品。如立無常。除無常外自餘一切苦無我等。慮礙等義皆名異品。陳那以後皆不許然。如無常宗。無常無處即名異品。不同先古。理門破云。非與同品相違或異。若相違者。應唯簡別。謂彼若非無所立處名為異品。要相違法名異品者。應唯簡別。是則唯立相違之法簡別同品。不是返遮宗因二有。若許爾者。則一切法
應有三品。如立善宗不善違害。唯以簡別名為異品。無記之法無簡別故。便成第三品非善非不善故。此中容品。既望善宗非相違害。豈非第三。由此應知。無所立處即名異品。不善無記既無所立。皆名異品。便無彼過。又難或異名異品云。若別異者應無有因。謂若說言與宗有異即名異品。則應無有決定正因。如立聲無常。聲上無我苦空等義。皆名異品。所作性因。于異既有。何名定因。謂隨所立一切宗法。傍意所許。亦因所成。此傍意許。既名異品。因復能成。故一切量皆無正因。故知。但是無所立處。即名異品。此亦有二。一宗異品。故下論云。異品者。謂於是處無其所立。二因異品。故下論云。異法者。若於是處說所立無。因遍非有。然論多說宗之異品名為異品。宗類異故。因之異品名為異法。宗法異故。何須二異。因之無處說宗異品。欲顯其因隨宗無故。宗之無處說因異品。顯因無處宗必先無。且宗異品。何者名異。若異有法。同法所依有法各別。亦應名異。若異於法。敵本不許所立之法于有法有。一切異法皆應名同。此異品者。不別取二。總取一切無宗法處。名宗異品。故論說言。謂於是處無其所立。又若是常。見非所作。如虛空等。此但略無正諍無常。唯舉見常名為異品準理同前。無隨所應所立之法。無此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 應有三種品類。例如，確立善良的宗旨，不善良的則與之相違背和損害。僅僅通過區分，才能將它們區分為不同的品類。而無記之法（既非善也非不善的法）因為沒有區分，便成為第三種品類，因為它既非善良也非不善良。這裡容許有品類，既然期望善良的宗旨不互相違背和損害，難道不是第三種嗎？由此應該知道，沒有確立之處，就叫做異品。不善良和無記既然沒有確立之處，都叫做異品，就沒有上述的過失了。又有人質疑，或者異名就是異品。如果區分不同，就應該沒有原因。如果說與宗旨不同就叫做異品，那麼就應該沒有決定的正因。例如，確立聲音是無常的，聲音上沒有我、苦、空等的意義，都叫做異品。所作性（由造作而有的性質）作為因，在異品中既然存在，為什麼叫做定因呢？因為隨所確立的一切宗旨和法，旁人所認可的，也是因所成就的。這旁人所認可的，既然叫做異品，因又能夠成就它，所以一切量（衡量、推理）都沒有正因。所以要知道，只是沒有確立之處，就叫做異品。這也有兩種：一是宗旨的異品，所以下文論述說：『異品，是指在那個地方沒有所確立的。』二是因的異品，所以下文論述說：『異法，是指在那個地方說所確立的沒有，因普遍不存在。』然而論典大多說宗旨的異品叫做異品，因為宗旨的類別不同。因的異品叫做異法，因為宗旨的法不同。為什麼需要兩種異品呢？在因不存在的地方說宗旨的異品，是爲了顯示那個因隨著宗旨而沒有。在宗旨不存在的地方說因的異品，是爲了顯示因不存在的地方，宗旨必定先不存在。暫且說宗旨的異品，什麼叫做異呢？如果異於有法（具有某種性質的事物），同法所依賴的有法各自不同，也應該叫做異。如果異於法，對方本來就不認可所確立的法在有法中存在，一切異法都應該叫做同。這異品，不分別選取兩種，總選取一切沒有宗旨之法的地方，叫做宗旨的異品。所以論典說：『是指在那個地方沒有所確立的。』又如果它是常，就能看見它不是所造作的，例如虛空等。這只是省略了沒有真正爭論的無常，只舉出看見常叫做異品，按照道理與前面相同。沒有隨所應確立的法，沒有這個。
【English Translation】 English version: There should be three categories. For example, establishing a good principle, that which is not good is contrary to it and harmful. Only through distinguishing can they be differentiated into different categories. As for the unrecordable dharmas (neither good nor bad dharmas), because there is no distinction, they become the third category, as they are neither good nor bad. Here, categories are allowed; since the expectation is that good principles do not contradict or harm each other, isn't that the third? From this, it should be known that where nothing is established is called a 'dissimilar category' (異品, yìpǐn). Since the not-good and the unrecordable have no established place, they are all called 'dissimilar categories,' and there is no fault as mentioned above. Someone might question whether a different name is a dissimilar category. If different things are distinguished, there should be no cause. If it is said that what is different from the principle is called a 'dissimilar category,' then there should be no definitive valid reason. For example, establishing that sound is impermanent, and that there is no self, suffering, or emptiness in sound, all of these are called 'dissimilar categories.' The nature of being produced (所作性, suǒzuòxìng) as a cause exists in the dissimilar category, so why is it called a definitive cause? Because whatever principle and dharma is established, what is acknowledged by others is also accomplished by the cause. Since what is acknowledged by others is called a 'dissimilar category,' and the cause can accomplish it, then all measurements (量, liàng, inference, reasoning) have no valid cause. Therefore, it should be known that only where nothing is established is called a 'dissimilar category.' This also has two aspects: one is the dissimilar category of the principle, so the following treatise says: 'A dissimilar category is where there is nothing established.' The second is the dissimilar category of the cause, so the following treatise says: 'A dissimilar dharma is where it is said that what is established does not exist, and the cause is universally absent.' However, the treatises mostly refer to the dissimilar category of the principle as 'dissimilar category,' because the categories of the principle are different. The dissimilar category of the cause is called 'dissimilar dharma,' because the dharmas of the principle are different. Why are two dissimilar categories needed? Saying the dissimilar category of the principle in a place where the cause does not exist is to show that the cause does not exist along with the principle. Saying the dissimilar category of the cause in a place where the principle does not exist is to show that where the cause does not exist, the principle must not exist first. For now, let's talk about the dissimilar category of the principle. What is called 'dissimilar'? If it is dissimilar to the possessor of dharma (有法, yǒufǎ, a thing that possesses a certain quality), and the possessors of dharma on which the same dharma relies are different from each other, it should also be called 'dissimilar.' If it is dissimilar to the dharma, the opponent originally does not acknowledge that the established dharma exists in the possessor of dharma, and all dissimilar dharmas should be called the same. This dissimilar category does not separately select two, but generally selects all places where there is no dharma of the principle, and is called the dissimilar category of the principle. Therefore, the treatise says: 'It refers to where there is nothing established.' Also, if it is permanent, it can be seen that it is not produced, such as space. This only omits the impermanence that is not truly disputed, and only cites seeing permanence as a dissimilar category, according to the same principle as before. There is no dharma that should be established, and there is none of this.
宗處定遍無因。名因異品。然雖異品亦取因異。顯無宗處因定隨無。翻顯有因宗定隨轉。雖復離法先宗后因。彼若不然。便成異法。今顯能立本欲成宗。于異品無其宗便立。故正宗異後方因異。其因於彼宗異品處決定遍無。故言異品遍無性也。問言遍無性。已顯無因宗必隨無。何須言異品。既云異品。即顯無宗因亦隨無。何須復云遍無性也。答但言遍無不言異品。乃顯此因成相違法等。非離於宗返成宗義。但言異品不言遍無。亦顯此因成不定等非定成宗。今顯此因定成於宗同品定有。于異品上決定遍無。故說異品遍無性也。由此應為四句分別。有異品非遍無。謂宗異品非因遍無。即九句中。除二五八。餘六句是。一三七九四是不定。四六相違。如前配釋。有遍無非異品。謂因遍無非宗異品。即九句中。第四五六。四六相違。第五不定。有異品亦遍無。謂宗異品亦因遍無。即九句中第二五八。二八正因。第五不定。有非異品亦非遍無。謂非宗異品。亦非因遍無。即九句中。除四五六。餘六句是。二八正因。餘四不定。如上所說諸句料簡。自句他句皆無過者。正因所攝。當句之中雖無其過。他句有過。故應如前一一分別。初三句中。唯第三句少分正因。余皆有過。為簡彼過故說異品遍無性也。問此三相中。何故不言遍是宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『宗』（命題）所處之處，『定遍無因』（遍無因）是指在『異品』（反例）中沒有原因。雖然是『異品』，也取『因異』（原因不同）之處。這表明如果『宗』所處之處沒有原因，那麼原因的確定性也就不存在。反過來說，如果存在原因，那麼『宗』的確定性也會隨之轉變。即使在論證方法上是先有『宗』後有『因』，如果情況不是這樣，就會變成『異法』（不同的法則）。現在表明，能立（論證者）的根本目的是爲了成立『宗』，如果在『異品』中沒有『宗』，那麼『宗』就成立不了。所以，只有在『宗』與『異品』不同之後，『因』才能不同。這個『因』在與『宗』不同的『異品』之處，是決定性的、普遍不存在的。所以說『異品遍無性』（在反例中普遍不存在的性質）。 有人問：既然說了『遍無性』，就已經表明沒有原因，『宗』必然也就不存在。為什麼還要說『異品』呢？既然說了『異品』，就表明沒有『宗』，『因』也隨之不存在。為什麼還要再說『遍無性』呢？ 回答說：只說『遍無』，而不說『異品』，就表明這個『因』可能構成『成相違法』（與自相矛盾）等過失，而不是脫離『宗』反而成立『宗』的意義。只說『異品』，而不說『遍無』，也表明這個『因』可能構成『不定』等過失，而不是確定地成立『宗』。現在表明，這個『因』確定地成立『宗』，在『同品』（同類）中是確定存在的，在『異品』上是決定性的、普遍不存在的。所以才說『異品遍無性』。 由此應該進行四句分別： 1. 有『異品』，但不是『遍無』。指的是『宗』的『異品』，不是『因』的『遍無』。也就是九句中的，除去第二、第五、第八句，剩下的六句。第一、第三、第七、第九、第四句是不定的，第四、第六句是相違的，如前面所解釋的。 2. 有『遍無』，但不是『異品』。指的是『因』的『遍無』，不是『宗』的『異品』。也就是九句中的第四、第五、第六句。第四、第六句是相違的，第五句是不定的。 3. 有『異品』，也是『遍無』。指的是『宗』的『異品』，也是『因』的『遍無』。也就是九句中的第二、第五、第八句。第二、第八句是正因，第五句是不定的。 4. 沒有『異品』，也不是『遍無』。指的是不是『宗』的『異品』，也不是『因』的『遍無』。也就是九句中的，除去第四、第五、第六句，剩下的六句。第二、第八句是正因，剩下的四句是不定的。如上面所說的各種句子的分析，自己這一句和他人那一句都沒有過失的，是正因所包含的。在自己這一句中雖然沒有過失，但在他人那一句中可能有過失。所以應該像前面那樣一一分別。最初的三句中，只有第三句是少分正因，其餘都有過失。爲了簡別那些過失，所以才說『異品遍無性』。 有人問：在這三相（三種特徵）中，為什麼不說『遍是宗』（普遍是『宗』）呢？
【English Translation】 English version 'Zong' (proposition) is where 'Ding Bian Wu Yin' (Pervasive Absence of Cause) means there is no cause in 'Yi Pin' (counter-examples). Although it is 'Yi Pin', it also takes the 'Yin Yi' (difference in cause). This shows that if there is no cause where 'Zong' is, then the certainty of the cause does not exist. Conversely, if there is a cause, then the certainty of 'Zong' will also change accordingly. Even if the method of argumentation is that 'Zong' comes before 'Yin', if this is not the case, it will become 'Yi Fa' (different law). Now it shows that the fundamental purpose of the proponent is to establish 'Zong'. If there is no 'Zong' in 'Yi Pin', then 'Zong' cannot be established. Therefore, only after 'Zong' is different from 'Yi Pin' can 'Yin' be different. This 'Yin' is decisive and universally absent in the 'Yi Pin' that is different from 'Zong'. Therefore, it is said 'Yi Pin Bian Wu Xing' (the nature of being universally absent in counter-examples). Someone asks: Since 'Bian Wu Xing' (pervasive absence) has already been said, it has already shown that there is no cause, and 'Zong' must also not exist. Why is it necessary to say 'Yi Pin'? Since 'Yi Pin' has been said, it shows that there is no 'Zong', and 'Yin' also does not exist. Why is it necessary to say 'Bian Wu Xing' again? The answer is: Only saying 'Bian Wu' without saying 'Yi Pin' shows that this 'Yin' may constitute faults such as 'Cheng Xiang Wei Fa' (contradicting itself), rather than departing from 'Zong' and establishing the meaning of 'Zong'. Only saying 'Yi Pin' without saying 'Bian Wu' also shows that this 'Yin' may constitute faults such as 'Bu Ding' (uncertainty), rather than definitely establishing 'Zong'. Now it shows that this 'Yin' definitely establishes 'Zong', and it is definitely present in 'Tong Pin' (similar examples), and it is decisive and universally absent in 'Yi Pin'. That's why it is said 'Yi Pin Bian Wu Xing'. Therefore, there should be a four-sentence distinction: 1. There is 'Yi Pin', but it is not 'Bian Wu'. It refers to the 'Yi Pin' of 'Zong', not the 'Bian Wu' of 'Yin'. That is, in the nine sentences, removing the second, fifth, and eighth sentences, the remaining six sentences. The first, third, seventh, ninth, and fourth sentences are uncertain, and the fourth and sixth sentences are contradictory, as explained earlier. 2. There is 'Bian Wu', but it is not 'Yi Pin'. It refers to the 'Bian Wu' of 'Yin', not the 'Yi Pin' of 'Zong'. That is, in the nine sentences, the fourth, fifth, and sixth sentences. The fourth and sixth sentences are contradictory, and the fifth sentence is uncertain. 3. There is 'Yi Pin', and it is also 'Bian Wu'. It refers to the 'Yi Pin' of 'Zong', and it is also the 'Bian Wu' of 'Yin'. That is, in the nine sentences, the second, fifth, and eighth sentences. The second and eighth sentences are the correct cause, and the fifth sentence is uncertain. 4. There is no 'Yi Pin', and it is also not 'Bian Wu'. It refers to not being the 'Yi Pin' of 'Zong', and also not being the 'Bian Wu' of 'Yin'. That is, in the nine sentences, removing the fourth, fifth, and sixth sentences, the remaining six sentences. The second and eighth sentences are the correct cause, and the remaining four sentences are uncertain. As analyzed in the various sentences mentioned above, those that have no faults in their own sentence and the other person's sentence are included in the correct cause. Although there are no faults in one's own sentence, there may be faults in the other person's sentence. Therefore, it should be distinguished one by one as before. In the first three sentences, only the third sentence is a small part of the correct cause, and the rest have faults. In order to distinguish those faults, it is said 'Yi Pin Bian Wu Xing'. Someone asks: In these three characteristics (three features), why not say 'Bian Shi Zong' (universally is 'Zong')?
品性。而云法性。同異二相何故不言同定有法性。異遍無法性。而皆云品。答宗一所立。總說為宗。狹不說品。喻寬能立。皆說品字。以因成宗。非成二品。初相云法。后二不言。問此之三相。為具方成。為闕亦得。若具方成。何故前言闕無異品亦成正因。既不要具。何須三相。答要具三相。止異濫而成因。非關喻依故。闕無而許正。同法本成宗義。無依不順成宗。異法本止濫非。濫止便成宗義。故同必須依體。異法無依亦成。此說有體成有體宗。故異體無亦具三相。上來三句所說過者。各自句中四句之過。若談闕過。闕有二種。一無體闕。二有體闕。無體闕者。謂不陳言。但在三支。非在三相。若陳因言。必有體闕。三相既義故非無體。無體闕者。此中相對互說有無亦為四句。有闕因非同異喻。有闕同異喻非因。有闕因亦闕同異喻。有非闕因非闕同異喻。此四句中。初句闕一。第二句闕二。第三句闕三。第四句非過。如是乃至三立皆闕。三皆不闕。有闕皆過。不闕不定。雖有所陳似立生故。三皆闕者。唯陳其宗。不陳余故。如是合有三個四句。一個兩句。但名闕過非余過攝。有體闕者。復有二種。一者以因三相而為能立雖說因三相。少相名闕。二者因一喻二三為能立。雖陳其體。義少名闕。且因三相少相闕者。有闕
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 品性。如果說法性，為什麼不說同相和異相呢？如果說同相決定有法性，異相普遍沒有法性，而都稱為品呢？回答：宗（Sādhyā，有待證明的命題）的建立，總體上說是宗，狹義上不說品。比喻（Dṛṣṭānta，例子）寬泛，能立（Hetu，理由）都說品字。因為因（Hetu，理由）能成立宗，而不是成立兩種品。初相（Paksadharma，周遍性）說『法』，后兩個相不說。問：這三個相，是必須全部具備才能成立，還是缺少也可以？如果必須全部具備才能成立，為什麼前面說缺少異品也能成為正因（Sadhetu，有效理由）？既然不需要全部具備，為什麼需要三個相？回答：需要具備三個相，是爲了阻止不合格的理由而成為因，而不是因為比喻的依賴關係。所以缺少異品也可以成為正因。同法（Sapaksa，同品）本來就能成立宗的意義，沒有依據就不能順應成立宗。異法（Vipaksa，異品）本來就能阻止不合格的理由，不合格的理由被阻止就能成立宗的意義。所以同相必須依據本體，異相沒有依據也可以成立。這裡說的是有本體成立有本體的宗，所以異體沒有也具備三個相。上面三句話所說過的，各自句中都有四句的過失。如果談論缺少過失，缺少有兩種：一是無體缺少，二是有體缺少。無體缺少，是指不陳述，只在三支（論證的三個部分：宗、因、喻）中，不在三相中。如果陳述因，一定是有體缺少。三相既然有意義，就不是無體。無體缺少，這裡相對互相說明有無，也成為四句。有缺少因，沒有缺少同喻和異喻；有缺少同喻和異喻，沒有缺少因；有缺少因，也缺少同喻和異喻；沒有缺少因，也沒有缺少同喻和異喻。這四句中，第一句缺少一個，第二句缺少兩個，第三句缺少三個，第四句沒有過失。像這樣乃至三個立論都缺少，三個都不缺少。有缺少都有過失，不缺少不一定。雖然有所陳述，但像是立論產生的。三個都缺少，只是陳述了宗，沒有陳述其餘的。像這樣合起來有三個四句，一個兩句。只稱為缺少過失，不屬於其餘的過失。有體缺少，又有兩種：一種是以因的三個相作為能立，雖然說了因的三個相，缺少一個相就稱為缺少。另一種是以因一個相，比喻兩個相，三個相作為能立，雖然陳述了本體，意義缺少就稱為缺少。且說因的三個相缺少一個相的情況，有缺少
【English Translation】 English version Qualities. If we speak of Dharmatā (法性, the nature of reality), why don't we mention similarity and difference? If similarity definitely possesses Dharmatā, and difference universally lacks Dharmatā, why are both called 'qualities'? Answer: The establishment of Sādhyā (宗, the proposition to be proved) is generally referred to as Sādhyā, but narrowly speaking, not as 'quality'. Dṛṣṭānta (比喻, example) is broad, and Hetu (能立, reason) all use the word 'quality'. Because Hetu establishes Sādhyā, not two kinds of qualities. The first aspect (Paksadharma, 周遍性) speaks of 'Dharma', the latter two aspects do not mention it. Question: Are these three aspects required to be fully present for validity, or can they be lacking? If all three are required, why did we previously say that the absence of dissimilar instances (Vipaksa, 異品) can still form a valid Hetu (Sadhetu, 有效理由)? If they are not all required, why are three aspects necessary? Answer: Three aspects are required to prevent unqualified reasons from becoming Hetu, not because of the dependence on Dṛṣṭānta. Therefore, the absence of dissimilar instances is permissible for a valid Hetu. Similar instances (Sapaksa, 同品) inherently establish the meaning of Sādhyā; without a basis, they cannot conform to establishing Sādhyā. Dissimilar instances inherently prevent unqualified reasons; preventing unqualified reasons establishes the meaning of Sādhyā. Therefore, similarity must rely on substance, while dissimilarity can be established even without a basis. This refers to a substance establishing a Sādhyā with substance, so even without a different substance, all three aspects are present. The above three sentences each contain four types of faults within their respective sentences. If we discuss the faults of absence, there are two types of absence: absence of substance and absence with substance. Absence of substance refers to not stating, but only within the three members (宗, 因, 喻 - proposition, reason, example) of the argument, not within the three aspects. If Hetu is stated, there must be absence with substance. Since the three aspects have meaning, they are not without substance. Absence of substance, where relative mutual explanations of presence and absence also form four sentences. There is absence of Hetu, but no absence of similar and dissimilar examples; there is absence of similar and dissimilar examples, but no absence of Hetu; there is absence of Hetu, and also absence of similar and dissimilar examples; there is no absence of Hetu, and no absence of similar and dissimilar examples. In these four sentences, the first sentence lacks one, the second sentence lacks two, the third sentence lacks three, and the fourth sentence has no fault. Thus, even if all three arguments are lacking, or all three are not lacking. Having absence always has faults, not lacking is uncertain. Although something is stated, it is like an argument being generated. If all three are lacking, only Sādhyā is stated, and the rest are not stated. Thus, there are three sets of four sentences, and one set of two sentences. These are only called faults of absence, and are not included in other faults. Absence with substance has two types: one is using the three aspects of Hetu as the means of proof, but even if the three aspects of Hetu are stated, lacking one aspect is called absence. The other is using one aspect of Hetu and two aspects of Dṛṣṭānta as the means of proof, but even if the substance is stated, lacking meaning is called absence. Let's discuss the case where one aspect of the three aspects of Hetu is lacking, there is absence of
初相非后二。有闕后二非初相。有闕初相亦后二。有不闕初相亦非后二。如是乃至。三相俱闕。三相俱不闕。此中總有三種四句。一種兩句。唯闕初相四不成攝。如是二合闕。乃至三合闕。隨應唯有不成不定及相違過。皆因過故。若因一喻二陳為能立義少闕者。亦有三種四句。一種二句。且闕因義非后二。四不成過。有闕第二非初后。俱不成攝。有闕第三非初二。俱不遣攝。如是闕二乃至闕三。及三不闕。闕者皆過。不闕非過。隨應各有因四不成。同喻俱不成。異喻俱不遣。或具二過。或具三過賢愛論師。陳那菩薩等。不以無體為闕。故唯六句。雖唯陳宗從元無能立。何名能立缺減之過。諸德皆說總有七句。不言有能立以成過。但是闕能立過。故說七闕。問理門論料簡九句云。于同有及二。在異無是因。返此名相違。所餘皆不定。謂九句中。唯有法自相一違。及五不定。餘四不成。一不定。三相違。何故不攝。答以因親成於宗。所以說其相順。同異成宗疏遠。故但標其順違。由此余過不攝之盡。上三相中各自為句。及三相對闕。論文雖無次第作處。道理定然。鉅細分別更有多種。且以初相三句之中一句為首。對餘二相作四句者。有是宗法而非遍。非是同品非定有性。有是同品非定有性。非是宗法而非遍有是宗法而非遍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『初相』（pakṣadharmatva，宗法性）不成立，則『后二相』（sapakṣe sattvam，同品定有性；vipakṣe asattvam，異品遍無性）也不成立。如果『后二相』不成立，則『初相』可能成立，也可能不成立。如果『初相』成立，則『后二相』一定不成立。如此類推，直到『三相』（trirūpa-hetu，因的三相）全部不成立，以及『三相』全部成立。這裡總共有三種四句式，以及一種兩句式。只有『初相』不成立的情況，四句式無法完全涵蓋。同樣，兩個相不成立，乃至三個相都不成立的情況，根據具體情況，只會產生『不成』（asiddha，因不成）、『不定』（anaikāntika，因不定）以及『相違』（viruddha，因相違）的過失，這些都是因為『因』的過失導致的。 如果因為一個『因』（hetu，因）和兩個『陳述』（dṛṣṭānta，喻）作為能立（sādhana，能立）的義理有所缺失，也會有三種四句式，以及一種兩句式。例如，如果缺失『因義』，則『后二相』不成立，這屬於『四不成過』。如果缺失第二個陳述，則『初相』和『后相』都不成立，這不被『俱不成』所涵蓋。如果缺失第三個陳述，則『初相』和『第二相』都不成立，這不被『俱不遣』所涵蓋。如此類推，缺失兩個乃至三個陳述，以及三個陳述都不缺失的情況，缺失的情況都屬於過失，不缺失的情況則不屬於過失。根據具體情況，分別有『因四不成』、『同喻俱不成』、『異喻俱不遣』，或者同時具備兩種過失，或者同時具備三種過失。賢愛論師（Bhadanta Śubhagupta），陳那菩薩（Dignāga）等，不認為『無體』（asattva，無）是缺失，因此只有六句式。即使唯識宗（Vijñānavāda）認為根本沒有能立，又怎麼會有能立缺失的過失呢？諸位大師都說總共有七句式，而不是說有能立而造成過失，只是說缺失能立的過失，所以說是七種缺失。有人問，《理門論》（Hetucakraḍamaru）中分析了九句式，說：『在同品中存在，以及存在於兩個同品中，在異品中不存在，這是『因』。反過來就是『相違』，其餘都是『不定』。』也就是說，在九句式中，只有『法自相』（svabhāvahetu，自性因）一種是『相違』，以及五種是『不定』，其餘四種是『不成』，一種是『不定』，三種是『相違』，為什麼不把它們涵蓋進去呢？回答說，因為『因』直接成就『宗』（pakṣa，宗），所以只說其相順的情況。『同喻』（sapakṣa，同品）和『異喻』（vipakṣa，異品）成就『宗』的關係比較疏遠，所以只標明其順違的情況。因此，其餘的過失沒有完全涵蓋。上面三種相各自作為一句，以及三種相相對缺失的情況，論文雖然沒有按照次第進行闡述，但道理一定是這樣的。如果進行更細緻的區分，還會有更多種情況。暫且以『初相』的三句式中的一句為首，對剩餘的兩個相作四句式，即：有的是『宗法』（pakṣadharmatva，宗法性），但不是『遍』（vyāpaka，周遍），不是『同品定有性』（sapakṣe sattvam，同品定有性）。有的是『同品定有性』，但不是『宗法』，也不是『遍』。有的是『宗法』，但不是『遍』。
【English Translation】 English version If the 『initial characteristic』 (pakṣadharmatva, presence in the subject) is not established, then the 『latter two characteristics』 (sapakṣe sattvam, presence in similar instances; vipakṣe asattvam, absence in dissimilar instances) are also not established. If the 『latter two characteristics』 are not established, then the 『initial characteristic』 may or may not be established. If the 『initial characteristic』 is established, then the 『latter two characteristics』 are certainly not established. And so on, until the 『three characteristics』 (trirūpa-hetu, the three aspects of a reason) are all not established, and the 『three characteristics』 are all established. Here, there are a total of three types of four-fold negations and one type of two-fold negation. Only when the 『initial characteristic』 is not established, the four-fold negation cannot fully encompass it. Similarly, when two characteristics are not established, and even when three characteristics are not established, depending on the specific situation, only the faults of 『unestablished』 (asiddha, unestablished reason), 『uncertain』 (anaikāntika, uncertain reason), and 『contradictory』 (viruddha, contradictory reason) will arise, and these are all due to the faults of the 『reason』 (hetu, reason). If, because one 『reason』 (hetu, reason) and two 『statements』 (dṛṣṭānta, example) are deficient in the meaning of the means of proof (sādhana, means of proof), there will also be three types of four-fold negations and one type of two-fold negation. For example, if the 『meaning of the reason』 is deficient, then the 『latter two characteristics』 are not established, which belongs to the 『four unestablished faults』. If the second statement is deficient, then the 『initial characteristic』 and the 『latter characteristic』 are both not established, which is not encompassed by 『both unestablished』. If the third statement is deficient, then the 『initial characteristic』 and the 『second characteristic』 are both not established, which is not encompassed by 『both not excluded』. And so on, when two or even three statements are deficient, and when all three statements are not deficient, the deficient situations all belong to faults, and the non-deficient situations do not belong to faults. Depending on the specific situation, there are respectively 『four unestablished reasons』, 『both similar examples unestablished』, 『both dissimilar examples not excluded』, or simultaneously possessing two faults, or simultaneously possessing three faults. The Venerable Śubhagupta (Bhadanta Śubhagupta), Dignāga Bodhisattva (Dignāga), etc., do not consider 『non-existence』 (asattva, non-existence) as a deficiency, therefore there are only six negations. Even if the Consciousness-Only school (Vijñānavāda) believes that there is fundamentally no means of proof, how can there be a fault of deficiency in the means of proof? All the masters say that there are a total of seven negations, rather than saying that there is a means of proof that causes a fault, but only saying that there is a fault of deficiency in the means of proof, so it is said to be seven deficiencies. Someone asked, in the Hetucakraḍamaru (Hetucakraḍamaru), nine negations are analyzed, saying: 『Existing in similar instances, and existing in two similar instances, not existing in dissimilar instances, this is the 『reason』. The reverse is 『contradictory』, and the rest are 『uncertain』.』 That is to say, in the nine negations, only one of the 『own-nature reason』 (svabhāvahetu, own-nature reason) is 『contradictory』, and five are 『uncertain』, and the remaining four are 『unestablished』, one is 『uncertain』, and three are 『contradictory』, why are they not encompassed? The answer is that because the 『reason』 directly establishes the 『subject』 (pakṣa, subject), only the situation of their agreement is discussed. The relationship between 『similar examples』 (sapakṣa, similar instances) and 『dissimilar examples』 (vipakṣa, dissimilar instances) in establishing the 『subject』 is more distant, so only the situations of their agreement and contradiction are indicated. Therefore, the remaining faults are not fully encompassed. Each of the above three characteristics is taken as a negation, and the situation of the relative deficiency of the three characteristics, although the text does not elaborate in order, the principle must be like this. If a more detailed distinction is made, there will be more situations. For the time being, taking one of the three negations of the 『initial characteristic』 as the starting point, the four-fold negation is made for the remaining two characteristics, that is: some are 『presence in the subject』 (pakṣadharmatva, presence in the subject), but not 『pervasive』 (vyāpaka, pervasive), not 『definitely present in similar instances』 (sapakṣe sattvam, definitely present in similar instances). Some are 『definitely present in similar instances』, but not 『presence in the subject』, and not 『pervasive』. Some are 『presence in the subject』, but not 『pervasive』.
。亦是同品非定有性。有非宗法而非遍。亦非同品非定有性。如是以初相第一句。對第二相四句。有四種四句復以此句對第三相四句。復有四種四句。如是初相第一句。對餘二相四句。有八種四句。以初相餘二句為首。對餘二相各四句亦如是。其初相三句為首。對余有三種八句。總成二十四種四句。以第二相四句。對第三相四句。一一各別有四種四句。覆成一十六種四句。如是總成四十種四句。有是有非。恐文繁廣略示而已。於前諸句總說頌曰。于宗法三相。各對互隨無如應為不成。不定相違等。等言意顯諸缺減過。同喻異喻諸所有失。皆此所攝。宗法三相。因三相也。於此三相而釋義故。因親成宗相寬遍故。各對互隨無者。此有四類。一者各對。三相一一各對自法為句。初相有三。后二各四。二者互隨無。三相更互闕無綺對為句。古今合有多釋。今唯取宗法三相。入此頌中有三種四句。有一種兩句。三者各對互隨無。以初相三句中一一句。各對后二相中各四句一一。更互隨有無以為四句及以第二相四句一一。對第三相四句一一。更互隨有無以為四句。合有四十種四句。四者各對互隨。以因三相。如其所應。初相有過。名為不成。於後二相有過。名為不定。于其二相有相違過。名曰相違。若三支互闕。因闕名不成。同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 同樣，『是同品』（samanajātīya，相似品類）並非必然具有『定有性』（niyata-bhāva，必然存在）。存在『非宗法』（a-pakṣa-dharma，不屬於宗的性質）但『非遍』（a-vyāpaka，不普遍）的情況，也存在『非同品』（a-samanajātīya，非相似品類）並非必然具有『定有性』的情況。如此，以初相的第一句，對應第二相的四句，有四種四句。再次，以此句對應第三相的四句，又有四種四句。這樣，初相的第一句，對應其餘二相的四句，有八種四句。以初相的其餘二句為首，對應其餘二相的各四句，也同樣如此。初相的三句為首，對應其餘有三種八句，總共構成二十四種四句。以第二相的四句，對應第三相的四句，一一分別有四種四句，再次構成一十六種四句。如此總共構成四十種四句，有『是』有『非』。恐怕文字繁多，僅作簡略展示。對於前面各種句子，總括而言，頌曰： 『于宗法三相，各對互隨無，如應為不成，不定相違等。』 『等』字意在顯示各種缺失的過失，同喻、異喻的各種所有缺失，都包含在此處。『宗法三相』，即因的三相。因為對此三相進行解釋，因才能親近併成就宗，相才能寬廣而普遍。『各對互隨無』，這裡有四類。一者，『各對』，三相一一各自對應自身之法而為句。初相有三句，后二相各有四句。二者，『互隨無』，三相更互相缺而綺對為句。古今結合有多種解釋，現在只取宗法三相，納入此頌中，有三種四句，有一種兩句。三者，『各對互隨無』，以初相三句中的每一句，各自對應后二相中的各四句一一，更互相隨有無以為四句，以及以第二相四句一一，對應第三相四句一一，更互相隨有無以為四句，合計有四十種四句。四者，『各對互隨』，以因的三相，如其所應，初相有過失，名為『不成』。對於后二相有過失，名為『不定』。對於后二相有相違的過失，名為『相違』。如果三支互相缺失，因缺失則名為『不成』，同喻、異喻等缺失，也包含在『等』字之中。
【English Translation】 English version Similarly, 'being in the same class' (samanajātīya) does not necessarily have 'definite existence' (niyata-bhāva). There are cases of 'non-property of the subject' (a-pakṣa-dharma) that are 'non-pervasive' (a-vyāpaka), and there are also cases where 'not being in the same class' (a-samanajātīya) does not necessarily have 'definite existence'. Thus, with the first phrase of the first aspect corresponding to the four phrases of the second aspect, there are four types of four-phrase combinations. Again, with this phrase corresponding to the four phrases of the third aspect, there are another four types of four-phrase combinations. In this way, the first phrase of the first aspect, corresponding to the four phrases of the remaining two aspects, has eight types of four-phrase combinations. Taking the remaining two phrases of the first aspect as the starting point, the correspondence to the four phrases of each of the remaining two aspects is similar. With the three phrases of the first aspect as the starting point, there are three types of eight-phrase combinations, totaling twenty-four types of four-phrase combinations. With the four phrases of the second aspect corresponding to the four phrases of the third aspect, each separately has four types of four-phrase combinations, again forming sixteen types of four-phrase combinations. Thus, a total of forty types of four-phrase combinations are formed, with 'is' and 'is not'. Fearing that the text would be too extensive, only a brief demonstration is given. Regarding all the preceding phrases, in summary, the verse says: 'Regarding the three aspects of the property of the subject (宗法三相), each correspondence, mutual following, absence, as appropriate, constitutes non-establishment (不成), uncertainty (不定), contradiction (相違), etc.' The word 'etc.' is intended to show various deficiencies, and all deficiencies in similar examples (同喻) and dissimilar examples (異喻) are included here. 'The three aspects of the property of the subject' are the three aspects of the reason (因). Because these three aspects are explained, the reason can be close to and accomplish the subject (宗), and the aspect can be broad and pervasive. 'Each correspondence, mutual following, absence' has four categories. First, 'each correspondence' means that each of the three aspects corresponds to its own dharma to form a phrase. The first aspect has three phrases, and the latter two aspects each have four phrases. Second, 'mutual following, absence' means that the three aspects mutually lack and ornate each other to form a phrase. Combining ancient and modern interpretations, there are various explanations, but now only the three aspects of the property of the subject are taken and included in this verse, with three types of four-phrase combinations and one type of two-phrase combination. Third, 'each correspondence, mutual following, absence' means that each phrase of the three phrases of the first aspect corresponds to each of the four phrases of each of the latter two aspects, mutually following existence and non-existence to form four-phrase combinations, and each of the four phrases of the second aspect corresponds to each of the four phrases of the third aspect, mutually following existence and non-existence to form four-phrase combinations, totaling forty types of four-phrase combinations. Fourth, 'each correspondence, mutual following' means that with the three aspects of the reason, as appropriate, if the first aspect has a fault, it is called 'non-establishment'. If the latter two aspects have a fault, it is called 'uncertainty'. If the latter two aspects have a contradictory fault, it is called 'contradiction'. If the three branches mutually lack, the lack of the reason is called 'non-establishment', and the lack of similar examples and dissimilar examples is also included in the word 'etc'.
闕名俱不成。異闕名俱不遣。三支雖具。自他各對互隨是非名相違決定。是故稱等。如是總攝因過皆盡。此中合有四十五種四句。一種三句。一種兩句。或闕一有三句。闕二有三等。是名略釋宗法三相。
論。云何名為同品異品。
述曰。四別釋有二。初問。后答。此問也。何故三相不問釋初。答有二釋。一者同品異品各各有二。一宗同異二因同異。今說宗同異。恐濫因同異。故偏問之。初相無濫。故不須簡。問遍是宗法。宗有別總。義亦有濫。何故不徴。答因於有無說宗同異。宗成順違說因同異。故於宗因同異不定。為簡此過。遂別徴二。由因但是有法宗法。成於法故。不是總宗及法之法。無濫可遮故不徴釋。此問二體相成顯故。二者宗是有法。上已明之。二品未明。故須徴釋。
論。謂所立法均等義品說名同品。
述曰。下答前徴有二。初同。后異。同中復二。一總出體。二別指法。此初也。所立法者。所立謂宗。法謂能別。均謂齊均。等謂相似。義謂義理。品謂種類。有無法處。此義總言。謂若一物。有與所立總宗中法。齊均相似義理體類。說名同品。是中意說宗之同品。所立宗者。因之所立自性差別不相離性。同品亦爾。有此所立中法。互差別聚不相離性相似種類即是同品。若與所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 闕名俱不成：缺少名稱則一切都不能成立。 異闕名俱不遣：不同的缺少名稱的情況都不能被忽略。 三支雖具，自他各對互隨是非名相違決定：即使三個部分都具備，自身和他人的觀點各自相對，相互跟隨，但如果名稱和概念相互矛盾，就無法得出確定的結論。 是故稱等：因此，才需要稱量和比較。 如是總攝因過皆盡：像這樣總括起來，所有的原因和過失就都能夠被涵蓋。 此中合有四十五種四句，一種三句，一種兩句，或闕一有三句，闕二有三等：這裡面總共有四十五種四句結構，一種是三句結構，一種是兩句結構，或者缺少一句有三種情況，缺少兩句有三種情況等等。 是名略釋宗法三相：這叫做簡略地解釋宗法的三種相。
論：云何名為同品異品？（什麼是同品和異品？）
述曰：四別釋有二。初問。后答。此問也。何故三相不問釋初。答有二釋。一者同品異品各各有二。一宗同異二因同異。今說宗同異。恐濫因同異。故偏問之。初相無濫。故不須簡。問遍是宗法。宗有別總。義亦有濫。何故不徴。答因於有無說宗同異。宗成順違說因同異。故於宗因同異不定。為簡此過。遂別徴二。由因但是有法宗法。成於法故。不是總宗及法之法。無濫可遮故不徴釋。此問二體相成顯故。二者宗是有法。上已明之。二品未明。故須徴釋。 （解釋有四種區別，首先是提問，然後是回答。這裡是提問。為什麼三種相不先問解釋第一個相？回答有兩種解釋。一是同品和異品各自有兩種情況：一是宗的相同和不同，二是因的相同和不同。現在說的是宗的相同和不同，恐怕會和因的相同和不同混淆，所以只問宗的。第一個相沒有混淆的情況，所以不需要簡化。問：普遍都是宗法，宗有區別和總括，意義也有混淆的情況，為什麼不徵求意見？回答：因為根據有無來說宗的相同和不同，宗的成立與否順應或違背來說因的相同和不同。所以在宗和因的相同和不同不確定的情況下，爲了簡化這個過失，所以分別徵求兩種意見。因為因只是有法宗法，成就於法，不是總宗和法的法，沒有可以遮蓋的混淆，所以不徵求解釋。這個提問是因為兩種體相成就而顯現的緣故。二是宗是有法，上面已經說明了，兩種品類還沒有說明，所以需要徵求解釋。）
論：謂所立法均等義品說名同品。（所謂的同品，是指在所要證明的法上，具有均等意義的品類。）
述曰：下答前徴有二。初同。后異。同中復二。一總出體。二別指法。此初也。所立法者。所立謂宗（proposition），法謂能別。均謂齊均。等謂相似。義謂義理。品謂種類。有無法處。此義總言。謂若一物。有與所立總宗中法。齊均相似義理體類。說名同品。是中意說宗之同品。所立宗者。因之所立自性差別不相離性。同品亦爾。有此所立中法。互差別聚不相離性相似種類即是同品。若與所 （下面回答前面的徵詢，分為兩個部分：一是同品，二是異品。同品中又分為兩個部分：一是總的說明體性，二是分別指出法。這裡是第一個部分。所立法，指的是所要建立的，也就是宗（proposition），法指的是能夠區別的。均指的是齊一，等指的是相似，義指的是義理，品指的是種類，有法和無法之處。這個意義總的來說，指的是如果一個事物，具有和所要建立的總宗（proposition）中的法，齊一相似的義理體類，就叫做同品。這裡的意思是說宗（proposition）的同品。所要建立的宗（proposition），是因所要建立的自性差別不相離的性質。同品也是這樣，具有這個所要建立的法，互相差別聚集不相離的性質相似的種類，就是同品。如果和所）
【English Translation】 English version Absence of a name leads to the failure of everything. Different instances of name absence cannot be ignored. Even if the three components are present, the perspectives of oneself and others are relative and follow each other, but if the names and concepts contradict each other, a definite conclusion cannot be reached. Therefore, weighing and comparison are necessary. Thus, when summarized, all causes and faults can be covered. Here, there are a total of forty-five types of four-line structures, one type of three-line structure, one type of two-line structure, or three cases of missing one line, three cases of missing two lines, and so on. This is called a brief explanation of the three aspects of the doctrine.
Question: What are called 'similar instances' (sapaksha) and 'dissimilar instances' (vipaksha)?
Explanation: There are four distinct explanations, first a question, then an answer. This is the question. Why are the three aspects not asked to explain the first aspect? There are two explanations. First, similar instances and dissimilar instances each have two aspects: one is the similarity and dissimilarity of the proposition (paksha), and the other is the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason (hetu). Now we are talking about the similarity and dissimilarity of the proposition (paksha), fearing confusion with the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason (hetu), so we only ask about the proposition (paksha). The first aspect has no confusion, so there is no need to simplify. Question: Universally, it is the property of the proposition (paksha). The proposition (paksha) has distinctions and generalizations, and the meaning also has confusion. Why not seek opinions? Answer: Because the similarity and dissimilarity of the proposition (paksha) are based on existence or non-existence, and the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason (hetu) are based on whether the proposition (paksha) is established in accordance or violation. Therefore, in the case where the similarity and dissimilarity of the proposition (paksha) and the reason (hetu) are uncertain, in order to simplify this fault, two opinions are sought separately. Because the reason (hetu) is only the property of the existent and the property of the proposition (paksha), and is established in the property, it is not the general proposition (paksha) and the property of the property. There is no confusion that can be covered, so no explanation is sought. This question is because the two entities are accomplished and manifested. Second, the proposition (paksha) is the existent, which has been explained above. The two categories have not been explained, so an explanation is needed.
Treatise: 'That which has equal meaning in the property to be established is called a similar instance (sapaksha).'
Explanation: The following answers the previous inquiry in two parts: first, similar instances (sapaksha), and second, dissimilar instances (vipaksha). The similar instances (sapaksha) are further divided into two parts: first, a general explanation of the nature, and second, a separate indication of the property. This is the first part. 'Property to be established' refers to what is to be established, which is the proposition (paksha), and 'property' refers to what can be distinguished. 'Equal' refers to uniformity, 'similar' refers to resemblance, 'meaning' refers to the principle, and 'category' refers to the type, the place of existence and non-existence. This meaning generally refers to if a thing has the same and similar meaning, essence, and type as the property in the general proposition (paksha) to be established, it is called a similar instance (sapaksha). The intention here is to speak of the similar instances (sapaksha) of the proposition (paksha). The proposition (paksha) to be established is the nature of the self-nature difference that the reason (hetu) wants to establish, which is inseparable. The similar instance (sapaksha) is also like this, having this property to be established, the nature of mutual difference gathering and inseparability, the similar type is the similar instance (sapaksha). If with what
立總宗。相似一切種類之聚名同品者。宗上意許所有別法。皆入總宗。且如異品虛空上無我。與聲意許無我相似應名同品。若與所立有法相似種類之聚名為同品。即一切宗多無同品。如聲有法。瓶非同故至下喻中當廣建立。為遮此二。總標所立法而簡別之。若聚有于賓主所諍因所立法聚相似種類即名同品。由法能別之所別宗因之所成。故舉此法以彰彼聚。問若爾。聲上無我等義。非因所立應名異品。答彼若不許聲有法有亦成異品。宗因無故。若彼許有。為因所成。隨意所諍亦名同品。故有有法差別相違。
論。如立無常瓶等無常是名同品。
述曰。此別指法。如立宗中陳無常法聚名宗者。瓶等之上亦有無常。故瓶等聚名為同品。此中但取因成法聚名為同品。故瑜伽言。同類者。謂隨所有法望所餘法。其相展轉少分相似。有五相似。一相狀二自體。三業用。四法門。五因果。今此中說法門相似。
論。異品者謂於是處無其所立。
述曰。下解異品有二。一總出體。二別指法。此初也。處謂處所。即除宗外餘一切法。體通有無。若立有宗。同品必有體。所以前言均等義品。異品通無體。故言是處。所立謂宗不相離性。謂若諸法處無因之所立即名異品。非別無彼言所陳法。及與有法名為異品。過如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 建立總宗。相似於一切種類聚集，名稱相同的品類稱為同品。宗的意圖在於允許所有不同的法都歸入總宗。例如，在異品虛空上不存在『我』（ātman），與聲音意圖上不存在『我』相似，應該被歸為同品。如果與所建立的有法相似的種類聚集被稱為同品，那麼一切宗派大多沒有同品。例如，聲音是有法，瓶不是同品，這將在後面的比喻中詳細闡述。爲了排除這兩種情況，總的標明所立之法，並加以區分。如果聚集具有賓主雙方所爭論的因所立之法聚集的相似種類，就稱為同品。由於法能夠區分所要區分的宗和因所成就的，所以舉出此法來彰顯那個聚集。問：如果這樣，聲音上不存在『我』等意義，不是因所立，應該被歸為異品。答：如果對方不承認聲音是有法，那麼聲音也成為異品，因為沒有宗和因。如果對方承認有，並且是由因所成就的，那麼隨意爭論的也稱為同品。所以有有法的差別和相違。
論：例如，建立無常，瓶等無常就是同品。
述曰：這是特別指明法。例如，在建立宗中陳述無常法聚集名為宗，瓶等之上也有無常，所以瓶等聚集稱為同品。這裡只取因所成就的法聚集稱為同品。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『同類』是指隨所有法相對於其餘法，其相貌輾轉有少部分相似。有五種相似：一、相狀；二、自體；三、業用；四、法門；五、因果。現在這裡說的是法門相似。
論：異品是指在那個地方沒有其所立之法。
述曰：下面解釋異品有兩種：一是總的說明體性，二是分別指明法。這是第一種。處是指處所，即除了宗以外的其餘一切法。體性包括有和無。如果建立有宗，同品必定有體性，所以前面說均等義品。異品包括沒有體性，所以說是『是處』。所立是指宗不相離的性質。也就是說，如果諸法之處沒有因所立，就稱為異品。不是特別沒有那個陳述的法，以及與有法被稱為異品。過失如同...
【English Translation】 English version: Establish the general thesis (zong). Those aggregates of similar types with the same name are called 'same class' (tongpin). The intention of the thesis is to allow all different dharmas to be included in the general thesis. For example, the non-self (anātman) on the 'different class' (yipin) of space is similar to the intended non-self on sound, and should be classified as 'same class'. If the aggregates of types similar to the established 'existent dharma' (youfa) are called 'same class', then most theses of all schools do not have 'same class'. For example, sound is an 'existent dharma', and a pot is not 'same class', which will be elaborated in the following analogy. To exclude these two cases, the established dharma is generally indicated and distinguished. If the aggregate has similar types of aggregates of the dharma established by the reason (hetu) that is disputed by both the host and the guest, it is called 'same class'. Because the dharma can distinguish the thesis to be distinguished and what is accomplished by the reason, this dharma is cited to highlight that aggregate. Question: If so, the meaning of non-self on sound, etc., is not established by the reason and should be classified as 'different class'. Answer: If the other party does not admit that sound is an 'existent dharma', then sound also becomes a 'different class' because there is no thesis and reason. If the other party admits that it exists and is accomplished by the reason, then what is disputed at will is also called 'same class'. Therefore, there are differences and contradictions in 'existent dharma'.
Treatise: For example, establishing impermanence, the impermanence of pots, etc., is called 'same class'.
Commentary: This specifically refers to dharma. For example, in establishing the thesis, stating the aggregate of impermanent dharmas is called the thesis, and there is also impermanence on pots, etc., so the aggregate of pots, etc., is called 'same class'. Here, only the aggregate of dharmas accomplished by the reason is taken as 'same class'. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Same kind' refers to the fact that with respect to the remaining dharmas, the appearances of all dharmas are partially similar in a revolving manner. There are five similarities: 1. appearance; 2. self-nature; 3. function; 4. dharma-gate; 5. cause and effect. Here, we are talking about the similarity of dharma-gates.
Treatise: 'Different class' refers to the place where the established dharma is not present.
Commentary: The following explains 'different class' in two ways: first, a general explanation of the substance; second, a separate indication of the dharma. This is the first. 'Place' refers to the location, that is, all dharmas other than the thesis. The substance includes existence and non-existence. If an 'existent' thesis is established, the 'same class' must have a substance, so the previous statement was 'equal meaning class'. The 'different class' includes the absence of substance, so it is said 'this place'. 'Established' refers to the nature of the thesis that is inseparable. That is to say, if the place of dharmas is not established by the reason, it is called 'different class'. It is not particularly the absence of the stated dharma, and what is called 'existent dharma' is not called 'different class'. The fault is like...
前說。此中不言無所立法。前于同品已言均等所立法訖。此準可知。但無所立。義已成故。理門亦云。若所立無說名異品。但無所立即是異品。同品不說處。異體通無故。瑜伽說言。異類者。謂所有法望所餘法。其相展轉少不相似。故非一切全不相似。但無隨應因所成故。與同相違亦有五種。
論。若有是常見非所作如虛空等。
述曰。此別指法。如立其無常宗。所作性為因。若有處所是常法聚。見非是所作。如虛空等。說名異品。此中既說宗之異品。唯應說云謂若是常。如虛空等。復云見非所作者。舉因異品。兼釋遍無。問何故前說宗之同品不兼定有。此釋異品兼解遍無。答有二解。一者影彰同品之中但為簡別因之同品。顯異亦爾。不要解于定無之相。故文略之異品之中。乘言便故。兼釋遍無。顯同亦爾。二者同品順成。但許有因即成同品。易故不解決定有性。異品止濫。必顯遍無方成止濫。故解異品。兼解遍無同品因也。為顯同異二品別故。問如立無常。龜毛無彼常住之相亦名無常。於一切時性常無故。亦得名常。何故不立非同異品。答聲言無常。性是滅義。所作性者。體是生義。龜毛非滅。亦非有生。既無所立。即入異品。故喻唯二。更無雙非。若常宗有亦入異品。若非有品便入同中。
論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：前文已經說過，這裡不再贅述無所立法（不存在的法）。之前在同品（相似事例）中已經說明了均等所立法（相等的事例）的含義，可以參照理解。只是因為無所立的意義已經成立，所以不再重複。理門（因明理論）也說，如果所立（要證明的觀點）不存在，就稱為異品（不相似事例）。但無所立就是異品。同品不說明之處，是因為異體普遍不存在的緣故。《瑜伽師地論》中說：『異類』是指所有法相對於其餘法，它們的相狀輾轉之間略有不相似之處。因此，並非一切都完全不相似，只是因為沒有隨應因（相應的理由）所成立的緣故。與同相違背的情況也有五種。
論：如果有是常見（恒常存在）而非所作（非人為製造）的事物，比如虛空等。
述曰：這裡特別指出法。比如，如果立『無常』為宗（要證明的觀點），以『所作性』為因（理由）。如果有處所是常法（恒常存在的法）的集合，可見不是人為製造的，比如虛空等，就稱為異品。這裡既然說了宗的異品，就應該說『如果是常，比如虛空等』。又說『見非所作』，是舉出因的異品，兼解釋遍無（普遍不存在）。問：為什麼前面說宗的同品（相似事例）時不兼顧定有（必定存在）？這裡解釋異品時兼顧遍無？答：有兩種解釋。一是暗示同品之中只是爲了簡別因的同品，顯示異品也是如此，不必解釋定無之相，所以省略了。異品之中，順便就兼解釋了遍無，顯示同品也是如此。二是同品順應成立，只要允許有因，就成為同品，容易理解，所以不解決定有性。異品是爲了防止氾濫，必須顯示遍無才能防止氾濫，所以解釋異品，兼解釋遍無的同品因。爲了顯示同品和異品的區別。問：比如立『無常』，龜毛（虛無的事物）沒有常住的相狀，也稱為無常。因為在任何時候其自性都是不存在的，也可以稱為常。為什麼不設立非同非異品？答：聲言『無常』，其性質是滅亡的意思。『所作性』，其本體是產生的意思。龜毛既不是滅亡，也不是產生。既然沒有所立，就歸入異品。所以比喻只有兩種，沒有雙重否定。如果常宗存在，也歸入異品。如果不是有品，就歸入同品。
論
【English Translation】 English version: Previously, it was said that there is no need to elaborate on what is not established (non-existent dharmas). Earlier, in the similar instances (Sapaksha), the meaning of equally established instances has been explained, which can be referred to for understanding. It's just that because the meaning of what is not established is already established, there is no need to repeat it. The 'Hetu Chakra Damaru' (a text on logic) also says that if what is to be established (the thesis) does not exist, it is called dissimilar instances (Vipaksha). But what is not established is the dissimilar instance. The reason why similar instances are not explained is because different entities universally do not exist. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Dissimilar' refers to all dharmas in relation to other dharmas, their characteristics are slightly dissimilar in their transformations. Therefore, not everything is completely dissimilar, but because it is not established by a corresponding reason (Hetu). There are also five kinds of opposition to similarity.
Treatise: If there are things that are eternal (Nitya) and not made (Akritaka), such as space (Akasha) etc.
Commentary: This specifically points out dharmas. For example, if 'impermanence' (Anitya) is established as the thesis (Paksha), and 'being made' (Kritakatva) is the reason (Hetu). If there is a place that is a collection of eternal dharmas, it can be seen that it is not man-made, such as space, etc., it is called dissimilar instances. Since the dissimilar instances of the thesis are mentioned here, it should be said 'If it is eternal, such as space, etc.' Furthermore, saying 'seen as not made' is citing the dissimilar instances of the reason, and also explaining universal absence (Vyapaka-anupalabdhi). Question: Why didn't the previous explanation of the similar instances of the thesis include definite existence (Niyata-bhava)? Why does this explanation of dissimilar instances include universal absence? Answer: There are two explanations. One is to imply that within the similar instances, it is only to distinguish the similar instances of the reason, and the same is true for showing dissimilar instances, there is no need to explain the aspect of definite absence, so it is omitted. Within the dissimilar instances, it is convenient to also explain universal absence, and the same is true for showing similarity. Second, similar instances are easily established, as long as the reason is allowed, it becomes a similar instance, so it is easy to understand, so it does not resolve the nature of definite existence. Dissimilar instances are to prevent abuse, it is necessary to show universal absence to prevent abuse, so explain the dissimilar instances, and also explain the similar instance of universal absence. In order to show the difference between similar and dissimilar instances. Question: For example, if 'impermanence' is established, rabbit hair (a non-existent thing) does not have the characteristic of permanence, and is also called impermanent. Because its nature is non-existent at all times, it can also be called permanent. Why not establish a neither similar nor dissimilar instance? Answer: The term 'impermanence' means extinction in nature. 'Being made' means production in essence. Rabbit hair is neither extinct nor produced. Since there is nothing to be established, it is classified as a dissimilar instance. Therefore, there are only two metaphors, there is no double negation. If the eternal thesis exists, it is also classified as a dissimilar instance. If it is not an existent instance, it is classified as a similar instance.
Treatise:
。此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性。
述曰。五示法也。于中有三。初舉兩因。次成三相。后顯所成。此初也。此中者。發端義。或於此所說因義之中。雙舉兩因者。略有三義。一對二師。二釋遍定。三舉二正。對二師者。聲論師中總有二種。一聲從緣生即常不滅。二聲本常住。從緣所顯今方可聞。緣響若息。還不可聞。聲生亦爾。緣息不聞。緣在故聞。此二師皆有一分一切內外異性。一體多體能詮別故。若佛弟子。對聲生論立聲無常。所作性因。便具三相。對聲顯論。言所作性。隨一不成。若對聲顯言勤勇因。便具三相。對聲生論。立一切聲皆是無常。勤勇為因。宗法非遍兩俱不成。今顯對聲生。所作為因。若對聲顯。勤勇為因。又立內外聲皆無常。因言所作。若立內聲。因言勤勇。不爾因有兩俱一分兩俱不成。為對計別。故陳二因。釋遍定者。所作性因。成無常宗。三相俱遍。勤勇因成。同定余遍。顯順成宗同定亦得不要三遍。故舉二因。舉二正者。顯九句中。此中所作。彼第二因。此勤勇因。彼第八句。陳那說二俱是正因。具三相故。今顯彼二因皆具三相。故雙陳之。所作性者。因緣所作。彰其生義。勤勇無間所發性者。勤勇謂策發。善即精進。染謂懈怠。無記謂欲解。或是作意。或是尋伺。或是思慧。由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這裡所說的『所作性』（因緣和合而生）或『勤勇無間所發性』（通過努力和精進而產生的性質）。
解釋：這是五種顯示方法之一。其中有三個部分：首先列舉兩個原因，其次成立三種相，最後顯示所成立的結論。這是第一個部分。『此中』指的是發端的意思，或者是在這裡所說的原因的意義之中。同時列舉兩個原因，大概有三個意義：一是針對兩位論師，二是解釋周遍和決定，三是列舉兩個正因。針對兩位論師：聲論師中總共有兩種觀點，一是聲音從因緣而生，因此是常住不滅的；二是聲音本來就是常住的，只是通過因緣顯現出來，現在才能被聽到。因緣的影響如果消失，聲音就不能被聽到。聲音的產生也是這樣，因緣消失就聽不到，因緣存在就能聽到。這兩位論師都有一部分觀點與一切內外異性相符，因為一體多體和能詮不同。如果佛弟子針對聲生論，立『聲無常』，以『所作性』為因，就具備三種相。如果針對聲顯論，說『所作性』，那麼隨便哪一種相都不能成立。如果針對聲顯論，說『勤勇』為因，就具備三種相。如果針對聲生論，立『一切聲皆是無常』，以『勤勇』為因，那麼宗法不周遍，兩種情況都不能成立。現在顯示針對聲生論，以『所作』為因；如果針對聲顯論，以『勤勇』為因。又立內外聲都是無常，以『所作』為因。如果立內聲，以『勤勇』為因，否則因有兩方面，一方面不成立，兩方面都不成立。爲了針對不同的觀點，所以陳述兩個原因。解釋周遍和決定：『所作性』這個因，成立無常這個宗，三種相都周遍。『勤勇』這個因成立，同品決定，其餘的周遍。顯示順向成立宗，同品決定也可以，不一定三種相都周遍。所以列舉兩個原因。列舉兩個正因：顯示九句中，這裡所說的『所作』，是第二種因；這裡所說的『勤勇』，是第八句。陳那說這兩個都是正因，因為具備三種相。現在顯示這兩個因都具備三種相，所以同時陳述它們。『所作性』，是因緣所作，彰顯其生起之義。『勤勇無間所發性』，勤勇指的是策發，善指的是精進，染指的是懈怠，無記指的是欲解，或者是作意，或者是尋伺，或者是思慧。由於……
【English Translation】 English version: Here, 『being made』 (produced by causes and conditions) or 『being produced without interval by effort』 (a quality produced through effort and diligence) are referred to.
Explanation: This is one of the five methods of demonstration. It has three parts: first, listing two causes; second, establishing the three characteristics; and third, showing the conclusion that is established. This is the first part. 『Here』 refers to the meaning of initiating, or within the meaning of the causes mentioned here. Listing two causes simultaneously has roughly three meanings: first, it is directed at two teachers; second, it explains pervasiveness and definiteness; and third, it lists two valid reasons. Regarding the two teachers: in the school of sound, there are generally two views: one is that sound arises from conditions and is therefore permanent and indestructible; the other is that sound is inherently permanent, but it is manifested through conditions, and only now can it be heard. If the influence of conditions disappears, the sound cannot be heard. The production of sound is also like this; if the conditions disappear, it cannot be heard; if the conditions exist, it can be heard. Both of these teachers have a portion of views that are consistent with all internal and external different natures, because the one body and multiple bodies and the ability to express are different. If a Buddhist disciple, in response to the theory of sound arising, establishes 『sound is impermanent,』 using 『being made』 as the cause, then it possesses the three characteristics. If, in response to the theory of sound manifestation, it is said 『being made,』 then any one of the characteristics cannot be established. If, in response to the theory of sound manifestation, it is said 『effort』 as the cause, then it possesses the three characteristics. If, in response to the theory of sound arising, it is established 『all sounds are impermanent,』 using 『effort』 as the cause, then the property of the subject is not pervasive, and both situations cannot be established. Now it is shown that in response to the theory of sound arising, 『being made』 is used as the cause; if in response to the theory of sound manifestation, 『effort』 is used as the cause. Furthermore, it is established that both internal and external sounds are impermanent, using 『being made』 as the cause. If internal sound is established, 『effort』 is used as the cause; otherwise, the cause has two aspects, one aspect cannot be established, and both aspects cannot be established. In order to address different views, two causes are stated. Explaining pervasiveness and definiteness: the cause of 『being made』 establishes the thesis of impermanence, and all three characteristics are pervasive. The cause of 『effort』 establishes, the similar class is definite, and the rest are pervasive. Showing that the thesis is established in a forward direction, the similar class can also be definite, and it is not necessary for all three characteristics to be pervasive. Therefore, two causes are listed. Listing two valid reasons: showing that among the nine phrases, the 『being made』 mentioned here is the second cause; the 『effort』 mentioned here is the eighth phrase. Dignāga said that both of these are valid reasons because they possess the three characteristics. Now it is shown that both of these causes possess the three characteristics, so they are stated simultaneously. 『Being made』 is produced by causes and conditions, highlighting its meaning of arising. 『Being produced without interval by effort,』 effort refers to instigation, good refers to diligence, defilement refers to laziness, and neutral refers to the desire to understand, or it is attention, or it is investigation and analysis, or it is thought and wisdom. Due to...
此等故。擊臍輪等風。乃至展轉擊咽喉唇舌等。勇銳無間之所發顯。
論。遍是宗法于同品定有于異品遍無。
述曰。顯成三相。如上所說。生顯二因皆具三相。故成正因。義應一一皆準前作若遍若闕。
論。是無常等因。
述曰。顯因所成。等者。等取空無我等。此上二因。不但能成宗無常法。亦能成立空無我等。隨其所應。非取一切。若所作因。亦能成立言所陳苦等及無常宗。意所許苦等一切法者。此因便有不定等過。謂立量云。聲亦是苦。所作性故。以無漏法而為異品。所作性因於其異品一分上轉。應為不定言。此所成聲。為如於瓶。所作性故。體是其苦。為如自宗道諦等法。所作性故。體非是苦。此既正因。無不定過。故此言等。隨其所應。故瑜伽說同異喻云。少分相似及不相似。不說一切皆相似。一切皆不相似。不爾一切便無異品。因狹若能成立狹法。其因亦能成立寬法。同品之上雖因不遍。于異品中定遍是無故。因寬若能成立寬法。此必不能定成狹法。于異品有。不定過等隨此生故。是故於此應設劬勞也。
因明入正理論疏捲上
建武二年七月一日上卷之分三帖寫功了以筆跡之結緣備尊神之法味冀一天風收而都鄙歸正理四生浪靜而升沉萌善因耳。
(一交了
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，擊打臍輪等處的風，乃至逐漸擊打咽喉、嘴唇、舌頭等部位，是勇猛精進、毫無間斷地顯發出來的（結果）。
論：普遍性在於，作為宗法的同品中必定存在，而在異品中則完全不存在。
述曰：顯現成就三相，如上所述。生因和顯因都具備三相，因此成為正因。其意義應該一一參照前面所說的，或普遍存在，或有所欠缺。
論：是無常等因。
述曰：顯現因所成就的。『等』字，包括空、無我等。以上兩種因，不僅能成立宗法的無常，也能成立空、無我等，隨其所應。並非指所有。如果以『所作』為因，也能成立所陳述的苦等，以及無常宗。如果認為所許的苦等一切法，這個因便有不確定的過失。比如立論說：『聲音也是苦，因為是所作性。』以無漏法作為異品，所作性因在異品的一部分上存在，應該是不確定的。比如，這個所成就的聲音，像瓶子一樣，因為是所作性，本體是苦；又像自宗的道諦等法，因為是所作性，本體不是苦。這既然是正因，就沒有不確定的過失。所以這裡說『等』，是隨其所應。所以《瑜伽師地論》說同喻和異喻時說：『少部分相似和不相似』，而不是說『一切都相似』或『一切都不相似』。否則一切就沒有異品了。如果因狹窄，只能成立狹窄的法，那麼這個因也能成立寬泛的法。雖然在同品之上，因不普遍存在，但在異品中，必定完全不存在。如果因寬泛，能成立寬泛的法，那麼這個因必定不能確定地成立狹窄的法，因為在異品中存在，會產生不確定的過失等。因此，對於這一點應該努力研究。
《因明入正理論疏》捲上
建武二年七月一日，上卷的三份抄寫完成，以筆跡結緣，準備尊神的法味，希望一天風氣收斂，都城和邊鄙都歸正理，四生波浪平靜，上升和沉淪都萌發善因。
（一次交了）
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, striking the winds in the navel chakra (umbilical wheel) and so on, and gradually striking the throat, lips, tongue, etc., is the manifestation of courageous and uninterrupted effort.
Treatise: Universality lies in the fact that it necessarily exists in the homologue (same class) of the thesis and is completely absent in the heterologue (different class).
Commentary: Manifesting and accomplishing the three characteristics, as mentioned above. Both the productive cause (hetu) and the manifesting cause possess the three characteristics, thus becoming a valid cause (hetu). Its meaning should be referred to the previous statements, either universally present or partially lacking.
Treatise: It is the cause of impermanence (anitya) etc.
Commentary: Manifesting what is accomplished by the cause. 'Etc.' includes emptiness (sunyata), non-self (anatman), etc. The above two causes can not only establish the impermanence of the thesis but also establish emptiness, non-self, etc., as appropriate. It does not refer to everything. If 'what is made' (krtaka) is taken as the cause, it can also establish the suffering (duhkha) etc. stated, as well as the impermanence thesis. If it is considered that all phenomena such as suffering etc. are accepted, then this cause will have the fault of uncertainty (anaikantika). For example, if one argues: 'Sound is also suffering because it is made.' Taking unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta-dharma) as the heterologue, the cause of 'being made' exists in a part of the heterologue, which should be uncertain. For example, this accomplished sound, like a pot, is suffering because it is made; and like the Path (marga) of one's own school, it is not suffering because it is made. Since this is a valid cause, there is no fault of uncertainty. Therefore, 'etc.' here means 'as appropriate.' Therefore, the Yoga-sastra says in the examples of similarity and dissimilarity: 'A small part is similar and dissimilar,' rather than saying 'everything is similar' or 'everything is dissimilar.' Otherwise, there would be no heterologue at all. If the cause is narrow and can only establish a narrow dharma, then this cause can also establish a broad dharma. Although the cause is not universally present in the homologue, it is definitely completely absent in the heterologue. If the cause is broad and can establish a broad dharma, then this cause cannot definitely establish a narrow dharma, because it exists in the heterologue, which leads to the fault of uncertainty, etc. Therefore, one should strive to study this.
Nyayapravesa-sutra-tika Volume 1
On July 1st of Jianwu Year 2, the three copies of the first volume were completed. Connecting through the merit of handwriting, preparing the Dharma flavor for the revered deities, hoping that the atmosphere of the day will be contained, and both the capital and the borders will return to the correct principle, the waves of the four births will be calm, and the ascending and sinking will sprout good causes.
(One submission completed)
一交了) 權律師尊經(懸車餘二)
同十九日點了
或本云點本者元興寺明詮僧都道點也。
但處處有不契明燈抄計音石先德未被披覽歟(或云)。
校本云。
依長者殿仰以明詮點為本重以愚案點三卷疏此卷始自仁平四年正月十六日至於二月十四日二十七日讀了字點有誤者改直了。
左大臣在御判
同月二十八日讀序了本點(序非明詮)不甘心者任愚意削改了
自正月十六日至於二月十四日午克點了
五月二十八日直了六月二十四日一遍讀合了
久壽三年二月三日重讀了(不對師)去月二十四日始之久壽三年三月十八日重讀了去月二十二日始之今度別紙書目六。 大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1840 因明入正理論疏
因明入正理論疏卷中
大慈恩寺沙門基撰
論。喻有二種。
述曰。自下第三示喻之相。文段有三。一標舉。二列名。三隨釋。此初也。梵云達利瑟致案多。達利瑟致云見。案多雲邊。由此比況。令宗成立究竟名邊。他智解起。照此宗極名之為見。故無著云。立喻者。謂以所見邊。與未所見邊。和合正說。師子覺言。所見邊者。謂已顯了分。未所見邊者。謂未顯了分。以顯了分顯未顯了分。令義平等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： （一交了）權律師尊經（懸車餘二）
同十九日點了
或有版本說點本者是元興寺明詮僧都所點。
但處處有不符合明燈抄計音石先德未被披覽的地方（或者說）。
校對版本說：
依照長者殿的指示，以明詮的點校為基礎，重新以我個人的理解點校三卷疏，此卷從仁平四年正月十六日開始，到二月十四日，二十七日讀完，字有點錯的地方改正了。
左大臣在御判
同月二十八日讀序完畢，本點（序不是明詮所點），不滿意的地方按照我的意思刪改了。
從正月十六日到二月十四日午時點完。
五月二十八日改正完畢，六月二十四日一遍讀完。
久壽三年二月三日重讀完畢（不對師），上個月二十四日開始的，久壽三年三月十八日重讀完畢，上個月二十二日開始的，這次別紙書目六。 《大正藏》第44冊 No. 1840 《因明入正理論疏》
《因明入正理論疏》卷中
大慈恩寺沙門基撰
論：喻有兩種。
述曰：從下面開始第三部分，展示比喻的相狀。文段有三部分：一、標舉；二、列名；三、隨釋。這是第一部分。梵文是Dṛṣṭānta（ दृष्टान्त ），Dṛṣṭānta（ दृष्टान्त ）意思是『見』，anta意思是『邊』。通過這種比況，使宗的成立達到究竟的邊際。他人的智慧因此而生起，照亮這個宗的終極，稱之為『見』。所以無著說：『立喻者，就是用所見之邊，與未所見之邊，和合正確地說明。』師子覺說：『所見之邊，是指已經顯明的部分；未所見之邊，是指尚未顯明的部分。用顯明的部分來顯明未顯明的部分，使意義平等。』
【English Translation】 English version: (Delivered once) The esteemed Lawyer Quan reveres the scriptures (remaining two after retirement).
Finished marking on the 19th.
Some versions say that the marker of this edition was the monk Mingquan of Gangō-ji Temple.
However, there are discrepancies everywhere that do not match the Mingdeng Chao Jishi Yinshi's predecessors' unexamined records (or so it is said).
The collated version says:
According to the instructions of Elder Hall, taking Mingquan's marking as the basis, I have re-marked the three-volume commentary with my own understanding. This volume started on the 16th day of the first month of Ninpei 4 (1154), and was completed on the 14th and 27th days of the second month. Errors in the characters have been corrected.
Left Minister's seal of approval.
On the 28th of the same month, the preface was read and completed, marked (the preface was not marked by Mingquan). Unsatisfactory parts have been deleted and modified according to my own ideas.
From the 16th day of the first month to noon on the 14th day of the second month, marking was completed.
On the 28th day of the fifth month, corrections were completed. On the 24th day of the sixth month, one reading was completed.
On the 3rd day of the second month of Kyūju 3 (1156), re-reading was completed (not against the teacher). Started on the 24th day of last month. On the 18th day of the third month of Kyūju 3, re-reading was completed. Started on the 22nd day of last month. This time, a separate paper lists six items. Taisho Tripitaka Volume 44 No. 1840 Commentary on the Nyayapravesa
Commentary on the Nyayapravesa, Middle Volume
Composed by the Shramana Ji of Da Ci'en Temple
Treatise: There are two types of example (hetu).
Commentary: From below is the third part, showing the characteristics of the example (upama). There are three sections: 1. Statement; 2. Enumeration; 3. Explanation. This is the first. In Sanskrit, it is Dṛṣṭānta ( दृष्टान्त ). Dṛṣṭānta ( दृष्टान्त ) means 'seeing,' and anta means 'edge.' Through this analogy, the establishment of the thesis (paksa) reaches the ultimate edge. The wisdom of others arises from this, illuminating the ultimate of this thesis, which is called 'seeing.' Therefore, Asanga says: 'The establisher of the example is one who correctly explains the seen edge in conjunction with the unseen edge.' Sthiramati says: 'The seen edge refers to the already manifest part; the unseen edge refers to the not-yet-manifest part. Using the manifest part to manifest the not-yet-manifest part makes the meaning equal.'
。所有正說。是名立喻。今順方言。名之為喻。喻者。譬也。況也。曉也。由此譬況。曉明所宗。故名為喻。前雖舉因亦曉宗義。未舉譬況令極明瞭。今由此況宗義明極。故離因立獨明喻名。
論。一者同法二者異法。
述曰。二列名也。同者相似。法謂差別。共許自性名為有法。此上差別所立名法。今與彼所立差別相似名同法。無彼差別名為異法。異者別也。問何故宗同異名品。因同異名法。答若同異總宗不相離性種類名品。若不同異於總宗。亦不同異於宗有法。但同異于有法之上所作義者。名之為法。又此所作。非總所立。不得名品。名之為法。宗總所立。遂與品名。能所異故。又因宗二同異名法。別同異名品。此同異二。故名為法。次下二因同異。及上宗同異。並別同異。故皆名品。
論。同法者若於是處顯因同品決定有性。
述曰。三隨釋有二。一解同。二解異。理門論云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。此二名譬喻。余皆此相似。解初中有三。一牒名。二總顯。三別指。同法牒名。余文總顯。處謂處所。即是一切除宗以外有無法處。顯者。說也。若有無法。說與前陳。因相似品。便決定有宗法。此有無處。即名同法。因者。即是有法之上共許之法。若處有此名因同品。所立之法。是有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所有正確的論述，都叫做『立喻』。現在按照通俗的說法，稱之為『喻』。『喻』的意思是譬如、比況、曉示。通過這樣的譬如比況，能夠明白所要闡明的宗旨，所以叫做『喻』。前面雖然舉出了『因』，也能明白宗旨的意義，但沒有舉出譬如比況，就不能使意義達到最明白的程度。現在通過比況，宗旨的意義就非常明白了，所以離開『因』，單獨建立『明喻』這個名稱。
論：一是同法，二是異法。
述曰：這是列出兩個名稱。『同』是相似的意思，『法』是指差別。共同認可的自性叫做『有法』（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物），在這個『有法』上的差別所建立的名稱叫做『法』。現在與那個所建立的差別相似，叫做『同法』。沒有那個差別，叫做『異法』。『異』是不同的意思。問：為什麼宗的同異叫做『品』（paksa，類），而因的同異叫做『法』？答：如果同異是總體的，宗的不相離的性質和種類叫做『品』。如果不同異於總體的宗，也不同異於宗的『有法』。只是同異于『有法』之上所作的意義，稱之為『法』。而且這種所作，不是總體所建立的，所以不能叫做『品』，而稱之為『法』。宗是總體所建立的，所以用『品』這個名稱。能立和所立不同。另外，『因』和『宗』的同異叫做『法』，個別的同異叫做『品』。這裡的同異是兩個方面，所以叫做『法』。接下來『因』的同異，以及上面『宗』的同異，都是個別的同異，所以都叫做『品』。
論：同法是指在某個地方，顯示『因』與『同品』（sapaksa，與宗具有相同性質的事物）決定具有相同的性質。
述曰：這裡分為兩部分來解釋，一是解釋『同』，二是解釋『異』。《理門論》說：『說明因隨宗，宗無因不有，這二者叫做譬喻，其餘都與此相似。』解釋第一部分，分為三點：一是標出名稱，二是總體顯示，三是分別指明。『同法』是標出名稱，其餘的文字是總體顯示。『處』是指處所，也就是一切除了『宗』以外的有或沒有『法』的處所。『顯』是說明的意思。如果在有或沒有『法』的地方，說明與前面陳述的『因』相似的『品』，便決定具有『宗』的性質。這種有或沒有的處所，就叫做『同法』。『因』，就是『有法』之上共同認可的『法』。如果某個地方有這種叫做『因』的『同品』，那麼所要建立的『法』，就是有的。
【English Translation】 English version: All correct statements are called 'establishing an analogy' (liyu). Now, according to common parlance, it is called 'analogy' (yu). 'Analogy' means simile, comparison, and clarification. Through such similes and comparisons, one can understand the purpose to be elucidated, so it is called 'analogy'. Although 'reason' (hetu) was mentioned earlier, it can also clarify the meaning of the purpose (paksa), but without citing similes and comparisons, the meaning cannot reach the most clarity. Now, through comparison, the meaning of the purpose becomes very clear, so apart from 'reason', the name 'clear analogy' (mingyu) is established separately.
Treatise: One is similarity of property (sadharmya), and the other is dissimilarity of property (vaidharmya).
Commentary: This lists two names. 'Similarity' (sadrsa) means resemblance, and 'property' (dharma) refers to difference. A commonly recognized self-nature is called 'subject of property' (dharmin, that which possesses a certain quality), and the name established on the difference in this 'subject of property' is called 'property'. Now, that which resembles the established difference is called 'similarity of property'. That which does not have that difference is called 'dissimilarity of property'. 'Dissimilarity' (vidharma) means different. Question: Why is the similarity and dissimilarity of the purpose called 'class' (paksa), while the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason is called 'property'? Answer: If the similarity and dissimilarity are general, the inseparable nature and type of the purpose are called 'class'. If it is not different from the general purpose, it is also not different from the 'subject of property' of the purpose. Only the meaning made on the 'subject of property' is called 'property'. Moreover, this making is not established by the general, so it cannot be called 'class', but is called 'property'. The purpose is established by the general, so it uses the name 'class'. The establisher and the established are different. Also, the similarity and dissimilarity of 'reason' and 'purpose' are called 'property', and the individual similarity and dissimilarity are called 'class'. The similarity and dissimilarity here are two aspects, so it is called 'property'. Next, the similarity and dissimilarity of 'reason', as well as the similarity and dissimilarity of the 'purpose' above, are all individual similarity and dissimilarity, so they are all called 'class'.
Treatise: Similarity of property refers to a place where it is shown that the 'reason' and the 'similar instance' (sapaksa, things with the same property as the paksa) definitely have the same nature.
Commentary: This is explained in two parts, one is to explain 'similarity', and the other is to explain 'dissimilarity'. The Nyayapravesa says: 'Explaining that the reason follows the purpose, and the purpose does not exist without the reason, these two are called analogy, and the rest are similar to this.' Explaining the first part, it is divided into three points: one is to mark the name, two is to generally show, and three is to specifically point out. 'Similarity of property' is to mark the name, and the rest of the text is a general display. 'Place' refers to the location, that is, all places with or without 'property' other than the 'purpose'. 'Show' means to explain. If in a place with or without 'property', it is explained that the 'class' similar to the 'reason' stated earlier definitely has the nature of the 'purpose'. This place with or without is called 'similarity of property'. 'Reason' is the 'property' commonly recognized above the 'subject of property'. If there is this 'similar instance' called 'reason' in a certain place, then the 'property' to be established is existent.
法上不共許法。若處有共因。決定有此不共許法。名定有性。以共許法成不共故。理門論云。說因宗所隨。是名同喻。除宗以外有無聚中。有此共許不共許法。即是同故。以法同故。能所同故。二合同故。此中正取因之同品。由有此故宗法必隨。故亦兼取宗之同品。合名同法。問顯因同品。宗法必隨。何須復言決定有性。言決定有性。因必在宗。何須復說顯因同品。答唯言因同品。不說定有性。即九句中諸異品有。除二五八餘六句是。相違不定亦二過攝。異喻亦犯能立不遣。若言定有性。不說因同品。亦即是九句中同品非有。四五六是。相違不定亦二過攝。同喻亦犯能立不成。若非因同品亦非定有性。即九句中異品非有。二五八是。正因不定二種所攝。同喻亦犯俱不成過。若顯因同品。亦決定有性。即九句中同品亦有句。除四五六餘六句是。正因不定二種所攝。異品無過。正因所攝。異品有過。不定所攝。異喻或有一分全分能立不遣。此同異喻所犯諸過。或自或他。或全或一分。隨其所應。皆應思惟。為遮前三句及第四少分所說過失。顯第四句少分為正。必須雙言顯因同品決定有性。
論。謂若所作見彼無常譬如瓶等。
述曰。別指法也。如立聲無常宗。所作性因。瓶為同喻。此中指法。以相明故。合結
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法上不共許法：如果某個地方存在共許的因，那麼一定存在這種不共許的法，這被稱為『定有性』，因為共許的法成就了不共許的法。《理門論》中說：『因與宗所隨順，這被稱為同喻。』在宗以外的有無集合中，存在這種共許和不共許的法，這就是相同的原因。因為法相同，能立和所立相同，兩種相同結合在一起。這裡主要選取因的同品，因為有了這個，宗法必然隨順，所以也兼取宗的同品，合起來稱為同法。 問：如果已經顯示了因的同品，宗法必然隨順，為什麼還要再說『決定有性』？如果說了『決定有性』，因必然在宗中，為什麼還要再說顯示因的同品？ 答：如果只說因的同品，而不說『定有性』，那麼在九句中，異品存在的情況，除了二、五、八句之外，其餘六句都屬於這種情況。相違和不定兩種過失也包含在其中。異喻也犯了能立不遣的過失。如果說『定有性』，而不說因的同品，那麼也就是九句中同品不存在的情況，即四、五、六句。相違和不定兩種過失也包含在其中。同喻也犯了能立不成的過失。如果既不是因的同品，也不是『定有性』，那麼就是九句中異品不存在的情況，即二、五、八句。正因和不定兩種過失都包含在其中。同喻也犯了俱不成過。 如果顯示了因的同品，也決定具有『定有性』，那麼就是九句中同品也存在的情況，除了四、五、六句之外，其餘六句都屬於這種情況。正因和不定兩種過失都包含在其中。異品沒有過失，屬於正因所攝；異品有過失，屬於不定所攝。異喻或者有一部分或者全部分能立不遣。這些同喻和異喻所犯的各種過失，或者來自自身，或者來自他方，或者全部，或者一部分，根據具體情況，都應該仔細思考。爲了遮止前面三句和第四句少部分所說的過失，顯示第四句少部分是正確的，必須同時說顯示因的同品和決定有性。
論：例如，如果所作，則見彼無常，譬如瓶等。
述曰：這是分別指明法。例如，立論『聲是無常』，以『所作性』為因，瓶子為同喻。這裡指明法，因為通過相來闡明。
【English Translation】 English version The non-common accepted dharma on the dharma: If there is a commonly accepted cause in a place, then there must be this non-commonly accepted dharma. This is called 'definitely existent nature' (定有性), because the commonly accepted dharma accomplishes the non-commonly accepted dharma. The Nyayapravesa (理門論) says: 'The reason follows the subject, this is called a similar example.' In the collection of existence and non-existence outside the subject, there is this commonly accepted and non-commonly accepted dharma, which is the same reason. Because the dharma is the same, the establisher and the established are the same, and the two similarities are combined. Here, the similar class of the reason is mainly selected, because with this, the property of the subject must follow, so the similar class of the subject is also included, and together they are called similar dharma. Question: If the similar class of the reason has already been shown, and the property of the subject must follow, why is it necessary to say 'definitely existent nature' again? If 'definitely existent nature' has been said, and the reason must be in the subject, why is it necessary to say showing the similar class of the reason again? Answer: If only the similar class of the reason is said, and 'definitely existent nature' is not said, then in the nine sentences, the cases where the dissimilar class exists, except for sentences two, five, and eight, the remaining six sentences belong to this situation. The two faults of contradiction and uncertainty are also included in it. The dissimilar example also commits the fault of non-rejection of the establisher. If 'definitely existent nature' is said, and the similar class of the reason is not said, then it is the case where the similar class does not exist in the nine sentences, namely sentences four, five, and six. The two faults of contradiction and uncertainty are also included in it. The similar example also commits the fault of non-accomplishment of the establisher. If it is neither the similar class of the reason nor 'definitely existent nature', then it is the case where the dissimilar class does not exist in the nine sentences, namely sentences two, five, and eight. Both the correct reason and the uncertain reason are included in it. The similar example also commits the fault of both non-accomplishment. If the similar class of the reason is shown, and it also definitely has 'definitely existent nature', then it is the case where the similar class also exists in the nine sentences, except for sentences four, five, and six, the remaining six sentences belong to this situation. Both the correct reason and the uncertain reason are included in it. The dissimilar class has no fault, and belongs to what the correct reason includes; the dissimilar class has a fault, and belongs to what the uncertain reason includes. The dissimilar example either has a part or the whole of the non-rejection of the establisher. These various faults committed by the similar and dissimilar examples, either from oneself or from others, either the whole or a part, should be carefully considered according to the specific situation. In order to prevent the faults mentioned in the first three sentences and a small part of the fourth sentence, and to show that the small part of the fourth sentence is correct, it is necessary to say both showing the similar class of the reason and definitely existent nature.
Treatise: For example, if it is produced (所作), then it is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc.
Commentary: This specifically points out the dharma. For example, establishing the proposition 'sound is impermanent', using 'being produced' (所作性) as the reason, and a pot as the similar example. Here, the dharma is pointed out, because it is clarified through characteristics.
