T44n1841_因明義斷
大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1841 因明義斷
No. 1841 [cf. No. 1630]
因明義斷
淄洲大云寺苾芻慧沼撰
詳夫。因明論者銓衡八藏。繩墨四韋。九十六道之規模。二十八師之軌轍。宗歸立破。道洽自他。寔大夜之玉珠。是長昏之龍燭。故暢其鴻賾者。乃樹正之司南。控彼宏綱者。誠破邪之逐北。是以。法王肇出。初辟幽關。智將嗣生。重開奧府。無著聳八支以立玄極。同八柱以承天。世親陳五分。以顯深幾。若五山而鎮地。復有陳那命世以秀出。舉三立以類三光。天主應時以挺生。張二悟而齊二耀。可謂。趨寶山之帝輦。出朽宅之王軒。故用之者稱智雄。述之者標詞杰。所以。演暢之輩。皆吐袪闇之神燈。注述之儔。各奮斬邪之智劍。故言申即陳立破。開章先辨正邪。紛綸於八極之間。暐曄於六合之內。沼雖不敏。敢慕高蹤。故輒藻鏡是非。議詳得失。豈只故乖前哲。務為成其本宗。冀來鑒忽披。幸知其意耳。
有人解能立云。若立三支。令他解悟。故名能立。若望因喻先成宗支未許。為成未信必藉能成。因喻既為能成。能成必有所立。即以宗為所立。因喻為能立。其義云何。答若以一向。望于敵論宗他未許。必因喻成故。所立中者。共量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《因明義斷》
淄州大云寺苾芻（bì chú，和尚）慧沼（huì zhǎo，人名） 撰
詳細來說，因明理論是衡量佛教八藏（bā zàng，佛教經典總彙）的標準，是規範印度四吠陀（sì fèi tuó，古印度經典）的準繩，涵蓋了九十六種外道（jiǔ shí liù zhǒng wài dào，泛指非佛教的學說）的規模，以及二十八位外道宗師（èr shí bā wèi wài dào zōng shī，外道宗師）的軌跡。其宗旨在於建立正論、破斥邪說，其道理普及自身與他人。它確實是漫長黑夜中的寶珠，是驅散長久昏暗的龍燭。所以，能夠充分闡揚其博大精深之處的人，就是樹立正見的指南針；能夠駕馭其宏偉綱領的人，確實是破斥邪說的先鋒。因此，法王（fǎ wáng，指佛陀）開始出現時，首先開闢了幽深玄妙的法門；智慧的將領相繼誕生，重新開啟了奧妙的府庫。無著（wú zhuó，菩薩名）聳立八支（bā zhī，因明的組成部分）以建立玄妙的極則，如同八根柱子支撐著天宇。世親（shì qīn，菩薩名）陳述五分（wǔ fēn，因明的組成部分），以彰顯深奧的玄機，猶如五座大山鎮守著大地。後來又有陳那（chén nà，論師名）應運而生，才華出衆，舉出三支論式（sān zhī lùn shì，因明的論證結構）來比擬太陽、月亮、星辰三光。天主（tiān zhǔ，論師名）應時而生，闡揚二悟（èr wù，兩種覺悟）來比肩日月的光輝。這真可謂是走向寶山的帝王車輦，走出朽敗房屋的王者軒車。所以，運用它的人被稱為智慧雄杰，著述它的人被譽為文辭俊傑。因此，演說闡揚因明的人們，都吐露出驅散黑暗的神燈；註釋著述因明的人們，都奮起斬斷邪說的智慧之劍。所以說，言辭申明就是要陳述建立和破斥，文章開頭首先要辨別正邪。因明理論紛繁複雜，遍佈於八方極遠之處；光明照耀，普及於天地六合之內。我慧沼雖然不敏，也敢於仰慕前賢的高尚足跡，所以就嘗試著用藻鏡來辨別是非，詳細地討論得失。難道只是故意違背前人的哲理，務必要成就自己的宗派嗎？只是希望後來的鑑賞者偶爾翻閱，能夠了解我的用意罷了。
有人解釋能立（néng lì，論證者）說，如果建立三支論式，使他人理解領悟，所以稱為能立。如果希望因（yīn，理由）、喻（yù，比喻）先於宗（zōng，論點）支成立，但宗支尚未被認可，爲了成就未被相信的宗支，必須憑藉能成（néng chéng，能成立的論證）。因和喻既然是能成，能成必定有所立（suǒ lì，被論證的），就用宗作為所立，因和喻作為能立。這個道理怎麼樣呢？回答說，如果從一開始就針對敵論者，他的宗支不被認可，必須憑藉因和喻來成立，所以在所立中，是共同衡量（gòng liáng，共同認可的標準）。
【English Translation】 English version The Meaning of Hetu-vidyā (Logic) Decided
Composed by Bhiksu (Buddhist monk) Huizhao (慧沼), of Dayun Temple (大云寺) in Zizhou (淄洲)
In detail, the Hetu-vidyā (因明, logic) theory is the standard for weighing the Eightfold Treasury (八藏, a complete collection of Buddhist scriptures), and the guideline for regulating the Four Vedas (四吠陀, ancient Indian scriptures). It encompasses the scope of the ninety-six non-Buddhist paths (九十六道, referring to non-Buddhist doctrines) and the tracks of the twenty-eight non-Buddhist masters (二十八師). Its purpose lies in establishing correct arguments and refuting wrong views, its principles extend to oneself and others. It is indeed a precious pearl in the long night and a dragon candle dispelling prolonged darkness. Therefore, those who can fully expound its vast and profound aspects are the compasses for establishing correct views; those who can control its grand principles are indeed the vanguards for refuting wrong views. Thus, when the Dharma King (法王, referring to the Buddha) first appeared, he opened the profound and mysterious Dharma gate; wise generals were born in succession, reopening the mysterious treasury. Asanga (無著) erected the eight components (八支, components of Hetu-vidyā) to establish the profound ultimate, like eight pillars supporting the sky. Vasubandhu (世親) presented the five aspects (五分, components of Hetu-vidyā) to manifest profound mysteries, like five great mountains guarding the earth. Later, Dignāga (陳那) emerged in response to the times, with outstanding talent, raising the three-part syllogism (三支論式, the structure of logical argument) to compare with the three lights of the sun, moon, and stars. Ishvarasena (天主) was born in response to the times, expounding the two understandings (二悟, two kinds of understanding) to match the brilliance of the sun and moon. This can be described as the imperial chariot heading towards the treasure mountain, the royal carriage emerging from the dilapidated house. Therefore, those who use it are called wise heroes, and those who write about it are praised as literary talents. Therefore, those who expound and elaborate on Hetu-vidyā all emit the divine lamp that dispels darkness; those who annotate and write about Hetu-vidyā all wield the sword of wisdom that cuts off wrong views. Therefore, stating the words is to present the establishment and refutation, and the beginning of the article is to distinguish between right and wrong. The theory of Hetu-vidyā is complex and widespread, covering all directions; its light shines brightly, extending to the six directions of the universe. Although I, Huizhao, am not talented, I dare to admire the noble footsteps of the predecessors, so I try to use the algae mirror to distinguish right from wrong, and discuss the gains and losses in detail. Is it just deliberately violating the philosophy of the predecessors, and must achieve my own sect? I only hope that future appreciators will occasionally read it and understand my intention.
Someone explains the 'prover' (能立, one who proves) by saying that if the three-part syllogism is established to make others understand, it is called the 'prover'. If one hopes that the reason (因, hetu) and example (喻, dṛṣṭānta) are established before the thesis (宗, paksha), but the thesis has not been accepted, in order to achieve the unaccepted thesis, one must rely on the 'accomplisher' (能成, that which accomplishes the proof). Since the reason and example are the 'accomplisher', the 'accomplisher' must have something to be proven (所立, that which is to be proven), so the thesis is used as the 'that which is to be proven', and the reason and example are used as the 'prover'. What is the principle of this? The answer is that if from the beginning it is aimed at the opponent, his thesis is not accepted, and it must be established by reason and example, so in 'that which is to be proven', it is a common measure (共量, a commonly accepted standard).
可爾。他自如何。豈可宗支自生不信。又前說在能立之時。宗豈他家已許。若他已許舉。即相符極成。若他不許。恒在所立之內。何故前說。宗在能立之中。若云前望生他智解。宗居能立之中。若為因喻所成故。在所立之內者。此亦不然。瑜伽對法俱云。所立有二。謂自性差別。能立有八。謂宗因等。理門亦云。由宗因喻。辨說他未了義。說名能立。不說他智在所立中。何故今者。說宗望他即為能立。又宗他既不許。何得說為能立。故理門論云。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。宗不共許。故非望他說為能立。說能立者。即是言宗。望所詮義名為能立。為所立者。宗言雖說。義未顯決。假因喻成。言義方顯。故名所立。若望敵者。宗名所立。以他不許。今成立故。雖本立義為生他解。不望他智說為能立。然此論云。已說宗等如是多言。開悟他時。說名能立者。此據因果合說。以由因喻成宗顯決。他智得生。若其不能成彼所立。令其顯決。他智不起故。比量為因。他智為果。能立所成離過。圓滿能為因故。由此理門云。今此唯依證了因故。宗生他智。豈名證了。又云。辨說他未了義。說名能立。說他智為所立。曾無教故。若會今古能所立殊。如本疏說。
有人云。然舊來相傳皆作解云。無著世親已前。說八為能立。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：那麼，『宗』（pakṣa，論題）本身又是什麼呢？難道可以憑空產生不被認可的『宗』嗎？而且，之前說過在『能立』（sādhana，論證）成立的時候，『宗』難道已經被對方認可了嗎？如果對方已經認可，那麼提出『宗』就成了極成（prasiddha，已成立）的，沒有意義。如果對方不認可，那麼『宗』就始終在『所立』（sādhya，待證）的範圍內，為什麼之前說『宗』在『能立』之中呢？ 如果說，『宗』是爲了引發對方的理解，所以才說『宗』屬於『能立』；如果說，『宗』是因為被『因』（hetu，理由）和『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例證）所成立，所以才屬於『所立』，那麼這種說法也是不對的。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）和《阿毗達磨集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）都說，『所立』有兩種，即自性和差別；『能立』有八種，即『宗』、『因』等。《理門論》（Nyāya-mukha）也說，通過『宗』、『因』、『喻』，辨明闡述對方尚未理解的意義，才叫做『能立』，並沒有說對方的理解屬於『所立』。為什麼現在說，『宗』針對對方就屬於『能立』呢？ 而且，『宗』既然對方不認可，怎麼能說是『能立』呢？所以，《理門論》說，只有雙方都認可的、確定的言辭，才叫做『能立』。『宗』是不被共同認可的，所以不能針對對方說是『能立』。所謂『能立』，就是指言辭上的『宗』，針對所要詮釋的意義，才叫做『能立』；而作為『所立』，『宗』的言辭雖然說了，但意義還沒有明確，需要藉助『因』和『喻』來成立，言辭的意義才能顯現，所以叫做『所立』。如果針對辯論的對方來說，『宗』就屬於『所立』，因為對方不認可，所以現在要成立它。雖然本來立『宗』是爲了引發對方的理解，但不能針對對方的理解就說是『能立』。 然而，這部論典說，已經說了『宗』等這些言辭，在開導啓發對方的時候，才叫做『能立』，這是根據因果關係合起來說的。因為通過『因』和『喻』成立『宗』，使『宗』的意義顯現明確，對方的理解才能產生。如果不能成立對方的『所立』，使『所立』的意義顯現明確，對方的理解就不會產生。所以，比量（anumāna，推理）是『因』，對方的理解是『果』。『能立』因為成立了『所立』，遠離了過失，圓滿具足，所以能作為『因』。因此，《理門論》說，現在這裡僅僅依靠證明了的『因』，『宗』才能引發對方的理解，怎麼能說是證明了呢？又說，辨明闡述對方尚未理解的意義，才叫做『能立』，說對方的理解屬於『所立』，從來沒有這樣的教義。如果想要會通今古對『能立』和『所立』的不同理解，可以參考本疏的解釋。 有人說，然而舊來相傳的解釋都認為，在無著（Asaṅga）和世親（Vasubandhu）之前，說八支為『能立』。
【English Translation】 English version: Objection: Then, what is the 'pakṣa' (thesis) itself? Can an unaccepted 'pakṣa' arise spontaneously? Moreover, it was previously stated that when the 'sādhana' (proof) is established, is the 'pakṣa' already accepted by the other party? If the other party has already accepted it, then proposing the 'pakṣa' becomes 'prasiddha' (already established), which is meaningless. If the other party does not accept it, then the 'pakṣa' always remains within the scope of the 'sādhya' (that which is to be proven). Why was it previously said that the 'pakṣa' is within the 'sādhana'? If it is said that the 'pakṣa' is to generate understanding in the other party, hence it is said that the 'pakṣa' belongs to the 'sādhana'; if it is said that the 'pakṣa' is established by the 'hetu' (reason) and 'dṛṣṭānta' (example), hence it belongs to the 'sādhya', then this statement is also incorrect. Both the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' (Compendium of Abhidharma) state that there are two types of 'sādhya', namely, self-nature and difference; and there are eight types of 'sādhana', namely, 'pakṣa', 'hetu', etc. The 'Nyāya-mukha' (Introduction to Logic) also states that by means of 'pakṣa', 'hetu', and 'dṛṣṭānta', clarifying and explaining the meaning that the other party has not yet understood is called 'sādhana'. It does not say that the other party's understanding belongs to the 'sādhya'. Why is it now said that the 'pakṣa' is 'sādhana' in relation to the other party? Moreover, since the other party does not accept the 'pakṣa', how can it be said to be 'sādhana'? Therefore, the 'Nyāya-mukha' states that only mutually accepted and definite statements are called 'sādhana'. The 'pakṣa' is not mutually accepted, so it cannot be said to be 'sādhana' in relation to the other party. The so-called 'sādhana' refers to the 'pakṣa' in terms of words, which is called 'sādhana' in relation to the meaning to be explained; while as the 'sādhya', although the words of the 'pakṣa' have been spoken, the meaning is not yet clear, and it needs to be established by means of 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta' so that the meaning of the words can be revealed, hence it is called 'sādhya'. If it is said in relation to the opponent in the debate, the 'pakṣa' belongs to the 'sādhya', because the other party does not accept it, so it needs to be established now. Although the original purpose of establishing the 'pakṣa' is to generate understanding in the other party, it cannot be said to be 'sādhana' in relation to the other party's understanding. However, this treatise states that the words such as 'pakṣa' have already been spoken, and it is called 'sādhana' when guiding and enlightening the other party. This is based on the combination of cause and effect. Because the 'pakṣa' is established through 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta', making the meaning of the 'pakṣa' clear and definite, the other party's understanding can arise. If the other party's 'sādhya' cannot be established, making the meaning of the 'sādhya' clear and definite, the other party's understanding will not arise. Therefore, 'anumāna' (inference) is the 'hetu', and the other party's understanding is the 'fruit'. Because the 'sādhana' establishes the 'sādhya', is free from faults, and is fully complete, it can serve as the 'hetu'. Therefore, the 'Nyāya-mukha' states that now it is only based on the proven 'hetu' that the 'pakṣa' can generate understanding in the other party. How can it be said to be proven? It also says that clarifying and explaining the meaning that the other party has not yet understood is called 'sādhana'. There has never been such a teaching that the other party's understanding belongs to the 'sādhya'. If you want to reconcile the different understandings of 'sādhana' and 'sādhya' in the past and present, you can refer to the explanation in this commentary. Someone says, however, the traditional explanation has always been that before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the eight limbs were said to be 'sādhana'.
自性差別二為所立。乃至即牒先疏。依于聲明為難。並疏解云。因有三相。因一喻二。皆名多言。由此定知。宗是所立。世親已前。顯諸所諍。不過自性差別二種。故是所立宗為能立。立此二故。陳那已后。以此二種。未互差別成不相離。不是所諍。此意云。先德一向定判。陳那已后。宗為所立。已前宗為能立。不許互通。故云今依自解者。乃至云。古師亦說宗為所立。廣教理成。陳那宗亦能成多理教立。其義云何。答此乃廣前所釋。何云唯自新知。故本疏云。陳那已后略有三釋。一云宗言所詮義為所立。故瑜伽論第十五云。所成立義有二種。一自性。二差別能成立法有八種。其宗能詮之言。及因等言義。皆名能立。其宗之言。因喻成故。雖亦所立。彼于次說。何故先立宗耶。為先顯示自所愛樂宗義。故亦所立。非定所立。能成義故。猶如於因。喻對所成故。但名能立。宗所詮義。定唯所立。獨名所成。此即具釋宗通能所成。何言先不說。二云。總聚自性差別。教理。俱是所立。論俱名義。總中一分。對敵所申。若言若義。自性差別。俱名為宗。即名能立。雖此對宗。亦是所立。能立總故。得能立名。故陳那等。宗名所立。與瑜伽等理不相違。瑜伽等不說宗非一向唯能立故。此亦俱通豈不明說。三云。自性差別。合所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自性差別二者作為『所立』（svalakṣaṇa-viśeṣa，需要證明的觀點）。乃至直接沿用先前的疏文，依據聲明（śabda，語言）進行辯難。疏文解釋說：『因』（hetu，理由）有三種相狀，『因一喻二』（hetu-ekam-udāharaṇa-dvayam，一個理由，兩個例子）都可稱為多言。由此可以確定，『宗』（pakṣa，論題）是『所立』。在世親（Vasubandhu）之前，所爭論的不過是自性和差別兩種。因此，『宗』是『所立』，作為『能立』（sādhana，證明方法）來成立這二者。陳那（Dignāga）之後，這兩種（自性、差別）未互相區分，成為不可分離的整體，因此不是爭論的焦點。此意是說，先前的學者一向判定，陳那之後，『宗』是『所立』，之前『宗』是『能立』，不允許互相通用。所以說，現在依據自己的理解，乃至說，古代的論師也說『宗』是『所立』，廣泛地用教理來成立。陳那的『宗』也能成立多種教理，這是什麼意思呢？回答說，這乃是廣泛地解釋先前所說的，怎麼能說是自己新知道的呢？所以本疏說，陳那之後，大概有三種解釋。第一種說法是，『宗』所詮釋的意義是『所立』。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第十五卷說，『所成立的意義有兩種：一是自性，二是差別。能成立的法有八種。』『宗』的能詮之言，以及『因』等言語的意義，都可稱為『能立』。『宗』的言語，因為『因』和『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子）而成立，雖然也是『所立』，但在接下來會說，『為什麼要先立宗呢？』爲了先顯示自己所喜愛的『宗』的意義，所以也是『所立』，並非一定是『所立』，因為它能成立意義，就像『因』和『喻』一樣，因為對『所成』（sādhya，需要證明的）進行成立，所以只稱為『能立』。『宗』所詮釋的意義，一定是『所立』，獨自被稱為『所成』。這即是詳細解釋了『宗』可以通用『能立』和『所成』，怎麼能說先前沒有說過呢？第二種說法是，總括自性、差別、教理，都是『所立』。論典都稱為『義』，總括中的一部分，針對敵方所提出的，無論是言語還是意義，自性和差別，都稱為『宗』，即稱為『能立』。雖然這個『宗』也是『所立』，但因為它能成立總括，所以得到『能立』的名稱。所以陳那等人認為，『宗』名為『所立』，與《瑜伽師地論》等的道理不相違背。《瑜伽師地論》等沒有說『宗』不是一向唯一的『能立』，這難道不是明白地說出來了嗎？第三種說法是，自性和差別，合起來作為『所』
【English Translation】 English version The two, svalakṣaṇa (own-nature) and viśeṣa (difference), are established as 'svalakṣaṇa-viśeṣa' (that which is to be proven). Even directly following the previous commentary, relying on śabda (language) to argue. The commentary explains: 'Hetu' (reason) has three aspects, 'hetu-ekam-udāharaṇa-dvayam' (one reason, two examples) can all be called excessive words. From this, it can be determined that 'pakṣa' (thesis) is 'that which is to be proven'. Before Vasubandhu, what was disputed was nothing more than the two types of svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa. Therefore, 'pakṣa' is 'that which is to be proven', serving as 'sādhana' (means of proof) to establish these two. After Dignāga, these two (svalakṣaṇa, viśeṣa) were not distinguished from each other, becoming an inseparable whole, and therefore not the focus of dispute. The meaning here is that previous scholars have always determined that after Dignāga, 'pakṣa' is 'that which is to be proven', and before that, 'pakṣa' is 'sādhana', not allowing them to be used interchangeably. Therefore, it is said that now, based on one's own understanding, even saying that ancient teachers also said that 'pakṣa' is 'that which is to be proven', extensively using doctrine to establish. Dignāga's 'pakṣa' can also establish various doctrines, what does this mean? The answer is that this is extensively explaining what was said earlier, how can it be said that it is something newly known? Therefore, the original commentary says that after Dignāga, there are roughly three explanations. The first explanation is that the meaning expressed by 'pakṣa' is 'that which is to be proven'. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 15 says, 'There are two types of meanings to be established: one is svalakṣaṇa, and the other is viśeṣa. There are eight types of means of proof.' The expressive words of 'pakṣa', as well as the meaning of words such as 'hetu', can all be called 'sādhana'. The words of 'pakṣa', because of 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta' (example), although also 'that which is to be proven', but it will be said next, 'Why establish pakṣa first?' In order to first show the meaning of the 'pakṣa' that one loves, it is also 'that which is to be proven', but not necessarily 'that which is to be proven', because it can establish meaning, just like 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta', because it establishes 'sādhya' (that which needs to be proven), it is only called 'sādhana'. The meaning expressed by 'pakṣa' is definitely 'that which is to be proven', and is uniquely called 'sādhya'. This is a detailed explanation of how 'pakṣa' can be used interchangeably as 'sādhana' and 'sādhya', how can it be said that it was not said before? The second explanation is that the totality of svalakṣaṇa, viśeṣa, and doctrine are all 'that which is to be proven'. The scriptures are all called 'artha' (meaning), a part of the totality, proposed against the opponent, whether it is words or meaning, svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa are both called 'pakṣa', which is called 'sādhana'. Although this 'pakṣa' is also 'that which is to be proven', it obtains the name 'sādhana' because it can establish the totality. Therefore, Dignāga and others believe that 'pakṣa' is named 'that which is to be proven', which is not contrary to the principles of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others did not say that 'pakṣa' is not always uniquely 'sādhana', isn't this clearly stated? The third explanation is that svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa together as 'that which is'
依義。名為所立。能依合宗。說為能立。總立別故。非此總宗定唯能立。對敵合申。因喻成故。亦是所立。由非定所立。故得能立名。陳那但以共許因喻。成他未許。他未許者。唯是合宗。宗為所立。自性差別。但是宗依。非正所立。所立之具。所望義殊。不相違也。不爾慈氏無著天親。豈不解因明。說所為能立(此亦明說)。此即撮諸幾要。提彼宏綱足悉不違。何勞煩重。諸論互申異義。並不相違。若言陳那文義盡同舊師。天親豈不解因明。許令乖異。又復陳那立宗因喻。即說皆同古師能立。現比等支。何故即許除簡。又如瑜伽八支之內。開喻無合結支。雜集能立八中。合喻加於合結。若云合結即同類異類。名目何不相當。如實論亦五支合結。云何即別獨許陳那遮五能立。說彼唯言。不聽遮於八支。唯三外有能立。若云如實非真道理。此語未是誠言。若亦許解因明。何故開遮不等。又如古師立量。即加聖教為三。陳那為自悟門。量中但唯二種。故知。諸論開合親疏不倫。取捨異途各據一義。其中會釋。具本疏辨。由此更廣以理教徴。即為徒設。
有人云。若因一喻二為多言名能立者。于中隨闕。名能立過。如闕異喻。應是過收。若言是過。違掌珍論。彼闕異喻。非過故也。此義如何。答亦不然。誰言彼論比量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依仗意義而建立的，稱為『所立』（sadhya，意欲證明的論題）。能夠依仗（因和喻）而符合宗（paksha，論題），被稱為『能立』（sadhana，論證）。因為總的論題和個別的論題有所不同，所以總的論題不一定只是能立。針對論敵而共同提出的，通過因（hetu，理由）和喻（drshtanta，例證）來成立的，也是所立。由於不是絕對的所立，所以可以得到能立的名稱。陳那（Dignaga）只是用雙方都認可的因和喻，來成立對方不認可的。對方不認可的，只是合宗（sapaksha，同品）。宗是所立，自性差別只是宗的依據，不是真正的所立。作為所立的工具，所期望的意義不同，並不互相違背。如果不是這樣，慈氏（Maitreya）、無著（Asanga）、天親（Vasubandhu）難道不了解因明（hetuvidya，論理學）嗎？（他們）說所為是能立（這也明確說明了）。這就像是抓住了幾個要點，提起了宏大的綱領，完全沒有違背。何必費力重複呢？各論之間互相闡述不同的意義，並不互相違背。如果說陳那的文義完全和舊師相同，那麼天親難道不了解因明嗎？允許（他們的觀點）乖離差異。而且陳那立宗、因、喻，就說都和古師的能立相同，現量（pratyaksha，現量）、比量（anumana，比量）等支分，為什麼就允許刪除簡化呢？又如瑜伽（yoga）八支之內，開喻（udaharana，例）而沒有合（upanaya，合），結支（nigamana，結）。《雜集》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）能立八支中，合喻加在合結（upanaya-nigamana）上。如果說合結就等同於同類（sapaksha）異類（vipaksha），為什麼名稱不相當呢？《如實論》（Tattvasamgraha）也是五支合結，為什麼就特別允許陳那遮止五支能立？說他只是說，不允許遮止八支。只有三種外在的能立。如果說《如實論》不是真正的道理，這話就不是誠實之言。如果也允許瞭解因明，為什麼開合不等呢？又如古師立量（pramana，量），就加上聖教（agama，聖言）為三種。陳那爲了自我領悟的門徑，量中只有兩種。所以知道，各論的開合、親疏不倫，取捨的途徑不同，各自依據一個意義。其中的會通解釋，都記載在本疏中。因此再廣泛地用理和教來徵詢，就是徒勞的設定。 有人說，如果因、一喻、二為多言，名為能立，那麼其中隨便缺少一個，就叫做能立的過失。如果缺少異喻（vydrstantas，異例），應該是過失的收錄。如果說是過失，就違背了《掌珍論》（Tarkajvala）。因為（《掌珍論》認為）缺少異喻，不是過失。這個意義如何？回答說，也不是這樣。誰說那部論的比量（anumana）……
【English Translation】 English version: That which is established based on meaning is called 'sadhya' (the thesis to be proven). That which can rely on (reason and example) and conform to the 'paksha' (the subject of the thesis) is called 'sadhana' (the means of proof). Because the general thesis and the specific thesis are different, the general thesis is not necessarily just the 'sadhana'. That which is jointly proposed against the opponent, and is established through 'hetu' (reason) and 'drshtanta' (example), is also 'sadhya'. Because it is not absolutely 'sadhya', it can obtain the name of 'sadhana'. Dignaga only uses 'hetu' and 'drshtanta' that are accepted by both parties to establish what the other party does not accept. What the other party does not accept is only the 'sapaksha' (similar instances). The 'paksha' is 'sadhya', and the difference in nature is only the basis of the 'paksha', not the real 'sadhya'. As a tool for 'sadhya', the meanings expected are different, and they do not contradict each other. If this were not the case, would Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu not understand 'hetuvidya' (logic)? (They) say that 'what is to be done' is 'sadhana' (this is also clearly stated). This is like grasping a few key points and raising a grand outline, without any contradiction. Why bother repeating it? The various treatises explain different meanings to each other, and they do not contradict each other. If it is said that Dignaga's text is completely the same as the old masters, then does Vasubandhu not understand 'hetuvidya'? (He) allows (their views) to be divergent and different. Moreover, Dignaga establishes 'paksha', 'hetu', and 'drshtanta', and says that they are all the same as the 'sadhana' of the ancient masters. 'Pratyaksha' (perception), 'anumana' (inference), and other limbs, why are they allowed to be deleted and simplified? Furthermore, within the eight limbs of yoga, 'udaharana' (example) is opened, but there is no 'upanaya' (application) and 'nigamana' (conclusion). In the eight limbs of 'sadhana' in 'Abhidharmasamuccaya', 'upanaya-nigamana' is added to 'upanaya'. If it is said that 'upanaya-nigamana' is equivalent to 'sapaksha' (similar instances) and 'vipaksha' (dissimilar instances), why are the names not corresponding? 'Tattvasamgraha' is also a five-limbed 'upanaya-nigamana', why is Dignaga specially allowed to prohibit the five-limbed 'sadhana'? Saying that he only said, not allowing the prohibition of the eight limbs. There are only three external 'sadhanas'. If it is said that 'Tattvasamgraha' is not the true principle, then this statement is not sincere. If it is also allowed to understand 'hetuvidya', why are the opening and closing not equal? Furthermore, as the ancient masters established 'pramana' (means of knowledge), they added 'agama' (scriptural authority) as three types. Dignaga, for the path of self-realization, only has two types in 'pramana'. Therefore, it is known that the opening and closing, closeness and distance of the various treatises are inconsistent, and the paths of acceptance and rejection are different, each based on one meaning. The explanations of their convergence are all recorded in this commentary. Therefore, to further solicit opinions with reason and teaching is a futile setting. Someone says, if 'hetu', one 'drshtanta', and two or more words are called 'sadhana', then if any one of them is missing, it is called a fault of 'sadhana'. If 'vydrstantas' (dissimilar examples) are missing, it should be included as a fault. If it is said to be a fault, it violates 'Tarkajvala'. Because (according to 'Tarkajvala') the lack of dissimilar examples is not a fault. What is the meaning of this? The answer is, it is not so. Who said that the 'anumana' (inference) of that treatise...
無過。唯識論云。有依大乘遣相空理。依似比量。撥無此識及一切法。若云彼說餘量。非掌珍者。應舉誠言。又此量中。豈不撥無一切法耶。又理門論云。為必具二譬喻言詞。方成能立。為如其因。但隨說一。論自答云。若就正理。應具說二。由是具足。顯示所立。乃至云。若有於此一分已成。隨說一分亦成能立。準彼論意。於二喻中。若隨解一。不舉非過。若俱妄解。待說方悟。要具說之。故云若就正理。應具說二。若不說者。明知不正。又此論云。又初能立。缺減過性。若云喻總言闕一不成闕。亦應宗總言闕一不成闕。又解。誰言掌珍。闕于異喻。異喻本為遮因濫行。無依因不濫。去正無宗因。即是異喻。故理門論釋二喻云。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。乃至云。由是雖對不立實有太虛空等。而得顯示無有宗處無因義成。若無異所依。異喻不得立。此言何用。若爾既具支。何名似比量。答犯余過。廣如別疏。
有人云。陳那既乖古說。何故竟無論文破斥。其事云何。答此亦不然。陳那明古說。非可須破斥。但取義異故不破斥。如世親說五能立。亦不非於舊陳。陳那雖三分能成。何假非於古說。設云破古因明師者。余不正者。非瑜伽等。然有說彼瑜伽等非。自余之過。非前所引疏家之咎。若云三分說宗等三者。既許
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 沒有過失。《唯識論》說：『有人依據大乘遣相空的道理，憑藉相似的比量，否定此識以及一切法。』如果說那是其他論師的觀點，不是《掌珍論》的觀點，就應該舉出確鑿的證據。而且，這個比量中，難道不是否定了一切法嗎？還有，《理門論》說：『必須具備兩個譬喻的言辭，才能成立能立，還是像因一樣，只隨便說一個？』論中自己回答說：『如果就正理來說，應該全部說出兩個。』因為這樣才能完整地顯示所要成立的。乃至說：『如果對於其中一部分已經成立，隨便說一部分也能成立能立。』按照《理門論》的意思，在兩個譬喻中，如果隨便理解一個，不舉出不是過失。如果都錯誤地理解，等待解說才能明白，就要全部說出。所以說『如果就正理來說，應該全部說出兩個。』如果不說，明顯知道是不正的。而且，此論說：『最初的能立，缺少減損的過失。』如果說譬喻總的來說缺少一個不成缺少，也應該宗總的來說缺少一個不成缺少。又解釋說：『誰說《掌珍論》缺少異喻？異喻本來是爲了遮止因的濫用，沒有所依的因不濫用，去掉正因就沒有宗因，這就是異喻。』所以《理門論》解釋兩個譬喻說：『前面是遮詮，後面只是止濫。』乃至說：『因此，即使對於不成立實有的太虛空等，也能顯示沒有宗處沒有因的意義成立。』如果沒有異所依，異喻就不能成立，這句話有什麼用？如果這樣，既然具備了支分，為什麼叫做相似比量？回答說：犯了其他的過失，詳細的在別的疏文中說明。
有人說：『陳那既然違背了古老的說法，為什麼竟然沒有論文破斥？』事情是怎樣的？回答說：『這也不對。陳那闡明了古老的說法，不是可以需要破斥的。只是因為取義不同，所以不破斥。』例如世親菩薩說五能立，也沒有否定舊的陳述。陳那雖然用三分能成立，何必否定古老的說法？假設說破斥古代因明師的人，其餘不正的人，不是瑜伽等。然而有人說那些瑜伽等不是，是其餘的過失，不是前面所引用的疏家的過錯。如果說三分說宗等三者，既然允許
【English Translation】 English version: No fault. The Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says: 'Some rely on the Mahayana's principle of emptiness of characteristics, using similar inferences to deny this consciousness and all dharmas.' If you say that is the view of other logicians, not the Tattvarthasamgraha, you should provide solid evidence. Moreover, in this inference, isn't it denying all dharmas? Also, the Hetu-vidya says: 'Must one have two examples to establish a proposition, or like the reason, just state one?' The treatise itself answers: 'If according to correct reasoning, one should state both.' Because this is complete, it shows what is to be established. Even saying: 'If one part of this is already established, stating one part is enough to establish the proposition.' According to the meaning of the Hetu-vidya, in the two examples, if one understands one at will, not citing it is not a fault. If both are misunderstood, waiting for explanation to understand, one must state them all. Therefore, it says 'If according to correct reasoning, one should state both.' If one does not state them, it is clearly known to be incorrect. Moreover, this treatise says: 'The initial establishment of a proposition, lacking the nature of a deficiency.' If you say that the example in general lacking one does not constitute a deficiency, it should also be that the proposition in general lacking one does not constitute a deficiency. Also, it explains: 'Who says that the Tattvarthasamgraha lacks a counter-example? The counter-example is originally to prevent the misuse of the reason. A reason without a basis is not misused. Removing the correct reason, there is no proposition-reason, which is the counter-example.' Therefore, the Hetu-vidya explains the two examples saying: 'The former is exclusion, the latter is only to stop misuse.' Even saying: 'Therefore, even for not establishing the real existence of empty space, etc., it can show that there is no proposition where the meaning of no reason is established.' If there is no different basis, the counter-example cannot be established, what is the use of this statement? If so, since it has the limbs, why is it called a similar inference? The answer is: it commits other faults, as explained in detail in other commentaries.
Someone says: 'Since Dignaga contradicted the ancient sayings, why is there no treatise refuting him?' What is the matter? The answer is: 'This is also not right. Dignaga clarified the ancient sayings, it is not something that needs to be refuted.' It is only because the meaning taken is different, so it is not refuted. For example, Vasubandhu said the five members of inference, also did not negate the old statements. Although Dignaga can establish with three members, why negate the ancient sayings? Suppose that the one who refutes the ancient logicians, the remaining incorrect ones, are not Yoga, etc. However, some say that those Yoga, etc. are not, it is the fault of the others, not the fault of the commentator quoted earlier. If you say that the three members say the proposition, etc. are three, since it is allowed
陳那宗亦所成。能立之中。豈唯三也。若云據宗在能立。說為三分者。若宗在所立。即應唯二分。若爾何故。虛設唯言。二亦能故。若云宗在所立。即開喻為三者。由此故知。言三分者。但一因二喻。又復古師。宗為能立。陳那順古言中不違。所以理門等中。能立皆言宗等。文同意異。乃翻譯之主。能知陳那宗許能成。亦是先德已了。但為今造論意。正明宗在所立之中。釋宗為能立之言。疏中亦以具解。餘者不悉。執說皆同。未悟作者本意有別。疏主。既當入室親承指撝。況復大小因明明說。故理門頌云。是中唯取隨自意樂。為所成立說名宗。不說能立說名宗。故釋中雲。故此多言。于論式等。說名能立。即顯順古。正釋即云。言是中者。是簡持義。是宗等中故名是中。言唯者。是簡別義。簡別能立說為所立。此正明說若今宗亦能立。何故須唯。又云。樂為所立。謂不樂為能成立性。又云。若爾。既取智爲了因。是言便失能成立義。此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。及此論中。皆無正釋宗為能立。既云唯此三分說名能立。故知。一因二喻。以立宗時他智未生。要待因喻。他方解故。藉因三相。比智生故。故此論云。言比量者。謂藉眾相。而觀于義。乃至云。由彼為因於所比義。有正智生。理門云。謂智是前智。余從如所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 陳那（Dignāga）宗也認可這種觀點，在能立（sādhanavākya，論證）之中，難道只有三種成分嗎？如果說根據宗（pakṣa，論題）在能立中，所以說成三分，那麼如果宗在所立（sādhya，被證明的）中，就應該只有兩分了。如果這樣，為什麼還要虛設『二亦能故』（兩個也能成立）的說法呢？如果說宗在所立中，就展開比喻成為三分，由此可知，說三分，只不過是一個因（hetu，理由）和兩個喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）。 而且，古代的論師認為宗是能立，陳那順應古人的說法並沒有違背。所以在《理門論》（Nyāyamukha）等論著中，能立都說成是宗等，文字相同而意義不同，這是翻譯者的主張。能夠知道陳那認可宗可以成立，也是先賢已經明白的。但是因為現在造論的意圖，正是要說明宗在所立之中。解釋宗為能立的說法，疏中也已經詳細解釋了，其餘的就不一一列舉了。執著于相同的說法，是沒有領悟到作者的本意有所不同。疏主既然是當面接受教誨，況且大小因明明說了。所以《理門論頌》說：『其中只取隨自己的意願，爲了所要成立的而說的叫做宗。』沒有說能立叫做宗。所以解釋中說：『所以這裡多說，在論式等中，說成能立，就顯示了順應古人的說法。』正確的解釋是說：『說其中，是簡擇的意義，是宗等之中，所以叫做其中。』說『唯』，是簡別的意義，簡別能立說成所立。這正是明白地說如果現在的宗也是能立，為什麼需要『唯』呢？』又說：『樂於作為所立，就是不樂於作為能成立的性質。』又說：『如果這樣，既然取智作爲了因，這個說法就失去了能成立的意義。』這也不對，是爲了讓他們回憶起原本極成的事物。以及這部論中，都沒有正式解釋宗為能立。既然說只有這三分叫做能立，就知道是一個因和兩個喻。因為在立宗的時候，他人的智慧還沒有產生，要等待因和喻，他人才能夠理解。憑藉因的三相，比量智才能夠產生。所以這部論說：『說比量，是憑藉眾多的相，而觀察意義。』乃至說：『由於它作為原因，對於所要比量的意義，有正確的智慧產生。』《理門論》說：『說智是前智，其餘的都按照所說的。』
【English Translation】 English version Dignāga's school also acknowledges this view. Within the sādhanavākya (means of proof), are there only three components? If it is said that based on the pakṣa (thesis) being in the sādhanavākya, it is described as having three parts, then if the pakṣa is in the sādhya (what is to be proven), there should only be two parts. If so, why falsely assert 'two can also establish'? If it is said that the pakṣa is in the sādhya, then the analogy is expanded into three parts, from which it is known that saying three parts is merely one hetu (reason) and two dṛṣṭānta (examples). Moreover, ancient teachers considered the pakṣa to be the sādhanavākya, and Dignāga, in accordance with the ancient saying, did not contradict it. Therefore, in works like the Nyāyamukha, the sādhanavākya is referred to as the pakṣa, etc., with the words being the same but the meanings different. This is the view of the translator. Being able to know that Dignāga acknowledges that the pakṣa can be established is something that the earlier sages already understood. However, the intention of writing this treatise now is precisely to explain that the pakṣa is within the sādhya. The explanation of the pakṣa as the sādhanavākya has also been explained in detail in the commentary; the rest will not be listed one by one. Those who adhere to the same saying have not understood that the author's original intention is different. The commentator, since he received the teachings in person, moreover, the major and minor reasons are clearly stated. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha verse says: 'Among these, only what is taken according to one's own intention, and said for what is to be established, is called the pakṣa.' It does not say that the sādhanavākya is called the pakṣa. Therefore, the explanation says: 'Therefore, here it is said more, in the logical form, etc., it is called the sādhanavākya, which shows that it is in accordance with the ancient saying.' The correct explanation is: 'Saying 'among these' is the meaning of selection, it is among the pakṣa, etc., so it is called 'among these'.' Saying 'only' is the meaning of distinction, distinguishing the sādhanavākya as the sādhya. This is precisely saying clearly that if the current pakṣa is also the sādhanavākya, why is 'only' needed?' It also says: 'Being pleased to be the sādhya is not being pleased to be the nature of the sādhanavākya.' It also says: 'If so, since taking wisdom as the reason, this saying loses the meaning of the sādhanavākya.' This is also not correct, it is to remind them of the originally established things. And in this treatise, there is no formal explanation of the pakṣa as the sādhanavākya. Since it is said that only these three parts are called the sādhanavākya, it is known that it is one hetu and two dṛṣṭānta. Because at the time of establishing the pakṣa, the wisdom of others has not yet arisen, and they must wait for the hetu and dṛṣṭānta for others to understand. Relying on the three aspects of the hetu, the inference wisdom can arise. Therefore, this treatise says: 'Saying inference is relying on many aspects to observe the meaning.' And even says: 'Because it is the cause, for the meaning to be inferred, correct wisdom arises.' The Nyāyamukha says: 'Saying wisdom is the previous wisdom, and the rest is according to what is said.'
