T44n1842_因明入正理論義纂要
大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1842 因明入正理論義纂要
No. 1842 [cf. No. 1630]
因明入正理論義纂要
淄洲大云寺沙門慧沼集
依此論標五釋之中。第一解者。明但是教。即五明之總名。因即生了。是一明之別稱。復含言生之與智義。今此正理。即二因之少分取義非余。因明生了達解正理。名之為入。由明此二因。入解諸法之真性。即入屬正理。彼因與明能生此入。入于正理故。因及明屬正理之入。故云亦入正理之因明。又入正理。不約立敵以分。泛明因此詮因之教。入解正理。雖復此論亦名因教。亦詮二因故。然是通名。唯正理入。是此別目。第二第三解。細思取別。第四五解。又約人屬教。立者言生。敵者智了。併名為因。各望果故。了即照解所宗。言即顯彰所立。俱複稱明。各顯了故。余文自顯。今于第三解下。更助二解。一云。或因明者。並立論者詮因喻。言能生敵論者了宗之智。復能明顯自所立宗。論體離復不殊。望義別故。因明兩別。亦因亦明。故持業釋。入者敵論者之智。因立論言為因為明。能有證入。正理者即所立宗義。由彼因明能生敵智。入此正理。正理之入。入亦因明。並依主釋。二云。因明與入並通立敵。敵者之智慧照所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
[大正藏第 44 冊 No. 1842 因明入正理論義纂要]
[No. 1842 [cf. No. 1630]]
因明入正理論義纂要
淄洲大云寺沙門慧沼集
依據此論的標題，有五種解釋。第一種解釋是：『明』只是一個總稱，即五明（Pancavidya，古印度學問的五個主要分支）的總名；『因』即『生了』，是五明中因明（Hetuvidya，邏輯學）的別稱，又包含言生（通過言語產生理解）和智義（智慧的意義）。現在所說的『正理』，只是『二因』（能立、能破二種因）中的少部分取義，而非全部。因明能生了達、理解正理，這叫做『入』。通過明白這二因，就能深入理解諸法的真性，即『入』屬於『正理』。『因』和『明』能產生這種『入』，因為『入』于『正理』，所以『因』和『明』屬於『正理』的『入』。因此說『亦入正理之因明』。而且，『入正理』不侷限於立論者和敵論者的區分，而是泛指通過『因』來詮釋『因』的教義，從而深入理解『正理』。雖然這部論也可以稱為『因教』，因為它也詮釋了二因，但這只是一個通名。只有『正理入』才是這部論的別名。第二種和第三種解釋，需要仔細思考才能區分。第四種和第五種解釋，又是從人（立論者和敵論者）屬於教義的角度來解釋。立論者的『言』產生理解，敵論者的『智』產生了悟，都稱為『因』，因為各自都指向結果。『了』即照亮和理解所宗（Sva-paksha，自己所主張的宗義），『言』即彰顯所立（自己所要建立的論點）。兩者都可以稱為『明』，因為各自都顯現了悟性。其餘的文字含義自明。現在在第三種解釋下，再補充兩種解釋。一種說法是：或者說『因明』，是說立論者詮釋『因』和『喻』（Drishtanta，例子），『言』能使敵論者產生對所宗的了悟之智，又能明顯地彰顯自己所立的宗義。論的本體雖然沒有改變，但從意義上來說是不同的，所以『因』和『明』是兩個不同的概念，既是『因』又是『明』，因此是持業釋（Karmadharaya，一種複合詞的構成方式）。『入』是指敵論者的智慧，立論者的『言』作為『因』和『明』，能夠產生證入。『正理』就是所立宗義。通過『因明』能使敵論者產生智慧，從而深入理解這個『正理』，即『正理』的『入』，『入』也屬於『因明』，這是一種依主釋（Tatpurusha，一種複合詞的構成方式）。另一種說法是：『因明』和『入』都適用於立論者和敵論者。敵論者的智慧照亮所 English version
[Taisho Tripitaka Vol. 44 No. 1842 Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra]
[No. 1842 [cf. No. 1630]]
Concise Essentials of the Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra
Compiled by the Sramana Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
According to the title of this treatise, there are five interpretations. The first interpretation is: 『Ming』 (Vidya, knowledge) is merely a general term, namely the general name for the five Vidyas (Pancavidya, the five major branches of ancient Indian learning); 『Yin』 (Hetu, reason) is 『sheng liao』 (production and understanding), which is a specific term for Hetuvidya (logic) among the five Vidyas, and also contains the meaning of 『yan sheng』 (generating understanding through speech) and 『zhi yi』 (the meaning of wisdom). The 『Zhengli』 (correct principle) mentioned here is only a small part of the 『two Hetus』 (the two types of reasons: establishing and refuting), not the entirety. Hetuvidya can generate understanding and comprehension of the correct principle, which is called 『Ru』 (entry). By understanding these two Hetus, one can deeply understand the true nature of all Dharmas, that is, 『Ru』 belongs to 『Zhengli』. 『Hetu』 and 『Ming』 can produce this 『Ru』, because 『Ru』 is in 『Zhengli』, so 『Hetu』 and 『Ming』 belong to the 『Ru』 of 『Zhengli』. Therefore, it is said 『also enters the Hetuvidya of Zhengli』. Moreover, 『entering Zhengli』 is not limited to the distinction between the proponent and the opponent, but generally refers to the doctrine of interpreting 『Hetu』 through 『Hetu』, thereby deeply understanding 『Zhengli』. Although this treatise can also be called 『Hetu doctrine』 because it also interprets the two Hetus, this is only a general term. Only 『Zhengli Ru』 is the specific name of this treatise. The second and third interpretations require careful consideration to distinguish. The fourth and fifth interpretations are explained from the perspective of people (proponent and opponent) belonging to the doctrine. The 『yan』 (speech) of the proponent generates understanding, and the 『zhi』 (wisdom) of the opponent generates enlightenment, both are called 『Hetu』, because they each point to a result. 『Liao』 (understanding) illuminates and understands the Sva-paksha (所宗, one's own asserted tenet), and 『yan』 (speech) manifests what is to be established (one's own proposition). Both can be called 『Ming』 (illumination), because they each manifest enlightenment. The meaning of the remaining text is self-evident. Now, under the third interpretation, two more interpretations are added. One saying is: or 『Hetuvidya』 means that the proponent interprets 『Hetu』 and 『Drishtanta』 (喻, example), 『yan』 (speech) can enable the opponent to generate the wisdom of understanding the Sva-paksha (所宗), and can clearly manifest the tenet established by oneself. Although the substance of the treatise has not changed, it is different in meaning, so 『Hetu』 and 『Ming』 are two different concepts, being both 『Hetu』 and 『Ming』, therefore it is a Karmadharaya (持業釋, appositional compound). 『Ru』 (entry) refers to the wisdom of the opponent, and the proponent's 『yan』 (speech) as 『Hetu』 and 『Ming』 can produce evidence of entry. 『Zhengli』 (正理) is the established tenet. Through 『Hetuvidya』, the opponent can generate wisdom, thereby deeply understanding this 『Zhengli』, that is, the 『Ru』 of 『Zhengli』, and 『Ru』 also belongs to 『Hetuvidya』, which is a Tatpurusha (依主釋, dependent determinative compound). Another saying is: 『Hetuvidya』 and 『Ru』 both apply to the proponent and the opponent. The opponent's wisdom can illuminate what is
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation
[Taisho Tripitaka Vol. 44 No. 1842 Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra]
[No. 1842 [cf. No. 1630]]
Concise Essentials of the Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra
Compiled by the Sramana Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
According to the title of this treatise, there are five interpretations. The first interpretation is: 'Ming' (Vidya, knowledge) is merely a general term, namely the general name for the five Vidyas (Pancavidya, the five major branches of ancient Indian learning); 'Yin' (Hetu, reason) is 'sheng liao' (production and understanding), which is a specific term for Hetuvidya (logic) among the five Vidyas, and also contains the meaning of 'yan sheng' (generating understanding through speech) and 'zhi yi' (the meaning of wisdom). The 'Zhengli' (correct principle) mentioned here is only a small part of the 'two Hetus' (the two types of reasons: establishing and refuting), not the entirety. Hetuvidya can generate understanding and comprehension of the correct principle, which is called 'Ru' (entry). By understanding these two Hetus, one can deeply understand the true nature of all Dharmas, that is, 'Ru' belongs to 'Zhengli'. 'Hetu' and 'Ming' can produce this 'Ru', because 'Ru' is in 'Zhengli', so 'Hetu' and 'Ming' belong to the 'Ru' of 'Zhengli'. Therefore, it is said 'also enters the Hetuvidya of Zhengli'. Moreover, 'entering Zhengli' is not limited to the distinction between the proponent and the opponent, but generally refers to the doctrine of interpreting 'Hetu' through 'Hetu', thereby deeply understanding 'Zhengli'. Although this treatise can also be called 'Hetu doctrine' because it also interprets the two Hetus, this is only a general term. Only 'Zhengli Ru' is the specific name of this treatise. The second and third interpretations require careful consideration to distinguish. The fourth and fifth interpretations are explained from the perspective of people (proponent and opponent) belonging to the doctrine. The 'yan' (speech) of the proponent generates understanding, and the 'zhi' (wisdom) of the opponent generates enlightenment, both are called 'Hetu', because they each point to a result. 'Liao' (understanding) illuminates and understands the Sva-paksha (所宗, one's own asserted tenet), and 'yan' (speech) manifests what is to be established (one's own proposition). Both can be called 'Ming' (illumination), because they each manifest enlightenment. The meaning of the remaining text is self-evident. Now, under the third interpretation, two more interpretations are added. One saying is: or 'Hetuvidya' means that the proponent interprets 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta' (喻, example), 'yan' (speech) can enable the opponent to generate the wisdom of understanding the Sva-paksha (所宗), and can clearly manifest the tenet established by oneself. Although the substance of the treatise has not changed, it is different in meaning, so 'Hetu' and 'Ming' are two different concepts, being both 'Hetu' and 'Ming', therefore it is a Karmadharaya (持業釋, appositional compound). 'Ru' (entry) refers to the wisdom of the opponent, and the proponent's 'yan' (speech) as 'Hetu' and 'Ming' can produce evidence of entry. 'Zhengli' (正理) is the established tenet. Through 'Hetuvidya', the opponent can generate wisdom, thereby deeply understanding this 'Zhengli', that is, the 'Ru' of 'Zhengli', and 'Ru' also belongs to 'Hetuvidya', which is a Tatpurusha (依主釋, dependent determinative compound). Another saying is: 'Hetuvidya' and 'Ru' both apply to the proponent and the opponent. The opponent's wisdom can illuminate what is English version
[Taisho Tripitaka Vol. 44 No. 1842 Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra]
[No. 1842 [cf. No. 1630]]
Concise Essentials of the Commentary on the Nyayapravesa Sutra
Compiled by the Sramana Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
According to the title of this treatise, there are five interpretations. The first interpretation is: 'Ming' (Vidya, knowledge) is merely a general term, namely the general name for the five Vidyas (Pancavidya, the five major branches of ancient Indian learning); 'Yin' (Hetu, reason) is 'sheng liao' (production and understanding), which is a specific term for Hetuvidya (logic) among the five Vidyas, and also contains the meaning of 'yan sheng' (generating understanding through speech) and 'zhi yi' (the meaning of wisdom). The 'Zhengli' (correct principle) mentioned here is only a small part of the 'two Hetus' (the two types of reasons: establishing and refuting), not the entirety. Hetuvidya can generate understanding and comprehension of the correct principle, which is called 'Ru' (entry). By understanding these two Hetus, one can deeply understand the true nature of all Dharmas, that is, 'Ru' belongs to 'Zhengli'. 'Hetu' and 'Ming' can produce this 'Ru', because 'Ru' is in 'Zhengli', so 'Hetu' and 'Ming' belong to the 'Ru' of 'Zhengli'. Therefore, it is said 'also enters the Hetuvidya of Zhengli'. Moreover, 'entering Zhengli' is not limited to the distinction between the proponent and the opponent, but generally refers to the doctrine of interpreting 'Hetu' through 'Hetu', thereby deeply understanding 'Zhengli'. Although this treatise can also be called 'Hetu doctrine' because it also interprets the two Hetus, this is only a general term. Only 'Zhengli Ru' is the specific name of this treatise. The second and third interpretations require careful consideration to distinguish. The fourth and fifth interpretations are explained from the perspective of people (proponent and opponent) belonging to the doctrine. The 'yan' (speech) of the proponent generates understanding, and the 'zhi' (wisdom) of the opponent generates enlightenment, both are called 'Hetu', because they each point to a result. 'Liao' (understanding) illuminates and understands the Sva-paksha (所宗, one's own asserted tenet), and 'yan' (speech) manifests what is to be established (one's own proposition). Both can be called 'Ming' (illumination), because they each manifest enlightenment. The meaning of the remaining text is self-evident. Now, under the third interpretation, two more interpretations are added. One saying is: or 'Hetuvidya' means that the proponent interprets 'Hetu' and 'Drishtanta' (喻, example), 'yan' (speech) can enable the opponent to generate the wisdom of understanding the Sva-paksha (所宗), and can clearly manifest the tenet established by oneself. Although the substance of the treatise has not changed, it is different in meaning, so 'Hetu' and 'Ming' are two different concepts, being both 'Hetu' and 'Ming', therefore it is a Karmadharaya (持業釋, appositional compound). 'Ru' (entry) refers to the wisdom of the opponent, and the proponent's 'yan' (speech) as 'Hetu' and 'Ming' can produce evidence of entry. 'Zhengli' (正理) is the established tenet. Through 'Hetuvidya', the opponent can generate wisdom, thereby deeply understanding this 'Zhengli', that is, the 'Ru' of 'Zhengli', and 'Ru' also belongs to 'Hetuvidya', which is a Tatpurusha (依主釋, dependent determinative compound). Another saying is: 'Hetuvidya' and 'Ru' both apply to the proponent and the opponent. The opponent's wisdom can illuminate what is
宗。名之為明宗果義彰。復賴敵智故名為因。因即是明。持業釋也。宗義顯邊名明。能證解邊名入。因明即入。亦持業釋。由立者言。正能為因生於明入。明入之因亦名明入。因從果名。如菩提因亦名菩提。正理如前。于第五解下更助一解。或因明正理。並佛本經之名。入者即天主論稱。以能入彼根本佛說因明正理。或因明者。通內外道之名。正理者根本佛說之號。入乃此論之目。天主欲令趣入于佛所說正理故。或因明者。佛根本名。入正理者。天主論稱。應云正理入。能入因明正理故。依結略中正理。加二正理佛根本名。或天主論稱。總成七釋。以歷於前五解因明。成三十五釋。若細分別總解因明。有十一釋。此以正理歷而明之。成七十七。若綺互單重。數即更廣。
解妨難中第六。助為一釋。宗既是義。義生了因。復由因喻證宗令明。亦正因明。又宗言生敵智因也。顯了所立宗義明也。
有解。能立有四。一真能立。二真似能立。三似能立。四似似能立。以相違決定。為真似能立。四不定因為似似能立。今謂不爾。何者如真似能立。只是似立。何須言真似能立。若如此解。即有自語相違之失。又若似中有似似。亦應真中有真真。此既不爾彼云何然。故但言真似。即攝義周。設真似及似似言。深為無用
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 宗（paksha，論題）。名為明宗，是因為果和義理彰顯。又依賴敵方的智慧，所以名為因（hetu，理由）。因即是明，這是持業釋（karmadharaya）。宗義顯現的一面名為明，能夠證實理解的一面名為入。因明即入，也是持業釋。由立論者說，正因能夠作為產生明入的原因。明入的原因也名為明入，這是因從果得名，如同菩提因也名為菩提一樣。正理如同前面所說。在第五種解釋下，再補充一種解釋：或者因明是正理，並且是佛陀根本經典的名稱。入，則是天主論（Sastra of the Lord of the World）的稱謂，因為它能夠進入佛陀所說的根本因明正理。或者因明，是通內外道的名稱，正理是根本佛陀所說的稱號，入是這部論的名稱。天主想要使人趣入佛陀所說的正理，所以這樣命名。或者因明，是佛陀根本的名稱，入正理，是天主論的稱謂，應該說正理入，因為它能夠進入因明正理。依據總結概括中的正理，加上兩個正理，是佛陀根本的名稱，或者是天主論的稱謂。總共形成七種解釋。用前面的五種解釋來歷數因明，可以形成三十五種解釋。如果仔細分別總的解釋因明，有十一種解釋。這裡用正理來歷數並闡明它，可以形成七十七種解釋。如果綺互單重，數量就更加廣泛了。
在解釋妨難中的第六種，補充一種解釋。宗既然是義理，義理產生了因。又通過因和喻（drshtanta，例證）來證實宗，使之明了，這也是正因明。又宗的言論能夠產生敵方的智慧，是因。顯現所立的宗義，是明。
有一種解釋說，能立（sadhana，論證）有四種：一是真能立，二是真似能立，三是似能立，四是似似能立。以相違決定為真似能立，四不定因為似似能立。現在認為不是這樣。為什麼呢？如果真似能立只是似立，何必說真似能立呢？如果這樣解釋，就會有自語相違的過失。又如果似中有似似，也應該真中有真真。既然不是這樣，那彼怎麼會是這樣呢？所以只說真似，就涵蓋了意義周全。設立真似和似似的說法，實在是無用。
【English Translation】 English version: Paksha (subject). It is called Ming Zong (clear subject) because the fruit and meaning are manifested. Moreover, relying on the wisdom of the opponent, it is called Hetu (reason). Hetu is Ming, which is Karmadharaya (determinative compound). The aspect where the subject's meaning is manifested is called Ming, and the aspect that can prove and understand is called Ru (entry). Hetu-vidya is Ru, which is also Karmadharaya. According to the proponent, the correct reason can be the cause of generating Mingru. The cause of Mingru is also called Mingru. This is because the cause is named after the effect, just as the cause of Bodhi is also called Bodhi. The correct principle is as mentioned before. Under the fifth explanation, add another explanation: Or Hetu-vidya is the correct principle, and it is the name of the Buddha's fundamental scriptures. Ru is the title of Sastra of the Lord of the World, because it can enter the fundamental Hetu-vidya correct principle spoken by the Buddha. Or Hetu-vidya is the name common to both internal and external paths, Zhengli (correct principle) is the title spoken by the fundamental Buddha, and Ru is the title of this treatise. The Lord of the World wants to make people enter the correct principle spoken by the Buddha, so he named it this way. Or Hetu-vidya is the fundamental name of the Buddha, and Ru Zhengli is the title of Sastra of the Lord of the World. It should be called Zhengli Ru, because it can enter Hetu-vidya Zhengli. According to the Zhengli in the summary, adding two Zhengli is the fundamental name of the Buddha, or the title of Sastra of the Lord of the World. A total of seven explanations are formed. Using the previous five explanations to enumerate Hetu-vidya, thirty-five explanations can be formed. If the overall explanation of Hetu-vidya is carefully distinguished, there are eleven explanations. Here, Zhengli is used to enumerate and clarify it, which can form seventy-seven explanations. If the numbers are ornate, mutually singular, and multiple, the numbers will be even more extensive.
In the sixth of explaining obstacles, add an explanation. Since the subject is meaning, the meaning generates the reason. Moreover, the subject is proved through reason and Drshtanta (example), making it clear. This is also the correct Hetu-vidya. Moreover, the words of the subject can generate the opponent's wisdom, which is the reason. Manifesting the established subject's meaning is Ming.
There is an explanation that Sadhana (proof) has four types: first, true Sadhana; second, true-like Sadhana; third, like Sadhana; and fourth, like-like Sadhana. Contradictory determination is true-like Sadhana, and the four uncertain reasons are like-like Sadhana. Now it is considered not to be the case. Why? If true-like Sadhana is just like Sadhana, why say true-like Sadhana? If explained in this way, there will be the fault of self-contradictory words. Moreover, if there is like-like in like, there should also be true-true in true. Since this is not the case, how can that be the case? Therefore, only saying true-like covers the meaning completely. Establishing the statements of true-like and like-like is really useless.
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疏解能破。定非似立似破。真似異故。今謂或有。且如能立既對似破。云何能破不對似立。如聲顯論對勝論。立聲是常住。彼覆成立聲是無常。豈非能破。自義不定。何得非似立。若不能破他。彼應真立故。又復能立能破置與字。顯彼相違。似立能破無文正障。又云。能立似破。俱句中釋無此句。其理決然。云但似破。恐義未盡。何者。或隨聲勝先立。自宗隨應為敵。豈非似立。此意或據他破。非約自立義故。
問瑜伽對法。俱以自性差別為所立。宗為能立。何故理門入理。皆共宗為所立耶。答先解古解。次述今明。古有解云。以諸法自性差別。總為一聚。為所成立。于中。別隨自意所許。取一自性及一差別。合之為宗。宗既合彼總中別法。合非別故。故是能立。且詳此意。理應不爾。若無簡別。總以諸法自性差別。總為一聚。為所立者。如別立聲為無常宗。既云能立。立彼總聚。總聚之中。有常無常。立常為無常。違自教過等。立無常宗。非遍不許。有相符過。若言諸法但取無常。猶有一分相符之過。若云但別自意所許。一自性差別。別為所立。合為能立。即不應言以諸法自性差別。總為一聚為所成立。慈恩唯識法師。亦有三釋。初后無違。中釋似過。且隨應言。簡無為法。就有為中。猶有似一分
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 疏解能破。『定』並非像是『立』又像是『破』。『真』與『似』不同。現在說或許有這種情況。例如，『能立』既然與『似破』相對，為什麼『能破』不與『似立』相對呢？比如《聲顯論》對抗勝論，立論『聲是常住』，對方又立論『聲是無常』，這難道不是『能破』嗎？如果自己的論點不確定，怎麼能說不是『似立』呢？如果不能駁倒對方，對方就應該是真正的『立』了。而且，『能立』、『能破』與『置與』字，顯示它們相互違背。『似立』、『能破』沒有文字上的明確障礙。又說，『能立』、『似破』都在句中解釋，沒有這樣的句子，道理很明顯。只說『似破』，恐怕意思沒有完全表達。為什麼呢？或許跟隨聲音的優勢先立論，自己的宗派隨後應該成為對方的敵論，這難道不是『似立』嗎？這個意思或許是根據對方的破斥，不是就自己的立論而言。
問：瑜伽和對法，都以自性差別作為所立，宗作為能立，為什麼《理門入理》都以共宗作為所立呢？答：先解釋古人的解釋，再闡述現在的理解。古人的解釋是，以諸法的自性差別，總合為一個整體，作為所要成立的。其中，分別根據自己的意願所允許的，取一個自性和一個差別，合在一起作為宗。宗既然符合那個整體中的部分法，符合的不是全部，所以是能立。但是仔細分析這個意思，應該不是這樣。如果沒有簡別，總以諸法的自性差別，總合為一個整體，作為所立的話，比如單獨立論『聲是無常』作為宗，既然說是能立，成立那個總的整體，總的整體之中，有常有無常，立常為無常，就違背了自教過失等。立無常宗，並非普遍不認可，有相符的過失。如果說諸法只取無常，仍然有一部分相符的過失。如果說只是分別自己意願所允許的，一個自性差別，分別作為所立，合在一起作為能立，就不應該說以諸法的自性差別，總合為一個整體作為所成立。慈恩唯識法師，也有三種解釋，最初和最後沒有違背，中間的解釋似乎有過失。姑且隨便說說，簡別無為法，就在有為法中，仍然有像一部分。
【English Translation】 English version Explanation of 'able to refute'. 'Certainty' is not like 'establishing' and also like 'refuting'. 'Truth' is different from 'semblance'. Now it is said that perhaps there is such a situation. For example, since 'able to establish' is opposed to 'semblance of refutation', why is 'able to refute' not opposed to 'semblance of establishing'? For example, the Śabdānuśāsana (Sound Doctrine) opposes the Vaiśeṣika school, establishing that 'sound is permanent', and the opponent establishes that 'sound is impermanent'. Is this not 'able to refute'? If one's own argument is uncertain, how can it not be 'semblance of establishing'? If one cannot refute the other party, then the other party should be truly 'established'. Moreover, 'able to establish', 'able to refute', and the word 'to place with' show that they contradict each other. 'Semblance of establishing' and 'able to refute' have no clear textual obstacles. It is also said that 'able to establish' and 'semblance of refutation' are explained in the sentence, but there is no such sentence, and the reasoning is obvious. Only saying 'semblance of refutation' may not fully express the meaning. Why? Perhaps following the advantage of sound, one first establishes the argument, and one's own school should then become the opponent's adversary, is this not 'semblance of establishing'? This meaning is perhaps based on the opponent's refutation, not in terms of one's own establishment.
Question: Both Yoga and Abhidharma use self-nature and difference as what is to be established, and the thesis as the means of establishing. Why does the Nyāyamukha (The Gate of Logic) use the common thesis as what is to be established? Answer: First explain the ancient interpretations, and then elaborate on the current understanding. The ancient interpretation is that the self-nature and differences of all dharmas are combined into a whole, as what is to be established. Among them, according to one's own intention, one takes one self-nature and one difference, and combines them as the thesis. Since the thesis conforms to a part of the whole, and what conforms is not the whole, it is the means of establishing. However, upon careful analysis, this meaning should not be so. If there is no distinction, and the self-nature and differences of all dharmas are combined into a whole as what is to be established, such as separately establishing 'sound is impermanent' as the thesis, since it is said to be the means of establishing, establishing that total whole, in the total whole, there are permanent and impermanent, establishing the permanent as impermanent, then it violates the fault of self-teaching, etc. Establishing the impermanent thesis is not universally unacknowledged, and there is the fault of conformity. If it is said that only the impermanent is taken from all dharmas, there is still a fault of partial conformity. If it is said that only one's own intended self-nature and difference are separately taken as what is to be established, and combined as the means of establishing, then it should not be said that the self-nature and differences of all dharmas are combined into a whole as what is to be established. The Dharma Master Ci'en of the Consciousness-Only school also has three interpretations, the first and last are not contradictory, and the middle interpretation seems to have faults. Let's just talk about it casually, distinguishing the unconditioned dharmas, and within the conditioned dharmas, there is still something like a part.
相符之過。如立聲無常。雖總聚中隨應有法。此聲自性差別。總別合之併名為宗。則彼總聚更無有聲。以立為宗故。復以此別宗立彼總者。若立所餘可有無常。非彼一切不許無常。故有似一分相符之過。既云隨應。並已簡訖。隨應對彼所不許者。以量立之。故實無過。今又解云。所成立義有二種。一者唯理非教。教名為宗。或可。立宗之言。立彼教理。教隨詮彼。亦名自性及以差別。立宗之言。或亦並教名之為宗。是所尊故。二謂自性及於差別。非唯說聲為常無常。名自性差別。亦以先陳后說。言顯意許。如次為之。非欲合二以為宗依。此但所爭之義。或爭有法。或爭於法。或爭言顯。或爭意許。或二俱爭。由此得有四相違因。故瑜伽等言所立自性者。謂有立為有。無立為無。此直有法為有無。不爭有法之上余差別名為自性。如立我有及以非有等。所立差別者。謂有上立有上。無上立無上。常立為常。無常立無常等。此爭有法之上別法。如立於聲常無常等。隨爭於此自性差別。或破於他。或立自義。所有言教。或除于教。對敵所立。皆名為宗。故瑜伽云。問何故先立宗耶。答為先顯示自所愛樂宗義。故對能立言。則名為義。義即道理。教隨於理。立論言詮。亦名為義。能成名法。謂立論言。或可即教法。法望理為能立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相符之過。例如，如果主張聲音是無常的（anitya，impermanent）。即使在總聚（總和，totality）中，隨其所應有法（dharma，事物、現象）而存在。此聲音的自性（svalaksana，自相）差別（visesa，特性）。總（總和）別（個體）合起來併名為宗（paksa，論題、主張）。那麼，那個總聚中就不再有聲音了，因為已經立（sthāpana，建立）為宗了。又用這個別宗（特定論題）來立彼總（總體論題）的話，如果主張其餘部分可能是無常的，而不是主張一切都是無常的，那麼就有了類似於一部分相符的過失。既然說了『隨應』，就已經簡擇完畢了。隨應針對那些不承認無常的人，用量（pramana，量， प्रमाण，認識的工具，如現量、比量等）來建立。所以實際上沒有過失。現在又解釋說，所成立的義（artha，意義）有兩種。一種是唯理（僅限於理證），而非教（agama，聖教、經文）。教名為宗。或者，可以認為，『立宗』的說法，是建立那個教理。教隨之詮釋那個理，也名為自性以及差別。『立宗』的說法，或者也可以將教並稱為宗，因為它是所尊重的。第二種是指自性以及差別，並非僅僅說聲音是常（nitya，永恒）或無常，名為自性差別，也用先陳后說的方式，用言語來顯示意許。依次這樣做。不是想要將二者合起來作為宗依（論題的依據）。這只是所爭論的意義，或者爭論有法（dharmin，有法，具有某種性質的事物），或者爭論於法（dharma，法，性質），或者爭論言語的顯示，或者爭論意許，或者二者都爭論。由此就有了四種相違因（viruddha hetu，相違因，與所立相違背的理由）。所以《瑜伽師地論》等所說的『所立自性』，是指有就立為有，無就立為無。這直接是有法為有無，不爭論有法之上的其餘差別，名為自性。例如，主張『我』有以及非有等。『所立差別』，是指在有之上立有，在無之上立無，常立為常，無常立為無常等。這是爭論有法之上的別法（不同的性質）。例如，主張聲音是常或無常等。隨著爭論於此自性差別，或者破斥他人，或者建立自己的義。所有的言教，或者排除于教，針對敵方所立的，都名為宗。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『問：為什麼先立宗呢？』答：『爲了先顯示自己所愛樂的宗義。』所以對能立（sadhana，能立，證明）而言，就名為義。義就是道理。教隨順於理，立論的言詮，也名為義。能成名為法。是指立論的言語。或者可以認為就是教法。法相對於理來說是能立。
【English Translation】 English version The fault of correspondence. For example, if one asserts that sound is impermanent (anitya). Even within the totality (samuccaya), according to the dharma (phenomenon) that exists accordingly. This sound's own-nature (svalaksana) and distinction (visesa). The combination of the totality and the individual is named the thesis (paksa). Then, there would be no sound in that totality, because it has been established as the thesis. Furthermore, if one uses this specific thesis to establish that general thesis, and if one asserts that the remaining part may be impermanent, rather than asserting that everything is impermanent, then there is a fault similar to partial correspondence. Since it is said 'accordingly,' it has already been discerned. 'Accordingly' is directed towards those who do not accept impermanence, and it is established using valid means of knowledge (pramana). Therefore, there is actually no fault. Now, it is further explained that there are two kinds of meaning (artha) to be established. One is solely based on reasoning (yukti), not on scripture (agama). Scripture is named the thesis. Or, it can be considered that the statement 'establishing the thesis' is establishing that scriptural reasoning. Scripture follows and explains that reasoning, and is also named own-nature and distinction. The statement 'establishing the thesis' may also include scripture as the thesis, because it is respected. The second refers to own-nature and distinction, not merely saying that sound is permanent (nitya) or impermanent, which is named own-nature and distinction, but also using the method of stating first and then explaining later, using words to reveal the intended meaning. This is done in sequence. It is not intended to combine the two as the basis of the thesis. This is merely the meaning being disputed, or disputing the subject (dharmin), or disputing the property (dharma), or disputing the verbal expression, or disputing the intended meaning, or disputing both. From this, there arise four contradictory reasons (viruddha hetu). Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others say that 'the own-nature to be established' refers to establishing existence as existence, and non-existence as non-existence. This directly concerns the subject as existence or non-existence, and does not dispute the remaining distinctions above the subject, which are named own-nature. For example, asserting 'I' exist and do not exist, etc. 'The distinction to be established' refers to establishing existence above existence, non-existence above non-existence, permanence as permanence, impermanence as impermanence, etc. This disputes the different properties above the subject. For example, asserting that sound is permanent or impermanent, etc. Depending on the dispute over this own-nature and distinction, either refuting others or establishing one's own meaning. All verbal teachings, or excluding scripture, directed towards what the opponent has established, are all named the thesis. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Question: Why establish the thesis first?' Answer: 'In order to first show the meaning of the thesis that one cherishes.' Therefore, in relation to the means of proof (sadhana), it is named meaning. Meaning is the principle. Scripture follows the principle, and the verbal expression of establishing the argument is also named meaning. That which accomplishes is named dharma. This refers to the words of establishing the argument. Or, it can be considered that it is the scriptural dharma. Dharma, in relation to principle, is the means of proof.
。或立論言。雙望教理俱為能立。然因等七。不唯望彼自性差別。兼望宗言。或正望宗言。故瑜伽云。辨因者。謂為成就所立宗義。必依所引喻等。解喻亦云。為成就所立宗義故。瑜伽等宗望自性差別。因等望二。諸所有言皆名能立。陳那天主。但以因喻望于宗言。宗為所立。因等多言名為能立。理實相似。但說宗名為所立。因喻等言名為能立者。為此多言生敵智勝。故理門等皆云。多言開示諸有問者。何以得知。勝但取言。雜集論云。謂以所應成自許義。宣示於他。瑜伽解因云。順益道理言論。喻言比況言論。故並取言。實兼于義。所詮亦名宗因喻故。故顯揚論。皆不云言論。言生智勝。瑜伽偏說所詮。先有智不能生。今藉立言方憶因喻。故言生勝。顯揚據兼。若無其義言何所詮。敵等了何。故兼取也。
問既言所成有二。為並俱成。為隨成一。答隨所爭成。問若爾何名所成有二。答所爭之義不過此二。問若爭於差別。可說法與有法。和合為宗。若爭自性。如爭我有無。說與誰和合。答雖但爭自性。如先舉我即為有法。立為有無。即名為法。亦得說和合。問如爭我有。有與我和合以俱有。若立我無何法和合。答無與無和合。因明理不違。問若爾還爭於法。何名爭有法。答舉宗成立。即須加言說為成法。望不加
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：或者建立論點時，雙重期望教義和理論都作為能立（證明者）。然而，因（hetu，理由）、同喻（sāmānya-dṛṣṭānta，共同例子）等七支，不僅期望彼（對方）的自性差別，也期望宗（pakṣa，論題）的陳述。或者主要期望宗的陳述。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『辨別因，是爲了成就所立的宗義，必須依靠所引用的譬喻等。』解釋譬喻也說：『爲了成就所立的宗義。』《瑜伽師地論》等宗派期望自性差別，因等期望兩者。所有陳述都稱為能立。陳那（Dignāga）和法稱（Dharmakīrti）論師，只用因和喻來期望宗的陳述，宗是所立（被證明者），因等多種陳述稱為能立。實際上，情況類似，只是說宗是所立，因喻等陳述是能立，這是因為這些陳述能使對方產生智慧上的勝利。所以《理門論》等都說，多種陳述是爲了開示那些有疑問的人。憑什麼得知勝利只在于言辭？《雜集論》說：『就是用所應成就的自己認可的意義，宣示給他人。』《瑜伽師地論》解釋因說：『順益道理的言論，譬喻是比況的言論。』所以都取言辭，實際上兼顧意義，因為所詮釋的也稱為宗、因、喻。所以《顯揚聖教論》都不說言論，因為言辭產生智慧上的勝利。《瑜伽師地論》偏重於所詮釋的，因為先有的智慧不能產生，現在藉助立論的言辭才能回憶起因和喻，所以說言辭產生勝利。《顯揚聖教論》兼顧兩者，如果沒有意義，言辭詮釋什麼？對方又能理解什麼？所以兼顧兩者。
問：既然說所成（被證明）有兩種，是同時成就，還是隨其一成就？答：隨所爭論的而成就。問：如果這樣，為什麼說所成有兩種？答：所爭論的意義不過這兩種。問：如果爭論差別，可以說『法』（dharma，性質）與『有法』（dharmin，具有性質的事物）和合為宗。如果爭論自性，比如爭論『我』的有無，說與誰和合？答：雖然只是爭論自性，比如先舉出『我』就作為有法，立為有無，就稱為法，也可以說和合。問：比如爭論『我有』，『有』與『我』和合，因為它們俱有。如果立『我無』，什麼法和合？答：『無』與『無』和合，因明的道理不違背。問：如果這樣，還是爭論法，為什麼說爭論有法？答：舉出宗來成立，就必須加上言說來成就法，期望不加上。
【English Translation】 English version: Or, when establishing a thesis, both the expectation of doctrine and reasoning serve as 'established proofs' (niscita-hetu). However, the seven members such as 'hetu' (reason), 'sāmānya-dṛṣṭānta' (common example), etc., not only consider the specific differences of the opponent's position but also the statement of the 'pakṣa' (thesis). Or, they primarily consider the statement of the thesis. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Distinguishing the reason is to accomplish the established thesis, and it is necessary to rely on the cited metaphors, etc.' Explaining the metaphor also states: 'To accomplish the established thesis.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other schools expect specific differences, while the reason, etc., expect both. All statements are called 'established proofs.' Dignāga and Dharmakīrti only use reason and metaphor to expect the statement of the thesis. The thesis is the 'established' (sādhya), and the multiple statements such as reason are called 'established proofs.' In reality, the situation is similar, but saying that the thesis is the 'established' and the statements such as reason and metaphor are 'established proofs' is because these statements can generate intellectual victory over the opponent. Therefore, the Hetu-cakra-ḍamaru and others all say that multiple statements are to enlighten those who have questions. How is it known that victory lies only in words? The Abhidharma-samuccaya states: 'It is to declare to others the meaning of what one acknowledges should be accomplished.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains the reason as: 'Statements that benefit the principle, metaphors are statements of comparison.' Therefore, both take words, but in reality, they also consider the meaning, because what is explained is also called thesis, reason, and metaphor. Therefore, the Śūrangama Sūtra does not mention statements, because words generate intellectual victory. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra emphasizes what is explained, because prior wisdom cannot generate it, and now, by means of the words of the thesis, one can recall the reason and metaphor, so it is said that words generate victory. The Śūrangama Sūtra considers both, because if there is no meaning, what do the words explain? What can the opponent understand? Therefore, both are considered.