總陳。若所作者。即前總顯因之同品。見彼無常。亦則前顯決定有性。諸有生處。決定有滅。母牛去處。犢子必隨。因有之處。宗必隨逐。此為合也。若有所作。其立敵證等見彼無常。如瓶等者。舉其喻依有法結也。前宗以聲為有法。無常所作為法。今喻以瓶等為有法所作無常為法。正以所作無常為喻。兼舉瓶等喻依。合方具矣。等者等取余盆罌等。理門論云。若爾喻言應非異分。顯因義故。古因明師因外有喻。如勝論云。聲無常宗。所作性因。同喻如瓶。異喻如空。不舉諸所作者皆無常等貫於二處。故因非喻。瓶為同喻體。空為異喻體。陳那已后。說因三相即攝二喻。二喻即因。俱顯宗故。所作性等貫二處故。古師難云。若喻亦是因所攝者。喻言應非因外異分。顯因義故。應唯二支何須二喻。陳那釋云。事雖實爾。然此因言。唯為顯了是宗法性。非為顯了同品異品有性。無性。故須別說同異喻言。意答。喻體實是因。爾不應別說。然立因言。正唯為顯宗家法性是宗之因。非正為顯同有異無順返。成於所立宗義。故於因外別說二喻。顯因有處。宗必隨逐。並返成故。令宗義成。彼復難言。若唯因言所詮表義。說名為因。斯有何失。此難意說。如所作言所詮表義。唯名為因。瓶同空異名喻。非因斯有何失。復問彼言。復
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 總述：如果存在『所作』（kṛta，被製造的事物）這一屬性，那麼就如同前面總體顯示的『因』（hetu，理由、原因）的同品（sapakṣa，相似的例子）一樣，看到它是無常的。這也如同前面顯示的，決定具有『有性』（astitva，存在性）。凡是有生之處，必定有滅。母牛去的地方，小牛必定跟隨。『因』存在的地方，『宗』（pakṣa，論題、主張）必定跟隨。這就是『合』（upanaya，應用）。 如果存在『所作』，那麼就像立論者的敵對者所舉的例子，比如看到瓶子等是無常的，這就是舉出作為比喻依據的『有法』（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）來總結。前面的『宗』以聲音作為『有法』，無常和『所作』作為『法』（dharma，屬性）。現在用瓶子等作為比喻的『有法』，『所作』和無常作為『法』。正是以『所作』和無常作為比喻，同時舉出瓶子等比喻的依據，這樣『合』就完備了。『等』字包括其餘的盆、罐等。 《理門論》（Hetuvidyā-dvāra-śāstra）說：『如果這樣，比喻的言辭就不應該與『因』有區別，因為它也顯示了『因』的意義。』古因明師認為，在『因』之外還有比喻。如勝論（Vaiśeṣika）說：『聲音是無常的，『所作性』（kṛtakatva，被製造的性質）是『因』，同喻（sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta，正面例子）如瓶子，異喻（vaidṛśya-dṛṣṭānta，反面例子）如虛空。』沒有舉出所有『所作』的事物都是無常的，這種普遍性貫穿于兩個地方，所以『因』不是比喻。瓶子是同喻的實體，虛空是異喻的實體。陳那（Dignāga）之後，說『因』的三相（trairūpya，三個特徵）就包含了兩個比喻，兩個比喻就是『因』，因為它們都顯示了『宗』。 『所作性』等貫穿于兩個地方。古師反駁說：『如果比喻也是『因』所包含的，那麼比喻的言辭就不應該與『因』有區別，因為它也顯示了『因』的意義。應該只有兩個支分（aṅga，論證的組成部分），為什麼需要兩個比喻？』陳那解釋說：『事情雖然確實如此，但這裡的『因』的言辭，只是爲了顯示『宗』的法性，而不是爲了顯示同品和異品具有或不具有這種性質。所以需要分別說明同喻和異喻的言辭。』 意思是回答說：比喻的實體實際上就是『因』，不應該另外說明。然而，建立『因』的言辭，正是爲了顯示『宗』的法性是『宗』的『因』，而不是爲了正面顯示同品有、異品無，從而順應或反過來成就所要建立的『宗』的意義。因此，在『因』之外分別說明兩個比喻，顯示『因』存在的地方，『宗』必定跟隨，並且反過來成就，從而使『宗』的意義得以成立。 他們又反駁說：『如果只有『因』的言辭所詮釋的意義，才被稱為『因』，那有什麼過失？』這個反駁的意思是說，就像『所作』這個詞所詮釋的意義，只被稱為『因』，瓶子是同喻，虛空是異喻，被稱為比喻，而不是『因』，那有什麼過失？ 又問他們說：『又』
【English Translation】 English version General statement: If there is the attribute of 'being produced' (kṛta, that which is made), then, just like the similar instances (sapakṣa) of the 'reason' (hetu, cause, reason) that was generally shown earlier, seeing that it is impermanent. This is also like what was shown earlier, that it definitely has 'existence' (astitva). Wherever there is birth, there is definitely destruction. Wherever the mother cow goes, the calf will definitely follow. Wherever the 'reason' exists, the 'thesis' (pakṣa, proposition, assertion) will definitely follow. This is the 'application' (upanaya). If there is 'being produced', then, like the example cited by the opponent of the proponent, such as seeing that pots, etc., are impermanent, this is citing the 'subject of attribute' (dharmin, that which possesses attributes) as the basis of the analogy to conclude. The previous 'thesis' takes sound as the 'subject of attribute', and impermanence and 'being produced' as the 'attribute' (dharma). Now, pots, etc., are taken as the 'subject of attribute' of the analogy, and 'being produced' and impermanence as the 'attribute'. It is precisely taking 'being produced' and impermanence as the analogy, and at the same time citing the basis of the analogy, such as pots, etc., so that the 'application' is complete. The word 'etc.' includes the remaining basins, jars, etc. The Hetuvidyā-dvāra-śāstra (Treatise on the Door to the Science of Reasoning) says: 'If that is the case, the words of the analogy should not be different from the 'reason', because it also reveals the meaning of the 'reason'.' Ancient logicians of Hetuvidyā believed that there was an analogy outside of the 'reason'. As the Vaiśeṣika (Particularist school) says: 'Sound is impermanent, 'being produced' (kṛtakatva) is the 'reason', the positive example (sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta) is like a pot, and the negative example (vaidṛśya-dṛṣṭānta) is like space.' It does not cite that all 'produced' things are impermanent, this universality pervades the two places, so the 'reason' is not an analogy. The pot is the entity of the positive example, and space is the entity of the negative example. After Dignāga, saying that the three characteristics (trairūpya) of the 'reason' includes the two analogies, the two analogies are the 'reason', because they both reveal the 'thesis'. 'Being produced', etc., pervades the two places. Ancient teachers refuted: 'If the analogy is also included in the 'reason', then the words of the analogy should not be different from the 'reason', because it also reveals the meaning of the 'reason'. There should only be two limbs (aṅga, components of the argument), why are two analogies needed?' Dignāga explained: 'Although the matter is indeed so, the words of the 'reason' here are only to reveal the nature of the 'thesis', not to reveal whether similar and dissimilar instances have or do not have this nature. Therefore, it is necessary to separately explain the words of the positive and negative analogies.' The meaning is to answer: The entity of the analogy is actually the 'reason', and should not be explained separately. However, establishing the words of the 'reason' is precisely to reveal that the nature of the 'thesis' is the 'reason' for the 'thesis', not to positively show that similar instances have it and dissimilar instances do not, thereby conforming to or reversing the meaning of the 'thesis' to be established. Therefore, separately explaining the two analogies outside of the 'reason' shows that wherever the 'reason' exists, the 'thesis' will definitely follow, and conversely achieve it, so that the meaning of the 'thesis' can be established. They further refuted: 'If only the meaning expressed by the words of the 'reason' is called the 'reason', what fault is there?' The meaning of this refutation is that, just like the meaning expressed by the word 'produced', only it is called the 'reason', the pot is the positive example, and space is the negative example, called the analogy, not the 'reason', what fault is there? Again ask them, 'Again'
有何德。彼古答言。別說喻分是名為德。陳那復難。應如世間所說方便。與其因義都不相應。此難意云。如世間外道亦說因外別有二喻。汝于因外說喻亦爾。遍宗法性既是正因。所說二喻非是正因。但為方便助成因義。此喻方便既與因別。則與因義都不相應。古師復云。若爾何失。縱同外道亦何過耶。如外道說有五根識。佛法亦有。非為失故。陳那難云。此說但應類所立義。無有功能。非能立義。由彼但說所作性故所類同法。不說能立所成立義。此中難意。我亦不說同於外道說極成義名之為失。由同彼說不極成義有過失故。謂諸古師同外道說。聲無常宗。所作性因。同喻如瓶。異喻如空。不極成義。陳那難云。若說瓶體空體為喻。但應以瓶類于所立無常之義。既喻不言諸所作者皆是無常。舉瓶證聲無有功能。其喻便非能立之義。由彼舉因。但說所作法。舉瓶類聲同無常。不說能立諸所作者。及與所立皆是無常。故無功能非能立義。又若以瓶即為喻體。瓶即四塵。可燒可見。聲亦應爾。若我如說所作者皆是無常。譬如瓶等所作。既為宗正同法。無常隨之亦決定轉。舉瓶喻依以顯其事。便無一切皆相類失。汝既不然。故有前過。陳那又難。又因喻別。此有所立同法異法。終不能顯因與所立不相離性。是故但有類所立義。然
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有什麼功德？那位古師回答說：『別說（Visesa）』、『喻分（Upamana）』就叫做功德。陳那（Dignaga）反駁說：『應該像世間所說的方便一樣，與它的因義都不相應。』這個反駁的意思是說，就像世間外道也說在『因（Hetu）』之外別有二『喻（Upamana）』，您在『因』之外說『喻』也是這樣。『遍宗法性（paksa-dharma）』既然是正『因』，所說的二『喻』就不是正『因』，只是爲了方便幫助成就『因』的意義。這個『喻』的方便既然與『因』有區別，就與『因』的意義都不相應。古師又說：『如果這樣，有什麼過失？縱然與外道相同，又有什麼過錯呢？』就像外道說有五根識，佛法也有，這並不是過失。陳那反駁說：『這種說法只能類比所立的意義，沒有能立的功能，不能成立意義。』因為他們只是說『所作性（Krtakatva）』，所以類比相同的法，不說能成立所成立的意義。這裡反駁的意思是，我也不說與外道相同說極成義叫做過失，因為與他們相同說不極成義才有過失。所謂各位古師與外道相同說，聲是無常的宗（paksa），所作性是因（hetu），同喻（sadharmya-drstanta）如瓶，異喻（vaidharmya-drstanta）如空，是不極成的意義。陳那反駁說：『如果說瓶體、空體作為喻體，只能用瓶來類比所立的無常之義。既然這個比喻沒有說凡是所作的都是無常，用瓶來證明聲是無常就沒有功能。』這個比喻就不是能立的意義。因為他們舉『因』，只是說所作法，用瓶來類比聲是相同的無常，沒有說能成立的凡是所作，以及所立的都是無常，所以沒有功能，不是能立的意義。而且如果用瓶作為喻體，瓶就是四大微塵，可以燒燬，可以看見，聲音也應該這樣。如果我像這樣說凡是所作的都是無常，譬如瓶等所作。既然作為宗的正同法，無常隨著它也一定轉變。舉瓶作為比喻的依據來顯示這件事，就沒有一切都相似的過失。您既然不是這樣，所以有前面的過失。陳那又反駁說：『而且因和喻是不同的，這裡有所立的同法異法，始終不能顯示因與所立不相離的性質。』所以只有類比所立的意義，然而
【English Translation】 English version: What merit is there? That ancient master replied: 『Visesa (distinction)』 and 『Upamana (example)』 are called merit.』 Dignaga (Chenna) retorted: 『It should be like the expedient means spoken of in the world, which are not in accordance with their causal meaning.』 The meaning of this refutation is that, just as the heretics in the world also say that there are two 『Upamana』 apart from 『Hetu (cause)』, you also say 『Upamana』 apart from 『Hetu』. Since 『paksa-dharma (pervading property of the subject)』 is the correct 『Hetu』, the two 『Upamana』 spoken of are not the correct 『Hetu』, but are only for the convenience of helping to accomplish the meaning of 『Hetu』. Since this convenience of 『Upamana』 is different from 『Hetu』, it is not in accordance with the meaning of 『Hetu』. The ancient master then said: 『If so, what is the fault? Even if it is the same as the heretics, what is the fault?』 Just as the heretics say that there are five sense consciousnesses, Buddhism also has them, which is not a fault. Dignaga retorted: 『This statement can only be analogous to the meaning of what is established, and has no function of establishing, and cannot establish the meaning.』 Because they only say 『Krtakatva (the property of being produced)』, so they analogize the same dharma, and do not speak of the meaning of what can be established and what is established. The meaning of the refutation here is that I do not say that it is a fault to say that the extremely accomplished meaning is the same as that of the heretics, because it is a fault to say that the unaccomplished meaning is the same as them. The so-called ancient masters say the same as the heretics, that the sound is the impermanent paksa (thesis), the property of being produced is the Hetu (reason), the sadharmya-drstanta (example of similarity) is like a bottle, and the vaidharmya-drstanta (example of dissimilarity) is like space, which is an unaccomplished meaning. Dignaga retorted: 『If the body of the bottle and the body of space are taken as examples, the bottle can only be used to analogize the impermanent meaning of what is established. Since this metaphor does not say that all that is produced is impermanent, it has no function to prove that the sound is impermanent by using the bottle.』 This metaphor is not the meaning of what can be established. Because they cite 『Hetu』, they only say the dharma of being produced, and use the bottle to analogize that the sound is the same as impermanence, and do not say that all that can be established and what is established are impermanent, so it has no function and is not the meaning of what can be established. Moreover, if the bottle is used as the metaphor, the bottle is the four great elements, which can be burned and seen, and the sound should also be like this. If I say that all that is produced is impermanent, like the production of bottles and so on. Since it is the correct same dharma of the thesis, impermanence will also inevitably change with it. Taking the bottle as the basis of the metaphor to show this matter, there is no fault that everything is similar. Since you are not like this, you have the previous fault.』 Dignaga also retorted: 『Moreover, the Hetu and the Upamana are different, and the same dharma and different dharma of what is established here can never show the nature of the Hetu and what is established being inseparable.』 Therefore, there is only the analogy of the meaning of what is established, but
無功能。此意難言。因喻既別。同喻但有所立無常。異喻無此。汝同喻不說諸所作者皆是無常。異喻不雙無。終不能顯所作性因。與所立無常不相離性。總結之云。是故但有類所立義。然無功能。非能立義。古師復問。何故無能。陳那難云。以同喻中不必宗法宗義相類。此復余譬所成立故。應成無窮。意說因喻無能所以。既汝不言諸所作者皆是無常。故彼同喻不必以因宗法。及無常宗義相類。但云如瓶。他若有問。瓶復如何無常。復言如燈。如是展轉應成無窮。是無能義。我若喻言諸所作者皆是無常。譬如瓶等。既以宗法宗義相類。總遍一切瓶燈等盡。不須更問。故非無窮成有能也。復難彼言。又不必定有諸品類。若但瓶體為同喻者。非燒見等一切皆類。便成過失。若如我說彼喻依中。但以所作無常等類。便無彼過。又難言。若唯宗法是因性者。其有不定應亦成因。此意難言。唯以所作遍宗法性是其因性。同有異無但喻非因。是故瓶空喻非因者。即不定因應亦成因。但有遍宗法。無後二相故。古返難言。云何具有所立能立及異品法。二種譬喻而有此失。彼意難言。云何同品瓶上。具有所立無常。能立所作。及異品法。此二喻中有不定失。陳那難云。若於爾時所立異品。非一種類。便有此失。如初后三各最後喻。謂立量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此意難以言說。因為比喻已經不同，相同的比喻只是爲了確立無常，不同的比喻則沒有這個作用。你所說的相同比喻並沒有說所有被製造的東西都是無常的，不同的比喻不成雙，最終不能夠顯現所作性（hetu）的原因，與所要確立的無常不相分離的性質。總結來說，因此只有類似於所要確立的意義，然而沒有功能，不是能夠確立的意義。古師又問，為什麼沒有功能？ 陳那（Dignāga）反駁說，因為在相同的比喻中，不必宗法（pakṣadharmatva）和宗義（sādhyadharma）相似，這又成了其他譬喻所成立的原因，應該會變成無窮無盡。意思是說，原因和比喻沒有功能的原因在於，既然你沒有說所有被製造的東西都是無常的，那麼那個相同的比喻就不必以原因的宗法，以及無常的宗義相似，只是說『比如瓶子』。如果其他人問，瓶子又是如何無常的呢？又說『比如燈』。這樣輾轉下去，應該會變成無窮無盡，這就是沒有功能的意思。如果我用比喻說所有被製造的東西都是無常的，比如瓶子等等，既然以宗法和宗義相似，總括一切瓶子、燈等等都包括在內，不需要再問，所以不是無窮無盡，而是有功能的。 又反駁對方說，又不一定有各種品類，如果只是瓶子的個體作為相同的比喻，不是燒、見等等一切都類似，就會有過失。如果像我說的那樣，那個比喻所依據的，只是以所作、無常等等類似，就沒有那個過失。又反駁說，如果只有宗法是原因的性質，那麼不確定的也應該成為原因。這個意思難以言說，只有以所作遍及宗法的性質才是原因的性質，同有異無只是比喻而不是原因。因此，瓶子和空的比喻不是原因，那麼不確定的原因也應該成為原因，只是有遍及宗法，沒有後兩個相狀的緣故。 古師反駁說，為什麼具有所要確立的、能夠確立的以及異品法，這兩種譬喻會有這個缺失？他的意思是說，為什麼在相同的品類瓶子上，具有所要確立的無常，能夠確立的所作，以及異品法，這兩種比喻中會有不確定的缺失？陳那反駁說，如果在那個時候，所要確立的異品不是一種種類，就會有這個缺失，比如初、后、三各最後的比喻，也就是立量（anumāna）。
【English Translation】 English version This meaning is difficult to express. Because the analogy is already different, the same analogy is only to establish impermanence, while different analogies do not have this effect. The same analogy you mentioned does not say that all things that are made are impermanent, and different analogies are not paired, and ultimately cannot reveal the nature of the cause (hetu) of being made, which is inseparable from the impermanence to be established. In summary, therefore, there is only something similar to the meaning to be established, but it has no function and is not a meaning that can be established. The ancient teacher asked again, why is there no function? Dignāga refuted, because in the same analogy, it is not necessary for the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) and the property to be proven (sādhyadharma) to be similar, which becomes the reason for the establishment of other analogies, and it should become endless. The meaning is that the reason why the cause and analogy have no function is that since you did not say that all things that are made are impermanent, then that same analogy does not need to be similar in terms of the property of the subject of the cause and the property to be proven of impermanence, but only says 'like a pot'. If others ask, how is the pot impermanent? Then say 'like a lamp'. If this goes on and on, it should become endless, which is the meaning of having no function. If I use the analogy to say that all things that are made are impermanent, such as pots, etc., since they are similar in terms of the property of the subject and the property to be proven, everything including pots, lamps, etc. is included, and there is no need to ask again, so it is not endless, but has a function. He also refuted the other party, saying that there is not necessarily a variety of categories. If only the individual pot is taken as the same analogy, not everything like burning and seeing is similar, then there will be a fault. If, as I said, what that analogy relies on is only similar in terms of being made, impermanence, etc., then there will be no such fault. He also refuted, saying that if only the property of the subject is the nature of the cause, then the uncertain should also become the cause. This meaning is difficult to express, only the nature of being made that pervades the property of the subject is the nature of the cause, and the presence in the same and absence in the different is only an analogy and not a cause. Therefore, the analogy of the pot and emptiness is not a cause, then the uncertain cause should also become a cause, only because it has the pervasion of the property of the subject and does not have the latter two characteristics. The ancient teacher refuted, why do these two kinds of analogies, which have what is to be established, what can be established, and the property of the different class, have this defect? His meaning is, why does the same category of pot have the impermanence to be established, the being made that can be established, and the property of the different class, and why do these two analogies have an uncertain defect? Dignāga refuted, if at that time, the different class to be established is not a kind of category, then there will be this defect, such as the first, last, and third analogies, which is the inference (anumāna).
時。所立異品亦有非有。非一種類。汝既但指瓶為同品。空為異喻。雖具二喻。喻若非因。便此不定。如初三最後喻者。謂九句中。初三第三句同品有異品有非有。后三最後喻者。謂九句中。后三第三句同品有非有異品亦有非有。此二喻中。若同取有義。異取無義。同喻亦具所立能立及異法喻。然由異品一分有故。因成不定。以汝同喻如瓶異喻如空。喻非因故。不別簡言謂若是常見非所作如虛空等。便有不定。若別簡別。喻即是因。便無彼失。簡彼兩三。非正因故。要異遍無。是正因故。彼復結云。故定三相唯為顯因。由是道理。雖一切分皆能為因顯了所立。然唯一分且說為因。此中故定唯為之聲。彰因三相顯了于宗。二喻即因。雖俱是因顯了宗義。於三相中遍宗法性。唯此一分且說為因。餘二名喻。據勝偏明。非盡理說。故名為且。前文依此顯了宗義。說因之三相亦不相違。問何故共許法不共許法分為宗因。同喻上二合為一支。答對敵申宗。不共而為所立。由因成此。共許別立能成。同喻令義見邊。二俱助成前立。故因宗別說。同喻合故問因陳所作已貫瓶中。同喻再申豈非鄭重。答因雖總說。宗義未明。指事明前。非為鄭重。古師合云。瓶有所作性。瓶是無常。聲有所作性。聲亦無常。今陳那云。諸所作者皆是無常
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 當時，你所提出的異品也存在『非有』的情況，並非只有一種類別。你既然只指出瓶子是同品，而空是異喻，雖然具備了兩種比喻，但比喻如果不是原因，就成了不定因。如同最初三個和最後三個比喻的情況。所謂『最初三個』，是指九句中的前三個，即同品有、異品有、非有。『最後三個』，是指九句中的后三個，即同品有、非有、異品也有、非有。在這兩種比喻中，如果同喻取『有』的意義，異喻取『無』的意義，那麼同喻也具備了所立、能立以及異法喻。然而，由於異品的一部分存在『有』的情況，原因就成了不定因。因為你的同喻如同瓶子，異喻如同虛空，比喻不是原因的緣故。如果不加區分地說，如果是常見的、非所作的，如虛空等，就會有不定因。如果加以區分，比喻就是原因，就不會有那種過失。區分那兩種或三種，因為不是正因的緣故。一定要異品普遍沒有，才是正因的緣故。因此總結說，所以確定三種相狀只是爲了顯示原因。由於這個道理，雖然一切部分都能作為原因來顯示所立，但只說一個部分作為原因。這裡『所以確定』只是爲了強調，彰顯原因的三種相狀能夠顯明所立。兩種比喻即原因，雖然都是原因，能夠顯明宗義，但在三種相狀中，普遍具有宗法性的，只有這一個部分才被說成是原因，其餘兩個被稱為比喻。這是根據最突出的方面來說明，並非窮盡了道理，所以稱為『且』。前面的文章依據這個來顯明宗義，說原因的三種相狀也不相違背。 問：為什麼共許法和不共許法要分為宗和因，而同喻上的兩個要合併爲一個支？ 答：爲了針對對方申述宗義，用不共許法作為所立，通過原因來成就這個所立。共許法另外建立能成。同喻是爲了讓意義顯現出來，兩者都幫助成就前面的立論。所以原因和宗要分別說明，而同喻要合併。 問：原因陳述了『所作』已經貫穿于瓶子中，同喻再次申述，難道不是重複嗎？ 答：原因雖然總體上說了，但宗義還沒有明確。指明事物是爲了明確前面的內容，不是爲了重複。古師合併說：『瓶子具有所作性，瓶子是無常的。聲音具有所作性，聲音也是無常的。』現在陳那說：『凡是所作的，都是無常的。』
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, the dissimilar instances you propose also have the characteristic of 'non-existence,' and are not of only one category. Since you only point to the pot as a similar instance and emptiness as a dissimilar example, although you have two examples, if the example is not the cause, it becomes an inconclusive reason. This is like the first three and last three examples. The 'first three' refer to the first three of the nine clauses, namely, similar instance exists, dissimilar instance exists, and non-existence. The 'last three' refer to the last three of the nine clauses, namely, similar instance exists, non-existence, and dissimilar instance also has non-existence. In these two examples, if the similar example takes the meaning of 'existence' and the dissimilar example takes the meaning of 'non-existence,' then the similar example also possesses the proposition, the proof, and the dissimilar property example. However, because a part of the dissimilar instance has 'existence,' the reason becomes inconclusive. Because your similar example is like a pot and the dissimilar example is like emptiness, the example is not the cause. If it is not distinguished, if it is a common, uncreated thing like emptiness, there will be an inconclusive reason. If it is distinguished, the example is the cause, and there will be no such fault. Distinguishing those two or three, because they are not the correct reason. It must be that the dissimilar instance is universally absent for it to be the correct reason. Therefore, it is concluded that the three characteristics are only to reveal the cause. Because of this reason, although all parts can be the cause to reveal the proposition, only one part is said to be the cause. Here, 'therefore determined' is only to emphasize, highlighting that the three characteristics of the cause can clarify the proposition. The two examples, which are the cause, although both are the cause and can clarify the meaning of the proposition, among the three characteristics, only this one part, which universally possesses the property of the proposition, is said to be the cause, and the remaining two are called examples. This is explained according to the most prominent aspect, not exhausting the reason, so it is called 'moreover.' The previous text relies on this to clarify the meaning of the proposition, and saying that the three characteristics of the cause are not contradictory. Question: Why are the commonly accepted property (共許法) and the uncommonly accepted property (不共許法) divided into the thesis (宗) and the reason (因), while the two on the similar example (同喻) are combined into one branch? Answer: In order to state the thesis against the opponent, the uncommonly accepted property is used as the proposition, and this proposition is achieved through the reason. The commonly accepted property separately establishes the proof. The similar example is to make the meaning appear, and both help to achieve the previous argument. Therefore, the reason and the thesis must be explained separately, while the similar example must be combined. Question: The reason states that 'createdness' has already permeated the pot, and the similar example states it again. Isn't this redundant? Answer: Although the reason has stated it in general, the meaning of the proposition is not yet clear. Pointing out the thing is to clarify the previous content, not to be redundant. The ancient teachers combined and said: 'The pot has createdness, the pot is impermanent. Sound has createdness, sound is also impermanent.' Now Dignāga (陳那) says: 'Whatever is created is impermanent.'
。顯略除繁。喻宗雙貫。何勞長議。故改前師。古師結云。是故得知聲是無常。今陳那云。譬如瓶等。顯義已成。何勞重述。故於喻中雙陳因宗二種明矣。至后當知。
論。異法者若於是處說所立無因遍非有。
述曰。下解異有四。一牒名。二總顯。三別指。四釋成。此即初二。處謂處所。除宗已外有無法處。謂若有體若無體法。但說無前所立之宗。前能立因亦遍非有。即名異品。以法異故。二俱異故。理門頌云。宗無因不有。是名異法。有解。正取因之異品。由無此故宗必隨無。故亦兼取無宗名異。合名異法。復自難言。若但無因即名異法。同品非有應是異喻者。若爾。聲無常宗。以電瓶等而為同喻。勤勇之因。于電非有。應成異品。宗定隨無。由此應言同成宗故。因為正同。宗為助同。異品離故。宗為正異。因為助異。偏取非異。故理門云。宗無因不有。名為異法不云因無宗不有。名為異喻。然此不欲別成異法。故先無宗。後方無因。問何故所立不言遍無。能立之因言遍非有。答宗不成因。不言遍無。因成宗故言遍非有。因不遍無便成異法。不定相違種種過起。宗之所立。其法極寬。如聲無我。空等亦有。若異皆無。都無異品。如空等言。便徒施設。故知但無隨應小分因之所立。即是異宗。非謂一切
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
顯明扼要地去除繁瑣，用比喻的方式將宗（pakṣa，需要證明的陳述）和因（hetu，理由）雙重貫穿起來，何必再多費口舌？所以更改了前代論師的觀點。古老的論師總結說：『因此可以得知聲音是無常的。』而陳那（Dignāga）論師說：『譬如瓶子等。』意義已經很明顯了，何必重複敘述？所以在比喻中，因和宗兩種都闡述得很清楚了。這一點到後面自然會明白。
論：與所立法不同的法，如果在這個地方說所立的宗沒有因遍在，那麼就是異法（vipakṣa，反例）。
述：下面解釋『異』有四種方式：一是標明名稱，二是總的顯示，三是分別指出，四是解釋成立。這裡是前兩種。『處』指的是處所，除了宗以外，有有法和無法的處所。只是說沒有前面所立的宗，前面的能立因也普遍不存在，這就叫做異品。因為法不同，兩者都不同。理門頌（Hetu-cakra-ḍamaru）中說：『宗不存在，因也不存在，這叫做異法。』有一種解釋是，只取因的異品，因為沒有這個，宗必然隨之不存在，所以也兼取沒有宗的情況，合起來叫做異法。又自己提出疑問說：如果僅僅是沒有因就叫做異法，那麼同品（sapakṣa，正例）中沒有因的情況，是否應該算是異喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）呢？如果是這樣，聲音是無常的這個宗，用閃電和瓶子等作為同喻，勤奮努力這個因，在閃電中不存在，應該成為異品，宗一定會隨之不存在。因此應該說，宗的成立是因為因是正同（sādharmya，相似），宗是輔助的相似；異品的分離是因為宗是正異（vaidharmya，相異），因是輔助的相異。只取非異，所以理門中說：『宗不存在，因也不存在，叫做異法』，而不是說『因不存在，宗也不存在，叫做異喻』。然而這裡並不想單獨成立異法，所以先是沒有宗，然後才沒有因。問：為什麼所立的宗不說普遍不存在，而能立的因卻說普遍不存在呢？答：宗不能成立因，所以不說普遍不存在；因能成立宗，所以說普遍不存在。因如果不普遍不存在，就會成為異法，出現不定、相違等各種過失。宗的所立，其法非常寬泛，如聲音是無我，空等也有。如果異品都無，那就沒有異品了，如空等，就白費力氣了。所以要知道，只要沒有隨應的小部分因的所立，就是異宗，而不是說一切都沒有。
【English Translation】 English version:
Clearly and concisely removing the complexities, using analogy to doubly connect the pakṣa (the proposition to be proved) and the hetu (the reason), why bother with lengthy discussions? Therefore, the views of previous teachers are changed. Ancient teachers concluded: 'Therefore, it can be known that sound is impermanent.' While Dignāga (Chenna) said: 'For example, a pot, etc.' The meaning is already clear, why repeat it? Therefore, in the analogy, both the hetu and the pakṣa are clearly stated. This will become clear later.
Treatise: If a different dharma (vipakṣa) says that the established pakṣa does not have the hetu pervading it, then it is a vipakṣa.
Commentary: The following explains 'different' in four ways: first, naming; second, general explanation; third, specific indication; fourth, explanatory completion. These are the first two. 'Place' refers to the location, other than the pakṣa, there are places with and without dharma. It only says that there is no previously established pakṣa, and the previous establishing hetu is also universally absent, which is called vipakṣa. Because the dharma is different, both are different. The Hetu-cakra-ḍamaru (Limen Song) says: 'If the pakṣa does not exist, the hetu does not exist, this is called vipakṣa.' One explanation is that only the vipakṣa of the hetu is taken, because without this, the pakṣa will necessarily not exist, so it also includes the case where there is no pakṣa, which together is called vipakṣa. It also raises the question itself: If merely the absence of the hetu is called vipakṣa, then should the absence of the hetu in the sapakṣa (example) be considered a dṛṣṭānta (example)? If so, the pakṣa that sound is impermanent, using lightning and pots as sapakṣa, the effort (hetu) does not exist in lightning, it should become a vipakṣa, and the pakṣa will necessarily not exist. Therefore, it should be said that the establishment of the pakṣa is because the hetu is sādharmya (similarity), and the pakṣa is an auxiliary similarity; the separation of the vipakṣa is because the pakṣa is vaidharmya (difference), and the hetu is an auxiliary difference. Only taking non-difference, so the Limen says: 'If the pakṣa does not exist, the hetu does not exist, it is called vipakṣa', rather than saying 'If the hetu does not exist, the pakṣa does not exist, it is called dṛṣṭānta'. However, here it is not intended to establish vipakṣa alone, so first there is no pakṣa, and then there is no hetu. Question: Why is it that the established pakṣa is not said to be universally non-existent, while the establishing hetu is said to be universally non-existent? Answer: The pakṣa cannot establish the hetu, so it is not said to be universally non-existent; the hetu can establish the pakṣa, so it is said to be universally non-existent. If the hetu is not universally non-existent, it will become a vipakṣa, and various faults such as uncertainty and contradiction will arise. The establishment of the pakṣa is very broad, such as sound is non-self, emptiness, etc. also exist. If all vipakṣa are non-existent, then there is no vipakṣa, such as emptiness, etc., which is a waste of effort. Therefore, it should be known that as long as there is no corresponding small part of the establishment of the hetu, it is a vipakṣa, rather than saying that everything does not exist.
皆遍非有。
問說所立無。因已非有。何須復說因遍無耶。說因遍無。已無所立。何須復說所立宗無。答但言所立無。因不遍非有。即九句中異品有攝。除二八五餘六句是。異喻亦犯能立不遣。若言因遍非有。不說所立無。即九句中同品非有攝。四六五是。同品亦犯能立不成。若非說所立無。亦非因遍非有。即九句中同品有句。除中三句餘六句是。異喻亦犯俱不遣過。若說所立無因亦遍非有。即九句中二五八是。二八為正。第五不定。同喻或犯俱不成過。他句有過故此有過。不爾此句非有過收。此中諸過。或自或他。或全或分。隨其所應準前思作。第四句小分為正。余皆有過。為遮此等。必須雙言說所立無因遍非有。
論。謂若是常見非所作如虛空等。
述曰。別指法也。如無常宗。是常為異。所作性因。非作為異。返顯義言。于常品中既見非作。明所作者定見無常。同成宗故。先因后宗。異法離前。宗先因后。若異離中因先宗后。如言非作定是常住。翻成本來非諍空常住。非是離前成於無常之宗義也。若成常住。便犯相符。舊已定宗。今成立故。同既成立先因后宗。異既離前隨宗先後。意欲翻顯前成立義。今者宗無因既不轉。明因有處宗必定隨。異但說離。離成即得。必先宗無後因無也。故理門
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 皆遍非有。
問：如果說『所立』（Sapaksha，同品）是『無』，因為『因』（Hetu，理由）已經『非有』（不存在），為什麼還需要再說『因遍無』呢？說了『因遍無』，就已經沒有『所立』了，為什麼還需要再說『所立宗無』（Sapaksha不存在）？ 答：如果只說『所立無』，『因』不普遍『非有』，那麼就屬於九句中的『異品有』（Vipaksha存在）的情況，排除了第二、第八、第五句，剩下六句。『異喻』（Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta，反例）也會犯『能立不遣』（Sādhanāvyāvartaka，不能排除反例）的過失。如果說『因遍非有』，不說『所立無』，那麼就屬於九句中的『同品非有』的情況，即第四、第六、第五句。『同品』也會犯『能立不成』（Sādhanāsiddha，理由不成立）的過失。如果既不說『所立無』，也不說『因遍非有』，那麼就屬於九句中的『同品有』的情況，排除中間三句，剩下六句。『異喻』也會犯『俱不遣過』（Ubhayāvyāvartaka，正反例都不能排除）的過失。如果說『所立無』，『因』也普遍『非有』，那麼就屬於九句中的第二、第五、第八句。第二、第八句是正確的，第五句是不定的。『同喻』（Sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta，正例）可能會犯『俱不成過』（Ubhayāsiddha，正反例都不成立）的過失。因為其他句子有過失，所以這個句子也有過失。否則，這個句子就不會被歸為有過失。這些過失，或者來自自身，或者來自他人，或者全部，或者部分，根據具體情況，參照前面的分析進行思考。 第四句的小分是正確的，其餘都有過失。爲了遮止這些過失，必須同時說『所立無』，『因遍非有』。
論：例如，如果是常見（Nitya，常恒）的，不是所作（Krita，造作）的，就像虛空等。
述曰：這是特別指明方法。例如，對於『無常』（Anitya，非常恒）的宗（Paksha，論題），『常』（Nitya，常恒）是『異』（Vipaksha，反例）。『所作性』（Kritakatva，有為性）的『因』，『非作』（Akrita，非造作）是『異』。反過來顯示意義，在常品中既然看到『非作』，就說明『所作』的一定看到『無常』，因此成就宗。先因后宗。異法離開前面。宗先因后。如果異離中，因先宗后。例如說『非作』一定是『常住』（Dhruva，常恒），就翻成本來非諍的『空常住』，而不是離開前面成就『無常』的宗義。如果成就『常住』，就犯了『相符』（Siddhasādhana，已成能成）的過失，因為舊的已經確定的宗，現在又去成立。同既成立，先因后宗。異既離前，隨宗先後。意欲翻顯前面成立的意義。現在宗無，因既然不轉，說明因有的地方，宗必定跟隨。異但說離，離成即得。必須先宗無，后因無。所以理門（Nyāyamukha，因明入門）。
【English Translation】 English version All are universally non-existent.
Question: If it is said that the 'Sapaksha' (similar instance, the subject of the proposition) is 'non-existent' because the 'Hetu' (reason, the probans) is already 'non-existent,' why is it necessary to further state that the 'Hetu is universally non-existent'? If the 'Hetu is universally non-existent' is stated, there is already no 'Sapaksha' to establish. Why is it necessary to further state that the 'Sapaksha is non-existent'? Answer: If only 'Sapaksha is non-existent' is stated, and the 'Hetu' is not universally 'non-existent,' then it belongs to the 'Vipaksha exists' (dissimilar instance exists) category among the nine possibilities, excluding the second, eighth, and fifth possibilities, leaving six possibilities. The 'Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (negative example) will also commit the fallacy of 'Sādhanāvyāvartaka' (non-exclusion of the counter-example). If it is said that the 'Hetu is universally non-existent' without stating that the 'Sapaksha is non-existent,' then it belongs to the 'Sapaksha is non-existent' category among the nine possibilities, namely the fourth, sixth, and fifth possibilities. The 'Sapaksha' will also commit the fallacy of 'Sādhanāsiddha' (unestablished reason). If neither 'Sapaksha is non-existent' nor 'Hetu is universally non-existent' is stated, then it belongs to the 'Sapaksha exists' category among the nine possibilities, excluding the middle three possibilities, leaving six possibilities. The 'Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' will also commit the fallacy of 'Ubhayāvyāvartaka' (non-exclusion of both positive and negative examples). If it is said that the 'Sapaksha is non-existent' and the 'Hetu' is also universally 'non-existent,' then it belongs to the second, fifth, and eighth possibilities among the nine possibilities. The second and eighth are correct, and the fifth is uncertain. The 'Sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (positive example) may commit the fallacy of 'Ubhayāsiddha' (both positive and negative examples are unestablished). Because other sentences have fallacies, this sentence also has fallacies. Otherwise, this sentence would not be classified as having fallacies. These fallacies may come from oneself or from others, either entirely or partially. According to the specific situation, contemplate and analyze them by referring to the previous analysis. The small division of the fourth sentence is correct, and the rest have fallacies. To prevent these fallacies, it is necessary to state both 'Sapaksha is non-existent' and 'Hetu is universally non-existent'.
Treatise: For example, if it is 'Nitya' (eternal, permanent), not 'Krita' (created, made), like space, etc.
Commentary: This specifically points out the method. For example, for the 'Anitya' (impermanent) Paksha (thesis), 'Nitya' (permanent) is the 'Vipaksha' (counter-example). For the 'Kritakatva' (createdness) Hetu, 'Akrita' (uncreated) is the 'Vipaksha'. Conversely, it reveals the meaning that since 'Akrita' is seen in the permanent category, it shows that 'Krita' must see 'Anitya', thus accomplishing the thesis. First Hetu, then Paksha. The dissimilar method departs from the front. Paksha first, then Hetu. If the dissimilar departs from the middle, Hetu first, then Paksha. For example, saying 'Akrita' must be 'Dhruva' (constant), it turns into the originally undisputed 'empty constant', rather than departing from the front to accomplish the meaning of the 'Anitya' thesis. If 'Dhruva' is accomplished, it commits the fallacy of 'Siddhasādhana' (proving what is already proven), because the old, already established thesis is now being established again. Since the similar is established, first Hetu, then Paksha. Since the dissimilar departs from the front, it follows the order of Paksha. The intention is to conversely reveal the meaning of the previously established. Now that the Paksha is non-existent, and the Hetu does not change, it shows that where the Hetu exists, the Paksha must follow. The dissimilar only speaks of departure, and accomplishment is obtained by departure. It is necessary that the Paksha is non-existent first, and then the Hetu is non-existent. Therefore, Nyāyamukha (Introduction to Logic).
云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。如空等者。此舉喻依。以彰喻體。標其所依有法。顯能依之法非有。等者。等取隨所應宗涅槃等法。
論。此中常言表非無常非所作言表無所作。
述曰。下釋成義。顯異無體亦成三相。正因所攝。因明之法。以無為宗。無能成立。有無皆異。即如論云。和合非實。許六句中隨一攝故。如前五句。前破五句。體非實有。故得為喻。此中以無而成無故。應以有法而為異品。無其體故。還以無法而為異云。諸是實者。非六句攝。無其異體。若無為宗。有非能成。因無所依。喻無所立。故可有為異。異於無故。以有為宗。有為能成。順成有故。無非能立。因非能成。喻無所立。故有無並異。皆止濫故。無常之宗既是有體。所作瓶等有為能立。故於異品。若薩婆多立有體空為異。若經部等立以無體空為異。但止宗因諸濫盡故。不要異喻必有所依。同喻能立。成有必有。成無必無。表詮遮詮二種皆得。異喻不爾。有體無體一向皆遮。性止濫故。故常言者。遮非無常宗。非所作言。表非所作因。不要常非作別詮二有體。意顯異喻通無體故。理門論云。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。由合及離比度義故。前之同喻亦遮亦詮。由成無以無。成有以有故。后之異喻一向止濫。遮而不詮。由同喻合比度義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：云。（指）說明因宗（hetu-dharma，理由和結論）所隨順的關係。如果宗（dharma，結論）沒有因（hetu，理由），就不會成立，就像空（śūnyatā，空性）等等。（這）是舉出比喻的所依，用以彰顯比喻的本體，標明其所依的有法（dharmin，具有特定性質的事物），顯示能依之法（dharma，性質）並非實有。『等』字，包括隨所應的宗（dharma，結論）涅槃（nirvāṇa，寂滅）等法。
論：這裡說『常』（nitya，常）這個詞，表示『非無常』（anitya，無常），說『非所作』（akṛta，非造作）這個詞，表示『無所作』（akṛta，非造作）。
述曰：下面解釋成就意義，顯示異品（vipakṣa，反例）無體也能成就三相（trilakṣaṇa，因的三種性質）。正因（hetu，正確的理由）所包含的，因明（hetuvidyā，因明學）的法則，以無為宗（dharma，結論），無法成立。有和無都是異品（vipakṣa，反例）。就像論中說的：『和合（saṃghāta，組合）不是真實的』，因為它被包含在六句（ṣaṭ-prakāra，六種範疇）中的任何一句中。就像前面破斥五句一樣，它們的本體不是真實存在的，所以可以作為比喻。這裡因為用無來成就無，所以應該用有法（dharmin，具有特定性質的事物）作為異品（vipakṣa，反例），因為它沒有本體。反過來，又用無法作為異品（vipakṣa，反例），凡是真實存在的，都不被六句所包含，因為它沒有異體。如果以無為宗（dharma，結論），有就不能成立，因為因（hetu，理由）沒有所依，比喻沒有所立。所以可以用有為作為異品（vipakṣa，反例），因為它異於無。如果以有為宗（dharma，結論），有為就能成立，因為它順應成就了有。無就不能成立，因為因（hetu，理由）不能成立，比喻沒有所立。所以有和無都作為異品（vipakṣa，反例），都是爲了防止謬誤。無常的宗（dharma，結論）既然是有體，所作的瓶子等有為就能成立。所以在異品（vipakṣa，反例）方面，如果薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）立有體空為異品（vipakṣa，反例），如果經部（Sautrāntika，經量部）等立以無體空為異品（vipakṣa，反例）。只要防止宗（dharma，結論）和因（hetu，理由）的各種謬誤就可以了。不需要異喻（vaidṛṣṭānta，異喻）必須有所依，同喻（sadṛṣṭānta，同喻）能夠成立。成就『有』必定有，成就『無』必定無，表詮（vidhi-mukha，正面表述）和遮詮（niṣedha-mukha，反面表述）兩種都可以。異喻（vaidṛṣṭānta，異喻）不是這樣，有體和無體一概都遮止，因為它的性質是防止謬誤。所以說『常』（nitya，常）這個詞，是爲了遮止『非無常』（anitya，無常）的宗（dharma，結論），說『非所作』（akṛta，非造作）這個詞，表示『非所作』（akṛta，非造作）的因（hetu，理由）。不需要『常』（nitya，常）和『非作』（akṛta，非造作）分別表詮兩個有體，意思是顯示異喻（vaidṛṣṭānta，異喻）可以通於無體。理門論說，前面是遮詮（niṣedha-mukha，反面表述），後面只是防止謬誤，因為通過結合和分離來比較推度意義。前面的同喻（sadṛṣṭānta，同喻）既遮止又表詮，因為通過無來成就無，通過有來成就有。後面的異喻（vaidṛṣṭānta，異喻）一概只防止謬誤，遮止而不表詮，因為同喻（sadṛṣṭānta，同喻）通過結合來比較推度意義。
【English Translation】 English version: Cloud. (It) explains the relationship that the hetu-dharma (reason and conclusion) follows. If the dharma (conclusion) does not have a hetu (reason), it will not be established, like śūnyatā (emptiness) and so on. (This) is to present the basis of the analogy, in order to highlight the substance of the analogy, marking the dharmin (subject possessing a specific property) on which it relies, showing that the dharma (property) on which it relies is not real. The word 'and so on' includes dharma (conclusion) such as nirvāṇa (extinction) and other dharmas as appropriate.
Treatise: Here, the word 'nitya' (permanent) expresses 'anitya' (impermanent), and the word 'akṛta' (uncreated) expresses 'akṛta' (uncreated).
Commentary: The following explains the accomplishment of meaning, showing that the absence of substance in the vipakṣa (counter-example) can also accomplish the three characteristics (trilakṣaṇa, the three characteristics of a reason). The rules of hetuvidyā (the science of reasoning) contained in the correct hetu (reason) cannot be established with non-being as the dharma (conclusion). Being and non-being are both vipakṣa (counter-examples). Just as the treatise says: 'Saṃghāta (combination) is not real' because it is included in any one of the ṣaṭ-prakāra (six categories). Just as the previous refutation of the five categories, their substance is not really existent, so it can be used as an analogy. Here, because non-being is used to accomplish non-being, a dharmin (subject possessing a specific property) should be used as a vipakṣa (counter-example) because it has no substance. Conversely, non-being is used as a vipakṣa (counter-example). Whatever is really existent is not included in the six categories because it has no different substance. If non-being is the dharma (conclusion), being cannot be established because the hetu (reason) has no basis and the analogy has no foundation. Therefore, being can be used as a vipakṣa (counter-example) because it is different from non-being. If being is the dharma (conclusion), being can be established because it accords with the accomplishment of being. Non-being cannot be established because the hetu (reason) cannot be established and the analogy has no foundation. Therefore, both being and non-being are used as vipakṣa (counter-examples) to prevent fallacies. Since the dharma (conclusion) of impermanence has substance, the created pot and other beings can be established. Therefore, in terms of vipakṣa (counter-examples), if the Sarvāstivāda (the 'All Exists' school) establishes emptiness with substance as a vipakṣa (counter-example), if the Sautrāntika (the 'Sutra school') and others establish emptiness without substance as a vipakṣa (counter-example). It is only necessary to prevent various fallacies of the dharma (conclusion) and the hetu (reason). It is not necessary for the vaidṛṣṭānta (dissimilar example) to have a basis, the sadṛṣṭānta (similar example) can be established. Accomplishing 'being' must have being, accomplishing 'non-being' must have non-being, both vidhi-mukha (affirmative expression) and niṣedha-mukha (negative expression) are possible. The vaidṛṣṭānta (dissimilar example) is not like this, both substance and non-substance are always excluded because its nature is to prevent fallacies. Therefore, the word 'nitya' (permanent) is to prevent the dharma (conclusion) of 'anitya' (impermanent), and the word 'akṛta' (uncreated) expresses the hetu (reason) of 'akṛta' (uncreated). It is not necessary for 'nitya' (permanent) and 'akṛta' (uncreated) to separately express two substances, meaning to show that the vaidṛṣṭānta (dissimilar example) can apply to non-substance. The Treatise on the Door of Reasoning says that the former is niṣedha-mukha (negative expression), and the latter only prevents fallacies because the meaning is compared and inferred through combination and separation. The former sadṛṣṭānta (similar example) both prevents and expresses because non-being is used to accomplish non-being, and being is used to accomplish being. The latter vaidṛṣṭānta (dissimilar example) only prevents fallacies, preventing but not expressing, because the sadṛṣṭānta (similar example) compares and infers meaning through combination.
故。由異喻離比度義故。彼復結云。由是雖對不立實有太虛空等。而得顯示無有宗處無因義成。古說聲無常。異喻如虛空。理門難云。非異品中不顯無性。有所簡別能為譬喻。謂于無常異品。應言謂若是常。見非所作。如虛空等。正以常為異品。兼非所作。空為喻依。要此簡別。顯異品無。返顯有所作因。無常宗必隨逐。汝但云如空者。今返難云。非於異品不顯無宗。及無因性。即有簡別。故能為異喻。長讀文勢義道亦遠。又難古言。世間但顯宗因異品同處有性為異法喻。非宗無處因不有性。故定無能。初四句牒。后三句非。此說外道名為世間。但顯宗因常。及非所作異品同在虛空上。故說此虛空為異喻體。此牒彼宗而申難言。非宗無處。因不有性。故定無能。異品不言謂若是常宗無之處。見非所作因不有性。以離宗因。返顯有因。宗必定有。故古異品。決定無能。由此但應如我所說。
論。如有非有說名非有。
述曰。恐說異喻。遮義不明。指事為例。此有二釋。一云。如勝論師。為其五頂不信有性實等外有。遂立量云。有性非實非德非業。有一實故有德業故。如同異性。陳那破云。此因有有法自相相違。謂有性應非有。有一實故有德業故。如同異性。此引陳那有非有言。豈言非有別有所目。一向遮有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，由於通過異喻（不同性質的比喻）和離比（排除相似性的比較）來推斷意義，所以他們總結說：『因此，雖然承認太虛空等不是真實存在的，但可以顯示出沒有宗（要證明的觀點），沒有處（存在的場所），沒有因（理由）的意義成立。』古人說聲音是無常的，用虛空作為異喻。理門（因明學）對此提出疑問：『如果異品（與宗相反的事物）中沒有顯示出無自性，那麼就無法通過簡別（區分）來作為譬喻。』也就是說，在無常的異品中，應該說『如果它是常，那麼就不是被製造的』，比如虛空等。正確的方法是以常作為異品，兼顧『不是被製造的』，以虛空作為譬喻的依據。必須通過這種簡別，來顯示異品中沒有『有所作』的因，從而反過來顯示出『有所作』的因，無常的宗必然隨之成立。你只是說『像虛空一樣』，現在反過來問你：『如果異品中沒有顯示出無宗和無因的性質，那麼就存在簡別，因此可以作為異喻。』長篇大論的文勢和義理都相差甚遠。另外，反駁古人的觀點：『世間只是顯示宗、因、異品在同一處具有性質，作為異法喻（不同性質的例子），而不是宗不存在的地方，因就不具有性質，所以肯定沒有能力。』前四句是重複，后三句是反駁。這裡說外道被稱為世間，只是顯示宗（常）、因（非所作）和異品（虛空）在同一處，所以說這個虛空是異喻的本體。這是重複他們的觀點，並提出反駁：『不是宗不存在的地方，因就不具有性質，所以肯定沒有能力。』異品沒有說『如果它是常，宗不存在的地方，就看不到非所作的因不具有性質』，而是通過離開宗和因，反過來顯示出有因，宗必定存在。因此，古人的異品，肯定沒有能力。因此，應該像我所說的那樣。 論：如果說『有』不是『有』，就叫做『非有』。 述曰：恐怕說異喻遮蓋意義不明確，所以舉例說明。這裡有兩種解釋。一種說法是：像勝論師（Vaisheshika）一樣，因為他們的五頂（五種最高範疇）不相信有性（existence）實等外在的存在，於是立論說：『有性不是實（substance），不是德（quality），不是業（action），因為它有一個實，有德業，如同異性（difference）。』陳那（Dignāga）反駁說：『這個因具有有法（具有性質的事物）自相矛盾。』也就是說，有性應該不是有，因為它有一個實，有德業，如同異性。這裡引用陳那的『有非有』的說法，難道說『非有』另有所指嗎？完全是否定『有』。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, because the meaning is inferred through heterologous metaphor (喻, different nature analogy) and separation analogy (離比, excluding similarity comparison), they conclude: 'Therefore, although admitting that the great void (太虛空) etc. are not truly existent, it can be shown that the meaning of no thesis (宗, the proposition to be proved), no place (處, the place of existence), and no cause (因, the reason) is established.' The ancients said that sound is impermanent, using the void as a heterologous metaphor. The Logic Gate (理門, Hetuvidya) raises the question: 'If the absence of self-nature (無自性) is not shown in the dissimilar class (異品, the opposite of the thesis), then it cannot be used as a metaphor through differentiation (簡別).' That is to say, in the dissimilar class of impermanence, it should be said 'If it is permanent, then it is not made (所作)', such as the void etc. The correct method is to take permanence as the dissimilar class, taking into account 'not made', and take the void as the basis of the metaphor. It is necessary to show through this differentiation that there is no cause of 'made' in the dissimilar class, thereby conversely showing the cause of 'made', and the thesis of impermanence must necessarily be established. You just say 'like the void', now I ask you in return: 'If the absence of thesis and the nature of no cause are not shown in the dissimilar class, then there is differentiation, so it can be used as a heterologous metaphor.' The writing style and meaning of the long argument are far apart. In addition, refute the ancient view: 'The world only shows that the thesis, cause, and dissimilar class have properties in the same place, as a heterologous example (異法喻, example of different nature), rather than the place where the thesis does not exist, the cause does not have properties, so it is certainly incapable.' The first four sentences are repetition, and the last three sentences are refutation. Here it says that the heretics are called the world, only showing that the thesis (permanent), cause (not made), and dissimilar class (void) are in the same place, so it says that this void is the body of the heterologous metaphor. This is repeating their point of view and raising a refutation: 'It is not the place where the thesis does not exist, the cause does not have properties, so it is certainly incapable.' The dissimilar class did not say 'If it is permanent, the place where the thesis does not exist, you cannot see that the cause of not made does not have properties', but by leaving the thesis and cause, conversely showing that there is a cause, the thesis must exist. Therefore, the ancient dissimilar class is certainly incapable. Therefore, it should be as I said. Treatise: If saying 'being' is not 'being', it is called 'non-being'. Commentary: Fearing that saying heterologous metaphor obscures the meaning, so give an example to illustrate. There are two explanations here. One explanation is: like the Vaisheshika (勝論師), because their five highest categories (五頂) do not believe in the external existence of existence (有性), substance (實) etc., so they argue: 'Existence is not substance (實), not quality (德), not action (業), because it has a substance, has quality and action, like difference (異性).' Dignāga (陳那) refutes: 'This cause has a self-contradiction of the property-bearer (有法, that which possesses the property).' That is to say, existence should not be being, because it has a substance, has quality and action, like difference. Here, quoting Dignāga's saying 'being non-being', does it mean that 'non-being' refers to something else? It completely denies 'being'.
故言非有。常等亦爾。一向遮無常及所作性故。非有所目。二云。此言非有。非引陳那所說非有。泛言非有。略有二義。一者勝論。除有五句。皆是非有。此即表詮。二者非有。但非於有。非有所目。欲顯同喻成有體宗。可如表五。異喻止濫。可如遮有。然中道大乘。一切法性。皆離假智及言詮表。言與假智俱不得真。一向遮詮都無所表。唯于諸法共相而轉。因明之法。即不同彼。然共相中可有詮表義。同喻成立有無二法。有成於有可許詮也。無成於無即可遮也。異喻必遮。故言此遮非有所表。異不同同。理如前說。理門論中。於此二喻而設難言。復以何緣第一說因宗所隨逐。第二說宗無因不有。不說因無宗不有耶。此中難意。前頌所言說因宗所隨宗無因不有。此二名譬喻。何不以同例異。先宗后因。說無常者皆是所作。而言諸所作者皆是無常。說有因處宗所隨逐。何不以異例同。先因后宗。說非所作皆見是常。而言若有是常見非所作。說宗無處因亦隨無。彼論答云。由如是說。能顯示因。同品定有。異品遍無。非顛倒說。即彼頌言。應以非作證其常。或以無常成所作。若爾應成非所說。不遍非樂等合離。初三句答所作遍因。后一句答勤勇狹因。第一同喻先宗后因。第二異喻先因后宗。返覆相例俱為不可。若以離類合
先因后宗。而云非所作者皆是常住。即應以非所作因自證常住。非離先立先宗后因。若許爾者。亦應成立非本所說無常之宗。又空常住。立敵本成。若今更立。犯相符過。既非本諍。翻乃立常。由此故言。若爾應成非本所說。若以合類離先宗后因。而云諸無常者皆是所作。即應以無常成所作性。非以所作成宗無常。若許爾者。即應成立非本所諍無常宗義。又聲無常非兩所許。聲上所作兩本許成。若以不共許無常。成共許之所作。宗既相符。因亦隨一。故云若爾即應成立非本所諍。問聲瓶俱無常。諸所作者皆無常。聲瓶無常兩俱成。聲瓶俱所作。諸無常者皆所作。何廢聲瓶所作兩俱成。答彼聲所作非無常。瓶許所作亦無常。舉瓶所作既無常。類聲所作亦無常。不欲成瓶所作無常。何得別以無常成所作。其第四句。釋勤勇因。亦為不可。言不遍者。若以離類合。先言若非勤勇無間所發定是常住。電非勤發而非常住。非勤因寬。常住宗局。局宗不遍常住寬因。即應以非勤發成其常住。若爾應成非本所說。若以合類離。先言諸無常者皆勤勇發。電等無常非勤所發。無常因寬。勤發宗狹。宗狹因寬亦是不遍。若亦許爾。應成非本所諍之說。此勤勇因。既同所作。應言又不遍。略故無又字。其非樂者。此不遍因。應別有成立不愛樂
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 先有因後有宗。如果說凡不是造作的都是常住，那就應該用『不是造作』這個因來自己證明是常住。不能離開先立的宗，后立的因。如果允許你這樣，也應該成立『不是本來所說的無常』這個宗。而且，空是常住，立論與對方的本意相同，如果現在再立，就犯了『相符』的過失。既然不是本來爭論的，反而要立常住。因此說，如果這樣，就應該成為不是本來所說的。如果用合類離，先說凡是無常的都是造作的，那就應該用無常來成立造作性，而不是用造作來成立無常的宗。如果允許你這樣，就應該成立不是本來爭論的無常宗義。而且，聲音是無常的，不是雙方都認可的；聲音是造作的，雙方本來就認可成立的。如果用不共同認可的無常，來成立共同認可的造作，宗既然相同，因也隨之相同。所以說，如果這樣，就應該成立不是本來爭論的。問：聲音和瓶子都是無常的，凡是造作的都是無常的，聲音和瓶子都是無常的，雙方都認可成立。聲音和瓶子都是造作的，凡是無常的都是造作的，為什麼聲音和瓶子是造作的，雙方不能都認可成立？答：那個聲音的造作不是無常的，瓶子被認為是造作的也是無常的。舉出瓶子的造作是無常的，類比聲音的造作也是無常的。不想要成立瓶子的造作是無常的，怎麼能另外用無常來成立造作呢？第四句，解釋勤勇因，也是不可以的。說不周遍，如果用離類合，先說如果不是勤勇無間所發，一定是常住。閃電不是勤勇所發，但不是常住。不是勤勇的因寬泛，常住的宗侷限。侷限的宗不周遍寬泛的因，就應該用『不是勤勇所發』來成立其常住。如果這樣，就應該成為不是本來所說的。如果用合類離，先說凡是無常的都是勤勇所發，閃電等無常不是勤勇所發。無常的因寬泛，勤勇所發的宗狹窄。宗狹窄因寬泛也是不周遍。如果也允許這樣，就應該成為不是本來爭論的說法。這個勤勇因，既然和造作相同，應該說也不周遍。因為省略的緣故沒有『又』字。那個不是快樂的，這個不周遍的因，應該另外有成立不愛樂。
【English Translation】 English version: First the reason, then the proposition. If you say that whatever is not made is permanent (Nitya), then you should use 'not made' as the reason (Hetu) to prove its permanence. You cannot separate establishing the proposition first and then the reason later. If you allow that, you should also establish the proposition of 'not impermanent as originally stated'. Moreover, emptiness (Śūnyatā) is permanent, which agrees with the opponent's original position. If you establish it now, you commit the fault of 'agreement'. Since it is not the original point of contention, you are instead establishing permanence. Therefore, it is said that if you do that, it would become something not originally stated. If you use a combination of similar and dissimilar instances, first saying that whatever is impermanent is made, then you should use impermanence to establish the nature of being made, not use being made to establish the proposition of impermanence. If you allow that, you should establish the meaning of the impermanence proposition that was not originally contended. Furthermore, the impermanence of sound (Śabda) is not agreed upon by both parties; the fact that sound is made is agreed upon by both parties. If you use the non-commonly agreed upon impermanence to establish the commonly agreed upon being made, since the proposition agrees, the reason also follows suit. Therefore, it is said that if you do that, you should establish something not originally contended. Question: Both sound and a pot (Ghaṭa) are impermanent, and whatever is made is impermanent. The impermanence of both sound and a pot is established by both parties. Both sound and a pot are made, and whatever is impermanent is made. Why can't the fact that both sound and a pot are made be established by both parties? Answer: The being made of that sound is not impermanent; the pot is considered made and is also impermanent. Since the being made of the pot is impermanent, by analogy, the being made of sound is also impermanent. If you don't want to establish that the being made of the pot is impermanent, how can you separately use impermanence to establish being made? The fourth statement, explaining the effort (Kṛta) reason, is also not acceptable. Saying it is not pervasive, if you use a combination of dissimilar instances, first saying that if something is not produced without interruption by effort, it is definitely permanent. Lightning (Vidyut) is not produced by effort but is not permanent. The reason of 'not produced by effort' is broad, while the proposition of permanence is limited. The limited proposition does not pervade the broad reason, so you should use 'not produced by effort' to establish its permanence. If you do that, it should become something not originally stated. If you use a combination of similar instances, first saying that whatever is impermanent is produced by effort, lightning and other impermanent things are not produced by effort. The reason of impermanence is broad, while the proposition of being produced by effort is narrow. A narrow proposition and a broad reason are also not pervasive. If you also allow that, it should become a statement not originally contended. This effort reason, since it is the same as being made, should also be said to be not pervasive. The word 'also' is omitted for brevity. That which is not pleasurable (Asukha), this non-pervasive reason, should separately establish non-desire (Anabhirati).
宗。謂若以離類合。言諸非勤發皆常住者。空非勤發可是常住。電非勤發如何皆常。此因既于異品中有。即成不定。便為成立電等常住不樂之宗。又若以合類離。言諸無常者皆是勤發。瓶等無常則是勤發。電等無常如何勤發。此勤發因亦于異品中有。還成不定。既以無常成立電等而是勤發。還非所樂。由此合離二等相例。咸為不可。是故但應合離同異如我所說。彼又問言。為要具二譬喻言詞方成能立。為如其因但隨說一。此問二喻。為要具說二。方成能立。成所立宗。為如所作勤勇二因。但隨說一。即成能立。成所立宗。彼自答言。若就正理。應具說二。由是具足顯示所立不離其因。以具顯示同品定有。異品遍無。能正對治相違不定。由具顯二。故能顯示宗不相離因。亦顯宗因同品定有。異品遍無。二喻既足。故能正除相違不定。相違不定二相過故。相違之因同無異有。不定之因二有二無。故說二喻具以除二過。彼復又言。若有於此一分已成。隨說一分亦成能立。謂於二喻。有已解同。應但說異有已解異。應但說同。不具說二亦成能立。彼論又言。若如其聲。兩義同許。俱不須說。或由義準。一能顯二。聲謂有法。所作性因。依此聲有。若敵證等聞此宗因。如其聲上兩義同許。即解因上二喻之義。同異二喻俱不須說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 宗（paksha，論題）。如果用離類合的方法，說所有非勤奮引發的事物都是常住的，那麼空不是勤奮引發的，但可以是常住的。閃電不是勤奮引發的，怎麼能說是常住的呢？這個原因在異品中存在，就成了不定因，反而成了要成立閃電等是常住的，但卻不是大家所認可的論題。又如果用合類離的方法，說所有無常的事物都是勤奮引發的，瓶子等是無常的，所以是勤奮引發的。閃電等是無常的，怎麼能說是勤奮引發的呢？這個勤奮引發的原因也在異品中存在，還是成了不定因。既然用無常來成立閃電等是勤奮引發的，也不是大家所認可的。由此可見，合類離和離類合這兩種情況，都是不可取的。所以，應該像我所說的那樣，用合、離、同、異的方法。對方又問：是否一定要具備兩個比喻的言辭，才能構成能立（sadhanavakya，論證）？還是像因一樣，只要說一個就可以了？這個提問是關於兩個比喻的。是否一定要完整地說出兩個比喻，才能構成能立，成立所要成立的論題？還是像所作和勤勇這兩個原因一樣，只要說一個，就能構成能立，成立所要成立的論題？對方自己回答說：如果按照正理，應該完整地說出兩個比喻。因為這樣才能完整地顯示所要成立的論題不離開它的原因，完整地顯示在同品中一定有，在異品中普遍沒有，才能正確地對治相違和不定。因為完整地顯示了兩個比喻，所以能夠顯示論題不離開原因，也顯示了論題和原因在同品中一定有，在異品中普遍沒有。兩個比喻都具備了，所以能夠正確地排除相違和不定。相違和不定有兩種過失，相違的原因是同品中沒有，異品中有；不定的原因是同品中有，異品中沒有。所以說兩個比喻是爲了排除這兩種過失。對方又說：如果對於其中一部分已經理解，那麼只說一部分也能構成能立。也就是說，對於兩個比喻，如果已經理解了同品，就應該只說異品；如果已經理解了異品，就應該只說同品，不必完整地說出兩個比喻，也能構成能立。對方的論點又說：如果像聲音一樣，兩種含義都認可，那麼都不需要說。或者通過義理推斷，一個就能顯示兩個。聲音指的是有法（dharmin，具有屬性的事物），所作性因（karyatvahetu，由作為產生的原因）。依據這個聲音的存在，如果敵方和證人等聽到這個論題和原因，如果像聲音一樣，兩種含義都認可，就理解了原因上的兩個比喻的含義，同品和異品這兩個比喻都不需要說。 English version: Paksha (thesis). If, using the method of 'separation and combination', one says that all things not produced by effort are permanent, then space is not produced by effort, yet it can be permanent. How can lightning, which is not produced by effort, be said to be permanent? This reason, being present in the dissimilar class, becomes an uncertain reason, and instead establishes a thesis that lightning, etc., are permanent, which is not accepted. Furthermore, if using the method of 'combination and separation', one says that all impermanent things are produced by effort, then pots, etc., are impermanent, therefore they are produced by effort. How can lightning, etc., which are impermanent, be said to be produced by effort? This reason of 'produced by effort' is also present in the dissimilar class, and again becomes an uncertain reason. Since impermanence is used to establish that lightning, etc., are produced by effort, it is also not accepted. Thus, both the 'combination and separation' and 'separation and combination' methods are not acceptable. Therefore, one should use combination, separation, similarity, and difference as I have described. The opponent further asks: Is it necessary to have the words of two examples to constitute a valid proof (sadhanavakya)? Or, like the reason, is it sufficient to state only one? This question concerns the two examples. Is it necessary to fully state both examples to constitute a valid proof and establish the thesis to be established? Or, like the two reasons of 'produced' and 'effort', is it sufficient to state only one to constitute a valid proof and establish the thesis to be established? The opponent answers himself: According to right reasoning, both examples should be fully stated. This is because it fully shows that the thesis to be established does not depart from its reason, and it fully shows that it is definitely present in the similar class and universally absent in the dissimilar class, which can correctly counteract contradiction and uncertainty. Because both examples are fully shown, it can show that the thesis does not depart from the reason, and it also shows that the thesis and reason are definitely present in the similar class and universally absent in the dissimilar class. Since both examples are complete, it can correctly eliminate contradiction and uncertainty. Contradiction and uncertainty have two faults: a contradictory reason is absent in the similar class and present in the dissimilar class; an uncertain reason is present and absent in both classes. Therefore, stating two examples is to eliminate these two faults. The opponent further says: If one part of this is already understood, then stating only one part can also constitute a valid proof. That is, for the two examples, if the similarity is already understood, then only the dissimilarity should be stated; if the dissimilarity is already understood, then only the similarity should be stated. It is not necessary to fully state both examples to constitute a valid proof. The opponent's argument further states: If, like sound, both meanings are accepted, then neither needs to be stated. Or, through inference, one can reveal both. 'Sound' refers to the dharmin (subject, the thing possessing the attribute), and the karyatvahetu (reason of being produced). Based on the existence of this sound, if the opponent and the witness, etc., hear this thesis and reason, and if, like sound, both meanings are accepted, then the meaning of the two examples on the reason is understood, and neither the similar nor the dissimilar example needs to be stated.
【English Translation】 Paksha (thesis). If, using the method of 'separation and combination', one says that all things not produced by effort are permanent, then space is not produced by effort, yet it can be permanent. How can lightning, which is not produced by effort, be said to be permanent? This reason, being present in the dissimilar class, becomes an uncertain reason, and instead establishes a thesis that lightning, etc., are permanent, which is not accepted. Furthermore, if using the method of 'combination and separation', one says that all impermanent things are produced by effort, then pots, etc., are impermanent, therefore they are produced by effort. How can lightning, etc., which are impermanent, be said to be produced by effort? This reason of 'produced by effort' is also present in the dissimilar class, and again becomes an uncertain reason. Since impermanence is used to establish that lightning, etc., are produced by effort, it is also not accepted. Thus, both the 'combination and separation' and 'separation and combination' methods are not acceptable. Therefore, one should use combination, separation, similarity, and difference as I have described. The opponent further asks: Is it necessary to have the words of two examples to constitute a valid proof (sadhanavakya)? Or, like the reason, is it sufficient to state only one? This question concerns the two examples. Is it necessary to fully state both examples to constitute a valid proof and establish the thesis to be established? Or, like the two reasons of 'produced' and 'effort', is it sufficient to state only one to constitute a valid proof and establish the thesis to be established? The opponent answers himself: According to right reasoning, both examples should be fully stated. This is because it fully shows that the thesis to be established does not depart from its reason, and it fully shows that it is definitely present in the similar class and universally absent in the dissimilar class, which can correctly counteract contradiction and uncertainty. Because both examples are fully shown, it can show that the thesis does not depart from the reason, and it also shows that the thesis and reason are definitely present in the similar class and universally absent in the dissimilar class. Since both examples are complete, it can correctly eliminate contradiction and uncertainty. Contradiction and uncertainty have two faults: a contradictory reason is absent in the similar class and present in the dissimilar class; an uncertain reason is present and absent in both classes. Therefore, stating two examples is to eliminate these two faults. The opponent further says: If one part of this is already understood, then stating only one part can also constitute a valid proof. That is, for the two examples, if the similarity is already understood, then only the dissimilarity should be stated; if the dissimilarity is already understood, then only the similarity should be stated. It is not necessary to fully state both examples to constitute a valid proof. The opponent's argument further states: If, like sound, both meanings are accepted, then neither needs to be stated. Or, through inference, one can reveal both. 'Sound' refers to the dharmin (subject, the thing possessing the attribute), and the karyatvahetu (reason of being produced). Based on the existence of this sound, if the opponent and the witness, etc., hear this thesis and reason, and if, like sound, both meanings are accepted, then the meaning of the two examples on the reason is understood, and neither the similar nor the dissimilar example needs to be stated.
或立論者已說一喻。義準顯二。敵證生解但為說一。此上意說二俱不說。或隨說一。或二具說。隨對時機一切皆得。
論。已說宗等如是多言開悟他時說名能立。
述曰。解能立中。自下第三總結成前。簡擇同異。于中有二。初結成前。后簡同異。結成有二。初總結成。后別牒結。此即初也。若順世親。宗亦能立。故言宗等。宗因喻三名為多言。立者以此多言。開悟敵證之時。說名能立。陳那已后。舉宗能等。取其所等一因二喻名為能立。宗是能立之所立具。故於能立總結明之。
論。如說聲無常是立宗言。
述曰。下別牒結能立。文勢有四。此文初也。牒前宗后指法雲。如有成立聲是無常者。此是所諍立宗之言。
論。所作性故者是宗法言。
述曰。第二文也。牒前因后指法雲。此中所作性者。是宗之法能立因言。由是宗法故能成前聲無常宗。名為因也。有故字者。前無今有顯立因法必須言故。不爾便非標宗所以。前略指法。由此略無。前指法中指示二因。今唯牒一。前者欲顯同品定有。餘二言遍三相異故。別顯二因。今略結指。故唯牒一。
論。若是所作見彼無常如瓶等者是隨同品言。
述曰。第三文也。牒前同喻。后指法雲。謂若有所作因。見有無常宗。猶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 或者立論者已經說了一個比喻。按照這個意義，可以顯現兩個方面。敵方爲了理解辯證，只說了一個方面。以上的意思是說兩個方面都不說，或者只說一個方面，或者兩個方面都說。根據面對的時機，一切都可以。
論：已經說了宗（proposition，論題）等，像這樣用很多言辭來開悟對方的時候，就叫做能立（means of proof，論證方法）。
述曰：解釋能立中，從下面第三點開始總結前面所說的內容，區分相同和不同之處。其中有兩點：第一是總結前面所說的，第二是分別解釋總結。這裡是第一點。如果順從世親（Vasubandhu）的觀點，宗也可以作為能立。所以說宗等。宗、因（reason，理由）、喻（example，例子）三者稱為多言。立論者用這些多言來開悟敵方的時候，就叫做能立。陳那（Dignāga）之後，舉出宗能等，取其所等的一個因和兩個喻，稱為能立。宗是能立所要成立的對象，所以在能立的總結中要說明它。
論：例如說『聲是無常』，這是立宗的言辭。
述曰：下面分別解釋總結能立。文勢有四種，這是第一種。解釋前面的宗，然後指出法，說如果有人要成立『聲是無常』這個論題，這就是所要辯論的立宗之言。
論：『因為是所作性』，這是宗法的言辭。
述曰：這是第二種文勢。解釋前面的因，然後指出法，說這裡所說的『所作性』，是宗的法，是能立的因的言辭。因為是宗的法，所以能夠成立前面的『聲是無常』這個宗。所以稱為因。加上『故』字，表示前面沒有，現在有，說明立因法必須說『故』，否則就不能標明宗的理由。前面只是大概地指出法，所以這裡也省略了。前面指出法的時候，指示了兩個因，現在只解釋一個。前面是爲了顯示同品（similar instance，相似例子）必定有，其餘兩個方面因為三種特性不同，所以分別顯示兩個因。現在只是大概地總結指示，所以只解釋一個。
論：『如果是所作，就能看到它是無常的，比如瓶子等』，這是隨同品（concomitance with similar instances，與相似例子的同在）的言辭。
述曰：這是第三種文勢。解釋前面的同喻，然後指出法，說如果有所作的因，就能看到有無常的宗，就像瓶子等。
【English Translation】 English version: Or the proponent has already stated one example. According to this meaning, two aspects can be revealed. The opponent, in order to understand the dialectic, only states one aspect. The above meaning is that neither of the two aspects is stated, or only one aspect is stated, or both aspects are stated. Depending on the occasion, everything is possible.
Treatise: Having stated the proposition (宗, proposition) etc., when using many words like these to enlighten the opponent, it is called the means of proof (能立, means of proof).
Commentary: Explaining the means of proof, starting from the third point below, summarizing what was said earlier, distinguishing similarities and differences. Among them, there are two points: the first is to summarize what was said earlier, and the second is to explain the summary separately. This is the first point. If following the view of Vasubandhu (世親), the proposition can also be used as a means of proof. Therefore, it is said 'proposition etc.' The proposition, reason (因, reason), and example (喻, example) are called many words. When the proponent uses these many words to enlighten the opponent, it is called the means of proof. After Dignāga (陳那), the proposition etc. is mentioned, taking one reason and two examples that it equals, called the means of proof. The proposition is the object to be established by the means of proof, so it must be explained in the summary of the means of proof.
Treatise: For example, saying 'sound is impermanent' is the statement of establishing the proposition.
Commentary: Below, explain and summarize the means of proof separately. There are four types of textual structure, this is the first type. Explaining the previous proposition, and then pointing out the dharma, saying that if someone wants to establish the proposition 'sound is impermanent', this is the statement of establishing the proposition to be debated.
Treatise: 'Because it is produced' is the statement of the property of the proposition.
Commentary: This is the second type of textual structure. Explaining the previous reason, and then pointing out the dharma, saying that what is said here as 'produced' is the property of the proposition, and is the statement of the reason for the means of proof. Because it is the property of the proposition, it can establish the previous proposition 'sound is impermanent'. Therefore, it is called the reason. Adding the word 'because' indicates that it did not exist before, but now it exists, indicating that the statement of the reason must include 'because', otherwise it cannot indicate the reason for the proposition. The previous pointing out of the dharma was only approximate, so it is also omitted here. When pointing out the dharma previously, two reasons were indicated, but now only one is explained. The previous was to show that similar instances (同品, similar instance) must exist, and the other two aspects are different because of the three characteristics, so the two reasons are shown separately. Now it is just a rough summary and indication, so only one is explained.
Treatise: 'If it is produced, then it can be seen that it is impermanent, like a pot etc.' is the statement of concomitance with similar instances (隨同品, concomitance with similar instances).
Commentary: This is the third type of textual structure. Explaining the previous similar example, and then pointing out the dharma, saying that if there is a reason of being produced, then it can be seen that there is a proposition of impermanence, like a pot etc.
如瓶等。是無常宗隨因所作同品之言。雖所作因舉聲上有以顯無常。無常猶未隨所作因。所作因通聲瓶兩處名因同品。今舉瓶上所作故無常。顯聲無常亦隨因同品。義決定故。又同品者。是宗同品。昔雖舉因。宗猶未隨自瓶同品無常義定。今顯有因宗法必有。如瓶等故。其所立聲。定隨同品無常義立。問敵者不解聲有無常。何得以瓶而為同品。答兩家共許所作同。故因正同品。立者所立本立無常。故舉于瓶為宗同品。亦無過也。
論。若是其常見非所作如虛空者是遠離言。
述曰。第四文也。牒前異喻。后指法雲。若是其常。離所立宗。見非所作。離能立因。如虛空者。指異喻依。此指於前宗因二濫名遠離言。遠宗離因。或通遠離。或體疏名遠。義乖名離。與所能立。體相疏遠。義理乖絕。故名遠離。問何故但離宗之與因。不能離喻。答別離宗因。合則離喻。更不別說。然同成宗。故必須體。今以止非。不須異性。問何故但名異喻。不名異宗因耶。答喻合兩法。宗因各一。說異喻以總苞。言異二而為失。若言異宗異因。謂更別成他義。非是離前。返成能立。故總名異喻。合異宗因。不別說異宗異因之號。
論。唯此三分說名能立。
述曰。此簡同異。理門論云。又比量中。唯見此理若所比處
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：比如瓶子等。這是無常宗（Anityata-paksha，意為以無常為宗的論證）隨順『所作』（kritaka，意為被製造的）之因的同品（sapaksha，意為相似實例）之言。雖然以『所作』之因在聲音上揭示了無常，但無常仍然沒有隨順『所作』之因。『所作』之因既適用於聲音，也適用於瓶子，因此被稱為『因同品』。現在以瓶子上的『所作』來證明無常，這表明聲音的無常也隨順了『因同品』，因為其意義是確定的。此外，『同品』是指與宗（paksha，意為論題）相同的品類。過去即使舉出了『因』，宗仍然沒有隨順其自身與瓶子相同的『無常』之義。現在表明，凡是有『因』，宗法（paksha-dharma，意為論題的性質）必定存在，就像瓶子等一樣。因此，所要建立的聲音，必定隨順『同品』的『無常』之義而成立。如果論敵不理解聲音具有無常的性質，怎麼能以瓶子作為『同品』呢？回答是，雙方都認可『所作』是相同的，因此『因』正是『同品』。立論者所要建立的根本是『無常』，所以舉出瓶子作為宗的『同品』，也沒有過失。
論：如果它是常見的、非所作的，比如虛空，這就是遠離言（viruddha-drishtanta，意為反例）。
述曰：這是第四段文字。引用前面的異喻（vaidharmya-drishtanta，意為不同例證），後面指出法（dharma，意為性質）。如果它是常見的，遠離所要建立的宗，看到它不是『所作』的，遠離能立的『因』，比如虛空，這是指異喻的依據。這裡指的是前面宗和因二者都含糊不清，被稱為『遠離言』。遠離宗，遠離因，或者從普遍意義上說是『遠離』，或者從本體疏遠上說是『遠』，從意義乖違上說是『離』。與所能立（sadhana，意為論證）在本體和現象上疏遠，在義理上乖違斷絕，所以稱為『遠離』。問：為什麼只遠離宗和因，而不能遠離喻呢？答：分別遠離宗和因，合起來就遠離了喻，不再分別說明。然而，『同品』成就了宗，所以必須有本體。現在是爲了阻止錯誤，不需要不同的性質。問：為什麼只稱為『異喻』，而不稱為『異宗』、『異因』呢？答：『喻』結合了兩種法，而宗和因各只有一種。說『異喻』是爲了總括，說『異』二就成了過失。如果說『異宗』、『異因』，就意味著另外成立其他的意義，而不是遠離前面的，反而成了能立。所以總稱為『異喻』，合起來就是『異宗』、『異因』，不分別說『異宗』、『異因』的名稱。
論：只有這三部分才能被稱為能立（sadhana，意為論證）。
述曰：這是爲了簡要說明『同品』和『異品』。《理門論》說：『此外，在比量（anumana，意為推理）中，只有看到這個道理，才能在所要比較的地方……』
【English Translation】 English version: For example, like a pot, etc. This is a statement of the sapaksha (similar instance) that follows the hetu (reason) of 'being produced' (kritaka) in the Anityata-paksha (the thesis of impermanence). Although the hetu of 'being produced' reveals impermanence in sound, impermanence still does not follow the hetu of 'being produced'. The hetu of 'being produced' applies to both sound and pot, hence it is called 'hetu-sapaksha' (reason-similar instance). Now, using 'being produced' on a pot to demonstrate impermanence, it shows that the impermanence of sound also follows the 'hetu-sapaksha', because its meaning is definite. Furthermore, 'sapaksha' refers to the same category as the paksha (thesis). In the past, even if the hetu was cited, the paksha still did not follow its own meaning of 'impermanence' that is the same as the pot. Now it is shown that wherever there is a hetu, the paksha-dharma (property of the thesis) must exist, just like a pot, etc. Therefore, the sound to be established must follow the meaning of 'impermanence' in the 'sapaksha' to be established. If the opponent does not understand that sound has the nature of impermanence, how can a pot be used as a 'sapaksha'? The answer is that both parties agree that 'being produced' is the same, therefore the hetu is precisely the 'sapaksha'. What the proponent wants to establish fundamentally is 'impermanence', so citing a pot as the paksha's 'sapaksha' is also without fault.
Treatise: If it is permanent and not produced, like space, that is a viruddha-drishtanta (counter-example).
Commentary: This is the fourth passage. It refers to the previous vaidharmya-drishtanta (dissimilar example), and later points out the dharma (property). If it is permanent, away from the paksha to be established, seeing that it is not 'produced', away from the sadhana (means of proof) of the hetu, like space, this refers to the basis of the dissimilar example. This refers to the ambiguity of both the paksha and the hetu mentioned earlier, which is called 'viruddha-drishtanta'. Being away from the paksha, being away from the hetu, either generally speaking it is 'away', or in terms of ontological distance it is 'distant', and in terms of semantic discrepancy it is 'away'. It is distant from the sadhana (means of proof) in terms of ontology and phenomena, and discrepant and severed in terms of meaning and principle, so it is called 'viruddha-drishtanta'. Question: Why is it only away from the paksha and the hetu, and not away from the example? Answer: Separately away from the paksha and the hetu, together they are away from the example, and no further explanation is needed. However, the 'sapaksha' accomplishes the paksha, so there must be an ontology. Now it is to prevent errors, and different natures are not needed. Question: Why is it only called 'vaidharmya-drishtanta', and not called 'viruddha-paksha' or 'viruddha-hetu'? Answer: The 'example' combines two dharmas, while the paksha and the hetu each have only one. Saying 'vaidharmya-drishtanta' is to encompass everything, and saying 'viruddha' twice becomes a fault. If you say 'viruddha-paksha' or 'viruddha-hetu', it means establishing other meanings separately, instead of being away from the previous ones, and instead becomes the sadhana. Therefore, it is generally called 'vaidharmya-drishtanta', which together is 'viruddha-paksha' and 'viruddha-hetu', and the names 'viruddha-paksha' and 'viruddha-hetu' are not mentioned separately.
Treatise: Only these three parts can be called sadhana (means of proof).
Commentary: This is to briefly explain 'sapaksha' and 'vipaksha'. The Nyayamukha says: 'Furthermore, in anumana (inference), only by seeing this principle can one be in the place to be compared...'
。此相審定(遍是宗法性也)于余同類。念此定有(同品定有性也)于彼無處。念此遍無(異品遍無性也)是故由此生決定解。即是此中唯舉三能立。彼引本頌言。如自決定已。悕他決定生。說宗法相應。所立余遠離。此說二比。一自。二他。自比處在弟子之位。此復有二。一相比量。如見火相煙。知下必有火。二言比量。聞師所說比度而知。於此二量自生決定。他比處在師主之位。與弟子等。作其比量。悕他解生。上之二句。如次別配。彼論自釋下二句言。為于所比。顯宗法性。故說因言。為顯於此不相離性。故說喻言(順成返成宗因不相離性即是二喻)為顯所比故說宗言。故因三相宗之法性。與所立宗說為相應。釋余遠離言。除此更無其餘支分。由是遮遣余審察等。及與合結。即是此論說唯此言。即簡別故。諸外道等立審察支。立敵皆于未立論前。先生審察問定宗徒。以為方便言申宗致。集量破云。由汝父母生汝身故。方能立論。又由證者語具床座等。方得立論。皆應名能立。立者智生。望他宗智。皆疏遠故。尚非能立。況余法耶。古師所立八四三等為能立支。皆非親勝所以不說。故說等言。其合結支。離因喻無故不別立。性殊勝故。于喻過中。無合倒合過為增勝。故名似立。至下當知。
論。雖樂成立由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此相的審定（普遍是宗法性），對於其餘同類事物也是如此。念及此定有（同品定有性），在其他地方則沒有。念及此普遍沒有（異品普遍沒有性），因此由此產生決定的理解。這就是其中只舉出三種能成立的理由。他們引用本頌說：『如自己決定后，希望他人決定產生，說明宗法相應，所立的其餘部分遠離。』這說明了兩種比量：一是自比，二是比他。自比處於弟子的位置，這又分為兩種：一是相比量，如見到火的現象煙，就知道下面一定有火；二是言比量，聽到老師所說，通過比度而知。對於這兩種比量，自己產生決定。他比處於師主的位置，與弟子等，作出比量，希望他人理解產生。上面的兩句，依次分別對應。他們的論述解釋下面的兩句說：『爲了對於所比，顯示宗法性，所以說因；爲了顯示於此不相離性，所以說喻（順成和返成宗因不相離性就是兩種比喻）；爲了顯示所比，所以說宗。』所以因的三相，宗的法性，與所立的宗，說是相應的。解釋其餘遠離說：『除了這些，再沒有其餘的支分。』由此遮遣其餘的審察等，以及合和結論。這就是此論只說這些的原因，也就是簡別的緣故。那些外道等設立審察支，設立敵人在未立論之前，先生審察問定宗徒，作為方便來闡述宗的意旨。集量駁斥說：『由於你父母生了你的身體，才能立論；又由於證人的語言、具備床座等，才能立論，都應該叫做能立。』立者智慧產生，對於其他宗派的智慧，都疏遠，尚且不是能立，何況其餘的法呢？古師所立的八支、四支、三支等作為能立支，都不是親近和殊勝的，所以不說。所以說『等』。那合和結論支，離開了因和喻就沒有，所以不單獨設立。因為性質殊勝的緣故，在比喻的過失中，沒有合倒合的過失，作為增勝，所以叫做似立，到下面會知道。 論：雖然樂於成立，由於……
【English Translation】 English version: This determination of the characteristic (universally possessing the property of the subject) is also true for other similar things. Considering that this determination exists (possessing the property of being definitely present in similar instances), it does not exist elsewhere. Considering that this is universally absent (possessing the property of being universally absent in dissimilar instances), therefore, a decisive understanding arises from this. This is why only three reasons for establishing are mentioned here. They quote the original verse saying: 'As after one's own decision, one hopes that another's decision arises, explaining the correspondence of the property of the subject, the rest of what is established is distant.' This explains two types of inference: one's own inference and another's inference. One's own inference is in the position of a disciple, which is further divided into two types: inference by comparison, such as seeing the phenomenon of smoke indicating fire below; and inference by words, knowing through comparison and inference what the teacher says. For these two types of inference, one's own decision arises. Another's inference is in the position of the teacher, who, like the disciple, makes inferences, hoping that others' understanding arises. The above two sentences correspond to each other in order. Their argument explains the following two sentences saying: 'In order to show the property of the subject for what is being compared, the reason is stated; in order to show the inseparability from this, the example is stated (the positive and negative establishment of the inseparability of the subject and reason are the two examples); in order to show what is being compared, the subject is stated.' Therefore, the three characteristics of the reason, the property of the subject, and the established subject are said to correspond. Explaining 'the rest is distant' says: 'Besides these, there are no other parts.' From this, the rest of the examination and so on, as well as the combination and conclusion, are rejected. This is why this treatise only says these, which is for the sake of distinction. Those non-Buddhists establish the examination part, establishing the opponent before establishing the argument, first examining and questioning the followers of the subject, as a means to elaborate on the meaning of the subject. The Collected Measures refutes saying: 'Because your parents gave birth to your body, you can establish an argument; also because the witness's words, possessing a bed and seat, etc., can establish an argument, they should all be called establishing.' The wisdom of the establisher arises, but it is distant from the wisdom of other schools, and is not even establishing, let alone the rest of the Dharma? The eight parts, four parts, three parts, etc., established by ancient teachers as establishing parts are neither close nor superior, so they are not mentioned. Therefore, it says 'etc.' The combination and conclusion part is absent without the reason and example, so it is not established separately. Because of the superior nature, in the faults of the example, there is no fault of combination and inverted combination, as an increase in superiority, so it is called pseudo-establishment, which will be known below. Treatise: Although happy to establish, due to...
與現量等相違故名似立宗。
述曰。依標釋中大文有六。自下第二次解似立。文段有二。初列解似。后結非真。初中有三。初解似宗。次解似因。后解似喻。初復有二。初牒已說有過非真。后隨標似列指釋結。此即初也。樂為有二。一當時樂為。二后時樂為。前樂為當時之所樂。似宗所立。后時樂為。故樂為言。義通真似。前將當時之樂。為簡非當時之所樂。故似宗等非是真宗。論說雖言。義兼德失。雖復前言樂所成立說名為宗。此為德也。當時立故。無諸過故。若與現量等相違。故后時樂為。非當時之所樂。名似立宗。此為失也。后時立故。有諸過故。又此雖言亦顯不定。欲顯樂為通其今後二時不定。前當時樂所立名宗。后時樂為名似立宗。今顯后樂故名似宗。
論。謂現量相違比量相違自教相違世間相違自語相違。
述曰。下隨標似列指釋結有三。初隨標列。次隨列指法。后隨指釋結。列名有二。初隨古列。后隨今列。此隨古也。陳那唯立此五。天主又加餘四。故理門論云。非彼相違義能遣。義如前說。若依結文。或列有三。初顯乖法。次顯非有。后顯虛功。此即初也。乖法有二。自教自語。唯違自而為失。余之三種。違自共而為過。又現比違立敵之智。自教違所依憑。世間依勝義而無違。依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：與現量（ प्रत्यक्ष, perception）等相違背，因此稱為似立宗（似宗，fallacious thesis）。
述曰：依據標宗解釋中的大文，共有六個部分。從下文開始是第二次解釋似立。文段分為兩個部分：首先列出並解釋似立，然後總結其並非真實。第一個部分包含三個小部分：首先解釋似宗，其次解釋似因，最後解釋似喻。解釋似宗又分為兩個小部分：首先重複已說的有過失而非真實的宗，然後根據標宗列出、指明、解釋並總結。這裡是第一個小部分。樂為（認可，acceptance）有兩種：一是當時認可，二是後來認可。前一種認可是在當時被認可的，是似宗所立的；后一種認可是在後來被認可的，因此『樂為』這個詞，意義上既包含真實的也包含虛假的。前面將當時的認可，是爲了簡別非當時的認可，因此似宗等不是真宗。論述雖然說，意義上兼顧了功德和過失。雖然前面說認可所成立的說法稱為宗，這是功德，因為是在當時成立的，沒有各種過失。如果與現量等相違背，那麼後來認可的，就不是當時所認可的，稱為似立宗，這是過失，因為是在後來成立的，有各種過失。而且這裡雖然這樣說，也顯示了不確定性，想要顯示認可貫通今後兩個時間段，具有不確定性。前面當時認可所立的稱為宗，後來認可的稱為似立宗。現在顯示後來的認可，所以稱為似宗。
論：所謂的現量相違（ प्रत्यक्षविरुद्ध, contradictory to perception）、比量相違（ अनुमानविरुद्ध, contradictory to inference）、自教相違（ स्वसमयविरुद्ध, contradictory to one's own doctrine）、世間相違（ लोकविरुद्ध, contradictory to common sense）、自語相違（ स्वागमविरुद्ध, contradictory to one's own statement）。
述曰：下面根據標宗列出、指明、解釋並總結，分為三個部分：首先根據標宗列出，其次根據列出的指明法，最後根據指明的解釋並總結。列出名稱有兩種方式：一是根據古人的列法，二是根據現在的列法。這裡是根據古人的列法。陳那（Dignāga）隻立了這五種，天主（Īśvarasena）又增加了其餘四種，所以《理門論》（Hetucakraḍamaru）說：『非彼相違義能遣』，意義如前面所說。如果依據總結的文句，或者可以列出三種：首先顯示乖法，其次顯示非有，最後顯示虛功。這裡是第一個部分。乖法有兩種：自教相違和自語相違。只有違背自身才算是過失，其餘三種，違背自身和共同認可的都算是過失。而且現量和比量違背了立論者和對方的智慧，自教違背了所依據的憑證，世間相違依勝義諦（ परमार्थसत्य, ultimate truth）而沒有違背，依...
【English Translation】 English version: That which contradicts direct perception (pratyakṣa), etc., is called a fallacious thesis (siddhāntābhāsa).
Commentary: According to the explanation of the major topics in the statement of thesis, there are six parts. From the following text onwards is the second explanation of fallacious establishment. The section is divided into two parts: first, listing and explaining the fallacies; second, concluding that they are not genuine. The first part contains three subsections: first, explaining fallacious thesis; second, explaining fallacious reason; and third, explaining fallacious example. Explaining fallacious thesis is further divided into two subsections: first, repeating the previously stated thesis with faults and not genuine; second, listing, pointing out, explaining, and summarizing according to the statement of thesis. This is the first subsection. 'Acceptance' (lakṣaṇa) has two types: acceptance at the time and acceptance later. The former acceptance is what is accepted at the time, which is what the fallacious thesis establishes; the latter acceptance is what is accepted later, so the word 'acceptance' has a meaning that includes both true and false. The former acceptance at the time is to distinguish what is not accepted at the time, so fallacious thesis, etc., are not genuine theses. Although the treatise says that the meaning includes both merits and faults, although it was previously said that the statement established by acceptance is called a thesis, this is a merit because it is established at the time and has no faults. If it contradicts direct perception, etc., then what is accepted later is not what is accepted at the time, and it is called a fallacious thesis, which is a fault because it is established later and has various faults. Moreover, although it is said here, it also shows uncertainty, wanting to show that acceptance runs through both the present and future time periods, having uncertainty. What is established by acceptance at the time is called a thesis, and what is accepted later is called a fallacious thesis. Now showing the later acceptance, it is called a fallacious thesis.
Treatise: What is contradictory to direct perception (pratyakṣaviruddha), contradictory to inference (anumānaviruddha), contradictory to one's own doctrine (svasamayaviruddha), contradictory to common sense (lokaviruddha), and contradictory to one's own statement (svāgamaviruddha).
Commentary: Below, according to the statement of thesis, listing, pointing out, explaining, and summarizing, divided into three parts: first, listing according to the statement of thesis; second, pointing out the dharma according to the listed items; and third, explaining and summarizing according to the pointed out items. There are two ways to list names: one is according to the listing of the ancients, and the other is according to the listing of the present. This is according to the listing of the ancients. Dignāga only established these five, and Īśvarasena added the remaining four, so the Hetucakraḍamaru says: 'The meaning that contradicts them cannot be rejected,' the meaning is as previously stated. If according to the concluding sentences, or three can be listed: first, showing the violation of dharma; second, showing non-existence; and third, showing empty effort. This is the first part. There are two types of violating dharma: contradictory to one's own doctrine and contradictory to one's own statement. Only violating oneself is considered a fault, the remaining three, violating oneself and common acceptance are considered faults. Moreover, direct perception and inference violate the wisdom of the proponent and the opponent, one's own doctrine violates the basis of reliance, contradiction to common sense relies on ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and has no violation, relying on...
世俗而有犯。據世間之義立。違世間之理智。自語立論之法有體有義。體據義釋。立敵共同。后不順前。義不符體。標宗既已乖角能立何所順成。故此五違皆是過攝。
論。能別不極成所別不極成俱不極成。
述曰。若為二科。下隨今列。初三闕依。后一義順。若為三科。下顯非有。宗非兩許。依必共成。依若不成。宗依何立。且如四支無闕勝軍可成。眾支既虧勝軍寧立。故依非有宗義不成。
論。相符極成。
述曰。此顯虛功。對敵諍宗。本由理返。立宗順敵。虛棄已功。故亦過攝。
論。此中現量相違者如說聲非所聞。
述曰。自下第二隨列指法。同前科列。此中簡持。唯且明一。現量體者。立敵親證法自相智。以相成宗。本符智境。立宗已乖正智。令智那得會真。耳為現體彼此極成。聲為現得本來共許。今隨何宗所立。但言聲非所聞。便違立敵證智。故名現量相違。此有全分一分四句。全四句者。有違自現非他。如勝論師對大乘雲。同異大有。非五根得。彼宗自許現量得故。雖此亦有違教相符。今者但彰違自現量。有違他現非自。如佛弟子對勝論云。覺樂欲瞋非我現境。彼宗說為我現得故。雖有此自能別不成。今此但取違他現量。有違共現。謂論所陳。一切皆許聲所聞故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 世俗之人也會犯錯。依據世俗的道理立論，卻違背世間的理智。自己所說的立論方法，有其形式和意義，形式依據意義來解釋。立論者和辯論對手有共同之處，後面的論述不能與前面的相符，意義不能符合形式。如果標明的宗旨已經乖離，那麼所要成立的論點又怎麼能順理成章呢？因此，這五種違背都是過失。
論：能別（區分事物的特性）不極成（未被充分證明），所別（被區分的事物）不極成，或者兩者都不極成。
述：如果分為兩類，下面就按照現在的排列。前三種情況缺乏依據，后一種情況意義順暢。如果分為三類，下面會說明並非如此。宗（論點）並非雙方都認可，依據必須是共同成立的。如果依據不能成立，那麼宗又如何立足呢？就像軍隊缺少四個支柱，即使有強大的軍隊也無法成功。各個支柱都缺失了，強大的軍隊又怎麼能建立呢？所以，依據不存在，宗的意義也就不能成立。
論：與雙方都認可的相符。
述：這顯示了虛假的功勞。與辯論對手爭論宗，本來是因為道理被駁倒。如果立宗順應辯論對手，那就是白白放棄了自己的功勞，所以也屬於過失。
論：這裡，與現量（直接經驗）相違背的例子，比如聲不是所能聽到的。
述：下面第二部分，按照排列順序指出方法，與前面的分類相同。這裡進行簡要的說明，只明確說明一種情況。現量的本體，是立論者和辯論對手親自證實的法的自相智（認識事物自身性質的智慧）。用它來成立宗，本來是符合智慧的境界的。如果立宗已經違背了正確的智慧，那麼智慧又怎麼能符合真理呢？耳朵是現量的本體，這是雙方都認可的。聲音是現量所獲得的，本來也是雙方都認可的。現在無論按照哪個宗派所立的論點，只要說聲音不是所能聽到的，就違背了立論者和辯論對手的證實智慧，所以叫做現量相違。這種情況有全部、部分和四種情況。全部四種情況是：有違背自己的現量，但不違揹他人的。比如勝論師（Vaisheshika）對大乘（Mahayana）說，同異（事物之間的相同和不同）非常大，不是五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）所能獲得的。因為他們自己承認現量可以獲得。雖然這種情況也有違背教義相符的情況，但現在只說明違背自己的現量。有違揹他人的現量，但不違背自己的。比如佛弟子對勝論師說，覺（感覺）、樂（快樂）、欲（慾望）、瞋（嗔恨）不是我的現量境界。因為他們說這些是我現量所能獲得的。雖然這種情況有自己能夠區分但不能成立的情況，但現在只取違揹他人現量的情況。有違背共同現量的情況，就像論中所陳述的，所有人都承認聲音是可以聽到的。
【English Translation】 English version Even worldly people make mistakes. To establish a theory based on worldly principles, yet violate worldly reason and intellect. The method of establishing arguments that one speaks of has its form and meaning, with the form explained according to the meaning. The proponent and the opponent have common ground, but the subsequent arguments cannot be consistent with the preceding ones, and the meaning cannot conform to the form. If the stated purpose has already deviated, then how can the argument to be established be logically consistent? Therefore, these five contradictions are all faults.
Argument: The distinguisher (characteristic that distinguishes things) is not fully proven, the distinguished (the thing being distinguished) is not fully proven, or neither is fully proven.
Commentary: If divided into two categories, the following will be listed accordingly. The first three cases lack a basis, and the last case has a smooth meaning. If divided into three categories, it will be shown below that this is not the case. The thesis (proposition) is not agreed upon by both parties, and the basis must be mutually established. If the basis cannot be established, then how can the thesis stand? Just as a army lacking four pillars, even a strong army cannot succeed. With all the pillars missing, how can a strong army be established? Therefore, if the basis does not exist, the meaning of the thesis cannot be established.