說能立因生。是緣彼義。不說從彼能立宗生。又宗不共許。立時他智不生。因喻共成。引證彼智方起。故理門云。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。又理門云。又比量中。唯見此理。若所比處。此相定遍於余同類。念此定有。于彼無處。念此遍無。是故。由此生決定解。故知。所比即是所立。由此解生。即因三相。又云。故定三相。唯為顯因。由此道理。雖一切分皆能為因。顯了所立。然唯一分。且說為因。故唯三言。定目因喻。若言陳那。定判其宗在能成者。釋中何無正說。但見標結順古之文。即定判為能立。其若船行逐水處異船同。執此定判能成。可謂見船執依舊水。昔聞刻舟求劍。斯之謂矣。
有人正釋論文解能立中雲。依舊解云。世親已前。舉宗等取因喻。瑜伽總名能立。由有多言故。陳那已后。但取因喻。不取其宗。取所等因喻。乃至云。自釋教東流。皆為此解。準依理教。即理未然。其義云何。答此亦不然。此還將元一向唯說。陳那以宗唯在所立。不在能立。古之會釋所引如前。但是據今陳那論意。唯說因喻名為能立。廣顯同異。理教如前。此乃重陳。繁不再述。
有人云。如立量破他。宗因喻三。俱為能破。立量為申正義。何故獨簡其宗。其義如何。答此亦不例。如破他中有出過立量二破。
豈可能立亦令立量出過二立。又破他出過。隨一一支。皆成能破。豈可量立。隨一一支。皆成能立。又立量明宗通能所立。豈立量破宗。通能所破。又復誰言。能破亦復通宗。因喻定故。可能破他。宗他不許。何成能破。故理門云。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。或名能破。非互不成猶豫言詞。復待成故。又過類中。名似能破。據立量中。是因喻過。翻此能破。故但因喻立宗。雖為破他。無因他宗不破。故但因喻。唯識第十四。出其宗非。似出過破。不是立量。故無立量破他。亦名宗為能破。準此還是例于能立。但應因喻。
有人云。古人解云。古因明師。或聲為宗。或無常為宗。或合為宗。乃至云相傳。雖有此分別。理恐未然。所以知者。古師既有異說。應有論文。撿如實等並無此文。何得異說者。其義云何。答亦不然。說古師非。誰言即指瑜伽等論。說為餘人。又不可云。瑜伽等中。不作是說。故今古同。不得言異古因明師。古因明師。豈但瑜伽等。諸釋因明者。名為古因明師故。故理門云。又于負處。舊因明師。諸有所說。或有墮在能破中攝。或有極粗。或有非理。如詭語類。故此不錄。又云。又此方隅。我于破古因明論中。已具分別。故知。有古師說非者即破之。不言瑜伽等。
有人云。論云差
別為性。言差別性故者非也。其義云何。答此亦不然。三藏本譯云差別性故。后呂才與文軌法師。改云差別為性。豈以昧識為誠言。靈哲為謾語。若是翻譯之輩。可許義正以改之。彼解疏尚破之。改論那宜遂許之。又言故者。結定之詞。顯此宗者要依法與有法。共相差別。違他順已。方為宗故。故云有法及法者。皆須極成。所以宗中。有此故字。具顯所以。如本疏明。
有人云。先釋即不共許。是所立法。所作性因。彼此極成。即能立法。故無常法。正是所立。此解雖爾。未是通途。所以然者。且如立聲無常一量。可如所說。以為所諍。若依有性等量。豈得以非實。為所立法耶。本意諍有法大有性非實即實等。其義云何。答應此共思。若本諍有法。不諍法者。言非實等。為是有法。為當法耶。若是有法。即應先陳。若其是法。不為所諍。言法何為。又以何為極成有法。極成能別。差別為宗。若言彼據諍其法說。若諍有法。何為能所別。不可將有法。為能別故。以先陳故。又若有法。正是所諍。一切諍有法。皆無同喻過。又法不成有法故。又復不可大有非實。俱是所諍。無極成有法。依何立宗。又若大有正所諍。所成之宗。即合名法。故理門云。又於此中。觀所成故。立法有法。故知。還以非實等為法。即是所諍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不要執著于『性』。如果說是由於『差別性』的緣故，那是不對的。那麼它的含義是什麼呢？回答說，這種說法也是不對的。《三藏》原本翻譯為『差別性』的緣故，後來呂才和文軌法師將其改為『差別為性』。難道能因為對『昧識』（無明）的理解而認為是真誠的言語，而認為『靈哲』（智慧）是虛假的嗎？如果是翻譯的人，或許可以允許爲了義理正確而修改它。但他們的解釋疏漏之處尚且被駁斥，怎麼能允許修改論著呢？又說『故』字，是總結決定的詞語，顯示這個宗派的人要依據『法』（dharma）和『有法』（dharmin）的相互差別，違揹他人，順從自己，才成為宗派的緣故。所以說『有法』和『法』，都必須是極其確定的。因此在宗（paksha）中，有這個『故』字，充分顯示了原因，如本疏所闡明。 有人說，先解釋不共同認可的，是所要建立的法（sadhyadharma），所作性是因（hetu），彼此都認可的，是能建立的法（sādhanadharma），所以無常法（anitya-dharma）正是所要建立的。這種解釋雖然可以，但不是普遍適用的。為什麼這樣說呢？比如建立『聲音是無常的』這樣一個量（pramana），可以像所說的那樣，作為所爭論的。如果依據『有性』（astitva）等量，怎麼能以非實在（asat）作為所要建立的法呢？本意是爭論有法（dharmin）的『大有性』（mahattva）是非實在還是實在等，它的含義是什麼呢？應該共同思考這個問題。如果原本爭論的是有法，不爭論法，那麼說非實在等，是指有法，還是指法呢？如果是指有法，就應該先陳述。如果是指法，就不是所爭論的，說法做什麼呢？又以什麼作為極其確定的有法，極其確定的能別（vyavartaka），差別作為宗呢？如果說他們是根據爭論其法來說的，如果爭論有法，為什麼有能別和所別（vyavartya）的區分呢？不能將有法作為能別，因為已經先陳述了。又如果是有法，正是所爭論的，一切爭論有法，都沒有同喻過（sadharmya-dṛṣṭānta-doṣa）。又法不能成立有法，又不能『大有』和『非實』都是所爭論的，沒有極其確定的有法，依據什麼來建立宗呢？又如果『大有』正是所爭論的，所成立的宗，就應該叫做『法』。所以《理門》（Nyāyamukha）說，又在這裡面，觀察所要成立的，建立法和有法。因此知道，還是以非實在等作為法，就是所爭論的。
【English Translation】 English version: Do not be attached to 'nature' (性, xìng). To say it is because of 'distinctive nature' (差別性, chābié xìng) is incorrect. What is its meaning? The answer is, this statement is also incorrect. The original translation of the Tripiṭaka says 'because of distinctive nature.' Later, Lü Cai and Dharma Master Wen Gui changed it to 'distinctiveness as nature.' Can we consider ignorant understanding (昧識, mèi shí) as sincere words and wisdom (靈哲, líng zhé) as false speech? If they were translators, perhaps it would be permissible to modify it for the sake of correct meaning. However, their explanatory notes are still refuted, so how can we allow the modification of treatises? Furthermore, the word 'therefore' (故, gù) is a concluding term, indicating that followers of this school must rely on the mutual distinction between 'dharma' (法) and 'dharmin' (有法), opposing others and conforming to themselves, to establish a tenet. Therefore, it is said that both 'dharmin' and 'dharma' must be extremely well-established. Thus, in the paksha (宗), there is this word 'therefore,' fully revealing the reason, as explained in the commentary. Some say that what is first explained as not commonly accepted is the property to be established (sadhyadharma), the property of being produced is the reason (hetu), and what is mutually accepted is the property that establishes (sādhanadharma). Therefore, impermanence (anitya) is precisely what is to be established. Although this explanation is possible, it is not universally applicable. Why is this so? For example, in establishing the inference 'sound is impermanent,' it can be taken as the subject of debate as stated. If based on properties like 'existence' (astitva), how can non-reality (asat) be taken as the property to be established? The original intention is to debate whether the 'great existence' (mahattva) of the dharmin is non-real or real, etc. What is its meaning? This question should be considered together. If the original debate is about the dharmin and not about the dharma, then does saying 'non-real,' etc., refer to the dharmin or the dharma? If it refers to the dharmin, it should be stated first. If it refers to the dharma, it is not the subject of debate, so what is the point of saying it? Furthermore, what is taken as the extremely well-established dharmin, the extremely well-established differentiator (vyavartaka), and distinction as the paksha? If it is said that they are speaking based on debating its dharma, if debating the dharmin, why is there a distinction between the differentiator and the differentiated (vyavartya)? The dharmin cannot be taken as the differentiator because it has already been stated first. Furthermore, if it is the dharmin that is being debated, then all debates about the dharmin have no fault of similar example (sadharmya-dṛṣṭānta-doṣa). Furthermore, the dharma cannot establish the dharmin, and it is also impossible for both 'great existence' and 'non-reality' to be the subject of debate. There is no extremely well-established dharmin, so on what basis is the paksha established? Furthermore, if 'great existence' is precisely what is being debated, then the established paksha should be called 'dharma.' Therefore, the Nyāyamukha says that in this, one observes what is to be established and establishes the dharma and dharmin. Thus, it is known that non-reality, etc., are still taken as the dharma, which is what is being debated.
。廣其所以。如本疏釋。準彼。既無別解。舊釋故合通途。及解大有為法有法。會理門論。皆如本疏及別抄釋。
有人云。因喻何無極成。自解云。因喻必要極成。以無濫故。真似相翻。皆無此說。其義云何。答此亦不然。因中既有兩俱不成。隨一不成。翻彼故須極成。但言略故。準理定有。故成唯識論第五卷云。極成六識隨一攝故等。又理門云。令彼憶念本極成故。是故此中。唯取彼此俱定許義。故知。因喻亦有極成。
有人云。因必是扶順。順益所立。是宗之義。將為新妙。其義云何。答此則舊德釋成。何得稱為新異。故本疏云。又建立義。能建立彼所立宗故。或順益義。由立此因。順益宗義。令宗義立。是故名因。此則先成。豈云新解。
有人云。法性法爾必然之理者。方是正因。其事云何。答此釋未為盡理。如所作性因。立聲無常。對聲顯論。隨一不成。豈作必然之理。又理門論云。是故此中。唯取彼此俱定許義則為善說。由是。若有彼此不同許定非宗法。又云。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。又方便心論云。凡聖同解。方得為喻。喻則因相。故知。不定唯取法爾必然之理。皆為正因。若唯取者。應云法爾道理。言論即為善說。及能立言詞。何須共許。由此故知。雖非法爾。但諸過無違。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
關於這些內容的原因，可以參考本疏的解釋。按照本疏，既然沒有其他的解釋，舊的解釋仍然適用於普遍情況。以及解釋『大有為法有法』，參考《會理門論》，都按照本疏和其他抄本的解釋。
有人說，為什麼作為理由的例子不需要完全成立呢？他們自己解釋說，作為理由的例子必須完全成立，以避免混淆。但《真似相翻》中並沒有這樣的說法。這是什麼意思呢？回答是，這種說法是不對的。因為在理由中，可能出現雙方都不認可的情況，或者任何一方不認可的情況，爲了駁倒對方，就必須是完全成立的。只是因為文字簡略，所以省略了，但按照道理，一定是存在的。所以《成唯識論》第五卷說：『因為完全成立的六識包含其中』等等。另外，《理門論》說：『爲了讓對方回憶起原本完全成立的』。因此，這裡只取雙方都確定認可的意義。所以要知道，作為理由的例子也有完全成立的情況。
有人說，理由必須是扶持順應的，順應並增益所要建立的宗義，這才是新的精妙之處。這是什麼意思呢？回答是，這實際上是舊的解釋，怎麼能說是新的呢？所以本疏說：『又建立的意義，能夠建立他所要建立的宗義』。或者說是順應增益的意義，因為建立了這個理由，順應並增益了宗義，使宗義得以成立，所以稱為理由。這已經是先前的解釋，怎麼能說是新的解釋呢？
有人說，符合法性、自然而然、必然的道理，才是真正的理由。這是怎麼回事呢？回答是，這種解釋並不完全合理。比如用『所作性』作為理由，來證明『聲音是無常的』，如果對『聲顯論』來說，任何一方不認可，怎麼能說是必然的道理呢？而且《理門論》說：『因此，這裡只取雙方都確定認可的意義，才是好的說法』。因此，如果有雙方不認可的，就不能作為宗法。又說：『只有雙方都認可的、確定的言辭，才能稱為能立』。另外，《方便心論》說：『凡夫和聖人都理解的，才能作為比喻。比喻就是理由的相』。所以要知道，不一定只有符合法性、自然而然、必然的道理，才能作為真正的理由。如果只取這種，就應該說法性道理的言論才是好的說法，以及能立的言辭，何必需要雙方都認可呢？由此可知，即使不符合法性，只要沒有各種過失違背，也可以作為理由。
【English Translation】 English version:
The reasons for these points can be found in the commentary of this treatise (本疏). According to this treatise, since there is no other explanation, the old explanation still applies to the general situation. And regarding the explanation of 'Great Conditioned Dharma has Dharma' (大有為法有法), referring to the Nyayapravesa (會理門論), all follow the explanations of this treatise and other transcripts.
Someone asks, why doesn't the example (喻) used as a reason (因) need to be perfectly established (極成)? They explain themselves by saying that the example used as a reason must be perfectly established to avoid confusion. However, there is no such statement in Tattvasamgraha (真似相翻). What does this mean? The answer is, this statement is incorrect. Because in the reason, there may be a situation where both parties do not agree, or any one party does not agree. In order to refute the other party, it must be perfectly established. It's just that the text is brief, so it is omitted, but according to reason, it must exist. Therefore, the fifth volume of Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (成唯識論) says: 'Because the perfectly established six consciousnesses are included in it,' and so on. In addition, the Nyayapravesa (理門論) says: 'In order to let the other party recall the originally perfectly established.' Therefore, here we only take the meaning that both parties definitely agree on. So you should know that the example used as a reason also has a perfectly established situation.
Someone says that the reason must be supportive and compliant, complying with and benefiting the proposition (宗義) to be established, which is the new and wonderful point. What does this mean? The answer is, this is actually an old explanation, how can it be said to be new? Therefore, this treatise says: 'Also, the meaning of establishing is that it can establish the proposition that he wants to establish.' Or it is the meaning of complying with and benefiting, because the reason is established, it complies with and benefits the proposition, so that the proposition can be established, so it is called a reason. This is already a previous explanation, how can it be said to be a new explanation?
Someone says that the reason that conforms to the nature of Dharma (法性), is natural and inevitable, is the true reason. What's going on? The answer is, this explanation is not entirely reasonable. For example, using 'being produced' (所作性) as a reason to prove that 'sound is impermanent' (聲無常的), if it is not recognized by either party in relation to Sabdabhasya (聲顯論), how can it be said to be an inevitable reason? Moreover, the Nyayapravesa (理門論) says: 'Therefore, here we only take the meaning that both parties definitely agree on, which is a good statement.' Therefore, if there is something that both parties do not agree on, it cannot be used as a proposition. It also says: 'Only words that are agreed upon and determined by both parties can be called proof (能立).' In addition, the Upayahrdaya (方便心論) says: 'What is understood by both ordinary people and sages can be used as a metaphor. A metaphor is the characteristic of a reason.' So you should know that it is not necessarily only the reason that conforms to the nature of Dharma, is natural and inevitable, that can be used as a true reason. If only this is taken, then it should be said that the statement of the nature of Dharma is a good statement, and the words of proof, why should both parties agree? From this, it can be known that even if it does not conform to the nature of Dharma, as long as there are no various faults and contradictions, it can also be used as a reason.
能立宗義。俱共許者。即得為因。如見自鷺。表水有無。見燈火處。表知熱觸。非於此處。法爾有火。及以白鷺。此例非一。故知。不定唯取法爾。
有人。釋因中敘舊解云。言義智三。皆通生了。皆名為因。云相傳皆此分別。然泛爾對果辨因。非無此義。若望此中。辨因相者。恐非善說。何以知者。今所明因。望所立義。不望智果。又云。若依親生敵智。以釋生因。恐為猛浪。能生敵智。非唯因故。其義云何。答此亦未閑疏中所說。疏中初雖泛說。然亦此因。各具三相。闕一即非正取成宗。疏中自簡云。正取言生。正能立故。即是明因。望所立義。此生智了。照解宗故。故正因體。言生智了。兼亦通余。能建宗果。故知。不是唯望智果。又雖云生。不言唯因能生他智。然因正是勝增上緣。能生他智。如說了因。雖言義智。然意正取智了非余。以他智生宗方顯故。故知。生因雖宗因喻。若言若義。正能生因。即因喻言。故理門云。若爾。既取智爲了因者。此即牒言因。難云。是言便失能成立義。釋云。此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。既云令彼憶念本極成。即生彼智。故他智生。勝但因喻。故下復云。唯有共許決定言詞。說名能立。又云。若所比處。此相定遍。于余同類。念此定有。于彼無處。念此遍無。是故。
由此生決定解。又云。余所說因生者。謂智是前智。余從如所說能立因生。以此故知。望了宗邊。正取智了。望生他智。正取立者。詮因喻言。何以故。本意立量。為生他智。何故說因唯望宗果。故望于宗。即唯依了。望成宗義。為生他解。即取生因。不爾。如何言生決定解。又云。能立因生。又云。開示諸有問者未了義故。又云。開悟他時。說名能立等。故此因言。定通生了。
有人云。相傳解云。陳那已前。相者體相。非指瑜伽等。如前以引。破古體者。廣如理門。
有釋遍是宗法性四句云。有是宗法非遍者。即所依不成是也。
有人破云。德所依因闕所依。故因無所依。因體不成。故非宗法。其義云何。答此亦不然。若有有法之宗。可說德所依故是宗家法。本無有法。是誰宗家之法。云是宗法而非遍。
有人云。若據似因說。遍非宗法者。即不定因是。其義云何。答此亦不然。既遍在宗。何非宗法。若云不正不名宗法者。云何理門九句。俱云宗法。又若初相中。兼簡余相過。可得云非宗法。遍是宗法性。但顯初相。既遍有法。何非法性。若言要是正因。方名遍是宗法性者。但說遍是宗法性。即是已簡過盡。何須更說。同品定有等。又雖遍於宗。有不定故。非宗法者。即應言正是宗法性
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 由此生決定解。又說，我所說的『因生』，是指智慧是之前的智慧所生。其餘的，如所說的那樣，能夠成立的因也是由（智慧）所生。因此可知，從瞭解宗的角度來看，主要在於智慧的理解。從產生他人智慧的角度來看，主要在於立論者。詮釋因和比喻的言辭，是為什麼呢？根本的意圖在於通過立論，來產生他人的智慧。為什麼說『因』僅僅指向宗的果呢？所以，對於宗來說，就僅僅依賴於理解。爲了成就宗的意義，爲了產生他人的理解，就選取產生（理解）的『因』。如果不是這樣，又怎麼能說產生決定性的理解呢？又說，能夠成立的『因』產生（理解）。又說，爲了開示那些有疑問的人尚未理解的意義。又說，在開悟他人的時候，稱之為能立等等。所以，這裡的『因』，必定貫通產生（理解）和理解（本身）。
有人說，相傳的解釋是，在陳那（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家）之前，『相』指的是體相，而不是指瑜伽（Yoga）等等。就像前面引用的那樣，破斥古代體相的說法，詳細內容見《理門論》（Nyāyamukha）。
有人解釋『遍是宗法性』（pervasion is a property of the subject）的四句式，說：『有是宗法而非遍者』，指的就是『所依不成』（āśrayāsiddha，基不成）的過失。
有人反駁說，『德所依』（quality-dependent）的『因』缺少所依，所以『因』沒有所依，『因』的本體不能成立，所以不是宗法。這是什麼意思呢？回答說，這種說法也不對。如果存在具有有法（dharmin，有屬性者）的宗，可以說因為『德所依』所以是宗家的法。如果原本沒有有法，是誰宗家的法呢？怎麼能說是宗法而非遍呢？
有人說，如果根據似因（hetvābhāsa，似是而非的因）來說，『遍非宗法』，指的就是不定因（anaikāntika，不定的因）。這是什麼意思呢？回答說，這種說法也不對。既然『遍』存在於宗中，為什麼不是宗法呢？如果說不正確就不能稱為宗法，那麼《理門論》中的九句，為什麼都說是宗法呢？而且如果在初相中，兼顧簡別其餘相的過失，可以說不是宗法。『遍是宗法性』，只是顯現初相。既然『遍』具有有法，為什麼不是法性呢？如果說要是正因（saddhetu，正確的因），才能稱為『遍是宗法性』，那麼僅僅說『遍是宗法性』，就已經簡別了所有的過失，為什麼還需要再說『同品定有』（sapakṣe sattva，在同品中存在）等等呢？而且即使『遍』于宗，因為有不定，所以不是宗法，就應該說『正是宗法性』。
【English Translation】 English version From this arises a decisive understanding. Furthermore, it is said that what I call 'cause of arising' refers to wisdom arising from prior wisdom. The rest, as stated, the cause that can establish also arises from (wisdom). Therefore, it is known that, from the perspective of understanding the thesis (paksha), the focus is on the understanding of wisdom. From the perspective of generating wisdom in others, the focus is on the proponent. The words that explain the reason (hetu) and example (dṛṣṭānta), why is that? The fundamental intention lies in generating wisdom in others through establishing the argument. Why is it said that the 'cause' only points to the result of the thesis? Therefore, with respect to the thesis, it relies solely on understanding. In order to accomplish the meaning of the thesis, in order to generate understanding in others, one selects the 'cause' that generates (understanding). If it were not so, how could it be said that it generates a decisive understanding? Furthermore, it is said that the 'cause' that can establish generates (understanding). Furthermore, it is said that it is to reveal the meaning not yet understood by those who have questions. Furthermore, it is said that when enlightening others, it is called the establisher, and so on. Therefore, the word 'cause' here necessarily encompasses both generating (understanding) and understanding (itself).
Someone says that the transmitted explanation is that, before Dignāga (Dignāga, an ancient Indian Buddhist logician), 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) refers to the intrinsic characteristic, not to Yoga, etc. As quoted earlier, the refutation of the ancient notion of intrinsic characteristic is detailed in the Nyāyamukha (Nyāyamukha).
Someone explains the fourfold expression of 'pervasion is a property of the subject' (vyāptiḥ pakṣadharmatā) by saying: 'There is a property of the subject that is not pervasive,' which refers to the fallacy of 'unestablished locus' (āśrayāsiddha).
Someone refutes by saying that the 'cause' that is 'quality-dependent' (guṇāśraya) lacks a locus, so the 'cause' has no locus, and the entity of the 'cause' cannot be established, so it is not a property of the subject. What does this mean? The answer is that this statement is also incorrect. If there is a thesis with a subject possessing a property (dharmin), it can be said that because it is 'quality-dependent,' it is a property of the subject's family. If there is originally no subject possessing a property, whose subject's family is it? How can it be said to be a property of the subject that is not pervasive?
Someone says that if based on a fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa), 'pervasion is not a property of the subject' refers to the inconclusive reason (anaikāntika). What does this mean? The answer is that this statement is also incorrect. Since 'pervasion' exists in the subject, why is it not a property of the subject? If it is said that if it is not correct, it cannot be called a property of the subject, then why are all nine expressions in the Nyāyamukha said to be properties of the subject? Moreover, if in the first characteristic, the faults of distinguishing the remaining characteristics are also considered, it can be said that it is not a property of the subject. 'Pervasion is a property of the subject' only reveals the first characteristic. Since 'pervasion' possesses a subject with a property, why is it not a property? If it is said that only a correct reason (saddhetu) can be called 'pervasion is a property of the subject,' then merely saying 'pervasion is a property of the subject' has already distinguished all the faults, why is it necessary to say 'existence in the similar instance' (sapakṣe sattva), etc.? Moreover, even if 'pervasion' is in the subject, because there is uncertainty, it is not a property of the subject, then it should be said 'it is precisely a property of the subject.'
。何須遍言。遍言。不能離諸過故。若言以遍不能離過故。須更言是宗法性。即應云正。正能離過故。無有正非宗法者。即唯一句。已辨正因。不勞煩語。既不作是說。故知。遍是宗法性。但顯初相。故理門云。雖一切分皆能為因。顯了所立。然唯一分。且說為因。既說且言。明非具簡。
有人云。同品定有性。異品遍無性。各有四句。然但置唯言。為異舊人。以雖簡過。有不盡故。其義云何。答此亦不然。今雖置唯。還同不盡。不能簡得不共不定。又若唯言。簡異品有。亦應唯言。但在同品。亦遮遍宗。以置唯同品有言故。故知。各為顯其自相。但同品定有。即第二相。有過生者。是余相過故。異品遍無。應知。亦是但明第三相。雖異遍無。有過起者。自是余相。若云既簡過不盡。何須四句。今作亦同。何乃偏責。故知。各別簡明自相后取此相。相對而辨。方顯正因。煩不能具。于余異遍無中。諸多解釋。皆應更思。悉未盡理。故此簡者。方窮正理之妙門。得作者之深意。故作四句。非為徒設。
有人云。同有因法宗法不同有者。雖名同法。而非喻也。故下文云。此因以樂以空。為同法故。亦是不定。即判云。恐未盡理。自決云。若望其宗名為同品。望因名同法。其義云何。答此不異前。何勞更釋。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：何必全部說出來呢？全部說出來，也不能脫離各種過失的緣故。如果說因為『遍』不能脫離過失的緣故，就必須進一步說是『宗法性』，那就應該說『正』。因為『正』能夠脫離過失的緣故，沒有『正』不是『宗法』的。那麼只有一句話，就已經辨明了『正因』，不必多費口舌。既然不是這樣說，就知道『遍』是『宗法性』，只是顯現最初的相狀。所以《理門》說：『雖然一切分都能作為因，顯明所要建立的，然而只有一分，且說是因。』既然說是『且』，就表明不是完全概括。有人說，『同品定有性，異品遍無性』，各有四句。然而只是設定『唯』字，是爲了區別于舊人，因為即使簡別過失，也有不完全的地方。它的含義是什麼呢？回答說，這也是不對的。現在即使設定『唯』字，仍然和不完全一樣，不能簡別『不共不定』。而且如果只說『唯』，簡別異品有，也應該只說『唯』，只在同品，也遮止了『遍宗』。因為設定了『唯同品有』這句話的緣故。所以知道，各自是爲了顯明自己的相狀。只是『同品定有』，就是第二相，有過失產生，是其餘相的過失的緣故。『異品遍無』，應該知道，也是隻說明第三相。即使『異遍無』，有過失產生，自然是其餘相。如果說既然簡別過失不完全，何必設定四句？現在這樣做也一樣，為什麼偏要責備？所以知道，各自簡別明白自己的相狀后，才取用這個相狀，相對而辨別，才顯明『正因』。煩瑣不能詳盡，對於其餘『異遍無』中，諸多的解釋，都應該進一步思考，都沒有完全窮盡道理。所以這樣簡別的人，才窮盡了『正理』的妙門，得到作者的深刻用意，所以才設定四句，不是徒勞的。 有人說，同有因法宗法不同有的人，雖然名叫『同法』，但不是比喻。所以下文說：『這個因以樂以空，作為同法的緣故』，也是不定。就判斷說，恐怕沒有完全窮盡道理。自己判斷說，如果望其宗名叫『同品』，望因名叫『同法』，它的含義是什麼呢？回答說，這和前面沒有區別，何必再解釋呢？又
【English Translation】 English version: Why is it necessary to state everything exhaustively? Even stating everything exhaustively cannot avoid all faults. If it is argued that 'comprehensiveness' cannot avoid faults, then it must be further stated as 'property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva)'. In that case, it should be said 'correctness (samyak)'. Because 'correctness' can avoid faults, and there is no 'correctness' that is not a 'property of the subject'. Then, with just one statement, the 'correct reason (samyak hetu)' is already distinguished, and there is no need for further elaboration. Since it is not stated in this way, it is known that 'comprehensiveness' is a 'property of the subject', merely revealing the initial aspect. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: 'Although all parts can serve as a reason, clarifying what is to be established, only one part is spoken of as the reason.' Since it is said 'moreover', it indicates that it is not a complete generalization. Someone says, 'Definitely present in similar instances (sapakṣa niyatam)', 'Universally absent in dissimilar instances (vipakṣa vyāpakam)', each has four possibilities. However, merely adding the word 'only (eva)' is to distinguish from the old masters, because even if faults are distinguished, there are still incomplete aspects. What is its meaning? The answer is, this is also incorrect. Even if 'only' is now added, it is still the same as incomplete, and cannot distinguish 'non-common uncertain (asādhāraṇa anaikāntika)'. Moreover, if only 'only' is said, distinguishing presence in dissimilar instances, it should also only say 'only', only in similar instances, also preventing 'pervading the subject (vyāpaka pakṣa)'. Because the statement 'only present in similar instances' is made. Therefore, it is known that each is to reveal its own aspect. Only 'definitely present in similar instances' is the second aspect, and if a fault arises, it is because of the fault of the remaining aspects. 'Universally absent in dissimilar instances', it should be known, is also only clarifying the third aspect. Even if 'universally absent', if a fault arises, it is naturally the remaining aspects. If it is said that since distinguishing faults is incomplete, why set up four possibilities? Doing it this way is the same, why specifically blame? Therefore, it is known that each distinguishes and clarifies its own aspect, and then takes this aspect, distinguishing relatively, to reveal the 'correct reason'. Tedious details cannot be fully explained. Regarding the many explanations in the remaining 'universally absent in dissimilar instances', all should be further considered, as they have not fully exhausted the principle. Therefore, those who distinguish in this way exhaust the wonderful gate of 'correct reasoning', and obtain the profound intention of the author, so the four possibilities are set up, not in vain. Someone says, those who have the same presence of the reason-property (hetudharma) and the subject-property (pakṣadharma) but not the same presence, although named 'same property (sādharmya)', are not an example (dṛṣṭānta). Therefore, the following text says: 'This reason, because of pleasure and emptiness, is the same property', and is also uncertain. It is judged that it is feared that the principle has not been fully exhausted. It is self-determined that if it is named 'similar instance (sapakṣa)' in relation to its subject, and named 'same property' in relation to the reason, what is its meaning? The answer is, this is no different from before, why bother explaining it again? Furthermore,
自云。夫有能立因法。所立宗法必隨。故於喻中但說因法。宗法自隨逐也。此言有濫。不簡別故。若言有因宗定隨者。云何喻中。有所立不定過。但許有能立。又復誰說。于同喻中。但說因法。宗法自隨。準理門論。舉喻之時。要具說因宗。不單說因故。準理正因。因有之處。宗必定隨。然舉喻時。必須俱說。不爾無合。異喻例此。又云。若望因名品名法具得二名。望宗亦名品名法。此亦先陳。何煩複說。先德云。但同異于有法之上所作義者。名之為法。又此所作。非總所立。不得名品。名之為法。宗總所立。遂與品名。能所異故。又因宗二。同異名法。別同異名品。此同異二。故名為法。次下因同異。及上宗同異。並別同異。故皆名品。
有人云。設天親以瓶體為喻。教理無違。何假斯救。若以燒見等破。自是似破。理非我咎。何以知者。今但由瓶。有所作義。定有無常。取瓶為喻。以所作是無常義故。雖有燒見。所作非因。何得為難者。其義云何。答此亦不然。若以瓶體為喻。由瓶有所作義。故有無常。即應云顯瓶決定有性。何得言顯因同品。決定有性。以瓶所作。與聲所作為同品。以彼瓶處所作。有無常隨。故名同品。瓶體四塵。豈名所作同品。
有人難云。若言夫喻況法。法必似喻者。未知能喻
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有人說：『如果能確立作為理由的「因法」（hetu，能成立的理由），那麼所要成立的「宗法」（sādhya，需要證明的命題）必然隨之成立。』因此，在比喻中只說「因法」，「宗法」自然隨之成立。這種說法有疏漏，因為沒有進行區分。如果說有「因」存在，「宗」必定隨之成立，那麼為什麼在比喻中，會出現所要成立的「宗」不確定的過失呢？僅僅承認有能成立的理由，又有誰說過在同喻（sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta，正面例子）中，只說「因法」，「宗法」自然隨之成立呢？按照《理門論》（Nyāyamukha）的原則，舉例的時候，要完整地說出「因」和「宗」，不能只說「因」。按照正確的理由（正因，saddhetu）的原則，「因」存在的地方，「宗」必定隨之成立。然而，舉例的時候，必須一起說出「因」和「宗」，否則就沒有共同點。異喻（vipakṣa-dṛṣṭānta，反面例子）也是如此。還有人說：『如果從「因」的角度來看，名稱、類別名稱和「法」都具備兩種名稱。從「宗」的角度來看，也稱為類別名稱和「法」。』這些之前已經陳述過了，為什麼還要重複說呢？先德說：『只有在有法（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）之上所作的意義的相同或不同，才稱之為「法」。』而且，這種所作並非總體的所立，不能稱為類別名稱，稱之為「法」。「宗」是總體所立，因此與類別名稱相同。能立和所立不同。而且，「因」和「宗」的相同或不同稱為「法」，區別相同或不同稱為類別。這種相同或不同，因此稱為「法」。其次，下面的「因」的相同或不同，以及上面的「宗」的相同或不同，都區別相同或不同，因此都稱為類別。
有人說：『假設天親（Vasubandhu）以瓶子的實體作為比喻，教義上沒有違背，何必需要這種辯解？如果用燒見等來反駁，那只是表面上的反駁，道理上不是我的過錯。』為什麼這麼說呢？現在僅僅因為瓶子具有所作的性質，必定是無常的，所以用瓶子作為比喻，因為所作是無常的緣故。即使有燒見，所作也不是原因，怎麼能用來反駁呢？』這個意思是什麼呢？回答說：『這種說法也不對。如果以瓶子的實體作為比喻，因為瓶子具有所作的性質，所以是無常的，就應該說顯示瓶子決定具有自性。怎麼能說顯示「因」與同品（sapakṣa，相似的例子）決定具有自性呢？因為瓶子的所作與聲音的所作是同品，因為那個瓶子所處的地方，所作具有無常的伴隨，所以稱為同品。瓶子的實體是四大微塵，怎麼能稱為所作的同品呢？』
有人反駁說：『如果說比喻的情況，「法」必定類似於比喻，不知道能比喻
【English Translation】 English version: Someone says: 'If one can establish the 'hetu' (reason, the means of proof), then the 'sādhya' (proposition to be proved) that is to be established will necessarily follow.' Therefore, in the example, only the 'hetu' is stated, and the 'sādhya' naturally follows. This statement is flawed because it does not distinguish. If it is said that where there is a 'hetu', the 'sādhya' must follow, then why, in the example, does the fault of the 'sādhya' being uncertain occur? Only admitting that there is a means of proof, who has ever said that in the sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta (positive example), only the 'hetu' is stated, and the 'sādhya' naturally follows? According to the principles of the Nyāyamukha, when giving an example, both the 'hetu' and the 'sādhya' must be stated completely, not just the 'hetu'. According to the principle of the correct reason (saddhetu), where the 'hetu' exists, the 'sādhya' must follow. However, when giving an example, both the 'hetu' and the 'sādhya' must be stated together; otherwise, there is no common ground. The vipakṣa-dṛṣṭānta (negative example) is the same. Someone also says: 'If viewed from the perspective of the 'hetu', the name, category name, and 'dharma' (quality, characteristic) all possess two names. Viewed from the perspective of the 'sādhya', it is also called a category name and 'dharma'.' These have been stated before, so why repeat them? The former masters said: 'Only the similarities or differences in the meaning made on the dharmin (subject possessing attributes) are called 'dharma'.' Moreover, this making is not the overall proposition, so it cannot be called a category name, but is called 'dharma'. The 'sādhya' is the overall proposition, so it is the same as the category name. The means of proof and what is to be proved are different. Moreover, the similarities or differences of the 'hetu' and 'sādhya' are called 'dharma', and distinguishing similarities or differences are called categories. These similarities or differences are therefore called 'dharma'. Next, the similarities or differences of the 'hetu' below, and the similarities or differences of the 'sādhya' above, all distinguish similarities or differences, so they are all called categories.
Someone says: 'Suppose Vasubandhu uses the substance of a pot as an example, there is no contradiction in the doctrine, so why is this defense needed? If one refutes with burning and seeing, it is only a superficial refutation, and the fault is not mine.' Why is this said? Now, simply because the pot has the nature of being made, it must be impermanent, so the pot is used as an example, because being made is the reason for impermanence. Even if there is burning and seeing, being made is not the cause, so how can it be used to refute?' What does this mean? The answer is: 'This statement is also incorrect. If the substance of the pot is used as an example, because the pot has the nature of being made, it is impermanent, then it should be said that the pot definitely has its own nature. How can it be said that the 'hetu' shows that the sapakṣa (similar example) definitely has its own nature? Because the making of the pot and the making of sound are of the same kind, because the place where that pot is located, the making has the accompaniment of impermanence, so it is called the same kind. The substance of the pot is the four great elements, how can it be called the same kind of making?'