Question: Since it is said that there are two 'established' (sādhya), are they accomplished simultaneously, or is one accomplished at a time? Answer: It is accomplished according to what is being argued. Question: If so, why is it said that there are two 'established'? Answer: The meaning of what is being argued is no more than these two. Question: If the difference is being argued, it can be said that 'dharma' (quality) and 'dharmin' (the possessor of quality) are combined as the thesis. If the nature is being argued, such as arguing the existence or non-existence of 'self' (ātman), with whom is it combined? Answer: Although only the nature is being argued, such as first mentioning 'self' as the 'dharmin', and establishing existence or non-existence, it is called 'dharma', and it can also be said to be combined. Question: For example, if arguing 'I exist', 'existence' and 'I' are combined because they co-exist. If establishing 'I do not exist', what dharma is combined? Answer: 'Non-existence' is combined with 'non-existence', and the principle of logic does not contradict this. Question: If so, it is still arguing the dharma, why is it said to be arguing the 'dharmin'? Answer: To establish the thesis, it is necessary to add words to accomplish the dharma, expecting not to add.
言本意所爭。即爭有法。問若爾云何諸宗皆云。為簡古師或但有法。或但成法。或二俱爭不約和合。答雖言簡古。不即無著等師。但古余師不解因明之者。有難古師以宗為能立。與作相違決定量云。宗非能立。以不詮因相故。今云不爾。不要詮因方為能立。現比二量智非詮故。若云二量非能立者。是何所攝。若云陳那不許二量在能立因非不定者。終有違教。犯宗中過。陳那天主。為顯瑜伽。何得與作相違決定。若云破余古師。亦不定失。
問古師能立皆說三量。今者陳那量何唯二。答論一切法不過二相。一自二共。得自相心名為現量。得共相心名為比量。定心緣教。即得自相。散心緣教即得共相。陳那約此能緣之心量但立二。故理門云。由此能了自共相故。非離此二別有所量。爲了知彼更立餘量。古立三者。有云。古師以緣聖教及所餘心故分三量。緣于聖教所生現比名聖教量。緣于所餘現比心得名現比量。今助一解。即能詮教名聖教量。何以故。成唯識云。聖教正理為定量故。豈以小乘不信第八。取信大乘緣教之智。以為量耶。又顯揚第十一云。聖言所攝者。所謂如來及諸弟子。所說經教。展轉流佈傳來至今。名不違正法正義。不言所生之智。如立量言名為量故。量即有二量具。得此量名能生量故。故理門云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所爭論的根本意圖在於爭論『有法』（dharmin，具有特定性質的事物）。有人問：如果這樣，為什麼各宗派都說，是爲了簡化古代論師的觀點，或者只爭論『有法』，或者只爭論『成法』（siddha-dharmin，已成立的性質），或者兩者都爭論，而不涉及和合（samavaya，結合）？回答：雖然說是簡化古代論師的觀點，但並非指無著（Asanga）等論師。只是古代其他不理解因明（hetuvidya，因明學）的論師，有人反駁古代論師，認為宗（paksa，論題）是能立（sadhana，論證），並用相違決定量（viruddha-vyavasthita-pramana，與結論相矛盾的可靠認知方式）反駁說：『宗不是能立，因為它不詮釋因相（hetu-linga，作為理由的特徵）。』現在說不是這樣，不必詮釋因相才能成為能立，因為現量（pratyaksa，直接認知）和比量（anumana，推論認知）的智慧並不詮釋。如果說現量和比量不是能立，那麼它們屬於什麼？如果說陳那（Dignaga）不允許現量和比量在能立中，因（hetu，理由）不是不定（anaikantika，不確定），最終會違反教義，犯宗過（paksadosa，論題的過失）。陳那天主（Dignaga），爲了闡明瑜伽（yoga，結合），怎麼能與相違決定量相矛盾？如果說是爲了駁斥其他古代論師，也不一定有不定過失。
有人問：古代論師的能立都說有三量（pramana，認知方式），現在陳那的量為什麼只有二量？回答：論述一切法（dharma，事物）都離不開兩種相（laksana，特徵）：一者自相（svalaksana，獨特特徵），二者共相（samanyalaksana，普遍特徵）。獲得自相的心識稱為現量，獲得共相的心識稱為比量。定心（samahita-citta，專注的心）緣于教（agama，聖典），就能獲得自相；散心（viksipta-citta，散亂的心）緣于教，就只能獲得共相。陳那根據這種能緣的心識，隻立現量和比量二量。所以《理門論》（Nyayamukha）說：『由此能了知自相和共相，並非離開這二者之外還有其他所量。爲了了知彼，才另立其他量。』古代論師立三量，有人說：古代論師因為緣于聖教（agamas，聖典）及其他心識，所以分為三量。緣于聖教所產生的現量和比量，稱為聖教量（agmapramana，聖典認知）；緣于其他現量和比量心識，稱為現比量。現在我來補充一種解釋，即能詮釋的教法稱為聖教量。為什麼這樣說呢？因為《成唯識論》（Vijnaptimatratasiddhi）說：『聖教和正理是可靠的認知方式。』難道小乘不相信第八識（alayavijnana，阿賴耶識），而取信大乘緣于教法的智慧，作為量嗎？又《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayalankara）第十一卷說：『聖言所攝的，就是如來（Tathagata）和諸弟子所說的經教，輾轉流佈傳承至今，名為不違背正法正義。』並沒有說所產生的智慧是量。如立量時說『名為量』，量即有二量具，獲得此量名為能生量。所以《理門論》說：
【English Translation】 English version The fundamental intention of the dispute lies in arguing about 'dharmin' (the subject possessing specific qualities). Someone asks: If that's the case, why do all schools say that it's to simplify the views of ancient teachers, or only argue about 'dharmin', or only argue about 'siddha-dharmin' (established qualities), or argue about both, without involving 'samavaya' (inherence)? The answer is: Although it's said to simplify the views of ancient teachers, it doesn't refer to teachers like Asanga. It's just that some ancient teachers who didn't understand 'hetuvidya' (the science of reasoning), someone refuted the ancient teachers, considering 'paksa' (thesis) as 'sadhana' (proof), and refuted with 'viruddha-vyavasthita-pramana' (a reliable means of cognition that contradicts the conclusion), saying: 'Paksa is not sadhana, because it doesn't explain the 'hetu-linga' (the characteristic as a reason).' Now it's said that it's not like that, it's not necessary to explain the hetu-linga to become sadhana, because the wisdom of 'pratyaksa' (direct perception) and 'anumana' (inference) doesn't explain. If it's said that pratyaksa and anumana are not sadhana, then what do they belong to? If it's said that Dignaga doesn't allow pratyaksa and anumana in sadhana, and 'hetu' (reason) is not 'anaikantika' (uncertain), it will ultimately violate the teachings, committing the fault of paksa (the fallacy of the thesis). Dignaga, to clarify 'yoga' (union), how can he contradict viruddha-vyavasthita-pramana? If it's said that it's to refute other ancient teachers, it doesn't necessarily have the fault of uncertainty.
Someone asks: The sadhana of ancient teachers all say there are three 'pramana' (means of cognition), why does Dignaga's pramana only have two? The answer is: Discussing all 'dharma' (phenomena) cannot be separated from two 'laksana' (characteristics): one is 'svalaksana' (unique characteristic), and the other is 'samanyalaksana' (universal characteristic). The mind that obtains svalaksana is called pratyaksa, and the mind that obtains samanyalaksana is called anumana. 'Samahita-citta' (concentrated mind) relies on 'agama' (scripture), and can obtain svalaksana; 'viksipta-citta' (distracted mind) relies on agama, and can only obtain samanyalaksana. Dignaga, based on this mind that can cognize, only establishes pratyaksa and anumana as two pramanas. Therefore, 'Nyayamukha' (The Introduction to Logic) says: 'Because of this, one can understand svalaksana and samanyalaksana, and there is no other object of cognition apart from these two. To understand that, other pramanas are established.' Ancient teachers established three pramanas, some say: Ancient teachers divided them into three pramanas because they relied on 'agamas' (scriptures) and other minds. Pratyaksa and anumana produced from relying on agamas are called 'agmapramana' (scriptural cognition); relying on other pratyaksa and anumana minds is called pratyaksa and anumana. Now I will add an explanation, that is, the teaching that can explain is called agmapramana. Why is that? Because 'Vijnaptimatratasiddhi' (Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only) says: 'Scripture and correct reasoning are reliable means of cognition.' Could it be that Hinayana doesn't believe in the eighth consciousness ('alayavijnana', storehouse consciousness), but believes in the wisdom of Mahayana relying on the teachings, as a pramana? Also, 'Abhisamayalankara' (The Ornament of Clear Realization), Volume 11, says: 'That which is included in the sacred words is the sutras and teachings spoken by the Tathagata and his disciples, which have been transmitted and spread to this day, and are called not violating the correct Dharma and correct meaning.' It doesn't say that the wisdom produced is a pramana. As it is said when establishing pramana 'called pramana', pramana has two pramana-instruments, obtaining this pramana is called the producer of pramana. Therefore, 'Nyayamukha' says:
彼處亦應于其現因說為現量。俱不遮止。古師心境別明。陳那隱境從心不越二量。故不違也。問所言至教取何教耶。為但佛說。亦通弟子。答通弟子說。如顯揚說前已引訖。若爾如唯識論。諸師互非。大小二乘亦更相斥。何成定量。答說與正理不相違背。展轉傳來名為至教。非諸弟子所可說言。皆為定量。又大小乘各自信受。說不違理。名為聖教。非約遍許。不爾大乘小乘不信。豈大乘經不名至教。諸外道等自為許教。亦彼至教各自宗故。
釋諸有問者。有云。不對證人但為敵人。即宗未了重問因喻。通舉量敵故說諸言。今謂不爾。論云問者。舉量為諸。何預問者。今謂立宗非唯擬一。但諸不許。對彼即為問者。立為悟彼。故說諸言。又疏辨釋。
有釋極成有法能別中雲。西方二釋。一云。聲上別不極成。余總極成。以總合別可極成。今謂不爾。以總合別。為當爲現。若別聲上。敵許極成。何假因喻。立已成過。若當極成。現未獲者闕宗依過。第二師云。以立宗時。雖未極成。當可極成。依當說現故說極成。此釋同前闕所依過。二釋俱非。今云能別所別。但約自他宗中有無。為極不極。彼此宗有即名極成。攬作宗依。令不相離。復順自宗。不爾雖有非有法法。立不相離。有諸過起。名似立宗。故彼此宗不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在那種情況下，也應該將『現因』（pratyaksha hetu，直接可感知的理由）視為『現量』（pratyaksha，直接認知）。這兩者並不互相排斥。古代的論師認為心和境是分別清晰的。陳那（Dignāga）認為，隱蔽的境並不超出心和二量（pramāṇa，量，有效的認知手段），因此並不矛盾。有人問：你所說的『至教』（āpta-vacana，可靠的教導）指的是什麼教導？僅僅是佛陀所說，還是也包括弟子所說？回答是：也包括弟子所說。正如《顯揚聖教論》（Śrāvakabhūmi）所說，前面已經引用過了。如果這樣，就像《唯識論》（Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi）中，各位論師互相否定，大乘和小乘也互相排斥，這怎麼能成為可靠的依據呢？回答是：所說的內容與正確的道理不相違背，輾轉相傳，就稱為『至教』。不是所有弟子所說的話，都可以作為可靠的依據。而且，大乘和小乘各自相信並接受，所說的內容不違背道理，就稱為『聖教』。這不是指普遍認可。如果不是這樣，小乘不相信大乘，難道大乘經典就不能稱為『至教』了嗎？那些外道等，自己認可的教義，也是他們自己的『至教』，因為那是他們自己的宗派。 有人提問說：不對證人，只對敵人，宗義沒有明確，重複提問原因和比喻，總括地針對敵人，所以說『諸言』。現在我認為不是這樣。論中說『問者』，是爲了舉量，與提問者有什麼關係？現在我認為，樹立宗義不是隻針對一個人，而是針對所有不認可的人，針對他們就是提問者，樹立宗義是爲了讓他們領悟，所以說『諸言』。而且疏中也辨析解釋了。 有人解釋『極成有法能別』（prasiddha dharma viśeṣa，以極成之法來區分）時說：西方有兩種解釋。一種解釋說：聲音上的差別是不極成的，其餘總體上是極成的。因為總體和差別可以極成。現在我認為不是這樣。因為總體和差別，是應當極成還是現在極成？如果是聲音上的差別，敵人已經認可極成，何必假借原因和比喻？這是樹立已成之過。如果是應當極成，現在還沒有獲得，就存在缺少所依之過。第二位論師說：在樹立宗義時，雖然沒有極成，但應當可以極成，依據應當說現在，所以說極成。這種解釋和前面的解釋一樣，存在缺少所依之過。這兩種解釋都不對。現在我認為，能區分的和所區分的，只是根據自己和他人的宗派中有沒有來判斷是否極成。彼此宗派中都有，就稱為極成。攬取作為宗依，使之不相分離，又順應自己的宗派。如果不是這樣，即使有非有法法，樹立不相分離，也會產生各種過失，稱為相似立宗。所以彼此宗派不...
【English Translation】 English version: In that case, the 'pratyaksha hetu' (directly perceptible reason) should also be considered 'pratyaksha' (direct cognition). Neither of these excludes the other. Ancient teachers considered the mind and object to be distinctly clear. Dignāga (陳那) believed that the hidden object does not go beyond the mind and the two 'pramāṇa' (量, valid means of cognition), therefore there is no contradiction. Someone asks: What 'āpta-vacana' (至教, reliable teaching) are you referring to? Is it only what the Buddha said, or does it also include what the disciples said? The answer is: It also includes what the disciples said. As the Śrāvakabhūmi (顯揚聖教論) says, it has already been quoted before. If so, like in the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (唯識論), the various teachers negate each other, and the Mahayana and Hinayana also reject each other, how can this become a reliable basis? The answer is: What is said does not contradict the correct reason, and is transmitted from one to another, is called 'āpta-vacana'. Not all the words spoken by the disciples can be taken as a reliable basis. Moreover, the Mahayana and Hinayana each believe and accept, and what is said does not contradict the reason, is called 'holy teaching'. This does not refer to universal recognition. If it were not so, if the Hinayana did not believe in the Mahayana, would the Mahayana scriptures not be called 'āpta-vacana'? Those non-Buddhists, etc., the doctrines they themselves recognize are also their own 'āpta-vacana', because that is their own school. Someone asks: Not addressing the witness, but only the opponent, the doctrine is not clear, repeating the question of reason and analogy, addressing the opponent in general, therefore saying 'words'. Now I think it is not so. The treatise says 'questioner', in order to raise the measure, what does it have to do with the questioner? Now I think that establishing the doctrine is not only aimed at one person, but at all those who do not recognize it, addressing them is the questioner, establishing the doctrine is to make them understand, therefore saying 'words'. Moreover, the commentary also distinguishes and explains. Someone explains 'prasiddha dharma viśeṣa' (極成有法能別, distinguishing by a well-established property) by saying: There are two explanations in the West. One explanation says: The difference in sound is not well-established, and the rest is generally well-established. Because the general and the difference can be well-established. Now I think it is not so. Because the general and the difference, should it be well-established or is it now well-established? If it is the difference in sound, the opponent has already recognized it as well-established, why borrow the reason and analogy? This is establishing the fault of what has already been established. If it should be well-established, but has not yet been obtained, then there is the fault of lacking the basis. The second teacher says: When establishing the doctrine, although it is not well-established, it should be able to be well-established, based on what should be said now, therefore saying well-established. This explanation is the same as the previous explanation, there is the fault of lacking the basis. Both explanations are wrong. Now I think that what can be distinguished and what is distinguished are only judged according to whether they exist in one's own and other's schools. If both schools have it, it is called well-established. Taking it as the basis of the doctrine, so that it is not separated, and conforming to one's own school. If it were not so, even if there are non-existent dharmas, establishing non-separation would cause various faults, called similar establishment of doctrine. Therefore, the two schools do not...
許有者。以何為依。故須共許有法及法。方名極成。此據共量。不要他許法依。有法方名極成。若許相符。不假量立。彼許余有。亦即名極成。若自他量。隨自他教。或至理有總名極成。
有云。克實所別之法。立量之時。得更互許有。各容極成。能別之法。必兩教同許方名極成。不約立者暫許名成。如對數論說神我體生滅無常。敵者不許。本非能別。故自他及共。三種比量。能別之法。必須同許方名極成。今謂不爾。若其共量能所。皆須兩許。自他二量能所。何假共成。若要爾。如佛法說諸行滅壞無常。豈彼數論不許。宗義不成。名為似立。如論所明。是共比量故滅無常能別非極。若準論定。所別亦須兩許。何但能別。立我是思。所別非極。此據共量。若自他量不要共許。設共比量。他雖不許。以言簡略。亦彼無過。論文但據不簡為過。如真性有為空。以簡別故說無為宗。如因必須共許。若置言簡。設他不許。亦得成因。如唯識論成大乘經真是佛說。樂大乘者許能顯示無顛倒理契經攝故因等。故準宗依簡即無過。自他亦爾。如唯識論等皆悉具有。
問宗過有九。何但簡三。有云。五違一順。原非是宗。設約有法及法。不相離宗。仍須極成。故但簡三不拂余過。今謂不爾。若違順非宗故不須簡。俱不極成
。豈可是宗而須簡耶。故知。且約辨宗所依簡此三種。非不簡余。或與理門影顯。互簡九過皆盡。余有云云繁不能述。
謂極成有法等。有云。三釋不同。一隨義別門釋。二簡過不同釋。三展轉除疑釋。簡過釋中雲。明宗義即簡九過。初簡所別。次簡能別。合二即簡俱不極成。
言隨自者。即簡相符。言樂為者。即簡現比等五違。及似因喻並非樂為者。今謂。余解無違。簡樂有失。有樂成立猶違現量等。故下論云。雖樂成立。由與現量等相違故。名似立宗。故知。樂為非簡彼五。釋疑同失。雖自問言。若樂為簡。何故九過亦云樂為。答初雖樂為。被破已后不樂為故。雖作此解。樂為言濫有不定失。復違理門論。彼樂為言。簡于似因喻。故彼論云樂為所立。謂不樂為能成立性。若異此者。說所成立。似因似喻。應亦名宗。又云。為顯離余立宗過失故。言非彼相違義能遣。故知。樂為不簡九過。若以義釋。理即無違。
有言。差別性故者。非如青花更相差別。但別他宗。故言差別。以違他順己成宗義故。今謂不爾。差別他何。若言別他常。別何常耶若別聲常。不異先釋。若不別他聲常等宗。不成差別。問辨依之中。何故能別唯在於法。出體之內。互為能所別。答先皆釋云。辨依約對敵故。法為能別。明
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：難道只是確立宗旨才需要簡別嗎？因此可知，暫且依據辨別宗旨所依據的三種情況來簡別這些，並非不簡別其他的。或許與理門（Nyaya school of logic）的闡釋相互輝映，互相簡別，九種過失都能完全避免。其他還有種種說法，過於繁瑣，無法一一敘述。
所謂『極成有法等』，有人說，有三種解釋不同。一是隨順意義，從不同角度解釋；二是簡別過失的不同來解釋；三是輾轉排除疑惑來解釋。在簡別過失的解釋中說，闡明宗義就能簡別九種過失。首先簡別所別（subject of the proposition），其次簡別能別（predicate of the proposition）。將兩者結合起來，就能簡別俱不極成（both unestablished）。
說到『隨自』，就是簡別相符（consistent）。說到『樂為』，就是簡別現量（perception）、比量（inference）等五種相違，以及似因（fallacious reason）、似喻（fallacious example）並非樂於接受的。現在我認為，其他的解釋沒有衝突，但簡別『樂為』有缺失。因為有樂於成立但仍然與現量等相違的情況。所以下面的論述說，即使樂於成立，由於與現量等相違，也稱為似立宗（fallacious thesis）。因此可知，『樂為』並非簡別那五種相違。這種解釋疑惑同樣有缺失。雖然自己問，如果『樂為』可以簡別，為何九種過失也說是『樂為』？回答說，最初雖然樂於接受，但被駁倒之後就不樂於接受了。即使這樣解釋，『樂為』這個詞仍然有不確定的缺失。又與理門論相違背，理門論中『樂為』是用來簡別似因、似喻的。所以那部論說，『樂為所立』，是指不樂於接受能成立的性質。如果不是這樣，那麼所成立的，似因、似喻，也應該稱為宗（thesis）。又說，爲了顯示遠離其他立宗的過失，所以說非彼相違的意義能夠排除。因此可知，『樂為』不能簡別九種過失。如果用義理來解釋，道理上就沒有衝突。
有人說，『差別性故』，不是像青花那樣互相差別，而是區別于其他宗派，所以說是差別。因為違背其他宗派，順應自己的宗派，才能成就宗義。現在我認為不是這樣。差別于其他的什麼呢？如果說是差別于其他的常，差別于什麼常呢？如果差別于聲常，與先前的解釋沒有不同。如果不差別于其他的聲常等宗，就不能成就差別。問：在辨別所依據的事物中，為何能別隻在於法（dharma）？在出體（defining the essence）之內，可以互相作為能別和所別。答：先前的解釋都說，辨別所依據的事物是針對論敵的，所以法作為能別，是明確的。
【English Translation】 English version: Is it only when establishing a thesis that one needs to distinguish and select? Therefore, it is known that we should provisionally distinguish these three based on the three aspects upon which the discernment of a thesis relies, not that we do not distinguish others. Perhaps, mirroring the explanations of the Nyaya school of logic, through mutual distinction, all nine faults can be completely avoided. There are various other explanations, which are too numerous to elaborate.
Regarding 'established subject, etc.,' some say there are three different interpretations. First, to explain from different angles according to the meaning. Second, to explain by distinguishing different faults. Third, to explain by progressively eliminating doubts. In the explanation of distinguishing faults, it is said that clarifying the meaning of the thesis can distinguish the nine faults. First, distinguish the subject of the proposition (所別, so bie). Second, distinguish the predicate of the proposition (能別, neng bie). Combining the two can distinguish 'both unestablished' (俱不極成, ju bu ji cheng).
Speaking of 'according to oneself' (隨自, sui zi), it distinguishes 'consistent' (相符, xiang fu). Speaking of 'willing to accept' (樂為, le wei), it distinguishes the five contradictions such as perception (現量, xian liang), inference (比量, bi liang), etc., as well as fallacious reason (似因, si yin) and fallacious example (似喻, si yu) that are not willingly accepted. Now, I think that other explanations are not contradictory, but distinguishing 'willing to accept' has shortcomings. Because there are cases where one is willing to establish something but it still contradicts perception, etc. Therefore, the following discussion says that even if one is willing to establish it, because it contradicts perception, etc., it is called a 'fallacious thesis' (似立宗, si li zong). Therefore, it is known that 'willing to accept' does not distinguish those five contradictions. This explanation of doubt also has shortcomings. Although one asks oneself, if 'willing to accept' can distinguish, why are the nine faults also said to be 'willing to accept'? The answer is that although one is initially willing to accept it, after being refuted, one is no longer willing to accept it. Even with this explanation, the term 'willing to accept' still has an uncertain shortcoming. It also contradicts the Nyaya school of logic, where 'willing to accept' is used to distinguish fallacious reason and fallacious example. Therefore, that treatise says, 'willing to establish' refers to the nature of not being willing to accept what can be established. If it were not so, then what is established, fallacious reason, and fallacious example, should also be called a thesis (宗, zong). It also says that in order to show the avoidance of other faults in establishing a thesis, it is said that the meaning of non-contradiction can eliminate them. Therefore, it is known that 'willing to accept' cannot distinguish the nine faults. If explained with reason, there is no conflict in principle.
Some say that 'because of the nature of difference' (差別性故, cha bie xing gu) is not like the mutual difference of blue flowers, but distinguishes it from other schools, so it is said to be different. Because it contradicts other schools and conforms to one's own school, one can achieve the meaning of the thesis. Now I think it is not so. What does it differentiate from others? If it is said to differentiate from other eternals, what eternal does it differentiate from? If it differentiates from the eternal of sound, it is no different from the previous explanation. If it does not differentiate from other theses such as the eternal of sound, it cannot achieve difference. Question: Among the things on which discernment relies, why is the predicate only in dharma (法, fa)? Within defining the essence (出體, chu ti), they can mutually serve as predicate and subject. Answer: The previous explanations all say that discerning the things on which it relies is aimed at the opponent, so dharma as the predicate is clear.
宗據體義。即互為能別。問此中唯明法體義。可互辨于能所。但為對敵出於宗。何須體義互差別。今解云。非唯體義互相差別。若望對敵。后同於前。若據體義。前同於后。又解。前約增勝。后名能別。此具足明互相差別。有問云。大乘經部。許能所相無異體者。可不違自云相差別不相離性。薩婆多宗。既許異體。何不違自。答薩婆多宗。雖復異體。能所相屬。故立五蘊同名無常。蘊外無為是常住攝。故對敵申亦無違自。
今謂。通難粗雖可爾。究理未然。何者。今薩婆多言無常宗。為十六行無常耶。為四相耶。若是四相。既許能相離所相法。今云互不相離。何不違宗。不言互相屬故。然談本宗。但說體異而不言離。既不相離。差別性故。此有何違。須言相屬。改動論文。若言十六行之無常。此是其理。何以得知。作諦觀者名理觀故。理不離事。言不即者。據事理別。復通余故。非體相離。亦名共相。共相與自。亦不相離。故唯識說。故此與依他。非異非不異。如無常等性。舉如薩婆多故言不離。亦不相違。以無彼常故。故名無常。非唯四相。問若爾二皆有過。若約四相滅相無常。言聲無常。是違宗過。以彼法體非滅相故。若理無常。應過類中成無別過。答且一解。應云聲有無常。若爾違論。論示法雲。如有成
立聲是無常。答論據大乘。不約有部四相以說。或總示則不細簡之。若爾亦過。以許別有無常之性與聲相隨。常有無常。即是常義。常無常雜。陳那菩薩。釋此難云。不別立有無常性故。今別立有。豈非過耶。此亦非過。外難意云。應別有一恒法。能令聲無常。此滅體不恒故亦非過。若爾。恒有此滅體。何非雜一過。此亦不爾。性遷流故。墮三世故。彼意難云。應有一常滅。與此聲和雜。由此不然故為此難。是過類攝。上據事釋。約理無常立無常者。如何遣過。答過類中言無異者。同是無常。陳那菩薩釋云。以無常取滅義。所作取生義。此事亦得。約理取有滅義為宗。取有生義為因。義既有殊。不成無異。大乘準釋。有云。親生因者。唯取敵論了因之智。能親生彼了宗智。故自難言。若取言為親生因者。亦應說為親了因。理門說名爲了因。相從而說。又云。于所比審觀察智。從現量生。或比量生。又敵無解智。三相義不成。故解因智為親智生。今謂不爾。理門云。從現量生。或比量生。是所緣境。比量之具。非說了宗智從彼二智生。又此論說。生因之者據增上緣。不約親辨自體。若據親因。現從種起。現非現生。何須說從現比智生。又自比量。了宗之智。從自了因二智而生。今據對敵為生彼智。故立論言正彼生因。故
【現代漢語翻譯】 立聲（Shēng，聲音）是無常。答論據大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘佛教）。不約有部（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部）四相（four characteristics，四種特徵）以說。或總示則不細簡之。若爾亦過。以許別有無常之性與聲相隨。常有無常。即是常義。常無常雜。陳那菩薩（Dignāga，古印度佛教論師）釋此難云：『不別立有無常性故。』今別立有。豈非過耶？此亦非過。外難意云：『應別有一恒法（eternal dharma，永恒的法），能令聲無常。』此滅體不恒故亦非過。若爾，恒有此滅體，何非雜一過？此亦不爾。性遷流故，墮三世（three times，過去、現在、未來）故。彼意難云：『應有一常滅，與此聲和雜。』由此不然故為此難。是過類攝。上據事釋。約理無常立無常者，如何遣過？答過類中言無異者，同是無常。陳那菩薩釋云：『以無常取滅義，所作取生義。』此事亦得。約理取有滅義為宗，取有生義為因。義既有殊，不成無異。大乘準釋。有云：『親生因者，唯取敵論了因之智，能親生彼了宗智。』故自難言：『若取言為親生因者，亦應說為親了因。』理門說名爲了因。相從而說。又云：『于所比審觀察智，從現量（pratyakṣa，現量）生，或比量（anumāna，比量）生。』又敵無解智，三相義不成。故解因智為親智生。今謂不爾。理門云：『從現量生，或比量生。』是所緣境，比量之具。非說了宗智從彼二智生。又此論說，生因之者據增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣），不約親辨自體。若據親因，現從種起，現非現生。何須說從現比智生？又自比量，了宗之智，從自了因二智而生。今據對敵為生彼智，故立論言正彼生因。故 聲音的生起是無常的。這是對大乘佛教論點的迴應。這裡沒有采用說一切有部的四相理論來解釋。如果只是概括地說明，而不做詳細區分，那麼就會出現問題。因為如果承認存在一種與聲音相伴隨的無常的性質，那麼常有的事物就具有了無常的性質，這就等同於常有的定義，即常有和無常混雜在一起。陳那菩薩解釋這個難題時說：『因為沒有另外設立一個無常的性質。』現在另外設立一個，難道不是錯誤嗎？這也不是錯誤。對方的難題意思是：『應該另外存在一種永恒的法，能夠使聲音成為無常。』因為這種滅的本體不是永恒的，所以也不是錯誤。如果這樣，始終存在這種滅的本體，為什麼不是混雜為一的錯誤呢？這也不是這樣，因為性質是遷流變化的，並且屬於過去、現在、未來三世。對方的難題意思是：『應該存在一種常有的滅，與這個聲音混合在一起。』因為不是這樣，所以提出這個難題，屬於過失的範疇。以上是根據事物本身來解釋。如果根據道理，以無常來確立無常，那麼如何消除過失呢？回答說，過失的類別中說沒有差異，是因為它們都是無常的。陳那菩薩解釋說：『用無常來理解滅的含義，用所作來理解生的含義。』這件事也是可以成立的。根據道理，以存在的滅的含義作為宗，以存在的生的含義作為因。含義既然有區別，就不會構成沒有差異。大乘佛教按照這個標準來解釋。有人說：『親生的因，只是選取對方辯論者理解原因的智慧，能夠親生對方理解宗的智慧。』所以自己提出難題說：『如果選取言語作為親生的因，也應該說是親理解的因。』理門學說中稱作理解的因，是相互跟隨來說的。又說：『對於所比較的審察觀察智慧，是從現量產生，或者從比量產生。』而且對方沒有理解的智慧，三相的意義就不能成立。所以解釋說，原因的智慧是親生的智慧。現在認為不是這樣。理門學說中說：『從現量產生，或者從比量產生。』是所緣的境界，是比量的工具。不是說理解宗的智慧是從這兩種智慧產生的。而且這個論述說，產生原因的人是根據增上緣，不是根據親近來辨別自體。如果根據親因，現象是從種子產生的，現象不是從現象產生。何必說從現量和比量的智慧產生呢？而且自己的比量，理解宗的智慧，是從自己理解原因的兩種智慧產生的。現在根據針對對方來產生那種智慧，所以立論說正是那種智慧產生的原因。所以。
【English Translation】 The arising of sound (Śabda) is impermanent. This is a response based on the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) arguments. It does not discuss this in terms of the four characteristics (four characteristics) according to the Sarvāstivāda (the 'All Exists' school). To give a general indication without detailed analysis would be a fault. If so, it is also a fault because it admits that there is a separate nature of impermanence that accompanies sound. If something permanent has impermanence, that is the meaning of permanence, a mixture of permanence and impermanence. Dignāga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) explains this difficulty by saying, 'Because an impermanent nature is not separately established.' Now, if one separately establishes it, is that not a fault? This is also not a fault. The intention of the external objection is: 'There should be a separate eternal dharma (eternal law) that can make sound impermanent.' Since this entity of cessation is not eternal, it is also not a fault. If so, if this entity of cessation is always present, why is it not the fault of being mixed into one? This is also not so, because its nature is in flux and belongs to the three times (past, present, and future). Their intention in raising the difficulty is: 'There should be a permanent cessation that is mixed with this sound.' Because this is not the case, this difficulty is raised, and it falls into the category of faults. The above explanation is based on the facts. If one establishes impermanence based on reason, how can one eliminate the fault? The answer is that in the category of faults, saying there is no difference means that they are both impermanent. Dignāga explains, 'Impermanence is taken to mean cessation, and 'what is made' is taken to mean arising.' This matter is also valid. According to reason, taking the meaning of the cessation of existence as the thesis, and taking the meaning of the arising of existence as the reason. Since the meanings are different, it does not constitute 'no difference.' The Mahāyāna explains according to this standard. Some say, 'The directly producing cause only takes the wisdom of the opponent's understanding of the cause, which can directly produce their wisdom of understanding the thesis.' Therefore, they themselves raise the difficulty: 'If one takes speech as the directly producing cause, one should also say it is the directly understanding cause.' In the school of logic, it is called the understanding cause, and they are spoken of in sequence. Furthermore, they say, 'The wisdom of careful observation regarding what is being compared arises from direct perception (pratyakṣa), or from inference (anumāna).' Moreover, if the opponent has no wisdom of understanding, the meaning of the three aspects cannot be established. Therefore, they explain that the wisdom of the cause is the directly produced wisdom. Now, we say it is not so. The school of logic says, 'It arises from direct perception, or from inference.' These are the objects of cognition, the tools of inference. It is not that the wisdom of understanding the thesis arises from these two wisdoms. Moreover, this treatise says that the one who produces the cause relies on the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), and does not discern the self-nature based on closeness. If based on the direct cause, the phenomenon arises from the seed, and the phenomenon does not arise from the phenomenon. Why is it necessary to say that it arises from the wisdom of direct perception and inference? Moreover, one's own inference, the wisdom of understanding the thesis, arises from one's own two wisdoms of understanding the cause. Now, based on addressing the opponent to produce that wisdom, therefore the thesis is established, saying that it is precisely the cause of producing that wisdom. Therefore.