Argument: Conforms to what is fully proven by both parties.
Commentary: This shows false merit. Arguing with an opponent about the thesis is originally due to the principle being refuted. If establishing the thesis conforms to the opponent, it is a waste of one's own merit, so it is also considered a fault.
Argument: Here, an example of contradiction with direct perception (pratyaksha) is saying that sound is not something that can be heard.
Commentary: In the second part below, the methods are pointed out in order of arrangement, the same as the previous classification. Here, a brief explanation is given, only clarifying one situation. The essence of direct perception is the self-nature wisdom (svalakshana-jnana) of the dharma (phenomena) that the proponent and opponent personally verify. Using it to establish the thesis originally conforms to the realm of wisdom. If establishing the thesis has already violated correct wisdom, then how can wisdom conform to the truth? The ear is the essence of direct perception, which is agreed upon by both parties. Sound is what is obtained by direct perception, which is originally agreed upon by both parties. Now, no matter which school's thesis is established, as long as it says that sound is not something that can be heard, it violates the verifying wisdom of the proponent and opponent, so it is called contradiction with direct perception. This situation has whole, part, and four possibilities. The whole four possibilities are: there is contradiction with one's own direct perception, but not with others'. For example, the Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika) says to the Mahayana (Mahayana), that sameness and difference (between things) are very large and cannot be obtained by the five senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body). Because they themselves admit that direct perception can obtain it. Although this situation also has conformity with contradiction of doctrine, now only contradiction with one's own direct perception is explained. There is contradiction with others' direct perception, but not with one's own. For example, a Buddhist disciple says to the Vaisheshika, that feeling (vedana), pleasure (sukha), desire (kama), and anger (krodha) are not my direct perception realm. Because they say that these are what my direct perception can obtain. Although this situation has the ability to distinguish but cannot be established, now only the situation of contradicting others' direct perception is taken. There is contradiction with common direct perception, just as stated in the treatise, everyone admits that sound can be heard.
。雖此亦有違教世間。今者但取違共現量。有俱不違。如前所說聲是無常。一分四句者。有違自一分現非他。如勝論立一切四大。非眼根境。彼說風大及三極微非眼根得。三粗可得。今說一切。違自一分。雖此亦有違教等失。今取違現。有違他一分現非自。如佛弟子對勝論云。地水火三非眼所見。彼說粗三是眼所見。極微非見。故違一分。有俱違一分現。如勝論師對佛弟子立色香味皆非眼見。唯色眼見。彼此共知。余皆非見。名違共一分。雖此亦有一分違自教世間相符。今者但取俱違一分。俱不違一分者。如佛弟子對數論云。自性我體。皆轉變無常。雖違彼教。非現量故。此二四句中。違他及俱不違。並非過攝。立宗本欲違害他故。違他非過。況俱不違。違自及共皆是過收。現比量等立義之具。今既違之。無所準憑。依何立義。論中指法。依共全違。例余諸句。令皆準悉。此初示法略顯方隅。下陳過中非無餘過。既止繁議皆應準解。
論。比量相違者如說瓶等是常。
述曰。比量體者謂證敵者。籍立論主。能立眾相而觀義智。宗因相順。他智順生。宗既違因。他智返起故所立宗名比量相違。此中意言。彼此共悉瓶所作性。決定無常。今立為常。宗既違因。令義乖返。義乖返故。他智異生。由此宗過名比量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：雖然這些也存在與教義和世俗認知相悖的情況，但現在只取與共同現量相違背的情況。存在既不相違背的情況，如前面所說的『聲音是無常』。一部分四句式是：存在與自己一部分現量相違背，但不與他人相違背的情況，例如勝論派主張一切四大（地、水、火、風）都不是眼根的對境。他們認為風大和三個極微不是眼根可以感知的，而三個粗大的地、水、火是可以感知的。現在說一切四大都不是眼根的對境，這與自己的一部分現量相違背。雖然這也存在與教義等相悖的過失，但現在只取與現量相違背的情況。存在與他人一部分現量相違背，但不與自己相違背的情況，例如佛教弟子對勝論派說，地、水、火三種不是眼睛所能見到的。勝論派認為粗大的三種是眼睛所能見到的，極微是不能見到的，所以這與他人的一部分現量相違背。存在與共同一部分現量相違背的情況，例如勝論師對佛教弟子主張色、香、味都不是眼睛所能見到的，只有顏色是眼睛能見到的。這是彼此都知道的，其餘的都不是眼睛能見到的，這叫做與共同一部分現量相違背。雖然這也存在一部分與自己的教義相符，與世俗認知相符的情況，但現在只取與共同相違背的部分。既不與一部分相違背的情況，例如佛教弟子對數論派說，自性（Prakrti）和神我（Purusha）的本體，都是轉變無常的。雖然這與他們的教義相違背，但不是與現量相違背。這兩種四句式中，與他人相違背以及既不相違背，都不屬於過失的範疇，因為立宗的根本目的就是要反駁他人，所以與他人相違背不是過失，更何況既不相違背。與自己相違背以及與共同相違背，都屬於過失的範疇。現量、比量等是確立論義的工具，現在既然與它們相違背，就沒有什麼可以作為依據了，依靠什麼來確立論義呢？論中指出的方法，是依據與共同完全相違背的情況，以此為例，其餘的各種情況都應該參照理解。這最初揭示的方法只是略微顯示了方向，下面陳述的過失中並非沒有其他的過失，既然停止了繁瑣的討論，都應該參照理解。 論：比量相違，例如說瓶子等是常住的。 述曰：比量的本體，是指爲了論證對方，憑藉立論者所建立的各種論證方式，而觀察義理的智慧。宗（命題）和因（理由）相互順應，他人的智慧也隨之產生。如果宗與因相違背，他人的智慧就會反過來產生，所以所立的宗就叫做比量相違。這裡的意思是說，彼此都知道瓶子的所作性決定是無常的，現在卻主張它是常住的。宗既然與因相違背，就會導致義理的乖謬和反駁。因為義理的乖謬和反駁，他人的智慧就會產生不同的看法，因此這種宗的過失叫做比量相違。
【English Translation】 English version: Although there are instances where these also contradict the teachings and worldly perceptions, we now only consider contradictions to commonly perceived reality. There are instances where there is no contradiction, as previously stated, 'Sound is impermanent.' One type of fourfold statement is: there are contradictions to one's own perceived reality but not to others. For example, the Vaisheshika school asserts that all four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) are not objects of the eye sense. They say that the wind element and the three atoms are not perceivable by the eye sense, while the three gross elements (earth, water, and fire) are perceivable. Now, stating that all four great elements are not objects of the eye sense contradicts one's own perceived reality. Although this also has faults such as contradicting the teachings, we now only consider contradictions to perceived reality. There are contradictions to others' perceived reality but not to one's own. For example, Buddhist disciples say to the Vaisheshika school that earth, water, and fire are not seen by the eye. The Vaisheshika school believes that the gross three are seen by the eye, while the atoms are not seen, thus contradicting others' perceived reality. There are contradictions to commonly perceived reality. For example, the Vaisheshika teachers assert to the Buddhist disciples that color, smell, and taste are not seen by the eye, only color is seen by the eye. This is commonly known, and the rest are not seen, which is called contradicting commonly perceived reality. Although there are instances where a part of this aligns with one's own teachings and worldly perceptions, we now only consider the part that contradicts commonly perceived reality. There are instances where there is no contradiction to a part, such as Buddhist disciples saying to the Samkhya school that the nature (Prakrti) and the self (Purusha) are both changing and impermanent. Although this contradicts their teachings, it does not contradict perceived reality. In these two fourfold statements, contradicting others and not contradicting at all are not considered faults, because the fundamental purpose of establishing a thesis is to refute others. Therefore, contradicting others is not a fault, let alone not contradicting at all. Contradicting oneself and contradicting commonly held beliefs are considered faults. Perceived reality, inference, etc., are tools for establishing arguments. Now, since we contradict them, there is nothing to rely on. What can we rely on to establish arguments? The method pointed out in the treatise is based on complete contradiction to commonly held beliefs. Using this as an example, all other situations should be understood accordingly. This initial revelation of the method only slightly shows the direction. The faults stated below are not without other faults. Since the tedious discussions have stopped, everything should be understood accordingly. Treatise: Contradiction to inference is like saying that a pot, etc., is permanent. Commentary: The essence of inference refers to the wisdom that observes the meaning by relying on the various means of proof established by the proponent in order to argue against the opponent. The thesis (proposition) and the reason (cause) are mutually consistent, and the wisdom of others arises accordingly. If the thesis contradicts the reason, the wisdom of others will arise in reverse. Therefore, the established thesis is called contradiction to inference. The meaning here is that everyone knows that the produced nature of a pot is definitely impermanent, but now it is asserted to be permanent. Since the thesis contradicts the reason, it leads to the perversion and refutation of the meaning. Because of the perversion and refutation of the meaning, the wisdom of others will generate different views. Therefore, this fault of the thesis is called contradiction to inference.
相違。亦有全分一分四句。全分四句者。有違自比非他。如勝論師立和合句義非實有體。彼宗自許比知有故。有違他比非自。如小乘者對大乘立。第七末那定非實有。大乘除佛比量知有。如眼根等為六依故。有違共比。即論所陳。彼此比知瓶無常故。一分四句者。有違自一分比非他。如勝論師對佛法雲。我六句義皆非實有。彼說前五現量所得。和合一句比量知故。有違他一分比非自。如大乘者對一切有。說十色處定非實有。彼說五根。除佛已外。皆比得故。有違共一分比。如明論師對佛法者。立一切聲是常。彼宗自說明論聲常可成宗義。除此餘聲。彼此皆說體是無常。故成一分。或是他全自宗一分。其違比量同前現量。全及一分。皆有俱不違。易故不述。下皆準知。違自及共可此過收。違他非過。若俱不違。或非此過。有相符失。立量本欲違他比故。論中指法。依共全違。余準知爾。此中但明宗法自相比量相違。準因亦有法之差別。有法自相。有法差別比量相違。因違宗喻既有四失。宗違因喻理亦有四。恐文繁憒。所以略之。至相違決定。廣當顯示。
論。自教相違者如勝論師立聲為常。
述曰。自教有二。一若立所師對他異學自宗承教。二若不顧立隨所成教。今此但舉自宗承教。對他異學。凡所競理。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相違。也有全分相違和一分相違四種情況。全分四句是：有違背自己的比量而非他人的比量。例如，勝論師（Vaisheshika）立『和合』（samavaya，整體和部分之間的關係）句義不是真實存在的實體，因為他們自己的宗派承認可以通過比量認知到它。有違揹他人的比量而非自己的比量。例如，小乘（Hinayana）論者對大乘（Mahayana）論者立論說，第七末那識（manas，意識的根本）決定不是真實存在的。大乘認為，除了佛陀之外，可以通過比量認知到它，就像眼根等是六識的所依一樣。有違背共同的比量，即論中所陳述的，彼此都通過比量認知到瓶子是無常的。一分四句是：有違背自己一部分的比量而非他人的比量。例如，勝論師對佛法說，我的六句義都不是真實存在的。他們說，前五句是通過現量所得，而『和合』一句是通過比量認知到的。有違揹他人一部分的比量而非自己的比量。例如，大乘論者對一切有部（Sarvastivada）說，十色處（dasarupa-ayatana，十種色法）決定不是真實存在的。他們說，五根（pancha-indriya，五種感覺器官），除了佛陀之外，都可以通過比量獲得認知。有違背共同一部分的比量，例如，聲明論者對佛法論者立論說，一切聲音是常。他們宗派自己聲明，聲明論的聲音是常，可以成立宗義。除了這個聲音之外，彼此都說其體是無常的，所以構成一部分相違。或者，是他人全分，自己宗派一部分。這種違背比量的情況與前面現量的情況相同。全分和一分，都有俱不違的情況，因為容易理解，所以不詳細敘述。以下情況都可以類推得知。違背自己和共同的比量可以歸為此過失。違揹他人的比量不是過失。如果都不違背，或者不是此過失。有相符失，因為立量本來就是想要違揹他人的比量。論中指出的法，是依據共同的全分相違。其餘情況可以類推得知。這裡只說明宗法自相和比量相違。依據因也有法的差別，有法自相，有法差別比量相違。因違背宗和喻已經有四種過失，宗違背因和喻在道理上也有四種過失，恐怕文字繁瑣，所以省略了。到相違決定時，會詳細說明。
論：自教相違，例如勝論師立聲為常。
述曰：自教有兩種。一種是如果立宗者所師承的，是對他人的異學，是自己宗派所承教的。另一種是不顧立宗者所立的，是隨所成就的教義。現在這裡只舉自宗承教，對他人異學，凡是所爭論的道理。
【English Translation】 English version Contradiction. There are also four cases of complete and partial contradiction. The four cases of complete contradiction are: contradicting one's own inference but not another's. For example, the Vaisheshika (school) posits that the category of 'inherence' (samavaya, the relationship between a whole and its parts) is not a real entity, because their own school admits that it can be known through inference. Contradicting another's inference but not one's own. For example, a Hinayana (Theravada) proponent argues against a Mahayana proponent that the seventh consciousness, manas (the root of consciousness), is definitely not real. Mahayana believes that, except for the Buddha, it can be known through inference, just as the eye faculty and others are the basis of the six consciousnesses. Contradicting a common inference, as stated in the treatise, both sides recognize through inference that a pot is impermanent. The four cases of partial contradiction are: contradicting a part of one's own inference but not another's. For example, the Vaisheshika says to the Buddhist Dharma, 'None of my six categories are real.' They say that the first five are obtained through direct perception, while the category of 'inherence' is known through inference. Contradicting a part of another's inference but not one's own. For example, a Mahayana proponent says to the Sarvastivada (school), 'The ten sense-fields of form (dasarupa-ayatana, ten kinds of material phenomena) are definitely not real.' They say that the five sense faculties (pancha-indriya, five sense organs), except for the Buddha, can all be known through inference. Contradicting a common part of an inference, for example, a proponent of sound argues to a Buddhist Dharma proponent that all sounds are permanent. Their own school declares that the sound in their own system is permanent, and this proposition can be established. Apart from this sound, both sides say that its substance is impermanent, thus constituting a partial contradiction. Alternatively, it is the entirety for others but a part for one's own school. This contradiction of inference is the same as the previous case of direct perception. Both complete and partial cases have situations where there is no contradiction, and because they are easy to understand, they are not described in detail. The following cases can be understood by analogy. Contradicting oneself and a common inference can be classified as this fault. Contradicting another is not a fault. If there is no contradiction at all, or it is not this fault. There is a fault of agreement, because the purpose of establishing an inference is originally to contradict another's inference. The Dharma pointed out in the treatise is based on a common complete contradiction. The remaining cases can be understood by analogy. Here, only the contradiction between the self-nature of the subject-property (dharma) and the inference is explained. According to the difference in the property (dharma) of the reason (hetu), there is the self-nature of the property and the difference in the property contradicting the inference. Since the reason contradicting the thesis and example already has four faults, the thesis contradicting the reason and example also has four faults in principle. Fearing that the text would be cumbersome, it has been omitted. It will be explained in detail when the contradiction is determined.
Treatise: Self-doctrine contradiction, for example, the Vaisheshika posits that sound is permanent.
Commentary: There are two kinds of self-doctrine. One is if what the founder of the school relies on is a different school of others, it is the doctrine accepted by one's own school. The other is regardless of what the founder of the school establishes, it is the doctrine that is accomplished. Now, this only cites the doctrine accepted by one's own school, against other schools, regarding all the principles that are disputed.
必有據憑。義既乖于自宗。所競何有憑據。亦有全分一分四句。全四句者。有違自教非他。如論說是。有違他教非自。如佛弟子對聲論師立聲無常。有違共教如勝論師對佛弟子立聲為常。一分四句者。有違自一分教非他。如化地部對薩婆多。立三世非有。違自所宗現世有故。有違他一分教非自。如化地部對大乘師。立九無為皆有實體。違大乘師。除真如外無實體故。有違共一分教。如經部師對一切有。立色處色皆非實有。粗微非實。可對成宗。彼宗共許極微實有。違共一分。或違他全自成一分。上二四句唯違他句。非是過攝。違自及共皆是過收。理如前說。雖共違教亦是過收。但取一分違自為失。故論但說自教相違。引自為證。他未信從。能立之法。必極成故。對敵申宗。必乖競故。違自憑據即便為失。毀背所師無宗稟故。若俱不違。雖非此過。必有相符極成之失。
論。世間相違者如說懷兔非月有故又如說言人頂骨凈眾生分故猶如螺貝。
述曰。可破壞義。有遷流義名世也。墮世中故名間。大般若云。是世間出。故名世間。造世間故由世間故。為世間故。因世間故屬世間故。依世間故名為世間。廣如第五百卷說此有二種。一非學世間。除諸學者。所餘世間所共許法。二學者世間。即諸聖者所知粗法。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 必須要有依據。如果意義違背了自己的宗義，那麼所爭論的又有什麼依據呢？也有全分、一分四句的說法。全四句是指：有違背自己教義而非其他教義的，例如論師的說法；有違背其他教義而非自己教義的，例如佛弟子對聲論師立論說聲音是無常的；有違背共同教義的，例如勝論師對佛弟子立論說聲音是常的。一分四句是指：有違背自己一分教義而非其他教義的，例如化地部對薩婆多部立論說三世非有，違背了自己宗派認為現世是有的觀點；有違揹他人一分教義而非自己教義的，例如化地部對大乘師立論說九無為皆有實體，違背了大乘師認為除了真如外沒有實體的觀點；有違背共同一分教義的，例如經部師對一切有部立論說色處色都不是實有，粗微都不是真實的，可以用來對治成實宗，因為成實宗共同承認極微是實有的，這違背了共同的一分教義。或者違揹他人全部而自己成為一分。以上兩種四句都只是違揹他人的觀點，不屬於過失的範疇。違背自己和共同的觀點都屬於過失的範疇，道理如前所述。即使是共同違背的教義也屬於過失的範疇，但只取違背自己一分的作為過失，所以論中只說與自己教義相違背，引用自己的教義作為證據。他人不相信，能成立的法，必定是極其確定的。針對敵方申述自己的宗義，必定會違背爭論的焦點。違背自己的依據，就成為過失，因為毀壞背離了老師，沒有宗義可以稟承。如果都不違背，即使不是這種過失，也必定有相互符合極其確定的過失。
論：與世間常識相違背的，例如說懷裡揣著兔子是因為月亮沒有的緣故，又例如說人的頭頂骨是清凈的，是因為屬於眾生的緣故，就像螺貝一樣。
述曰：可以被破壞的意義，有遷流變化的意義，叫做『世』（世，Kala）。墮落在世間中的緣故，叫做『間』（間，Antara）。《大般若經》說：『從世間出，所以叫做世間。』創造世間，由於世間，爲了世間，因為世間，屬於世間，依靠世間，所以叫做世間。詳細內容如第五百卷所說。這有兩種：一是非學世間，除了學習者之外，其餘世間所共同認可的法則；二是學者世間，也就是聖者所知道的粗淺法則。如果
【English Translation】 English version There must be a basis. If the meaning deviates from one's own doctrine (自宗, zizong), what basis is there for the contention? There are also four possibilities: whole and part. 'Whole' refers to four possibilities: contradicting one's own teachings but not others, such as in the arguments of debaters; contradicting others' teachings but not one's own, such as when a Buddhist disciple argues with a Sound theorist (聲論師, shenglunshi) that sound is impermanent; contradicting common teachings, such as when a Vaisheshika (勝論師, shenglunshi) argues with a Buddhist disciple that sound is permanent. 'Part' refers to four possibilities: contradicting a part of one's own teachings but not others, such as when the Dharmaguptaka (化地部, huadibu) argues against the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多, saboduo) that the three times (三世, sanshi) do not exist, contradicting their own doctrine that the present exists; contradicting a part of others' teachings but not one's own, such as when the Dharmaguptaka argues against the Mahayana (大乘, dacheng) masters that the nine unconditioned dharmas (九無為, jiuwuwei) all have substance, contradicting the Mahayana masters who believe that only Suchness (真如, zhenru) has substance; contradicting a part of common teachings, such as when the Sautrantikas (經部師, jingbushi) argue against the Sarvastivadins that the sense-spheres (色處, sechu) and colors (色, se) are not real, neither gross nor subtle, which can be used to counter the Tattvasiddhi School (成宗, chengzong), as they commonly accept that ultimate particles (極微, jiwei) are real, thus contradicting a part of common teachings. Or contradicting others entirely while one's own becomes a part. The above two sets of four possibilities only contradict others' views and are not considered faults. Contradicting oneself and common views are both considered faults, as explained earlier. Even commonly contradicted teachings are considered faults, but only contradicting a part of oneself is taken as a mistake. Therefore, the treatise only discusses contradictions with one's own teachings, citing one's own teachings as evidence. If others do not believe it, the dharma that can be established must be extremely certain. When stating one's doctrine against an opponent, it will inevitably deviate from the focus of the debate. Contradicting one's own basis becomes a fault because it destroys and turns away from the teacher, leaving no doctrine to rely on. If there are no contradictions, although it is not this fault, there must be the fault of being too similar and extremely certain.
Treatise: Contradicting worldly conventions, such as saying that one carries a rabbit in one's bosom because the moon does not exist, or saying that the skull of a human head is pure because it belongs to sentient beings, like a conch shell.
Commentary: The meaning that can be destroyed, the meaning of flowing and changing, is called 'world' (世, Kala). Because it falls within the world, it is called 'between' (間, Antara). The Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (大般若經, Dabanruo Jing) says: 'It comes from the world, therefore it is called the world.' Creating the world, because of the world, for the sake of the world, due to the world, belonging to the world, relying on the world, therefore it is called the world. The details are as described in the five hundredth volume. There are two types: one is the non-learning world, which refers to the laws commonly accepted by the rest of the world except for the learners; the other is the learning world, which refers to the crude laws known by the sages. If
深妙法便非世間。初非學世間者。即此所言月是懷兔。人頂骨不凈。一切共知月有兔故。說此因緣。如西域記。世間共知死人頂骨為不凈故。若諸外道對佛弟子。有法不簡擇。但總說言懷兔非月。以有體故。如日星等。雖因喻正。宗違世間。故名為過。然論但有宗因無喻。理門論云。又若於中由不共故。無有比量。為極成言相違義遣。如說懷兔非月有故彼言意顯以不共世間所共有知故。無有道理可成比量。令余不信者。信懷兔非月。是故為過。正與此同此論又言。如迦波離外道。此名結鬘穿人髑髏。以為鬘飾。人有誚者。遂立量言。人頂骨凈宗。眾生分故因。猶如螺貝喻。能立因喻雖無有過。宗違世間共為不凈。是故為失。此二皆是非學世間。但有違共。無自他等。文唯說全。理亦應有一分違者。若有合說懷兔非日月。唯月一分違共世間。日不違故。問且如大師。周遊西域。學滿將還。時戒日王。王五印度。為設十八日無遮大會。令大師立義遍諸天竺。簡選賢良皆集會所。遣外道小乘。競申論詰。大師立量。時人無敢對揚者。大師立唯識比量云。真故極成色不離於眼識宗。自許初三攝眼所不攝故因。猶如眼識喻。何故不犯世間相違。世間共說色離識故。答凡因明法。所能立中。若有簡別。便無過失。若自比量。以許言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 深奧微妙的佛法並非世俗之理。最初就不是爲了迎合世俗之人而設立的。就像世人常說『月亮里有兔子』（懷兔：古代認為月亮中有兔子的說法），以及『人的頭蓋骨是不潔凈的』一樣，這些都是世人皆知的常識。之所以要說這些因緣，就像《西域記》中記載的那樣，世間普遍認為死人的頭蓋骨是不潔凈的。如果某些外道反駁佛弟子，對於佛法不加分辨，只是籠統地說『懷兔不是月亮』，因為月亮是有實體的，就像太陽和星星一樣。雖然從比喻的角度來說是正確的，但從根本上違背了世俗的認知，所以這是一種過失。然而，辯論中只有論點和理由，而沒有比喻，就像《理門論》中說的那樣：『如果因為不共通的原因，就無法進行比量，這就會導致與普遍接受的觀點相違背。』例如，如果有人說『懷兔不是月亮，因為它具有實體』，這句話的意思很明顯，因為它不被世人所普遍接受，所以無法成立比量，無法讓那些不相信的人相信『懷兔不是月亮』，因此這是一種過失。這與上述情況是相同的。此論又說，例如迦波離外道（Kapalika），這個名字的意思是『結鬘者』，他們用人的頭蓋骨穿成項鍊作為裝飾。有人嘲笑他們，於是他們就提出了一個論點：『人的頭蓋骨是潔凈的（宗），因為它是眾生的一部分（因），就像螺貝一樣（喻）。』雖然這個論點和比喻本身沒有過失，但從根本上違背了世俗的認知，因為世人都認為頭蓋骨是不潔凈的，所以這是一種過失。這兩種情況都是不迎合世俗的例子，只是違背了普遍的認知，而沒有涉及到自相矛盾或他相矛盾等情況。文中所說的只是完全違背的情況，但從道理上來說，也應該存在一部分違背的情況。例如，如果有人籠統地說『懷兔不是日月』，那麼只有月亮這一部分違背了世俗的認知，而太陽並沒有違背。問：那麼，像玄奘大師（大師：指玄奘）周遊西域，學成歸來時，當時的戒日王（Śīlāditya），統治著五印度，為玄奘大師設立了十八天的無遮大會（ सर्ववादिविजय，Sarvavadivijaya，一種公開辯論的集會），讓玄奘大師在整個天竺（印度古稱）闡述佛法，選拔賢良之士。玄奘大師派遣外道和小乘佛教徒，互相辯論詰難。玄奘大師提出了一個論點，當時沒有人敢於反駁。玄奘大師提出了一個唯識宗的比量：『真實的、被普遍認可的色法（Rūpa，物質現象）不離於眼識（宗），因為它不被自許的最初三個識所包含（因），就像眼識一樣（喻）。』為什麼這不犯世間相違的過失呢？因為世間普遍認為色法是獨立於識的。答：凡是因明（Hetuvidya，古印度邏輯學）的法則，在所要建立的論點中，如果有所區分，就不會有過失。如果是自比量，以允許的言辭來說明，
【English Translation】 English version The profound and subtle Dharma is not of this world. It is not initially intended for those who are worldly. It is like saying 'there is a rabbit in the moon' (懷兔, Huái tù: an ancient belief that there is a rabbit in the moon), and 'a human skull is impure,' which are common knowledge in the world. The reason for mentioning these causes and conditions is like what is recorded in the Records of the Western Regions (西域記, Xīyù jì): the world generally considers the skull of a dead person to be impure. If certain non-Buddhist schools (外道, wàidào) refute Buddhist disciples without distinguishing the Dharma, but simply say 'the rabbit in the moon is not the moon' because the moon has substance, like the sun and stars, although it is correct from the perspective of analogy, it fundamentally violates worldly knowledge, so it is a fault. However, in an argument, if there is only a thesis and a reason, but no example, as stated in the Nyāyamukha (理門論, Lǐ mén lùn): 'If, due to a non-common reason, a syllogism cannot be established, it leads to contradiction with universally accepted views.' For example, if someone says 'the rabbit in the moon is not the moon because it has substance,' the meaning of this statement is clear: because it is not universally accepted by the world, a syllogism cannot be established to convince those who do not believe that 'the rabbit in the moon is not the moon,' therefore it is a fault. This is the same as the above situation. This treatise also says, for example, the Kāpālika (迦波離, Jiā bō lí) heretics, whose name means 'garland wearers,' adorn themselves with necklaces made of human skulls. When someone mocks them, they propose an argument: 'The human skull is pure (thesis) because it is a part of living beings (reason), like conch shells (example).' Although this argument and example themselves have no faults, they fundamentally violate worldly knowledge because the world generally considers skulls to be impure, so it is a fault. Both of these cases are examples of not catering to the world, only violating common knowledge, without involving self-contradiction or other-contradiction. What is said in the text is only a complete violation, but in principle, there should also be a partial violation. For example, if someone generally says 'the rabbit in the moon is not the sun or the moon,' then only the moon part violates worldly knowledge, while the sun does not. Question: Then, when the Great Master Xuanzang (大師, Dàshī: referring to Xuanzang) traveled to the Western Regions, and upon his return after completing his studies, King Śīlāditya (戒日王, Jiè rì wáng), who ruled the five Indias, established an eighteen-day Sarvavadivijaya (無遮大會, Wú zhē dà huì: a public debate assembly) for the Great Master Xuanzang, allowing the Great Master to expound the Dharma throughout India (天竺, Tiānzhú), and select virtuous and talented individuals. The Great Master Xuanzang sent non-Buddhists and Theravada Buddhists to debate and challenge each other. The Great Master Xuanzang proposed an argument, and no one dared to refute it at that time. The Great Master Xuanzang proposed a Yogācāra (唯識宗, Wéishì zōng) syllogism: 'Real and universally recognized form (Rūpa, 色法) is not separate from eye-consciousness (thesis) because it is not included in the initially admitted three consciousnesses (reason), like eye-consciousness (example).' Why does this not commit the fault of contradicting worldly knowledge? Because the world generally believes that form is independent of consciousness. Answer: In the laws of Hetuvidya (因明, Yīnmíng: ancient Indian logic), if there is a distinction in the thesis to be established, there will be no fault. If it is a self-syllogism, explaining it with permissible words,
簡。顯自許之無他隨一等過。若他比量。汝執等言簡。無違宗等失。若共比量等。以勝義言簡。無違世間自教等失。隨其所應。各有標簡。此比量中。有所簡別。故無諸過。有法言真。明依勝義。不依世俗。故無違于非學世間。又顯依大乘殊勝義立。非依小乘。亦無違于阿含等教色離識有。亦無違于小乘學者世間之失。極成之言。簡諸小乘後身菩薩染污諸色。一切佛身有漏諸色。若立為唯識。便有一分自所別不成。亦有一分違宗之失。十方佛色及佛無漏色。他不許有。立為唯識有他一分所別不成。其此二因。皆有隨一一分所依不成。說極成言為簡於此。立二所餘共許諸色為唯識故。因云初三攝者。顯十八界六三之中初三所攝。不爾便有不定。違宗。謂若不言初三所攝。但言眼所不攝故。便有不定言。極成之色為如眼識眼所不攝故。定不離眼識。為如五三眼所不攝故。極成之色定離眼識。若許五三眼所不攝故。亦不離眼識。便違自宗。為簡此過言初三攝。其眼所不攝言。亦簡不定及法自相決定相違。謂若不言眼所不攝。但言初三所攝故。作不定言。極成之色。為如眼識。初三攝故定不離眼識。為如眼根。初三攝故非定不離眼識。由大乘師說彼眼根。非定一向說離眼識。故此不定云非定不離眼識。不得說言定離眼識。作法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 簡要地說，（這個論證）表明自身沒有其他任何隨一等過失。（如果）使用他比量（parārthānumāna，為他人建立的推理），你所執持的『等』字是簡要的，沒有違背宗義等過失。（如果）使用共比量等，以勝義（paramārtha，究竟真實）的『言簡』，沒有違背世間（loka，世界）、自教（svasiddhānta，自宗）等過失。根據具體情況，各有標明簡要之處。這個比量中，有所簡別，所以沒有各種過失。 『有法言真』，表明依據勝義，不依據世俗（saṃvṛti，相對真實），所以沒有違背非學世間（aśaikṣa-loka，未受過訓練的世間）。又表明依據大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘佛教）殊勝義理而建立，不是依據小乘（Hīnayāna，小乘佛教），也沒有違背阿含（Āgama，早期佛教經典）等教義中色（rūpa，物質）與識（vijñāna，意識）分離的觀點，也沒有違背小乘學者世間的過失。 『極成之言』，簡別了小乘後身菩薩（bodhisattva，菩薩）染污的各種色，以及一切佛身（buddhakāya，佛的身）的有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的各種色。如果立為唯識（vijñānamātra，唯識論），便有一部分是自所別不成（svasādhāraṇāsiddha，自證不成），也有一部分是違背宗義的過失。十方佛（daśadigbuddha，十方世界的佛）的色以及佛的無漏色（anāsrava-rūpa，無煩惱的色），他人不承認有，立為唯識，有他人一部分所別不成（parā-sādhāraṇāsiddha，他證不成）。這兩種原因，都有隨一（ekatara，其中之一）部分所依不成（āśrayāsiddha，所依不成）。說『極成之言』是爲了簡別這些。 建立其餘共許的各種色為唯識的緣故，因（hetu，原因）中說『初三攝』，表明十八界（aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ，十八界）中六三（六根、六境、六識）之中的初三（眼、耳、鼻）所攝。不然便有不定（anaikāntika，不確定）和違宗（viruddha，矛盾）。如果不是說初三所攝，只說『眼所不攝故』，便有不定之言。極成的色，因為如眼識（cakṣurvijñāna，眼識）一樣眼所不攝，所以一定不離眼識；因為如五三（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）一樣眼所不攝，所以極成的色一定離開眼識。如果承認五三眼所不攝，也不離眼識，便違背自宗。爲了簡別這個過失，所以說『初三攝』。 『其眼所不攝言』，也簡別了不定以及法自相決定相違（svabhāva-viruddha，自性相違）。如果不是說『眼所不攝』，只說『初三所攝故』，就作出不定之言。極成的色，因為如眼識一樣初三攝故，一定不離眼識；因為如眼根（cakṣurindriya，眼根）一樣初三攝故，並非一定不離眼識。因為大乘師說那眼根，並非一定一向說離開眼識。所以這個不定之言『並非一定不離眼識』，不能說『一定離開眼識』，作為法（dharma，事物）。
【English Translation】 English version: Briefly, (this argument) shows that it has no other fallacies such as the fallacy of 'any one' (ekatara). If using parārthānumāna (inference for others), your held 'etc.' (ādi) word is concise, without fallacies such as contradicting the thesis (virodha). If using common inference (sādhāraṇa anumāna) etc., with the concise 'word' of paramārtha (ultimate truth), there are no fallacies such as contradicting the loka (world), svasiddhānta (own doctrine), etc. According to the specific situation, each has its marked conciseness. In this inference, there are distinctions, so there are no various fallacies. 'The statement that the subject exists' (dharmi-vacana) indicates that it is based on paramārtha, not based on saṃvṛti (conventional truth), so there is no contradiction with the aśaikṣa-loka (world of the uninitiated). It also indicates that it is established based on the superior meaning of Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), not based on Hīnayāna (Lesser Vehicle), and there is no contradiction with the view in the Āgama (early Buddhist scriptures) etc. that rūpa (matter) is separate from vijñāna (consciousness), nor is there a contradiction with the fallacies of the world of Hīnayāna scholars. 'The statement of extreme establishment' (atyanta-prasiddha) distinguishes the defiled rūpas of the bodhisattva (enlightenment being) in the later body of the Hīnayāna, and all the sāsrava (contaminated) rūpas of all the buddhakāyas (Buddha's bodies). If established as vijñānamātra (consciousness-only), then one part is svasādhāraṇāsiddha (unproven by oneself), and there is also a fallacy of contradicting the thesis. The rūpas of the daśadigbuddhas (Buddhas of the ten directions) and the anāsrava-rūpa (uncontaminated rūpa) of the Buddha, which others do not acknowledge, are established as vijñānamātra, and one part is parā-sādhāraṇāsiddha (unproven by others). These two reasons both have āśrayāsiddha (unestablished locus) in one part (ekatara). Saying 'the statement of extreme establishment' is to distinguish these. Because the remaining mutually acknowledged rūpas are established as vijñānamātra, the hetu (reason) says 'included in the first three' (prathama-traya-saṃgraha), indicating that it is included in the first three (eye, ear, nose) among the six threes (six sense organs, six sense objects, six consciousnesses) of the aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ (eighteen elements). Otherwise, there would be anaikāntika (uncertainty) and viruddha (contradiction). If it is not said that it is included in the first three, but only said 'because it is not apprehended by the eye', then there is an uncertain statement. The extremely established rūpa, because it is not apprehended by the eye like cakṣurvijñāna (eye consciousness), is certainly not separate from eye consciousness; because it is not apprehended by the eye like the five threes (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), the extremely established rūpa is certainly separate from eye consciousness. If it is acknowledged that the five threes are not apprehended by the eye, and it is also not separate from eye consciousness, then it contradicts one's own thesis. To distinguish this fallacy, it is said 'included in the first three'. 'The statement that it is not apprehended by the eye' also distinguishes uncertainty and svabhāva-viruddha (self-contradictory). If it is not said 'not apprehended by the eye', but only said 'because it is included in the first three', then an uncertain statement is made. The extremely established rūpa, because it is included in the first three like eye consciousness, is certainly not separate from eye consciousness; because it is included in the first three like cakṣurindriya (eye sense organ), it is not necessarily not separate from eye consciousness. Because the Mahāyāna masters say that the eye sense organ is not necessarily always said to be separate from eye consciousness. Therefore, this uncertain statement 'not necessarily not separate from eye consciousness' cannot be said to be 'certainly separate from eye consciousness', as a dharma (thing).
自相相違言。真故極成色非不離眼識。初三攝故。猶如眼根。由此復有決定相違。為簡此三過。故言眼所不攝故。若爾。何須自許言耶。為遮有法差別相違過。故言自許。非顯極成色。初三所攝。眼所不攝。他所不成。唯自所許。謂真故極成色。是有法自相。不離於眼識。是法自相。定離眼識色。非定離眼識色。是有法差別。立者意許是不離眼識色。外人遂作差別相違言。極成之色非是不離眼識色。初三所攝眼所不攝故。猶如眼識。為遮此過。故言自許。與彼比量作不定言。極成之色。為如眼識。初三所攝眼所不攝故。非不離眼識色。為如自許他方佛等色。初三所攝眼所不攝故。是不離眼識色。若因不言自許。即不得以他方佛色而為不定。此言便有隨一過故。汝立比量。既有此過。非真不定。凡顯他過。必自無過。成真能立必無似故。明前所立無有有法差別相違。故言自許。然有新羅順憬法師者。聲振唐蕃學苞大小。業崇迦葉。每稟行於杜多。心務薄俱。恒馳誡于小欲。既而蘊藝西夏。傳照東夷。名道日新。緇素欽挹。雖彼龍象不少。海外時稱獨步。於此比量作決定相違。干封之歲。寄請師釋云。真故極成色定離於眼識。自許初三攝眼識不攝故。猶如眼根。時為釋言。凡因明法。若自比量。宗因喻中皆須依自。他共亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『自相相違言』。真實且已被普遍認可的色法（Satya siddha rupa），並非不與眼識相分離，因為它被最初的三種色法所包含（初三攝故），就像眼根（眼等五根）。由此會產生確定的矛盾。爲了避免這三種過失，所以說『眼所不攝故』（不被眼根所包含）。如果這樣，為什麼需要『自許言』呢？爲了避免有法差別相違的過失，所以說『自許』。並非是爲了表明已被普遍認可的色法，被最初的三種色法所包含，不被眼根所包含，是他人所不能成立的，僅僅是自己所認可的，即真實且已被普遍認可的色法，是有法的自相，不離於眼識，是法（dharma）的自相，一定與眼識相分離的色法，並非一定與眼識相分離的色法，是有法的差別。立論者意圖認可它是不離眼識的色法，外人於是提出差別相違的說法：已被普遍認可的色法並非不離眼識，因為它被最初的三種色法所包含，不被眼根所包含，就像眼識。爲了避免這種過失，所以說『自許』。用那個比量作為不確定的說法：已被普遍認可的色法，就像眼識，因為它被最初的三種色法所包含，不被眼根所包含，並非不離眼識的色法；就像自己認可的，他方佛等色法，因為它被最初的三種色法所包含，不被眼根所包含，是不離眼識的色法。如果因（hetu）中沒有『自許』，就不能用他方佛的色法作為不確定。這個說法便有隨一過失。你所立的比量，既然有這種過失，就不是真正的不確定。凡是揭示他人的過失，自己必須沒有過失。成為真正的能立（sadhana），一定沒有相似之處。爲了表明前面所立的論證沒有有法差別相違，所以說『自許』。然而有新羅的順憬法師，聲名遠揚唐朝和吐蕃，學識淵博，精通大小乘佛教，致力於迦葉的修行方式，經常奉行頭陀行（dhuta），內心致力於減少慾望，經常告誡自己要減少小小的慾望。後來將佛法傳到西夏，又傳到東夷，名聲和道行日益增長，僧俗都敬佩他。即使那裡的龍象（指傑出的人）不少，海外也時常稱他為獨步。對於這個比量，他提出了確定的矛盾。干封年間，他寄信請教老師說：『真實且已被普遍認可的色法一定與眼識相分離，因為它被自己認可的最初三種色法所包含，不被眼識所包含，就像眼根。』當時為他解釋說：『凡是因明（hetuvidya）的方法，如果是自己的比量，宗（paksha）、因（hetu）、喻（dristanta）中都必須依據自己和他人都認可的。
【English Translation】 English version 『Self-contradictory statement.』 A true and well-established color (Satya siddha rupa), is not inseparable from eye-consciousness, because it is included in the first three types of color (prathama traya sangraha), just like the eye-organ (eye, etc., five organs). From this, a definite contradiction arises. To avoid these three faults, it is said 『eye-unperceived』 (not included by the eye-organ). If so, why is the term 『self-acknowledged』 needed? To avoid the fault of difference-contradiction of the subject (dharmin), it is said 『self-acknowledged.』 It is not to indicate that the well-established color, included in the first three types of color, unperceived by the eye-organ, cannot be established by others, but is only acknowledged by oneself, that is, the true and well-established color, is the self-nature of the subject, inseparable from eye-consciousness, is the self-nature of the dharma, a color that is definitely separate from eye-consciousness, a color that is not definitely separate from eye-consciousness, is the difference of the subject. The proponent intends to acknowledge that it is a color inseparable from eye-consciousness, and outsiders then propose the statement of difference-contradiction: the well-established color is not inseparable from eye-consciousness, because it is included in the first three types of color, unperceived by the eye-organ, just like eye-consciousness. To avoid this fault, it is said 『self-acknowledged.』 Use that inference as an uncertain statement: the well-established color, like eye-consciousness, because it is included in the first three types of color, unperceived by the eye-organ, is not inseparable from eye-consciousness; like the colors of Buddhas in other realms, which are self-acknowledged, because they are included in the first three types of color, unperceived by the eye-organ, is inseparable from eye-consciousness. If the reason (hetu) does not include 『self-acknowledged,』 then the colors of Buddhas in other realms cannot be used as uncertain. This statement then has the fault of being one-sided. Since the inference you established has this fault, it is not truly uncertain. Whoever reveals the faults of others must be without faults themselves. To become a true means of proof (sadhana), there must be no similarity. To show that the previously established argument has no difference-contradiction of the subject, it is said 『self-acknowledged.』 However, there was the Dharma Master Sun-gyeong of Silla, whose reputation spread far and wide in the Tang Dynasty and Tibet, whose learning was profound, mastering both Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism, who was dedicated to the practices of Kashyapa, who frequently practiced asceticism (dhuta), whose mind was devoted to reducing desires, and who constantly admonished himself to reduce even small desires. Later, he transmitted Buddhism to Xixia, and then to Dongyi, his fame and virtue grew day by day, and both monks and laypeople admired him. Even though there were many outstanding individuals (dragons and elephants) there, he was often called unparalleled overseas. Regarding this inference, he raised a definite contradiction. During the Ganfeng era, he sent a letter to his teacher asking: 『The true and well-established color is definitely separate from eye-consciousness, because it is included in the first three types of color that are self-acknowledged, unperceived by eye-consciousness, just like the eye-organ.』 At that time, it was explained to him: 『In the method of Hetuvidya (logic), if it is one's own inference, the subject (paksha), reason (hetu), and example (dristanta) must all be based on what is acknowledged by both oneself and others.』
爾。立依自他共。敵對亦須然。名善因明無疏謬矣。前云唯識。依共比量。今依自立。即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論。立聲無常。所作性故。譬如瓶等。聲生論言聲是其常。所聞性故。如自許聲性。應是前量決定相違。彼既不成。故依自比。不可對共而為比量。又宗依共已言極成。因言自許。不相符順。又因便有隨一不成。大乘不許。彼自許眼識不攝故。因於共色轉故。又同喻亦有所立不成。大乘眼根。非定離眼識。根因識果。非定即離故。況成事智。通緣眼根。疏所緣緣。與能緣眼識。有定相離義。又立言自許。依共比量。簡他有法差別相違。敵言自許。顯依自比眼識不攝。豈相符順。又彼比量宗喻二種皆依共比。唯因依自。皆相乖角。故雖微詞通起。而未可為指南。幸能審鏡前文。應亦足為理極。上因傍論廣說師宗。宗中既標真故。無違世間之失。上說名為非學世間。二學者世間。眾多學人所共知故。若違深淺二義。俱得名違自教。若唯違于淺義。亦得名違世間。深義幽懸。非是世間所共知故。亦有全分一分四句。是過非過。皆如自教相違中釋。違學者世間必違自教故。論中但有違非學世間全分俱句。余準定然。凡若宗標勝義。如掌珍言。真性有為空。如幻緣生故。無為無有實。不起似空花。亦無違自教
世間等過失。
論。自語相違者如言我母是其石女。
述曰。宗之所依。謂法有法。有法是體。法是其義。義依彼體。不相乖角。可相順立。今言我母。明知有子。復言石女。明委無兒。我母之體與石女義。有法及法不相依順。自言既已乖反。對敵何所申立。故為過也。石女正翻應為虛女。今順古譯存石女名。理門論云。如立一切言皆是妄。謂有外道立一切言皆是虛妄。陳那難言。若如汝說諸言皆妄。則汝所言稱可實事。既非是妄。一分實故。便違有法一切之言。若汝所言自是虛妄。余言不妄。汝今妄說。非妄作妄。汝語自妄。他語不妄。便違宗法言皆是妄。故名自語相違。若有依教名為自語。此中亦有全分一分二種四句。全四句者。有違自語非他。如順世外道對空論言。四大無實。彼說四大必非無實。彼云無實。必非四大。以違自教自語非他。有違他語非自。如佛法者對數論言。彼我非受者。彼所說我必非非受者。若非受者。必非彼我。故違他教他語非自。有俱違自他語。謂如一切言皆是妄。此依違教方有諸句。故此一分句。亦即是前一分自教相違。義準應悉。二四句中。違自及共。皆此過攝。其違共中。違他非過。違自為失。故此但名自語相違。雖俱不違非此過攝。兩同必有相符極成。故亦過攝。唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 世間等過失。
論：自語相違者，如言『我母是石女』（不能生育的女子）。
述曰：宗（論點）所依賴的基礎，包括『法』（性質）和『有法』（具有該性質的事物）。『有法』是本體，『法』是它的意義。意義依附於本體，兩者不應相互矛盾，才能相互支援成立。現在說『我母』，明顯表示有兒子；又說『石女』，明確表示沒有孩子。『我母』的本體和『石女』的意義，『有法』和『法』之間不能相互依存順應。自己說的話已經前後矛盾，如何向對方申明立論？所以這是過失。『石女』正確的翻譯應該是『虛女』，現在爲了尊重古譯，保留『石女』的名稱。《理門論》中說，例如立論『一切言語都是虛妄』。有外道立論說一切言語都是虛妄。陳那（Dignāga）反駁說，如果像你所說一切言語都是虛妄，那麼你所說的話是否可以稱為真實？既然不是虛妄，有一部分是真實的，就違背了『一切』之言。如果你所說的話本身就是虛妄，其他言語不是虛妄，你現在虛妄地說，不是虛妄的當作虛妄。你的話自己是虛妄的，別人的話不是虛妄的，就違背了宗法『一切言語都是虛妄』。所以叫做自語相違。如果依據教義稱為自語，這裡也有全分、一分兩種四句。全四句是：有違背自己的話而不是別人的，例如順世外道（Lokāyata）對空論（Śūnyavāda）說『四大（地、水、火、風）無實』，他們說四大必定不是無實，他們說無實，必定不是四大，因為違背了自己的教義，自己的話而不是別人的。有違背別人的話而不是自己的，例如佛法修行者對數論（Sāṃkhya）說，『彼我（Purusha）不是受者』，他們所說的『我』必定不是非受者，如果不是受者，必定不是『彼我』，所以違背了別人的教義，別人的話而不是自己的。有同時違背自己和他人的話，例如『一切言語都是虛妄』。這依據違背教義才能有各種句子。所以這裡的一分句，也就是前面的一分自教相違，意義上應該全部理解。在二四句中，違背自己和共同的，都屬於這種過失。其中違背共同的，違揹他人不是過失，違背自己是過失，所以這裡只稱為自語相違。即使都不違背，也不屬於這種過失。兩者相同必定有相符的極成，所以也是過失。只有
【English Translation】 English version These are faults such as those found in the world.
Treatise: Self-contradiction is like saying, 'My mother is a barren woman' (a woman who cannot bear children).
Explanation: The basis upon which a thesis (宗, zōng) relies includes 'dharma' (法, nature) and 'dharmin' (有法, the thing possessing that nature). 'Dharmin' is the substance, and 'dharma' is its meaning. The meaning adheres to the substance, and the two should not contradict each other, so that they can support each other's establishment. Now, saying 'my mother' clearly indicates having a son; yet saying 'barren woman' explicitly indicates having no children. The substance of 'my mother' and the meaning of 'barren woman,' 'dharmin' and 'dharma' cannot mutually depend on and accord with each other. One's own words are already contradictory, how can one declare and establish a thesis to the opponent? Therefore, this is a fault. The correct translation of 'barren woman' (石女, shínǚ) should be 'empty woman' (虛女, xū nǚ), but now, to respect the ancient translation, the name 'barren woman' is retained. The Nyāyamukha-śāstra says, for example, establishing the thesis 'all words are false.' Some non-Buddhist (外道, wàidào) establish the thesis that all words are false. Dignāga (陳那, Chénnà) refutes, saying, if as you say all words are false, then can what you say be called true? Since it is not false, and a part of it is true, then it contradicts the word 'all.' If what you say is itself false, and other words are not false, you are now falsely saying, treating what is not false as false. Your words themselves are false, and others' words are not false, then it contradicts the principle of the thesis 'all words are false.' Therefore, it is called self-contradiction. If according to the teachings it is called self-speech, here there are also two types of four sentences: complete and partial. The complete four sentences are: there is contradicting one's own words but not others', such as the Lokāyata (順世外道, Shùnshì wàidào) saying to Śūnyavāda (空論, Kōnglùn), 'The four elements (四大, sìdà) [earth, water, fire, wind] are unreal,' they say the four elements must not be unreal, they say unreal, must not be the four elements, because it contradicts their own teachings, their own words but not others'. There is contradicting others' words but not one's own, such as Buddhist practitioners saying to Sāṃkhya (數論, Shùlùn), 'Purusha (彼我, bǐwǒ) is not the experiencer,' what they say as 'I' must not be non-experiencer, if not experiencer, must not be 'Purusha', so it contradicts others' teachings, others' words but not one's own. There is simultaneously contradicting one's own and others' words, such as 'all words are false.' This relies on contradicting the teachings to have various sentences. Therefore, the partial sentence here is also the previous partial self-teaching contradiction, the meaning should be fully understood. In the two four sentences, contradicting oneself and the common, both belong to this fault. Among them, contradicting the common, contradicting others is not a fault, contradicting oneself is a fault, so here it is only called self-contradiction. Even if neither contradicts, it does not belong to this fault. The two being the same must have a corresponding extreme, so it is also a fault. Only
違於他。總非過攝。本害他故。此說決定自語相違。亦有兩俱隨一全分猶預自語相違。恐繁且止。至不成中當具顯示。
論。能別不極成者如佛弟子對數論師立聲滅壞。
述曰。若作二科。上明古似。下明今似。今似有二。初三闕依。后一義順。若為三科。上五顯乖法。明相違義。次三顯非有。明所依無。成劫之初。有外道出。名劫比羅。此云黃赤色仙人。鬚髮面色皆黃赤故。古云迦毗羅仙人訛也。其後弟子。十八部中上首者。名筏里沙。此名為雨。雨際生故。其雨徒黨名雨眾。梵云僧佉奢薩坦羅。此名數論。謂以智數數度諸法。從數起論。論能生數。複名數論。其學數論。及造彼者。名數論師。彼說二十五諦。略為三。中為四。廣為二十五諦。略為三者。謂自性。變易。我知者。自性者。古云冥性。未成大等名自性。將成大等亦名勝性。勝異舊故。變易者。謂中間二十三諦。非體新生。根本自性所轉變故。我知者。謂神我。能受用境有妙用故。中為四者。一本而非變易。謂自性。能成他故名本。非他成故非變易有變易而非本。此有二義。一云十六諦。謂十一根及五大。二云十一種。除五大。有亦本亦變易。亦有二義。一云七諦。謂大我執五唯量。二云十二種。謂前七加五大。能成他故名本。為他成故名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 違背其他宗義。總的來說，都不是因為過失而攝受。因為其本質是損害他人。這種說法確定與自己的言論相違背。也有兩種情況：要麼全部，要麼部分，猶豫不定，與自己的言論相違背。恐怕過於繁瑣，就此打住。到『不成』的部分再詳細說明。
論：能區分但並不完全成立的例子，就像佛教弟子針對數論師提出的『聲音是滅壞的』這一觀點。
述：如果分為兩科，上面說明的是『古似』，下面說明的是『今似』。『今似』有兩種情況：前三種是缺少所依，后一種是義理順暢。如果分為三科，上面五種是顯示乖法，說明相違的意義；接下來三種是顯示『非有』，說明所依不存在。在成劫之初，有外道出現，名叫Kapila（迦毗羅，意為黃赤色仙人），因為他的鬚髮和麵色都是黃赤色。古時候說的『迦毗羅仙人』是訛傳。他的後來的弟子，在十八部中為首的，名叫Varsagana（筏里沙，意為雨），因為在雨季出生。他的徒黨被稱為雨眾，梵文是Samkhya Sastra（僧佉奢薩坦羅），意思是數論，即用智慧來計數和衡量諸法。從數產生論，論又能產生數，所以又名數論。學習數論以及創造數論的人，被稱為數論師。他們宣揚二十五諦，簡略地說是三種，中等說是四種，廣說是二十五諦。簡略的三種是：自性（Prakriti，古時稱為冥性，未形成『大』等的狀態稱為自性，將要形成『大』等的狀態也稱為勝性，因為勝過舊的狀態），變易（Vikriti，指中間的二十三諦，不是本體新生，而是根本自性所轉變），我知者（Purusha，指神我，能夠受用境界，具有微妙的作用）。中等的四種是：一是『本』而非『變易』，指自性，能夠成就其他事物，所以稱為『本』，不是由其他事物成就，所以不是『變易』；二是『有變易』而非『本』，這有兩種說法：一種說法是十六諦，指十一根和五大；另一種說法是十一種，除去五大；三是『亦本亦變易』，也有兩種說法：一種說法是七諦，指『大』、『我執』、五唯量；另一種說法是十二種，指前面的七種加上五大。能夠成就其他事物，所以稱為『本』，因為其他事物成就，所以稱為『變易』。
【English Translation】 English version: Contradictory to other doctrines. Generally, it is not appropriation due to faults, because its essence is to harm others. This statement is definitely contradictory to one's own words. There are also two situations: either completely or partially, hesitatingly, contradicting one's own words. Fearing it's too cumbersome, I'll stop here. I will explain it in detail in the 'non-accomplishment' section.
Treatise: An example of being able to distinguish but not being completely established is like the Buddhist disciples' view against the Samkhya（數論） masters that 'sound is destructible'.
Commentary: If divided into two categories, the above explains 'ancient similarity', and the below explains 'modern similarity'. There are two situations of 'modern similarity': the first three lack a basis, and the last one is logically smooth. If divided into three categories, the above five show conflicting dharmas, explaining the meaning of contradiction; the next three show 'non-existence', explaining that the basis does not exist. At the beginning of the formation kalpa, an outsider appeared, named Kapila（迦毗羅，meaning yellow-red ascetic）, because his beard, hair, and complexion were all yellow-red. The ancient saying 'Kapila ascetic' is a corruption. His later disciple, the leader of the eighteen schools, was named Varsagana（筏里沙，meaning rain）, because he was born in the rainy season. His followers are called the Rain Assembly, in Sanskrit Samkhya Sastra（僧佉奢薩坦羅）, meaning number theory, that is, using wisdom to count and measure all dharmas. From number arises theory, and theory can generate number, so it is also called number theory. Those who study number theory and those who create it are called Samkhya masters. They proclaim twenty-five Tattvas (諦, truths), briefly three, moderately four, and broadly twenty-five. The brief three are: Prakriti（自性, nature, in ancient times called the dark nature, the state before the formation of 'Mahat' (大, great) etc. is called nature, and the state about to form 'Mahat' etc. is also called superior nature, because it surpasses the old state), Vikriti（變易, change, referring to the middle twenty-three Tattvas, not the new birth of the body, but the transformation of the fundamental nature), Purusha（我知者, the knower, referring to the divine self, able to enjoy the realm, with subtle functions). The moderate four are: one is 'source' but not 'change', referring to Prakriti, able to accomplish other things, so it is called 'source', not accomplished by other things, so it is not 'change'; the second is 'change' but not 'source', there are two sayings: one saying is sixteen Tattvas, referring to the eleven senses and the five great elements; the other saying is eleven kinds, excluding the five great elements; the third is 'both source and change', there are also two sayings: one saying is seven Tattvas, referring to Mahat, ego, and the five Tanmatras (唯量, subtle elements); the other saying is twelve kinds, referring to the previous seven plus the five great elements. Able to accomplish other things, so it is called 'source', because other things accomplish it, so it is called 'change'.
變易。四非本非變易。謂神我。不能成他非他成故。廣為二十五諦。一自性。二大。三我執。四五唯。五五大。六五知根。七五作業根。八心平等根。九我知者。於此九法。開為二十五諦。謂初自性。總名自性。別名三德。薩埵剌奢答摩。一一皆有三種德故。初云薩埵。此云有情及勇健義。今取勇義。剌阇云微。亦名塵坌。今取塵義。答摩云闇。闇鈍之闇。自性正名勇塵闇也。言三德者。如次古名染粗黑。今名黃赤黑。舊名喜憂舍。今名貪瞋癡。舊名樂苦癡。今名樂苦舍。由此三德是生死因。神我本性解脫。我思勝境。三德轉變。我乃受用。為境纏縛。不得涅槃。后厭修道。我既不思。自性不變。我離境縛。便得解脫。中間二十三諦。雖是無常而是轉變。非有生滅。自性神我。用或有無。體是常住。然諸世間無滅壞法。廣如金七十論及唯識疏解。今佛弟子對數論師。立聲滅壞。有法之聲。彼此雖許。滅壞宗法。他所不成。世間無故。總無別依。應更須立。非真宗故。是故為失。如是等義皆如上說。此有全分一分四句。全四句者。有自能別不成非他。如數論師對佛弟子云。色聲等五藏識現變。有法色等雖此共成。藏識變現自宗非有。有他能別不成非自。如論所陳。立聲滅壞。有俱能別不成。如數論師對佛弟子。說色等五
【現代漢語翻譯】 變易。四非本非變易。指的是神我（Purusha，精神自我）。因為它不能變成其他事物，也不能被其他事物所變成。廣泛地分為二十五諦（Tattva，真實）。一是自性（Prakriti，本原），二是大（Mahat，智性），三是我執（Ahamkara，自我意識），四是五唯（Tanmatra，五種感覺的本原），五是五大（Mahabhuta，五種元素），六是五知根（Jnana-indriya，五種感覺器官），七是五作業根（Karma-indriya，五種行動器官），八是心平等根（Manas，心），九是我知者（Kshetrajna，知者）。在這九法中，展開為二十五諦。最初的自性，總稱為自性，別名為三德（Guna，三種屬性）：薩埵（Sattva，純粹），剌奢（Rajas，激情），答摩（Tamas，惰性）。每一個都具有三種德性。最初稱為薩埵，意為有情和勇健，這裡取勇健之義。剌奢意為微細，也稱為塵坌，這裡取塵義。答摩意為闇，闇鈍之闇。自性的正名為勇塵闇。所說的三德，依次古名為染粗黑，現在稱為黃赤黑，舊名為喜憂舍，現在稱為貪瞋癡，舊名為樂苦癡，現在稱為樂苦舍。由此三德是生死之因。神我本性是解脫的，我思惟勝境，三德轉變，我便受用，被境界纏縛，不得涅槃。後來厭倦修道，我既不思惟，自性不變，我便脫離境界的束縛，便得解脫。中間的二十三諦，雖然是無常的，但是轉變的，不是有生滅的。自性神我，用或有或無，體是常住的。然而世間沒有滅壞之法，詳細內容見《金七十論》及《唯識疏》的解釋。現在佛弟子針對數論師，立聲滅壞。有法之聲，彼此雖然認可，滅壞宗法，他人所不能成立，因為世間沒有。總無別依，應該更需要建立，因為不是真宗，所以是過失。像這樣的意義都如上所說。這裡有全分一分四句。全四句是：有自能別不成非他。如數論師對佛弟子說：色聲等五藏識現變。有法色等雖然彼此共同認可，藏識變現自宗沒有。有他能別不成非自。如論中所陳述的，立聲滅壞。有俱能別不成。如數論師對佛弟子說色等五 藏識現變。有法藏識雖此共成。色等變現自宗非有。有非俱能別不成。如佛弟子對數論師。說聲生滅。有法聲等雖此共成。生滅之法自他俱無。是故為失。
【English Translation】 Changeable. The four are not fundamentally changeable. This refers to Purusha (the spiritual self). Because it cannot become other things, nor can it be made into other things. It is broadly divided into twenty-five Tattvas (realities). First is Prakriti (the primordial nature), second is Mahat (intellect), third is Ahamkara (ego-consciousness), fourth is the five Tanmatras (subtle elements), fifth is the five Mahabhutas (gross elements), sixth is the five Jnana-indriyas (sense organs), seventh is the five Karma-indriyas (action organs), eighth is Manas (mind), and ninth is Kshetrajna (the knower). Among these nine dharmas, they are expanded into twenty-five Tattvas. The initial Prakriti is generally called Prakriti, and specifically called the three Gunas (qualities): Sattva (purity), Rajas (passion), and Tamas (inertia). Each of them possesses three qualities. Initially called Sattva, meaning sentient and courageous, here taking the meaning of courageous. Rajas means subtle, also called dust, here taking the meaning of dust. Tamas means darkness, the darkness of dullness. The proper name of Prakriti is Courage-Dust-Darkness. The so-called three Gunas were formerly called colored, coarse, and black, now called yellow, red, and black, formerly called joy, sorrow, and indifference, now called greed, hatred, and delusion, formerly called pleasure, pain, and ignorance, now called pleasure, pain, and indifference. Therefore, these three Gunas are the cause of birth and death. The nature of Purusha is liberation. When 'I' contemplate superior states, the three Gunas transform, and 'I' then enjoy them, becoming entangled by the states, unable to attain Nirvana. Later, becoming weary of cultivation, if 'I' do not contemplate, Prakriti does not change, and 'I' am freed from the bondage of states, then attaining liberation. The twenty-three Tattvas in between, although impermanent, are transformative, not subject to birth and death. Prakriti and Purusha, their function may be present or absent, but their essence is permanent. However, there is no destruction in the world, as detailed in the explanations of the Samkhyakarika and the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi. Now, Buddhist disciples, in response to Samkhya teachers, assert the destruction of sound. The sound of dharma, although mutually acknowledged, the doctrine of destruction cannot be established by others because it does not exist in the world. Lacking a separate basis, it should be further established, but because it is not a true doctrine, it is a fault. Such meanings are as described above. Here, there are four possibilities of whole and part. The complete four possibilities are: 'There is that which can be distinguished by itself and does not become other.' For example, Samkhya teachers say to Buddhist disciples: 'The five, such as form and sound, are manifestations of the Alaya-consciousness.' Although the dharmas such as form are mutually acknowledged, the manifestation of Alaya-consciousness does not exist in their own doctrine. 'There is that which can be distinguished by others and does not become itself.' As stated in the treatise, establishing the destruction of sound. 'There is that which can be distinguished by both and does not become.' For example, Samkhya teachers say to Buddhist disciples, the five such as form are manifestations of Alaya-consciousness. Although Alaya-consciousness is mutually acknowledged, the manifestation of form, etc., does not exist in their own doctrine. 'There is that which cannot be distinguished by either and does not become.' For example, Buddhist disciples say to Samkhya teachers, 'Sound is produced and destroyed.' Although sound, etc., are mutually acknowledged, the dharma of production and destruction does not exist in either their own or the other's doctrine. Therefore, it is a fault.
。德句所收。彼此世間無德攝故。一分四句者。有自一分能別不成非他。如薩婆多對大乘者。說所造色。大種藏識二法所生。一分藏識自宗無故。有他一分能別不成非自。如佛弟子對數論師。立耳等根。滅壞有易。有易彼宗可有。一分滅壞無故。有俱一分能別不成。如勝論師對佛弟子。立色等五。皆從同類及自性生。同類所生兩皆許有。自性所起兩皆無故。此二四句。唯俱成是。余皆非攝。論說於他全分不成。余皆準悉。
論。所別不極成者如數論師對佛弟子說我是思。
述曰。即前數論立神我諦體為受者由我思用五塵諸境。自性便變二十三諦。故我是思。是思宗法彼此共成。佛法有思是心所故。唯有法我。佛之弟子多分不立。除正量等余皆無故。理如前說。此有全分一分四句。全四句者。有自所別不成非他。如佛弟子對數論言。我是無常。是無常法彼此許有。有法神我自所不成。今此有法不標汝執。故是宗過。有簡便無。有他所別不我非自。如數論者立我是思。有俱所別不成。如薩婆多對大眾部。立神我實有。實有可有。我兩無故。一分四句者。有自一分所別不成非他。如佛弟子對數論言。我及色等皆性是空。色等許有。我自無故。宗無簡別。為過如前。有他一分所別不成非自。如數論師對佛弟子。立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：德句所包含的內容，是因為彼此世間沒有功德的攝取。一部分四句式的情況是：有從自身一部分能夠區分但不能成立，而非對方的。例如，薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）對於大乘佛教徒說，所造的色（rupa，物質），是由大種（mahabhuta，四大）和藏識（alayavijnana，阿賴耶識）兩種法所生。一部分藏識在薩婆多部自身的宗義中是沒有的。有從對方一部分能夠區分但不能成立，而非自身的。例如，佛陀的弟子對於數論師（Samkhya）說，耳等根（indriya，根）是滅壞且變化的。變化在數論師的宗義中是可能存在的，但一部分滅壞是不存在的。有雙方一部分都能夠區分但不能成立的。例如，勝論師（Vaisesika）對於佛陀的弟子說，色等五種（五境），都是從同類和自性所生。同類所生是雙方都認可的，但自性所起是雙方都沒有的。這兩種四句式，只有雙方都成立的情況，其餘都不包含在內。論中說對於對方全部分不能成立，其餘情況都可依此類推。 論：所區分的（法）不被完全認可的情況，例如數論師對於佛陀的弟子說，『我是思』。 述：就是前面所說的數論師建立神我（atman，神我）的諦體作為受者，通過我的思考作用五塵（色聲香味觸）等境，自性就變化為二十三種諦。所以『我是思』。『是思』這個宗法是雙方都認可的。佛法中有思，是因為有心所（caitasika，心所法）的緣故，只有法我（dharma-atman，法我）。佛陀的弟子大多不建立神我，除了正量部（Sammatīya）等，其餘都沒有。道理如前面所說。這裡有全部分和一部分的四句式。全部分四句式的情況是：有從自身所區分的不能成立，而非對方的。例如，佛陀的弟子對於數論師說，『我是無常』。『是無常』這個法是雙方都認可的，有法神我自身不能成立。現在這個有法沒有標明你所執著的，所以是宗過（hetvābhāsa，宗因過）。有簡便的沒有。有從對方所區分的不能成立，而非自身的。例如，數論師建立『我是思』。有雙方所區分的都不能成立的。例如，薩婆多部對於大眾部（Mahasanghika）說，神我是真實存在的。真實存在是可能存在的，但我雙方都沒有神我。一部分四句式的情況是：有從自身一部分所區分的不能成立，而非對方的。例如，佛陀的弟子對於數論師說，『我及色等都是自性空』。色等是認可存在的，但我自身是沒有的。宗無簡別，作為過失如前面所說。有從對方一部分所區分的不能成立，而非自身的。例如，數論師建立
【English Translation】 English version: The content included in the 'virtue' sentences is because there is no 'virtue' that encompasses each other's worlds. A portion of the fourfold possibilities is: there is a distinction that can be made from one's own part but cannot be established, and is not the other's. For example, the Sarvastivadins (those who assert that 'everything exists') say to the Mahayana Buddhists that the created 'rupa' (matter) is produced by the 'mahabhuta' (the four great elements) and the 'alayavijnana' (store consciousness). A portion of the 'alayavijnana' does not exist in the Sarvastivadins' own doctrine. There is a distinction that can be made from the other's part but cannot be established, and is not one's own. For example, the Buddha's disciples say to the Samkhya philosophers that the 'indriya' (sense faculties) such as the ears are destructible and changeable. Changeability may exist in the Samkhya philosophers' doctrine, but a portion of destructibility does not exist. There is a distinction that can be made from both sides' parts but cannot be established. For example, the Vaisesika philosophers say to the Buddha's disciples that the five 'objects' such as 'rupa' (form) are all produced from the same kind and from their own nature. Production from the same kind is acknowledged by both sides, but arising from one's own nature is not acknowledged by either side. Of these two fourfold possibilities, only the case where both sides are established is included; the rest are not included. The treatise says that it cannot be established in its entirety for the other side; the rest can be inferred accordingly. Treatise: The case where what is being distinguished is not completely acknowledged, such as when the Samkhya philosophers say to the Buddha's disciples, 'I am thought'. Commentary: That is, the aforementioned Samkhya philosophers establish the 'atman' (self) as the experiencer, and through my thinking, the five 'dusts' (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) and other objects, the nature transforms into the twenty-three 'tattvas' (principles). Therefore, 'I am thought'. The 'is thought' as a thesis is acknowledged by both sides. In the Buddha's Dharma, there is thought because there are 'caitasika' (mental factors), and there is only 'dharma-atman' (self of phenomena). Most of the Buddha's disciples do not establish the 'atman' (self), except for the Sammatīya school and others; the rest do not. The reasoning is as mentioned before. Here, there are fourfold possibilities of the whole and a part. The fourfold possibilities of the whole are: there is a distinction that can be made from one's own part but cannot be established, and is not the other's. For example, the Buddha's disciples say to the Samkhya philosophers, 'I am impermanent'. The 'is impermanent' as a Dharma is acknowledged by both sides, but the 'atman' (self) cannot be established by itself. Now, this 'is' Dharma does not specify what you are attached to, so it is a fallacy of the thesis. There is a simple one that does not exist. There is a distinction that can be made from the other's part but cannot be established, and is not one's own. For example, the Samkhya philosophers establish 'I am thought'. There is a distinction that can be made by both sides that cannot be established. For example, the Sarvastivadins say to the Mahasanghika school that the 'atman' (self) is truly existent. True existence may be possible, but neither of us has the 'atman' (self). The fourfold possibilities of a part are: there is a distinction that can be made from one's own part but cannot be established, and is not the other's. For example, the Buddha's disciples say to the Samkhya philosophers, 'I and 'rupa' (form) etc. are all empty in nature'. 'Rupa' (form) etc. are acknowledged to exist, but I myself do not exist. The thesis has no distinction, and the fault is as mentioned before. There is a distinction that can be made from the other's part but cannot be established, and is not one's own. For example, the Samkhya philosophers establish
我色等皆並實有。佛法不許有我體故。有俱一分所別不成。如薩婆多對化地部。說我去來皆是實有。世可俱有。我俱無故。此二四句。唯俱不違非是過攝。余皆是過。論說他全所別不成。余皆準悉。問若說我是思所別不成者。如何可立我等為有。答若有所簡。即便無過。謂我能詮必有所目。如色等類。便無過故。不爾便成。上二過中。初過亦名所依不成。能別有故。後過亦名能依不成。所別有故。兩俱隨一全分一分皆悉具有。由是所立不與能依所依之名。義準亦有能別所別猶預不成。偏生疑故。至因當知。
論。俱不極成者如勝論師對佛弟子立我以為和合因緣。
述曰。前已偏句。一有一無。今兩俱無。故亦是過。成劫之末。有外道出。名嗢露迦。此云鵂鹠。晝藏夜出。遊行乞利。人以為名。舊云優婁佉訛也。后因夜遊驚傷產婦。遂收場碾米齊食之。因此亦號為蹇拏仆。云食米齊仙人。舊云蹇拏陀訛也。亦云吠世史迦。此云勝論。古云鞞世師衛世師皆訛也。造六句論。諸論中勝。或勝人造故名勝論。此說六句。一實。二德。三業。四有。十句論中亦名為同。俱舍論名總同句義。五同異。十句論名俱分。六和合。實有九種。謂地水火風空時方我意。德有二十四。謂色味香觸數量別性合離彼性此性覺樂苦欲瞋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 我（ātman）和色（rūpa）等一切都是真實存在的。佛法不允許有『我』（ātman）的實體，因此，『俱一分所別不成』（ubhaya-ekadeśa-viśeṣa-asiddha，部分相關的能別和所別都不成立）是不成立的。就像薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）對化地部（Mahīśāsaka）說，『我的過去和未來都是真實存在的，世間可以同時存在』。因為『我』（ātman）同時不存在，所以這兩種四句（catuskoṭi）中，只有『俱不』（ubhaya-na，兩者都不）不違背，不是過失的範疇，其餘都是過失。論中說，『他全所別不成』（anya-sarva-viśeṣa-asiddha，完全不同的所別不成立），其餘的都應該照此推論。問：如果說『我』（ātman）是思（citta）所區分的，那麼如何才能確立『我』（ātman）等為存在呢？答：如果有所簡別，那麼就沒有過失。意思是說，『我』（ātman）的能詮（abhidhāna，能表達的）必定有所指，就像色（rūpa）等一樣，就沒有過失。否則，就會構成上面兩種過失。最初的過失也叫做『所依不成』（āśraya-asiddha，所依不成立），因為能別（viśeṣaṇa，能區分的）存在。後面的過失也叫做『能依不成』（āśrita-asiddha，能依不成立），因為所別（viśeṣya，被區分的）存在。兩者都具有全分和一分。因此，所立（sādhya，要證明的）不與能依（āśrita，能依靠的）和所依（āśraya，所依靠的）之名相關。根據意義，也存在能別所別猶豫不成（viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-vicikitsā-asiddha，對於能別和所別猶豫不決而不成立），因為會產生偏頗的懷疑。至於因（hetu），應當知道。
論：『俱不極成』（ubhaya-asiddha，雙方都不承認）就像勝論師（Vaiśeṣika）對佛弟子立『我』（ātman）作為和合因緣（samavāya-kāraṇa）。
述曰：前面已經說了偏句，一有一無。現在是兩俱無，所以也是過失。成劫（saṃvarta-kalpa）之末，有外道出現，名叫嗢露迦（Ulūka），意思是鵂鹠（owl），白天隱藏，夜晚出來。**乞利（Kaṇāda）是人的名字。舊譯優婁佉是訛誤。後來因為夜遊驚嚇傷害了產婦，於是收集場上碾米的碎屑一起吃。因此也號為蹇拏仆（Kaṇabhuk），意思是食米齊仙人。舊譯蹇拏陀是訛誤。也叫吠世史迦（Vaiśeṣika），意思是勝論。古譯鞞世師、衛世師都是訛誤。他造了六句論。在各種論中最為殊勝。或者因為殊勝的人所造，所以叫勝論。這裡說六句，一實（dravya），二德（guṇa），三業（karma），四有（sāmānya），十句論中也叫做同。俱舍論中叫做總同句義。五同異（viśeṣa），十句論中叫做俱分。六和合（samavāya）。實有九種，即地（pṛthivī）、水（ap）、火（tejas）、風（vāyu）、空（ākāśa）、時（kāla）、方（dik）、我（ātman）、意（manas）。德有二十四種，即色（rūpa）、味（rasa）、香（gandha）、觸（sparśa）、數量（saṃkhyā）、別性（pṛthaktva）、合（saṃyoga）、離（vibhāga）、彼性（paratva）、此性（aparatva）、覺（buddhi）、樂（sukha）、苦（duḥkha）、欲（icchā）、瞋（dveṣa）。
【English Translation】 English version I (ātman), color (rūpa), and everything else are all truly existent. The Buddha's teachings do not allow for the existence of a self (ātman) entity, therefore, 'ubhaya-ekadeśa-viśeṣa-asiddha' (the non-establishment of partial relatedness of both the qualifier and the qualified) is not valid. Just as the Sarvāstivāda school says to the Mahīśāsaka school, 'My past and future are truly existent, the world can exist simultaneously.' Because the 'I' (ātman) does not exist simultaneously, among these two sets of four possibilities (catuskoṭi), only 'ubhaya-na' (neither of the two) does not contradict and is not a category of fault; the rest are faults. The treatise says, 'anya-sarva-viśeṣa-asiddha' (the non-establishment of complete difference of the qualified), and the rest should be inferred accordingly. Question: If it is said that 'I' (ātman) is distinguished by thought (citta), how can we establish 'I' (ātman) and others as existent? Answer: If there is some distinction, then there is no fault. It means that the expression (abhidhāna, that which expresses) of 'I' (ātman) must have something to refer to, just like color (rūpa) and others, then there is no fault. Otherwise, it will constitute the two faults mentioned above. The initial fault is also called 'āśraya-asiddha' (non-establishment of the basis), because the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa, that which distinguishes) exists. The latter fault is also called 'āśrita-asiddha' (non-establishment of the dependent), because the qualified (viśeṣya, that which is distinguished) exists. Both have complete and partial aspects. Therefore, the thesis (sādhya, that which is to be proven) is not related to the names of the dependent (āśrita, that which depends) and the basis (āśraya, that which is relied upon). According to the meaning, there is also 'viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-vicikitsā-asiddha' (non-establishment due to hesitation about the qualifier and the qualified), because it generates biased doubt. As for the reason (hetu), it should be known.
Treatise: 'Ubhaya-asiddha' (unestablished for both parties) is like the Vaiśeṣika arguing to a Buddhist disciple that 'I' (ātman) is the inherent cause (samavāya-kāraṇa).
Commentary: The previous statement already mentioned the partial case, one exists and one does not. Now both do not exist, so it is also a fault. At the end of the saṃvarta-kalpa, an heretic appeared named Ulūka, which means owl, hiding during the day and coming out at night. Kaṇāda is a person's name. The old translation '優婁佉' is a corruption. Later, because night travels frightened and injured pregnant women, he collected the rice husks from the threshing floor and ate them together. Therefore, he is also called Kaṇabhuk, meaning 'rice-eating sage'. The old translation '蹇拏陀' is a corruption. He is also called Vaiśeṣika, meaning 'superior doctrine'. The ancient translations '鞞世師' and '衛世師' are both corruptions. He created the six categories doctrine. Among all doctrines, it is the most superior. Or because it was created by a superior person, it is called Vaiśeṣika. Here it speaks of six categories: 1. Substance (dravya), 2. Quality (guṇa), 3. Action (karma), 4. Generality (sāmānya), also called 'sameness' in the ten categories doctrine. In the Abhidharmakośa, it is called the meaning of 'total sameness'. 5. Particularity (viśeṣa), called 'difference' in the ten categories doctrine. 6. Inherence (samavāya). There are nine kinds of substances: earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), fire (tejas), wind (vāyu), space (ākāśa), time (kāla), direction (dik), self (ātman), and mind (manas). There are twenty-four qualities: color (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), number (saṃkhyā), distinctness (pṛthaktva), conjunction (saṃyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), remoteness (paratva), nearness (aparatva), cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), and anger (dveṣa).
勤勇重性液性潤性法非法行聲。業有五。謂取捨屈伸行。有體是一。實德業三同一有故。同異體多。實德業三各有總別之同異故。和合唯一。能令實等不相離相屬之法故。十八部中上首名戰達羅。此云慧月。造十句論。此六加四。謂異。有能。無能。無說。廣如勝論宗十句論。並唯識疏解。彼說地水各並有十四德。火有十一。風有九德。空有六德。時方各五。我有十四德。謂數量別性合離覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇法非法行。意有八德。和合因緣者。十句論云。我云何。謂是覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇法非法行等和合因緣。起智為相名我。謂和合性。和合諸德與我合時。我為和合因緣。和合始能和合。令德與我合。不爾便不能。我之有法此已不成。和合因緣此亦非有。故法有法兩俱不成。此中不偏取和合。亦不偏取因緣。總取和合之因緣故名不成。不爾便成。自亦許有。此中全分及一分。各有五種四句。初四句者。有自能別不成他所別。如數論者對勝論云自性體是和合因緣。所別他非有。能別自不成。有他能別不成自所別。如數論師對勝論雲和合因緣體是自性。所別自非有。能別他不成。有俱能別不成自所別。如數論師對大乘立阿賴耶識是和合因緣。所別自不成。能別俱非有。有俱能別不成他所別。如大乘師對數論立藏識體是和合因緣所別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勤勇（pravrtti，努力）重性（gurutva，重量）液性（dravatva，流動性）潤性（sneha，粘性）法（dharma，正法）非法（adharma，非法）行（gati，運動）聲（shabda，聲音）。業（karma，行為）有五種。即取（utkshepana，向上拋）舍（avaksepana，向下拋）屈（akunchana，收縮）伸（prasárana，伸展）行（gamana，移動）。有體（dravya，實體）是一。因為實體、德（guna，性質）、業三種是同一的。同異體（sámánya-vishesha，共性與殊性）是多的。因為實體、德、業三種各有總（sámánya，共性）別（vishesha，殊性）的同異。和合（samaváya，內在關係）是唯一的。因為它能使實體等不相離、相互關聯。十八部中上首名為戰達羅（Chandrakirti），這裡譯為慧月。他造了《十句論》。這六加四，指的是異（bheda，差異）、有能（sámarthya，能力）、無能（asamarthya，無能力）、無說（anukta，未說）。詳細內容見《勝論宗十句論》以及唯識疏解。他們說地、水各有十四種德，火有十一種，風有九種德，空有六種德，時、方各有五種，我有十四種德，即數量（sankhya，數量）、別性（prthaktva，獨特性）、合（samyoga，結合）、離（vibhaga，分離）、覺（jnana，知覺）、樂（sukha，快樂）、苦（duhkha，痛苦）、欲（iccha，慾望）、瞋（dvesha，憎恨）、勤勇（prayatna，努力）、法（dharma，正法）、非法（adharma，非法）、行（gati，運動）。意有八種德。和合因緣（samaváya-kárana，內在關係的原因）指的是，《十句論》中說：『我』是什麼？指的是覺、樂、苦、欲、瞋、勤勇、法、非法、行等和合的因緣。以生起智慧為相，名為『我』。指的是和合性。和合諸德與我結合時，我成為和合的因緣。和合才能使德與我結合，否則就不能。如果『我』沒有法，這一點就不能成立。和合因緣也就沒有了。所以法和有法兩方面都不能成立。這裡不偏取和合，也不偏取因緣，總取和合的因緣，所以說不能成立，否則就能成立，自己也承認有。這裡全分和一分，各有五種四句。最初的四句是：有自能別（svayam-vishesha，自身能區分）不成他所別（paratah-avishesa，不能被他者區分），例如數論者對勝論者說，自性體是和合因緣，所別是他沒有的，能別是自身不能成立的。有他能別（paratah-vishesha，他者能區分）不成自所別（svayam-avishesa，不能被自身區分），例如數論師對勝論者說，和合因緣體是自性，所別是自身沒有的，能別是他者不能成立的。有俱能別（ubhayatah-vishesha，兩者都能區分）不成自所別（svayam-avishesa，不能被自身區分），例如數論師對大乘立阿賴耶識是和合因緣，所別是自身不能成立的，能別是兩者都沒有的。有俱能別（ubhayatah-vishesha，兩者都能區分）不成他所別（paratah-avishesa，不能被他者區分），例如大乘師對數論者立藏識體是和合因緣所別。
【English Translation】 English version Diligence (pravrtti), heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), viscosity (sneha), dharma (righteousness), adharma (unrighteousness), motion (gati), sound (shabda). Action (karma) is of five kinds: namely, throwing upwards (utkshepana), throwing downwards (avaksepana), contraction (akunchana), extension (prasárana), and moving (gamana). Substance (dravya) is one, because substance, quality (guna), and action are the same. Commonality and particularity (sámánya-vishesha) are many, because substance, quality, and action each have common and particular similarities and differences. Inherence (samaváya) is unique, because it enables substances, etc., to be inseparable and related to each other. Among the eighteen schools, the foremost is named Chandrakirti, which is translated here as Wisdom Moon. He composed the 'Ten Categories Treatise.' This six plus four refers to difference (bheda), capability (sámarthya), incapability (asamarthya), and unsaid (anukta). For details, see the 'Vaisheshika School's Ten Categories Treatise' and the commentary on the Vijnanavada. They say that earth and water each have fourteen qualities, fire has eleven, wind has nine qualities, space has six qualities, time and direction each have five, and 'I' has fourteen qualities, namely, number (sankhya), distinctness (prthaktva), conjunction (samyoga), disjunction (vibhaga), cognition (jnana), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), desire (iccha), hatred (dvesha), effort (prayatna), dharma (righteousness), adharma (unrighteousness), and motion (gati). Mind has eight qualities. The cause of inherence (samaváya-kárana) refers to what the 'Ten Categories Treatise' says: 'What is 'I'?' It refers to the cause of inherence of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, dharma, adharma, motion, etc. Taking the arising of wisdom as its characteristic is called 'I.' It refers to the nature of inherence. When the qualities of inherence combine with 'I,' 'I' becomes the cause of inherence. Inherence can only enable qualities to combine with 'I,' otherwise it cannot. If 'I' does not have dharma, this point cannot be established. The cause of inherence would also not exist. Therefore, both dharma and that which has dharma cannot be established. Here, we do not partially take inherence, nor do we partially take cause; we take the cause of inherence as a whole, so it is said that it cannot be established; otherwise, it can be established, and one also admits that it exists. Here, the whole and a part each have five kinds of four sentences. The initial four sentences are: 'Self-distinctive (svayam-vishesha) but not distinguished by others (paratah-avishesa),' for example, the Samkhya proponent says to the Vaisheshika proponent that the nature of prakriti is the cause of inherence, what is distinguished is not possessed by others, and what can distinguish cannot be established by itself. 'Distinguished by others (paratah-vishesha) but not self-distinctive (svayam-avishesa),' for example, the Samkhya teacher says to the Vaisheshika teacher that the nature of the cause of inherence is prakriti, what is distinguished is not possessed by itself, and what can distinguish cannot be established by others. 'Distinguished by both (ubhayatah-vishesha) but not self-distinctive (svayam-avishesa),' for example, the Samkhya proponent establishes the Alaya-vijnana for the Mahayana as the cause of inherence, what is distinguished cannot be established by itself, and what can distinguish is not possessed by both. 'Distinguished by both (ubhayatah-vishesha) but not distinguished by others (paratah-avishesa),' for example, the Mahayana teacher establishes the store consciousness as distinguished by the cause of inherence for the Samkhya proponent.
他不成。能別俱非有。第二四句者。有自能別不成俱所別。如數論師對勝論立藏識體是和合因緣。有他能別不成俱所別。如勝論對數論立藏識體是和合因緣。有俱能別不成俱所別。如薩婆多對大乘立我是和合因緣。有俱能別不成俱非所別。唯此一句。是前偏句能別不成中全俱非句是。前之七句皆是此過。如能別不成為首有二四句。如是所別不成為首。亦有二種四句。初四句者。有自所別不成他能別。即前第二句。有他所別不成自能別。即前第一句。有俱所別不成自能別。即前第五句。有俱所別不成他能別。即前第六句。第二四句者。有自所別不成俱能別。即前第三句。有他所別不成俱能別。即前第四句。有俱所別不成俱能別。即前第七句。有俱所別不成俱非能別。非是前說能別為首句。但是偏句所別不成中全俱非句是。其前七句皆是此過。然即是前七句所攝。更無有異。復有自兩俱不成非他。如佛弟子對勝論師立我以為和合因緣。有他兩俱不成非自。如勝論師對佛弟子立於此義。有俱兩俱不成。如薩婆多對大乘者立於此義。有俱非自他兩俱不成。如無過宗。初三皆過。第四非過。上來合說五種全句。一一離之。復為一分成五別句。復將自能別一分不成等句。對余全句。復將全能別不成等句。對餘一分句。皆理定有。隨
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 他不成。能別俱非有。第二四句者：有自能別不成俱所別，例如數論師（Sāṃkhya）對勝論師（Vaiśeṣika）立藏識體（Ālayavijñāna）是和合因緣。有他能別不成俱所別，例如勝論師對數論師立藏識體是和合因緣。有俱能別不成俱所別，例如薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）對大乘（Mahāyāna）立我是和合因緣。有俱能別不成俱非所別，唯獨這一句，是前面偏句能別不成中全俱非句。前面的七句都是這個過失。如同能別不成為首有二四句，像這樣所別不成為首，也有兩種四句。 初四句：有自所別不成他能別，即前面第二句。有他所別不成自能別，即前面第一句。有俱所別不成自能別，即前面第五句。有俱所別不成他能別，即前面第六句。 第二四句：有自所別不成俱能別，即前面第三句。有他所別不成俱能別，即前面第四句。有俱所別不成俱能別，即前面第七句。有俱所別不成俱非能別，不是前面所說的能別為首句，但是偏句所別不成中全俱非句。前面的七句都是這個過失。然而就是前面七句所包含的，沒有其他差異。還有自兩俱不成非他，例如佛弟子對勝論師立我以為和合因緣。有他兩俱不成非自，例如勝論師對佛弟子立於此義。有俱兩俱不成，例如薩婆多部對大乘者立於此義。有俱非自他兩俱不成，例如無過宗。最初三個都是過失，第四個不是過失。上面合起來說了五種全句，一一分開，又成為一分成五種別句。又將自能別一分不成等句，對余全句。又將全能別不成等句，對餘一分句，都是理所當然有的，隨之……
【English Translation】 English version He does not succeed. The differentiator is neither both nor non-existent. Regarding the second four phrases: There is the case where the self-differentiator fails to differentiate both the differentiated, such as when the Sāṃkhya (數論師) school posits to the Vaiśeṣika (勝論師) school that Ālayavijñāna (藏識體) is the cause and condition of aggregation. There is the case where the other-differentiator fails to differentiate both the differentiated, such as when the Vaiśeṣika school posits to the Sāṃkhya school that Ālayavijñāna is the cause and condition of aggregation. There is the case where both differentiators fail to differentiate both the differentiated, such as when the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部) school posits to the Mahāyāna (大乘) school that 'I' is the cause and condition of aggregation. There is the case where both differentiators fail to differentiate what is neither both nor non-existent; only this phrase is the complete neither-both-nor phrase among the partial phrases where the differentiator fails. The preceding seven phrases all have this fault. Just as there are two sets of four phrases beginning with the failure of the differentiator, similarly, there are also two sets of four phrases beginning with the failure of the differentiated. The first four phrases: There is the case where the self-differentiated fails to be differentiated by the other-differentiator, which is the second phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where the other-differentiated fails to be differentiated by the self-differentiator, which is the first phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where both the differentiated fail to be differentiated by the self-differentiator, which is the fifth phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where both the differentiated fail to be differentiated by the other-differentiator, which is the sixth phrase mentioned earlier. The second four phrases: There is the case where the self-differentiated fails to be differentiated by both differentiators, which is the third phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where the other-differentiated fails to be differentiated by both differentiators, which is the fourth phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where both the differentiated fail to be differentiated by both differentiators, which is the seventh phrase mentioned earlier. There is the case where both the differentiated fail to be differentiated by what is neither both nor non-differentiator; it is not the phrase beginning with the differentiator mentioned earlier, but it is the complete neither-both-nor phrase among the partial phrases where the differentiated fails. The preceding seven phrases all have this fault. However, it is included in the preceding seven phrases; there is no other difference. Furthermore, there is the case where the self is both failing and not the other, such as when a Buddhist disciple posits to a Vaiśeṣika philosopher that 'I' is the cause and condition of aggregation. There is the case where the other is both failing and not the self, such as when a Vaiśeṣika philosopher posits this meaning to a Buddhist disciple. There is the case where both are both failing, such as when the Sarvāstivāda school posits this meaning to a Mahāyāna practitioner. There is the case where neither self nor other is both failing, such as the faultless school. The first three are faults; the fourth is not a fault. The above combines to state five complete phrases; separating them one by one, they become five separate phrases divided into one part. Furthermore, the phrase 'one part of the self-differentiator fails' is compared to the remaining complete phrases. Furthermore, the phrase 'the complete differentiator fails' is compared to the remaining one-part phrases; all are logically certain to exist, following...