Someone refutes: 'If it is said that the situation of the example, the 'dharma' must be similar to the example, I do not know what can be exemplified'
所喻之法。其體為一為別。若言一者。體既是一。彼此共知。何待因成。若言別者。即明別體之法。有別同相。有因義者。引之為喻。何得例難。令法體相一切皆同。其義云何。答此義不然。若取瓶體為喻。此與聲宗為一為別。若言是一。即同前難。又有多過。若言別者。何得名同法。若云聲有所作。瓶亦有所作。故名同法者。不然。何以故。應云顯瓶決定有無常。何須云顯因同品。決定有性。因是所作。瓶上之義。豈可瓶體名所作性。若爾。應聲體為所作體。若如是。即取有法聲名之為因。還成宗義一分為因。宗因無別過。余多問難得失例知。煩不具述。然既取瓶為喻。將作殊能。今者據彼略舉三難。一云。古師許瓶燒見。理令自許聲燒見者。陳那順此作難。為以聲是燒見。為非燒見。若自許即相符極成。若自不許。今者難他。何非自違耶者。不然。由彼取瓶。為同喻體。陳那就他為難云。汝所許聲。應可燒見。猶如瓶等。如難勝論云。汝地應非有礙身根所得。許眼見故。猶如色等。豈自不許地身根得。而為難耶。故就他難。即無自過。明非自許。二云。故理門釋喻中雲。由如是說。能顯示因同品定有。異品遍無。非顛倒說。既不取瓶。此乃重頌前因。云何能顯因也。如言聲無常所作性故。諸所作皆無常。如所作無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所比喻的法，它的本體是一還是異？如果說是一，本體既然是一，彼此都應該知道，何必等待因緣和合而成？如果說是異，那就是說，不同的本體之法，有異有同的表象。有因的意義，可以用來作為比喻，怎麼能用完全相同的例子來責難呢？使得法的本體和表象一切都相同，這又是什麼道理呢？回答說，這種說法不對。如果取瓶子的本體作為比喻，這和『聲』（shēng，聲音）的宗義是一還是異？如果說是一，就和前面的責難一樣，又有很多過失。如果說是異，怎麼能稱為『同法』呢？如果說『聲』（shēng，聲音）是所作，瓶子也是所作，所以稱為『同法』，那是不對的。為什麼呢？應該說『顯現瓶子決定有無常』，何必說『顯現因在同品中，決定具有自性』？因為『因』是『所作』，瓶子上的意義，怎麼能把瓶子的本體稱為『所作性』呢？如果這樣，那麼『聲』（shēng，聲音）的本體就應該是『所作』的本體。如果這樣，就取有法『聲』（shēng，聲音）作為『因』，反而成了宗義的一部分作為『因』，宗和因沒有區別的過失。其餘的很多問難得失，可以依此類推得知，因為繁瑣就不一一敘述了。既然取瓶子作為比喻，將要進行特殊的論述，現在根據他們的觀點，簡單地提出三個責難。第一種說法是，過去的論師允許瓶子被火燒后可以看見，按照道理應該允許『聲』（shēng，聲音）被火燒后可以看見。陳那（Chénnà）順著這個思路進行責難，是認為『聲』（shēng，聲音）是可以被火燒后看見，還是不可以被火燒后看見？如果自己承認可以被火燒后看見，那就和對方的觀點完全一致了。如果自己不承認，現在卻用這個來責難對方，這不是自相矛盾嗎？不對。因為他們取瓶子，作為同喻的本體。陳那就用這個來責難他們說，你們所承認的『聲』（shēng，聲音），應該可以被火燒后看見，就像瓶子一樣。就像難勝論（Nánshèng lùn）中說，你們的地（dì，土地）應該不是有礙的身根所能得到的，因為你們承認眼睛能看見它，就像顏色一樣。難道自己不承認地（dì，土地）能被身根得到，卻用這個來責難對方嗎？所以就對方的觀點進行責難，就沒有自相矛盾的過失。明確表示自己不承認。第二種說法是，所以《理門》（Lǐ mén）解釋比喻中說，通過這樣說，能夠顯示『因』在同品中必定存在，在異品中普遍不存在，而不是顛倒的說法。既然不取瓶子，這只是重複前面的『因』，怎麼能顯示『因』呢？就像說『聲』（shēng，聲音）是無常的，因為它是所作的。凡是所作的都是無常的，就像所作的...
【English Translation】 English version The dharma being illustrated, is its substance one or different? If it is said to be one, since the substance is one, both sides should know it, why wait for causes and conditions to come together? If it is said to be different, then it is clear that the dharma of different substances has different and same appearances. The meaning of cause can be used as a metaphor, how can one use completely identical examples to criticize? Making the substance and appearance of the dharma all the same, what is the reason for this? The answer is, this statement is not correct. If we take the substance of a pot as a metaphor, is this one or different from the doctrine of 'sound' (shēng)? If it is said to be one, it is the same as the previous criticism, and there are many faults. If it is said to be different, how can it be called 'same dharma'? If it is said that 'sound' (shēng) is created, and the pot is also created, so it is called 'same dharma', that is not correct. Why? It should be said 'manifesting the pot is definitely impermanent', why say 'manifesting the cause in the same category, definitely has nature'? Because 'cause' is 'created', the meaning on the pot, how can the substance of the pot be called 'created nature'? If so, then the substance of 'sound' (shēng) should be the substance of 'created'. If so, then taking the dharma-possessing 'sound' (shēng) as the 'cause', it becomes a part of the proposition as the 'cause', the proposition and the cause have no difference. The remaining many questions and answers, gains and losses, can be known by analogy, and will not be described in detail because they are cumbersome. Since the pot is taken as a metaphor, a special discussion will be conducted. Now, according to their point of view, three criticisms are briefly raised. The first statement is that the ancient teachers allowed the pot to be seen after being burned, and logically should allow 'sound' (shēng) to be seen after being burned. Dignāga (Chénnà) followed this line of thought to criticize, is it thought that 'sound' (shēng) can be seen after being burned, or cannot be seen after being burned? If one admits that it can be seen after being burned, then it is completely consistent with the other party's point of view. If one does not admit it, but now uses this to criticize the other party, is this not self-contradictory? That's not right. Because they take the pot as the substance of the same metaphor. Dignāga (Chénnà) then used this to criticize them, saying that the 'sound' (shēng) that you admit should be able to be seen after being burned, just like a pot. Just like in the Nayasena's argument (Nánshèng lùn), it is said that your earth (dì) should not be obtainable by the obstructive body-sense, because you admit that the eyes can see it, just like color. Does one not admit that earth (dì) can be obtained by the body-sense, but use this to criticize the other party? Therefore, criticizing from the other party's point of view, there is no fault of self-contradiction. Clearly stating that one does not admit it. The second statement is that, therefore, the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Lǐ mén) explains in the metaphor, that by saying this, it can show that the 'cause' must exist in the same category, and universally does not exist in the different category, and not the inverted statement. Since the pot is not taken, this is just repeating the previous 'cause', how can it show the 'cause'? Just like saying 'sound' (shēng) is impermanent, because it is created. All that is created is impermanent, just like what is created...
常等。豈成能立者。不然。前所作無常。但別宗因。后舉諸所作。總攝宗喻。無常亦爾。不唯重頌。亦正是合。故定所作無常是喻體。若如先所說。取瓶為喻體。即應直指瓶。何須重舉。諸勤發皆無常。猶如瓶等耶。又若取瓶體為喻。成立聲無常等。何故。云說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。不言說瓶因所隨。瓶無因不有。此二名譬喻。余皆此相似。又云。應以非作證其常。或以無常成所作。此顯正說。應以所作成無常。以常離所作。不言以瓶證無常。故正喻體。所作無常。舉依以顯。若不如是。舉瓶即知定有所作。舉喻之時。但云如瓶。何須俱牒宗因。云諸所作皆是無常。猶如瓶等。何須煩重。又瓶為喻體。即因外立別法為喻。與其因義。都不相應。乃至云。所作性故。所類同法。不說能立所成立義。此意不說能立之因。所立宗義。以為喻故。又因所作性。喻體即瓶。以瓶有所作故無常。不是所作無常為同品。即唯宗法名因。瓶體非因。雖瓶體上。有于因宗。終是大過。故理門云。若唯宗法。是因性者。其有不定。應亦成因。云何具有所立能立。及異品法二種譬喻。而有此失。準此論文。故不取瓶等體。正為其喻。三云。陳那意。以外人立無義之因。于同異品。義相各別。以義別。不得和合正說。為非彼義。故云喻顯于因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 常等。豈成能立者。不然。前所作無常，但別宗因。后舉諸所作，總攝宗喻。無常亦爾。不唯重頌，亦正是合。故定所作無常是喻體。若如先所說，取瓶為喻體，即應直指瓶，何須重舉。諸勤發皆無常，猶如瓶等耶。又若取瓶體為喻，成立聲無常等。何故，云說因宗所隨，宗無因不有。不言說瓶因所隨，瓶無因不有。此二名譬喻，余皆此相似。又云，應以非作證其常，或以無常成所作。此顯正說，應以所作成無常，以常離所作。不言以瓶證無常。故正喻體，所作無常。舉依以顯。若不如是，舉瓶即知定有所作。舉喻之時，但云如瓶，何須俱牒宗因。云諸所作皆是無常，猶如瓶等。何須煩重。又瓶為喻體，即因外立別法為喻，與其因義，都不相應。乃至云，所作性故，所類同法。不說能立所成立義。此意不說能立之因，所立宗義，以為喻故。又因所作性，喻體即瓶。以瓶有所作故無常，不是所作無常為同品。即唯宗法名因。瓶體非因。雖瓶體上，有于因宗，終是大過。故理門云，若唯宗法，是因性者，其有不定，應亦成因。云何具有所立能立，及異品法二種譬喻。而有此失。準此論文，故不取瓶等體，正為其喻。三云，陳那（Dignāga）意，以外人立無義之因，于同異品，義相各別。以義別，不得和合正說。為非彼義。故云喻顯于因。 通常等等。難道能成立嗎？不是的。前面說『所作皆無常』，只是分別宗和因。後面舉出『諸所作』，總括宗和喻。『無常』也是這樣。不只是重複頌說，也正是契合。所以確定『所作皆無常』是喻體。如果像先前所說，取瓶子為喻體，就應該直接指瓶子，何必重複舉例。『所有努力產生的都是無常的，就像瓶子一樣』嗎？又如果取瓶子的本體為喻，來成立聲音是無常等等。為什麼說『因隨著宗，宗沒有因就不存在』。不說『瓶子的因隨著宗，瓶子沒有因就不存在』。這兩種才叫做譬喻，其餘都與此相似。又說，『應該用非所作來證明常，或者用無常來成立所作』。這顯示了正確的說法，應該用所作來成立無常，因為常是遠離所作的。不說用瓶子來證明無常。所以正確的喻體是『所作皆無常』。舉出『依』是爲了顯明。如果不是這樣，舉出瓶子就應該知道一定是所作的。舉喻的時候，只說『像瓶子一樣』，何必一起重複宗和因。說『所有所作都是無常的，就像瓶子一樣』。何必這樣煩瑣重複。又如果瓶子為喻體，就是從因之外建立別的法作為喻，與它的因的意義，都不相應。乃至說，『因為是所作性，所以是同類法』。不說能成立的意義和所成立的意義。這個意思是說，不把能成立的因，和所成立的宗義，作為譬喻的緣故。又因為因是所作性，喻體就是瓶子。因為瓶子是所作的所以是無常的，不是所作無常作為同品。就是隻有宗法才叫做因。瓶子的本體不是因。即使瓶子的本體上，有因和宗，終究是大過失。所以《理門》說，如果只有宗法，是因的性質，那麼它就是不確定的，也應該成為因。怎麼能具有所立、能立，以及異品法兩種譬喻，而有這種過失。根據這篇論文，所以不取瓶子等本體，作為正確的譬喻。第三種說法是，陳那（Dignāga）的意思是，外道立了沒有意義的因，在同品和異品中，意義各不相同。因為意義不同，不能和合正確地說。認為不是那個意義。所以說喻顯明瞭因。
【English Translation】 English version Are 'always' and so on, able to establish something? No. The previous statement 'whatever is made is impermanent' only distinguishes between the thesis (宗, zōng) and the reason (因, yīn). The later statement 'all that is made' encompasses both the thesis and the example (喻, yù). 'Impermanence' is also like this. It is not merely a repetition, but also a precise agreement. Therefore, it is determined that 'whatever is made is impermanent' is the example. If, as previously stated, a jar is taken as the example, then one should directly point to the jar. Why repeat it? 'All that is produced by effort is impermanent, like a jar?' Furthermore, if the substance of the jar is taken as the example to establish that sound is impermanent, etc., why is it said that 'the reason follows the thesis, and the thesis does not exist without the reason'? It is not said that 'the reason of the jar follows the thesis, and the jar does not exist without the reason.' These two are called metaphors (譬喻, pìyù), and the rest are similar to this. Furthermore, it is said, 'One should use what is not made to prove permanence, or use impermanence to establish what is made.' This shows the correct statement: one should use what is made to establish impermanence, because permanence is separate from what is made. It is not said to use a jar to prove impermanence. Therefore, the correct example is 'whatever is made is impermanent.' Citing 'dependence' is to clarify. If it were not so, citing a jar would immediately indicate that it is definitely made. When giving an example, one would only say 'like a jar.' Why repeat both the thesis and the reason? Saying 'all that is made is impermanent, like a jar' is unnecessarily repetitive. Furthermore, if the jar is the example, it is establishing a separate dharma (法, dharma) outside of the reason as the example, which does not correspond to the meaning of the reason. Even saying, 'Because of the nature of being made, it is a similar dharma.' It does not speak of the meaning of what can be established and what is established. This means that the reason that can establish and the meaning of the thesis that is established are not taken as the example. Furthermore, because the reason is the nature of being made, the example is the jar. Because the jar is made, it is impermanent. It is not that 'whatever is made is impermanent' is the same category. Only the dharma of the thesis is called the reason. The substance of the jar is not the reason. Even though the substance of the jar has the reason and the thesis, it is ultimately a great fault. Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha (理門) says, 'If only the dharma of the thesis is the nature of the reason, then it is uncertain and should also become the reason.' How can one have both the established, the establishing, and the two types of examples of dissimilar dharmas and have this fault? According to this text, the substance of the jar, etc., is not taken as the correct example. The third view is that Dignāga's (陳那) intention is that outsiders establish a meaningless reason, and the meanings are different in similar and dissimilar categories. Because the meanings are different, they cannot be harmoniously and correctly stated. They consider it not to be that meaning. Therefore, it is said that the example clarifies the reason.
。無別喻體者。亦不然。準此意許。若有義之因。因外立喻。即取瓶等。若爾。何得喻是因分。因是所作。瓶四塵故。即違理門。彼云。若爾。喻言應非異分。答云。事雖實爾。然此因言。唯為顯了是宗法性。非為顯了同品異品。有性無性。故立同異。顯后二品。因言顯初相。即聲所作。同顯第二。故瓶所作。若以同顯第二。即取瓶體。因顯初相。應當取聲。既詮初相。取聲上所作故。詮第二相。取瓶所作。故下文云。故定三相。唯為顯因。由此道理。雖一切分皆能為因。顯了所立。然唯一分。且說為因。故第二分明。亦所作不可難言。即第三分說為異喻。亦應所作。第三遮詮。故不為例。又第三相。異遍非有。舉異非有。正即是因。故舉瓶等。但是喻依。若作斯解。可謂妙解。余謬名妙。非為實妙。諸餘不正。準此例知。故作三解。喻體之中。第三順古。文義無違。初二皆違。可熟思察。故不煩顯。
有人解唯此三分說名能立云。古解言。因一喻二。以為三分。即設難云。若依掌珍論。闕異喻亦成能立。何得言唯三分耶。其義云何。答此難不然。清辨勝義一切皆空。空為同品。雖無于有。亦得云無宗之處。因不有性。異喻得成。以異止濫。濫除即異喻。故理門云。后唯止濫。由合及離。比度義故。由是。雖對
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果沒有任何可以比擬的事物，那也是不對的。按照這個意思來推斷，如果存在具有意義的『因』（hetu，理由、原因），就可以在『因』之外建立『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子），比如選取瓶子等事物。如果這樣，怎麼能說『喻』是『因』的一部分呢？『因』是『所作』（kṛtaka，被製造出來的），而瓶子是由四大元素組成的，這就違反了正理門（Nyāyamukha）。 對方說：『如果這樣，那麼『喻』的陳述就不應該與『因』不同。』回答說：『事情確實如此。然而，這裡的『因』的陳述，僅僅是爲了顯示它是宗法性（pakṣadharmatva，周遍性）的，而不是爲了顯示在同品（sapakṣa，相似例子）和異品（vipakṣa，相異例子）中，具有或不具有這種性質。』因此，建立同品和異品，是爲了顯示后兩種情況，而『因』的陳述是爲了顯示第一種情況，比如『聲音是所作』。同品是爲了顯示第二種情況，比如『瓶子是所作』。如果用同品來顯示第二種情況，就選取瓶子的本體；『因』的陳述是爲了顯示第一種情況，就應當選取聲音。既然詮釋第一種情況，就選取聲音上的『所作』；詮釋第二種情況，就選取瓶子的『所作』。所以下文說：『因此，確定三種相，僅僅是爲了顯示『因』。』 由於這個道理，雖然一切部分都能作為『因』，來顯示所要建立的結論，但只選取其中一部分來說明是『因』。因此，第二部分明顯也是『所作』，不可反駁。第三部分說是『異喻』，也應該是『所作』。第三種遮詮，不能作為例子。而且，第三相是『異遍非有』（vipakṣavyāpakatva，在相異例子中不普遍存在），舉出『異非有』，正是『因』本身。所以舉出瓶子等事物，只是作為『喻』的依據。如果這樣解釋，可以說是巧妙的解釋。其餘錯誤的稱為巧妙，並非真正的巧妙。其餘不正當的，按照這個例子來推知。所以做了三種解釋，在『喻』的本體中，第三種順應古義，文義沒有違背，前兩種都違背了，可以仔細思考觀察，所以不必詳細說明。 有人解釋說，只有這三個部分才能稱為『能立』（sādhana，論證）。古老的解釋說，『因』是一個，『喻』是兩個，合起來是三個部分。於是就有人提出疑問：『如果按照《掌珍論》（Tarka-mudrā），缺少『異喻』也能成立『能立』，怎麼能說只有三個部分呢？』它的意義是什麼呢？回答說：『這個疑問不對。清辨（Bhāvaviveka）認為勝義（paramārtha，勝義諦）上一切皆空，空作為同品，即使沒有『有』，也可以說是『無宗之處，因不有性』，『異喻』得以成立。用『異』來阻止氾濫，氾濫消除就是『異喻』。』所以《理門》（Hetu-mukha）說：『後來只是阻止氾濫，通過結合和分離，來比較衡量意義。』因此，即使對...
【English Translation】 English version: If there is no analogy (upama), that is also not right. According to this meaning, if there is a meaningful 'hetu' (reason, cause), then an 'example' (dṛṣṭānta) can be established outside of the 'hetu', such as taking a pot or other things. If so, how can it be said that the 'example' is a part of the 'hetu'? The 'hetu' is 'produced' (kṛtaka), while the pot is made of the four great elements, which violates the Nyāyamukha (Introduction to Logic). The opponent says: 'If so, then the statement of the 'example' should not be different from the 'hetu'.' The answer is: 'The matter is indeed so. However, the statement of 'hetu' here is only to show that it is pakṣadharmatva (property of the subject), not to show whether it has or does not have this property in the sapakṣa (similar instances) and vipakṣa (dissimilar instances).' Therefore, establishing sapakṣa and vipakṣa is to show the latter two situations, while the statement of 'hetu' is to show the first situation, such as 'sound is produced'. Sapakṣa is to show the second situation, such as 'the pot is produced'. If the second situation is shown by sapakṣa, then the essence of the pot is taken; the statement of 'hetu' is to show the first situation, then sound should be taken. Since the first situation is explained, the 'produced' on the sound is taken; the second situation is explained, the 'produced' of the pot is taken. Therefore, the following text says: 'Therefore, determining the three aspects is only to show the 'hetu'.' Due to this reason, although all parts can be used as 'hetu' to show the conclusion to be established, only one part is selected to explain that it is 'hetu'. Therefore, the second part is obviously also 'produced' and cannot be refuted. The third part is said to be 'vipakṣa', and it should also be 'produced'. The third negation cannot be used as an example. Moreover, the third aspect is 'vipakṣavyāpakatva' (not universally present in dissimilar instances), and the 'dissimilar non-existence' is the 'hetu' itself. Therefore, citing pots and other things is only the basis for the 'example'. If this is explained in this way, it can be said to be a clever explanation. The rest of the wrong ones are called clever, but they are not really clever. The rest of the improper ones can be inferred from this example. Therefore, three explanations are made. In the essence of the 'example', the third one conforms to the ancient meaning, and the meaning of the text is not violated, while the first two violate it. You can think and observe carefully, so there is no need to explain it in detail. Some people explain that only these three parts can be called 'sādhana' (proof). The ancient explanation says that 'hetu' is one and 'example' is two, which together are three parts. Then someone raised the question: 'If according to the Tarka-mudrā (Treatise on Logic), the 'sādhana' can be established even if the 'vipakṣa' is missing, how can it be said that there are only three parts?' What is its meaning? The answer is: 'This question is not right. Bhāvaviveka believes that everything is empty in paramārtha (ultimate truth), and emptiness is the same as sapakṣa. Even if there is no 'existence', it can be said that 'there is no place for the subject, and the hetu does not have the property of existence', and the 'vipakṣa' can be established. Using 'dissimilarity' to prevent proliferation, and the elimination of proliferation is 'vipakṣa'.' Therefore, the Hetu-mukha (Introduction to Logic) says: 'Later, it only prevents proliferation, and compares and measures the meaning through combination and separation.' Therefore, even if...
不立。實有大虛空等。而得顯示無有宗處。無因義成。正解二喻。具足宗因。若非異喻。此言徒設。
有人釋云。但遮外道小乘。及天親等。立五支等。以為能立。說唯三分。乃至云。非唯因喻。引對法雲。釋宗因喻訖。次釋合云。謂由三分。成立如前所成義已。故知。三分是宗因喻以為證者。其義云何。答此亦不然。對法若云唯此三分。可引彼證。彼云由三。更舉合結等。即知能立。不唯前三。不說唯故。前三正能合結傍顯。俱能立故。故彼論解合云。遂引彼義。令就此法。正說道理。解結云。結者謂到究竟趣。所有正說。由此道理極善成就。故是此事。決定無異。結會究竟是名結。既由結支。決定究竟。明唯前三。能立不足。又復標云。能立有八。今者言三。違彼說故。若云合結助非正立故。唯前三者。此亦不然。喻亦助因。應唯二分。又無唯字。故知。引非。若爾無著等。豈不解因明。立八為能立。今陳那並遮。若爾天親。豈不解因明。今陳那設遮。又豈天親。不見瑜伽對法論等。立五為能立。五八既不說相違。略三何要同古。故知。作者意別各不相違。親疏合離。取捨異故。
有人引理門云。于比量中。唯見此理。乃至云。遮合結等。此意。以論云爲于所比。顯宗法性。故說因言。為顯於此。不
【現代漢語翻譯】 不設立場。如果確實存在廣大的虛空等等，就能顯示出沒有宗派之處，無因而義理自成。正確理解兩種比喻，就具備了宗和因。如果不是異喻，這些話就毫無意義。
有人解釋說，只是爲了遮破外道、小乘以及世親（Vasubandhu）等人，他們設立五支等作為能立（sādhanavākya，論證），說只有三分（宗、因、喻）。甚至說，不僅僅是因和喻，還引用《對法論》（Abhidharma）來說明。解釋完宗、因、喻后，接著解釋合（upanaya）說：『通過三分，成立了前面所成立的意義。』由此可知，三分是宗、因、喻作為證據。』這個說法是什麼意思呢？回答說，這種說法也是不對的。《對法論》如果說只有這三分，還可以引用它來證明。但它說『通過三』，又舉出合、結等，就知道能立不僅僅是前面的三支。因為它沒有說『唯』。前面的三支是主要的，合、結是輔助顯示的，都能成立論證。所以，《對法論》解釋合時，就引用那個意義，使之符合這個法，正確地闡述道理。解釋結（nigamana）說：『結，是指到達究竟趣（ultimate goal）的所有正確說法。』由於這個道理極其善妙地成就，所以這件事是決定無疑的。總結會歸到究竟，就叫做結。既然由結支來決定究竟，就說明僅僅前面的三支，能立是不夠的。而且，前面還標明說，能立有八支，現在卻說三支，這與前面的說法相違背。如果說合、結是輔助，不是正式的能立，所以只有前面的三支，這種說法也是不對的。比喻也是輔助因的，應該只有二分。而且沒有『唯』字，所以知道引用是錯誤的。如果這樣，無著（Asanga）等人難道不是解釋因明（hetuvidyā，邏輯學），設立八支作為能立嗎？現在陳那（Dignāga）一併遮破。如果這樣，世親難道不是解釋因明嗎？現在陳那設立遮破。而且難道世親沒有看到《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）、《對法論》等，設立五支作為能立嗎？五支和八支既然沒有說互相違背，省略成三支又何必要和古人相同呢？所以知道，作者的意圖不同，各自不相違背。親疏、合離，取捨不同罷了。
有人引用《理門論》（Nyāyamukha）說：『在比量（anumāna，推論）中，只看到這個道理。』甚至說，遮破合、結等。』這個意思是，因為論中說『爲了對於所比，顯示宗的法性，所以說因。爲了顯示於此，不……』
【English Translation】 No establishment. If there truly exist vast empty space, etc., then it can reveal that there is no sectarian position, and the meaning is established without a cause. Correctly understanding the two metaphors, one possesses both the thesis (paksha) and the reason (hetu). If it were not a dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta), these words would be meaningless.
Someone explains that it is only to refute the non-Buddhists, the Hīnayāna, and Vasubandhu (世親) and others, who establish five members, etc., as the means of proof (sādhanavākya), saying that there are only three parts (thesis, reason, example). They even say that it is not only the reason and the example, and they cite the Abhidharma (對法論) to explain. After explaining the thesis, reason, and example, they then explain the application (upanaya), saying: 'Through the three parts, the meaning that was previously established is established.' From this, it can be known that the three parts are the thesis, reason, and example as evidence. What is the meaning of this statement? The answer is that this statement is also incorrect. If the Abhidharma said that there are only these three parts, it could be cited as proof. But it says 'through three' and also mentions application, conclusion, etc., so it is known that the means of proof is not only the previous three members. Because it does not say 'only'. The previous three members are the main ones, and the application and conclusion are auxiliary, and all can establish the argument. Therefore, when the Abhidharma explains the application, it cites that meaning to make it conform to this Dharma, and correctly expounds the principle. Explaining the conclusion (nigamana), it says: 'The conclusion refers to all the correct statements that reach the ultimate goal (究竟趣).' Because this principle is extremely well accomplished, this matter is definitely without difference. Summarizing and converging to the ultimate is called the conclusion. Since the conclusion member determines the ultimate, it shows that the previous three members alone are not sufficient to establish the argument. Moreover, it is stated earlier that there are eight members of the means of proof, but now it is said that there are three members, which contradicts the previous statement. If it is said that the application and conclusion are auxiliary and not formal means of proof, so there are only the previous three members, this statement is also incorrect. The example also assists the reason, so there should only be two parts. Moreover, there is no word 'only', so it is known that the citation is wrong. If so, did Asanga (無著) and others not explain logic (hetuvidyā 因明), establishing eight members as the means of proof? Now Dignāga (陳那) refutes them all together. If so, did Vasubandhu not explain logic? Now Dignāga establishes a refutation. Moreover, did Vasubandhu not see the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), the Abhidharma, etc., establishing five members as the means of proof? Since the five and eight members are not said to contradict each other, why is it necessary to be the same as the ancients when abbreviating to three members? Therefore, it is known that the intentions of the authors are different, and they do not contradict each other. It is just that the closeness, separation, combination, and acceptance are different.
Someone cites the Nyāyamukha (理門論), saying: 'In inference (anumāna 比量), only this principle is seen.' And even says, 'Refuting the application, conclusion, etc.' The meaning of this is because the treatise says, 'In order to show the nature of the thesis for what is to be inferred, the reason is stated. In order to show this, not...'
相離性。故說喻言。為顯所比。故說宗言。于所比中除此。更無其餘支分。故知。陳那說宗因喻。云唯三分者。其義云何。答不然。前云。又比量中。唯見此理。若所比處。此相定遍於余同類。念此定有。于彼無處。念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。即因三相。不說其宗。又云。于所比中故宗為所比。即所立因喻。能比即能立。故不取宗。云唯三分。又云。故定三相。唯為顯因。由此道理。雖一切分皆能為因。顯了所立。然唯一分。且說為因。以此故知。宗為所立。三相能顯。即為能立。余所引證。立理設難。並如前說。
有人會對法瑜伽云。對法中合。即瑜伽同類。自解對法合支。如遮破我類遣執常。復云。瑜伽同類等。即此同喻等。其義云何。答不相當。既云瑜伽同類即此同喻。云何得與對法論中合支相似。彼類余法以為合故。如先德釋。可同因明。又許如實能立。異瑜伽等。不許陳那造意少別。豈獨陳那。解因明理。天親不悟。愛憎與奪。何太不倫。
有人自問答云。瑜伽對法。皆說八為能立。此但為三。豈成相順。答因明即瑜伽十支之一支。豈得違反本經。自為鉾楯等。其義云何。答此亦不然。如實亦瑜伽一支。何得許乖本論。若云不乖彼說合結。陳那何故遮卻。又複合結。名言不殊。那知不遮對
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
關於相離性（aprthaktva）：所以要說譬喻（udaharana），爲了彰顯所要比擬的事物：所以要說宗（paksa）。在所比擬的事物中，除了這三者，沒有其他的組成部分。因此，要知道陳那（Dignaga）說宗、因（hetu）、喻（udaharana）只有三分，是什麼意思呢？回答：不是這樣的。前面說過：『又在比量（anumana）中，只見到這個道理，如果所比擬的事物，這個相（laksana）一定普遍存在於其餘同類事物中，想到這個一定存在；在彼處沒有，想到這個普遍不存在。』所以由此產生決定的理解，就是因的三相（trairupya），沒有說宗。又說：『在所比擬的事物中，所以宗是所比擬的。』就是所建立的因和喻，能比擬的就是能立（sadhana），所以不取宗，說只有三分。又說：『所以確定三相，只是爲了彰顯因。』由此道理，雖然一切部分都能作為因，顯明所要建立的，然而只有一部分，且說是因。因此要知道，宗是所要建立的，三相能夠顯明，就是能立。其餘所引用的證據，建立理論，設定難題，都如前面所說。
有人會對法瑜伽（Abhidharma-yoga）說：『對法中的合（upanaya），就是瑜伽的同類。』自己解釋對法的合支（avayava），如遮破我（atman）的種類，遣除執著常（nitya）。又說：『瑜伽的同類等，就是這個同喻（samanodaharana）等。』這是什麼意思呢？回答：不相當。既然說瑜伽的同類就是這個同喻，怎麼能與對法論中的合支相似呢？因為彼類其餘法作為合的緣故。如先德的解釋，可以等同於因明（hetuvidya）。又允許如實能立，不同於瑜伽等，不允許陳那的造意稍微不同。難道只有陳那理解因明的道理，天親（Vasubandhu）沒有領悟嗎？愛憎的取捨，何等不倫！
有人自問自答說：『瑜伽和對法，都說八支為能立，這裡卻只有三支，怎麼能說是相順呢？』回答：『因明就是瑜伽十支中的一支，怎麼能違反本經，自己作為矛和盾呢？』這是什麼意思呢？回答：這也是不對的。如實也是瑜伽的一支，怎麼能允許違背本論呢？如果說不違背彼說的合和結（nigamana），陳那為什麼要遮卻呢？又複合和結，名言沒有差別，怎麼知道不遮對法呢？
【English Translation】 English version:
Concerning aprthaktva (inseparability): Therefore, examples (udaharana) are stated to reveal what is to be compared; therefore, the thesis (paksa) is stated. Among the things to be compared, there are no other components besides these three. Therefore, how should we understand Dignaga's statement that the thesis, reason (hetu), and example (udaharana) are only three parts? Answer: It is not so. It was said earlier: 'Moreover, in inference (anumana), only this principle is seen. If the thing to be compared has this characteristic (laksana) that is certainly pervasive in other similar things, one thinks of this as certainly existing; where it is not, one thinks of this as universally non-existent.' Therefore, from this arises a definite understanding, which is the three aspects (trairupya) of the reason, without mentioning the thesis. It is also said: 'Among the things to be compared, the thesis is what is to be compared.' That is, the established reason and example, what can compare is the means of proof (sadhana), so the thesis is not taken, saying there are only three parts. It is also said: 'Therefore, the three aspects are determined only to reveal the reason.' From this principle, although all parts can serve as the reason, clarifying what is to be established, yet only one part is said to be the reason. Therefore, know that the thesis is what is to be established, and the three aspects can reveal it, which is the means of proof. The remaining cited evidence, establishing theories, and setting up difficulties are all as previously stated.
Someone might say to Abhidharma-yoga: 'The application (upanaya) in Abhidharma is the same category as yoga.' They themselves explain the application limb (avayava) of Abhidharma, such as refuting the category of self (atman) and eliminating the attachment to permanence (nitya). And they say: 'The same category of yoga, etc., is the same example (samanodaharana), etc.' What does this mean? Answer: It is not appropriate. Since it is said that the same category of yoga is the same example, how can it be similar to the application limb in the Abhidharma treatises? Because that category uses other dharmas as the reason for application. As explained by earlier virtuous ones, it can be equated with logic (hetuvidya). Also, allowing the means of proof to be as it is, different from yoga, etc., does not allow Dignaga's intention to be slightly different. Is it only Dignaga who understands the principles of logic, and Vasubandhu who did not comprehend it? The acceptance and rejection of love and hatred are so inappropriate!
Someone asks and answers themselves, saying: 'Yoga and Abhidharma both say that eight limbs are the means of proof, but here there are only three limbs. How can this be said to be consistent?' Answer: 'Logic is one of the ten limbs of yoga, how can it violate the original scripture, using oneself as both spear and shield?' What does this mean? Answer: This is also incorrect. Suchness is also a limb of yoga, how can it be allowed to contradict the original treatise? If it is said that it does not contradict the application and conclusion (nigamana) mentioned there, why did Dignaga reject them? Moreover, the application and conclusion have no difference in name, how do you know that it does not reject Abhidharma?
法中八。由據增勝說唯三。遮意解不同。釋亦少別。如瑜伽論。八為能成。尚自料簡。真唯有三。余能立之能立。名為能立。非實說八。俱為能立。末代解釋。取捨尚然。于古聖賢。何苦不許。
有人解似宗過中俱不極成云。執我是思。即蘊計我。無思極成。其義云何。答亦不得然。亦應我為因緣。即蘊計我。無因極成。若云猶計我與和合作因緣。不俱言因緣。何得相例者。本來執異。何須前例。故知。說神我佛法不許。非極成。若假我者。佛法即許。非不成。今言我與和合作因緣。和合即實有。大乘不許。俱不極成。亦不得云。立我是思。非外道宗。故是極成。論云如數論師。對佛弟子。若立佛法宗。是第九過故。何云所別。亦不得言二十五諦。不立思故。非外道宗。以即計我是思。何得更立思耶。以許有實思故。極成不許實和合故不成。
有釋不成因過中雲繩輪咽臍所作。不應分別。並極成因。他亦顯生俱所作。二俱所作併爲因。其義云何。答此難不然。所作名生。所顯非生。何得二因俱名成作。又引廣百論第一云。又無常因。有不成過。就生滅義。自宗不成。隱顯義釋。他宗不成者。待撿彼文。
有解不成。總料簡中雲。兩俱隨一。既對立敵以辯。不得更約自他等辯句也。此義如何。此亦不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於『法中八』，根據增勝的觀點，實際上只有三種。對於『遮意』的理解不同，解釋也略有差異。例如，《瑜伽師地論》中，認為八種是能成立的，但尚且需要自己去衡量判斷。真正來說只有三種，其餘的能成立的能成立者，可以稱之為能成立，但並非實際說了八種，都作為能成立。後世的解釋，取捨尚且如此，對於古代的聖賢，為何偏偏不認可呢？ 有人解釋說，類似於『宗過』中，『俱不極成』的情況，說『執著我是思』，即是『蘊計我』，沒有『思』就極成。這個意義是什麼呢？回答說，這樣也不對。也應該說『我』是因緣，即『蘊計我』，沒有『因』就極成。如果說仍然認為『我』與『和合』作為因緣，不一起說『因緣』，怎麼能相比呢？本來執著就不同，何須用之前的例子？所以要知道，說『神我』佛法是不允許的，所以『非極成』。如果說是『假我』，佛法就允許，就『非不成』。現在說『我』與『和合』作為因緣，『和合』就是實有的，大乘佛教不允許，所以『俱不極成』。也不能說，『立我是思』，不是外道的宗義，所以是『極成』。《論》中說，如同數論師，對於佛弟子，如果立佛法的宗義，就是第九過。為何說有所區別呢？也不能說二十五諦，不立『思』，所以不是外道的宗義。因為已經認為『我』是『思』，為何還要再立『思』呢？因為允許有真實的『思』，所以『極成』，不允許真實的和合，所以『不成』。 有人解釋『不成因過』中說，繩子、輪子、咽喉、肚臍所製造的東西，不應該分別，都是『極成因』。他人也顯示『生』和『俱所作』，兩個都是『所作』並作為『因』，這個意義是什麼呢？回答說，這個責難不對。『所作』的意思是『生』，『所顯』不是『生』，怎麼能兩個『因』都稱為『成作』呢？又引用《廣百論》第一卷說，又有『無常因』，有『不成過』，就『生滅』的意義來說，自宗不成立；用『隱顯』的意義來解釋，他宗不成立。需要查閱原文。 有人解釋『不成』，在總的衡量判斷中說，兩個都隨其中一個，既然是對立的敵對方進行辯論，就不能再用自己或他人等辯論的語句了。這個意義如何？這個也不對。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the 'Eight Aspects of Dharma', according to the view of increasing superiority, there are actually only three. The understanding of 'obstructing intention' differs, and the explanations also vary slightly. For example, in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), it is considered that eight aspects are capable of establishing, but it is still necessary to measure and judge for oneself. In reality, there are only three; the remaining aspects that establish the establishment can be called capable of establishing, but it is not actually said that there are eight, all as capable of establishing. Later generations' interpretations, acceptance and rejection are still like this, so why not acknowledge the ancient sages? Someone explains that, similar to the case of 'both unestablished' (俱不極成) in 'doctrinal fault' (宗過), saying 'clinging to the self as thought' (執著我是思) is 'aggregates conceiving self' (蘊計我), and without 'thought' it is established. What is the meaning of this? The answer is that this is also incorrect. It should also be said that 'self' is a condition, that is, 'aggregates conceiving self', and without 'condition' it is established. If it is said that it is still considered that 'self' and 'combination' (和合) act as conditions, and 'condition' is not mentioned together, how can they be compared? The clinging is inherently different, so why use the previous example? Therefore, it should be known that the Dharma does not allow the concept of 'divine self' (神我), so it is 'not established' (非極成). If it is 'provisional self' (假我), the Dharma allows it, so it is 'not unestablished' (非不成). Now it is said that 'self' and 'combination' act as conditions, and 'combination' is real, which Mahayana Buddhism does not allow, so it is 'both unestablished'. It cannot be said that 'establishing self as thought' is not the doctrine of non-Buddhists, so it is 'established'. The Sastra says that, like the Samkhya (數論師) philosopher, if a Buddhist disciple establishes the doctrine of Buddhism, it is the ninth fault. Why say there is a difference? It cannot be said that the twenty-five principles do not establish 'thought', so it is not the doctrine of non-Buddhists. Because it is already considered that 'self' is 'thought', why establish 'thought' again? Because it is allowed that there is real 'thought', so it is 'established'; real combination is not allowed, so it is 'unestablished'. Someone explains that in the 'unestablished reason fault' (不成因過), things made by rope, wheel, throat, and navel should not be distinguished, and are all 'established reasons' (極成因). Others also show 'birth' (生) and 'both made' (俱所作), and both are 'made' and used as 'reason'. What is the meaning of this? The answer is that this criticism is incorrect. 'Made' means 'birth', and 'manifested' is not 'birth', so how can both 'reasons' be called 'established made'? It also quotes the first volume of the Guang Bai Lun (廣百論) saying that there is also 'impermanent reason' (無常因), and there is 'unestablished fault' (不成過). In terms of the meaning of 'birth and death' (生滅), one's own school is not established; explaining it in terms of 'concealment and manifestation' (隱顯), the other school is not established. It is necessary to check the original text. Someone explains 'unestablished' and says in the general measurement and judgment that both follow one of them. Since it is a debate with opposing opponents, one cannot use statements of debate such as oneself or others. What is the meaning of this? This is also incorrect.