理門云。余所說因生。釋云。從如所說能立因生。是緣彼義。又論前云。令彼憶念本極成故。又云。由宗因喻多言。開示諸有問者未了義故等。故立論言正是生因。若云約智生因說。此是言生者。何故自舉言生為難。又若智生。即立論者智故。瑜伽等皆說三量為能立。故理門亦云。亦不離此得成能立。亦不得言。雖由他智起因等言。自緣因智親為生因。緣因之時智猶未起。舉喻解生。解生之時即兼了宗。由此。陳那除合結支。又緣因喻念力能故。故理門云。令彼憶念本極成故。又云。及憶此因與所立宗不相離念由是成。前舉所說力不說智。故當知此中。據增上力說。立者智名為智生因。不爾據自應說種故。
釋因三相。陳那釋云。即取義相。破古諸師。或外道師。或內古師。有云。先解古師三相。謂具三體。如如實論等。云詳彼說意。決定不然。謂彼意取聲上所作為初相。瓶上所作為第二相。虛空上無為第三相。非即取彼瓶等有法。今謂古解指如如實論。取瓶空體為同異喻。可如所非。若云無古取瓶空體為二相者。即違理門。故彼論云。云何別法于別處轉。此古師難。由彼相似不說異名。論主答。若不說異。云何此因說名宗法。外難。此中但說定是宗法。不欲說言唯是宗法。論主解。故知。古有三相即體。又下
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《理門論》中說：『我所說的因由生。』解釋說：『從如你所說，能夠成立的因由生，這是因為它的緣故。』而且論中前面說：『爲了讓他回憶起原本已經成立的道理。』又說：『因為宗、因、喻這許多言辭，開示給那些有疑問卻不明白道理的人。』所以，立論的言辭正是產生理解的原因。如果說這是就智慧產生的原因來說，而這裡說的是言辭的產生，那麼為什麼自己要舉出言辭的產生作為難題呢？而且如果是智慧的產生，那就是立論者的智慧。瑜伽等論都說三種量是能夠成立論證的。所以《理門論》也說：『也不能離開這些而能夠成立論證。』也不能說：『雖然由於他人的智慧而產生原因等言辭，但自己緣于原因的智慧才是產生理解的直接原因。』在緣于原因的時候，智慧還沒有產生。舉出比喻來解釋產生，在解釋產生的時候就兼顧了宗。因此，陳那論師去除了合和結這兩個支分。而且緣于因和比喻的念力能夠做到這一點。所以《理門論》說：『爲了讓他回憶起原本已經成立的道理。』又說：『以及回憶起這個原因與所要成立的宗不相分離，念頭由此而成立。』前面舉出所說的力量，沒有說智慧。所以應當知道，這裡是就增上力的角度來說的，立論者的智慧被稱為智慧產生的原因。否則，如果就自身來說，就應該說種子了。
解釋因的三相。《陳那論》解釋說：『就是取義相。』破斥古代的諸位論師，或者外道論師，或者內道古代的論師。有人說：『先解釋古代論師的三相，就是具備三種體性，如《如實論》等。』說詳細考察他們的說法，一定不是這樣的。他們是取聲音上的所作作為第一相，瓶子上的所作作為第二相，虛空上的無為作為第三相，不是直接取瓶子等有法。現在認為古代的解釋指的是《如實論》，取瓶子和虛空的體性作為同喻和異喻，可以像所非議的那樣。如果說沒有古代論師取瓶子和虛空的體性作為二相，那就違背了《理門論》。所以那部論說：『為什麼不同的法在不同的地方轉變？』這是古代論師的難題。因為他們相似而不說不同的名稱。論主回答說：『如果不說不同，為什麼這個原因被稱為宗法？』外道反駁說：『這裡只是說一定是宗法，不是想要說只有是宗法。』論主解釋說：『所以知道，古代的三相就是體性。』而且下面還有。
【English Translation】 English version: The Nyayapravesa (理門論) says: 'What I say is born of the cause.' The explanation is: 'From what you say, the cause that can establish is born, and this is because of that reason.' Moreover, the treatise says earlier: 'In order to make him recall the originally established principle.' It also says: 'Because of the many words of thesis, reason, and example, to enlighten those who have questions but do not understand the meaning.' Therefore, the words of establishing a thesis are precisely the cause of understanding. If it is said that this is in terms of the cause of the arising of wisdom, and here it speaks of the arising of words, then why does one raise the arising of words as a difficulty? Moreover, if it is the arising of wisdom, then it is the wisdom of the one establishing the thesis. Yoga and other treatises all say that the three pramanas (三量) are capable of establishing proof. Therefore, the Nyayapravesa also says: 'One cannot be separated from these and be able to establish proof.' Nor can it be said: 'Although due to the wisdom of others, the words of cause, etc., arise, one's own wisdom regarding the cause is the direct cause of arising.' When one is considering the cause, wisdom has not yet arisen. The example is given to explain the arising, and in explaining the arising, it also includes the thesis. Therefore, Dignaga (陳那) eliminated the members of application and conclusion. Moreover, the power of mindfulness regarding the cause and example is capable of doing this. Therefore, the Nyayapravesa says: 'In order to make him recall the originally established principle.' It also says: 'And recalling that this cause is not separate from the thesis to be established, the thought is thereby established.' Earlier, the power of what was said was mentioned, not wisdom. Therefore, it should be known that here, in terms of the power of increase, the wisdom of the one establishing the thesis is called the cause of the arising of wisdom. Otherwise, in terms of oneself, one should speak of the seed.
Explaining the three aspects of the cause. Dignaga (陳那) explains: 'It is taking the aspect of meaning.' Refuting the ancient teachers, either non-Buddhist teachers or ancient Buddhist teachers. Some say: 'First explain the three aspects of the ancient teachers, which is possessing three natures, such as in the Tattvasamgraha (如實論).' Saying to examine their meaning in detail, it is definitely not like this. They are taking the action on sound as the first aspect, the action on a pot as the second aspect, and the non-action on space as the third aspect, not directly taking the dharmas (有法) such as the pot. Now it is thought that the ancient explanation refers to the Tattvasamgraha, taking the nature of the pot and space as the similar and dissimilar examples, which can be like what is criticized. If it is said that no ancient teacher took the nature of the pot and space as two aspects, then that violates the Nyayapravesa. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Why do different dharmas transform in different places?' This is the difficulty of the ancient teachers. Because they are similar but do not speak of different names. The author replies: 'If they do not speak of difference, why is this cause called the property of the thesis?' The opponent retorts: 'Here it is only said that it is definitely the property of the thesis, not wanting to say that it is only the property of the thesis.' The author explains: 'Therefore, know that the three aspects of the ancients are the nature.' And below there is more.
云。若爾喻言應非異分。顯因義故。此古師難。難意欲令同異二喻但總名因。是因相故。論主答云。事雖實爾。然此因言。唯為顯了是宗法性(此即初相)非為顯了同品異品。有性無性。故須別說同異喻言。外人復難。若唯因言所詮表義說名為因。斯有何失。此難意云。若唯因言詮遍宗法。不取餘二名為因相。即二喻體斯有何失。論主詰云復有何德。意云。因言唯詮初相。餘二即喻復有何德。外答云。別說喻云是名為德(已上論文)既云別說喻分是名為德。明知古師。立餘二相即二喻體。亦不應云喻體雖復取瓶。亦為顯二相。何以故。彼論次云。所類同法。不說能立所成立義。若顯因相云何難言不說能立。復云。非異品中不顯無性。有所簡別。此意難云。若異品中不顯無性。非能簡了。若顯無者何須此難。又復若取彼二上作與非作。及於聲有以為因者。何故復云。若唯宗法是因性者。其有不定。應亦成因。明知。不取瓶上所作亦為因也。若取為因。過非因故。又不應言若唯宗法是因性也。故知。古師言三相者。即體相也。因唯取宗上法。二喻別體。又即此文證知。陳那因體。不唯取于聲上一所作性。若言義于彼相有遍彼成過。古師救義應亦同然。故三相因。陳那總取聲瓶上諸所作性。及異無性三種義相。然立宗時言所
作者。唯顯初相。故理門云。雖一切分皆能為因。顯了所立。然唯一分且說為因。
言遍是宗法性。理門論云。有法不成於有法及法。此非成有法。若以有法成有法。兩俱所依不成過。及有法成法。亦犯兩俱不成。及相違過。何者。彼中先敘難云。如以煙立火。以火立觸。以煙立火。有法成有法。以火立觸。有法成法。陳那為釋。但為成立此相應物。不言煙下有火。火下有觸。若不爾者。依煙立火等牒難意云。彼煙下定有火。煙為有法。火為其法。既合名宗。還取有法一分為因。此有法一分。亦名為宗。如遍宗法言。此即取宗有法為因。既取為因。闕宗有法。因無所依故。論云。依煙立火。應成立宗一分為因。以火立觸。云火為有法。定有熱觸。是法以是火。故因亦取有法以為其因。還闕所依。亦犯相符。故理門云。非欲成立火觸有性。煙下之火。依火有觸。共知有故。故亦不得以有法成有法等。
問彼立如何。答陳那釋云。彼意立云。彼山等處定是有火。以現煙故。彼爐等中定有熱觸。以有火故。故彼論云。此中非以成立火觸為宗。但為成立此相應物。問若以法成有法者。何過非耶。答若以法成有法。即闕同喻。及因第二相同品定有性。即成有法自相相違過。如薩婆多對大乘。立眼識所緣定是離色實色
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：作者認為，只有最初的顯現才是真實的相。所以《理門論》中說：『雖然一切部分都能作為原因，來顯明所要建立的理論，但只選取其中一部分來說明是原因。』 關於『遍是宗法性』，《理門論》中說：『有法不能成立有法和法。』這不能成立有法。如果用有法來成立有法，就會出現兩方所依據的事物都不成立的過失；如果用有法來成立法，也會犯兩方都不成立以及互相矛盾的過失。這是為什麼呢？ 其中先提出疑問說：例如用煙來證明有火，用火來證明有觸。用煙來證明有火，是有法成立有法；用火來證明有觸，是有法成立法。陳那解釋說：只是爲了成立與此相應的物體，並不是說煙下面一定有火，火下面一定有觸。如果不是這樣，依據煙來證明有火等，重複疑問的意思是說：那煙下面一定有火，煙是有法，火是其法，既然合起來稱為宗，還取有法的一部分作為因。這有法的一部分，也稱為宗。例如說『遍宗法』，這就是取宗的有法作為因。既然取為因，就缺少宗的有法，因沒有所依據的事物。所以論中說：依據煙來證明有火，應該成立宗的一部分作為因；用火來證明有觸，說火是有法，一定有熱觸是法，因為有火。所以因也取有法作為它的因，仍然缺少所依據的事物，也犯了互相矛盾的過失。所以《理門論》中說：不是想要成立火觸的性質，煙下面的火，依據火有觸，這是大家都知道的。所以也不得用有法來成立有法等。 問：他們是如何立論的？答：陳那解釋說：他們的意思是說：那山等地方一定有火，因為有煙的緣故；那爐子等裡面一定有熱觸，因為有火的緣故。所以那部論中說：『這裡不是要成立火觸為宗，只是爲了成立與此相應的物體。』問：如果用法來成立有法，會有什麼過失呢？答：如果用法來成立有法，就缺少同喻，以及因的第二相同品一定有性，就成了有法自相矛盾的過失。例如薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）對大乘（Mahayana）說，眼識所緣一定是離色的實色。
【English Translation】 English version: The author believes that only the initial manifestation is the true appearance. Therefore, the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Nyaya-pravesa) says: 'Although all parts can be the cause to clarify the theory to be established, only a part is selected to explain the cause.' Regarding 'pervasion is the property of the subject (paksa)', the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Nyaya-pravesa) says: 'The subject (dharmin) cannot establish the subject (dharmin) and the property (dharma).' This cannot establish the subject (dharmin). If the subject (dharmin) is used to establish the subject (dharmin), there will be a fault that both parties' basis are not established; if the subject (dharmin) is used to establish the property (dharma), it will also commit the fault that both parties are not established and contradict each other. Why is this? Among them, first raise a question saying: For example, using smoke to prove fire, using fire to prove touch. Using smoke to prove fire is the subject (dharmin) establishing the subject (dharmin); using fire to prove touch is the subject (dharmin) establishing the property (dharma). Dignāga (Chenna) explained: It is only to establish the object corresponding to this, not to say that there must be fire under the smoke, and there must be touch under the fire. If this is not the case, according to the smoke to prove the fire, etc., repeating the meaning of the question is: There must be fire under the smoke, smoke is the subject (dharmin), fire is its property (dharma), since it is called the subject (paksa), it also takes a part of the subject (dharmin) as the reason (hetu). This part of the subject (dharmin) is also called the subject (paksa). For example, saying 'pervasion is the property of the subject (paksa)', this is taking the subject (dharmin) of the subject (paksa) as the reason (hetu). Since it is taken as the reason (hetu), it lacks the subject (dharmin) of the subject (paksa), and the reason (hetu) has nothing to rely on. Therefore, the treatise says: According to the smoke to prove the fire, a part of the subject (paksa) should be established as the reason (hetu); using fire to prove touch, saying that fire is the subject (dharmin), there must be hot touch as the property (dharma), because there is fire. Therefore, the reason (hetu) also takes the subject (dharmin) as its reason (hetu), and it still lacks the basis, and also commits the fault of contradiction. Therefore, the Hetu-cakra-damaru (Nyaya-pravesa) says: It is not intended to establish the nature of fire touch, the fire under the smoke, according to the fire has touch, which is known to everyone. Therefore, it is also not possible to use the subject (dharmin) to establish the subject (dharmin), etc. Question: How do they establish their argument? Answer: Dignāga (Chenna) explained: Their meaning is: There must be fire in the mountains and other places, because there is smoke; there must be hot touch in the stove and other places, because there is fire. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Here, it is not to establish fire touch as the subject (paksa), but only to establish the object corresponding to this.' Question: If the property (dharma) is used to establish the subject (dharmin), what fault will there be? Answer: If the property (dharma) is used to establish the subject (dharmin), there will be a lack of similar examples (sapaksa), and the second similar property (sapaksa) of the reason (hetu) must have the property of existence, which becomes the fault of the subject (dharmin) contradicting itself. For example, the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins) said to the Mahayana (Mahayana) that the object of eye consciousness must be a real color separate from color.
。以五境中隨一攝故。如香味等。取五境別香非是色。闕同喻故。因此遍轉故成相違。或取能別為因。云以是色故。還是宗義一分為因。宗闕能立。宗闕支過。由此。不得有法成有法等。設爭有法。他不許有。因成於此闕初相過。問如立最勝無。云何名為有法為所立。設立有法無。復有何過。如唯識論破同異性云。勿此亦非實德業性。此意同異性。異實句等。外別有體。然是彼性故。破云。同異性應非同異性。以異實等故。如德業。答理門論中所難意。別非正為難。但以法成法。不得成有法等。乘便兼難。前宗之法唯依有法。有法若無。因無所依。故難彼立最勝無雲。若許有體。不可言無。自語相違。若其無體。因無所依。豈不亦是成立有法。論主意云。若成有法有體。及是此法。故有前過。及因有體表而亦遮。必依有體有法。今立最勝無。亦假安立不可得法為因。其因無體。但遮非表。以無為依故。非無依及成有法過。不障立他所立有法體性為無為破他故。不爾不得與他宗。作有法自相相違因過等。是故唯識難非彼性。若即直難。理亦無違。但因明法。不得直以有法。成有法有及是此法等。以犯過故。問若不得成有法為有。如何瑜伽云。所成立義有二種。一謂自性。二謂差別。立自性者。有立為有。無立為無。如立
我有無等。立差別者。如立有上無上等。如何言法不成有法。答已釋訖。不得立有法為有。破他立無無過。若爾如何言有立為有。答有立為有。方便成立。義即無妨。直成有法。即有前過。如立他方佛有。方便立云。他方是有法。定應有佛是法。以有機欲及修行者故。如此世界。又如煙立火等量陳那正釋。將為法成法。若望比量成立。即名為法。瑜伽談其法體。名自性差別。故理門云。觀所成故立法有法。非德有德故無有過。問若不得直成有法。如何得有四種相違耶。如翻法自相差別相違。得有正量。應翻有法自相相違差別相違。亦有正量。若云如立火有。豈非有法自相者。陳那既將山處為有法。火即當法。何名立有法之量耶。答取山處為有法。取現煙義為因。取有火義為法。不即取所有火也。如是資益成得火有有法。問法及有法不定。如何定說火為有法。答此文且約體義一門。為難及釋。若如成立我是有無。我是其有法。有無為法。意不直爭有之與無。爭彼我體。此類即是成彼先陳。立聲常等。即爭后說。但不得將宗中有法。及宗能別為因。成此二所爭者。不障別以余理。成立有法及法。此即隨應。先陳后說。名有法法。有正不正。得有四違。問遍是宗法性。說因依宗有法之上。何故不依能別法耶。答先有三解。一
云。宗中能別他不許故。因非遍彼。今難云。若爾應犯能別不成。若云許無常于別法有。而不在聲故。無此過者。即是許有無常。云何不許因遍在彼。若云無常與聲合者。彼不許之。今言宗者。取此為宗。故因不依。若依彼者。即彼隨一所依不成。若爾亦應聲與無常不相離者。他亦不許。說因依聲。應隨一過。一云滅法是無因不依彼。若許因依。闕所依過。今亦難云。如立無常宗。滅無非因依。立聲為常等。非無應為依。若言許有即依。無體即有過。為此不許因依能別者。豈可為無非依遮有為依故。不許依于能別。今者解云。本欲成法依有法。不欲成有法依法。故因不得在能別上。如舉其喻。顯有所作處。無常必隨逐故。所作在聲。無常隨在聲。若因在能別。便顯無常有所作。聲在於無常。乃別爭于聲。非爭本無常。又以法成法。因在有法上。不得以法成有法。故不在法上。遍是宗法性。先云四句。或三二句。且四句云。有是遍而非宗法性。言如大乘師對薩婆多。立業所引聲必是異熟。以大造故。因雖遍聲。然是體異。非是宗法。是故雖遍而非宗法。此釋不然。且問云。以大造故。因為詮以大種所造故。名以大造。為詮聲體是大種故。名以大造。若云以大種所造故。名以大造。與所作因。義有何別。彼亦取所生義。所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：宗派中能夠區分它，但不允許這個緣故。因為並非普遍存在於彼處。現在提出疑問：如果這樣，應該會犯能區分不成（Siddhasādhanatā）的過失。如果說無常存在於其他的法中，但不在聲音中，因此沒有這個過失。這實際上是承認了無常的存在，為何不允許因普遍存在於彼處？如果說無常與聲音結合，對方是不允許的。現在所說的宗，是取這個作為宗，所以因不依賴於它。如果依賴於它，那麼它所依賴的任何一個都會不成。如果這樣，聲音與無常不相離，對方也是不允許的。說因依賴於聲音，應該犯隨一過（Anyatarāsiddha）。 一種觀點認為，滅法是無因的，不依賴於它。如果允許因依賴於它，就會有缺少所依的過失。現在也可以提出疑問：如果立無常為宗，滅無並非因所依賴的；如果立聲音為常等，並非沒有應該作為所依的。如果說允許存在就依賴，沒有實體就有過失。因此不允許因依賴於能區分者，難道可以因為無非所依而遮蔽有為所依的緣故，就不允許依賴於能區分者嗎？現在解釋說，本來想要成就法依于有法，不想要成就有法依於法，所以因不能在能區分者上。比如舉例，顯示有所作之處，無常必定跟隨。所以所作在聲音上，無常隨之在聲音上。如果因在能區分者上，就顯示無常有所作，聲音在於無常，乃是另外爭論聲音，並非爭論本來的無常。又以法成就法，因在有法上，不能以法成就有法，所以不在法上。普遍性是宗法的性質。先前說四句，或者三句、兩句。先說四句，有是普遍的但不是宗法的性質。例如大乘師對薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）說，由業所引的聲音必定是異熟（vipāka，果報），因為是由大種所造的緣故。因雖然普遍存在於聲音中，但是體性不同，不是宗法。因此雖然普遍但不是宗法。這種解釋不對。且問，因為是由大種所造的緣故，是因為詮釋由大種所造，所以稱為由大造，還是詮釋聲音的體性是大種，所以稱為由大造？如果說因為是由大種所造，所以稱為由大造，那麼與所作因的意義有什麼區別？他們也取所生的意義，所
【English Translation】 English version: Question: In the school, one can distinguish it, but this reason is not allowed. Because it is not universally present there. Now, a difficulty is raised: If so, it should commit the fallacy of 'the distinguisher being unestablished' (Siddhasādhanatā). If it is said that impermanence exists in other dharmas but not in sound, therefore there is no such fault, this is actually admitting the existence of impermanence. Why is it not allowed that the reason is universally present there? If it is said that impermanence is combined with sound, the opponent does not allow this. The 'thesis' (paksha) now spoken of takes this as the thesis, so the reason does not depend on it. If it depends on it, then any one of those it depends on would be unestablished. If so, the opponent also does not allow that sound and impermanence are inseparable. Saying that the reason depends on sound should commit the fallacy of 'one or the other being unestablished' (Anyatarāsiddha). One view is that cessation (nirodha) is without a cause and does not depend on it. If it is allowed that the reason depends on it, there would be the fault of lacking a substratum. Now, it can also be questioned: If impermanence is established as the thesis, cessation is not what the reason depends on; if sound is established as permanent, etc., it is not that there is nothing that should serve as a substratum. If it is said that allowing existence means dependence, and lacking substance means there is a fault, therefore, not allowing the reason to depend on the distinguisher, can it be that because of non-non-substratum, one prevents the reason from depending on the distinguisher? Now, it is explained that originally one wanted to establish the dharma as dependent on the possessor of dharma (dharmī), not wanting to establish the possessor of dharma as dependent on the dharma, so the reason cannot be on the distinguisher. For example, to illustrate, it shows that wherever there is something made, impermanence necessarily follows. So, 'being made' is in sound, and impermanence follows in sound. If the reason is on the distinguisher, it would show that impermanence is something made, and sound is in impermanence, which is another argument about sound, not an argument about the original impermanence. Also, with dharma establishing dharma, the reason is on the possessor of dharma, and one cannot use dharma to establish the possessor of dharma, so it is not on the dharma. Universality is the nature of the property of the thesis (pakshadharma). Previously, it was said that there are four possibilities, or three, or two. First, the four possibilities: there is that which is universal but not the property of the thesis. For example, a Mahayana teacher says to a Sarvāstivāda (Sarvāstivāda, the school of 'everything exists'), 'The sound produced by karma must be a result (vipāka, fruition), because it is made of great elements.' Although the reason is universally present in sound, its nature is different, it is not the property of the thesis. Therefore, although it is universal, it is not the property of the thesis. This explanation is not correct. And ask, 'Because it is made of great elements,' does it mean that it explains that it is made of great elements, so it is called 'made of great elements,' or does it explain that the nature of sound is great elements, so it is called 'made of great elements'? If it is said that because it is made of great elements, it is called 'made of great elements,' then what is the difference in meaning from the reason of 'being made'? They also take the meaning of 'being produced,' the
造所生義俱遍宗。何得云遍而非宗法。若云是大種故。名以大造。此俱不成。何得名遍。若云不取所造。亦不說聲名為大造。但別說言以大造。故不相關帶。何得名遍。若云雖取大種所造之義。猶有大種別體故。遍非宗法。此亦不爾。取所造義。不說大種故。又如薩婆多對聲論。云聲是無常。以所作性故。豈得言雖取所生義。猶有生別體故。遍非宗法。問因云所作性。取聲是所作義。不取能作。如立山等處定應有火。以現煙故。取能現煙義。不取所現之煙。云何得有比量之智。從現量生。以現煙義。非現量得故。答有二解。一云。取能所現。合名為因。若爾豈非有法成有法。答因明不許將宗有法。還成有法。不障以余。成此有法。故理門云。若為煙立火。以火立觸。便成宗義一分為因。如雲彼煙下定有火。復云以現煙故。即取宗中有法為因。故是宗義一分為因。若云彼山等處決定有火。以現煙故。既以山處為有法。取能所現為因。即無其過。故比量智從現量生。二云。即現煙義亦現量得。不爾見煙依于山處。有煙之義更須比耶。故火雖不見。以其現量知煙之智。能生比知有火之智。問自比知火可如所說。對敵申言。立彼有火。敵證解起。彼智從何。若現量生。待言方解。散緣名言非現量故。若亦緣彼現煙義等立言是何
。答遠從於現。近立言生。故了宗智從現比起。故理門云。是近及遠。比度因故。二釋后勝。問準所作性因。應雲山處定有火。所現煙故。答言論方便說不一途。隨義便說。若云所現煙故。義不相關。何成因法。或立二句云。無是宗法而非遍。如立一切聲是無常。勤發因望內聲上。遍是宗法。若望外聲。非遍非宗法。此亦不然。總立內外一切聲宗。勤勇發因。不可別望內外聲。分為是為非。故勤勇發。必是無常。得名宗法。但非遍故。
問言同品定有性。何法名同品。因於何有。且答初問。舊有數釋。一云。以瓶等體名為同品。以瓶與聲同常無常之品類故。名為同品。一云。除聲已外為品。有無常者為同。與初解同。一云。如立聲無常。除聲一切無常為同品。一云。以宗既取和合為宗。同品亦取瓶無常合。以為同品。然既說其因。皆依別瓶。非依無常。如宗法故。依宗有法。非法故也。今者不爾。先明同品。后明定有性。即以瓶上無常。與聲無常。法法相似。名為同品。故論云。同品者。謂所立法均等義品。說名同品。理門亦云。此中若品與所立法。鄰近均等。說名同品。以一切義皆名品故。問聲上無常。敵論不許。何得瓶上無常。名為同品。答若敵同許。即立已成。但除宗外所有無常。與所爭同即名同品。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：答：從現在推及到遙遠的未來。從眼前確立，言語由此產生。因此，瞭解根本的智慧是從現在開始的。所以《理門論》說：『這是由近及遠，通過比量推度的原因。』這是第二個解釋，說明後者更為重要。問：如果按照所作性的因，應該說山上有火，因為那裡有煙。答：言論的表達方式多種多樣，不能只用一種方法。應該根據意義的方便來表達。如果說『因為那裡有煙』，意義就不相關聯，怎麼能成為有效的因呢？或者可以設立兩個條件：沒有既是宗法又不是遍的情況。例如，如果說一切聲音都是無常的，勤奮產生的原因是針對內在的聲音而言，遍是宗法。如果針對外在的聲音，就既不是遍也不是宗法。這樣說也是不對的，應該將內外一切聲音總括起來作為宗，勤奮產生的原因，不能分別針對內外聲音，分為是或非。因此，勤奮產生必定是無常的，才能被稱為宗法，但因為不是遍。\n\n問：『同品必定具有這種性質』，什麼法被稱為同品？因存在於什麼之上？先回答第一個問題。舊的解釋有幾種。一種說法是：以瓶子等實體稱為同品，因為瓶子與聲音同屬於常或無常的品類，所以稱為同品。一種說法是：除了聲音以外的，具有無常性質的為同品，這與第一種解釋相同。一種說法是：例如，如果說聲音是無常的，那麼除了聲音以外的一切無常事物都屬於同品。一種說法是：因為宗已經取了和合作為宗，同品也取瓶子的無常和合，作為同品。然而，既然說了這個因，都是依據個別的瓶子，而不是依據無常，就像宗法一樣，依據宗的有法，而不是非法。現在不是這樣。先說明同品，后說明必定具有這種性質，就是以瓶子上的無常，與聲音的無常，法法相似，稱為同品。所以論中說：『同品，是指與所要證明的法具有均等意義的品類，稱為同品。』《理門論》也說：『這裡，如果品類與所要證明的法，鄰近且均等，就稱為同品。』因為一切事物都可以稱為品。問：聲音上的無常，對方不承認，怎麼能把瓶子上的無常稱為同品？答：如果對方也承認，那就已經成立了。只要把宗以外的所有無常事物，與所爭論的相同，就稱為同品。另外
【English Translation】 English version: Answer: Extending from the present to the distant future. Establishing from the immediate, speech arises from this. Therefore, understanding fundamental wisdom begins from the present. Hence, the Nyaya-mukha (Treatise on the Entrance to Logic) says: 'This is from near to far, due to inference by comparison.' This is the second explanation, indicating that the latter is more important. Question: According to the reason of being produced, it should be said that there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke present there. Answer: The ways of expressing arguments are diverse and cannot be limited to one method. One should express according to the convenience of the meaning. If it is said 'because there is smoke present there,' the meaning is not relevant; how can it become a valid reason? Or one can establish two conditions: there is nothing that is both a property of the subject (paksha-dharma) and not pervasive (vyapaka). For example, if it is said that all sound is impermanent, the reason of effort-production is directed towards the internal sound; pervasiveness is a property of the subject. If it is directed towards the external sound, it is neither pervasive nor a property of the subject. This is also incorrect; one should encompass all internal and external sounds as the subject, with effort-production as the reason. One cannot separately target internal and external sounds, dividing them into yes or no. Therefore, effort-production must be impermanent to be called a property of the subject, but because it is not pervasive.\n\nQuestion: 'The similar instance (sapaksha) must possess this property,' what dharma is called a similar instance? Upon what does the reason exist? First, answer the first question. There are several old explanations. One says: entities like a pot are called similar instances because the pot and sound belong to the same category of permanent or impermanent, hence they are called similar instances. One says: except for sound, those with the nature of impermanence are similar instances; this is the same as the first explanation. One says: for example, if it is said that sound is impermanent, then everything impermanent except sound belongs to the similar instance. One says: because the subject has already taken the combination as the subject, the similar instance also takes the combination of the pot's impermanence as the similar instance. However, since this reason is stated, it is based on the individual pot, not on impermanence, just like the property of the subject; it is based on the property of the subject, not on what is not the property. Now it is not like this. First, explain the similar instance, then explain that it must possess this property, that is, the impermanence on the pot is similar to the impermanence of sound, dharma to dharma, and is called the similar instance. Therefore, the treatise says: 'The similar instance refers to the category with equal meaning to the dharma to be proven, and is called the similar instance.' The Nyaya-mukha also says: 'Here, if the category is close and equal to the dharma to be proven, it is called the similar instance,' because everything can be called a category. Question: The opponent does not accept the impermanence of sound; how can the impermanence of the pot be called a similar instance? Answer: If the opponent also accepts it, then it is already established. As long as all impermanent things outside the subject are the same as what is being argued, they are called similar instances. Also
彼此同。有此所立法。不要同許宗有法有。方可說同。問前之四釋。其義云何。答若以無常為同品者。知見共同。因依義異。次下當說。若以瓶等為同品。及瓶無常合以為同品。皆悉未可。亦難以瓶為同品者。若言以瓶等有法。同有無常。名為同品。違論所說。謂所立法均等義品。說名同品。此即正取瓶上無常。與所立法相似名同。不言有所立法。名為同品。論指法雲。如說無常。瓶等無常。若以瓶同於聲。有無常性。名為同品。應云如說聲有無常。瓶等有無常。名為同品。又所立相似名之為同。聲瓶有法。豈是所立耶。雖指法中。云瓶等無常。舉瓶為同品依。意取無常名為同品。如指瓶等以為喻依。又與理門所說相違。文如前引。難云。聲及無常。和合不相離。名為同品者。豈可二合為所立。若俱所立。一切同品。皆有一分所立不成。又準喻中所立不成。皆約能別。不併有法。論云如立無常。瓶等無常。不言如立聲無常。雖和合名宗。意立無常不離於聲。不欲成立聲在無常。又法成法。若二和合俱名所立。即雙成有法及法。違理門論。又復同異品。即二喻一分。喻既不取瓶空等體。云何同異品。則取瓶空體耶。若云非同異喻體之一分者。如何理門約辨于因。故彼頌云。于因有及二。在異無是因。翻此名相違。所餘皆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 彼此相同。如果存在這種被立之法（所立法，Sādhyadharma），並且不要同樣允許宗（Paksha）也具有這種法（有法，dharmin），才可以稱之為相同。問：前面四種解釋，它們的含義是什麼？答：如果以無常作為同品（Sapaksha）的話，知見是共同的，因（Hetu）和依（依處，āśraya）的意義不同，接下來會詳細說明。如果以瓶子等作為同品，或者瓶子和無常合在一起作為同品，都是不合適的。如果難以將瓶子作為同品，如果說以瓶子等有法（dharmin）共同具有無常，稱之為同品，就違背了論中所說。論中說，被立之法均等的品類，稱之為同品。這正是選取瓶子上的無常，與被立之法相似而得名，而不是說有所立法就稱之為同品。論中指法（Dharma）說，例如說無常，瓶子等是無常的。如果以瓶子與聲音相同，具有無常性，稱之為同品，應該說，例如說聲音具有無常，瓶子等具有無常，稱之為同品。又，與所立相似的稱之為同。聲音和瓶子是有法（dharmin），怎麼是被立之法呢？雖然在指法中，說瓶子等是無常的，舉瓶子作為同品的依據，意在選取無常作為同品，如同指瓶子等作為比喻的依據。又與理門（Nyāyamukha）所說相違背，文句如前面所引用。難：聲音和無常，和合不相分離，稱之為同品，難道可以將二者合在一起作為所立嗎？如果都是所立，一切同品都有一部分所立不能成立。又按照比喻中所立不能成立，都是關於能別（viśeṣaṇa），不包括有法（dharmin）。論中說，例如立無常，瓶子等是無常的，不說例如立聲音是無常的。雖然和合稱為宗（Paksha），意在立無常不離開聲音，不是要成立聲音存在於無常之中。又是法成立法，如果二者和合都稱為所立，就同時成立有法和法，違背理門論。又，同品和異品，就是兩個比喻的一部分，比喻既然不取瓶子和空間等的本體，為什麼同品和異品，就取瓶子和空間的本體呢？如果說不是同喻和異喻的本體的一部分，理門如何依據因來辨別呢？所以那首偈頌說：『于因有及二，在異無是因，翻此名相違，所餘皆…』
【English Translation】 English version They are mutually the same. If there is such a Sādhyadharma (所立法, the property to be proven), and it is not also allowed that the Paksha (宗, the subject of the inference) possesses this dharmin (有法, the property-possessor), then it can be called the same. Question: What are the meanings of the previous four explanations? Answer: If impermanence is taken as the Sapaksha (同品, similar instance), then the knowledge and views are common, but the meanings of Hetu (因, reason) and āśraya (依處, basis) are different, which will be explained in detail later. If a pot, etc., is taken as the Sapaksha, or a pot and impermanence are combined as the Sapaksha, both are inappropriate. If it is difficult to take a pot as the Sapaksha, if it is said that the pot, etc., as a dharmin (有法) commonly possesses impermanence, and is called the Sapaksha, it violates what is said in the treatise. The treatise says that the category of equally established dharmas (所立法), is called the Sapaksha. This is precisely selecting the impermanence on the pot, which is named because it is similar to the dharma to be proven, rather than saying that anything with a dharma to be proven is called the Sapaksha. The treatise points to the Dharma (法) and says, for example, impermanence, pots, etc., are impermanent. If the pot is the same as sound, possessing impermanence, and is called the Sapaksha, it should be said, for example, sound possesses impermanence, pots, etc., possess impermanence, and is called the Sapaksha. Moreover, that which is similar to what is to be proven is called the same. Sound and pot are dharmin (有法), how can they be the dharma to be proven? Although in pointing to the Dharma, it is said that pots, etc., are impermanent, taking the pot as the basis of the Sapaksha, the intention is to select impermanence as the Sapaksha, just as pointing to pots, etc., as the basis of the analogy. It also contradicts what is said in the Nyāyamukha (理門), the text is as quoted earlier. Objection: Sound and impermanence, combined and inseparable, are called the Sapaksha, can the two be combined as what is to be proven? If both are what is to be proven, a part of all Sapakshas cannot be established. Moreover, according to the analogy, what is to be proven cannot be established, all are about the viśeṣaṇa (能別, qualifier), not including the dharmin (有法). The treatise says, for example, establishing impermanence, pots, etc., are impermanent, not saying, for example, establishing sound is impermanent. Although combined and called Paksha (宗), the intention is to establish impermanence without leaving sound, not to establish that sound exists in impermanence. Moreover, it is the Dharma that establishes the Dharma, if the two are combined and both are called what is to be proven, then both the dharmin and the Dharma are established simultaneously, violating the Nyāyamukha treatise. Furthermore, the Sapaksha and Vipaksha (異品, dissimilar instance) are a part of the two analogies, since the analogy does not take the substance of the pot and space, etc., why do the Sapaksha and Vipaksha take the substance of the pot and space? If it is said that it is not a part of the substance of the similar and dissimilar analogies, how does the Nyāyamukha distinguish based on the Hetu (因)? Therefore, that verse says: 'In the Hetu there is existence and two, in the dissimilar there is no Hetu, reversing this is called contradictory, all the rest are...'