其所應。諸兩俱過。皆名兩俱不極成。諸自他過。皆名隨一不極成。由此亦兩俱隨一猶預全分一分等過。能所別中俱生疑故。論中且說。隨他一全分俱不極成。以示其法余應準知。上來三過皆說自相。若三差別亦有不極成。如勝論云。四大種常。四大種中。意之所許實非實攝。有法差別。他宗不許有實攝法。即名所別差別他不極成。如數論師眼等必為他用。為他用中。意之所許積聚他不積聚他。是法差別。佛法不許有不積聚他。即名能別差別他不極成。如大乘師對數論立識能變色等宗。此中有法識自相中。阿賴耶識心平等根識。是有法差別。他不許有差別藏識。自不許有心平等識。其法自相能變色等中。生起轉變。常住轉變是法差別。生起轉變他不許有。常住轉變自不許有。名兩俱不極成。于彼三種差別不極成中。亦有自他兩俱全分一分等過。恐厭繁文故不具述。
論。相符極成者如說聲是所聞。
述曰。為二科中。今似有二。上三明闕依。此一明義順。若依三科。此顯虛功。對敵申宗。本諍同異。依宗兩順。枉費成功。凡對所敵立聲所聞。必相符故。論不標主。此有全分一分四句。全四句者。有符他非自。如數論師對勝論者立業滅壞。有符自非他。如勝論師對數論立業滅壞。有俱相符。如聲是所聞。有
俱不符。如數論師對佛法立業滅壞。一分四句者。有符他一分非自。如薩婆多對數論立我意實有。說意為實兩不相符。立我實有符他一分。有符自一分非他。如薩婆多對大乘立我及極微二俱實有。我體實有兩不相符。極微有實符自一分。有俱符一分。如薩婆多對勝論立自性及聲二俱無常。自性無常兩不相符。聲是無常兩符一分。有俱不符一分。如薩婆多對大乘立我體實有。此諸句中符他兩符全分一分皆是此過。符自全分。或是真宗。並俱不符。或是所別能別不成。俱不極成。違教等過。皆如理思。論中但依兩俱全分相符極成以示其法。余令準悉。問此九過中頗有現量相違。亦比量相違耶。乃至有現量相違。亦相符極成耶。如是現量一個有八四句。如是比量一個有七。乃至俱不極成一個有一。合三十六一個四句。答此九過中有自他共不共全分一分。由是綺互各為四句。有是違現非比。如聲非所聞。有違比非現。如說瓶常。有違現亦比。如小乘師對大乘立觸處諸色非定心得。有違現非自教。如違他現非違自教。有違自教非現。如勝論師立聲是常。有違現亦自教。諸違自現必違自教故。有違現非世間。如違自現非非學世間。有違世間非現。如說懷兔非月。有違現亦世間。如說聲非所聞。有違現非自語。如違他現。有違自語非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 都不相符。例如，順世論者（Lokāyata，古印度唯物主義學派）對佛教的『業』（karma，行為）和『滅壞』（destruction，消滅）的觀點提出異議。 一部分四句式（tetralemma，四句判斷）是：有一部分符合對方，但不符合自己。例如，一切有部（Sarvāstivāda，佛教部派）針對順世論者提出『意』（manas，意識）是真實存在的。認為『意』是真實存在的，這兩種觀點並不相符。提出『我』（ātman，靈魂）真實存在，這符合對方的一部分觀點。 有一部分符合自己，但不符合對方。例如，一切有部針對大乘佛教（Mahāyāna，佛教宗派）提出『我』和『極微』（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）都是真實存在的。『我』的本體真實存在，這兩種觀點並不相符。『極微』是真實存在的，這符合自己的一部分觀點。 有一部分是互相符合的。例如，一切有部針對勝論派（Vaiśeṣika，古印度哲學流派）提出『自性』（prakṛti，本性）和『聲』（śabda，聲音）都是無常的。『自性』是無常的，這兩種觀點並不相符。『聲』是無常的，這符合一部分觀點。 有一部分是完全不相符的。例如，一切有部針對大乘佛教提出『我』的本體是真實存在的。在這些論述中，符合對方的，無論是符合全部還是符合一部分，都是這種過失。符合自己的全部，或許是真正的宗旨。完全不相符的，或許是所別（distinction，區別）和能別（differentiator，區分者）不能成立，或者是一切都不極成（asiddha，未證實），以及違背教義等等過失，都應該如理思維。論中只是依據兩方完全相符且極成的情況來展示其方法，其餘的可以類推得知。 問：這九種過失中，有沒有與現量（pratyakṣa，直接感知）相違背的，或者與比量（anumāna，推理）相違背的呢？乃至有沒有與現量相違背，也相符合且極成的呢？像這樣，現量一個有八種四句式，比量一個有七種，乃至一切都不極成的一個有一種，總共三十六個四句式。 答：這九種過失中，有自、他、共、不共，全分、一部分。因此，互相交錯，各有四句式。有的是違背現量而非比量，例如『聲音不是所聞』。有的是違背比量而非現量，例如說『瓶子是常』。有的是既違背現量也違背比量，例如小乘佛教的論師針對大乘佛教提出『觸處』（sparśa-āyatana，觸覺的場所）的諸色（rūpa，顏色）並非一定與心相應。 有的是違背現量而非自己的教義，例如違背對方的現量而非違背自己的教義。有的是違背自己的教義而非現量，例如勝論派認為『聲音是常』。有的是既違背現量也違背自己的教義，因為凡是違背自己現量的，必定違背自己的教義。有的是違背現量而非世間共識，例如違背自己的現量而非非學習者的世間共識。有的是違背世間共識而非現量，例如說『月亮里有兔子』。有的是既違背現量也違背世間共識，例如說『聲音不是所聞』。有的是違背現量而非自己的言語，例如違背對方的現量。有的是違背自己的言語而非
【English Translation】 English version None of them agree. For example, the Lokāyata (ancient Indian materialistic school) opposes the Buddhist views on 'karma' (action) and 'destruction'. One type of tetralemma (four-cornered argument) is: one part agrees with the other side, but not with oneself. For example, the Sarvāstivāda (a Buddhist school) argues against the Lokāyata by asserting that 'manas' (mind, consciousness) is real. The view that 'manas' is real is not in agreement. Asserting that 'ātman' (self, soul) is real agrees with a part of the other side's view. One part agrees with oneself, but not with the other side. For example, the Sarvāstivāda argues against the Mahāyāna (a Buddhist school) by asserting that both 'ātman' and 'paramāṇu' (ultimate particle, the smallest unit of matter) are real. The statement that the 'ātman' is real is not in agreement. The statement that 'paramāṇu' is real agrees with a part of one's own view. One part is mutually agreeable. For example, the Sarvāstivāda argues against the Vaiśeṣika (ancient Indian philosophical school) by asserting that both 'prakṛti' (nature, essence) and 'śabda' (sound) are impermanent. The statement that 'prakṛti' is impermanent is not in agreement. The statement that 'śabda' is impermanent agrees with a part of the view. One part is completely disagreeable. For example, the Sarvāstivāda argues against the Mahāyāna by asserting that the essence of 'ātman' is real. In these arguments, agreeing with the other side, whether in whole or in part, is a fault. Agreeing with oneself entirely might be the true doctrine. Completely disagreeing might mean that the distinction (distinction) and differentiator (differentiator) cannot be established, or that everything is unproven (asiddha), and there are faults such as contradicting the teachings. All of these should be considered with reason. The treatise only demonstrates the method based on the case where both sides completely agree and are proven, and the rest can be inferred. Question: Among these nine faults, are there any that contradict direct perception (pratyakṣa) or inference (anumāna)? Or even any that contradict direct perception but also agree and are proven? In this way, direct perception has eight types of tetralemmas, inference has seven, and the case where everything is unproven has one, totaling thirty-six tetralemmas. Answer: Among these nine faults, there are self, other, common, uncommon, whole part, and partial part. Therefore, they are intertwined, each having four possibilities. Some contradict direct perception but not inference, such as 'sound is not audible'. Some contradict inference but not direct perception, such as saying 'a pot is permanent'. Some contradict both direct perception and inference, such as when a Hīnayāna (small vehicle) teacher argues against Mahāyāna by asserting that the colors (rūpa) of the 'sparśa-āyatana' (sense-sphere of touch) are not necessarily associated with the mind. Some contradict direct perception but not one's own doctrine, such as contradicting the other's direct perception but not one's own doctrine. Some contradict one's own doctrine but not direct perception, such as when the Vaiśeṣika school believes that 'sound is permanent'. Some contradict both direct perception and one's own doctrine, because whatever contradicts one's own direct perception necessarily contradicts one's own doctrine. Some contradict direct perception but not worldly consensus, such as contradicting one's own direct perception but not the worldly consensus of non-learners. Some contradict worldly consensus but not direct perception, such as saying 'there is a rabbit in the moon'. Some contradict both direct perception and worldly consensus, such as saying 'sound is not audible'. Some contradict direct perception but not one's own words, such as contradicting the other's direct perception. Some contradict one's own words but not
現。如說一切言皆是妄。有違現亦自語。如違自現必違自教自語。有違現非能別不成。如聲非所聞。有能別不成非違現。如對數論立聲滅壞。有違現亦能別不成。如唯違自現及他能別不成。若違共現能別必成故。有違現非所別不成。如聲非所聞。有所別不成非違現。如對佛弟子說我是思。有違現亦所別不成。如違自現亦所別不成。若違共現所別必成故。有違現非俱不成。如聲非所聞。有俱不成非違現。如對佛法說我以為和合因緣。有違現亦俱不成。如違自現他俱不成。若違共現他俱必成故。有違現非相符。如聲非所聞。有相符非違現。如聲所聞。有違現亦相符。如違自現有符他義。如勝論立覺樂等德。非我境界。若違共現必非相符故。如是乃至有俱不成非相符。如對佛法說我以為和合因緣。有相符非俱不成。如聲是所聞。有俱不成亦相符。謂自兩俱不成亦相符他故。如是合有三十六四句。頗有現量相違亦比量自教相違。如以現量合二有二十八四句。以比量合二有二十一四句。自教合二有十五四句。世間合二有十種四句。自語合二有六四句。能別合二有三四句。所別合二有一四句。如是三合總有八十四種四句。頗有現量相違。亦比量自教世間相違耶。如以現量合三有二十一四句。比量合三有十五四句。自教合三或有十種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 現在，如果說一切言論都是虛妄的，那麼就違背了現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知），也違背了自己的言論。如果違背了自己的現量，必定違背了自己的教義和自己的言論。有些違背現量的情況，不能作為能別（distinguisher，區分者）而成立，例如聲音不是所聞。有些不能作為能別而成立的情況，並非違背現量，例如針對數論者（Samkhya）主張聲音是滅壞的。有些違背現量的情況，也不能作為能別而成立，例如僅僅違背了自己的現量，並且不能作為他人的能別而成立。如果違背了共同的現量，那麼能別必定成立。有些違背現量的情況，不能作為所別（distinguished，被區分者）而成立，例如聲音不是所聞。有些不能作為所別而成立的情況，並非違背現量，例如對佛陀的弟子說『我是思』。有些違背現量的情況，也不能作為所別而成立，例如違背了自己的現量，並且不能作為所別而成立。如果違背了共同的現量，那麼所別必定成立。有些違背現量的情況，並非兩者都不能成立，例如聲音不是所聞。有些兩者都不能成立的情況，並非違背現量，例如對佛法說『我認為和合是因緣』。有些違背現量的情況，兩者都不能成立，例如違背了自己的現量，並且他人的觀點也不能成立。如果違背了共同的現量，那麼他人的觀點必定成立。有些違背現量的情況，並非相符，例如聲音不是所聞。有些相符的情況，並非違背現量，例如聲音是所聞。有些違背現量的情況，也相符，例如違背了自己的現量，但符合他人的意義，例如勝論者（Vaisheshika）主張覺、樂等德不是我的境界。如果違背了共同的現量，必定不相符。像這樣，乃至有些兩者都不能成立的情況，並非相符，例如對佛法說『我認為和合是因緣』。有些相符的情況，並非兩者都不能成立，例如聲音是所聞。有些兩者都不能成立的情況，也相符，指的是自己的兩種觀點都不能成立，但也符合他人的觀點。像這樣，總共有三十六種四句式。有沒有與現量相違，也與比量（Anumana，推理）、自教（自己的教義）相違的情況呢？例如用現量組合兩個，有二十八種四句式。用比量組合兩個，有二十一種四句式。用自教組合兩個，有十五種四句式。用世間（普遍認知）組合兩個，有十種四句式。用自語（自己的言論）組合兩個，有六種四句式。用能別組合兩個，有三種四句式。用所別組合兩個，有一種四句式。像這樣，三種組合總共有八十四種四句式。有沒有與現量相違，也與比量、自教、世間相違的情況呢？例如用現量組合三個，有二十一種四句式。用比量組合三個，有十五種四句式。用自教組合三個，或許有十種
【English Translation】 English version Now, if it is said that all speech is false, then it contradicts Pratyaksha (direct perception), and also contradicts one's own speech. If one contradicts one's own Pratyaksha, one will certainly contradict one's own doctrine and one's own speech. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha cannot be established as a distinguisher (distinguisher), for example, sound is not heard. Some cases that cannot be established as a distinguisher do not contradict Pratyaksha, for example, against the Samkhya (Samkhya) who argue that sound is destructible. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha cannot be established as a distinguisher, for example, only contradicting one's own Pratyaksha, and cannot be established as another's distinguisher. If the common Pratyaksha is contradicted, then the distinguisher will certainly be established. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha cannot be established as the distinguished (distinguished), for example, sound is not heard. Some cases that cannot be established as the distinguished do not contradict Pratyaksha, for example, saying to the Buddha's disciples 'I am thought'. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha cannot be established as the distinguished, for example, contradicting one's own Pratyaksha, and cannot be established as the distinguished. If the common Pratyaksha is contradicted, then the distinguished will certainly be established. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha are not both unestablished, for example, sound is not heard. Some cases where both are unestablished do not contradict Pratyaksha, for example, saying to the Dharma 'I think combination is the cause'. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha, both are unestablished, for example, contradicting one's own Pratyaksha, and the views of others cannot be established. If the common Pratyaksha is contradicted, then the views of others will certainly be established. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha are not consistent, for example, sound is not heard. Some cases that are consistent do not contradict Pratyaksha, for example, sound is heard. Some cases of contradicting Pratyaksha are also consistent, for example, contradicting one's own Pratyaksha, but consistent with the meaning of others, for example, the Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika) argue that perception, pleasure, etc. are not my realm. If the common Pratyaksha is contradicted, it will certainly not be consistent. Like this, even to the point where some cases where both are unestablished are not consistent, for example, saying to the Dharma 'I think combination is the cause'. Some cases that are consistent are not both unestablished, for example, sound is heard. Some cases where both are unestablished are also consistent, referring to one's own two views being unestablished, but also consistent with the views of others. Like this, there are a total of thirty-six types of four-part formulas. Is there a case where it contradicts Pratyaksha, and also contradicts Anumana (inference), one's own doctrine? For example, using Pratyaksha to combine two, there are twenty-eight types of four-part formulas. Using Anumana to combine two, there are twenty-one types of four-part formulas. Using one's own doctrine to combine two, there are fifteen types of four-part formulas. Using the world (universal cognition) to combine two, there are ten types of four-part formulas. Using one's own speech to combine two, there are six types of four-part formulas. Using the distinguisher to combine two, there are three types of four-part formulas. Using the distinguished to combine two, there is one type of four-part formula. Like this, the total of three combinations is eighty-four types of four-part formulas. Is there a case where it contradicts Pratyaksha, and also contradicts Anumana, one's own doctrine, the world? For example, using Pratyaksha to combine three, there are twenty-one types of four-part formulas. Using Anumana to combine three, there are fifteen types of four-part formulas. Using one's own doctrine to combine three, there may be ten types
四句。世間合三有六四句。自語合三有三四句。能別合三有一四句。如是四合總有五十六種四句。頗有現量相違。亦比量自教世間自語相違耶。如以現量合四有十五四句。比量合四有十種四句。自教合四有六四句。世間合四有三四句。自語合四有一四句。如是五合總有三十五種四句。頗有現量相違。亦比量自教世間自語相違能別不極成耶。如以現量合五有十種四句。比量合五有六四句。自教合五有三四句。世間合五有一四句。如是六合總有二十種四句。頗有現量相違。亦比量自教世間自語相違所別能別不成耶。如以現量合六有六四句。比量合六有三四句。自教合六有一四句。如是七合總有十種四句。頗有現量相違。亦比量自教世間自語相違能別所別俱不成耶。如以現量合七有三四句。比量合七有一四句。如是八合有四四句。頗有現量相違。亦餘八過耶。如是九合有一四句。上來二合乃至八合。有二百一十種四句。並前一個三十六種四句。總計合二百四十六種四句。前云且答現量一個八種四句。此論所說現量相違有四過合。現量自教世間自語。比量亦四。比量自教世間自語。自教亦四。自教比量世間自語。世間二違。世間比量。或加自教。或加自語。自語亦四。自語比量自教世間。能別不成唯一能別。雖違他教。作他比
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 四句（Sì jù）：世間（Shìjiān，世俗）合三有六十四句（Sì jù）。自語（Zì yǔ，自相矛盾）合三有三四句。能別（Néng bié，能區分）合三有一四句。如此四合總共有五十六種四句。是否有現量（Xiànliàng，現量，直接感知）相違，也與比量（Bǐliàng，比量，推理）、自教（Zì jiào，自教，自身教義）、世間（Shìjiān，世俗）、自語（Zì yǔ，自相矛盾）相違呢？ 如以現量合四有十五四句。比量合四有十種四句。自教合四有六四句。世間合四有三四句。自語合四有一四句。如此五合總共有三十五種四句。是否有現量相違，也與比量、自教、世間、自語相違，能別不極成（Néng bié bù jí chéng，能區分不完全）呢？ 如以現量合五有十種四句。比量合五有六四句。自教合五有三四句。世間合五有一四句。如此六合總共有二十種四句。是否有現量相違，也與比量、自教、世間、自語相違，所別（Suǒ bié，所區分）能別不成（Néng bié bù chéng，能區分不成立）呢？ 如以現量合六有六四句。比量合六有三四句。自教合六有一四句。如此七合總共有十種四句。是否有現量相違，也與比量、自教、世間、自語相違，能別所別俱不成（Néng bié suǒ bié jù bù chéng，能區分和所區分都不成立）呢？ 如以現量合七有三四句。比量合七有一四句。如此八合有四四句。是否有現量相違，也與其餘八過（Yú qí bā guò，其餘八種過失）呢？ 如此九合有一四句。上面二合乃至八合，有二百一十種四句。加上前面一個三十六種四句，總計合二百四十六種四句。前面說暫且回答現量一個八種四句。此論所說現量相違有四過合：現量、自教、世間、自語。比量也有四：比量、自教、世間、自語。自教也有四：自教、比量、世間、自語。世間有兩種相違：世間、比量，或者加上自教，或者加上自語。自語也有四：自語、比量、自教、世間。能別不成只有能別。即使違揹他教（Tā jiào，其他教義），作為他比（Tā bǐ，其他比量）。
【English Translation】 English version Fourfold negations (Sì jù): The combination of the mundane (Shìjiān, worldly) and the three existences yields sixty-four fourfold negations (Sì jù). Self-contradiction (Zì yǔ, self-contradictory statements) combined with the three existences yields three fourfold negations. Distinguishability (Néng bié, ability to distinguish) combined with the three existences yields one fourfold negation. Thus, these four combinations result in a total of fifty-six types of fourfold negations. Is there any contradiction with direct perception (Xiànliàng, direct perception), and also with inference (Bǐliàng, inference), one's own teachings (Zì jiào, one's own teachings), the mundane (Shìjiān, worldly), and self-contradiction (Zì yǔ, self-contradictory statements)? For example, combining direct perception with four yields fifteen fourfold negations. Inference combined with four yields ten types of fourfold negations. One's own teachings combined with four yields six fourfold negations. The mundane combined with four yields three fourfold negations. Self-contradiction combined with four yields one fourfold negation. Thus, these five combinations result in a total of thirty-five types of fourfold negations. Is there any contradiction with direct perception, and also with inference, one's own teachings, the mundane, and self-contradiction, where distinguishability is incomplete (Néng bié bù jí chéng, distinguishability is incomplete)? For example, combining direct perception with five yields ten types of fourfold negations. Inference combined with five yields six fourfold negations. One's own teachings combined with five yields three fourfold negations. The mundane combined with five yields one fourfold negation. Thus, these six combinations result in a total of twenty types of fourfold negations. Is there any contradiction with direct perception, and also with inference, one's own teachings, the mundane, and self-contradiction, where the distinguished (Suǒ bié, what is distinguished) and distinguishability are not established (Néng bié bù chéng, distinguishability is not established)? For example, combining direct perception with six yields six fourfold negations. Inference combined with six yields three fourfold negations. One's own teachings combined with six yields one fourfold negation. Thus, these seven combinations result in a total of ten types of fourfold negations. Is there any contradiction with direct perception, and also with inference, one's own teachings, the mundane, and self-contradiction, where both distinguishability and what is distinguished are not established (Néng bié suǒ bié jù bù chéng, both distinguishability and what is distinguished are not established)? For example, combining direct perception with seven yields three fourfold negations. Inference combined with seven yields one fourfold negation. Thus, these eight combinations yield four fourfold negations. Is there any contradiction with direct perception, and also with the remaining eight faults (Yú qí bā guò, the remaining eight faults)? Thus, these nine combinations yield one fourfold negation. The combinations from two to eight above yield two hundred and ten types of fourfold negations. Adding the previous thirty-six types of fourfold negations, the total is two hundred and forty-six types of fourfold negations. Previously, it was said to temporarily answer one eightfold fourfold negation regarding direct perception. This treatise states that contradictions with direct perception have four fault combinations: direct perception, one's own teachings, the mundane, and self-contradiction. Inference also has four: inference, one's own teachings, the mundane, and self-contradiction. One's own teachings also have four: one's own teachings, inference, the mundane, and self-contradiction. The mundane has two contradictions: the mundane and inference, or adding one's own teachings, or adding self-contradiction. Self-contradiction also has four: self-contradiction, inference, one's own teachings, and the mundane. Non-establishment of distinguishability only has distinguishability. Even if it contradicts other teachings (Tā jiào, other teachings), it serves as another inference (Tā bǐ, other inference).
量皆非失故。所別不成唯一所別。或加比量。彼我非思。許是我故。如勝論我。俱不極成唯違自一。或加比量。彼我非和合因緣許是我故。如數論我。相符唯一。謂自相符。如是總說有二違一。能別相符。有二違二。所別及俱不極成。有四違四。現量比量自教自語。其世間相違不定或二。或三。或四。如前總為四類。如上所說九種過中。或少或多。如各自處。且為大例。一一過中有自他俱不俱全分一分二種四句。以現量中初違自現。對比量中違自比為四句云。有違自全現非違自全比量。有違自全比非違自全現。有違自全現亦違自全比。有非違自全現亦非違自全比。為初四句。其比量中既有八句。如自現相對為四句。以現量中餘七。對比量中八句。各為四句亦爾。如是比量相對為句。計有六十四種四句。如是以現量八句。乃至對相符極成八句合計既現量八句一個有八類六十四種四句。合成五百一十二種四句。以比量句對餘七種六十四種四句。合成四百四十八種四句。自教對餘六種六十四句。合成三百八十四種四句。世間對餘五種六十四句。合成三百二十種四句。自語對餘四種六十四句。合成二百五十六種四句。能別對餘三種六十四句。合成一百九十二種四句。所別對餘二種六十四句。合成一百二十八種四句。俱不極成對
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：數量都不是缺失的原因。所區分的不是唯一的所區分者。或者加上比量（anumana，推理）。『彼』（para，他者）和『我』（atman，自我）不是可以思考的。因為許可是『我』的緣故。就像勝論（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）的『我』。兩者都不極成（aprasiddha，未被證實），僅僅是違背自身。或者加上比量。『彼』和『我』不是和合因緣，因為許可是『我』的緣故。就像數論（Samkhya，印度哲學流派）的『我』。相符是唯一的。所謂自身相符。像這樣總的說來，有二種違背『一』。能區分者相符，有二種違背『二』。所區分者以及兩者都不極成，有四種違背『四』。現量（pratyaksha，現量）、比量、自教（svagama，自身教義）、自語（svavacana，自身言論）。其世間相違是不定的，或者二種，或者三種，或者四種。像前面總共分為四類。像上面所說的九種過失中，或者少，或者多。像各自所處的位置。且作為大的例子。每一個過失中，有自、他、俱、不俱、全分、一分、二種四句。 以現量中最初違背自身現量。對比量中違背自身比量為四句說：有違背自身全部現量，不是違背自身全部比量。有違背自身全部比量，不是違背自身全部現量。有違背自身全部現量，也違背自身全部比量。有沒有違背自身全部現量，也沒有違背自身全部比量。作為最初的四句。其比量中已經有八句。像自身現量相對為四句。以現量中其餘七種，對比量中八句。各自作為四句也是這樣。像這樣比量相對作為句，計算有六十四種四句。像這樣以現量八句。乃至對相符極成八句合計，既然現量八句一個有八類六十四種四句，合成五百一十二種四句。以比量句對剩餘七種六十四種四句，合成四百四十八種四句。自教對剩餘六種六十四句，合成三百八十四種四句。世間對剩餘五種六十四句，合成三百二十種四句。自語對剩餘四種六十四句，合成二百五十六種四句。能別對剩餘三種六十四句，合成一百九十二種四句。所別對剩餘二種六十四句，合成一百二十八種四句。俱不極成對...
【English Translation】 English version: Quantity is not the reason for non-loss. What is distinguished is not the only distinguished thing. Or add inference (anumana). 'That' (para) and 'self' (atman) are not thinkable. Because permission is the reason for 'self'. Like the 'self' of Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy). Neither is unestablished (aprasiddha), only contradicting itself. Or add inference. 'That' and 'self' are not the cause of combination, because permission is the reason for 'self'. Like the 'self' of Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy). Agreement is unique. So-called self-agreement. Thus, in general, there are two contradictions to 'one'. The distinguisher agrees, there are two contradictions to 'two'. The distinguished and both are unestablished, there are four contradictions to 'four'. Perception (pratyaksha), inference, self-doctrine (svagama), self-utterance (svavacana). Its worldly contradiction is uncertain, either two, or three, or four. Like the previous total is divided into four categories. Like the nine kinds of faults mentioned above, either few or many. Like their respective locations. And as a big example. In each fault, there are four sentences of self, other, both, not both, whole part, one part, two kinds. In perception, the initial contradiction to self-perception. Comparing the inference to the contradiction to self-inference as four sentences: There is a contradiction to the entire self-perception, not a contradiction to the entire self-inference. There is a contradiction to the entire self-inference, not a contradiction to the entire self-perception. There is a contradiction to the entire self-perception, and also a contradiction to the entire self-inference. There is no contradiction to the entire self-perception, and there is no contradiction to the entire self-inference. As the initial four sentences. There are already eight sentences in the inference. Like self-perception relative to four sentences. With the remaining seven types in perception, comparing the eight sentences in inference. Each as four sentences is also the same. Like this, inference relative as a sentence, calculating there are sixty-four kinds of four sentences. Like this, with eight sentences of perception. Even against the eight sentences of agreement established, since one of the eight sentences of perception has eight types of sixty-four kinds of four sentences, synthesizing five hundred and twelve kinds of four sentences. With the inference sentence against the remaining seven types of sixty-four kinds of four sentences, synthesizing four hundred and forty-eight kinds of four sentences. Self-doctrine against the remaining six types of sixty-four sentences, synthesizing three hundred and eighty-four kinds of four sentences. The world against the remaining five types of sixty-four sentences, synthesizing three hundred and twenty kinds of four sentences. Self-utterance against the remaining four types of sixty-four sentences, synthesizing two hundred and fifty-six kinds of four sentences. The distinguisher against the remaining three types of sixty-four sentences, synthesizing one hundred and ninety-two kinds of four sentences. The distinguished against the remaining two types of sixty-four sentences, synthesizing one hundred and twenty-eight kinds of four sentences. Both are unestablished against...
餘一種六十四句。總計合有二千三百四種四句。是句非句。準前八句。各如理思。恐憂文繁。所以略止。
論。如是多言是遣諸法自相門故不容成故立無果故。名似立宗過。
述曰。此第三段隨指釋結。如是多言。牒前九過。下之三故。釋過所由。名似立宗。總結成也。是遣諸法自相門故。釋立初五相違所由。此中意說。宗之有法名為自相。局附自體不共他故。立敵證智名之為門。由能照顯法自相故。立法有法。擬生他順智。今標宗義。他智解返生。異智既生。正解不起。無由照解所立宗義。故名遣門。又則自相名之為門以能通生敵證智故凡立宗義能生他智可名為門。前五立宗不令自相。正生敵證真智解故。名遣諸法自相之門。不容成故容謂可有。宗依無過。宗可有成。依既不成。更須成立。故所立宗不容成也。故似宗內。立次三過。立無果者。果謂果利。對敵申宗。本爭先競。返順他義。所立無果。由此相符亦為過失。結此九過名似立宗。然雜集論第十六云。立宗者。謂以所應成。自所許義。宣示於他。令彼解了。此簡五失。師子覺說。若不言以所應成者。自宗已成。而說示他。應名立宗。此言意說。若非今競所應成義。但說自宗先已成義。應名立宗。若不言自所許義者。說示他宗所應成義應名立宗。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：還有一種六十四句的偈頌。總計共有二千三百四種四句偈。這些是句子還是非句子，參照前面的八句偈頌，各自如理思維。恐怕文字過於繁瑣，所以略微停止。
論：像這樣多餘的言語，是因為捨棄了諸法（dharma）的自相之門，所以不能成立，因此成立了沒有結果，這被稱為『似立宗過』。
述曰：這是第三段，隨著指出的內容解釋並總結。『如是多言』，是指前面九種過失。下面的三個『故』，解釋了產生過失的原因。『名似立宗』，是總結性的陳述。『是遣諸法自相門故』，解釋了成立最初五個相違的原因。這裡的意思是說，宗（thesis）的有法（dharma）被稱為自相，因為它侷限於自身，不與他者共有。立敵證智（establishing opposing proof）被稱為門，因為它能夠照亮並顯示法的自相。立法有法，是爲了引發他人的順應智慧。現在標立宗義，他人的智慧反而產生相反的理解。既然產生了不同的理解，正確的理解就無法產生，也就無法照亮和理解所立的宗義，所以稱為『遣門』。或者說，自相被稱為門，因為它能夠引導產生敵人的證明智慧。凡是成立宗義能夠產生他人智慧的，都可以稱為門。前面的五個立宗，沒有讓自相真正產生敵人的證明智慧，因此稱為『捨棄諸法自相之門』。『不容成故』，『容』指的是可能存在。宗依（basis of the thesis）沒有過失，宗就可以成立。如果宗依不能成立，就需要進一步成立，所以所立的宗不能成立。因此在『似宗』中，成立了接下來的三個過失。『立無果者』，『果』指的是果利（benefit）。對敵人陳述宗，本來是爲了爭論和競爭，結果反而順應了對方的觀點，所立的宗沒有結果。由此相符也是一種過失。總結這九種過失，稱為『似立宗』。然而，《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第十六卷說：『立宗者，謂以所應成，自所許義，宣示於他，令彼解了。』這是爲了簡略五種過失。師子覺（Simhabodhi）說，如果不說『以所應成者』，那麼自己的宗已經成立，而說給他人，也應該稱為立宗。這裡的意思是說，如果不是現在爭論所應該成立的意義，只是說自己宗派先前已經成立的意義，也應該稱為立宗。如果不說『自所許義者』，那麼說給他人宗派所應該成立的意義，也應該稱為立宗。
【English Translation】 English version: There is another kind with sixty-four lines. In total, there are two thousand three hundred and four kinds of four-line verses. Whether these are sentences or non-sentences, refer to the previous eight lines and contemplate each according to reason. Fearing that the text would be too verbose, I will stop here.
Treatise: Such excessive words are because they abandon the gate of self-characteristics of all dharmas (dharmas), so they cannot be established, and therefore establish no result, which is called 'semblance of establishing a thesis' (siddhānta-ābhāsa).
Commentary: This is the third section, explaining and concluding based on the indicated content. 'Such excessive words' refers to the previous nine faults. The following three 'because' explain the reasons for the faults. 'Called semblance of establishing a thesis' is a concluding statement. 'Because it abandons the gate of self-characteristics of all dharmas' explains the reasons for establishing the first five contradictions. The meaning here is that the dharma (dharma) of the thesis (paksha) is called self-characteristic (svalakshana), because it is limited to itself and not shared with others. Establishing opposing proof (pratipaksha-sadhana) is called a gate, because it can illuminate and reveal the self-characteristic of the dharma. Establishing the dharma has the purpose of eliciting others' conforming wisdom. Now, by stating the meaning of the thesis, others' wisdom instead produces the opposite understanding. Since different understandings have arisen, the correct understanding cannot arise, and thus cannot illuminate and understand the established thesis, so it is called 'abandoning the gate'. Or rather, the self-characteristic is called a gate, because it can guide the production of the enemy's proof wisdom. All those who establish a thesis that can produce others' wisdom can be called a gate. The previous five establishments of the thesis did not allow the self-characteristic to truly produce the enemy's proof wisdom, so it is called 'abandoning the gate of self-characteristics of all dharmas'. 'Cannot be established because', 'can' refers to possibility. If the basis of the thesis (paksha-dharma) has no faults, the thesis can be established. If the basis of the thesis cannot be established, it needs to be further established, so the established thesis cannot be established. Therefore, in 'semblance of a thesis', the next three faults are established. 'Establishing without result', 'result' refers to benefit. Stating the thesis to the enemy is originally for argument and competition, but it instead conforms to the other party's view, and the established thesis has no result. This conformity is also a fault. Concluding these nine faults is called 'semblance of establishing a thesis'. However, the sixteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Establishing a thesis means declaring to others what should be accomplished, the meaning that one oneself accepts, so that they may understand it.' This is to simplify the five faults. Simhabodhi (Simhabodhi) said that if one does not say 'what should be accomplished', then one's own thesis is already established, and saying it to others should also be called establishing a thesis. The meaning here is that if it is not the meaning that should be established in the current argument, but only saying the meaning that one's own school has already established, it should also be called establishing a thesis. If one does not say 'the meaning that one oneself accepts', then saying to others the meaning that their school should establish should also be called establishing a thesis.
此二以簡相符極成。若不言他者。獨唱此言應名立宗。今要有敵亦為九過。彼說無敵亦為過故。若不言宣示者。以身表示此義應名立宗。以言能立不待身故。若如提婆破外道義。動身令解亦名破他。若不言令他解了者。聽者未解此義應名立宗。即除相符。攝餘八過。他皆未解皆非真宗。或此闕無能立亦非所競之宗。他未解故。或猶預宗。他未解故。隨其所應。九過中攝。準因當知。若如所安立無一切過量故。建立我法自性若有若無。我法差別遍不遍等。具足前相。是名立宗。若準彼文。過多於此。第三第四。或並第五少分。此中無故。
論。已說似宗當說似因。
述曰。下解似因。文分為二。初結前生后。后依標正解。此初也。
論。不成不定及與相違是名似因。
述曰。下依標釋為二。初列三名。后隨別釋。此初也。能立之因不能成宗。或本非因不成因義。名為不成。或成所立。或同異宗。無楷準名不定。能立之因違害宗義。返成異品名相違。雖因三相隨應有過。俱不能成宗。應皆名不成。若后二相俱有俱無。異全同分。同全異分。俱分難準不能定成一宗。令義無所決斷。與名不決定若后二相。同無異遍異分同無。不成所立。返成異品。與名相違。若是初相。于宗有失。不能成宗。無別勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這兩種情況都以簡要的方式符合了『極成宗』（Siddha-siddhānta，已成立的宗義）。如果不說其他，僅僅宣唱這個言論就應該被稱作『立宗』（sthāpanā，宗義的建立）。現在如果要有論敵，也會有九種過失。因為對方說沒有論敵也是一種過失。如果不通過言語宣示，而是通過身體來表示這個意義，也應該被稱作『立宗』，因為通過言語就能成立，不需要身體。如果像提婆（Deva，論師名）那樣爲了讓外道理解而動用身體，也叫做破斥他人。如果不通過言語讓對方理解，聽者沒有理解這個意義，也應該被稱作『立宗』，這樣就排除了『相符』，包含了其餘八種過失。他人都沒有理解，都不是真正的『宗』（Siddhānta，宗義）。或者這裡缺少能立（sādhana，能成立的理由），也不是所要爭論的『宗』，因為他人沒有理解。或者屬於猶豫宗（saṃśaya-siddhānta，猶豫不決的宗義），因為他人沒有理解。根據具體情況，包含在九種過失中。根據『因』（hetu，理由）可以知道。如果像所安立的那樣，沒有一切過失，建立我法（ātma-dharma，自身和法的自性）的自性，無論是有還是無，我法差別（ātma-dharma-viśeṣa，自身和法的差別）的周遍或不周遍等，都具備前面的相狀，這就叫做『立宗』。如果按照那篇文章，過失比這裡更多，第三第四，或者包括第五少部分，這裡沒有這些過失。 論：已經說了『似宗』（宗的相似），應當說『似因』（因的相似）。 述曰：下面解釋『似因』。文章分為兩部分。首先是總結前面，引出後面。然後是根據標題正式解釋。這是第一部分。 論：不成（asiddha，不成立）、不定（anaikāntika，不確定）以及相違（viruddha，相違背）是名為『似因』。 述曰：下面根據標題解釋，分為兩部分。首先是列出三個名稱。然後是分別解釋。這是第一部分。能成立的『因』不能成立『宗』，或者本來不是『因』，不成立『因』的意義，名為『不成』。或者成立所立，或者對於同類和異類沒有標準，名為『不定』。能成立的『因』違背『宗』的意義，反而成立異品，名為『相違』。即使『因』的三相（trairūpya，因的三種特徵）隨應有過失，都不能成立『宗』，都應該叫做『不成』。如果后兩個相狀（pakṣadharmatva, sapakṣasattva, vipakṣāsattva，因存在於宗所法，存在於同品，不存在於異品）既有又有，異類完全相同，同類完全相異，既有部分相同，難以確定，不能確定成立一個『宗』，使得意義沒有決斷，與『不定』這個名稱相符。如果后兩個相狀，同類沒有，異類周遍，異類部分相同，同類沒有，不能成立所立，反而成立異品，與『相違』這個名稱相符。如果是第一個相狀（pakṣadharmatva，因存在於宗所法），對於『宗』有缺失，不能成立『宗』，沒有其他殊勝之處。
【English Translation】 English version: These two cases conform to the 'Siddha-siddhānta' (established tenet) in a concise manner. If nothing else is said, merely chanting this statement should be called 'sthāpanā' (establishment of a tenet). Now, if there is an opponent, there will also be nine faults. Because the opponent saying there is no opponent is also a fault. If it is not declared through speech, but the meaning is expressed through the body, it should also be called 'sthāpanā', because it can be established through speech, without needing the body. If, like Deva (name of a logician), the body is used to make the heretics understand, it is also called refuting others. If the other party is not made to understand through speech, and the listener does not understand this meaning, it should also be called 'sthāpanā', thus excluding 'conformity' and including the remaining eight faults. If others do not understand, it is not a true 'Siddhānta' (tenet). Or if there is a lack of 'sādhana' (means of proof) here, it is not the 'Siddhānta' to be argued, because others do not understand. Or it belongs to 'saṃśaya-siddhānta' (tenet of doubt), because others do not understand. According to the specific situation, it is included in the nine faults. It can be known according to 'hetu' (reason). If, like what is established, there are no faults, establishing the nature of 'ātma-dharma' (self and dharma), whether it exists or not, the pervasiveness or non-pervasiveness of 'ātma-dharma-viśeṣa' (distinction of self and dharma), etc., all possess the preceding characteristics, this is called 'sthāpanā'. If according to that article, there are more faults than here, the third and fourth, or including a small part of the fifth, these faults are not present here. Treatise: Having spoken of 'Siddhānta-ābhāsa' (semblance of a tenet), 'hetvābhāsa' (semblance of a reason) should be spoken of. Commentary: The following explains 'hetvābhāsa'. The text is divided into two parts. First, summarizing the previous and introducing the following. Then, formally explaining according to the title. This is the first part. Treatise: 'Asiddha' (unestablished), 'anaikāntika' (uncertain), and 'viruddha' (contradictory) are called 'hetvābhāsa'. Commentary: The following explains according to the title, divided into two parts. First, listing the three names. Then, explaining them separately. This is the first part. The 'hetu' that can establish cannot establish the 'Siddhānta', or it is not originally a 'hetu', and the meaning of 'hetu' is not established, called 'asiddha'. Or it establishes what is to be established, or there is no standard for similar and dissimilar classes, called 'anaikāntika'. The 'hetu' that can establish contradicts the meaning of the 'Siddhānta', and instead establishes the opposite, called 'viruddha'. Even if the three characteristics of 'hetu' (trairūpya, three characteristics of a reason) have faults accordingly, they cannot establish the 'Siddhānta', and should all be called 'asiddha'. If the latter two characteristics (pakṣadharmatva, sapakṣasattva, vipakṣāsattva, the presence of the reason in the subject, its presence in similar instances, and its absence in dissimilar instances) are both present, the dissimilar class is completely the same, the similar class is completely different, and some parts are the same, it is difficult to determine, and it cannot be determined to establish a 'Siddhānta', making the meaning undecided, conforming to the name 'anaikāntika'. If the latter two characteristics, the similar class is absent, the dissimilar class is pervasive, the dissimilar class is partially the same, and the similar class is absent, it cannot establish what is to be established, and instead establishes the opposite, conforming to the name 'viruddha'. If it is the first characteristic (pakṣadharmatva, the presence of the reason in the subject), there is a deficiency in the 'Siddhānta', and it cannot establish the 'Siddhānta', without any other special qualities.
用。與名不成。若因自不成名不成。非不能成宗名不成者。因是誰因。言自不成。離宗獨說有因。可因自不成因既是宗因。有過不能堪為因。明知不能成宗名不成。又若因自不成名不成。亦應喻自不成名不成。非不能成宗因名不成。能立不成等。便徒施設。又文說不成之義。皆因於宗不成。故知不成非自不成。是故應如此中所說。或理釋言。因之與喻並自不成。兩俱非因。隨一非因。于因生疑。因無所依。喻無能立。或無所立。或二俱無。義不明顯。體不成喻。由此因喻並自不成。理亦無失。
論。不成有四一兩俱不成二隨一不成三猶預不成四所依不成。
述曰。下隨別釋有三。初不成。次不定。后相違。初文有二。初標數列名。后隨列別釋。此初也。凡立比量。因后宗前。將已極成。成未共許。彼此俱謂因於有法非有。不能成宗。故名兩俱不成。一許一不許因於有法有。非兩俱極成。故名隨一不成。說因依有法。決定可成宗。說因既猶預。其宗不定成。名猶預不成。無因依有法。有法通有無。有因依有法。有法唯須有。因依有法無。無依因不立。名所依不成。故初相過。立此四種。
論。如成立聲為無常等若言是眼所見性故兩俱不成。
述曰。別釋為四。初二句宗。次二句因。后一句結。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果『因』（hetu，理由、原因）本身不能成立，那麼就不能成立『名』（nāma，名稱、術語）。如果因為『自』（svabhāva，自性、本性）不能成立，『名』就不能成立，那麼就不能成立『宗』（pakṣa，論題、主張），『名』也不能成立。『因』是誰的『因』？如果說『自』不能成立，離開『宗』單獨說有『因』，可以因為『因』本身不能成立，『因』既然是『宗』的『因』，有過失就不能作為『因』，明明知道不能成立『宗』，『名』就不能成立。又如果『因』本身不能成立，『名』就不能成立，也應該『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子、比喻）本身不能成立，『名』也不能成立，不能成立『宗』，『因』的『名』也不能成立，能立（sādhana，能證明者）不能成立等等，就只是徒勞的施設。而且文中所說不能成立的意義，都是因為『宗』不能成立。所以知道不能成立不是『自』不能成立。因此應該如此中所說，或者用道理來解釋說，『因』和『喻』都本身不能成立，兩者都不是『因』。隨便一個不能成立，對於『因』產生懷疑，『因』沒有所依賴的，『喻』沒有能成立的，或者沒有所要成立的，或者兩者都沒有，意義不明顯，體不能成立『喻』。由此『因』、『喻』都本身不能成立，道理也沒有缺失。
論：不成有四種：一、兩俱不成；二、隨一不成；三、猶豫不成；四、所依不成。
述曰：下面隨著類別解釋有三種：首先是不成，其次是不定，然後是相違。首先的文有兩部分：首先是標出數列出名稱，然後是隨著列出的名稱分別解釋。這是開始的部分。凡是建立比量（anumāna，推理），『因』在『宗』之後，將已經極度成立的，用來成立未被共同認可的。彼此都認為『因』在有法（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）上沒有，不能成立『宗』，所以叫做『兩俱不成』。一個認可一個不認可，『因』在有法上有，不是兩者都極度成立，所以叫做『隨一不成』。說『因』依賴於有法，決定可以成立『宗』。說『因』既然猶豫不定，它的『宗』就不確定成立，叫做『猶豫不成』。沒有『因』依賴於有法，有法可以是有也可以是無。有『因』依賴於有法，有法就必須有。『因』依賴於有法沒有，沒有所依賴的『因』就不能成立，叫做『所依不成』。所以首先有過失，立這四種。
論：例如成立『聲』（śabda，聲音）是無常（anitya，無常）等等，如果說『是眼所見性故』，就是兩俱不成。
述曰：分別解釋為四部分：首先兩句是『宗』，其次兩句是『因』，最後一句是結論。
【English Translation】 English version: If the 'hetu' (reason, cause) itself cannot be established, then the 'nāma' (name, term) cannot be established. If because the 'svabhāva' (self-nature, inherent nature) cannot be established, the 'nāma' cannot be established, then the 'pakṣa' (thesis, proposition) cannot be established, and the 'nāma' also cannot be established. Whose 'hetu' is it? If it is said that the 'svabhāva' cannot be established, speaking of 'hetu' separately from the 'pakṣa', it can be because the 'hetu' itself cannot be established. Since the 'hetu' is the 'hetu' of the 'pakṣa', having faults, it cannot serve as a 'hetu'. Clearly knowing that the 'pakṣa' cannot be established, the 'nāma' cannot be established. Furthermore, if the 'hetu' itself cannot be established, the 'nāma' cannot be established, it should also be that the 'dṛṣṭānta' (example, analogy) itself cannot be established, and the 'nāma' also cannot be established. Not being able to establish the 'pakṣa', the 'nāma' of the 'hetu' also cannot be established, the 'sādhana' (means of proof) cannot be established, etc., then it is just a futile arrangement. Moreover, the meaning of not being able to establish, as stated in the text, is all because the 'pakṣa' cannot be established. Therefore, it is known that not being able to establish is not because the 'svabhāva' cannot be established. Therefore, it should be as said in this, or explained with reason, that both the 'hetu' and the 'dṛṣṭānta' themselves cannot be established, and neither of them is a 'hetu'. If any one of them cannot be established, doubt arises regarding the 'hetu'. The 'hetu' has nothing to rely on, the 'dṛṣṭānta' has nothing to establish, or has nothing to be established, or both have nothing. The meaning is not clear, the substance cannot establish the 'dṛṣṭānta'. Therefore, both the 'hetu' and the 'dṛṣṭānta' themselves cannot be established, and there is no loss of reason.
Treatise: There are four types of unestablishedness: 1. Both are unestablished; 2. One of them is unestablished; 3. Uncertain unestablishedness; 4. Basis unestablished.
Commentary: The following explains according to the categories, there are three: first, unestablishedness; second, uncertainty; and third, contradiction. The first text has two parts: first, listing the names in sequence; and second, explaining each name listed separately. This is the beginning part. In establishing inference (anumāna), the 'hetu' is after the 'pakṣa', using what is already extremely established to establish what is not commonly accepted. Both sides consider that the 'hetu' does not exist on the 'dharmin' (subject possessing the property), and cannot establish the 'pakṣa', so it is called 'both are unestablished'. One accepts and one does not accept, the 'hetu' exists on the 'dharmin', it is not extremely established by both, so it is called 'one of them is unestablished'. Saying that the 'hetu' relies on the 'dharmin', it can definitely establish the 'pakṣa'. Saying that the 'hetu' is uncertain, its 'pakṣa' is not certainly established, it is called 'uncertain unestablishedness'. There is no 'hetu' relying on the 'dharmin', the 'dharmin' can be existent or non-existent. If the 'hetu' relies on the 'dharmin', the 'dharmin' must exist. If the 'hetu' relies on the 'dharmin' and it does not exist, the 'hetu' without a basis cannot be established, it is called 'basis unestablished'. Therefore, there is a fault in the beginning, establishing these four types.
Treatise: For example, establishing that 'sound' (śabda) is impermanent (anitya), etc., if it is said 'because it is visible to the eye', it is both unestablished.
Commentary: Explaining separately in four parts: first, the two sentences are the 'pakṣa'; second, the two sentences are the 'hetu'; and last, the one sentence is the conclusion.
如勝論對聲論立聲無常宗。眼所見因。凡宗法因。必兩俱許。依宗有法。而成隨一不共許法。今眼見因。勝聲二論。皆不共許聲有法有。非但不能成宗。自亦不成因義。立敵俱不許。名為俱不成。此不成因。依有有法。合有四句。一有體全分兩俱不成。如論所說。二無體全分兩俱不成。如聲論師對佛弟子立聲是常。實句攝故。此實攝因。兩說無體。共說于彼有法無故。三有體一分兩俱不成。如立一切聲皆常宗。勤勇無間所發性因。立敵皆許此因。于彼外聲無故。四無體一分兩俱不成。如聲論師對佛弟子說聲常宗。實句所攝。耳所取因。耳所取因。立敵皆許于聲上有。實句所攝一分因言。兩俱無故。于聲不轉。此四皆過。不成宗故。論眼見因。不但成聲無常為失。成聲之上無漏等義。一切為過。故宗云等。
論。所作性故對聲顯論隨一不成。
述曰。初一句因體。次一句辯宗。后一句結過。能立共許。不須更成。可成所立。既非共許。應更須成。故非能立。宗與前同。故唯敘因。若勝論師對聲顯論。立聲無常。所作性因。其聲顯論。說聲緣顯。不許緣生。所作既生。由斯不許。故成隨一。非為共因。問亦有傳釋。所作通顯。云何此因名為隨一。答依文釋義。深達聖情。理外浪加。未可依據。此之所作。對聲
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果勝論（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派）用『眼所見』作為理由來論證聲音是無常的，這就是建立了一個『聲無常宗』（聲音是無常的論點）。一般來說，一個宗（paksha，論點）的成立，其所依賴的法（dharma，性質）和因（hetu，理由）必須是雙方都認可的。依據宗所具有的法，會形成隨一不共許法（svaika asiddha，理由不被雙方共同認可）。現在，『眼所見』這個理由，勝論和聲論（Shabda，主張聲音永恒的學派）都不共同認可聲音具有『有』（bhava，存在）這個法。這不僅不能成立宗，自身也無法成立因的意義。立論者和對方都不認可的，稱為『俱不成』（ubhayasiddha，雙方都不認可）。這種不成因，依據『有有法』（bhava dharma，具有存在的性質），可以組合成四種情況： 一、有體全分兩俱不成。就像論中所說的那樣。 二、無體全分兩俱不成。比如聲論師對佛弟子說『聲音是常』，因為『實句所攝』（屬於實在的範疇）。這個『實攝因』，雙方都認為沒有實體，因為雙方都認為在那個有法（dharmin，具有性質的事物）上不存在。 三、有體一分兩俱不成。比如立論『一切聲音都是常』，理由是『勤勇無間所發性』（由不間斷的努力產生）。立論者和對方都認可這個理由，但在外聲（bahya shabda，外部的聲音）上不存在。 四、無體一分兩俱不成。比如聲論師對佛弟子說『聲音是常』，理由是『實句所攝』，並且用『耳所取』（耳朵所感知）作為因。『耳所取』這個因，立論者和對方都認可在聲音上存在，但『實句所攝』這個一部分的因，雙方都不認可，因此在聲音上無法成立。這四種情況都是過失，因為無法成立宗。所以，用『眼所見』作為理由，不僅會造成聲音無常的過失，還會造成聲音之上沒有無漏等意義的過失，一切都是過失。所以宗才說『等』。
論：因為『所作性』（krtakatva，被製造的性質），所以對聲顯論（Shabda Advaita，主張聲音非二元的學派）來說，隨一不成。
述曰：第一句是關於因的本體，第二句是辯論宗，最後一句是總結過失。能立（sadhana，成立論證的手段）如果是雙方都認可的，就不需要再成立。可以成立的是所立（sadhya，需要成立的論點），如果不是雙方都認可的，就應該進一步成立，所以不是能立。宗和前面相同，所以只敘述因。如果勝論師對聲顯論立論『聲音是無常』，理由是『所作性』。聲顯論認為聲音是緣顯（pratyaya，條件）所顯現，不認可緣生（pratityasamutpada，緣起）。『所作』既然是生，因此不認可。所以會成為隨一，不是共同的因。有人傳釋說『所作』是普遍顯現的，為什麼這個因被稱為隨一呢？回答是，應該依據經文來解釋意義，深刻理解聖人的心意，在道理之外隨意新增，是不可靠的。這個『所作』，對於聲音...
【English Translation】 English version: If the Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy) establishes the doctrine that sound is impermanent (shabda anitya宗) using 'being seen by the eye' as the reason (hetu因), then this establishes the 'sound is impermanent' thesis. Generally, for a thesis (paksha宗) to be established, the property (dharma法) and the reason (hetu因) upon which it relies must be accepted by both parties. Based on the property possessed by the thesis, a svaika asiddha (隨一不共許法, a reason not commonly accepted by both parties) is formed. Now, the reason 'being seen by the eye,' neither the Vaisheshika nor the Shabda (聲論, the school that asserts the eternality of sound) schools commonly accept that sound possesses the property of 'being' (bhava有). This not only fails to establish the thesis but also fails to establish the meaning of the reason itself. What is not accepted by both the proponent and the opponent is called 'ubhayasiddha' (俱不成, not accepted by both parties). This kind of unestablished reason, based on 'bhava dharma' (有有法, the property of having being), can be combined into four cases: 1. Both the substance and the entirety are not established by both parties. As stated in the treatise. 2. Neither the substance nor the entirety are established by both parties. For example, when a Shabda proponent tells a Buddhist disciple that 'sound is eternal' because it is 'included in the category of reality' (實句所攝). This 'real inclusion reason' (實攝因) is considered to have no substance by both parties because both parties agree that it does not exist in that dharmin (有法, the subject possessing the property). 3. The substance exists, but a part of it is not established by both parties. For example, if one asserts 'all sounds are eternal' with the reason 'being produced by uninterrupted effort' (勤勇無間所發性). The proponent and the opponent both accept this reason, but it does not exist in external sound (bahya shabda外聲). 4. Neither the substance nor a part of it is established by both parties. For example, when a Shabda proponent tells a Buddhist disciple that 'sound is eternal' because it is 'included in the category of reality' and uses 'being perceived by the ear' (耳所取) as the reason. The proponent and the opponent both accept that the reason 'being perceived by the ear' exists in sound, but the part of the reason 'being included in the category of reality' is not accepted by both parties, so it cannot be established in sound. These four cases are all faults because they cannot establish the thesis. Therefore, using 'being seen by the eye' as the reason not only causes the fault of sound being impermanent but also causes the fault that there is no unconditioned meaning, etc., above sound; everything is a fault. That is why the thesis says 'etc.'
Treatise: Because of 'being produced' (krtakatva所作性), it is svaika asiddha (隨一不成) for the Shabda Advaita (聲顯論, the school that asserts the non-duality of sound).
Commentary: The first sentence is about the substance of the reason, the second sentence is about debating the thesis, and the last sentence is about summarizing the faults. If the sadhana (能立, the means of establishing the argument) is accepted by both parties, then there is no need to establish it further. What can be established is the sadhya (所立, the point to be established), and if it is not accepted by both parties, then it should be further established, so it is not the sadhana. The thesis is the same as before, so only the reason is described. If the Vaisheshika proponent argues to the Shabda Advaita proponent that 'sound is impermanent' with the reason 'being produced,' the Shabda Advaita proponent believes that sound is manifested by conditions (pratyaya緣顯) and does not accept dependent origination (pratityasamutpada緣起). Since 'being produced' is produced, it is therefore not accepted. Therefore, it becomes svaika asiddha and is not a common reason. Some transmissions explain that 'being produced' is universally manifested; why is this reason called svaika asiddha? The answer is that the meaning should be interpreted according to the scriptures, deeply understanding the mind of the sages; adding things arbitrarily outside of reason is unreliable. This 'being produced,' for sound...
顯論不成。故所作言。必唯生義。此隨一因於有有法。略有八句。一有體他隨一。如論所說。二有體自隨一。如聲顯論對佛弟子。立聲為常所作性故。三無體他隨一。如勝論師對諸聲論。立聲無常德句所攝故。聲論不許有德句故。四無體自隨一。如聲論師對勝論。立聲是常。德句攝故。五有體他一分隨一。如大乘師對聲論者。立聲無常。佛五根取故。大乘佛等諸根互用。于自可成。於他一分四根不取。六有體自一分隨一。如聲論師對大乘者。立聲為常。說次前因。七無體他一分隨一。如勝論師對聲論者。立聲無常。德句所攝耳根取故。耳根取因。兩皆許轉。德句攝因。他一分不成。八無體自一分隨一。如聲論師對勝論者。立聲為常。說次前因。此中諸他隨一全句。自比量中說自許言。諸自隨一全句。他比量中說他許言。一切無過。有簡別故。若諸全句。無有簡別。及一分句。一切為過。如攝大乘論說。諸大乘經皆是佛說。一切不違補特伽羅無我理故。如增一等。此對他宗有隨一失。他宗不許大乘不違無我理故。說有常我為真理故。設許不違亦有不定。六足等論。皆不違故。而為不定。故有大名居士。聲德獨高。道穎五天。芳傳四主。時賢不敢斥其尊德。號曰抱蹉迦。此云食邑。學藝超群。理當食邑。即勝軍論師也。四
十餘年立一比量云。諸大乘經皆佛說宗。兩俱極成非諸佛語所不攝故因。如增一等阿笈摩喻。注在唯識抉擇中。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝者。立敵共許非佛語所不攝。即非外道及六足等教之所攝故。時久流行。無敢徴詰。大師至彼而難之曰。且發智論薩婆多師自許佛說。亦余小乘及大乘者。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝。豈汝大乘許佛說耶。又誰許大乘兩俱極成非佛語所不攝。是諸小乘及諸外道。兩俱極成非佛語所攝。唯大乘者許非彼攝。因犯隨一。若以發智亦入宗中違自教。因犯一分兩俱不成。因不在彼發智宗故。不以為宗。故有不定。小乘為不定言。為如自許發智。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故。汝大乘教非佛語耶。為如增一等。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故。汝大乘教並佛語耶。若立宗為如發智。極成非佛語所不攝。薩婆多等便違自宗。自許是佛語故。故為不定言。為如自許發智。極成非佛語所不攝。彼大乘非佛語耶。以不定中亦有自他及兩俱過。今與大乘為自不定故。由此大師正彼因云。自許極成非佛語所不攝故。簡彼發智等非自許故。便無茲失。唯識亦言。諸大乘經至教量攝。樂大乘者許能顯示無顛倒理契經攝故。如增一等。以諸因中皆應簡別。並如前說。
論。于霧等性起疑惑時為成大種和合火有而有所說猶預不成
。
述曰。初四句顯宗。次一句因體。后一句結過。西方濕熱。地多叢草。既足虻蚊。又豐煙霧時有遠望。屢生疑惑。為塵為煙。為蚊為霧。由此論文于霧等性。火有二種。一者性火。如草木中極微火大。二者事火。炎熱騰焰。煙照飛煙。其前性火。觸處可有。立乃相符。其後事火。有處非有。故今建立。凡諸事火。要有地火為質為依。風飄動焰。水加流潤。故名成大種和合火有。有彼火故。如有多人遠共望彼。或霧或塵。或煙或蚊。皆共疑惑。其間或立有事火宗云。彼所見煙等下。似有事火。而有說者。謂立彼因。理門論云。以現煙故。喻如廚等。此因不但立者自惑不能成宗。亦令敵者于所成宗疑惑不定。夫立共因。成宗不共。欲令敵證決定智生。于宗共有疑。故言于霧等性起疑惑時。更說疑因。不成宗果。決智不起。是故為過。此有六句。一兩俱全分猶預。如論所說。于因宗內雖皆生疑。成宗不決。故但因過。二兩俱一分猶預。如有立敵俱于近處見煙決定。遠處霧等疑惑不定。便立量云。彼近遠處定有事火。以有煙等故。如廚等中。近處一分見煙決定。遠處一分俱說疑故。三隨他一全分猶預。如有立者。從遠處來。見定是煙。敵者疑惑。立初全分比量。四隨自一全分猶預。如有敵者。從遠處來。見煙決定。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：最初的四句經文闡明了宗旨（顯宗），接下來的句子說明了原因（因體），最後一句總結了過失（結過）。西方地區潮濕炎熱，地面多是茂密的草叢，既有充足的蚊虻，又有濃厚的煙霧，時常有遠望的情況，因此屢次產生疑惑，分不清是塵土還是煙霧，是蚊蟲還是霧氣。因此，本文討論關於霧等事物的性質。火有兩種：一種是自性之火（性火），例如草木中極其微小的火的本性；另一種是現象之火（事火），是炎熱升騰的火焰、煙照和飛煙。之前的自性之火，到處都可能存在，建立起來是相符的。之後的現象之火，有些地方有，有些地方沒有，所以現在建立。凡是現象之火，必須要有地火作為本質和依靠。風吹動火焰，水增加流動和滋潤，所以說是由四大種（地、水、火、風）和合而成的火。因為有這種火，所以如果有多人從遠處一起觀看，對於那裡的東西是霧還是塵土，是煙還是蚊蟲，都會共同產生疑惑。其中，如果有人建立現象之火的宗（事火宗），說『他們所看到的煙等事物下面，好像有現象之火』，而有解說者說，建立這個因（因明）時，理門論中說，『因為有顯現的煙的緣故，比如廚房等』。這個因不僅讓立論者自己迷惑，不能成立宗，也讓對方對於所要成立的宗產生疑惑和不定。建立共同的因，來成立不共同的宗，想要讓對方產生決定的智慧，卻對於宗有共同的疑惑，所以說在對於霧等性質產生疑惑的時候，再說疑惑的因，不能成立宗的果，決定的智慧不能產生，所以這是過失。這裡有六句：一、立敵雙方都完全猶豫不決（兩俱全分猶預），就像論中所說，在因和宗之內都產生懷疑，不能確定宗，所以只是因的過失。二、立敵雙方都有一部分猶豫不決（兩俱一分猶預），例如，立論者和對方都對於近處看到的煙確定無疑，對於遠處的霧等事物疑惑不定，於是建立量式說：『那近處和遠處一定有現象之火，因為有煙等事物的緣故，比如廚房等』。近處一部分看到煙確定無疑，遠處一部分都說疑惑不定。三、隨對方一方完全猶豫不決（隨他一全分猶預），例如，立論者從遠處來，確定看到的是煙，對方疑惑不定，建立最初完全的比量。四、隨自己一方完全猶豫不決（隨自一全分猶預），例如，對方從遠處來，確定看到的是煙。
【English Translation】 English version: Statement: The first four sentences clarify the doctrine (顯宗, xiǎn zōng - revealing the doctrine). The next sentence explains the reason (因體, yīn tǐ - the body of the cause). The last sentence concludes the fault (結過, jié guò - concluding the fault). The Western regions are humid and hot, with abundant grass. There are plenty of mosquitoes and gnats, and thick fog. Distant views are common, leading to frequent doubts, unable to distinguish between dust and smoke, mosquitoes and fog. Therefore, this text discusses the nature of things like fog. There are two types of fire: one is inherent fire (性火, xìng huǒ - nature fire), such as the extremely subtle fire element within plants; the other is phenomenal fire (事火, shì huǒ - event fire), which is the blazing flame, smoke, and flying embers. The former, inherent fire, can be found everywhere, and its establishment is consistent. The latter, phenomenal fire, exists in some places but not others, so it is now established. All phenomenal fire must have earth fire as its essence and reliance. Wind moves the flame, and water adds flow and moisture, so it is said that fire is formed by the combination of the four great elements (地, dì - earth, 水, shuǐ - water, 火, huǒ - fire, 風, fēng - wind). Because of this fire, if many people view something from afar together, they will all have doubts about whether it is fog or dust, smoke or mosquitoes. Among them, if someone establishes the thesis of phenomenal fire (事火宗, shì huǒ zōng - event fire thesis), saying, 'Below the smoke and other things they see, there seems to be phenomenal fire,' and someone explains that when establishing this cause (因明, yīnmíng - hetu-vidya), the Nyaya-mukha-sastra says, 'Because there is visible smoke, like in a kitchen.' This cause not only confuses the proponent himself, making it impossible to establish the thesis, but also makes the opponent doubtful and uncertain about the thesis to be established. Establishing a common cause to establish an uncommon thesis, wanting to make the opponent generate decisive wisdom, but having common doubts about the thesis, so it is said that when doubts arise about the nature of fog and other things, further stating the cause of doubt cannot establish the result of the thesis, and decisive wisdom cannot arise, so this is a fault. There are six sentences here: 1. Both the proponent and the opponent are completely hesitant (兩俱全分猶預, liǎng jù quán fēn yóuyù - both sides fully hesitant), as the treatise says, doubts arise within both the cause and the thesis, and the thesis cannot be determined, so it is only a fault of the cause. 2. Both the proponent and the opponent are partially hesitant (兩俱一分猶預, liǎng jù yī fēn yóuyù - both sides partially hesitant), for example, the proponent and the opponent are certain about the smoke seen nearby, but uncertain about the fog and other things in the distance, so they establish the syllogism saying: 'There must be phenomenal fire in the near and far places, because there are smoke and other things, like in a kitchen.' The nearby part sees the smoke with certainty, and the distant part both say they are uncertain. 3. Following the opponent, one side is completely hesitant (隨他一全分猶預, suí tā yī quán fēn yóuyù - following the other side, one side fully hesitant), for example, the proponent comes from afar and is certain that what they see is smoke, but the opponent is uncertain, establishing the initial complete syllogism. 4. Following oneself, one side is completely hesitant (隨自一全分猶預, suí zì yī quán fēn yóuyù - following oneself, one side fully hesitant), for example, the opponent comes from afar and is certain that what they see is smoke.
立者疑惑。立初全分比量。五隨他一一分猶預如有立者。于近遠處。見煙決定。敵者近定。遠處有疑。立第二一分比量。六隨自一一分猶預如有敵者。俱于近遠。見煙決定。立者近定。遠處有疑。立第二一分比量。能別所別總別猶預各有六句。謂兩俱全分。及一分隨他。及自各全一分。合成十八句。如於角決定。于牛有疑。或於火決定。于煙有疑。或二俱疑故。別於三事。並生猶預不過六因。故唯說六句。問此宗此因俱有疑惑。因名猶預。宗何過耶。答若所別定。即是能別猶預不成。若能別定。即是所別猶預不成。互生疑故。互決定故。若兩俱疑。即是兩俱俱不極成。若隨一疑。即是隨一俱不極成。前似宗中。但說所依無體俱不極成。義準亦有有體猶預俱不極成。不生自他決定智故。或此亦是自語相違。言似煙等。云何可言定有事火。定有事火。云何可言彼似煙等。或此亦是相符極成。他本生疑。符彼疑故。獨法合法。兩俱隨一全分一分。言相違故。順符彼故。
論。虛空實有德所依故對無空論所依不成。
述曰。初一句宗。次一句因。次一句敵。后一句結。如勝論師對經部。立虛空實有宗。德所依因。凡法有法。必須極成。不更須成。宗方可立。況諸因者。皆是有法宗之法性。標空實有。有法已不成。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 立者（論證者）疑惑。立初全分比量（完全的比量）。五隨他一一分猶預（五種情況跟隨他人，各自一部分猶豫不決），如有立者（論證者）。于近遠處，見煙決定。敵者（反駁者）近處確定，遠處有疑。立第二一分比量（第二種一部分的比量）。六隨自一一分猶預（六種情況跟隨自己，各自一部分猶豫不決），如有敵者（反駁者）。俱于近遠，見煙決定。立者（論證者）近處確定，遠處有疑。立第二一分比量（第二種一部分的比量）。能別（能區分的特徵）所別（被區分的事物）總別（總體和個別）猶豫各有六句。謂兩俱全分（兩者都完全），及一分隨他（一部分跟隨他人），及自各全一分（各自完全一部分），合成十八句。如於角決定，于牛有疑。或於火決定，于煙有疑。或二俱疑故。別於三事，並生猶豫不過六因。故唯說六句。問此宗（論題）此因（理由）俱有疑惑，因名猶豫，宗（論題）何過耶？答若所別定，即是能別猶豫不成。若能別定，即是所別猶豫不成。互生疑故，互決定故。若兩俱疑，即是兩俱俱不極成（都不能成立）。若隨一疑，即是隨一俱不極成（都不能成立）。前似宗中，但說所依無體俱不極成（都不能成立）。義準亦有有體猶豫俱不極成（都不能成立）。不生自他決定智故。或此亦是自語相違。言似煙等，云何可言定有事火？定有事火，云何可言彼似煙等？或此亦是相符極成（相互符合而成立）。他本生疑，符彼疑故。獨法（獨特的性質）合法（共同的性質），兩俱隨一全分一分。言相違故，順符彼故。
論：虛空實有德所依故（虛空是真實存在的，因為它具有德性作為所依），對無空論所依不成（對於否定虛空存在的人來說，所依是不成立的）。
述曰：初一句宗（論題），次一句因（理由），次一句敵（反駁），后一句結（結論）。如勝論師對經部，立虛空實有宗（論題）。德所依因（理由）。凡法有法（任何事物和性質），必須極成（必須被普遍認可），不更須成（不需要進一步證明），宗（論題）方可立。況諸因者，皆是有法宗之法性。標空實有，有法已不成（有待證明），
【English Translation】 English version The proponent is in doubt. Establish the initial complete part of inference. The five follow others, each with a partial hesitation, as if there is a proponent. Regarding near and far places, the smoke is determined. The opponent determines the near place, but doubts the far place. Establish the second partial inference. The six follow oneself, each with a partial hesitation, as if there is an opponent. Both near and far places, the smoke is determined. The proponent determines the near place, but doubts the far place. Establish the second partial inference. The distinguishable (能別), the distinguished (所別), the general (總) and the specific (別) each have six sentences of hesitation. These are when both are complete, and a partial following of others, and each complete part of oneself, forming eighteen sentences. For example, being certain about the horns, but doubting the cow. Or being certain about the fire, but doubting the smoke. Or both are doubted. Distinguishing three things, hesitation arises for no more than six reasons. Therefore, only six sentences are spoken. Question: If both the thesis (宗) and the reason (因) are doubted, the reason is called hesitation, but what is the fault of the thesis (宗)? Answer: If the distinguished (所別) is determined, then the distinguishable (能別) cannot be hesitated. If the distinguishable (能別) is determined, then the distinguished (所別) cannot be hesitated. Because they mutually generate doubt, they mutually determine. If both are doubted, then both are unestablished. If one is doubted, then that one is unestablished. In the previous pseudo-thesis, only the unestablished basis is mentioned. By implication, there is also the established basis with hesitation that is unestablished. Because it does not generate decisive knowledge for oneself or others. Or this is also self-contradictory. Saying 'like smoke, etc.,' how can it be said that there is definitely fire? If there is definitely fire, how can it be said that it is 'like smoke, etc.'? Or this is also mutually established. Others originally doubt, conforming to their doubt. Unique properties (獨法) and common properties (合法), both complete and partial. Because the words contradict, they conform to them.
Treatise: 'Space is real because it is the basis of qualities (德所依故),' against those who deny space, the basis is unestablished.
Commentary: The first sentence is the thesis (宗), the second is the reason (因), the third is the opponent (敵), and the last is the conclusion (結). For example, the Vaisheshika (勝論師) establishes the thesis (宗) that 'space is real' against the Sautrantika (經部). The reason (因) is 'because it is the basis of qualities (德所依因).' Any dharma (法) with a property (有法) must be established (極成), and does not need further establishment (不更須成), only then can the thesis (宗) be established. Moreover, all reasons (因) are the nature of the dharma (法) of the thesis (宗). Declaring that space is real, the dharma (有法) is already unestablished.
更復說因。因依於何立。故對無空論。因所依不成。問勝論師說空有六德。數量別性合離與聲。經部不許。云何今說德所依故他隨一因。答示法舉略。非顯唯有所依不成。無他隨一。既具二過。體即隨一所依不成。問如前所說無為無因。今因既隨一無。依隨一無有法。何故說因無所依過。答宗因不極。須置簡言。不簡立以為宗。所別便成不極。說因依立。即成因過。況俱不極。無因更依不極有法。許是宗過非因過耶。雖說無為無因。不說兩皆無過。豈以有為有因。宗因有俱非失。如宗能別不成。因成有法自相相違。同喻亦有所立不成。異喻亦有所立不遣。何妨宗有所別不成。因是所依不成之過。然今此過。所依必無。能依之因有無不定。由此總有二類差別。一兩俱所依不成有三。一有體全分。如薩婆多對大乘師。立我者常住。識所緣故。所依我無。能依因有。二無體全分。如數論師對佛弟子。立我實有。德所依故。三有體一分。如勝論師對大乘者。立我業實。有動作故。此于業有。於我無故。二隨一所依不成有六。一有體他隨一。如數論師對佛弟子。立自性有。生死因故。二有體自隨一。如數論師對大乘者。立藏識常。生死因故。三無體他隨一。理門論說。或於是處有法不成。如成立我其體周遍。於一切處生樂等故。
數論雖立大乘不許。亦如此論所說者是。四無體自隨一。如經部師立此論義。五有體他一分隨一。如數論師對大乘者。立五大常。能生果故。四大生果。二俱可成。空大生果。大乘不許故。六有體自一分隨一。如大乘者對數論。立五大非常。能生果故。上來所說兩俱隨一二種不成。所依唯有。因通有無。然皆決定兩隨一無。所以並得能依有無以為諸句。猶預不成。所依能依。雖復皆有。因不決定。故總為句。不分有無。所依不成。所依唯無。能依通有。但兩俱隨一所依不成為句。故無他自無體隨一一分所依不成。若許自他少分。因於宗有。必非一分隨一所依不成。亦無猶預所依不成。后二不成。二種所依有無別故。二種能依疑定異故。所依若無。不猶預故。時或有釋。亦有猶預所依不成。疏既盛行。人多信學。依文誦習。未曾輒改。所作之法有法皆有。何名此過。請審詳之。問依論但說四全不成。何須強作多種分別。答論略示法。不必具陳。設文外加。亦何爽理。況有誠證。理門論中解不成已結云。如是所說一切品類。所有言詞皆非能立。若非如前種種差別。更說何法名為品類。故應如前差別分別。問諸兩俱不成。皆隨一不成耶。乃至諸猶預不成。皆所依不成耶。答此四皆別。兩俱必非隨一。二一相違故。亦非猶預。
定疑相返故。亦非所依。兩俱所依有。此所依無故。隨一不成亦非餘二。定疑異故。二種所依。有無異故。猶預不成亦非后一。疑決異故。此依陳那四不成說。若依古師外道因明。不成唯二。但立兩俱及隨一過。依彼所說兩俱隨一。因通疑定。所依通無。然彼兩俱不成。全分一分。若疑若定。合有九句。隨一不成。若自若他。全分一分。若疑若定。合十八句。由四不成一切合有二十七。故陳那以前。唯二大略。差別難知。所以開之。故今四因。體性無亂。因三相中初遍宗法。總成三句。一宗法而非遍。四不成中皆一分攝。合攝十二句。非遍非宗法。四不成中皆是全分。合攝十五句。如前已說。然上但說因於宗不成理。理實此因。于同異喻。隨應亦有四種不成。故理門論解不成已云。于其同品有非有等。亦隨所應當如是說。至下當知。然名不定及名相違。不名不成。問因於宗無。喻於二無。與名不成。何故宗于因喻上無。因於二喻無。不名不成。答成他名成。翻名不成。因本成宗。而非二喻。喻成宗因。非宗成二。本成事別。故翻名不成。異此不然。非名不成。問若爾。因過皆欲成宗。何故但一名為不成。答因雖三相。唯初一相正親成宗。翻名不成。余皆宗具。合二建宗。成宗義疏。故翻但名不定相違。各隨義親。以得
其稱。皆準此知。
論。不定有六一共二不共三同品一分轉異品遍轉四異品一分轉同品遍轉五俱品一分轉六相違決定。
述曰。下第二釋不定有三。初標。次列。后釋。此初二也。因三相中。后二相過。于所成宗及宗相違二品之中。不定成故。名為不定。若立一因。于同異品。皆有名共。皆無名不共。同分異全是第三。同全異分是第四。同異俱分是第五。若二別因。三相雖具。各自決定。成相違宗。令敵證智。不隨一定。名相違決定。初五過中。唯第二過。是因三相。第二相失。于宗同品非定有故。餘四皆是第三相失。謂于異品非遍無故。后一並非。至下當知。
論。此中共者如言聲常所量性故常無常品皆共此因是故不定。
述曰。下別顯六。初共有三。一標名舉宗因。二釋不定義。三指不定相。此初二也。如聲論者對佛法者。立聲常宗。心心所法所量度性為因。空等常法為同品。瓶等無常為異品。故釋共義。同異品中。此因皆遍。二共有故。名為不定。
論。為如瓶等所量性故聲是無常為如空等所量性故聲是其常。
述曰。指不定相。狹因能立。通成寬狹兩宗。故雖同品而言定有非遍寬因能立。唯成寬宗。今既以寬成狹。由此因便成共。共因不得成不共法。若有簡略。則便無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他們所說的，都應該按照這個原則來理解。
論：不決定因有六種：一是共有，二是二俱不共，三是同品一分轉異品遍轉，四是異品一分轉同品遍轉，五是俱品一分轉，六是相違決定。
述記：下面第二部分解釋不決定因，分為三個部分：首先是標出，其次是列舉，最後是解釋。這裡是前兩個部分。在因的三種性質中，后兩種性質有過失，因為對於所要成立的宗（結論）以及與宗相違背的兩種情況中，不能確定成立哪一種，所以叫做不決定。如果建立一個因，在同品和異品中，都有名稱叫做共有，都沒有名稱叫做不共。同品一部分，異品全部是第三種情況。同品全部，異品一部分是第四種情況。同品和異品都是一部分是第五種情況。如果有兩個不同的因，雖然三種性質都具備，但各自決定，成立相反的宗，使得對方的認知，不能隨之確定，叫做相違決定。前面的五種過失中，只有第二種有過失，是因的三種性質中，第二種性質缺失，因為在與宗相同的品類中，不是必然存在。其餘四種都是第三種性質缺失，因為在與宗相異的品類中，不是普遍不存在。最後一種不是，到後面會知道。
論：這種共有就像說，聲音是常，因為它是可量性（prameyatva）（可被量度的性質），所以常和無常的品類都共有這個因，因此是不決定的。
述記：下面分別顯示這六種情況。首先是共有，分為三個部分：一是標出名稱，舉出宗和因，二是解釋不決定的意義，三是指明不決定的相狀。這裡是前兩個部分。比如聲論者（Shabda theorists）針對佛法修行者，立論說聲音是常，以心和心所法所具有的可量度性作為原因。空等常法作為同品，瓶子等無常法作為異品。所以解釋共有的意義，在同品和異品中，這個原因都普遍存在，因為是二者共有的，所以叫做不決定。
論：因為像瓶子等一樣具有可量性，所以聲音是無常的；因為像虛空等一樣具有可量性，所以聲音是常的。
述記：指明不決定的相狀。狹窄的因能夠成立，普遍成立寬泛和狹窄兩種宗。所以即使是同品，也說是一定存在，而不是普遍存在。寬泛的因能夠成立，只能成立寬泛的宗。現在既然用寬泛的因來成立狹窄的宗，因此這個因就成了共有的。共有的因不能成立不共有的法。如果有所省略，那就沒有了。
【English Translation】 English version: What they say should all be understood according to this principle.
Treatise: Undetermined reasons are of six kinds: first, common; second, mutually uncommon; third, partially present in similar instances and universally present in dissimilar instances; fourth, partially present in dissimilar instances and universally present in similar instances; fifth, partially present in both similar and dissimilar instances; sixth, contradictory determination.
Commentary: The second part below explains the undetermined reason, divided into three parts: first, labeling; second, listing; and third, explaining. This is the first two parts. Among the three characteristics of a reason, the latter two characteristics have faults, because it cannot be determined which of the proposition to be established (paksha) and the opposite of the proposition is established, so it is called undetermined. If a reason is established, it is called 'common' if it exists in both similar and dissimilar instances, and it is called 'uncommon' if it does not exist in either. Partially present in similar instances and universally present in dissimilar instances is the third case. Universally present in similar instances and partially present in dissimilar instances is the fourth case. Partially present in both similar and dissimilar instances is the fifth case. If there are two different reasons, although all three characteristics are present, they each determine and establish contradictory propositions, causing the opponent's cognition to be uncertain, which is called contradictory determination. Among the first five faults, only the second has a fault, which is the loss of the second characteristic of the reason, because it is not necessarily present in the similar instances of the proposition. The remaining four are all losses of the third characteristic, because they are not universally absent in the dissimilar instances. The last one is not, as will be known later.
Treatise: This commonality is like saying that sound is permanent because it is measurable (prameyatva), so both permanent and impermanent categories share this reason, therefore it is undetermined.
Commentary: The following separately shows these six situations. First is commonality, divided into three parts: first, labeling the name, citing the proposition and the reason; second, explaining the meaning of undetermined; and third, indicating the appearance of undetermined. This is the first two parts. For example, the Shabda theorists, in response to Buddhist practitioners, argue that sound is permanent, using the measurability possessed by mind and mental factors as the reason. Permanent dharmas such as space are taken as similar instances, and impermanent dharmas such as bottles are taken as dissimilar instances. Therefore, explaining the meaning of commonality, this reason is universally present in both similar and dissimilar instances, because it is common to both, so it is called undetermined.
Treatise: Because it has measurability like bottles, sound is impermanent; because it has measurability like space, sound is permanent.
Commentary: Indicates the appearance of undetermined. A narrow reason can be established, universally establishing both broad and narrow propositions. Therefore, even if it is a similar instance, it is said to be necessarily present, but not universally present. A broad reason can be established, only establishing a broad proposition. Now that a broad reason is used to establish a narrow proposition, therefore this reason becomes common. A common reason cannot establish an uncommon dharma. If something is omitted, then there is nothing.
失。故理門云。諸有皆共。無簡別因。此唯于彼俱不相違。是疑因性。此說共不定。諸有立因。于同異品。皆共有性。無有簡別。如聲常宗。所量性因。二品皆有。然宗有二。一寬。二狹。如立聲無我名寬。聲外一切皆無我故。立聲無常為狹。除聲以外有常法故。因品亦二。所量所知所取等名寬。無有一法非所量等故。勤勇所作性等名狹。更有餘法非勤勇發非所作故。若立其狹常無常宗。說前寬因。同異二品因皆遍轉。故成不定。若望寬宗。其義可立。唯說狹因。可成狹宗。亦可成寬。異品無故。可成正因。如聲論師對勝論。立聲常為宗。耳心心所所量性故。猶如聲性。有此簡略。即便無失。故此與不共二不定差別。彼於一切品皆都無故。然諸比量。略有三種。一他。二自。三共。他比量中略有三共。自比共比。各三亦然。合有九共。今此舉三。恐文繁故。下皆準知。一他共。二自共。三共共。如以佛法破數論。云汝我無常。許諦攝故。如許大等。此他比量無常之宗。二十三諦為同品。以自性為異品。許諦攝因。于同異品皆悉遍有。故是他共。若不爾者。宗因喻等。皆有違于自教等失。數論計我我是常。許諦攝故。如許自性。此自比量立我常宗。自性為同。大等為異。許諦攝因。二皆遍轉。故是自共。如論所說。即是
【現代漢語翻譯】 失。因此，從理門的角度來說，『諸有皆共，無簡別因』（一切存在都是共同的，沒有區分的原因）。這僅僅是因為它與兩者都不矛盾，是懷疑的原因。這裡說的是共同不定。凡是作為論證原因的，在同品和異品中都具有共同的性質，沒有區分。例如，以『聲是常』為宗（命題），『所量性』為因（理由），在同品和異品中都存在。然而，宗有兩種：一種是寬泛的，一種是狹窄的。例如，如果立『聲是無我』，這是寬泛的，因為聲音之外的一切都是無我的。如果立『聲是無常』，這是狹窄的，因為除了聲音之外，還有常法存在。因品也有兩種：『所量』、『所知』、『所取』等是寬泛的，因為沒有一種法不是所量等的。『勤勇所作性』等是狹窄的，因為還有其他的法不是通過努力產生的，也不是被製造出來的。如果立狹窄的『常』或『無常』為宗，而使用前面寬泛的『因』，那麼這個『因』在同品和異品中都會普遍存在，因此就構成了不定。如果針對寬泛的『宗』，這個論證的意義是可以成立的。只有使用狹窄的『因』，才能成立狹窄的『宗』，也可以成立寬泛的『宗』，因為它沒有異品，可以成為正因。例如，聲論師（Shabda-vadins）針對勝論（Vaisheshika），立『聲是常』為宗，因為『耳、心、心所所量性』，就像聲音的性質一樣。有了這種簡略的說明，就不會有錯誤。因此，這與不共不定（Anavasthita）的區別在於，不共不定在一切品中都不存在。然而，各種比量（Anumana，推理），大致有三種：一是他比量（Parartha-anumana，為他人的推理），二是自比量（Svartha-anumana，為自己的推理），三是共比量（Ubhaya-anumana，共同的推理）。在他比量中，大致有三種共同的情況。自比量和共比量也各有三種。總共有九種共同的情況。現在這裡只舉出三種，因為恐怕文字過於繁瑣。下面的情況都可以以此類推。一是他共，二是自共，三是共共。例如，用佛法來駁斥數論（Samkhya），說：『你我都是無常的，因為是被許諦（許諦，Pradhana，自性）所包含的』，就像被許大（許大，Mahat，大覺）等所包含一樣。這個他比量中，『無常』是宗，二十三諦（二十三諦，the twenty-three principles）是同品，以自性（自性，Prakriti，本性）為異品。『許諦攝』這個因，在同品和異品中都普遍存在，所以是他共。如果不是這樣，那麼宗、因、喻等，都會有違背自己教義的過失。數論認為『我』是常的，因為『是被許諦所包含的』，就像被許自性所包含一樣。這個自比量立『我是常』為宗，自性為同品，大等為異品。『許諦攝』這個因，在兩者中都普遍存在，所以是自共。正如論中所說，就是這樣。
【English Translation】 Lost. Therefore, the principle gate says, 'All existences are common, without distinguishing causes.' This is only because it is not contradictory to either, and is a cause for doubt. This speaks of the common uncertain. All that is established as a cause has a common nature in both similar and dissimilar classes, without distinction. For example, with 'sound is permanent' as the thesis (宗, zong, proposition), 'being measurable' as the reason (因, yin, reason), it exists in both similar and dissimilar classes. However, there are two types of thesis: one broad and one narrow. For example, if 'sound is without self' is established, this is broad, because everything outside of sound is without self. If 'sound is impermanent' is established, this is narrow, because besides sound, there are permanent dharmas. There are also two types of cause class: 'measurable,' 'knowable,' 'graspable,' etc., are broad, because there is no dharma that is not measurable, etc. 'Produced by effort,' 'made,' etc., are narrow, because there are other dharmas that are not produced by effort or made. If the narrow 'permanent' or 'impermanent' is established as the thesis, and the preceding broad cause is used, then this cause will universally exist in both similar and dissimilar classes, thus constituting uncertainty. If directed towards the broad thesis, the meaning of this argument can be established. Only by using the narrow cause can the narrow thesis be established, and the broad thesis can also be established, because it has no dissimilar class, and can become a correct cause. For example, the Shabda-vadins (聲論師, shēng lùn shī, sound theorists) argue against the Vaisheshika (勝論, shèng lùn, particularist school), establishing 'sound is permanent' as the thesis, because of 'being measurable by ear, mind, and mental states,' just like the nature of sound. With this brief explanation, there will be no error. Therefore, this differs from the uncommon uncertain (不共不定, bù gòng bù dìng, Anavasthita), because the uncommon uncertain does not exist in any class. However, various inferences (比量, bǐ liàng, Anumana), roughly have three types: one is inference for others (他比量, tā bǐ liàng, Parartha-anumana), two is inference for oneself (自比量, zì bǐ liàng, Svartha-anumana), and three is common inference (共比量, gòng bǐ liàng, Ubhaya-anumana). In inference for others, there are roughly three common situations. Inference for oneself and common inference also each have three. In total, there are nine common situations. Now, only three are mentioned here, because it is feared that the text would be too cumbersome. The following situations can all be inferred by analogy. One is common for others, two is common for oneself, and three is common for both. For example, using Buddhism to refute Samkhya (數論, shù lùn, enumeration school), saying: 'You and I are both impermanent, because they are included by Pradhana (許諦, xǔ dì, Pradhana, primordial matter),' just like being included by Mahat (許大, xǔ dà, Mahat, the Great One), etc. In this inference for others, 'impermanence' is the thesis, the twenty-three principles (二十三諦, èr shí sān dì, the twenty-three principles) are the similar class, and Prakriti (自性, zì xìng, Prakriti, nature) is the dissimilar class. The cause 'included by Pradhana' universally exists in both similar and dissimilar classes, so it is common for others. If it were not so, then the thesis, reason, example, etc., would all have the fault of contradicting one's own teachings. Samkhya believes that 'self' is permanent, because 'it is included by Pradhana,' just like being included by Prakriti. This inference for oneself establishes 'self is permanent' as the thesis, Prakriti as the similar class, and Mahat, etc., as the dissimilar class. The cause 'included by Pradhana' universally exists in both, so it is common for oneself. As the treatise says, that is it.
共共也。
論。言不共者如說聲常所聞性故常無常品皆離此因常無常外余非有故是猶預因。
述曰。第二不共有三。一標名舉宗因。二釋不定義。三指不定相。此初二也。如聲論師對除勝論。立聲常宗。耳所聞性為因。此中常宗。空等為同品。電等為異品。所聞性因。二品皆離。于同異品皆非有故。離常無常。更無第三雙非二品。有所聞性故。釋不共云。離常無常二品之外。更無餘法是所聞性。故成猶預。不成所立常。亦不返成異品無常故。其勝論師亦立有聲性。謂同異性等。並所聞性。若對彼宗。非無同喻。故除勝論對立成過。
論。此所聞性其猶何等。
述曰。指不定相。猶者。如也。夫立論宗因喻能立。舉因無喻。因何所成。其何等。可舉方比。因既無方。明因不定。不能生他決定智故。問舉因能立。立未成宗。無喻順成。其宗不立。宗既順先不立。此因應非不定。答因闕同喻。宗義無能可成。亦不返成異宗。由此名為不定。非是定能成一宗義故。不與其定名。理門難云。理應四種名不定因。二俱有故。所聞云何。古因明師不許四外有此不共。故今難云。以理言之。除決定相違。餘四不定。于同異品。若遍不遍。皆悉俱有。可成異類法。故可名不定。今所聞性因。不可屬異類。無更所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
共相（Gongxiang）。
論：所謂『不共』，例如聲常論者說，『聲音是常住的』，理由是『因為它具有被聽聞的性質』。因此，常品和無常品都遠離這個原因。除了常和無常之外，沒有其他東西，所以這是一個猶豫因。
述記：第二種不共因有三個方面：一是標明名稱，舉出宗和因；二是解釋不定義的含義；三是指明不定的相狀。這裡是前兩個方面。例如，聲論師針對勝論派，立『聲音是常住的』這個宗，以『耳朵所聽聞的性質』作為理由。這裡，常宗，如空等，是同品；電等是異品。『所聞性』這個因，兩種品類都遠離它，因為它在同品和異品中都不存在。離開了常和無常，沒有第三種既非兩者都是又非兩者都不是的品類，具有『所聞性』。所以解釋不共因說，離開了常和無常這兩種品類之外，沒有其他法是『所聞性』，因此造成猶豫，不能成立所立的常宗，也不能反過來成立異品無常。如果勝論師也立『有聲性』，即同異性等，以及『所聞性』，那麼針對他們的宗，並非沒有同喻，所以針對勝論派立論就成了過失。
論：這個『所聞性』，它像什麼呢？
述記：這是指明不定的相狀。『猶』，是『如』的意思。建立論證，宗、因、喻能夠成立。如果舉出因卻沒有比喻，這個因靠什麼成立呢？它像什麼呢？可以舉出什麼來比較呢？因既然沒有方向，說明因是不定的，不能使他人產生決定的智慧。問：舉出因能夠成立，成立未完成的宗，沒有比喻也能順應成立，那麼這個宗不是成立了嗎？宗既然順應先前成立，這個因應該不是不定因。答：因為缺少同喻，宗的意義無法成立，也不能反過來成立異宗。因此，稱它為不定因，因為它不能確定地成立一個宗的意義。所以不給它『定』這個名稱。理門（正理之門）的論難說：理應有四種名稱的不定因，因為兩種都有。『所聞』是什麼呢？古代因明師不允許這不共因之外還有第四種。所以現在論難說：用道理來說，除了決定相違之外，其餘四種不定因，在同品和異品中，如果普遍或不普遍，都完全具有，可以成立異類法，所以可以稱為不定因。現在『所聞性』這個因，不能歸屬於異類，沒有更多的東西。
【English Translation】 English version:
Gonggongye (Common characteristic).
Treatise: What is meant by 'non-common' is like the sound theorists saying, 'Sound is permanent' because 'it has the nature of being heard.' Therefore, both the permanent and impermanent categories are separate from this cause. Apart from permanence and impermanence, there is nothing else, so this is a hesitant cause.
Commentary: The second type of non-common cause has three aspects: first, naming and citing the thesis and the cause; second, explaining the meaning of indefinite; and third, pointing out the indefinite characteristics. Here are the first two aspects. For example, the sound theorists, in response to the Vaisheshika school, establish the thesis that 'sound is permanent,' using 'the nature of being heard by the ear' as the reason. Here, the permanent thesis, such as space, is the similar category; lightning, etc., are the dissimilar category. The cause of 'audibility' is separate from both categories because it does not exist in either the similar or dissimilar categories. Apart from permanence and impermanence, there is no third category that is neither both nor neither, possessing 'audibility.' Therefore, explaining the non-common cause says that apart from the two categories of permanence and impermanence, there is no other dharma that is 'audibility,' thus creating hesitation, unable to establish the proposed permanence, nor can it conversely establish the dissimilar category of impermanence. If the Vaisheshika school also establishes 'sound-ness,' i.e., similarity and dissimilarity, etc., as well as 'audibility,' then, in response to their thesis, it is not without a similar example, so arguing against the Vaisheshika school becomes a fault.
Treatise: This 'audibility,' what is it like?
Commentary: This is pointing out the indefinite characteristics. 'You' means 'like.' Establishing an argument, the thesis, cause, and analogy can be established. If the cause is cited but there is no analogy, what is this cause established by? What is it like? What can be cited for comparison? Since the cause has no direction, it shows that the cause is indefinite, unable to produce definite wisdom in others. Question: Citing the cause can establish, establishing the uncompleted thesis, without analogy can also accord with establishment, then is this thesis not established? Since the thesis accords with prior establishment, this cause should not be an indefinite cause. Answer: Because of the lack of a similar analogy, the meaning of the thesis cannot be established, nor can it conversely establish a dissimilar thesis. Therefore, it is called an indefinite cause because it cannot definitely establish the meaning of one thesis. Therefore, it is not given the name 'definite.' The difficulty of the 'Gate of Reasoning' says: There should be four types of indefinite causes, because both are present. What is 'audibility'? Ancient logicians did not allow a fourth type outside of this non-common cause. Therefore, now the difficulty says: Speaking with reason, apart from definite contradiction, the remaining four indefinite causes, in the similar and dissimilar categories, if universal or non-universal, are completely present, and can establish dissimilar dharmas, so they can be called indefinite causes. Now, the cause of 'audibility' cannot be attributed to the dissimilar category, there is nothing more.