爾。如俱不成。無約自他分別之者。可如所說。隨一之中。何故不得約自他辯。隨一言通。但言全分一分隨一不成。為隨敵不成。為隨立不成。既有立敵二殊。約自約他。極妙猶豫所依過亦準此。不得茍乖前哲。置此迷辭。
有人作四句中。有遍是宗法性。非同定有。非異遍無者。即法差別相違因是。此義如何。答亦復不可。指此為句不違道理。然云于同品真他上。無故非同品定有。他中含真假他。若為復將真他為同品。設若言他是假他故。真他為同。臥具亦同品。即同定有性。何得為此句。若云以臥具是真他用。是異品收。豈非假他亦受用耶。
有人云。有非遍是宗法性。是同品定有。是異品遍無。即聲論相違決定亦是。此亦不然。豈聲論所聞因。于聲遍非有。而說闕初相。又云。俱非句者。即法自相相違因是。此亦不爾。聲生論許常聲是所作。如何闕初相。又云。或第五不定。亦是此句。亦為不可。若此論中。第五不定。聲常無礙。因許於樂有。明聲亦成。若理門第五。不定所聞性因於異遍無。于聲上有。何得闕三。理門論云。一向離故。不云闕二。若云不能成宗故。不得云遍是宗法性者。即諸不定因。皆是此句。何但第五辨相是非句數。得失如前已述故不重明。
有人云。假立無為常。以非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果兩者都不成立，沒有約定從自身或他者進行區分的情況，可以像你所說的那樣。在隨一的情況下，為什麼不能從自身或他者的角度進行辯論？『隨一』這個詞語是通用的，但說全分、一分隨一不成立，是爲了隨敵方不成立，還是隨立論者不成立？既然有立論者和敵論者兩種不同的情況，那麼從自身或他者的角度進行辯論，極妙的猶豫所依據的過失也應該以此為準。不能隨意違背前人的觀點，把這個令人迷惑的說法放在一邊。
有人在四句中提出：『有遍是宗法性（pakṣadharmatva，宗法性），非同品定有（sapakṣa-niyata，同品決定有），非異品遍無（vipakṣa-vyāpaka，異品遍無）』，這就是法差別相違因（dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu，以法差別為特徵的相違因）。這個說法怎麼樣？回答說：也不可以。指出這個作為句子不違反道理。然而說在同品真他上沒有，所以不是同品決定有。『他』中包含真他和假他。如果又將真他作為同品，假設說因為他是假他，所以真他為同品，臥具也成了同品，那就成了同品決定有性，怎麼能用這個作為句子呢？如果說臥具是真他用，是異品收，難道假他不受用嗎？
有人說：『有非遍是宗法性，是同品定有，是異品遍無』，這就是聲論相違決定（śabda-viruddha-niścaya，與聲音理論相違的決定）也是。這個說法也不對。難道聲論所聞因（śabda-śruta-hetu，聲音理論中聽覺所依賴的因），在聲音中普遍不存在，而說缺少初相（prathama-lakṣaṇa，第一個特徵）？又說：『俱非句』，就是法自相相違因（dharma-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha-hetu，以法自相為特徵的相違因）。這個說法也不對。聲生論（Śabdotpattivaāda，聲音產生論）允許常聲是所作（kṛtaka，被製造的），怎麼會缺少初相？又說：『或者第五不定（anaikāntika，不確定），也是這個句子』，這個說法也不可以。如果在這個論中，第五不定，聲常無礙（nitya，永恒），因允許在樂中有，說明聲音也成立。如果理門（Nyāyamukha，入正理論）第五，不定所聞性因（śruta-hetu，聽覺所依賴的因）在異品中普遍不存在，在聲音上有，怎麼會缺少三個特徵？理門論說：『一向離故』，不說缺少兩個。如果說不能成立宗（pakṣa，論題），所以不能說遍是宗法性，那麼所有不定因（anaikāntika-hetu，不確定因）都是這個句子，何必只在第五不定中辨別相的是非，句子的得失像前面已經說過的，所以不再重複說明。
有人說：假設立論無為（asaṃskṛta，非造作的）是常（nitya，永恒的），以非...
【English Translation】 English version: If both are not established, and there is no agreement to distinguish from oneself or others, it can be as you say. In the case of 'any one', why can't one argue from the perspective of oneself or others? The term 'any one' is general, but saying that the whole, a part of any one is not established, is it because it is not established according to the opponent, or not established according to the proponent? Since there are two different situations of proponent and opponent, then arguing from the perspective of oneself or others, the fault based on extremely subtle hesitation should also be based on this. One should not arbitrarily violate the views of predecessors and put aside this confusing statement.
Someone in the four statements proposed: 'There is pervasively the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva), not definitely present in the similar instance (sapakṣa-niyata), not pervasively absent in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa-vyāpaka)', that is the contradictory reason due to the difference in properties (dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu). What about this statement? The answer is: it is also not acceptable. Pointing this out as a statement does not violate reason. However, saying that it is not present on the true other of the similar instance, therefore it is not definitely present in the similar instance. 'Other' includes true other and false other. If the true other is again taken as the similar instance, assuming that because it is the false other, the true other is the similar instance, then bedding also becomes the similar instance, then it becomes the property of being definitely present in the similar instance, how can this be used as a statement? If it is said that bedding is used as the true other, and is included in the dissimilar instance, isn't the false other also used?
Someone says: 'There is not pervasively the property of the subject, is definitely present in the similar instance, is pervasively absent in the dissimilar instance', that is also the contradictory determination of sound theory (śabda-viruddha-niścaya). This statement is also incorrect. Is it that the reason of hearing in sound theory (śabda-śruta-hetu) is universally non-existent in sound, and it is said that the first characteristic (prathama-lakṣaṇa) is missing? Also saying: 'Neither statement', that is the contradictory reason of the self-characteristic of the property (dharma-svalakṣaṇa-viruddha-hetu). This statement is also incorrect. The sound production theory (Śabdotpattivaāda) allows permanent sound to be produced (kṛtaka), how can the first characteristic be missing? Also saying: 'Or the fifth uncertain (anaikāntika) is also this statement', this statement is not acceptable. If in this treatise, the fifth is uncertain, permanent sound is unobstructed (nitya), because it is allowed to be in pleasure, it shows that sound is also established. If in the Nyāyamukha (Nyāyamukha), the fifth, the uncertain reason of being heard (śruta-hetu) is universally non-existent in the dissimilar instance, and is present in sound, how can three characteristics be missing? The Nyāyamukha says: 'Because it is always separate', it does not say that two are missing. If it is said that the subject (pakṣa) cannot be established, so it cannot be said that it is pervasively the property of the subject, then all uncertain reasons (anaikāntika-hetu) are this statement, why only distinguish the right and wrong of the characteristics in the fifth uncertain, the gains and losses of the statements have been described before, so they will not be repeated.
Someone says: hypothetically establishing the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) as permanent (nitya), with non...
作故。此無同喻。異喻如瓶。此是何過。乃至云。或可龜毛望宗所立無處。名為異品。若望其因。應是同品。此義未詳者。今為詳云。龜毛常無。尚不得為宗同品。雖非所作。亦非因同品。若無所表常體。非宗同品。亦無所表非所作體。非因同品。有人約六不定別。別作八句中。且第一句。有唯犯自共非他俱云。如大乘師。對小乘雲。極成之聲定是識變之聲。自許所知性故。無共同品者。其義云何。答此理不然。以何故。此對於誰。若對經部。夢所聞聲。彼許識變。若對有部。極苦獄卒等所發之聲。亦許識變。俱為共同。何得云無。若云獄卒許變。聲非許變者。不然。無異品故。設有部宗。不許獄卒是識變者。對經部師。終有前過。又復立云。極成之聲。定是識變聲。于比量中。不見是理。但爭識變非識變。故設救云。極成之聲。攝獄卒等所起之聲。理亦不爾。非遍許故。諸空見者不許有故。何得極成。據立敵同許。即名極成。終有前過。成唯識論。既取為喻。故共同品應云。極成之聲是耳識變。許所知故。如耳識見分等。余宗不立有三分故。夢中耳識。許不行故。獄卒叫聲。第六變故。設許耳識變。即極成收。攝入有法故。非耳識變。皆為異品。所知故。因皆遍轉故。為自共不定。
有人云。有唯犯他共非自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『作故。此無同喻。異喻如瓶。此是何過。』乃至云：『或可龜毛（不存在的事物）望宗所立無處，名為異品。若望其因，應是同品。』此義未詳者，今為詳云：龜毛常無，尚不得為宗同品；雖非所作，亦非因同品。若無所表常體，非宗同品；亦無所表非所作體，非因同品。有人約六不定別，別作八句中，且第一句，有唯犯自共非他俱云，如大乘師，對小乘雲：極成之聲定是識變之聲，自許所知性故。無共同品者，其義云何？答：此理不然。以何故？此對於誰？若對經部（佛教部派之一），夢所聞聲，彼許識變。若對有部（佛教部派之一），極苦獄卒等所發之聲，亦許識變，俱為共同，何得云無。若云獄卒許變，聲非許變者，不然，無異品故。設有部宗，不許獄卒是識變者，對經部師，終有前過。又復立云：極成之聲，定是識變聲，于比量中，不見是理，但爭識變非識變。故設救云：極成之聲，攝獄卒等所起之聲，理亦不爾，非遍許故。諸空見者不許有故，何得極成。據立敵同許，即名極成，終有前過。《成唯識論》既取為喻，故共同品應云：極成之聲是耳識變，許所知故，如耳識見分等。余宗不立有三分故，夢中耳識，許不行故，獄卒叫聲，第六變故。設許耳識變，即極成收，攝入有法故。非耳識變，皆為異品，所知故，因皆遍轉故，為自共不定。
有人云：有唯犯他共非自 English version:
'It is made. There is no similar example for this. A dissimilar example is like a bottle. What is the fault in this?' It even says: 'Or perhaps, turtle hair (something that does not exist) has no place established by the proposition, and is called a dissimilar class. If viewed from the cause, it should be a similar class.' For those who do not understand this meaning, I will now explain it in detail: Turtle hair never exists, so it cannot be a similar class for the proposition; although it is not made, it is also not a similar class for the cause. If there is no constant entity represented, it is not a similar class for the proposition; and if there is no non-made entity represented, it is not a similar class for the cause. Someone, based on the six uncertain distinctions, separately makes eight sentences, and in the first sentence, there is the statement that it only violates self, common, and not other, all together. For example, a Mahayana master says to a Hinayana master: 'Established sound is definitely sound transformed by consciousness, because it is admitted to be knowable.' What is the meaning of having no common class? Answer: This reasoning is not correct. Why? To whom is this addressed? If it is addressed to the Sautrantikas (a Buddhist school), the sound heard in a dream is admitted by them to be transformed by consciousness. If it is addressed to the Sarvastivadins (a Buddhist school), the sound emitted by extremely suffering hell guards is also admitted to be transformed by consciousness, both being common, so how can it be said that there is none? If it is said that the hell guards admit transformation, but the sound is not admitted to be transformation, that is not correct, because there is no dissimilar class. Even if there is a Sarvastivadin school that does not admit that hell guards are transformed by consciousness, there is still the previous fault when addressing the Sautrantika master. Furthermore, it is established that 'Established sound is definitely sound transformed by consciousness.' In comparison, this reasoning is not seen, but there is only contention about whether it is transformation by consciousness or not. Therefore, a rescue is proposed: 'Established sound includes the sound produced by hell guards, etc.' The reasoning is also not correct, because it is not universally admitted. Those who hold views of emptiness do not admit its existence, so how can it be established? According to the agreement between the proponent and the opponent, it is called established, but there is still the previous fault. Since the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi takes it as an example, the common class should be: 'Established sound is a transformation of ear consciousness, because it is admitted to be knowable, like the seeing aspect of ear consciousness, etc.' Other schools do not establish having three aspects, because ear consciousness in dreams is admitted not to function, and the screaming of hell guards is the sixth transformation. If transformation by ear consciousness is admitted, it is immediately included in the established, and included in existent dharmas. Non-transformation by ear consciousness is all a dissimilar class, because it is knowable, and the cause is universally present, so it is uncertain for self and common.
Someone says: There is only violation of other, common, and not self.
【English Translation】 "Made on purpose. There is no similar analogy for this. A dissimilar analogy is like a bottle. What is the fault in this?" It even says: "Or perhaps, turtle hair (something that doesn't exist) has no place established by the proposition, and is called a dissimilar class. If viewed from the cause, it should be a similar class." For those who do not understand this meaning, I will now explain it in detail: Turtle hair never exists, so it cannot be a similar class for the proposition; although it is not made, it is also not a similar class for the cause. If there is no constant entity represented, it is not a similar class for the proposition; and if there is no non-made entity represented, it is not a similar class for the cause. Someone, based on the six uncertain distinctions, separately makes eight sentences, and in the first sentence, there is the statement that it only violates self, common, and not other, all together. For example, a Mahayana master says to a Hinayana master: 'Established sound is definitely sound transformed by consciousness, because it is admitted to be knowable.' What is the meaning of having no common class? Answer: This reasoning is not correct. Why? To whom is this addressed? If it is addressed to the Sautrantikas (one of the Buddhist schools), the sound heard in a dream is admitted by them to be transformed by consciousness. If it is addressed to the Sarvastivadins (one of the Buddhist schools), the sound emitted by extremely suffering hell guards is also admitted to be transformed by consciousness, both being common, so how can it be said that there is none? If it is said that the hell guards admit transformation, but the sound is not admitted to be transformation, that is not correct, because there is no dissimilar class. Even if there is a Sarvastivadin school that does not admit that hell guards are transformed by consciousness, there is still the previous fault when addressing the Sautrantika master. Furthermore, it is established that 'Established sound is definitely sound transformed by consciousness.' In comparison, this reasoning is not seen, but there is only contention about whether it is transformation by consciousness or not. Therefore, a rescue is proposed: 'Established sound includes the sound produced by hell guards, etc.' The reasoning is also not correct, because it is not universally admitted. Those who hold views of emptiness do not admit its existence, so how can it be established? According to the agreement between the proponent and the opponent, it is called established, but there is still the previous fault. Since the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi takes it as an example, the common class should be: 'Established sound is a transformation of ear consciousness, because it is admitted to be knowable, like the seeing aspect of ear consciousness, etc.' Other schools do not establish having three aspects, because ear consciousness in dreams is admitted not to function, and the screaming of hell guards is the sixth transformation. If transformation by ear consciousness is admitted, it is immediately included in the established, and included in existent dharmas. Non-transformation by ear consciousness is all a dissimilar class, because it is knowable, and the cause is universally present, so it is uncertain for self and common. Someone says: There is only violation of other, common, and not self.
俱句。云如小乘師。對大乘雲。極成之聲。非是識變聲。所知性故。以色等為共同品。無共異品以菩薩不善色聲。為自同品。無自異品者。其義云何。答此亦不然。經部許夢聞聲。有部獄卒叫。俱共異品。何得云無。若云此等聲。是極成攝。立非識變。有部可爾。若經部師。即違自宗。以薩婆多。云獄卒等雖非有情。由惡業感。四大所造。為有情相。能為逼害。非識變故。若云但對經部。且辨因過。非無宗過者。又亦不得。若如所立無正量過。皆犯相違決定過故。又復。宗因辨過之中。無將有法為法出過者。又理如前。若云如薩婆多。對大乘等云。心心所法。定有自種。許所知故。如余有為法。此無自共同品。唯有他同品。以真無為為異品。因遍轉故。為他共不定。
有人云。共比量唯他不定。非不定者。其義云何。答此義應思。所以者何。共量為生他解。因唯自許。尚得成因。以正翻邪唯他不定。何故非過。又如唯立自量。於他不定非過。以自定故。今者共量。雖復共定。於他宗中。因有不定。何得非過。或可。他喻非自所許。是故非過。或可。立量欲令他解。喻自雖不許。是他宗所許故。他情疑亦說為過。準此。他共二量之中。三種不定。俱說為過。唯自比量。於他不定。不說為過。非對於他令他解故。或
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『俱句』（Kou-Kou，人名）。如果小乘論師反駁大乘論師說：『極成的聲音，不是識所變現的聲音，因為它具有所知的性質。』並且以色等法作為共同的同品（即雙方都認可的例子），認為沒有共同的異品（即雙方都認可的反例），因為菩薩不善的色聲可以作為自己的同品，而沒有自己的異品。這是什麼意思呢？ 回答：這種說法也是不對的。經部宗承認夢中聽到的聲音，有部宗承認地獄獄卒的叫喊聲，這些都是共同的異品，怎麼能說沒有呢？如果說這些聲音是極成所攝，以此來證明聲音不是識變，有部宗或許可以接受。但如果經部宗這樣說，就違背了自己的宗義。因為薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）認為，獄卒等雖然不是有情，但由於惡業的感召，由四大組成，呈現出有情的形態，能夠造成逼迫和傷害，所以不是識變。 如果說只是針對經部宗，辨析其中的因過，而不是無宗過，這也是不成立的。如果像所立那樣沒有正確的量，就都犯了相違決定的過失。而且，在宗因辨析過失的過程中，沒有將『有法』作為『法』來指出過失的。而且道理和前面一樣。如果像薩婆多部那樣，對大乘等宗派說：『心和心所法，一定有自己的種子，因為它被認為是所知法，就像其他的有為法一樣。』這種說法沒有共同的同品，只有其他的同品，因為以真無為作為異品，因遍轉的緣故，所以是『他共不定』。 有人說：『共同的比量只有他不定，而不是不定。』這是什麼意思呢？回答：這個意思應該仔細思考。為什麼呢？因為共同的比量是爲了產生他人的理解，即使因只是自己認可的，仍然可以成立為因。因為正確地推翻邪說，只是『他不定』，為什麼不是過失呢？又比如，只是建立自比量，對於他人來說是不定的，這不是過失，因為自己已經確定了。現在這個共同的比量，雖然是共同確定的，但在其他宗派中，因有不定，怎麼能不是過失呢？或許，他人的比喻不是自己所認可的，所以不是過失。或許，建立量是爲了讓他人理解，比喻自己雖然不認可，但卻是其他宗派所認可的，他人情識的懷疑也被認為是過失。按照這個標準，在他共二量之中，三種不定都被認為是過失。只有自比量，對於他人來說是不定的，不被認為是過失，因為它不是爲了對他人進行辯論，讓他人理解。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Kou-Kou』 (a person's name). If a Hinayana (Small Vehicle) teacher refutes a Mahayana (Great Vehicle) teacher, saying: 『The perfectly established sound is not a sound transformed by consciousness, because it has the nature of being knowable.』 And uses phenomena like color as a common similar instance (i.e., examples agreed upon by both sides), arguing that there is no common dissimilar instance (i.e., counter-examples agreed upon by both sides), because the unwholesome color and sound of a Bodhisattva can be used as their own similar instance, and there is no dissimilar instance of their own. What does this mean? Answer: This statement is also incorrect. The Sautrantika (Sutra School) school admits that sounds heard in dreams, and the Sarvastivada (All Exist School) school admits the cries of hell wardens, are common dissimilar instances. How can it be said that there are none? If it is said that these sounds are included in the perfectly established, to prove that sound is not a transformation of consciousness, the Sarvastivada school might accept it. But if the Sautrantika school says this, it contradicts their own doctrine. Because the Sarvastivadins believe that although hell wardens are not sentient beings, they are formed by the four great elements due to the influence of evil karma, and they appear in the form of sentient beings, capable of causing oppression and harm, so they are not transformations of consciousness. If it is said that it is only aimed at the Sautrantika school, analyzing the faults in the reason, and not a fault of having no doctrine, this is also not valid. If, like what is established, there is no correct measure, then all commit the fault of contradictory determination. Moreover, in the process of analyzing faults in the subject and reason, there is no case of pointing out the fault by using 『something that exists』 as 『a property』. And the reasoning is the same as before. If, like the Sarvastivada school, one says to the Mahayana school: 『Mental and mental factors definitely have their own seeds, because they are considered knowable, just like other conditioned phenomena.』 This statement has no common similar instance, only other similar instances, because it uses true unconditioned phenomena as dissimilar instances, and because the reason is universally present, it is a 『common uncertain for others』. Someone says: 『A common syllogism is only uncertain for others, not uncertain.』 What does this mean? Answer: This meaning should be carefully considered. Why? Because a common syllogism is for generating understanding in others, even if the reason is only accepted by oneself, it can still be established as a reason. Because correctly overturning a wrong view is only 『uncertain for others』, why is it not a fault? Also, for example, if only establishing a syllogism for oneself, it is uncertain for others, but this is not a fault, because it is already determined for oneself. Now, this common syllogism, although it is commonly determined, in other schools, the reason has uncertainty, how can it not be a fault? Perhaps, the analogy of others is not accepted by oneself, so it is not a fault. Perhaps, establishing a measure is to make others understand, although the analogy is not accepted by oneself, it is accepted by other schools, and the doubts of others are also considered faults. According to this standard, among the two common measures, the three kinds of uncertainty are all considered faults. Only the syllogism for oneself, which is uncertain for others, is not considered a fault, because it is not for arguing with others to make them understand.
自共量。唯他不定。非不定過。為違於他。立自共故。
有人云。有犯自他共不定。非俱共不定者。如大乘對小乘雲。極成之聲是識所變。所知性故。如相分。無共異品。其義云何。答此亦不然。以諸無為。為共異品。俱許無為有非所變。故獄卒夢聲為共同品。設聲入有法。猶有色等。為共同品。俱識變故。何得云自他不是俱共過。又以菩薩不善心相分。為他同品者。亦復不然。豈諸小乘。許心別變作相分耶。若許心變相分。為能所緣。若云所緣。小乘不許。若非所緣。如何變相。準小乘釋。心上行相。是能緣心行解相狀。非是變起心上相分。成唯識論第二捲雲。執有識外所緣境者。外境是所緣。行相是能緣見分名事故。此廣推徴。如俱舍法師俱舍疏述。此句應云。如薩婆多對大乘師。立第六識能為諸法因緣。以所知性故。或法所攝故。亦得無共同品。有共異品。大乘以第六識。能熏諸法種故為因緣。以第八等。為自同品。薩婆多師。以俱有因等皆因緣性。即第六相應諸心所等。皆為彼自同品。因俱遍轉無為共同。故自他共非共共也。二宗因緣。互非所許。故或可。無此若有自他同品。即共許故。
有人解不共不定中。與他相違決定量。出不定過云。謂如共等四不定因。后二相中。闕一相故是不定。為如
【現代漢語翻譯】 自共量（svataḥ sādhana，自立量）。唯他不定（kevala-parāniścaya，唯他不定）。非不定過（anaiścaya-doṣa，不定過失）。為違於他（paraviruddha，與他相違），立自共故（svataḥ sādhana，自立量）。
有人云（kenacit，有人說）：有犯自他共不定（ubhaya-sādhāraṇa-anaiścaya，自他俱共不定），非俱共不定者（kevala-ubhaya-anaiścaya，非俱共不定）。如大乘對小乘雲（Mahāyānaḥ Śrāvakayānikebhyo，大乘對小乘說）：『極成之聲是識所變（prasiddhaḥ śabdaḥ vijñāna-pariṇāmaḥ，極成的聲音是識所變），所知性故（prameyatvāt，因為是所知性）。如相分（ākāra-bhāga，如相分）。無共異品（sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa-abhāva，沒有共同的異品），其義云何（kaḥ arthaḥ，這是什麼意思）？』答（uttara，回答）：此亦不然（idam api na，這也不對）。以諸無為（kṛtsna-asaṃskṛta，所有的無為法），為共異品（sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa，作為共同的異品）。俱許無為有非所變（ubhaya-abhyupagamena asaṃskṛtaḥ asti apariṇāmaḥ，雙方都承認無為法不是識所變）。故獄卒夢聲為共同品（nirayapāla-svapna-śabdaḥ sādhāraṇa-pakṣaḥ，所以獄卒夢中的聲音是共同品）。設聲入有法（yadi śabdaḥ dharmiṇi praviśati，如果聲音進入有法），猶有色等（tathā rūpa-ādi，仍然有色等），為共同品（sādhāraṇa-pakṣa，作為共同品）。俱識變故（ubhaya-vijñāna-pariṇāmatvāt，因為都是識所變）。何得云自他不是俱共過（katham ucyate svaparaḥ na kevala-ubhaya-doṣaḥ，怎麼能說自他和他是非俱共過）？又以菩薩不善心相分（bodhisattva-akuśala-citta-ākāra-bhāga，又以菩薩不善心的相分），為他同品者（para-sapakṣa，作為他的同品），亦復不然（idam api na，這也不對）。豈諸小乘（kim kṛtsna-Śrāvakayāna，難道所有的小乘），許心別變作相分耶（abhyupagacchati cittaḥ pṛthak pariṇāmaḥ ākāra-bhāgaḥ，承認心單獨變現為相分嗎）？若許心變相分（yadi abhyupagacchati cittaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ākāra-bhāgaḥ，如果承認心變現為相分），為能所緣（kartṛ-karmatva，作為能緣和所緣）。若云所緣（yadi ucyate karmatva，如果說是所緣），小乘不許（Śrāvakayānaḥ na abhyupagacchati，小乘不承認）。若非所緣（yadi na karmatva，如果不是所緣），如何變相（katham pariṇāmaḥ ākāraḥ，如何變現為相）？準小乘釋（Śrāvakayāna-anuguṇa-vyākhyāna，按照小乘的解釋），心上行相（citta-upari-ākāra，心上的行相），是能緣心行解相狀（kartṛ-citta-ākāra-jñāna-lakṣaṇa，是能緣心的行解相狀），非是變起心上相分（na asti pariṇāma-utpanna-citta-upari-ākāra-bhāga，不是變現產生的心上相分）。成唯識論第二捲雲（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra dvitiya adhyāya uktam，成唯識論第二卷說）：『執有識外所緣境者（asti vijñāna-bāhya-ālambana-viṣaya-grahakaḥ，執著有識外的所緣境的人），外境是所緣（bāhya-viṣayaḥ karmatva，外境是所緣），行相是能緣見分名事（ākāraḥ kartṛ-darśana-bhāga-nāma-vastu，行相是能緣見分的名事）。』故此廣推徴（ataḥ idam vistṛta-parīkṣaṇa，因此這裡廣泛地推究）。如俱舍法師俱舍疏述（Abhidharmakośa-ācārya Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā-varṇana，如俱舍法師在俱舍疏中闡述）。此句應云（idam vākyaḥ ucyate，這句話應該說）：『如薩婆多對大乘師（yathā Sarvāstivādaḥ Mahāyāna-ācāryāya，如薩婆多對大乘師），立第六識能為諸法因緣（sthāpayati ṣaṣṭha-vijñānaḥ śaknoti kṛtsna-dharma-hetu-pratyayaḥ，建立第六識能夠作為諸法的因緣），以所知性故（prameyatvāt，因為是所知性）。或法所攝故（dharma-saṃgrahatvāt，或者被法所攝故）。』亦得無共同品（api labhyate na sādhāraṇa-pakṣaḥ，也可以沒有共同品），有共異品（asti sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa，有共同的異品）。大乘以第六識（Mahāyānaḥ ṣaṣṭha-vijñānena，大乘以第六識），能熏諸法種故為因緣（śaknoti kṛtsna-dharma-bīja-vāsanā-hetu-pratyayaḥ，能夠熏習諸法種子作為因緣），以第八等（aṣṭama-ādi，以第八識等），為自同品（svasapakṣa，作為自己的同品）。薩婆多師（Sarvāstivāda-ācārya，薩婆多師），以俱有因等皆因緣性（sahabhū-hetu-ādi kṛtsna-hetu-pratyayatva，以俱有因等都是因緣性），即第六相應諸心所等（tat ṣaṣṭha-saṃprayukta-kṛtsna-caitasika-ādi，即第六識相應的諸心所等），皆為彼自同品（kṛtsnaḥ tasya svasapakṣa，都是他的自同品）。因俱遍轉無為共同（hetuḥ saha-vyāpta-asaṃskṛtaḥ sādhāraṇa，因為共同遍轉的無為法是共同的）。故自他共非共共也（ataḥ svapara-sādhāraṇaḥ na sādhāraṇa-sādhāraṇaḥ api，所以自他和他是非共同的）。二宗因緣（dvaya-sampradāya-hetu-pratyaya，二宗的因緣），互非所許（paraspara-na-abhyupagata，互相不承認）。故或可（ataḥ sambhavati，所以有可能）。無此若有自他同品（na asti yadi asti svapara-sapakṣa，沒有如果存在自他的同品），即共許故（tat sādhāraṇa-abhyupagata，即共同承認的）。
有人解不共不定中（kenacit vyākhyāna asādhāraṇa-anaiścaya-madhye，有人解釋不共不定中），與他相違決定量（para-viruddha-niścaya-māṇa，與他相違的決定量），出不定過云（nirgacchati anaiścaya-doṣaḥ uktam，說出現不定過失）。謂如共等四不定因（yathā sādhāraṇa-ādi catuḥ-anaiścaya-hetu，例如共同等四種不定因），后二相中（paścāt dvaya-lakṣaṇa-madhye，后兩種相中），闕一相故是不定（ekalakṣaṇa-rahita-ataḥ anaiścaya，缺少一個相所以是不定），為如（yathā，例如）
【English Translation】 Svataḥ sādhana (self-established proof). Kevala-parāniścaya (exclusively uncertain for others). Anaiścaya-doṣa (the fallacy of uncertainty). Paraviruddha (contradictory to others), because it establishes itself.
Someone says (kenacit): There is the fault of being uncertain for both oneself and others (ubhaya-sādhāraṇa-anaiścaya), but not uncertain exclusively for both (kevala-ubhaya-anaiścaya). For example, the Mahāyāna says to the Śrāvakayāna (Mahāyānaḥ Śrāvakayānikebhyo): 'The well-known sound is a transformation of consciousness (prasiddhaḥ śabdaḥ vijñāna-pariṇāmaḥ), because it is knowable (prameyatvāt), like the appearance aspect (ākāra-bhāga). There is no common counter-example (sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa-abhāva).' What does this mean (kaḥ arthaḥ)?' The answer (uttara): This is also not the case (idam api na). Because all unconditioned phenomena (kṛtsna-asaṃskṛta) serve as common counter-examples (sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa). Both sides acknowledge that unconditioned phenomena are not transformations (ubhaya-abhyupagamena asaṃskṛtaḥ asti apariṇāmaḥ). Therefore, the sound in the dream of a hell-guard (nirayapāla-svapna-śabdaḥ) is a common example (sādhāraṇa-pakṣaḥ). Even if sound enters into the subject (yadi śabdaḥ dharmiṇi praviśati), there are still forms, etc. (tathā rūpa-ādi) as common examples (sādhāraṇa-pakṣa), because they are both transformations of consciousness (ubhaya-vijñāna-pariṇāmatvāt). How can it be said that it is not a fault that is uncertain exclusively for both oneself and others (katham ucyate svaparaḥ na kevala-ubhaya-doṣaḥ)? Furthermore, taking the appearance aspect of a Bodhisattva's unwholesome mind (bodhisattva-akuśala-citta-ākāra-bhāga) as a similar instance for others (para-sapakṣa) is also not the case (idam api na). Do all Śrāvakayānas (kim kṛtsna-Śrāvakayāna) acknowledge that the mind separately transforms into the appearance aspect (abhyupagacchati cittaḥ pṛthak pariṇāmaḥ ākāra-bhāgaḥ)? If they acknowledge that the mind transforms into the appearance aspect (yadi abhyupagacchati cittaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ākāra-bhāgaḥ), is it as the agent or the object (kartṛ-karmatva)? If it is said to be the object (yadi ucyate karmatva), the Śrāvakayāna does not acknowledge it (Śrāvakayānaḥ na abhyupagacchati). If it is not the object (yadi na karmatva), how does it transform into the appearance (katham pariṇāmaḥ ākāraḥ)? According to the Śrāvakayāna's explanation (Śrāvakayāna-anuguṇa-vyākhyāna), the appearance on the mind (citta-upari-ākāra) is the characteristic of the knowing mind's activity (kartṛ-citta-ākāra-jñāna-lakṣaṇa), not an appearance aspect that arises as a transformation on the mind (na asti pariṇāma-utpanna-citta-upari-ākāra-bhāga). The second chapter of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra says (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra dvitiya adhyāya uktam): 'Those who hold that there are objects of perception external to consciousness (asti vijñāna-bāhya-ālambana-viṣaya-grahakaḥ), the external object is the object (bāhya-viṣayaḥ karmatva), and the appearance is the name and thing of the seeing part that is the agent (ākāraḥ kartṛ-darśana-bhāga-nāma-vastu).' Therefore, this is extensively examined (ataḥ idam vistṛta-parīkṣaṇa), as described in the Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā by the Abhidharmakośa-ācārya (Abhidharmakośa-ācārya Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā-varṇana). This sentence should be said as follows (idam vākyaḥ ucyate): 'As the Sarvāstivāda says to the Mahāyāna teacher (yathā Sarvāstivādaḥ Mahāyāna-ācāryāya), establishing that the sixth consciousness can be the cause and condition for all phenomena (sthāpayati ṣaṣṭha-vijñānaḥ śaknoti kṛtsna-dharma-hetu-pratyayaḥ), because it is knowable (prameyatvāt), or because it is included in the dharma (dharma-saṃgrahatvāt).' It is also possible to have no common example (api labhyate na sādhāraṇa-pakṣaḥ), but to have a common counter-example (asti sādhāraṇa-vipakṣa). The Mahāyāna, with the sixth consciousness (Mahāyānaḥ ṣaṣṭha-vijñānena), can be the cause and condition for perfuming the seeds of all phenomena (śaknoti kṛtsna-dharma-bīja-vāsanā-hetu-pratyayaḥ), with the eighth consciousness, etc. (aṣṭama-ādi) as its own similar instances (svasapakṣa). The Sarvāstivāda teacher (Sarvāstivāda-ācārya), with co-existent causes, etc. all being of the nature of cause and condition (sahabhū-hetu-ādi kṛtsna-hetu-pratyayatva), that is, all the mental factors, etc. associated with the sixth consciousness (tat ṣaṣṭha-saṃprayukta-kṛtsna-caitasika-ādi), are all its own similar instances (kṛtsnaḥ tasya svasapakṣa). Because the unconditioned, which is co-extensive, is common (hetuḥ saha-vyāpta-asaṃskṛtaḥ sādhāraṇa). Therefore, it is not common to both oneself and others (ataḥ svapara-sādhāraṇaḥ na sādhāraṇa-sādhāraṇaḥ api). The causes and conditions of the two schools (dvaya-sampradāya-hetu-pratyaya) are mutually unacknowledged (paraspara-na-abhyupagata). Therefore, it is possible (ataḥ sambhavati). There is no such thing as a similar instance for both oneself and others (na asti yadi asti svapara-sapakṣa), because it is commonly acknowledged (tat sādhāraṇa-abhyupagata).
Someone explains that within the uncommon uncertain (kenacit vyākhyāna asādhāraṇa-anaiścaya-madhye), the definitive measure that contradicts others (para-viruddha-niścaya-māṇa), the fallacy of uncertainty arises (nirgacchati anaiścaya-doṣaḥ uktam). For example, the four uncertain reasons, such as the common one (yathā sādhāraṇa-ādi catuḥ-anaiścaya-hetu), in the latter two characteristics (paścāt dvaya-lakṣaṇa-madhye), are uncertain because they lack one characteristic (ekalakṣaṇa-rahita-ataḥ anaiścaya), such as (yathā)
緣生故因。后二相中。闕一相故。非不定攝。以有此過故。不成相違決定者。其義云何。答此亦不然。此緣生因。闕於何相。若有異品。因或濫行。異品既無。因無濫失。即是其因。唯同品有。異品遍無。豈無異體。此緣生因。于異品轉。云闕一相。此量是非。及相闕具。亦廣如前。更不重述。
有人解不共不定中雲。有人云。自不共者。如佛弟子對聲論。云聲是無常。所聞性故。不然。何以故。以虛空為共異品。瓶等為共同品。因皆非有。何故非俱耶。判云。理唯是俱不共過者。其義云何。答亦不然。亦是自不共過。除佛余大乘人。以他方佛色。為自同品。真如無為。為自異品。因俱不轉。何得唯俱。若云並佛色。亦所聞故唯俱者。亦不然。以空非所聞。唯他獨許。大乘準佛無非所聞。若云據小乘人說。為唯俱不共者。理亦不然。小乘擇滅。為自異品。實無表色等。為自同品。因亦非有故。
有人云。若小乘師。對聲論師。立此比量。以耳識相分。為自同品。為自比量。即無過也者。其義云何。答此亦不然。誰部小乘。許識變聲相為所緣者。彼之行相談當大乘所變相分。非彼自許心起相分。是所緣故。廣如前引。
有人云。有唯犯他不共。非自共不共。云如小乘對大乘。云極成之聲。非是唯識所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『緣生故因』（因為緣起而產生的因）。在『后二相』（后兩個特徵）中，缺少一個特徵，因此不屬於『不定攝』（不確定類）。因為有這個過失，所以不能成立『相違決定者』（互相矛盾的決定者）。這是什麼意思呢？回答說：這也不對。這個『緣生因』，缺少哪個特徵呢？如果存在『異品』（反例），這個因可能會濫用。既然沒有異品，因就不會濫用。這個因只在『同品』（同類）中存在，在所有異品中都不存在，難道沒有不同的實體嗎？這個『緣生因』，在異品中轉化，說缺少一個特徵。這個衡量是非，以及特徵的缺失和具備，也像前面廣泛論述的那樣，不再重複敘述。
有人解釋『不共不定』（不共不定因）時說：有人說，『自不共』（自身不共）的例子，比如佛弟子對聲論師說，『聲音是無常的，因為它是可被聽聞的』。這是不對的。為什麼呢？因為以虛空為共同的異品，瓶子等為共同的同品，因都不存在。為什麼不是『俱』（兩邊都不成立）呢？判斷說：道理上只能是『俱不共過』（兩邊都不成立的不共的過失）。這是什麼意思呢？回答說：也不對。也是『自不共過』（自身不共的過失）。除了佛以外的大乘修行人，以他方佛的色身為自身的同品，真如無為為自身的異品，因都不成立。怎麼能說是『俱』呢？如果說連佛的色身也是可被聽聞的，所以是『唯俱』（只有兩邊都成立）的話，也是不對的。因為虛空不是可被聽聞的，只有他方獨許。大乘修行人按照佛的觀點，沒有不是可被聽聞的。如果說是根據小乘人的觀點來說，是『唯俱不共』（只有兩邊都成立的不共）的話，道理也是不對的。小乘的『擇滅』（通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）為自身的異品，實在沒有表色等為自身的同品，因也不存在。
有人說，如果小乘論師，對聲論師，立下這樣的比量，以耳識的相分為自身的同品，作為自身的比量，就沒有過失了。這是什麼意思呢？回答說：這也不對。哪個部派的小乘，允許識所變的聲相作為所緣呢？他們所說的行相，應當是大乘所變的相分，不是他們自己承認的心所起的相分是所緣。詳細的論述像前面引用的那樣。
有人說，有隻犯『他不共』（對方不共），而不是『自共不共』（自身共不共）。比如小乘對大乘說，『極成之聲』（雙方都認可的聲音），不是唯識所...
【English Translation】 English version: 'Cause arising from conditions' (hetu arising from dependent origination). Among the 'latter two characteristics,' (the latter two aspects) lacking one characteristic, therefore it does not belong to 'indefinite inclusion' (uncertain category). Because of this fault, it cannot establish 'mutually contradictory determiners' (mutually contradictory determinants). What does this mean? The answer is: This is also incorrect. Which characteristic does this 'cause arising from conditions' lack? If there are 'dissimilar instances' (counterexamples), the cause might be misused. Since there are no dissimilar instances, the cause is not misused. That cause only exists in 'similar instances' (examples), and does not exist in all dissimilar instances. Are there no different entities? This 'cause arising from conditions' transforms in dissimilar instances, saying that it lacks one characteristic. This measurement of right and wrong, as well as the lack and possession of characteristics, is also extensively discussed as before, and will not be repeated.
Someone explains 'non-common uncertain' (non-common uncertain reason) by saying: Someone says that an example of 'self-non-common' (self-exclusive) is like a Buddhist disciple saying to a sound theorist, 'Sound is impermanent because it is audible.' This is incorrect. Why? Because space is a common dissimilar instance, and bottles, etc., are common similar instances, and the cause does not exist in either. Why is it not 'both' (neither side is established)? The judgment is: In principle, it can only be a 'both-non-common fault' (the fault of being non-common on both sides). What does this mean? The answer is: Also incorrect. It is also a 'self-non-common fault' (self-exclusive fault). Apart from the Buddha, Mahayana practitioners take the form body of Buddhas in other realms as their own similar instance, and Suchness as unconditioned as their own dissimilar instance, and the cause is not established in either. How can it be said to be 'both'? If it is said that even the form body of the Buddha is audible, so it is 'only both' (only both sides are established), that is also incorrect. Because space is not audible, only the other side exclusively admits it. Mahayana practitioners, according to the Buddha's view, have nothing that is not audible. If it is said that according to the view of Hinayana practitioners, it is 'only both non-common' (only both sides are established as non-common), the principle is also incorrect. The 'cessation through discrimination' (extinction through wisdom) of Hinayana is their own dissimilar instance, and there are really no expressive forms, etc., as their own similar instance, and the cause also does not exist.