不定。由此故知。宗之同品。即取與宗能別法同。名為同品。若云陳那亦取瓶空等體。為二喻者。不然。廣如理門所破繁不具引。
次釋定有性。問其能立因。為依瓶等有法之上。名定有性。為依無常等。名定有性。答有二解。一云。依瓶等有法。義如常解。第二又解。依無常上。名同品定有性。以瓶等體非同品故。又理門云。以所作性。于無常見故。于常不見故。不言于瓶上見。故知同品。無常之上有所作性。問若言因依同品無常。無常即喻。如何說言瓶有所作性。瓶體是無常。當知聲有所作性。聲體是無常。準此。所作即依瓶等。答此古師合非陳那義。陳那立云。諸所作者皆是無常。譬如瓶等。瓶等喻依。非因依也。問何故宗上無常。非因所依。同品無常。即為因依。答宗中敵不許。能別非因依。同品兩俱成故。得為因依。有立量云。瓶上無常非因依。所立法故。如聲上無常。此是似破。因隨一故。或俱不成。誰許瓶無常是所立法。復是違教。喻名能立。若爾何故。同無能別。名闕所立。答喻上無常。似所立法。從似為名。如所作因。問若無常同品。定有所作。此是滅法。云何得言定有所作。滅非因生故。答有二解。一云。言無常者。非唯滅相。無彼常故名為無常。即住異等俱名無常依此何過。二云。無常
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不確定。因此可知，宗的同品，就是與宗的能區別法相同的，稱為同品。如果說陳那（Dignāga）也取瓶子、虛空等實體作為兩種比喻，那就錯了。詳細的駁斥在《理門論》（Hetu-cakra-damaru）中，這裡不一一引用。
接下來解釋『定有性』。問：能成立的因，是依據瓶子等有法之上，稱為『定有性』，還是依據無常等，稱為『定有性』？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，依據瓶子等有法，意義如通常的解釋。第二種解釋是，依據無常之上，稱為同品的『定有性』，因為瓶子等的實體不是同品。而且《理門論》說，因為所作性在無常中可見，在常中不可見，所以沒有說在瓶子上可見。因此可知，同品無常之上有所作性。問：如果說因依據同品無常，無常就是比喻，如何說瓶子有所作性？瓶子的實體是無常。應當知道聲音有所作性，聲音的實體是無常。照此推論，所作性就依據瓶子等。答：這是古代論師的觀點，不是陳那（Dignāga）的意義。陳那（Dignāga）立論說：『凡是所作的都是無常，譬如瓶子等。』瓶子等是比喻所依據的，不是因所依據的。問：為什麼宗上的無常，不是因所依據的，而同品無常，就是因所依據的？答：宗中的對方不認可，能區別的不是因所依據的，同品兩方都認可，所以可以作為因所依據的。有人立論說：『瓶子上的無常不是因所依據的，因為是所立法，如同聲音上的無常。』這是相似的破斥，因為因隨於一方，或者雙方都不成立。誰認可瓶子的無常是所立法？而且這是違背教義的。比喻名為能成立。如果這樣，為什麼同品無能區別，名為缺少所立？答：比喻上的無常，類似於所立法，從相似而得名，如所作因。問：如果無常同品，一定有所作性，這是滅法，怎麼能說一定有所作性？因為滅不是因所生的。答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，所說的無常，不僅僅是滅相，因為沒有常的緣故，稱為無常，即住、異等都稱為無常，依據這個有什麼過失？第二種說法是，無常
【English Translation】 English version Uncertain. Hence it is known that the similar instance (Sapaksha) of the thesis (Paksha) is that which shares the same distinguishing characteristic (Vyāvṛtti) as the thesis, and is called a similar instance. If it is said that Dignāga also takes entities such as jars and space as two examples, that is not correct. The detailed refutation is in the Hetu-cakra-damaru, which will not be quoted in full here.
Next, the 'definitely existent nature' (Niyata-bhāva) is explained. Question: Is the probans (Hetu) that establishes the thesis called 'definitely existent nature' because it relies on the subject (Dharmin) such as jars, or is it called 'definitely existent nature' because it relies on impermanence (Anitya) etc.? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it relies on the subject such as jars, and the meaning is as commonly understood. The second explanation is that it relies on impermanence and is called the 'definitely existent nature' of the similar instance, because the entities such as jars are not similar instances. Moreover, the Hetu-cakra-damaru says that because being produced (Krtakatva) is seen in impermanence, and not seen in permanence, it is not said to be seen in jars. Therefore, it is known that being produced exists in the impermanence of the similar instance. Question: If it is said that the probans relies on the similar instance of impermanence, and impermanence is the example, how can it be said that jars have being produced? The entity of jars is impermanent. It should be known that sound has being produced, and the entity of sound is impermanent. According to this reasoning, being produced relies on jars etc. Answer: This is the view of ancient teachers, not the meaning of Dignāga. Dignāga establishes the thesis: 'Whatever is produced is impermanent, like jars etc.' Jars etc. are what the example relies on, not what the probans relies on. Question: Why is the impermanence on the thesis not what the probans relies on, while the impermanence of the similar instance is what the probans relies on? Answer: The opponent in the thesis does not accept it, and what can distinguish is not what the probans relies on. Both sides agree on the similar instance, so it can be what the probans relies on. Someone establishes the argument: 'The impermanence on jars is not what the probans relies on, because it is what is to be established, like the impermanence on sound.' This is a fallacious refutation, because the probans follows one side, or both sides are not established. Who accepts that the impermanence of jars is what is to be established? Moreover, this is contrary to the teachings. The example is called the establisher. If so, why is the similar instance without the ability to distinguish, and called lacking what is to be established? Answer: The impermanence on the example is similar to what is to be established, and is named from the similarity, like the probans of being produced. Question: If the similar instance of impermanence definitely has being produced, and this is a ceasing dharma, how can it be said to definitely have being produced? Because cessation is not produced by a cause. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that what is said to be impermanent is not only the aspect of cessation, but is called impermanent because it lacks permanence, that is, abiding, change, etc. are all called impermanent. What fault is there in relying on this? The second explanation is that impermanence
即是滅相。定有性者。定曾有性也。觀果知因。非當有性。雖不因生。因生始滅故不有違。問何故宗同品中所作。即言曾有。因同品中無常。不言曾有。答因為順成宗。瓶有所作。當無常生非滅相起。不言瓶生曾有滅。問若同定有。是曾非現。應隨一攝等因現非有。答不言唯定曾有因性。隨一現有定義何違。二解無常。后解為勝。問云何因望宗上。言遍是宗法性。不言遍是宗品性。同異二喻俱言品耶。答因即宗法。體義分故。更無別聚。故云宗法。同異二喻。別聚類法。故得名品。又解。因為成宗云宗法性。不成二喻。故二言品。問但云同品。何須定有性等耶。答若不言定有性。即喻有能立不成過。不顯因第二相故。若言定有性。不言同品。亦非正顯因第二相。即有不定相違過。今為明因第二相故。雙言同品定有性也。何者是也。欲作此句。先敘陳那九句之義。方可於中而自聊簡。九句義者。彼次頌言。宗法于同品。謂有非有俱。于異品各三。有非有及二。此解因法。于同異品。謂于同品。有非有有非有各有三句。于異法中。亦各有三句。何者是因望於何宗。彼理門云。常無常勤勇恒住堅牢性非勤遷不變。由所量等九。此即宗也。由者第三囀于聲。由以因法。為能成之具。故宗有九。所量作無常作性聞勇發無常勇無觸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『即是滅相』（『滅相』指事物消滅的現象）。如果斷定事物具有『定有性』（『定有性』指事物必然存在的性質），那麼就是斷定它『曾有性』（『曾有性』指事物過去存在過的性質）。通過觀察結果可以推知原因，但不能說它『當有性』（『當有性』指事物將來會有的性質）。雖然事物不是因為原因而產生，但因為原因產生才開始消滅，所以說『不有』（『不有』指事物不存在）並不矛盾。 問：為什麼在宗（『宗』指論題）的同品（『同品』指與論題性質相同的例子）中所作（『所作』指有為法，即由因緣和合而成的現象），就說是『曾有』，而在因（『因』指理由）的同品中無常（『無常』指事物變化不定的性質），卻不說『曾有』呢？ 答：因為這是爲了順應宗的成立。瓶子有所作，當無常生起時，並不是滅相生起。所以不說瓶子產生時，滅相曾有。 問：如果和『定有』相同，是『曾有』而不是『現』（『現』指現在存在），那麼應該被『隨一攝』（『隨一攝』指被其中一種情況包含）等因（『因』指理由）所包含，現在不是『有』（『有』指存在）。 答：我們沒有說只有『定有』才具有『因性』（『因性』指作為理由的性質），『隨一現有』（『隨一現有』指在任何一種情況下都存在）的定義有什麼矛盾呢？ 第二種解釋『無常』，后一種解釋更為優勝。 問：為什麼因在宗上，說是『遍是宗法性』（『遍是宗法性』指因普遍存在於宗的性質中），而不說『遍是宗品性』（『遍是宗品性』指因普遍存在於宗的類別中）呢？同喻（『同喻』指與論題相似的例子）和異喻（『異喻』指與論題相異的例子）都說是『品』嗎？ 答：因就是宗的法，是本體和意義的區分，沒有其他的聚合，所以說是『宗法』。同喻和異喻是不同的聚合類別法，所以可以稱為『品』。另一種解釋是，因為因是爲了成立宗，所以說是『宗法性』，不能成立同喻和異喻，所以同喻和異喻才說是『品』。 問：只說『同品』，為什麼需要『定有性』等呢？ 答：如果不說『定有性』，那麼比喻就有了『能立不成過』（『能立不成過』指不能成立論證的過失），不能明顯地顯示因的第二相（『因的第二相』指因必須在同品中存在）。如果說『定有性』，而不說『同品』，也不是正確地顯示因的第二相，就會有『不定相違過』（『不定相違過』指理由不確定且與論題相違背的過失）。現在爲了闡明因的第二相，所以同時說『同品定有性』。 這是什麼意思呢？想要作出這個句子，先敘述陳那（Dignāga）的九句之義，才能在其中自己稍微簡略。九句的意義是，他的頌詞說：『宗法于同品，謂有非有俱，于異品各三，有非有及二。』這是解釋因法在同品和異品中，在同品中，有、非有、有非有各有三句，在異法中，也各有三句。什麼是因，相對於什麼宗呢？他的《理門論》（Hetucakraḍamaru）說：『常無常勤勇恒住堅牢性非勤遷不變，由所量等九。』這就是宗。『由』是第三囀于聲（第三囀于聲指梵文語法中的第三格），因為用因法作為能成立的工具，所以宗有九種。所量作無常作性聞勇發無常勇無觸。
【English Translation】 English version 'That is the aspect of cessation' ('aspect of cessation' refers to the phenomenon of things ceasing to exist). If it is determined that things have 'definite existence' ('definite existence' refers to the nature of things necessarily existing), then it is determined that they have 'past existence' ('past existence' refers to the nature of things that existed in the past). By observing the result, the cause can be inferred, but it cannot be said that it has 'future existence' ('future existence' refers to the nature of things that will exist in the future). Although things are not produced because of the cause, they begin to cease because of the cause, so saying 'non-existence' ('non-existence' refers to the non-existence of things) is not contradictory. Question: Why is it said that what is 'produced' ('produced' refers to conditioned phenomena, i.e., phenomena that arise from the combination of causes and conditions) in the similar instances ('similar instances' refer to examples with the same nature as the thesis) of the thesis ('thesis' refers to the proposition to be proved) is 'past existence', but in the similar instances of the reason ('reason' refers to the justification), impermanence ('impermanence' refers to the nature of things being constantly changing) is not said to be 'past existence'? Answer: Because this is to comply with the establishment of the thesis. When a pot is produced, the aspect of cessation does not arise when impermanence arises. Therefore, it is not said that when a pot is produced, the aspect of cessation existed in the past. Question: If it is the same as 'definite existence', it is 'past existence' and not 'present' ('present' refers to existing now), then it should be included in 'inclusion by one' ('inclusion by one' refers to being included in one of the situations) and other reasons ('reasons' refers to the justification), and now it is not 'existence' ('existence' refers to existing). Answer: We did not say that only 'definite existence' has the 'nature of reason' ('nature of reason' refers to the nature of being a justification), what contradiction is there in the definition of 'existence in any one' ('existence in any one' refers to existing in any one situation)? The second explanation of 'impermanence' is superior to the previous one. Question: Why is it said that the reason in the thesis is 'pervading the nature of the thesis' ('pervading the nature of the thesis' refers to the reason universally existing in the nature of the thesis), and not 'pervading the category of the thesis' ('pervading the category of the thesis' refers to the reason universally existing in the category of the thesis)? Are both similar examples ('similar examples' refer to examples similar to the thesis) and dissimilar examples ('dissimilar examples' refer to examples different from the thesis) called 'category'? Answer: The reason is the dharma of the thesis, which is the distinction between the essence and the meaning, and there is no other aggregation, so it is called 'thesis dharma'. Similar and dissimilar examples are different aggregated category dharmas, so they can be called 'category'. Another explanation is that because the reason is to establish the thesis, it is called 'thesis nature', and similar and dissimilar examples cannot be established, so similar and dissimilar examples are called 'category'. Question: Only saying 'similar instances', why is 'definite existence' etc. needed? Answer: If 'definite existence' is not said, then the metaphor has the fault of 'inability to establish' ('inability to establish' refers to the fault of not being able to establish the argument), and the second aspect of the reason ('the second aspect of the reason' refers to the reason must exist in similar instances) cannot be clearly shown. If 'definite existence' is said, but 'similar instances' is not said, it is also not a correct display of the second aspect of the reason, and there will be the fault of 'uncertain contradiction' ('uncertain contradiction' refers to the fault that the reason is uncertain and contradicts the thesis). Now, in order to clarify the second aspect of the reason, 'definite existence in similar instances' is said at the same time. What does this mean? If you want to make this sentence, first narrate the meaning of the nine sentences of Dignāga, so that you can slightly simplify it yourself. The meaning of the nine sentences is, his verse says: 'The thesis dharma in similar instances, called existence, non-existence, and both, in dissimilar instances each three, existence, non-existence, and two.' This is to explain the reason dharma in similar and dissimilar instances, in similar instances, existence, non-existence, and existence and non-existence each have three sentences, and in dissimilar dharmas, each also has three sentences. What is the reason, relative to what thesis? His Hetucakraḍamaru says: 'Permanent, impermanent, diligent, constant, firm nature, non-diligent, changing, unchanging, by what is measured, etc. nine.' This is the thesis. 'By' is the third case in sound (the third case in sound refers to the third case in Sanskrit grammar), because the reason dharma is used as a tool to be established, so there are nine kinds of thesis. What is measured is made impermanent, made nature, heard, brave, issued impermanent, brave, no touch.
。依常性等九。此即因也。依者第五囀從聲。以從所依此常等九宗有九因。以此九因。如次配釋前之九宗。成立比量。為九句義。立量云。聲常是所量性故。同喻如空等。異喻如瓶等。此所量性同異俱有。即此論中共不定也。立聲無常。所作性故。同品如瓶等。異品如空等。此即正因也。立聲是其勤勇所發無常性故。同品瓶等。異品電空等。此無常因。于同品遍有。于異品分無。以于電有。于空是無。即此論中。同品遍有。異品一分轉。立聲為常。所作性故。同品空等。異品如瓶等。此所作因。于同品無。異品遍有。即此論中。法自相相違也。立聲為常。所聞性故。同品空等。此因遍無。異品瓶等。亦遍非有。即此論中。不共不定也。立聲為常。勤勇所發。同品空等無。異品瓶有。于電是無。亦即此論。法自相相違也。立聲非勤勇所發。無常性故。同品電等有。空等是無。異品瓶等。此因遍有。即此論中。同品一分轉異品遍轉。立聲無常。勤勇發性。同品瓶有。電等是無。于異品空。因遍非有。此即正因。立聲為常。無質礙故。同品空有。極微上無。以立極微有質礙故。異品樂有。瓶等因無。即此論中。俱品分轉。問何以得知。第二第八等是正因等。答即理門引云。故本頌云。于同有及二。在異無是因。翻此名相違。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依據常性等九種特性，這就是『因』（hetu，理由、原因）。這裡的『依』是第五格變格的『從』的聲音。因為從所依據的這個常性等九宗，有九種『因』。用這九種『因』，依次配合解釋前面的九宗，成立比量，構成九句意義。 例如，立論說：『聲音是常住的，因為它是可量知的』。同喻（sapaksa，相似例子）如虛空等，異喻（vipaksa，相異例子）如瓶子等。這個『可量知性』在同喻和異喻中都存在，這就是此論中的『共不定』（sadharana-anaikantika，共通不定因）。 立論說：『聲音是無常的，因為它是被製造出來的』。同品（sapaksa，同類例子）如瓶子等，異品（vipaksa，異類例子）如虛空等。這就是『正因』（samyak hetu，正確的理由）。 立論說：『聲音是勤奮努力所發出的，所以是無常的』。同品如瓶子等，異品如閃電、虛空等。這個『無常因』在同品中普遍存在，在異品中部分不存在，因為在閃電中有，在虛空中沒有。這就是此論中的『同品遍有，異品一分轉』。 立論說：『聲音是常住的，因為它是被製造出來的』。同品如虛空等，異品如瓶子等。這個『所作因』在同品中不存在，在異品中普遍存在，這就是此論中的『法自相相違』（svabhava-viruddha，自性相違）。 立論說：『聲音是常住的，因為它是可聽聞的』。同品如虛空等，這個『因』普遍不存在，異品如瓶子等，也普遍不存在，這就是此論中的『不共不定』（asadharana-anaikantika，不共通不定因）。 立論說：『聲音是常住的，因為它是勤奮努力所發出的』。同品如虛空等沒有，異品如瓶子有，在閃電中沒有。這也是此論中的『法自相相違』。 立論說：『聲音不是勤奮努力所發出的，因為它是無常的』。同品如閃電等有，虛空等沒有，異品如瓶子等，這個『因』普遍存在，這就是此論中的『同品一分轉，異品遍轉』。 立論說：『聲音是無常的，因為它是勤奮發出的』。同品如瓶子有，閃電等沒有，在異品虛空中，『因』普遍不存在，這就是『正因』。 立論說：『聲音是常住的，因為它沒有質礙』。同品如虛空有，在極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）上沒有，因為立論說極微有質礙。異品如快樂有，瓶子等『因』沒有，這就是此論中的『俱品分轉』（ubhaya-paksa-vyapaka，俱品分轉）。 問：如何得知第二和第八等是『正因』等？ 答：即理門（Nyaya-mukha，因明入門）中引用說：所以本頌說：『在同品中有，在異品中無，這就是『因』。與此相反，就叫做『相違』（viruddha，相違因）。』
【English Translation】 English version: Based on the nine characteristics such as permanence, etc., this is the 'hetu' (reason, cause). Here, 'based on' is the sound of the ablative fifth case. Because from what is based on, these nine categories such as permanence have nine 'hetus'. Using these nine 'hetus', sequentially matching and explaining the preceding nine categories, establishing inference, constitutes nine sentences of meaning. For example, the proposition states: 'Sound is permanent because it is knowable'. Sapaksa (similar example) is like space, etc., and vipaksa (dissimilar example) is like a pot, etc. This 'knowability' exists in both sapaksa and vipaksa, which is the 'common uncertain' (sadharana-anaikantika) in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is impermanent because it is produced'. Sapaksa (homogeneous example) is like a pot, etc., and vipaksa (heterogeneous example) is like space, etc. This is the 'correct reason' (samyak hetu). The proposition states: 'Sound is produced by diligent effort, therefore it is impermanent'. Sapaksa is like a pot, etc., and vipaksa is like lightning, space, etc. This 'impermanent cause' is universally present in sapaksa and partially absent in vipaksa, because it is present in lightning but not in space. This is 'universally present in sapaksa, partially changing in vipaksa' in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is permanent because it is produced'. Sapaksa is like space, etc., and vipaksa is like a pot, etc. This 'produced cause' is absent in sapaksa and universally present in vipaksa, which is 'self-contradictory nature' (svabhava-viruddha) in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is permanent because it is audible'. Sapaksa is like space, etc. This 'cause' is universally absent, and vipaksa is like a pot, etc., which is also universally absent. This is 'uncommon uncertain' (asadharana-anaikantika) in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is permanent because it is produced by diligent effort'. Sapaksa like space, etc., does not have it, vipaksa like a pot has it, and lightning does not have it. This is also 'self-contradictory nature' in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is not produced by diligent effort because it is impermanent'. Sapaksa like lightning, etc., has it, space, etc., does not have it, and vipaksa like a pot, etc., this 'cause' is universally present, which is 'partially changing in sapaksa, universally changing in vipaksa' in this treatise. The proposition states: 'Sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort'. Sapaksa like a pot has it, lightning, etc., does not have it, and in vipaksa space, the 'cause' is universally absent. This is the 'correct reason'. The proposition states: 'Sound is permanent because it has no obstruction'. Sapaksa like space has it, and paramanu (the smallest unit of matter) does not have it, because the proposition states that paramanu has obstruction. Vipaksa like happiness has it, and the 'cause' of pots, etc., does not have it, which is 'partially changing in both categories' (ubhaya-paksa-vyapaka) in this treatise. Question: How do we know that the second and eighth, etc., are 'correct reasons', etc.? Answer: That is, the Nyaya-mukha (Introduction to Logic) quotes: Therefore, the original verse says: 'What is present in sapaksa and absent in vipaksa is the 'hetu'. The opposite of this is called 'contradictory' (viruddha).'
所餘皆不定。本頌者。或足目所造因明論。或世親所造論軌等中。故知二八句而為正。第四翻第二。第六翻第八。故說為相違。余因通同異。第五俱非有。故說為不定。故作頌云。二八為正因。四六相違攝。所餘皆不定。正似應當知。然此九句狹于天主。闕無相違決定過也。故釋及無三相違。然準論中。具有此過。又復唯依有體法說。不依無體。云依無體者。四六無別。何以故。以第六同品非有。異品有非有。今第四句。若取兔角等。為異品者。亦是同非有異有非有也。作四句者。一者是同品而非定有性。即中三句同品。皆言遍非有故。若取分無。並后三句。以空電極微俱無因故。雖是同品而非有性。若中三句。因有相違不共不定。若后三句除第二句。因有不定。喻闕一支。無能立故。問何不言遍有性。答若言遍有性。即九句中第八非正。彼既是正。故不言遍。二是定有非同品者。三三句中。各除中句。若取全有。即第一第四。及第七句。若取分有。並第三第六第九句。是四六兩句顯因相違。所餘不定。三亦同品亦定有性。即除中三句。若取全初三句。若取分及后三。若簡喻中無能立過。俱是正喻。若簡因過。猶有邪。以遍異品是不定因。除其二八。二八即正因。四非同品非定有性。即三三句中各中句是。若取分者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所剩下的情況都是不確定的。本頌所指的是，或者是足目（Akṣapāda）所造的因明論，或者是世親（Vasubandhu）所造的論軌等。因此可知，第二句和第八句是正確的正因。第四句顛倒為第二句，第六句顛倒為第八句，所以說是相違因。其餘的因，有的與正因相同，有的與正因相異。第五句是同品和異品都不存在，所以說是不定因。因此作頌說：『第二句和第八句是正因，第四句和第六句屬於相違因，其餘的都是不定因，應當知道這個道理。』然而這九句比天主的理論還要狹隘，缺少了無相違決定的過失。所以註釋和論中沒有三種相違因。然而按照論中的說法，具有這種過失。而且僅僅是依據有體法來說，不依據無體法。如果依據無體法，那麼第四句和第六句就沒有區別。為什麼呢？因為第六句是同品非有，異品有非有。現在第四句，如果取兔角等作為異品，也是同品非有，異品有非有。作四句的情況是：一是同品，但不是決定有自性的，即中間三句的同品，都說是普遍非有。如果取部分非有，加上后三句，因為空、電、極微都是無因的緣故，雖然是同品，但不是有自性的。如果是中間三句，因有相違不共不定。如果是后三句，除了第二句，因有不定，比喻缺少一支，沒有能成立的緣故。問：為什麼不說普遍有自性呢？答：如果說普遍有自性，那麼九句中的第八句就不是正確的。因為它已經是正確的，所以不說普遍。二是決定有自性，但不是同品的，三三句中，各除去中間的句子。如果取全部有，即第一句、第四句和第七句。如果取部分有，加上第三句、第六句和第九句。這四句和六句顯示了因的相違。其餘的是不定的。三是既是同品，又是決定有自性的，即除去中間的三句。如果取全部，是前三句。如果取部分，是后三句。如果簡略比喻中沒有能成立的過失，都是正確的比喻。如果簡略因的過失，仍然有邪因，因為普遍異品是不定因。除去第二句和第八句，第二句和第八句就是正因。四是非同品，也不是決定有自性的，即三三句中各中間的句子。如果取部分，那麼... English version All that remains is uncertain. This verse refers to either the epistemological treatise (Nyaya Sutra) composed by Akṣapāda (足目, founder of the Nyaya school) or the treatises on logic composed by Vasubandhu (世親, a famous Buddhist scholar). Therefore, it is known that the second and eighth sentences are the correct valid reasons (hetu). The fourth sentence is the reverse of the second, and the sixth is the reverse of the eighth, hence they are said to be contradictory reasons. The remaining reasons are either the same as or different from the valid reason. The fifth sentence is neither present in the similar instances (sapaksha) nor the dissimilar instances (vipaksha), hence it is said to be an uncertain reason. Therefore, a verse is composed: 'The second and eighth sentences are valid reasons, the fourth and sixth are included in contradictory reasons, the rest are uncertain, this should be known.' However, these nine sentences are narrower than the theory of Ishvara (天主, God), lacking the fault of non-contradictory determination. Therefore, the commentary and the treatise do not have three contradictory reasons. However, according to the treatise, it has this fault. Moreover, it is only based on the existence of entities (bhava-dharma) that it speaks, not based on the non-existence of entities (abhava-dharma). If based on the non-existence of entities, then there is no difference between the fourth and sixth sentences. Why? Because the sixth sentence is non-existent in the similar instances and existent in the dissimilar instances. Now, the fourth sentence, if taking rabbit horns (兔角) etc. as dissimilar instances, is also non-existent in the similar instances and existent in the dissimilar instances. The four sentences are: first, it is a similar instance but not necessarily of a definite nature, that is, the similar instances of the middle three sentences, all saying universally non-existent. If taking partial non-existence, plus the last three sentences, because space (空), lightning (電), and atoms (極微) are all without cause, although they are similar instances, they are not of a definite nature. If it is the middle three sentences, the reason has contradictory, uncommon, and uncertain qualities. If it is the last three sentences, except for the second sentence, the reason has uncertainty, the analogy lacks a branch, and there is no ability to establish. Question: Why not say universally of a definite nature? Answer: If saying universally of a definite nature, then the eighth of the nine sentences is not correct. Because it is already correct, so it is not said to be universal. Second, it is definitely of a definite nature but not a similar instance, in the three sets of three sentences, each excluding the middle sentence. If taking all existence, that is the first, fourth, and seventh sentences. If taking partial existence, plus the third, sixth, and ninth sentences. These four and six sentences show the contradiction of the reason. The rest are uncertain. Third, it is both a similar instance and definitely of a definite nature, that is, excluding the middle three sentences. If taking all, it is the first three sentences. If taking part, it is the last three. If briefly, there is no fault of being able to establish in the analogy, they are all correct analogies. If briefly, there is a fault of the reason, there is still a wrong reason, because the universal dissimilar instance is an uncertain reason. Excluding the second and eighth, the second and eighth are the valid reasons. Fourth, it is neither a similar instance nor definitely of a definite nature, that is, each of the middle sentences in the three sets of three sentences. If taking part, then...
【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2
三三句中各取第二。若取正因。初后三中各中句是。余皆不正。今此四句。非全明因具足三相。但明第二相。故雖四句無有唯正顯第二相。第三句是。問所作即是宗之別法。云何所作于余處轉。答理門云。由彼相似不說異名。言即是此故無有失。此意以喻與宗所作無別故說相似。非說聲上所作在瓶上。故無有失。問既于喻有。云何但說為宗法耶。答此中但說定是宗法。不欲說言唯是宗法。故亦無妨。故理門論亦作是說。
論云異品遍無性者。解如疏述。問何故異品言遍無性。答若不言遍無性。即有相違不定。及異喻能立不遣。故言遍無性。亦作四句聊簡。一是異品非遍無。若言無者簡分轉不得。故言遍無。即三三句中各除中句。第一第三第七第九是不定過。異喻有能立不遣。若第四第六因有相違。異有能立。二是遍無非異喻。即中三句同法喻。是三亦異品亦遍無。即二八也。四非異品非遍無。即除中三初后三句同法喻。是今取初第三。故云異品遍無性也。問此四句簡得正因不。答非但簡得第三相。雖亦異品亦遍無。而不簡得不共不定。問同品但與因同。不與宗同。得名同喻不。答不得。但名同品。以品類故不與宗同。說喻于誰。若與宗同不與因同。亦只名同品。若但因同無所立故。亦異品故。非同品也。然與宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三三句中各取第二。如果取正因，那麼最初、最後的三句中，每組的中間一句是正因，其餘都不是正因。現在這四句，並非完全闡明因的三種特性都具備，只是闡明第二種特性。所以雖然有四句，但沒有一句完全正確地顯現第二種特性，只有第三句是。問：『所作』（karya-hetu，行為因）就是宗（paksha，論題）的別法，為什麼說『所作』可以在其他地方轉變？答：理門（Nyayapravesa，入正理論）中說，因為它們相似，所以不說不同的名稱，說『即是此』，因此沒有錯誤。這個意思是說，比喻（dristanta， दृष्टान्त）和宗的『所作』沒有區別，所以說相似，不是說聲音上的『所作』在瓶子上，所以沒有錯誤。問：既然在比喻中有，為什麼只說是宗法呢？答：這裡只說一定是宗法，不是想說只有宗法，所以也沒有妨礙。所以理門論也這樣說。
論中說『異品遍無性』（vipaksha vyapaka，反例普遍不存在的性質），解釋如同疏述。問：為什麼異品要說『遍無性』？答：如果不說『遍無性』，就會有相違不定（viruddha-anaikantika，矛盾不定）的過失，以及異喻（vaidharmya-dristanta，反例）能夠成立而無法排除。所以說『遍無性』。也作四句來稍微簡別：一是異品並非普遍沒有，如果說沒有，就無法簡別分轉。所以說『遍無』。也就是三三句中各除去中間一句。第一、第三、第七、第九是不定過失，異喻有能成立而無法排除。如果第四、第六因有相違，異喻有能成立。二是普遍沒有但不是異喻，也就是中間三句的同法喻（sadharmya-dristanta，正例）。三是既是異品也普遍沒有，也就是第二和第八句。四是非異品也非普遍沒有，也就是除去中間三句，最初和最後三句的同法喻。現在取最初和第三句，所以說『異品遍無性』。問：這四句能簡別得到正因嗎？答：非但簡別得到第三相，雖然也是異品也普遍沒有，但不能簡別得到不共不定（asadharna-anaikantika，不共不定）。問：同品（sapaksha，同類）只與因相同，不與宗相同，能稱為同喻嗎？答：不能。只能稱為同品，因為是同類，但不與宗相同，說比喻給誰聽呢？如果與宗相同但不與因相同，也只能稱為同品。如果只與因相同，因為沒有所立，也是異品，所以不是同品。然而與宗
【English Translation】 English version Take the second phrase from each of the three-three phrases. If we take the valid reason (hetu), then the middle phrase in each of the first and last three phrases is the valid reason; the rest are not valid. Now, these four phrases do not fully clarify that the three characteristics of a reason are complete, but only clarify the second characteristic. Therefore, although there are four phrases, none of them correctly manifests the second characteristic; only the third phrase does. Question: 'What is produced' (karya-hetu) is a specific property of the thesis (paksha). How can 'what is produced' be transferred elsewhere? Answer: The Nyayapravesa (入正理論) says that because they are similar, different names are not used. Saying 'is this' means there is no error. This means that the 'what is produced' of the example (dristanta) and the thesis are not different, so they are said to be similar. It is not saying that the 'what is produced' in sound is on the pot, so there is no error. Question: Since it exists in the example, why is it only said to be a property of the thesis? Answer: Here, it is only said that it must be a property of the thesis; it is not intended to say that it is only a property of the thesis, so there is no obstacle. Therefore, the Nyayapravesa also says this.