成。如何不定。比量難云。所聞性因非不定攝宗。異品無故因。如二八因喻。又所聞因非不定攝宗。同品無故因。如四六因喻。彼論釋云。由不共故。謂如山野。多有草木。雖無的屬。若有取之。即可屬彼。亦是不定。此因亦爾。同異二品。雖皆不共。無定所屬。望所成立宗法同異。可有通於成隨一義。故名不定。彼釋此不共義云。以若不共所成立法。所有差別遍攝一切。皆是疑因。謂若不共所聞性因。凡所成立常無常等法。所有一切差別之義。遍攝一切佛法外道等宗。于彼宗中隨所立宗。此不定因。皆是疑因。如佛法立若法處攝。若聲處攝。若有漏攝。若無漏攝。此等諸聲皆無常等為宗。數論立聲。若是實有。若是自性等為宗。勝論立聲。若德句攝。若非德句攝。離系親子立二句法。有命。無命。有動增長名為有命。無動不增長名為無命。聲是無命。我是有命等。如是一切所立聲宗。所聞性因。遍於彼宗。皆二品無。並不能令宗性決定。故是疑因。彼重釋言。唯彼有性。彼所攝故。一向離故。此意解云。所聞性因唯彼有性有法之聲。彼所攝屬。不唯為同品所攝。亦不異品所攝屬故。是故不定。或所聞性名為有性。彼所聞性。唯彼有性聲所攝故。二品皆無。由此名不定。上為釋難。未破前量。彼破前云。一向離故。向
【現代漢語翻譯】 成。如何是不定因？用比量來辯難說：『所聞性』（śrāvakatva，being audible）作為因，並非是不定因，因為它在異品中沒有。例如二八因喻（dva-aṣṭa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta，example of the cause of two eights）。又，『所聞性』作為因，並非是不定因，因為它在同品中沒有。例如四六因喻（catuḥ-ṣaṣṭi-hetu-dṛṣṭānta，example of the cause of four sixes）。 他們的論釋說：因為是不共的緣故。譬如山野，多有草木，雖然沒有明確的歸屬，如果有人取用，就可以歸屬於他。這個因也是這樣，同品和異品都不共，沒有確定的歸屬。對於所要成立的宗法的同異，可以通於成立或隨順其中一種意義，所以叫做不定因。 他們解釋這個『不共』的意義說：如果『不共』的所成立的法，所有差別遍攝一切，都是疑因。也就是說，如果『不共』的『所聞性』因，凡是所要成立的常、無常等法，所有一切差別的意義，遍攝一切佛法、外道等宗派，在那些宗派中，無論立什麼宗，這個不定因，都是疑因。例如，佛法立『若法處攝』（yadi dharma-dhātu-saṃgṛhīta，if included in the realm of dharma），『若聲處攝』（yadi śabda-dhātu-saṃgṛhīta，if included in the realm of sound），『若有漏攝』（yadi sāsrava-saṃgṛhīta，if included in the contaminated），『若無漏攝』（yadi anāsrava-saṃgṛhīta，if included in the uncontaminated），這些聲音都是以『無常』等為宗。數論立聲，『若是實有』（yadi satya-bhūta，if it is real），『若是自性』（yadi prakṛti，if it is nature）等為宗。勝論立聲，『若德句攝』（yadi guṇa-vākya-saṃgṛhīta，if included in the category of quality），『若非德句攝』（yadi aguna-vākya-saṃgṛhīta，if not included in the category of quality）。離系親子立二句法，『有命』（sa-jīva，living），『無命』（a-jīva，non-living），有動增長名為『有命』，無動不增長名為『無命』，聲是『無命』，我是『有命』等。像這樣一切所立的聲宗，『所聞性』因，遍於那些宗派，都是二品皆無，並不能使宗性決定，所以是疑因。 他們再次解釋說：唯獨它具有這種性質，因為它被它所攝屬，一向遠離。這個意思解釋說，『所聞性』因，唯獨它具有性質的有法之聲，被它所攝屬，不唯獨為同品所攝屬，也不為異品所攝屬，所以是不定因。或者，『所聞性』名為『有性』，這個『所聞性』，唯獨被它具有性質的聲音所攝屬，二品都沒有，因此名為不定。上面是爲了解釋辯難，還沒有破斥前面的比量。他們破斥前面說：一向遠離。
【English Translation】 What is an uncertain (anirṇīta) reason? A syllogistic refutation states: 'Audibility (śrāvakatva) as a reason is not an uncertain reason, because it is absent in the dissimilar instances.' For example, the cause of two eights (dva-aṣṭa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta). Also, 'audibility' as a reason is not an uncertain reason, because it is absent in the similar instances. For example, the cause of four sixes (catuḥ-ṣaṣṭi-hetu-dṛṣṭānta). Their commentary states: 'Because it is non-common (asādhāraṇa).' For example, in mountains and fields, there are many grasses and trees. Although they do not have a definite owner, if someone takes them, they can belong to him. This reason is also like that. It is non-common to both similar and dissimilar instances, and it does not have a definite belonging. Regarding the similarity and dissimilarity of the thesis (pakṣa-dharma) to be established, it can be connected to establishing or conforming to one of the meanings, so it is called an uncertain reason. They explain the meaning of 'non-common' as follows: 'If the established dharma (established thing) is non-common, and all its differences pervade everything, then it is a doubtful reason.' That is to say, if the 'non-common' reason of 'audibility', whatever dharma such as permanence or impermanence is to be established, all the meanings of its differences pervade all schools such as Buddhist dharma and non-Buddhist schools. In those schools, whatever thesis is established, this uncertain reason is a doubtful reason. For example, the Buddhist dharma establishes 'if included in the realm of dharma' (yadi dharma-dhātu-saṃgṛhīta), 'if included in the realm of sound' (yadi śabda-dhātu-saṃgṛhīta), 'if included in the contaminated' (yadi sāsrava-saṃgṛhīta), 'if included in the uncontaminated' (yadi anāsrava-saṃgṛhīta), these sounds are all based on 'impermanence' and so on as the thesis. The Sāṃkhya school establishes sound as 'if it is real' (yadi satya-bhūta), 'if it is nature' (yadi prakṛti), etc., as the thesis. The Vaiśeṣika school establishes sound as 'if included in the category of quality' (yadi guṇa-vākya-saṃgṛhīta), 'if not included in the category of quality' (yadi aguna-vākya-saṃgṛhīta). The Jains establish the two-sentence dharma, 'living' (sa-jīva), 'non-living' (a-jīva), having movement and growth is called 'living', without movement and no growth is called 'non-living', sound is 'non-living', I am 'living', and so on. Like this, for all the established sound theses, the reason of 'audibility' pervades those schools, and is absent in both similar and dissimilar instances, and cannot make the nature of the thesis definite, so it is a doubtful reason. They explain again: 'Only it has this nature, because it is included by it, and always separate.' This means that the reason of 'audibility', only the sound of dharma that has the nature of it is included by it, and is not only included by the similar instances, but also not included by the dissimilar instances, so it is an uncertain reason. Or, 'audibility' is called 'having nature', this 'audibility' is only included by the sound that has the nature of it, and both similar and dissimilar instances are absent, therefore it is called uncertain. The above is to explain the refutation, and has not yet refuted the previous syllogism. They refute the previous one by saying: 'Always separate.'
者。面也。邊也。相也。即因三相。亦名三向三面三邊。此所聞性。唯闕一相。謂同品定有。由此宗法決定相違。前有諸師立理門論破比量云。所聞性因是不定因。宗也。闕一相故。猶如共等四種不定。喻也。此四皆闕異品遍無之一相故。若作此解。有不定過。非決定相違。彼不共因。為如共等。闕一相故。是不定攝。為如隨一不成。闕一相故。非不定攝。如對聲顯立聲無常。所作性故。如瓶盆等。此因但闕初之一相。非不定攝。如何乃以闕一相因為相違量。應與初量作不定過。此不共因。為如二八。異品無故。非不定攝。為如三九。異品無故。是不定因。與前第二作不定云。此不共因。為如四六。同品無故。非不定因。為如七九。同品無故。是不定因。前因總言同異品有無。不為簡別。故有不定。由此彼因應言異品遍無故。同品遍無故。既遮不定。便無彼失。此不共因。不唯闕初相。非不成攝。不返成異宗。非相違攝。前既唯闕無第三相名共不定。今唯闕無第二相。故名不共不定。不順不違成共宗故。今作決定相違量。解理門云。所聞性因不定因攝宗。同異相中隨離一故。如共因等。因簡初相。故無前失。理門復云。若對許有聲性是常。此應成因。此中問意。如聲論師對勝論立所聞性因。如聲性常。應成正因。彼自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『者』，是方面，也是邊，也是相。即是由於這三種相，也叫做三向、三面、三邊。這所聽聞的性質，只缺少一個相，就是同品必定存在。因此，這個宗法決定是相違的。之前有各位老師在《理門論》中建立理論來破斥比量，說：『所聞性』這個因是不定因。宗：因為它缺少一個相的緣故。例如共同等四種不定。喻：這四種都缺少異品普遍不存在的這一個相的緣故。如果這樣解釋，就有不定的過失，不是決定相違。這個不共因，是像共同等一樣，因為缺少一個相的緣故，所以屬於不定攝呢？還是像隨一不成一樣，因為缺少一個相的緣故，所以不屬於不定攝呢？例如針對聲音的顯現，建立聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的。例如瓶子、盆子等。這個因只缺少最初的一個相，不屬於不定攝。怎麼能用缺少一個相的因作為相違量呢？應該與最初的量構成不定的過失。這個不共因，是像二和八一樣，因為異品不存在的緣故，所以不屬於不定攝呢？還是像三和九一樣，因為異品不存在的緣故，所以是不定因。與前面的第二個量構成不定，說：這個不共因，是像四和六一樣，因為同品不存在的緣故，所以不是不定因呢？還是像七和九一樣，因為同品不存在的緣故，所以是不定因。前面的因籠統地說同品和異品的存在與否，沒有進行區分，所以有不定的情況。因此，那個因應該說異品普遍不存在，或者說同品普遍不存在。既然遮止了不定，就沒有那個過失了。這個不共因，不僅僅缺少最初的相，不屬於不成攝，也不會反過來成就異宗，不屬於相違攝。前面僅僅缺少沒有第三個相，叫做共同不定。現在僅僅缺少沒有第二個相，所以叫做不共不定。不順也不違背，成就共同的宗旨。現在建立決定相違量，解釋《理門論》說：『所聞性』這個因屬於不定因攝，宗：因為在同異相中隨便離開一個的緣故。例如共因等。因簡要說明最初的相，所以沒有前面的過失。《理門論》又說：如果針對承認聲音的性質是常，這應該成為正因。這裡提問的意思是，如果聲音論師針對勝論派建立『所聞性』這個因，例如聲音的性質是常，應該成為正因。
【English Translation】 English version '者' (zhě): aspect, side, or characteristic. It refers to the three aspects, also known as three directions, three faces, or three sides. This nature of what is heard lacks only one aspect, namely, the definite existence in the same category. Therefore, this established principle is definitely contradictory. Previously, some teachers established theories in the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Treatise on the Wheel of Reason) to refute inference, saying: 'The nature of what is heard' as a reason is an uncertain reason. Thesis: because it lacks one aspect. Example: like the common and other four types of uncertainty. Illustration: all four of these lack the one aspect of universal absence in the different category. If explained this way, there is the fault of uncertainty, not definite contradiction. Is this uncommon reason like the common and others, belonging to the category of uncertainty because it lacks one aspect? Or is it like 'one of them is unestablished,' not belonging to the category of uncertainty because it lacks one aspect? For example, in relation to the manifestation of sound, establishing that sound is impermanent because it is produced. Like pots and pans. This reason only lacks the first aspect and does not belong to the category of uncertainty. How can a reason lacking one aspect be used as a contradictory measure? It should constitute the fault of uncertainty with the initial measure. Is this uncommon reason like two and eight, not belonging to the category of uncertainty because the different category is absent? Or is it like three and nine, being an uncertain reason because the different category is absent? Constructing uncertainty with the second previous measure, saying: Is this uncommon reason like four and six, not being an uncertain reason because the same category is absent? Or is it like seven and nine, being an uncertain reason because the same category is absent? The previous reason generally speaks of the presence or absence of the same and different categories without distinction, so there is uncertainty. Therefore, that reason should state that the different category is universally absent, or that the same category is universally absent. Since uncertainty is prevented, there is no such fault. This uncommon reason not only lacks the initial aspect, not belonging to the category of unestablished, but also does not conversely establish a different doctrine, not belonging to the category of contradiction. Previously, only the absence of the third aspect was lacking, called common uncertainty. Now, only the absence of the second aspect is lacking, so it is called uncommon uncertainty. Neither conforming nor contradicting, it achieves a common purpose. Now, establishing a definitely contradictory measure, explaining the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Treatise on the Wheel of Reason) by saying: 'The nature of what is heard' as a reason belongs to the category of uncertain reasons, Thesis: because it arbitrarily departs from one of the same and different aspects. Like the common reason and others. The reason briefly explains the initial aspect, so there is no previous fault. The Hetu-cakra-damaru (Treatise on the Wheel of Reason) further says: If, in response to admitting that the nature of sound is permanent, this should become a valid reason. The meaning of the question here is, if the sound theorist establishes 'the nature of what is heard' as a reason against the Vaisheshika (School of Particulars), such as the nature of sound being permanent, it should become a valid reason.
答云。若於爾時。無有顯示所作性等是無常因。容有此義。然俱可得。一義相違不容有故。是猶預因。此意答言。若勝論師于立論時愚鈍無智。不與聲論立所作因成聲無常。彼可正因。若對俱時立無常宗所作因等。一義相違不容有故。是猶預因。此亦有三。如佛弟子對勝論。立他比量云。彼實非實。執德依故。非實之宗。彼德句等。以為同品。雖無異體。許德依因。于同異品皆非有故。名他不共。若勝論立我實有。許德依故。于同異品二皆非有。名自不共。如論所陳。名共不共。
論。同品一分轉異品遍轉者如說聲非勤勇無間所發無常性故。
述曰。下第三釋同分異全。文亦有三。此初標名舉宗因。若聲生論。本無今生。是所作性。非勤勇顯。若聲顯論。本有今顯。勤勇顯發。非所作性。故今聲生對聲顯宗。聲非勤勇無間所發。無常性因。此因雖是兩俱全分兩俱不成。今取不定亦無有過。
論。此中非勤勇無間所發宗以電空等為其同品此無常性于電等有于空等無。
述曰。自下第二顯不定義。有三。初顯同分。次顯異全。后結不定。此初也。非勤勇宗電晃等並虛空等皆是同品。並非勤勵勇銳無間所發顯故。無常之因。電有空無。故是同品一分轉也。
論。非勤勇無間所發宗以瓶等為異
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：回答說：如果在那個時候，沒有顯示『所作性』（由造作產生）等是『無常』（變化無常）的原因，或許還有這種說法。然而，兩者可以同時成立，因為一個意義上相互矛盾是不允許的，所以這是『猶預因』（不確定的原因）。這個意思是回答說，如果勝論師在立論的時候愚鈍無知，不使用『所作因』（由造作產生的原因）來成立『聲』（聲音）是『無常』，那麼這可以作為『正因』（正確的理由）。如果針對同時成立『無常』宗（無常的觀點）的『所作因』等，一個意義上相互矛盾是不允許的，所以這是『猶預因』。這裡也有三種情況。例如，佛弟子針對勝論，建立他比量說：『彼』（事物）是『實』（實在）還是『非實』（不實在），因為執著于『德依』（屬性的依賴）。對於『非實』的宗（不實在的觀點），他們將『德句』（屬性的句子）等作為『同品』（相似的例子）。雖然沒有不同的實體，但允許『德依』作為原因。因為在『同品』和『異品』（不同的例子）中都不存在，所以稱為『他不共』（與他不同的不共因）。如果勝論建立『我』（自我）是『實有』（真實存在），因為允許『德依』，所以在『同品』和『異品』中都不存在，稱為『自不共』（自身不共的不共因）。如論中所陳述的，稱為『共不共』（既共又不共的不共因）。 論：『同品』（相似的例子）一部分成立，『異品』（不同的例子）全部成立，例如說『聲』（聲音）不是『勤勇無間所發』（不經過努力和瞬間產生），因為是『無常性』（無常的性質）。 述曰：下面第三個解釋『同分異全』（同品一部分，異品全部）。文也有三個部分。這是最初的標名舉宗因。如果『聲生論』（聲音產生論），本來沒有現在產生，是『所作性』（由造作產生）。不是『勤勇』（努力）顯現。如果『聲顯論』（聲音顯現論），本來有現在顯現，是『勤勇』顯發。不是『所作性』。所以現在『聲生』對『聲顯』宗（聲音顯現的觀點），『聲』不是『勤勇無間所發』，『無常性』是原因。這個原因雖然是兩邊都全部成立，兩邊都不成立，現在取『不定』（不確定）也沒有過失。 論：『非勤勇無間所發』宗（不經過努力和瞬間產生）以『電』（閃電）、『空』（虛空）等作為它的『同品』（相似的例子），這個『無常性』（無常的性質）在『電』等中有，在『空』等中沒有。 述曰：從下面第二個顯示『不定義』（不確定的定義）。有三個部分。首先顯示『同分』（同品一部分），其次顯示『異全』（異品全部），最後總結『不定』（不確定）。這是最初的部分。『非勤勇』宗（不經過努力）的『電晃』（閃電的光芒）等和『虛空』等都是『同品』，因為不是『勤勵勇銳無間所發顯』（不經過努力和瞬間顯現）。『無常』的原因，『電』有『空』無。所以是『同品一分轉』（同品一部分成立）。 論：『非勤勇無間所發』宗（不經過努力和瞬間產生）以『瓶』（瓶子）等作為『異品』（不同的例子）。
【English Translation】 English version: He answers: If at that time, there was no demonstration that '所作性' (so zuo xing, the nature of being made or created) etc. is the cause of '無常' (wu chang, impermanence), there might be this meaning. However, both can be obtained, because contradictory meanings are not allowed, so this is a '猶預因' (you yu yin, a doubtful cause). This means answering that if the Vaisheshika philosopher is dull and ignorant when establishing a thesis, and does not use '所作因' (suo zuo yin, the cause of being made) to establish that '聲' (sheng, sound) is '無常', then this can be a '正因' (zheng yin, a correct reason). If, against the '無常' (impermanence) doctrine established at the same time, '所作因' etc., contradictory meanings are not allowed, so this is a '猶預因'. There are also three situations here. For example, a Buddhist disciple, against the Vaisheshika, establishes another inference saying: '彼' (bi, that thing) is '實' (shi, real) or '非實' (fei shi, unreal), because it clings to '德依' (de yi, dependence on attributes). For the '非實' (unreal) doctrine, they take '德句' (de ju, attribute sentences) etc. as '同品' (tong pin, similar examples). Although there is no different entity, they allow '德依' as a cause. Because it does not exist in both '同品' and '異品' (yi pin, dissimilar examples), it is called '他不共' (ta bu gong, dissimilar to others). If the Vaisheshika establishes that '我' (wo, self) is '實有' (shi you, truly existent), because it allows '德依', it does not exist in both '同品' and '異品', it is called '自不共' (zi bu gong, dissimilar to itself). As stated in the treatise, it is called '共不共' (gong bu gong, both similar and dissimilar). Treatise: '同品' (similar examples) partially apply, '異品' (dissimilar examples) entirely apply, for example, saying that '聲' (sound) is not '勤勇無間所發' (qin yong wu jian suo fa, produced without effort and instantaneously), because it is '無常性' (wu chang xing, the nature of impermanence). Commentary: Below, the third explains '同分異全' (tong fen yi quan, similar part, dissimilar whole). The text also has three parts. This is the initial naming and citing of the doctrine cause. If the '聲生論' (sheng sheng lun, sound production theory), originally did not exist and now is produced, it is '所作性' (the nature of being made). It is not manifested by '勤勇' (effort). If the '聲顯論' (sheng xian lun, sound manifestation theory), originally existed and now is manifested, it is manifested by '勤勇'. It is not '所作性'. Therefore, now '聲生' (sound production) against the '聲顯' (sound manifestation) doctrine, '聲' (sound) is not '勤勇無間所發' (produced without effort and instantaneously), '無常性' (impermanence) is the cause. Although this cause is entirely established on both sides and not established on both sides, there is no fault in taking '不定' (bu ding, uncertain) now. Treatise: The '非勤勇無間所發' (not produced without effort and instantaneously) doctrine takes '電' (dian, lightning), '空' (kong, space) etc. as its '同品' (similar examples), this '無常性' (impermanence) exists in '電' etc., but does not exist in '空' etc. Commentary: From below, the second shows '不定義' (bu ding yi, uncertain definition). There are three parts. First, it shows '同分' (similar part), second, it shows '異全' (dissimilar whole), and finally, it concludes '不定' (uncertain). This is the initial part. '電晃' (dian huang, lightning flash) etc. and '虛空' (xu kong, empty space) etc. of the '非勤勇' (without effort) doctrine are all '同品' (similar examples), because they are not '勤勵勇銳無間所發顯' (qin li yong rui wu jian suo fa xian, manifested without effort and instantaneously). The cause of '無常' (impermanence), '電' (lightning) has it, '空' (space) does not have it. Therefore, it is '同品一分轉' (tong pin yi fen zhuan, similar examples partially apply). Treatise: The '非勤勇無間所發' (not produced without effort and instantaneously) doctrine takes '瓶' (ping, bottle) etc. as '異品' (dissimilar examples).
品于彼遍有。
述曰。此顯異全。瓶是勤勵勇銳無間。因四塵泥所顯發故。無常之因於彼遍有。
論。此因以電瓶等為同品故亦是不定。
述曰。此結不定。若宗同品。電空為同。俱非勤勇所顯發故。若因同法。電瓶為同。俱無常故。此因雖于宗同品空上無。雙于宗同異二品電瓶上有。不唯定成一宗。故亦不定。亦前二也。
論。為如瓶等無常性故彼是勤勇無間所發為如電等無常性故彼非勤勇無間所發。
述曰。第三指不定相。彰無常因。能成前聲。或是勤勇。或非勤勇。何非不定。此亦有三。如小乘等對大乘立他比量云。汝之藏識非異熟識。執識性故。如彼第七等。此非異熟識宗。以除異熟六識外餘一切法而為同品。執識性因。于第七等有。於色聲等無異熟六識而為異品。執識性因。于彼遍有。故是他同分異全。如薩婆多對大乘立自比量云。我之命根定是實有。許無緣慮故。如許色聲等。此實有宗。以餘五蘊無為等為同品。無緣慮因。於色等有。于識等無。以瓶盆等而為異品。無緣慮因於彼遍有。故是自同分異全。如論所陳。即是共同分異全。
論。異品一分轉同品遍轉者如立宗言聲是勤勇無間所發無常性故。
述曰。下第四釋異分同全有二。此初標名舉宗因。謂聲顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 品在於彼普遍存在。
述曰：這顯示了差異的完全性。瓶是由於勤奮努力、勇猛精進且不間斷的原因，由四種塵土顯發而成的。因此，無常的原因在瓶子上普遍存在。
論：這個原因因為電和瓶等是同類事物，所以也是不確定的。
述曰：這是總結不確定性。如果以宗的同品來說，電和空是同類。因為電和空都不是勤奮努力所顯發的。如果以因的同法來說，電和瓶是同類，因為它們都是無常的。這個原因雖然在宗的同品空上沒有，但在宗的同異二品電和瓶上都有。不能只確定地成立一個宗，所以也是不確定的。也和前面的兩種情況一樣。
論：是因為像瓶等一樣具有無常的性質，所以它是勤奮努力且不間斷所產生的；還是因為像電等一樣具有無常的性質，所以它不是勤奮努力且不間斷所產生的？
述曰：第三種是指不確定相。彰顯無常的原因，能夠成立前一種聲音（即『是勤勇』）。或者『是勤勇』，或者『非勤勇』，為什麼不是不確定的呢？這也有三種情況。例如小乘等對於大乘，立他比量說：『你的藏識不是異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）。因為具有識的性質，就像第七識（末那識，Manas）等一樣。』這個『非異熟識』是宗，以除了異熟六識之外的一切法作為同品。『具有識的性質』這個因，在第七識等上有，在色聲等沒有異熟六識的異品上普遍存在。所以是『他同分異全』。例如薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部）對於大乘，立自比量說：『我的命根一定是實有的。因為允許沒有緣慮，就像允許色聲等一樣。』這個『實有』是宗，以其餘五蘊（Skandha）和無為法等作為同品。『沒有緣慮』這個因，在色等上有，在識等沒有。以瓶盆等作為異品，『沒有緣慮』這個因在瓶盆等上普遍存在。所以是『自同分異全』。如論中所陳述的，就是『共同分異全』。
論：異品一部分轉變，同品普遍轉變，例如立宗說：聲音是勤奮努力且不間斷所產生的，因為具有無常的性質。
述曰：下面第四種解釋『異分同全』，有兩種。這是首先標出名稱，舉出宗和因。所謂聲音顯現。
【English Translation】 English version: Category is universally present in that.
Commentary: This shows the completeness of the difference. A pot is manifested from the four elements of earth due to diligent effort, vigor, and continuous action. Therefore, the cause of impermanence is universally present in the pot.
Treatise: This cause is also uncertain because electricity and pots are similar categories.
Commentary: This concludes the uncertainty. If considering the similar category of the thesis, electricity and space are similar. Because neither electricity nor space is manifested by diligent effort. If considering the similar property of the cause, electricity and pots are similar because they are both impermanent. Although this cause is absent in the similar category of the thesis, space, it is present in both the different and similar categories of the thesis, electricity and pots. It cannot definitively establish one thesis, so it is also uncertain. It is also like the previous two cases.
Treatise: Is it because it has the nature of impermanence like pots, etc., that it is produced by diligent effort and continuous action; or is it because it has the nature of impermanence like electricity, etc., that it is not produced by diligent effort and continuous action?
Commentary: The third refers to the uncertain aspect. Manifesting the cause of impermanence, it can establish the previous statement (i.e., 'is diligent effort'). Either 'is diligent effort' or 'is not diligent effort,' why is it not uncertain? There are also three cases. For example, the Hīnayāna (小乘, Lesser Vehicle) establishes a parārthānumāna (他比量, inference for others) against the Mahāyāna (大乘, Great Vehicle), saying: 'Your Ālaya-vijñāna (藏識, store consciousness) is not Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness). Because it has the nature of consciousness, like the seventh consciousness (Manas, 末那識) etc.' This 'not Vipāka-vijñāna' is the thesis, with all dharmas (法, phenomena) other than the Vipāka-vijñānas as the similar category. The cause 'has the nature of consciousness' is present in the seventh consciousness etc., and is universally present in the different category of the six Vipāka-vijñānas, which are absent in form, sound, etc. Therefore, it is 'heterogeneous in the same part of others'. For example, the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多, the 'All Exists' school) establishes a svārthānumāna (自比量, inference for oneself) against the Mahāyāna, saying: 'My jīvitendriya (命根, life faculty) must be real. Because it is admitted to have no object-cognition, like admitted form, sound, etc.' This 'real existence' is the thesis, with the other five Skandhas (五蘊, aggregates) and unconditioned dharmas (無為法) etc. as the similar category. The cause 'no object-cognition' is present in form etc., and absent in consciousness etc. With pots, basins, etc. as the different category, the cause 'no object-cognition' is universally present in them. Therefore, it is 'homogeneous in the different part of oneself'. As stated in the treatise, it is 'homogeneous in the different part of both'.
Treatise: When a part of the dissimilar category transforms, and the similar category transforms universally, for example, establishing the thesis saying: sound is produced by diligent effort and continuous action, because it has the nature of impermanence.
Commentary: The fourth explanation of 'homogeneous in the different part' below has two aspects. This is the first to mark the name, citing the thesis and the cause. What is called sound manifests.
論對聲生立。是勤勇無間所發宗。無常性因。
論。勤勇無間所發宗以瓶等為同品其無常性於此遍有。
述曰。下顯不定義有三。此顯同全。一切轉故。
論。以電空等為異品于彼一分電等是有空等是無。
述曰。此顯異分。半有轉故。
論。是故如前亦為不定。
述曰。此結不定。是因不但能成於聲。如瓶盆等。是勤勇發。亦能成聲。如電光等。非勤勇發。是故如前成二品故。亦為不定。此亦有三。如大乘師對薩婆多。立他比量云。汝執命根定非實有。許無緣慮故。如所許瓶等。非實有宗。以瓶等為同品。無緣慮因。于彼遍有。以餘五蘊無為為異品。無緣慮因於彼一分色等上有。心心所無。故是他異分同全。大乘若云我之藏識是異熟識。許識性故。如異熟六識。異熟識宗。以異熟六識而為同品。許識性因。於此遍有。以除異熟六識。餘一切法而為異品。許識性因。于彼一分非業果心有。于彼一分色等上無。故是自異分同全。如前所說。勝軍論師成立大乘真是佛語。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故。如增一等。亦是此過。此中佛語宗。以增一等而為同品。大小乘兩俱極成非佛語所不攝因。於此遍有。以發智六足等而為異品。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝因。于發智有。於六足無以發智論等小
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於對『聲生立』（聲音由努力產生）的論證。這是以『勤勇無間所發宗』（由持續努力產生的宗）為基礎，並以『無常性因』（無常的性質作為原因）來論證。
論：『勤勇無間所發宗』以瓶子等作為同品（相似的例子），其無常性在此普遍存在。
述曰：下面揭示了不定義有三種情況。這裡揭示了同品周遍的情況，因為一切都在變化。
論：以閃電、天空等作為異品（不同的例子），在這些異品中，一部分（如閃電）是有無常性的，一部分（如天空）是沒有無常性的。
述曰：這裡揭示了異品部分的情況，因為一半存在變化。
論：因此，像前面一樣，這也是不確定的。
述曰：這裡總結了不確定性。這個原因不僅能成立聲音是由努力產生的，如瓶子、盆子等。也能成立聲音不是由努力產生的，如閃電、光等。不是由努力產生的。因此，像前面一樣，因為它能成立兩種品類，所以也是不確定的。這裡也有三種情況。例如，大乘論師針對薩婆多部，立他比量說：『你所執著的命根必定不是實有的，因為你承認它是無緣慮的。』如同你所承認的瓶子等。『非實有宗』（不是真實存在的宗），以瓶子等作為同品，『無緣慮因』（沒有認知能力的原因）在這些同品中普遍存在。以其餘五蘊、無為法作為異品，『無緣慮因』在這些異品的一部分（如色等）上存在，在心、心所上不存在。所以這是他異品部分周遍的情況。大乘如果說：『我的藏識是異熟識（果報識），因為你承認它具有識的性質。』如同異熟六識。『異熟識宗』（果報識的宗），以異熟六識作為同品，『許識性因』（承認具有識的性質的原因）在此普遍存在。以除去異熟六識之外的一切法作為異品，『許識性因』在這些異品的一部分（如非業果心）上存在，在這些異品的另一部分（如色等）上不存在。所以這是自異品部分周遍的情況。如前面所說，勝軍論師成立大乘是真正的佛語，因為大小乘都極度認可，並且不是非佛語所不包含的，如同增一阿含經等。這也是這種過失。這裡以佛語作為宗，以增一阿含經等作為同品，大小乘都極度認可，並且不是非佛語所不包含的原因，在此普遍存在。以發智論、六足論等作為異品，大小乘都極度認可，並且不是非佛語所不包含的原因，在發智論中存在，在六足論中不存在，因為發智論等小乘
【English Translation】 English version On establishing 'sound is produced' (聲生立). This is based on the 'Diligence and Effort Without Interruption as the Basis' (勤勇無間所發宗), with 'impermanent nature as the cause' (無常性因).
Treatise: 'Diligence and Effort Without Interruption as the Basis' takes bottles, etc., as the homogeneous class (同品), and their impermanent nature is universally present in them.
Commentary: The following reveals three types of undefinedness. This reveals the complete pervasion of the homogeneous class, because everything changes.
Treatise: It takes lightning, the sky, etc., as the heterogeneous class (異品), in which a portion (such as lightning) has impermanence, and a portion (such as the sky) does not.
Commentary: This reveals the partial heterogeneous class, because half of it changes.
Treatise: Therefore, as before, this is also undefined.
Commentary: This concludes the undefinedness. This cause can not only establish that sound is produced by effort, like bottles, pots, etc., but also that sound is not produced by effort, like lightning, light, etc., which are not produced by effort. Therefore, as before, because it can establish two classes, it is also undefined. There are also three cases here. For example, a Mahayana (大乘) master, addressing the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多), establishes the following inference for others: 'Your asserted life-faculty is definitely not real, because you admit it is without object-cognition.' Like the bottles, etc., that you admit. 'The thesis of non-reality' (非實有宗), takes bottles, etc., as the homogeneous class, and the 'cause of no object-cognition' (無緣慮因) is universally present in these homogeneous classes. It takes the remaining five aggregates (五蘊) and unconditioned dharmas (無為法) as the heterogeneous class, and the 'cause of no object-cognition' is present in a portion of these heterogeneous classes (such as form, etc.), but not in mind and mental factors. Therefore, this is the case of partial pervasion of the heterogeneous class for others. If Mahayana says: 'My store consciousness (藏識) is the resultant consciousness (異熟識), because you admit it has the nature of consciousness.' Like the resultant six consciousnesses. 'The thesis of resultant consciousness' (異熟識宗), takes the resultant six consciousnesses as the homogeneous class, and the 'cause of admitting the nature of consciousness' (許識性因) is universally present in this. It takes all dharmas other than the resultant six consciousnesses as the heterogeneous class, and the 'cause of admitting the nature of consciousness' is present in a portion of these heterogeneous classes (such as non-karmic result mind), but not in another portion of these heterogeneous classes (such as form, etc.). Therefore, this is the case of partial pervasion of the heterogeneous class for oneself. As mentioned before, Master Shenggun (勝軍論師) establishes that Mahayana is the true words of the Buddha, because both the Hinayana (小乘) and Mahayana schools extremely acknowledge it, and it is not excluded by non-Buddha's words, like the Ekottara Agama (增一阿含經), etc. This is also this fault. Here, it takes the Buddha's words as the thesis, and the Ekottara Agama, etc., as the homogeneous class, and the cause that both the Hinayana and Mahayana schools extremely acknowledge and are not excluded by non-Buddha's words is universally present in this. It takes the Jnanaprasthana (發智論), the Six Padas (六足論), etc., as the heterogeneous class, and the cause that both the Hinayana and Mahayana schools extremely acknowledge and are not excluded by non-Buddha's words is present in the Jnanaprasthana, but not in the Six Padas, because the Jnanaprasthana, etc., are Hinayana
乘自許亦是佛語。大乘不許。亦汝大乘及余小乘。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故因。既于彼有。亦此因過攝。如論所陳。即是共異分同全。
論。俱品一分轉者如說聲常無質等故。
述曰。第五俱分有二。此初標名舉宗因。聲勝二論皆說聲無質礙。無質礙故。空大為耳根亦無質礙。今聲論對勝論立聲常宗。無質礙因。
論。此中常宗以虛空極微等為同品無質礙性于虛空等有于極微等無。
述曰。下顯不定亦三。此顯同分。二宗俱說。地水火風。極微常住。粗者無常。劫初成體非生。劫后壞體非滅。二十空劫。散居處處。后劫成位。兩合生果。如是展轉乃至大地。所生皆合一。能生皆離多。廣如二十唯識疏中解。此空等。等彼時等。極微言等。等取彼意等。如極微亦有礙故。故此常宗。虛空極微為同喻。無質礙因。于空等有。極微等無。故是同分。
論。以瓶樂等為異品於樂等有于瓶等無。
述曰。此顯異分。並前合顯俱一分轉。彼二宗中。皆說覺樂欲瞋等為心心所。此二非常。為常異品。無質礙因。於樂等中有。于瓶等上無。故是異分。
論。是故此因以樂以空為同法故亦名不定。
述曰。結不定。無質礙因。空為同品。能成聲常。樂為同品。能成無常。由成二品。是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『自許』（Sva-anumana，自認為正確的推理）也算是佛語嗎？大乘佛教不認可。無論是你們的大乘，還是其他小乘，都普遍承認『非佛語所不攝』（apratisedha-hetu，不被佛語否定的理由）是成立的，因此這個『因』（hetu，理由）在他們那裡是成立的，那麼這個『因過』（hetvabhasa，似因）也同樣成立，就像論中所說的那樣，這就是『共異分同全』（sadharmya-vaidharmya-ubhayavayapi，在相似和相異兩方面都遍及的）。
論：『俱品一分轉』（ubhaya-ekadesa-vyapi，在兩類例子中只在一部分中存在的）例如說『聲常無質等故』（sabda nitya niravayavatvat，聲音是常住的，因為它沒有實體）
述曰：第五種『俱分』（ubhaya-avayava，兩部分）有兩種。這是最初的標名，舉出宗和因。『聲論』（sabda-vadin，主張聲音是實體的人）和『勝論』（Vaisesika，勝論派）都說聲音沒有實體阻礙。因為沒有實體阻礙，所以空大（akasa-dhatu，空界）對於耳根（srotra-indriya，聽覺器官）也沒有實體阻礙。現在『聲論』針對『勝論』立『聲常』（sabda-nitya，聲音常住）的宗（paksa，主張），以『無質礙』（niravayava，沒有實體阻礙）為因（hetu，理由）。
論：『此中常宗以虛空極微等為同品無質礙性于虛空等有于極微等無』（atra nitya-pakse akasa-paramanu-adi sadharmya niravayavatvam akasa-adau asti paramanu-adau nasti，在這個常住的例子中，虛空、極微等是相似的例子，沒有實體阻礙的性質在虛空等中有，在極微等中沒有）。
述曰：下面顯示『不定』（anaikantika，不確定）也有三種。這是顯示『同分』（sapaksa-avayava，相似部分的例子）。兩個宗派都說，地、水、火、風，極微是常住的，粗大的東西是無常的。劫初形成物體不是生，劫后壞滅物體不是滅。二十空劫，分散居住在各處。后劫形成位置，兩兩結合產生結果。像這樣輾轉乃至大地。所生的都是結合成一體，能生的都是分離成多個。詳細的解釋在《二十唯識疏》中。這個空等，等於那個時候等。極微等，等於取那個意思等。例如極微也有阻礙。所以這個常宗，虛空極微作為同喻（sadharmya-drstanta，相似的例子）。無質礙因，在空等中有，在極微等中沒有，所以是同分。
論：『以瓶樂等為異品於樂等有于瓶等無』（ghata-sukha-adi vaidharmya sukha-adau asti ghata-adau nasti，瓶子、快樂等是相異的例子，沒有實體阻礙的性質在快樂等中有，在瓶子等中沒有）。
述曰：這是顯示『異分』（vipaksa-avayava，相異部分的例子）。和前面合起來顯示『俱一分轉』（ubhaya-ekadesa-vyapi，在兩類例子中只在一部分中存在的）。在那兩個宗派中，都說覺、樂、欲、瞋等是心心所（citta-caitta，心理活動和心理作用）。這兩種都不是常住的，作為常住的異品（vipaksa，相異的例子）。無質礙因，在樂等中有，在瓶等上沒有，所以是異分。
論：『是故此因以樂以空為同法故亦名不定』（tasmad ayam hetu sukhena akasena ca sadharmyatvat anaikantika iti ucyate，因此，這個因，因為與快樂和虛空有相似之處，所以也稱為不確定）。
述曰：總結『不定』。無質礙因，空作為同品，能成立聲音常住。樂作為同品，能成立聲音無常。由於能成立兩種品類，所以是『不定』。
【English Translation】 English version Is 『Sva-anumana』 (self-presumption, inference considered correct by oneself) also considered Buddha's words? Mahayana Buddhism does not acknowledge it. Whether it's your Mahayana or other Hinayana, both universally acknowledge that 『apratisedha-hetu』 (a reason not contradicted by Buddha's words) is valid. Therefore, this 『hetu』 (reason) is valid in their view, then this 『hetvabhasa』 (fallacious reason) is also valid, just as stated in the treatise. This is 『sadharmya-vaidharmya-ubhayavayapi』 (pervading both similarities and dissimilarities).
Treatise: 『Ubhaya-ekadesa-vyapi』 (existing in only a part of both categories) is like saying 『sabda nitya niravayavatvat』 (sound is permanent because it has no substance).
Commentary: The fifth type of 『ubhaya-avayava』 (both parts) has two kinds. This is the initial naming, presenting the thesis and the reason. 『Sabda-vadin』 (those who argue that sound is a substance) and 『Vaisesika』 (Vaisesika school) both say that sound has no substantial obstruction. Because there is no substantial obstruction, 『akasa-dhatu』 (space element) also has no substantial obstruction for the 『srotra-indriya』 (auditory organ). Now, 『Sabda-vadin』 establishes the 『sabda-nitya』 (sound is permanent) thesis against 『Vaisesika』, using 『niravayava』 (without substantial obstruction) as the 『hetu』 (reason).
Treatise: 『Atra nitya-pakse akasa-paramanu-adi sadharmya niravayavatvam akasa-adau asti paramanu-adau nasti』 (In this case of permanence, space, atoms, etc., are similar examples; the property of having no substantial obstruction exists in space, etc., but does not exist in atoms, etc.).
Commentary: Below, it shows that 『anaikantika』 (uncertain) also has three kinds. This shows the 『sapaksa-avayava』 (example of similar part). Both schools say that earth, water, fire, wind, and atoms are permanent, while coarse things are impermanent. The formation of objects at the beginning of a kalpa is not birth, and the destruction of objects after a kalpa is not death. Twenty empty kalpas are scattered and reside everywhere. Later kalpas form positions, and two combine to produce results. In this way, it transforms even to the great earth. What is produced is all combined into one, and what can produce is separated into many. Detailed explanations are in the 『Twenty Vijnapti Treatise』. This space, etc., is equal to that time, etc. Atoms, etc., are equal to taking that meaning, etc. For example, atoms also have obstruction. Therefore, this permanent thesis, space and atoms are used as 『sadharmya-drstanta』 (similar examples). The reason of no substantial obstruction exists in space, etc., but does not exist in atoms, etc., so it is a similar part.
Treatise: 『Ghata-sukha-adi vaidharmya sukha-adau asti ghata-adau nasti』 (Pots, happiness, etc., are dissimilar examples; the property of having no substantial obstruction exists in happiness, etc., but does not exist in pots, etc.).
Commentary: This shows the 『vipaksa-avayava』 (example of dissimilar part). Combined with the previous one, it shows 『ubhaya-ekadesa-vyapi』 (existing in only a part of both categories). In those two schools, they both say that perception, happiness, desire, anger, etc., are 『citta-caitta』 (mental activities and mental functions). These two are not permanent, and are used as 『vipaksa』 (dissimilar examples) of permanence. The reason of no substantial obstruction exists in happiness, etc., but does not exist on pots, etc., so it is a dissimilar part.
Treatise: 『Tasmad ayam hetu sukhena akasena ca sadharmyatvat anaikantika iti ucyate』 (Therefore, this reason, because it has similarities with happiness and space, is also called uncertain).
Commentary: Concluding 『anaikantika』 (uncertain). The reason of no substantial obstruction, space as a similar example, can establish that sound is permanent. Happiness as a similar example, can establish that sound is impermanent. Because it can establish two categories, it is 『uncertain』.
故如前亦為不定。理門論云。若於其中俱分是有。亦是定因簡別余故。是名差別。謂此第五俱分之因。于同異品。皆悉分有。是不定因。由有相違及正因故。此所說因。不於一分異品轉故。是定因攝。如立聲常宗。無質礙故因。諸無質礙。皆悉是常。猶如虛空為同喻。若是無常。即有質礙。猶如瓶等為異喻。空為同品。無質礙因有。瓶為異品。無質礙因無。故是其正。若望樂等心心所法。異品有故。即是相違。謂聲無常。無質礙故。如心心所。謂若是常。見有質礙。猶如極微。今此不定因。望異品一分無邊。可是決定。若望異品一分有邊。即成相違。故是猶預。或於其中俱分有者。非唯此一。第一第三四五。皆名俱分。並有此義。同品異品名為俱分。非俱一分名為俱分。若作后解。攝不定盡。前不共因。無有定義。宜簡別自余不定因故。是名不定。與余差別。次上二因。唯有二段。無第三段。指不定相。同前第三。易故不說。此亦有三。如大乘師對薩婆多。立他比量。汝之命根非是異熟。以許非識故。如許電等。此非異熟宗。以非業果五蘊無為而為同品。許非識因。于電等有。於心等無。以業果五蘊而為異品。許非識因。於心等無。于眼等有。故是他俱品一分轉。小乘返立。即自俱品一分轉。如論所陳。即是共俱品一
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 故如前亦為不定。理門論云：『若於其中俱分是有，亦是定因簡別余故，是名差別。』謂此第五俱分之因，于同異品，皆悉分有，是不定因，由有相違及正因故。此所說因，不於一分異品轉故，是定因攝。如立聲常宗，無質礙故因。諸無質礙，皆悉是常，猶如虛空為同喻。若是無常，即有質礙，猶如瓶等為異喻。空為同品，無質礙因有。瓶為異品，無質礙因無。故是其正。若望樂等心心所法，異品有故，即是相違。謂聲無常，無質礙故，如心心所。謂若是常，見有質礙，猶如極微。今此不定因，望異品一分無邊，可是決定。若望異品一分有邊，即成相違，故是猶預。或於其中俱分有者，非唯此一。第一第三四五，皆名俱分，並有此義。同品異品名為俱分，非俱一分名為俱分。若作后解，攝不定盡。前不共因，無有定義。宜簡別自余不定因故，是名不定。與余差別。次上二因，唯有二段，無第三段。指不定相，同前第三，易故不說。此亦有三。如大乘師對薩婆多(Sarvastivadins，一切有部)，立他比量。汝之命根非是異熟，以許非識故，如許電等。此非異熟宗，以非業果五蘊無為而為同品。許非識因，于電等有，於心等無。以業果五蘊而為異品。許非識因，於心等無，于眼等有。故是他俱品一分轉。小乘返立，即自俱品一分轉。如論所陳，即是共俱品一。 因此，如同前面所說，這也是不確定的。《理門論》說：『如果在其中共同具有某些屬性，這也是爲了區分其他確定原因，所以稱為差別。』 這第五種共同具有的因，在同品和異品中都部分存在，因此是不確定的原因，因為它既有相反的例子，也有正確的例子。 這個所說的因，不是在異品的一部分中轉變，所以屬於確定的原因。 例如，建立『聲音是常』的宗，以『沒有物質阻礙』為因。所有沒有物質阻礙的事物，都是常的，就像虛空是同喻。如果是有變化的，就會有物質阻礙，就像瓶子等是異喻。虛空是同品，沒有物質阻礙的因存在。瓶子是異品，沒有物質阻礙的因不存在。所以這是正確的。 如果考慮到樂等心和心所法，因為異品存在，這就是相反的。例如，『聲音是無常的，因為它沒有物質阻礙』，就像心和心所一樣。如果是有常的，就會看到有物質阻礙，就像極微一樣。 現在這個不確定的因，如果考慮到異品的一部分是無限的，那麼它可能是確定的。如果考慮到異品的一部分是有限的，那麼它就變成了相反的，所以它是猶豫不決的。 或者在其中共同具有某些屬性的，不僅僅是這一個。第一、第三、第四、第五，都稱為共同具有，並且具有這個含義。同品和異品稱為共同具有，而不是共同的一部分稱為共同具有。如果按照後面的解釋，就包含了所有不確定的情況。前面的不共因，沒有定義。應該區分其他不確定的原因，所以稱為不確定，與其他的不同。 其次，上面的兩個因，只有兩個部分，沒有第三個部分。指出不確定的相，與前面的第三個相同，容易理解所以不說了。 這也有三種情況。例如，大乘的老師針對薩婆多(Sarvastivadins，一切有部)，建立他人的比量。你的命根不是異熟果，因為你承認它不是識，就像承認電等一樣。這個不是異熟果的宗，以非業果的五蘊和無為法作為同品。承認非識的因，在電等存在，在心等不存在。以業果的五蘊作為異品。承認非識的因，在心等不存在，在眼等存在。所以這是在他共同品的一部分中轉變。小乘反過來建立，就是在自己共同品的一部分中轉變。正如論中所說，這就是共同的共同品的一部分。
【English Translation】 English version Hence, as before, it is also uncertain. The Hetu-cakra-damaru states: 'If it is partly present in both, it is called a difference because it distinguishes other definite causes.' This fifth cause, which is partly present in both similar and dissimilar instances, is an uncertain cause because it has both contradictory and correct instances. This stated cause, because it does not occur in a portion of the dissimilar instances, is included in the definite cause. For example, establishing the proposition 'sound is permanent' with the reason 'because it is without material obstruction.' All that is without material obstruction is permanent, like space as a similar example. If it were impermanent, it would have material obstruction, like a pot as a dissimilar example. Space is the similar instance, where the cause 'without material obstruction' exists. A pot is the dissimilar instance, where the cause 'without material obstruction' does not exist. Therefore, it is correct. If considering feelings and mental factors, because the dissimilar instance exists, it is contradictory. For example, 'sound is impermanent because it is without material obstruction,' like feelings and mental factors. If it were permanent, it would be seen to have material obstruction, like atoms. Now, this uncertain cause, considering a portion of the dissimilar instances as infinite, can be definite. If considering a portion of the dissimilar instances as finite, it becomes contradictory, therefore it is doubtful. Or, that which is partly present in both, is not only this one. The first, third, fourth, and fifth are all called partly present, and have this meaning. Similar and dissimilar instances are called partly present, not a single part is called partly present. If interpreted in the latter way, it encompasses all uncertain cases. The previous non-common cause has no definition. It should distinguish itself from other uncertain causes, therefore it is called uncertain, differing from others. Next, the above two causes have only two sections, without a third section. Pointing out the uncertain aspect is the same as the previous third, it is easy to understand so it is not discussed. This also has three cases. For example, a Mahayana teacher, in response to the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, those who assert everything exists), establishes an inference for others. 'Your life-force is not a Vipaka (Vipaka, fruit of action), because you admit it is not consciousness, like admitting lightning etc.' This is the proposition that it is not a Vipaka (Vipaka, fruit of action), with the non-karmic aggregates and unconditioned as the similar instance. The cause 'admitting it is not consciousness' exists in lightning etc., but does not exist in mind etc. With the karmic aggregates as the dissimilar instance. The cause 'admitting it is not consciousness' does not exist in mind etc., but exists in eye etc. Therefore, it occurs in a portion of the other's similar instance. The Hinayana refutes this, establishing it as occurring in a portion of their own similar instance. As stated in the treatise, this is a portion of the common similar instance.
分轉。
論。相違決定者。
述曰。第六相違決定有三。此初標名。具三相因。各自決定。成相違之宗。名相違決定。相違之決定。決定令相違。第三第六兩囀。俱是依主釋也。有比量云。此之二因非是過因。三相具故。如二八因。或二八因應非正因。具三相故。如此二因。應為彼立相違量云。此之二因不定因攝。令敵證者生疑智故。如五不定。或此二因非正因攝。不令敵證生定智故。如余過因。若二八因。許非正因。便無正量。違教世間種種過失。故知。彼是正因所攝。此二乃是不定所收。二八句因正因所攝。生敵證者決定智故。如余正因。
論。如立宗言聲是無常所作性故譬如瓶等。
述曰。下第二顯宗因有二。此乃勝論對聲生論。義如前說。若對聲顯隨一不成。
論。有立聲常所聞性故譬如聲性。
述曰。此乃聲生對勝論立。若對余宗說所聞性。是前所說不共不定。勝論聲性。謂同異性。實德業三。各別性故。本有而常。大有共有。非各別性。不名聲性。聲生說聲總有三類。一者響音。雖耳所聞。不能詮表。如近坑語。別有響聲。二者聲性。一一能詮。各有性類。離能詮外。別有本常。不緣不覺。新生緣具。方始可聞。不同勝論。三者能詮。離前二有。響及此二皆新生。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：相違決定者。
述曰：第六相違決定有三。此初標名。具三相因。各自決定。成相違之宗。名相違決定。相違之決定。決定令相違。第三第六兩囀。俱是依主釋也。有比量云：此之二因非是過因。三相具故。如二八因。或二八因應非正因。具三相故。如此二因。應為彼立相違量云：此之二因不定因攝。令敵證者生疑智故。如五不定。或此二因非正因攝。不令敵證生定智故。如余過因。若二八因。許非正因。便無正量。違教世間種種過失。故知。彼是正因所攝。此二乃是不定所收。二八句因正因所攝。生敵證者決定智故。如余正因。
論：如立宗言聲是無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。
述曰：下第二顯宗因有二。此乃勝論對聲生論。義如前說。若對聲顯隨一不成。
論：有立聲常，所聞性故，譬如聲性。
述曰：此乃聲生對勝論立。若對余宗說所聞性。是前所說不共不定。勝論聲性。謂同異性。實德業三。各別性故。本有而常。大有共有。非各別性。不名聲性。聲生說聲總有三類。一者響音。雖耳所聞。不能詮表。如近坑語。別有響聲。二者聲性。一一能詮。各有性類。離能詮外。別有本常。不緣不覺。新生緣具。方始可聞。不同勝論。三者能詮。離前二有。響及此二皆新生。
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: The contradictory determination.
Commentary: The sixth contradictory determination has three aspects. This initially states the name. It possesses the three characteristics of a reason (hetu), each of which is determined. It forms a thesis (paksha) that is contradictory, hence the name 'contradictory determination'. It is the determination of contradiction, determining the contradiction. The third and sixth inflections are both possessive compound resolutions. There is an inference (anumana) that states: These two reasons are not flawed reasons because they possess the three characteristics, like the reasons 'two' and 'eight'. Or, the reasons 'two' and 'eight' should not be valid reasons because they possess the three characteristics, like these two reasons. One should establish a contradictory inference for them, stating: These two reasons are included in the uncertain reason (anaikantika-hetu) because they cause the opponent to generate doubt, like the five uncertain reasons. Or, these two reasons are not included in the valid reason because they do not cause the opponent to generate certain knowledge, like other flawed reasons. If the reasons 'two' and 'eight' are admitted to be invalid reasons, then there would be no valid means of knowledge (pramana), violating the teachings and causing various faults in the world. Therefore, it is known that they are included in the valid reason. These two are included in the uncertain. The reasons 'two' and 'eight' are included in the valid reason because they generate certain knowledge in the opponent, like other valid reasons.
Treatise: For example, establishing the thesis that sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot.
Commentary: The following second section reveals that the reason for the thesis has two aspects. This is the Vaisheshika school's argument against the Shabda Utpadavadin (Sound-Production proponent). The meaning is as previously stated. If one argues against sound, either one of the aspects will not be established.
Treatise: Someone establishes that sound is permanent because it is audible, like sound-ness (shabdatva).
Commentary: This is the Shabda Utpadavadin's argument against the Vaisheshika school. If one speaks of audibility against other schools, it is the non-common uncertain reason previously mentioned. Vaisheshika's 'sound-ness' refers to the common and distinct properties, the particular properties of substance, quality, and action. It is originally existent and permanent. The great existent is common, not a particular property, and is not called 'sound-ness'. The Shabda Utpadavadin says that sound has three categories in total: First, reverberating sounds, although heard by the ear, cannot express meaning, like speech near a pit, which has a distinct reverberating sound. Second, sound-ness, each of which can express meaning, each having its own class. Apart from the expressive, there is an original permanent existence. It is not perceived without conditions; only when the conditions for new production are complete can it be heard, unlike the Vaisheshika school. Third, the expressive, which exists apart from the previous two. Reverberating sounds and these two are all newly produced.
響不能詮。今此新生聲是常住。以本有聲性為同品。兩宗雖異。並有聲性可聞且常住。故總為同喻。不應分別。何者聲性。如立無常。所作性因。瓶為同品。豈應分別。何者所作。何者無常。若繩輪所作。打破無常。聲無瓶有。若尋伺所作。緣息無常。聲有瓶無。若爾。一切皆無因喻。故知因喻之法。皆不應分別。由此聲生立量無過。若分別者。便成過類分別相似。
論。此二皆是猶預因故俱名不定。
述曰。第三結成不定也。二因皆不能令他敵證生決定一智。故如前五俱是不定。理門論頌。結四相違及不定云。觀宗法審察。若所樂違害。成躊躇顛倒。異此無似因。由觀察宗法。令審察者智成躊躇。名不定因。二因雖皆具足三相。令他不定。與不定名。論說此二俱不定攝。故不應分別前後是非。凡如此二因。二皆不定故。古有斷言如殺遲棋。後下為勝。若爾。聲強勝論應負。然理門論。謗斷聲勝二論義云。又於此中現教力勝。故應依此思求決定。彼說此因二皆不定。然斷聲論先立聲常。所聞性因。勝論后說所作性因。云聲無常。可如殺遲棋。先下負后勝。今此與彼前後相違。故不應爾。又彼外難所聞性因。若對有聲性應正因。論主非之。令依現教。現謂世間。見聲間斷。有時不聞。眾緣力起。教謂佛教。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 響不能詮釋。現在這個新產生的聲是常住的，因為其本有的聲性是同類的。雖然兩派觀點不同，但都認為聲性可以被聽到且是常住的，所以總的來說可以作為同喻，不應該加以分別。什麼是聲性呢？就像建立『無常』這個命題，以『所作性』作為原因，瓶子作為同品。難道應該分別什麼是『所作』，什麼是『無常』嗎？如果說是繩輪所作，打破了『無常』，聲有而瓶沒有；如果說是尋伺所作，緣息則『無常』，聲有而瓶沒有。如果這樣，一切都將沒有原因和比喻了。所以要知道原因和比喻的法則，都不應該加以分別。因此，用『聲生』來建立量式沒有過失。如果加以分別，就會變成過失，類似於分別相似。
論：這兩種原因都是猶豫不決的原因，所以都叫做『不定』。
述曰：第三部分總結為『不定』。這兩種原因都不能使對方產生確定的智慧，所以像前面的五種情況一樣，都是『不定』。理門論的頌詞總結了四種相違和『不定』，說：『觀察宗法，審察，如果所樂的相違害，就成了躊躇顛倒，除此之外沒有相似的原因。』由於觀察宗法，使審察者的智慧產生躊躇，就叫做『不定因』。這兩種原因雖然都具備了三相，但使對方不確定，所以被命名為『不定』。論中說這兩種都屬於『不定』的範疇，所以不應該分別前後的是非。凡是像這兩種原因的情況，都是『不定』的。古人有斷言說像下棋一樣，後下為勝。如果這樣，聲強勝論就應該失敗。然而，理門論駁斥了斷聲勝二論的觀點，說：『又於此中，現教力勝，所以應該依此思求決定。』他們說這兩種原因都是『不定』的。然而，斷聲論先立『聲常』，以『所聞性』為原因，勝論后說『所作性』為原因，說『聲無常』，可以像下棋一樣，先下負後下勝。現在這種情況與之前的情況相反，所以不應該這樣。另外，對方質疑『所聞性』這個原因，如果對『有聲性』來說應該是正因，論主否定了這一點，讓他們依據現教。『現』指的是世間，看到聲音間斷，有時聽不到，是眾緣和合而起；『教』指的是佛教。
【English Translation】 English version: Sound cannot be defined. Now, this newly produced sound is permanent because its inherent sound-nature (shēngxìng) [sound-nature] is of the same kind. Although the two schools have different views, both agree that sound-nature can be heard and is permanent, so in general, it can be used as a similar example (tongyù) [similar example], and should not be distinguished. What is sound-nature? It's like establishing the proposition of 'impermanence' (wúcháng) [impermanence], using 'being produced' (suǒzuòxìng) [being produced] as the reason, and a jar as the similar instance (tongpǐn) [similar instance]. Should we distinguish what is 'being produced' and what is 'impermanent'? If it is said that it is produced by rope and wheel, breaking 'impermanence', sound exists but the jar does not; if it is said that it is produced by seeking and contemplating, when conditions cease, it is 'impermanent', sound exists but the jar does not. If so, everything will have no cause and no analogy. Therefore, it should be known that the laws of cause and analogy should not be distinguished. Therefore, establishing a proposition with 'sound is produced' has no fault. If distinctions are made, it will become a fault, similar to distinguishing similarities.
Treatise: These two are both causes of hesitation, so they are both called 'uncertain' (bùdìng) [uncertain].
Commentary: The third part concludes as 'uncertain'. These two causes cannot make the opponent generate a definite wisdom, so like the previous five cases, they are all 'uncertain'. The verse of the Reasoning Door Treatise (Lǐmén Lùn) [Reasoning Door Treatise] summarizes the four contradictions and 'uncertainty', saying: 'Observe the property of the subject (zōngfǎ) [property of the subject], examine carefully, if what is desired contradicts and harms, it becomes hesitation and inversion, besides this there is no similar cause.' Because of observing the property of the subject, making the wisdom of the examiner generate hesitation, it is called 'uncertain cause'. Although these two causes both possess the three characteristics, they make the opponent uncertain, so they are named 'uncertain'. The treatise says that these two both belong to the category of 'uncertain', so there should be no distinction between right and wrong before and after. All cases like these two causes are 'uncertain'. The ancients had a saying that it is like playing chess, the later move wins. If so, the sound-stronger argument should fail. However, the Reasoning Door Treatise refutes the view of the sound-stopping and sound-stronger arguments, saying: 'Also in this, the power of the evident teaching (xiànjiào) [evident teaching] is stronger, so one should rely on this to seek determination.' They say that these two causes are both 'uncertain'. However, the sound-stopping argument first establishes 'sound is permanent', using 'being heard' (suǒwénxìng) [being heard] as the cause, and the sound-stronger argument later says 'being produced' as the cause, saying 'sound is impermanent', it can be like playing chess, the first move loses and the later move wins. Now this situation is the opposite of the previous situation, so it should not be like this. In addition, the opponent questions the cause of 'being heard', if it is for 'having sound-nature' (yǒu shēngxìng) [having sound-nature], it should be a correct cause, the treatise master denies this, and asks them to rely on the evident teaching. 'Evident' refers to the world, seeing that sound is intermittent, sometimes not heard, it arises from the combination of many conditions; 'teaching' refers to Buddhism.
說聲無常。佛于說教最為勝故。由此二義。勝論義勝。又釋迦佛現證諸法。見聲無常。依現說教。教說無常。故勝論先。不應依于外道常教。又諸外道不許佛勝者。應依世間現有至實可信之說。聲逢緣有。暫有還無。世可信者所共說教。故勝論先。聲論墮負。彼且斷于聲勝二義。聲負勝先。非諸決定相違。皆先負后勝。若爾便決定。云何名不定。由此論主。恐謂一切決定相違皆后為勝。故結之云。二俱不定。此亦有三。如大乘破薩婆多。云汝無表色定非實色。許無對故。如心心所。彼立量云。我無對色定是實色。許色性故。如許色聲等。此他比量相違決定。初是他比。后必自比。若立自比。對他比。名自比量相違決定。無二自他。若二自他。俱真立破。非似立故。如大乘立前破無表比量。小乘對云。大乘無表定有實色。許非極微等是無對色故。如許定果色。此非相違決定。俱真能立真能破故。由此立敵共申一有法。諍此法等。方是此故。若先立自義。后他方破。即是自比相違決定。如論所說。有共相違決定之過。是名為三。問若共不定亦不共耶。乃至復俱品一分轉。亦相違決定耶。答此六過體。行相別故。皆名相違。體相無雜。無二同體。況多合耶。問此六過因。於九句因各是何過。答此初共因。是彼初句。此第二不
共。是彼第五句。此第三是彼第七句。此第四是彼第三句。此第五是彼第九句。此第六過彼因所無。此相無闕。彼有闕也。問相違決定。與比量相違。有何差別。答彼宗違因。此因違宗。彼寬此狹二類別故。由此說諸相違決定。皆比量相違。有比量相違。非相違決定。但宗違因無二因故。問相違決定違法自相。亦有法差別。有法自相。有法差別耶。答有。若不改前因。違宗四種。是后相違過。若改前因。違宗四種。皆相違決定。若共比量。如勝論師對聲論。立聲無常已。聲論若言聲應非聲。許德攝故。如色香等。而為有法自相相違決定者。決定彼違自宗。若云無常之聲。應非無常之聲。所作性故。如瓶。以為有法自相相違決定。此非過攝。雙牒法有法為法宗。于諸過中無此相故。其無常言根本所諍法之自相。非有法上意許差別。不可說為有法差別。是故此量非過所攝。若許為過。即一切量無真量者。皆有此故。但是過類分別相似。由是因明總無此過。如勝論師。立自比量云。所說有性非四大種。許除四大體非無故。如色聲等。以除四大及有性外併爲同喻。無自不定。他便作有法自相相違難言。汝有性非有性。非四大故。如色聲等。是名有法自相相違決定。即以此因。復作有法差別相違云。汝之有性應不能作有有緣性。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 共。這是對方的第五句。這第三句是對方的第七句。這第四句是對方的第三句。這第五句是對方的第九句。這第六句超過了對方原因所沒有的。這個方面沒有缺失，對方有缺失。問：『相違決定』（viruddha-niścaya，矛盾決定）與『比量相違』（anumāna-viruddha，與推論相矛盾）有什麼差別？答：對方是原因與（他們的）宗義相違背，而這是原因與（我們的）宗義相違背。對方寬泛，我方狹窄，這是兩種類別的原因。因此說，所有的『相違決定』都是『比量相違』，但有『比量相違』，卻不一定是『相違決定』。只是因為宗義與原因相違背，沒有兩個原因的緣故。問：『相違決定』違背了『有法自相』（dharmi-svalakṣaṇa，自相的主體），也有『有法差別』（dharmi-viśeṣa，差別的法），有『有法自相』，有『有法差別』嗎？答：有。如果不改變前面的原因，與宗義相違背的四種情況，是後面的『相違過』（viruddhāvyāpta，相違不遍）。如果改變前面的原因，與宗義相違背的四種情況，都是『相違決定』。如果共同的比量，例如勝論師（Vaiśeṣika）針對聲明論者（Śabdika），立論說聲音是無常的。聲明論者如果說，聲音應該不是聲音，因為它被承認為德（guṇa）所包含，就像色（rūpa）、香（gandha）等。這就是作為『有法自相相違決定』（dharmi-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha-niścaya，自相的主體矛盾決定）的情況，決定了它違背了自己的宗義。如果說，無常的聲音，應該不是無常的聲音，因為它具有所作性（kṛtakatva），就像瓶子。這不屬於過失的範疇。因為同時涉及法（dharma）、有法（dharmin）作為法宗（dharma-pakṣa），在各種過失中沒有這種形式。其中的『無常』一詞，是根本所爭論的法的自相，不是有法上意許的差別，不能說是『有法差別』。因此，這個量不是過失所包含的。如果認為這是過失，那麼一切量都沒有真量了，因為都有這種情況。但這只是過失類別中相似的分別。因此，因明（hetuvidyā，論理學）總的來說沒有這種過失。例如，勝論師，建立自己的比量說：『所說有性（astitva，存在）不是四大種（mahābhūta），因為它被認為是除了四大之外的實體，不是沒有的，就像色、聲等。』把除了四大和有性之外的東西都作為同喻（sapakṣa，相似例證），沒有自不定（sva-aniyata，自身不決定）。對方就作『有法自相相違』的責難說：『你的有性不是有性，因為它不是四大，就像色、聲等。』這被稱為『有法自相相違決定』。即以此因，又作『有法差別相違』說：『你的有性應該不能作為有有緣性（bhāva-bhāva-hetutva，存在的原因）。』
【English Translation】 English version Common. This is their fifth statement. This third is their seventh statement. This fourth is their third statement. This fifth is their ninth statement. This sixth exceeds what is absent in their cause. This aspect is without deficiency, while theirs has deficiencies. Question: What is the difference between 'viruddha-niścaya' (contradictory determination) and 'anumāna-viruddha' (contradictory to inference)? Answer: Theirs is a cause contradictory to (their) thesis, while this is a cause contradictory to (our) thesis. Theirs is broad, ours is narrow, hence two different categories. Therefore, it is said that all 'viruddha-niścaya' are 'anumāna-viruddha', but there are 'anumāna-viruddha' that are not necessarily 'viruddha-niścaya'. It is simply because the thesis contradicts the cause, and there are no two causes. Question: Does 'viruddha-niścaya' violate the 'dharmi-svalakṣaṇa' (self-character of the subject), and also have 'dharmi-viśeṣa' (difference of the subject)? Is there 'dharmi-svalakṣaṇa', and 'dharmi-viśeṣa'? Answer: Yes. If the previous cause is not changed, the four types that contradict the thesis are the subsequent 'viruddhāvyāpta' (contradictory non-pervasion). If the previous cause is changed, the four types that contradict the thesis are all 'viruddha-niścaya'. If it is a common inference, such as the Vaiśeṣika (atomist) arguing against the Śabdika (grammarian), establishing that sound is impermanent. If the Śabdika says that sound should not be sound, because it is acknowledged to be included in qualities (guṇa), like color (rūpa), smell (gandha), etc. This is a case of 'dharmi-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha-niścaya' (contradictory determination of the subject's own nature), determining that it contradicts their own thesis. If one says that impermanent sound should not be impermanent sound, because it has the property of being produced (kṛtakatva), like a pot. This does not fall under the category of fallacy. Because it simultaneously involves dharma (property), dharmin (subject), as dharma-pakṣa (property-side), there is no such form among the various fallacies. The word 'impermanent' in it is the self-character of the property fundamentally in dispute, not a difference intentionally permitted on the subject, and cannot be said to be 'dharmi-viśeṣa'. Therefore, this inference is not included in fallacies. If it is considered a fallacy, then all inferences would lack true validity, because all have this case. But this is only a similar distinction in the category of fallacies. Therefore, hetuvidyā (the science of reasoning) generally does not have this fallacy. For example, the Vaiśeṣika, establishing his own inference, says: 'The said existence (astitva) is not the four great elements (mahābhūta), because it is considered to be a substance other than the four great elements, not non-existent, like color, sound, etc.' Taking everything other than the four great elements and existence as sapakṣa (similar example), there is no sva-aniyata (self-undetermined). The opponent then makes the objection of 'dharmi-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha' (contradictory to the subject's own nature), saying: 'Your existence is not existence, because it is not the four great elements, like color, sound, etc.' This is called 'dharmi-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha-niścaya' (contradictory determination of the subject's own nature). Using this cause again, he makes the 'dharmi-viśeṣa-viruddha' (contradictory to the subject's difference) saying: 'Your existence should not be able to act as bhāva-bhāva-hetutva (the cause of existence).'
許非四大故。如色聲等。彼意說。有能作有性之有能緣性故。作有有緣性。非有有緣性。是意所許有性有法之差別也。其非四大種。是法自相。能有四大非四大種。不能有四大非四大種。是法差別。復作法差別相違決定云。汝之有性非能有四大非四大種。許非無故。如色聲等。彼說。色等雖非四大種。不能有四大。然說有性。能有四大。非四大種。故成法差別相違決定。今論但說言之所陳。違宗能別本所諍因。名相違決定。其有法自相。雖言所陳。非宗相返本所諍法。二種差別意之所許。雖意所諍。非言所陳。此三決定相違之因。皆略不說。以此準前比量相違亦有四種。論中亦但說法自相比量。問此諸不定有分有全耶。答無理窮盡故。如前所說五十四種不定之中。自共比中諸自不定。及共不定。是不定過。自共有過。非真能立。何名破他。他比量中。若他不定及共不定。亦不定過。立他違他及共有過。既非能破。何成能立。自比量中。諸他不定。他比量中。諸自不定。皆非過攝。立義本欲違害他故。諸立自非他。他不定非。立他非自。自不定非。隨其所應皆如理悉。此論且依兩俱不定過說。立敵俱許因於二喻。共不共等說為過故。二喻雖共。若因隨一。因疑之喻同喻無體。隨應即是隨一猶預所依不成不定過攝。五十四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 許非四大（四大種：地、水、火、風）的緣故。例如色、聲等。他們的意思是說，因為有能作（能作：具有產生作用的能力）和有性的有能緣性（能緣性：作為所認知對象的能力），所以能作是有緣性的，而非有則沒有緣性。這是他們所認可的有性和有法之間的差別。那些不是四大種的，是法（法：事物、現象）的自相（自相：自身獨特的性質）。能夠有四大和非四大種，不能夠有四大和非四大種，這是法的差別。又作法差別相違決定說：『你的有性不能有四大和非四大種，因為你承認非無，就像色、聲等。』他們說：『色等雖然不是四大種，不能有四大，但說有效能夠有四大和非四大種。』因此構成法差別相違決定。現在討論只說言語所陳述的，違背宗（宗：論點）的能別（能別：能夠區分事物的特性）和原本所爭論的因（因：理由、原因），叫做相違決定。至於有法自相，雖然是言語所陳述的，但不是與宗相反的原本所爭論的法。兩種差別的意思是他們所認可的，雖然是他們所爭論的，但不是言語所陳述的。這三種決定相違的因，都省略不說。以此類推，前面的比量相違也有四種，論中也只說法自相比量。問：這些不定有（不定有：不確定的存在）有部分有全部嗎？答：因為沒有窮盡一切道理，就像前面所說的五十四種不定之中，自共比（自共比：自己和他人的比較）中的各種自不定（自不定：自己不確定的）以及共不定（共不定：共同不確定的），是不定過（不定過：不確定的過失）。自共有過，不是真正的能立（能立：能夠成立論點），憑什麼破斥他人？在他人比量中，如果他人不定以及共不定，也是不定過。成立他人，違揹他人以及共有過，既然不能破斥，憑什麼成立？在自比量中，各種他人不定，在他人比量中，各種自不定，都不是過失的範疇。立義（立義：確立意義）原本就想要違害他人，各種確立自己而非他人，他人不定就不是；確立他人而非自己，自己不定就不是，都應該按照道理來詳細分析。這個論述暫且依據兩方都承認不定過來說，確立和敵對雙方都認可的因，在兩個比喻中，共同或不共同等，說是過失的緣故。兩個比喻雖然共同，如果因隨著其中一個，因懷疑的比喻，同喻沒有實體，相應地就是隨著其中一個猶豫所依據的不成不定過範疇。五十四種不定。
【English Translation】 English version The reason why something is not the Four Great Elements (Four Great Elements: earth, water, fire, and wind). For example, color, sound, etc. Their intention is that because there is the ability to act (ability to act: having the ability to produce effects) and the existence of 'having-nature' with the ability to be cognized (ability to be cognized: the ability to be an object of cognition), therefore 'having-nature' that can act has the ability to be cognized, while 'non-having' does not have the ability to be cognized. This is the difference between 'having-nature' and 'having-dharma' that they acknowledge. Those that are not the Four Great Elements are the self-characteristics (self-characteristics: unique qualities) of dharmas (dharmas: things, phenomena). Being able to have the Four Great Elements and non-Four Great Elements, and not being able to have the Four Great Elements and non-Four Great Elements, this is the difference of dharmas. Furthermore, they make a contradictory determination of dharma-difference, saying: 'Your 'having-nature' cannot have the Four Great Elements and non-Four Great Elements, because you admit that 'non-having' does not exist, just like color, sound, etc.' They say: 'Although color, etc., are not the Four Great Elements and cannot have the Four Great Elements, it is said that 'having-nature' can have the Four Great Elements and non-Four Great Elements.' Therefore, it constitutes a contradictory determination of dharma-difference. Now, the discussion only speaks of what is stated in words, which contradicts the distinguishing characteristic (distinguishing characteristic: the characteristic that can distinguish things) of the thesis (thesis: argument) and the original reason (reason: justification, cause) being debated, and is called contradictory determination. As for the self-characteristic of 'having-dharma', although it is stated in words, it is not the dharma being originally debated that is contrary to the thesis. The meaning of the two kinds of differences is what they acknowledge, although it is what they are debating, it is not stated in words. These three kinds of determined contradictory reasons are all omitted. By analogy, the previous contradictory inference also has four kinds, and the treatise only speaks of the self-characteristic inference of dharma. Question: Do these uncertain existences (uncertain existences: uncertain existences) have parts or are they complete? Answer: Because there is no exhaustive reasoning, just like the fifty-four kinds of uncertainties mentioned earlier, among the self-common comparisons (self-common comparisons: comparisons between oneself and others), the various self-uncertainties (self-uncertainties: one's own uncertainties) and common uncertainties (common uncertainties: shared uncertainties) are uncertain faults (uncertain faults: uncertain errors). Self-common faults are not true establishers (establishers: those who can establish arguments), so how can they refute others? In others' inferences, if others' uncertainties and common uncertainties are also uncertain faults. Establishing others, contradicting others, and having common faults, since they cannot refute, how can they establish? In self-inferences, the various others' uncertainties, and in others' inferences, the various self-uncertainties, are not within the category of faults. Establishing meaning (establishing meaning: establishing meaning) originally intends to harm others, various establishing oneself and not others, others' uncertainties are not; establishing others and not oneself, oneself's uncertainties are not, and all should be analyzed in detail according to reason. This discussion temporarily relies on both parties admitting uncertain faults, the reason that both the establisher and the opponent acknowledge, in the two metaphors, common or uncommon, etc., is said to be the reason for the fault. Although the two metaphors are common, if the reason follows one of them, the metaphor of the reason for doubt, the similar metaphor has no substance, correspondingly it is the category of uncertain faults based on hesitation following one of them. Fifty-four kinds of uncertainties.
種。諸不定過。既各有四。即成二百一十六種不定過攝。若四不成有體無體全分一分自他共許合二十七。皆準前說。其二十七過。五十四諸不定過一一皆有總成一千四百五十八種諸不定過理門既云。四種不成。于其同品有非有等亦隨所應當如是說。故知。道理決定如是。然理門論攝此頌云。若法是不共。共決定相違。遍一切法彼。皆是疑因性。共定攝四不定之因。同異品中。隨其所應。若全若分皆共有故。不共相違。各唯攝一。此六不定遍一切宗。于彼諸法皆是疑因。不獨于上所說宗中名不定也。
因明入正理論卷中
建武二年九月三日當卷之分書寫之訖依公家御祈禱大乘院御參籠于舟戶館真讀大般若被催六口人數之間寫功遲引畢。
依摧邪之功萬國歸正理因明神之助一人行政德矣。
(一交了一交了)權律師尊經
同月二十三日湯治之餘暇點之了 大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1840 因明入正理論疏
因明入正理論疏卷下
大慈恩寺沙門基撰
論。相違有四謂法自相相違因法差別相違因有法自相相違因有法差別相違因等。
述曰。下第三解相違有三。初標。次列。后釋。此初二也。相違因義者。謂兩宗相返。此之四過。不改他因。能令立者宗成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 種類。各種不定過失。既然各有四種情況，就形成了二百一十六種不定過失的集合。如果四種不成（指體有、體無、全分、一分）與自、他、共許相結合，共有二十七種情況，都按照前面的說法處理。這二十七種過失，五十四種不定過失，每一種都有總共形成一千四百五十八種不定過失。理門（指《因明入正理論》）中說，四種不成，對於其同品中的有非有等，也應當根據情況如是說。因此可知，道理決定是這樣的。然而，《理門論》收錄此頌說：『如果一個法是不共的，與共同決定的相違背，遍及一切法，那麼它都是懷疑的因性。』共同決定包含四種不定的原因，在同品和異品中，根據情況，全部或部分都是共同的。不共相違，各自只包含一種。這六種不定遍及一切宗派，對於那些法都是懷疑的原因，不僅僅在上面所說的宗派中才被稱為不定。 《因明入正理論卷中》 建武二年九月三日，此卷之部分書寫完畢，依據公家御祈禱大乘院御參籠，于舟戶館真讀《大般若經》，被催促六口人數之間，寫功遲緩完畢。 依據摧毀邪惡的功德，萬國歸於正理，因明神明的幫助，一人行政德啊。 （一交了一交了）權律師尊經 同月二十三日，在湯治的閑暇時間點校完畢 《大正藏》第 44 冊 No. 1840 《因明入正理論疏》 《因明入正理論疏卷下》 大慈恩寺沙門基撰 論：相違有四種，即法自相相違因（dharma-svalaksana-viruddha-hetu），法差別相違因（dharma-visesa-viruddha-hetu），有法自相相違因（dharmin-svalaksana-viruddha-hetu），有法差別相違因（dharmin-visesa-viruddha-hetu）等。 述曰：下面第三個解釋相違有三種，首先是標明，其次是列舉，最後是解釋。這裡是前兩種。相違因的意義是，兩種主張相互矛盾。這四種過失，不改變其他原因，能夠使立論者的主張成立。
【English Translation】 English version: Kinds. Various uncertain faults. Since each has four situations, they form a collection of two hundred and sixteen kinds of uncertain faults. If the four 'not established' (referring to existence of substance, non-existence of substance, whole part, one part) are combined with self, other, and common agreement, there are a total of twenty-seven situations, all handled according to the previous explanation. These twenty-seven faults, fifty-four uncertain faults, each has a total of one thousand four hundred and fifty-eight kinds of uncertain faults. The 'Treatise on Reasoning' (referring to the Nyāyapraveśa) says that the four 'not established,' for their homogeneous counterparts such as existence and non-existence, should also be stated accordingly. Therefore, it can be known that the reasoning is definitely like this. However, the Treatise on Reasoning includes this verse, saying: 'If a dharma is non-common, contradicts common determination, and pervades all dharmas, then it is the nature of doubt.' Common determination includes the causes of the four uncertainties, in homogeneous and heterogeneous counterparts, according to the situation, all or part are common. Non-common contradiction, each only includes one. These six uncertainties pervade all schools, and for those dharmas are the cause of doubt, not only in the schools mentioned above are they called uncertain. Nyāyapraveśa, Volume Middle On September 3rd of the second year of Jianwu, the writing of this volume's portion was completed, based on the public imperial prayer at the Mahayana Temple, at the Funato Hall, truly reading the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, being urged by six people, the writing was delayed and completed. Based on the merit of destroying evil, all nations return to the correct principle, with the help of the Nyaya deity, one person administers virtue. (One exchange, one exchange, one exchange) Provisional Lawyer Zunjing On the 23rd of the same month, proofread during leisure time while hot spring bathing. Taisho Tripitaka Volume 44 No. 1840 Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, Volume Lower Compiled by the Sramana Ji of Daci'en Temple Treatise: There are four kinds of contradiction, namely dharma-svalaksana-viruddha-hetu (因法自相相違因), dharma-visesa-viruddha-hetu (法差別相違因), dharmin-svalaksana-viruddha-hetu (有法自相相違因), and dharmin-visesa-viruddha-hetu (有法差別相違因), etc. Commentary: The third explanation of contradiction below has three parts: first, the indication; second, the enumeration; and third, the explanation. Here are the first two. The meaning of contradictory cause is that the two positions contradict each other. These four faults, without changing other causes, can make the proponent's position established.
相違。與相違法而為因故。名相違因。因得果名名相違也。非因違宗名為相違。故無宗亦違因。例而成難。理門論云。若法能成相違所立。是相違過。即名似因。如無違法。相違亦爾。所成法無定無有故。由彼說故因仍舊定。喻可改依。故下四過。初一改喻。后三依舊。問有因返宗。不順因義。因名相違。宗亦返因。不順宗義。應名相違。答由因成宗令宗相返。因名相違。非宗成因。令因相返。不名相違。又因名法自相相違。宗名比量相違。因別疏條。相違開四。宗違合說。唯名比量相違。以宗準因。故知亦有法之差別。有法自相。有法差別比量相違。不爾何故但說有法自相比量相違。其相違決定。及相違因。各四種耶。此宗說法略有二種。一自性。二差別。此有三重。一者局通。對法等言。所成立自性者。謂我自性。法自性。若有若無。所成立故。各別性故。差別者。謂我差別。法差別。若一切遍。若非一切遍。若常若無常。若有色若無色。如是等無量差別。隨其所應。空等遍有。色等非遍。前局后通故二差別。二者先後。于總聚中。言先陳者名為自性。言后說者名為差別。以後所陳分別前故。佛地論云。彼因明論自相共相。與此有異。彼說諸法各別局附自性。名為自相。貫通他上如縷貫花。名為共相。故依於此。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相違（Xiāng wéi）：與所要證明的觀點相反，卻被用作論證的原因，因此稱為相違因（xiāng wéi yīn）。因為這個『因』會導致與最初的『宗』相反的結論。如果不是因為『因』與『宗』相違背，那麼即使沒有『宗』，也會因為『因』本身的問題而導致論證失敗。這就像一個反例，可以用來駁倒原論點。《理門論》中說：『如果某種論證方法能夠導致與所要建立的觀點相反的結論，那麼這就是相違的過失，也就是一種虛假的『因』。』就像沒有違法一樣，相違也是如此。因為所要證明的法是不確定的，不存在的。因為這個原因，『因』仍然是固定的。比喻可以修改，所以接下來的四種過失，第一種是修改比喻，后三種仍然保持不變。 問：如果『因』導致了與『宗』相反的結論，這不符合『因』的定義。『因』被稱為相違。那麼『宗』也導致了與『因』相反的結論，這不符合『宗』的定義，應該也稱為相違嗎？ 答：因為『因』導致了『宗』的相反，所以『因』被稱為相違。而不是因為『宗』導致了『因』的相反，所以『宗』不被稱為相違。而且，『因』指的是法自身的相違，而『宗』指的是比量（bǐliàng）的相違。『因』有單獨的詳細分類，相違分為四種。『宗』的相違是合併在一起說的，只稱為比量的相違。以『宗』來衡量『因』，因此可知也有法的差別。有法自身的相，有法差別比量的相違。如果不是這樣，為什麼只說有法自身的相，比量的相違？為什麼相違決定和相違因各有四種呢？ 這個宗（zōng）的說法略有兩種：一是自性（zìxìng），二是差別（chābié）。這裡有三重含義：一是局通，針對法等概念而言。所要成立的自性，指的是我自性，法自性，無論是有還是無，都是所要成立的，因為它們各自具有不同的性質。差別，指的是我的差別，法的差別，無論是普遍存在，還是非普遍存在，無論是常還是無常，無論是有色還是無色，等等，有無數的差別。根據具體情況，空等是普遍存在的，色等是非普遍存在的。前者是區域性的，後者是普遍的，這是兩種差別。二是先後，在總的集合中，先陳述的稱為自性，后說的稱為差別。因為後面所陳述的是對前面的分別說明。《佛地論》中說：『彼因明論的自相（zìxiāng）和共相（gòngxiāng），與此不同。彼論說諸法各自侷限於自身的性質，稱為自相。貫穿于其他事物之上，像用線穿花一樣，稱為共相。』因此，依據於此。
【English Translation】 English version Contradiction (Xiāng wéi): It refers to using something that contradicts the view to be proven as the reason for the argument, hence it's called contradictory reason (xiāng wéi yīn). This 'reason' leads to a conclusion opposite to the initial 'thesis' (zōng). If it weren't for the 'reason' contradicting the 'thesis,' even without a 'thesis,' the argument would fail due to the problem with the 'reason' itself. It's like a counterexample that can be used to refute the original argument. The Nyayapravesa states: 'If a method of argumentation leads to a conclusion contrary to the view to be established, then this is the fault of contradiction, which is a false 'reason'.' Just like there's no violation, so is contradiction. Because the dharma to be proven is uncertain and non-existent. For this reason, the 'reason' remains fixed. Metaphors can be modified, so the following four faults, the first is modifying the metaphor, and the latter three remain unchanged. Question: If the 'reason' leads to a conclusion contrary to the 'thesis,' doesn't this contradict the definition of 'reason'? The 'reason' is called contradictory. Then the 'thesis' also leads to a conclusion contrary to the 'reason,' doesn't this contradict the definition of 'thesis,' and should also be called contradictory? Answer: Because the 'reason' leads to the contradiction of the 'thesis,' the 'reason' is called contradictory. It's not because the 'thesis' leads to the contradiction of the 'reason,' so the 'thesis' is not called contradictory. Moreover, the 'reason' refers to the self-contradiction of the dharma itself, while the 'thesis' refers to the contradiction of inference (bǐliàng). The 'reason' has a separate detailed classification, and contradiction is divided into four types. The contradiction of the 'thesis' is spoken of together, only called the contradiction of inference. Measuring the 'reason' by the 'thesis,' it can be known that there are also differences in dharmas. There is the self-nature of the dharma, and the contradiction of inference in the difference of the dharma. If it weren't like this, why only say the self-nature of the dharma, the contradiction of inference? Why are there four types each of contradictory determination and contradictory reason? This statement of the thesis (zōng) has roughly two types: one is self-nature (zìxìng), and the other is difference (chābié). There are three levels of meaning here: one is limitation and generality, referring to concepts such as dharma. The self-nature to be established refers to my self-nature, the self-nature of the dharma, whether it exists or not, is what is to be established, because they each have different properties. Difference refers to my difference, the difference of the dharma, whether it is universally present or non-universally present, whether it is permanent or impermanent, whether it is with form or without form, etc., there are countless differences. Depending on the specific situation, emptiness, etc., are universally present, while form, etc., are non-universally present. The former is limited, and the latter is universal, these are two differences. Two is the order of precedence, in the total collection, what is stated first is called self-nature, and what is said later is called difference. Because what is stated later is a separate explanation of what came before. The Buddhabhumi Sutra states: 'The self-characteristic (zìxiāng) and common characteristic (gòngxiāng) of the Hetuvidya, are different from this. That treatise says that the dharmas are each limited to their own nature, called self-characteristic. Penetrating through other things, like threading flowers with a string, is called common characteristic.' Therefore, based on this.
聲等局體名為自性。無常貫他名為差別。得名不定。若立五蘊一切無我。五蘊名為自相。我無我等名為差別。若說我是思。思為差別。我為自性。是故不定。以理推之。此雖即前。然教少異。義亦別故。分為二門。三者言許。言中所陳。前局及后通。俱名自性。故法有法皆有自性。自意所許別義。所可成立名為差別。故法有法皆有差別。非取一切。義如前說。今說有因令此四種宗之所立返成相違。故名法自相相違因等。論說等言者。義顯別因。所乖返宗不過此四。故論但說有四相違。能乖返因有十五類。違一有四。謂各別違。違二有六。謂違初二。違初三。違初四。違二三。違二四。違三四。違三有四。謂互除一。違四有一。故成十五。論中但顯初二別違一因。后二共違二因。舉此三種等餘十二。故說等言。
論。此中法自相相違因者如說聲常所作性故或勤勇無間所發性故。
述曰。下別釋四。初文有三。初標牒名。次顯宗因。后成違義。此初二也。問相違有四。何故初說法自相因。答正所諍故。上比量相違。相違決定。皆唯說彼法自相故。從彼初說。此有二師。如聲生論。立聲常宗。所作性因。聲顯論立勤勇無間所發性因。
論。此因唯于異品中有是故相違。
述曰。此成違義。由初常宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『聲』等聚集的個體，被稱為『自性』（svarupa，事物自身不變的性質）。『無常』等貫穿于其他事物，被稱為『差別』（vishesha，事物與他物不同的性質）。名稱的獲得是不確定的。如果建立五蘊（skandha，構成人身的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）一切皆無我的觀點，那麼五蘊的名稱就是『自相』（svalakshana，事物獨有的特性），我、無我等名稱就是『差別』。如果說『我』是『思』，那麼『思』就是『差別』，『我』就是『自性』。因此，（自性和差別的定義）是不確定的。用道理來推斷，這雖然與前面所說相似，但教義略有不同，意義也有區別，所以分為兩個方面（來討論）。第三種是『言許』，言語中所陳述的，無論是區域性的還是普遍的，都稱為『自性』。因此，有法（dharma，事物）和非法（adharma，非事物）都具有自性。自己意念所允許的、與衆不同的意義，以及可以成立的（論點），稱為『差別』。因此，有法和非法都具有差別。並非選取一切（事物），意義如前所述。現在說有『因』（hetu，理由、原因），使得這四種宗（paksha，論點）所建立的（論證）反而成為相互違背，因此稱為『法自相相違因』等。論中說的『等』字，意思是顯現『差別因』。所違背的（論點）不會超過這四種，所以論中只說了有四種相違。能夠違背（論點的）『因』有十五類。違背一個（論點）的有四種，即各自單獨違背。違背兩個（論點）的有六種，即違背最初兩個、違背最初三個、違背最初四個、違背第二三個、違背第二四個、違背第三四個。違背三個（論點）的有四種，即互相排除一個。違背四個（論點）有一種。因此總共有十五種。論中只顯現了最初兩個（論點）單獨違背一個『因』，以及後面兩個（論點）共同違背兩個『因』。舉出這三種（情況）等同於其餘十二種，所以說了『等』字。
論：此中『法自相相違因』，例如說『聲是常』，因為『所作性』的緣故，或者因為『勤勇無間所發性』的緣故。
述曰：下面分別解釋四種（相違因）。最初的文有三個部分：首先是標明名稱，其次是顯示宗和因，最後是成立違背的意義。這是最初的兩個部分。問：相違有四種，為什麼首先說法自相因？答：因為這是正要爭論的。上面的比量相違，相違決定，都只說了那個法自相，所以從那裡開始說。這裡有兩種觀點，如《聲生論》中，立『聲是常』的宗，用『所作性』作為因。《聲顯論》中，立『勤勇無間所發性』作為因。
論：這個『因』只在異品（vipaksha，反例）中存在，因此是相違的。
述曰：這是成立違背的意義。因為最初的『常』宗。
【English Translation】 English version The individual entities aggregated as 'sound' etc., are called 'svarupa' (self-nature, the unchanging nature of a thing itself). 'Impermanence' etc., pervading other things, are called 'vishesha' (difference, the nature of a thing that distinguishes it from others). The attainment of names is uncertain. If we establish the view that in the five skandhas (the five aggregates constituting a person: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) everything is without self, then the names of the five skandhas are 'svalakshana' (unique characteristics, the unique characteristics of a thing), and the names of self, non-self, etc., are 'vishesha'. If we say 'I' is 'thought', then 'thought' is 'vishesha' and 'I' is 'svarupa'. Therefore, (the definition of self-nature and difference) is uncertain. Reasoning from principles, although this is similar to what was said before, the teachings are slightly different, and the meanings are also different, so it is divided into two aspects (for discussion). The third is 'verbal acceptance', what is stated in words, whether partial or universal, is called 'svarupa'. Therefore, dharma (things) and adharma (non-things) both have self-nature. The different meaning allowed by one's own intention, and what can be established (arguments), are called 'vishesha'. Therefore, dharma and adharma both have difference. It does not select everything (things), the meaning is as previously stated. Now it is said that there is a 'hetu' (reason, cause) that causes the (arguments) established by these four pakshas (viewpoints) to become contradictory to each other, therefore it is called 'dharma svalakshana contradictory hetu' etc. The word 'etc.' in the treatise means to reveal 'difference hetu'. What is violated (the argument) will not exceed these four, so the treatise only says that there are four contradictions. The 'hetu' that can violate (the argument) has fifteen categories. There are four types of violating one (argument), which are each individually violating. There are six types of violating two (arguments), which are violating the first two, violating the first three, violating the first four, violating the second and third, violating the second and fourth, violating the third and fourth. There are four types of violating three (arguments), which are mutually excluding one. There is one type of violating four (arguments). Therefore, there are a total of fifteen types. The treatise only shows the first two (arguments) individually violating one 'hetu', and the latter two (arguments) jointly violating two 'hetus'. Mentioning these three (situations) is equivalent to the remaining twelve, so the word 'etc.' is used.
Treatise: Among these, 'dharma svalakshana contradictory hetu' is like saying 'sound is permanent' because of 'being produced' or because of 'being produced without interruption by effort'.
Commentary: Below, the four (contradictory hetus) are explained separately. The initial text has three parts: first, stating the name, second, showing the paksha and hetu, and finally, establishing the meaning of contradiction. These are the first two parts. Question: There are four types of contradiction, why is dharma svalakshana hetu mentioned first? Answer: Because this is what is being argued about. The above contradiction by inference, the determination of contradiction, all only mentioned that dharma svalakshana, so it is said from there first. There are two views here, such as in the 'Sound Production Treatise', establishing the paksha that 'sound is permanent', using 'being produced' as the hetu. In the 'Sound Manifestation Treatise', establishing 'being produced without interruption by effort' as the hetu.