Someone says that if a Hinayana theorist establishes this analogy against a sound theorist, taking the appearance-aspect of ear consciousness as their own similar instance, as their own analogy, then there is no fault. What does this mean? The answer is: This is also incorrect. Which school of Hinayana allows the sound-aspect transformed by consciousness to be taken as the object of cognition? The characteristics they speak of should be the appearance-aspect transformed by Mahayana, not the appearance-aspect arising from their own mind that they admit is the object of cognition. The detailed discussion is as quoted before.
Someone says that there is only the fault of 'other-non-common' (other-exclusive), not 'self-common-non-common' (self-common-exclusive). For example, Hinayana says to Mahayana, 'Extremely established sound' (sound that is recognized by both sides) is not only consciousness...
變之聲。宗。是有漏性故。因。以色等為共同品。因於遍有無共異品。菩薩不善色等。為自同品。因亦遍有。無自異品。他許他方佛色聲。為他同異品。因遍無故。唯他不共者。其義云何。答亦不應理。過失準前。獄卒等聲。為共異品。因於彼轉。成共不定因。若此聲在有法。即違宗過。何名不共。又有漏故。因亦他一分不成之過。何得但是唯他不共。亦有他不成。如此方佛聲。極成所攝。大乘不許是有漏故。若大眾部等立此量者。因俱一分不成。不得言唯他不共。
有人云。有唯犯自不共不定。非他俱。云如大乘對小乘。云極成之聲。定是識變之聲。有漏性故因。其義云何。答此亦不然。非是所變聲。即自異品。第七八識。俱不是所變聲。第八所變聲。為自同品。因二遍轉。何得云唯自不共過。又云。唯犯自不共非過。以不能壞共量道理。亦不損自義。故非過也。此亦不然。如佛法立。聲是無常。所作性故。彼立聲常。所聞性故。無共同品。以大乘宗不立虛空。真如他宗非有。既不壞共量。又不能損自他。亦應非過。應解云。因於同品有非有。異品非有。望彼同一分非有。立自不共。同一分有。得是正因。故不有過。若作斯解。得成無過。若如所解。共亦非過。又雖唯自不共不定。雖不壞共量。亦不能立自。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 聲音是識的變現。理由：因為它是有漏的性質。論證：以色等作為共同品。理由在普遍存在的例子中沒有共同的差異品。菩薩不認為是善的色等，作為自身的相同品。理由也普遍存在。沒有自身的差異品。其他人認為他方佛的聲音，作為他人的相同和差異品。理由普遍不存在。只有他人的不共同之處，是什麼意思呢？回答說，這也不合理。過失與前面類似。獄卒等的聲音，作為共同的差異品。理由在那些例子中成立，成為共同不定因。如果這個聲音存在於有法中，就違反了宗的過失。憑什麼稱為不共同呢？而且因為是有漏的緣故，理由也存在他人一部分不成立的過失。怎麼能僅僅說是唯他不共呢？也有他人不成立的情況。比如此方佛的聲音，屬於極成所攝。大乘不承認它是有漏的緣故。如果大眾部等建立這個量，理由兩方一部分都不成立。不能說唯他不共。
有人說，有隻犯自身不共不定，不是他人共同的。比如大乘對小乘，說極成的聲音，一定是識變的聲音，因為是有漏的緣故。這是什麼意思呢？回答說，這也不對。不是所變的聲音，就是自身的差異品。第七識和第八識，都不是所變的聲音。第八識所變的聲音，是自身的相同品。理由在兩方面都成立。怎麼能說是唯自不共的過失呢？又說，只犯自身不共不是過失，因為它不能破壞共同的量道理，也不損害自身的意義，所以不是過失。這也是不對的。比如佛法認為，聲音是無常的，因為是所作的緣故。他們認為聲音是常的，因為是所聽的緣故。沒有共同的品類。因為大乘宗不承認虛空，真如在他宗不存在。既然不破壞共同的量，又不能損害自己和他人，也應該不是過失。應該解釋說，理由在相同品中既有存在也有不存在，在差異品中不存在。希望在相同的品類中一部分不存在，建立自身不共同。在相同的品類中一部分存在，就能成為正確的理由，所以沒有過失。如果這樣解釋，就能成為沒有過失。如果像所解釋的那樣，共同的也應該不是過失。又即使是唯自不共不定，即使不破壞共同的量，也不能成立自身。
【English Translation】 English version The sound is a manifestation of consciousness. Reason: because it is of a contaminated nature. Argument: taking form, etc., as a common property. The reason lacks a common differing property in universally existing examples. Bodhisattvas do not consider form, etc., which are not wholesome, as their own similar property. The reason also universally exists. There is no differing property of its own. Others consider the sound of Buddhas in other realms as similar and differing properties of others. The reason universally does not exist. What does it mean to say that it is only unshared by others? The answer is that this is also unreasonable. The fault is similar to the previous one. The sound of prison guards, etc., is a common differing property. The reason is established in those examples, becoming a common uncertain reason. If this sound exists in the subject, it violates the fault of the thesis. Why is it called unshared? Moreover, because it is contaminated, the reason also has the fault of being unestablished for a portion of others. How can it be said to be only unshared by others? There is also the situation where it is unestablished for others. For example, the sound of Buddhas in this realm is included in what is extremely established. The Mahayana does not acknowledge it as being contaminated. If the Mahasanghika school, etc., establishes this inference, the reason is unestablished for a portion of both sides. It cannot be said to be only unshared by others.
Someone says that there is only the fault of being unshared and uncertain by oneself, not shared by others. For example, the Mahayana versus the Hinayana, saying that the extremely established sound must be a sound transformed by consciousness, because it is of a contaminated nature. What does this mean? The answer is that this is also incorrect. What is not a transformed sound is one's own differing property. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not transformed sounds. The sound transformed by the eighth consciousness is one's own similar property. The reason is established on both sides. How can it be said to be only the fault of being unshared by oneself? Furthermore, it is said that only committing the fault of being unshared by oneself is not a fault, because it cannot destroy the common reasoning and does not harm one's own meaning, so it is not a fault. This is also incorrect. For example, in the Buddhist Dharma, it is established that sound is impermanent because it is produced. They establish that sound is permanent because it is heard. There is no common category. Because the Mahayana school does not acknowledge space, suchness does not exist in other schools. Since it does not destroy the common reasoning and cannot harm oneself and others, it should also not be a fault. It should be explained that the reason exists and does not exist in the similar property, and does not exist in the differing property. Hoping that a portion does not exist in the similar category, establish oneself as unshared. A portion exists in the similar category, then it can become a correct reason, so there is no fault. If explained in this way, it can become without fault. If it is explained as it is, the common should also not be a fault. Moreover, even if it is only unshared and uncertain by oneself, even if it does not destroy the common reasoning, it cannot establish oneself.
何得非過。
有云。有唯犯共不共。非自他者。如大乘對小乘。欲立七八識。云六種識身離自體外。更有餘識。宗。是識攝故。因。以色等為共同品。此因不轉。無共異品。以自許第七。為自同品。總以八識。為自異品。此意以無共異品。即是異品遍無相。何故前與他相違決定量。作不定過云。為如緣生故。后二相中。闕一相故非不定。即許無異喻。闕第三相。不共不定。但闕第二。不闕第三。準前無異。闕后二相。是相違因。何名。不共不定。若許無異亦異品無。但闕第二。判緣生因闕一即非。前後相違故定一過。
有唯犯自他不共非共。如大乘對小乘。云極成之聲定是識變。以是共許攝故因。此亦不然。望自望他。許共攝因於宗非有。以各自許。非共許故。是不成因非不定因。若云雖是不成亦犯不定。若爾。即是有是不成亦不定。不得唯犯自他不共。犯三之中。佛弟子對數論云。聲識變。所聞性因。此亦不然。此是共他。不是自故。以自變色等。許成智聞故。復判不定中。句雖有八。過但有四。犯他非自俱。犯自非他俱。犯自他非俱。三俱不犯。此四句非過。如前解釋。此是共量唯三不犯。決定非過。可如所判。余判非過。理亦如前。
同分異遍轉中作八句云。有唯犯自同一分異遍。非他共者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如何才能避免過失？
有人說：存在只違反共同和不共同，而非自方和他方的情況。例如，大乘對小乘，想要建立第七識和第八識，說六種識身離開自體之外，還有其他的識。宗（論題）：這是識所攝。因（理由）：因為以色等作為共同品。這個因不轉變。沒有共同的異品。因為自方承認第七識為自方同品，總以八識為自方異品。這個意思是，因為沒有共同的異品，就是異品普遍不存在的情況。為什麼之前與他方相違的決定量，被認為是『不定』的過失呢？因為像『緣生』的緣故。后兩種相中，缺少一個相，所以不是『不定』。即使承認沒有異喻，也只是缺少第三個相。不共同的『不定』，只是缺少第二個相，不缺少第三個相。按照之前的說法，沒有異喻，缺少后兩個相，是相違的因。為什麼稱為不共同的『不定』呢？如果承認沒有異喻，也就是異品也不存在，只是缺少第二個相，判斷『緣生』的因缺少一個相就不是。前後相違，所以必定是一種過失。
存在只違反自方、他方不共同，而非共同的情況。例如，大乘對小乘，說極成的聲音一定是識的變現，因為是共同承認的所攝。這個說法也不對。從自方和他方來看，承認共同攝的因，對於宗來說並不存在。因為各自承認，不是共同承認的緣故。這是不成因，不是不定因。如果說即使是不成因，也犯了『不定』的過失，那麼，就是有不成因也是『不定』。不能說是隻違反自方、他方不共同。在三種情況中，佛弟子對數論說，聲音是識的變現，以所聞性作為因。這個說法也不對。這是共同的他方，不是自方。因為自方變現的色等，承認是智所聞的緣故。再判斷『不定』中，句子雖然有八種，過失卻只有四種：違反他方而非自方，違反自方而非他方，違反自方和他方而非共同，三種都不違反。這四種句子不是過失，就像之前的解釋。這是共同的量，只有三種不違反，決定不是過失，可以按照所判斷的。其餘判斷不是過失，道理也和之前一樣。
在同分、異遍的轉變中，作出八句，說：存在只違反自方同一分、異遍，而非他方共同的情況。
【English Translation】 English version: How can one avoid faults?
Some say: There are cases that only violate the common and uncommon, but not the self and other. For example, the Mahayana against the Hinayana, wanting to establish the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, says that the six kinds of consciousness bodies, apart from their own essence, have other consciousnesses. The proposition (宗, zōng - thesis): This is included in consciousness. The reason (因, yīn - reason): Because it takes form, etc., as a common property. This reason does not change. There is no common dissimilar property. Because the self admits the seventh consciousness as its own similar property, and generally takes the eight consciousnesses as its own dissimilar property. This means that because there is no common dissimilar property, it is a case where dissimilar properties are universally non-existent. Why was the decisive measure that previously contradicted the other party considered the fault of 'indecisive' (不定, bù dìng - uncertain)? Because it is like 'arising from conditions' (緣生, yuán shēng - dependent origination). In the latter two aspects, one aspect is missing, so it is not 'indecisive'. Even if it is admitted that there is no dissimilar example, only the third aspect is missing. The uncommon 'indecisive' only lacks the second aspect, not the third. According to the previous statement, without a dissimilar example, lacking the latter two aspects, it is a contradictory reason. Why is it called an uncommon 'indecisive'? If it is admitted that there is no dissimilar example, that is, dissimilar properties do not exist either, only the second aspect is missing, judging that the reason of 'dependent origination' is not valid if one aspect is missing. The front and back contradict each other, so it must be a fault.
There are cases that only violate the self, the other's uncommon, but not the common. For example, the Mahayana against the Hinayana, says that the extremely established sound must be a manifestation of consciousness, because it is included in what is commonly admitted. This statement is also incorrect. From the perspective of the self and the other, admitting that the reason commonly included does not exist for the proposition. Because each admits it, it is not commonly admitted. This is an unestablished reason, not an uncertain reason. If it is said that even if it is an unestablished reason, it also commits the fault of 'indecisive', then, it means that there is an unestablished reason that is also 'indecisive'. It cannot be said that it only violates the self, the other's uncommon. Among the three cases, a Buddhist disciple says to the Samkhya school that sound is a manifestation of consciousness, using the property of being heard as the reason. This statement is also incorrect. This is a common other, not the self. Because the self's manifested forms, etc., are admitted to be heard by wisdom. Furthermore, judging in 'indecisive', although there are eight sentences, there are only four faults: violating the other but not the self, violating the self but not the other, violating the self and the other but not the common, and not violating all three. These four sentences are not faults, just like the previous explanation. This is a common measure, only three do not violate, it is definitely not a fault, it can be judged accordingly. The remaining judgments are not faults, and the reasoning is the same as before.
In the transformation of same-part and different-universal, making eight sentences, saying: There are cases that only violate the self's same-one-part, different-universal, but not the other's common.
。如小乘對大乘。云極成之聲定非耳識所變。第二三中隨一攝故。以一切色等。為共同品。此因不轉。以耳識相分為共異品。此因遍轉者。亦不然。一切色等。及以耳根。俱共同品。因於耳根轉。乃是共同一分異遍。何名唯自。耳識相分。為他異品。小乘不許耳識變相分。理如前說。菩薩不善色聲。為自同品。此因分轉不善耳識相分。為自異品。理同前非。又云。他方佛色等。為他同品。因不遍轉。以聲為他異品等。此亦不然。以他方佛色。及根俱他同品。因即分轉。以聲為異品因即遍轉。何唯是自。又云。亦是法自相相違過者。亦不然。作相違云。極成之聲定耳識變。以第二三中隨一攝故。同喻如何。設許取耳識相。猶有不定過。為如相分。第二三中隨一攝故。是所變。為如耳根。第二三隨一攝故。非耳識變。況不共許耳識變相。若以成所作智。亦緣變耳根。無不定過者。不然他不許故。若改因喻。便非相違。余諸句過準例可知。煩不具敘。
又有人解決定相違。問云。此與比量相違何別。解云。比量相違。但有立宗因。喻未必得成。如立瓶等。即違共比量。因喻皆闕。相違決定宗因喻皆成。未詳此釋。既因法皆闕。何成比量。而言相違。又既無因。宗不違因。即與自教相違何別。第二解云。望違宗邊。亦不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：例如小乘對大乘的觀點，如果說極成之聲（已經確立的聲音）一定是耳識所變現的，因為它屬於第二識或第三識中的一種。如果將一切色法等作為共同品（相似的例子），那麼這個原因（因明術語，指論證的理由）就不成立。如果將耳識的相分（耳識所呈現的表象）作為共異品（既有相似之處又有不同之處的例子），那麼這個原因就普遍成立，這種說法也是不對的。因為一切色法等以及耳根（聽覺器官）都是共同品。原因在耳根上成立，只是共同品中的一部分差異。為什麼說只有耳識的相分才是他異品（完全不同的例子）呢？小乘不承認耳識會變現相分，道理和前面說的一樣。菩薩認為不善的色聲是自同品（自身相似的例子），這個原因只是部分成立；認為不善的耳識相分是自異品（自身不同的例子），道理和前面一樣，是不成立的。又有人說，他方佛的色法等是他同品（與對方相似的例子），原因不普遍成立；以聲音為他異品（與對方不同的例子）等等，這種說法也是不對的。因為他方佛的色法和根都是他同品，原因只是部分成立；以聲音為異品，原因就普遍成立。為什麼說只是自身呢？又有人說，這也是法自相相違的過失，這種說法也是不對的。如果說相違，那麼可以說，極成之聲一定是耳識所變現的，因為它屬於第二識或第三識中的一種。同喻（相同的比喻）又如何呢？即使允許取耳識的相，仍然有不確定的過失。例如，相分屬於第二識或第三識中的一種，所以是所變現的；又如耳根屬於第二識或第三識中的一種，所以不是耳識所變現的。更何況不共同承認耳識會變現相。如果用成所作智（四智之一，指成就一切所應作事的智慧）也能緣變耳根，就沒有不確定的過失，這種說法也是不對的，因為對方不承認。如果改變原因和比喻，就不是相違。其餘句子的過失可以參照類推得知，不再一一敘述。 又有人解決定相違的問題，問道：『這與比量相違（與正確的推理相矛盾）有什麼區別？』解釋說：『比量相違只是有立宗（所要建立的觀點）和因，比喻未必能成立。例如，立瓶等，就違背了共同的比量，原因和比喻都缺失。相違決定是宗、因、喻都成立。』這種解釋不詳細。既然原因和法都缺失，怎麼能成立比量，而說是相違呢？又既然沒有原因，宗就不違背因，那麼這與自教相違（與自己的教義相矛盾）有什麼區別呢？』第二種解釋說：『從違背宗的角度來看，也不……』
【English Translation】 English version: For example, the Theravada (Small Vehicle) view versus the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) view. If one says that an established sound (an already determined sound) must be a transformation of ear-consciousness, because it is included in either the second or third consciousness. If all forms (rupa) etc. are taken as a common class (similar examples), then this reason (hetu, in logic, the reason for the argument) does not hold. If the appearance-aspect (相分, nimitta-bhāga) of ear-consciousness is taken as a common-different class (examples with both similarities and differences), then this reason universally holds, this statement is also incorrect. Because all forms etc. and the ear-organ (hearing organ) are both common classes. The reason holds for the ear-organ, but it is only a partial difference within the common class. Why is it said that only the appearance-aspect of ear-consciousness is a different class (completely different examples)? The Theravada does not accept that ear-consciousness transforms into appearance-aspects, the reasoning is as previously stated. A Bodhisattva considers unwholesome forms and sounds as a self-same class (examples similar to oneself), this reason only partially holds; considering the unwholesome appearance-aspect of ear-consciousness as a self-different class (examples different from oneself), the reasoning is the same as before, it is not valid. Furthermore, someone says that the forms etc. of Buddhas in other realms are other-same classes (examples similar to the opponent), the reason does not universally hold; taking sound as an other-different class (examples different from the opponent) etc., this statement is also incorrect. Because the forms and organs of Buddhas in other realms are both other-same classes, the reason only partially holds; taking sound as a different class, the reason universally holds. Why is it said to be only oneself? Furthermore, someone says that this is also the fault of self-contradiction of dharma (法, dharma), this statement is also incorrect. If one speaks of contradiction, then one can say that an established sound must be a transformation of ear-consciousness, because it is included in either the second or third consciousness. How about the same analogy (同喻, samāna-dṛṣṭānta)? Even if one allows taking the appearance-aspect of ear-consciousness, there is still the fault of uncertainty. For example, the appearance-aspect belongs to either the second or third consciousness, therefore it is what is transformed; also, like the ear-organ belongs to either the second or third consciousness, therefore it is not a transformation of ear-consciousness. Moreover, it is not commonly accepted that ear-consciousness transforms into appearances. If one uses Accomplishment-of-Wisdom (成所作智, kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna, one of the four wisdoms, referring to the wisdom that accomplishes all that should be done) to also cognize the transformed ear-organ, there is no fault of uncertainty, this statement is also incorrect, because the opponent does not accept it. If one changes the reason and analogy, it is not a contradiction. The faults of the remaining sentences can be known by analogy, I will not describe them one by one. Furthermore, someone resolves the problem of definite contradiction, asking: 'What is the difference between this and contradiction of inference (比量相違, anumāna-viruddha, contradiction with correct reasoning)?' The explanation is: 'Contradiction of inference only has the thesis (立宗, pratijñā, the view to be established) and the reason, the analogy may not be established. For example, establishing a pot etc., it contradicts the common inference, the reason and analogy are both lacking. Definite contradiction is that the thesis, reason, and analogy are all established.' This explanation is not detailed. Since the reason and dharma are both lacking, how can inference be established, and it be said to be a contradiction? Furthermore, since there is no reason, the thesis does not contradict the reason, then what is the difference between this and self-contradiction of doctrine (自教相違, sva-śāstra-viruddha, contradiction with one's own teachings)?' The second explanation says: 'From the perspective of contradicting the thesis, also not...'
望違因。望違因是比量相違者。若違他宗立是比量。若違自宗亦與自教相違何別。第三解難中雲。若闕初相。但后二相。由后二相。令前立因成不定者。即唯相違決定。不是比量相違。若爾。與兩俱隨一不成何別。俱闕初相。有後二相。若云初二不成。或有後二相。或無後二相。故有別者。不然。若闕初相。與不成無別。若具三相。與比量相違不殊。前二不攝。可立別過。離二更無別相違相。何須別立。由彼自云。闕初具后二。即相違決定。準此意許具三相者。即亦名比量相違。故有此難。又復所作因具三相。可得名決定。所聞闕初相。如何稱決定。故不可以闕相之因。與具相因。能作相違。應更細思。所聞之因。何以闕初。若以不能成宗故闕初相。即所聞因。亦闕后二。皆不能成所立宗故。若云同有異無不闕后二。所聞聲有何即闕初。如雲眼見。彼此不成。聲是所聞一切同許。定有初相。不得言闕。故理門云。唯彼有性。彼所攝故。一向離故。既言一向離。明有初相。若云不共不定。闕第二相。相違決定。即闕二相。俱是所聞。更有何別。不許聲有。故具三相。方名相違。俱決定故。又自下文難他不定。元不成因。何得云具后二相也。此所聞因。既闕初相。如何具后。又云。雖闕于初相。二喻證決定。亦應具足后二
相無違宗得立。問既爾。破他自解。相違決定與比量相違何別。答如本疏釋。今更助解。相違決定是因過。比量相違是宗過。又比量相違前邪后正。相違決定前後俱邪。此比量相違。后必破前。相違決定。則不如是。為正量違故。名比量相違。如違現等。此釋極妙。窮至理也。故二差別。問若爾。比量相違與自教相違有何別。答自教相違。宗違自教。如勝論教說常無常。今立為常。故違自教。不違因故。比量相違。非但違教。亦違于因。故二差別。問若爾。如勝論師。許聲所作。教說無常。今立為常。自違宗因。何名自教。答勝論師立順所聞因。同喻證成。非全違因。偏違所作立瓶常。宗遍違因故。故二過別。又違自教。不必違因。有雖違因。必違自教。如聲生立內聲無常。此雖違宗。不違因義。以許其聲是所作故。若遍違因。即比聲相違。
有人將不成對不定為四句云。有不成因非不定。即四不成。有不定因非不成。即五不定。或唯第四。俱句即第六。亦可取初及二三五四相違因。其義云何。答理全不然。所聞雖不成。而自名不定。又前自云。雖是不成。何妨不定。如不共不定等。故初句非。不共既不定。與所聞何殊。即許非不成。唯是前不定。若言所聞同非有。故得是不成。亦所聞性遍宗。何得不成攝。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相違背的宗派得以成立。問：既然這樣，駁倒他人，自己解釋。相違決定和比量相違有什麼區別？答：如同本疏的解釋。現在進一步解釋，相違決定是因的過失，比量相違是宗的過失。而且比量相違是前面錯誤，後面正確；相違決定是前後都錯誤。這種比量相違，後面必定駁倒前面；相違決定則不是這樣，因為是違背了正確的量，所以叫做比量相違，如同違背現量等。這個解釋非常精妙，窮盡了事理。所以這二者有差別。問：如果是這樣，比量相違和自教相違有什麼區別？答：自教相違是宗違背了自己的教義，例如勝論的教義說常和無常，現在立為常，所以違背了自己的教義，但不違背因的緣故。比量相違，不僅違背教義，也違背了因，所以這二者有差別。問：如果是這樣，例如勝論師，允許聲音是所作的，教義說無常，現在立為常，自己違背了宗和因，為什麼叫做自教？答：勝論師立順所聞的因，用同喻來證明，不是完全違背因，只是部分違背所作，立瓶是常，宗普遍違背因的緣故，所以這兩種過失有區別。而且違背自教，不一定違背因；有雖然違背因，必定違背自教，例如聲音是生起的，立內聲是無常，這雖然違背宗，但不違背因的意義，因為允許這個聲音是所作的緣故。如果普遍違背因，就是比量相違。
有人將不成對不定分為四句，說：有不成因不是不定，就是四不成；有不定因不是不成，就是五不定；或者只有第四句；俱句就是第六句。也可以取最初以及二三五四相違因，這其中的含義是什麼？答：道理完全不對。所聞雖然不成，但自己叫做不定。而且前面自己說，雖然是不成，有什麼妨礙不定，例如不共不定等。所以第一句不對。不共既然是不定，和所聞有什麼區別？就是允許不是不成，只是前面的不定。如果說所聞和非有相同，所以才是不成，也是所聞的性質普遍存在於宗，怎麼能被不成所包含？如果
【English Translation】 English version The establishment of a contradictory tenet is possible. Question: If that's the case, refute others and explain yourself. What is the difference between contradictory determination and contradictory inference? Answer: As explained in the commentary. Now, let's further clarify: contradictory determination is a fault of the reason (hetu), while contradictory inference is a fault of the proposition (paksha). Moreover, in contradictory inference, the former is incorrect, and the latter is correct; contradictory determination is incorrect both before and after. This kind of contradictory inference necessarily refutes the former; contradictory determination is not like this because it contradicts a valid means of knowledge (pramana), hence it's called contradictory inference, like contradicting direct perception (pratyaksha) and so on. This explanation is extremely subtle, exhausting the principles. Therefore, there is a difference between the two. Question: If that's the case, what is the difference between contradictory inference and contradiction to one's own doctrine (svasiddhanta-virodha)? Answer: Contradiction to one's own doctrine is when the proposition contradicts one's own doctrine. For example, the Vaisheshika doctrine speaks of permanence and impermanence, but now it is established as permanent, thus contradicting one's own doctrine, but not contradicting the reason. Contradictory inference not only contradicts the doctrine but also contradicts the reason, so there is a difference between the two. Question: If that's the case, for example, the Vaisheshika philosopher, who admits that sound is produced, and the doctrine says it is impermanent, but now establishes it as permanent, contradicting both the proposition and the reason, why is it called one's own doctrine? Answer: The Vaisheshika philosopher establishes the reason of 'following what is heard' (shruta), using a similar example (drshtanta) to prove it, not completely contradicting the reason, only partially contradicting 'being produced', establishing the pot as permanent, the proposition universally contradicts the reason, so there is a difference between these two faults. Moreover, contradicting one's own doctrine does not necessarily contradict the reason; there are cases where, although contradicting the reason, it necessarily contradicts one's own doctrine, for example, sound is produced, establishing inner sound as impermanent, although this contradicts the proposition, it does not contradict the meaning of the reason, because it admits that this sound is produced. If it universally contradicts the reason, it is a contradictory inference.
Someone divides the unestablished (asiddha) and the uncertain (anaikantika) into four categories, saying: there is an unestablished reason that is not uncertain, which is the four unestablished; there is an uncertain reason that is not unestablished, which is the five uncertain; or only the fourth category; the combined category is the sixth category. It is also possible to take the initial and the second, third, fifth, and fourth contradictory reasons, what is the meaning of this? Answer: The reasoning is completely incorrect. Although 'what is heard' (shruta) is unestablished, it is itself called uncertain. Moreover, you yourself said earlier, although it is unestablished, what prevents it from being uncertain, like the non-common uncertain (asadharna-anaikantika) and so on. Therefore, the first category is incorrect. Since the non-common is uncertain, what is the difference between it and 'what is heard'? That is, it admits that it is not unestablished, only the former is uncertain. If it is said that 'what is heard' is the same as 'non-existent', therefore it is unestablished, also the nature of 'what is heard' is universally present in the proposition, how can it be included in the unestablished? If
言非遍宗。自教等違攝俱句。即第六所作豈不成。所聞性如前。亦非不成攝。如第四無常因。即唯不定非不成。第三亦是無常因。何故即為俱句攝。又四相違因。如立聲常所作性故。豈聲非有。亦俱句耶。又假問云。缺減過雖七。闕異不成過。何妨作法。具初闕后二。就理中即無。即解云。誰言闕異非過。若有不引。理是闕減。若無異濫除。亦名為具。故不相似。此亦不然。前自數立。如緣生因。闕異非過。如何今說無異濫除。亦名為具。即緣生因三相具足。破他引之為闕。自立即云具足。如何於法得自在耶。
又云。誰言缺過望因三相。此亦不然。如闕同有等。豈非是過耶。故尋諸解。竟無一當。亦應更思。
有人解四相違敘古人釋。言顯意許。為自性差別。云理恐不然。即申難云。如他用為言顯。真他為意許。因為違差別。亦應有性為言顯。離實大有是意許。應名差別非自相。此既不然。故彼釋非者。其義如何。答此亦未詳。如有法自相差別。至后當知。且此法差別。若非意許。豈言顯耶。又敘舊通。如軌法師疏。即難云。五頂弟子。豈可自難實等不無之宗。令成非有也。此乃自違。何成出過者。此亦不然。本立宗云。有性為宗有法。非實等為宗法。今弟子翻難云。汝有應非有。有一實故。如同異。
此豈難實等不無耶。既言非實。明離實有。難彼成非有。故不是自違。又難。若云數論他用含真假。真他受用義雖無。眼等他用宗不失者。亦應五頂有性含即離。離實之有宗雖無。即實之有宗不失。應名差別相違。非自相者。此亦不然。誰言五頂有性含即離。以五頂有唯離實等。弟子立有。唯即實等。故言有時。望自望他。俱不得含。以同異性離實等。得成非實等。以同異性不名有故。成有非有。名俱決定。彼實等雖體不無。而不名有。何故如是是宗計故。若五頂實等。亦名有者。豈成自相相違。返彼量云。有應非有。有一實等故。如同異性。同異性名有。何得成相違。諸過類知。又五頂若許有即實等有。今總成非實等。豈非自違。故知。五頂不立即實等有。三解自相差別。第三云。隨應何法談其自體性者。說名自相。即於此法所有別義者。名為差別。此解不違。古德意云。以爭彼差別。必非言顯。但意所許。不障自相亦有意許。通言顯故。故云言陳者名自相。意所爭者名差別。若云依第三解。以法有法。各有自體及以別義者。如立聲無常。有部可有別體。大乘如何無常等各有別體復俱不離色等自相。何緣名體。何緣名義。何故有為之上生滅等。名有自體。常住無為不遷不滅等。即名別義。
又釋自性差別有三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：難道這很難確定真實與不真實嗎？既然說不是真實的，就明顯是離開了真實而存在的。如果以此來反駁對方，說這構不成非有，那就不是自相矛盾。又反駁說，如果數論者說『他所用的概念包含真實和虛假，真實的概念對他來說沒有用處，但眼等概念對他來說並沒有失去其宗義』，那麼，五頂（Pañcaśikha，印度教神祇）也應該具有包含即是分離的性質。雖然離開了真實的有，宗義上沒有，但即是真實的有，宗義上並沒有失去。這應該被稱為差別相違，而不是自相矛盾。如果說這也不對，那是因為誰說五頂具有包含即是分離的性質呢？因為五頂的有僅僅是離開了真實等等，而弟子（指佛教徒）所立的有，僅僅是即是真實等等。所以說，有時從自身來看，有時從他人來看，都不能包含。因為相同和相異的性質離開了真實等等，就可以構成非真實等等。因為相同和相異的性質不被稱為有，所以構成有和非有，名稱都是確定的。那些真實等等雖然本體不是沒有，但不被稱為有。為什麼會這樣呢？因為這是宗義的計度。如果五頂的真實等等，也被稱為有，那怎麼會構成自相矛盾呢？反過來可以用量式反駁他們說：『有應該是沒有，因為它具有真實等等，如同相同和相異的性質。』相同和相異的性質被稱為有，怎麼能構成相違呢？各種過失都可以依此類推。而且，如果五頂允許有即是真實等等的有，現在總的來說構成非真實等等，難道不是自相矛盾嗎？所以要知道，五頂不立即是真實等等的有。 第三種解釋自相和差別。第三種解釋說：『根據什麼法來談論它的自體性，就稱之為自相。即對於此法所具有的特殊意義，就稱為差別。』這種解釋不違背古德的意圖。因為爭論那些差別，必然不是言語所能完全表達的，而是意念所允許的。不障礙自相，也是意念所允許的，因為言語可以普遍表達。所以說，言語所陳述的稱為自相，意念所爭論的稱為差別。如果說按照第三種解釋，法和有法，各自具有自體和特殊意義，比如建立聲音是無常的，有部（Sarvāstivāda，佛教部派）可以有不同的本體，大乘（Mahāyāna，佛教宗派）如何認為無常等各自具有不同的本體，又都不離開色等自相呢？為什麼稱為體？為什麼稱為義？為什麼有為法之上的生滅等等，被稱為具有自體，而常住無為的不遷不滅等等，就被稱為特殊意義呢？ 又解釋自性和差別有三種。
【English Translation】 English version: Is it truly difficult to ascertain what is real and unreal? Since it's stated to be unreal, it's clearly separate from reality. If one argues against this, saying it doesn't constitute non-existence, then it's not self-contradictory. Furthermore, if a Sāṃkhya (數論, a school of Indian philosophy) proponent were to say, 'The concepts they use contain both truth and falsehood; the true concepts are useless to them, but the eye and other concepts haven't lost their tenets,' then Pañcaśikha (五頂, a Hindu deity) should also possess a nature that includes both being identical to and separate from reality. Although the 'being separate from reality' is absent in their tenets, the 'being identical to reality' isn't lost. This should be called a difference contradiction, not a self-contradiction. If one argues that this is also incorrect, it's because who says that Pañcaśikha possesses a nature that includes both being identical to and separate from reality? Because Pañcaśikha's 'being' is only separate from reality, etc., while the disciple's (referring to a Buddhist) established 'being' is only identical to reality, etc. Therefore, it's said that sometimes, from one's own perspective, and sometimes from another's, it cannot include both. Because the nature of sameness and difference is separate from reality, etc., it can constitute unreality, etc. Because the nature of sameness and difference isn't called 'being,' it constitutes both being and non-being, and the names are definite. Those realities, etc., although their essence isn't non-existent, aren't called 'being.' Why is this so? Because it's the calculation of the tenets. If Pañcaśikha's realities, etc., are also called 'being,' how could it constitute self-contradiction? One can conversely refute them with the following inference: 'Being should be non-being, because it possesses reality, etc., just like the nature of sameness and difference.' The nature of sameness and difference is called 'being,' how can it constitute contradiction? Various faults can be inferred in this way. Moreover, if Pañcaśikha allows 'being' to be identical to reality, etc., and now generally constitutes unreality, etc., isn't it self-contradictory? Therefore, know that Pañcaśikha doesn't immediately constitute 'being' identical to reality, etc. The third explanation of self-nature and difference. The third explanation says: 'According to what dharma (法, teaching or law) one discusses its own nature, it's called self-nature. That is, for this dharma, the special meaning it possesses is called difference.' This explanation doesn't contradict the intention of the ancient masters. Because arguing about those differences is necessarily not fully expressible by words, but is allowed by intention. Not obstructing self-nature is also allowed by intention, because words can universally express. Therefore, it's said that what is stated by words is called self-nature, and what is argued by intention is called difference. If one says that according to the third explanation, dharma and the subject of dharma each possess self-nature and special meaning, such as establishing that sound is impermanent, the Sarvāstivāda (有部, a Buddhist school) can have different entities, how does Mahāyāna (大乘, a Buddhist tradition) consider that impermanence, etc., each possess different entities, and yet don't depart from the self-nature of form, etc.? Why is it called essence? Why is it called meaning? Why are arising and ceasing, etc., above conditioned dharmas called possessing self-nature, while the unchanging and unceasing, etc., of permanent unconditioned dharmas are called special meaning? Furthermore, there are three explanations of self-nature and difference.