The treatise says 'absence of pervasion in dissimilar instances' (vipaksha vyapaka), the explanation is as in the commentary. Question: Why does the dissimilar instance say 'absence of pervasion'? Answer: If 'absence of pervasion' is not said, then there will be the fault of contradictory uncertainty (viruddha-anaikantika), and the counter-example (vaidharmya-dristanta) can be established and cannot be eliminated. Therefore, 'absence of pervasion' is said. Four phrases are also made to briefly distinguish: First, the dissimilar instance is not universally absent. If it is said to be absent, then the division and transfer cannot be distinguished. Therefore, 'pervasion' is said. That is, remove the middle phrase from each of the three-three phrases. The first, third, seventh, and ninth are the faults of uncertainty, and the counter-example can be established and cannot be eliminated. If the fourth and sixth reasons are contradictory, the counter-example can be established. Second, it is universally absent but not a counter-example, which is the positive example (sadharmya-dristanta) of the middle three phrases. Third, it is both a dissimilar instance and universally absent, which are the second and eighth phrases. Fourth, it is neither a dissimilar instance nor universally absent, which is the positive example of the first and last three phrases, excluding the middle three phrases. Now, take the first and third phrases, so it is said 'absence of pervasion in dissimilar instances'. Question: Can these four phrases distinguish and obtain the valid reason? Answer: It not only distinguishes and obtains the third characteristic, although it is also a dissimilar instance and universally absent, but it cannot distinguish and obtain the non-common uncertainty (asadharna-anaikantika). Question: The similar instance (sapaksha) is only the same as the reason, not the same as the thesis. Can it be called a similar example? Answer: No. It can only be called a similar instance, because it is of the same kind, but it is not the same as the thesis. To whom is the example given? If it is the same as the thesis but not the same as the reason, it can only be called a similar instance. If it is only the same as the reason, because there is nothing to establish, it is also a dissimilar instance, so it is not a similar instance. However, with the thesis
同。雖亦名喻。而亦非真。無能立故。問異法喻與宗同。不與因同。得名異不。答不得。若言得者。同喻無能立。亦得名異品。此既不爾彼云何然。問異無宗有因。得名異品不。答非也。由此又作四句分別。一有異品而有宗無因。即所立不遣過也。二有是異品有因無宗。即九句中各除中句。即能立不遣過也。三是異品有宗因。即俱不遣過也。四是異品無宗因。即三三句中各各中句。是正喻也。又復以因望宗同喻。作四句分別。一有遍是宗法性。而非同品定有性。即九句中中三句。及后三句中初后二句。兼取分全說。若取全者。中三句是。二有同品定有性。而非遍是宗法性。即九句中佛法所說第九句是。以許聲等有質礙故。三亦同品定有。亦遍是宗法。即初后三句。四有非同品定有。非遍是宗法。約聲顯論。第四句是。于中過性思之可知。以因望宗及異法喻。亦有四句。有遍是宗法性。而非異品遍無性。即三三句中各除中句。有是異品遍無性。而非遍是宗法性。約九句闕。通約法作亦得有之。如小乘立聲無常所見性故。異品空無而於宗不有。有亦遍是宗法性。亦異品遍無性。即二八是。有非遍是宗法性。非異品遍無。即聲顯論第四句是。若佛法立第九句是。聲顯相違因。佛法不定攝。又復以因望同異品。而作四句。有是
【現代漢語翻譯】 同（相同）。雖亦名喻（比喻），而亦非真（真實）。無能立故（因為它不能確立任何東西）。 問：異法喻（反例）與宗（論題）相同，不與因（理由）相同，能因此得名『異品』嗎？ 答：不得（不能）。若言得者（如果說可以），同喻（正例）無能立（不能確立任何東西），亦得名異品（也能被稱為反例）。此既不爾（既然不是這樣），彼云何然（那怎麼能那樣呢）？ 問：異（不同）無宗（論題），有因（理由），得名異品（反例）不？ 答：非也（不是）。由此又作四句分別（因此又可以作四句來區分）： 一、有異品（反例）而有宗（論題）無因（理由），即所立不遣過也（即所要建立的論點沒有排除錯誤）。 二、有是異品（反例）有因（理由）無宗（論題），即九句中各除中句（即在九句中各自排除中間的句子），即能立不遣過也（即能確立論點的理由沒有排除錯誤）。 三、是異品（反例）有宗（論題）因（理由），即俱不遣過也（即兩者都沒有排除錯誤）。 四、是異品（反例）無宗（論題）因（理由），即三三句中各各中句（即在三句一組的句子中，每組的中間一句），是正喻也（是正確的例子）。 又復以因望宗同喻（又以理由來觀察論題和正例），作四句分別： 一、有遍是宗法性（普遍具有論題的性質），而非同品定有性（但並非在所有正例中都必然存在）。即九句中中三句（即九句中的中間三句），及后三句中初后二句（以及后三句中的第一個和最後一個句子）。兼取分全說（兼顧部分和整體來說）。若取全者（如果取整體來說），中三句是（就是中間三句）。 二、有同品定有性（在所有正例中都必然存在），而非遍是宗法性（但並非普遍具有論題的性質）。即九句中佛法所說第九句是（即九句中佛法所說的第九句）。以許聲等有質礙故（因為承認聲音等有物質阻礙的緣故）。 三、亦同品定有（也在所有正例中都必然存在），亦遍是宗法（也普遍具有論題的性質）。即初后三句（即最初和最後的三句）。 四、有非同品定有（並非在所有正例中都必然存在），非遍是宗法（也非普遍具有論題的性質）。約聲顯論（就聲音的顯現來說），第四句是（第四句是）。于中過性思之可知（其中的錯誤性質思考一下就可以知道）。 以因望宗及異法喻（以理由來觀察論題和反例），亦有四句： 有遍是宗法性（普遍具有論題的性質），而非異品遍無性（但並非在所有反例中都不存在）。即三三句中各除中句（即三句一組的句子中，各自排除中間的句子）。 有是異品遍無性（在所有反例中都不存在），而非遍是宗法性（但並非普遍具有論題的性質）。約九句闕（就九句來說是缺失的）。通約法作亦得有之（總的來說，按照法則來做也是可以有的）。如小乘立聲無常所見性故（例如小乘宗派認為聲音是無常的，因為它是可見的）。異品空無而於宗不有（反例是空無，但在論題中不存在）。 有亦遍是宗法性（也普遍具有論題的性質），亦異品遍無性（也在所有反例中都不存在）。即二八是（即第二和第八句是）。 有非遍是宗法性（並非普遍具有論題的性質），非異品遍無（並非在所有反例中都不存在）。即聲顯論第四句是（即聲音顯現的第四句是）。若佛法立第九句是（如果佛法建立，則是第九句）。聲顯相違因（聲音顯現是相違的理由）。佛法不定攝（佛法不確定包含）。 又復以因望同異品（又以理由來觀察正例和反例），而作四句：
【English Translation】 Same. Although it is also called 'metaphor' (upama), it is not truly (satya) so, because it cannot establish anything (anupalabdhi). Question: If the dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta) is the same as the thesis (pakṣa) but not the same as the reason (hetu), does it get the name 'dissimilar instance' (vipakṣa)? Answer: It does not (na). If you say it does, then the similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) cannot establish anything, and it can also be called a dissimilar instance. Since this is not so, how can that be? Question: If something is dissimilar (bhinnā), lacks a thesis (pakṣa), but has a reason (hetu), does it get the name 'dissimilar instance' (vipakṣa)? Answer: No (na). From this, four distinctions (catuṣkoṭi) are made: 1. There is a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) but there is a thesis (pakṣa) without a reason (hetu), which means the established point does not eliminate the fault (sādhyāvyāvṛtti). 2. There is a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) with a reason (hetu) but without a thesis (pakṣa), which means each of the nine possibilities (navakoṭi) excludes the middle one, which means the establishing reason does not eliminate the fault (sādhanāvyāvṛtti). 3. It is a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) with a thesis (pakṣa) and a reason (hetu), which means both do not eliminate the fault. 4. It is a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) without a thesis (pakṣa) and a reason (hetu), which means each middle possibility in the three sets of three (trika), which is a correct example (samyag-dṛṣṭānta). Furthermore, considering the reason (hetu) in relation to the thesis (pakṣa) and similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), four distinctions are made: 1. There is something that pervades the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) but is not necessarily present in the similar instance (sapakṣa-nityatva). This refers to the middle three possibilities in the nine possibilities, and the first and last two possibilities in the last three possibilities. Considering both partial and complete statements. If we take the complete statement, it is the middle three possibilities. 2. There is something that is necessarily present in the similar instance (sapakṣa-nityatva) but does not pervade the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva). This refers to the ninth possibility spoken of in the Buddhist teachings among the nine possibilities, because it admits that sound, etc., have material obstruction. 3. It is necessarily present in the similar instance (sapakṣa-nityatva) and also pervades the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva). This refers to the first and last three possibilities. 4. There is something that is not necessarily present in the similar instance (sapakṣa-nityatva) and does not pervade the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva). Regarding the manifestation of sound (śabda), it is the fourth possibility. The nature of the fault within it can be known through reflection. Considering the reason (hetu) in relation to the thesis (pakṣa) and dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta), there are also four distinctions: There is something that pervades the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) but is not entirely absent in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa-vyāpakābhāva). This refers to each excluding the middle possibility in the three sets of three. There is something that is entirely absent in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa-vyāpakābhāva) but does not pervade the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva). This is missing in the nine possibilities. Generally speaking, it can also exist by acting according to the Dharma. For example, the Theravada (Hinayana) school establishes that sound is impermanent because it is visible. The dissimilar instance is empty and non-existent, but it does not exist in the thesis. There is something that pervades the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) and is also entirely absent in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa-vyāpakābhāva). This refers to the second and eighth possibilities. There is something that does not pervade the property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) and is not entirely absent in the dissimilar instance (vipakṣa-vyāpakābhāva). This refers to the fourth possibility in the manifestation of sound. If the Buddhist Dharma establishes it, it is the ninth possibility. The manifestation of sound is a contradictory reason (viruddha-hetu). The Buddhist Dharma does not definitely include it (anaikāntika). Furthermore, considering the reason (hetu) in relation to the similar (sapakṣa) and dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), four distinctions are made:
同品定有。非異品遍無。初后三句中各除中句。有是異無非同定有。即中三中句是不定因。三有同定有亦異遍無。即初后三句中各除初后。此是正因。四俱非有。即中三句取其初后。即相違因。若取分說等準此可知。然別作法。不可依此九句而作。問此論之中因后二相。于理門論何句所收耶。有答云。此之二相。唯是第二第八二收。今謂。此對理未必然。若總問因。此之二因唯彼二八。若約相辨同有異無。即后二相何唯二八。若第二相初后各三。若第三相三三各中。皆是同有異品無故。問彼九句中。何故無此餘三相違。答誰言不攝餘三相違。準文如是立聲為常。所作勤勇二法為因。唯法自相豈名為余。若不明四。次下攝頌何故云耶。證法有法自性或差別。此成相違因。長行既無別解。總攝於上。故知九因亦有攝四。若云九句有攝四違。如何說言如法成法。不言成有法。又彼九因。望違于常及非勤勇。此但違法。如何攝四。答雖云違有法。實唯成法。如難有性而非有性。難彼意許離實等有。而非有性。故唯成法。此意即顯。理門望為量。成立必須加言。如立大有云有離實等有。更無同喻。有一實等因於同異有。即唯異轉違彼后陳。總名相違。不分自相及與差別攝。頌中雲。耶證法有法。及此論中立四違者。望不加言本意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『同品定有』（在相同的類別中必然存在），『非異品遍無』（在不同的類別中普遍不存在）。在最初和最後的三個句子中，各自排除中間的句子。『有是異無』（存在即不同，不存在即相同）『非同定有』（不是相同的就必然存在），即中間的三個句子是不確定的原因（不定因）。『三有同定有』（三種存在與相同必然存在），『亦異遍無』（也與不同普遍不存在），即最初和最後的三個句子中，各自排除最初和最後的句子。這是正確的理由（正因）。『四俱非有』（四種情況都不存在），即中間的三個句子取其最初和最後的。這是相反的理由（相違因）。如果取部分說明等，可以參照這個來理解。然而，另外設立方法，不能依據這九個句子來做。問題：這個論述中的原因（因）和後面的兩個特徵（二相），在《理門論》中被哪句話所包含？有人回答說：這兩個特徵，僅僅是被第二和第八句所包含。現在我認為，這個對應關係未必必然。如果總的提問原因（因），這兩個原因僅僅是第二和第八句。如果根據特徵來辨別相同存在和不同不存在，那麼後面的兩個特徵為何僅僅是第二和第八句？如果第二個特徵是最初和最後的各三個，如果第三個特徵是三個句子中各自的中間，都是因為在相同的類別中存在，在不同的類別中不存在。問題：在那九個句子中，為什麼沒有其餘三種相反的情況（相違）？回答：誰說沒有包含其餘三種相反的情況？按照文義，像這樣設立聲音是常住的，所作和勤奮努力兩種法作為原因（因），僅僅是法的自相，怎麼能稱為其餘？如果不明白四種情況，下面的偈頌為什麼說呢？『證明法、有法、自性或者差別』，這構成了相反的原因（相違因）。長行沒有另外的解釋，總的包含在上面。所以知道九個原因（因）也包含了四種相反的情況（相違）。如果說九個句子包含了四種相反的情況（相違），如何說『如法成法』，不說『成有法』？而且那九個原因（因），相對於常住和非勤奮努力來說，這僅僅是違背了法，如何包含四種情況？回答：雖然說違背了有法，實際上僅僅是成就了法。比如難以具有的性質而不是具有的性質，難以允許離開真實等而存在，而不是具有的性質，所以僅僅是成就了法。這個意思就是顯示，理門希望作為量，成立必須加上言語。比如設立大有，說有離開真實等而存在，更沒有相同的比喻。有一個真實等的原因（因）在於相同和不同存在，僅僅是不同的轉變違背了後面的陳述，總的名稱是相反，不區分自相以及差別。偈頌中說：『證明法、有法』，以及這個論述中設立四種相反的情況（相違）的人，希望不加上言語的本意。 English version 'Samānajāti niyatam asti' (necessarily exists in the same category), 'vipakṣe vyāpakam nāsti' (universally does not exist in different categories). In the first and last three sentences, each excludes the middle sentence. 'Asti bhinnam nāsti' (existence is different, non-existence is the same), 'na samam niyatam asti' (what is not the same necessarily exists), that is, the middle three sentences are uncertain reasons (hetu anaikāntika). 'Tri-asti samam niyatam asti' (three existences are the same and necessarily exist), 'api bhinnam vyāpakam nāsti' (also different and universally do not exist), that is, in the first and last three sentences, each excludes the first and last sentences. This is the correct reason (hetu sat). 'Catuḥ sarvam nāsti' (four all do not exist), that is, the middle three sentences take their first and last. This is the contradictory reason (hetu viruddha). If taking partial explanations etc., one can refer to this to understand. However, establishing methods separately, one cannot rely on these nine sentences to do. Question: In this treatise, the reason (hetu) and the two subsequent characteristics (dve rūpe), in the Nyāyamukha-śāstra, which sentence contains them? Some answer: These two characteristics are only contained by the second and eighth sentences. Now I think that this correspondence is not necessarily certain. If generally asking about the reason (hetu), these two reasons are only the second and eighth sentences. If distinguishing the same existence and different non-existence according to characteristics, then why are the latter two characteristics only the second and eighth sentences? If the second characteristic is the first and last three each, if the third characteristic is the middle of each of the three sentences, it is because they exist in the same category and do not exist in different categories. Question: In those nine sentences, why are there no remaining three contradictory situations (viruddha)? Answer: Who said that the remaining three contradictory situations are not included? According to the meaning of the text, like this, establishing sound as permanent, the made and diligent effort two dharmas as the reason (hetu), are only the self-nature of the dharma, how can they be called the remaining? If not understanding the four situations, why does the following verse say? 'Proving dharma, dharmin, self-nature or difference', this constitutes the contradictory reason (viruddha hetu). The long passage has no other explanation, generally included above. Therefore, knowing that the nine reasons (hetu) also include the four contradictory situations (viruddha). If saying that the nine sentences include the four contradictory situations (viruddha), how to say 'like dharma accomplishing dharma', not saying 'accomplishing dharmin'? Moreover, those nine reasons (hetu), relative to permanence and non-diligent effort, this only violates the dharma, how to include the four situations? Answer: Although saying violating dharmin, in reality only accomplishing dharma. For example, the nature of being difficult to have rather than the nature of having, difficult to allow existing apart from reality etc., rather than the nature of having, therefore only accomplishing dharma. This meaning is to show that the Nyāyamukha-śāstra hopes to be a measure, establishing must add language. For example, establishing great existence, saying existence exists apart from reality etc., there is no same metaphor. There is a real etc. reason (hetu) in the same and different existence, only different transformation violates the subsequent statement, the general name is contradictory, not distinguishing self-nature and difference. The verse says: 'Proving dharma, dharmin', and those who establish the four contradictory situations (viruddha) in this treatise, hope for the original intention of not adding language.
【English Translation】 'The presence of the same kind is definite' (Samānajāti niyatam asti), 'the absence of a different kind is universal' (Vipakṣe vyāpakam nāsti). In the first and last three sentences, each excludes the middle sentence. 'Existence is different, absence is the same' (Asti bhinnam nāsti), 'not the same is definitely existent' (Na samam niyatam asti), that is, the middle three sentences are uncertain reasons (anaikāntika-hetu). 'Three existences are the same and definitely existent' (Tri-asti samam niyatam asti), 'also different and universally absent' (Api bhinnam vyāpakam nāsti), that is, in the first and last three sentences, each excludes the first and last sentences. This is the correct reason (samyak-hetu). 'All four are non-existent' (Catuḥ sarvam nāsti), that is, the middle three sentences take their first and last. This is the contradictory reason (viruddha-hetu). If taking partial explanations, etc., one can understand this by analogy. However, establishing methods separately, one cannot rely on these nine sentences to do so. Question: In this treatise, the reason (hetu) and the two subsequent characteristics (lakṣaṇa-dvaya), in the Hetuvidyā-śāstra (Nyāyamukha), which sentence contains them? Some answer: These two characteristics are only contained by the second and eighth sentences. Now I say that this correspondence is not necessarily certain. If generally asking about the reason (hetu), these two reasons are only the second and eighth sentences. If distinguishing the same existence and different non-existence according to characteristics, then why are the latter two characteristics only the second and eighth sentences? If the second characteristic is the first and last three each, if the third characteristic is the middle of each of the three sentences, it is because they exist in the same category and do not exist in different categories. Question: In those nine sentences, why are there no remaining three contradictory situations (viruddha)? Answer: Who said that the remaining three contradictory situations are not included? According to the meaning of the text, like this, establishing sound as permanent, the made and diligent effort two dharmas as the reason (hetu), are only the self-nature of the dharma, how can they be called the remaining? If not understanding the four situations, why does the following verse say? 'Proving dharma, dharmin, self-nature or difference', this constitutes the contradictory reason (viruddha-hetu). The long passage has no other explanation, generally included above. Therefore, knowing that the nine reasons (hetu) also include the four contradictory situations (viruddha). If saying that the nine sentences include the four contradictory situations (viruddha), how to say 'like dharma accomplishing dharma', not saying 'accomplishing dharmin'? Moreover, those nine reasons (hetu), relative to permanence and non-diligent effort, this only violates the dharma, how to include the four situations? Answer: Although saying violating dharmin, in reality only accomplishing dharma. For example, the nature of being difficult to have rather than the nature of having, difficult to allow existing apart from reality, etc., rather than the nature of having, therefore only accomplishing dharma. This meaning is to show that the Hetuvidyā (science of reasoning) hopes to be a measure, establishing must add language. For example, establishing great existence, saying existence exists apart from reality, etc., there is no same metaphor. There is a real, etc., reason (hetu) in the same and different existence, only different transformation violates the subsequent statement, the general name is contradictory, not distinguishing self-nature and difference. The verse says: 'Proving dharma, dharmin', and those who establish the four contradictory situations (viruddha) in this treatise, hope for the original intention of not adding language.
所爭。言陳意許故有四種。問若違意許離實有。即違言陳不無有。此乃雙違。如何但言違有法自相。答不爾。何以故。如法差別。言陳他用他有真假。二各有體。違真成假仍不違他。但名差別。今此不無無即離二。彼意許者。即此言陳不無之有。不別有彼意許大有。故違所諍。正違言顯。故但名違有法自相。問以更無別名違自相。作有緣性亦應同然。答夫論差別。要有二等方名差別。如立他用意許他中。有其真假名法差別。今此有中無即離二。故違所爭。即名違自相。以作有緣性。作非有緣性。各有別體。雖違作有緣性。作非有緣性存。無彼即離二有。違有更無別有。故名違有法自相。以斯研究深契幽微。后哲若披可為龜鏡。問何故九句無相違決定。答理門頌中據別而說。不對許有聲性論者。立所作因。故九中無故。彼中難所聞性因。若對許有聲性是常。此應成因。此難不共不定。準此故知。不約對二。彼論長行及此論中。據二宗對故。有相違決定。然正釋文準釋異品。同於同品應言。同品者。謂所立法均等義品。說名同品。若有所作見彼無常。解異品中。亦應云異品者。謂於是處無其所立說名異品。此即論主。欲詞約理繁互顯故爾。有問云。若是正因要具三相耶。若言具者。如掌珍論立真性有為空。以緣生故如幻。
此無異品應非正因。即自解云。具三相者必是正因。自有正因不必具三相。此釋全非。誰言此因不具三相。既無異品有法。即因不濫行。豈非異品遍無之相。若闕此相是真因者。諸不定因皆闕此相。亦應名正。又若具三。皆正因者。決定相違應正因攝。又復此量亦非正因。成唯識說為似量故。出此量非如唯識抄。
解喻。問詮喻之言。及此喻體。為俱喻耶。答準宗義言既為宗者。喻言及喻俱喻何失。問若爾何者為言生因體。若云詮因者為言生因體。詮喻言非。即喻應非因第二相。既第二相亦應言因。答有二解。一云。詮宗因喻言。皆言生因。皆能令敵。者了宗智起。故此論云。由宗因喻多言。開示諸有問者未了義故。若爾即應無宗喻別。答望義有別。言生他智名言生因。故三皆是為他所成。名為宗支。正助成宗說名因喻。由喻助因曉宗義故。故三言別。二云。除詮宗言。非因相故。因喻果故。唯詮因喻言為生因。正生他智此解為正。問因亦曉宗應名為喻。答因雖正為成宗。未舉共許已顯了義。曉宗未明。舉有此因定有所立。方為比類。故因非喻。問舉因宗未顯。因不得喻名。陳因智未生。非言生因攝。答爾。言因必對果。無果是誰因。故敵智未生。非是言生攝。
言顯因同品決定有性。有云。顯因同品決
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這個『無異品』（沒有反例）的論證並非正確的理由（正因）。有人自作解釋說，具備三種特徵（三相）的論證必然是正確的理由，但有正確的理由不一定具備三種特徵。這種解釋完全錯誤。誰說這個理由不具備三種特徵？既然沒有反例，並且在有法（論題所指的對象）中存在，那麼這個理由就不會氾濫（不周遍），難道不是在反例中完全不存在的特徵嗎？如果缺少這個特徵也能成為真正的理由，那麼所有不確定的理由都缺少這個特徵，也應該被稱為正確的理由。而且，如果具備三種特徵就都是正確的理由，那麼決定性的矛盾也應該被納入正確的理由之中。此外，這個論證也不是正確的理由，因為《成唯識論》中說它是相似的論證。提出這個論證並非像《唯識抄》那樣。
解釋比喻（喻支）。問：詮釋比喻的言辭和這個比喻的本體，是都屬於比喻嗎？答：按照宗義來說，既然是作為論宗（宗支）的，那麼比喻的言辭和比喻的本體都屬於比喻，有什麼不對嗎？問：如果是這樣，那麼哪個是言語產生原因的本體？如果說是詮釋原因（因支）的言辭是言語產生原因的本體，那麼詮釋比喻的言辭就不是。這樣，比喻就不應該具有原因的第二種特徵（同品定有性）。既然第二種特徵也應該是言語的原因。答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，詮釋論宗、原因、比喻的言辭，都是言語產生的原因，都能使對方瞭解，使對方產生對論宗的智慧。所以這部論典說，通過論宗、原因、比喻的多種言辭，來開示那些有疑問的人尚未了解的意義。如果是這樣，那麼論宗和比喻就沒有區別了。答：從作用上來說是有區別的。言語產生他人的智慧，稱為言語產生的原因。所以這三者都是爲了他人而成立的，被稱為論宗的組成部分。正確地輔助成立論宗的，稱為原因和比喻。因為比喻輔助原因來使人明白論宗的意義。所以這三種言辭是有區別的。另一種說法是，除了詮釋論宗的言辭，因為它不是原因的特徵。因為有原因、比喻和結果的關係，只有詮釋原因和比喻的言辭才是言語產生的原因，才能真正產生他人的智慧。這種解釋是正確的。問：原因也能使人明白論宗，應該被稱為比喻。答：原因雖然是爲了成立論宗，但沒有舉出共同認可的、已經顯明的意義，使人明白論宗還不明確。舉出有這個原因就一定有所成立的，才算是比類。所以原因不是比喻。問：舉出原因，論宗還不明顯，原因就不能得到比喻的名稱。陳述原因，智慧還沒有產生，就不屬於言語產生的原因。答：是的。言語的原因必然對應結果，沒有結果是誰的原因呢？所以對方的智慧還沒有產生，就不是言語產生的原因。
言語顯示原因在同品中必定存在。有人說，顯示原因在同品中必定存在
【English Translation】 English version: This 'absence of dissimilar instances' (An異品, absence of counterexamples) inference is not a correct reason (正因, valid reason). Someone explains it themselves, saying that what possesses three characteristics (三相, three aspects) must be a correct reason, but having a correct reason does not necessarily mean possessing three characteristics. This explanation is completely wrong. Who says that this reason does not possess three characteristics? Since there are no dissimilar instances and it exists in the subject of the argument (有法, locus of the argument), then this reason will not be indiscriminate (不周遍, non-overextended), isn't it the characteristic of being completely absent in dissimilar instances? If lacking this characteristic can also be a true reason, then all uncertain reasons lack this characteristic and should also be called correct reasons. Moreover, if possessing three characteristics are all correct reasons, then decisive contradictions should also be included in correct reasons. Furthermore, this inference is also not a correct reason, because the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (成唯識論, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) says it is a similar inference. Presenting this inference is not like the Yuishiki Shō (唯識抄, Notes on Consciousness-Only).
Explaining the example (喻支, example limb). Question: Do the words that explain the example and the substance of this example both belong to the example? Answer: According to the tenets of the proposition (宗義, tenet of the proposition), since it is serving as a proposition (宗支, proposition limb), what is wrong with the words of the example and the substance of the example both belonging to the example? Question: If that is the case, then which is the substance that generates the cause of speech? If it is said that the words that explain the reason (因支, reason limb) are the substance that generates the cause of speech, then the words that explain the example are not. In this way, the example should not have the second characteristic of the reason (同品定有性, invariable concomitance with similar instances). Since the second characteristic should also be the cause of speech. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the words that explain the proposition, reason, and example are all the cause of speech, and all can make the opponent understand, causing the opponent to generate wisdom about the proposition. Therefore, this treatise says that through the multiple words of the proposition, reason, and example, it reveals the meanings that those who have questions have not yet understood. If that is the case, then there would be no distinction between the proposition and the example. Answer: There is a distinction in terms of function. Speech that generates the wisdom of others is called the cause of speech generation. Therefore, these three are all established for the sake of others and are called the components of the proposition. Correctly assisting in establishing the proposition is called the reason and the example. Because the example assists the reason in making people understand the meaning of the proposition. Therefore, these three words are different. Another explanation is that, except for the words that explain the proposition, because it is not a characteristic of the reason. Because there is a relationship of reason, example, and result, only the words that explain the reason and the example are the cause of speech generation, and can truly generate the wisdom of others. This explanation is correct. Question: The reason can also make people understand the proposition, so it should be called an example. Answer: Although the reason is for establishing the proposition, it does not present a commonly accepted and already manifest meaning, so making people understand the proposition is not yet clear. Presenting that there is this reason, then something is definitely established, and only then is it a comparison. Therefore, the reason is not an example. Question: Presenting the reason, the proposition is not yet clear, so the reason cannot obtain the name of example. Stating the reason, wisdom has not yet arisen, so it does not belong to the cause of speech generation. Answer: Yes. The cause of speech must correspond to a result, and without a result, who is the cause of? Therefore, the opponent's wisdom has not yet arisen, so it is not the cause of speech generation.
Speech reveals that the reason must exist in similar instances. Someone says that revealing that the reason must exist in similar instances
定有性。是顯因第二同品定有性。顯因於宗同品中。決定有此所作因性。本意舉喻為顯因故。今謂不爾應云顯因同品。即除因余所作。決定有性。即所立無常性。如解宗同品。舉余無常。為同品故。若不爾者。何故。前解宗同品。云如立無常。瓶等無常。是名同品。應解喻中言。謂若所作。瓶等中見彼所作。或應謂。若無常見彼所作。云何乃言。謂若所作。見彼無常。又解因中即舉宗同品。以瓶等無常。說名同品。言定有性。即有所作性。故知解喻言同品者。以瓶所作。為因同品。決定有性。即有所立無常。若解喻中言同品。是宗同品者。此即改動數處論文。即喻文言顯因同法。又下解不定中。此因以樂以空。為同法故。又云。以電瓶等。為同法故。若不有因同品者。如何說言。以樂以空等。又云。謂若所作。見彼無常。又理門論。解同喻等為同法耶。然雖品法宗殊。俱是因類。云第一說因。宗所隨逐。第二說宗無因不有。準此即違多教。又因順成宗。即云宗同品中。有所作性。喻既順因。亦應云因同品中。有無常性。又若同喻。唯同因法。即名同喻。喻闕所立。應非過收。異不離宗。亦應非過。準此即違理。故舊解是。又引理門云。由如是說。能顯示因同品定有性。異品遍無性。故知。言顯因同品決定有性者。是顯
因第二相。于宗同品中。定有性也。此亦不爾。彼文意別。此是彼答詞。彼有難言。復以何緣。第一說因宗所隨逐。第二說宗無因不有。不說因無宗不有耶。言第一者。喻有二種。第一即同喻。何故同喻。即先明因。顯所立隨逐。即此論中。謂若所作。見彼無常。第二類此可知。此牒論主宗。不說因無宗不有者。申難影顯。難同喻何。不說有無常故所作。答云。由如是說。能顯示因同品定有。異品遍無。非顛倒說。此意同品有所作。欲將所作成無常。于無常上。見有所作故。聲上有所作。明非是常。于余常上。不見所作。故於同喻。舉有所作。無常隨故。若云以無常故所作者。便以無常。成其所作。非本所爭。是故同喻等作如是說。但知偏引局文。不解遠尋深意其類猶執指求兔。于自豈不誤哉。又有解云。言說因宗所隨者。立喻宣說次第。非正明體。故同於前。顯第二相。此亦不然。理門論云。如是已辨。因及似因。喻今當說。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。此二名譬喻。余皆此相似。此正出體。豈依立說。若依者說。應云此二說譬喻。又明喻體是非。豈直明其言說。又正明喻。喻具二立。方名正喻。若唯明因第二者。豈唯一立。即為正喻。又云。既言顯因同品。同品即宗相對。若所作相類。應名同法定有性。故下云。此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為第二相，在宗（paksha，論題）的同品（sapaksha，相似實例）中，確定具有這種性質。但這裡並非如此，那段文字的意思不同。這是對彼方提問的回答。彼方曾提出疑問：『又根據什麼緣由，第一句說因（hetu，理由）隨逐于宗，第二句說宗沒有因就不存在，而不說因沒有宗就不存在呢？』 說到第一句，譬喻（dristanta，例子）有兩種。第一種就是同喻（sadharmya-dristanta，肯定例）。為什麼是同喻呢？因為先闡明因，顯示所立的隨逐關係。就像這個論證中說的，『如果有所作性（krtakatva，被製造性），就能看到它是無常的（anitya，無常）』。第二類可以依此類推。這裡是論主重申宗，不說『因沒有宗就不存在』，是爲了進一步闡明疑問，顯示出疑問與同喻的矛盾之處。為什麼不同喻說『因為無常所以有所作』呢？ 回答說，像這樣說，能夠顯示因在同品中確定存在，在異品（vipaksha，相異實例）中普遍不存在，而不是顛倒過來說。這個意思是，在同品中有所作性，想要將所作性變成無常性，在無常的事物上，看到有所作性。例如，聲音（shabda，聲音）上有所作性，說明它不是常（nitya，常）。在其餘常的事物上，看不到有所作性。所以在同喻中，舉出有所作性，無常隨之而來。如果說『因為無常所以有所作』，那就變成了用無常來證明所作性，而不是原本要論證的。所以同喻等才這樣說。只是知道片面引用區域性的文字，不理解深遠的含義，就像緣木求魚一樣，對自己難道沒有誤導嗎？ 還有一種解釋說，『說因隨逐于宗』，是確立譬喻時宣說的次第，並非真正闡明本體。所以和前面一樣，顯示第二相。這種說法也不對。《理門論》（Nyayapravesa）中說：『像這樣已經辨別了因和似因（hetvabhasa，似因），現在應當說譬喻。』『說因隨逐于宗，宗沒有因就不存在』，這兩種叫做譬喻，其餘都與此相似。這裡是真正闡明本體，怎麼能依據確立的次第來說呢？如果依據確立的次第來說，應該說『這兩種是說譬喻』。而且闡明譬喻的本體是正確還是錯誤，難道只是闡明它的言說嗎？而且真正闡明譬喻，譬喻具備兩種確立，才能稱為正喻（valid example）。如果只闡明因的第二相，難道只有一種確立，就能成為正喻嗎？ 又說，既然說『顯示因在同品中』，同品就是與宗相對的。如果所作性是相似的，應該叫做『同法定有性』。所以下面說，『此』
【English Translation】 English version Because of the second characteristic, it is definitely present in the same class (sapaksha, similar instances) of the thesis (paksha, the subject of the argument). But this is not the case here; that passage has a different meaning. This is a response to a question posed by the other party. The other party had asked: 'Furthermore, for what reason does the first statement say that the reason (hetu, the justification) invariably accompanies the thesis, and the second statement say that the thesis cannot exist without the reason, but not say that the reason cannot exist without the thesis?' Regarding the first statement, there are two types of example (dristanta, illustration). The first type is the positive example (sadharmya-dristanta, affirmative example). Why is it a positive example? Because it first clarifies the reason, showing the invariable concomitance of what is being established. Just as it is said in this argument, 'If there is createdness (krtakatva, the property of being made), then it is seen to be impermanent (anitya, impermanent).' The second type can be understood in a similar way. Here, the proponent restates the thesis, not saying 'the reason cannot exist without the thesis,' in order to further clarify the question, revealing the contradiction between the question and the positive example. The answer is that saying it in this way can show that the reason is definitely present in the same class and universally absent in the different class (vipaksha, dissimilar instances), rather than saying it in reverse. The meaning of this is that in the same class there is createdness, wanting to turn createdness into impermanence, seeing createdness in impermanent things. For example, sound (shabda, sound) has createdness, indicating that it is not permanent (nitya, permanent). In other permanent things, createdness is not seen. Therefore, in the positive example, createdness is cited, and impermanence follows. If it were said 'because of impermanence, there is createdness,' then it would become using impermanence to prove createdness, rather than what was originally to be argued. Therefore, positive examples and others are stated in this way. Only knowing to quote partial and local texts, not understanding the far-reaching meaning, is like climbing a tree to catch a fish, wouldn't it be misleading to oneself? There is also an explanation that 'saying the reason invariably accompanies the thesis' is the order of declaration when establishing an example, not truly clarifying the essence. Therefore, it is the same as before, showing the second characteristic. This statement is also incorrect. The Nyayapravesa says: 'Having thus distinguished between the reason and the pseudo-reason (hetvabhasa, fallacy of reason), now the example should be discussed.' 'Saying the reason invariably accompanies the thesis, and the thesis cannot exist without the reason,' these two are called examples, and the rest are similar to this. Here, the essence is truly clarified, how can it be based on the order of establishment to say it? If it were based on the order of establishment to say it, it should be said 'these two are saying examples.' Moreover, clarifying whether the essence of the example is correct or incorrect, is it merely clarifying its statement? Moreover, truly clarifying the example, the example possesses two establishments, only then can it be called a valid example. If only the second characteristic of the reason is clarified, can only one establishment become a valid example? Furthermore, since it is said 'showing the reason in the same class,' the same class is relative to the thesis. If createdness is similar, it should be called 'the property of being definitely present in the same class.' Therefore, below it says, 'this'
因以樂以瓶。為同法故。此亦不爾。若言同法。唯因相望者。云何理門。及此論中。俱云喻有二種。一者同法。二者異法。豈可二喻唯望因耶。
喻者。西方云烏播磨。此譯為喻。今因明中后同異支。準西方云達利瑟致案多。此云見邊。為順此方故義言喻。問同異二喻。為即因耶。為當有別。答設爾何失。二俱有失。若即是因。因唯所作。喻中何故兼說無常。若與因別。理門論中。不應難古于因分外。別立二喻。他不應難。若爾喻言。應非異分。顯因義故。又復論主。不應答言。事雖實爾。如前廣引。答應言二喻體。即是因后之二相。如前道理。問后難善釋。前難何通。答因言所作。體含無常。非離所作唯在余法。然所作言。無常義隱。故舉喻體及於喻依。雙顯因中作無常義。以瓶之上有其所作。即無常隨。故此因言所作。明無常隨。是故成宗。聲既即所作。明無常亦隨。又解因唯初相。二喻即后二相。故理門云。雖一切分皆能為因顯了所立。然唯一分且說為因。但以初相顯因猶隱。故約二品有無不同。及二品依。重彰因義。故此二品。即是同有異無。二相方得成因。二喻之中。顯因有處必有果。隨無果不成能立。果若無處。因即不有。明因有無有果。即不成離別。即前因相。雙顯有無即是二喻。理門說即因約
二相說故。二解任情。問因中二品有之與無。與此二喻。體性何別。答即此二喻。前總因體具顯三相。及分因喻。且說初相。以之為因。復有無相即同異喻。理門云。然唯一分且為因故。更有異釋。繁不能敘。當知言喻與因體別。準論知非。不可依信。問因與二喻所依各別。云何因喻即名為一。答所依雖殊。所作無常其義相似。故合為一。因言含故。不同別指瓶空喻依。約依言別。故理門云。云何別法于別亦轉。此難意。云何聲上所作。于別瓶上轉。論主答云。由彼相似不說異名。言即是此故無有失。問同喻即因相。因同於瓶作無常。異喻亦因相。因同於空常非作。答同喻順成因。所作故因。同瓶作無常異。喻反顯以明因。因不同空常非作。問因言所作亦無常。因喻相似可言一。異空是常非所作。不同於因體性殊。答第三因相異遍無。取遮于宗因。不有異喻常空非所作。取遮非表故即因。問同喻作無常。異喻常非作。俱不取彼所依。彼二何收。答隨二能依亦同二攝。若爾即應取彼瓶體為同喻耶。答依無常門。瓶無別體。故亦同喻。瓶依別門故非同喻。義別不可一準。異喻所依亦同此解。有言陳那。不以相似及異為異喻。如何舉空常非作。解云。通有無體舉空非作。非據體說。此解問答不相應也。論文自釋。何繁異計。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二相說的緣故，對二解可以各自根據自己的理解。問：作為原因的二品（指同喻和異喻）存在或不存在，與這兩個比喻（瓶子和虛空）的體性有什麼區別？答：就是這兩個比喻，前面總的因體已經完全顯示了三相（宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性），以及分開來說的因喻，且只說了初相（宗法性），並以此作為原因。又有無相，即同異的比喻。理門中說：『然而只取其中一部分作為原因。』還有其他的解釋，過於繁瑣不能一一敘述。應當知道言語比喻與因體是不同的，按照論證來判斷是非，不可輕易相信。問：原因與兩個比喻所依據的事物各不相同，為什麼原因和比喻可以稱為一體？答：所依據的事物雖然不同，但所產生的無常的性質是相似的，所以可以合為一體。原因這個詞本身就包含了比喻，所以不同於單獨指瓶子和虛空的比喻所依據的事物，因此從所依據的事物來說是有區別的。所以《理門論》中說：『為什麼不同的法在不同的事物上也能成立？』這是責難的意思，即為什麼在聲音上所產生的（無常），也能在不同的瓶子上成立？論主回答說：『由於它們相似，所以不說不同的名稱，言語指的就是這個，所以沒有過失。』問：同喻就是原因的相，原因和瓶子一樣是所作的無常；異喻也是原因的相，原因和虛空一樣是常的非所作。答：同喻順著來成立原因，因為是所作的緣故，原因和瓶子一樣是無常的；異喻反過來顯示來闡明原因，因為原因和虛空不同，是常的非所作。問：原因說是所作也是無常的，原因和比喻相似可以說是一體；異喻是常的非所作，和原因不同，體性差別很大。答：第三因相（異品遍無性）是遮遣宗的，原因不具有異品遍無性，取遮遣宗的原因，不具有異喻的常空非所作，取遮遣非表述，所以就是原因。問：同喻是所作的無常，異喻是常的非所作，都不取它們所依據的事物，那麼這兩個比喻應該歸到哪裡？答：隨著兩個能依據的事物，也同樣歸到兩個範疇中。如果這樣，那麼就應該取瓶子的本體作為同喻嗎？答：從無常的角度來說，瓶子沒有單獨的本體，所以也是同喻；從瓶子所依據的事物來說，所以不是同喻。意義不同，不可一概而論。異喻所依據的事物也可以這樣理解。有人說陳那（Dignāga，古印度佛教邏輯學家），不以相似和不同作為異喻，如何舉出虛空的常非所作？解釋說：普遍的有無體，舉出虛空的非所作，不是根據本體來說的。這個解釋問答不相應。論文自己解釋，何必繁瑣地採用不同的說法呢？
【English Translation】 English version Because of the explanation of two aspects, one can interpret the two explanations according to one's own understanding. Question: Do the two categories (similarity example and dissimilarity example) as the cause exist or not, and what is the difference in nature between these two metaphors (the bottle and the void)? Answer: These two metaphors, the former general cause body has fully shown the three characteristics (presence in the subject, presence in similar instances, absence in dissimilar instances), and the separate cause metaphor, only the first characteristic (presence in the subject) is mentioned, and this is taken as the cause. There is also the absence of characteristics, which is the metaphor of similarity and dissimilarity. The 'Nyaya-mukha' says: 'However, only a part of it is taken as the cause.' There are other explanations, which are too complicated to describe one by one. It should be known that verbal metaphors are different from the cause body, and one should judge right and wrong according to argumentation, and should not easily believe it. Question: The things that the cause and the two metaphors rely on are different, so why can the cause and the metaphor be called one? Answer: Although the things they rely on are different, the impermanent nature of what they produce is similar, so they can be combined into one. The word 'cause' itself contains the metaphor, so it is different from the things that the metaphors of the bottle and the void rely on separately, so there is a difference in terms of the things they rely on. Therefore, the 'Nyaya-mukha' says: 'Why can different dharmas be established on different things?' This is the meaning of blame, that is, why can the (impermanence) produced on sound also be established on different bottles? The author of the treatise replied: 'Because they are similar, different names are not used, and the words refer to this, so there is no fault.' Question: The similarity example is the characteristic of the cause, and the cause is impermanent like the bottle; the dissimilarity example is also the characteristic of the cause, and the cause is permanent and non-produced like the void. Answer: The similarity example follows to establish the cause, because it is produced, the cause is impermanent like the bottle; the dissimilarity example shows the cause in reverse, because the cause is different from the void, it is permanent and non-produced. Question: The cause says that what is produced is also impermanent, and the cause and the metaphor are similar and can be said to be one; the dissimilarity example is permanent and non-produced, which is different from the cause, and the nature is very different. Answer: The third characteristic of the cause (absence in dissimilar instances) is to negate the thesis, and the cause does not have the absence in dissimilar instances, taking the cause of negating the thesis, does not have the permanent void non-produced of the dissimilarity example, taking the negation and not the expression, so it is the cause. Question: The similarity example is the impermanence of what is produced, and the dissimilarity example is the permanence of what is not produced, and neither takes the things they rely on, so where should these two metaphors be classified? Answer: Following the two things that can be relied on, they are also classified into two categories. If so, then should the body of the bottle be taken as a similarity example? Answer: From the perspective of impermanence, the bottle does not have a separate body, so it is also a similarity example; from the perspective of the things that the bottle relies on, it is not a similarity example. The meanings are different and cannot be generalized. The things that the dissimilarity example relies on can also be understood in this way. Some say that Dignāga (an ancient Indian Buddhist logician) does not take similarity and difference as dissimilarity examples, how can the permanent non-produced of the void be cited? The explanation says: The universal existence and non-existence body, citing the non-produced of the void, is not based on the body. This explanation does not correspond to the question and answer. The treatise itself explains, why bother to adopt different statements?