Treatise: This 'hetu' only exists in the vipaksha (counter-example), therefore it is contradictory.
Commentary: This is establishing the meaning of contradiction. Because of the initial 'permanent' paksha.
。空等為同品。瓶等為異品。所作性因。同品遍非有。異品遍有。九句因中。第四句也。應為相違量云。聲是無常。所作性故。譬如瓶等。由第二宗。空為同品。以電瓶等而為異品。勤勇發故因。于同遍無。于異品電無瓶等上有。九句因中。第六句也。此之二因。返成無常。違宗所陳法自相故。名相違因。故理門云。于同有及二。在異無是因。返此名相違。所餘皆不定。此所作性因。翻九句中第二正因。彼同品有異品非有。此同非有異品有故。此勤勇因。翻九句中第八正因。彼同品有非有異品非有。此同非有異品有非有故。上已數論。略不繁述。此一似因。因仍用舊。喻改先立。后之三因。因喻皆舊。由是四因。因必仍舊。喻任改同。若不爾者。必無法自相與余隨一合。可成違二因。許初改喻。后三不改故。又九因中第四第六名相違因。要同非有。異有或俱。若隨所立。后三相違直觀立者因於同有。如何復難成相違耶。理門但言若法能成相違所立。是相違過。即名似因。不說同喻亦仍用舊。此論示法。初一改喻。后三依舊。欲令學者知因決定。非喻前過故。下之三因。觀立雖成。反為相違。一一窮究。皆亦唯是同無異有。成相違故。至下當知。問如聲論言。汝聲無常應非是聲無常。所作性故。如瓶盆等。第二正因。豈
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『空』（Ākāśa，虛空）等是同品（Sapaksha，相似例子）。『瓶』（Ghata，瓦罐）等是異品（Vipaksha，相異例子）。『所作性』（Krtakatva，被製造的性質）作為因（Hetu，理由），在同品中普遍不存在，在異品中普遍存在。這是九句因（Hetu-cakra，九句因明）中的第四句。應該成為相違量（Viruddha-anumana，矛盾的推論），例如：『聲音是無常的，因為它具有所作性，就像瓶子等。』這是由於第二宗（Paksha，論題）。以『空』作為同品，以『電』和『瓶』等作為異品。『勤勇發』（Prayatnānantariyakatva，由努力產生）作為因，在同品中普遍不存在，在異品中，『電』不存在，而『瓶』等存在。這是九句因中的第六句。這兩個因，反而證明了『無常』，因為它們違背了宗（Paksha，論題）所陳述的法自相（Dharma-svalakshana，事物的自性）。因此被稱為相違因（Viruddha-hetu，矛盾的理由）。所以《理門論》（Hetu-vidyā，因明學）說：『在同品中存在，或者兩者都存在，在異品中不存在，這樣的因，反過來就叫做相違。其餘的都是不定（Anaikāntika，不確定的）。』這個『所作性』因，顛倒了九句中的第二正因（Samyak-hetu，正確的理由）。那個正因在同品中存在，在異品中不存在；而這個因在同品中不存在，在異品中存在。這個『勤勇發』因，顛倒了九句中的第八正因。那個正因在同品中存在且不不存在異品中不存在；而這個因在同品中不存在，在異品中存在且不存在。 以上已經對數論（Sāmkhya，僧佉）進行了簡略的闡述，不再贅述。這一個似因（Hetvābhāsa，似是而非的理由），因仍然使用舊的，只是比喻（Drshtanta，例子）改變了先前的設定。後面的三個因，因和比喻都是舊的。因此，這四個因，因必定仍然是舊的，比喻可以任意改變。如果不是這樣，必定無法使法自相與其餘的任何一個相合，從而構成違二因（Viruddha-dvi-hetu，雙重矛盾的理由）。允許最初改變比喻，後面的三個不改變。此外，九因中的第四和第六被稱為相違因。要同品中不存在，異品中存在或兩者都存在。如果隨所立（Sadhya，所要證明的），後面的三個相違直觀立者，因在同品中存在，如何又能構成相違呢？《理門論》只是說，如果法能夠構成與所立相違背的，就是相違過（Viruddha-dosha，矛盾的過失），就叫做似因。沒有說同喻（Samāna-drshtanta，相同的例子）也仍然使用舊的。此論顯示，最初一個改變比喻，後面的三個依舊，是爲了讓學者知道因是決定的，而不是比喻先前的過失。下面的三個因，觀立雖然成立，但反而構成了相違。一一窮究，也都是同品中不存在，異品中存在，從而構成相違。到下面就會知道。問：如聲論（Shabda-shastra，聲論）說：『你的聲音是無常的，應該不是聲音是無常的，因為它是所作性，就像瓶盆等。』這是第二正因，難道...
【English Translation】 English version: 'Ākāśa' (space) and others are Sapaksha (similar examples). 'Ghata' (pot) and others are Vipaksha (dissimilar examples). 'Krtakatva' (being produced) as Hetu (reason) is universally absent in Sapaksha and universally present in Vipaksha. This is the fourth sentence in the Hetu-cakra (nine-fold reason). It should become Viruddha-anumana (contradictory inference), such as: 'Sound is impermanent because it has the nature of being produced, like pots, etc.' This is due to the second Paksha (thesis). Taking 'Ākāśa' as Sapaksha and 'electricity,' 'pots,' etc., as Vipaksha. 'Prayatnānantariyakatva' (produced by effort) as Hetu is universally absent in Sapaksha, and in Vipaksha, 'electricity' is absent, while 'pots,' etc., are present. This is the sixth sentence in the nine-fold reason. These two reasons, on the contrary, prove 'impermanence' because they contradict the Dharma-svalakshana (self-nature of things) stated in the Paksha. Therefore, they are called Viruddha-hetu (contradictory reasons). So, the Hetu-vidyā (science of reasoning) says: 'Existing in Sapaksha, or both, and not existing in Vipaksha, such a reason, conversely, is called contradictory. The rest are Anaikāntika (uncertain).' This 'Krtakatva' reason reverses the second Samyak-hetu (correct reason) in the nine sentences. That correct reason exists in Sapaksha and does not exist in Vipaksha; while this reason does not exist in Sapaksha and exists in Vipaksha. This 'Prayatnānantariyakatva' reason reverses the eighth correct reason in the nine sentences. That correct reason exists in Sapaksha and does not exist in Vipaksha; while this reason does not exist in Sapaksha and exists and does not exist in Vipaksha. The above has briefly explained Sāmkhya (enumeration), and will not be elaborated further. This one Hetvābhāsa (fallacious reason), the reason still uses the old one, only the Drshtanta (example) has changed the previous setting. The latter three reasons, both the reason and the example are old. Therefore, these four reasons, the reason must still be old, and the example can be changed arbitrarily. If not, it will certainly not be possible to make the Dharma-svalakshana agree with any of the others, thus constituting a Viruddha-dvi-hetu (double contradictory reason). It is permissible to change the example initially, and the latter three are not changed. In addition, the fourth and sixth of the nine reasons are called Viruddha-hetu. It is necessary that it does not exist in Sapaksha, and exists or both exist in Vipaksha. If according to Sadhya (what is to be proved), the latter three contradictory direct observers, the reason exists in Sapaksha, how can it constitute a contradiction? The Hetu-vidyā only says that if a Dharma can constitute a contradiction to what is established, it is a Viruddha-dosha (contradictory fault), and it is called a fallacious reason. It does not say that the Samāna-drshtanta (same example) is still used as before. This treatise shows that the first one changes the example, and the latter three remain the same, in order to let scholars know that the reason is definite, not the previous fault of the example. The following three reasons, although the observation is established, on the contrary, constitute a contradiction. Upon thorough investigation, they are all non-existent in Sapaksha and existent in Vipaksha, thus constituting a contradiction. It will be known below. Question: As the Shabda-shastra (science of sound) says: 'Your sound is impermanent, it should not be that sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like pots and basins, etc.' This is the second correct reason, could it be...
非有法自相相違。答彼非過收。如立聲無常。無常為法自相。若所立因。返成聲常。可是此過。今者雙牒有法及法為法有法。故非此過。此乃但是分別相似過類。因犯兩俱不成。所作性因。立敵不許依無常故。生滅異故。設彼許依。亦犯隨一。又無常無。能依所作性。亦犯所依不成過故。設有難言。汝聲無常應非是聲無常。許無常故。如瓶無常。此亦非過。諸似立無此過相故。聲有無常是根本諍。聲是有法。非是法上意所許義。不可說為法差別過。亦非相違決定所收。非根本諍故。設許上說皆為過者。即一切量無正因者。故於似立不見其過。皆是似破。至下當知。
論。法差別相違因者如說眼等必為他用積聚性故如臥具等。
述曰。準前亦三。此初二也。凡二差別名相違者。非法有法上除言所陳。餘一切義皆是差別。要是兩宗各各隨應因所成立。意之所許所諍別義方名差別。因令相違。名相違因。若不爾者。如立聲無常宗。聲之上可聞不可聞等義。無常之上作彼緣性非彼緣性等。如是一切皆謂相違。因令相違名為彼因。若爾。便無相違因義。比量相違等。皆準此釋。此中義說。若數論外道對佛弟子。意欲成立我為受者。受用眼等。若我為有法受用眼等。便有宗中所別不成。積聚性因。兩俱不成。如臥具喻
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 非有法自相相違。答：彼非過收。如立『聲無常』，『無常』為法自相。若所立因，反成『聲常』，可是此過。今者雙牒『有法』及『法』為『法有法』，故非此過。此乃但是分別相似過類，因犯兩俱不成。『所作性』因，立敵不許依無常故，生滅異故。設彼許依，亦犯隨一。又無常無能依『所作性』，亦犯所依不成過故。設有難言：『汝聲無常，應非是聲無常，許無常故，如瓶無常。』此亦非過。諸似立無此過相故。『聲有無常』是根本諍，『聲』是有法，非是法上意所許義，不可說為法差別過，亦非相違決定所收，非根本諍故。設許上說皆為過者，即一切量無正因者。故於似立不見其過，皆是似破，至下當知。
論：法差別相違因者，如說『眼等必為他用，積聚性故，如臥具等』。
述曰：準前亦三。此初二也。凡二差別名相違者，非法有法上除言所陳，餘一切義皆是差別。要是兩宗各各隨應因所成立，意之所許所諍別義，方名差別，因令相違，名相違因。若不爾者，如立『聲無常』宗，『聲』之上可聞不可聞等義，『無常』之上作彼緣性非彼緣性等，如是一切皆謂相違，因令相違名為彼因。若爾，便無相違因義，比量相違等，皆準此釋。此中義說，若數論外道對佛弟子，意欲成立『我』為受者，受用眼等。若『我』為有法受用眼等，便有宗中所別不成，積聚性因，兩俱不成，如臥具喻。
【English Translation】 English version It is not a contradiction of the self-nature of the Dharma (法) and the possessor of Dharma (有法). Answer: That is not an over-inclusion. For example, establishing 'sound is impermanent,' 'impermanence' is the self-nature of the Dharma. If the established reason (因) instead proves 'sound is permanent,' that would be a fault. Now, we doubly state 'possessor of Dharma' and 'Dharma' as 'Dharma-possessor of Dharma,' so this is not a fault. This is merely a kind of similar fallacy, where the reason commits the fault of being unestablished for both sides. The reason of 'being produced' is not accepted by the proponent of the opposite view as being based on impermanence, because arising and ceasing are different. Even if they were to accept it, it would still commit one of the fallacies. Furthermore, impermanence cannot rely on 'being produced,' so it also commits the fault of the unestablished basis. If someone were to object, saying, 'Your sound is impermanent, so it should not be sound impermanent, because it is admitted to be impermanent, like a pot is impermanent.' This is also not a fault, because such a fallacy does not have this characteristic. 'Sound is impermanent' is the fundamental dispute. 'Sound' is the possessor of Dharma, not a meaning intended to be accepted on the Dharma, so it cannot be said to be a fault of difference in Dharma, nor is it included in decisive contradiction, because it is not the fundamental dispute. If we were to accept all the above as faults, then all inferences would lack a valid reason. Therefore, in a pseudo-establishment, we do not see its fault; they are all pseudo-refutations, as will be known below.
Treatise: The contradictory reason due to difference in Dharma is like saying, 'Eyes, etc., must be for the use of others because they are of an accumulative nature, like bedding, etc.'
Commentary: According to the previous explanation, there are also three. This is the first two. Generally, two differences are called contradictory, meaning that everything other than what is stated on the Dharma-possessor of Dharma is a difference. It must be that the different meanings accepted and disputed by each school, established by the reason accordingly, are called differences. The reason causes contradiction, hence the name contradictory reason. If not, like establishing the thesis 'sound is impermanent,' the meanings of audible and inaudible, etc., on 'sound,' and being caused by that condition and not being caused by that condition, etc., on 'impermanence,' all such would be called contradictory, and the reason causing contradiction would be called that reason. If so, there would be no meaning of contradictory reason, and contradictions in inference, etc., would all be explained accordingly. The meaning here is that if a Samkhya (數論) heretic intends to establish 'self' (我) as the enjoyer, using eyes, etc., against a Buddhist disciple, if 'self' is the possessor of Dharma using eyes, etc., then there would be an unestablished difference in the thesis, and the reason of accumulative nature would be unestablished for both sides, like the example of bedding.
。所立不成。若言眼等必為我用。能別不成。闕無同喻。積聚性因。違法自相。臥具喻有所立不成。若成眼等為假他用。相符極成。由此方便矯立宗云。眼等必為他用。眼等有法。指事顯陳。為他用法。方便顯示。意立必為法之差別。不積聚他。實我受用。若顯立云不積聚他用。能別不成。所立亦不成。亦闕無同喻。因違法自相。故須方便立。積聚性因。積多極微成眼等故。如臥具喻。其床座等是積聚性。彼此俱許為他受用。故得為同喻。因喻之法不應分別。故總建立。
論。此因如能成立眼等必為他用如是亦能成立所立法差別相違積聚他用。
述曰。此成違義有二。初舉所違法差別因。后釋所由。此初也。初文有二。此因如能成立眼等必為他用。此牒前因能立所立法之自相。如是亦能下。又顯此因亦能與彼法差別為相違因。其數論師。眼等五法。即五知根。臥具床座。即五唯量所整合法。不積聚他。謂實神我。體常本有。其積聚他。即依眼等所立假我。無常轉變。然眼等根不積聚他實我用勝。親用於此受五唯量故。由依眼等方立假我。故積聚我用眼等劣。其臥具等。必其神我須思量受用。故從大等次第成之。若以所思實我用勝。假我用劣。然以假我安處所須。方受床座。故於臥具假他用勝。實我用劣。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說建立的觀點不能成立，如果說眼睛等器官一定是被『我』所使用，那麼就無法區分，缺少相同的比喻。『積聚性』作為原因，違反了自相矛盾的原則。用臥具作比喻，所要建立的觀點不能成立。如果承認眼睛等器官是被其他事物所使用，這與極成相符。因此，爲了方便起見，可以巧妙地建立宗義，認為眼睛等器官一定是被其他事物所使用。眼睛等器官具有『有法』的性質，明確地陳述，是爲了其他事物所使用的方法，方便地顯示出來。意圖建立的觀點一定是法的差別，不是積聚其他事物，而是真實的我所受用。如果明確地建立觀點，認為不是積聚其他事物所使用，那麼就無法區分，所要建立的觀點也不能成立，也缺少相同的比喻。原因違反了自相矛盾的原則，所以需要方便地建立。『積聚性』作為原因，因為許多極微聚集形成了眼睛等器官，就像臥具的比喻一樣。其中的床座等是積聚性的，彼此都承認是被其他事物所受用，所以可以作為相同的比喻。原因和比喻的法則不應該分別，所以總的來說要這樣建立。 論：這個原因如果能夠成立眼睛等器官一定是被其他事物所使用，那麼也能夠成立所要建立的法的差別，與積聚其他事物所使用相違背。 述曰：這個成立相違的意義有兩方面。首先舉出與所要建立的法差別相違的原因，然後解釋原因。這是第一方面。第一方面的內容有兩點。這個原因如果能夠成立眼睛等器官一定是被其他事物所使用，這是引用前面的原因，能夠成立所要建立的法的自相。『如是亦能下』，又顯示這個原因也能夠與那個法的差別作為相違的原因。數論師認為，眼睛等五種法，就是五種知根（pancha-jnanendriyani，五種感覺器官）。臥具床座，就是五唯量（pancha-tanmatrani，五種感覺的潛在形式）所整合的法。『不積聚他』，指的是真實的神我（Atman，靈魂），本體是常有的。『積聚他』，指的是依靠眼睛等器官所建立的假我，是無常變化的。然而，眼睛等根不是積聚其他事物，而是真實的我所使用，並且真實的我勝過假我，因為真實的我親自使用這些器官來感受五唯量。因為依靠眼睛等器官才建立了假我，所以積聚的我使用眼睛等器官的能力較弱。至於臥具等，一定是神我需要思量受用，所以從大等（Mahat，宇宙理智）次第形成。如果認為所思量的真實的我使用臥具的能力勝過假我，假我使用臥具的能力較弱，那麼是因為假我安頓在所需要的地方，才能受用床座，所以在臥具方面，假我使用臥具的能力勝過真實的我，真實的我使用臥具的能力較弱。
【English Translation】 English version: If the established viewpoint cannot stand, if it is said that the eyes and other organs must be used by 'I' (Atman, soul), then it cannot be distinguished, and there is a lack of a common analogy. 'Accumulative nature' as a cause violates the principle of self-contradiction. Using bedding as a metaphor, the viewpoint to be established cannot stand. If it is admitted that the eyes and other organs are used by other things, this is consistent with the ultimate truth. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, one can cleverly establish the tenet that the eyes and other organs must be used by other things. The eyes and other organs have the nature of 'possessing dharma' (dharma-svabhava), clearly stated, is the method for other things to use, conveniently displayed. The viewpoint intended to be established must be the difference of dharma, not accumulating other things, but the real 'I' (Atman, soul) that enjoys it. If the viewpoint is clearly established, believing that it is not accumulating other things for use, then it cannot be distinguished, and the viewpoint to be established cannot stand, and there is also a lack of a common analogy. The cause violates the principle of self-contradiction, so it needs to be conveniently established. 'Accumulative nature' as a cause, because many extremely small particles accumulate to form the eyes and other organs, just like the metaphor of bedding. The bed and seats in it are accumulative in nature, and it is mutually admitted that they are enjoyed by other things, so it can be used as the same analogy. The laws of cause and analogy should not be distinguished, so in general, it should be established in this way. Treatise: If this cause can establish that the eyes and other organs must be used by other things, then it can also establish the difference of the dharma to be established, which contradicts the use of accumulating other things. Commentary: There are two aspects to this meaning of establishing contradiction. First, the cause that contradicts the difference of the dharma to be established is cited, and then the reason is explained. This is the first aspect. There are two points in the first aspect. If this cause can establish that the eyes and other organs must be used by other things, this is quoting the previous cause, which can establish the self-nature of the dharma to be established. 'As such, it can also...' further shows that this cause can also be used as a contradictory cause to the difference of that dharma. The Samkhya (Samkhya, a school of Indian philosophy) philosophers believe that the five dharmas such as the eyes are the five senses (pancha-jnanendriyani, five sense organs). Bedding and seats are the dharmas integrated by the five subtle elements (pancha-tanmatrani, five potential forms of sensation). 'Not accumulating others' refers to the real Self (Atman, soul), whose essence is constant. 'Accumulating others' refers to the false self established by relying on the eyes and other organs, which is impermanent and changing. However, the roots such as the eyes do not accumulate other things, but are used by the real Self, and the real Self is superior to the false self, because the real Self personally uses these organs to experience the five subtle elements. Because the false self is established by relying on the eyes and other organs, the accumulating self has a weaker ability to use the eyes and other organs. As for bedding, it must be that the Self needs to contemplate and enjoy it, so it is formed in sequence from the Great (Mahat, cosmic intellect). If it is believed that the real Self that is contemplated has a greater ability to use bedding than the false self, and the false self has a weaker ability to use bedding, then it is because the false self is settled in the place it needs, so it can enjoy the bed and seats. Therefore, in terms of bedding, the false self has a greater ability to use bedding than the real Self, and the real Self has a weaker ability to use bedding.
今者陳那。即以彼因。與所立法勝劣差別而作相違。非法自相。亦非法上一切差別。皆作相違。故論但言與所立法差別相違。先牒前因能成所立法自相云。此前所說積聚性因。如能成立數論所立眼等有法。必為他用法之自相。即指此因。如是亦能成立所立宗法自相。意許差別相違之義積聚他用。宗由他用。是法自相。此自相上意之所許。積聚他用。不積聚他用。是法差別。彼積聚因今更不改。還即以彼。成立意許法之差別積聚他用。其臥具等。積聚性故。既為積聚假我用勝。眼等亦是積聚性故。應如臥具亦為積聚假我用勝。若不作此勝用難者。其宗即有相符極成。他宗眼等亦許積聚假他用故。但可難言假他用勝。不得難言實我用劣。違自宗故。共比量中無同喻故。若他比量一切無遮。西域諸師有不善者。此直申差別相違過云。眼等應為積聚他用。因喻同前。數論難云。汝宗相符。誰說眼等積聚他不用。西域又釋。數論眼等唯為不積聚他用。床座通二他用。故今以臥具。例令眼等亦為積聚他用。無相符失。數論難云。陳那弟子非善我宗。神我受用三德所成二十三諦。豈于眼等無能受用。唯識亦云。執我是思。受用薩埵剌阇答摩所成大等二十三法。由此眼等實我亦用。故但應如前所分別。不應于中生異覺云。眼等唯為實他
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現在陳那（Dignāga），就用那個『積聚性』因，與所立的『假我用勝』法的勝劣差別構成相違。『非法自相』，以及『非法上的一切差別』，也都構成相違。所以論中只說與所立法的差別相違。先複述前面的『積聚性』因，能夠成立數論派所立的眼等有法，必定是『他用法』的自相，就是指這個『積聚性』因。這樣也能成立所立宗法的自相，意思是允許『差別相違』的意義，即『積聚他用』，宗是『他用』，是法的自相。在這個自相上，意之所許，『積聚他用』和『不積聚他用』，是法的差別。那個『積聚性』因現在不改變，還是用它來成立意許法的差別，即『積聚他用』。像臥具等，因為是積聚性的，所以是『積聚假我用勝』。眼等也是積聚性的，應該像臥具一樣，也是『積聚假我用勝』。如果不提出這個『勝用』的難題，那麼這個宗就有『相符極成』的過失，因為其他宗派也承認眼等是『積聚假他用』。只能反駁說『假他用勝』，不能反駁說『實我用劣』，因為這違反了自己的宗義，而且在共比量中沒有同喻。如果其他比量一切都不遮止，那麼西域的有些老師就不好了。這直接陳述了『差別相違』的過失，說眼等應該是『積聚他用』，因和喻與前面相同。數論派反駁說：『你的宗義相符，誰說眼等積聚他不用？』西域又解釋說：『數論派認為眼等只是不積聚他用，床座則通於兩種他用。所以現在用臥具來類比，使眼等也是積聚他用，沒有相符的過失。』數論派反駁說：『陳那的弟子不瞭解我的宗義。神我受用三德（Sattva, Rajas, Tamas）所成的二十三諦（Tattvas），難道眼等沒有能受用的嗎？』唯識宗也說：『執著我是思，受用薩埵（Sattva）、剌阇（Rajas）、答摩（Tamas）所成的大等二十三法。』由此可見，眼等也是實我所用。所以應該像前面所分別的那樣，不應該在其中產生不同的想法，說眼等只是實他用。
【English Translation】 English version: Now Dignāga (Chenna), using that 'aggregate nature' (ji ju xing) as the reason, creates a contradiction with the superiority or inferiority difference of the established 'superiority in use by a false self' (jia wo yong sheng) dharma. 'Non-self-nature of dharma' (fei fa zi xiang), and 'all differences on non-dharma' (fei fa shang de yi qie cha bie), also constitute a contradiction. Therefore, the treatise only says that it contradicts the difference of the established dharma. First, restating the previous 'aggregate nature' reason, which can establish the eye etc. (yan deng) as the subject of the Samkhya school, must be the self-nature of 'use by others' (ta yong), referring to this 'aggregate nature' reason. Thus, it can also establish the self-nature of the established thesis, meaning to allow the meaning of 'contradiction in difference', that is, 'aggregate use by others' (ji ju ta yong). The thesis is 'use by others' (ta yong), which is the self-nature of the dharma. On this self-nature, what the mind allows, 'aggregate use by others' (ji ju ta yong) and 'non-aggregate use by others' (bu ji ju ta yong), are the differences of the dharma. That 'aggregate nature' reason is not changed now, and it is still used to establish the difference of the dharma allowed by the mind, that is, 'aggregate use by others' (ji ju ta yong). Like bedding etc. (wo ju deng), because it is aggregate nature, it is 'superior in use by an aggregate false self' (ji ju jia wo yong sheng). The eye etc. (yan deng) are also aggregate nature, so they should be like bedding, also 'superior in use by an aggregate false self' (ji ju jia wo yong sheng). If this difficulty of 'superior use' (sheng yong) is not raised, then this thesis has the fault of 'extreme agreement' (xiang fu ji cheng), because other schools also admit that the eye etc. (yan deng) are 'aggregate use by others' (ji ju jia ta yong). One can only refute 'superiority in use by a false other' (jia ta yong sheng), but cannot refute 'inferiority in use by a real self' (shi wo yong lie), because this violates one's own doctrine, and there is no similar example in the common analogy. If all other analogies are not prohibited, then some teachers in the Western Regions are not good. This directly states the fault of 'contradiction in difference' (cha bie xiang wei), saying that the eye etc. (yan deng) should be 'aggregate use by others' (ji ju ta yong), the reason and example being the same as before. The Samkhya school refutes: 'Your thesis agrees, who says that the eye etc. (yan deng) do not aggregate use by others?' The Western Regions further explain: 'The Samkhya school believes that the eye etc. (yan deng) only do not aggregate use by others, while beds are used by both. Therefore, bedding is now used as an analogy to make the eye etc. (yan deng) also aggregate use by others, without the fault of agreement.' The Samkhya school refutes: 'Dignāga's disciple does not understand my doctrine. Does the self (shen wo) not use the twenty-three Tattvas (truth) (er shi san di) formed by the three Gunas (qualities) (san de) of Sattva (sa duo), Rajas (la zha), and Tamas (da mo)?' The Yogacara school also says: 'Clinging to the self is thinking, using the twenty-three dharmas such as the great (da) formed by Sattva (sa duo), Rajas (la zha), and Tamas (da mo).' From this, it can be seen that the eye etc. (yan deng) are also used by the real self. Therefore, it should be as distinguished before, and one should not have different thoughts in it, saying that the eye etc. (yan deng) are only used by a real other.
受用。臥具假用。或眼等通二。臥具唯假用。勝義七十對金七十。亦徴彼云。必為他用。是何他也。若說積聚他。犯相符過。若不積聚他。能別不成。闕無同喻。臥具為喻所立不成。亦即此中法差別過。問于因三相。是何過耶。答彼立因意。成非積聚他用勝。其積聚他用勝。即是異品。宗無同喻。佛法都無不積他故。積聚性因。于異品有。此顯還是九句之中異有同無。故成相違。闕第二相同品定有。亦闕第三異品遍無。
論。諸臥具等為積聚他所受用故。
述曰。此釋所由。成比量云。眼等必為積聚他用勝。積聚性故。如臥具等。諸非積聚他用勝者。必非積聚性。如龜毛等。故今難云。諸臥具等。兩宗共許為積聚他受用勝故。論雖無勝字。量義意必然。不須異求。應作此解。
論。有法自相相違因者如說有性非實非德非業有一實故有德業故如同異性。
述曰。準前作三。此即初二。標名舉宗因。鵂鹠因緣如前已說。時彼仙人。既悟所證六句義法。謂證菩提便欣入滅。但嗟所悟未有傳人。傳者必須具七德故。一生中國。二上種姓。三有寂滅因。四身相圓滿。五聰明辯捷。六性行柔和。七具大悲心。經無量時伺無具者。后經多劫。婆羅痆斯國。有婆羅門名摩納縛迦。此云儒童。儒童有子。名般遮
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 受用。臥具假用。或眼等通二。臥具唯假用。勝義七十對金七十。亦徴彼云。必為他用。是何他也。若說積聚他。犯相符過。若不積聚他。能別不成。闕無同喻。臥具為喻所立不成。亦即此中法差別過。問于因三相。是何過耶。答彼立因意。成非積聚他用勝。其積聚他用勝。即是異品。宗無同喻。佛法都無不積他故。積聚性因。于異品有。此顯還是九句之中異有同無。故成相違。闕第二相同品定有。亦闕第三異品遍無。
論。諸臥具等為積聚他所受用故。
述曰。此釋所由。成比量云。眼等必為積聚他用勝。積聚性故。如臥具等。諸非積聚他用勝者。必非積聚性。如龜毛等。故今難云。諸臥具等。兩宗共許為積聚他受用勝故。論雖無勝字。量義意必然。不須異求。應作此解。
論。有法自相相違因者如說有性非實非德非業有一實故有德業故如同異性。
述曰。準前作三。此即初二。標名舉宗因。鵂鹠因緣如前已說。時彼仙人。既悟所證六句義法。謂證菩提便欣入滅。但嗟所悟未有傳人。傳者必須具七德故。一生中國。二上種姓。三有寂滅因。四身相圓滿。五聰明辯捷。六性行柔和。七具大悲心。經無量時伺無具者。后經多劫。婆羅痆斯國。有婆羅門名摩納縛迦（婆羅門的名字）。此云儒童。儒童有子。名般遮
【English Translation】 English version Use. Bedding is used conditionally. Or eyes, etc., encompass both. Bedding is only used conditionally. The seventy supreme meanings correspond to the seventy of gold. It is also questioned, 'It must be for another's use. What is this 'other'?' If it is said to be an accumulation of others, it commits the fault of correspondence. If it is not an accumulation of others, it cannot be distinguished, lacking a similar example. Bedding as an example cannot be established, which is also a fault of difference in dharma here. Question: Regarding the three characteristics of a cause, what fault is there? Answer: The intention of establishing the cause is to prove that it is not superior in the use of accumulated others. That which is superior in the use of accumulated others is a different category. There is no similar example in the doctrine, because all Buddhist teachings involve non-accumulation of others. The cause of accumulative nature exists in the different category. This shows that it is still 'different existence, same non-existence' among the nine statements, thus becoming contradictory, lacking the second characteristic of definitely existing in the same category, and also lacking the third characteristic of universally not existing in the different category.
Treatise: All bedding, etc., is used by the accumulation of others.
Commentary: This explains the reason. It forms a syllogism: Eyes, etc., must be superior in the use of accumulated others because of their accumulative nature, like bedding, etc. Those that are not superior in the use of accumulated others must not be of accumulative nature, like tortoise hair, etc. Therefore, it is now argued that all bedding, etc., is mutually acknowledged by both schools to be superior in the use of accumulated others. Although the treatise does not have the word 'superior,' the meaning of the measure is necessarily so, and there is no need to seek it differently. This explanation should be made.
Treatise: A cause that contradicts its own nature is like saying that existence is neither real, nor attribute, nor action, because it has one reality, and because it has attributes and actions, like sameness and difference.
Commentary: According to the previous, make three. This is the first two, stating the name and citing the proposition and cause. The owl's cause has been explained before. At that time, that ascetic, having understood the meaning of the six statements of dharma he had realized, thought he had attained Bodhi and was pleased to enter Nirvana. But he lamented that there was no one to transmit what he had understood. The transmitter must possess seven virtues: 1. Born in China (referring to the central region where Buddhism flourished). 2. Of a noble lineage. 3. Possessing the cause of quiescence. 4. Having a perfect physical appearance. 5. Intelligent and eloquent. 6. Gentle in nature and conduct. 7. Possessing great compassion. He waited for countless times without finding someone who possessed these qualities. After many kalpas, in the country of Varanasi, there was a Brahmin named Manavaka (name of the Brahmin). This is called 'Confucian Child.' The Confucian Child had a son named Pancha.
尸棄。此云五頂。頂發五旋。頭有五角。七德雖具。根熟稍遲。為染妻孥。率難化導。經無量歲。伺其根熟。后三千歲。戲遊園苑。共妻兢花。因相忿恨。鵂鹠引通。化五頂不從。又三千歲。化復不得。更三千歲。兩競尤甚。相厭既切。仰念空仙。仙人應時神力化引。騰空迎往所住山中。徐說先悟六句義法。說實德業。彼皆信之。至大有句。彼便生惑。仙言。有者能有實等。離實德業三外別有。體常是一。弟子不從云。實德業性不無。即是能有。豈離三外別有能有。仙人便說同異句義。能同異彼實德業三。此三之上各各有一總同異性。隨應各各有別同異。如是三中隨其別類。復有總別諸同異性。體常眾多。復有一常能和合性。和合實德業。令不相離互相屬著。五頂雖信同異和合。然猶不信別有大有。鵂鹠便立論所陳量。此量有三。實德業三各別作故。今指彼論。故言如說。有性有法。非實者法。合名為宗。此言有性。仙人五頂兩所共許。實德業上能非無性。故成所別。若說大有。所別不成。因犯隨一。此之有性。體非即實。因云有一實故。勝論六句。束為四類。一者無實。二者有一實。三者有二實。四者有多實。地水火風父母常極微空時方我意。並德業和合。皆名無實。四本極微體性雖多。空時等五體各唯一。皆無實
因。德業和合。雖依于實和合于實。非以為因。故此等類併名無實。大有同異。名有一實。俱能有於一一實故。至劫成初。兩常極微合。生第三子微。雖體無常。量德合故。不越因量。名有二實。自類眾多。各各有彼因二極微之所生故。自此已后。初三三合生第七子。七七合生第十五子。如是展轉生一大地。皆名有多實。有多實因之所生故。大有同異。能有諸實。亦得名為有一實有二實有多實。然此三種實等。雖有功能各別。皆有大有。令體非無。皆有同異。令三類別。名有一實有德業者。亦有無有。非大有也。若是大有。因成隨一。同異非喻能立不成。如佛法言有色有漏。有漏之有。能有之法。能有所有煩惱漏體。猶如大有。能有實等。有色之言。如有一實及有德等。無別能有而有於色。此色體上有其色義。如空有聲。非空之外別有能有。但是屬著法體之言。是故於因無隨一過。有一一實故。更不須徴。即實離實之有一實。況復此因。不應分別。應分別者。便無同喻。問何故不言有于無實二實多實。答若言有於二實多實。云何得以非實為宗。其因便有不定之失。為如同異有二多實。故彼有性非實。為如子微等有二多實。故彼有性是實。由此不言有二多實。若言有無實者。和合句義亦名無實。若有彼無實。犯兩俱不成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：原因在於，『德業』（Deya，指功德和行為）的和合。即使依賴於真實的和合，也不能作為原因。因此，這些類別都被稱為『無實』（Wushi，指非實體）。『大有』（Dayou，指大有）既有相同之處，也有不同之處，被稱為『有一實』（Youyishi，指具有一個實體），因為它能夠擁有每一個實體。直到劫初形成時，兩個『常極微』（Changjimi，指常恒的最小微粒）結合，產生第三個『子微』（Ziwei，指子微粒）。雖然其本體無常，但由於其量和德業的和合，其量不超越原因的量，因此被稱為『有二實』（Youershi，指具有兩個實體）。這類事物眾多，各自都有其原因，即由兩個極微所生。從此之後，最初的三個三合產生第七個『子』（Zi，指子微粒），七個七合產生第十五個『子』（Zi，指子微粒）。這樣輾轉相生，形成一大地，都被稱為『有多實』（Youduoshi，指具有多個實體），因為它們是由多個實體的因所生。『大有』既有相同之處，也有不同之處，能夠擁有各種實體，也可以被稱為『有一實』、『有二實』、『有多實』。然而，這三種實體等，雖然功能各不相同，但都具有『大有』，使本體不是虛無，都具有相同之處和不同之處，使三種類別成立。被稱為『有一實』、『有德業』的事物，也有不存在的情況，不是『大有』。如果是『大有』，原因的成立就隨其中之一而定，相同之處和不同之處就不能作為比喻，論證就不能成立。就像佛法所說的『有色有漏』（Youseyoulou，指有形色和煩惱），『有漏』的『有』，是能夠擁有的法，能夠擁有所有煩惱的漏體，就像『大有』，能夠擁有實體等。『有色』的說法，就像『有一實』和『有德』等，沒有其他的能夠擁有，而只是擁有形色。這種形色本體上具有形色的意義，就像空中存在聲音一樣。不是在空之外另有能夠擁有聲音的事物，而只是屬於法體的說法。因此，在原因上沒有隨其中之一而定的過失，因為存在一個一個的實體，所以不需要再徵詢。即實體離開實體而存在一個實體，更何況這個原因，不應該分別。應該分別的話，就沒有相同的比喻。問：為什麼不說『有于無實』、『二實』、『多實』呢？答：如果說『有於二實』、『多實』，怎麼能以非實體作為宗呢？那麼原因就有了不確定的過失。是如同相同之處和不同之處，存在兩個或多個實體，所以它們的有性是非實體呢？還是如同子微等，存在兩個或多個實體，所以它們的有性是實體呢？因此不說『有二多實』。如果說『有無實』，那麼和合的句義也稱為『無實』。如果存在那個『無實』，就犯了兩者都不成立的過失。
【English Translation】 English version: The reason lies in the combination of 'Deya' (德業, merits and actions). Even if it relies on a real combination, it cannot be taken as the cause. Therefore, these categories are all called 'Wushi' (無實, non-entities). 'Dayou' (大有, Great Existence) has both similarities and differences, and is called 'Youyishi' (有一實, having one entity) because it is capable of possessing each entity. Until the beginning of the kalpa (劫, aeon) when two 'Changjimi' (常極微, constant ultimate particles) combine to produce the third 'Ziwei' (子微, subatomic particle), although its substance is impermanent, its quantity does not exceed the quantity of the cause due to the combination of its quantity and Deya. Therefore, it is called 'Youershi' (有二實, having two entities). There are many things of this kind, each having its cause, which is produced by two ultimate particles. From then on, the initial three triads produce the seventh 'Zi' (子, subatomic particle), and seven heptads produce the fifteenth 'Zi' (子, subatomic particle). In this way, they generate each other to form a great earth, all of which are called 'Youduoshi' (有多實, having multiple entities) because they are produced by the cause of multiple entities. 'Dayou' has both similarities and differences, and is capable of possessing various entities, and can also be called 'Youyishi', 'Youershi', 'Youduoshi'. However, although these three kinds of entities have different functions, they all have 'Dayou', making the substance not empty, and they all have similarities and differences, making the three categories established. Things called 'Youyishi', 'Youdeye', also have non-existence, and are not 'Dayou'. If it is 'Dayou', the establishment of the cause depends on one of them, and the similarities and differences cannot be used as a metaphor, and the argument cannot be established. Just like the Buddhist saying 'Youseyoulou' (有色有漏, having form and outflows), the 'You' of 'Youlou' is the dharma that can be possessed, and can possess all the outflows of afflictions, just like 'Dayou', which can possess entities and so on. The saying 'Youse' is like 'Youyishi' and 'Youde', etc. There is no other that can possess, but only possesses form. This form itself has the meaning of form, just like there is sound in the air. It is not that there is something else outside the air that can possess the sound, but only a statement belonging to the dharma body. Therefore, there is no fault of depending on one of them in the cause, because there is one entity after another, so there is no need to inquire further. That is, the entity exists apart from the entity as one entity, let alone this cause, which should not be distinguished. If it should be distinguished, there would be no same metaphor. Question: Why not say 'Youyuwushi', 'Ershi', 'Duoshi'? Answer: If you say 'Youyuershi', 'Duoshi', how can you take non-entity as the proposition? Then the cause has the fault of uncertainty. Is it like the similarities and differences, there are two or more entities, so their existence is non-entity? Or is it like Ziwei, etc., there are two or more entities, so their existence is entity? Therefore, it is not said 'Youerduoshi'. If you say 'Youwushi', then the meaning of the combination is also called 'Wushi'. If that 'Wushi' exists, then the fault of both being unestablished is committed.
。實等能有上無有無實故。其喻亦犯能立不成。因亦不遍。乍似唯能有于實句之無實故。亦欲顯九實一一皆有。故云一實。能有一一實故。問有性有法。有一實因。不相關預。云何不是兩俱不成。答有性有法。是實德業之能有性。有一實因。能有於一一實故。是宗之法。故無兩俱。此非實句為一宗已。非德非業后二宗法。有法同前。此二因云有德業故。謂能有彼德之與業。如言有色亦屬著義。問既于德業一一皆有。云何不言有一德業。答實有多類。不言有一。但言有實。即犯不定。謂子微等皆有實故。德業無簡。不須一言。二因一喻。如同異性。此於前三。一一皆有亦如有性。是故為喻。仙人既陳三比量已。五頂便信。法既有傳。仙便入滅。勝論宗義由此悉行。陳那菩薩。為因明之準的。作立破之權衡。重述彼宗。載申過難。故今先敘彼比量也。
論。此因如能成遮實等如是亦能成遮有性俱決定故。
述曰。此成違義有二。初二句牒。彼先立因。遮有非實。謂有一實有德業因。如前所說能成有性遮是實等。等德及業。后三句顯。此因亦能令彼有法自相相違。謂指於前如是此因。亦能成立遮彼有性而非有性。謂前宗言有性非實。有性是前有法自相。今立量云。所言有性應非有性。有一實故有德業故。如同異
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：實際上，如果『能有』（使之存在）的事物本身並不存在，那麼『無實』（非實在）的說法就沒有依據。這個比喻也犯了『能立不成』的錯誤，因為前提條件本身就不成立。而且，這個原因（因明中的『因』）也不普遍適用。乍一看，似乎只有在實在的句子中，『無實』才能成立，但實際上，這是爲了表明九種實體（九實）中的每一種都存在，所以才說『一實』，因為『能有』可以使每一種實體存在。有人問：『有性』（存在的性質）和『有法』（具有性質的事物），以及『有一實因』（具有一個實在的原因），彼此之間沒有關聯，為什麼不能說是兩方面都不能成立呢？回答是：『有性有法』，是指實體、德性和業的『能有性』。『有一實因』，能夠使每一種實體存在，這是宗（論題）的法（性質），所以不存在兩方面都不能成立的情況。這裡，『非實句』被作為一個宗（論題），『非德非業』是後面的兩個宗法，『有法』與前面相同。這兩個原因（因）都說『有德業故』，意思是能夠使德性和業存在，就像說『有色』也包含著依附的含義。有人問：既然對於德性和業，每一種都存在，為什麼不說『有一德業』呢？回答是：實體有很多種類，所以不說『有一』，只說『有實』，否則就會犯『不定』的錯誤，因為像子、微塵等都具有實體，德性和業沒有簡別，所以不需要說『一』。這兩個原因（因）和一個比喻，就像同異性一樣，對於前面的三種情況，每一種都存在，也像『有性』一樣，所以可以作為比喻。仙人陳述了這三個比量之後，五頂（聽眾）就相信了。佛法既然已經傳授，仙人就入滅了。勝論宗的義理由此得以流傳。陳那菩薩，作為因明的準繩，建立了立論和破論的權衡標準，重新闡述了勝論宗，並提出了其中的過失和難題。所以現在先敘述勝論宗的比量。 論：這個原因（因）如果能夠成立遮蔽實體等，那麼也能成立遮蔽有性，因為兩者都是確定的。 述曰：這裡成立相反的含義有兩種。前兩句是重複，重複他們先前建立的原因（因），遮蔽『有』而不是『實』，即『有一實有德業因』，就像前面所說的，能夠成立『有性』，遮蔽『是實等』，『等』指德和業。后三句是顯示，這個原因（因）也能使他們所說的『有法』自相矛盾，即指前面的『如是此因』，也能成立遮蔽『有性』而不是『有性』，即前面的宗（論題）說『有性非實』，『有性』是前面『有法』的自相。現在立量說：所說的『有性』應該不是『有性』，因為『有一實故』，『有德業故』，就像同異性一樣。
【English Translation】 English version: In reality, if the 'that which enables existence' (the cause of existence) does not itself exist, then the statement of 'non-reality' (non-existence of substance) has no basis. This analogy also commits the fallacy of 'the proponent's thesis being unestablished,' because the premise itself is not established. Moreover, this reason (the 'hetu' in Hetuvidya) is not universally applicable. At first glance, it seems that only in statements about reality can 'non-reality' be established, but in fact, this is to show that each of the nine substances (Nine Realities) exists, so it is said 'one reality,' because 'that which enables existence' can enable each substance to exist. Someone asks: 'Existence-nature' (the nature of existence) and 'existence-property' (the thing possessing the nature), and 'having one real cause' (possessing one real cause), are not related to each other, so why can't it be said that both sides are unestablished? The answer is: 'Existence-nature and existence-property' refer to the 'ability to exist' of substance, quality, and action. 'Having one real cause' is able to make each substance exist, which is the property of the thesis (proposition), so there is no situation where both sides are unestablished. Here, 'the non-reality statement' is taken as a thesis (proposition), 'non-quality and non-action' are the two subsequent properties of the thesis, and 'existence-property' is the same as before. These two reasons (causes) both say 'because there are qualities and actions,' meaning that they can make qualities and actions exist, just like saying 'having color' also contains the meaning of attachment. Someone asks: Since for qualities and actions, each exists, why not say 'having one quality and action'? The answer is: There are many kinds of substances, so it is not said 'having one,' but only 'having substance,' otherwise it would commit the fallacy of 'indefinite,' because things like particles and atoms all have substance, and qualities and actions are not distinguished, so there is no need to say 'one.' These two reasons (causes) and one analogy are like similarity and difference, and for the previous three situations, each exists, just like 'existence-nature,' so it can be used as an analogy. After the sage presented these three inferences, the five-crested ones (the audience) believed. Since the Dharma has been transmitted, the sage entered Nirvana. The doctrines of the Vaisheshika school were thus spread. Bodhisattva Dignāga, as the standard of Hetuvidya, established the balance of establishing and refuting arguments, re-explained the Vaisheshika school, and pointed out its faults and difficulties. Therefore, we will now first describe the inferences of the Vaisheshika school. Treatise: If this reason (hetu) can establish the obscuration of substance, etc., then it can also establish the obscuration of existence-nature, because both are definite. Commentary: There are two ways to establish the opposite meaning here. The first two sentences are a repetition, repeating the reason (hetu) they previously established, obscuring 'existence' rather than 'reality,' that is, 'having one real substance, quality, and action as the cause,' just as mentioned before, which can establish 'existence-nature,' obscuring 'being reality, etc.,' where 'etc.' refers to quality and action. The last three sentences show that this reason (hetu) can also make their so-called 'existence-property' contradict itself, that is, referring to the previous 'such as this reason,' it can also establish the obscuration of 'existence-nature' rather than 'existence-nature,' that is, the previous thesis (proposition) said 'existence-nature is not reality,' and 'existence-nature' is the self-nature of the previous 'existence-property.' Now, establishing the inference says: The so-called 'existence-nature' should not be 'existence-nature,' because 'there is one reality,' 'there are qualities and actions,' just like similarity and difference.
性。同異能有於一實等。同異非有性。有效能有於一實等。有性非有性。釋所由云。此因既能遮有性非實等。亦能遮有性非是大有性。兩俱決定故。問今難有性應非有性。如何不犯自語相違。答若前未立有性非實。今難實等能有非有。此言乃犯自語相違。亦違自教。彼先已成非實之有。今即難彼。破他違他。非成諸過。問于因三相是何過耶。答彼立宗言有性非實。有性言是有法自相。彼說離實有體。能有實之大有。其同異性。雖離實等有體能有。而非大有。雖因同法。便是所立宗之異品。離實大有。雖無同品。有一實因。同品非有。于其異品同異之上遍皆隨轉。此亦是因后二品過。于同品無異品有故。問若爾立聲為無常。宗聲體可聞。瓶有燒見。其瓶與聲。應成異品。若許為異。不但違論。亦一切宗皆無同品。答豈不已說。其聲之體非所諍故。聲上無常是所成立。瓶既同有。故是同品。彼說離實有體有性為宗有法。以有一實因所成立。同異既非離實有體之有性。故成於異品。問前論說云。與所立法均等義品。說名同品。但言所立法均等有名之為同。不說有法均等名同品。如何說有有法自相相違耶。答今若但以有性與同異為同品。可如所責。違前論文。既以離實有性而為同品。亦是宗中所立法均等有。故即此過無違論理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 性（性質）。同異（相同和不同）能否存在於一個實體等等之中？同異不具有自性（自身存在的性質）。具有自效能否存在於一個實體等等之中？具有自性不具有自性。解釋原因說：這個因既能夠遮止『有性不是實體』等等的說法，也能夠遮止『有性不是大有性』的說法，兩者都是確定的緣故。問：現在如果反駁『有性應當不是有性』，如何不犯自語相違的過失？答：如果先前沒有立『有性不是實體』的觀點，現在反駁『實體等等能夠具有非有』，這種說法就犯了自語相違的過失，也違背了自己的教義。他們先前已經成立了『非實之有』，現在就反駁他們，破斥他人，違揹他人，而不是成立諸種過失。問：在因的三相（體相、用相、自相）上，這是什麼過失呢？答：他們立宗說『有性不是實體』，『有性』是指有法的自相。他們說離開實體而有自體，能夠具有實體的『大有』，其同異性，雖然離開實體等等而有自體，能夠具有，但不是『大有』。雖然因與同法相同，便是所立宗的異品。離開實體的大有，雖然沒有同品，有一個實體因，同品非有，對於其異品的相同和不同之上，普遍地隨之轉變。這也是因的后二品過失，因為在同品中沒有，在異品中有的緣故。問：如果這樣，立『聲為無常』，宗是『聲體可聞』，瓶子有燒燬的現象。那麼瓶子和聲音，應當成為異品。如果允許是異品，不但違背了論述，而且一切宗都沒有同品。答：難道沒有說過嗎？聲音的本體不是所爭論的對象。聲音上的無常才是所要成立的。瓶子既然共同具有，所以是同品。他們說離開實體而有自體，有自性的『有性』作為宗的有法，以有一個實體因所成立。相同和不同既然不是離開實體而有自體的『有性』，所以成爲了異品。問：先前的論述說：『與所要成立的法均等的義品，叫做同品』，只是說與所要成立的法均等，才叫做同品，沒有說與有法均等叫做同品。如何說具有有法自相是相違的呢？答：現在如果僅僅以『有性』與『相同和不同』作為同品，就可以像你所責備的那樣，違背了先前的論文。既然以離開實體而有自性的『有性』作為同品，也是宗中所要成立的法均等具有的，所以這個過失沒有違背論理。
【English Translation】 English version Nature (svabhava). Can sameness and difference (tadatmya and anyatmya) exist in one reality, etc.? Sameness and difference do not have inherent existence. Can inherent existence exist in one reality, etc.? Inherent existence does not have inherent existence. The explanation says: This reason can both negate the statement 'inherent existence is not reality,' etc., and also negate the statement 'inherent existence is not great existence,' because both are definite. Question: Now, if we refute 'inherent existence should not be inherent existence,' how do we avoid the fault of self-contradiction? Answer: If the view 'inherent existence is not reality' was not previously established, then refuting 'reality, etc., can have non-existence' would be a self-contradictory fault and would also contradict one's own doctrine. They have already established 'non-real existence,' and now we refute them, refuting others, contradicting others, and not establishing various faults. Question: In the three aspects of the reason (intrinsic nature, function, and self-characteristic), what is this fault? Answer: They establish the thesis that 'inherent existence is not reality.' 'Inherent existence' refers to the self-characteristic of the subject of the thesis. They say that apart from reality, there is self-existence, which can possess the 'great existence' of reality. Its sameness and difference, although apart from reality, etc., have self-existence and can possess it, but it is not 'great existence.' Although the reason is the same as the similar instance, it is the dissimilar instance of the established thesis. The great existence apart from reality, although there is no similar instance, there is one reality as the reason. The similar instance does not exist, and it universally transforms on the sameness and difference of its dissimilar instances. This is also the fault of the latter two aspects of the reason, because it does not exist in the similar instance but exists in the dissimilar instance. Question: If so, establishing 'sound is impermanent,' the thesis is 'the sound-entity is audible,' and there is the phenomenon of a pot being burned. Then the pot and the sound should become dissimilar instances. If it is allowed to be a dissimilar instance, it not only contradicts the argument, but also all theses would have no similar instances. Answer: Haven't we already said that the entity of sound is not the object of dispute? The impermanence of sound is what is to be established. Since the pot has it in common, it is a similar instance. They say that 'inherent existence' with self-existence apart from reality is the subject of the thesis, established by one reality as the reason. Since sameness and difference are not 'inherent existence' with self-existence apart from reality, they become dissimilar instances. Question: The previous argument said: 'The instances that are equal to the dharma to be established are called similar instances.' It only says that being equal to the dharma to be established is called a similar instance, and it does not say that being equal to the subject of the thesis is called a similar instance. How can it be said that having the self-characteristic of the subject of the thesis is contradictory? Answer: If we now only take 'inherent existence' and 'sameness and difference' as similar instances, then it would be as you accuse, contradicting the previous text. Since we take 'inherent existence' with self-existence apart from reality as a similar instance, it is also equal to the dharma to be established in the thesis, so this fault does not contradict the logical reasoning.
。問有性既為有法自相。離實有性是其差別。有一實因。便是有法差別之因。如何今說為自相過。答彼宗意許離實有性。實是差別。言陳有性。既是自相。今非此言陳。即是違自相。故自相過。非差別因。若不爾者。極成所別皆無此過。違自宗故。問若難離實之大有性。所別所依犯自不成。亦犯違宗隨一不成。若難不離實等大有而非有性。既犯相符亦違自教。彼豈非有。答彼先總說。今亦總難。彼既成立離實之有。故今難有。令非此有。言同意別。故無諸過。
論。有法差別相違因者如即此因即於前宗有法差別作有緣性。
述曰。下文亦三。此即初二。標名舉宗因。此言意說。彼勝論立大有句義有實德業。實德業三和合之時。同起詮言。詮三為有。同起緣智。緣三為有。實德業三。為因能起。有詮緣因。即是大有。大有能有實德業故。十句論說。同句義云何。謂有性。何等為有性。謂與一切實德業句義和合。一切根所取。于實德業有詮智因。是名有性。智謂能緣。彼下又說。如是有性。定非所作。常。無德。無動作。無細分亦爾。有實德業。除同有能無能俱分異。所和合一有。同詮緣因。彼鵂鹠仙。以五頂不信離實德業別有有故。即以前因。成立前宗言陳有性有法自相意許差別為有緣性。有性同異。有緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果『有性』（astitva，存在性）已經是『有法』（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）的自相（svalaksana，自身特性），那麼『離實有性』（dravyadi-vyatirikta astitva，與實體等不同的存在性）就是它的差別（visesa，特殊性）。如果有一個『實因』（dravyakaranatva，作為實體的因），便是『有法差別』的因。為何現在說這是自相過（svalaksana-viruddha，與自身特性相違背的過失）？ 答：他們的宗派（指勝論派Vaisesika）意許『離實有性』，『實』（dravya，實體）是差別。說『陳有性』（kevala astitva，純粹的存在性），已經是自相。現在如果說『陳』（kevala，純粹）就是違背自相，所以是自相過，而不是差別因。如果不是這樣，那麼極成（prasiddha，公認的）的所別（visesya，被區分者）都不會有這種過失，因為違背了自宗（svasiddhanta，自己的宗義）。 問：如果責難『離實』（dravya-vyatirikta，與實體不同）的『大有性』（mahasatta，普遍存在性），那麼所別（visesya，被區分者）和所依（asraya，所依賴者）就會犯自不成（svarupasiddhi，自身不成），也會犯違宗（svasiddhanta-virodha，違背自宗）和隨一不成（anyatarasiddha，兩者之一不成）中的一個。如果責難『不離實等』（dravya-samaveta，與實體等同在）的『大有』（mahasatta，普遍存在），但不是『有性』（astitva，存在性），那麼既犯相符（siddhasadhana，已成立者重證），也違背自教（svagama-virodha，違背自己的教義），他們難道沒有這些過失嗎？ 答：他們先前是總說（samanya-kathana，一般性陳述），現在我也是總難（samanya-dusana，一般性責難）。他們既然成立了『離實之有』（dravya-vyatirikta astitva，與實體不同的存在），所以現在責難『有』（astitva，存在性），使其不是此『有』（idam astitva，這個存在）。言語的意義不同，所以沒有這些過失。 論：『有法差別相違因』（dharmi-visesa-viruddhahetu，與有法差別相違背的因）例如，這個因在前宗（purvapaksa，前一宗派）中，對於『有法差別』（dharmi-visesa，有法差別）來說，是『有緣性』（astitva-hetu，存在性的原因）。 述曰：下文也有三部分，這是最初的兩部分。標明名稱，舉出宗派的因。這段話的意思是說，勝論派（Vaisesika）立『大有』（mahasatta，普遍存在）的句義（padartha，範疇）有『實』（dravya，實體）、『德』（guna，屬性）、『業』（karma，活動）。當『實』、『德』、『業』三者和合（samavaya，內在關係）的時候，同時產生詮言（sabda，語言），詮釋三者為『有』（astitva，存在）。同時產生緣智（jnana，認知），認知三者為『有』（astitva，存在）。『實』、『德』、『業』三者，作為因能夠產生『有』（astitva，存在）的詮釋和認知，這個因就是『大有』（mahasatta，普遍存在）。『大有』（mahasatta，普遍存在）能夠使『實』、『德』、『業』存在。 《十句論》（Dasapadartha-sastra）說：『同句義』（samanya-padartha，共相範疇）是什麼？回答說：是『有性』（astitva，存在性）。什麼是『有性』（astitva，存在性）？回答說：是與一切『實』（dravya，實體）、『德』（guna，屬性）、『業』（karma，活動）句義和合，一切根（indriya，感官）所取，對於『實』、『德』、『業』有詮釋和認知的因，這叫做『有性』（astitva，存在性）。智（jnana，認知）是指能緣（alambana，對像）。他們下面又說，像這樣的『有性』（astitva，存在性），一定不是所作（krtaka，被製造的），是常（nitya，常恒的），無德（aguna，沒有屬性），沒有動作（akriya，沒有活動），沒有細分（niravayava，沒有細分）。有『實』（dravya，實體）、『德』（guna，屬性）、『業』（karma，活動），除去共同的『有』（astitva，存在）之外，有能（samarthya，能力）和無能（asamarthya，無能力）的區分。所和合的『一』（eka，單一），共同詮釋和認知的因。那位鵂鹠仙（Uluka，勝論派的創始人），以五頂（panca-sikha，五種論證方式）不相信離開『實』（dravya，實體）、『德』（guna，屬性）、『業』（karma，活動）另外有『有』（astitva，存在）的緣故，就以前面的因，成立前宗（purvapaksa，前一宗派）所說的『陳有性』（kevala astitva，純粹的存在性）是『有法』（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）的自相（svalaksana，自身特性），意許差別（visesa，特殊性）為『有緣性』（astitva-hetu，存在性的原因），『有性』（astitva，存在性）的同異（sadharana-vaidharmya，共同和不同）是有緣（hetu，原因）。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If 'astitva' (existence) is already the 'svalaksana' (self-characteristic) of 'dharmin' (that which possesses attributes), then 'dravyadi-vyatirikta astitva' (existence distinct from substance, etc.) is its 'visesa' (distinction). If there is a 'dravyakaranatva' (being the cause of substance), it is the cause of the 'dharmi-visesa' (distinction of that which possesses attributes). Why is it now said to be a 'svalaksana-viruddha' (fault of contradicting its own characteristic)? Answer: Their school (referring to Vaisesika) intends to allow 'dravyadi-vyatirikta astitva' (existence distinct from substance, etc.), 'dravya' (substance) is the distinction. Saying 'kevala astitva' (mere existence) is already a self-characteristic. Now, if saying 'kevala' (mere) is contradicting the self-characteristic, then it is a 'svalaksana-viruddha' (fault of contradicting its own characteristic), not a cause of distinction. If it were not so, then the 'prasiddha' (well-known) 'visesya' (that which is distinguished) would not have this fault, because it contradicts its own doctrine ('svasiddhanta'). Question: If one criticizes the 'mahasatta' (universal existence) that is 'dravya-vyatirikta' (distinct from substance), then the 'visesya' (that which is distinguished) and the 'asraya' (that which is relied upon) will commit 'svarupasiddhi' (self-non-establishment), and will also commit one of 'svasiddhanta-virodha' (contradiction of one's own doctrine) and 'anyatarasiddha' (non-establishment of either). If one criticizes 'mahasatta' (universal existence) that is 'dravya-samaveta' (inherent in substance, etc.), but is not 'astitva' (existence), then it commits 'siddhasadhana' (proving what is already established) and also contradicts its own teachings ('svagama-virodha'). Do they not have these faults? Answer: They previously made a general statement ('samanya-kathana'), and now I also make a general criticism ('samanya-dusana'). Since they have established 'dravya-vyatirikta astitva' (existence distinct from substance), I now criticize 'astitva' (existence), making it not this 'idam astitva' (this existence). The meanings of the words are different, so there are no such faults. Treatise: 'Dharmi-visesa-viruddhahetu' (reason contradictory to the distinction of that which possesses attributes) is, for example, this reason in the previous school ('purvapaksa'), for the 'dharmi-visesa' (distinction of that which possesses attributes), is 'astitva-hetu' (the cause of existence). Commentary: The following text also has three parts, this is the first two. It indicates the name and cites the reason of the school. The meaning of this passage is that the Vaisesika school establishes that the meaning of 'mahasatta' (universal existence) has 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action). When these three, 'dravya', 'guna', and 'karma', are in 'samavaya' (inherence), at the same time, 'sabda' (language) arises, explaining the three as 'astitva' (existence). At the same time, 'jnana' (cognition) arises, cognizing the three as 'astitva' (existence). The three, 'dravya', 'guna', and 'karma', as the cause, can produce the explanation and cognition of 'astitva' (existence), and this cause is 'mahasatta' (universal existence). 'Mahasatta' (universal existence) can cause 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action) to exist. The 'Dasapadartha-sastra' (Treatise on Ten Categories) says: What is 'samanya-padartha' (the category of generality)? The answer is: It is 'astitva' (existence). What is 'astitva' (existence)? The answer is: It is that which inheres in all 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action) categories, is apprehended by all 'indriya' (senses), and is the cause of explanation and cognition of 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action). This is called 'astitva' (existence). 'Jnana' (cognition) refers to the 'alambana' (object). They further say below that such 'astitva' (existence) is certainly not 'krtaka' (produced), is 'nitya' (eternal), 'aguna' (without quality), 'akriya' (without action), and 'niravayava' (without parts). There are 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action), apart from the common 'astitva' (existence), there is a distinction between 'samarthya' (capability) and 'asamarthya' (incapability). The 'eka' (one) that is inherent, is the common cause of explanation and cognition. That Uluka (the founder of the Vaisesika school), with the five peaks ('panca-sikha', five types of arguments), does not believe that there is 'astitva' (existence) apart from 'dravya' (substance), 'guna' (quality), and 'karma' (action), so he uses the previous reason to establish that the 'kevala astitva' (mere existence) mentioned in the previous school ('purvapaksa') is the 'svalaksana' (self-characteristic) of 'dharmin' (that which possesses attributes), intending to allow 'visesa' (distinction) as 'astitva-hetu' (the cause of existence), and the 'sadharana-vaidharmya' (commonality and difference) of 'astitva' (existence) is the 'hetu' (cause).
性同。詮言各別。故彼不取。心心所法是能緣性。有緣謂境。有能緣故。謂境有體。為因能起有緣之性。若無體者。心如何生。以無因故。緣無不生。如同異性。有一實故。作有緣性。體非實等。有性有一實。亦作有緣性。故知體亦非實德業。此言有者。有無之有非作境因有能緣性故。非大有也。若作大有緣性。能別不成。闕無同喻。同異為喻。所立不成。有性言陳有法自相。作有緣性。非有緣性是自相上意許差別。是故前因亦是有法差別之因。是本成故。
論。亦能成立與此相違作非有緣性如遮實等俱決定故。
述曰。此成違義有二。初三句顯此因亦能令彼有法差別而作相違。后二句釋所由。作非有緣性者。作非彼意許大有句義有緣之性。謂即此因。亦能成立與彼所立意許別義作有緣性差別相違。而作非大有有緣之性。同異有一實。而作非大有有緣性。有性有一實。應作非大有有緣性。不遮作有緣性。但遮作大有有緣性。故成意許別義相違。不爾違宗有性可作有緣性故。文言雖略。義覈定然。釋所由云。如遮實等俱決定故。勝論此因既成有性遮非實等。而作有緣性。此因亦遮有性非作有性有緣性。此如彼遮兩皆決定。故成違彼差別之因。此宗自相差別不定。如前已說。今此略以言陳為自相。意許為差別
。故無妨難。問于因三相是何過耶。答有性有緣性。因本所成有法差別。宗無同品。因於遍無。同異非有性有緣性是宗異品。因於遍有。有一實因。同無異有。后二相過。故成相違。問如聲論言聲應非聲作有緣性。所作性故。如瓶等。亦應說是有法差別相違。答彼自違宗。故非彼過。本亦不諍聲非作聲有緣性故。彼似破攝。如非聲有緣性。如是應非擊發所生起等。皆準此知。問又如彼言聲之無常應非作聲無常有緣性。所作性故。如瓶等。應是法差別相違。答亦不然。彼犯兩俱不成。無常有法兩俱不許有所作性。亦似破攝。如是應非緣息無常等。皆準此知。此四過中。初二種因。各唯違一。后二種因。一因違二。其有一因通違三者。如勝論立所說有性非四大種。許除四大體非無故。如色聲等。自所餘法。皆入同喻。無不定過。非四大種是法自相。能有四大非四大種。不能有四大非四大種。是法差別。彼意本成能有四大非四大種。故今與彼法差別為相違云。所說有性非能有四大非四大種。許除四大體非無故。如色聲等。所說有性是有法自相。與此有法自相為相違云。所說有性應非有性。許除四大體非無故。如色聲等。彼說有性離實有性。今非此有。不犯自語自教相違。隨言即非。故違自相。有性既是有法自相。作有性有緣
性。作非有性有緣性。是有法差別。彼意本成作有性有緣性。故今與彼有法差別為相違云。有性應非作有性有緣性。許除四大體非無故。如色聲等。不改本因。即為違量。故成違三。有唐興縣雋法師者。釋門之樞紐也。綺歲標奇。泛慈舟于濟蟻。髫年發穎。濤辨水于澄鹙。是以初業有宗。西河謝其獨步。創探空旨。北地譽其孤雄。天縱英姿。生摛睿質。余欣其雅量。偏結交期。情契蘭金。言符藥石。時假談笑。論及因明。法師乃囑古疏以文披。一攬略窮其趣。探新知以理窮。再閱廣究其微。始驗驥駿駑駘。驤中原以分駕。鵬鶱鸚翥。繞沖天而別羽。乃申難曰核觀論勢。文理不同。準九因中。第四第六名曰相違因。于同品無異品有。此四相違。唯法自相可與彼同。其後三違。因皆同有。異品上無。既不同於四六如何返成相違。又法自相。他因於同遍無。于異品中說有。用他異品為同。得成相違之義。后之三違。他因皆于同有。異品上無。用他能立因喻。與他作三相違。行相既自不同。如何可得法自相相違。與餘三合。而言二合違有六。三合違有四。四合違有一。余性不匿賢。況乎知已。故錄之於疏例。示詳藻思玄深。自論道東譯。無申此難者。匪發彼之千鈞。誰發我之萬碩者歟。夫正因相者。必遍宗法。同有異無。生他
決智。因法成宗。可成四義。有法及法。此二各有言陳自相。意許差別。隨宗所諍。成一或多。故宗同品。說所立法均等義品名為同品。隨其所諍。所立之法有處名同。非取宗上一切皆同。若爾便無異喻品故。若令皆同。亦是分別相似過類。又非唯取言所陳法。不爾便無自余過失。如前數說。故隨所應因成宗中。一乃至四。所兩競義。有此法處名為同品。問理門論云。但由法故以成其法。如何今說因成四耶。答實唯成法。如難有性而非有性。難彼意許離實等有而非有性。故唯成法。雖難意許。尋言即難。更不加言。故名有法自相相違。加言便成難彼差別。今望言陳。因成宗四。理門望諍有法之上意許別義。故云但以法成其法。理不相違。此論所說法自相因。唯違於一。故顯示因。同無異有。自餘三因。乍觀他立。皆似其因。同有異無。彼此所諍宗上餘三。以理窮之。皆無同品。其因亦是異有同無。如法差別不積聚他用。有法自相離實等有性。有法差別作大有有緣性。皆無同喻。彼因但于異品上有。由彼矯立以異為同。故今違之以彼異為同。成相違義。論中示法各各不同。法自相相違。改他同喻為異。改他異喻為同。后之三違。以他同爲同。以他異為異。欲顯相違。因必仍舊。喻或改新。其不定因。立順因正。破乃相違
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 決智（具有決斷智慧的人）。因為論證方法而確立論宗，可以成立四種意義。即有法和法，這兩者各自有言陳自相（語言陳述的自身性質）和意許差別（意圖認可的差異）。根據論宗所爭論的內容，可以成立一個或多個意義。所以論宗的同品（相似類別），是指陳述所要建立的法義均等的類別，稱為同品。根據所爭論的內容，所要建立的法義在某些方面相同，並非指在論宗上一切都相同。如果那樣，就沒有異喻品（不同類別）了。如果要求一切都相同，那就是分別相似的過失。而且，並非只取語言所陳述的法義，否則就會有其他的過失，如前面多次所說。所以，根據情況，在因為論證方法而確立論宗的過程中，從一到四，對於雙方爭論的意義，有此法義的地方稱為同品。 問：理門論（Nyaya-pravesa）說，只是因為法義的緣故才能成立法義，為什麼現在說因為論證方法能成立四種意義呢？ 答：實際上只是成立法義。例如，難以具有的性質，而不是具有的性質。難以認可對方意圖離開真實等而具有的性質，而不是具有的性質。所以只是成立法義。雖然難以認可對方的意圖，但尋究其言語就能駁難，不需要再加其他言語，所以稱為有法自相相違（在作為論題的事物自身上存在自相矛盾）。如果加上其他言語，就成了駁難對方的差別。現在從語言陳述的角度來看，因為論證方法能成立論宗的四種意義。理門論是從爭論的有法之上，意圖認可不同的意義的角度來說的，所以說只是以法義成立法義，道理上並不矛盾。此論所說的法自相因（以事物自身性質作為理由），只是違背於一種情況，所以顯示出理由，在同品中沒有，在異品中有。其餘三種理由，乍一看對方所立的，都像是正確的理由，在同品中有，在異品中沒有。對於彼此所爭論的論宗上的其餘三種情況，用道理來追究，都沒有同品。其理由也是在異品中有，在同品中沒有。例如，法義的差別不積累其他作用，有法自相離開真實等而具有的性質，有法差別作為大的具有因緣的性質，都沒有同喻（相似的例子）。對方的理由只是在異品上有，因為對方錯誤地把異品當作同品，所以現在反駁對方，把對方的異品當作同品，成立相反的意義。論中顯示法義各自不同，法自相相違。改變對方的同喻為異喻，改變對方的異喻為同喻。後面的三種相違，是以對方的同品為同品，以對方的異品為異品，想要顯示相違，理由必須仍然是原來的，比喻可以改變新的。對於不定的理由，建立順因（正面的理由）是正確的，駁斥則是相反的。
【English Translation】 English version The wise one with decisive intellect. Establishing a thesis based on the method of reasoning can establish four meanings: 'possessor of the property' (dharmin) and 'property' (dharma). These two each have 'verbal expression of its own nature' (言陳自相) and 'intentional acceptance of difference' (意許差別). Depending on what is being argued in the thesis, one or more meanings can be established. Therefore, the 'similar instances' (同品) of the thesis refer to categories where the dharma to be established is equally present, and are called 'similar instances'. Depending on what is being argued, the dharma to be established is the same in some aspects, but it does not mean that everything is the same on the thesis. If that were the case, there would be no 'dissimilar instances' (異喻品). If everything were required to be the same, that would be the fallacy of distinguishing similarities. Moreover, it is not only the dharma expressed in words that is taken into account, otherwise there would be other fallacies, as mentioned many times before. Therefore, depending on the situation, in the process of establishing a thesis based on the method of reasoning, from one to four, for the meanings disputed by both sides, the place where this dharma exists is called 'similar instances'. Question: The Nyaya-pravesa (理門論) says that it is only because of the dharma that the dharma can be established. Why do you now say that the method of reasoning can establish four meanings? Answer: In reality, it is only the dharma that is established. For example, the nature of being difficult to possess, rather than the nature of possessing. It is difficult to accept the other party's intention to have a nature that is separate from reality, etc., rather than having a nature. Therefore, it is only the dharma that is established. Although it is difficult to accept the other party's intention, examining their words can refute them, without the need to add other words. Therefore, it is called 'contradiction in the own-nature of the possessor of the property' (有法自相相違). If other words are added, it becomes a refutation of the other party's difference. Now, from the perspective of verbal expression, the method of reasoning can establish the four meanings of the thesis. The Nyaya-pravesa speaks from the perspective of intending to accept different meanings on the disputed 'possessor of the property', so it says that it is only with the dharma that the dharma is established, which is not contradictory in principle. The 'reason based on the own-nature of the dharma' (法自相因) spoken of in this treatise only contradicts one situation, so it shows that the reason is absent in the similar instances and present in the dissimilar instances. The remaining three reasons, at first glance, seem to be correct reasons established by the other party, present in the similar instances and absent in the dissimilar instances. For the remaining three situations on the thesis disputed by each other, upon investigation with reason, there are no similar instances. The reason is also present in the dissimilar instances and absent in the similar instances. For example, the difference in dharma does not accumulate other functions, the nature of the 'possessor of the property' being separate from reality, etc., and the nature of the difference in the 'possessor of the property' being a great condition, all have no similar examples. The other party's reason is only present in the dissimilar instances, because the other party mistakenly takes the dissimilar instances as similar instances, so now we refute the other party, taking the other party's dissimilar instances as similar instances, establishing the opposite meaning. The treatise shows that the dharmas are different from each other, and the own-nature of the dharma contradicts each other. Changing the other party's similar example to a dissimilar example, and changing the other party's dissimilar example to a similar example. The latter three contradictions are to take the other party's similar instances as similar instances, and to take the other party's dissimilar instances as dissimilar instances, wanting to show contradiction, the reason must still be the original one, and the metaphor can be changed to a new one. For the uncertain reason, establishing a 'concordant reason' (順因) is correct, and refuting it is the opposite.
。因雖不改。通二品轉。不生決智。立不定名。此相違因。隨應所成。立必同無異有。破必同有異無。決智既生。故與前別。若立因正。破者相違。因通二品。豈非不定。故此四因。不違四六。又將法自相因同無異有。就后三種同有異無。與三合說。一往觀文。必無是理。初以異為同。后以同爲同故。今將后三。以就初一。以異為同。便有合者。改他能立之同喻故。如勝論立所說有性離實等外有別自性。許非無故。如同異性。乍觀此因是共不定。二皆有故。然彼五頂諍五句外無別有性。故立有性離實等五有別自性。闕宗同品。其同異性。既是異品所離之外。由彼勝論。方便矯立。舉異為同。許非無因。唯于異品實等上有。同遍非有。亦如論說聲常之宗法自相因。對無空論闕無同喻。所作等因。望于異品瓶等上有。同上遍無。許成相違。今此亦爾。依此比量。后三從初。一因違四。法自相相違者。所說有性離實等外無別自性。許非無故。如實德等。同異入宗所等之中。故無不定。彼所立量。離實等有性是法自相。能有實德業離實等有性。不能有實德業離實等有性。是法差別。彼意本欲成能有實德業離實等有性。故今與彼法差別為相違云。所說有性應非能有實德業離實等有性。許非無故。如實德等。為有法自相相違云。所
說有性應非有性。許非無故。如實德業。彼說離實等有性。今隨難言陳而非有性。故違自相。不違自教自語之宗。同喻亦無所立不成。有性既為有法自相。作有性有緣性。作非有性有緣性是有法差別。彼意本成作有性有緣性。故今與彼有法差別為相違云。所說有性非作有性有緣性。許非無故。如實德等。不改故因。即為違量。故成四因。此上同喻。舉同異為喻亦得。隨所立故。違一有四。論自說二。違二有六。論自說一。違三有四。今略敘一。違四有一。今亦示法。自餘十種。皆如理思。此四亦有他自共比。各三亦說有違他自共。四相違因合三十六。論文所說。皆共比違共。向三四因。皆自比違自。他比違他等。皆應準知。諸自共比。違共及自。皆為過失。違他非過。他比違他及共為失。違自非過。義同前說。此但說全。應詳一分。既許一因通違四種。故知此四非必相違。問四相違九句何句所攝。答乍觀文勢。唯初一違是九句中第四第六。具二因故。九中二因違法自相相違因故。今觀后三皆彼第四。同品非有異品有故。違所立故。此上所說但是立敵兩俱不成四相違因。亦有隨一猶預所依餘三不成四相違因。三十六中。一一有四。合計一百四十四種諸相違因。如不定中引理門說。皆應思惟。恐文繁雜故略不述。然理門論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說『有性』（svabhāva，自性）應當是非『有性』，這是允許的，並非沒有理由，就像『如實德業』（tathatā-guṇa-karma，如實功德事業）一樣。對方說離開『實』（tattva，真實）等而有『有性』。現在，我方隨順對方的論難陳述說『而非有性』，因此這違背了自身的體相（svalakṣaṇa，自相）。這並不違背自身的教義和言語之宗（svasya siddhānta，自宗）。相同的比喻也無法成立，因為無法確立。『有性』既然作為『有法』（dharmin，有法者）的自相，將『有性』作為『有緣性』（hetu，因），將『非有性』作為『有緣性』，這是『有法』的差別。對方本意是成立將『有性』作為『有緣性』，所以現在我方以『有法』的差別作為相違的原因來說：『所說的有性並非作為有性有緣性』，這是允許的，並非沒有理由，就像『如實德』等一樣。不改變原來的原因，就成爲了違背量（pramāṇa，量）的論證，因此構成了四種原因（違四因）。 在上述的同喻（sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta，同喻）中，舉出同品（sapakṣa，同品）和異品（vipakṣa，異品）作為比喻也是可以的，因為這是隨順所立宗（pakṣa，宗）。違背一個方面有四種情況，論者自己說了兩種。違背兩個方面有六種情況，論者自己說了一種。違背三個方面有四種情況，現在簡略敘述一種。違背四個方面有一種情況，現在也展示了方法。其餘的十種，都應該如理思維。這四種情況也有他比（parārtha-anumāna，他比量）、自比（svārtha-anumāna，自比量）、共比（sādhāraṇa-anumāna，共比量）的差別。各自的三種情況也說有違揹他、自、共的差別。四種相違因合起來有三十六種。論文中所說的，都是共比違共。前面的三種或四種原因，都是自比違自。他比違他等，都應該依此類推。諸如自比、共比，違背共及自，都是過失。違揹他則不是過失。他比違揹他及共是過失，違背自則不是過失。意義與前面所說相同。這裡只是說了全部，應該詳細分析一部分。既然允許一個因通達違背四種情況，因此可知這四種情況並非必定相違。 問：四相違（catuḥ-pratipakṣa，四相違）的九句（nava-vākya，九句因）中，哪一句所攝？答：乍一看文勢，只有最初的『一違』是九句中的第四和第六，因為它具備兩種原因。九句中的兩種原因違背了自相相違因。現在看後面的三種情況，都屬於九句中的第四種，因為在同品中沒有，在異品中有，所以違背了所立宗。以上所說的只是立論者和敵論者兩方都不成立的四相違因，也有隨順一方猶豫所依，其餘三種不成立的四相違因。三十六種情況中，每一種情況有四種，合計一百四十四種諸相違因。就像在『不定』（anaikāntika，不定因）中引用的《理門論》（Hetu-dvāra-śāstra，因明入門論）所說的那樣，都應該思維。恐怕文字繁雜，所以略不敘述。然而，《理門論》...
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that 'inherence' (svabhāva, intrinsic nature) should be non-'inherence,' this is permissible and not without reason, like 'suchness-virtue-karma' (tathatā-guṇa-karma, the qualities and actions of suchness). The opponent says that apart from 'reality' (tattva, truth) etc., there is 'inherence.' Now, following the opponent's challenge, I state that it is 'non-inherence,' therefore this contradicts its own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa, self-nature). This does not contradict one's own doctrine and the principle of speech (svasya siddhānta, one's own tenet). The same analogy cannot be established either, because it cannot be established. Since 'inherence' is the self-characteristic of the 'possessor of property' (dharmin, subject), taking 'inherence' as the 'reason' (hetu, cause), and taking 'non-inherence' as the 'reason,' this is the difference of the 'possessor of property.' The opponent's original intention is to establish taking 'inherence' as the 'reason,' so now I use the difference of the 'possessor of property' as a contradictory reason to say: 'The so-called inherence is not taken as the inherence-reason,' this is permissible and not without reason, like 'suchness-virtue' etc. Not changing the original reason becomes an argument that contradicts the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa, valid cognition), thus constituting the four reasons (four contradictory reasons). In the above-mentioned similar example (sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta, example of similarity), it is also possible to cite the similar class (sapakṣa, similar instance) and the dissimilar class (vipakṣa, dissimilar instance) as examples, because this follows the established thesis (pakṣa, thesis). Contradicting one aspect has four situations, and the debater himself has stated two. Contradicting two aspects has six situations, and the debater himself has stated one. Contradicting three aspects has four situations, and now I briefly describe one. Contradicting four aspects has one situation, and now I also show the method. The remaining ten situations should all be considered according to reason. These four situations also have the difference of inference for others (parārtha-anumāna, inference for others), inference for oneself (svārtha-anumāna, inference for oneself), and common inference (sādhāraṇa-anumāna, common inference). Each of the three situations also says that there are differences of contradicting others, oneself, and the common. The four contradictory reasons together have thirty-six situations. What is said in the treatise is all common inference contradicting the common. The previous three or four reasons are all self-inference contradicting oneself. Inference for others contradicting others, etc., should all be inferred by analogy. Such as self-inference and common inference, contradicting the common and oneself are all faults. Contradicting others is not a fault. Inference for others contradicting others and the common is a fault, contradicting oneself is not a fault. The meaning is the same as what was said before. Here, only the whole is said, and a part should be analyzed in detail. Since it is permissible for one reason to penetrate and contradict four situations, therefore it can be known that these four situations are not necessarily contradictory. Question: Among the nine sentences (nava-vākya, nine-sentence reason) of the four contradictions (catuḥ-pratipakṣa, four contradictions), which sentence does it belong to? Answer: At first glance at the text, only the initial 'one contradiction' is the fourth and sixth of the nine sentences, because it possesses two reasons. The two reasons in the nine sentences contradict the self-characteristic contradictory reason. Now, looking at the following three situations, they all belong to the fourth of the nine sentences, because it is not in the similar class but is in the dissimilar class, so it contradicts the established thesis. What is said above is only the four contradictory reasons that are not established by both the proponent and the opponent, and there are also four contradictory reasons that are not established by the other three, depending on the hesitation of one party. Among the thirty-six situations, each situation has four, totaling one hundred and forty-four kinds of contradictory reasons. Just like what is said in the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra (Hetu-dvāra-śāstra, The Gate of Reasoning), which is cited in 'uncertainty' (anaikāntika, uncertain reason), all should be contemplated. Fearing that the text is complicated, I will not describe it briefly. However, the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra...
攝此頌云。邪證法有法。自性或差別。此成相違因若無所違害。問如前所說十四似因。設有兩俱不成。亦有不定及相違耶。如是乃至設相違決定。亦相違因耶。答若有兩俱不成。必無不定及與相違。兩俱不成。彼此俱說因於宗無。不定之因於宗定有。彼因立正。用此因違。彼正必違。此違必正。令宗不定。相違之因亦于宗有。隨其所應即用此因成彼義。此違無正。彼正無違。令宗決定故名相違。由此若有兩俱不成。必無不定及與相違。若有後三不成。可有不定及與相違。隨應還成隨一等不定及相違義。由因於宗隨一猶預隨一所依而說有故。然非一切。就三隨一可說有故。自他共比既各有三。有體無體全分一分。總相而說二十七不成。五十四不定。三十六相違。合計一百一十七句似因。相對寬狹以辨有無。皆應思惟。恐繁且止。依理門云。因與似因多是宗法。不定相違並於宗有。多並宗法。唯四不成於宗亦無。非宗法故。有四不成。定無相違及不定過。此說共者。余如理思。
論。已說似因當說似喻。
述曰。似能立中。下第三解似喻有二。初結前生后。后依生正釋。此初也。
論。似同法喻有其五種一能立法不成二所立法不成。三俱不成四無合五倒合。
述曰。下依生正釋有二。初標列。后
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 總攝此頌文說：邪證法有法，自性或差別。此成立相違之因，如果沒有任何違害之處。（問：）如前面所說的十四種相似因，假設有兩俱不成的情況，也會有不定和相違的情況嗎？像這樣，乃至假設相違決定，也是相違因嗎？（答：）如果出現兩俱不成的情況，必定不會有不定和相違。兩俱不成，是指彼此都說因在宗（paksha，論題）上不存在。不定的因在宗上確定存在，用這個因來確立正論，這個因必定與正論相違背，這個相違背的因必定是正確的，從而使宗不確定。相違的因也在宗上存在，根據情況，可以用這個因來成立那個義理，這個相違沒有正論，那個正論沒有相違，從而使宗確定，所以叫做相違。因此，如果有兩俱不成的情況，必定不會有不定和相違。如果出現后三種不成的情況，可能會有不定和相違，根據情況，還會成立隨一等的不定和相違的義理。因為因在宗上，對於隨一的情況猶豫不決，對於隨一所依賴的情況而說有。然而並非一切情況都是如此，就三種隨一的情況來說，可以說有。自己、他人、共同比量，各自有三種，有體、無體、全分、一分。總的來說，有二十七種不成，五十四種不定，三十六種相違，總計一百一十七句相似因。相對的寬泛和狹窄，用來辨別有和無，都應該仔細思考。因為內容繁多，所以就此停止。依據《理門論》所說，因和相似因大多是宗法，不定和相違都在宗上存在，大多也符合宗法。只有四種不成在宗上也不存在，因為不是宗法。有四種不成，一定沒有相違和不定的過失。這裡說的是共同的情況，其餘的要根據道理來思考。
論：已經說了相似因，下面應當說相似喻。
述曰：在相似能立中，下面第三個部分是解釋相似喻，分為兩部分，首先是總結前面，引出後面，然後是依據引出，正式解釋。這是第一部分。
論：相似同法喻有五種：一、能立法不成；二、所立法不成；三、俱不成；四、無合；五、倒合。
述曰：下面依據引出，正式解釋，分為兩部分，首先是標列，然後是解釋。
【English Translation】 English version: This verse is summarized as follows: 'False proof, dharma with property, self-nature or difference. This establishes a contradictory reason if there is no contradiction.' (Question:) As mentioned earlier, regarding the fourteen types of fallacious reasons (hetuabhasa), if there are cases where both are unestablished (asiddha), will there also be uncertain (anaikantika) and contradictory (viruddha) cases? Like this, even if the contradiction is definite, is it still a contradictory reason? (Answer:) If both are unestablished, there will definitely be no uncertainty or contradiction. 'Both unestablished' means that both sides say the reason does not exist in the subject (paksha). An uncertain reason definitely exists in the subject. Using this reason to establish a correct argument, this reason must contradict the correct argument, and this contradictory reason must be correct, thus making the subject uncertain. A contradictory reason also exists in the subject. Depending on the situation, this reason can be used to establish that meaning. This contradiction has no correct argument, and that correct argument has no contradiction, thus making the subject definite, so it is called contradictory. Therefore, if both are unestablished, there will definitely be no uncertainty or contradiction. If the latter three types of unestablished cases occur, there may be uncertainty and contradiction. Depending on the situation, it can also establish the uncertain and contradictory meanings of 'one of the following'. Because the reason is in the subject, there is hesitation about one of the situations, and it is said to exist based on what one relies on. However, this is not the case in all situations. In the case of three of the following, it can be said to exist. Self, others, and common inference each have three types: with substance, without substance, whole part, one part. In general, there are twenty-seven types of unestablished, fifty-four types of uncertain, and thirty-six types of contradictory, totaling one hundred and seventeen phrases of fallacious reasons. Relative breadth and narrowness are used to distinguish between existence and non-existence, and all should be carefully considered. Because the content is numerous, it will stop here. According to the Nyayamukha (理門論), reasons and fallacious reasons are mostly properties of the subject (pakshadharma), uncertainty and contradiction both exist in the subject, and mostly conform to the properties of the subject. Only four types of unestablished do not exist in the subject, because they are not properties of the subject. If there are four types of unestablished, there will definitely be no contradiction or uncertain faults. This refers to the common situation, and the rest should be considered according to reason.
Treatise: Having discussed fallacious reasons, we should now discuss fallacious examples (dristanta).
Commentary: In the fallacious means of proof, the third part below explains fallacious examples, divided into two parts: first, summarizing the previous and introducing the following; then, based on the introduction, formally explaining. This is the first part.
Treatise: There are five types of fallacious examples of similarity (sadharmya-dristanta): 1. The property to be established is unestablished; 2. The property to be proven is unestablished; 3. Both are unestablished; 4. No connection (avyapti); 5. Inverted connection (viparitavyapti).
Commentary: Below, based on the introduction, the formal explanation is divided into two parts: first, listing; then, explaining.
別解。標列有二。初標列同。后標列異。此初也。因名能立。宗法名所立。同喻之法。必須具此二。因貫宗喻。喻必有能立。令宗義方成。喻必有所立。令因義方顯。今偏或雙。于喻非有。故有初三。喻以顯宗。令義見其邊極。不相連合。所立宗義不明。照智不生。故有第四。初標能以所逐。有因宗必定隨逐。初宗以後因。乃有宗以因其逐。返覆能所。令心顛倒。共許不成。他智翻生。故有第五。依增勝過但立此五。故無無結及倒結等。以似翻真故亦無合結。
論。似異法喻亦有五種一所立不遣二能立不遣三俱不遣四不離五倒離。
述曰。此標列異。異喻之法須無宗因。離異簡濫方成異品。既偏或雙。于異上有。故有初三。要依簡法。簡別離二令宗決定方名異品。既無簡法令義不明故有第四。先宗后因可成簡別。先因后宗反立異義。非為簡濫故有第五。翻同立異。同既五過異不可增。故隨勝過亦唯五立。
論。能立法不成者如說聲常無質礙故諸無質礙見彼是常猶如極微。
述曰。下別釋中。初同。后異。同中有二。初別解五。后總結非。解初不成有二。初舉體。后釋不成。此初也。舉彼宗因者。顯似喻體。如聲論師對於勝論立聲是常宗。兩俱許聲體無質礙。以勝論師聲是德句德句無礙。聲論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 別解。標列有二。初標列同。后標列異。此初也。因（hetu，理由）名能立，宗（paksa，論題）法名所立。同喻之法，必須具此二。因貫宗喻，喻必有能立，令宗義方成。喻必有所立，令因義方顯。今偏或雙，于喻非有。故有初三。喻以顯宗，令義見其邊極，不相連合，所立宗義不明，照智不生。故有第四。初標能以所逐，有因宗必定隨逐。初宗以後因，乃有宗以因其逐。返覆能所，令心顛倒。共許不成，他智翻生。故有第五。 依增勝過但立此五。故無無結及倒結等。以似翻真故亦無合結。
論。似異法喻亦有五種：一、所立不遣；二、能立不遣；三、俱不遣；四、不離；五、倒離。
述曰。此標列異。異喻之法須無宗因。離異簡濫方成異品。既偏或雙，于異上有。故有初三。要依簡法。簡別離二，令宗決定方名異品。既無簡法令義不明，故有第四。先宗后因可成簡別。先因后宗反立異義，非為簡濫，故有第五。翻同立異。同既五過異不可增。故隨勝過亦唯五立。
論。能立法不成者，如說聲常，無質礙故。諸無質礙，見彼是常，猶如極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）。
述曰。下別釋中。初同，后異。同中有二。初別解五，后總結非。解初不成有二。初舉體，后釋不成。此初也。舉彼宗因者，顯似喻體。如聲論師對於勝論立聲是常宗。兩俱許聲體無質礙。以勝論師聲是德句德句無礙。聲論
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation of differences. There are two types of classifications. The initial classification is the same, while the subsequent classification is different. This is the first point. The 'hetu' (reason) is called the 'prover' (that which establishes), and the 'paksa' (thesis) is called the 'provable' (that which is to be established). The method of 'similarity example' (samanadharmya-drstanta) must possess both of these. The reason pervades the thesis and the example. The example must have a prover so that the meaning of the thesis can be established. The example must have a provable so that the meaning of the reason can be clarified. If it is partial or dual, it is not present in the example. Therefore, there are the first three. The example clarifies the thesis, allowing the meaning to be seen in its entirety. If they are not connected, the meaning of the thesis to be established is unclear, and illuminating wisdom does not arise. Therefore, there is the fourth. The initial mark is that the prover is followed by the provable; the reason and the thesis must necessarily follow each other. The initial thesis is followed by the subsequent reason, and then the thesis follows the reason. Reversing the prover and the provable causes the mind to be confused. Mutual agreement is not achieved, and other wisdom arises instead. Therefore, there is the fifth. Based on the increased superior faults, only these five are established. Therefore, there are no inconclusive or inverted conclusions, etc. Because the similar reverses the true, there is also no comprehensive conclusion.
Treatise: There are also five types of dissimilar examples: 1. The provable is not rejected; 2. The prover is not rejected; 3. Both are not rejected; 4. Not separate; 5. Inverted separation.
Commentary: This classification is different. The method of dissimilar examples must be without thesis and reason. Separating the dissimilar and distinguishing the excessive forms a different category. Since it is partial or dual, it exists in the dissimilar. Therefore, there are the first three. It is necessary to rely on the method of separation to distinguish the two separations, so that the thesis is determined and named as a different category. Since there is no method of separation, the meaning is unclear, therefore there is the fourth. Thesis first, then reason, can achieve separation. Reason first, then thesis, establishes a reversed meaning, which is not for separating the excessive, therefore there is the fifth. Reversing the similar establishes the dissimilar. Since the similar has five faults, the dissimilar cannot be increased. Therefore, according to the superior faults, only five are established.
Treatise: An unestablished prover is like saying that sound is permanent because it is without obstruction. Whatever is without obstruction is seen as permanent, like a 'paramanu' (atom).