重。初二如舊。第三云。談其自性名自相。談其別義名差別。復云法與有法。各有自體。及以別義。既稱別義。何得云有法。即差別等義屬於體。應說之差別。若言即有法。故不得說之。云何言此之別義。亦有自體。既許有多義。故應依主。應可更思。若以聲瓶等異為差別。不得云別義。若即聲等體上有別義。不應云各有體。又云。相違有三。一自體相違。如言常非常等。二形待相違。如言真假等。三性別相違。如言色心等。又云。言詮有二。一遮。二表。如立有非有。即自體相違。第一遮詮。如言真他假他。即但表真假。不非真假。此即義別相形。名差別相違。乃至自問云。若義別相違。名差別相違者。即如論中作非有緣性。亦非有緣性之自體。應名自相。非差別也(上自問也)此問元非有緣性是別義。作非有緣性。即義相違。何名自相。若此亦名自相。自相差別。有何殊異。又論云差別。何得稱自相。若云此之別義。亦有別體。既有自體。何名談自性談別義。又如聲瓶可燒可見等。豈離聲瓶。外有別體。然自解云。不然。若言非作有緣性者。即是正非有緣性之自體。論中既說作非有緣性。作非有緣性言。此乃別表緣余也。此釋不然。此中為爭作所緣境。為爭能緣有心。若言爭能緣心。自是別法。豈名有法差別。若
言大有。是緣大有心境性。不是緣有心之境性。此是有法差別。今爭大有。與能緣有心作境性。不作緣有心境性。因與作緣有心之境性。相違作非緣有之心境性。為因名差別相違因。何得云此乃別表緣余性。若言別表緣余性。便是難能緣心。不難有法之上差別義。又更解云。或可。不成自違。緣有之心。應非緣有心。但非有緣心。不表緣余性。故名自相非差別。今論說言。作非有緣性。雖非緣有之自體。緣余之義心不失。此即緣有緣余。是別義故。故非自相名差別。此亦不然。論云。即於前宗之上。作有緣性。即是許有是緣有。心所取境性。豈成於心能緣于有名差別。若云成緣有心。豈得云以有一實故等因。成心為能緣有即。翻彼云。緣非有如同異性。同異性豈是能緣。云緣余之義心不失耶。又解三相違中。第三性別相違。與初自體相違何別。又云。一遮詮如言非有非無非人非天無我無常等。但遮有等。不表非有之體。若爾。如立聲無常。豈但遮常。不表無常之體耶。既許無常亦遮亦表。何得言非但是遮。非之與無義相似故。既許詮中亦有遮。如何得言真詮。只應言有表必遮詮。有遮非表詮。又釋云。若但言非有。不言非無。即是唯遮。即自引佛地等。為難云。如來功德非有非無。自通云。般若雙言方有其表者。此與
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 言大有（Dà yǒu，存在）。這是因為大有（Dà yǒu）是心境的本性，而不是因為有心而產生境的本性。這是有法（yǒu fǎ，存在的法）的差別。現在爭論的是大有（Dà yǒu）是否作為能緣有心（néng yuán yǒu xīn，能認知存在的心的）的境性（jìng xìng，對像），而不是作為緣有心（yuán yǒu xīn，以存在為對象的心的）的境性（jìng xìng）。因為與作為緣有心（yuán yǒu xīn）的境性（jìng xìng）相反的是作為非緣有心（fēi yuán yǒu xīn，不以存在為對象的心的）的境性（jìng xìng），所以這個因被稱為差別相違因（chā bié xiāng wéi yīn，因本身就存在矛盾）。怎麼能說這是爲了特別表明緣余性（yuán yú xìng，以其他為對像）呢？如果說是爲了特別表明緣余性（yuán yú xìng），那就是難以認知能緣心（néng yuán xīn，能認知的心），而不是難以理解有法（yǒu fǎ）之上的差別意義。又進一步解釋說，或許可以避免自相矛盾，緣有之心（yuán yǒu zhī xīn，以存在為對象的心）應該不是緣有心（yuán yǒu xīn），但如果不是有緣心（yǒu yuán xīn，有對象的心），就不能表明緣余性（yuán yú xìng），所以稱為自相非差別（zì xiāng fēi chā bié，自身沒有差別）。現在論述說，作為非有緣性（fēi yǒu yuán xìng，不是以存在為對像）的境性（jìng xìng），雖然不是緣有（yuán yǒu，以存在為對像）的自體（zì tǐ，自身），但緣余（yuán yú，以其他為對像）的意義並沒有喪失。這就是緣有（yuán yǒu）和緣余（yuán yú）是不同的意義，所以不是自相，稱為差別。這也是不對的。論中說，就在之前的宗派之上，作為有緣性（yǒu yuán xìng，以存在為對像）的境性（jìng xìng），就是承認有是緣有（yuán yǒu，以存在為對像）的心所取境性（xīn suǒ qǔ jìng xìng，心所認知的對象），怎麼能成就心能認知有（yǒu，存在）的差別呢？如果說成就了緣有心（yuán yǒu xīn），怎麼能說以有一實故（yǒu yī shí gù，因為有一個真實的存在）等因，成就心作為能緣有（néng yuán yǒu，能認知存在）呢？反過來說，緣非有（yuán fēi yǒu，以非存在為對像）如同異性（tóng yì xìng，相同和不同），相同和不同怎麼是能認知呢？怎麼能說緣余（yuán yú）的意義沒有喪失呢？又解釋三種相違（sān zhǒng xiāng wéi，三種矛盾）中，第三種性別相違（xìng bié xiāng wéi，性質上的矛盾）與最初的自體相違（zì tǐ xiāng wéi，自身矛盾）有什麼區別？又說，一遮詮（yī zhē quán，一種遮詮）如說非有非無（fēi yǒu fēi wú，既非存在也非不存在）、非人非天（fēi rén fēi tiān，既非人也非天）、無我（wú wǒ，沒有我）、無常（wú cháng，無常）等，只是遮止有（yǒu，存在）等，不表明非有（fēi yǒu，非存在）的本體。如果這樣，如立聲無常（lì shēng wú cháng，建立聲音是無常的），難道只是遮止常（cháng，常），不表明無常（wú cháng）的本體嗎？既然承認無常（wú cháng）既遮止也表明，怎麼能說只是遮止呢？非（fēi，非）與無（wú，無）的意義相似，既然承認詮釋中也有遮止，怎麼能說是真詮（zhēn quán，真正的詮釋）呢？只應該說有表必遮詮（yǒu biǎo bì zhē quán，有表述必然有遮止），有遮非表詮（yǒu zhē fēi biǎo quán，有遮止不一定有表述）。又解釋說，如果只說非有（fēi yǒu），不說非無（fēi wú），就是唯遮（wéi zhē，只是遮止），就自己引用佛地（fó dì，佛的境界）等，來反駁說，如來功德非有非無（rú lái gōng dé fēi yǒu fēi wú，如來的功德既非存在也非不存在），自己解釋說，般若（bō rě，智慧）雙言（shuāng yán，兩種說法）才有所表明。這與
【English Translation】 English version It is said that Dà yǒu (大有, Great Existence) is the nature of the mind-object, not the nature of the object arising from the mind. This is a difference in yǒu fǎ (有法, existing dharmas). Now, the argument is whether Dà yǒu (大有) acts as the object of néng yuán yǒu xīn (能緣有心, the mind that cognizes existence), rather than acting as the object of yuán yǒu xīn (緣有心, the mind that takes existence as its object). Because what contradicts acting as the object of yuán yǒu xīn (緣有心) is acting as the object of fēi yuán yǒu xīn (非緣有心, the mind that does not take existence as its object), this cause is called chā bié xiāng wéi yīn (差別相違因, contradictory cause due to difference). How can it be said that this specifically indicates yuán yú xìng (緣餘性, taking other things as objects)? If it is said that it specifically indicates yuán yú xìng (緣餘性), then it is difficult to cognize the néng yuán xīn (能緣心, the mind that can cognize), not difficult to understand the meaning of difference above yǒu fǎ (有法). Furthermore, it is explained that perhaps self-contradiction can be avoided; the yuán yǒu zhī xīn (緣有之心, the mind that takes existence as its object) should not be yuán yǒu xīn (緣有心), but if it is not yǒu yuán xīn (有緣心, a mind with an object), it cannot indicate yuán yú xìng (緣餘性), so it is called zì xiāng fēi chā bié (自相非差別, no difference in itself). Now, the argument states that acting as the nature of fēi yǒu yuán xìng (非有緣性, not taking existence as an object), although it is not the zì tǐ (自體, self-essence) of yuán yǒu (緣有, taking existence as an object), the meaning of yuán yú (緣餘, taking other things as objects) is not lost. This means that yuán yǒu (緣有) and yuán yú (緣餘) are different meanings, so it is not self-contradictory and is called difference. This is also incorrect. The treatise states that on top of the previous school, acting as the nature of yǒu yuán xìng (有緣性, taking existence as an object) is to admit that existence is the object taken by the mind that takes existence as its object (xīn suǒ qǔ jìng xìng, 心所取境性), how can it accomplish the difference that the mind can cognize existence? If it is said that it accomplishes yuán yǒu xīn (緣有心), how can it be said that the cause of 'because there is one reality' (yǒu yī shí gù, 有一實故) etc., accomplishes the mind as néng yuán yǒu (能緣有, able to cognize existence)? Conversely, taking fēi yǒu (非有, non-existence) as an object is like tóng yì xìng (同異性, sameness and difference), how can sameness and difference be able to cognize? How can it be said that the meaning of yuán yú (緣餘) is not lost? Furthermore, what is the difference between the third type of contradiction, xìng bié xiāng wéi (性別相違, contradiction in nature), and the initial zì tǐ xiāng wéi (自體相違, self-contradiction) among the three contradictions (sān zhǒng xiāng wéi, 三種相違)? Furthermore, yī zhē quán (一遮詮, one negation) is like saying 'neither existence nor non-existence' (fēi yǒu fēi wú, 非有非無), 'neither human nor deva' (fēi rén fēi tiān, 非人非天), 'no self' (wú wǒ, 無我), 'impermanence' (wú cháng, 無常), etc., only negating existence (yǒu, 有) etc., without indicating the essence of non-existence (fēi yǒu, 非有). If so, like establishing 'sound is impermanent' (lì shēng wú cháng, 立聲無常), does it only negate permanence (cháng, 常) without indicating the essence of impermanence (wú cháng, 無常)? Since it is admitted that impermanence (wú cháng) both negates and indicates, how can it be said that it only negates? The meaning of 'not' (fēi, 非) and 'no' (wú, 無) are similar, since it is admitted that there is also negation in interpretation, how can it be said to be true interpretation (zhēn quán, 真詮)? It should only be said that 'having expression necessarily has negation' (yǒu biǎo bì zhē quán, 有表必遮詮), 'having negation does not necessarily have expression' (yǒu zhē fēi biǎo quán, 有遮非表詮). Furthermore, it is explained that if only 'non-existence' (fēi yǒu) is said without saying 'non-non-existence' (fēi wú), it is only negation (wéi zhē, 唯遮), and one quotes Buddha-land (fó dì, 佛地) etc., to refute, such as 'the merits of the Tathagata are neither existence nor non-existence' (rú lái gōng dé fēi yǒu fēi wú, 如來功德非有非無), and one explains oneself by saying that prajna (bō rě, 般若) with dual speech (shuāng yán, 雙言) has something to indicate. This is with
唯識。亦有相違。第一中雲。若言是表。應不雙非。故相違也。又云。今但約自體相違。名自相相違。不據言顯。豈立有時。言中不顯有耶。若云元不說大有。但詮不無有。此有相符。又因同有。豈是名相違。又言既不申大有。元不立大有為有法。云何因望于彼名相違。若既言陳。如何得言不據言顯。
釋法差別相違中自云。同無異有。方是相違。此因同有龜毛遍無何名相違。答云。此中外道。雖總言他用。意成眼等為無積他用。據此即無同。除宗已外。諸臥具等。皆不為無積他用。即為異品。因彼遍轉。故是相違。此釋不然。唯識論云。執我是思。受用薩埵賴阇答摩所成。大等二十三法。云何但許受用五知。不受用余。故此釋非。又云。二細微共生一粗。所生子微。不越因量。裹前二細。而別有體。此亦不然。果遍在因中。非果裹父母。如唯識論辨。
解有法自相中雲。有人云。既違意許。應是差別。何名自相。答言有性者。意詮離實等有為有法自相。然以有法須極成故。不可別云離實等有。故雖意許。而是言顯。自相宗不同作有緣性。是離實等。有差別之義。為意所許差別宗也。難云。此解不然。若以今言有性。意許離實有為有法。有法須極成。不言離實有。雖是意許。而名為言顯者。亦應意詮真他
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 唯識宗（Yogacara，佛教宗派，強調萬法唯識所變）的觀點也有自相矛盾之處。在《成唯識論》的第一部分中說：『如果說是表詮，就不應該雙重否定。』因此是相違背的。又說：『現在只是就自體上的矛盾來說，稱為自相相違，不是根據言語的顯現。』難道成立『有時』，言語中不顯現有嗎？如果說原本沒有說『大有』，只是詮釋『不無有』，這與『有』相符。又因為『同有』，怎麼能說是相違背呢？又說既然不申明『大有』，原本不成立『大有』作為有法（dharma，事物、法則），怎麼能因為期望它而說是相違背呢？如果已經說了，怎麼能說不是根據言語的顯現呢？
在解釋法差別相違時，自己說：『同無異有，才是相違。』因為『同有』，龜毛（烏龜的毛）普遍不存在，怎麼能說是相違背呢？回答說：『這裡的外道（非佛教的修行者），雖然總的說他人之用，意思是說眼睛等沒有積累他人之用。』根據這個意思，就沒有『同』。除了宗（自己的主張）以外，其他的臥具等，都不被認為是『沒有積累他人之用』，就是異品。因為它們普遍周遍，所以是相違背的。這種解釋不對。《唯識論》說：『執著我是思，受用薩埵（sattva，純粹）、賴阇（rajas，激情）、答摩（tamas，黑暗）所成的大等二十三種法。』為什麼只允許受用五種知覺，而不受用其他的呢？所以這種解釋不對。又說：『兩個細微的共同產生一個粗大的，所生的子微，不超過因的量，包裹著前面的兩個細微，而另外有自體。』這也是不對的。果普遍存在於因中，不是果包裹著父母，就像《唯識論》所辨析的那樣。
在解釋有法自相中說：『有人說，既然違背了意許，應該是差別，怎麼能說是自相呢？』回答說：『有性，是意詮釋離開實等有為有法（conditioned dharma，有為法）的自相。』然而因為有法必須是極成（公認的），所以不能另外說『離開實等有』。所以雖然是意許，而是言語顯現。自相宗不同於『作為有緣性』，是離開實等有差別的意義，是意所允許的差別宗。』反駁說：『這種解釋不對。如果用現在的言語說『有性』，意許離開實有為有法，有法必須是極成，不說離開實有，雖然是意許，而稱為言語顯現，也應該意詮真他（真實的他）。』
【English Translation】 English version: There are also contradictions within the Yogacara (a school of Buddhism emphasizing that all phenomena are manifestations of consciousness) perspective. In the first part of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only), it says: 'If it is said to be expressive, it should not be doubly negative.' Therefore, it is contradictory. It also says: 'Now, it is only in terms of the contradiction in the self-nature that it is called self-contradiction, not based on the manifestation of language.' Does establishing 'sometimes' not manifest existence in language? If it is said that originally there was no mention of 'great existence,' but only an interpretation of 'not non-existence,' this is consistent with 'existence.' Moreover, because of 'co-existence,' how can it be said to be contradictory? Furthermore, since 'great existence' is not declared, 'great existence' was not originally established as a dharma (thing, principle). How can it be said to be contradictory because of expecting it? If it has already been said, how can it be said that it is not based on the manifestation of language?
In explaining the contradiction of the difference in dharmas, it says itself: 'Only when there is co-absence and difference in existence is there contradiction.' Because of 'co-existence,' turtle hair (hair of a turtle) is universally non-existent, how can it be said to be contradictory? The answer is: 'Here, the Tirthikas (non-Buddhist practitioners), although generally speaking of the use of others, mean that the eyes, etc., do not accumulate the use of others.' According to this meaning, there is no 'co-'. Except for the sect (one's own doctrine), other bedding, etc., are not considered 'not accumulating the use of others,' which is a different category. Because they are universally pervasive, it is contradictory. This explanation is incorrect. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'Clinging to the self is thought, enjoying the twenty-three dharmas such as Mahat (great principle) composed of sattva (purity), rajas (passion), and tamas (darkness).' Why is it only allowed to enjoy the five senses and not enjoy the others? Therefore, this explanation is incorrect. It also says: 'Two subtle things together produce one coarse thing, and the subtle offspring produced does not exceed the amount of the cause, wrapping the previous two subtle things, and there is another self-nature.' This is also incorrect. The effect is universally present in the cause, not that the effect wraps the parents, as analyzed in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.
In explaining the self-nature of a dharma, it says: 'Someone says, since it violates the intended permission, it should be a difference, how can it be said to be self-nature?' The answer is: 'Existence is the self-nature of the conditioned dharma (conditioned dharma) that the intention interprets as being apart from reality, etc.' However, because the dharma must be well-established (universally accepted), it cannot be said separately 'apart from reality, etc.' Therefore, although it is intended permission, it is a manifestation of language. The self-nature sect is different from 'being a causal nature,' which is the meaning of being different from reality, etc., and is the difference sect allowed by intention.' The rebuttal says: 'This explanation is incorrect. If the current language says 'existence,' and the intention permits the conditioned dharma to be apart from reality, and the dharma must be well-established, and it is not said to be apart from reality, although it is intended permission, and it is called the manifestation of language, it should also intentionally interpret the true other (the real other).'
用。能別須極成。不言真他用。雖是意許。而名言顯。亦應是自相非差別。故約言顯意許。解自相差別者。未為當理(上他敘難)今共詳云。若彼大有意許離實。今言有時。不即詮彼大有者。豈詮即實等有。若詮即實等有。五頂成非實等。亦違自弟子成非有。亦自違。若非言所顯。何故尋言難。又五頂不許即實等有。弟子不許離實等有。今者言中。恐有法不成。不言大有。但總云有。有言雖通。豈顯即實有。設若五頂。許即實有。今言即實有。云非實等。是自違過。況複本意。爭大有句。何須詮即實。以五頂不許有即實有。故言有時。即顯大有句。若直言大有。有法不成。為此但言有性。泛爾言有。彼此俱成。以為有法。不須分別即離。言非實等為法。以弟子有即實。今言非實。違他順己。故得為宗。由此故知。離實等有。雖是意許。言有之時。即言所顯。離言所顯有。外更無別有。不同他用離真他外。有假他用。真他他雖不成。假他他自同許。故。成真他不用眼等。假他用在不違言顯。故違差別。
解有一實因廣事云。云無一可取。如破他立。以同異性。含于實等。名有實等。是彼性故。名有實等。出何典據。勝論但云同異是實等性。不云有故。又自云。戒賢師解。應云有實故。言一者相從故來。此從何聞耶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：能起作用是因為必須達到某種程度。如果不說『真他用』（truly other-dependent），即使是意許（implicitly accepted），而名言（explicitly stated）顯現，也應該是自相矛盾而非差別。所以，如果僅僅通過言語來顯現意許，那麼對自相差別的解釋就未見得合理（以上是他人敘述的難題）。現在我們一起來詳細討論：如果對方（五頂，Pañcaśikhā）確實意許存在一個獨立於實（reality）的『大有』（great existence），那麼現在說『有時』（sometimes exists），難道不是在詮釋那個『大有』嗎？如果詮釋的是與實等同的存在，那麼五頂就成了不承認實等同的存在，這也違背了他們的弟子承認非有（non-existence）。這也自相矛盾。如果不是言語所能顯現的，為何還要尋言來辯難？而且，五頂不承認與實等同的存在，他們的弟子不承認獨立於實的存在，現在在言語中，恐怕『有』（existence）這個法（dharma）無法成立。不說『大有』，只是籠統地說『有』，『有』這個詞雖然通用，難道就能顯現與實等同的存在嗎？假設五頂承認與實等同的存在，現在說與實等同的存在『非實等』（not real, etc.），這就是自相矛盾。更何況本來的意圖，爭論『大有』這個詞，何必詮釋與實等同的存在？因為五頂不承認『有』與實等同，所以說『有時』，就顯現了『大有』這個詞。如果直接說『大有』，『有』這個法就無法成立。因此，只能說『有性』（having existence），泛泛地說『有』，這樣彼此都能成立，作為『有』這個法，不需要分別即（identity）和離（difference）。說『非實等』作為法，因為弟子承認與實等同，現在說『非實』，違揹他人而順從自己，所以可以作為宗（thesis）。由此可知，獨立於實的存在，雖然是意許，但在說『有』的時候，就是言語所顯現的。在言語所顯現的『有』之外，沒有其他的『有』。不同於他用（other-dependent）獨立於真他（truly other），存在一個假他用（falsely other-dependent）。真他他即使不能成立，假他他自己也承認。所以，成立真他不用眼等（eyes, etc.），假他用在於不違背言語的顯現，所以違背了差別（difference）。 解釋『有一實因廣事』（a single real cause extensively）時說：說『沒有什麼是可以把握的』，就像破斥他人的立論一樣，因為同異性（identity and difference）包含在實等（reality, etc.）之中，所以稱為『有實等』（having reality, etc.），因為是它的性質，所以稱為『有實等』。這是出自什麼典籍？勝論（Vaiśeṣika）只是說同異是實等的性質，沒有說『有』。而且自己說，戒賢（Śīlabhadra）論師的解釋，應該說『因為有實，所以說一』，這是從哪裡聽來的呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Functionality arises from the necessity of reaching a certain degree. If one doesn't speak of 'truly other-dependent' (satya-paratantra), even if it's implicitly accepted (i.e., intended), and the explicit expression (nāma-vacana) manifests, it should be a self-contradiction rather than a distinction. Therefore, if one merely uses language to manifest intention, the explanation of self-distinction might not be reasonable (the above is a narration of difficulties by others). Now, let's discuss it in detail together: If the other party (Pañcaśikhā) truly intends that there is a 'great existence' (mahā-bhāva) independent of reality (vastu), then when we say 'sometimes exists' (kadācit asti), aren't we interpreting that 'great existence'? If we are interpreting existence as identical to reality, then Pañcaśikhā would be denying existence as identical to reality, which also contradicts their disciples' acceptance of non-existence (abhāva). This is also self-contradictory. If it's not what language can manifest, why seek language to argue? Moreover, Pañcaśikhā doesn't accept existence as identical to reality, and their disciples don't accept existence as independent of reality. Now, in language, I fear that the dharma of 'existence' (asti) cannot be established. Not speaking of 'great existence,' but generally saying 'existence,' although the word 'existence' is common, does it manifest existence as identical to reality? Suppose Pañcaśikhā accepts existence as identical to reality, and now says that existence as identical to reality is 'not real, etc.' (na vastu-ādi), this is self-contradictory. Moreover, what was originally intended, arguing about the term 'great existence,' why interpret existence as identical to reality? Because Pañcaśikhā doesn't accept 'existence' as identical to reality, therefore saying 'sometimes exists' manifests the term 'great existence.' If one directly says 'great existence,' the dharma of 'existence' cannot be established. Therefore, one can only say 'having existence' (astitva), generally saying 'existence,' so that both sides can establish it as the dharma of 'existence,' without needing to distinguish between identity (tādātmya) and difference (bheda). Saying 'not real, etc.' as a dharma, because the disciples accept existence as identical to reality, and now saying 'not real' contradicts others while conforming to oneself, so it can be taken as a thesis (pakṣa). From this, we know that existence independent of reality, although it is intended, when speaking of 'existence,' it is what language manifests. Outside of the 'existence' manifested by language, there is no other 'existence.' It is different from other-dependent (paratantra) being independent of truly other (satya-para), there exists a falsely other-dependent (mithyā-paratantra). Even if truly other cannot be established, falsely other is self-admitted. Therefore, establishing truly other doesn't require eyes, etc., falsely other is in not contradicting the manifestation of language, so it contradicts distinction. When explaining 'a single real cause extensively' (eka-satya-hetu-vistara), it says: Saying 'there is nothing that can be grasped,' is like refuting others' arguments, because identity and difference (sāmānya-viśeṣa) are contained within reality, etc. (vastu-ādi), therefore it is called 'having reality, etc.' (vastu-ādi-yukta), because it is its nature, therefore it is called 'having reality, etc.' From what scripture does this come? The Vaiśeṣika only says that identity and difference are the nature of reality, etc., and doesn't say 'having.' Moreover, you yourself say that the explanation of teacher Śīlabhadra should say 'because there is reality, therefore it is called one,' from where did you hear this?
。游夏不聞斯說。張禹何因謾談。乃至云。今更解云。由虛空等不與諸法同聚。故約空等辨其有性。未詳此釋。虛空不遍。可不同聚。既許體遍。何處別居。設言非聚類。可非同法處等。又復解云。一切諸法。有他不自有。乃至云。空不用他所成。故名一實。自體不自有。為大有所有故。名有一實。若依此解。大有能有五全四小分。名有一實。此亦不然。自體不自有。別為大有有。乃師主之義。非弟子許。若弟子許別為有。有便立已成。何須云大有非實等。若弟子不許。一一實上不無之有。能有實等。名有一實。即有一實因。犯隨一不成過。何能成比量。問若取有二實等為因。有不定。許一一實自能有體。云有一實。取此為因。亦不定過。答不例。子微有二實。彼此俱成。別有子體。實上不無之有。弟子自許。故無不定。因不分別。但云有一實等。又問云。何故不名無實二實多實耶。有人簡云。若言有無實及有二實為因者。有兩俱不成過。若言有多實。有不成過者。恐未研核。何以知者。難若望五頂意許所立。可說不成。今望弟子所許。敵論何得不成者。此亦未可。今言有者。實德業上。同許能有之有。不分即離。豈許此有能有和合句耶。但自有故。故是不成。何分師弟。二俱爾故。若云以和合句。既和合實等。何故
不得言。實德業等。不無之有。有于和合。名有無實者。此亦不然。此亦師弟同許。何得雲師不成。弟子得成。又若取此為因。即喻無能立。同異不能同異和合性。和合性復非同異和合性故。故不得云若言有無實故。亦得成因。又本簡云。若云有二多實為因有不定。有無實為因有不成。不言有二實為因不成。文外加諸。故應如本簡過成因。又云。若唯望意許離實有說者。以無實及有二實為因。此乃是隨一所依不成。及兩俱不成過。此亦不然。隨一所依不成可爾。弟子不許離實等有故。何得云俱不成。師主豈可不許大有。有于空等無實之實。有于子微有二實之實。又云。若以多實為因者。亦有隨一所依不成。及不定過者。亦不必然。不成可爾。不定須思。不共不定可爾。以有多實因。于孫微上有故。為不定者。不然。若望師主。孫微雖有多實。不是大有。復非彼性。不同同異故。有多實因於子微上無。談師主意。說彼大有。有于多實故。然不得云是大有有多實。無同法故。以因不應分別。為大有有。為不無有。故同異性。得為同喻。不爾望師主。即不共不定。同異非大有故。望于弟子。即隨一不成。弟子不許故。故知所判。更成疏略。又云。若以無實為因。即不定過。為如和合非實。為如時等是實耶者。亦未盡理。若其
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不應這樣說。如果說『實德業』（真實功德事業）等等，並非完全沒有，而是在和合中存在，因此名為『有無實』（既有真實又無真實），這也是不對的。因為這也是師父和弟子共同認可的，怎麼能說師父不能成立，而弟子卻能成立呢？ 又如果以此作為理由，就如同比喻沒有能力成立。『同異』（相同與不同）不能成立『同異和合性』（相同與不同結合的性質），因為『和合性』並非『同異和合性』。所以不能說如果說有無真實，就可以成立理由。 而且原本的簡略本說，如果說『有二多實』（具有兩種或多種真實）作為理由，就會有不確定性；『有無實』作為理由，就會有不能成立。並沒有說『有二實』（具有兩種真實）作為理由就不能成立。現在在原文之外增加這些，所以應該像原本的簡略本那樣，將『過成因』（過失成為理由）作為理由。 又說，如果僅僅希望按照意願，脫離真實而說，以『無實』（沒有真實）以及『有二實』作為理由，這就是隨一所依不成，以及兩俱不成（兩個都不成立）的過失。這也是不對的。隨一所依不成或許可以，因為弟子不認可脫離真實等等而存在，怎麼能說是兩個都不成立呢？師父難道會不認可『大有』（大乘有），即在空等等中存在的『無實之實』（沒有真實的真實），以及在子微（極微）中存在的『有二實之實』（具有兩種真實的真實）嗎？ 又說，如果以『多實』（多種真實）作為理由，也會有隨一所依不成，以及不確定的過失。這也不一定。不能成立或許可以，但不確定性需要思考。不共不定或許可以，因為在孫微（更微小的微塵）上有多種真實的原因，所以是不確定的。如果這樣認為，那是不對的。如果從師父的角度來看，孫微雖然有多種真實，但不是『大有』，也不是它的性質，不同於『同異』。所以多種真實的原因在子微上不存在。談論師父的意圖，說彼『大有』，存在於多種真實中。然而不能說『大有』具有多種真實，因為沒有共同的法。因為理由不應該分別，是爲了『大有』而有，還是爲了不無有。所以『同異性』可以作為同喻。否則從師父的角度來看，就是不共不定，因為『同異』不是『大有』。從弟子的角度來看，就是隨一不成，因為弟子不認可。所以知道所作的判斷，更加顯得疏漏。 又說，如果以『無實』作為理由，就會有不確定的過失，是像和合那樣不是真實，還是像時間等等那樣是真實呢？這也沒有窮盡道理。如果...
【English Translation】 English version It should not be said like that. If it is said that 'real virtues and deeds' (true merits and deeds), etc., are not completely non-existent, but exist in combination, therefore named 'having non-reality' (both having reality and not having reality), this is also incorrect. Because this is also recognized by both the teacher and the disciple, how can it be said that the teacher cannot be established, but the disciple can be established? Moreover, if this is taken as a reason, it is like a metaphor that cannot be established. 'Sameness and difference' (same and different) cannot establish 'the nature of sameness and difference in combination' (the nature of combining sameness and difference), because 'the nature of combination' is not 'the nature of sameness and difference in combination'. Therefore, it cannot be said that if it is said that there is reality and non-reality, the reason can be established. Moreover, the original abridged version said that if 'having two or more realities' (having two or more realities) is taken as a reason, there will be uncertainty; if 'having non-reality' is taken as a reason, it will not be established. It did not say that 'having two realities' (having two realities) as a reason cannot be established. Now adding these outside the original text, it should be like the original abridged version, taking 'fault becoming reason' (fault becoming reason) as the reason. It is also said that if one only hopes to speak according to intention, detached from reality, taking 'non-reality' (no reality) and 'having two realities' as reasons, this is the fault of 'one-sided dependence not being established' and 'both not being established' (neither being established). This is also incorrect. 'One-sided dependence not being established' may be possible, because the disciple does not recognize existence detached from reality, etc., how can it be said that neither is established? Would the teacher not recognize 'Great Existence' (Mahayana existence), that is, 'the reality of non-reality' (the reality of no reality) existing in emptiness, etc., and 'the reality of having two realities' (the reality of having two realities) existing in Sub-microscopic (extremely small particles)? It is also said that if 'multiple realities' (multiple realities) are taken as a reason, there will also be the fault of 'one-sided dependence not being established' and 'uncertainty'. This is not necessarily the case. Not being established may be possible, but uncertainty needs to be considered. Non-common uncertainty may be possible, because there are multiple real reasons on Sun-microscopic (even smaller particles), so it is uncertain. If it is thought like this, it is incorrect. If viewed from the teacher's perspective, although Sun-microscopic has multiple realities, it is not 'Great Existence', nor is it its nature, different from 'sameness and difference'. Therefore, the reason for multiple realities does not exist on Sub-microscopic. Talking about the teacher's intention, saying that 'Great Existence' exists in multiple realities. However, it cannot be said that 'Great Existence' has multiple realities, because there is no common Dharma. Because the reason should not be distinguished, whether it is for 'Great Existence' to exist, or for not being non-existent. Therefore, 'the nature of sameness and difference' can be used as a similar metaphor. Otherwise, from the teacher's perspective, it is non-common uncertainty, because 'sameness and difference' is not 'Great Existence'. From the disciple's perspective, it is one-sided non-establishment, because the disciple does not recognize it. Therefore, knowing the judgment made, it appears even more negligent. It is also said that if 'non-reality' is taken as a reason, there will be the fault of uncertainty, is it like combination that is not real, or is it like time, etc., that is real? This has not exhausted the truth either. If...
不云有無實故。但云無實故。因俱不成過。何名不定。若言有無實故。望和合性。分不成過。望時方上不無之有。即不定過。有無實因。非和合有。又非同喻。何得望彼為不定過。又云。以有二實故為因。是一分兩俱不成過。亦犯似同喻中。能立不成過。以同異性雖是非實。不名有二實故。此亦不然。無俱不成相故。又豈不許同異。同異于父母耶。同異于空等。有一實因成同異合父母。有二何不許。準此有不定。不言有二實。故知。云不得作不定者非。又云。若二實為因者。是法自相相違過。過云。有性是實。有二實故。如子微。為有此過。不立為因。此不必然。因同喻有義如前說。但不定過。非是相違。又云。若實句不名有德業者。如何得說共許不無之有。名有德業耶。故知。依彼實句不無之有。說名有德業也。如同異性者。舉喻。此未善釋。若成實句之上。不無之有。云非德業。此立已成。如立量云。有非德業。有德業故。如同異性。何以能顯離德業之大有。故知。各成三句之上。不無之有。為三比量。顯有離三。若望成實句上。不無之有。云非德業。如何作有法自相相違之因。若望其意許離實大有。豈可師主。不立離德業之大有。但立離實之大有耶。問若成德業上不無之有。云非德業。以有德業因。于實亦轉。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不應說因為有和無的實體，所以才說沒有實體。因為這樣會導致因俱不成（hetu-asiddha，因不能被證明）的過失。如果這樣說，那又叫什麼不定（anaikantika，不確定）呢？如果說因為有和無的實體，從和合性（samghata-svabhava）的角度來看，會有分不成（ekadesa-asiddha，部分不成立）的過失；從時間和空間的角度來看，不無之有（asti-nastitva，存在與不存在）的狀態，就成了不定過（anaikantika）。有和無的實體作為因，既不是和合而有，也不是同喻（sapaksha，同品），怎麼能說它是不定過呢？ 又說，以有二個實體作為因，這是一分兩俱不成（ubhaya-asiddha，雙方不成立）的過失，也犯了相似同喻（sadharana）中的能立不成（sadhana-asiddha，能立不成立）的過失。因為同異性（bheda-abheda）雖然不是實體，但也不能說是有二個實體。這種說法也是不對的，因為沒有俱不成（ubhaya-asiddha）的相。難道不允許同異嗎？同異于父母，同異于空等。有一個實體因成就同異和父母，有兩個實體為什麼不允許呢？按照這個標準，有不定過失，不說有二個實體。所以說，不能作為不定過失的說法是不對的。 又說，如果二個實體作為因，那麼這個法就有了自相相違（svabhava-viruddha）的過失。過失在於，有性（astitva）是實體，有二個實體，就像子微（kanika，極微）一樣。會有這樣的過失嗎？不立為因。這不一定。因在同喻中有意義，如前面所說，只是不定過失，不是相違。又說，如果實體句（vastu-vada）不稱為有德業（guna），怎麼能說共許的不無之有，稱為有德業呢？所以說，依據實體句的不無之有，才稱為有德業。如同異性一樣，這是舉例說明。如果成實句（siddha-vastu-vada）之上，不無之有，說不是德業，這個立論已經成立。如同立量（anumana）說，有非德業，因為有德業，如同同異性。怎麼能顯示離開德業的大有（mahat-satta）呢？所以說，各自成就三句之上，不無之有，作為三個比量（pramana），顯示有離開三者的。如果希望成實句之上，不無之有，說不是德業，怎麼能作為有法自相相違的因呢？如果希望他的意思是離開實體的大有，難道師主不立離開德業的大有，隻立離開實體的大有嗎？問：如果成德業之上不無之有，說不是德業，因為有德業因，對於實體也會轉變。
【English Translation】 English version: It should not be said that because there are entities of existence and non-existence, it is said that there is no entity. Because this would lead to the fallacy of 'hetu-asiddha' (the reason cannot be proven). If it is said like this, then what is called 'anaikantika' (uncertain)? If it is said that because there are entities of existence and non-existence, from the perspective of 'samghata-svabhava' (the nature of aggregation), there will be the fallacy of 'ekadesa-asiddha' (partially unestablished); from the perspective of time and space, the state of 'asti-nastitva' (existence and non-existence) becomes 'anaikantika' (uncertain). The entities of existence and non-existence as the reason are neither aggregately existent nor 'sapaksha' (similar instance), how can it be said that it is 'anaikantika'? Furthermore, it is said that taking the existence of two entities as the reason is the fallacy of 'ubhaya-asiddha' (unestablished for both parties), and also commits the fallacy of 'sadhana-asiddha' (the probandum is unestablished) in 'sadharana' (common). Because 'bheda-abheda' (difference and non-difference), although not an entity, cannot be said to be two entities. This statement is also incorrect because there is no characteristic of 'ubhaya-asiddha'. Is difference and non-difference not allowed? Difference and non-difference from parents, difference and non-difference from emptiness, etc. One entity-reason accomplishes difference and non-difference and parents, why are two entities not allowed? According to this standard, there is the fallacy of 'anaikantika', not saying that there are two entities. Therefore, the statement that it cannot be taken as the fallacy of 'anaikantika' is incorrect. Furthermore, it is said that if two entities are taken as the reason, then this dharma has the fallacy of 'svabhava-viruddha' (self-contradictory nature). The fallacy lies in that 'astitva' (existence) is an entity, and having two entities is like 'kanika' (atom). Will there be such a fallacy? It is not established as the reason. This is not necessarily the case. The reason has meaning in 'sapaksha' as mentioned earlier, it is only the fallacy of 'anaikantika', not contradictory. Furthermore, it is said that if 'vastu-vada' (realistic statement) is not called 'guna' (attribute), how can it be said that the commonly accepted 'asti-nastitva' is called 'guna'? Therefore, it is said that based on the 'asti-nastitva' of 'vastu-vada', it is called 'guna'. Like difference and non-difference, this is an illustration. If above the 'siddha-vastu-vada' (established realistic statement), 'asti-nastitva' is said not to be 'guna', this proposition is already established. Like establishing 'anumana' (inference) saying, there is non-attribute, because there is attribute, like difference and non-difference. How can it reveal the 'mahat-satta' (great being) that is apart from attributes? Therefore, it is said that above each of the three accomplished statements, 'asti-nastitva' is taken as three 'pramana' (proofs), showing that there is separation from the three. If one hopes that above the 'siddha-vastu-vada', 'asti-nastitva' is said not to be 'guna', how can it be taken as the reason for the self-contradictory nature of the subject? If one hopes that his meaning is the great being apart from entity, does the master not establish the great being apart from attributes, but only establish the great being apart from entity? Question: If above the accomplished attribute, 'asti-nastitva' is said not to be attribute, because there is attribute-reason, it will also transform for the entity.
豈無過耶。答亦無過。立非德業。實亦同喻。論中且舉別因通喻。不爾言非德業宗實句是何收。又解云。有德業言。意說彼性。實雖有德業。非彼性故。望義別故。此有令彼體性不無。名之為有實德業等。實名有德業。以相依故名之為有。不能令彼成其不無。有言雖同。詮義各別。若爾。同異性即非同喻。答爾若爾。云何俱得決定。答望為性成非實等。望能有有。即是相違。若成有非。實有德業因。此不定過。以彼實句有德業故。有一實因。成非德業。不定亦爾。然待撿彼勝論方知。又云。五頂但據三因別成三宗故無有過。問若爾無過何名相違。答若望言顯無過。今望意許故犯相違。此亦未詳。既言非實非德業宗明即大有若非大有更有何有非實等耶雖不言大言有已顯。故彼弟子。望立非實德業之有。得作相違。又云。問同異二品豈可得約有法立耶。解云。夫同異品。但隨有法及法中意所立者。即望此為同異品。今既意立有性。離實等外別有其體。故得望離實等有性。為同異品。此釋未善。若以有法是所爭故。意所立者。即應名法。何名有法。故理門云。又於此中。觀所成故。立法有法。非如德有德。故無有過。若爾如何。今解。意立實等上。不無之有為有法。定非是實等。言非實等者。是離實等。有義為法。望此即為
【現代漢語翻譯】 豈無過失嗎？回答說也沒有過失。如果立論說『不是德業』，實際上也同樣可以比喻。論證中姑且舉出個別的因和普遍的比喻。不然的話，說『不是德業』，宗和實句應該如何歸納？又解釋說：『有德業』這句話，意思是說那個自性。實際上雖然有德業，但不是那個自性，因為所期望的意義不同。這裡有使那個體性不無的情況，稱之為『有實德業』等等。『實』被稱為『有德業』，因為相互依存的緣故稱之為『有』，但不能使那個（體性）成為不無。『有』這個詞雖然相同，但所詮釋的意義各自不同。如果這樣，『同異性』就不是相同的比喻了。回答說，如果是這樣，怎麼能夠都得到決定呢？回答說，期望成為自性，而不是實際等等。期望能夠『有有』，這就是相違背。如果成立『有非』，實際上有德業的因，這就有不確定的過失，因為那個實句有德業的緣故。有一個實際的因，成立『不是德業』，不確定也是這樣。然而要等到考察勝論才能知道。又說，五頂只是根據三個因分別成立三個宗，所以沒有過失。問：如果這樣沒有過失，為什麼稱之為相違背？答：如果期望言語顯現沒有過失，現在期望意思允許，所以犯了相違背。這個解釋也不詳細。既然說『不是實』、『不是德業』，宗明確地表明就是『大有』，如果不是『大有』，還有什麼『有非實』等等呢？雖然沒有說『大』，但說『有』已經很明顯了。所以他的弟子，期望立論『不是實德業』的『有』，可以作為相違背。 又說，問：『同異』兩種品類，怎麼可以憑藉有法來立論呢？解釋說：『同異品』，只是隨著有法以及法中的意思所立的，就期望這個作為『同異品』。現在既然意思上立『有性』，在實等等之外另外有它的體性，所以可以期望離開實等等的『有性』，作為『同異品』。這個解釋不太好。如果以有法是所爭論的緣故，意思上所立的，就應該稱為法，為什麼稱為有法？所以《理門》說：『又在這裡面，觀察所成就的緣故，立法有法，不像德有德，所以沒有過失。』如果這樣怎麼樣呢？現在解釋，意思上立在實等等之上，不無的『有』作為有法，一定不是實等等。說『不是實等等』，是離開實等等，有意義作為法，期望這個就成為。
【English Translation】 Could there be no fault? The answer is also no fault. Establishing 'not a virtue' is actually the same analogy. In the argument, let's cite individual causes and universal analogies. Otherwise, how should the proposition and the 'real' statement be categorized when saying 'not a virtue'? Another explanation says: 'Having virtue' means that nature. Although there is actually virtue, it is not that nature because the expected meaning is different. Here, there is a situation where that nature is not non-existent, which is called 'having real virtue' and so on. 'Real' is called 'having virtue' because it is called 'having' due to mutual dependence, but it cannot make that (nature) non-existent. Although the word 'having' is the same, the meanings interpreted are different. If so, 'sameness and difference' are not the same analogy. The answer is, if so, how can both be determined? The answer is, expecting to become nature, not reality, etc. Expecting to 'have having' is contradictory. If 'having not' is established, the cause of actually having virtue has an uncertain fault because that real statement has virtue. There is an actual cause that establishes 'not a virtue,' and uncertainty is also the same. However, it must wait until examining the Vaisheshika Sutra (勝論) to know. It is also said that the Five Peaks (五頂) only establish three propositions separately based on three causes, so there is no fault. Question: If there is no fault in this way, why is it called contradictory? Answer: If expecting the words to appear without fault, now expecting the meaning to be allowed, then it commits contradiction. This explanation is also not detailed. Since it is said 'not real' and 'not virtue,' the proposition clearly shows that it is 'great existence' (大有). If it is not 'great existence,' what else is 'having not real' and so on? Although 'great' is not said, saying 'having' is already very obvious. Therefore, his disciple, expecting to establish 'having' that is 'not real virtue,' can be regarded as contradictory. It is also said, Question: How can the two categories of 'same and different' be established based on the subject (有法, dharmin)? Explanation: 'Same and different categories' are only established according to the subject and the meaning in the dharma (法, dharma), and this is expected to be the 'same and different categories.' Now that 'having nature' (有性, astita) is established in meaning, there is another nature outside of reality, etc., so it can be expected that 'having nature' apart from reality, etc., is the 'same and different categories.' This explanation is not very good. If the subject is the reason for the dispute, and what is established in meaning should be called dharma, why is it called the subject? Therefore, the Hetu-vidya (理門) says: 'Also in this, observing the reason for what is accomplished, establishing the subject, not like virtue having virtue, so there is no fault.' If so, how is it? Now explain, establishing in meaning on reality, etc., the 'having' that is not non-existent is the subject, and it is certainly not reality, etc. Saying 'not reality, etc.' is apart from reality, etc., having meaning as dharma, expecting this becomes.