是隨同品言者。有云。同法喻言。顯因隨逐同品處有。名隨同品。以於此言能顯因相第二相故。異品準此。此釋亦非。準破解喻中顯因同品決定有性。類此可悉。
言唯此三分說名能立。問為要具三方成能立。為闕亦是。答設爾何失。二俱有過。若闕亦能何說唯。違廣百論無異成過。若要具者。如大乘立聲無常宗。既無虛空。能依喻闕。豈似能立。如實義者異喻既遮。設無虛空。然非所作及非無常遮義得立。故亦具支。若無異喻言為過者。據因濫說故不相違。此解極妙。問何理得知。無其異喻遮義亦成得成能立。答準理門論云。云何得說彼處此無。此問意如立無常。既一無常空可為異喻。云何可說常上因無。答言。若彼無有于彼不轉。全無有疑。故無此過。答意。若彼常空無有。此因於彼全不轉故。故無有疑。又云。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。由合及離比度義故。由是雖對不立。實有大虛空等。而得顯示無有宗處。無因義成。有依此論及廣百文。判無性攝論。證第七有不共無明。所立量非。以無同喻但異喻顯。缺減性故。又異法喻有倒離過。此亦不爾。不了彼文漫推求故。何理得知彼無同喻。答彼若有者。何故但云不共無明。於五識中無容得有宗。無能對治故。而不舉同類耶。而便舉異喻云。若處有能治。
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", " 這是關於『隨同品』的討論。有人說：『同法喻言』（samāna-dharma-dṛṣṭānta-vacana，以相似的例子來說明），顯示了『因』（hetu，理由、原因）隨著『同品』（sapakṣa，與所立宗義相同的例子）而存在的處所，這被稱為『隨同品』。因為它能在此言論中顯示『因相』（hetvābhāsa，似因）的第二個特徵。『異品』（vipakṣa，與所立宗義不同的例子）可以依此類推。但這種解釋是不對的，應該參照破解『喻』（dṛṣṭānta，例子）時所說的，『因』在『同品』中必定存在。類似的道理可以理解。", "", " 只有這三個部分（宗、因、喻）才能被稱為『能立』（sādhana，論證）。有人問：是否必須具備這三個部分才能構成『能立』？缺少任何一個是否也可以？回答說：如果這樣認為，會有什麼問題？兩種情況都有過失。如果缺少一部分也能成立，那麼為什麼說『唯』（只有）這三個部分？這違反了《廣百論》（Vidyāmātra-siddhi-śāstra）的說法，會犯『無異成過』（anarthāntara，同義反復）的錯誤。如果必須具備這三個部分，那麼就像大乘（Mahāyāna）論證『聲無常』（śabda anitya，聲音是無常的）這個宗義時，因為沒有『虛空』（ākāśa，空間）作為『能依喻』（āśraya-dṛṣṭānta，作為依據的例子），難道還能算是『能立』嗎？實際上，如果『異喻』（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta，反例）已經被排除，即使沒有『虛空』，『非所作』（akṛtaka，非造作）以及『非無常』（anitya，非常）的遮遣意義也能成立，所以仍然具備完整的論證結構。如果缺少『異喻』，會有什麼過失呢？這是因為『因』被濫用，所以並不矛盾。這種解釋非常精妙。有人問：根據什麼道理可以得知，即使沒有『異喻』，遮遣的意義也能成立，從而構成『能立』？回答說：參照《理門論》（Nyāyamukha-śāstra）所說：『如何能說彼處此無？』（katham tatra tad abhāvaḥ?）這個問題就像論證『無常』（anitya，無常）一樣，既然沒有『常』（nitya，常）的『空』（śūnya，空性）可以作為『異喻』，怎麼能說在『常』之上沒有『因』呢？回答說：『如果彼處沒有，此因就不會在彼處起作用』（yadi tatra nāsti, hetus tatra na vartate），完全沒有疑問，所以沒有這個過失。回答的意思是：如果彼處的『常』是空無的，那麼這個『因』就不會在彼處起作用，所以沒有疑問。又說：『前面是遮詮（prasajyapratiṣedha，遣除性否定），後面只是爲了防止濫用』（pūrvaṃ prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ, paścāt kevalam ativyāpti-nivāraṇam），因為有『合』（anvaya，肯定）和『離』（vyatireka，否定）的比度意義。因此，即使針對不成立的觀點，實際上存在著廣大的虛空等，也能顯示出沒有宗義之處，從而使『無因』（ahetu，非因）的意義成立。根據這部論以及《廣百論》的文句，可以判斷《無性攝論》（Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha）證明第七識（末那識，manas-vijñāna）具有『不共無明』（asaṃhāra-avidyā，獨特的無明）所立的量（pramāṇa，量度、證據）是不成立的，因為它沒有『同喻』（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta，正例），只有『異喻』來顯示，具有缺減的性質。而且『異法喻』（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta，反例）有『倒離過』（vyatireka-viparyāsa，倒轉的否定）的過失，但這裡並非如此，因為沒有理解那段文字而隨意推求。根據什麼道理可以得知彼處沒有『同喻』呢？回答說：如果彼處有『同喻』，為什麼只說『不共無明』，在五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）中沒有容納宗義的地方，沒有能對治（pratipakṣa，對治）的法，而不舉出同類的例子呢？卻舉出『異喻』說：『如果某處有能對治的法……』", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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"", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", ], "english_translations": [ "English version:", "These are discussions regarding 'sapakṣa' (同品，similar instances). Some say: 'samāna-dharma-dṛṣṭānta-vacana' (同法喻言, statement of example with similar properties) shows that the 'hetu' (因，reason, cause) exists where 'sapakṣa' (同品，instances similar to the proposition) exists, and this is called 'sapakṣa'. Because it can show the second characteristic of 'hetvābhāsa' (因相，fallacy of reason) in this statement. 'Vipakṣa' (異品，instances dissimilar to the proposition) can be understood analogously. But this explanation is incorrect; it should refer to what is said when refuting 'dṛṣṭānta' (喻，example), that 'hetu' must exist in 'sapakṣa'. Similar principles can be understood.", "", "Only these three parts (proposition, reason, example) can be called 'sādhana' (能立，means of proof). Someone asks: Is it necessary to have all three parts to constitute 'sādhana'? Is it also 'sādhana' if any part is missing? The answer is: If you think so, what problems would arise? Both cases have faults. If it can be established even with a missing part, then why say 'only' these three parts? This contradicts the statement in 'Vidyāmātra-siddhi-śāstra' (廣百論) and commits the error of 'anarthāntara' (無異成過，tautology). If all three parts are necessary, then like in the Mahāyāna's (大乘) argument that 'sound is impermanent' (śabda anitya, 聲無常), since there is no 'ākāśa' (虛空，space) as 'āśraya-dṛṣṭānta' (能依喻，example as a basis), can it still be considered 'sādhana'? In reality, if 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (異喻，counter-example) has been excluded, even without 'ākāśa', the exclusionary meaning of 'akṛtaka' (非所作，uncreated) and 'anitya' (非無常，not impermanent) can be established, so it still has a complete argument structure. If 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' is missing, what faults would there be? This is because 'hetu' is misused, so there is no contradiction. This explanation is very subtle. Someone asks: According to what principle can it be known that even without 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta', the exclusionary meaning can be established, thus constituting 'sādhana'? The answer is: Refer to what is said in 'Nyāyamukha-śāstra' (理門論): 'How can it be said that this is absent in that place?' (katham tatra tad abhāvaḥ?). This question is like arguing for 'impermanence' (anitya, 無常); since there is no 'śūnya' (空，emptiness) of 'permanence' (nitya, 常) that can be used as 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta', how can it be said that there is no 'hetu' on 'permanence'? The answer is: 'If it is absent there, this hetu will not operate there' (yadi tatra nāsti, hetus tatra na vartate), there is absolutely no doubt, so there is no such fault. The meaning of the answer is: If the 'permanence' there is empty, then this 'hetu' will not operate there, so there is no doubt. It is also said: 'The former is exclusionary definition (prasajyapratiṣedha, 遮詮), the latter is only to prevent misuse' (pūrvaṃ prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ, paścāt kevalam ativyāpti-nivāraṇam), because there are the meanings of comparison through 'concordance' (anvaya, 合) and 'difference' (vyatireka, 離). Therefore, even if targeting an unestablished viewpoint, the vast space, etc., actually exists, it can still show that there is no proposition, thus establishing the meaning of 'ahetu' (無因，non-reason). Based on this treatise and the sentences in 'Vidyāmātra-siddhi-śāstra', it can be judged that the 'pramāṇa' (量，means of valid cognition, proof) established by Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (無性攝論) to prove that the seventh consciousness (manas-vijñāna, 末那識) has 'asaṃhāra-avidyā' (不共無明，unique ignorance) is not established, because it lacks 'sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta' (同喻，positive example) and only uses 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' to show it, having a deficient nature. Moreover, 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' has the fault of 'vyatireka-viparyāsa' (倒離過，inverted difference), but this is not the case here, because it is a random pursuit without understanding that passage. According to what principle can it be known that there is no 'sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta' there? The answer is: If there were 'sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta' there, why only say 'asaṃhāra-avidyā', where there is no place to accommodate the proposition in the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, 五識，eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness), and there is no 'pratipakṣa' (能對治，counteracting factor), without citing similar examples? Instead, it cites 'vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta' saying: 'If there is a counteracting factor in a certain place...'", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "",
必定有所作耶。此亦不爾。論略不舉此之同喻。誰謂無同喻異喻顯耶。所以者何。此為設遮。諸小乘執五識中有不共無明。彼自許第六識有能治。即有所治。今約有見道難。不爾大乘五八識中有無漏俱。應有不共。今大乘難。意識起善時不有不共無明。有應成染。不可有無明。設遮彼轉計云。在五識故。立量成眼等識無同喻。如色等後方返顯。必在第七。不得說量。以有過故。若言第七識。必有不共無明。他所別不成。若言不共無明必在第七。他能別不成。此共量故。復設遮云。非於不染意識中有。由彼此應成染性故者。約起善時或諸識為難。設遮彼執在第六識故。約起善時非染識難。謂若與俱由彼。此應成染性故者。此意云。由彼無明。與起善時意識俱故。應當成染。意云。應成不善。與不共俱故。彼既不許故不與俱。五識前遮。故令信有此第七識。可為彼依。由自大乘許自見道平等智生。為能對治。故得令有。若準此義。第七亦能為對治道。唯說第六有離染者。據三乘通說。不爾前量有不定失。為如色等無能治道。眼等識無不共無明。為如汝許。第七無能治道。得與俱耶。然異法喻亦無次第。阿毗達磨性相。為文非次第求。如唯識論中。此例非一。
比量相違亦有自共他。有難余疏云。解違自比不應正理。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『必定有所作為嗎？』回答：『也不是這樣。』論中省略了與此相關的同喻。誰說沒有同喻和異喻來顯明呢？為什麼這樣說呢？這是爲了設定遮止。一些小乘宗派認為五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）中有不共無明（與善法不共存的無明）。他們自己承認第六識（意識）有能對治（能克服無明）的力量，即有所被對治的。現在，我們依據有見道（證悟真理的道路）來提出質疑。如果不是這樣，大乘的五識和八識（阿賴耶識）中都有無漏（沒有煩惱）的功德，應該有不共無明。現在，我們用大乘的觀點來提出質疑：意識生起善念的時候，不應該有不共無明，如果有，就應該變成染污。不可能有無明。假設遮止他們辯解說：『（無明）存在於五識中。』立論來證明眼等識沒有同喻，就像色等事物，之後才反過來顯現，必定存在於第七識（末那識）。不能這樣說，因為有錯誤。如果說第七識必定有不共無明，那麼他所區分的（第七識）就不能成立。如果說不共無明必定存在於第七識，那麼他所區分的（不共無明）就不能成立。這是共同的論證。再次設定遮止說：『不是在不染污的意識中有（不共無明），因為彼此應該變成染污的性質。』這是針對生起善念的時候或者各個識來提出質疑。假設遮止他們認為（無明）存在於第六識中，這是針對生起善念時不是染污的識來提出質疑。如果（無明）與（善念）同時存在，由於它的緣故，這個（意識）應該變成染污的性質。』這裡的意思是說，由於那個無明，與生起善念時的意識同時存在，所以應該變成染污。意思是說，應該變成不善，因為與不共無明同時存在。他們既然不承認這一點，所以（無明）不與（善念）同時存在。先前對五識的遮止，是爲了讓人相信有第七識，可以作為它們的依靠。由於大乘承認自己的見道平等智生起，可以作為能對治的力量，所以才能讓（第七識）存在。如果按照這個意義，第七識也能成為對治的道路。只說第六識有脫離染污的能力，是根據三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）通用的說法。如果不是這樣，前面的論證就有不確定的錯誤，就像色等事物沒有能對治的道路一樣。眼等識沒有不共無明，就像你承認的第七識沒有能對治的道路一樣，可以與（無明）同時存在嗎？然而，異法喻也沒有次第。阿毗達磨的體性和現象，是爲了文章而不是爲了按次第尋求。就像唯識論中，這樣的例子不止一個。
比量相違也有自共他。有難余疏說：『理解違背自己的比量是不合道理的。』
【English Translation】 English version: 『Is there necessarily something being done?』 The answer is: 『It is not like that either.』 The treatise omits the similar analogy related to this. Who says that there are no similar and dissimilar analogies to clarify? Why is it said this way? This is to establish a refutation. Some Hinayana (Small Vehicle) schools hold that there is uncommon ignorance (avidya) in the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). They themselves admit that the sixth consciousness (manas) has the power to counteract (overcome ignorance), that is, there is something being counteracted. Now, we raise a question based on the path of seeing (the path of realizing the truth). If it is not like this, the Mahayana's (Great Vehicle) five consciousnesses and eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) all have unconditioned (without afflictions) merits, there should be uncommon ignorance. Now, we raise a question using the Mahayana's viewpoint: When the consciousness arises with good thoughts, there should not be uncommon ignorance, if there is, it should become defiled. It is impossible to have ignorance. Suppose they refute by saying: 『(Ignorance) exists in the five consciousnesses.』 Establish a thesis to prove that the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses have no similar analogy, just like things such as color, which only manifest in reverse later, must exist in the seventh consciousness (manas). It cannot be said this way because there is a fault. If it is said that the seventh consciousness must have uncommon ignorance, then what he distinguishes (the seventh consciousness) cannot be established. If it is said that uncommon ignorance must exist in the seventh consciousness, then what he distinguishes (uncommon ignorance) cannot be established. This is a common argument. Again, set up a refutation saying: 『It is not in the undefiled consciousness that there is (uncommon ignorance), because they should become defiled in nature.』 This is to raise a question targeting the time when good thoughts arise or the various consciousnesses. Suppose they refute by thinking that (ignorance) exists in the sixth consciousness, this is to raise a question targeting the consciousness that is not defiled when good thoughts arise. 『If (ignorance) exists simultaneously (with good thoughts), because of it, this (consciousness) should become defiled in nature.』 The meaning here is that, because of that ignorance, it exists simultaneously with the consciousness when good thoughts arise, so it should become defiled. The meaning is that it should become unwholesome because it exists simultaneously with uncommon ignorance. Since they do not admit this, (ignorance) does not exist simultaneously (with good thoughts). The previous refutation of the five consciousnesses is to make people believe that there is a seventh consciousness, which can be relied upon. Because the Mahayana admits that its own path of seeing, the arising of equal wisdom, can be used as a counteracting force, it can allow (the seventh consciousness) to exist. If according to this meaning, the seventh consciousness can also become the path of counteraction. Only saying that the sixth consciousness has the ability to be free from defilement is based on the common saying of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna). If it is not like this, the previous argument has an uncertain error, just like things such as color do not have a path to counteract. The eye consciousness and other consciousnesses do not have uncommon ignorance, just like you admit that the seventh consciousness does not have a path to counteract, can it exist simultaneously with (ignorance)? However, the dissimilar analogy also has no order. The nature and phenomena of Abhidharma are for the sake of the text, not for seeking in order. Just like in the Yogācāra theory, there are more than one example of this.
Contradiction in inference also has self, common, and other. Someone difficultly explains in the commentary: 『Understanding the inference that contradicts oneself is not reasonable.』
應言如小乘。立現在諸法離因扶助。獨有力用取等流果。如是方名不正之宗。準自於他共比量中。皆加離因扶助獨五字。方成不正。違大小乘因緣扶助取果之義。故是比量相違所攝。今謂此難非。彼雖成能破。自量還有過失。如實有非實有及世攝因。皆于異品轉。如何名正因。言宗違正因耶。問何名比量相違。答一釋云。以立於宗違正量因。由自共因正故。立量正違此量。云比量相違。問若宗違因立為宗過。如何理門不許立耶。答理門云。諸有說。言宗因相違名宗違者。此非宗過。此意不是宗違于因過。是因喻過約立量破。不遮一切言無宗違因過。舉量云。如立聲常非一切故。約此量辨。古名宗過。陳那云。此量是因喻過。非是宗因相違。又復陳那。不障宗違因過。立比量相違故。但遮古立宗相違。釋義如前。問此立聲常不名宗過者。立瓶為常。應非宗過。俱無常故。答不言立聲常。非比量相違。但對因別。理門望非一切因。因過非宗。以彼不許聲所作故。入理約所作因。宗非因過。對彼許聲是所作故。又解對一切宗瓶常宗過。聲常。非過。有不許聲是所作故。若爾亦有不許于瓶是所作故。即從緣顯了宗。是故前釋勝。
解俱不極成云。我為有法和合因緣為法故以佛法中因緣雖有。為舉和合。取此因緣。故亦不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 應說如小乘那樣，主張現在諸法脫離因的扶助，獨自具有力量而取得同類果報。像這樣才可稱為『不正之宗』。依照自己與他人的共同比量中，都加上『脫離因的扶助』這五個字，才能構成『不正』，違背了大小乘因緣扶助而取得果報的教義。所以這是屬於比量相違所包含的。現在說這種責難並不成立。即使對方成立了能破，自己的立量仍然有過失。如『實有』、『非實有』以及『世攝因』，都在異品中轉，如何能稱為正因？說宗違背正因嗎？ 問：什麼叫做比量相違？ 答：一種解釋是說，因為所立的宗違背了正確的量因，由於自己與他人的因是正確的，所以所立的量違背了這個量，稱為比量相違。 問：如果宗違背了因，就立為宗的過失，為什麼因明學不許可這樣立呢？ 答：因明學說：『如果有人說，宗與因相違叫做宗違，這不是宗的過失。』這裡的意義不是說宗違背了因的過失，而是因和喻的過失，是就立量來破斥，並不是遮止一切說沒有宗違背因的過失。舉例來說，如立『聲是常，因為不是一切』。就這個例子來辨別，古人稱為宗的過失。陳那（Dignāga）說：『這個量是因和喻的過失，不是宗和因相違。』而且陳那不阻礙宗違背因的過失，因為成立了比量相違的緣故，只是遮止古人所立的宗相違。解釋的意義如前所述。 問：如果立『聲是常』不稱為宗的過失，那麼立『瓶子是常』，應該也不是宗的過失，因為兩者都是無常的緣故。 答：不能說立『聲是常』不是比量相違，只是針對因的不同。因明學認為『不是一切』的因，是因的過失而不是宗的過失，因為他們不承認聲音是所作的緣故。入理（Nyāyapraveśa）是就『所作』的因來說，宗不是因的過失，因為他們承認聲音是所作的緣故。另一種解釋是，針對一切宗，瓶子是常是宗的過失，而聲音是常不是過失，因為有人不承認聲音是所作的緣故。如果這樣，也有人不承認瓶子是所作的緣故，就是從因緣顯現了宗，所以前面的解釋更好。 解釋『俱不極成』說：我爲了有法和合因緣作為法，所以在佛法中因緣雖然有，爲了舉出和合，才取這個因緣，所以也不是。
【English Translation】 English version: It should be said like the Hinayana (Small Vehicle), asserting that the present dharmas (phenomena) are independent of the assistance of causes, possessing power on their own to obtain results of the same kind. Only in this way can it be called an 'incorrect tenet'. According to the common inference of oneself and others, adding the five words 'independent of the assistance of causes' is necessary to constitute 'incorrectness', which violates the doctrine of both the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) and Hinayana that causes and conditions assist in obtaining results. Therefore, this belongs to what is included in contradictory inference. Now, it is said that this criticism is not valid. Even if the opponent establishes a refutation, one's own proposition still has faults. For example, 'real existence', 'non-real existence', and 'worldly cause' all operate in dissimilar classes. How can they be called correct causes? Is it said that the tenet contradicts the correct cause? Question: What is called contradictory inference? Answer: One explanation is that because the established tenet contradicts the correct reason of the inference, and because one's own and others' reasons are correct, the established inference contradicts this inference, and is called contradictory inference. Question: If the tenet contradicts the reason, it is established as a fault of the tenet. Why does Hetuvidya (logic) not permit such establishment? Answer: Hetuvidya says: 'If someone says that the tenet contradicting the reason is called tenet contradiction, this is not a fault of the tenet.' The meaning here is not that the tenet contradicts the fault of the reason, but rather the fault of the reason and example. It is to refute based on the established inference, not to prevent all statements that there is no fault of the tenet contradicting the reason. For example, establishing 'sound is permanent because it is not everything'. Based on this example, the ancients called it a fault of the tenet. Dignāga (Dignāga) said: 'This inference is a fault of the reason and example, not a contradiction between the tenet and the reason.' Moreover, Dignāga does not hinder the fault of the tenet contradicting the reason, because contradictory inference is established. It only prevents the anciently established tenet contradiction. The meaning of the explanation is as previously stated. Question: If establishing 'sound is permanent' is not called a fault of the tenet, then establishing 'a pot is permanent' should also not be a fault of the tenet, because both are impermanent. Answer: It cannot be said that establishing 'sound is permanent' is not a contradictory inference, but it is only directed at the difference in the reason. Hetuvidya considers the reason of 'not everything' to be a fault of the reason, not a fault of the tenet, because they do not acknowledge that sound is produced. Nyāyapraveśa (Introduction to Logic) speaks of the reason of 'produced', the tenet is not a fault of the reason, because they acknowledge that sound is produced. Another explanation is that, regarding all tenets, 'a pot is permanent' is a fault of the tenet, while 'sound is permanent' is not a fault, because some do not acknowledge that sound is produced. If so, there are also those who do not acknowledge that a pot is produced, which is why the tenet is manifested from conditions. Therefore, the previous explanation is better. Explaining 'both are not extremely established' says: I take the aggregation of causes and conditions as the dharma for the existing dharma, so although causes and conditions exist in Buddhism, in order to exemplify aggregation, I take these causes and conditions, so it is also not.
成。今問此釋。云何以和合。標取此因緣。若以和合與他作因緣。因緣是法和合成有法。言我何為。若以和合因緣俱為法者。此即一分能別不成。亦非全分。因緣佛法共許有故。應言我是有法。能與和合為因緣是法。若言因緣。非自不許。由言神我能與和合為因緣。即佛法不許。如言釋迦菩薩實不善聲。實不善聲。非大乘不許。約人立有。即是不成。大乘不許釋迦菩薩有不善聲。此因緣亦爾。又和合亦無。故十句論云。我云何。覺樂等。和合因緣起智故為相。此即由與和合作因緣。和合始能。令覺樂等。與我和合。故全名俱不極成。
有解是遣諸法自相門故。云初五為他之所違遣故。如理門說。今謂不爾。彼言非彼相違義遣。即非為他相違義所遣。故理門論云。為此極成現量比量相違義遣。此論云。是遣諸法自相門。即說為能遣。豈以形似之文。皆同一判。今解二論各據一義。理門據現量等力勝。故能遣彼。故離五過方成立宗。此約所立欲強違彼現量等故。以不正能違遣彼故。立此五過名似立宗。
問宗中既有九過。因皆有立不。答初之五違。及能別不成。即兩俱隨一二不成收。如言聲常眼所見故。即違現量自教。及世間等。有云。雖違於此而非因過。此亦不爾。若非因過。何故不成所別不成。即第四不
成。相符極成因中不立。宗須互返立擬果生。若兩俱成虛功為失。所以宗中違過。因必共許。證不極成。許即能成。不許為失。故無相符。問因十四過。宗何不立。答因寬宗狹。過不相攝。望義各別。又設解九過。亦攝因十四過。其五相違。及所別不極成。攝四不成過。又比量相違。攝五不成。除不共不定。相違決定。義顯可悉。如所量因。成立常宗。無常宗有。成無常宗。常宗亦有兩互返故。亦攝四相違。如立聲常。所作故因。雖是違宗。亦違所作及以無常。故攝此九。前解為正。
問同異二喻合有十過。因何故不立。答同喻前三。因第二相過。能立不成所立及俱。即四句中。除第三句亦同品亦定有性。是偏句過。所立不成。或即四相違。能立不成。即四不成。俱不成即合二過。無合倒合義立。無體因過依體。故無彼二。異中前三。即是因中第三相過。所立不遣。即是遍無性非異品。以有所立故。能立不遣。及俱不遣。即是相違。及不定過。不離倒離。亦是義立更無別體。因無彼過。問因十四過。二喻十過。亦攝彼不。答有攝不攝。準前可悉。問宗中何故不立彼十。答同喻所立不成。即宗能別不成。能立不成。即宗現比量。及自教違。非二量教。于彼喻中可知許故。俱不成合前二過。合如因說。異喻疏遠。宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『成』（siddha，已成立）。『相符極成因中不立』（siddha ekadesa hetu，部分成立的因不成立）。宗（paksa，論題）必須互相返回才能確立擬議的結果。如果兩者都成立，那麼虛功就成了失敗。因此，在宗中存在違背之處。因（hetu，理由）必須是雙方都認可的。證（sadhana，證明）不能是部分成立的。如果認可，就能成立；如果不認可，就是失敗。所以沒有相符之處。問：因有十四種過失，為什麼宗不成立？答：因寬泛而宗狹隘，過失不能相互包含。望文生義，各有區別。又假設解釋九種過失，也包含因的十四種過失。其中五種是相違的，以及所區別的部分不成立，包含四種不成立的過失。又比量相違，包含五種不成立，除了不共不定。相違是確定的，意義顯而易見。如所量因，成立常宗（nitya paksa，常住的論題），無常宗（anitya paksa，無常的論題）存在。成立無常宗，常宗也存在，因為兩者互相返回。也包含四種相違。如立聲常（sabda nitya，聲音是常住的），所作故因（krtakatva hetu，因為它是被造作的）。雖然是違背宗的，也違背所作以及無常。所以包含這九種。之前的解釋是正確的。 問：同喻（samanadharmya drstanta，相同例證）和異喻（vaidharmya drstanta，不同例證）合起來有十種過失，為什麼因不成立？答：同喻的前三種，是因中第二相的過失。能立不成所立以及俱，即四句中，除了第三句『亦同品亦定有性』（sapaksa eva niyatam vartate，只存在於同品中），是偏句的過失。所立不成，或者就是四相違。能立不成，就是四不成。俱不成就是合併兩種過失。無合倒合義立，無體因過依體，所以沒有那兩種。異喻中的前三種，就是因中第三相的過失。所立不遣，就是遍無性非異品（vipaksa vyavrtti，在異品中遍無），因為有所立的緣故。能立不遣以及俱不遣，就是相違以及不定過。不離倒離，也是義立，更沒有別的體。因沒有那些過失。問：因的十四種過失，二喻的十種過失，也包含那些嗎？答：有包含有不包含，參照前面可以知道。問：宗中為什麼不成立那十種？答：同喻所立不成，就是宗能別不成。能立不成，就是宗現比量以及自教違，不是二量教，在那些比喻中可以知道允許的緣故。俱不成合並前兩種過失。合併如因所說。異喻疏遠，宗（paksa，論題）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Siddha' (成, established). 'Siddha ekadesa hetu' (相符極成因中不立, partially established reason is not established). The paksa (宗, thesis) must reciprocate to establish the proposed result. If both are established, then the futile effort becomes a failure. Therefore, there is a contradiction in the thesis. The hetu (因, reason) must be mutually accepted. The sadhana (證, proof) cannot be partially established. If accepted, it can be established; if not accepted, it is a failure. Therefore, there is no correspondence. Question: Why are the fourteen faults of the hetu not established in the thesis? Answer: The hetu is broad and the thesis is narrow, and the faults cannot encompass each other. Judging by the meaning, they are different. Furthermore, assuming the explanation of nine faults also includes the fourteen faults of the hetu. Among them, five are contradictory, and the partially unestablished that is distinguished includes the four faults of non-establishment. Furthermore, the inference is contradictory, including the five non-establishments, except for the uncommon and uncertain. The contradiction is definite, and the meaning is obvious. For example, the measured reason establishes the nitya paksa (常宗, permanent thesis), and the anitya paksa (無常宗, impermanent thesis) exists. Establishing the impermanent thesis, the permanent thesis also exists because the two reciprocate. It also includes the four contradictions. For example, establishing 'sabda nitya' (聲常, sound is permanent), the 'krtakatva hetu' (所作故因, because it is created) is the reason. Although it contradicts the thesis, it also contradicts the created and the impermanent. Therefore, it includes these nine. The previous explanation is correct. Question: The samanadharmya drstanta (同喻, similar example) and the vaidharmya drstanta (異喻, dissimilar example) together have ten faults, why is the hetu not established? Answer: The first three of the samanadharmya are the faults of the second aspect of the hetu. 'The establisher does not establish the established and both', that is, in the four sentences, except for the third sentence 'sapaksa eva niyatam vartate' (亦同品亦定有性, only exists in the similar class), which is the fault of the partial sentence. The established is not established, or it is the four contradictions. The establisher is not established, which is the four non-establishments. Both non-establishments are the combination of two faults. There is no combination of inverted combination meaning establishment, and the fault of the reason without substance depends on the substance, so there are not those two. The first three in the vaidharmya are the faults of the third aspect of the hetu. The established is not excluded, which is 'vipaksa vyavrtti' (遍無性非異品, universally absent in the dissimilar class), because there is something to be established. The establisher is not excluded and both are not excluded, which are the contradictory and uncertain faults. Non-separation and inverted separation are also meaning establishment, and there is no other substance. The hetu does not have those faults. Question: Do the fourteen faults of the hetu and the ten faults of the two examples also include those? Answer: There is inclusion and non-inclusion, which can be known by referring to the previous. Question: Why are those ten not established in the thesis? Answer: The established of the samanadharmya is not established, which is that the thesis cannot be distinguished. The establisher is not established, which is that the thesis is directly inferred and contradicts its own teachings, not the two inferences and teachings, because it can be known in those metaphors. Both non-establishments combine the previous two faults. The combination is as the hetu said. The dissimilar example is distant, the paksa (宗, thesis).