Commentary: In the following separate explanation, the first is similar, and the second is dissimilar. In the similar, there are two parts: the first separately explains the five, and the second summarizes the non-establishment. In explaining the initial non-establishment, there are two parts: the first gives the substance, and the second explains the non-establishment. This is the first. Giving the thesis and reason shows the substance of the similar example. For example, the sound theorist establishes the thesis that sound is permanent against the Vaisheshika school. Both agree that the substance of sound is without obstruction. Because for the Vaisheshika school, sound is a quality, and qualities are unobstructed. The sound theorist
雖無德句。然以其聲隔障等聞故知無礙。若據合顯。亦是因過。以心心所為因同法無礙因轉。前已明因。今辯喻過故不言因。
論。然彼極微所成立法常性是有。
述曰。此下釋不成中有二。初明所立有。后辯能立無。此初也。以聲勝論俱許極微。體常住故。準釋能立無。此處應言以諸極微常住性故。以互意存影略故略無也。
論。能成立法無質礙無以諸極微質礙性故。
述曰。此釋能立無。此聲勝論計微質礙。故無能立。問因為成宗。因有兩俱隨一等過。喻亦成宗。何故但名能立不成。不明余耶。答因親成宗。故有四過。喻是助成。故無四過。又解。因是初相。據初辯四。顯第二相亦有四種。彼開此合。義實相似。以喻準因亦有四種。一兩俱不成。即論說是。隨一不成。彼聲論師對佛弟子。立聲常宗。無質礙因。舉喻如業。佛法不許。即是隨一。雖俱所立無。且辯能立隨一。猶預不成準理有二。一宗二因。前已具顯。今喻亦二。于中綺互。或因猶預非喻能立。或喻能立非因猶預。或俱猶預。或俱不猶預。前三是過。第四非過。因猶預非喻能立者。如於霧等性起疑惑時。為煙為霧。即立彼處定應有火。以現煙故。如廚舍等處。或指如余疑惑因喻舉一例余。即可思準。或可。因是宗法。有法猶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即使沒有功德之句，但因為聲音能夠穿透障礙等而被聽到，所以知道沒有阻礙。如果根據合顯的觀點，這也是一種因過，因為心和心所作為因，同法無礙因轉變。前面已經闡明了因，現在辨別比喻的過失，所以不談因。
論：然而，那些由極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）所成立的法的常性是存在的。
述曰：下面解釋不成中有兩種情況。首先闡明所立宗的「有」，然後辨別能立宗的「無」。這是開始。因為聲論和勝論都認可極微，並且認為其本體是常住的。準此解釋能立宗的「無」。這裡應該說，因為諸極微具有常住的性質。因為相互之間的意思存在省略，所以省略了「無」。
論：能成立法的無質礙性，是因為諸極微具有質礙性。
述曰：這是解釋能立宗的「無」。因為聲論和勝論認為極微具有質礙性，所以沒有能立宗。問：因為是用來成立宗的，因有兩俱隨一等過失，比喻也是用來成立宗的，為什麼只說能立不成，而不說明其他的過失呢？答：因為因是直接用來成立宗的，所以有四種過失。比喻是用來輔助成立宗的，所以沒有四種過失。又一種解釋是，因是初相，根據初相來辨別四種過失，顯示第二相也有四種。他們展開，我們合併，意義實際上是相似的。用比喻來比照因，也有四種情況。一是兩俱不成，也就是論中所說的。二是隨一不成，比如聲論師針對佛弟子，立聲常宗，以無質礙為因，舉例說如業。佛法不認可，這就是隨一不成。雖然俱所立無，但先辨別能立隨一。猶豫不成，按照道理有兩種，一是宗，二是因。前面已經詳細闡明了。現在比喻也有兩種。其中交錯互用。或者因猶豫，比喻不能成立。或者比喻能成立，因猶豫。或者兩者都猶豫。或者兩者都不猶豫。前三種是過失，第四種不是過失。因猶豫，比喻不能成立的情況，比如對於霧等性質產生疑惑時，是煙還是霧。就立彼處一定有火，因為出現了煙。比如廚房等處。或者指出像其他疑惑的因喻，舉一例可以推斷其他。或者可以。因是宗法，有法猶豫。
【English Translation】 English version: Even without meritorious phrases, it is known to be unobstructed because the sound can be heard through barriers, etc. If based on the perspective of combined manifestation, this is also a fallacy of 'hetu' (reason), because 'citta' (mind) and 'caitta' (mental factors) serve as the cause, and the 'samānadharmya anupalabdhi hetu' (reason of non-apprehension of a common property) transforms. The 'hetu' has already been clarified earlier; now, the fallacy of 'dṛṣṭānta' (example) is being distinguished, so the 'hetu' is not discussed.
Treatise: However, the constant nature of the dharmas (phenomena) constituted by 'paramāṇu' (atoms) exists.
Commentary: The following explains the two aspects of 'asiddha' (unestablished). First, it clarifies the 'sapakṣa' (similar instance) of the proposition; then, it distinguishes the 'vipakṣa' (dissimilar instance) of the 'sādhana' (means of proof). This is the beginning. Because both the 'Śabda' (sound) school and the 'Vaiśeṣika' (Particularist) school acknowledge 'paramāṇu', and its essence is permanent. Accordingly, it explains the 'vipakṣa' of the 'sādhana'. Here, it should be said that because all 'paramāṇu' have a permanent nature. Because the mutual meanings are implied and abbreviated, the 'non-existence' is omitted.
Treatise: The 'sādhana' (means of proof) cannot establish the absence of material obstruction because all 'paramāṇu' have material obstruction.
Commentary: This explains the 'vipakṣa' of the 'sādhana'. Because the 'Śabda' and 'Vaiśeṣika' schools consider 'paramāṇu' to have material obstruction, there is no 'sādhana'. Question: Because the 'hetu' is used to establish the proposition, it has fallacies such as 'ubhayāsiddha' (unestablished for both) and 'anyatarāsiddha' (unestablished for one). The 'dṛṣṭānta' is also used to establish the proposition, so why is it only said that the 'sādhana' is unestablished, and not other fallacies? Answer: Because the 'hetu' is directly used to establish the proposition, it has four fallacies. The 'dṛṣṭānta' is used to assist in establishing the proposition, so it does not have four fallacies. Another explanation is that the 'hetu' is the first aspect, and the four fallacies are distinguished based on the first aspect, showing that the second aspect also has four types. They expand, and we combine, and the meaning is actually similar. Using the 'dṛṣṭānta' to compare with the 'hetu', there are also four situations. First, 'ubhayāsiddha', which is what the treatise says. Second, 'anyatarāsiddha', for example, the 'Śabda' school, targeting Buddhist disciples, establishes the doctrine of the permanence of sound, using the absence of material obstruction as the 'hetu', and giving an example such as 'karma' (action). Buddhism does not acknowledge this, which is 'anyatarāsiddha'. Although both 'sapakṣa' are 'vipakṣa', first distinguish the 'sādhana' as 'anyatara'. 'Anavasthita' (uncertain), according to reason, has two types, one is the proposition, and the other is the 'hetu'. This has already been explained in detail earlier. Now, the 'dṛṣṭānta' also has two types. Among them, they are intertwined. Or, if the 'hetu' is uncertain, the 'dṛṣṭānta' cannot be established. Or, if the 'dṛṣṭānta' can be established, the 'hetu' is uncertain. Or, both are uncertain. Or, neither is uncertain. The first three are fallacies, and the fourth is not a fallacy. The situation where the 'hetu' is uncertain and the 'dṛṣṭānta' cannot be established is, for example, when there is doubt about the nature of fog, etc., whether it is smoke or fog. It is then established that there must be fire in that place, because smoke has appeared. For example, in kitchens, etc. Or, pointing to other doubtful 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta', one example can be used to infer others. Or, it can be. The 'hetu' is a property of the subject, and the subject is uncertain.
預。因亦成過。如廚等現煙立敵俱決定。何成猶預。又解。因具三相。二喻即因。既第二相。何非猶預。能立所依不成者。不同於因有第二三相。無宗有法。但闕初相。此所依無能立亦無。然亦得名無能立所依不成。如數論師對佛弟子。立思受用諸法宗。以是神我故。如眼等根。若言假我。因喻無過。今言以是神我故因佛法不許。故隨一無。此因既無。故喻無依。此約依因。或喻所依無。名所依不成。且約依因。如下更解。然有說言。謂所立既成。必有所依。故無第四不成之過。今謂不爾。為依于彼所立之宗。為依喻上所立無常。若依所立。因喻相似喻依因不依。故知不可。若依喻上所立無常者。此非喻依。喻依依極微故。亦復不可。又縱有所立。不立第四過。或若所立無。第四豈不立。設雙依彼有法及法。如俱不成豈無此過。若言即依因。如闕宗因。豈無此過。問若喻上能立不依所立。能立依何。答二解。一言。以依因故。因無無依。問若因無依。喻是何過。答若因依無。即不成因。因體非有。即是喻中所依不成。問若言因無依故即因不成。故喻能立亦無所依者。即無無宗有因喻等諸闕減句。若言無能別故說為無宗者。豈無所別不無宗耶。若言無所別即宗因無者。因有三相。彼但無初。后二相有。何不名因。若言有
【現代漢語翻譯】 預。因為已經成立過失。比如廚師等出現煙霧，敵對雙方都已確定，如何還能猶豫？又解釋說，因為具備三種特性，兩個比喻就是原因。既然是第二種特性，為什麼不是猶豫？能成立的所依不成，不同於原因有第二、第三種特性。沒有宗的法，只是缺少第一種特性。這個所依沒有能成立的，也沒有。然而也可以稱為沒有能成立的所依不成。比如數論師對佛弟子，立思受用諸法宗（一切法皆為神我所用）。因為這是神我（Purusha）的緣故，就像眼等根。如果說是假我，原因和比喻沒有過失。現在說因為這是神我（Purusha）的緣故，佛法不認可。所以隨一沒有。這個原因既然沒有，所以比喻沒有依據。這是關於依據原因。或者比喻所依沒有，稱為所依不成。暫且說依據原因，如下面進一步解釋。然而有人說，如果所立已經成立，必定有所依據，所以沒有第四種不成的過失。現在認為不是這樣，是依據于那個所立的宗，還是依據比喻上所立的無常？如果依據所立，原因和比喻相似，比喻依據原因不依據，所以知道不可以。如果依據比喻上所立的無常，這不是比喻依據，比喻依據極微（paramāṇu）的緣故，也不可以。又縱然有所立，不立第四種過失。或者如果所立沒有，第四種難道不成立？假設雙重依據那個有法和法，比如都不能成立，難道沒有這種過失？如果說就是依據原因，比如缺少宗因，難道沒有這種過失？問：如果比喻上的能立不依據所立，能立依據什麼？答：兩種解釋。一種說，因為依據原因的緣故，原因沒有無依。問：如果原因沒有依據，比喻是什麼過失？答：如果原因依據沒有，就是不成因，原因的本體沒有，就是比喻中所依不成。問：如果說原因沒有依據，所以原因不成，所以比喻能立也沒有所依，就是沒有無宗有因喻等各種缺少減少的語句。如果說沒有能區別的，所以說為沒有宗，難道沒有所區別的就沒有宗嗎？如果說沒有所區別的，就是宗因沒有，原因有三種特性，他只是沒有第一種，后兩種特性有，為什麼不叫原因？如果說有
【English Translation】 'Pūrva. Because the cause has already become a fault. For example, when smoke appears from a kitchen, both the opponent and the proponent are certain, how can there still be hesitation? Another explanation is that because the cause possesses three characteristics, the two analogies are the cause. Since it is the second characteristic, why is it not hesitation? The basis of what can be established is not established, which is different from the cause having the second and third characteristics. A dharma without a thesis only lacks the first characteristic. This basis has nothing that can be established, nor does it have anything. However, it can also be called the basis of what can be established not being established. For example, a Sāṃkhya philosopher argues with a Buddhist disciple, establishing the thesis that all dharmas are for the sake of the self's enjoyment. Because it is the self (Purusha), like the sense organs such as the eyes. If it is said to be a false self, there is no fault in the cause and analogy. Now, because it is said to be the self (Purusha), Buddhism does not accept it. Therefore, one of them is missing. Since this cause is missing, the analogy has no basis. This is about relying on the cause. Or the basis of the analogy is missing, which is called the basis not being established. Let's talk about relying on the cause for now, as explained further below. However, some say that if what is to be established is already established, there must be a basis, so there is no fourth fault of not being established. Now, it is thought that this is not the case, is it based on the thesis that is to be established, or is it based on the impermanence established on the analogy? If it is based on what is to be established, the cause and analogy are similar, and the analogy relies on the cause but does not rely on what is to be established, so it is known that it is not possible. If it is based on the impermanence established on the analogy, this is not the basis of the analogy, because the analogy relies on atoms (paramāṇu), which is also not possible. Also, even if there is something to be established, the fourth fault is not established. Or if what is to be established is missing, wouldn't the fourth be established? Suppose there is a dual reliance on that dharma-possessor and dharma, such as both not being established, wouldn't there be this fault? If it is said that it is based on the cause, such as lacking the thesis and cause, wouldn't there be this fault? Question: If the establisher on the analogy does not rely on what is to be established, what does the establisher rely on? Answer: Two explanations. One says that because it relies on the cause, the cause has no non-reliance. Question: If the cause has no reliance, what is the fault of the analogy? Answer: If the cause's reliance is missing, then it is not a cause, and the essence of the cause is missing, which is the basis of the analogy not being established. Question: If it is said that the cause has no reliance, so the cause is not established, so the establisher of the analogy also has no basis, then there are no missing or reduced statements such as having a cause and analogy without a thesis. If it is said that there is nothing that can be distinguished, so it is said to be without a thesis, is it that there is no thesis if there is nothing to be distinguished? If it is said that there is nothing to be distinguished, then the thesis and cause are missing, the cause has three characteristics, but it only lacks the first one, and the latter two characteristics are present, why is it not called a cause? If it is said that there is'
過故不名因。即十四因總名不成。皆有過故。何須別說。然準道理。言因之時。唯取初相。有法無故。闕無初相。即是無因。以後二相說為喻故。故無所依。設有能別。而無有法。亦其是過。問何以得知。有此四過。答準因可有。喻既助因。因既無已。喻何所助。如因成宗有法無故。因何所成。故併爲過。問喻上能立。何不依宗有法而依因耶。答以隔因故。問若隔因故應不成宗。答助因有力故說成宗。問喻既依因。舉彼瓶等欲何所用。答所依有二。一自體依。二所助依。瓶自體依。因所助依。一云盡理而言。準論但約自體辯依。據兩俱隨一但望喻依。不可說言無礙因上兩俱隨一不許無礙。但于喻依。許不許故。此說為善。順論文故。
論。所立法不成者謂說如覺。
述曰。解所立不成有二。初牒指體。后釋其義。此初也。牒前總別宗因同前俱別舉喻。謂如覺。覺者即心心法之總名也。
論。然一切覺能成立法無質礙有。
述曰。下釋成初能立有。后所立無。此初也。以心心法皆無礙故。文準於前。
論。所成立法常住性無以一切覺皆無常故。
述曰。釋所立無。喻上常住實非所立。即同於彼。所立能立二種法者。即是其喻。從所同爲名。故名所立。準前能立亦有四種。即文所辯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『過故不名因』，即十四因（Sādhanābhāsa，似因）總括起來都不能成立，因為都有過失。何須另外說明？然而按照道理，說『因』的時候，只取最初的相狀。因為『有法』（dharmin，具有所立性質的事物）不存在的緣故，缺少最初的相狀，就是沒有『因』。以後的兩個相狀說是比喻的緣故，所以沒有所依。假設有能區別的，而沒有『有法』，也是過失。問：怎麼知道有這四種過失？答：根據『因』可以有，比喻既然輔助『因』，『因』既然沒有了，比喻輔助什麼？如同『因』成立『宗』（paksa，論題），因為『有法』不存在的緣故，『因』成立什麼？所以都成為過失。問：比喻在能立方面，為什麼不依靠『宗』的『有法』，而依靠『因』呢？答：因為隔著『因』的緣故。問：如果隔著『因』的緣故，應該不能成立『宗』。答：輔助『因』有力量的緣故，說成立『宗』。問：比喻既然依靠『因』，舉出瓶子等想要做什麼用？答：所依靠的有兩種：一是自體依，二是所助依。瓶子是自體依，『因』是所助依。一種說法是窮盡道理來說，按照論典只就自體來辨別所依。根據兩者都隨順一個，只希望比喻依靠。不能說無礙『因』上兩者都隨順一個，不允許無礙。只在比喻依上，允許不許的緣故。這種說法是好的，順從論文的緣故。
論：『所立法不成』，是指說如『覺』（citta，心）。
述曰：解釋『所立不成』有兩種，先是標出本體，后是解釋它的意義。這是開始。標出前面總別『宗』、『因』，如同前面一樣，都是分別舉出比喻，是指如『覺』。『覺』，就是心和心法的總稱。
論：然而一切『覺』能成立法是無質礙的。
述曰：下面解釋成立最初的能立有，後面所立無。這是開始。因為心和心法都沒有障礙的緣故。文句依照前面。
論：所成立法是常住的性質，沒有，因為一切『覺』都是無常的緣故。
述曰：解釋所立沒有。比喻上的常住，實際上不是所立，就和那個相同。所立和能立兩種法，就是那個比喻。從所相同的地方作為名稱，所以名叫『所立』。根據前面，能立也有四種，就是文中辨別的。
【English Translation】 English version 'The reason is not named as cause because of faults.' That is, the fourteen Sādhanābhāsa (fallacious reasons) cannot be established in general because they all have faults. Why is it necessary to explain them separately? However, according to reason, when speaking of 'cause,' only the initial appearance is taken. Because the 'dharmin' (subject possessing the property to be established) does not exist, lacking the initial appearance is equivalent to having no cause. The subsequent two appearances are said to be metaphors, so there is nothing to rely on. Suppose there is something that can distinguish, but there is no 'dharmin,' that is also a fault. Question: How do we know that there are these four faults? Answer: According to the possibility of 'cause,' since the metaphor assists the 'cause,' if the 'cause' no longer exists, what does the metaphor assist? Just as the 'cause' establishes the 'paksa' (thesis), but because the 'dharmin' does not exist, what does the 'cause' establish? Therefore, they all become faults. Question: In terms of establishment, why does the metaphor not rely on the 'dharmin' of the 'paksa,' but rely on the 'cause'? Answer: Because it is separated by the 'cause.' Question: If it is separated by the 'cause,' then the 'paksa' should not be established. Answer: Because the assistance of the 'cause' is powerful, it is said that the 'paksa' is established. Question: Since the metaphor relies on the 'cause,' what is the purpose of citing examples such as a jar? Answer: There are two types of reliance: one is self-reliance, and the other is assisted reliance. A jar is self-reliant, while the 'cause' is assisted reliant. One explanation is to exhaust the reasoning, according to the treatise, only self-reliance is discussed. According to both following one, only the metaphor is hoped to rely on. It cannot be said that both follow one on the unimpeded 'cause,' unimpededness is not allowed. Only on the metaphor reliance, allowance or disallowance is permitted. This explanation is good, because it follows the treatise.
Treatise: 'The proposition to be established is not established' refers to saying something like 'consciousness' (citta).
Commentary: There are two ways to explain 'the proposition to be established is not established': first, to state the entity, and then to explain its meaning. This is the beginning. Stating the general and specific 'paksa' and 'hetu' (reason), as before, the metaphor is cited separately, referring to something like 'consciousness.' 'Consciousness' is the general name for mind and mental factors.
Treatise: However, all 'consciousness' can establish that the dharma is without material obstruction.
Commentary: The following explains the establishment of the initial establishment, and the subsequent non-establishment. This is the beginning. Because mind and mental factors are all without obstruction. The wording follows the previous.
Treatise: The property to be established is permanent, which is not, because all 'consciousness' is impermanent.
Commentary: Explaining that what is to be established does not exist. The permanence in the metaphor is actually not what is to be established, which is the same as that. The two types of dharma, what is to be established and what can establish, are that metaphor. From the place where they are the same, it is named 'what is to be established.' According to the previous, there are also four types of what can establish, which are distinguished in the text.
。兩俱不成。舉極微對佛法立。隨一不成。雖有餘過且取所立以辯於過猶預所立不成者。猶預亦二。綺互亦四。準前能立。如大乘人對薩婆多。立預流等定有大乘種姓。然不定知此預流等有大乘姓不。故懷猶預。因云有情攝故。如余有情。然余有情亦懷猶預。不知定有大乘姓不。此俱猶預餘者類思。
所依不成者。且約依宗為喻所依。如數論師對佛法者。立眼等根為神我受用。同喻如色等。此即能別不極成故。喻無所立。亦無所依。由無所依。喻上所立亦不得成。有云。既有能立。故無第四。若二立無。豈無此過。
問喻上所立為依何法。若依能立。不應說因獨依有法。以因喻二俱能立故。若依所立。如前已難。答有二解。一云因喻雖俱能立。以隔因故。一云依宗所立。問若爾即有隨一所依不成。宗中所立敵不許故。答既云諸皆。方舉于喻。即兼合已。證彼極成故得為依。不同舉因未極成故。若爾有舉因已即解宗者。依所立不。答亦不得。同喻先以不合故。又或舉因有未解故。若爾舉喻未解如何。一云依喻所依。諸論說但舉瓶空等法為喻依故。此解為正。若據后解。所依不成。彼聲論師對大乘立。舉極微為喻。此闕所依。所依既無。所立亦闕。以大乘宗不立微故。細準而言。有自他共。全分一分。有體無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：兩種情況都不成立。如果以極微（Anu，最小的物質單位）來反對佛法，那麼任何一種情況都不能成立。即使有其他的過失，也暫且採用所提出的觀點來辨別過失，因為對所提出的觀點猶豫不決，猶豫不決也有兩種情況，互相矛盾也有四種情況，參照前面的能立（Sadhana，論證）方式。例如，大乘修行者對薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的人說，預流果（Srotapanna，須陀洹）等必定具有大乘種姓（Mahayana gotra，大乘根性）。然而，不能確定這些預流果等是否具有大乘種姓，所以心懷猶豫。理由是，因為他們被有情（Sattva，眾生）所包含，就像其他的有情一樣。然而，其他的有情也心懷猶豫，不知道是否一定具有大乘種姓。這是雙方都猶豫不決的情況，其餘的情況可以類推。 所依不成（Ashrayasiddha， आधारसिद्ध，基不成）是指，暫且以依宗（Ashraya， आधार）作為比喻的所依。例如，數論師（Samkhya， सांख्य）對佛法修行者說，眼等根（Indriya，感官）是神我（Atman， आत्मा）所受用的，同喻（Samanodaharana， समानोदाहरण）就像色等。這也就是能別（Vishesa， विशेष）不極成（Aprasiddha， अप्रसिद्ध）的緣故。比喻沒有所立，也沒有所依。由於沒有所依，比喻上所提出的觀點也不能成立。有人說，既然有能立，就沒有第四種過失。如果雙方都沒有所立，難道就沒有這種過失嗎？ 問：比喻上所提出的觀點是依據什麼法？如果依據能立，不應該說因（Hetu，हेतु）只依據有法（Dharmin，धर्मिन्），因為因和比喻都是能立。如果依據所立，就像前面已經提出的疑問。答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，因和比喻雖然都是能立，但因為有因的間隔。另一種說法是，依據宗（Siddhanta， सिद्धान्त）所提出的觀點。問：如果這樣，就會有隨一所依不成的情況，因為宗中所提出的觀點是對方不認可的。答：既然說是『諸皆』，才舉出比喻，也就是兼顧了已經證明對方極成（ Prasiddha，प्रसिद्ध）的觀點，所以可以作為依據。這不同於舉出尚未極成的因。如果這樣，有舉出因就已經解釋了宗的情況，是依據所立嗎？答：也不可以，因為同喻首先是不符合的。又或者舉出因有尚未解釋的情況。如果這樣，舉出比喻尚未解釋怎麼辦？一種說法是，依據比喻的所依，因為各種論典都說只舉出瓶子、空間等法作為比喻的依據。這種解釋是正確的。如果根據後面的解釋，所依不成。例如，聲明論師（Shabda-pramanavadin， शब्द-प्रमाणवादी）對大乘修行者提出觀點，舉出極微作為比喻，這就缺少所依。所依既然沒有，所立也缺少，因為大乘宗不立極微。仔細推敲而言，有所依是自、他、共，全分、一分，有體、無體等情況。
【English Translation】 English version: Both are not established. If one uses 'extremely minute particles' (Anu) against the Buddha's teachings, neither side can be established. Even if there are other faults, let's temporarily adopt the proposed view to discern the faults, because of hesitation regarding the proposed view. Hesitation also has two types, and mutual contradiction has four types, referring to the previous means of proof (Sadhana). For example, a Mahayana practitioner says to a Sarvastivadin, 'Stream-enterers (Srotapanna) and others definitely have the Mahayana gotra (Mahayana lineage).' However, it is uncertain whether these stream-enterers and others have the Mahayana lineage, so there is hesitation. The reason is, 'Because they are included in sentient beings (Sattva), like other sentient beings.' However, other sentient beings also hesitate, not knowing whether they definitely have the Mahayana lineage. This is a case of mutual hesitation; the remaining cases can be inferred. 'The unestablished basis' (Ashrayasiddha) refers to temporarily using the 'basis of the doctrine' (Ashraya) as the basis of the metaphor. For example, a Samkhya philosopher says to a Buddhist practitioner, 'The sense organs such as the eyes are used by the self (Atman),' and the 'similar example' (Samanodaharana) is like form, etc. This is because the 'distinguishing feature' (Vishesa) is not 'well-established' (Prasiddha). The metaphor has neither what is to be established nor a basis. Because there is no basis, the view proposed above the metaphor cannot be established either. Some say that since there is a means of proof, there is no fourth fault. If neither side has what is to be established, is there no such fault? Question: What dharma is the view proposed above the metaphor based on? If it is based on the means of proof, it should not be said that the reason (Hetu) only relies on the subject (Dharmin), because both the reason and the metaphor are means of proof. If it is based on what is to be established, as previously questioned. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that although both the reason and the metaphor are means of proof, there is a separation of the reason. Another explanation is that it is based on the view proposed in the doctrine (Siddhanta). Question: If so, there will be a case where one of the bases is not established, because the view proposed in the doctrine is not recognized by the opponent. Answer: Since it is said 'all,' the metaphor is brought up, which means that it also takes into account the view that has already been proven to be well-established for the opponent, so it can be used as a basis. This is different from bringing up a reason that is not yet well-established. If so, is it based on what is to be established when bringing up a reason has already explained the doctrine? Answer: It is also not possible, because the similar example is not consistent in the first place. Or, there may be cases where bringing up a reason has not yet been explained. If so, what if bringing up a metaphor has not been explained? One explanation is that it is based on the basis of the metaphor, because various treatises say that only things like a pot, space, etc., are brought up as the basis of the metaphor. This explanation is correct. If based on the latter explanation, the basis is not established. For example, if a grammarian (Shabda-pramanavadin) proposes a view to a Mahayana practitioner, using extremely minute particles as a metaphor, this lacks a basis. Since there is no basis, what is to be established is also lacking, because the Mahayana doctrine does not establish extremely minute particles. Upon careful examination, there are cases where the basis is self, other, common, whole, part, with substance, without substance, etc.
體。思之可悉。恐繁不述。
論。俱不成者。
述曰。下解第三過。文分為三。初總牒。次別開。后釋成。此初也。
論。復有二種有及非有。
述曰。此別開列也。初開后列此二文也。有謂有彼喻依。無即無彼喻依。
論。若言如瓶有俱不成若說如空對無空論無俱不成。
述曰。此釋成。以立聲常宗。無質礙因。瓶體雖有。常無礙無。虛空體無。二亦不立。有無雖二。皆是俱無。問虛空體無。常可不有。空體非有。無礙豈無。答立聲常宗無質礙因宗因俱表。虛空不有故無礙無。理門但舉有喻所依。兩俱隨一猶預所依。及喻無依。皆略不明。準此有無。有即初二。無即第四。或有或無。即第三過。此有四句。一宗因俱有體無俱不成。即對無空論是。二宗因無體有俱不成。如數論師對薩婆多。立思是我以受用二十三諦故。如瓶盆等。三宗因有體。有俱不成。即論所說有俱不成是。四宗因無體。無俱不成。即前第二對佛法中無空論者。然此有兩俱隨一猶預及所依不成。初三各分於二。有及非有。且依有俱不成。兩俱不成。如論說是。隨一有二。一自隨一如外道立我能受苦樂。以作業故。對佛法中無空論者。取空為同喻。二他隨一有俱不成。如說聲常。無質礙故。對佛法者同喻如語業
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 體性。仔細思考就可以完全明白。恐怕過於繁瑣，所以不詳細敘述。
論：都不能成立的情況。
述曰：下面解釋第三種過失。文章分為三部分。首先是總的概括，其次是分別展開，最後是解釋成立的原因。這是第一部分。
論：又有兩種情況：有和非有。
述曰：這是分別展開列舉。先展開，后列舉，就是這兩段文字。『有』是指有那個比喻所依賴的事物，『無』是指沒有那個比喻所依賴的事物。
論：如果說像瓶子那樣，有和沒有都不能成立；如果說像虛空那樣，針對『無』，用虛空來論證『無』，也不能成立。
述曰：這是解釋成立的原因。以建立『聲音是常』的宗，以『沒有質礙』為因。瓶子的體性雖然有，但常和無礙都沒有。虛空的體性是無，兩種情況都不能成立。有和無雖然是兩種情況，但都是『俱無』。問：虛空的體性是無，常難道不可以有嗎？空的體性不是有，無礙難道沒有嗎？答：建立『聲音是常』的宗，以『沒有質礙』為因，宗和因都表明虛空不是有，所以沒有阻礙。理門只舉了『有』的比喻所依賴的事物，兩種情況都隨其中一種，猶豫所依賴的事物，以及比喻沒有所依賴的事物，都省略沒有說明。按照這個，有和無，『有』就是前兩種情況，『無』就是第四種情況，『或有或無』就是第三種過失。這裡有四句話：一是宗和因都有體性，沒有都不能成立，就是針對用虛空來論證『無』的情況。二是宗和因沒有體性，有都不能成立，比如數論師針對薩婆多，建立『思是我』，因為能受用二十三種諦，就像瓶子盆子等。三是宗和因有體性，有都不能成立，就是論中所說的『有都不能成立』的情況。四是宗和因沒有體性，沒有都不能成立，就是前面第二種情況，針對佛法中用虛空來論證『無』的人。然而這裡有兩俱隨一，猶豫以及所依賴的事物不能成立。前三種情況各自分為兩種，有和非有。暫且依據『有都不能成立』，兩種情況都不能成立，就像論中所說的那樣。隨一種情況有兩種，一是自己隨一種情況，比如外道建立『我能感受苦樂』，因為能作業，針對佛法中用虛空來論證『無』的人，取虛空作為同喻。二是他人隨一種情況，有都不能成立，比如論證『聲音是常』，因為沒有質礙，針對佛法的人，同喻就像語業。
【English Translation】 English version: The nature. It can be fully understood by careful consideration. Fearing it would be too verbose, I will not elaborate.
Treatise: Cases where both cannot be established.
Commentary: The following explains the third fault. The text is divided into three parts. First, a general summary; second, separate elaborations; and third, an explanation of the reasons for establishment. This is the first part.
Treatise: There are also two kinds of existence and non-existence.
Commentary: This is a separate elaboration and enumeration. First elaborate, then enumerate; these are the two passages. 'Existence' refers to having that which the analogy relies on. 'Non-existence' refers to not having that which the analogy relies on.
Treatise: If it is said that like a 'bottle', both existence and non-existence cannot be established; if it is said that like 'emptiness', arguing 'non-existence' with 'emptiness' cannot be established.
Commentary: This explains the reasons for establishment. Establishing the proposition that 'sound is permanent' with the reason that it 'has no material obstruction'. Although the nature of a bottle exists, permanence and non-obstruction do not. The nature of emptiness is non-existence; neither case can be established. Although existence and non-existence are two cases, both are 'both non-existent'. Question: The nature of emptiness is non-existence; can permanence not exist? The nature of emptiness is not existence; can non-obstruction not exist? Answer: Establishing the proposition that 'sound is permanent' with the reason that it 'has no material obstruction', both the proposition and the reason indicate that emptiness is not existence, therefore there is no obstruction. The 'Hetu-vidya' (理門) only cites the analogy of 'existence' and what it relies on. Both cases follow one, what is relied on with hesitation, and the analogy without reliance, are all omitted and not explained. According to this, existence and non-existence, 'existence' is the first two cases, 'non-existence' is the fourth case, 'either existence or non-existence' is the third fault. Here are four sentences: First, both the proposition and the reason have a nature, and non-existence cannot be established, which is the case of arguing 'non-existence' with 'emptiness'. Second, the proposition and the reason have no nature, and existence cannot be established, such as the Samkhya school arguing against the Sarvastivadins, establishing 'thought is self' because it can experience the twenty-three 'tattvas' (諦), like bottles and basins. Third, the proposition and the reason have a nature, and existence cannot be established, which is the case of 'existence cannot be established' as stated in the treatise. Fourth, the proposition and the reason have no nature, and non-existence cannot be established, which is the second case mentioned earlier, arguing against those in Buddhism who argue 'non-existence' with 'emptiness'. However, here both follow one, hesitation, and what is relied on cannot be established. The first three cases are each divided into two, existence and non-existence. For now, based on 'existence cannot be established', both cases cannot be established, as stated in the treatise. Following one case has two situations: first, oneself follows one case, such as the heretics establishing 'I can experience suffering and joy' because I can perform actions, arguing against those in Buddhism who argue 'non-existence' with 'emptiness', taking emptiness as a similar analogy. Second, others follow one case, and existence cannot be established, such as arguing 'sound is permanent' because it has no material obstruction, for those in Buddhism, the similar analogy is like verbal karma.
。猶預有俱不成者。如說彼廚等中定有火。以現畑故。如山等處。于霧等性。既懷猶預。皆火有不決。山處是有。故成猶預。有俱不成所依不成者。喻依既有。闕無此句。若說依因宗即有此句前四句中第二句是前之四種。隨其所應。亦有全分一分。思準可知。恐繁不述。問前二偏無。何故不開有無二耶。答雙無既開。顯偏亦爾。偏既不立。俱無亦然。以影略故。無俱不成亦有兩俱隨一猶預及所依不成。兩俱無俱不成。如聲論師對勝論立聲常宗。所聞性故。如第八識。二俱不立有第八識故。隨一無俱不成者。如聲論師對大乘者。立此比量。彼自不許有第八識故。是自隨一。舉喻如空對無空論。即他隨一。猶預無俱不成者。既無喻依。決無二立。疑決既不異分。故闕此句。所依不成。若說依喻。即前說是。皆無喻依故。說依宗因。即前四句第四句是。于中復有兩俱隨一全分一分。恐繁不述。問真如常有。故說為常。虛空恒無。何非常住。又虛空無。何非無礙。答立宗法略有二種。一者但遮而無有表如言我無。但欲遮我不別立無。喻亦但遮而不取表。二亦遮亦表。如說我常。非但遮無常。亦表有常體。喻即有遮表。依前喻無體。有遮亦得成。依后但有遮無表二立闕。今立聲常。是有遮表。對無空論。但有其遮而無有表。故是
喻過。有云。聲宗上遮表。虛空喻上遮。別既兩俱成。總非能立闕。答若聲論師作此立者。即是所立不成過者。此亦不然。虛空之上。但有遮無常。無所表常。即所立不成。既但遮礙無所表無礙。何非能立闕古破他救云聲無礙有遮有表。喻遮非表。喻不似因。亦不反成云。如咽等所作。杖等所作。雖不相似。所作義同。亦得成喻者。此亦不爾。同有所作即遮表同。故得為因。彼遮無表。不與此例又云。若唯遮喻無能立者。亦應小乘對大乘。立虛空是常。以非作故。立者許有遮表。敵者唯遮。望自應有隨一不成過。故知能立不成者。不約具遮表。此意以立對敵。敵但許有遮亦得成喻。全不許者方是喻過。故將此量為不定過。此量亦非。誰言無過。對大乘立。即無空論所別不成。宗無簡故。因有隨一。並闕所依。及不定過。為如擇滅。為類龜毛又擇滅喻常與非作。共許遮表。非是不成。故所引非。設若救云。聲空俱取于遮。不取于表。可非能立闕不成過。然有破云。若聲取遮不取表者。因喻亦爾。即有二過違理及教。以陳那菩薩理門論云若法有遮表。不得唯取遮。而不取于表。此難亦非。以彼外道不以此教。為定量故。今云。此約虛空辯無二立者。據彼本計言。常無質礙。定有遮表。不唯取遮。故是喻過。
論。無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 辯論繼續進行。有人提出：『聲宗（Shabda，聲音）以上遮表（apoha，否定表詮），虛空喻（akasha，空間）以上遮（apoha，否定表詮）。如果遮和表兩者都成立，那麼總體上就不能成立。』回答：如果聲論師（Shabda-vadin，主張聲音是永恒的學派）這樣立論，那就是所立不成過（sādhyāsiddha，有待證明的論點未被證實的謬誤）。但這種說法也不對。在虛空之上，只有遮無常（anitya，非永恒），沒有表常（nitya，永恒），即所立不成（sādhyāsiddha，有待證明的論點未被證實）。既然只是遮礙而沒有表無礙，為什麼不是能立闕（sādhanavaikalya，論證不充分）呢？ 對方辯駁說，聲音無礙，有遮有表，比喻遮非表，比喻不像因（hetu，理由）。這也不能反駁，例如咽等所作（喉嚨等產生的聲音），杖等所作（棍子等產生的聲音），雖然不相似，但所作的意義相同，也可以成為比喻。這種說法也不對，因為同有所作，即遮表相同，所以可以作為因。而彼遮無表，不與此例。 又有人說，如果只有遮喻而沒有能立，那麼小乘（Hinayana，早期佛教）對大乘（Mahayana，後期佛教）立虛空是常（nitya，永恒），以非作故（akritakatva，非造作性）。立論者允許有遮表，對方只允許遮，從自身來看，應該有隨一不成過（vyabhicāra，不定）。所以知道能立不成，不是因為具備遮表。這個意思是說，以立論對敵論，敵論者只允許有遮也可以成為比喻，完全不允許的才是比喻過。所以將此量（anumana，推論）作為不定過（anaikāntika，不確定）。 這個推論也不是沒有過失。對大乘立論，即無空論所別不成（asiddha，未被證實），宗（paksha，論題）沒有簡別。因（hetu，理由）有隨一，並闕所依（ashraya，基礎），及不定過（anaikāntika，不確定）。例如擇滅（nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定），或者類似於龜毛（kurma-loma，烏龜的毛）。又擇滅比喻常與非作，共同允許遮表，不是不成。所以所引用的不是。 假設有人辯解說，聲音和虛空都取于遮，不取于表，可能不是能立闕不成過。然而有人反駁說，如果聲音取遮不取表，因喻也是如此，即有二過，違背理和教。因為陳那菩薩（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家）在《理門論》（Hetu-cakra-damaru，因明學著作）中說，如果法有遮表，就不能只取遮而不取表。這種責難也不對，因為那些外道（tirthika，非佛教徒）不以此教為定量（pramāṇa，有效認知）。現在說，這是關於虛空辯論沒有二立者，根據他們的本意說，常無質礙，一定有遮表，不只是取遮，所以是比喻過。 論：無
【English Translation】 English version: The debate continues. Someone proposes: 'Sound (Shabda) is above apoha (negation), space (akasha) is above apoha (negation). If both negation and affirmation are established, then the totality cannot be established.' The response: If the Shabdavadin (those who assert sound is eternal) were to establish this, it would be the fallacy of sādhyāsiddha (the unproven thesis). But this is not correct either. Above space, there is only the negation of impermanence (anitya), not the affirmation of permanence (nitya), which is the fallacy of sādhyāsiddha (the unproven thesis). Since it only negates obstruction and does not affirm non-obstruction, why is it not sādhanavaikalya (deficiency in the proof)? The opponent argues that sound is unobstructed, with both negation and affirmation, the analogy negates affirmation, the analogy is not like the reason (hetu). This cannot be refuted, for example, sounds produced by the throat, etc., sounds produced by sticks, etc., although dissimilar, the meaning of 'produced' is the same, and can be an analogy. This is also incorrect, because 'produced' is the same, that is, negation and affirmation are the same, so it can be used as a reason. But that which negates without affirming is not an example of this. Someone also says that if there is only a negation analogy without establishment, then the Hinayana (Early Buddhism) establishes that space is permanent (nitya) to the Mahayana (Later Buddhism), because of akritakatva (non-createdness). The proponent allows negation and affirmation, the opponent only allows negation, from one's own perspective, there should be the fallacy of vyabhicāra (inconclusive). Therefore, knowing that the establishment is not complete is not because it possesses negation and affirmation. The meaning of this is that, in establishing against the opponent, the opponent allowing only negation can also be an analogy, and that which is completely disallowed is the fallacy of analogy. Therefore, this anumana (inference) is not without fault. Establishing against the Mahayana, there is the fallacy of asiddha (unproven), the paksha (thesis) is not distinguished. The hetu (reason) has vyabhicāra (inconclusive), and lacks ashraya (basis), and the fallacy of anaikāntika (uncertain). For example, nirodha-samāpatti (cessation), or similar to kurma-loma (turtle hair). Also, nirodha-samāpatti (cessation) is an analogy for permanence and non-createdness, commonly allowing negation and affirmation, it is not incomplete. Therefore, what is cited is not. Suppose someone argues that sound and space both take negation, not affirmation, which may not be the fallacy of sādhanavaikalya (deficiency in the proof). However, someone refutes that if sound takes negation and does not take affirmation, the reason and analogy are also like this, that is, there are two faults, violating reason and teaching. Because Dignāga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) said in the Hetu-cakra-damaru (a work on logic), if a dharma has negation and affirmation, one cannot only take negation and not take affirmation. This accusation is also incorrect, because those tirthika (non-Buddhists) do not take this teaching as pramāṇa (valid cognition). Now it is said that this is about the debate of space without two establishments, according to their original intention, permanence is unobstructed, there must be negation and affirmation, not just taking negation, so it is the fallacy of analogy. Treatise: None
合者。
述曰。下解第四過有四。一牒章。二標體。三釋義。四示法。此初也。
論。謂於是處無有配合。
述曰。標無合體。謂於是喻處。若不言諸所作者。皆無常。猶如瓶等。即不證有。所作處。無常必隨。即所作無常。不相屬著。是無合義。由此無合。縱使聲上見有所作。不能成立聲是無常。故若無合即是喻過。若云諸所作者皆是無常。猶如瓶等。即能證彼無常。必隨所作性。聲既有所作。亦必無常隨。即相屬著是有合義。問諸所作者皆是無常。合宗因不。有云。不合。以聲無常。他不許故。但合宗外余有所作及無常。猶此相屬。能顯聲上有所作故。無常必隨。今謂不爾。立喻本欲成宗。合既不合于宗。立喻何關宗事。故云諸所作者。即合聲上所作皆是無常即以無常合屬所作。不欲以瓶所作合聲所作。以瓶無常合聲無常。若不無常合屬所作。如何解同喻云。說因宗所隨。若云聲無常他不許不合者。不爾。若彼許者。即立已成。以彼不許故。須合顯云諸所作者。皆是無常。猶如瓶等。又設難云。異喻亦言諸皆。豈欲籠括宗因耶。答不例。異喻本欲離彼宗因。顯無宗處因定不有。如何得合。返顯順成諸皆之言。定合聲上所作與彼無常令屬著因。
論。但于瓶等雙現能立所立二法。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 合者。
述曰：下面解釋第四種過失，共有四點：一是總述章節，二是標明體性，三是解釋含義，四是揭示法則。這裡是第一點。
論：指的是在某個地方沒有配合。
述曰：標明沒有『合』的體性。指的是在譬喻的例子中，如果不說『凡是所造作的事物，都是無常的，就像瓶子一樣』，就不能證明『有』。『所作』之處，『無常』必定相隨。也就是說，『所作』和『無常』不相互關聯，這就是沒有『合』的含義。因為沒有『合』，即使在聲音上看到有所造作，也不能成立聲音是無常的。所以如果沒有『合』，就是譬喻的過失。如果說『凡是所造作的事物都是無常的，就像瓶子一樣』，就能證明那『無常』必定伴隨『所作』的性質。聲音既然有所造作，也必定有『無常』相隨，這就是相互關聯，是有『合』的含義。有人問：『凡是所造作的事物都是無常的』，這句話是否與宗和因相合？有人說：不相合，因為『聲音是無常的』，對方不認可。但與宗以外的『有所作』和『無常』相合，就像這樣相互關聯，能夠顯示聲音上『有所作』，所以『無常』必定相隨。現在我認為不是這樣。建立譬喻本來是爲了成就宗，如果『合』不符合宗，建立譬喻與宗有什麼關係？所以說『凡是所造作的事物』，就是使聲音上的『所作』都與『無常』相合，即用『無常』來關聯『所作』，而不是用瓶子的『所作』來與聲音的『所作』相合，用瓶子的『無常』來與聲音的『無常』相合。如果『無常』不與『所作』相關聯，如何解釋同喻說『因』伴隨『宗』？如果說『聲音是無常的』，對方不認可，所以不相合，不是這樣的。如果對方認可，那就是立論已經成立。因為對方不認可，所以需要用『合』來顯示，說『凡是所造作的事物，都是無常的，就像瓶子一樣』。又假設提問說，異喻也說『凡是』，難道想要包括宗和因嗎？回答說，不能類比。異喻本來想要離開宗和因，顯示沒有宗的地方，因一定不存在，怎麼能相合呢？反過來顯示順成，『凡是』這句話，一定使聲音上的『所作』與那『無常』相關聯，成為『因』。
論：只是在瓶子等事物上同時顯現能立和所立兩種法。
【English Translation】 English version: The 'Agreement'.
Statement: The following explains the fourth fault, which has four aspects: 1. Summarizing the chapter; 2. Identifying the nature; 3. Explaining the meaning; 4. Revealing the principle. This is the first.
Treatise: It refers to a situation where there is no coordination.
Statement: It indicates the nature of 'no agreement'. It refers to the example of the analogy. If it is not said that 'all created things are impermanent, like a bottle', then it cannot prove 'existence'. Where there is 'creation', 'impermanence' must follow. That is to say, 'creation' and 'impermanence' are not related to each other, which is the meaning of 'no agreement'. Because there is 'no agreement', even if creation is seen in sound, it cannot establish that sound is impermanent. Therefore, if there is 'no agreement', it is a fault of the analogy. If it is said that 'all created things are impermanent, like a bottle', it can prove that 'impermanence' must accompany the nature of 'creation'. Since sound is created, it must also have 'impermanence' following it. This is mutual association, which is the meaning of 'agreement'. Someone asks: 'All created things are impermanent', does this sentence agree with the thesis (宗) and the reason (因)? Some say: It does not agree, because 'sound is impermanent' is not accepted by the other party. However, it agrees with 'creation' and 'impermanence' outside the thesis. Just like this mutual association, it can show that there is 'creation' in sound, so 'impermanence' must follow. Now I think it is not like this. Establishing an analogy is originally to accomplish the thesis. If the 'agreement' does not conform to the thesis, what does establishing an analogy have to do with the thesis? Therefore, it is said that 'all created things' is to make the 'creation' on sound agree with 'impermanence', that is, to use 'impermanence' to associate with 'creation', rather than using the 'creation' of the bottle to agree with the 'creation' of sound, or using the 'impermanence' of the bottle to agree with the 'impermanence' of sound. If 'impermanence' is not related to 'creation', how to explain the similar analogy that the 'reason' accompanies the 'thesis'? If it is said that 'sound is impermanent', the other party does not accept it, so it does not agree, it is not like this. If the other party accepts it, then the argument has already been established. Because the other party does not accept it, it is necessary to use 'agreement' to show that 'all created things are impermanent, like a bottle'. Also, suppose someone asks, the dissimilar analogy also says 'all', does it want to include the thesis and the reason? The answer is, it cannot be compared. The dissimilar analogy originally wanted to leave the thesis and the reason, showing that where there is no thesis, the reason must not exist, how can it agree? Conversely, it shows the success of the similar analogy. The sentence 'all' must make the 'creation' on sound associate with that 'impermanence', becoming the 'reason'.
Treatise: It only shows both the establishing and the established dharmas simultaneously in things like bottles.
述曰。此釋義也。謂但言所作性故。譬如瓶等有所作性及無常性。不以之成所作成無常。
論。如言于瓶見所作性及無常性。
述曰。此示法。若如古師。立聲無常。以所作故。猶如於瓶。即別合云。瓶有所作。瓶即無常。當知。聲有所作。聲即無常。故因喻外別立合支。陳那菩薩云。諸所作者。即合聲上所作之性。定是無常猶如瓶等。瓶等所作有無常。即顯聲有所作非常住。即于喻上義立合言。何須別立於合支。
論。倒合者。
述曰。下解第五過。文有其二。初牒。后釋。此初也。
論。謂應說言諸所作者皆是無常。
述曰。下釋。釋中有二。初舉正合。后顯倒合。此初也。宗因可知。
論。而倒說言諸無常者皆是所作。
述曰。正顯倒合。謂正應以所作證無常。今翻無常證所作。故是喻過。即成非所立。有違自宗。及相符等。如正喻中已廣分別。前之三過。皆有自他共分全等。此後二過。但有共全。無所餘也。或無分全。可分他自共。以隨立量有自等三故。總計似同。初三各四成其十二兼后二過總有十四分自他共有四十二于中細分全分一分。復以似因問似喻過。數乃無量。恐繁且止。
論。如是名似同法喻品。
述曰。此即第二總結非也。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：這是解釋意義。意思是隻說『所作性』的緣故。譬如瓶子等有『所作性』（Krtakatva，被製造的性質）及『無常性』（Anityatva，非永恒的性質），不能因此成立『所作成無常』。
論：例如說在瓶子上見到『所作性』及『無常性』。
述曰：這是顯示法則。如果像古代的論師，立論說聲音是無常的，因為它是『所作』的，就像瓶子一樣。就另外結合說：瓶子是『所作』的，瓶子就是無常的。應當知道，聲音是『所作』的，聲音就是無常的。所以，在因喻之外，另外建立『合支』（Upanaya，應用）。陳那（Dignāga）菩薩說：凡是『所作』的，就結合聲音上『所作』的性質，一定是無常的，就像瓶子等一樣。瓶子等『所作』的有無常，就顯示聲音是『所作』的，不是常住的。就在比喻上以意義建立『合言』（應用語句），何須另外建立『合支』呢？
論：倒合者。
述曰：下面解釋第五種過失。文中有兩個部分，先是標舉，后是解釋。這是第一部分。
論：意思是應該說凡是『所作』的都是無常的。
述曰：下面是解釋。解釋中有兩個部分，先是舉出正確的『合』（應用），后是顯示顛倒的『合』。這是第一部分。宗（Paksha，論題）、因（Hetu，理由）可以知道。
論：卻顛倒地說凡是無常的都是『所作』的。
述曰：正是顯示顛倒的『合』。意思是本來應該用『所作』來證明無常，現在反而用無常來證明『所作』，所以是比喻的過失，就成為『非所立』（Asiddha，未證成的），有違背自己的宗義，以及『相符』（Sapaksha，同品）等。如在正確的比喻中已經廣泛地分別過。前面的三種過失，都有自、他、共三種區分，全分、部分等。這後面的兩種過失，只有共全，沒有其餘的。或者沒有全分，可以區分他、自、共，因為隨著所立的量有自等三種緣故。總計相似的，最初三種各有四種，成為十二種，加上後面的兩種過失，總共有十四種。區分自、他、共有四十二種，在其中細分全分、一分。再用相似的因來問相似的比喻過失，數量就無數了，恐怕繁瑣，就此停止。
論：這叫做『似同法喻品』（Sadhyasama-dharma-dṛṣṭānta，具有與所立相似性質的例子）。
述曰：這是第二種總結，是不正確的。
【English Translation】 English version: Śāstra says: This is an explanation of the meaning. It means that only 『Krtakatva』 (the property of being made) is mentioned. For example, pots and the like have 『Krtakatva』 and 『Anityatva』 (the property of impermanence), but this does not establish 『being made is impermanent.』
Treatise: For example, it is said that in a pot, 『Krtakatva』 and 『Anityatva』 are seen.
Śāstra says: This shows the principle. If, like the ancient teachers, one establishes that sound is impermanent because it is 『made,』 like a pot, then one separately combines and says: A pot is 『made,』 therefore a pot is impermanent. It should be known that sound is 『made,』 therefore sound is impermanent. Therefore, outside of the reason and example, one separately establishes the 『Upanaya』 (application). Bodhisattva Dignāga said: Whatever is 『made,』 combines with the property of 『being made』 on sound, and is certainly impermanent, like pots and the like. The 『made』 of pots and the like is impermanent, which shows that sound is 『made』 and not permanent. One establishes the 『application statement』 based on meaning in the example, so why is it necessary to separately establish the 『Upanaya』?
Treatise: The inverted application...
Śāstra says: Below explains the fifth fault. There are two parts to the text: first, a citation, then an explanation. This is the first part.
Treatise: It means that it should be said that whatever is 『made』 is impermanent.
Śāstra says: Below is the explanation. There are two parts to the explanation: first, giving the correct 『application,』 then showing the inverted 『application.』 This is the first part. The Paksha (thesis) and Hetu (reason) can be known.
Treatise: But it is inverted to say that whatever is impermanent is 『made.』
Śāstra says: This precisely shows the inverted 『application.』 It means that originally 『being made』 should be used to prove impermanence, but now impermanence is used to prove 『being made,』 so it is a fault of the example, and becomes 『Asiddha』 (unproven), which violates one's own tenets, and 『Sapaksha』 (similar instances), etc. As has been extensively distinguished in the correct example. The first three faults have self, other, and common distinctions, whole and partial. The latter two faults only have common whole, and nothing else. Or there is no whole part, and one can distinguish other, self, and common, because according to the established measure, there are three types: self, etc. In total, the similar ones, the first three each have four types, making twelve, plus the latter two faults, totaling fourteen. Distinguishing self, other, and common, there are forty-two types, in which one finely distinguishes whole part and one part. Furthermore, using a similar reason to question the fault of a similar example, the number is countless, so fearing complexity, I will stop here.
Treatise: This is called 『Sadhyasama-dharma-dṛṣṭānta』 (an example with properties similar to what is to be established).
Śāstra says: This is the second summary, which is incorrect.
論。似異法中所立不遣者。
述曰。下解似異五過為五。此即第一。于中有三。初簡牒。次指體。后釋成。此初也。簡有二重。一簡似同。云似異中。二簡自五。以似異中過有五種。先明所立不遣似異法中。所立不遣者。即牒也。
論。且如有言諸無常者見彼質礙譬如極微。
述曰。第二指體。宗因如前。此中不舉。但標似異所立不遣。此類非一。隨明於一故云且也。或不具詞。似五明一。故亦云且。
論。由於極微所成立法常性不遣彼立極微是常住故。
述曰。下釋成有二。初所立有。后能立無。此初也。初三句依指正釋。下兩句牒計顯成。聲勝二論。俱計極微常故。不遣所立。
論。能成立法無質礙無。
述曰。下明能立無。淮所立有。亦應言彼立極微有質礙故。文影略爾。此中亦有兩俱隨一猶預無依不遣。或無第四過。以異喻體但遮非表。依無非過。但有前三。或亦有四。如立我無。許諦攝故。異喻如空。對無空論雖無所依。亦不遣其所立法故。此論所明。聲對勝論兩俱不遣。若對薩婆多隨一不遣。薩婆多計微非常故。猶預不遣者。如言彼山等處定應有火。以現煙故。如余廚等處。異喻諸無火處皆不現煙。如余處等。然有火處亦無其煙。故懷猶預。不現煙處火
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：在相似差異法中所建立的，沒有被否定的情況。
述記：下面解釋相似差異的五種過失，這是第一種。其中有三個部分：首先是簡要說明，其次是指明本體，最後是解釋成立。這是第一部分。簡要說明有兩重含義：一是簡要說明與相同情況的相似之處，即在『相似差異』中；二是簡要說明自身五種過失，因為在『相似差異』中，過失有五種。首先闡明在相似差異法中，所建立的沒有被否定的情況，這就是簡要說明。
論：例如有人說，『凡是無常的事物，其本質都是有障礙的，就像極微（最小的物質單位）一樣』。
述記：第二部分是指明本體。宗（命題）、因（理由）如前所述，這裡不再贅述。只是標明相似差異中，所建立的沒有被否定的情況。這種情況並非只有一種，只是隨便說明其中一種，所以說『例如』。或者是不完整地表達，在五種情況中說明一種，所以也說『例如』。
論：由於極微所成立的法，常性沒有被否定，因為他們認為極微是常住的。
述記：下面解釋成立，分為兩個部分：一是所建立的有，二是能成立的無。這是第一部分。第一部分有三句話，是根據指明來正式解釋。下面兩句話是引用他們的觀點來顯示成立。『聲論』和『勝論』，都認為極微是常住的，所以沒有否定所建立的。
論：能成立的法，沒有質礙。
述記：下面闡明能成立的無，對應于所建立的有，也應該說『他們認為極微是有質礙的』，這裡省略了文字。這裡也有兩方都隨同、隨一方、猶豫不決、沒有依據而沒有被否定的情況。或者沒有第四種過失，因為異喻的本體只是遮止而非表述。依據沒有而非過失，只有前三種。或者也有四種，例如建立『我』不存在，因為被『諦』所包含。異喻就像虛空，對於沒有虛空的論點，雖然沒有所依據，也沒有否定其所建立的法。這個論點所闡明的是，『聲論』對『勝論』，兩方都沒有否定。如果對『薩婆多』，則是隨一方沒有否定，因為『薩婆多』認為極微不是常住的。猶豫不決而沒有否定的情況，例如說『彼山等處一定有火，因為現在有煙，就像其餘廚房等處一樣』。異喻是『凡是沒有火的地方，都沒有煙』，就像其餘地方等。然而有火的地方也沒有煙，所以心懷猶豫，沒有煙的地方...
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Regarding what is established without being rejected in the method of seeming difference.
Commentary: The following explains the five faults of seeming difference, this being the first. There are three parts within this: first, a brief explanation; second, pointing out the substance; and third, explaining its establishment. This is the first part. The brief explanation has two aspects: one is a brief explanation of the similarity to sameness, that is, within 'seeming difference'; and the other is a brief explanation of the five faults themselves, because within 'seeming difference,' there are five kinds of faults. First, clarify that in the method of seeming difference, what is established without being rejected, that is the brief explanation.
Treatise: For example, if someone says, 'All impermanent things have a tangible nature, like atoms (the smallest units of matter).'
Commentary: The second part is pointing out the substance. The proposition (thesis) and reason (cause) are as before, and will not be repeated here. It only indicates that in seeming difference, what is established is not rejected. This kind of situation is not unique; it just explains one of them, so it says 'for example.' Or it is an incomplete expression, explaining one out of five situations, so it also says 'for example.'
Treatise: Because of the dharma established by atoms, the nature of permanence is not rejected, because they consider atoms to be permanent.
Commentary: The following explains the establishment, divided into two parts: first, what is established exists; second, what can establish does not exist. This is the first part. The first part has three sentences, which are formally explained according to the indication. The following two sentences quote their views to show the establishment. Both the 'Sound School' and the 'Vaisheshika School' consider atoms to be permanent, so what is established is not rejected.
Treatise: The dharma that can establish has no tangible nature.
Commentary: The following clarifies that what can establish does not exist, corresponding to what is established exists. It should also be said, 'They consider atoms to have a tangible nature,' but the text is abbreviated here. Here, there are also situations where both sides agree, one side agrees, there is hesitation, and there is no basis, without being rejected. Or there is no fourth fault, because the substance of the dissimilar example only prevents rather than expresses. Based on the absence of non-faults, there are only the first three. Or there are also four, such as establishing that 'self' does not exist, because it is included in 'Truth'. The dissimilar example is like emptiness. For the argument that there is no emptiness, although there is no basis, it does not reject the dharma that is established. What this argument clarifies is that, for the 'Sound School' versus the 'Vaisheshika School,' neither side rejects it. If it is against the 'Sarvastivada,' then one side does not reject it, because the 'Sarvastivada' considers atoms to be impermanent. The situation of hesitating and not rejecting is like saying, 'There must be fire in the mountains, etc., because there is smoke now, just like in other kitchens, etc.' The dissimilar example is 'Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke,' like other places, etc. However, there is no smoke where there is fire, so there is hesitation, and where there is no smoke...
為有無。故猶預不遣。維摩經說。如無煙。火如燋谷芽。今據顯相故無違也。然隨所應有自他共全分一分等。
論。能立不遣者。
述曰。下解第二有三。初牒章。次指體。后釋成。此初也。
論。謂說如業。
述曰。指體也。
論。但遣所立。
述曰。釋成有二。此釋所立無。以彼計業是無常故。
論。不遣能立彼說諸業無質礙故。
述曰。辯能立有有二。初明能立有。次牒計顯成。準前應言。彼說諸業體是無常。無質礙故。牒計顯有。以影彰無。亦準于兩俱隨一等過。思之可悉。
論。俱不遣者。
述曰。解第三過。文亦有三。此即牒也。
論。對彼有論說如虛空。
述曰。此指體也。即聲論師對薩婆多等。立聲常。無礙。異喻如空。
論。由彼虛空不遣常性無質礙故。
述曰。釋成有二。初明二立有。后約計釋成。此初也。
論。以說虛空是常性故無質礙故。
述曰。約計釋成也。兩宗俱計虛空實有。遍常無礙。所以二立不遣也。問似同不成。俱中開二。似異不遣。何不別明。答同約遮表。無依成過。異遮非表。依無俱遣。故無非過。問異喻但遮。異無非過。遮有立異。無豈非過。如立虛空定應非有。以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為有和無兩種可能性，所以猶豫不決，無法確定。正如《維摩經》所說：『如同沒有煙的火，如同燒焦的谷芽。』現在根據顯現的表相，所以沒有違背（經義）。然而，隨順所應，有自體、他體、共體、全分、一分等差別。
論：能夠成立（宗義），而不被遣除的情況。
述曰：下面解釋第二種情況，分為三個部分。首先是標舉章節，其次是指出本體，最後是解釋成立。這是第一個部分。
論：意思是說，譬如說業。
述曰：這是指出本體。
論：只是遣除所立的（宗義）。
述曰：解釋成立分為兩個部分。這是解釋所立的『無』，因為他們認為業是無常的。
論：不遣除能立（宗義），因為他們說諸業沒有質礙。
述曰：辨析能立的『有』，分為兩個部分。首先是說明能立的『有』，其次是依照他們的計度來顯明成立。按照前面的說法，應該說：『他們說諸業的體性是無常的，沒有質礙的。』依照他們的計度來顯明『有』，用影子來彰顯『無』。也類似於兩俱、隨一等過失，仔細思考就可以明白。
論：兩者都不被遣除的情況。
述曰：解釋第三種過失。文義也分為三個部分。這是標舉。
論：對於他們，有論者說譬如虛空。
述曰：這是指出本體。即是聲明論師對於薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）等人，立聲常，無礙，用虛空作為異喻。
論：因為他們不遣除虛空的常性，沒有質礙的緣故。
述曰：解釋成立分為兩個部分。首先是說明兩個能立的『有』，然後是依照他們的計度來解釋成立。這是第一個部分。
論：因為他們說虛空是常性，所以沒有質礙。
述曰：這是依照他們的計度來解釋成立。兩宗都認為虛空是實有的，普遍常在，沒有障礙，所以兩個能立都不被遣除。問：相似相同卻不能成立，在『俱』中開出兩種情況。相似相異卻不被遣除，為什麼不分別說明？答：相同是約遮表，有無所依而成立過失。相異是遮非表，有無所依則兩俱被遣除，所以沒有非過。問：異喻只是遮，有無沒有過失。遮『有』成立『異』，『無』難道沒有過失嗎？比如立虛空必定應該『非有』，因為……
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the possibilities of existence and non-existence, there is hesitation and uncertainty. As the Vimalakirti Sutra says: 'Like fire without smoke, like scorched sprouts of grain.' Now, according to the manifested appearance, there is no contradiction (to the sutra's meaning). However, according to what is appropriate, there are differences such as self-nature, other-nature, both-nature, whole-part, one-part, etc.
Treatise: The case where the proponent is able to establish (the thesis) without being refuted.
Commentary: The following explains the second case in three parts. First, the chapter is introduced; second, the substance is pointed out; and third, the establishment is explained. This is the first part.
Treatise: It means, for example, saying 'like karma'.
Commentary: This points out the substance.
Treatise: Only refuting what is established (the thesis).
Commentary: Explaining the establishment is divided into two parts. This explains the 'non-existence' of what is established, because they consider karma to be impermanent.
Treatise: Not refuting the proponent, because they say that all karmas have no material obstruction.
Commentary: Discriminating the 'existence' of the proponent is divided into two parts. First, explaining the 'existence' of the proponent; second, clarifying the establishment according to their calculation. According to the previous statement, it should be said: 'They say that the nature of all karmas is impermanent and has no material obstruction.' Clarifying 'existence' according to their calculation, using the shadow to manifest 'non-existence'. It is also similar to the faults of both-together, following-one, etc. Careful consideration will make it clear.
Treatise: The case where neither is refuted.
Commentary: Explaining the third fault. The meaning is also divided into three parts. This is the introduction.
Treatise: Regarding them, some debaters say, for example, 'like space'.
Commentary: This points out the substance. That is, the Sabda (sound) theorists, in relation to the Sarvastivadins (those who believe everything exists), establish that sound is permanent and unobstructed, using space as a different analogy.
Treatise: Because they do not refute the permanence and unobstructed nature of space.
Commentary: Explaining the establishment is divided into two parts. First, explaining the 'existence' of the two proponents; then, explaining the establishment according to their calculation. This is the first part.
Treatise: Because they say that space is permanent and therefore has no material obstruction.
Commentary: This is explaining the establishment according to their calculation. Both schools consider space to be real, universally permanent, and unobstructed, so neither proponent is refuted. Question: Similarity is the same but cannot be established, opening up two cases in 'both'. Similarity is different but is not refuted, why not explain separately? Answer: The same is about concealing and revealing, existence and non-existence rely on each other to establish faults. Difference is concealing non-existence and revealing existence, existence and non-existence rely on each other and both are refuted, so there is no non-fault. Question: The different analogy only conceals, existence and non-existence have no fault. Concealing 'existence' establishes 'difference', does 'non-existence' have no fault? For example, establishing space must be 'non-existent', because...
非作故。如龜毛等。諸常有者。皆必非作。如空花等。豈非無體俱不遣耶。答前望一宗。故同開二。此約別立。故合為一。立有異有。即有不遣。若無必遣。立無異無。即無不遣。異有必遣。故不開二。此中亦有兩俱不遣隨一猶預及無所依。亦隨所應。有自他共分全等過。如理思準。
論。不離者。
述曰。解第四過。文分為二。初牒章。后示法。此初也。
論。謂說如瓶見無常性有質礙性。
述曰。此示法。離者。不相屬著義。言諸無常者。即離常宗。見彼質礙。離無礙因。將彼質礙屬著無常返顯無礙屬著常宗。故聲無礙定是其常。今既但云見彼無常有質礙性。不見無常屬有礙性。即不能明無宗之處。因定非有。何能返顯有無礙處。定有其常。不令常無礙互相屬著。故為過也。合即先合聲上無礙。欲令無礙常住定隨。離即先離聲上常住。欲令無宗因定不有。返顯無礙之所至處。定有常住宗義隨逐。故理門云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。依第五顯喻。由合故知因。準此即是雙離宗因。合應返此。
論。倒離者。
述曰。下解第五過。文有二。如前科。此初也。
論。謂如說言諸質礙者皆是無常。
述曰。示法。宗因同喻。皆悉同前。異喻應言諸無常者見彼質礙。即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『非作故』，例如龜毛等不存在的事物。所有常有的事物，必定不是造作的，例如空花等。難道不是沒有實體，兩者都應該捨棄嗎？回答：前面是針對一個宗派，所以分開為二。這裡是另外建立，所以合為一個。建立『有』和『異有』，就存在不捨棄的情況。如果『無』，必定捨棄。建立『無』和『異無』，就存在不捨棄的情況。『異有』必定捨棄，所以不分開為二。這裡面也有兩者都不捨棄、隨一猶豫以及無所依據的情況，也隨其應有而定。存在自、他、共分、全等過失，如理思考衡量。
論：『不離者』。
述曰：解釋第四種過失。文分為二，首先是標明章節，然後是揭示方法。這是開始。
論：所謂說如瓶子，見到無常的性質和有質礙的性質。
述曰：這是揭示方法。『離』，是不相屬著的意思。說諸法無常，就是脫離了常宗。見到質礙，脫離了無礙的因。將質礙屬性歸屬於無常，反過來顯示無礙屬性歸屬於常宗。所以聲音的無礙必定是常。現在只是說見到無常具有質礙性，沒有見到無常歸屬於有礙性，就不能夠闡明無宗之處。因如果不是真實存在，又怎麼能夠反過來顯示有無礙之處，必定是常。不讓常和無礙互相屬著，所以是過失。『合』，就是首先將聲音和無礙合在一起，想要讓無礙常住必定跟隨。『離』，就是首先脫離聲音上的常住，想要讓無宗的因必定不存在，反過來顯示無礙所到達的地方，必定有常住的宗義跟隨。所以《理門》說，說明因是宗所跟隨的，宗沒有因就不會存在。依據第五種顯喻，因為『合』所以知道因。按照這個推論，這就是雙重脫離宗和因。『合』應該反過來這樣。
論：『倒離者』。
述曰：下面解釋第五種過失。文分為二，如同前面的科判。這是開始。
論：所謂說『凡是具有質礙的事物都是無常的』。
述曰：揭示方法。宗、因、同喻，都和前面相同。異喻應該說『凡是無常的事物，都可以看到它們的質礙』。
【English Translation】 English version 『Non-productive cause』. For example, like the hair of a tortoise, etc. All things that are permanent must not be created, like flowers in the sky, etc. Isn't it that they have no substance and both should be abandoned? Answer: The former was in relation to one school, so it was divided into two. This is established separately, so it is combined into one. Establishing 『existence』 and 『different existence』 means there are cases of non-abandonment. If it is 『non-existence』, it must be abandoned. Establishing 『non-existence』 and 『different non-existence』 means there are cases of non-abandonment. 『Different existence』 must be abandoned, so it is not divided into two. Here, there are also cases of both not being abandoned, hesitation between one or the other, and having no basis. It also depends on what is appropriate. There are faults of self, other, shared division, and complete equality. Consider and weigh them according to reason.
Treatise: 『Non-separation』.
Commentary: Explaining the fourth fault. The text is divided into two parts: first, stating the chapter; second, revealing the method. This is the beginning.
Treatise: It means saying, like a vase, seeing the impermanent nature and the nature of having material obstruction.
Commentary: This reveals the method. 『Separation』 means not being related or attached. Saying that all dharmas are impermanent means separating from the permanent school (常宗, Cháng Zōng). Seeing material obstruction means separating from the cause of non-obstruction. Attributing the property of material obstruction to impermanence, conversely reveals that the property of non-obstruction belongs to the permanent school. Therefore, the non-obstruction of sound must be permanent. Now, it only says that seeing impermanence has the nature of material obstruction, and does not see impermanence belonging to the nature of having obstruction, so it cannot clarify the place of the non-school. If the cause is not truly existent, how can it conversely reveal the place of having non-obstruction, which must be permanent. Not allowing permanence and non-obstruction to be mutually related, so it is a fault. 『Combination』 means first combining sound and non-obstruction, wanting to ensure that permanent non-obstruction necessarily follows. 『Separation』 means first separating from permanence on sound, wanting to ensure that the cause of the non-school necessarily does not exist, conversely revealing the place that non-obstruction reaches, which necessarily has the doctrine of permanent abiding following. Therefore, the Hetu-vidya says that the cause is what the thesis (宗, Zōng) follows; the thesis does not exist without the cause. According to the fifth type of explicit example, because of 『combination』, the cause is known. According to this inference, this is a double separation of the thesis and the cause. 『Combination』 should be reversed in this way.
Treatise: 『Inverted separation』.
Commentary: Below, explaining the fifth fault. The text has two parts, like the previous division. This is the beginning.
Treatise: It means saying, 『All things that have material obstruction are impermanent』.
Commentary: Revealing the method. The thesis, cause, and similar example are all the same as before. The dissimilar example should say, 『All things that are impermanent can be seen to have material obstruction』.
顯宗無因定非有。返顯正因。除其不定及相違濫。返顯有因宗必隨逐。此則顯彼宗因。今既倒云諸有質礙。皆是無常。自以礙因。成非常宗。不簡因濫。返顯于常。此有二過。如正異辯。亦可有三。自他及共。無一分過。總計似異中亦四十二。如同喻說。余細分別亦準上知。
論。如是等似宗因喻言非正能立。
述曰。此解似中。大文第二結非真也。言如是者。即指法之詞。復言等者。顯有不盡。向辯三支。皆據申言而有過故。未明缺減。非在言申。故以等等。復云似宗因喻者。等彼缺減。后牒前三。總結非真。故是言也。若爾何故不言如是似宗因喻等。而云如是等似宗因喻耶。答喻下言等。恐有離前似宗因喻。別有似支。顯離此三。更無有別似宗因喻。故於前等。
論。複次為自開悟當知唯有現比二量。
述曰。上已明真似立。次下第三明二真量。是真能立之所須具故之說。文分為四。一明立意。二明遮執。三辯量體。四明量果。或除伏難。此即初二也。與頌先後次第不同。如前已辯。問若名立具。應名能立。即是悟他。如何說言為自開悟。答此造論者。欲顯文約義繁故也。明此二量。親能自悟。隱悟他名及能立稱。次彼二立明。顯亦他悟疏能立。猶二燈二炬。互相影顯。故理門論解二量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：顯宗認為無因的定（Samadhi）是不存在的。反過來是爲了彰顯正確的因。排除其不確定性和互相矛盾的錯誤。反過來彰顯有因的宗（Siddhanta）必然伴隨。這就能彰顯彼宗（Para-Siddhanta）的因。現在既然反過來說，凡是有質礙的，都是無常的。自己用質礙的因，來成立非常的宗。不區分因的錯誤，反過來彰顯常。這有二種過失。如同正異的辯論一樣。也可以有三種過失：自己、他人和共同的。沒有一種沒有過失。總計相似的異中也有四十二種。如同比喻所說。其餘細緻的分別也參照上面所說來理解。
論：像這樣等等相似的宗、因、喻的言論，不是正確的能立（Sadhana）。
述曰：這是解釋相似的部分。大的方面來說，第二點是總結不是真實的。說『像這樣』，是指法的詞語。又說『等等』，顯示有未盡之處。前面辯論的三支（宗、因、喻），都是根據申述而言，所以有過失。沒有說明缺少和減少。不是在言語的申述上。所以用『等等』。又說『相似的宗、因、喻』，是包括那些缺少和減少的。後面重複前面的三支，總結不是真實的。所以是這樣說的。如果這樣，為什麼不說『像這樣相似的宗、因、喻等等』，而說『像這樣等等相似的宗、因、喻』呢？回答說，在『喻』字下面說『等等』，恐怕有離開前面的相似的宗、因、喻，另外有相似的支。顯示離開這三支，再沒有別的相似的宗、因、喻。所以在前面用『等等』。
論：再次，爲了自己開悟，應當知道只有現量（Pratyaksha）和比量（Anumana）這兩種量。
述曰：上面已經說明了真實和相似的能立。接下來第三部分說明兩種真實的量。是真實的能立所必須具備的。文字分為四個部分：一、說明立意；二、說明遮止執著；三、辯論量的本體；四、說明量的結果。或者排除潛藏的疑問。這就是最初的兩個部分。和頌的先後次序不同。如同前面已經辯論過的。問：如果名為立具，應該名為能立，就是使他人覺悟。為什麼說爲了自己開悟呢？回答說：這是造論者，想要顯示文字簡略而意義繁多。說明這兩種量，親自能夠自己覺悟。隱藏了覺悟他人的名稱和能立的稱呼。其次，那兩種立說明，也顯現了他人的覺悟，是疏能立。就像兩盞燈、兩支火炬，互相照耀顯現。所以《理門論》解釋兩種量。
【English Translation】 English version: The apparent school (顯宗, Xian Zong) holds that Samadhi (定, Ding) without a cause does not exist. Reversing this is to highlight the correct cause. Eliminate its uncertainty and mutually contradictory errors. Reversing this highlights that the tenet (宗, Zong) with a cause necessarily accompanies it. This can highlight the cause of the other tenet (彼宗, Bi Zong). Now that it is said in reverse, all that has material obstruction is impermanent. One uses the cause of material obstruction to establish the tenet of being non-eternal. Without distinguishing the errors of the cause, it highlights eternity in reverse. This has two faults. It is like the debate of correct difference. There can also be three faults: self, other, and common. None is without fault. In total, there are also forty-two kinds of similar differences. It is like what is said in the analogy. The remaining detailed distinctions can also be understood by referring to what was said above.
Treatise: Discourses such as these that are similar in terms of tenet, cause, and analogy are not correct means of establishment (Sadhana, 能立).
Commentary: This is an explanation of the similar aspects. In a broad sense, the second point is to conclude that it is not true. Saying 'like this' refers to the words of the Dharma. Saying 'and so on' indicates that there are things that have not been fully stated. The three branches (tenet, cause, and analogy) debated earlier are all based on statements, so there are faults. There is no explanation of what is lacking or reduced. It is not in the statement of words. Therefore, 'and so on' is used. Also, saying 'similar tenet, cause, and analogy' includes those that are lacking and reduced. Later, repeating the previous three branches concludes that it is not true. So that is what is said. If so, why not say 'like this similar tenet, cause, analogy, and so on,' but say 'like this and so on similar tenet, cause, and analogy'? The answer is that saying 'and so on' after 'analogy' is to avoid the possibility of there being a similar branch separate from the previous similar tenet, cause, and analogy. It shows that apart from these three branches, there are no other similar tenet, cause, and analogy. Therefore, 'and so on' is used before.
Treatise: Furthermore, for the sake of one's own enlightenment, one should know that there are only two kinds of valid cognition (Pramana, 量): perception (Pratyaksha, 現量) and inference (Anumana, 比量).
Commentary: The above has already explained the true and similar means of establishment. The next third part explains the two kinds of true valid cognition. It is what the true means of establishment must possess. The text is divided into four parts: first, explaining the intention of establishment; second, explaining the cessation of clinging; third, debating the substance of valid cognition; fourth, explaining the result of valid cognition. Or, eliminating hidden doubts. These are the first two parts. It is different from the order of the verses. As has already been debated earlier. Question: If it is called the means of establishment, it should be called the means of establishment, which is to enlighten others. Why say it is for one's own enlightenment? The answer is that this is because the author of the treatise wants to show that the words are concise but the meaning is abundant. Explaining these two kinds of valid cognition, one can personally enlighten oneself. It hides the name of enlightening others and the title of means of establishment. Secondly, the explanation of those two establishments also reveals the enlightenment of others, which is a means of indirect establishment. It is like two lamps and two torches, illuminating and revealing each other. Therefore, the Nyayapravesa explains the two kinds of valid cognition.
已云。如是應知悟他比量。亦不離此。得成能立。故知能立。必籍於此量。顯即悟他。明此二量。親疏合說。通自他悟及以能立。此即兼明立量意訖。當知唯有現比二量者。明遮執也。唯言是遮。亦決定義。遮立教量及譬喻等。決定有此現比二量。故言唯有。問古立有多。今何立二。答理門論云。由此能了自共相故。非離此二。別有所量。爲了知彼。更立餘量。故依二相。唯立二量。問陳那所造因明。意欲弘于本論。解義既相牟楯。何以能得順成。答古師從詮及義。智開三量。以詮義從智。亦復開三。陳那已后。以智從理。唯開二量。若順古並詮。可開三量。廢詮從旨古亦唯二。當知唯言。但遮一向執異二量外。別立至教及譬喻等。故不相違。廣此二量。如章具辯。有依於此唯二量文。遂立量云。似現比等皆比量攝。如疏具述。有過不習。又傳立云。外道立宗。現比量外。有至教等量云。非比極成現所有量。非現量攝。極成現量所不攝。量所攝故。猶如比量。言非比量。簡一分相符。以佛法許比量是現所有。非現量攝故。復欲取為同喻。即顯因具足三相故。言極成現量。簡不極成。以佛法許至教亦是現量攝故。言所有者。又簡自語相違。若直言極成現量非現量攝。既言極成現量。復非現量攝。故有相違。又若不言所有
。不詮得至教量。是現所有。然狹帶說。故云所有量。因中言極成。簡隨一過。以大乘至教量是現量攝故。言量所攝。簡不定過。為如比量。極成現量所不攝故。至教離現別有耶。為如非量。所不攝故。非別有體耶。又量所攝。簡非量相符。以大乘許非量現所有量。非現量攝。又成立離比量外更有喻等量者。以大乘許譬喻量等非現量攝。故立量云。非現極成比所有量非比量攝。極成比量所不攝量所攝故。如現量。簡過如前。陳那菩薩以此量無過。但與立量。為決定相違因量。立現比量外無至教。量云。非現極成比所有一分不極成量是現量攝。比量所不攝量所攝故。如現量。又成立離比量外無義準等。量云。非比極成現所有一分不極成量是比量攝。現量所不攝量所攝故。如比量。簡過如前。是故陳那依此二相。唯立二量。其二相體。今略明之。一切諸法。各附已體。即名自相。不同經中所說自相。以分別心假立一法。貫通諸法。如縷貫花。此名共相。亦與經中共相體別。有說。自相如火熱相等。名為自相。若為名言所詮顯者。此名共相。此釋全非。違佛地論。若以如火熱等方名自相。定心緣火。不得彼熱。應名緣共。及定心緣教所詮理亦為言顯。亦應名共相。若爾定心應名比量。不緣自相故。
乘斯義便。明自共
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不能用至教量來解釋（所證得的）。這是現量所能達到的境界。然而，因為（至教量）範圍較窄，所以說是『所有量』。在因明中說『極成』，是爲了排除『隨一過』。因為大乘的至教量是被現量所包含的。說『量所攝』，是爲了排除『不定過』，因為像比量這樣的，不被極成的現量所包含。至教量離開現量，是另外一種量嗎？就像非量一樣，不被（現量）所包含，所以不是獨立的實體嗎？又，『量所攝』，是爲了排除與非量相似的情況，因為大乘承認非量是現量所能達到的，但非量不被現量所包含。又，爲了成立除了比量之外，還有譬喻量等其他的量，因為大乘承認譬喻量等不被現量所包含。所以，建立量時說：『非現量、極成比量所包含的所有量，不被比量所包含，被極成比量所不包含的量所包含，就像現量一樣。』排除過失的方法和前面一樣。陳那菩薩認為這個量沒有過失，只是用來建立量，作為決定性的相違因量。建立現量、比量之外沒有至教量，說：『非現量、極成比量所包含的一部分不極成的量，是被現量所包含的，被比量所不包含的量所包含，就像現量一樣。』又，爲了成立除了比量之外，沒有義準等其他的量，說：『非比量、極成現量所包含的一部分不極成的量，是被比量所包含的，被現量所不包含的量所包含，就像比量一樣。』排除過失的方法和前面一樣。因此，陳那菩薩依據這兩種相，只建立了兩種量。這兩種相的本體，現在簡略地說明一下。一切諸法，各自附著于自身的本體，就叫做自相。這與經中所說的自相不同，因為分別心假立一個法，貫穿所有的法，就像用線穿花一樣，這叫做共相。這也與經中共相的本體不同。有人說，自相就像火的熱相等，叫做自相。如果被名言所詮釋顯現的，就叫做共相。這種解釋完全錯誤，違背了《佛地論》。如果像火的熱等才叫做自相，那麼定心緣火，不能得到火的熱，應該叫做緣共相。以及定心緣教所詮釋的道理，也被言語所顯現，也應該叫做共相。如果這樣，定心應該叫做比量，因為不緣自相的緣故。 乘著這個意義，來闡明自相和共相。
【English Translation】 English version: It is impossible to explain (what is attained) by means of 至教量 (revealed truth as a means of valid cognition). This is the realm that can be reached by 現量 (direct perception). However, because (至教量) is narrower in scope, it is said to be '所有量' (the totality of valid cognition). In Hetu-vidya (logic), saying '極成' (established) is to exclude the fallacy of '隨一過' (fallacy of being accepted by only one party). This is because the 至教量 of Mahayana is included in 現量. Saying '量所攝' (included in valid cognition) is to exclude the fallacy of '不定過' (fallacy of uncertainty), because 比量 (inference) is not included in the established 現量. Is 至教量 separate from 現量, another kind of valid cognition? Just like 非量 (invalid cognition), is it not included (in 現量), therefore not an independent entity? Furthermore, '量所攝' (included in valid cognition) is to exclude situations similar to 非量, because Mahayana acknowledges that 非量 can be reached by 現量, but 非量 is not included in 現量. Also, in order to establish that besides 比量, there are other valid cognitions such as 譬喻量 (analogy), because Mahayana acknowledges that 譬喻量 etc. are not included in 現量. Therefore, when establishing valid cognition, it is said: 'All valid cognitions that are not included in 現量 and established 比量 are not included in 比量, but are included in valid cognitions not included in established 比量, just like 現量.' The method of excluding fallacies is the same as before. Bodhisattva Chenna believes that this valid cognition has no fallacies, it is only used to establish valid cognition, as a decisive contradictory reason. Establishing that there is no 至教量 outside of 現量 and 比量, it is said: 'A portion of unestablished valid cognitions that are not included in 現量 and established 比量 are included in 現量, and are included in valid cognitions not included in 比量, just like 現量.' Also, in order to establish that there are no 義準 (implication) etc. other valid cognitions besides 比量, it is said: 'A portion of unestablished valid cognitions that are not included in 比量 and established 現量 are included in 比量, and are included in valid cognitions not included in 現量, just like 比量.' The method of excluding fallacies is the same as before. Therefore, based on these two characteristics, Bodhisattva Chenna only established two types of valid cognition. The essence of these two characteristics will now be briefly explained. All dharmas (phenomena), each attached to its own essence, are called 自相 (own-character). This is different from the 自相 mentioned in the sutras, because the discriminating mind artificially establishes a dharma, penetrating all dharmas, just like threading flowers with a string, this is called 共相 (common-character). This is also different from the essence of 共相 in the sutras. Some say that 自相 is like the heat of fire, etc., called 自相. If it is interpreted and manifested by name and language, it is called 共相. This explanation is completely wrong, contradicting the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. If only things like the heat of fire are called 自相, then when the mind in samadhi (meditative concentration) perceives fire, it cannot obtain the heat of the fire, it should be called perceiving 共相. And the principles interpreted by the teachings perceived by the mind in samadhi are also manifested by language, and should also be called 共相. If so, the mind in samadhi should be called 比量, because it does not perceive 自相. Riding on this meaning, to clarify 自相 and 共相.
相。諸外道等計。一切名言得法自相。如說召火但取於火。明得火之自相。佛法名言但得共相。彼即難言。若得共相。喚火應得於水。大乘解云。一切名言。有遮有表。言火遮非火。非得火自相。而得火來者。名言有表故得於火。有救難外云。汝若名言得火自相。說及心緣應燒心口。以得自相故。若他反難云。汝定心緣火。既得自相。應亦燒心。心此不燒。假智及詮。雖得自相。而不被燒。如何難我。即有解云。境有離合殊。緣合境者被燒。定心離取故不被燒。由此前難但應難名言。言依語表。表即依身。是閤中知。若得自相即合被燒。今問。此難為難因明自相。為經中自相耶。答云依因明自相。若爾此難並不應理。因明自相。非要如火熱為自相。如何難彼合火燒心等。設縱依經自共相難。即不得言假智及詮得自相救。彼假智詮。論自誠說得共相故。若據外宗。彼非假智詮。俱得自相。故可依此智以難於彼。彼返難曰。定心得自相。應定心被燒。亦不得以離合取救。誰言定心唯離取境。瑜伽說通離合取故。又若離取即不被燒。亦應離取不得自相。火以熱觸為自相故。又于極熱捺落迦中。意與身識。同取於火。既不被燒。應不悶絕。不與苦俱。彼既悶絕。及與苦俱。明得彼火熱自相故。前救及難。二併成非。今且自共相
【現代漢語翻譯】 相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）。諸外道等計，一切名言得法自相（svalakṣaṇa，自性）。如說『召火但取於火』，明得火之自相。佛法名言但得共相（sāmānyalakṣaṇa，共相）。彼即難言：『若得共相，喚火應得於水。』 大乘解云：『一切名言，有遮有表。言火遮非火，非得火自相，而得火來者，名言有表故得於火。』 有救難外云：『汝若名言得火自相，說及心緣應燒心口，以得自相故。』若他反難云：『汝定心緣火，既得自相，應亦燒心。心此不燒，假智及詮，雖得自相，而不被燒，如何難我？』 即有解云：『境有離合殊，緣合境者被燒，定心離取故不被燒。』由此前難但應難名言，言依語表，表即依身，是閤中知。若得自相即合被燒。 今問：此難為難因明自相，為經中自相耶？答云依因明自相。若爾此難並不應理。因明自相，非要如火熱為自相，如何難彼合火燒心等。 設縱依經自共相難，即不得言假智及詮得自相救。彼假智詮，論自誠說得共相故。若據外宗，彼非假智詮，俱得自相。故可依此智以難於彼。 彼返難曰：『定心得自相，應定心被燒。』亦不得以離合取救。誰言定心唯離取境？瑜伽說通離合取故。 又若離取即不被燒，亦應離取不得自相。火以熱觸為自相故。又于極熱捺落迦（naraka，地獄）中，意與身識，同取於火。既不被燒，應不悶絕，不與苦俱。彼既悶絕，及與苦俱，明得彼火熱自相故。 前救及難，二併成非。今且自共相。
【English Translation】 English version: Characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The non-Buddhists and others posit that all terms grasp the self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of phenomena. For example, saying 'calling fire only grasps fire' clarifies grasping the self-characteristic of fire. Buddhist terms only grasp the common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Then they argue: 'If you grasp the common characteristic, calling fire should result in water.' The Mahāyāna explains: 'All terms have exclusion and expression. Saying 'fire' excludes non-fire; it doesn't grasp the self-characteristic of fire. But the reason for grasping fire is that the term has expression, hence grasping fire.' Someone tries to refute this by saying: 'If your terms grasp the self-characteristic of fire, speaking and mentally engaging with it should burn the mouth and mind, because they grasp the self-characteristic.' If someone counters: 'Your focused mind engaging with fire, since it grasps the self-characteristic, should also burn the mind. The mind doesn't burn here because the assumed wisdom and expression, although grasping the self-characteristic, are not burned. How can you refute me?' Then someone explains: 'The object has differences in separation and combination. Engaging with an object in combination results in being burned; the focused mind doesn't burn because it engages separately.' Therefore, the previous refutation should only target terms. Words rely on verbal expression, and expression relies on the body, which is known in combination. If the self-characteristic is grasped, then combination results in being burned. Now, the question is: Does this refutation target the self-characteristic according to logic, or the self-characteristic in the scriptures? The answer is that it relies on the self-characteristic according to logic. If so, this refutation is not reasonable. The self-characteristic according to logic doesn't necessarily mean that heat is the self-characteristic of fire. How can you refute the combination of fire burning the mind, etc.? Even if the refutation relies on the self and common characteristics in the scriptures, you cannot say that the assumed wisdom and expression are saved by grasping the self-characteristic. Those assumed wisdom and expression, according to their own treatises, truthfully say that they grasp the common characteristic. According to non-Buddhist schools, those are not assumed wisdom and expression; they both grasp the self-characteristic. Therefore, you can rely on this wisdom to refute them. They counter-argue: 'The focused mind grasps the self-characteristic, so the focused mind should be burned.' You also cannot be saved by separation and combination. Who says that the focused mind only engages separately? Yoga says that it engages both separately and in combination. Furthermore, if separation prevents burning, then separation should also prevent grasping the self-characteristic, because heat and touch are the self-characteristic of fire. Also, in the extremely hot hell (naraka), the mind and body consciousness together grasp fire. Since they are not burned, they should not faint or experience suffering. Since they do faint and experience suffering, it is clear that they grasp the self-characteristic of the heat of fire. The previous refutation and defense are both incorrect. Now, let's consider the self and common characteristics.