所立。故理門論云。此中若品。與所立法。鄰近均等。說名同品。此論亦云。云何名為同品異品。謂所立法均等義品。說名同品。不望有法名同異品。如是方便成立有法。因喻既返。故成相違。若爾何名有法自相相違因耶。答望不加言。名有法自相。若加言已即名為法。不爾相違。又云古人云。問五頂信有有不。若信有性難令非有。便違共許。豈是相違。如言聲非聲也。若不信有。此即宗闕有法。因無所依。何容依此競其即離。作相違過。乃至廣敘云云言。今解應知。加汝字即無有失。謂汝執有性。應非有性。又無義宗法。許得依無。今言非有。但非彼所立。更無所表。但牒彼計。何用極成。如佛法破外道云。汝我應非我。亦得成破。此釋未善。無義宗法。可許依無有一實等因。豈無義宗法。但可隨他與作相違。即無有過。不勞分別有義宗法無義宗法。
釋有法差別相違因中雲。如即此因。即於前宗。不但能成有法差別作有緣性。亦能成立與有法差別。相違作非有緣性。此釋不然。若爾應成不定因性。非相違因。既無大有有緣性之同喻。何理能成作大有有緣性。論云。如遮實等。俱決定故。不云成作有緣性。亦得決定。下又正釋俱決定文。過亦同此。又自云。因唯異轉故非不定。既爾如何云俱決定。同品無故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所要建立的法。所以《理門論》說：『這裡如果有一個品類，與所要建立的法，在性質上鄰近且相等，就叫做同品。』此論也說：『什麼叫做同品異品？就是與所要建立的法性質相等的品類，叫做同品。不涉及有法，就叫做同異品。』像這樣方便地成立有法，如果因和比喻都相反，就成了相違。如果這樣，什麼叫做有法自相相違因呢？回答是：不加上任何言辭，就叫做有法自相。如果加上言辭，就叫做法，否則就不是相違。又說古人說：『問五頂是否相信有自性？如果相信有自性，就難以使其成為非有，便違背了共同的認可，這難道是相違嗎？就像說聲音不是聲音一樣。』如果不相信有自性，這就是宗缺少有法，因沒有所依賴的對象，怎麼能依靠它來爭論，從而立即脫離，造成相違的過失。』乃至廣泛地敘述。現在解釋應該知道，加上『你』字就沒有過失。就是說你執著有自性，就應該不是有自性。又沒有意義的宗法，允許依賴於無。現在說非有，只是並非他所建立的，沒有其他所要表達的，只是照錄他的觀點，何必用極成呢？就像佛法破斥外道說：『你我應該不是我』，也可以成立破斥。這種解釋不太好。沒有意義的宗法，可以允許依賴於無，有一個真實等的因，難道沒有意義的宗法，只能隨著他人而造成相違，就沒有過失嗎？不必分別有意義的宗法和沒有意義的宗法。
解釋有法差別相違因中說：『比如這個因，就在前面的宗中，不僅能成立有法差別作為有緣性，也能成立與有法差別相違，作為非有緣性。』這種解釋不對。如果這樣，就應該成為不定因性，而不是相違因。既然沒有大有有緣性的同喻，憑什麼能成立作為大有有緣性呢？論中說：『比如遮止真實等，都是決定的。』沒有說成立作為有緣性，也能決定。下面又正式解釋都是決定的文，過失也與此相同。又自己說：『因只是異轉，所以不是不定。』既然這樣，怎麼說都是決定的呢？因為沒有同品。
【English Translation】 English version: The dharma to be established. Therefore, the Li Men Lun (Treatise on the Gate of Reasoning) says: 'Here, if there is a category that is close and equal in nature to the dharma to be established, it is called the same category (tongpin).' This treatise also says: 'What are called the same category and different category (yipin)? That is, the category whose nature is equal to the dharma to be established is called the same category. Without involving the youfa (subject of the proposition), it is called the same and different category.' Establishing the youfa in this convenient way, if the cause and the analogy are reversed, it becomes contradictory. If so, what is called the youfa zixiang xiangwei yin (contradictory reason of the self-nature of the subject)? The answer is: without adding any words, it is called the self-nature of the youfa. If words are added, it is called dharma; otherwise, it is not contradictory. It is also said that the ancients said: 'Ask whether Wuding (Five Peaks) believes in self-nature (zixing)? If one believes in self-nature, it is difficult to make it non-existent, which violates common recognition. Is this contradictory? It's like saying sound is not sound.' If one does not believe in self-nature, then this is a zongque youfa (the proposition lacks the subject), and the cause has nothing to rely on. How can one rely on it to argue, thereby immediately breaking away and causing the fault of contradiction?' And so on, extensively narrating. Now, the explanation should be known that adding the word 'you' (you) has no fault. That is, if you cling to self-nature, then it should not be self-nature. Also, a meaningless zongfa (property of the proposition) is allowed to rely on non-existence. Now saying non-existence is only not what he established, and there is nothing else to express. It is only transcribing his view, so why use the extremely established? Just like the Buddhist dharma refuting the heretics saying: 'You and I should not be me,' it can also establish refutation. This explanation is not very good. A meaningless zongfa can be allowed to rely on non-existence, and there is a real cause, etc. Is it that a meaningless zongfa can only follow others to create contradiction, and there is no fault? There is no need to distinguish between meaningful zongfa and meaningless zongfa.
Explaining the youfa chabie xiangwei yin (contradictory reason of the difference of the subject), it says: 'For example, this cause, in the previous proposition, can not only establish the difference of the youfa as having a causal nature, but also establish the contradiction with the difference of the youfa as having a non-causal nature.' This explanation is not correct. If so, it should become an uncertain cause (buding yin), not a contradictory cause (xiangwei yin). Since there is no similar example of having a causal nature of great existence, how can it establish having a causal nature of great existence? The treatise says: 'For example, preventing reality, etc., are all definite.' It does not say that establishing having a causal nature can also be definite. The following also formally explains the text that they are all definite, and the fault is the same as this. Also, it says itself: 'The cause is only different, so it is not uncertain.' Since this is the case, how can it be said that they are all definite? Because there is no similar category.
問既言不以意許為差別。此作有緣性。為是言顯。為當意許。若云言陳者。如何立宗。云大有作有緣性。言大有時。他許不許。若許立已成。不許闕所別。作有緣性。為言大有。為不無有。言作大有有緣性。他許立已成。不許闕能別。故他不許。即俱不成。何成立量。若云言有意含。作有緣性亦含。此即意許。何得云言顯。不得云如汝立。彼云。言有非實。雖是意許。即言已顯。作有緣性。何不許然者。不然。何以故。前量云。非實故言有時即言顯。實上之有云非實。除大有外更有何有。故言有時即言顯。今作有緣性不云非實。以有為有法。作有緣性為法故。俱是不無之有。作有緣性中。意作大有有緣性。作非大有有緣性。是其差別。今據意許難令成過。故非言顯。問若據意許。立云有作有緣性。即是法差別。云何名有法差別。答準前釋。望不加言名有法差別。若加言已即名法故。然成此法意成有法。故理門云。但以法故成於法。如是成立於有法。問若加言已與法何殊。答法自相等本只爭法不爭有法故不得言如是成立於有法。若云即成聲無常等云成立有法者。不然。瑜伽等云所成立法有二種。一自性。二差別。若成聲之無常。亦名成自性。此二何別。故作此解妙之又妙。
解似同喻中雲。世親及小乘外道。立有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：既然說不以主觀意圖來區分差別，那麼『此作有緣性』（此生起是具有因緣的性質）這句話，是言語直接表達的，還是主觀意圖所允許的？如果說是言語陳述的，那麼如何確立宗（命題）呢？如果說『大有作有緣性』（極大的存在是具有因緣的性質），那麼對方是承認還是不承認？如果承認，那麼就成了已成立的論題；如果不承認，那麼就缺少了所別（被區分的對象）。『作有緣性』（生起是具有因緣的性質），是說『大有』（極大的存在），還是『不無有』（非不存在）？如果說『作大有有緣性』（生起是極大的存在所具有的因緣性質），對方如果承認，那麼就成了已成立的論題；如果不承認，那麼就缺少了能別（能區分的性質）。所以對方如果不承認，那麼就兩個方面都不成立，如何成立量（論證）呢？如果說言語中包含意圖，『作有緣性』也包含意圖，那麼這就是主觀意圖所允許的，怎麼能說是言語直接表達的呢？不能像你那樣立論。對方說：言語有非真實的部分，雖然是主觀意圖所允許的，但言語已經表達了『作有緣性』（生起是具有因緣的性質），為什麼不承認呢？不是這樣的。為什麼呢？因為前面的量（論證）說：因為非真實，所以言語有時即是言語直接表達的。真實之上的存在被稱為非真實，除了『大有』（極大的存在）之外還有什麼存在呢？所以言語有時即是言語直接表達的。現在說『作有緣性』（生起是具有因緣的性質）沒有說非真實，以『有』（存在）作為有法（具有某種性質的事物），『作有緣性』作為法（性質），所以都是『不無有』（非不存在）的存在。在『作有緣性』（生起是具有因緣的性質）中，意圖上區分『作大有有緣性』（生起是極大的存在所具有的因緣性質）和『作非大有有緣性』（生起是非極大的存在所具有的因緣性質），這是它們的差別。現在根據主觀意圖來責難，不能使過失成立，所以不是言語直接表達的。問：如果根據主觀意圖，立論說『有作有緣性』（存在是具有因緣的性質），這就是法差別（性質的差別），為什麼又稱為有法差別（具有某種性質的事物的差別）呢？答：參照前面的解釋，不加言語說明的稱為有法差別（具有某種性質的事物的差別），如果加上言語說明，那麼就稱為法（性質）了。然而成立這個法（性質），意圖上是成立有法（具有某種性質的事物）。所以理門說：只是因為法（性質）的緣故，才成立法（性質），像這樣才成立有法（具有某種性質的事物）。問：如果加上言語說明，那麼和法（性質）有什麼區別呢？答：法（性質）的自相等，本來只是爭論法（性質），不爭論有法（具有某種性質的事物），所以不能說像這樣才成立有法（具有某種性質的事物）。如果說成立聲無常等，就是成立有法（具有某種性質的事物），不是這樣的。《瑜伽師地論》等說，所成立的法（性質）有兩種：一是自性，二是差別。如果成立聲音的無常，也稱為成立自性，這兩種有什麼區別呢？所以這樣解釋非常巧妙。
解釋相似同喻中說：世親（Vasubandhu）及小乘外道，立有（存在）
【English Translation】 English version Question: Since it is said that differences are not distinguished by intention, is the statement 'This arising has the nature of dependent origination' expressed directly by words, or is it allowed by intention? If it is said to be a verbal statement, then how is the proposition established? If it is said that 'The great existence has the nature of dependent origination,' does the other party acknowledge it or not? If they acknowledge it, then it becomes an already established thesis; if they do not acknowledge it, then the distinguished object is missing. Does 'having the nature of dependent origination' refer to 'great existence' or 'non-non-existence'? If it is said that 'arising has the nature of dependent origination of great existence,' if the other party acknowledges it, then it becomes an already established thesis; if they do not acknowledge it, then the distinguishing characteristic is missing. Therefore, if the other party does not acknowledge it, then both aspects are not established, how can a valid argument be established? If it is said that language contains intention, and 'having the nature of dependent origination' also contains intention, then this is allowed by intention, how can it be said to be expressed directly by words? It cannot be established like you do. The other party says: Language has unreal aspects, although it is allowed by intention, the language has already expressed 'having the nature of dependent origination,' why not acknowledge it? It is not like that. Why? Because the previous argument said: Because it is unreal, therefore language sometimes is expressed directly by words. Existence above reality is called unreal, what existence is there besides 'great existence'? Therefore, language sometimes is expressed directly by words. Now saying 'having the nature of dependent origination' does not say unreal, taking 'existence' as the subject (dharmin), and 'having the nature of dependent origination' as the predicate (dharma), so both are 'non-non-existence'. In 'having the nature of dependent origination,' the intention distinguishes between 'having the nature of dependent origination of great existence' and 'having the nature of dependent origination of non-great existence,' this is their difference. Now, based on intentional criticism, the fault cannot be established, so it is not expressed directly by words. Question: If based on intention, establishing the thesis that 'existence has the nature of dependent origination,' this is a difference in predicate (dharma), why is it also called a difference in subject (dharmin)? Answer: Refer to the previous explanation, what is not explained in words is called a difference in subject (dharmin), if explained in words, then it is called a predicate (dharma). However, establishing this predicate (dharma), the intention is to establish the subject (dharmin). Therefore, the science of logic says: Only because of the predicate (dharma), the predicate (dharma) is established, like this the subject (dharmin) is established. Question: If explained in words, then what is the difference from the predicate (dharma)? Answer: The self-nature of the predicate (dharma) originally only argues about the predicate (dharma), not about the subject (dharmin), so it cannot be said that the subject (dharmin) is established like this. If it is said that establishing the impermanence of sound, etc., is establishing the subject (dharmin), it is not like that. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) and others say that there are two types of predicates (dharma) to be established: one is self-nature, and the other is difference. If the impermanence of sound is established, it is also called establishing self-nature, what is the difference between these two? Therefore, this explanation is very subtle.
The explanation in similar examples says: Vasubandhu (世親) and the Hinayana (小乘) heretics establish existence.
五分。慈尊無著陳那等。但立三分。合結為成於喻。是喻上之差別。善立於喻。足顯合結。無繁喻外。別立二支。又云。瑜伽同類即當對法合支。對法既立喻訖。何故復說合支。結既許同世親合支。如何即別。又瑜伽引喻之言。為同爲異。若其是總同類即是喻。何關對法合支。若引喻即說為同類。與世親合支何別。作斯會教全不相當。應知。對法合結。與世親不殊。瑜伽同類異類。與理門等二喻不別。作者各據一義。所以如古德述。下雖亦作是釋。但為前後相違。
釋二量中。以有古解。聖教由詮諸法共相故比量攝。非之可爾。若云一切定心亦得共相。應比量收。又比量心。亦得自相。應非比量。此難恐違。言定心緣得共相者。是何共相。若因明共相。違佛地論。理門亦云。諸修定者。離教分別。皆是現量。云何定心。得此共相。故雖定心緣比量教。離分別故。不名緣共相。以不分別。一因三相。貫通宗喻。各證知故。散心不證。但隨於教。分別貫通。故緣共相。名為比量。設聖者心。知分別心。以因貫之。亦證相故。不分別故。不名緣共相。若經中自共與因明別故。不應難云比得自相現得共相。若許得者。如何依二相。唯立二量耶。俱緣於二相。二量有何別。又與經說二相何別。
釋自共相經論相違中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於五分比量，慈尊（Maitreya，彌勒菩薩）、無著（Asanga，瑜伽行派創始人之一）、陳那（Dignāga，因明學大師）等人隻立三分比量，將合（Sapaksha，同品）和結（Nigamana，結論）合併到喻（Udaharanam，例證）中，這是喻支上的差別。善於安立喻支，就足以顯明合支和結支，沒有必要在喻支之外，另外安立合支和結支兩支。又有人說，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）中的『同類』相當於因明中的合支。既然對法中已經安立了喻支，為什麼還要再說合支呢？既然結支被允許與世親（Vasubandhu，著名佛教論師）的合支相同，又如何能說是不同的呢？而且，《瑜伽師地論》中引用的喻，是相同還是不同呢？如果說是總的同類，那就是喻支，與對法中的合支有什麼關係呢？如果說引喻就是說同類，那與世親的合支又有什麼區別呢？這樣來解釋教義，完全不恰當。應該知道，對法中的合支和結支，與世親的合支沒有區別。《瑜伽師地論》中的同類和異類，與理門等因明論著中的二喻（同喻和異喻）也沒有區別。作者們各自根據一個角度來立論，所以就像古德所說的那樣。下面的解釋雖然也是這樣，但前後是互相矛盾的。
在解釋二量（現量和比量）時，有一種古老的解釋認為，聖教（佛陀的教導）由於詮釋諸法的共相（salaksana，共相），所以屬於比量所攝。這種說法是不可以的。如果說一切定心（samadhi-citta，禪定中的心）也能緣得共相，那就應該被比量所攝。而且，比量心也能緣得自相（svalaksana，自相），那就應該不是比量。這個詰難恐怕是違背了教義。所說的定心緣得共相，是什麼共相呢？如果是因明中的共相，那就違背了《佛地經論》（Buddhabhumika-sastra）。《理門論》（Hetu-cakra-damaru）也說，那些修習禪定的人，遠離了教義的分別，都是現量。怎麼能說定心緣得這種共相呢？所以，雖然定心緣于比量教，但由於遠離了分別，所以不稱為緣共相。因為不分別一因三相（hetu-trilaksana，因的三種特徵）貫通宗（paksa，宗）和喻，各自證知。散亂的心不能證知，只是隨順於教義，分別貫通，所以緣共相，稱為比量。假設聖者的心，知道分別心，用因來貫通，也證知自相，因為不分別，所以不稱為緣共相。如果經中所說的自相和共相與因明不同，就不應該詰難說比量能緣得自相，現量能緣得共相。如果允許比量能緣得自相，現量能緣得共相，那麼如何依據自相和共相，只安立二量呢？如果都緣于自相和共相，那麼二量有什麼區別呢？又與經中所說的二相有什麼區別呢？
在解釋自相和共相與經論相違的問題中
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the five-part syllogism, the venerable Maitreya (慈尊，Maitreya, the future Buddha), Asanga (無著，Asanga, one of the founders of the Yogacara school), Dignāga (陳那，Dignāga, a master of logic) and others only establish a three-part syllogism, combining Sapaksha (合，homologue) and Nigamana (結，conclusion) into Udaharanam (喻，example). This is a difference in the example limb. Skillfully establishing the example limb is sufficient to clearly show the homologue and conclusion limbs. There is no need to separately establish the homologue and conclusion limbs outside of the example limb. Furthermore, some say that the 'similar class' (同類) in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (《瑜伽師地論》) is equivalent to the homologue limb in logic. Since the example limb has already been established in the Abhidharma (對法), why is it necessary to speak of the homologue limb again? Since the conclusion limb is allowed to be the same as Vasubandhu's (世親，Vasubandhu, a famous Buddhist philosopher) homologue limb, how can it be said to be different? Moreover, is the example cited in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra the same or different? If it is said to be the general similar class, then that is the example limb. What does it have to do with the homologue limb in Abhidharma? If citing an example is said to be the same class, then what is the difference between that and Vasubandhu's homologue limb? Such an interpretation of the teachings is completely inappropriate. It should be known that the homologue and conclusion limbs in Abhidharma are no different from Vasubandhu's homologue limb. The similar and dissimilar classes in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra are no different from the two examples (similar and dissimilar examples) in logical treatises such as the Hetu-cakra-damaru (理門論). The authors each establish their arguments based on one perspective, so it is as the ancient masters have stated. Although the following explanation is also like this, it is contradictory before and after.
In explaining the two means of valid cognition (perception and inference), there is an ancient explanation that the sacred teachings (the Buddha's teachings) are included in inference because they explain the common characteristics (共相，salaksana) of all dharmas. This statement is not acceptable. If it is said that all meditative minds (定心，samadhi-citta) can also cognize common characteristics, then they should be included in inference. Moreover, the inferential mind can also cognize particular characteristics (自相，svalaksana), then it should not be inference. This challenge is probably contrary to the teachings. What is the common characteristic that the meditative mind is said to cognize? If it is the common characteristic in logic, then it contradicts the Buddhabhumika-sastra (《佛地經論》). The Hetu-cakra-damaru (《理門論》) also says that those who practice meditation, being apart from the discriminations of the teachings, are all perception. How can it be said that the meditative mind cognizes this common characteristic? Therefore, although the meditative mind is related to the teachings of inference, because it is apart from discrimination, it is not called cognizing the common characteristic. Because it does not discriminate the three aspects of a reason (因三相，hetu-trilaksana) that pervade the thesis (宗，paksa) and the example, each knows. The distracted mind cannot know, but only follows the teachings, discriminating and pervading, so cognizing the common characteristic is called inference. Suppose the mind of a sage knows the discriminating mind, using the reason to pervade it, and also knows the particular characteristic, because it does not discriminate, it is not called cognizing the common characteristic. If the particular and common characteristics spoken of in the sutras are different from those in logic, then it should not be challenged that inference can cognize the particular characteristic and perception can cognize the common characteristic. If it is allowed that inference can cognize the particular characteristic and perception can cognize the common characteristic, then how can only two means of valid cognition be established based on the particular and common characteristics? If both are related to the particular and common characteristics, then what is the difference between the two means of valid cognition? And what is the difference between that and the two characteristics spoken of in the sutras?
In explaining the contradiction between the sutras and treatises regarding particular and common characteristics
。全未盡理。佛地經論。成唯識論。及因明等。說自共相。各少差別。且佛地經論所明自共。即三科等。皆名自相。各守自性。苦無常等。名為共相。理通余故。唯識論云。名詮自性。句詮差別。少與彼同。亦談彼二相故。然言假智及詮。唯依諸法共相而轉者。此約能詮不得彼體。如詮色時。以其色言通一切色。智增彼相。不得自體。詮於此轉。名為共相。不同無常等義。貫通一切。不唯色故。名為共相。即通於經所說二相。起詮之時。總名共相。非所詮者。即名自相。亦不同因明所立共相。彼約增其諸法自體。相通自類。不由他心總貫諸法。名為共相。因明論中。藉因三相。貫通宗喻。如縷貫花。比智方起。故理門云。若所比處。此相定遍於余同類。念此定有。于彼無處。念此遍無。是故。由此生決定解。此即于彼假智及詮共相之上。更起共相。不可說彼定即因明所說共相。不立比量。言不詮三相故。智緣于彼。不相通故。雖知此言。及比量智。亦于增益共相上轉。意不說彼。名因明中所立共相。彼不作想貫余法故。彼設通余。各自類故。今此貫余。通異類故。宗中所立。亦通喻故。說此為共。瑜伽等中。言自共相。因明論中。共相所攝。比量立故。然不同因。是先陳后說。自性差別攝。立我為有無。名立自相故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 全未盡理。《佛地經論》（Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra）、《成唯識論》（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra）及因明等，說自共相，各少差別。且《佛地經論》所明自共，即三科等，皆名自相，各守自性，苦無常等，名為共相，理通余故。《唯識論》云：『名詮自性，句詮差別。』少與彼同，亦談彼二相故。然言假智及詮，唯依諸法共相而轉者，此約能詮不得彼體，如詮色時，以其色言通一切色，智增彼相，不得自體，詮於此轉，名為共相，不同無常等義，貫通一切，不唯色故，名為共相。即通於經所說二相，起詮之時，總名共相，非所詮者，即名自相。亦不同因明所立共相，彼約增其諸法自體，相通自類，不由他心總貫諸法，名為共相。因明論中，藉因三相，貫通宗喻，如縷貫花，比智方起。故理門云：『若所比處，此相定遍於余同類，念此定有；于彼無處，念此遍無。』是故，由此生決定解。此即于彼假智及詮共相之上，更起共相。不可說彼定即因明所說共相。不立比量，言不詮三相故。智緣于彼，不相通故。雖知此言，及比量智，亦于增益共相上轉，意不說彼，名因明中所立共相。彼不作想貫余法故。彼設通余，各自類故。今此貫余，通異類故。宗中所立，亦通喻故。說此為共。瑜伽等中，言自共相，因明論中，共相所攝，比量立故。然不同因，是先陳后說。自性差別攝，立我為有無，名立自相故。 完全沒有窮盡真理。《佛地經論》、《成唯識論》以及因明等等，所說的自相和共相，各有少許差別。而且《佛地經論》所闡明的自相和共相，也就是三科等等，都叫做自相，各自保持自己的體性；苦、無常等等，叫做共相，因為道理可以貫通其他事物。《唯識論》說：『名詮釋自性，句詮釋差別。』稍微與《佛地經論》相同，也談論這兩種相。然而說假智和詮釋，僅僅依據諸法的共相而運轉，這是就能夠詮釋的事物不能獲得它們的本體而言的。例如詮釋顏色時，因為『顏色』這個詞可以貫通一切顏色，智慧增加了這些相，卻不能獲得顏色本身的自體，詮釋在這種情況下運轉，就叫做共相，不同於無常等等的意義，貫通一切事物，不僅僅是顏色，所以叫做共相。這就貫通了經書所說的兩種相，開始詮釋的時候，總的叫做共相，不是所詮釋的，就叫做自相。也不同於因明所建立的共相，因明是就增加諸法自體，相互貫通同類事物而言的，不是通過其他的心識來總括貫通諸法，叫做共相。在因明論中，憑藉因的三種相，貫通宗和喻，就像用線穿花一樣，比量智慧才能夠產生。所以《理門論》說：『如果所比較的事物，這個相一定普遍存在於其他同類事物中，想到這裡一定有；在那些沒有的地方，想到這裡普遍沒有。』因此，由此產生決定的理解。這就在假智和詮釋的共相之上，又產生了共相。不能說它一定就是因明所說的共相。不建立比量，是因為言語不能詮釋因的三種相。智慧攀緣於它，不能相互貫通。即使知道這個言語，以及比量智慧，也在增益的共相上運轉，意思不是說它就是因明中所建立的共相。因明不作意去貫通其他法，因明即使貫通其他法，也是各自的類別。現在這裡貫通其他法，是貫通不同的類別。宗中所建立的，也貫通比喻。所以說這是共相。在《瑜伽師地論》等等之中，所說的自相和共相，被因明論中的共相所包含，因為比量建立的緣故。然而不同於因，因是先陳述后說明。自性差別所包含的，建立我為有或者無，叫做建立自相的緣故。
【English Translation】 It's not fully understood. The Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-shastra, and Hetu-vidya (logic), etc., speak of Svalaksana (self-characteristic) and Samanya-laksana (universal characteristic), each with slight differences. Moreover, the Svalaksana and Samanya-laksana explained in the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, namely the three categories, etc., are all called Svalaksana, each maintaining its own nature; suffering, impermanence, etc., are called Samanya-laksana, because the principle is universally applicable. The Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-shastra says: 'Names explain self-nature, sentences explain differences.' It is slightly similar to the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, as it also discusses these two characteristics. However, when it is said that provisional wisdom and explanation only operate based on the Samanya-laksana of all dharmas, this refers to the fact that the explainer cannot obtain their substance. For example, when explaining color, because the word 'color' can encompass all colors, wisdom increases these characteristics, but cannot obtain the self-nature of color itself. Explanation operating in this situation is called Samanya-laksana, which is different from the meaning of impermanence, etc., which universally pervades everything, not just color, hence it is called Samanya-laksana. This pervades the two characteristics mentioned in the sutras. When explanation arises, it is generally called Samanya-laksana; what is not explained is called Svalaksana. It is also different from the Samanya-laksana established in Hetu-vidya, which refers to increasing the self-nature of all dharmas, mutually connecting similar categories, not through other minds universally pervading all dharmas, hence it is called Samanya-laksana. In Hetu-vidya, by means of the three aspects of Hetu (reason), the proposition and example are connected, like threading flowers with a string, only then can comparative wisdom arise. Therefore, the Nyaya-mukha-shastra (Introduction to Logic) says: 'If in the place being compared, this characteristic is definitely pervasive in other similar categories, thinking that it definitely exists; in those places where it is absent, thinking that it is universally absent.' Therefore, from this, a definite understanding arises. This is to further establish a Samanya-laksana on top of the provisional wisdom and explanation's Samanya-laksana. It cannot be said that it is definitely the Samanya-laksana spoken of in Hetu-vidya. Not establishing inference means that words cannot explain the three aspects of Hetu. Wisdom clings to it, unable to mutually connect. Although knowing this word and comparative wisdom also operate on the increased Samanya-laksana, the intention is not to say that it is the Samanya-laksana established in Hetu-vidya. Hetu-vidya does not intentionally pervade other dharmas; even if Hetu-vidya pervades other dharmas, they are of their own categories. Now, this pervades other dharmas, pervading different categories. What is established in the proposition also pervades the example. Therefore, it is said to be Samanya-laksana. In the Yoga-shastra, etc., the Svalaksana and Samanya-laksana mentioned are included in the Samanya-laksana in Hetu-vidya, because inference is established. However, it is different from Hetu, which is to state first and then explain later. What is included in the difference of self-nature, establishing 'I' as existent or non-existent, is called establishing Svalaksana.
因明自相。亦與經別。雖經自相。亦現量得。名為自相。然彼經中。自共二相。俱是因明所說自相。各附法體。別別證故。名現量緣。如斯分別。妙符經論所說理故。此即會釋並出體訖。余雖問答分別二相。引三藏釋。及解二量。問答門中。所說二相。不關因明自共二相。不能煩敘。彼略所問答。但于唯識。似謂增益名共相。中推求自共。亦不異經中所說二相。披者當悉。
今者總攝自相差別。略有二門。一依諸經論。二直據因明。且諸經論中自共二相。總有四對。一體義對。五蘊等法名為自性。苦無常等。名為差別。如佛地論等說。二總別對。泛名為色。即是自性。如有漏色無漏色等。名為差別。即前第一體之與義俱有總別。自共如次更無別體。即諸經論皆悉通明。三詮非詮對。非詮對者。名為自性。名言詮者。即名差別。即唯識等云。諸法自性假智。及詮俱非境故。亦通前二。若名言詮皆名共相。非名言詮即名自相。四名句對。名所詮者名為自相。句所詮名為差別。即唯識等云。名詮自性。句詮差別。亦通初二。詮體詮總名詮自性。詮義詮別名詮共相。望第三對。名及句身。並詮共相。以所增相。可通於余。非二自相。故名為共。除因明理攝諸說盡。若因明中所說二相亦有四對。一體義對。即瑜伽等言。所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『因明自相』（Hetu-vidya's Sva-lakshana，認識論中的自相），也與經文有所區別。雖然經文中的『自相』，也可以通過現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知）獲得，並稱之為『自相』。然而，那些經文中，『自相』和『共相』（Sāmānya-lakshana，共相）都是因明所說的『自相』，各自依附於法體（Dharma-kaya，法性之體），分別進行驗證，因此稱為現量所緣。這樣的區分，巧妙地符合經論所說的道理。這便是會通解釋並闡明本體的完畢。其餘雖然問答分別兩種相，引用三藏（Tripiṭaka，佛教經典的總稱）解釋，以及解釋二量（兩種量，指現量和比量），問答門中所說的兩種相，與因明的『自相』和『共相』無關，因此不再贅述。那些略微的問答，只是在唯識（Vijñāna-vāda，唯識宗）中，似乎認為增益（superimposition）名為『共相』，從中推求『自相』和『共相』，也不異於經文中所說的兩種相，讀者應當知悉。
現在總括『自相』的差別，略有兩方面。一是依據諸經論，二是直接根據因明。且諸經論中『自相』和『共相』，總共有四對。一體義對：五蘊（Skandha，構成人身的五種要素）等法稱為自性（Sva-bhava，自性），苦、無常（Anitya，無常）等，稱為差別（Viśeṣa，差別）。如《佛地論》等所說。二總別對：泛泛地稱為色（Rūpa，物質），就是自性，如有漏色、無漏色等，稱為差別。即前第一對的體和義都具有總別，『自相』和『共相』依次更無別的本體，即諸經論都明白地說明。三詮非詮對：非詮對者，稱為自性，名言詮者，即名差別。即唯識等說，諸法自性假智，以及詮釋都不是境。也通於前兩種。若名言詮釋都名共相，非名言詮釋即名自相。四名句對：名所詮釋的稱為自相，句所詮釋的稱為差別。即唯識等說，名詮釋自性，句詮釋差別。也通於初兩種。詮釋體、詮釋總名詮釋自性，詮釋義、詮釋別名詮釋共相。望第三對，名和句身，都詮釋共相，因為所增加的相，可以通於其餘，不是二者的自相，所以名為共相。除了因明的道理，囊括了所有的說法。若因明中所說的兩種相也有四對。一體義對：即瑜伽（Yoga，瑜伽）等所言，所
【English Translation】 English version 『Hetu-vidya's Sva-lakshana』 (Self-characteristic in epistemology), also differs from the scriptures. Although the 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) in the scriptures can also be obtained through Pratyaksha (direct perception) and is called 『Sva-lakshana』. However, in those scriptures, both 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) and 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) are the 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) mentioned in Hetu-vidya (epistemology), each attached to the Dharma-kaya (Dharma body, the body of Dharma nature), and verified separately, so it is called the object of direct perception. Such a distinction subtly conforms to the principles stated in the scriptures and treatises. This is the end of the explanation and clarification of the entity. Although the remaining questions and answers distinguish between the two characteristics, citing the interpretation of the Tripiṭaka (the general term for Buddhist scriptures), and explaining the two Pramanas (two kinds of valid cognition, referring to direct perception and inference), the two characteristics mentioned in the question and answer section are not related to the 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) and 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) of Hetu-vidya (epistemology), so they will not be elaborated further. Those brief questions and answers only seem to consider superimposition as 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) in the Vijñāna-vāda (Yogācāra, Consciousness-only school), and seeking 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) and 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) from it is no different from the two characteristics mentioned in the scriptures, which the reader should know.
Now, to summarize the differences of 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic), there are roughly two aspects. One is based on the scriptures and treatises, and the other is directly based on Hetu-vidya (epistemology). Moreover, in the scriptures and treatises, there are four pairs of 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) and 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) in total. The first is the pair of entity and meaning: the Skandhas (the five aggregates constituting the human body) and other Dharmas are called Sva-bhava (self-nature), and suffering, Anitya (impermanence), etc., are called Viśeṣa (difference). As stated in the Buddhabhumi Sutra (佛地論) and others. The second is the pair of general and specific: generally called Rūpa (matter), it is the self-nature, such as contaminated matter, uncontaminated matter, etc., are called differences. That is, the entity and meaning of the first pair both have general and specific aspects, and 『Sva-lakshana』 (self-characteristic) and 『Sāmānya-lakshana』 (common characteristic) have no other separate entities in turn, which is clearly stated in all scriptures and treatises. The third is the pair of expressive and non-expressive: the non-expressive is called self-nature, and the expressive in terms of language is called difference. That is, the Consciousness-only school (唯識) and others say that the self-nature of all Dharmas is false wisdom, and neither the interpretation nor the object. It also applies to the previous two types. If the interpretation in terms of language is called the common characteristic, and the non-expressive interpretation is called the self-characteristic. The fourth is the pair of name and sentence: what the name interprets is called the self-characteristic, and what the sentence interprets is called the difference. That is, the Consciousness-only school (唯識) and others say that the name interprets the self-nature, and the sentence interprets the difference. It also applies to the first two types. Interpreting the entity and interpreting the general are called interpreting the self-characteristic, and interpreting the meaning and interpreting the specific are called interpreting the common characteristic. Looking at the third pair, both the name and the sentence interpret the common characteristic, because the added characteristic can be applied to the rest, and it is not the self-characteristic of the two, so it is called the common characteristic. Except for the principles of Hetu-vidya (epistemology), it encompasses all the statements. If the two characteristics mentioned in Hetu-vidya (epistemology) also have four pairs. The first is the pair of entity and meaning: that is, what is said in Yoga (瑜伽) etc.