中不立。以隔于初因二相故。又異於宗。宗中不立。又釋。宗因喻三。各各別明。不必一切皆須共同。相望而立。此釋為勝。問如論所說為宗九過。一一別明。是因喻中何等過耶。答現量相符。無違因義。隨所舉因當辨其過。比量相違少分。即因四相違。及決定相違攝。同喻能立不成。異喻能立不遣。自教大同比量違說。若世間相違。因不定過。為如肉等。眾生分故。是不凈耶。準理而言。同喻無所立。以不必許貝等是凈。若爾即法自相相違。具等為異。眾生分因於彼轉故。即異喻能立不遣。若說懷兔非月。有故如日等。因喻無過。若云月非懷兔。有故如日等。此亦不定。以兔非無。而復懷兔。故為異喻。有因遍轉。異喻之中。能立不遣。自語相違。后違於前。因中所依不成過。前違於後。無同喻過。隨應舉因。或不定及相違。能別不極成。隨其何因。即四相違。及所餘不定。二喻可知。所別不極成。隨其何因。定有所依不成。所餘不定。未舉因故。若俱不極成。或隨一兩俱所依不成。余同前二。前二之中。亦復如是。問因懷猶豫。即墮過門。宗內生疑。何不為失。答準理應有。略而不論。如現違等。豈無兩俱及隨一等。故論略舉。以例余故。
問因為成宗。不成不定及以相違。俱不能成宗。何故初相有過獨名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：中（pakṣa）不成立。因為與最初的原因和兩種特徵相隔離的緣故。又與宗（sādhya）不同。宗中不成立。又解釋說，宗（sādhya）、因（hetu）、喻（dṛṣṭānta）三者，各自單獨說明，不必一切都必須共同，相互對應而成立。這種解釋更為優勝。問：如果像論中所說，作為宗（sādhya）有九種過失，一一分別說明，那麼這些是因（hetu）和喻（dṛṣṭānta）中的哪種過失呢？答：與現量（pratyakṣa）相符，沒有違背因（hetu）的意義。根據所舉的因（hetu）來辨別其中的過失。比量（anumāna）相違背少部分，即屬於因（hetu）的四種相違，以及決定相違所包含的。同喻（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta）能立不成，異喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta）能立不排除。自教大同，比量違背所說。如果與世間相違背，就是因（hetu）的不定過失，例如肉等，因為是眾生的組成部分，所以是不凈的嗎？按照道理來說，同喻（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta）沒有所要成立的，因為不必認為貝殼等是清凈的。如果這樣，就是法自相相違背，具等作為不同，眾生的組成部分的原因在其中轉化，這就是異喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta）能立不排除。如果說月亮沒有懷兔，因為有光亮像太陽等，因（hetu）和喻（dṛṣṭānta）沒有過失。如果說月亮不是沒有懷兔，因為有光亮像太陽等，這也是不定的，因為兔子並非沒有，而且懷有兔子，所以作為異喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta），有因（hetu）普遍轉化，在異喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta）之中，能立不排除。自語相違背，後面的違背前面的，因（hetu）中所依賴的不成立是過失，前面的違背後面的，沒有同喻（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta）的過失。根據相應的情況舉出因（hetu），或者是不定以及相違背，能區別但不完全成立，根據哪個因（hetu），就是四種相違背，以及其餘的不定，兩種喻（dṛṣṭānta）可以知道。所區別的不完全成立，根據哪個因（hetu），一定有所依賴的不成立，其餘的不定，因為沒有舉出因（hetu）的緣故。如果都不完全成立，或者根據其中一個或兩個所依賴的不成立，其餘的與前面兩種相同。在前面兩種之中，也同樣如此。問：因為懷有猶豫，就墮入過失之門，宗（sādhya）內產生懷疑，為什麼不是過失呢？答：按照道理應該有，省略而不論述，例如現量（pratyakṣa）相違等，難道沒有兩者都以及其中一個等嗎？所以論中省略舉例，用來類比其餘的情況。 問：因（hetu）爲了成立宗（sādhya），不成、不定以及相違背，都不能成立宗（sādhya），為什麼最初的特徵有過失卻單獨命名？
【English Translation】 English version: The pakṣa (subject) is not established because it is separated from the initial cause and the two characteristics. It is also different from the sādhya (thesis). The sādhya is not established within itself. Furthermore, it is explained that the sādhya, hetu (reason), and dṛṣṭānta (example) are each explained separately, and it is not necessary for all of them to be common and established in relation to each other. This explanation is superior. Question: If, as stated in the treatise, there are nine faults of the sādhya, each explained separately, which faults among the hetu and dṛṣṭānta do these correspond to? Answer: Being in accordance with pratyakṣa (perception), there is no contradiction to the meaning of the hetu. According to the hetu cited, its faults should be distinguished. If anumāna (inference) contradicts a small part, it belongs to the four contradictions of the hetu and is included in the determined contradiction. The sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta (positive example) fails to establish, and the vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta (negative example) fails to exclude. The self-doctrine is largely the same, and the inference contradicts what is said. If it contradicts the world, it is an indefinite fault of the hetu. For example, is meat impure because it is a part of living beings? According to reason, the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta has nothing to establish because it is not necessary to consider shells, etc., as pure. If so, it is a contradiction of the self-nature of the dharma. Having qualities, etc., as different, the reason of being a part of living beings transforms within it, which means the vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta fails to exclude. If it is said that the moon does not have a rabbit because it has light like the sun, etc., there are no faults in the hetu and dṛṣṭānta. If it is said that the moon is not without a rabbit because it has light like the sun, etc., this is also indefinite because the rabbit is not absent and has a rabbit. Therefore, as a vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta, the hetu universally transforms, and within the vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta, the establishment is not excluded. Self-contradictory speech, the latter contradicts the former, and the non-establishment of what is relied upon in the hetu is a fault. The former contradicts the latter, and there is no fault in the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta. According to the corresponding situation, cite the hetu, or it is indefinite and contradictory, able to distinguish but not completely established. According to which hetu, there are four contradictions, and the remaining indefinite, two dṛṣṭāntas can be known. What is distinguished is not completely established. According to which hetu, there must be a non-establishment of what is relied upon, and the remaining is indefinite because the hetu has not been cited. If neither is completely established, or according to one or two of them, the non-establishment of what is relied upon, the rest is the same as the previous two. In the previous two, it is also the same. Question: Because there is hesitation, one falls into the gate of faults. Doubt arises within the sādhya. Why is it not a fault? Answer: According to reason, it should be there, but it is omitted and not discussed. For example, contradiction with perception, etc., is there not both and one of them, etc.? Therefore, the treatise omits examples to analogize the remaining situations. Question: The hetu is for establishing the sādhya. Non-establishment, indefiniteness, and contradiction cannot establish the sādhya. Why is the initial characteristic named separately even though it is a fault?
不成。余立別名。答因之初相。正為成宗故須言遍。今若不遍即不成宗。餘二雖亦成宗。助而非正。隨立餘名不名不成。理實相似。然有釋云。不成宗故名不成者。如極成有法等。豈亦成宗。故知因體不成名不成。以自共他不許有故。云不成也。此不應爾。若自體不成名不成。如立喻中二立不成。豈自不成名不成耶。喻既不爾。因亦應然。若爾宗依不成。何名不成。立宗本藉所依。所依若無。宗便不立。故須俱極。此即明所依故亦成宗也。救云。誰言喻上所立不成。望他非自。若無二立體非喻故。若爾因喻本為成宗。不望宗明。誰之因喻。若不成宗名不成者。所餘十過亦不能成宗。應名不成。答事雖實爾。然據義有別。于宗上無名不成。同異俱有。或復俱無。不成自他。及各成自俱名不定。自他及共。隨應準知。唯他非自名相違。若為成自名不定者。如何說名相違決定。兩宗相返各決成自。無雙是非故名不定。又三相中遍在於宗名宗法。若闕初相不成宗法。余有初相。別成宗法。而有別過故。初名不成。又有助破。非不成宗故名不成。如所聞性因。亦不成宗。云何名成。故知因體不成名不成。云若作此破。他救雖無同喻顯宗。而亦得作異喻顯宗。亦得成宗故。不得言不能成宗。言若作此救。彼義還成。故不得將而聞性
難。今者謂。此救之與難並皆不是。誰言所聞性因名成因。夫成因者。三相具足方是成因。彼闕第二相。何名成因。設據當體。體亦不成。又設救云。顯成宗故。不名不成者。既能成宗。應非不定。又云。更破之。如相違因亦不成宗。應名不成。彼雖不成宗。由遍宗法故極成因。明知。不成約因體也。此難亦非。誰言唯名相違。不名不成。若遍宗法是極成。何名相違。又若許有初相即是成因。復違聖教。理門論云。若唯宗法是因性者。其有不定應亦成因。準此明知。有初無後亦不成因。有解云。闕初相名不成。闕第三名不定。闕第二名相違。若其一往如是判者。準理亦非。如第六不定。三相具足。何名不定。如猶豫因。三相俱闕。何獨不成。如不共不定。闕第二相。何非相違。故順疏解。
問虛空實有。德所依故。對無空論。所依不成者。如對大乘既立虛空。以為無為。所依有不。若其有者。大乘即非不立空。若無所依。大乘無為不立。答大乘不立別虛空體。故說為無依。依如及識立空無為。說因有所依。體實非空。對經部師。無虛空體。故無所依。或可。此因對經部及大乘立。望彼所爭。即有所依不成。隨一不成。有法自相。及差別違。四過所攝。有云。立我所許我是實有。即所別不成。因有自許言。亦應不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 難：現在說，這個『救』和『難』都不是。是誰說所聽聞的『性』是因為『名』而成就『因』？所謂『成因』，必須三個方面都具備才是『成因』。對方缺少第二個方面，怎麼能叫『成因』？假設依據當體，『體』也不能成立。又假設『救』說，因為能顯現『成宗』，所以不叫『不成』。既然能成立『宗』，就不應該是不定。又說，再破斥它。如同『相違因』也不能成立『宗』，應該叫做『不成』。它雖然不能成立『宗』，但因為周遍于『宗法』，所以是極成『因』。這明明知道，『不成』是就『因』的本體而言的。這個『難』也不對。是誰說僅僅是名稱『相違』，就不叫做『不成』？如果周遍于『宗法』就是極成，那怎麼能叫『相違』？又如果允許有第一個方面就是『成因』，又違背了聖教。《理門論》說，如果只有『宗法』是『因』的性質，那麼『不定』也應該成為『因』。根據這個可以明白，有第一個方面而沒有後面的方面，也不能成為『因』。有一種解釋說，缺少第一個方面叫做『不成』，缺少第三個方面叫做『不定』，缺少第二個方面叫做『相違』。如果按照這樣來判斷，根據道理也是不對的。比如第六種『不定』，三個方面都具備，為什麼叫做『不定』？比如『猶豫因』，三個方面都缺少，為什麼唯獨叫做『不成』？比如『不共不定』，缺少第二個方面，為什麼不是『相違』？所以順從疏解。 問：虛空是實有，因為是『德』所依賴的。針對『無空論』，『所依』不能成立。比如針對大乘，既然立『虛空』，認為是『無為』，『所依』存在嗎？如果存在，大乘就不是不立『空』。如果沒有『所依』，大乘的『無為』就不能成立。答：大乘不立單獨的『虛空』本體，所以說是沒有『所依』。依靠『如』和『識』來建立『空無為』，說『因』有所依賴，但本體實際上不是『空』。針對經部師，沒有『虛空』的本體，所以沒有『所依』。或者，這個『因』可以針對經部和大乘而立。針對他們所爭論的，就是『有所依』不能成立。隨便哪一個不能成立，都屬於『有法自相』以及『差別違』，被四種過失所攝。有人說，立『我』所允許的『我』是實有，這就是『所別』不能成立。因為『因』有自己允許的言論，也應該不成立。
【English Translation】 English version: Objection: Now it is said that this 'rescue' and 'difficulty' are both not valid. Who says that the 'nature' of what is heard is because of 'name' that 'cause' is accomplished? The so-called 'accomplished cause' must have all three aspects to be an 'accomplished cause'. The opponent lacks the second aspect, how can it be called an 'accomplished cause'? Suppose based on the entity itself, the 'entity' cannot be established either. And suppose the 'rescue' says that because it can manifest 'establishing the doctrine', it is not called 'not accomplished'. Since it can establish the 'doctrine', it should not be uncertain. It is also said, refute it again. Just like the 'contradictory cause' cannot establish the 'doctrine' either, it should be called 'not accomplished'. Although it cannot establish the 'doctrine', it is an extremely accomplished 'cause' because it pervades the 'doctrine-property'. This clearly knows that 'not accomplished' refers to the entity of the 'cause'. This 'difficulty' is also incorrect. Who says that merely the name is 'contradictory', it is not called 'not accomplished'? If pervading the 'doctrine-property' is extremely accomplished, then how can it be called 'contradictory'? And if it is allowed that having the first aspect is 'accomplished cause', it also violates the holy teachings. The Li Men Lun (Treatise on the Gate of Reasoning) says, if only the 'doctrine-property' is the nature of the 'cause', then the 'uncertain' should also become a 'cause'. According to this, it can be understood that having the first aspect but not the subsequent aspects cannot become a 'cause' either. One explanation says that lacking the first aspect is called 'not accomplished', lacking the third aspect is called 'uncertain', and lacking the second aspect is called 'contradictory'. If judging in this way, it is also incorrect according to reason. For example, the sixth type of 'uncertain', all three aspects are present, why is it called 'uncertain'? For example, the 'hesitation cause', all three aspects are lacking, why is it uniquely called 'not accomplished'? For example, the 'non-common uncertain', lacking the second aspect, why is it not 'contradictory'? Therefore, follow the commentary's explanation. Question: Empty space is truly existent, because it is what 'virtue' relies on. In response to the 'theory of no empty space', 'what is relied on' cannot be established. For example, in response to the Mahayana (Great Vehicle), since 'empty space' is established, it is considered 'unconditioned', does 'what is relied on' exist? If it exists, then the Mahayana is not not establishing 'emptiness'. If there is nothing to rely on, the Mahayana's 'unconditioned' cannot be established. Answer: The Mahayana does not establish a separate entity of 'empty space', so it is said to have no 'reliance'. Relying on 'suchness' and 'consciousness' to establish 'empty unconditioned', saying that the 'cause' has something to rely on, but the entity is actually not 'empty'. In response to the Sautrantika (Sutra School) masters, there is no entity of 'empty space', so there is nothing to rely on. Or, this 'cause' can be established in response to both the Sautrantika and the Mahayana. In response to what they are arguing about, 'what is relied on' cannot be established. Whichever one cannot be established belongs to 'the self-nature of the subject' and 'difference contradiction', encompassed by the four faults. Someone says that establishing 'I' as what 'I' allows is truly existent, this is 'what is differentiated' cannot be established. Because the 'cause' has its own allowed statements, it should also not be established.
極成。此我許言。唯顯自許敵者不許。望敵因無所依。亦不成也。此判不爾。若是共量。可不成收。若作自量置所許言。故亦非過。不爾因雖自許。亦是隨一不成。又復共量因置自許。亦得成因。如唯識論。樂大乘者。許能顯示無倒理故等。問共量因置自許言。無隨一過。宗置自許亦應無過。且釋。亦得無過。又釋。宗置自許。因即隨一無依故過。因置自許。有法不無非過。問既言共量。因喻須先共成。因言自許他無。如何自因是令共解。且解。據至極理他宗故違。因置自許。故得無過。即如唯識樂大乘者。許能顯示無顛倒理。契經攝故因。是以大乘經。顯無我理等。以彼故違言不能顯故言自許。非不極理置自亦得。又因明理。不簡有過。置自許簡共許無過。問四不成除兩俱不成。自余皆有自他猶豫所依不成。然除隨一餘二不成。頗有兩俱不成。亦自隨一猶豫所依不成耶。亦他亦共耶。如自問他共亦爾。答且兩俱不成。必無自他隨一不成。以二一別故。亦非自他共猶豫。以疑決異故。頗有兩俱不成。亦自他共所依不成耶。答有如佛弟子對數論。立我為實有。德所依故。此兩俱不許有德句。兩俱不成。然佛弟子等。不許有我故。自所依不成。若不爾者。宗有法無。豈即無過。不可是兩俱。即非彼過故。此即亦是自所別不
成。如大乘師對薩婆多。立他方佛聲。定唯是善。德句依故。此兩俱不成。他所依不成。以他不許有他方佛。亦他所別不成。即對此宗立我為有。德句所依。兩俱不成。共所依不成。俱所別不成。不得有自所別不成。是他所依不成。他所別自所依不成。既隨一所別不成。不得是共所依不成。以宗異故。如是頗有自隨一不成。亦自他共。猶豫所依不成耶。答若自隨一。必非自共猶豫。他自二別故。疑決異故。餘者可有。且自隨一不成。是他猶豫者。如大乘人對外道。立無餘滅人當得作佛。以有種姓故。此無餘人一切皆無。言有種姓自隨一不成。外道不知。無餘皆無。但疑種姓。為有無耶。亦自所依不成。並自能別不成。自隨一不成。亦自所依不成。如經部師對勝論。立虛空實有。德所依故。虛空德句自皆無故。唯彼宗有自隨一不成。亦他所依不成者。如大乘師對薩婆多。立他方佛聲定不離識。以是不善故。他許佛有如罵提婆。但自不許。他不許有他方佛故。聲亦是無他無所依。自隨一不成。共所依不成者。如大乘人對外道。立石女聲定是實有。我所知故。彼宗有我。有法聲無。大乘無我。故自隨一是俱無所依。問有自猶豫不成。亦自他共所依不成耶。答有不于有法猶豫。于有法猶豫。即非所依不成。疑決異故。又釋亦因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果大乘論師對薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）說：『他方佛的聲音，一定是善的，因為它具有功德。』這兩種說法都不成立。『他所依』（tāśraya，對方所依賴的）不成立，因為對方不承認有他方佛。『亦他所別』（api tāśraya-viśeṣa，對方所依賴的特殊性質）也不成立。即如果針對這個宗派，立論說『我』是存在的，因為它具有功德，那麼『所依』和『德句』（guṇa-vākya，功德之語）都不成立。『共所依』（ubhaya-āśraya，雙方共同依賴的）不成立，『俱所別』（ubhaya-viśeṣa，雙方共同依賴的特殊性質）不成立。『不得有自所別』（na labhyate sva-viśeṣa，無法獲得自身的特殊性質）不成立，因為『是他所依』（tat tāśraya，那是對方所依賴的）不成立。『他所別自所依』（tāśraya-viśeṣa sva-āśraya，對方所依賴的特殊性質，自身所依賴的）不成立。既然隨一所別不成立，就不能是『共所依』，因為宗派不同。 像這樣，有沒有『自隨一不成』（sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha，自身隨一不成立），也是『自他共猶豫所依不成』（sva-para-ubhaya-saṃśaya-āśraya-asiddha，自身、對方、共同猶豫所依賴的不成立）呢？答：如果『自隨一』，必定不是『自共猶豫』，因為『他自二別』（para-sva-dvaya-bheda，對方和自身是不同的），疑惑和決斷是不同的。其餘的情況是可能存在的。比如『自隨一不成』，是『他猶豫』（para-saṃśaya，對方猶豫）的情況，就像大乘人對外道說：『無餘滅的人應當能夠成佛，因為他具有種姓。』這個『無餘人』一切都已滅盡，說他『有種姓』，『自隨一』不成立。外道不知道『無餘』就是一切都滅盡，只是懷疑『種姓』是有還是無呢？『亦自所依不成』（api sva-āśraya-asiddha，自身所依賴的不成立），並且『自能別不成』（sva-samartha-viśeṣa-asiddha，自身能夠區分的不成立）。『自隨一不成』，也是『自所依不成』，比如經部師對勝論師說：『虛空是真實存在的，因為它具有功德。』虛空的功德，自身都無法確定，唯有勝論宗才認為有。『自隨一不成』，也是『他所依不成』的情況，比如大乘論師對薩婆多部說：『他方佛的聲音一定不離識，因為它是不善的。』對方承認佛是存在的，就像罵提婆（Mātṛceta，馬鳴菩薩）。但是自己不承認。對方不承認有他方佛，聲音也是不存在的，對方沒有所依賴的。『自隨一不成』，『共所依不成』的情況，比如大乘人對外道說：『石女的聲音一定是真實存在的，因為我所知。』對方宗派有『我』，有『法』，聲音不存在。大乘沒有『我』，所以『自隨一』是雙方都沒有所依賴的。 問：有沒有『自猶豫不成』（sva-saṃśaya-asiddha，自身猶豫不成立），也是『自他共所依不成』（sva-para-ubhaya-āśraya-asiddha，自身、對方、共同所依賴的不成立）呢？答：有。不于『有法』（dharmin，有屬性的事物）猶豫，而於『有法』猶豫，就不是『所依不成』，因為疑惑和決斷是不同的。又解釋了『亦因』（api hetu，也是原因）。
【English Translation】 English version: If a Mahayana master says to a Sarvastivadin (Sarvastivadins, those who believe in the existence of everything): 'The sound of a Buddha in another realm must be good because it possesses merit.' Both of these statements are invalid. 'Tāśraya' (tāśraya, that which is relied upon by the other party) is invalid because the other party does not acknowledge the existence of Buddhas in other realms. 'Api tāśraya-viśeṣa' (api tāśraya-viśeṣa, also the specific quality relied upon by the other party) is also invalid. That is, if, concerning this school, it is asserted that 'I' exists because it possesses merit, then both 'āśraya' (support) and 'guṇa-vākya' (guṇa-vākya, statement of merit) are invalid. 'Ubhaya-āśraya' (ubhaya-āśraya, that which is relied upon by both parties) is invalid, and 'ubhaya-viśeṣa' (ubhaya-viśeṣa, the specific quality relied upon by both parties) is invalid. 'Na labhyate sva-viśeṣa' (na labhyate sva-viśeṣa, one cannot obtain one's own specific quality) is invalid because 'tat tāśraya' (tat tāśraya, that is relied upon by the other party) is invalid. 'Tāśraya-viśeṣa sva-āśraya' (tāśraya-viśeṣa sva-āśraya, the specific quality relied upon by the other party, that which is relied upon by oneself) is invalid. Since the specific quality of any one is invalid, it cannot be 'ubhaya-āśraya' because the schools are different. Like this, is there 'sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha' (sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha, self-concomitance and exclusion not established), and also 'sva-para-ubhaya-saṃśaya-āśraya-asiddha' (sva-para-ubhaya-saṃśaya-āśraya-asiddha, self, other, both doubt, support not established)? Answer: If it is 'sva-anvaya-vyatireka', it is certainly not 'sva-ubhaya-saṃśaya' because 'para-sva-dvaya-bheda' (para-sva-dvaya-bheda, the other and the self are different), and doubt and certainty are different. The remaining situations are possible. For example, 'sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha' is a case of 'para-saṃśaya' (para-saṃśaya, the other doubts), just as a Mahayana person says to an outsider: 'A person who has attained nirvana without remainder should be able to become a Buddha because he possesses lineage.' This 'person without remainder' has completely ceased to exist. Saying that he 'possesses lineage', 'sva-anvaya-vyatireka' is not established. The outsider does not know that 'without remainder' means that everything has ceased to exist, but only doubts whether 'lineage' exists or not. 'Api sva-āśraya-asiddha' (api sva-āśraya-asiddha, also self-support not established), and also 'sva-samartha-viśeṣa-asiddha' (sva-samartha-viśeṣa-asiddha, self-capable distinction not established). 'Sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha' is also 'sva-āśraya-asiddha', for example, a Sautrantika says to a Vaisheshika: 'Space is truly existent because it possesses qualities.' The qualities of space cannot be determined by oneself, only the Vaisheshika school believes it exists. 'Sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha' is also a case of 'para-āśraya-asiddha', for example, a Mahayana master says to a Sarvastivadin: 'The sound of a Buddha in another realm is certainly not separate from consciousness because it is unwholesome.' The other party acknowledges that the Buddha exists, like Mātṛceta (Mātṛceta, Ashvaghosa). But oneself does not acknowledge it. The other party does not acknowledge the existence of Buddhas in other realms, and the sound is also non-existent, the other party has nothing to rely on. 'Sva-anvaya-vyatireka-asiddha', 'ubhaya-āśraya-asiddha' is the case, for example, a Mahayana person says to an outsider: 'The sound of a barren woman must be truly existent because I know it.' The other party has 'I', has 'dharma', the sound does not exist. Mahayana does not have 'I', so 'sva-anvaya-vyatireka' is that neither party has anything to rely on. Question: Is there 'sva-saṃśaya-asiddha' (sva-saṃśaya-asiddha, self-doubt not established), and also 'sva-para-ubhaya-āśraya-asiddha' (sva-para-ubhaya-āśraya-asiddha, self, other, both support not established)? Answer: Yes. Not doubting 'dharmin' (dharmin, a thing with attributes), but doubting 'dharmin', then it is not 'āśraya-asiddha' because doubt and certainty are different. Also explained 'api hetu' (api hetu, also the reason).
猶豫。亦猶豫所依不成。如因猶豫得名不成。有法猶豫。何非因中猶豫所依不成。且據決定所依不成。相對以明。但于因疑。非疑有法即是此過。如大乘人對薩婆多。立已入無餘人。應得作佛。佛為說法故。然彼滅無。兩非因依。但自疑佛為說法不。薩婆多師。決定知不說故。自猶豫不成。自猶豫不成。亦自所依不成者。如薩婆多對大乘。立他方佛聲定有不善。彼大乘者耳所聞故。然疑彼人為聞未聞故生猶豫。復不許有他方佛聲。故自無依自疑他無依者。如大乘人對薩婆多。立他方佛聲定唯是善。即取前因亦生疑故。他猶豫自所依不成共疑。及共所依不成。此四約因。雖有法。決定作此分別。于中有分有全。及有法雖疑復相對辨。亦有分全。皆準思之。問何理得知。復有此等過耶。答理門論中說不成已結云。如是所說一切品類所有言詞。皆非能立。若非如前有此分別。更說何法名為品類。故應如前差別分別。
解不定過。有自他共。一一各三。有自比量自不定。自比於他不定。自比于共不定。他共準之。然自比于自及共不定為過。於他非過。共量亦然。就他破他。於他及共自不定皆為過。有云。于自非過。故唯識第一破他我量。器色同處和雜等亦不為過此亦不爾。器色同處非彼類故。非雜體一。以若例同。應例
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 猶豫，以及猶豫所依賴的根據不成立。例如，因為猶豫而得出的名稱不成立。如果存在猶豫的法，為什麼不是因為猶豫而導致因的根據不成立呢？而且，根據決定的根據也不成立，這是相對而言的。只是對於因產生懷疑，並非懷疑有法本身就是這個過失。例如，大乘修行者針對薩婆多部派，提出已經進入無餘涅槃的人，應該能夠成佛，因為佛會為他們說法。然而，那些已經滅度的人是否真的存在，雙方都無法作為依據。只是自己懷疑佛是否會為他們說法。薩婆多部派的師父，因為確定知道佛不會為他們說法，所以自己的猶豫不成立。自己的猶豫不成立，也導致自己所依賴的根據不成立。例如，薩婆多部派針對大乘，提出他方佛的聲音必定是不善的，因為大乘修行者用耳朵聽到了。然而，懷疑那些人是聽到了還是沒聽到，從而產生猶豫。又不承認存在他方佛的聲音，所以自己沒有依據。自己懷疑，而他人沒有依據的情況，例如大乘修行者針對薩婆多部派，提出他方佛的聲音必定只是善的，即使取用之前的因，也會產生懷疑。他人猶豫，自己所依賴的根據不成立，以及共同猶豫和共同所依賴的根據不成立。這四種情況是針對因而言的，即使有法，也要確定地進行這種區分。其中有部分和全部的區別，以及有法即使懷疑，也要相對地進行辨別，也有部分和全部的區別，都應該依此進行思考。問：根據什麼道理得知，還存在這些過失呢？答：理門論中在說完不成之後總結說：『像這樣所說的一切品類所有的言詞，都不能成立。』如果不是像前面那樣進行區分，還要說什麼法才能稱為品類呢？所以應該像前面那樣進行差別區分。
解釋不定過。有自、他、共三種，每一種又各有三種情況：自己通過比量得出自己不確定，自己通過比量得出他人不確定，自己通過比量得出共同不確定。他人和共同的情況依此類推。然而，自己通過比量得出自己和共同不確定是過失，對於他人則不是過失。共同比量也是如此。就他人來駁斥他人，對於他人和共同，自己不確定都是過失。有人說，對於自己不是過失。所以唯識宗在第一品中駁斥他人我量的例子，器物和顏色同處、和合、雜亂等，也不算是過失，其實並非如此。器物和顏色同處，不是同一類事物。不是雜亂的統一體。如果用類比相同的方法，應該類比...
【English Translation】 English version Hesitation, and the basis upon which hesitation relies is not established. For example, a name derived from hesitation is not established. If there is a dharma of hesitation, why is it not that the basis upon which the cause of hesitation relies is not established? Moreover, the basis upon which a decision relies is also not established; this is relative. It is only doubt regarding the cause; it is not that doubting the dharma itself is this fault. For example, a Mahayana practitioner, in response to the Sarvastivadins, proposes that someone who has entered nirvana without remainder should be able to attain Buddhahood because the Buddha would preach to them. However, whether those who have passed away actually exist is something neither side can rely on. It is only that they themselves doubt whether the Buddha would preach to them. The Sarvastivadin master, because they are certain that the Buddha would not preach to them, their own hesitation is not established. Their own hesitation is not established, which also leads to the basis upon which they rely not being established. For example, the Sarvastivadins, in response to the Mahayana, propose that the sound of a Buddha in another realm must be unwholesome because the Mahayana practitioners heard it with their ears. However, they doubt whether those people heard it or did not hear it, thus generating hesitation. They also do not acknowledge the existence of the sound of a Buddha in another realm, so they have no basis themselves. The situation where one doubts themselves while others have no basis, for example, the Mahayana practitioners, in response to the Sarvastivadins, propose that the sound of a Buddha in another realm must only be wholesome, even if taking the previous cause, doubt will arise. Others hesitate, and the basis upon which one relies is not established, as well as mutual hesitation and the mutual basis upon which one relies is not established. These four situations are in regards to the cause; even if there is a dharma, this distinction must be made definitively. Among them, there are distinctions of part and whole, and even if there is doubt about the dharma, it must be distinguished relatively, and there are also distinctions of part and whole, all of which should be considered accordingly. Question: According to what principle do we know that these faults also exist? Answer: The Nyayapravesa (理門論) concludes after discussing the unestablished: 'All the words of all categories spoken in this way cannot be established.' If it were not distinguished as before, what dharma could be called a category? Therefore, it should be distinguished differently as before.
Explaining the fallacy of uncertainty. There are three types: self, other, and common, and each of these has three situations: one's own inference leads to one's own uncertainty, one's own inference leads to uncertainty about others, one's own inference leads to common uncertainty. The situations for others and common are analogous. However, one's own inference leading to uncertainty about oneself and common is a fallacy, but it is not a fallacy for others. The common inference is also like this. Using others to refute others, for others and common, one's own uncertainty is a fallacy. Some say that it is not a fallacy for oneself. Therefore, in the first chapter of Vijnaptimatrata (唯識), the example of refuting the inference of self by others, the location of objects and colors being the same, combination, confusion, etc., are not considered fallacies, but this is not the case. The location of objects and colors being the same is not the same kind of thing. It is not a confused unity. If using the method of analogy to be the same, it should be analogous to...