。外道未必皆有此二。佛法之中。有此義故。彼外道等。但言火等即得火體。火體為自相。而不立共相。不能分別經之與論。故總難之。若如說火。得火自相。即應燒口。此據言火在於口中。言得自相。自相亦不離口。故應燒口。或可。抑難。非正難彼合口被燒。口是發語之緣。非正語故。正難於彼尋名取境之心。亦得自相。得自相者心應覺熱。若他返難言。令我尋名緣火之心亦被燒者。自是被屈。非預我宗。尋名假智不得彼火之自相故。若覺熱觸即非假智。稱境知故。設定心中尋名緣火等亦是假智。不同比量假立一法貫在余法。名得自相。各附體故名得自相。是現量收。不得熱等相故假智攝。如假想定變水火等身雖在中。而無燒濕等用。如上定心緣地獄火雖是現量。所帶相分亦無燒濕等用。問若爾實變水火地等。有濕熱等用不。答雖有用而不燒心等。但任運變中。即是火體自相。定心亦爾。問身根實智俱得火之自相。云何得有燒不燒異。答火有微盛。燒不燒異。問因明自共相。有體無體耶。答此之共相。全無其體。設定心緣。因彼名言行解緣者。即是假智。依共相轉。然不計名與所詮義定相屬著。故云得自相。然是假智緣。得名為共相。作行解故。此之共相。但于諸法增益相狀。故是無體。同名句詮所依共相。若諸
現量所緣自相。即不帶名言。冥證法體。彼即有體。即法性故。若佛心緣。比量共相亦無有體。許佛遍緣故亦無失。有說共相亦是有體假。
此實不然。以何為體。若有體者。百法何收答言。法同分攝。許不相應是有體假此亦不然。謂誰言不相應是有體假。瑜伽五十二云。緣去來生滅等。是緣無體識。若許有體。不證緣無。問空無我等。此之共相為有體無。有云。有體。即此色等非我我所。名空無我等故。非境無故。成唯識云。非異非不異。如無常等性。又云。若無體者。如何與行非異耶。今謂不爾。若言即此色等非我我所名空無我故說非無。即應與色等是一而非異。如何非一異。又違五十二解云證緣無識。一緣無我觀智。二緣飲食。飲食即香等。離色香等都無所有。三邪見緣無。四又諸行中無常無恒不實。共相觀識非不緣此。五緣去來生滅等。既引證緣無。明知此無體。且止傍論。
論。此中現量。
述曰。下今辯體有二。初辯現量體。后明比量體。辯現量中。文復分四。一簡彰。二正辯。三釋義。四顯名。此即初也。言此中者。是簡持義。向標二量。且簡比量。持彰現量。故曰此中。言現量者。即正所持。欲明立量。
論。謂無分別。
述曰。第二正辯。言現量者。謂無分別。問
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知）所緣的是自相（svalakshana，獨特的個體特徵），即不帶名言概念，直接冥證法體（dharma-kaya，法的本質）。這個自相是有實體的，因為它就是法性（dharmata，法的本性）。如果佛的心緣取比量（anumana，推論認知）的共相（samanya-lakshana，普遍特徵），那麼共相也是沒有實體的。允許佛陀普遍緣取一切事物，這也沒有過失。有人說共相也是有實體的假法。 但這實際上是不對的。如果共相有實體，那麼在百法（百法明門論所列舉的百種法）中應該歸於哪一類呢？回答說：歸於法同分（dharma-sadrisa，法相似性）。如果承認不相應行法（viprayukta-samskara，既非色法也非心法的抽像概念）是有實體的假法，這也是不對的。誰說過不相應行法是有實體的假法呢？《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『緣過去、未來、生滅等，是緣無體之識。』如果承認有實體，就不能證明所緣是無。問：空（sunyata，空性）、無我（anatman，無我）等的共相是有實體還是沒有實體？有人說：有實體。即此色（rupa，色蘊）等非我、非我所（atmaniya，我所擁有之物），名為空、無我等。所以不是境（vishaya，所緣境）不存在。 《成唯識論》說：『非異非不異，如無常等性。』又說：『若無體者，如何與行非異耶？』 現在我認為不是這樣。如果說即此色等非我我所，名為空無我，所以說不是沒有。那麼就應該與色等是一而不是異，如何能說非一異呢？又違背了《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷的解釋，說證緣無識。一、緣無我觀智。二、緣飲食，飲食即香等，離開色香等都一無所有。三、邪見緣無。四、又諸行中無常、無恒、不實，共相觀識並非不緣此。五、緣過去、未來、生滅等。既然引證所緣是無，就明確知道這些是無實體的。且先停止這些旁論。 論：此中現量。 述記說：下面現在辨析體性，分為兩部分。首先辨析現量的體性，然後說明比量的體性。在辨析現量中，文又分為四個部分：一、簡要標明，二、正式辨析，三、解釋意義，四、顯示名稱。這（此中現量）就是第一部分。說『此中』，是簡別和持取的意思。先前標舉二量，這裡簡別比量，持取彰顯現量，所以說『此中』。說『現量』，就是正式所持取，想要闡明建立量。 論：謂無分別。 述記說：第二正式辨析。說『現量』，就是指無分別。問：
【English Translation】 English version: Pratyaksha (direct perception) cognizes svalakshana (own-characteristic), which means it directly and silently realizes the dharma-kaya (body of dharma) without involving conceptual constructs. This svalakshana has substance because it is dharmata (the nature of dharma). If the Buddha's mind cognizes the samanya-lakshana (universal characteristic) of anumana (inference), then the samanya-lakshana also has no substance. Allowing the Buddha to universally cognize all things is not a fault. Some say that samanya-lakshana is also a hypothetical entity with substance. But this is actually not correct. If samanya-lakshana has substance, then to which of the hundred dharmas (listed in the Hundred Dharmas Shastra) should it be assigned? The answer is: it belongs to dharma-sadrisa (similarity of dharmas). If one admits that viprayukta-samskara (non-associated formations, abstract concepts that are neither physical nor mental) are hypothetical entities with substance, this is also incorrect. Who said that non-associated formations are hypothetical entities with substance? Yoga-bhumi (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) fifty-second says: 'Cognizing past, future, arising, ceasing, etc., is cognizing consciousness without substance.' If one admits substance, one cannot prove that what is cognized is without substance. Question: Do the samanya-lakshanas of sunyata (emptiness), anatman (no-self), etc., have substance or not? Some say: They have substance. That is, these rupa (form, the skandha of form), etc., are not 'I' or 'mine' (atmaniya, belonging to self), and are called emptiness, no-self, etc. Therefore, it is not that the vishaya (object of cognition) does not exist. Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) says: 'Neither different nor not different, like impermanence, etc.' It also says: 'If there is no substance, how is it not different from formations?' Now I think it is not like this. If it is said that these rupa, etc., are not 'I' or 'mine', and are called emptiness and no-self, then it is said that it is not non-existent. Then it should be the same as rupa, etc., and not different. How can it be said to be neither the same nor different? It also contradicts the explanation in the fifty-second volume of Yoga-bhumi, which says that it proves the cognition of no-substance. First, the wisdom of cognizing no-self. Second, cognizing food, food is fragrance, etc., and there is nothing at all apart from form, fragrance, etc. Third, false views cognize non-existence. Fourth, also, among all formations, impermanence, non-permanence, and unreality, the consciousness of cognizing universal characteristics does not fail to cognize this. Fifth, cognizing past, future, arising, ceasing, etc. Since it is cited as proof that what is cognized is without substance, it is clear that these are without substance. Let's stop these digressions for now. Treatise: Here, direct perception. Commentary: Below, we now analyze the nature of reality, dividing it into two parts. First, analyze the nature of direct perception, and then explain the nature of inference. In analyzing direct perception, the text is further divided into four parts: first, a brief statement; second, a formal analysis; third, an explanation of meaning; and fourth, a display of names. This ('Here, direct perception') is the first part. Saying 'here' means to distinguish and hold. Previously, two kinds of valid cognition were mentioned, here distinguishing inference and holding and highlighting direct perception, so it is said 'here'. Saying 'direct perception' is what is formally held, wanting to clarify the establishment of valid cognition. Treatise: Meaning without conceptualization. Commentary: The second formal analysis. Saying 'direct perception' means without conceptualization. Question:
何智於何境離何分別。
論。若有正智於色等義。
述曰。第三釋義。文復分三。初簡邪。二定境。三所離。此初二也。若有正智。簡彼邪智。謂患翳目。見於毛輪第二月等。雖離名種等所有分別。而非現量。故雜集云。現量者。自正明瞭無迷亂義。此中正智。即彼無迷亂離旋火輪等。於色等義者。此定境也。言色等者。等取香等。義謂境義。離諸映障。即當雜集明瞭。雖文不顯。義必如是。不爾簡略過失不盡。如智不邪。亦無分別緣彼障境。應名現量故。
論。離名種等所有分別。
述曰。此所離也。謂有於前色等境上。雖無映障。若有名種等諸門分別。亦非現量。故須離此名言分別。種類分別。等取諸門分別。故理門論云。遠離一切種類名言假立無異諸門分別。言種類者。即勝論師大有同異。及數論師所立三德等。名言即目短為長等。皆非稱實名為假立。一依共相轉。名為無異。諸門六句。常無常等。或離一切種類名言。名言非一故名種類。依此名言。假立一法。貫通諸法。名為無異遍宗定有。異遍無等。名為諸門。或可。諸門即諸外道所有橫計安立諸法名為諸門。計非一故。此即簡非。若唯簡外及假名言。不簡比量心之所緣。過亦不盡。故須離此所有分別。方為現量。若一往唯言無二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 什麼智慧在什麼境界中遠離了什麼分別？
論：如果具有正確的智慧，對於色等事物。
述記：第三部分解釋意義。文章分為三部分。首先是簡別邪智，其次是確定境界，第三是所要遠離的。這是前兩部分。如果具有正確的智慧，這是爲了簡別那些邪智，比如患有眼翳的人，看到旋轉的火輪、第二個月亮等等。雖然遠離了名稱、種類等所有的分別，但不是現量。所以《雜集論》說，現量是指自身正確、明瞭、沒有迷惑錯亂的意義。這裡所說的『正智』，就是指沒有迷惑錯亂，遠離旋轉火輪等錯覺的智慧。『對於色等事物』，這是確定境界。『色等』，是等同於香等。『義』是指境界的意義。遠離各種遮蔽，就是《雜集論》中所說的明瞭。雖然文字上沒有明顯說明，但意義必然如此。否則，簡別的內容不夠全面。如果智慧沒有偏差，也沒有分別，緣于那些被遮蔽的境界，也應該被稱為現量。
論：遠離名稱、種類等所有的分別。
述記：這是所要遠離的。指的是對於前面的色等境界，即使沒有遮蔽，如果有名稱、種類等各種門類的分別，也不是現量。所以必須遠離這些名言分別、種類分別，以及等同於其他門類的分別。所以《理門論》說，遠離一切種類、名言、假立、無異等各種門類的分別。『種類』，指的是勝論師所說的大有、同異，以及數論師所立的三德等。『名言』，指的是把短的叫做長的等等，都不是真實的，稱為假立。『一依共相轉』，稱為『無異』。『諸門』，指的是六句，如常、無常等。或者，遠離一切種類名言。名言不是單一的，所以稱為種類。依據這些名言，假立一個法，貫通各種法，稱為『無異』，普遍存在於宗派之中。『異遍無等』，稱為『諸門』。或者，『諸門』就是指各種外道所持有的橫加計度的安立諸法，稱為『諸門』，因為他們的計度不是單一的。這部分是簡別非現量的情況。如果僅僅簡別外道和虛假名言，而不簡別比量心所緣的境界，那麼簡別的內容也不夠全面。所以必須遠離這些所有的分別，才能成為現量。如果只說沒有二元對立
【English Translation】 English version: What wisdom, in what realm, is free from what discriminations?
Treatise: If there is correct wisdom regarding objects such as form (rupa).
Commentary: The third part explains the meaning. The text is divided into three parts. First, distinguishing from wrong wisdom; second, defining the realm; and third, what is to be abandoned. These are the first two parts. 'If there is correct wisdom,' this is to distinguish from those wrong wisdoms, such as when someone with cataracts sees a whirling fire wheel, a second moon, and so on. Although they are free from all discriminations of name (nama), kind (jati), etc., they are not direct perception (pratyaksha). Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says, 'Direct perception means being correct, clear, and without confusion.' The 'correct wisdom' here refers to that which is without confusion, free from whirling fire wheels, etc. 'Regarding objects such as form,' this defines the realm. 'Form, etc.,' includes things like smell, etc. 'Object' refers to the meaning of the realm. Being free from various obscurations is what the Abhidharmasamuccaya calls 'clear.' Although the text does not explicitly state it, the meaning must be so. Otherwise, the distinction would not be comprehensive enough. For example, if the wisdom is not wrong and there is no discrimination, but it is still related to an obscured object, it should still be called direct perception.
Treatise: Free from all discriminations of name (nama), kind (jati), etc.
Commentary: This is what is to be abandoned. It refers to the fact that even if there are no obscurations on the preceding objects such as form, if there are discriminations of names, kinds, etc., it is not direct perception. Therefore, it is necessary to abandon these discriminations of names and kinds, as well as discriminations of other categories. Therefore, the Hetuvidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra says, 'Free from all discriminations of kinds, names, conceptual constructs, non-difference, and various categories.' 'Kinds' refers to the universals and particulars of the Vaisheshika school, and the three qualities (gunas) established by the Samkhya school. 'Names' refers to calling something short 'long,' etc., which are not true and are called conceptual constructs. 'Relying on a common characteristic' is called 'non-difference.' 'Various categories' refers to the six categories, such as permanent and impermanent. Or, it could mean being free from all kinds of names. Names are not singular, so they are called kinds. Based on these names, a dharma is conceptually constructed, pervading various dharmas, and is called 'non-difference,' universally existing in the tenet. 'Difference, non-pervasion, etc.,' are called 'various categories.' Or, 'various categories' could refer to the various falsely conceived establishments of dharmas held by externalists, because their conceptions are not singular. This part distinguishes non-direct perception. If only externalists and false names are distinguished, and not the objects of the inferential mind, the distinction would not be comprehensive enough. Therefore, it is necessary to abandon all these discriminations in order to be direct perception. If one only says there is no duality
或三所有分別。有太寬失。非彼二三全非現量。準七攝三。意地唯除無分別智。餘位隨應恒有彼故。然離分別略有四類。一五識身。二五俱意。三諸自證。四修定者。此言於色等義。是五識故。理門論引頌云。有法非一相。根非一切行。唯內證離言。是色根境界。次云。意地亦有離諸分別。唯證行轉又于貪等諸自證分諸修定者離教分別。皆是現量。問此入正理。為同於彼言於色等。但是五識亦有餘三。答有二解。一云同彼。於色等境。且明五識。以相顯故。此偏說之。彼論廣明。故具說四。二云具攝。言色等義。不唯五境。彼之三種。亦離名種等所有分別。此略總合。彼廣別說。問別明於五。五根非一。各現取境。可名現現別轉。餘三如何名現別轉。答各附體緣。不貫多法。名為別轉。文同理門。義何妨別問言修定者離教分別。豈諸定內不緣教耶。答雖緣聖教。不同散心計名屬義。或義屬名。兩各別緣。名離分別。非全不緣。方名現量。若不爾無漏心應皆不緣教。
論。現現別轉故名現量。
述曰。此顯名也。此四類心。或唯五識。現體非一名為現現。各附境體。離貫通緣。名為別轉。由此現現各各別緣。故名現量。故者。結上所以。是名現量。顯其名矣。雖無是字。準解比量。具合有之。彼文無故。闕
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 或者說，這三種情況都存在分別。如果範圍太寬泛就會出現錯誤。並非這二者或三者完全不是現量。按照《七十事論》所說，可以歸納為三種情況。在意識層面，只有無分別智可以排除，因為在其他情況下，這些分別總是存在。然而，離開分別大致有四種情況：一是五識身（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），二是與五識同時生起的意識，三是各種自證分，四是修習禪定的人。這裡所說的『於色等義』，指的是五識。因此，《理門論》引用偈頌說：『有法不是單一相，根不是一切行，唯有內在的證悟遠離言語，這是色根的境界。』接著又說：『意識層面也有遠離各種分別的情況，唯有證悟才能執行。』此外，對於貪等煩惱的各種自證分，以及修習禪定的人遠離教義的分別，這些都是現量。有人問：這裡所說的『入正理』，是否等同於前面所說的『於色等』，只是指五識，還是也包括其餘三種情況？回答有兩種解釋：一種解釋是等同於前面所說的，對於色等境界，只是說明五識，因為五識的相狀顯而易見，所以這裡只是偏重說明。而《理門論》則廣泛說明，所以具體說明了四種情況。另一種解釋是全部包括，所說的『色等義』，不僅僅指五境，那三種情況也遠離名稱、種類等所有分別。這裡是簡略地總括，而《理門論》則是廣泛地分別說明。有人問：分別說明五識，五根不是單一的，各自顯現並取境，可以稱為『現現別轉』，那麼其餘三種情況如何稱為『現別轉』呢？回答是：各自依附於自體和所緣，不貫穿多種法，所以稱為『別轉』。文句與《理門論》相同，意義上有什麼妨礙分別呢？有人問：說修習禪定的人遠離教義的分別，難道各種禪定中不緣教義嗎？回答是：雖然緣聖教，但不同於散亂心那樣計較名稱並歸屬意義，或者意義歸屬名稱，這兩種情況是分別緣取的，所以稱為『遠離分別』，並非完全不緣取，才稱為現量。如果不是這樣，那麼無漏心應該都不緣教義了。 論：現現別轉，所以稱為現量。 述曰：這是解釋名稱。這四類心，或者只是五識，顯現的體性不是單一的，稱為『現現』。各自依附於境界的體性，遠離貫通的緣取，稱為『別轉』。由此，現現各自個別地緣取，所以稱為現量。『所以』，是總結上面的原因。是現量之名，顯明它的名稱。雖然沒有『是』字，按照對比量來理解，應該具備『是』字。因為《理門論》的文句中沒有，所以省略了。
【English Translation】 English version Or, all three have discriminations. Too broad is a fault. Not that these two or three are entirely not perception. According to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, they can be summarized into three categories. In the realm of consciousness, only non-discriminating wisdom is excluded, because in other cases, these discriminations always exist. However, apart from discriminations, there are roughly four categories: first, the five sense consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses); second, the consciousnesses that arise simultaneously with the five sense consciousnesses; third, various self-cognitions; and fourth, those who practice meditation. The phrase 'regarding form, etc.' refers to the five sense consciousnesses. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha quotes a verse saying: 'A dharma is not a single characteristic, a sense organ does not act on everything, only inner realization is apart from words, this is the realm of the form sense organ.' Then it says: 'In the realm of consciousness, there are also cases apart from all discriminations, only realization can operate.' Furthermore, regarding the various self-cognitions of greed, etc., and those who practice meditation and are apart from doctrinal discriminations, these are all perceptions. Someone asks: Does 'entering into correct reasoning' here equate to the previous 'regarding form, etc.,' referring only to the five sense consciousnesses, or does it also include the remaining three cases? There are two explanations: one explanation is that it equates to the previous statement, regarding form, etc., it only explains the five sense consciousnesses, because the characteristics of the five sense consciousnesses are obvious, so it only emphasizes this explanation. The Nyāyamukha, however, explains it broadly, so it specifically explains all four cases. The other explanation is that it includes everything, the phrase 'regarding form, etc.' does not only refer to the five sense objects, those three cases are also apart from all discriminations of names, kinds, etc. Here it is a brief summary, while the Nyāyamukha explains it broadly and separately. Someone asks: Separately explaining the five sense consciousnesses, the five sense organs are not singular, each manifests and grasps objects, which can be called 'distinctly distinct operation', then how are the remaining three cases called 'distinct operation'? The answer is: each relies on its own entity and object, not pervading multiple dharmas, so it is called 'distinct operation'. The wording is the same as the Nyāyamukha, what harm is there in the difference in meaning? Someone asks: Saying that those who practice meditation are apart from doctrinal discriminations, does that mean that various meditations do not contemplate doctrines? The answer is: although they contemplate the holy teachings, it is different from the scattered mind that calculates names and assigns meanings, or meanings assigned to names, these two cases are separately contemplated, so it is called 'apart from discriminations', it is not that they do not contemplate at all, that is called perception. If it were not so, then all undefiled minds should not contemplate doctrines. Treatise: Because of distinct distinct operation, it is called perception. Commentary: This explains the name. These four types of mind, or only the five sense consciousnesses, the manifested nature is not singular, it is called 'distinct distinct'. Each relies on the nature of the object, apart from pervasive grasping, it is called 'distinct operation'. Therefore, distinct distinct each individually grasps, so it is called perception. 'Therefore' is summarizing the above reason. It is the name of perception, clarifying its name. Although there is no word 'is', according to the analogy of comparison, it should have the word 'is'. Because the wording of the Nyāyamukha does not have it, it is omitted.
結所以。影顯有故。俱為互文。其義相似。依理門論云。由不共緣。現現別轉。故名現量。五根各各明照自境。名之為現。識依於此。名為現現。各別取境。名為別轉。境各別故。名不共緣。若爾。互用豈亦別緣。答依未自在。且作是說。若依前解。即無此妨。或現之量。五根非一名現現。識名為量。現唯屬根。準理門釋。理則無違。若通明四。意根非現。又闕其識自體現名。但隨所應。依主持業二種釋也。
論。言比量者。
述曰。下明比量。文分為四。初牒名。二出體。三釋義。四結名。此即初也。
論。謂藉眾相而觀于義。
述曰。此出比體。謂若有智。藉三相因。因相有三。故名為眾。而方觀境義也。
論。相有三種如前已說由彼為因於所比義。
述曰。此下釋義有三。初釋前文。次簡因濫。后舉果顯智。此初文也。言相有三。釋前眾相。離重言失。故指如前。由彼為因。釋前藉義。由即因由。藉待之義。于所比義。此即釋前而觀于義。前談照境之能。曰之為觀。后約籌慮之用。號之曰比。言于所彰結比故也。
論。有正智生。
述曰。此簡因濫。謂雖有智藉三相因。而觀于境。猶預解起。此即因失。如前決定相違之因。或可。釋疑。前但略指三相如前。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 總結以上，『影顯有故』和『俱為互文』，它們的意義相似。依據《理門論》所說，由於不共之緣，現現別轉，所以稱為現量。五根各自明瞭地照見自己的境界，這稱為『現』。識依附於五根，稱為『現現』。各自取境，稱為『別轉』。境界各自不同，所以稱為『不共緣』。如果這樣，互相作用難道也是不同的緣嗎？回答是，依據未得自在的情況，暫且這樣說。如果依據前面的解釋，就沒有這個妨礙。或者，『現』的量，五根並非都名為『現現』，識才名為『量』。『現』只屬於五根。按照《理門論》的解釋，道理上就沒有違背。如果通達地說明四種，意根就不是『現』。又缺少了識的自體現名。但隨著所應，依據持業釋和依主釋兩種方式來解釋。
論：言比量者。
述曰：下面說明比量。文分為四個部分：一是標出名稱，二是說明體性，三是解釋意義，四是總結名稱。這裡是第一個部分。
論：謂藉眾相而觀于義。
述曰：這裡說明比量的體性。意思是說，如果有人有智慧，憑藉三種相的因，因相有三種，所以稱為『眾』，然後才能觀察境界的意義。
論：相有三種如前已說由彼為因於所比義。
述曰：下面解釋意義，分為三個部分：一是解釋前文，二是簡別因的泛濫，三是舉果來顯示智慧。這是第一個部分。『言相有三』，解釋前面的『眾相』，避免重複的說法，所以指『如前』。『由彼為因』，解釋前面的『藉義』，『由』就是因由，『藉』是憑藉的意思。『于所比義』，這是解釋前面的『而觀于義』。前面談論照見境界的功能，稱之為『觀』。後面依據籌劃思慮的作用，稱之為『比』。說『于所彰結比』，是因為要彰顯比量的作用。
論：有正智生。
述曰：這裡簡別因的泛濫。意思是說，即使有人有智慧，憑藉三種相的因，而觀察境界，仍然會產生猶豫不決的理解，這就是因的過失。如同前面決定的相違之因。或許可以解釋疑惑。前面只是簡略地指出了三種相如前。
【English Translation】 English version In summary, 'shadow manifestation with a cause' and 'both are mutual explanations' have similar meanings. According to the Li Men Lun (Treatise on Reasoning, 理門論), due to uncommon conditions, xian xian bie zhuan (現現別轉, distinct and separate transformations of the present), it is called xian liang (現量, direct perception). The five roots each clearly illuminate their own realms, which is called 'xian' (現, present). Consciousness relies on the five roots, which is called 'xian xian' (現現, present present). Each takes its own realm, which is called 'bie zhuan' (別轉, separate transformation). The realms are each different, so it is called 'bu gong yuan' (不共緣, uncommon condition). If so, is mutual interaction also a different condition? The answer is, according to the state of not yet being free, we will say it this way for now. If according to the previous explanation, there is no such obstacle. Or, the measure of 'xian' (現, present), the five roots are not all called 'xian xian' (現現, present present), only consciousness is called 'liang' (量, measure). 'Xian' (現, present) only belongs to the roots. According to the explanation of the Li Men Lun (理門論), there is no contradiction in principle. If we thoroughly explain the four, the mind-root is not 'xian' (現, present). Also lacking the self-manifestation name of consciousness. But according to what is appropriate, we explain it according to both chi ye shi (持業釋, appositional compound) and yi zhu shi (依主釋, dependent compound) types of explanations.
Treatise: 'Speaking of inference (bi liang, 比量).'
Commentary: The following explains inference (bi liang, 比量). The text is divided into four parts: first, stating the name; second, explaining the substance; third, explaining the meaning; and fourth, concluding the name. This is the first part.
Treatise: 'Meaning relying on multiple characteristics to observe the meaning.'
Commentary: This explains the substance of inference (bi liang, 比量). It means that if someone has wisdom, relying on the three aspects of the reason (yin, 因), the aspects of the reason are three, so it is called 'multiple' (zhong, 眾), and then they can observe the meaning of the realm.
Treatise: 'The characteristics are of three kinds, as previously stated, because they are the cause of the inferred meaning.'
Commentary: The following explains the meaning in three parts: first, explaining the previous text; second, distinguishing the overuse of the reason; and third, giving an example to show wisdom. This is the first part. 'The characteristics are of three kinds' explains the previous 'multiple characteristics' (zhong xiang, 眾相), avoiding redundant language, so it refers to 'as previously stated'. 'Because they are the cause' explains the previous 'relying on meaning' (jie yi, 藉義), 'because' is the cause, 'relying' is the meaning of depending on. 'In the inferred meaning' explains the previous 'and observing the meaning'. The previous discussion was about the function of illuminating the realm, which is called 'observing' (guan, 觀). The latter, according to the function of planning and thinking, is called 'inference' (bi, 比). Saying 'in what is manifested, concluding inference' is because it is to manifest the function of inference (bi liang, 比量).
Treatise: 'There is the arising of correct wisdom.'
Commentary: This distinguishes the overuse of the reason (yin, 因). It means that even if someone has wisdom, relying on the three aspects of the reason (yin, 因), and observing the realm, they will still produce hesitant understanding, which is the fault of the reason (yin, 因). Like the previously determined contradictory reason (xiang wei zhi yin, 相違之因). Perhaps it can explain doubts. The previous only briefly pointed out the three characteristics as before.
即有疑雲。如聲勝論因皆三相。豈緣彼智即為正也。遂即釋云。雖具三相。有正智生方真比量。彼智或生疑故不為正。
論。了知有火或無常等。
述曰。此即舉果顯智。明正比量。智爲了因。火無常等。是所了果。以其因有現比不同。果亦兩種火無常別。了火從煙現量因起。了無常等從所作等比量因生。此二望智俱為遠因。藉此二因。緣因之念。為智近因。憶本先知所有煙處必定有火。憶瓶所作而是無常。故能生智了彼二果。故理門云。謂于所比審觀察智。從現量生。或比量生。及憶此因與所立宗不相離念。由是成前舉所說力。念因同品定有等故。是近及遠比度因故。俱名比量。問言現量者。為境為心。答二種俱是。境現所緣。從心名現量。或體顯現為心所緣。名為現量。問言比量者。為比量智。為所觀因。答即所觀因。及知此聲所作因智。此未能生比量智果。知有所作處。即與無常宗不相離。能生此者。念因力故。問若爾現量比量及念。俱非比量智之正體。何名比量。答此三能為比量之智近遠生因。因從果名。故理門云。是近是遠。比量因故。俱名比量又云。此依作具作者而說。如似伐樹。斧等為作具。人為作者。彼樹得倒。人為近因。斧為遠因。有云。斧親斷樹為近因。人持于斧。疏非親因。此現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 即有疑問產生。例如，如果一個『聲』（shēng，聲音）勝論的『因』（yīn，原因、理由）具備了所有三個『相』（xiàng，特徵），那麼憑什麼說那個『智』（zhì，智慧、認知）就是正確的呢？於是就解釋說：即使具備了所有三個特徵，也只有當正確的『智』產生時，才能算是真正的『比量』（bǐliàng，推理、論證）。因為那個『智』可能會產生懷疑，所以不能算是正確的。
論：了知有火，或者了知事物是無常的等等。
述曰：這實際上是舉出結果來顯示『智』，以此來闡明正確的『比量』。『智』是『爲了因』（wèile yīn，近因），火、無常等等是所了知的『果』（guǒ，結果）。因為『因』有『現量』（xiànliàng，現量，直接感知）和『比量』的不同，所以『果』也有兩種，即火和無常的區別。了知火是從煙的『現量因』產生的，了知無常等是從『所作』（suǒzuò，被製造）等的『比量因』產生的。這兩種『因』對於『智』來說都是『遠因』（yuǎnyīn，遠因），憑藉這兩種『因』，作為『緣因』（yuányīn，緣因，輔助條件）的『念』（niàn，憶念），是『智』的『近因』（jìnyīn，近因）。回憶起先前所知的所有有煙的地方必定有火，回憶起瓶子是被製造的，所以是無常的，因此能夠產生『智』來了解這兩個結果。所以《理門論》說：『對於所要推理的事物進行審慎觀察的『智』，是從『現量』產生，或者從『比量』產生，以及憶念這個『因』與所要建立的『宗』（zōng，命題）不相分離的『念』。』由於這個原因，成就了前面所說的力量。因為憶念『因』與同品必定有等等，所以是『近』和『遠』的『比度因』（bǐdù yīn，推理的原因），都叫做『比量』。有人問：『現量』是指『境』（jìng，對像）還是指『心』（xīn，心識）？回答說：兩種都是。『境』是『現』所緣取的，從『心』的角度來說，叫做『現量』。或者說，本體顯現為『心』所緣取的，叫做『現量』。有人問：『比量』是指『比量智』，還是指所觀察的『因』？回答說：就是所觀察的『因』，以及知道這個聲音是『所作』的『因智』。這個還不能產生『比量智』的『果』。知道有所作的地方，就與無常的『宗』不相分離，能夠產生這個的是『念因』的力量。有人問：如果這樣，『現量』、『比量』以及『念』，都不是『比量智』的正體，那為什麼叫做『比量』呢？回答說：這三者能夠作為『比量』之『智』的『近』和『遠』的生『因』，因為『因』從『果』得名。所以《理門論》說：是『近』是『遠』的『比量因』，都叫做『比量』。又說：這是依據『作具』（zuòjù，工具）和『作者』（zuòzhě，作者）來說的，就像砍樹一樣，斧頭等是『作具』，人是『作者』，樹因此倒下，人是『近因』，斧頭是『遠因』。有人說：斧頭親自砍斷樹是『近因』，人拿著斧頭，不是親『因』。這個『現』
【English Translation】 English version Then doubts arise. For example, if the 『reason』 (yin, cause, reason) in a 『sound』 (sheng, sound) superiority argument possesses all three 『characteristics』 (xiang, characteristics), then why is that 『cognition』 (zhi, wisdom, cognition) considered correct? Thereupon, it is explained: Even if it possesses all three characteristics, only when correct 『inference』 (biliang, inference, reasoning) arises is it considered a true inference. Because that 『cognition』 may give rise to doubt, it is not considered correct.
Treatise: Knowing that there is fire, or knowing that things are impermanent, etc.
Commentary: This is actually citing the result to reveal 『cognition』, thereby clarifying correct 『inference』. 『Cognition』 is the 『proximate cause』 (weile yin, proximate cause), fire, impermanence, etc., are the known 『result』 (guo, result). Because the 『cause』 has differences between 『perception』 (xianliang, direct perception) and 『inference』, the 『result』 also has two types, namely the difference between fire and impermanence. Knowing fire arises from the 『perceptual cause』 of smoke, knowing impermanence, etc., arises from the 『inferential cause』 of 『being produced』 (suozuo, being produced), etc. These two 『causes』 are both 『remote causes』 (yuanyin, remote cause) for 『cognition』. Relying on these two 『causes』, the 『memory』 (nian, recollection) as a 『conditioning cause』 (yuanyin, conditioning cause) is the 『proximate cause』 (jinyin, proximate cause) of 『cognition』. Recalling that all places with smoke previously known must have fire, recalling that a pot is produced, therefore it is impermanent, thus it can generate 『cognition』 to understand these two results. Therefore, the Hetu-vidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra says: 『The 『cognition』 that carefully observes the things to be inferred arises from 『perception』 or from 『inference』, and the 『memory』 that this 『reason』 is inseparable from the 『thesis』 (zong, proposition) to be established.』 Because of this reason, the previously mentioned power is achieved. Because the memory of the 『reason』 and similar instances must have, etc., therefore it is the 『proximate』 and 『remote』 『inferential cause』 (bidu yin, cause of inference), both are called 『inference』. Someone asks: Does 『perception』 refer to the 『object』 (jing, object) or the 『mind』 (xin, mind)? The answer is: Both. The 『object』 is what 『perception』 apprehends, from the perspective of the 『mind』, it is called 『perception』. Or, the essence manifests as what the 『mind』 apprehends, it is called 『perception』. Someone asks: Does 『inference』 refer to 『inferential cognition』 or the observed 『reason』? The answer is: It is the observed 『reason』, and the 『cognition of the reason』 that knows this sound is 『produced』. This cannot yet produce the 『result』 of 『inferential cognition』. Knowing that where there is production, it is inseparable from the 『thesis』 of impermanence, what can produce this is the power of 『memory cause』. Someone asks: If so, 『perception』, 『inference』, and 『memory』 are not the true essence of 『inferential cognition』, then why is it called 『inference』? The answer is: These three can serve as the 『proximate』 and 『remote』 causes of the arising of 『cognition』 of 『inference』, because the 『cause』 is named after the 『result』. Therefore, the Hetu-vidya-nyaya-dvara-sastra says: Being the 『proximate』 and 『remote』 『cause of inference』, both are called 『inference』. It also says: This is based on 『tool』 (zuoju, tool) and 『agent』 (zuozhe, agent). Like cutting down a tree, the axe, etc., are the 『tool』, the person is the 『agent』, the tree therefore falls, the person is the 『proximate cause』, the axe is the 『remote cause』. Someone says: The axe personally cutting down the tree is the 『proximate cause』, the person holding the axe is not a direct 『cause』. This 『perception』
比量為作具。憶因之念為作者。或復翻此。避前二釋。故名比量。問理門論中現比量境及緣因念。隨其所應俱名現比。如何此中俱但說于智。何理得知。彼于現境亦名現量。比量之因亦名比量。答理門論中雲。問何故此中與前現量別異建立。此問詞。為現二門。此處亦應于其比果說為比量。彼處亦應于其現因說為現量。俱不遮止。
此答詞。即初后互明也。今者此中俱但出量體。略彼作具之與作者。略廣故爾。
論。是名比量。
述曰。第四結名。由藉三相因。比度知有火無常等。故是名比量。故是二字。如前應知。
論。於二量中即智名果是證相故如有作用而顯現故亦名為量。
述曰。第四明量果也。或除伏難。謂有難云。如尺秤等為能量。絹布等為所量。記數之智為量果。汝此二量。火無常等為所量。現比量智為能量。何者為量果。或薩婆多等難。我以境為所量。根為能量。彼以根見等。不許識見。故根為能量。依根所起心及心所而為量果。汝大乘中。即智為能量。復何為量果。或諸外道等執。境為所量。諸識為能量。神我為量果。彼計神我為能受者知者等故。汝佛法中既不立我。何為量果。智即能量故。論主答云。於此二量即智名果。即者不離之義。即用此量智。還為能量果。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『比量為作具』（anumana karana）。『憶因之念為作者』（hetusmriti kartri）。或者反過來理解，爲了避免前兩種解釋的不足，所以稱為比量。問：在《理門論》中，現量（pratyaksha，直接認知）的境和緣因念（pratyaya hetu smriti，條件因的記憶）都各自被稱為現量和比量，為什麼在這裡都只說是智（jnana，智慧）呢？根據什麼可以得知，在《理門論》中，對於現境（pratyaksha vishaya，直接認知的對象）也稱為現量，比量的因也稱為比量呢？答：《理門論》中說：『問：為什麼在這裡要與之前的現量區別開來建立呢？』這個問句是爲了說明現量和比量這兩個方面。這裡也應該將比量的結果說成是比量，那裡也應該將現量的因說成是現量，這兩種說法都不互相妨礙。
這個回答，就是前後互相說明。現在這裡都只說量（pramana，量）的本體，省略了作為工具和作者的部分，因為這裡是簡略的說法。
論：是名比量。
述曰：第四個是總結名稱。由於憑藉三相因（trilaksana hetu，具有三種特徵的因），通過比較推斷得知有火、無常等，所以稱為比量。『故是』這兩個字，應該像前面那樣理解。
論：在現量和比量這二量中，智（jnana，智慧）被稱為果，因為它具有證明的作用，並且像具有作用一樣顯現，所以也稱為量。
述曰：第四個是說明量的結果。或者爲了消除疑問。有人可能會問：像尺子、秤等是能量（pramana karana，工具），絹布等是所量（prameya，對像），記數的智慧是量果（pramana phala，量的結果）。你們這二量，火、無常等是所量，現量和比量智是能量，那麼什麼是量果呢？或者薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）等人會問難：我們以境為所量，根（indriya，感官）為能量，他們以根見等，不允許識見，所以根為能量，依靠根所生起的心和心所（citta-caitta，心和心所法）作為量果。你們大乘中，智就是能量，那麼什麼是量果呢？或者一些外道等執著，境為所量，諸識為能量，神我（atman，靈魂）為量果。他們認為神我是能接受者、知者等。你們佛法中既然不建立我，那麼什麼是量果呢？智就是能量。論主回答說：在這二量中，智被稱為果。『即』是不離的意思。就是用這個量智，還作為能量的果。
【English Translation】 English version 'Anumana is the instrument' (anumana karana). 'The memory of the reason is the agent' (hetusmriti kartri). Or, conversely, to avoid the shortcomings of the previous two interpretations, it is called anumana. Question: In the Nyayapravesa, both the object of pratyaksha (direct perception) and the memory of the condition-reason (pratyaya hetu smriti) are each called pratyaksha and anumana. Why are they both only referred to as jnana (wisdom) here? How can it be known that in the Nyayapravesa, the object of direct perception is also called pratyaksha, and the reason for anumana is also called anumana? Answer: The Nyayapravesa says: 'Question: Why is it established here differently from the previous pratyaksha?' This question is to explain the two aspects of pratyaksha and anumana. Here, the result of anumana should also be called anumana, and there, the reason for pratyaksha should also be called pratyaksha. These two statements do not contradict each other.
This answer is to explain each other from beginning to end. Now, here, only the essence of pramana (valid cognition) is mentioned, omitting the parts that serve as instruments and agents, because this is a concise explanation.
Treatise: This is called anumana.
Commentary: The fourth is to conclude the name. Because it relies on the three-characteristic reason (trilaksana hetu), through comparison and inference, it is known that there is fire, impermanence, etc., so it is called anumana. The words 'therefore it is' should be understood as before.
Treatise: In these two valid cognitions, pratyaksha and anumana, jnana (wisdom) is called the result, because it has the function of proof, and it appears as if it has a function, so it is also called valid cognition.
Commentary: The fourth is to explain the result of valid cognition. Or to eliminate doubts. Someone might ask: Like rulers, scales, etc., are the instrument of valid cognition (pramana karana), silk fabrics, etc., are the object of valid cognition (prameya), and the wisdom of counting is the result of valid cognition (pramana phala). In your two valid cognitions, fire, impermanence, etc., are the object of valid cognition, and pratyaksha and anumana jnana are the instrument of valid cognition, so what is the result of valid cognition? Or the Sarvastivadins (Everything Exists School) and others might question: We take the object as the object of valid cognition, and the sense organs (indriya) as the instrument of valid cognition. They take sense perception, etc., and do not allow consciousness perception, so the sense organs are the instrument of valid cognition, and the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) arising from the sense organs are taken as the result of valid cognition. In your Mahayana, jnana is the instrument of valid cognition, so what is the result of valid cognition? Or some non-Buddhists and others cling to the object as the object of valid cognition, the various consciousnesses as the instrument of valid cognition, and the atman (soul) as the result of valid cognition. They believe that the atman is the receiver, the knower, etc. Since you do not establish an atman in Buddhism, what is the result of valid cognition? Jnana is the instrument of valid cognition. The author of the treatise answers: In these two valid cognitions, jnana is called the result. 'That is' means inseparable. That is, this jnana of valid cognition is also used as the result of valid cognition.
彼復問云。何故即智複名果耶。答云。夫言量果者。能智知于彼。即此量智。能觀能證彼二境相故。所以名果。彼之境相於心上現。名而有顯現。假說心之一分名為能量。云如有作用。既於一心以義分能所故。量果又名為量。或彼所量。即於心現。不離心故。亦名為量。以境亦心。依二分解。或此中意約三分明。能量見分。量果自證分。體不離用。即智名果。是能證彼見分相故。相謂行相體相。非相分名相。如有作用而顯現者。簡異正量。彼心取境。如日舒光。如鉗鉗物。親照境故。今者大乘依自證分。起此見分取境功能。及彼相分為境生識。是和緣假如有作用。自證能起故言而顯現。故不同彼執直實取。此自證分。亦名為量。亦彼見分。或此相分。亦名為量。不離能量故。如色言唯識。此順陳那三分義解。
論。有分別智于義異轉名似現量。
述曰。下第四大段明二似量。真似相形。故次明也。于中有二。初似現。后似比。似現之中。復分為二。初標。后釋。此即初也。標中有三。一標似現體。二標所由。三標定名。有分別智。謂有如前。帶名種等諸分別起之智。不稱實境。別妄解生。名于義異轉。名似現量。此標似名。
論。謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生。
述曰。此下釋也。釋文亦三。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他繼續問道：『為什麼說智也叫做果呢？』回答說：『所說的量果，是能智認知于彼（指對像）。即此量智，能夠觀察和證實彼二境的相狀，所以叫做果。彼之境相在心上顯現，名為顯現。假說心的一部分名為能量，說它有作用。既然在一心中以義理區分能所，量果又叫做量。或者彼所量，即在心中顯現，不離心，所以也叫做量。因為境也是心，依二分解說。或者此中意是約三分來說明，能量是見分，量果是自證分，體不離用，即智名果，是能證彼見分之相的緣故。相是指行相和體相，不是相分之相，如有作用而顯現者，是爲了區別于正量。彼心取境，如太陽舒放光芒，如鉗子鉗住物體，親切地照了境。現在大乘依自證分，生起此見分取境的功能，以及彼相分作為境而生起識，這是和合因緣假如有作用。自證能生起，所以說顯現。所以不同於他們執著真實取境。此自證分，也叫做量，也是彼見分，或者此相分，也叫做量，不離能量的緣故。如色法唯識，這是順應陳那（Dignāga）的三分義的解釋。
論：有分別智對於義理的差異轉變，叫做相似現量。
述曰：下面第四大段說明二種相似量。真和似相互對比，所以接著說明。其中有二，先是相似現量，后是相似比量。相似現量之中，又分為二，先是標示，后是解釋。這就是最初的標示。標示中有三，一是標示相似現量的體性，二是標示所由，三是標示定名。有分別智，是指有如前所說的，帶有名稱、種類等各種分別而生起的智，不符合真實的境，另外虛妄地理解產生，叫做對於義理的差異轉變，叫做相似現量。這是標示相似的名。
論：所謂諸有智了知瓶、衣等分別而生。
述曰：這下面是解釋。解釋的文字也有三。
【English Translation】 English version: He further asked: 'Why is wisdom also called the fruit?' The answer is: 'What is called the 'fruit of measurement' is the wisdom that can know that (object). That is, this measuring wisdom can observe and verify the characteristics of those two realms, so it is called the fruit. The appearance of that realm manifests in the mind, and is called manifestation. It is said that a part of the mind is called energy, saying that it has a function. Since the ability and the object are distinguished in one mind by meaning, the fruit of measurement is also called measurement. Or what is measured, that is, manifests in the mind, not separate from the mind, so it is also called measurement. Because the realm is also the mind, according to the two-fold explanation. Or the intention here is to explain in terms of three parts, the energy is the seeing-part (darśana-bhāga), the fruit of measurement is the self-awareness-part (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga), the essence is not separate from the function, that is, wisdom is called the fruit, because it can verify the characteristics of that seeing-part. Characteristics refer to the functional characteristics and the essential characteristics, not the characteristics of the object-part (viṣaya-bhāga). Those that have a function and manifest are to distinguish them from valid cognition (pramāṇa). That mind takes the realm, like the sun spreading its light, like pliers clamping an object, intimately illuminating the realm. Now, the Mahāyāna relies on the self-awareness-part to generate the function of this seeing-part taking the realm, and that object-part as the realm generates consciousness. This is a combination of conditions that provisionally has a function. Self-awareness can generate, so it is said to manifest. Therefore, it is different from those who cling to taking the realm as real. This self-awareness-part is also called measurement, and it is also that seeing-part, or this object-part is also called measurement, because it is not separate from the energy. Like the Consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda) of form, this is in accordance with Dignāga's explanation of the three parts.'
Treatise: 'Discriminative wisdom that transforms differently in meaning is called apparent perception (sādṛśa-pratyakṣa).'
Commentary: 'The fourth major section below explains the two apparent cognitions. The true and the apparent contrast with each other, so it is explained next. Among them, there are two, first apparent perception, and then apparent inference. Among apparent perceptions, there are again two, first the indication, and then the explanation. This is the initial indication. There are three in the indication, one is to indicate the nature of apparent perception, the second is to indicate the reason, and the third is to indicate the fixed name. Discriminative wisdom refers to the wisdom that arises with various discriminations such as names and types as mentioned before, which does not conform to the real realm, and falsely understands and produces, is called transforming differently in meaning, is called apparent perception. This is the indication of the apparent name.'
Treatise: 'So-called all wisdom arises from the discrimination of pots, clothes, etc.'
Commentary: 'Below is the explanation. There are also three in the explanatory text.'
即釋初也。謂諸有了瓶衣等智。不稱實境。妄分別生。名分別智。準理門言。有五種智。皆名似現。一散心緣過去。二獨頭意識緣現在。三散意緣未來。四於三世諸不決智。五于現世諸惑亂智。謂見杌為人。睹見陽炎謂之為水。及瓶衣等名惑亂智。皆非現量。是似現收。或諸外道及餘情類。謂現量得故。故理門云。但於此中。了余境分。不名現量。由此即說憶念。比度。悕求。疑智。惑亂智等。于鹿愛等。皆非現量。隨先所受分別轉故。五智如次可配憶念等。智下言等是向內等。離此更無可外等故。于鹿愛等者。西域共呼陽炎為鹿愛。以鹿熱渴謂之為水而生愛故。此境言等。等彼見杌謂之為人。病眼空花毛輪二月瓶衣等。故彼復言。如是一切世俗有中。瓶等。數等。舉等。有性。瓶性等智。皆似現量。是假非真。名世俗有。舉瓶等取外道五唯量實句義等。數即勝論所計德句。言等等取彼量合離等。舉即業句。取捨屈伸行。舉即彼取。或是彼行。以等於余。有性即大有。瓶性等即瓶性同異。等取和合句等。智即緣此之智。皆似現量。此等皆於五塵實境之中。作余行相假合余義。分別轉故。問此緣瓶等智。即名似現。現比非量三中何收。答非量所攝。問如第七識。緣第八執我。可名非量。泛緣衣瓶。既非執心。何名非量。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是對『初』（初現量）的解釋。指的是各種有了瓶子、衣服等概念的認知，這些認知並不符合真實的境界，而是虛妄分別產生的，所以稱為『分別智』。按照《理門論》的說法，有五種智慧，都可稱為『似現量』：一是散亂心緣於過去；二是獨頭意識緣于現在；三是散亂心緣于未來；四是對三世（過去、現在、未來）的各種不確定的認知；五是對現在世間的各種迷惑顛倒的認知，比如把樹樁看成人，看到陽焰以為是水，以及對瓶子、衣服等的認知，都屬於『惑亂智』。這些都不是現量，而是被歸入『似現量』。或者有些外道以及其他眾生，認為這些是現量所得，所以《理門論》說，『但於此中，了余境分，不名現量』。因此，憶念、比度、希求、疑智、惑亂智等，對於鹿愛（陽焰）等，都不是現量，因為它們是隨著先前所接受的分別而轉動的。這五種智慧可以依次對應憶念等。『智下言等』，指的是向內等，因為除了向內，沒有其他向外的了。『于鹿愛等者』，在西域，人們把陽焰叫做『鹿愛』，因為鹿在炎熱乾渴時，會把陽焰誤認為水而產生愛著。『此境言等』，『等』指的是把樹樁看成人，病眼所見的空花、毛輪、二月，以及瓶子、衣服等。所以《理門論》又說，『如是一切世俗有中，瓶等、數等、舉等、有性、瓶性等智，皆似現量』。這些都是虛假的，不是真實的，所以稱為『世俗有』。『舉瓶等』，指的是外道所說的五唯量、實句義等。『數』指的是勝論派所計的德句。『言等』，『等』指的是他們的量、合離等。『舉』指的是業句，取捨、屈伸、行，『舉』就是指這些，或者是指他們的行為，『以等於余』。『有性』指的是大有，『瓶性等』指的是瓶子的自性、同異等，『等』指的是和合句等。『智』指的是緣于這些的智慧，這些都是似現量。這些都是在五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）的真實境界中，假合其他的行相，分別轉動而產生的。 問：這種緣于瓶子等的智慧，是屬於似現量、現量、比量這三種量中的哪一種？ 答：不屬於量。 問：像第七識緣于第八識執著為我，可以稱為非量。但泛泛地緣于衣服、瓶子，既不是執著心，為什麼稱為非量？
【English Translation】 English version: This explains 'prathama' (initial perception). It refers to various cognitions that have concepts of things like pots and clothes. These cognitions do not correspond to the actual reality but arise from false discriminations, hence they are called 'discriminating cognitions'. According to the Nyaya-pravesa, there are five types of cognitions that can all be called 'pseudo-perception': first, a distracted mind contemplating the past; second, a singular consciousness contemplating the present; third, a distracted mind contemplating the future; fourth, various uncertain cognitions about the three times (past, present, and future); fifth, various confused cognitions about the present world, such as seeing a tree stump as a person, seeing a mirage as water, and cognitions of pots and clothes, all of which belong to 'confused cognitions'. These are not valid perceptions but are categorized as 'pseudo-perceptions'. Alternatively, some non-Buddhists and other beings consider these to be obtained through valid perception, so the Nyaya-pravesa states, 'But in this case, understanding a different aspect of the object is not called valid perception'. Therefore, recollection, inference, desire, doubt, confused cognition, etc., regarding 'deer-love' (mirage), are not valid perceptions because they are based on previously accepted discriminations. These five types of cognitions can be sequentially matched with recollection, etc. 'Etc.' after 'cognition' refers to internal aspects, because there are no external aspects other than internal ones. 'Regarding deer-love, etc.', in the Western Regions, people call mirages 'deer-love' because deer, when hot and thirsty, mistake mirages for water and develop attachment to them. 'Etc. in this context' refers to seeing a tree stump as a person, the empty flowers, hair-wheels, and double moons seen by diseased eyes, as well as pots and clothes. Therefore, the Nyaya-pravesa further states, 'All such cognitions in mundane existence, such as those of pots, numbers, actions, existence, and the nature of pots, are pseudo-perceptions'. These are false, not true, and are called 'mundane existence'. 'Actions like holding a pot' refers to the five unique measures, reality, sentence meaning, etc., of non-Buddhists. 'Numbers' refers to the qualities and categories counted by the Vaisheshika school. 'Etc.' refers to their measures, conjunction, disjunction, etc. 'Actions' refers to the karma category, taking, giving, bending, stretching, and moving; 'actions' refers to these, or their behavior, 'with etc. to others'. 'Existence' refers to the great existence, 'the nature of pots, etc.' refers to the nature, similarity, and difference of pots, 'etc.' refers to the combination category, etc. 'Cognition' refers to the cognition of these, all of which are pseudo-perceptions. These are all based on the real objects of the five senses (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), falsely combining other aspects and discriminatingly transforming them. Question: This cognition of pots, etc., which of the three valid cognitions does it belong to: pseudo-perception, valid perception, or inference? Answer: It does not belong to valid cognition. Question: Like the seventh consciousness clinging to the eighth consciousness as self, it can be called non-valid cognition. But generally cognizing clothes and pots is not clinging, so why is it called non-valid cognition?
答應知非量不要執心。但不秤境。別作余解。即名非量。以緣瓶心。雖不必執。但惑亂故。謂為實瓶。故是非量。
問既有瓶衣。緣彼智起。應是稱所知。何名分別。
論。由彼于義不以自相為境界故。
述曰。此釋所由。由彼諸智。於四塵境。不以自相為所觀境。于上增益別實有物而為所緣。名曰異轉。此意以瓶衣等體即四塵。依四塵上唯有共相無其自體。此知假名瓶衣。不以本自相四塵為所緣。但於此共相瓶衣假法而轉。謂為實有。故名分別。
論。名似現量。
述曰。此釋定名。由彼瓶衣依四塵假。但意識緣共相而轉。實非眼識現量而得。自謂眼見瓶衣等。名似現量又但分別執為實有。謂自識現得。亦名似現。不但似眼現量而得。名似現量。此釋盡理。前解局故。
論。若似因智為先所起諸似義智名似比量。
述曰。此第二解似比。文亦有二。初標。后釋。此即初也。于中有三。初標似因。次標似體。后標似名。似因及緣似因之智為先生。后了似宗智。名似比量。問何故似現。先標似體。后標似因。此似比中。先因後果。答彼之似現。由率遇境。即便取解謂為實有。非后籌度。故先標果。此似比量。要因在先。後方推度邪智後起。故先舉因。或復影顯。三句三文。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：答應知非量（Anāgata-jñāna-pramāṇa，對未來知識的錯誤衡量）不要執著於心。但不要衡量外境。不要做其他的解釋。這就叫做非量（apramāṇa，非量）。因為緣于瓶子的心，雖然不必執著，但因為迷惑混亂，認為它是真實的瓶子，所以是非量。
問：既然有瓶衣（瓶子的外殼），緣於它的智慧生起，應該是符合所知（jñeya，所知）的，為什麼叫做分別（vikalpa，分別）？
論：因為它們對於義（artha，意義）不以自相（svalakṣaṇa，自性）作為境界的緣故。
述曰：這是解釋原因。因為這些智慧，對於地、水、火、風四塵境（bhūta-catuṣṭaya，四大元素），不以自相作為所觀察的境界，而是在上面增加別的真實存在的事物作為所緣，叫做異轉（anyathātvam，變異）。這個意思是說，瓶衣等的本體就是四塵，依靠四塵之上只有共相（sāmānyalakṣaṇa，共相），沒有它的自體。這種知道假名瓶衣，不以本來的自相四塵作為所緣，只是對於這個共相瓶衣的假法而轉，認為它是真實存在的，所以叫做分別。
論：名為似現量（pratibhāsa-pratyakṣa，相似現量）。
述曰：這是解釋定名。因為這個瓶衣依靠四塵是虛假的，只是意識緣于共相而轉，實際上不是眼識現量（cakṣu-pratyakṣa，眼識現量）所能得到的，自己卻認為眼睛看到了瓶衣等，所以叫做似現量。又只是分別執著認為是真實存在的，認為自己的意識現在得到了，也叫做似現。不只是像眼識現量所能得到的，叫做似現量。這個解釋窮盡了道理，之前的解釋侷限了。
論：如果以相似的因智（hetu-jñāna，因智）為先所生起的各種相似的義智（artha-jñāna，義智），叫做似比量（pratibhāsa-anumāna，相似比量）。
述曰：這是第二種解釋相似比量。文句也有兩個部分。首先是標示，然後是解釋。這是第一個部分。其中有三個部分。首先是標示相似的因，其次是標示相似的體，最後是標示相似的名稱。以相似的因以及緣于相似的因的智慧為先產生，然後瞭解相似的宗智（pakṣa-jñāna，宗智），叫做相似比量。問：為什麼相似現量，先標示相似的體，然後標示相似的因？而這個相似比量中，先因後果？答：那個相似現量，由於直接遇到外境，就立即理解認為是真實存在的，不是後來的籌劃思量，所以先標示果。這個相似比量，要因在先，然後才推測邪智後起，所以先舉出因。或者又顯示，三句是三個文句。
【English Translation】 English version: Do not cling to the Anāgata-jñāna-pramāṇa (non-measuring of future knowledge) in your mind. But do not measure external objects. Do not make other interpretations. This is called apramāṇa (non-measuring). Because the mind that cognizes a jar, although it need not be clung to, is confused and considers it a real jar, therefore it is apramāṇa.
Question: Since there is a 'jar-cloth' (the outer appearance of a jar), and wisdom arises in relation to it, it should conform to jñeya (knowable), so why is it called vikalpa (discrimination)?
Treatise: Because they do not take the svalakṣaṇa (self-nature) of artha (meaning) as their object.
Commentary: This explains the reason. Because these wisdoms, regarding the four material elements (bhūta-catuṣṭaya) of earth, water, fire, and wind, do not take their self-nature as the object of observation, but add other real things on top of them as the object of cognition, which is called anyathātvam (alteration). The meaning of this is that the substance of the 'jar-cloth' and so on is the four elements, and relying on the four elements, there is only sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal characteristic), without its own self-nature. This knowing of the nominal 'jar-cloth' does not take the original self-nature of the four elements as the object of cognition, but only turns towards the false dharma of this universal characteristic 'jar-cloth', considering it to be real, so it is called discrimination.
Treatise: It is called pratibhāsa-pratyakṣa (semblance of perception).
Commentary: This explains the fixed name. Because this 'jar-cloth' relies on the four elements and is false, it is only the consciousness that turns towards the universal characteristic, and it is actually not obtained by cakṣu-pratyakṣa (eye-consciousness perception), but one thinks that one's eyes have seen the 'jar-cloth' and so on, so it is called semblance of perception. Moreover, it is only discrimination that clings to it as real, thinking that one's own consciousness has now obtained it, so it is also called semblance of perception. It is not just like what can be obtained by eye-consciousness perception, so it is called semblance of perception. This explanation exhausts the reason, and the previous explanation was limited.
Treatise: If various similar artha-jñāna (knowledge of meaning) arise after a similar hetu-jñāna (knowledge of reason), it is called pratibhāsa-anumāna (semblance of inference).
Commentary: This is the second explanation of semblance of inference. The text also has two parts. First is the indication, and then the explanation. This is the first part. There are three parts in it. First is the indication of the similar reason, second is the indication of the similar substance, and finally is the indication of the similar name. The similar reason and the wisdom that cognizes the similar reason arise first, and then understanding the similar pakṣa-jñāna (knowledge of the subject), it is called similar inference. Question: Why in the semblance of perception, is the similar substance indicated first, and then the similar reason? But in this semblance of inference, the reason comes before the result? Answer: That semblance of perception, because it directly encounters the external object, immediately understands it and considers it to be real, without later planning and deliberation, so the result is indicated first. This semblance of inference requires the reason to be first, and then the evil wisdom arises after speculation, so the reason is given first. Or it also shows that the three sentences are three texts.
如次配釋。
論。似因多種如先已說用彼為因。
述曰。下釋。如先所說四不成。六不定。四相違。及其似喻。皆生似智因。併名似因。前已廣明。恐繁故指。準標有智及因。今釋亦有所知之因。及能知智。皆不正故。俱名似因。然釋文無。即舉因顯用彼因智以為先因。準理標中亦合云。若似因智。及邪憶彼所立宗因不相離念為先。文略故爾。釋文隨標。亦略不說。
論。于似所比諸有智生。
述曰。釋前所起諸似義智。起之與生。義同文異。如於霧等。妄謂為煙。言于似所比。邪證有火。于中智起。言有智生。
論。不能正解名似比量。
述曰。此釋名也。由彼邪因。妄起邪智。不能正解彼火有無等。是真之流。而非真故。名似比量。
論。複次若正顯示能立過失說名能破。
述曰。下第五大段解真能破。文分為三。初總標能破。次辨能破境。后兼顯悟他結能破號。或分為四。初二如前。第三齣能破體。第四結能破名。且依初科。此即初也。他立有失。如實能知。顯之令悟。名正顯示能立過失。其失者何。
論。謂初能立缺減過性立宗過性不成因性不定因性相違因性及喻過性。
述曰。此辨能破境。即他立失分二。初辯闕支。次明支失。謂初能立缺
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如下進行解釋。
論：似乎是因為多種原因，就像先前已經說過的，用那些原因作為因。
述記：下面解釋。就像先前所說的四種不成因（Siddhasādhanābhāsa，指因明推理中，因不能成立的情況），六種不定因（Anaikāntikahetu，指因明推理中，因不能確定地指向所立宗的情況），四種相違因（Viruddhahetu，指因明推理中，因與所立宗相矛盾的情況），以及相似的比喻（ दृष्टान्ताभास，Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa，指不正確的比喻），都會產生相似的智慧，這些都被稱為似因（Hetvābhāsa，指虛假的或有缺陷的因）。之前已經詳細說明過，因為內容繁多所以這裡只是指出來。按照標宗（Pakṣa，指論題）中包含的智慧和因，現在解釋的也包括所知的因，以及能知的智慧，因為都不正確，所以都稱為似因。然而解釋的文字中沒有提到，就舉出因來顯示使用那個因的智慧作為先因。按照道理，標宗中也應該說，如果相似的因的智慧，以及錯誤的記憶，以他們所立的宗（Sādhyadharma，指想要證明的性質）和因（Hetu，指理由或原因）不相離的念頭為先。因為文字簡略所以這樣。解釋的文字隨著標宗，也簡略而不說。
論：對於相似的比量（Anumāṇa，指推理）所比較的，各種有智慧的產生。
述記：解釋先前所產生的各種相似意義的智慧。『起』和『生』，意義相同只是用詞不同。例如對於霧等，錯誤地認為是煙。說『對於相似的比量所比較的』，是錯誤地證明有火，在其中智慧產生。說『有智慧的產生』。
論：不能正確理解的，稱為似比量（Anumāṇābhāsa，指不正確的推理）。
述記：這是解釋名稱。由於那些錯誤的因，錯誤地產生錯誤的智慧，不能正確理解那火的有無等，是真實的流派，但不是真實的，所以稱為似比量。
論：再次，如果正確顯示能立（Sādhanavākya，指論證的陳述）的過失，就稱為能破（Dūṣaṇa，指反駁）。
述記：下面第五大段解釋真正的能破。文章分為三部分。首先總標能破，其次辨別能破的境界，然後兼顯示悟他結能破的名稱。或者分為四部分。前兩部分和前面一樣。第三部分指出能破的體性，第四部分總結能破的名稱。暫且按照第一種分科，這就是第一部分。他人所立的論證有錯誤，如實地能夠知道，顯示出來使他領悟，稱為正確顯示能立的過失。那些過失是什麼呢？
論：所謂最初的能立缺少、減少過失的性質，立宗（Pakṣa，指論題）的過失的性質，不成因（Asiddhahetu，指不能成立的因）的性質，不定因（Anaikāntikahetu，指不能確定指向所立宗的因）的性質，相違因（Viruddhahetu，指與所立宗相矛盾的因）的性質，以及比喻（ दृष्टान्त，Dṛṣṭānta，指例子）的過失的性質。
述記：這是辨別能破的境界，也就是他人所立的論證的錯誤，分為兩部分。首先辨別缺少支分，其次說明支分的過失。所謂最初的能立缺少
【English Translation】 English version: Explanation proceeds as follows.
Treatise: It seems due to various reasons, as previously stated, using those reasons as the cause.
Commentary: Explaining below. Like the four types of unestablished reasons (Siddhasādhanābhāsa, referring to situations where the reason cannot be established in inference), the six types of uncertain reasons (Anaikāntikahetu, referring to situations where the reason cannot definitively point to the established proposition), the four types of contradictory reasons (Viruddhahetu, referring to situations where the reason contradicts the established proposition), and the similar analogies (Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, referring to incorrect analogies) as previously mentioned, all generate similar wisdom, and these are all called fallacious reasons (Hetvābhāsa, referring to false or flawed reasons). This has been explained in detail before, so it is only pointed out here due to the extensive content. According to the wisdom and reason contained in the proposition (Pakṣa, referring to the thesis), the explanation now also includes the known reason and the knowable wisdom, because they are both incorrect, so they are both called fallacious reasons. However, the explanatory text does not mention it, so the reason is given to show that the wisdom using that reason is taken as the prior cause. According to reason, it should also be said in the proposition that if the wisdom of a similar reason, and the wrong memory, take the thought of their established proposition (Sādhyadharma, referring to the property to be proven) and reason (Hetu, referring to the reason or cause) not being separate as the prior. It is like this because the text is brief. The explanatory text follows the proposition and is also brief and does not say it.
Treatise: Regarding the various productions of wisdom in relation to similar inferences (Anumāṇa, referring to reasoning).
Commentary: Explaining the various wisdoms of similar meanings that arose earlier. 'Arising' and 'production' have the same meaning but different words. For example, mistaking mist for smoke. Saying 'regarding what is compared by similar inferences' is wrongly proving that there is fire, in which wisdom arises. Saying 'there is a production of wisdom'.
Treatise: What cannot be correctly understood is called a fallacious inference (Anumāṇābhāsa, referring to incorrect reasoning).
Commentary: This is explaining the name. Because of those wrong reasons, wrong wisdom arises wrongly, and it cannot correctly understand the existence or non-existence of that fire, etc., which is a true lineage, but not true, so it is called a fallacious inference.
Treatise: Furthermore, if one correctly points out the faults of the statement of proof (Sādhanavākya, referring to the statement of argument), it is called refutation (Dūṣaṇa, referring to rebuttal).
Commentary: The fifth major section below explains the true refutation. The text is divided into three parts. First, the general statement of refutation, second, distinguishing the realm of refutation, and then also showing the name of the refutation that enlightens others. Or it is divided into four parts. The first two parts are the same as before. The third part points out the nature of refutation, and the fourth part summarizes the name of refutation. For the time being, according to the first division, this is the first part. If the argument established by others has errors, and one can truly know them, and show them to enlighten them, it is called correctly pointing out the faults of the statement of proof. What are those faults?
Treatise: What is meant is the nature of the initial statement of proof being deficient, the nature of the fault of the proposition (Pakṣa, referring to the thesis), the nature of the unestablished reason (Asiddhahetu, referring to the reason that cannot be established), the nature of the uncertain reason (Anaikāntikahetu, referring to the reason that cannot definitively point to the established proposition), the nature of the contradictory reason (Viruddhahetu, referring to the reason that contradicts the established proposition), and the nature of the fault of the analogy (Dṛṣṭānta, referring to the example).
Commentary: This is distinguishing the realm of refutation, that is, the errors of the argument established by others, divided into two parts. First, distinguishing the missing limbs, and second, explaining the faults of the limbs. What is meant is that the initial statement of proof is missing
減過性。此即初辯闕支。或總無言。或言無義。過重先明。故云初也。此之缺減。古師約宗因喻。或六七句。陳那已后。約因三相。亦六或七。並如前辯。或且約陳那因三相為七句者。闕一有三者。如數論師對聲論。立聲是無常。眼所見故。聲無常宗。瓶盆等為同品。虛空等為異品。此但闕初而有後二。聲論對薩婆多。立聲為常。所聞性故。虛空為共同品。瓶盆等為異。闕第二相。所量性因。闕第三相。闕二有三者。如立聲非勤發。眼所見故。虛空等為同。瓶盆等為異。闕初二相。如立我常。對佛法者。因云非勤發。虛空為同。電等為異。因闕所依。故無初相。電等上有。闕第三相。諸四相違因。即闕后二相。如立聲常。眼所見故。虛空為同。盆等為異。三相俱闕。立宗過性等下。別明支過。此等或於能破。立所破名。故理門云。能立缺減能破。立宗過效能破等。問云何能立缺減等名為能破。能破理在出彼過言故。答此于能破說所破名。據實能破在於言也。或於所作說能作名。能立缺減等為因。能起此能破言。名為能作。即能破言從起。名為所作。破實在言。缺減能破等。是于所作立能作名。亦如於果立彼因號故也。或云。此唯約境。以下更云顯示此言。若前是言。何須后說。
論。顯示此言開曉問者故名能破
【現代漢語翻譯】 減過性（減少過失的性質）。這就是最初辨析論證支分缺失的情況。或者完全沒有陳述，或者陳述沒有意義。因為過失的嚴重性先被闡明，所以說是『初』。這種缺失，古代的論師從宗（命題）、因（理由）、喻（例證）三個方面來分析，可能是六句或七句。陳那（Dignāga）之後，從因的三相（遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性）來分析，也是六句或七句，都如前面所辨析的那樣。或者暫且按照陳那的因三相來說，有七句的情況：缺失一個相有三種情況。例如，數論師（Sāṃkhya）針對聲論師（Śabdika）立論說，『聲音是無常的，因為是眼睛所見。』聲音無常是宗，瓶子、盆子等是同品，虛空等是異品。這只是缺失了第一個相（遍是宗法性），而有後兩個相。聲論師針對薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）立論說，『聲音是常的，因為是所聞性。』虛空是共同品，瓶子、盆子等是異品，缺失了第二個相（同品定有性）。『所量性』作為因，缺失了第三個相（異品遍無性）。缺失兩個相有三種情況。例如，立論說『聲音不是勤奮發出的，因為是眼睛所見。』虛空等是同品，瓶子、盆子等是異品，缺失了最初兩個相。例如，針對佛法修行者立論說『我是常的』，理由是『不是勤奮發出的』，虛空是同品，閃電等是異品。因為因缺失所依，所以沒有第一個相。閃電等上面有（無常性），缺失了第三個相。各種四相違因，就是缺失了后兩個相。例如，立論說『聲音是常的，因為是眼睛所見。』虛空是同品，盆子等是異品，三個相都缺失。立宗過性等以下，分別闡明論證支分的過失。這些過失，或者在能破（駁論）中，被立為所破（被駁斥的對象）的名稱。所以《理門論》說：『能立（論證）的缺失，能破（駁論）就立為宗過性（命題的過失）能破等。』問：為什麼能立的缺失等被稱為能破呢？能破的道理在於說出那些過失。答：這是在能破中說所破的名稱，實際上能破在於言語。或者對於所作（被做的事）說能作（能做的事）的名稱，能立的缺失等作為原因，能夠引起這種能破的言語，名稱為能作，即能破的言語是從（能立的缺失等）產生的，名稱為所作，破斥的實質在於言語。缺失的能破等，這是對於所作建立能作的名稱，也像對於結果建立那個原因的名稱一樣。或者說，這只是從境（對像）的角度來說的，以下又說『顯示此言』。如果前面是言語，為什麼後面還要說呢？
論：顯示此言，是爲了開導啓發提問者，所以名為能破（駁論）。 現代漢語譯本 減過性（減少過失的性質）。這就是最初辨析論證支分缺失的情況。或者完全沒有陳述，或者陳述沒有意義。因為過失的嚴重性先被闡明，所以說是『初』。這種缺失，古代的論師從宗（命題）、因（理由）、喻（例證）三個方面來分析，可能是六句或七句。陳那（Dignāga）之後，從因的三相（遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性）來分析，也是六句或七句，都如前面所辨析的那樣。或者暫且按照陳那的因三相來說，有七句的情況：缺失一個相有三種情況。例如，數論師（Sāṃkhya）針對聲論師（Śabdika）立論說，『聲音是無常的，因為是眼睛所見。』聲音無常是宗，瓶子、盆子等是同品，虛空等是異品。這只是缺失了第一個相（遍是宗法性），而有後兩個相。聲論師針對薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）立論說，『聲音是常的，因為是所聞性。』虛空是共同品，瓶子、盆子等是異品，缺失了第二個相（同品定有性）。『所量性』作為因，缺失了第三個相（異品遍無性）。缺失兩個相有三種情況。例如，立論說『聲音不是勤奮發出的，因為是眼睛所見。』虛空等是同品，瓶子、盆子等是異品，缺失了最初兩個相。例如，針對佛法修行者立論說『我是常的』，理由是『不是勤奮發出的』，虛空是同品，閃電等是異品。因為因缺失所依，所以沒有第一個相。閃電等上面有（無常性），缺失了第三個相。各種四相違因，就是缺失了后兩個相。例如，立論說『聲音是常的，因為是眼睛所見。』虛空是同品，盆子等是異品，三個相都缺失。立宗過性等以下，分別闡明論證支分的過失。這些過失，或者在能破（駁論）中，被立為所破（被駁斥的對象）的名稱。所以《理門論》說：『能立（論證）的缺失，能破（駁論）就立為宗過性（命題的過失）能破等。』問：為什麼能立的缺失等被稱為能破呢？能破的道理在於說出那些過失。答：這是在能破中說所破的名稱，實際上能破在於言語。或者對於所作（被做的事）說能作（能做的事）的名稱，能立的缺失等作為原因，能夠引起這種能破的言語，名稱為能作，即能破的言語是從（能立的缺失等）產生的，名稱為所作，破斥的實質在於言語。缺失的能破等，這是對於所作建立能作的名稱，也像對於結果建立那個原因的名稱一樣。或者說，這只是從境（對像）的角度來說的，以下又說『顯示此言』。如果前面是言語，為什麼後面還要說呢？
論：顯示此言，是爲了開導啓發提問者，所以名為能破（駁論）。
【English Translation】 Reducing faults. This is the initial analysis of the deficiency of the members of the argument. Either there is no statement at all, or the statement is meaningless. Because the severity of the fault is clarified first, it is called 'initial'. This deficiency, ancient teachers analyzed from the aspects of proposition (zong), reason (yin), and example (yu), possibly six or seven sentences. After Dignāga (Chenna), it is analyzed from the three aspects of the reason (pervasion of the property of the subject, definite presence in similar instances, complete absence in dissimilar instances), also six or seven sentences, all as analyzed before. Or, for the time being, according to Dignāga's three aspects of the reason, there are seven sentences: lacking one aspect has three situations. For example, the Sāṃkhya (Shulunshi) argues against the Śabdika (Shenglunshi), saying, 'Sound is impermanent because it is seen by the eye.' 'Sound is impermanent' is the proposition, bottles, pots, etc., are similar instances, and space, etc., are dissimilar instances. This only lacks the first aspect (pervasion of the property of the subject) but has the latter two aspects. The Śabdika argues against the Sarvāstivāda (Sapoduo Bu), saying, 'Sound is permanent because it is the property of being heard.' Space is a common instance, bottles, pots, etc., are dissimilar instances, lacking the second aspect (definite presence in similar instances). 'Measurability' as a reason lacks the third aspect (complete absence in dissimilar instances). Lacking two aspects has three situations. For example, arguing that 'sound is not produced by effort because it is seen by the eye.' Space, etc., are similar instances, bottles, pots, etc., are dissimilar instances, lacking the first two aspects. For example, arguing against Buddhist practitioners that 'I am permanent,' the reason is 'not produced by effort,' space is a similar instance, lightning, etc., are dissimilar instances. Because the reason lacks a basis, it does not have the first aspect. Lightning, etc., have (impermanence) above, lacking the third aspect. Various contradictory reasons lacking all four aspects lack the latter two aspects. For example, arguing that 'sound is permanent because it is seen by the eye.' Space is a similar instance, pots, etc., are dissimilar instances, all three aspects are lacking. Below 'establishing the fault of the proposition', the faults of the members of the argument are explained separately. These faults, or in refutation (nengpo), are established as the names of what is refuted (beibochi de duixiang). Therefore, the Hetucakra says: 'The deficiency of the proof (nengli), the refutation (nengpo) establishes the fault of the proposition (zong guoxing), refutation, etc.' Question: Why are the deficiencies of the proof, etc., called refutation? The reason for refutation lies in stating those faults. Answer: This is stating the name of what is refuted in the refutation; in reality, the refutation lies in speech. Or, for what is done (beizuo de shi), the name of what can be done (nengzuo de shi) is stated; the deficiency of the proof, etc., as a cause, can cause this speech of refutation, the name is what can be done, that is, the speech of refutation arises from (the deficiency of the proof, etc.), the name is what is done, the essence of refutation lies in speech. Deficient refutation, etc., this is establishing the name of what can be done for what is done, just as establishing the name of that cause for the result. Or it is said that this is only from the perspective of the object (jing); below, it is further said 'showing this speech'. If the previous was speech, why is it necessary to say it later?
Treatise: Showing this speech is to enlighten and inspire the questioner, so it is called refutation (nengpo).
。
述曰。兼顯悟他結能破號。立者過生。敵責言汝失。立證俱問。其失者何。名為問者。敵能正顯缺減等非。明之在言。名顯示此。因能破言。曉悟彼問。令知其失。舍妄趣真。此即悟他。名為能破。此即簡非。兼悟他以釋能破名。簡雖破他不令他悟亦非能破。
論。若不實顯能立過言名似能破。
述曰。此大段第六明似能破。文分為三。初標似能破。次出似破體。后結似破名。辯釋所以。此初也。
論。謂于圓滿能立顯示缺減性言于無過宗有過宗言于成就因不成因言于決定因不定因言于不相違因相違因言于無過喻有過喻言。
述曰。此出似能破體。初明妄言闕。后辯正言邪。立者量圓。妄言有缺。因喻無失。虛語過言。不了彼真。興言自負。由對真立。名似能破。準真能破。思之可悉。
論。如是言說名似能破。
述曰。下結似能破名。辯釋所以。于中分二。即結名及釋。此即初也。如是者。指前之詞言說者。即圓滿能立缺減言等。如此等言名為似破。問何故於圓滿能立。顯示缺減性言等。為似能破。
論。以不能顯他宗過失彼無過故。
述曰。釋所以。夫能破者。彼立有過。如實出之。顯示立證。敵令知其失。能生彼智。此有悟他之能。可名能破。彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：兼顧顯示領悟他人，斷除煩惱的能力，建立名號。『立者』指陳述觀點的人，『過生』指過失產生。『敵責』指對方責難，說『你』有缺失。『立證俱問』指對所立的論證都提出疑問。『其失者何』，名為『問者』。對方能夠正確地顯示出論證的缺陷、減少等錯誤，明白地表達出來，這叫做『顯示』。因為能夠駁斥對方的言論，使對方明白所提出的問題，從而知道自己的錯誤，捨棄虛妄而趨向真理，這就是『悟他』，名為『能破』。這也就是簡別非『能破』的情況。兼顧領悟他人來解釋『能破』的名稱。簡別即使駁倒對方，但不使對方領悟，也不能稱為『能破』。
論：如果不能真實地顯示出能立的過失，那麼這種言論就叫做『似能破』。
述曰：這大段第六部分說明『似能破』。文章分為三部分。首先標出『似能破』，其次說明『似能破』的體性，最後總結『似能破』的名稱，並解釋原因。這是第一部分。
論：所謂的『似能破』，是指對於圓滿的能立，卻顯示出其有缺陷；對於沒有過失的宗（paksha，論題），卻說它有過失；對於有過失的宗，卻說它沒有過失；對於成就的因（hetu，理由），卻說它是不成因；對於不成的因，卻說它是成就的因；對於決定的因，卻說它是不定的因；對於不定的因，卻說它是決定的因；對於不相違的喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子），卻說它是相違的喻；對於相違的喻，卻說它是不相違的喻；對於沒有過失的喻，卻說它有過失；對於有過失的喻，卻說它沒有過失。
述曰：這是說明『似能破』的體性。首先說明虛妄的言論有缺陷，然後辨別正確的言論有邪謬。立論者所建立的量（inference）是圓滿的，但虛妄的言論卻說它有缺陷。因和喻本來沒有缺失，但虛假的言語卻說它有過失。不能明白對方的真實之處，卻誇誇其談，自以為是。由於針對真實的能立，所以叫做『似能破』。參照真實的『能破』，思考就可以明白。
論：像這樣的言論叫做『似能破』。
述曰：下面總結『似能破』的名稱，並解釋原因。其中分為兩部分，即總結名稱和解釋原因。這是第一部分。『如是者』，指代前面的詞語。『言說者』，即圓滿能立的缺減言等。像這樣的言論叫做『似能破』。問：為什麼對於圓滿的能立，顯示出其有缺陷等言論，是『似能破』呢？
論：因為不能顯示出對方宗的過失，因為對方的宗沒有過失。
述曰：這是解釋原因。真正的『能破』，是對方的立論有過失，如實地指出它，顯示出立論和論證的錯誤，使對方知道自己的錯誤，能夠產生對方的智慧，這才有領悟他人的能力，可以稱為『能破』。對方
【English Translation】 English version: Statement: It also shows the ability to enlighten others and break through afflictions, establishing a title. 'Establisher' refers to the person who states the viewpoint, and 'fault arising' refers to the occurrence of a fault. 'Adversary's blame' refers to the opponent's accusation, saying 'you' have a deficiency. 'Both establishment and proof are questioned' refers to raising questions about the established arguments. 'What is the fault?' is called 'questioner'. The opponent can correctly show the defects, reductions, and other errors of the argument, and clearly express them, which is called 'showing'. Because it can refute the opponent's arguments, make the opponent understand the questions raised, and thus know their mistakes, abandon falsehood and move towards truth, this is 'enlightening others', called 'capable of refuting'. This is also distinguishing the non-'capable of refuting' situations. Considering enlightening others to explain the name 'capable of refuting'. Distinguishing that even if refuting the opponent, but not making the opponent understand, it cannot be called 'capable of refuting'.
Treatise: If one cannot truly show the faults of the valid proof, then such a statement is called 'pseudo-refutation'.
Statement: This sixth major section explains 'pseudo-refutation'. The article is divided into three parts. First, it marks out 'pseudo-refutation', second, it explains the nature of 'pseudo-refutation', and finally, it summarizes the name of 'pseudo-refutation' and explains the reasons. This is the first part.
Treatise: The so-called 'pseudo-refutation' refers to showing defects in a complete valid proof; saying that a thesis (paksha, topic) without faults has faults; saying that a thesis with faults has no faults; saying that an accomplished reason (hetu, reason) is an unaccomplished reason; saying that an unaccomplished reason is an accomplished reason; saying that a definite reason is an indefinite reason; saying that an indefinite reason is a definite reason; saying that a non-contradictory example (dṛṣṭānta, example) is a contradictory example; saying that a contradictory example is a non-contradictory example; saying that an example without faults has faults; saying that an example with faults has no faults.
Statement: This is to explain the nature of 'pseudo-refutation'. First, it explains that false statements have defects, and then it distinguishes that correct statements have fallacies. The inference established by the establisher is complete, but the false statement says it has defects. The reason and example originally have no defects, but the false words say it has faults. Unable to understand the truth of the opponent, but talking eloquently and being self-righteous. Because it is aimed at the true valid proof, it is called 'pseudo-refutation'. Refer to the true 'capable of refuting', and thinking about it can be understood.
Treatise: Such statements are called 'pseudo-refutation'.
Statement: The following summarizes the name of 'pseudo-refutation' and explains the reasons. It is divided into two parts, namely summarizing the name and explaining the reasons. This is the first part. 'Such' refers to the preceding words. 'Statement' refers to the defective statements of the complete valid proof, etc. Such statements are called 'pseudo-refutation'. Question: Why is it that showing defects in a complete valid proof, etc., is 'pseudo-refutation'?
Treatise: Because it cannot show the faults of the opponent's thesis, because the opponent's thesis has no faults.
Statement: This is to explain the reason. The true 'capable of refuting' is that the opponent's argument has faults, and truthfully points it out, showing the errors of the argument and proof, making the opponent know their mistakes, and being able to generate the opponent's wisdom, which has the ability to enlighten others, and can be called 'capable of refuting'. The opponent
實無犯。妄起言非。以不能顯他宗之過。何不能顯。彼無過故。由此立名為似能破。
論。且止斯事。
述曰。大文第三方隅略示。顯息煩文。論斯八義。真似寔繁。略辯為入廣之由。具顯恐無進之漸。故今略說之。云且止斯事。
論。已宣少句義為始立方隅其間理非理妙辨于余處。
述曰。一部之中文分為二。此即第二顯略指廣。上二句顯略。下二句指廣。略宣如前少句文義。欲為始學立其方隅。八義之中。理與非理。如彼理門。因門集量。具廣妙辨。
因明入正理論疏卷下
寫本云。
道本奧云。以天長六年十二月略見竟。予二年春欲披疏文。鳩集眾本。幸得明詮。自筆道本。矚而玩之。實為精要。但星霜久積。其文將消。意欲模寫胎之來葉。遂乃初移點。次寫道。后一攬。於是犁上卷之漸畢。夏天受病。模寫屬廢。三年夏重。中卷並四相違半未成。四年秋畢其功矣。多日采翰。疲眼竭力。雖懼移點之舛錯。猶懌模寫之果然。既而傳法燈於後代。開惠眼于來世(而已)。於時永久四年秋八月十日于興福寺灌頂院慧曉記之(云云寫本奧日比也)。
或本云。
始自仁平四年三月二十五日至五月二日移點畢。
釋氏藏俊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：實際上並沒有過失。只是虛妄地發起言論，說對方的宗義有過失，這是不正確的。為什麼不能揭示對方宗義的過失呢？因為對方實際上沒有過失。因此，這種情況被稱作『似能破』。
論：暫且停止討論這件事。
述曰：以上這段文字，從第三個方面簡略地揭示了要點，是爲了減少繁瑣的文字。論述這八種義理，真實和相似的情況非常繁多。簡略地辨析是爲了引匯入門，如果全部詳細地闡述，恐怕會使人失去進一步學習的興趣。所以現在簡略地說一下。『云且止斯事』（意思是說，暫且停止討論這件事）。
論：已經宣說了以簡短的語句和義理為開端，確立了立論的方方面面，其中關於理和非理的精妙辨析，在其他地方有詳細的論述。
述曰：一部論著的內容分為兩個部分，這裡是第二個部分，即簡略地揭示要點，廣泛地指引方向。前面兩句是簡略地揭示要點，後面兩句是廣泛地指引方向。像前面那樣簡略地宣說語句和義理，是爲了給初學者確立立論的方方面面。八種義理之中，關於理和非理，就像理門、因門、集量那樣，有詳細而精妙的辨析。
《因明入正理論疏》卷下
寫本上說：
道本奧說：在天長六年十二月大致看完。我於二年春天想要翻閱疏文，收集各種版本。幸運地得到了明詮的自筆道本，仔細地閱讀，確實非常精要。但是因為時間長久，文字將要消失。想要摹寫下來傳給後代，於是開始移動點，然後抄寫文字，最後全部抄寫完成。於是犁上卷漸漸完成。夏天生病，摹寫的事情停止了。三年夏天重新開始，中卷和四相違的一半還沒有完成。四年秋天完成了這項工作。花費了很多時間，眼睛疲勞，精力耗盡。雖然害怕移動點的時候出錯，但還是很高興能夠完成摹寫。這樣就可以將佛法傳給後代，開啟後人的智慧之眼（而已）。于永久四年秋八月十日，在興福寺灌頂院，慧曉記錄（云云寫本奧日比也）。
或者某個版本上說：
從仁平四年三月二十五日到五月二日，移動點的工作完成。
釋氏藏俊
【English Translation】 English version: In reality, there is no fault. It is merely a false arising of speech, claiming that the other's tenet has a fault, which is incorrect. Why can't the fault of the other's tenet be revealed? Because the other actually has no fault. Therefore, this situation is called 'seeming to be able to refute' (似能破).
Treatise: Let's stop discussing this matter for now.
Commentary: The above passage, from the third aspect, briefly reveals the key points in order to reduce verbose text. Discussing these eight meanings, the true and the similar are very numerous. Briefly analyzing is to guide entry, if all are explained in detail, it may cause people to lose interest in further learning. So now I will briefly say it. '云且止斯事' (meaning, let's stop discussing this matter for now).
Treatise: It has already been declared that with short sentences and meanings as the beginning, the aspects of establishing arguments have been established, and the subtle distinctions between reason and unreason are discussed in detail elsewhere.
Commentary: The content of a treatise is divided into two parts, this is the second part, which is to briefly reveal the key points and broadly guide the direction. The first two sentences are to briefly reveal the key points, and the last two sentences are to broadly guide the direction. Briefly explaining the sentences and meanings as before is to establish the aspects of establishing arguments for beginners. Among the eight meanings, regarding reason and unreason, like the Reason Gate (理門), the Cause Gate (因門), and the Collection of Measures (集量), there are detailed and subtle distinctions.
Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa (因明入正理論疏) - Volume 2
The manuscript says:
Daobon's Postscript says: I roughly finished reading it in December of Tencho 6 (天長六年). In the spring of the second year, I wanted to read the commentary and collect various versions. Fortunately, I obtained the Daobon (道本) handwritten by Myo Gen (明詮), and after carefully reading it, it was indeed very essential. However, because of the long time, the text was about to disappear. I wanted to copy it down to pass it on to future generations, so I started moving the dots, then copying the text, and finally copying everything. Thus, the first volume of the plow was gradually completed. I became ill in the summer, and the copying stopped. I restarted in the summer of the third year, and half of the middle volume and the four contradictions were not yet completed. I finished this work in the autumn of the fourth year. It took a lot of time, my eyes were tired, and my energy was exhausted. Although I was afraid of making mistakes when moving the dots, I was still very happy to be able to complete the copying. In this way, the Dharma can be passed on to future generations, and the eyes of wisdom can be opened for future generations (that's all). On the 10th day of the 8th month of autumn in Eikyu 4 (永久四年), recorded by Eikyo (慧曉) at the Abhiseka Hall (灌頂院) of Kofuku-ji Temple (興福寺) (etc., the postscript of the manuscript is also compared).
Or a certain version says:
From the 25th day of the 3rd month to the 2nd day of the 5th month of Ninpei 4 (仁平四年), the work of moving the dots was completed.
Shakushi Zoushun (釋氏藏俊)
久壽二年十二月二十九日以藏公為師讀
始同三年正月九日讀畢字點有誤者改直了。
從一位(在判)
藏俊幸入先師之室雖稟遺訓識隔正理之門不足傳燈況每披三卷大疏失文之首尾乍訪兩朝諸家迷義之淺深然依 長者殿下仰任明詮之點守先師說謹侍御讀之末座謬授因明之大疏其年月日詳于御筆。
久壽三─二─十七─重讀了(不對師)去十一─始之十三日抄三十三過文了。
見疏之間云點云義不審不少書其趣押其處追問藏公決之。
點不審自保元年五月二日至同八日決之。
義不審自同年同月八日至同十八日決之。
此中九十十一十七四ケ日隨決令藏公記問(余)答(藏公)之趣以備后鑒。
建武二年(乙亥)十一月三日書寫之
扶八九之老眼終三卷之微功愿因兔毫之緣列龍華之筵矣。
同三年正月二十五日點了 權律師尊經
(校者云。九帖之內。中下。下中。下下。三帖左記錄在)。
舍那瓶水芳流有盡此帖昔埋沒于明石之邊塵也既多年慈尊傳燈餘光尚照要文今還歸於興福之凈剎而再全部。
各投金錢寄附之
於時文化(庚午)年九月 日
法印大僧都
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 久壽二年十二月二十九日，以藏公為老師開始閱讀。 始同三年正月九日閱讀完畢，將字跡點校有誤的地方改正了。 從一位（在判） 藏俊倖進入先師的房間，雖然秉承了遺訓，但對正理之門的理解有所隔閡，不足以傳燈。況且每次翻閱三卷大疏，常常遺漏文章的首尾；偶爾拜訪兩朝諸家，也對義理的深淺感到迷惑。然而，依仗長者殿下，仰仗明詮的點校，遵循先師的說法，恭敬地在御讀的末座，謬誤地講授因明的大疏。其年月日詳細記錄在御筆中。 久壽三年二月十七日，重新閱讀完畢（沒有老師在場）。去掉十一，從十三日開始抄寫，三十三遍文章抄寫完畢。 看到疏文之間有點校和義理不清楚的地方，就稍微記錄下來，並記下其要點，追問藏公，由他來決斷。 點校不清楚的地方，從保元年五月二日至同月八日決斷完畢。 義理不清楚的地方，從同年同月八日至同月十八日決斷完畢。 這其中九日、十日、十一日、十七日這四天，隨著決斷，讓藏公記錄提問（剩餘的），回答（藏公）的要點，以備後來的借鑑。 建武二年（乙亥）十一月三日書寫。 扶著八九十歲的老眼，完成了三卷的微薄功勞，愿憑藉這兔毫的緣分，列席龍華的盛宴。 同三年正月二十五日點校完畢。權律師尊經。 （校者說：九帖之內，中下、下中、下下，三帖左側有記錄）。 舍那瓶中的水，芳香流淌終有盡時。此帖過去埋沒在明石（地名）的邊塵之中。如今多年過去，慈尊（Maitreya）傳燈的餘光依然照耀著重要的文章，現在又迴歸到興福寺（Kōfuku-ji）的清凈佛剎，得以再次全部展現。 各自投入金錢寄附。 於時文化（庚午）年九月日 法印大僧都
【English Translation】 English version On the 29th day of the twelfth month of Kyūju 2 (1155), began reading with Zōkō (藏公) as the teacher. Finished reading on the 9th day of the first month of Shidō 3 (1167), corrected the errors in the characters and punctuation. From Ichii (一位) (in judgment) Zōshun (藏俊幸) entered the room of the late master, although inheriting the teachings, his understanding of the gate of correct principles was somewhat lacking, insufficient to transmit the lamp. Moreover, each time he perused the three volumes of the great commentary, he often missed the beginning and end of the text; occasionally visiting various scholars of the two dynasties, he was also confused about the depth of the meaning. However, relying on Lord Chōja (長者殿下), relying on the punctuation of Myōsen (明詮), following the words of the late master, respectfully in the last seat of the imperial reading, mistakenly lectured on the great commentary of Hetuvidyā (因明). The details of the year and month are recorded in the imperial writing. Kyūju 3 (1156), February 17th, finished rereading (without a teacher present). Removed 11, started copying from the 13th, finished copying the 33 passages. When seeing unclear points in the commentary regarding punctuation and meaning, I slightly noted them down, and recorded their key points, questioning Zōkō (藏公), who would decide them. Unclear punctuation points were resolved from the 2nd day of the 5th month of Hoan 1 (1120) to the 8th day of the same month. Unclear meaning points were resolved from the 8th day of the same month to the 18th day of the same month. During these four days, the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 17th, as the decisions were made, I had Zōkō (藏公) record the questions (remaining), and the answers (from Zōkō (藏公)), for future reference. Written on the 3rd day of the 11th month of Kenmu 2 (1335). Supporting the old eyes of eighty or ninety, I completed the meager merit of the three volumes, wishing to attend the Dragon Flower Assembly (龍華) by virtue of this rabbit-hair brush. Finished punctuating on the 25th day of the first month of the same year. Provisional Lawyer Sonkyō (尊經). (The collator says: Within the nine volumes, the middle lower, lower middle, and lower lower, three volumes have records on the left). The fragrant flow of the water in the Kundika (舍那瓶) has an end. This volume was once buried in the dust near Akashi (明石). Now, after many years, the remaining light of Maitreya's (慈尊) transmission of the lamp still illuminates the important text, and it has now returned to the pure temple of Kōfuku-ji (興福寺), and can be fully displayed again. Each person contributes and donates money. At the time, the year of Bunka (文化) (Kōgo (庚午)), the 9th month, day. Hōin Daisōzu (法印大僧都)
訓 算
法印大僧都 專 賀
法印 英 專
法印 順 實
法印大僧都 訓 英
法印 榮 學
法印 秀 算
法印 章 誠
法印 教 憲
法印 弘 映
權律師 榮 宗
權律師 榮 尊
權律師 算 榮
擬講 秀 演
榮 懷
長 胤
愿 辨
長 有
智 興
訓 尊
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 訓 算
法印大僧都（佛教僧階名） 專 賀
法印（佛教僧階名） 英 專
法印（佛教僧階名） 順 實
法印大僧都（佛教僧階名） 訓 英
法印（佛教僧階名） 榮 學
法印（佛教僧階名） 秀 算
法印（佛教僧階名） 章 誠
法印（佛教僧階名） 教 憲
法印（佛教僧階名） 弘 映
權律師（佛教僧官名） 榮 宗
權律師（佛教僧官名） 榮 尊
權律師（佛教僧官名） 算 榮
擬講 秀 演
榮 懷
長 胤
愿 辨
長 有
智 興
訓 尊
【English Translation】 English version: Training in Calculation
Great Dharma Seal High Priest (Buddhist monastic rank) Sen Ka
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Ei Sen
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Jun Jitsu
Great Dharma Seal High Priest (Buddhist monastic rank) Kun Ei
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Ei Gaku
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Shu San
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Sho Sei
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Kyo Ken
Dharma Seal (Buddhist monastic rank) Ko Ei
Provisional Attorney (Buddhist ecclesiastical title) Ei Shu
Provisional Attorney (Buddhist ecclesiastical title) Ei Son
Provisional Attorney (Buddhist ecclesiastical title) San Ei
Proposed Lecturer Shu En
Ei Kai
Cho In
Gan Ben
Cho U
Chi Kyo
Kun Son