成有二。一自性。二差別。即前第一對。二總別對。四相違是。即前第二。且隨所爭。不過此二。據因明理。自共二相。非如前說體性各定。三先陳后說對。即辨宗依。是通前二對。但先陳者即為自相。后說者即為差別。非定何法。即攝所成非成對。以所成者。名為差別。非所成者。即名自相。故理門云。觀所成故。立法有法。但成於后。非成前故。四言陳意許對。即四相違因。所違者是。雖違有法及別義名二差別。相違之因然唯意許。不是言彰。如法差別。既不言彰。準知。有法差別相違。亦是意許。雖通局對。通名差別。局名自相。然此即前體義對攝。后說意許。即前總別對中別義。更無別體。問因明所陳。不過經中自共二相。如何說與經義有別。答有三義別。一因明二相據前後說分自共二。以後別前。非如經說。縱雖前後二相恒定。談法性故。二言陳意許。設經自性。對爭意許。亦名差別。三因明二相據通局分。以後所說。必貫于余。不爾。喻無非成比量。即名為似。前所說者。不必須通。因明論意。舉喻證宗。故須通喻。雖不通喻。亦名差別。即定是過。然體不定。經泛通辨。雖遍不遍。二相即定。故有差別。
約四無記辨二量云。如通果心。十四變化。與五俱者。容通現比。所餘唯比。此出何文。通
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所成有二：一是自性（svarupa，事物自身不變的性質），二是差別（visesa，事物與他物不同的性質）。這對應於前面所說的第一對概念。還有總別對，即四種相違的情況，對應於前面所說的第二對概念。無論爭論什麼，都離不開這兩種情況。 根據因明（hetuvidya，古印度邏輯學）的理論，自相（svalaksana，事物獨有的性質）和共相（samanyalaksana，事物與其他事物共有的性質）這兩種相，並非像前面所說的那樣，體性和定義是各自確定的。 第三種是對立是先陳述后說明的對立，即辨別宗（paksa，論題）和依（asraya，論題所依的對象）。這貫通了前面的兩種對立。但先陳述的就成為自相，后說明的就成為差別。並非確定什麼法。這就涵蓋了所成（sadhya，需要證明的）和非成（asiddha，不需要證明的）的對立。因為所成的，就叫做差別；非所成的，就叫做自相。所以《理門論》（Nyayapravesa）說：『觀察所成，所以建立有法（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）和法（dharma，屬性）。』只是成就於後者，而不是成就於前者。 第四種是對立是言語陳述和意念許可的對立，即四種相違因（viruddhahetu，與論題相違背的理由）。所違背的就是。雖然違背了有法（dharmin）和別義名（visesa-artha-nama，特殊意義的名稱）這兩種差別，但相違的因只是意念許可，而不是言語表達。如法的差別，既然不言語表達，那麼可以推知，有法的差別相違，也是意念許可。 雖然通和局的對立，通稱為差別，局稱為自相，但這實際上是前面體義對立的涵蓋。後面所說的意念許可，就是前面總別對立中的別義。沒有其他的本體。 問：因明所陳述的，不過是經文中的自相和共相，為什麼說與經文的意義有區別？ 答：有三種意義上的區別：一是因明的兩種相，根據前後陳述來區分自相和共相，以後者區別於前者，不像經文所說的那樣，即使前後兩種相恒定不變，也是在談論法性（dharmata，事物的本性）。二是言語陳述和意念許可，即使經文的自性，對於爭論的意念許可，也稱為差別。三是因明的兩種相，根據通和局來區分，以後面所說的，必定貫穿于其餘的。否則，比喻（drstanta，例子）沒有非成比量（ananvaya，不相關的例子），就叫做似（abhasa，虛假的）。前面所說的，不必須貫通。因明論的用意，是舉例證明宗，所以必須貫通比喻。即使不貫通比喻，也稱為差別，即定是過失。然而本體不確定。經文泛泛地普遍辨別，即使普遍或不普遍，兩種相都是確定的，所以有差別。 關於四種無記（avyakrta，不可言說的狀態）來辨別二量（pramana，認識的工具）的問題，例如通果心（vipakacitta，異熟果心），十四變化（vikara，變化），與五俱者（panca-samprayukta，與五種心所相應的），容許現量（pratyaksa，現量）和比量（anumana，比量）。其餘的只有比量。這出自什麼經文？通
【English Translation】 English version There are two aspects of what is to be established: one is self-nature (svarupa, the unchanging nature of a thing itself), and the other is difference (visesa, the nature that distinguishes a thing from others). This corresponds to the first pair of concepts mentioned earlier. There is also the pair of generality and particularity, which is the four types of contradiction, corresponding to the second pair of concepts mentioned earlier. No matter what is being argued, it cannot be separated from these two situations. According to the theory of Hetuvidya (ancient Indian logic), the self-characteristic (svalaksana, the unique nature of a thing) and the common characteristic (samanyalaksana, the nature that a thing shares with other things) are not, as mentioned earlier, fixed in their essence and definition. The third type of opposition is the opposition between what is stated first and what is explained later, which is to distinguish between the thesis (paksa, the topic of the argument) and the basis (asraya, the object on which the thesis relies). This connects the previous two oppositions. However, what is stated first becomes the self-characteristic, and what is explained later becomes the difference. It does not determine what dharma (law, principle) it is. This covers the opposition between what is to be established (sadhya, what needs to be proven) and what is not to be established (asiddha, what does not need to be proven). Because what is to be established is called difference; what is not to be established is called self-characteristic. Therefore, the Nyayapravesa (Treatise on Logic) says: 'Observing what is to be established, therefore establishing the dharmin (the subject possessing attributes) and the dharma (attribute).' It is only accomplished in the latter, not in the former. The fourth type of opposition is the opposition between verbal statement and mental permission, which is the four types of contradictory reasons (viruddhahetu, reasons that contradict the thesis). What is contradicted is. Although it contradicts the dharmin and the visesa-artha-nama (name with a special meaning), the contradictory reason is only mental permission, not verbal expression. Since the difference of dharma is not verbally expressed, it can be inferred that the contradictory difference of dharmin is also mental permission. Although the opposition between generality and particularity is generally called difference, and particularity is called self-characteristic, this is actually covered by the previous opposition between essence and meaning. The mental permission mentioned later is the particular meaning in the previous opposition between generality and particularity. There is no other entity. Question: What is stated in Hetuvidya is nothing more than the self-characteristic and common characteristic in the scriptures. Why is it said that it is different from the meaning of the scriptures? Answer: There are three differences in meaning: First, the two characteristics of Hetuvidya distinguish between self-characteristic and common characteristic based on the order of statement, with the latter distinguishing from the former, unlike what is said in the scriptures, even if the two characteristics before and after are constant, it is still talking about dharmata (the nature of things). Second, verbal statement and mental permission, even if the self-nature of the scriptures, for the mental permission of the argument, is also called difference. Third, the two characteristics of Hetuvidya are distinguished according to generality and particularity, with what is said later necessarily penetrating the rest. Otherwise, the drstanta (example) has no ananvaya (irrelevant example), and is called abhasa (false). What was said earlier does not necessarily have to penetrate. The intention of the Hetuvidya treatise is to prove the thesis by example, so it must penetrate the example. Even if it does not penetrate the example, it is called difference, which is definitely a fault. However, the essence is uncertain. The scriptures generally distinguish universally, even if universal or not universal, the two characteristics are fixed, so there is a difference. Regarding the question of distinguishing the two pramanas (instruments of cognition) by the four avyakrtas (indescribable states), for example, vipakacitta (resultant consciousness), fourteen vikaras (transformations), panca-samprayukta (associated with five mental factors), allow pratyaksa (direct perception) and anumana (inference). The rest only have anumana. From which scripture does this come? 通
果之心。為散為定。若依小乘。通果色心。可通欲界。既或許欲界。即是散心。若依大乘。心色俱是色界。亦非全散心。何唯比量耶。又自問云。如睡眠聞思所引。睡眠通聞思。化心由修引。化心通現量。答云。聞思約位起。睡眠通聞思。現量離動搖。散心非現量。此釋未善。睡眠通聞思。二量是何攝。若非二量既許是善。何非量收。若比量者。即例睡眠。比量引眠。亦通比量。化心現量引化心是現量。又變化非唯散。何假余例。
問若不是散。何名無記。答通二性。以為利樂及遊戲。故非全是散。復不全定。然屬定類問答中雲。安慧八識皆悉有執。悉名非量。此判不爾諸經論中。皆令依於三量觀法。理門復說。諸修定者。及於貪等諸自證分。皆名現量。見相遍計。可許非量。自證非妄。許通現量故。又云。似現通比非量攝。以理門云。由此。即說憶念比度悕求等。皆非現量。非量所攝。亦即無違。比量所攝。此即成過。理門論中。云皆非現量。且簡取現。不云此等名為似現。后出似現云。如是一切世俗有中。瓶等。數等。舉等。有性瓶性等智。皆似現量。不說憶念比度。即為似現。不障悕求疑智等。說名似現。又設憶念比度名似現者。亦非比量。比量智者。是決定故憶無謬故。為定量故。似現不爾。云何比收
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 果之心，是散亂還是禪定？如果按照小乘的觀點，果報的色和心都可以是散亂的，甚至可以存在於欲界。既然允許存在於欲界，那就是散亂的心。如果按照大乘的觀點，心和色都不是完全散亂的。為什麼只用比量來推斷呢？ 又自己提問說，比如睡眠是由聽聞和思考所引發的。睡眠可以通於聽聞和思考。化心是由修行所引發的，化心可以通於現量。回答說，聽聞和思考是就其所處的階段而言，睡眠可以通於聽聞和思考，現量是遠離動搖的，散亂的心不是現量。這個解釋不太好。睡眠可以通於聽聞和思考，這兩種量屬於什麼？如果不是這兩種量，既然允許它是善的，為什麼不歸入量呢？如果是比量，那就和睡眠一樣，比量可以引發睡眠，也可以通於比量。化心現量引發化心是現量。而且變化不只是散亂，為什麼還要用其他的例子呢？ 問：如果不是散亂，為什麼稱為無記？答：通於兩種性質，因為是爲了利益和快樂以及遊戲，所以不是完全散亂，也不是完全禪定，但屬於禪定的一類。問答中說，安慧認為八識都有執著，都不能稱為量。這種判斷是不對的。各種經論中，都要求依據三種量來觀察法。理門中又說，那些修禪定的人，以及對於貪等各種自證分，都稱為現量。見相遍計可以允許它不是量，自證不是虛妄的，可以允許它通於現量。所以說，相似現量可以通於比量，但不屬於非量所攝。理門中說，因此，就說憶念、比度、希求等，都不是現量，不屬於非量所攝，也就沒有矛盾。屬於比量所攝，這就成了過失。理門論中說，都不是現量，只是簡略地取了現量，沒有說這些叫做相似現量。後面出現的相似現量說，像世俗有中的瓶子等、數量等、舉動等、有性瓶性等智，都是相似現量。沒有說憶念比度就是相似現量，不妨礙希求、疑智等，說它們是相似現量。又假設憶念比度叫做相似現量，也不是比量。比量智是決定的，因為憶念沒有謬誤，是定量，相似現量不是這樣，怎麼能歸入比量呢？
【English Translation】 English version The mind of the fruit, is it scattered or concentrated? If according to the Hinayana (Small Vehicle), the form and mind of the fruit can both be scattered, and can even exist in the desire realm (kāmadhātu). Since it is allowed to exist in the desire realm, that is a scattered mind. If according to the Mahayana (Great Vehicle), both mind and form are not completely scattered. Why only use inference (anumāna) to deduce? Furthermore, one asks oneself, such as sleep induced by hearing (śruta) and thinking (cintā). Sleep can be connected to hearing and thinking. Transformation-mind (nirmita-citta) is induced by cultivation (bhāvanā), transformation-mind can be connected to direct perception (pratyakṣa). The answer is, hearing and thinking are in terms of the stage in which they arise, sleep can be connected to hearing and thinking, direct perception is free from agitation, a scattered mind is not direct perception. This explanation is not good. Sleep can be connected to hearing and thinking, to which of the two valid cognitions (pramāṇa) do these belong? If they are not these two valid cognitions, since it is allowed that they are wholesome (kuśala), why are they not included in valid cognition? If it is inference, then it is like sleep, inference can induce sleep, and can also be connected to inference. Transformation-mind direct perception inducing transformation-mind is direct perception. Moreover, transformation is not only scattered, why use other examples? Question: If it is not scattered, why is it called indeterminate (avyākṛta)? Answer: It is connected to two natures, because it is for benefit and happiness as well as play, so it is not completely scattered, nor is it completely concentrated, but it belongs to the category of concentration. In the question and answer it is said that Anhui (a Buddhist scholar) believes that all eight consciousnesses (vijñāna) have attachment (graha), and all cannot be called valid cognition. This judgment is incorrect. In various sutras (sūtra) and treatises (śāstra), it is required to observe the Dharma (dharma) based on the three valid cognitions. The 'Treatise on Reasoning' (Nyāyamukha) also says that those who cultivate concentration, and for the self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) of greed (rāga) etc., are all called direct perception. The perceived aspect (darśana-bhāga) and conceptual construction (parikalpita) can be allowed to be non-valid cognition, self-awareness is not false, it can be allowed to be connected to direct perception. Therefore, it is said that similar direct perception can be connected to inference, but it is not included in non-valid cognition. The 'Treatise on Reasoning' says, therefore, it is said that recollection (smṛti), comparison (upamā), desire (icchā), etc., are not direct perception, not included in non-valid cognition, so there is no contradiction. Included in inference, this becomes a fault. The 'Treatise on Reasoning' says that they are not direct perception, only briefly taking direct perception, not saying that these are called similar direct perception. The similar direct perception that appears later says that, like pots (ghaṭa) etc., numbers (saṃkhyā) etc., actions (kriyā) etc., existence (bhāva), pot-ness (ghaṭatva) etc. in all worldly existences (laukika-sat), are all similar direct perception. It does not say that recollection and comparison are similar direct perception, it does not hinder desire, doubt-wisdom (vicikitsā-jñāna) etc., saying that they are similar direct perception. Furthermore, assuming that recollection and comparison are called similar direct perception, they are also not inference. Inference-wisdom is definite, because recollection has no error, it is a definite cognition (pramāṇa), similar direct perception is not like this, how can it be included in inference?
。正釋文中雲。現量心離教分別。何故瑜伽七十七云。若菩薩修所成慧。亦依于文。亦不依文。七十二云。名是聞思所成。是三慧境界。解云。大小因明。據隨轉理說。喻伽據大乘盡理為論。又因明據不自在說。伽論約自在者說。此非善釋。因明現量離名分別者。非謂不緣名句文等。云離名分別。以不如名定執其義。亦不謂義定屬其名。及外道教。諸邪名言。云離於名。瑜伽等論。與此相似。
解量果中雲。第八無慧。依何說智。故更解云。夫現比取境。元為自悟。今取二境發解。分明究竟解了。故彼果同聚相應。總名為智。即果智也。此釋與問元不相關。因八無慧。何為同聚。總名為智。應知。此中說有二意。若泛言現量。第八亦是為自開悟。因八等非此約自悟。故智為果。若非自悟。泛爾現量。即現量心。亦名為果。故此論云。於二量中。即智名果。若量皆智。何須說中。故此中言。有所簡別。何理得知。非智現量。即心為果。即集量論以為明證。故集量論云。似境相所量。能取見自證。即能量及果。是三體無別。成唯識論第二。四分廣明。
解能破中。敘舊解云。又聲論師對佛弟子。立聲為常。德所依故。猶如擇滅。諸非常者。皆非德依。如四大種。此德依因。雖有所言。三相併闕。判云。此恐未
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：正釋文中說：『現量心（Pratyaksha-citta，直接認知的心）遠離教義的分別。』為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第七十七卷又說：『如果菩薩修習所成的智慧，也依賴於文字，也不依賴於文字。』第七十二卷又說：『名（Nāma，名稱）是聽聞和思惟所成就的，是三慧（tri-prajna，聞慧、思慧、修慧）的境界。』解釋說：『小乘和大乘的因明（Hetu-vidya，因明學）是根據隨順世俗的道理來說的，而《瑜伽師地論》是根據大乘窮盡真理的觀點來論述的。』又說：『因明是根據不自在的眾生來說的，《瑜伽師地論》是針對自在的菩薩說的。』這種解釋並不恰當。因明中說現量遠離名稱分別，並不是說不緣于名句文等，說遠離名稱分別，是因為不如同外道那樣，執著于名稱而固定其意義，也不是說意義一定屬於某個名稱，以及外道的教義和各種邪惡的名稱言論，才說是遠離於名。《瑜伽師地論》等論典，與此相似。
在解釋量果（pramana-phala，量的結果）時說：『第八識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）沒有智慧，依據什麼來說智（jnana，智慧）呢？』所以進一步解釋說：『現量和比量（anumana，比量）取境，原本是爲了自己開悟。現在取兩種境界，發起理解，分明究竟地瞭解，所以它的結果與聚相應，總稱為智，也就是果智（phala-jnana，果位的智慧）。』這種解釋與原來的問題並不相關。因為第八識沒有智慧，為什麼能與同聚相應，總稱為智呢？應該知道，這裡說有兩種含義。如果泛泛地說現量，第八識也是爲了自己開悟。因為第八識等不是指這種自己開悟，所以智是果。如果不是自己開悟，泛泛的現量，也就是現量心，也可以稱為果。所以此論說：『在二量中，智是果。』如果量都是智，何必再說中間的過程呢？所以這裡說，有所簡別。用什麼道理得知，非智的現量，即心為果呢？即《集量論》（Pramāṇasamuccaya）可以作為明證。所以《集量論》說：『相似的境相所量，能取見自證，即能量和果，這三者體性沒有差別。』《成唯識論》（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra）第二卷，四分廣明。
在解釋能破中，敘述舊的解釋說：『又有聲論師（Śabda-vādin，主張聲音是常住的論師）針對佛弟子，立聲為常，因為聲音是德（guna，屬性）所依，猶如擇滅（pratisamkhya-nirodha，擇滅無為）。凡是非常住的，都不是德所依，如四大種（四大元素）。』這個德依因，雖然有所言說，但三相（tri-lakshana，宗法、因法、同品定有性）都缺少。判斷說：『這恐怕未
【English Translation】 English version: The commentary in the Zheng Shi Wen states: 'The Pratyaksha-citta (mind of direct perception) is free from doctrinal distinctions.' Why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in its seventy-seventh fascicle, say: 'If the wisdom attained by a Bodhisattva through cultivation also relies on texts and also does not rely on texts'? And why does the seventy-second fascicle say: 'Nāma (name) is accomplished through hearing and contemplation; it is the realm of the three prajnas (tri-prajna, wisdom of hearing, wisdom of contemplation, and wisdom of cultivation)'? The explanation is: 'The Hetu-vidya (science of reasoning) of the Hinayana and Mahayana is based on the principle of following worldly reasoning, while the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra discusses the Mahayana perspective of exhausting the truth.' Furthermore, it is said: 'The Hetu-vidya is based on the perspective of those who are not self-mastered, while the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra speaks of those who are self-mastered.' This explanation is not appropriate. When the Hetu-vidya states that direct perception is free from name distinctions, it does not mean that it does not relate to names, phrases, or texts. Saying it is free from name distinctions means that it does not rigidly adhere to the meaning of a name, nor does it mean that the meaning necessarily belongs to a particular name, or to the doctrines and erroneous names of external paths. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises are similar in this regard.
In explaining the pramana-phala (result of valid cognition), it is said: 'The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness) has no wisdom; based on what is jnana (wisdom) spoken of?' Therefore, it is further explained: 'Direct perception and inference (anumana, inference) take objects primarily for self-enlightenment. Now, taking two objects, understanding arises, clearly and ultimately comprehending. Therefore, its result is associated with the aggregate, and is collectively called jnana, which is the phala-jnana (wisdom of the result).' This explanation is not relevant to the original question. Because the eighth consciousness has no wisdom, how can it be associated with the aggregate and collectively called jnana? It should be understood that there are two meanings here. If direct perception is spoken of generally, the eighth consciousness is also for self-enlightenment. Because the eighth consciousness, etc., are not referring to this self-enlightenment, jnana is the result. If it is not self-enlightenment, general direct perception, that is, the mind of direct perception, can also be called the result. Therefore, this treatise says: 'In the two valid cognitions, jnana is the result.' If all valid cognitions are jnana, why is it necessary to speak of the intermediate process? Therefore, it is said here that there is a distinction. How can it be known that non-jnana direct perception, that is, the mind, is the result? The Pramāṇasamuccaya (Compendium on Valid Cognition) can be taken as clear evidence. Therefore, the Pramāṇasamuccaya says: 'The similar object appearance that is measured, the ability to grasp the self-awareness, that is, the valid cognition and the result, these three are not different in nature.' The second fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) extensively explains the four divisions.
In explaining the refutation, the old explanation is narrated: 'Furthermore, the Śabda-vādin (those who assert that sound is eternal), in response to Buddhist disciples, establish sound as eternal because sound is the support of guna (attribute), like pratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through discrimination). Whatever is not eternal is not the support of attributes, like the four great elements (the four great elements).' Although this support-of-attributes reason has been stated, the three characteristics (tri-lakshana, presence in the subject, presence in the reason, and definite presence in similar instances) are all lacking.' It is judged: 'This is probably not
然。此應但是不成因攝。非謂缺減。此判不然。未詳作意。若據支顯。此不成收。今據相明。三相都闕。故是闕過。又闕初相。可名不成。亦闕后二。何獨不成。故名缺減。又引古云。又解云。古師既以八為能立。故亦依此以辨闕過。謂闕一有八。闕二有二十八。乃至闕七有八。闕八有一。名闕減過者。于理恐乖。且如現比二量。依何等相說名為闕。若以立量之時。無故名闕。有故名具。其相云何。若以違現比故名闕。不違名具者。既違現比。理應即于宗因喻中。隨其所應。定不成就。如何說言有闕一等過。故知非也。此判全非。設宗因喻。違現比量。何非闕過。如闕有法說因無依。宗等違量。何非是闕。既陳三支非是三闕。但違二量。故是闕過。方又二量。據立論者自解宗智。要依于自現比二智。以立比量。若自不閑。何以能立。故理門云。如自決定已。悕他決定生。又云。如是應知。悟他比量。亦不離此。得成能立。故闕成過。又違二量。即宗因喻不須別說。能立已說宗因喻訖。何須復說現等量耶。又宗等違猶無二智。故置此違。若依二智立必無違。故闕成過。然隨一闕。非是闕過。作句數爾。若闕二時。方為過故。自釋闕中。約因一喻二及因三相。句雖有七。過容有六。以闕異喻有非過故。若無故明闕。非缺減
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不然。這應該是不成因（asiddha-hetu，未成就的因）所包含的過失，而不是所謂的『缺減』（nyūnatā，不足）。這種判斷是不對的，我不太明白它的意圖。如果根據論證的支分來顯明，這不能被收攝。現在根據論證的相狀來闡明，因為三個相狀都缺失，所以是『闕過』（不足的過失）。又，缺失第一個相狀，可以稱為『不成』（asiddha，未成就）；也缺失后兩個相狀，為什麼單單稱為『不成』呢？所以稱為『缺減』。 又引用古人的話說，又解釋說，古師既然以八個方面作為能立（sādhana，論證），所以也依據這個來辨別『闕過』。說缺失一個方面有八種情況，缺失兩個方面有二十八種情況，乃至缺失七個方面有八種情況，缺失八個方面有一種情況，稱為『缺減過』，這在道理上恐怕有違背。 且如現量（pratyakṣa，現證）和比量（anumāna，推論）這兩種量，依據什麼樣的相狀說它們是『闕』（不足）呢？如果以建立量的時候，沒有（符合現量和比量）的緣故稱為『闕』，有（符合現量和比量）的緣故稱為『具』（完整），那麼它們的相狀是什麼呢？如果以違背現量和比量的緣故稱為『闕』，不違背稱為『具』，既然違背了現量和比量，理應就在宗（pakṣa，論題）、因（hetu，理由）、喻（dṛṣṭānta，例證）中，根據其所應，確定不能成就，如何說有缺失一個等過失呢？所以知道不是這樣。 這種判斷完全不對。假設宗、因、喻違背了現量和比量，為什麼不是『闕過』呢？如缺失有法（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）而說因無所依，宗等違背量，為什麼不是『闕』呢？既然陳述三個支分不是三個『闕』，只是違背了兩個量，所以是『闕過』。而且這兩個量，根據立論者自己理解的宗智，要依據于自己的現量和比量二智，來建立比量。如果自己不熟悉，怎麼能夠成立論證呢？所以《理門論》說：『如自己決定后，希望他人決定產生。』又說：『應當這樣知道，使他人領悟的比量，也不離開這個，才能成就論證。』所以『闕』是成立論證的過失。 又，違背了兩個量，即宗、因、喻不需要另外說明。能立已經說完宗、因、喻了，為什麼還要再說現量等量呢？又宗等違背猶如沒有二智，所以放置這種違背。如果依據二智來建立，必定沒有違背，所以『闕』是成立論證的過失。然而，缺失一個，不是『闕過』，只是構成句子的數量而已。如果缺失兩個的時候，才是過失的緣故。自己解釋『闕』中，大約因一個、喻兩個以及因三個相狀，句子雖然有七個，過失容許有六個，因為缺失異喻（vaidṛṣṭānta，反例）沒有過失的緣故。如果無緣無故地說明『闕』，不是『缺減』。
【English Translation】 English version: No. This should be a fault included under asiddha-hetu (unestablished reason), not what is called 'nyūnatā' (deficiency). This judgment is incorrect, and I don't quite understand its intention. If clarified based on the limbs of the argument, this cannot be included. Now, clarifying based on the aspects of the argument, because all three aspects are missing, it is a 'nyūnatā-doṣa' (fault of deficiency). Furthermore, missing the first aspect can be called 'asiddha' (unestablished); also missing the latter two aspects, why only call it 'asiddha'? Therefore, it is called 'nyūnatā'. Moreover, quoting the words of the ancients, and explaining that, since the ancient teachers used eight aspects as sādhana (proof), they also rely on this to distinguish 'nyūnatā-doṣa'. Saying that missing one aspect has eight situations, missing two aspects has twenty-eight situations, and so on until missing seven aspects has eight situations, and missing eight aspects has one situation, called 'nyūnatā-doṣa', this is probably contrary to reason. For example, with pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāna (inference), based on what kind of aspects are they said to be 'nyūnatā' (deficient)? If, when establishing the proof, it is called 'nyūnatā' because it does not (conform to perception and inference), and it is called 'pūrṇa' (complete) because it does (conform to perception and inference), then what are their aspects? If it is called 'nyūnatā' because it contradicts perception and inference, and not contradicting is called 'pūrṇa', since it contradicts perception and inference, it should be determined to be unestablished in the pakṣa (thesis), hetu (reason), and dṛṣṭānta (example), according to what is appropriate. How can it be said that there is a fault of missing one, etc.? Therefore, it is known that this is not the case. This judgment is completely incorrect. Suppose the pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta contradict perception and inference, why is it not a 'nyūnatā-doṣa'? For example, if the dharmin (subject possessing attributes) is missing and it is said that the reason has no basis, and the pakṣa, etc., contradict the means of knowledge, why is it not 'nyūnatā'? Since stating the three limbs is not three 'nyūnatā', but only contradicts the two means of knowledge, it is therefore a 'nyūnatā-doṣa'. Moreover, these two means of knowledge, according to the proponent's own understanding of the pakṣa-jñāna (knowledge of the thesis), must rely on their own pratyakṣa and anumāna-jñāna (knowledge of perception and inference) to establish the inference. If one is not familiar with it oneself, how can one establish the proof? Therefore, the Nyāyamukha says: 'After one's own decision, one hopes that the decision of others will arise.' It also says: 'It should be known in this way that the inference that makes others understand also does not depart from this, in order to accomplish the proof.' Therefore, 'nyūnatā' is a fault in establishing the proof. Furthermore, contradicting the two means of knowledge, namely the pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta, does not need to be explained separately. The proof has already finished stating the pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta, why is it necessary to say the means of knowledge such as perception again? Moreover, contradicting the pakṣa, etc., is like not having the two means of knowledge, so this contradiction is set aside. If it is established based on the two means of knowledge, there will certainly be no contradiction, so 'nyūnatā' is a fault in establishing the proof. However, missing one is not a 'nyūnatā-doṣa', it is only the number of constituents that make up the sentence. If two are missing, then it is a fault. In one's own explanation of 'nyūnatā', approximately one reason, two examples, and three aspects of the reason, although there are seven constituents in the sentence, there can be six faults, because missing the vaidṛṣṭānta (counter-example) is not a fault. If 'nyūnatā' is explained for no reason, it is not 'deficiency'.
過。有故辨闕故是過如前。故容有六。此亦不爾。有故辨違。亦不成過可容有六。有故辨闕既許是過即容有七。何但言六。又標說云及因三相。因三相中七句皆過。何容只六。又言闕異此非是過。此非了義。如立無常。常空非有。名闕異者。此判定非。故彼論云。若無常宗。全無異品。對不立有虛空等。論云何得說彼處此無。此敘他設難。非謂陳那不說為異故。論主答云。若彼無有。于彼不轉。全無有疑。故無此過。既言于彼不轉。全無有過。即是異品云無有過。故前復云。若所立無說名異品。非與同品相違或異。此意不要有體方名異喻。但無所立即名異故。故理門論正解喻云。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。由合及離比度義故。由是雖對不立實有大虛空等。而得顯示無有宗處無因義成。此即異喻不說云闕。若要有體方為異喻亦是遮詮。何成止濫。又解二似喻中。似同即有無俱不成。似異喻即無無俱不遣。無既雙遣。何非異喻。故知。言闕于異喻者。或言中不陳。或雖陳言。隨有不遣。即闕因相。名之為闕。此無異依。有異法喻。前雖具明。對此故亦更說。
又據世親五支之中。明缺減過者。有二十五或二十一。謂闕一有五。闕二有七。闕三有十。全闕有一。取捨如前。準此。只有二十三句。二十五句一總不相當。或是
寫錯。更勘餘本。
又敘方便心論三種增減。即證瑜伽云。言詞復重。或復減少。對法雲無限者。謂言詞重疊。所說義理。或增或減。此並古德成文。何得說言古師八為能立。即望八法辨闕。此亦不然。瑜伽顯揚對法三論。皆自顯說能立有八。何以故違云不說八。何不令陳那就古師能立八。強欲會本論就末陳那三。由此故知。今古意殊。各不乖返。廣會如前及本疏述。
論說其宗亦名能立。已如前解。更不繁述。若必宗支定為能立。何為所立。無所說能理為不可。若云非要故不說者。立量本令他悟。無所立法令他悟何。故此為要。既無別所立。明知今意宗為所立。此中隨古言能不違。云十四過類。義同如實論中道理難品中三種難也。此雖無文。今應略述。寬狹同異至下當知。
大乘心鏡論明八支。龍樹菩薩造。羅什法師譯。撿之。一顛倒難有十種。一同相難(即理門第一同法相似)。二異相難(即理門第二異法相似)。三長相難(即理門第三分別相似)。四無異難(即理門第四無異相似)。五至不至難(即理門第八至不至相似)。六無因難(即理門第九無因相似)。七顯別因難(即理門第五可得相似)。八疑難(即理門第六猶豫相似)。九未說難(即理門第十無說相似)。十事異難(即理門第十二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 寫錯了。再對照其他版本。
又敘述《方便心論》三種增減的情況。《瑜伽師地論》說，『言辭重複，或者減少。』《對法論》說『無限』，是指言辭重疊，所說的義理，或者增加或者減少。這些都是古代大德的成文說法。怎麼能說古代的老師以八支作為能立呢？如果以八法來辨別缺失，這也是不對的。《瑜伽師地論》、《顯揚聖教論》、《對法論》三部論典，都自己明確地說能立有八支。為什麼違背這些論典說沒有八支呢？為什麼不讓陳那（Dignāga，印度佛教邏輯學家）和古代的老師以八支作為能立呢？硬要會通本論而遷就末學陳那的三支。由此可知，現在和古代的觀點不同，各自沒有互相違背。更廣泛的會通如前文和本疏的敘述。
論中說宗（pakṣa，論題）也叫做能立，已經如前面解釋的，不再繁瑣敘述。如果一定要把宗支（pakṣāṅga，論題的組成部分）定為能立，那麼什麼是所立（sādhya，需要證明的）呢？沒有所說的能理是不可以的。如果說因為不重要所以不說，那麼，立量（pramāṇa，有效的認知手段）本來是爲了讓別人領悟，沒有所立，用什麼法讓別人領悟呢？所以所立是重要的。既然沒有別的所立，明顯知道現在的意思是宗作為所立。這裡隨順古人的說法，說能立不違背。所說的十四種過類，義同於《如實論》中道理難品中的三種難。雖然這裡沒有明文，現在應該簡略敘述。寬狹同異，到下文自然會知道。
《大乘心鏡論》闡明八支，龍樹菩薩（Nāgārjuna，印度佛教哲學家）造，鳩摩羅什法師（Kumārajīva，著名佛經翻譯家）翻譯。檢查一下，第一顛倒難有十種：一、同相難（即理門第一同法相似）。二、異相難（即理門第二異法相似）。三、長相難（即理門第三分別相似）。四、無異難（即理門第四無異相似）。五、至不至難（即理門第八至不至相似）。六、無因難（即理門第九無因相似）。七、顯別因難（即理門第五可得相似）。八、疑難（即理門第六猶豫相似）。九、未說難（即理門第十無說相似）。十、事異難（即理門第十二
【English Translation】 English version It's written incorrectly. Compare with other versions again.
Furthermore, it narrates the three kinds of augmentations and diminutions in the Upāyahṛdaya (方便心論, Treatise on the Heart of Expedient Means). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says, 'Words are repeated, or diminished.' The Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論, Compendium of Abhidharma) says 'unlimited,' referring to the overlapping of words, and the principles spoken of, either increasing or decreasing. These are all established statements by ancient worthies. How can it be said that ancient teachers used eight members as the sādhana (能立, means of proof)? If one distinguishes deficiencies based on the eight factors, this is also incorrect. The three treatises, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Śūnyatāsamuccaya (顯揚聖教論, Compendium of Manifest Teachings), and Abhidharmasamuccaya, all explicitly state that the sādhana has eight members. Why contradict these treatises by saying there are not eight? Why not let Dignāga (陳那, Indian Buddhist logician) and the ancient teachers use eight members as the sādhana? Forcibly trying to reconcile this treatise by accommodating the later scholar Dignāga's three members. From this, it can be known that the views of the present and the past are different, and each does not contradict the other. A more extensive reconciliation is as in the previous text and the commentary of this treatise.
The treatise says that the pakṣa (宗, thesis) is also called the sādhana, as has been explained before, and will not be elaborated on further. If one must define the pakṣāṅga (宗支, components of the thesis) as the sādhana, then what is the sādhya (所立, that which needs to be proven)? It is not permissible to have no sādhana to speak of. If it is said that it is not important, so it is not mentioned, then the pramāṇa (立量, valid means of cognition) is originally intended to make others understand; without the sādhya, what dharma is there to make others understand? Therefore, the sādhya is important. Since there is no other sādhya, it is clear that the present meaning is that the pakṣa is the sādhya. Here, following the ancient saying that the sādhana is not contradictory. The so-called fourteen types of fallacies are the same in meaning as the three types of difficulties in the 'Difficulties of Reasoning' chapter of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (如實論, Treatise on the Establishment of Truth). Although there is no explicit text here, it should now be briefly described. The breadth, narrowness, similarities, and differences will be known below.
The Mahāyānacitta-darśana-śāstra (大乘心鏡論, Treatise on the Great Vehicle Mind Mirror) elucidates the eight members, composed by Nāgārjuna (龍樹菩薩, Indian Buddhist philosopher), translated by Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什法師, famous translator of Buddhist scriptures). Upon examination, the first inverted difficulty has ten types: 1. Difficulty of similar aspects (i.e., the first similarity of the same dharma in the gate of reasoning). 2. Difficulty of dissimilar aspects (i.e., the second similarity of different dharma in the gate of reasoning). 3. Difficulty of long aspects (i.e., the third similarity of distinctions in the gate of reasoning). 4. Difficulty of no difference (i.e., the fourth similarity of no difference in the gate of reasoning). 5. Difficulty of arriving and not arriving (i.e., the eighth similarity of arriving and not arriving in the gate of reasoning). 6. Difficulty of no cause (i.e., the ninth similarity of no cause in the gate of reasoning). 7. Difficulty of revealing a separate cause (i.e., the fifth similarity of an obtainable cause in the gate of reasoning). 8. Difficulty of doubt (i.e., the sixth similarity of hesitation in the gate of reasoning). 9. Difficulty of not yet speaking (i.e., the tenth similarity of no speaking in the gate of reasoning). 10. Difficulty of different matters (i.e., the twelfth
所作相似)。二不實難有三。一顯不許義難(即理門第十三生過相似)。餘二難理門無。三相違難有三。一未生難(即理門第十一無生相似)。二常難(即理門第十四常住相似)。三自義相違難。理門所無。理門第七義準如實復無。其中義旨如下當述。未撿如實。待后細尋。然唯此斯釋將故錄。
因明義斷
元久二年九月十八日書道了書本云以興善院僧都本書了(云云)。
正治二年(庚申)六月二十九日巳克于超升寺東別所書寫了執筆信西。
同年七月十三日移點了(點本寶積房書也。寫本文顯房得業本也)。
抑當年者天下饑饉人力衰微而分括命畢寫功勵微力移點道耳志趣所之有二大愿當寺伽藍造功速成興隆正法惠命長遠(是一)順次生中往生內院面奉彌勒心不退轉(是二)。
點本云。
點本奧記云。
興福寺沙門齊順敬發大愿書一切大小乘經律論章疏等同寺覺詮依其勸誘以維久安四年歲次八月四日寫了。
傳同寺藏俊雇晴意移點已了於時永萬二年春二月十五日記。
點本延喜十六年普光寺長講東大寺圓超大法師所讀也墨讀永超僧都傳而已嘉應二年歲次(庚寅)十月二十一日比校點及文字了但點本字並點粗涉不審更尋訪根本點本可加複審也。比
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： （所作相似）。二、不實難有三種。一、顯不許義難（即理門第十三生過相似）。其餘兩種難點理門中沒有。三、相違難有三種。一、未生難（即理門第十一無生相似）。二、常難（即理門第十四常住相似）。三、自義相違難，理門所沒有。理門第七義準如實復無，其中的義旨如下所述。未撿如實，待以後仔細尋查。然而只有這斯釋將，所以記錄下來。
因明義斷
元久二年九月十八日書道了書本云以興善院僧都本書了（云云）。
正治二年（庚申）六月二十九日巳克于超升寺東別所書寫了，執筆信西。
同年七月十三日移點了（點本寶積房書也。寫本文顯房得業本也）。
當年天下饑荒，人力衰微，分括命畢，寫功勵微力移點道耳。志趣所之有二大愿：當寺伽藍（寺廟）造功速成，興隆正法，惠命長遠（這是一）；順次生中往生內院，面奉彌勒（Maitreya，未來佛），心不退轉（是二）。
點本云。
點本奧記云。
興福寺沙門齊順敬發大愿，書寫一切大小乘經律論章疏等，同寺覺詮依其勸誘，以維久安四年歲次八月四日寫了。
傳同寺藏俊雇晴意移點已了，於時永萬二年春二月十五日記。
點本延喜十六年普光寺長講東大寺圓超大法師所讀也，墨讀永超僧都傳而已。嘉應二年歲次（庚寅）十月二十一日比校點及文字了，但點本字並點粗涉不審，更尋訪根本點本可加複審也。比
【English Translation】 English version: (Similar to what has been done). Second, the 'unreal difficulty' has three types. First, the 'difficulty of revealing non-acceptance of meaning' (which is similar to the 'birth fault' in the thirteenth section of the Treatise on Reasoning). The other two difficulties are not found in the Treatise on Reasoning. Third, the 'contradictory difficulty' has three types. First, the 'difficulty of non-arising' (which is similar to the 'non-arising' in the eleventh section of the Treatise on Reasoning). Second, the 'difficulty of permanence' (which is similar to the 'permanence' in the fourteenth section of the Treatise on Reasoning). Third, the 'difficulty of self-contradictory meaning', which is not found in the Treatise on Reasoning. The seventh section of the Treatise on Reasoning, based on the principle of 'as it is', is also without. The essential meaning within it will be described below. 'Not yet examined as it is', to be carefully searched for later. However, only this explanation will be recorded.
Meaning Determination of Hetu-vidya (Logic)
Written on the 18th day of the 9th month of the 2nd year of Genkyu. The book says that the head monk of Kōzen-in (Kōzen-in Temple) finished this book (etc.).
On the 29th day of the 6th month of the 2nd year of Shōji (Kōshin), written at the east detached place of Chōshō-ji (Chōshō-ji Temple), by the hand of Shinzei.
Transferred the marks on the 13th day of the 7th month of the same year (the marked copy was written by Hōshaku-bō. The copied text was originally from the 得業 copy of Kenbō).
In that year, the land suffered famine, and human strength was weak. Dividing and summarizing the life, writing and encouraging the slight power to transfer the marks. The purpose is to fulfill two great vows: that the construction of the Garan (temple) of this temple be completed quickly, that the Right Dharma flourish, and that the blessed life be long (this is one); that in the next life, one be reborn in the inner court, face Maitreya (the future Buddha), and the mind not regress (this is two).
The marked copy says.
The colophon of the marked copy says.
The Shamon (monk) Saishun of Kōfuku-ji (Kōfuku-ji Temple) made a great vow to write all the Mahayana and Hinayana Sutras, Vinayas, Shastras, Commentaries, etc. Kakugen of the same temple, relying on his encouragement, finished writing on the 4th day of the 8th month of the 4th year of Kyūan.
It is said that Zōshun of the same temple hired Seii to transfer the marks. Recorded on the 15th day of the 2nd month of spring in the 2nd year of Eiman.
The marked copy was read by the Great Dharma Master Enchō of Tōdai-ji (Tōdai-ji Temple), who lectured at Pukwang-sa (Pukwang-sa Temple) in the 16th year of Engi. Only the biography of the monk Eiyō was read in ink. On the 21st day of the 10th month of the year of Kaō 2 (Kōin), the text and marks were compared, but the characters and marks in the marked copy were rough and unclear. It is necessary to find the original marked copy for further review. Compared.
校之間著法衣凈弊身。以終其功。伏乞回微功于群生。共向菩提同證佛果而已。
興福寺沙門釋覺憲記之(云云)
同寺沙門釋英弘矣
貞應元年自五月二十七日始之至六月五日九ケ日之間奉讀之了當年維摩遂講用意也 大法師英弘 聽眾良盛賴玄
當日者是吉日也仍參上階東妻室(修禪院)遂凈名居士大職冠之御影開眼並傳受大會表白了。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：寺廟之間穿著法衣，以清凈自身，最終完成功德。懇請將這微小的功德迴向給所有眾生，共同趨向菩提，一同證得佛果。
興福寺沙門釋覺憲記錄（云云）。
同寺沙門釋英弘。
貞應元年從五月二十七日開始，到六月五日，九日之間恭敬誦讀完畢。當年就講解《維摩經》，用心良苦。大法師英弘，聽眾非常多，仰仗玄妙的佛法。
當日是吉祥的日子，於是登上臺階，東邊的妻室（修禪院），於是為凈名居士大職冠的御影開眼，並且傳授大會表白完畢。
【English Translation】 English version: Monks in various temples wear Dharma robes to purify themselves and ultimately complete their merits. I earnestly request that this small merit be dedicated to all sentient beings, so that together we may move towards Bodhi and together attain Buddhahood.
Recorded by Shramana (monk) Shi Juexian of Xingfu Temple (etc.).
Shramana Shi Yinghong of the same temple.
Starting from the 27th day of the fifth month in the first year of the Zhenying era, until the 5th day of the sixth month, over nine days, the reading was respectfully completed. In the same year, the Vimalakirti Sutra was lectured with great dedication. Great Dharma Master Yinghong, with a large audience, relying on the profound Dharma.
That day was an auspicious day, so they ascended the platform. The wife (of the east side, from the Shuzen-in temple), then performed the eye-opening ceremony for the image of the Vimalakirti layman, who held the rank of Daishiki-kan (大職冠), and completed the transmission of the great assembly's declaration.