成假。故不得類作不定過。若破他于自不定非者。如毀他非他引同於自。豈非是過。為量亦爾。又云。共量於他有不定。亦得是過。此義不然。既云共量。即共因喻。於他不定。喻非已許。故非為過。或得為過。
解共不定中言。如大乘立離六識。外更有餘識。許所知故。如色等量。犯自共不定。無共異喻有自異喻。以總八識為異喻。所知因轉故。今謂不爾。且空花等為同異收。若是同品者有二過。一云。離自體外更有餘識。云何為離自。自體無故。故為一過。二云。設為同喻。便無喻依。以有義因成有義宗。便取有義同喻。有義同喻。依無義所依。此亦不可。因通於二。可得通依。喻不通無。故空花等非為同喻。若非同喻。便成異喻。所知之因共許異轉。何成自共不定。故此量非。或可為通。此量亦得。以空花等第六識緣離第六無。今者空花亦有法收。不離第六故。
解共品一分轉。問如立聲常。無質礙故。此因應隨一不成。何名不定。有云。取不障往來名無礙。今謂不爾。如山石等。不礙通人得往來故。應名無礙。今此就他宗。是俱品轉。若對佛法。亦隨一過。或聲論對勝論立聲為常。無質礙因。兩俱許故。但于同異。俱一分轉故。不定收。非隨一過。
解真故極成色。非定離眼識。自許初三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 成為虛假的。因此不能歸類為不定過。如果駁斥他人認為自己的論證是不定的，例如，反駁他人說他所引用的例子與自己的論證相同，難道不是一種過失嗎？對於量（推理）也是如此。又有人說，共同的量（推理）對於他人來說是不定的，也可以算作一種過失。這種說法是不對的。既然說是『共同的量』，那就是共同認可的因和喻。對於他人來說是不定的，是因為比喻不是自己已經認可的，所以不能算作過失。或者可以算作過失。 解釋共同不定中的說法，例如大乘佛教認為在六識之外，還有其他的識，因為它們也是所知，就像色等一樣。這犯了自共不定的錯誤，沒有共同的異喻，但有自己的異喻，因為總共有八識可以作為異喻，所知之因會轉變。現在我認為不是這樣。暫且把空花等歸為同喻或異喻。如果是同品，就有兩個過失。一是說，在自體之外還有其他的識，那麼『離自』是什麼意思呢？因為自體並不存在，所以這是一個過失。二是說，假設是同喻，就沒有比喻的依據，因為有意義的因成立有意義的宗，就取有意義的同喻。有意義的同喻，依賴於無意義的所依，這也是不可以的。因為因可以普遍適用於兩者，可以得到普遍的依據。比喻不能普遍適用於無，所以空花等不是同喻。如果不是同喻，就成了異喻，所知之因共同認可會轉變，怎麼能構成自共不定呢？所以這個量（推理）是不成立的。或者可以認為是通，這個量（推理）也可以成立，因為空花等是第六識所緣的，離開了第六識就沒有。現在空花也有法所包含，不離開第六識。 解釋共同品類中一部分轉變。例如，如果立論說聲音是常住的，因為沒有質礙。這個因應該隨一不成，為什麼說是『不定』呢？有人說，把不阻礙往來叫做『無礙』。現在我認為不是這樣。像山石等，不阻礙行人往來，應該叫做『無礙』。現在這是針對其他宗派來說的，是俱品轉變。如果針對佛法來說，也是隨一過。或者聲論派針對勝論派立論說聲音是常住的，用『沒有質礙』作為因，兩派都認可這個因，只是在同喻和異喻中，都有一部分轉變，所以歸為不定，而不是隨一過。 解釋真實的、極成的色，不是一定離開眼識的，這是自己認可的最初三個。
【English Translation】 English version: It becomes false. Therefore, it cannot be categorized as an uncertain fallacy. If one refutes another by saying that their own argument is uncertain, such as refuting another by saying that the example they cite is the same as their own argument, is that not a fallacy? It is the same for inference (reasoning). Furthermore, it is said that a common inference (reasoning) that is uncertain to others can also be considered a fallacy. This statement is incorrect. Since it is said to be a 'common inference,' it means a commonly accepted reason and example. If it is uncertain to others, it is because the analogy is not something that one has already accepted, so it cannot be considered a fallacy. Or, it could be considered a fallacy. Explaining the statement in common uncertainty, such as Mahayana Buddhism asserting that beyond the six consciousnesses (六識), there are other consciousnesses, because they are also knowable (所知), like form (色) and so on. This commits the error of self-common uncertainty, lacking a common counter-example (異喻), but having its own counter-example, because the total of eight consciousnesses can serve as a counter-example, as the reason of knowable transforms. Now, I say it is not so. Let's temporarily categorize empty flowers (空花) and the like as either similar or dissimilar examples. If it is a similar category, there are two fallacies. First, it is said that beyond the self-nature (自體), there are other consciousnesses, then what does 'apart from self' mean? Because self-nature does not exist, this is one fallacy. Second, suppose it is a similar example, then there is no basis for the analogy, because a meaningful reason establishes a meaningful thesis, and one takes a meaningful similar example. A meaningful similar example relies on a meaningless basis, which is also unacceptable. Because the reason can universally apply to both, a universal basis can be obtained. The analogy cannot universally apply to non-existence, so empty flowers and the like are not similar examples. If it is not a similar example, it becomes a dissimilar example, and the reason of knowable is commonly accepted to transform, how can it constitute self-common uncertainty? Therefore, this inference (reasoning) is not valid. Or, it can be considered common, and this inference (reasoning) can also be valid, because empty flowers and the like are objects of the sixth consciousness (第六識), and without the sixth consciousness, there is none. Now, empty flowers also have phenomena included, not separate from the sixth consciousness. Explaining the transformation of a portion within a common category. For example, if one posits that sound is permanent, because it has no obstruction (質礙). This reason should be unestablished in one aspect, why is it called 'uncertain'? Some say that not obstructing coming and going is called 'unobstructed' (無礙). Now, I say it is not so. Like mountains and rocks, they do not obstruct people from coming and going, so they should be called 'unobstructed.' Now, this is in relation to other schools, it is a transformation of both categories. If it is in relation to Buddhism, it is also a fallacy of one aspect. Or, the school of sound (聲論派) posits that sound is permanent against the Vaisheshika school (勝論派), using 'having no obstruction' as the reason, and both schools accept this reason, only in similar and dissimilar examples, there is a partial transformation, so it is categorized as uncertain, not a fallacy of one aspect. Explaining that true, perfectly established form (色) is not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness (眼識), this is the first three that are self-acknowledged.
攝者。有云。三藏為遮相違量。相違量云。真故極成色。應非即識之色。自許初三攝眼所不攝故。如眼識。為遮此量與作不定云。為如眼識。自許初三攝。非即識之色。為如我宗他方佛色。自許初三攝故是即識之色耶。今謂不爾。凡相違決定量。如常無常相違。今言離識不離識。可是相違決定。言應非即識之色。即非返初量。何成相違。若取此量即名相違。即一切量皆有此過。如立聲無常。應非無常聲。所作性故。如瓶等喻。故又相違決定。因喻共許。既云自許。即是自因。何得與他作相違量。若此成相違。一切無正量。又云。但言初三攝眼所不攝故。亦得與他作不定過。何須自許言耶。解云。若不言自許。有他不定。為如眼識不離識。為如我釋迦菩薩實不善色。定離於眼識。今謂不爾。若為簡此。即諸比量多有此過。如大乘破小乘。極微應非實有。有質礙故。如瓶盆等。此亦不定。為如瓶盆假非實有。為如我宗青黃等色是實有耶。又有釋言。此非立自。與他作相違決定。以他立云定是離眼識。是初三所攝眼識不攝故。如眼根。此亦不爾。量無不定等過。與作相違。因有不定。何須與作相違決定。以彼同喻有同分彼同分眼不許同分眼根定離識故。設彼改云如彼同分眼根。即有同分還為不定。又設若作。何須自許言。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論及『攝』（攝 shè，此處指歸納、包含）。有人說：『三藏』（三藏 sānzàng，佛教經典的總稱，包括經、律、論三部分）是爲了遮止『相違量』（相違量 xiāngwéi liàng，指前提互相矛盾的論證）。『相違量』是這樣說的：『真實的、被普遍認可的色（色 sè，佛教術語，指一切有形之物），應當不是與識（識 shì，佛教術語，指認識、辨別的能力）相應的色，因為它被自宗承認的前三種色蘊（色蘊 sèyùn，構成物質存在的五種要素之一，即色、受、想、行、識）所包含，而不被眼識（眼識 yǎnshì，通過眼睛產生的意識）所包含，就像眼識一樣。』 爲了遮止這個『量』，可以提出一個『不定』（不定 bùdìng，指論據不明確，無法確定結論）的反駁：『就像眼識一樣，它被自宗承認的前三種色蘊所包含，但不是與識相應的色；或者像我宗（我宗 wǒzōng，指自己的宗派）他方佛（他方佛 tāfāng fó，指其他世界的佛）的色，它被自宗承認的前三種色蘊所包含，所以是與識相應的色嗎？』 我認為不是這樣。凡是『相違決定量』，就像『常』（常 cháng，永恒不變）和『無常』（無常 wúcháng，變化不定）的相違一樣，現在說『離識』（離識 líshì，脫離意識）和『不離識』（不離識 bùlíshì，不脫離意識），可以說是『相違決定』（相違決定 xiāngwéi juédìng，指確定無疑的矛盾）。說『應當不是與識相應的色』，就不是反駁最初的『量』，怎麼能構成『相違』呢？如果採取這個『量』，那麼一切『量』都會有這個過失。比如立論說『聲是無常』，可以說『應當不是無常的聲，因為它是被造作的，就像瓶子等比喻一樣』。所以又是『相違決定』，因和比喻都是雙方認可的。既然說了『自許』（自許 zìxǔ，自己承認），那就是自己的論據，怎麼能用它來與他人進行『相違量』呢？如果這能構成『相違』，那麼一切都沒有正確的『量』了。 又有人說：『只要說「前三種色蘊所包含，而不被眼識所包含」，也可以用來與他人進行「不定」的反駁，何必說「自許」呢？』解釋說：『如果不說「自許」，就會有「他不定」（他不定 tābùdìng，指對於對方來說是不確定的）的過失，比如「就像眼識一樣，不離識；或者像我釋迦菩薩（釋迦菩薩 shìjiā púsà，指釋迦牟尼佛在成佛前的菩薩身份）實際上不好的色，一定脫離於眼識」。』 我認為不是這樣。如果爲了避免這種情況，那麼很多『比量』（比量 bǐliàng，通過推理得出的結論）都會有這個過失。比如大乘（大乘 dàshèng，佛教的一個主要流派）破斥小乘（小乘 xiǎoshèng，佛教的一個主要流派）：『極微（極微 jíwēi，物質的最小單位）應當不是真實存在的，因為它有質礙（質礙 zhì'ài，指有體積、有阻礙），就像瓶盆等一樣。』這也是『不定』的，『就像瓶盆是虛假的、不是真實存在的；或者像我宗的青黃等色是真實存在的嗎？』 還有一種解釋說：『這不是爲了確立自己的觀點，而是與他人進行「相違決定」。因為他人立論說一定是脫離眼識的，是因為它是前三種色蘊所包含，而不被眼識所包含，就像眼根（眼根 yǎngēn，眼睛的感官能力）一樣。』我認為也不是這樣。『量』沒有『不定』等過失，卻與它進行『相違』，原因是『不定』。何必與它進行『相違決定』呢？因為他們的同喻（同喻 tóngyù，指正面的例子）有『同分』（同分 tóngfēn，指相似的部分），他們的『彼同分』（彼同分 bǐtóngfēn，指與對方相似的部分）眼不承認『同分』，眼根一定脫離識。假設他們改變說法，說『就像他們的同分眼根』，那麼就會有『同分』反而成為『不定』。又假設如果這樣做，何必說「自許」呢？』
English version: Regarding 『Sangraha』 (Sangraha, here referring to compilation or inclusion). Some say: 『The Tripitaka』 (Tripitaka, the collection of Buddhist scriptures, including Sutra, Vinaya, and Abhidhamma) is to prevent 『contradictory inference』 (contradictory inference, referring to arguments with contradictory premises). 『Contradictory inference』 states: 『The real and universally accepted form (form, a Buddhist term referring to all tangible things) should not be the form corresponding to consciousness (consciousness, a Buddhist term referring to the ability to recognize and discern), because it is included in the first three skandhas of form (skandhas of form, one of the five elements constituting material existence, namely form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) acknowledged by our own school (our own school, referring to one's own sect), but not included in eye-consciousness (eye-consciousness, the consciousness produced through the eyes), just like eye-consciousness.』 To prevent this 『inference』, an 『uncertain』 (uncertain, referring to an unclear argument that cannot determine the conclusion) refutation can be proposed: 『Just like eye-consciousness, it is included in the first three skandhas of form acknowledged by our own school, but it is not the form corresponding to consciousness; or like the form of the Buddhas in other realms (Buddhas in other realms, referring to Buddhas in other worlds) of our school, it is included in the first three skandhas of form acknowledged by our own school, so is it the form corresponding to consciousness?』 I don't think so. All 『contradictory definitive inferences』, like the contradiction between 『eternal』 (eternal, unchanging) and 『impermanent』 (impermanent, constantly changing), now saying 『separate from consciousness』 (separate from consciousness, detached from consciousness) and 『not separate from consciousness』 (not separate from consciousness, not detached from consciousness), can be said to be 『contradictory definitive』 (contradictory definitive, referring to an undoubtedly contradiction). Saying 『should not be the form corresponding to consciousness』 is not refuting the initial 『inference』, how can it constitute a 『contradiction』? If this 『inference』 is adopted, then all 『inferences』 will have this fault. For example, if the proposition is 『sound is impermanent』, it can be said 『should not be impermanent sound, because it is created, just like the analogy of pots, etc.』 Therefore, it is again a 『contradictory definitive』, the cause and analogy are recognized by both parties. Since it is said 『self-acknowledged』 (self-acknowledged, acknowledged by oneself), then it is one's own argument, how can it be used to conduct a 『contradictory inference』 with others? If this can constitute a 『contradiction』, then there is no correct 『inference』 at all. Someone also said: 『As long as it is said 「included in the first three skandhas of form, but not included in eye-consciousness」, it can also be used to conduct an 「uncertain」 refutation with others, why say 「self-acknowledged」?』 The explanation is: 『If 「self-acknowledged」 is not said, there will be the fault of 「uncertain for others」 (uncertain for others, referring to uncertain for the other party), such as 「just like eye-consciousness, not separate from consciousness; or like the actually bad form of my Shakya Bodhisattva (Shakya Bodhisattva, referring to Shakyamuni Buddha in his Bodhisattva status before enlightenment), it is certainly detached from eye-consciousness」.』 I don't think so. If this is to be avoided, then many 『inferences』 (inferences, conclusions drawn through reasoning) will have this fault. For example, the Mahayana (Mahayana, a major school of Buddhism) refutes the Hinayana (Hinayana, a major school of Buddhism): 『The ultimate particle (ultimate particle, the smallest unit of matter) should not be real, because it has substance and obstruction (substance and obstruction, referring to having volume and obstruction), just like pots and basins, etc.』 This is also 『uncertain』, 『just like pots and basins are false and not real; or like the colors of blue and yellow, etc. of our school are real?』 There is another explanation: 『This is not to establish one's own point of view, but to conduct a 「contradictory definitive」 with others. Because others argue that it must be detached from eye-consciousness, because it is included in the first three skandhas of form, but not included in eye-consciousness, just like the eye-sense (eye-sense, the sensory ability of the eyes).』 I don't think so either. The 『inference』 does not have faults such as 『uncertain』, but it conducts a 『contradiction』 with it, because the cause is 『uncertain』. Why conduct a 『contradictory definitive』 with it? Because their positive example (positive example, referring to a positive example) has 『similarity』 (similarity, referring to similar parts), their 『dissimilar part』 (dissimilar part, referring to the part similar to the other party) eye does not acknowledge 『similarity』, the eye-sense must be detached from consciousness. Suppose they change their statement and say 『just like their similar eye-sense』, then there will be 『similarity』 that instead becomes 『uncertain』. Also, suppose if this is done, why say 「self-acknowledged」?』
【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2
有解云。因云共許初三攝。此即無過。若改因者。元非本量。別自成立。何須解彼。設云共許。亦有不定。同分彼同分。俱共許故。今謂設若彼。立云。是初三中眼識。及同分眼所不攝故。如彼同分眼。此因簡略無不定過。可與彼作相違決定。然復不假因自許言。置自許言。明不作前諸異分別。又有解言。真故極成色。不簡八六總為有法。義亦不然。有違自過。豈八六識所變之色。亦令不離眼識。令不離眼識。應不變相依眼識能親取。又云。此但遮他執定離。言非定離眼識。猶此不簡。八六俱得。不欲成定非離眼識。依此雖無宗過。然因自許。此即自因與他作相違決定。理亦不可。是故應如疏述。今者立宗。成自唯識不離於眼識。然云。為簡不定。及法自相相違決定過故。云初三攝眼所不攝。簡不定可爾。簡法自相相違決定。理未必然。以若無過可是相違。彼立量云。非不離眼識。初三攝故。猶如眼根。此有不定。何名決定。以同分根非定離故。但可遮余同遍異分之不定過。然法師意。據不定不離。與作決定。非據不定因復作決定過。又自許言。但簡有法差別。不言簡余。亦未盡理。有違宗過。或可不定。豈可六緣及非眼識正所緣色。亦令不離耶。今言亦簡向所辨色。然第六識。與眼同時親所緣者。及眼非緣之所有色
。皆初三攝。唯望根境。六所緣者不名初三。然法處中。不攝第六與五同緣稱實之色。由此亦是初色境收。成不離眼識故。有違自失。若在異喻中。即有不定過。故置自許。意云。是眼識自許所緣之色初三攝。非非所緣初三攝。若爾宗中有違自過。何不簡略。答此簡訖何謂為簡。第八所緣他不許有。五同緣意有部不成。若獨散意緣色非實。故極成言並以簡訖。
解四相違中言。如大乘對他立聲無常。意許是識變無常。以八六耳三識同取故。據別違一識故。唯違意許不失言顯。故成差別。今謂不爾。如成他用。二共許有假他。替處不失言顯。言無常者。無共許有。非是識變無常。替處亦失言顯。何名差別。若云以三識別。言耳識取無常。唯違耳識變。非三識故成差別者亦非。若準下解有法自相相違。此亦正法自相相違。違意許有。言顯亦失故。若爭無常復是意許。是識變無常。亦所爭者即違二。因何獨名差別。今疏解令準法師云。若立真我受用眼等。即所別不成積聚性因。兩俱不成明前所立。兩俱不成亦有所依不成等。故兩俱不成不必有法唯定有。問如立大有非實等。何得是有法自相相違因耶。答今取同異以為同喻。望彼宗中非實等法。即正能成。今亦成有性。此同異性便作異喻。此有一實因。于彼遍轉。彼但同
異。不是有性。故反成宗令作非有。故成相違。正成立有。以實德業和合同異。皆證為異喻。皆非大有故。今望所成宗中有性。令離實等有有自性。故有一實因。于同異有此有一實因不無能有。亦遍有法。故因無隨一兩俱不成。故為相違。即九句中第六句也。問若以同異。雖非不無。而不名有。有一實因。云何彼轉。解云雖體不名有。而體不無之義共許。今取此不無之義。為能有故。云有一實等。然同異等上不無之義。即不名為有。故望有句即為異喻。喻如空中有鳥。空雖不名有。而得說空能有于鳥。同異亦爾。故因遍轉故違所立。問實等五句。得名不無之有不。答曰雖言不無。然不名有。若爾成唯識。雲實等應非實有。應是相符。彼量若成。明實等五是不無之有。解云。雖立量破云應非實有。意破非假名實。以彼立實有實體故。然不名有。故論破意。應非有實自性。何故不無而不名有。彼計如此。如以實體不無。皆由大有有。同異和合非有有。云何體不無故。雖不無而不名有。若不爾者。即不得成有法自相相違。以言中說不無之有。而為有法。同異亦不無之有。何得違彼有法。若云由同異非大有。違意許大有。意許大有無。即言所顯不無之有。亦復不立。以實等不無。由大有有故。成有法自相相違者。此亦不爾。言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『異』（Dharmas different from each other）。如果不是『有』（existent），那麼反過來就成了『宗』（thesis）要求成為『非有』（non-existent），這樣就造成了矛盾。正確地成立『有』（existent），因為『實』（substance）、『德』（quality）、『業』（activity）的和合、相同和相異，都可以證明是『異喻』（different example），都不是『大有』（great existent）。現在希望在所成立的『宗』（thesis）中存在『有性』（existent nature），使得離開『實』（substance）等，具有『有自性』（own-nature）。所以有一個『實因』（real cause）。在相同和相異中，這個『有一實因』（one real cause）不是沒有能力存在，也普遍存在於法中。所以『因』（cause）沒有隨一或兩者都不成立的情況，因此是矛盾的。這就是九句中的第六句。 問：如果以相同和相異，即使不是『不無』（not non-existent），也不稱為『有』（existent），有一個『實因』（real cause），那它如何轉變？ 答：雖然本體不稱為『有』（existent），但是本體不是『不無』（not non-existent）的意義是共同認可的。現在取這個『不無』（not non-existent）的意義，作為能夠存在的原因。所以說『有一實』（one real cause）等。然而，相同和相異等上面的『不無』（not non-existent）的意義，就不稱為『有』（existent）。所以對於『有』（existent）的句子來說，就是『異喻』（different example）。比喻就像空中有鳥，空雖然不稱為『有』（existent），但是可以說空能夠有鳥。相同和相異也是如此。所以『因』（cause）普遍轉變，因此違背了所立的。 問：『實』（substance）等五句，可以稱為『不無之有』（existent of not non-existent）嗎？ 答：雖然說『不無』（not non-existent），但是不稱為『有』（existent）。如果這樣，那麼《成唯識論》（Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra）中說『實』（substance）等應該不是真實存在，應該是相符的。如果那個量成立，說明『實』（substance）等五句是『不無之有』（existent of not non-existent）。 答：雖然立量破斥說應該不是真實存在，意思是破斥不是假名實，因為他們立的是真實存在的實體。然而不稱為『有』（existent），所以論破斥的意思是，應該不是有真實的自性。為什麼『不無』（not non-existent）而不稱為『有』（existent）？他們認為如此，比如以實體『不無』（not non-existent），都是由『大有』（great existent）所『有』（existent）。相同和相異的和合不是『有』（existent）所『有』（existent）。為什麼本體『不無』（not non-existent）的緣故，即使『不無』（not non-existent）也不稱為『有』（existent）？如果不是這樣，就不能成立『有法自相相違』（contradiction of the own-character of the subject of the proposition），因為言語中說『不無之有』（existent of not non-existent），而作為『有法』（subject of the proposition），相同和相異也是『不無之有』（existent of not non-existent），怎麼會違背那個『有法』（subject of the proposition）？如果說由於相同和相異不是『大有』（great existent），違背了意許『大有』（great existent），意許『大有』（great existent）沒有，那麼言語所顯示的『不無之有』（existent of not non-existent）也不成立。因為『實』（substance）等『不無』（not non-existent），由於『大有』（great existent）所『有』（existent），成立『有法自相相違』（contradiction of the own-character of the subject of the proposition），這也是不對的，言語
【English Translation】 English version: 'Difference' (Dharmas different from each other). If it is not 'existent', then conversely it becomes the 'thesis' requiring to be 'non-existent', thus creating a contradiction. Correctly establishing 'existent', because the combination, sameness, and difference of 'substance' (dravya), 'quality' (guna), and 'activity' (karma) can all be proven as 'different examples', none of which are 'great existent'. Now, it is hoped that in the established 'thesis' there exists 'existent nature', so that apart from 'substance' etc., it possesses 'own-nature'. Therefore, there is one 'real cause'. In sameness and difference, this 'one real cause' is not incapable of existing, and also universally exists in dharmas. Therefore, the 'cause' does not have a situation where either one or both are not established, hence it is contradictory. This is the sixth sentence in the nine sentences. Question: If with sameness and difference, even if it is not 'not non-existent', it is not called 'existent', and there is one 'real cause', how does it transform? Answer: Although the entity is not called 'existent', the meaning that the entity is 'not non-existent' is commonly acknowledged. Now, taking this meaning of 'not non-existent' as the reason for being able to exist. Therefore, it is said 'one real cause' etc. However, the meaning of 'not non-existent' on sameness and difference etc., is not called 'existent'. Therefore, for the sentence of 'existent', it is a 'different example'. The analogy is like a bird in the sky, although the sky is not called 'existent', it can be said that the sky is capable of having a bird. Sameness and difference are also like this. Therefore, the 'cause' universally transforms, thus violating what was established. Question: Can the five sentences of 'substance' etc., be called 'existent of not non-existent'? Answer: Although it is said 'not non-existent', it is not called 'existent'. If so, then in the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), it says that 'substance' etc. should not be truly existent, and should be consistent. If that measure is established, it shows that the five sentences of 'substance' etc. are 'existent of not non-existent'. Answer: Although establishing a measure to refute saying that it should not be truly existent, the meaning is to refute that it is not nominally real, because they establish a truly existent entity. However, it is not called 'existent', so the meaning of the treatise's refutation is that it should not have a real own-nature. Why is it 'not non-existent' but not called 'existent'? They think like this, for example, with the entity 'not non-existent', it is all 'existent' by 'great existent'. The combination of sameness and difference is not 'existent' by 'existent'. Why is it that because the entity is 'not non-existent', even if it is 'not non-existent' it is not called 'existent'? If it is not like this, then the 'contradiction of the own-character of the subject of the proposition' cannot be established, because in the words it says 'existent of not non-existent', and as the 'subject of the proposition', sameness and difference are also 'existent of not non-existent', how can it violate that 'subject of the proposition'? If it is said that because sameness and difference are not 'great existent', it violates the intended 'great existent', intending that 'great existent' does not exist, then the 'existent of not non-existent' shown by the words is also not established. Because 'substance' etc. are 'not non-existent', due to 'existent' by 'great existent', establishing the 'contradiction of the own-character of the subject of the proposition', this is also incorrect, the words
中說有為有法。不唯取離實等上之有。但總相言不無之有。即同異上不無亦有。今喻雖違意許大有。不以意許大有無。言中之有不立。以同喻力證令非實等。復是不無之有。同喻力勝。不無有存。何名相違。若云同異雖不無。而不名有。故成相違者。即實等體雖復不無。亦不名有。俱不無故。若雲實等大有有不無之義得名有。同異非有有。不無不名有者。亦應實由有有體不無。彼非有有應非有。若言彼本許爾。何故不許本許實等不無。而非名有。名有之者。即大有性。疏問若難離實之大有性。所別所依。犯自不成。亦犯違宗隨一不成。若難不離實等大有。而非有性。即犯相符。亦違自教。彼寧非有。答彼先總說。今亦總難。彼既成立離實之有。故今難彼離實大有。令非此有。言同意別故無諸過。今謂。總難離實之有令非有。即應弟子正難離實之大有性。即有前過。若云不欲唯難離實之大有性。但總難者還有後過。今謂。法師此意言有假敘。如是若論弟子。唯難離實之大有性。以破他宗不要有有法而為所別。故無宗過。如破他我。應亦同此。若許有我。違自宗過。若言無我。闕因所別。彼既成量。此亦應然。由此應知。相違因者。若對敵論。不唯一過。望彼意許。亦有所別不極成因無所依過。如法差別不唯一故。此即立
者望敵。是他所別所依不成。今破他有。即自所別所依不成。若共自量。此是即過。為破於他。就他宗立。雖有所別所依不成。而不為過。又自共量有法無義有義因依。此即為過。有法有義無義因依。亦即為過。意云有義宗必有遮表。因若無義。唯遮無表。故亦為過。問如立我常。因云非作故此無義。因成立有法。如何言過。誰言非作唯遮非表。而是無義。此言非作詮非作體。如虛空喻故。若爾立我無雲非作故。應有義因依無義宗。何不為過。答雖俱言非作。而取義別。此即唯遮故。是無義不欲詮有非作體故。以龜毛等而為喻故。古亦有解。宗因喻有義無義依有無。有義但依有。而不分別自他共量。何者有義因依無義宗者。又若有義因。必依有義宗者。如薩婆多師破他。我應不作業受果。以周遍故因。如空為喻。彼我自無因體共有。如何依無。若分自他共。即無過也。若大乘師破他。即就他作量。俱他有體自皆無體。可如所說。有解言。同異有一實等。非離實有。故例破師主離實有。同異有一實等。非即實有。例破弟子即實有耶。解云。夫相違因。以立論之因。違立者之義故。唯難師主之有。不將立者因違敵者義故。不得破弟子之有也。問若爾有一實等因。為弟子共許。為師主獨成。師主獨成因犯隨一。若是共許。便
兩宗因。何獨名為立者之因。若云成即實有。不用此因。更有何因。設成皆過。又云不將立者因。違敵者之義者。立者之因上明。破敵者之義。何故不得違敵者之義。以共許因故。又凡立量。必違他順己。舉因立宗。本意違他。何非破他。又如勝論對聲論。立聲無常所作性。即聲論立聲常將所聞性。既非立者之因。云何敵者破立者義。若云共許。彼此俱然。云何偏責。若云只可敵者之因違立者義。如何不許立者之因。違敵者義。彼此異因不可得故。今解師主己義但欲令他信。對彼成立離實有。因違所立是相違。弟子之義。不欲令師信。不對成立即實有故。師主不得返破。不是即實有。若成實等不是有者。便壞己義。令彼弟子無所承受。便不信故。又復弟子。計同異性體既不無。亦是不無之有。無共同喻體雖是有。而非不無故。不得難即實之有也。此解極妙。無煩異求。古疏解。有一實因。何非隨一不成。如立覺慧非思。以無常故因。有隨一過。今此有一實因。以即離本非有一實故。因不是隨一過者。亦不然。如無常。不離隱顯及壞滅故。成於隨一。有一實因。亦不異即離故。應是隨一。今解。如立大有為有法。不是有法不成收。因言有一實。何故即為隨一攝故。今因者亦望實等之上不無之義。能有一實非即有句以為其
因。取此不無以為因故。又此有一實因同異之句。然離實等有一實義。俱共成故何須分別。為是即離不成隨一。此若分別。一切因皆有此過。如大乘對小乘。立過去未來體非實有。現在無為所不攝故。亦應分別現不攝因。為識變現不攝。為非識變現不攝。此因既不分別。彼因亦然。若爾數論對佛弟子。成立覺慧非思。以無常故。因亦不分別。答亦不應分別。但爭覺慧是思非思。若爾此量是無過者。便違自義思是覺慧。解云。此宗有過。以不簡故。有相符極成。許除思余諸心所法。雖亦是覺慧。而不是思。或慧非總心心所名。但是慧故。亦非是思。又因亦過。成法差別相違。故彼意覺慧非思。意許是余心心所法。即非心所。以為異喻。無常故因於彼遍轉。又無同喻。以彼覺慧是心心所總聚之名。意許是心心所。更無別心心所為同喻故。因但異有故成相違。設若非爭是余心所。猶有前過。故是似量。然現在無為所不攝因。或共或他俱亦無過。又云。后三相違。既約臥具同異喻中為難。此是喻過。何故乃說相違因耶。答約義為過。是相違因。不約言為難。故非喻過也。此解亦非。何以故。今此二喻。望所爭宗皆為異喻。因於彼轉。即異喻中能立不遣。自有能立不遣非相違過。即不定是。何非喻過。以此中解似因體故。不言喻
過。故不辨之。非非喻過。如宗過中所別不極成。豈唯宗過而無因過耶。
因明入正理論義纂要
有記云纂主大諱惠玄為忌三藏改為惠沼(云云)。
正治二年(庚申)六月二十日書畢執筆信西于超升寺東別所寫之
點本奧記云。
本奧記云。
興福寺沙門齊順敬發願書寫一切大小乘經律論章疏等依其勸誘同寺覺詮寫了。
於時久安四年歲次戊辰八月八日。
傳得大法師藏后雇誂同法勤慶奉移點了。
永萬二年春正月二十九日記。
點本奧記云元興明詮天長八年略勘了。
九年三月二十六日講興福寺僧定寂以安和三年(歲次庚午)二月(己午)晦日尋借明詮僧都點本書(云云)。
嘉應二年(庚寅)八月二十一日書寫了執筆沙門澄惠同九月二日寫里書了。
同年同月同日亥刻於燈下寫道了。
同九月十三日戌刻許于燈下寫點了。
同月二十一二三四都四ケ日之間加愚見比校之餘緣相交其功惟遲□里道點皆加校了其間專澡漱著法衣此書一卷三十八紙書寫及移點誂僧澄惠令終其功于比校者愚僧之功也以此善根敬報四恩愚僧遂出生死之遊泥群生速登菩提之彼岸(而已)。
末學沙門釋覺憲記之
正治二年夏六
【現代漢語翻譯】 過失。所以不辨析它。『非非喻過』，例如在『宗過』（命題的過失）中所區分的『不極成』（未被普遍認可）。難道只有『宗過』而沒有『因過』（理由的過失）嗎？
《因明入正理論義纂要》
有記載說，纂主（編纂者）的大名惠玄，因為避諱三藏（指玄奘）而改為惠沼（等等）。
正治二年（庚申年）六月二十日書寫完畢，執筆信西于超升寺東別所寫之。
點本奧記云。
本奧記云。
興福寺沙門齊順恭敬地發願書寫一切大小乘經律論章疏等，依照勸誘，同寺覺詮寫完了。
於時久安四年，歲次戊辰八月八日。
從大法師藏處僱請，同法勤慶奉移並點了校。
永萬二年春正月二十九日記。
點本奧記云，元興明詮天長八年略微勘校完畢。
九年三月二十六日，講師興福寺僧定寂，以安和三年（歲次庚午）二月（己午）晦日，尋借明詮僧都點校本書（等等）。
嘉應二年（庚寅）八月二十一日書寫完畢，執筆沙門澄惠，同九月二日寫里書完畢。
同年同月同日亥時于燈下書寫完畢。
同九月十三日戌時許于燈下寫點了校。
同月二十一、二、三、四都四日之間，加入愚見比校之後，因為因緣相交，其功勞惟遲□里道點，都加以校正。其間專心澡浴，穿著法衣。此書一卷三十八紙，書寫及移點，僱請僧人澄惠令其完成，其功勞在於比校者愚僧的功勞。以此善根，恭敬報答四恩，愚僧遂出生死之遊泥，群生迅速登上菩提的彼岸（而已）。
末學沙門釋覺憲記之
正治二年夏六
【English Translation】 Faults. Therefore, they are not discussed. 'Non-example fallacy,' such as the 'unestablished' (not universally accepted) distinguished in 'subject fallacy' (faults in the proposition). Is it only 'subject fallacy' and no 'reason fallacy' (faults in the reason)?
'Essentials of Entering the Treatise on Correct Reasoning'
There is a record stating that the compiler's great name, Huixuan, was changed to Huizhao (etc.) to avoid the taboo of Sanzang (referring to Xuanzang).
Written on the 20th day of the sixth month of the second year of Shoji (Kōshin year), penned by Shinsei at the eastern annex of Chōshō-ji Temple.
Annotation record says.
Original annotation record says.
The monk Qijun of Kōfuku-ji Temple respectfully vowed to write all the Mahayana and Hinayana sutras, vinayas, treatises, commentaries, etc., and according to the encouragement, Kakugen of the same temple finished writing them.
At the time, the eighth day of the eighth month of the fourth year of Kyūan, year of Wuchen.
Hired from the collection of the Great Dharma Master, and the fellow practitioner Kinsei respectfully moved and punctuated it.
Recorded on the 29th day of the first month of spring in the second year of Eiman.
Annotation record says, Genkō Myōchin roughly collated it in the eighth year of Tenchō.
On the 26th day of the third month of the ninth year, the lecturer, the monk Jōjaku of Kōfuku-ji Temple, borrowed this punctuated book from the monk Myōchin, the head monk, on the last day of the second month (Kibo) of the third year of Anwa (year of Kōgo) (etc.).
Completed writing on the 21st day of the eighth month of the second year of Kaō (Kōin), penned by the monk Chōkei, and completed writing the inner book on the 2nd day of the ninth month.
Completed writing under the lamp at the hour of Hai on the same day of the same month of the same year.
Permitted to write and punctuate under the lamp at the hour of Xu on the 13th day of the same month.
During the four days from the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of the same month, after adding my humble opinion for comparison, because of the intersection of causes and conditions, the merit is only delayed □ Rido punctuation, all were corrected. During this time, I wholeheartedly bathed and wore the Dharma robe. This book, one volume of thirty-eight pages, the writing and moving of punctuation, hired the monk Chōkei to complete it, the merit lies in the humble monk who compared it. With this good root, I respectfully repay the four debts, and the foolish monk emerges from the mud of birth and death, and all beings quickly ascend to the other shore of Bodhi (that's all).
Recorded by the novice monk Shakukyōken
Summer of the second year of Shoji, six
月之比語超升寺沙門信西十郎房終寫功了(寫本永尊得業書也)。
同年七月上旬三日移點書寫道了(點道本寶積院書也)抑當年者世間饑饉人力衰微也而分活命遂寫功勵微力移道點志趣所之聊有二愿當寺伽藍造功速成繼隆佛法惠命長遠(是一)往生內院面奉慈尊心不退轉發得菩提(是二)。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：月之比語超升寺的沙門信西十郎房最終完成了抄寫（這是抄本，永遠值得尊重和學習）。
同年七月上旬三日，完成了移點書寫（點道是寶積院的書）。想當年，世間正值饑荒，人力衰微。我分出活命的資糧，努力抄寫，轉移道點，我的志向在於略有二愿：一是希望本寺伽藍的建造工程迅速完成，繼續弘揚佛法，使佛法的恩惠長遠流傳；二是希望往生兜率內院，面見慈氏尊（Maitreya），內心不退轉，最終獲得菩提（Bodhi）。
【English Translation】 English version: The Shramana Shinsei Jurobo of Getsunohigo Choshō-ji Temple has finally completed the transcription (this is a manuscript, eternally worthy of respect and study).
On the third day of the first ten days of July of the same year, the transfer and writing of dots was completed (the dot transfer is from the book of Hōshaku-in Temple). Reflecting on that year, the world was in famine, and human strength was declining. I shared the resources for survival, diligently transcribed, and transferred the dots of the path. My aspiration lies in having two humble wishes: first, that the construction of this temple's Sangharama (monastery) be completed quickly, to continue promoting the Buddha Dharma (teachings of the Buddha), and that the blessings of the Dharma be spread far and wide; second, that I may be reborn in the inner court of Tushita Heaven (inner court of Maitreya's Pure Land), to directly serve the Compassionate One, Maitreya (慈尊), with a mind that does not regress, and ultimately attain Bodhi (菩提, enlightenment).